Central Bank Independence and Stability
Date
2023Author
Özarslan, Sait Can
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This study examines the impact of stability and institutional indicators on Central Bank
Independence (CBI) using a fixed effects panel data analysis for 51 countries from 2008
to 2017. Stability indicators include Past Inflation, Financial Depth, Trade Openness,
Total Government Debt, Current Account Balance, and GDP per Capita, while
institutional indicators encompass Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness,
Political Stability, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and Regulatory Quality. The
analysis adopts a broader measure of CBI developed by Romelli (2022). This paper aims
to enrich the literature by investigating how these indicators shape the independence of
central banks in the post-global crisis era, providing valuable insights for policymakers
and shedding light on essential elements that affect the autonomy of central banks. It
contributes to the existing literature by considering two additional important variables-
Current Account Balance and Total Government Debt- which have been largely
overlooked in previous studies. Based on the panel data analysis conducted with the
Driscoll & Kraay robust estimator, while all models turned out to be statistically
significant, only Past Inflation, Trade Openness, Government Debt, and Control of
Corruption were statistically significant at the variable level. The remaining variables did
not turn out to be significant in any model.