ETKİ VE SONUÇ BELİRSİZLİĞİNİN OLUMLU SOSYAL DAVRANIŞLAR VE KARAR VERME STRATEJİLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: DENEYSEL BİR ÇALIŞMA

Abstract

In this thesis study, the effects of impact uncertainty and outcome uncertainty, which are two distinct types of uncertainty playing a critical role in social dilemmas, on prosocial behavior and decision-making strategies were investigated. The research was conducted using an experimental paradigm built on the Public Goods Game (PGG). The study consists of two phases. In the first phase, individual interviews with 11 participants and a laboratory session with 20 participants were carried out to evaluate the validity and clarity of the impact and outcome uncertainty manipulations. The main experiment conducted in the second phase included 242 volunteer participants from Hacettepe University. Participants were randomly assigned to different experimental conditions within a 2 (outcome uncertainty: present/absent) x 4 (impact uncertainty: present, low income, high income, no information) between-subjects factorial design. The findings demonstrate that the main and interaction effects of impact and outcome uncertainty manipulations on the dependent variables were statistically insignificant. This suggests that both types of uncertainty directed participants toward a cautious evaluation. Specifically, rather than serving as a unidirectional stimulus that increases moral obligation as expected, impact uncertainty may have provided a basis for an evaluation process operating through different directions yet leading to behaviorally similar outcomes. In this context, the most prominent contribution of this study is that it offers an empirical example to the debate that the relationship between impact uncertainty and prosocial behavior may not manifest uniformly across different contexts. While previous theoretical expectations suggest that impact uncertainty can drive individuals to act more prosocially by prompting them to consider the potential harm to others, the current findings indicate that this effect can weaken in environments such as the PGG where social risk is high, the risk of wasted contributions is more visible, and dependence on others' behaviors is prominent.