Viyana Çevresi ve Metafizik Sorunu: Metafizik Karşıtlığı Metafizik Midir?

Abstract

The Vienna Circle, as the pioneer of logical positivism aiming to develop a worldview grounded in scientific knowledge, characterized metaphysics as a meaningless and unscientific domain. Their opposition to metaphysics forms a fundamental aspect of their understanding of knowledge based on the principle of verification. However, does this opposition itself carry a metaphysical claim? This question presents a significant challenge to the philosophical foundations of the Vienna Circle. This study seeks to examine the epistemological and ontological bases of their opposition to metaphysics and analyze the internal coherence of logical positivism. The question of whether their opposition aligns with its own premises allows for a reevaluation of the boundaries between science and philosophy. In this context, the legacy of the Vienna Circle is critically analyzed from a philosophical perspective.