Analysis of Greece’s Activities in Western Anatolia within the scope of Strategic Intelligence (1919-1924)

Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze the activities of Greece during the occupation of Anatolia from the perspective of strategic intelligence. The real motivation behind the military and political moves of the Greek authorities in Anatolia was attempted to be revealed and Greek massacres against the Turks were analyzed in detail. Whether Greek politicians acted according to the elements of strategic intelligence was examined. This thesis also analyzes developments before, during and after the occupation in the light of Ottoman, Greek, British, American and League of Nations archival documents, many of which are being used for the first time. It is emphasized how the events, which have not been uncovered until today or which have never been revealed before, were handled in intelligence reports. Most of the archival documents have not been used in other studies and offer new perspectives for researchers. Thanks to the archival documents, the course of Turkish-Greek relations during and after the occupation, the perspectives of Greek politicians towards Anatolia and the course of the relationship between politicians and intelligence officers have been tried to be revealed in an unbiased manner. The struggles of the intelligence organizations of the Allied states to be effective in Anatolia and similarly the role of Greek intelligence during the occupation of Anatolia are included. At the end of the war, Greece, which did not act within the framework of strategic intelligence and failed, what kind of a policy followed in the Lausanne Peace Negotiations and whether it applied the elements of strategic intelligence or not, is once again discussed in the light of archival documents. After the occupation, the developments in the population exchange process between Turks and Greeks were based on the archive documents of the League of Nations.