Kant'ta ve Adorno'da Özgürlük Sorunu

Abstract

The aim of this study is to discuss the types of freedom left ambiguous by Kant and the relation between volition and choice in the center of free choice. The distinction between volition and free choice is presented in Kant as a solution to the debate about the attributability of immoral acts to the agent. Our proposal to center Kant's idea of freedom on free choice will be discussed in conjunction with the distinction between volition and free choice. Since free choice is the source of maxims, the reasons for Adorno's criticism of Kant's ethics of temperament will be investigated by focusing on the distinctions between character, personality, temperament, maxim and original maxim (Gesinnung). Answers will be sought to the questions "Is Kant's ethics can be seen as temperament ethics?" and "Is the perspective centering on free choice respond to Adorno's criticism of disposition ethics?". Finally, Adorno's view of freedom, which is based on the feeling of compassion against Kant's perspective that emphasizes choice, will be discussed through resistance and empathy, and whether Adorno offers a new way of thinking about the possibility of both individual and social freedom will be discussed. In this context, this study focuses on showing the possibility of freedom in Kant and Adorno through the focus on choice, disposition and compassion.