Politik Kurumsal Yapının Mali Performans Üzerindeki Etkisi: Ülkeler Arası Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme

Abstract

There are various approaches in the political economy literature regarding the effects of the political structure on fiscal performance. The common ground of these approaches is the strategic preferences and the behavioral incentives of policy makers are reflected in the fiscal policy outcomes. Strong emphasis on political decision-making mechanisms and institutional structure in ensuring budget discipline, reveals the necessity to evaluate political and institutional elements together. The fact that countries with similar economic indicators display different performances in fiscal policies also draws attention to the importance of differences in political and institutional structures in these countries. Therefore, the importance of strategic interactions between policy makers and the institutional framework in which policy makers are involved in the process of the distribution of public resources emerges in regarding the fiscal performance. Political fragmentation in the executive level, democracy and fiscal rules are among the most important determinants of fiscal policy performance in budgetary decisions. In this study, the effect of political and institutional structures on fiscal performance is analyzed by panel fixed effects method using 21 years data of 63 countries covering 1995-2015 period. According to the empirical findings, in the budget-related decision-making mechanisms, the increase of political fragmentation has negative effects on public fiscal stance. However, the results regarding the institutionalization of democracy and rule-based practices in the budgeting process eliminate the negativities caused by political fragmentation are among the most important findings obtained from this study.