Olanak Kavramı Üzerine Bir Tartışma: Aristoteles ve Martin Heidegger

Abstract

In this study, I will discuss whether it is possible to ontologically determine “potentiality” that acknowledges reality but is not determined by reality, i.e. “potentiality qua potentiality”. In this research, as in any ontological research, the reason why it is worthy to study this topic will be shown by discussing the aporias related to the topic in the history of philosophy. In the introduction chapter, I will firstly examine the development of the notion of dynamis before Aristotle assigned it a “potentiality” meaning. Then, I will discuss the power that arises from the “potentiality” meaning assigned by Aristotle to dynamis and the reason why potentiality has been mostly regarded as something determined by reality in the history of philosophy after Aristotle’s new approach to the notion. Later, I will discuss how this new approach has been taken over by Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Hartmann, and the aporia arising from the understanding of potentiality as something determined by reality in the history until Heidegger. In the first chapter, I will examine Aristotle’s understanding of potentiality by determining its place in three layers. The first layer is the topos of the history that Aristotle showed its limits by referring its aporias. The second layer is the topos of Aristotle’s new system that is built in the way that it would not reproduce these aporias in the history of philosophy. The final one is the topos of Aristotle’s understanding of potentiality in his system. In the second chapter, I will discuss the new understanding of potentiality developed by Heidegger, who first refused Aristotle’s approach in the history, again by determining its place in three layers. The first layer is the topos of the history of philosophy and science that he showed their limits by referring their aporias. The second layer is the topos of Heidegger’s pre-ontological system that he developed by denying these aporias to reach euporia. The final one is the topos of Heidegger’s understanding of potentiality in his system. In the conclusion chapter, I will first demonstrate the reasons why the attempts of the ontological tradition, which understands reality that refers to “objective presence” as the only criteria, at capturing “potentiality qua potentiality” are destined to fail. Then, I will discuss how the (non)place of such potentiality, which is the ground (i.e. the pre-requisite) of reality, can be ontologically determined.