



Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of Peace Studies

Peace and Conflict Studies

**SOFT POWER AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION:
THE CASE OF TAIWAN**

Tural ISMAYILZADA

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2019

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
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ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Doç. Dr. Murat ÖNSOY danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

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For all the people fighting for peace, justice and equality

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ABSTRACT

ISMAYILZADA, Tural. *Soft Power and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Taiwan*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2019.

This thesis examines the role of soft power in conflict settings and its impact on the transformation of conflict. The research is aimed at drawing a theoretical framework that would depict the relationship between the use of soft power and conflict transformation. The Taiwan conflict is chosen for elaboration as the case study. The general proposition is that the use of soft power in conflict settings paves the way for the transformation of conflict, as it is observed in Taiwan case. The following research questions are answered: Does increasing use of soft power make the way for conflict transformation? In what direction has the Taiwan conflict been influenced by the increasing use of soft power by the parties? To what extent does the use of soft power by the PRC and Taiwan affect the future of the conflict between them? The main contribution of this thesis is that it generates a middle-range theory that identifies the relationship between two concepts, soft power and conflict transformation, with a constructivist approach to the Taiwan conflict.

Keywords

Soft power, conflict transformation, China, Taiwan, constructivism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL	i
YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI	ii
ETİK BEYAN	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
ABSTRACT	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
ABBREVIATIONS	xi
TABLES	xii
FIGURES	xiii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY	5
1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW	5
1.1.1. Soft Power	5
1.1.2. Conflict Transformation	8
1.1.3. Soft Power and Taiwan Conflict.....	11
1.1.4. Literature Gap.....	13
1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	13
1.2.1. Constructivism: Agent, Structure and Change.....	15
1.3. METHODOLOGY.....	17
1.3.1. Research Strategy	17
1.3.2. Research Design	18
1.3.3. Data Collection	18
1.3.4. Organization of the Study	19

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: SOFT POWER AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION	21
2.1. INTRODUCTION	21
2.2. POWER: THE CONCEPT AND CONCEPTIONS	21
2.2.1. Is Power What We Make of It?	25
2.3. TYPOLOGY OF POWER	27
2.3.1. Sources of Power	28
2.3.1.1. Military	28
2.3.1.2. Economy.....	30
2.3.1.3. Technology.....	31
2.3.1.4. Culture and Identity	32
2.3.1.5. Political system and Foreign policy.....	35
2.3.1.6. Institutions	37
2.3.2. Joseph Nye's Typology of Power	37
2.3.2.1. Hard and Soft Power	38
2.4. CONFLICT, CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND POWER	40
2.4.1. Conflict, Its Stages and Power Politics of Parties	41
2.4.2. Transformational Approach to Conflict	43
2.4.3. Hard Power as a Barrier to Peaceful Transformation of Conflicts.....	45
2.4.4. The Effect of Soft Power as a Facilitator of Transformation	46
CHAPTER 3: THE CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN	48
3.1. INTRODUCTION	48
3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	48
3.2.1. Chinese Civil War, 1945–1949	51

3.2.2. Kuomintang’s Escape to Taiwan	53
3.2.3. The Seventh Fleet	55
3.2.4. Cross-Strait Relations and the United States after the Korean War	57
3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT	58
3.3.1. Parties of the Conflict	59
3.3.1.1. The People’s Republic of China: Peaceful Rise?	59
3.3.1.2. Taiwan: An Unrecognized Giant	61
3.3.1.3. Positions, Interests, and Needs of the Primary Parties... ..	63
3.3.2. The Regional Context and the U.S. as a Secondary Party	68
3.3.3. ‘One China’ Policy and International Law	70
 CHAPTER 4: SOFT POWER, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE TAIWAN CONFLICT	 74
4.1. INTRODUCTION.....	74
4.2. CHINA’S SOFT POWER	74
4.2.1. Chinese Culture, Language and the Confucius Institutes ..	76
4.2.2. ‘Anti-Hegemonic Soft Power’: Peaceful Rise, Multilateralism and Good Neighborhood Policy	79
4.3. TAIWAN’S SOFT POWER: DEMOCRACY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY	80
4.4. SOFT POWER IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: HOW SOFT POWER TRANSFORMS THE CONFLICT	82
4.4.1. Context Transformations	83
4.4.2. Structure Transformations	86
4.4.3. Actor and Issue Transformations.....	88
4.4.4. Individual Transformations.....	94
4.5. XIAMEN–KINMEN: QUINTESSENCE OF TRANSFORMATION ...	96

CONCLUSION.....	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY	102
APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM	129
APPENDIX 2: ORIGINALITY REPORT	131
APPENDIX 3: THE CODETERMINATION OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESS	133
APPENDIX 4: CHANGES IN THE TAIWANESE/CHINESE IDENTITY OF TAIWANESE	134
APPENDIX 5: CHANGES IN THE UNIFICATION – INDEPENDENCE STANCES OF TAIWANESE	135
APPENDIX 6: CHANGES IN THE PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF TAIWANESE	136
AUTOBIOGRAPHY	137

ABBREVIATIONS

ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFP	Global Fire Power
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IR	International Relations (as a field of study)
KMT	Kuomintang
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
SEF	Straits Exchange Foundation
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

TABLES

Table 1: Types of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 12)

Table 2: Spectrum of power behaviors (Nye, 2011, p. 21)

FIGURES

Figure 1: Conflict escalation and de-escalation (Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse, 2011, p. 13)

INTRODUCTION

Constructivism in the International Relations (IR) field suggests that the “world is of our making” (Onuf, 1989) and “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). These opinions of two IR theorists gained utmost popularity and caused heated debate among IR scholars when a new world order was emerging after the Cold War. Close to the end of the Cold War and in its aftermath, based on the criticism of neorealism and neoliberalism, a new theory, which would take into consideration the social dimension and changeability of global system when exploring international relations, was needed. Constructivism came up with the idea that international system is a social construction, and that the structure and the agency are in a mutual interaction, that is, the intersubjective character of international relations (Fierke, 2013). This is to say, an agency chooses amity or enmity according to the perception of another agency following the initial interaction. The subjects of international relations act differently in the anarchical world, not because of their differing resources and power, but due to the choices the actors make under critical conditions effected by their changing interests and positions. Constructivism abolished the idea of monotony of states assumed by the conventional IR theories, and emphasized the social aspect of the anarchy and ongoing transformation in the international context (Zehfuss, 2004, p. 4).

Along with this constructivist turn in the IR field, new approaches and concepts, which lay stress on the social factors, vital shifts in the structures and power politics, emerged. Two concepts introduced in the late twentieth century, namely soft power and conflict transformation, have been elaborated comprehensively by outstanding scholars in the international relations and peace and conflict research fields respectively. Although Joseph Nye, who coined the term soft power, underlined the relation between soft power and peace in his work stating “winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace” (2004, p. XII), within academic research, only little thought has been given to a possible relation between soft power and conflict from constructivist perspective. Literature based on the use of soft power either focuses mainly on interstate relations, especially within regional context

(Gallarotti, 2016; Stuenkel, 2016; Tella, 2016; Goldthau & Sitter, 2015), or consists of efforts to establish conceptual framework (Gallarotti, 2011; Melissen, 2005; Chitty, Ji, Rawnsley, & Haiden, 2017; Rothman, 2011). Relatively little literature published on soft power reflects on conflicts as the case studies. Taking into account this gap in the literature, this study aims to present a twofold explication. First, I endeavor to review the existing literature on soft power and conflict transformation to have a better understanding of both concepts, their evolution and differing approaches to them. Second, I illustrate the possible relation between soft power and conflict transformation. The case study of the Taiwan conflict is suggested to contribute to the conceptualization of this relationship.

The primary aim of this study, therefore, is to investigate the possible relationship between the use of soft power and transformation of conflict. To be clearer, it is discussed that increasing use of soft power by the conflict parties creates more room for peaceful transformation of conflict. In order to achieve this aim, the author elaborates on the case of Taiwan for a number of reasons. First of all, the global changes in early 90's failed to leave out this region, as well. Most importantly, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China lost its most powerful communist ally. Moreover, the financial crisis taken place in most of the East and Southeast Asian countries created an opportunity for less effected countries entities like the PRC and Taiwan. This period also witnessed a remarkable development in cultural and economic regionalization (Jin, 2002). Secondly, 1990's can be seen as a milestone in both Taiwanese and Chinese history because of several shifts. The democratization process changed and strengthened the position of Taiwan in international politics, which in turn brought support and more diplomatic ties with numerous states. The previous policy towards the mainland China altered and Taiwanese administration started to put a greater emphasis on being recognized as the legitimate government of the island, rather than claiming for the whole China (McDougall, 2016). Thirdly, in the meanwhile, soft power was placed in the agenda of the PRC's foreign and domestic politics. The multilateralism, economic policy and the good neighborhood policy of the PRC in international arena and the so-called Chinese

model of development on an international and internal level excelled PRC's soft power (Zheng & Zhang, 2012). Finally, the abolition of martial law in Taiwan and the concession to family visits to the PRC in 1987 can be seen as a turning point in the history of the conflict.

The dynamics of power politics that the parties own might have various implications for the conflict between them. Carrying out an exploration of soft power and conflict transformation from a constructivist perspective, the author hypothesizes that:

- The change in interaction between IR subjects makes them employ various kinds of power sources over the time.
- The more soft power is employed by conflict parties towards each other and other subjects of international relations, the more opportunities emerge for peaceful transformation of the conflict.
- While PRC's hard power was the decisive factor of the cross-strait relations in the 20th century, it is partly substituted by soft power of both sides in the 21st century.

Based on these hypotheses, this research endeavours to answer the research questions below:

1. Does increasing use of soft power make the way for conflict transformation? In order to find an answer to this question, I will conduct a review of literature dedicated to the notion of power and, more specifically, soft power. The choice of power is one of the decisive factors that determines the course of conflict. The use of hard power damages the peace process and gained improvements. For instance, the violent armed clashes between Russia and Georgia over the two breakaway regions of Georgia in 2008 had left tragic devastation on the transformation of the conflict, and made a lasting detrimental impact on the collective memory of the people (Wertsch & Karumidze, 2009). The direct use of hard power in conflict settings annihilates the progress of years in the blink of an eye.

On the contrary, soft power is the power of attraction and seduction, which is peaceful and non-violent. The greater possession and exercise of soft power establishes a positive image, transforms the iniquitous perception of the enemy into that of an enviable partner. Moreover, the rising affection to the political system, economic development, cultural values and other intriguing assets of the opponent may result in the demands for peace narrated by the mass public. More importantly, the sides to conflict may opt for its peaceful transformation in an effort to be recognized as a peace-loving subject of international relations, and augment their soft power.

2. Following the conceptual analysis of the two phenomena, namely soft power and conflict transformation, this study seeks to answer the following questions based on the Taiwan case: In what direction has the Taiwan conflict been influenced by the increasing use of soft power by the parties? To what extent does the use of soft power instead of hard power by PRC and Taiwan affect the future of the conflict between them? The author acknowledges that it is relatively tough to give a scientifically proven answer to these questions. Having said that, our study will elaborate the power politics of both parties and their ascending soft power strategies with a comparison to their hard-power-centric policies in past. Further, the transformation of the conflict will be illustrated with reference to the direct negotiations, notable agreements, earned progress and active participation of different stake-holders. By doing so, the study will demonstrate the parallel developments in the use of soft power and the transformation of conflict. Finally, the future projections will be asserted.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1.1. Soft Power

Today a search for the phrase soft power on Google Scholar presents 3.44 million results, which makes up nearly 73% of that for hard power, that is, there exists a notable demand for such a topic of study. This is only a figure that shows to what extent soft power has gained interest in academic circles in less than three decades, while one can find what is defined as term as the soft power under various names such as public diplomacy and charm offensive. Since the term was coined by J. S. Nye (1990), American political scientist and founder of several theories in the IR field, soft power has become one of the most frequent focuses of research in related areas. Gallarotti (2011) discusses that the term soft power, together with its corollary, smart power, have been on the agenda of not only academics, but also policy-makers in the U.S. and around the globe.

Although soft power had been employed long before the U.S. included it in the international policies, in contemporary understanding, one can study soft power within global politics of the United States. In a new “power constellation”, the U.S. political elites understood that the wars fought around the globe need “a cloak of legitimacy”, as van Ham (2005, pp. 51-52) puts. Soft power would detract from the costs of resistance that sole use of hard power and coercive methods created. While Nye (2004) uses seduction and attraction versus coercion and inducement when comparing how countries achieve their goals using soft and hard power respectively, van Ham (2005, p. 53) labels soft power with respect and legitimacy, and hard power with fear and terror. Soft and hard power tools are regarded as complementary to each other, in the sense that soft power is established on and supported by a country’s hard power resources, whereas achievements gained through the use of hard power are framed with a positive image and reputation of the country. Rising attention to soft power came together with several other

revolutionary changes in politics, economics, technology and other realms of humanity. Gallarotti (2011, p. 26) underlines that humankind has experienced more transformation in the last century than what had been experienced in the preceding twelve millennia. It is suggested that national power strategies are not out of the scope of influence of these changes, which have placed soft power in national political strategies. The end of the Cold War appeared to be inevitable following a number of historic events including but not limited to failure of the USSR in Afghanistan, fall of communism in Eastern Europe and substitution of communist governments with non-communist administrations, and most importantly, demolition of the Berlin Wall and unification of Germany. Close to the end of 1980's, the Soviet Union acknowledged its defeat in the arms and economic race with the U.S., and Gorbachev – the very last leader of the Union – found himself under the wreck of one of the two so-called superpowers. Consequently, the U.S. had become the only hegemonic power without any even rival.

However, U.S. reputation in the world had faced serious decline since the end of Cold War due to a set of global shifts. First, the U.S. lost its role as the guardian of the world against the communist peril, to which the U.S. had resorted to justify its violent actions. Under these conditions, the U.S. would have to face denouncement by the international community for being an aggressor and putting national interests before international security when it takes any overseas military action. Second, it had got too costly to use sticks and carrots because of two notable developments in the global arena; First, the changing nature of the warfare towards guerrilla war left strong state actors in a never-likely-to-end struggle in their fight against non-state combatants (Arreguín-Toft, 2001). These “new wars” – as Mary Kaldor (Kaldor, 2012) call them – had brought new questions to the agenda, especially in terms of responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. Second, more economic interdependence forced states to find a way around military action. It is important to note that the rapid development of information and communication technologies fostered financial transactions of transnational companies, as well. The growth in the number and size of the transnational companies increased

economic interdependence between states. On the other hand, improved cyber-technologies opened the floodgates for global terrorism, cyber-wars and increased propaganda. Under these conditions the states – conventionally regarded as the chief actors of international relations – sought to adjust to the changing world order by employing different sources of power.

Discussing the changes in world politics, particularly during the Cold War, Joseph Nye suggests that “in general power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible” (1990, p. 167), however, “political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed” (2004, p. 1). After Nye introduced the term soft power, it has incontinently gained popularity in political and academic circles. However, in his following writings published since he first used the term in his book in 1990 (Nye J. J., *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power*), the author acknowledges that the term was misunderstood or misused by many. That is why he had to elaborate on the concept and published a book (Nye J. J., 2004) devoted to the concept. Despite the explication given in this book, the use of term has seen substantive differences.

Considering its ubiquitous interpretations, soft power can be regarded as an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie, 1956) in the IR field despite its popular usage in political discourse. Gallie suggest that one of the realms to which this kind of concepts often belong is political philosophy. It leads to contesting arguments when a concept is widely used but has no universally accepted definition and is used in various ways, so that it is challenging to choose one usage as the correct one. Democracy is given as an example of how different people come up with their own definition and approach to it (Gallie, 1956, pp. 167-168). Although one can state that the concept essentially contested concept can be regarded contested since by some others the conceptualization proposed by Gallie might be criticized or given differing definitions. However, this discussion lies outside of the scope of this study and needs further debate. According to Gallie’s thesis, soft power can be assessed as an essentially contested concept due to several reasons. First of all, the theory of soft power established by its founding father Joseph Nye has a number of flaws and shortcomings. Nye’s conceptualization fails to narrow down the scope of soft power, which in turn

brings substantial ambiguity. Chitty (2017, p. 25) argues that Nye hardly elaborates on the ontological relation between the sources of soft power.

One of the interpretation of Nye's conceptualization is drawn by Gallarotti (2011). It is discussed that soft power can be studied as "a form of meta-power" (p. 28) in the sense that it targets social relations and social structures, rather than material assets. Moreover, interactionist perspective on meta-power argues that the more one actor maintains interaction with other actors, the more flexible and read-to-respond in extreme situations it is (Hall, 2012). These facets of meta-power are akin to soft power in terms of multilateralism to build a better image in world politics.

One of the debated aspects of Nye's soft power theory is agenda-setting. It is contested because in the traditional realist view of hard power, agenda-setting and control over agenda were attached to the second face of power (Headey & Muller, 1996). While Gallarotti argues that the ability of setting political agenda has little relevance to soft power (2011, p. 29), it is thought to be closer to soft power instruments as it excludes material resources and coercive methods (Rothman, 2011, p. 53).

Constructivist theory, on the other hand, is of strong relevance when exploring soft power based on the conceptualization suggested by Zheng and Zhang (2012). They build up such a conceptualization on previous works and that of Nye's, however, criticizing Nye's concept of soft power for being static, self-contradicting, not scientific enough and in many cases irrelevant to the reality of international relations. Instead, dynamic approach to power is proposed. Zheng and Zhang's (2012) concept of soft power can be explained by constructivist theory because of the three suggested dynamics of power in international politics, of which I will draw a broader illustration in the Chapter 2.

1.1.2. Conflict Transformation

In spite of theoretical ambiguity of and differing perspectives on soft power, its increasing use forges broader space for peaceful transformation of conflict. In

order to have a better understanding of the relation between the use of soft power and conflict transformation, first, a review of literature on conflict transformation is of importance. In the peacebuilding field, a specific attention has been given to the transformational approach to conflict thanks to the global changes in recent years. The transformational tradition was first initiated by J. P. Lederach, an outstanding peace practitioner, who gained the necessary experience during his peacebuilding activities in the so-called intractable conflict zones such as Somalia, Nicaragua and Northern Ireland (Casciani, 2003). This idea of conflict transformation was a product of constructivist approach to peacebuilding. It is to say that, enormous changes in the global context, interstate relations and particularly in the structure of conflicts brought a new approach that would embrace experimented methods and introduce new vision and tools according to these shifts. Conflicts started to be seen as a drive of positive change in societies and thus, instead of avoiding conflict, it was accepted more feasible and beneficial to transform conflict, that is, using its negative energy to achieve positive changes and progress (Lederach, *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*, 1997).

Ryan (2007, p. 9) sees the end of Cold War as the main impetus for these changes in approaches to conflicts. First of all, he discusses that emergence of new conflicts, recurrence of the previously settled ones and most importantly, taking place of genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia brought humanitarian intervention to the fore, while state sovereignty used to be regarded more important than human rights and civil issues before. Therefore, peace as a concept, which had been used to describe the eradication of direct violence between conflicting parties, gained a more comprehensive meaning through this process, included human rights and democratization, and recognized them as significant as state sovereignty.

Secondly, several major shifts emerged in how international organizations, especially UN approached conflicts. Ryan (2007) points out that two documents, namely *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.*, 1992) and *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) issued by the UN played a significant

role for change from conventional approaches to a new generation of peacebuilding work. The latter document is relatively more noteworthy insofar as it puts a special emphasis on the importance of peacebuilding throughout the whole process of building peace, while the former describes peacebuilding as a post-conflict set of actions to prevent the conflict from recurrence. Moreover, local efforts and nongovernmental organization (NGO) work earned more recognition as a result of failures of the UN peace-keeping missions in early 90's.

Along with the transformation of the peace missions initiated by the UN, practitioners in the field and peace researchers commenced to question conventional approaches such as conflict management and resolution, criticizing them for being insufficient to describe how conflict is addressed and peace envisioned. Management approach to conflict regards the political leadership as the most critical actor and Track 1 diplomacy is accepted to be the chief tool of mediation between antagonists. Conflict management theory is criticized by many for addressing only direct violence, thus achieving fragile peace as a result. Paffenholz (2014) refers to the failed attempts of conflict management, such as Angola, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to illustrate the limitations of short-term solutions. The settlements of these conflicts are discussed to fail due to the fact that the peace process failed to involve all actors and stakeholders. Moreover, root causes of the conflict were not addressed as the grassroots were set aside. Rupesinghe (1995) criticizes the peace-keeping and mediation attempts initiated by the UN for being top-down enforcement. The peace agreements achieved through these attempts are bound to break down. Miall (2004) underlines the power factor in conflict management as the restricting aspect from long-lasting peace. He suggests that management efforts are aimed to contain the existing violence as any other resolution is seen unrealistic, and that a powerful external actor uses its levers to force the parties to end violence. Establishment of an "acceptable status quo" (Richmond, 2005) pursued by the third party in conflict management is suggested to be the most convenient, but not an ideal form of peace as it is limited.

Conflict resolution approach, on the other hand, requires the conflict parties to reframe their positions, interests and needs after exploration, analysis and

questioning of them (Miall, 2004). This process is thought to avoid the negative effects of limited peace achieved through conflict management that turns a blind eye to human needs which are regarded to be the underlying cause of the conflict when unmet (Reimann, 2004). Moreover, conflict resolution acknowledges the importance of civil society in the peace process. Resolution approach, nevertheless, holding the central place in the field, has faced a handful of criticism, as well. Schirch argues that the term “implies too much finality” (2008, p. 3), that is, resolution is result-targeted, rather than building sustainable peace. Moreover, resolution approach demonizes non-violent and civil resistance in favour of peace-keeping.

As a response to such criticism and changes in global politics, in the peacebuilding field a new transformational approach to conflicts emerged. Foundation of transformational approach to conflict was derived from previously existing theories and traditions. However, as an umbrella term, conflict transformation brought a brand-new multidimensional vision. Peacebuilding work is suggested to involve all actors and levels of leadership in the society, to set immediate, mid-term and long-term goals, and to envision a shift from conflict system to peace system (Miall, 2004).

1.1.3. Soft Power and Taiwan Conflict

Our study aims to contribute to the literature by illustrating the relationship between the use of soft power and transformation of the conflict over Taiwan. In recent years, especially Chinese scholars and those interested in China and East Asia have directed thought to the China’s soft power. The economic rise of China and its claims to be a hegemonic power have placed the country in the centre of the political literature. In addition to this, ongoing conflicts in the region, be they China’s intrastate issues or regional interstate disputes, have enormous influence on this trend.

As soon as the term soft power was introduced, it attracted enormous attention from political circles in China. The reason behind this tendency is explained

differently by researchers and analysts of various backgrounds. According to deLisle (2010, pp. 493-494), in general terms, China uses soft power to reframe its military development and neutralise those opposing its economic rise. Furthermore, China's soft power use towards cross-strait relation is calculated not only to achieve better position against Taiwan, but to attain a decrease in international support to Taiwan. For Taiwan, on the other hand, soft power is assessed as a significant substitute for hard power, from which Taiwan would hardly benefit against China. Another function of Taiwan's soft power serves to enhance political and material support given by the U.S. and other partners, and find new ones.

China and Taiwan have generated their own soft power conceptions which contain some unique features, rather than adopting Western version of it. For instance, Taiwan is discussed to consider domestic conditions and reactions before employing soft power resources for achieving national interest on an international level. China, whereas, endeavours to incorporate its economic policies and financial aid programs in underdeveloped regions with its global soft power strategy. Whatever strategies the two actors choose to implement soft power instruments in world politics and cross-strait relations, it should be noted that public diplomacy is an important aspect of these strategies (Rawnsley, 2012, p. 122).

China's soft power sources are not accepted by others as attractive and appealing as most underdeveloped countries do. That is, the Chinese model or Chinese consensus has long been criticized by Western democracies for being authoritarian and repressive, and thus its economic development allows intense armament, which in turn posits a serious threat to global security and regional stability. This gap between in how different countries percept Chinese soft power is underlined by Mingjiang Li as one of the loopholes of Nye's conceptualization. Another drawback, Li suggests, is the hard-line border between hard and soft power described in Nye's initial writings on soft power. China's economic and military power can be employed as soft power when the country offers economic aid and peace-keeping support (Li M. , 2009).

Hongyi Lai, after reviewing the existing literature on soft power and that of China, concludes that there is need for more comprehensive conceptualization of soft power and discussion on how to understand the difference between soft and hard power, and that soft power in Chinese context requires a local approach that takes into account the country-specific sources (2012).

There is no doubt that there has been a spurt in research on soft power, especially in Chinese context and cross-strait relations. However, there is still a big gap in literature with regard to the impact of soft power use of the parties on the current and future transformation of conflict.

1.1.4. Literature Gap

I shed light on some previous works that investigated differing approaches to soft power, the state-of-the-art developments in the peace and conflict studies field which gave birth to conflict transformation, and how soft power integrated to power sources of mainland China and Taiwan. Despite the abundant literature dedicated to the aforementioned topics, further research is necessary to reveal how the increased use of soft power caters favourable environment for peaceful transformation. Moreover, both theoretical and empirical ambiguity related to soft power and conflict transformation requires revisiting. That is why this study is also an attempt to contribute to the existing literature on these two concepts. It is believed that various researchers have brought a new valuable perspective on the concepts in focus, and thus our study aims to fill the gap in literature by incorporating those perspectives.

1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

What makes theory crucial in international relations is that it studies international affairs and developments theretofore and tries to make long-term, accurate and reliable predictions so that policymakers can shape their diplomacies. The two contemporary mainstream theories of international relations however failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War and other significant changes in world politics.

The unforeseen and peaceful end of the Cold War proved numerous IR theorists wrong.

Realism faced harsh criticism in 1970's as economic sphere came to the forth and it was understood that economic power is as important as military power. Moreover, the U.S. failure in Vietnam left the main assumptions of Realism under denunciation, demonstrating that the military power is not always decisive. Under this conditions, Realism was revisited by many scholars and Kenneth Waltz came up with structural realism as a response to the criticisms of Realism (Telhami, 2002), which was later called Neo-realism. The main differing feature of Neo-realism from classical Realism was its focus on structure, rather than individual. The structure takes its form and characteristics as a result of the rivalry between major powers at first, but then the behaviour of states is influenced by the structure (Kolasi, 2013, pp. 161-163).

The second pillar included in the Rationalist¹ methodological approach to international relations is Neo-liberalism. Although Neo-liberalism shares several commonalities with Neo-realism, such as the states being the chief actors, the interests being the decisive factor of their behaviour in world politics and rational choice being the common character of states (Snidal, 2013, p. 87), it has some fundamental differences. First, Neo-liberalism assumes that states should seek absolute gain, rather than relative gain in relation to other actors. Second, international cooperation is thought to be possible and more beneficial compared to self-help system, and international institutions facilitate this cooperation. Third, while states continue to be the main actors, the role of non-state actors, namely international institutions and transnational companies, in an interdependent system of states should not be undermined (Powell, 1994).

Rationalist theories led international relations not only during the Cold War, but they have been two most influential theories of our time. However, not all

¹ Rationalism is an approach to international relations, which adopts positivist understanding of the reality. Rationalists believe that international relations can be studied through observation and the knowledge can be acquired through empirical assessment as natural sciences. Rationalist theorists assume that the features of the structure are exogenously given, and that the agents' behaviours are defined by the anarchy (Smith, 2015, pp. 41-42).

developments recorded in last three decades can be explained with those theories. Consequently, failure of the rationalism to explain ongoing tendencies in the IR field close to the end of the Cold War and in its aftermath new debate triggered a new – the fourth² – Great Debate in this field of research. To be clearer, the positivist methodology of Rationalism was challenged by the so-called Reflectivists, which includes Constructivism, Feminism, Critical Theory and Post-modernism. The main assumption of the Reflectivist front, which is regarded as post-positivism, is that the knowledge in international relations should be produced through subjective interpretations involving values and norms, rather than naturalist observation. Under the light of this debate, Constructivism could take its place as a middle-ground (Smith, 2015, ss. 42-43).

1.2.1. Constructivism: Agent, Structure and Change

In his book *World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and international relations*, Nicholas Onuf (1989) brought the term Constructivism, which had been prevalent in other social sciences theretofore, to the IR Theory. Onuf suggests that “people and societies construct, or constitute, each other” (p. 36). The ideas that the character and structure of international relations are not given, but constructed by agents, and that agents play an important role the making of our world made up the backbone of the Constructivist Theory in International Relation. Moreover, Onuf’s work is of importance because it abolished the “sharp distinction between material and social realities” (p. 40).

Constructivism became a grand theory in International Relations thanks to Alexander Wendt’s thought-provoking article *Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics* (Wendt, *Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics*, 1992). Wendt criticizes Neorealism as its subscribers fail to consider dynamic natures of identity and interest as they are considered to be exogenously given and static. Neorealism wrongly defends

² It is believed that there have been four great debates in the international relations theory. Realism-Idealism, Traditionalism-Behaviourism, Neorealism-Neoliberalism are three previous debates (Lake, 2013).

that in a self-help system of agents, that is states, survival of the state and protection of interests are what states do without paying attention to other agents' behaviours. For Wendt, Neoliberalism, on the other hand, puts strong emphasis on the impact of structure on the process without acknowledging vice versa. However, although some liberals accept that identity and interest can change as a by-product of process, they abstain from seeing the whole interaction of process and structure (pp. 392-393).

Based on the strong relevance of the arguments of Constructivism Theory of International Relations, this study is built up on its main assumptions. First of all, it is not important what one has, but what it means for the other. To be clearer, actor's power capacity does not have the same meaning for different actors. Wendt illustrates on an example of the U.S. military power and its implication for Canada and Cuba. An actor's knowledge of self and other determines its actions, and actors' actions determine how anarchy evolves. According to constructivist epistemology, one's own power capacity is insufficient to anticipate its choices, but information about the threats posed by other. This is intersubjective character of power (1992, p. 397).

State identity is accepted to be "inherently relational" (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). That is to say, a state may have multiple identities acquired in interaction with others. For example, Azerbaijan identifies self as "Leader of the Caucasus", for Georgia, Azerbaijan can be identified as "Strategic partner", for Armenia, however, as "Antagonist neighbour", and finally, for the EU as "Energy source". Although these identities are thought to be "inherently social definition" (p. 398) and "relatively stable" (p. 399), they are formed within social context and thus they are subject to transform gradually. As identities are formed in social interactions, so are interests. If state identity and interests are subject to change due to the context and interaction, the power resources that a state owns and the way they are used can change, as well.

Intersubjective nature of identity and interest predicts the influence of process over structure, which is overlooked by Rationalism. Wendt's diagram (see Appendix 3), which suggests the codetermination of institutions and process,

demonstrates how the process of interaction between agents constitutes the structure (1992, p. 406). Agent-structure problem is one of the central issues of International Relations Theory, and of Constructivism. For Wendt, states do not behave in an exogenously given space of choices in favour of their survival. Rather, states are agents that make their choices on the basis of interaction with others, and this interaction creates norms and mutual understanding of one another (1987, pp. 337-339). It is how agents choose to behave towards others that forms anarchy.

Discussing Wendt's claim, Weber suggests that as Constructivism constitutes a middle ground and bridge between Neorealism and Neoliberalism, there is no need to define the nature of international anarchy either conflictual or cooperative (2010, p. 65). In general, it is hard to label international anarchy with a predominant character as it is "what states make of it" and thus it is constantly transforming and evolving. Anarchy is shaped by ideas and beliefs of agents. For Snyder (2009), "constructivists believe that debates about ideas are the fundamental building blocks of international life. Individual and groups become powerful if they can convince others to adopt their ideas.". Taking a constructivist approach, Ipek (2013) argues that ideational domestic forces influence the making of foreign policy, especially in terms of soft power use. What agents do and speak constructs the reality and other agents' knowledge of this reality. That is why Constructivism is concerned with the construction of reality as a result of mutual interaction and understanding of one another, as well as domestic social context (Kowert, 2015).

1.3. METHODOLOGY

1.3.1. Research Strategy

This study is developed upon qualitative research strategy as constructivist study on international relations takes into account the following arguments: 1) Intersubjective character of anarchy and agent-structure relationship can be observed with a constructivist perspective as actors' identities and interests

change over the time in a “spatial, historical, and social context” (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 9); 2) Soft power concept puts a greater emphasis on how power resources are used, rather than what power capabilities are owned. Similarly, constructivist research delves into the operation of power “through relationships rather than material capabilities” (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 11); 3) For constructivist researchers, epistemologically, meanings of and perspectives on existing phenomena interiorized by people constitutes one of the central topics of research. Klotz and Lynch argue that “by exploring the contexts within which meanings form structures, constructivists examine when, how and why particular practices become relatively fixed while others remain fluid” (2007, p. 25). In constructivist paradigm, relative ontology is employed. That is to say, “reality is relative, multiple, socially constructed, and ungoverned by natural laws” (Costantino, 2008, p. 117).

1.3.2. Research Design

Bryman argues that qualitative research is generally inductive as theories and concepts emerge from data, constructionist in its nature of ontology, and interpretive in epistemological position (2012, p. 380). This study adopts exploratory research methodology incorporating two –grounded theory and case study – designs. First, using grounded theory design, exploration of an alleged relation between the use of soft power and conflict transformation is aimed to generate a middle-range theory. Second, this theory is examined on the basis of the Taiwan case. Grounded theory design is found to be appropriate when exploring something new or an existing phenomenon beyond the veil. In our case, as mentioned before, the literature fails to study relationship between the two concepts in focus, soft power and conflict transformation. On the other hand, case study design allows the study to propose evidence from a well-known, still insufficiently studied context, where exists a long-lasting conflict and abundant use of soft power.

1.3.3. Data Collection

The necessary data for the theoretical and conceptual discussion was primarily collected from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, periodicals and other academic publications. Moreover, newspapers, outstanding magazines and other web resources were employed in order to keep up with the latest developments in the context of research. Primary sources – governmental documents, discourses of public figures, official statistics taken from the official platforms – were of importance, as well.

1.3.4. Organization of the Study

The study consists of four chapters and conclusion. The first chapter is introduction which presents background to the study, aim and justification of the study, hypotheses, research questions, theoretical framework, methodology and the organization of the study.

The second chapter provides a conceptual analysis of soft power and conflict transformation. First, I present a brief review of the literature on the concept of power, and the constructivist approach to the concept is elaborated. Second, the focus is given to the discussion on the typology of power, in particular, on soft power. Starting with Nye's conception of soft power I next provide insight into the dynamic conception of soft power, as well. Finally, I propose my thesis that increasing use of soft power in conflictual settings rather than hard power creates more space for the peaceful transformation of conflict.

The third chapter covers the analysis of the conflict over Taiwan between the PRC and ROC. I start with a brief description of the historical background of the conflict, discussing its underlying causes, and delving into the issues with reference to international law. Next, I list the primary and secondary actors, the current situation, and the turning points that led to the persisting status quo. In this regard, the positions, interests, and needs of the parties will be scrutinized in chronological order in order to make sense of the major shifts in the policies of both parties toward the conflict, and each other. Finally, I map the regional context and geopolitics regarding outsiders' interests and positions on the conflict, and

exogenous triggers and constraints.

The fourth chapter examines the role of soft power, that the parties of the Taiwan conflict own and cultivate, in cross-strait relations and the transformation of the conflict. To do so, I first explore the PRC's and ROC's soft power resources, and other power resources that contribute to their soft power. Then, I illustrate the transformation trends, especially having been observed since the late 1980s. A comprehensive understanding of the transformation of the conflict requires to evaluate the transformations taken place at all levels, namely context, structure, actor, issue and individual levels. Finally, I refer to the developments observed between China's Xiamen and Taiwan's Kinmen as a model for future transformation of the conflict.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: SOFT POWER AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a conceptual analysis of soft power and conflict transformation in an attempt to prepare a ground for empirical analysis of the relation between them. First, a brief review of the literature on the concept of power is conducted, and the constructivist approach to the concept is elaborated. Second, the focus is given to the discussion on the typology of power, in particular, on soft power. Starting with Nye's conception of soft power I next provide insight into the dynamic conception of soft power, as well. Finally, I propose my thesis that increasing use of soft power in conflictual settings rather than hard power creates more space for the peaceful transformation of conflict.

2.2. POWER: THE CONCEPT AND CONCEPTIONS

Bertrand Russell, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, argues that while humans have endless desires, power and glory are the most important two. People seek to obtain power in order to establish glory or sustain the glory they own. Insofar as power is an utmost desire of human being, it is a fundamental concept of social science. According to Russell, all social affairs can be understood and interpreted if one sees "love of power" (2004, p. 4) as the chief cause. There is no doubt that a comprehensive conception of power enables us to interpret the actions of actors of international relations.

Robert A. Dahl, based on former discussions on power, concluded that there is no universal and functional definition of power in literature. His attempt to conceptualize power with reference to the U.S. Senate plays an important starting point for subsequent generations of the IR students. Dahl's ultimate conclusion differentiates those who study power into two groups as "conceptual theoreticians"—who are in favor of building a universal concept of power with some flexible elements to be modified in certain cases and "operationalists"—who

refuse to use the concept of power like the former, and suggest to employ case-specific concepts (1957, p. 214). Out of this debate, one may derive that it is of significance to generate a conception according to the purpose of the research, yet to consider existing approaches to the concept itself.

In this sense, Weberian definition is one of the most preferred in terms of probabilistic causation of power, yet interpreted in various ways by commentators. Most generally, power is defined as the probability of one actor's actions to reach its goals in social relations despite opposition and resistance (Wallimann, Tatsis, & Zito, 1977). Human is the only being that consciously makes decisions and influences others' decisions for one's own interests. Therefore, Beerling defines power as the ability "to carry out decisions by which reality becomes changed" (1955, p. 215). In this definition, power is regarded not only as an influence on other subjects of international relations but also as the impact on the process.

Morgenthau, who sees the struggle for power as a fundamental feature of human and criticizes those who undermine its importance (Guzzini, Hans J. Morgenthau and the three purposes of power, 2018), assumes that all states strive to excel their power resources in order to dominate in world politics. As a realist, Morgenthau (1960) puts power in the center of the state interest. That is why he concludes that international relations can be read through the struggle for power and desire to dominate. Although there are several other ways for states to reach their goals, when it comes to political goals power becomes the focal point of the whole struggle. Regarding power as a means to reach goals is not unique to Morgenthau.

Holsti (1964) suggests that definition of power in international relations should contain a certain act of influence, through which actor 1 influences actor 2 so that actor 2 would behave in a way that the goals of actor 1 are enabled to reach. In other words, actor 1 has the capability to make actor 2 do what actor 1 wants it to do. However, it is also possible that one seeks to make another maintain the status quo or to prevent from behaving against its interests. This act of influence has some features. First of all, one side exerts influence on the other as an

instrument for further goals. Second, the act must contain certain capabilities, be it material or mental. Third, there must be a relationship and process between two sides where we observe the act. Fourth, one actor's power is nothing but meaningful when it is measured in relation to another, that is, power is relative (pp. 180–181). In this sense, it is important to have a clear understanding of how power capabilities are perceived by the one under influence. Especially, when the actor aims at influencing another by merely the fact that it owns enough power capabilities, but is not eager to put them into action. There can be anticipated different consequences if the actual capabilities are perceived as greater or smaller.

Barnett and Duvall (2005) claim that the concept of power has mostly been elaborated through (neo)realist tradition, although numerous endeavors have been made to bring alternative conceptions to the table. Power constitutes “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate” (p. 8). By this way of conceptualization, it is aimed at taking into consideration the two critical dimensions of power, that is, kind and specificity of social relations in which power operates. The kind of relations between subjects is one of the most decisive factors in exercising the existing capacity. When the relations between actors are interaction in nature one of them utilize power capabilities to have influence over the other. The kind of relations can be the social constitution and in this case, power defines the identities and capacities of actors. This dimension of power is based on the approaches power over – the ability to influence others' actions and power to – the ability to take action³.

By specificity of relations, Barnett and Duvall consider the social proximity of actors. Power takes on significance only when there is an observable connection between actors. This connection can either be direct and immediate when the subjects possess certain cross-border, economic, cultural or other relations or indirect and diffuse when the connection is established through institutions or other facilitators. The classification proposed by Barnett and Duvall is shown in

³ For a more extensive discussion on “power over” and “power to” see Gaus (2000).

the table below:

		Relational specificity	
		Direct	Diffuse
Power works through	interactions of specific actors	Compulsory	Institutional
	social relations of constitution	Structural	Productive

Table 1: Types of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 12)

The prevalence of (neo)realist inquiry of the concept of power in the IR literature obstructs its thorough understanding and polygonal application. One often encounters one of two mainstream conceptions; power is either seen as control over material capacities, i.e. arms and military equipment, natural resources, money and so on or control over outcomes, that is, ability to influence others' actions or decisions (Hindess, 1996; Berenskoetter, 2007).

Lukes's conceptual analysis of three-dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) paves the way for a wider yet social understanding of the concept. Three dimensions of power proposed by Lukes are described as follows; One-dimensional power is regarded as direct control over others' actions. By this control, one achieves compliance of others to one's domination. This view of power is discussed to be pluralist in nature and thus open to conflicts between actors who desire to exercise power over others. Two-dimensional power, however, takes into account the ability of agenda-setting by eliminating the possibility of conflicts. In other words, as the agenda is set by the ones who exert control, only issues which are under their control are brought to the table (Berenskoetter, 2007). This elitist view of power is supplemented by three-dimensional power, which considers the manipulation of the way people think rather than they act. To be clearer, people are directed to have opinions that would minimize the risk of opposing stance. Without having direct interaction with the subjects of power, the ones who control achieve their compliance. Under these conditions, people think in the desired way

and hold the knowledge that serves to the interests of its producer, which in turn results in absolute domination of the power owner (Lukes, 2005; Foucault, 2001).

2.2.1. Is Power What We Make of It?

Guzzini indicates that “just adding up facets of power is analytically insufficient” (2013, p. 226). Therefore, it is of significance to examine the constructivist conception of power in order to fully apprehend the role of power in agent-structure relation and the correlation between power and interest and identity. The constructivist IR theory digs into the social construction of knowledge and reality. Furthermore, constructivism suggests that the subjects of international relations have identities and interests that change over time. In this sense, constructivist analysis of power can enable the students of international relations to reveal how power and its various kinds condition the future of relations (Guzzini, 1993).

Alexander Wendt argues that ideas constitute the foundation for the meaning of power and the content of interests. That is why we can evaluate the outcomes of material capabilities only when “ideational conditions of possibility for power and interest explanations have been exposed and stripped out” (Wendt, 1999, p. 96). As a critic of Waltz’s Neo-realism, Wendt highlights the importance of the “distribution of ideas” (1999, p. 96) in international relations instead of the distribution of power. Although Wendt appreciates the role of power, he challenges Realists and Neo-realist by emphasizing the question “how power is constituted” (1999, p. 97).

Socialization comes to the fore as actors' behaviors and power politics are to be explained. The actors are first involved in a certain interaction with a set of initial assumptions about each other. While actors behave based on probabilities prior to the initial social act, their actions are formed a posteriori observations and calculations following the encounter, when the parties form a perception of each other and ascribe certain meanings to their actions. In other words, interests and identities of states come into existence as a consequence of this process of

ascribing meaning. Wendt claims that power politics is constituted by interest and identity, which are constituted by collective meanings formed and being transformed through the process (1992).

In a system of anarchy, while some states are determined about their security, others maintain an endless struggle to excel their material capabilities⁴. Wendt differentiates respectively status-quo and revisionist states according to their worldviews. Likewise, these two different positions the units of international relations have, anarchy and allocation of material capabilities carry differing meanings for them (1999, p. 105). Regardless of their positions, states hold certain beliefs about their circumstances and other states, which contribute to their actions toward others and to others' beliefs about them in turn.

Material-idea discussion is one of the primary issues in Wendt's Constructivism. Unlike other constructivists – Wendt regards himself as a moderate constructivist – Wendt states that material capabilities may have effects independent of underlying ideas in three main directions. First, the more material forces a state has, the more possibilities it has to prevail over the ones with fewer material capabilities. Especially, when there is a notable difference between the material capabilities of two states, it is doubtlessly obvious that who will win the game. Second, technological advances bring certain conditions to the international system. Coupled with cyber technologies, today's unmanned aerial vehicles and spy satellites allow us to gain more detailed information about the others' capacities diminishing uncertainties and forming a more accurate belief about them. Third, geographical location and natural resources have not lost their importance yet. In terms of national security and independence, they constitute profound significance for relatively weak states (1999, pp. 110–111).

Having said that, Wendt regards material resources effective when their interaction with ideas and cultures is considered, as well. It is the mutual constitution that causes more effects in terms of how capabilities and ideas turn into power. Ideas are a product of the social world. In this sense, Hirst (1998, p.

⁴ For a Neo-realist and Classical realist approaches to state interest see Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1960).

135) refers to Parsons's argument that power is but an element of social context, not only certain capabilities are of relevance to the constructivist conception of power. Power is an outcome and instrument of collective action and can be used relying on collective consent, as also advocated by Arendt (1970, p. 44).

Nicholas Onuf (1989), a political constructivist who regards himself as a philosophical idealist, avoids to use power as an umbrella term in his early writings and demonstrates quite a cautious stance towards the concept. Nonetheless, later on (2013; 2017) he gives a lot of thought to the discussion on power. Onuf (2017) holds that all concepts were originated from metaphors and became concepts over time. While some metaphors, losing their metaphorical characteristics, evolve into fixed concepts, others are constantly refreshed so that they fail to become a concept universally accepted as such. This is how essentially contested concepts tread the boards, Onuf suggests. He investigates the concept of power as a continuously refreshed metaphor. Onuf's conceptual analysis is based on that of Nye's, yet has considerable differences from that. He agrees with Nye on the argument that power and causation as metaphors are "largely interchangeable" (2017, p. 3). However, Onuf underlines the importance of examination of preferences associated with both the exercise of power and the subject of causation. What makes Onuf's conception valuable is that he sees power differently at each point of a "chain of proximate causes" (2017, p. 7), and his argument that it is observer's perception and perspective that accepts what is power.

2.3. TYPOLOGY OF POWER

Being an essentially contested concept, power is neither given a *sui generis* definition nor has it a universally adopted typology. This conceptual ambiguity stems from the aforementioned abundance of differing approaches to the concept itself. In order to develop a viable typology of power for the sake of our research, I will consider two basic dimensions. First, I will discuss different sources of power as material and non-material assets. In this case, power will be regarded as the resources of actors that allow them to exercise control or influence over other

actors, process and/or structure. Second, I will illustrate various uses of those resources with reference to the methods that actors resort to. By doing so, it will be possible to analyze power both as a material and social phenomenon.

2.3.1. Sources of Power

The subjects of international relations possess material capabilities, above all, in order to guarantee their survival and meet vital needs like security. However, not all subjects are status-quo states, as Wendt puts it. Some other polities choose to take an active part in world politics or in their immediate neighborhood. Moreover, status-quo states may also become revisionists when they face a threat or possibility of a threat to their security. In short, regardless of being a status-quo or revisionist state, all agents of international relations strive to augment their capabilities. I will classify material capabilities under three broad categories; a) Military, b) Economy, and c) Technology.

Although the aforementioned sources are the most frequently analyzed power capabilities, and almost every statecraft endeavors to enhance those resources, non-material and intangible sources of power should not be overlooked and underestimated. Non-material power is a controversial issue in the IR field. In particular, Realist and Neo-realist traditions refuse to accept the role of non-material, or intangible, sources of power. On the contrary, Idealism, Neo-liberalism and Constructivism put a great emphasis on non-material assets. I will list culture and identity, political system and foreign policy, and institutions as the examples of intangible sources of power.

2.3.1.1. Military

Throughout history, many acknowledged the close relationship between military power and politics from Thucydides to Machiavelli, and from Sun Tzu to Carl von Clausewitz. Stephen Biddle (2004) rightfully argues that today's political science embraces military balance as one of the significant realms to study. Political analysts are of no difference when it comes to comparison of two states,

particularly, in conflict. Although military capabilities fail to predict the course of the conflictual process or its outcome, research based on those capabilities hardly loses its significance. Biddle's stance is especially true for the period after the World War II, in the sense that by that time, the wars used to be won, with few exceptions, by the side who possessed more military capabilities.

While realists and neo-realists advocate augmentation of military power as a prerequisite for national security, those in the constructivist and idealist fronts hold that continuous aggrandizement of military power may lead to more confrontation and threats. Despite various position, modern states maintain military as the guarantor of their survival. Not only individual safety concerns determine the necessity of military, but collective security organizations and alliances are established on gun barrels. Security, threat and power are probably one of the most collocated terms in political literature. Power comes into prominence when security is exposed to certain threats or possibility of threats (Lee D. S., 2008).

Military capabilities are measured based on three variables (Biddle, 2004). First is numerical preponderance in terms of the amount of military equipment, as well as economic superiority. This dimension anticipates the victory of who has more equipment and budget for military expenditures. The second variable is the use of technology for military purposes. Biddle distinguishes two theories with regard to technology as systemic and dyadic. The former defends that attack or defense technologies prevail during a certain period of time, and thus the decisive factor of victory is the possession of more technologies that prevail. The latter, on the contrary, supports the view that regardless of the superiority of this or that type of technology, or action whether attack or defense, the victory will be the one who owns more of technological advances. The third variable is the number of active and reserve military personnel.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the volume of global arms trade has risen notably in the last five-year period. While countries in the Asia and Oceania region became the largest importer, the U.S. maintained its leadership in export with some %35 of total major arms exports

(2019). In terms of military expenditures estimated by SIPRI, the U.S. leads the list with nearly USD 610 billion in 2017, followed by the People's Republic of China with almost USD 230 billion. What is important to note is, while the U.S.'s military expenditure considerably fell compared to the amount spent in 2007, PRC doubled its military budget in this ten-year period (2019). Despite that the novel developments in technology and new types of wars (i.e. cyber wars) have brought a new dimension to the international politics, conventional warfare remains central and ineluctable in state power.

2.3.1.2. Economy

One immutable reality has not changed since humankind first possessed things: Humans believe that they are more powerful when they own more wealth. In other words, "wealth and power are ... usually inseparable. Wealth is often a source of power to get what one wants, which is often more wealth", as Nester (2010, p. 1) puts it. Natural resources, production, trade, and financial transactions are of the most significant factors that determine the economic power of a state. A century ago economic power was confined to natural resources, in the twenty-first century, however, the global political economy considers plenty of other variables. Economic power has become a decisive aspect of political rivalry in the forms of economic sanctions, embargoes, tariffs, investment, loans and so on. Particularly after the Bretton Woods Conference, which was aimed at determining the post-war economic system of the globe, the U.S. economy strengthened its supremacy. Despite its regulatory benefits and advantageous conditions for free trade, the Bretton Woods system could barely prevent economic conflicts and crises as it collapsed in 1971 following President Nixon's historic decision to make a shift from gold standard to dollar standard, which in turn led to 1973 Oil Crisis (Garber, 1993).

Between the trends like globalization-glocalization states are facing new economic challenges. Multinational companies dominate to a degree that today they are regarded as a subject of international relations along with states and international organizations. Under such conditions, political elites seek steady

economic growth not only to cope with international competition and economic threats but also to ensure domestic politics in terms of voters' economic welfare. Moreover, greater economic power allows states to establish more influence on other subjects of international relations. Although densely interdependent economies of the modern world make it hard to discern the relations of dependence, in times of crises the direction of dependence is divulged. For example, Russia-Ukraine crises (Reuters, 2009) exhibited the latter's desperate independence of Russia's gas supply. Similarly, the recent diplomatic crisis between the U.S. and Turkey (BBC News, 2019) affected the rates of Turkish Lira detrimentally and the currency plummeted enormously in spite of government's efforts to circumvent devaluation. In brief, there is a strong tie between national security and economic power.

2.3.1.3. Technology

Although the relationship between technology and state power is not obvious, it is irrefutable that technology has occupied almost every realm of state polity. Modern military powers benefit from technological advances such as combat drones, satellite observation, and global positioning systems. State-of-the-art technologies determine the future of economic trends, as well. Today the three biggest multinational companies (Feiner, 2019), Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple, are all based on cutting-edge technology. It should be noted that Internet technology, more precisely social networks, has played a remarkable role in events such as the so-called Arab Spring (Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheaffer, 2013). Technology, thus, should be taken into account when it comes to state power.

Cyber-power has come to the fore after the inclusion of the term cyberspace in the political literature. Cyberspace now is regarded as the fifth domain together with the land, the sea, the aerospace, and the outer space, in which humankind conducts political, economic, and military operations (Kuehl, 2009). The unit in this space is information and it is carried through information and communications technologies (ICT). The uniqueness of cyberspace is that it is a human-made artifact, and thus subject to the control of the powerful. Cyberspace, like any other

spaces, is operational, which means that the subjects use this domain as a channel to establish and enhance influence over others in a political sense. Tim Jordan (1999) refers to the three conceptions of power as possession, social order, and domination when explaining cyber-power. It is to say that there is no difference between cyber-power and other kinds of power I discussed in terms of their causality and function. Insofar as cyber-power is important for national security (i.e. cybersecurity), it is of significance with regard to economic operations. In today's digitalized world, almost all financial transactions, stock exchanges and a notable part of other economic interactions take place in the cyberspace during as short as a second (Kuehl, 2009).

2.3.1.4. Culture and Identity

Culture and identity have long been underestimated in the IR theory. Nevertheless, along with the constructivist turn and the rising cultural exchange through modern communication channels, culture and identity have become a focus of analysis. Mazarr (1996) distinguishes 4 models that culture falls into in the literature. The first model emphasizes the role of culture in the economic development of a nation. In this regard, the miracles of Japan and Taiwan are given as examples of culture's impact on economic trends (p. 178). When culture is seen as the equipment for life, it can be understood why oil-rich countries of the Middle East failed to achieve a fair distribution of oil capital and diversification of economy, whereas, Norway has successfully accomplished these tasks⁵. The second model evaluates culture as a cognitive filter through which decision-making process passes. Both on individual and collective levels, when a decision is made not only outcome calculations, but also cultural aspects – consciously or unconsciously – are considered. In other words, the decision-makers make moves under a heavy influence of the culture they are living in. Mazarr (p. 180) claims that cultural values have a strong impact on how and what political

⁵ In 2018, Norway had the most inclusive development according to the Inclusive Development Index (World Economic Forum, 2018b). The IDI is thought to be a more precise indicator of economic development as it considers factors like growth, development, inclusion, intergenerational equity, and sustainability. Moreover, Norway took the 16th place among 140 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report 2018 (World Economic Forum, 2018a).

problems are seen and addressed. In this sense, culture may have a causal and preventive effect on decision-making. The third model (pp. 180–181) suggests that culture performs as the socioeconomic architect in a country, that is, culture determines the level of social trust among the members of society. When the level of trust is high enough, these societies reach a high level of development thanks to the multinational companies built on trust as the strongest relationships are constructed on nothing but trust. Mazarr's third model takes its foundation from the influential work of Fukuyama (1995). The fourth model that comes to the forefront among the thought on the role of culture is based on 'The Clash of Civilizations?' (Huntington, 1993), Huntington's controversial essay, which suggests that the chief source of conflict will be the cultural differences between civilizations. Although this hypothesis was supported by many when it was first introduced, later on, the global trends have shown that intra-group conflicts (i.e. civil wars and asymmetric conflicts) are the main concern of global security nowadays.

Although Mazarr agrees on some points in the aforementioned model, he suggests an alternative perspective, which takes its roots from Toynbee's views on the cultural domain. Mazarr's approach suggests that some cultures are superior over others, thus, in the long run, the relatively weak cultures will be influenced by the strong ones to the degree that they will start internalizing the superior cultures' elements, and will end up becoming identical (1996). This view is parallel to how globalists see the future of cultures around the globe (Jacka, 1992). Mazarr's perspective has been proven to be correct to a certain extent, as culture and identity seem to remain decisive in the formation of interests and behavior.

Eric R. Wolf is a strong proponent of the decisive role that the ideas, norms and culture play in the consolidation and exercise of power. Moreover, Wolf (1999, pp. 288–289) constructs a relationship between culture and social change, and as such culture constitutes causal power. Culture is used as an instrument of both domestic and foreign policy-making. Within a country, culture is an inseparable element of political discourse and mobilization of social forces. In foreign affairs, culture performs as a proxy that enters other societies without a need for formal

agreement. In general terms, culture is the common way of life and behavior of a group of people. Since power is only meaningful in social relations whether within a group or between groups, Schoenmakers discusses that “power, power constellations and the maintenance of power are essentially culture” (2012, s. 91).

Identity, on the other hand, is included by IR students – constructivists, in particular – in a set of independent variables that determine state preferences, interests, and actions (Bucher & Jasper, 2017). Identity is a socially constructed phenomenon and changes as other social artifacts. Harshe (2006) claims that identities formed as a result of the establishment of nation-states were easier to discern and make sense of, but especially following the rise of ethnonational identities it is getting more complicated to shape the relationship between identity and international relations. While neo-realists and neo-liberals study state identity as given, Constructivism takes an approach that refers to the structures within international relations as intersubjective and social institutions, and thus, identities are neither exogenously given, nor are they constant and single. Identity is necessary, for Wendt (Wendt, 1996, p. 50), because identity is socially constructed meaning, and meanings determine relationships. He gives an example of a gun in a friend’s hand and in an enemy’s hand. The gun takes its meaning according to the identity of its owner. So does power. State power posits various meanings for other states according to its own identity and others’ identities.

Wendt's conceptualization of identity offers a handful basis for understanding the intersubjective character of state identity, yet it is not free of weaknesses. The main flaw would be that the identity a state adopts for self in interaction with others is not always consistent with the state's actions. In other words, the identity of a state fails to determine the state's behavior. The question is if the identity of a state is perceived identically by the state itself and its counterparts in interaction. The answer is usually no. Rather states endeavor to build an identity that is perceived by others in a preferred way. The U.S. tries to achieve a universally accepted identity as the modern cradle of democracy. The People's Republic of China makes every effort to be identified as the state of peaceful development.

Turkey claims to be the guarantor of peace and security in the Middle East. And when the desired identity is constructed and accepted by others, it becomes an important source of influence, or, an instrument of power.

2.3.1.5. Political system and Foreign policy

The domestic political system of a state can tell manifold things about its foreign political actions and use of power. States with alike political systems and administrative cultures build stronger relationship most often. In this regard, the powerful ones find it easier to establish influence over the weak with a similar domestic political system. Moreover, the current political system of a state may be the inheritance of former structures. In this case, states with common history share similar political systems such as post-Soviet countries. Not only shared history but also resembling political systems make these countries closer to each other. It can be concluded that Russia's power over most of the post-Soviet countries stems from not only geographic proximity but also systemic closeness. On the contrary, the EU requires its (future) members with Soviet heritage to undress their former political systems and adjust to the values of the EU. In this regard, the neighboring states of the EU are obliged to adopt the EU's political and juridical values in order to benefit from their relationships with the EU. Furthermore, the domestic structure has a great impact on the decision-making process. A typical example can be the process of Brexit. Although more than 2 years have passed since the vote for Brexit, the process has not finalized yet, mostly because of the political system of the UK, more precisely, the disagreement between the Prime Minister and the Parliament (Barnes, 2019). In modern democracies, particularly in terms of crucial foreign policy decisions such as military action, the procedure may take so long that the state will not be able to exercise its military power instantly (Emerson, 2012). While this feature of democracy may result in disastrous consequences, in other cases it leads to situations that gave birth to the Democratic Peace Theory (Rasler & Thompson, 2005).

Foreign policy, depending on the style and tools used, accomplishes goals. Although material resources and overall place of a state on the power spectrum play an important role in determining the interstate relations, a well-performed foreign policy supported with universal values constitutes a relative advantage for players. For instance, the Nordic countries have long been known for their global efforts to establish a convenient platform for peace talks between parties of several protracted conflicts. In spite of recent shifts in their foreign policies, as Wivel (2017) puts, Nordic model of foreign policy can be elaborated as a viable reference for successful international affairs. This, in turn, has allowed those countries to hold a notable influence, especially in international organizations. This model of foreign policy contains three main characteristics, according to Wivel (2017). Above all, taking an active role in international efforts for peace and security forms the foundation of the Nordic model. Second, Nordic activism for peace and security is based on humanist and legal values, which are the chief sources of the domestic polity as well. Finally, these states act in a well-organized manner coordinating their actions with international organizations, foremost with the UN (p. 490).

Foreign policy may emerge as a great source of power when it is grounded on multilateralism. Those states are suggested to achieve political goals at lower costs who enjoy bigger and more powerful allies (Ruggie, 1992). For instance, following joint embargoes and financial sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program to cease, the alliance of France, Germany, the UK, the Russian Federation, the United States, and China could reach a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 (BBC News, 2015). Turkey's the so-called enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy (Sevinç, 2018) complemented by the established alliances in Syria has contributed enormously its fight against terrorist groups settled in the bordering regions⁶. The emergence of organizations and alliances especially for economic cooperation collective security, which serve as a supplement to state power, shows that states need each other in order to augment their power.

⁶ To read more about Turkey's war on terror in the Middle East see <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror>

Public diplomacy and communication should be given special consideration in terms of effective foreign policy for the efficient use of power. These two phenomena have occupied minds of IR researchers and the literature, particularly with the rising effect of communication channels from TV to the social networks (Adesina, 2017; Ociepka, 2018; Sevin & Ingenhoff, 2018). Previously I discussed the role of new technology and social media in modern international affairs. Today's public diplomacy is not only about the conduct but its effective transmission to the target audience (Chitty, *International communication: Continuing into the 21st century as an academic 'commons'*, 2005).

2.3.1.6. Institutions

Institutions perform both as a source and as an instrument of power in places where economic or military actions are impossible or are required to be complimented. The institutions that states make use of can be divided into two principal groups as governmental and non-governmental bodies. The fields in which governmental institutions implement their activities include but are not limited to developmental aid, emergency rescue, cultural and touristic promotion, education, cooperation, and trade (Paschalidis, 2009; Thörn, 2011; Lawrimore & Vreeland, 2018). These institutions are not merely operating to fulfill their missions as publicized, but indirectly representing the origin state and protect its interests. On the other hand, non-governmental institutions take missions varying from promotion of democratic values to peacebuilding, as well as the missions that governmental institutions carry. Although non-governmental institutions are said to be formed independent from the central governments, that NGOs are unofficial representatives and instruments of the influence of states in other states is a re-echoing claim (Rossi, 2004; Fogarty, 2011; Fouksman, 2017; Steinberg, 2018).

2.3.2. Joseph Nye's Typology of Power

Discussing two main approaches to power in the political literature, Nye suggests that as behavioral outcomes are of importance we need to give more attention to how the power resources are converted into outcomes rather than the amount and size of those resources. Nye puts specific emphasis on several aspects of power in his book *The Future of Power*. The scope of power refers to the owner and exerciser of power, and others involved in this power relationship. This leads Nye to say that the exerciser of power expects to get the desired outcomes in certain domains. Another significant aspect is the provision of the preferred outcomes as a result of power relations. If those outcomes are not achieved, there is no point to measure or employ power capacities as it will end in a waste of resource (Nye J. J., 2011, pp. 6–7).

In terms of relational power, Nye divides the functions of power into three groups as faces of power referring to those proposed by Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), and Lukes (2005). In this sense, Nye reaffirms that power is not only the ability to command others to do in order for the commander to get the desired outcomes, but also to affect preferences (i.e. agenda-setting) or to create preferences of others so that they act in the desired way without the use of coercion or inducement (2011, p. 11). The latter two require structures that are constructed on the basis of outcomes that can only be produced within the conditions in those complex structures. I will later discuss that protracted and frozen conflicts are of those structures in which command power, coercion, and inducement are simply ineffective for a change towards the preferred outcomes.

2.3.2.1. Hard and Soft Power

Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (2011, pp. 20–21). This typology of power does not draw an apodictic line between the resources associated with hard and soft power, as Nye admits, too. Differing from his earlier propositions about the division between hard and soft power, Nye sees these categories as the two extremes of a power behavior spectrum:

H				S
A	Command>>	Coerce–Threat–Pay–Sanction–Frame–Persuade–Attract	<<Co-opt	O
R				F
D				T

Table 2: Spectrum of power behaviors (Nye J. J., 2011, p. 21)

As Nye explains, the military and economic resources, which are often associated with hard power can perform as a source of soft power when they cause attraction. It is all about the context and the skills that would allow the agent to use the resource as hard or soft power (2011, p. 22). In this regard, Zheng and Zhang's (2012) dynamic approach to power would help to explicate Nye's typology. In this division of power, a power source is thought to have hard or soft effectiveness depending upon whether it forces the other to act in a desired way or the other want(s) to act in a preferred direction as they are attracted by that power source or by the owner of the source. When one actor cannot achieve its goals by using either hard or soft power, the bargaining power is suggested to step up to the plate. This dynamic view of power suggests three features of power as follows. Horizontality (p. 28) of a power source means that while it performs as hard power on some subjects, for others it is assumed as soft power. For example, the provision of arms and military equipment to Taiwan by the U.S. can be explored as soft power with regard to Taiwan. On the contrary, for the Chinese government, this will be accepted as hard power. This feature of power is explained by the inter-subjectivity of international relations in constructivist theory. Verticality (p. 28) is the changing character of a power resource over a certain time span. To be more concise, the hard effect of a power source on a specific subject can transform into soft effect as a result of changing relations between those two subjects and other shifts in the structure and context. For instance, the financial assistance to Turkey after the Second World War can be seen as soft power since this aid effected a positive change of the image of U.S. and resulted in the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. However, during the recent crisis between Turkey and the U.S., American economic power and financial resources acted as hard power. Relativity (p. 29) in power politics is explained with the comparison of power preferences of two or more subjects during the same period.

If we compare the power use of Germany and the U.S. between two world wars, we can conclude that Germany had been opting for hard power more than the U.S. On the other hand, today's comparison would demonstrate vice versa as Germany performs 'softer' in world politics.

Nye acknowledges that soft power is relatively more challenging to be employed due to certain reasons. First of all, one can hardly predict the outcomes as the reaction to soft power is mostly unpredictable. In other words, except some universally accepted values, the cultural, political and other values that belong to one nation may not seem attractive to others. One's steady development may attract some, whereas it may create feelings of rivalry and cause competition. Fan (2008) argues that attraction is only meaningful, and can be regarded as soft power when the attracted group of people have a voice in decision-making process of the political unit. Furthermore, while some sources of soft power can be enhanced, modified or artificially created, others such as embedded cultural values cannot. It should also be noted that along with the changing nature of communication technologies (i.e. social networks that have billions of users globally), it becomes even harder to establish control over the outcomes. Fake news, disinformation, and black propaganda are dispersed within seconds if not shorter around the globe manipulating people's perception of reality. Since soft power addresses mostly what Carr (1946) called power over opinion, perception management occupies the central topic.

2.4. CONFLICT, CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND POWER

Soft power is important but not decisive in most cases. For example, if we observe the different stages of armed conflicts, it would be obvious that when crisis breaks out, the importance of hard power prevails that of soft power to a great extent. However, parties may attract allies and international support using their soft power, and thus change the course of the conflict. In the forthcoming sections, I will discuss approaches to conflict and peace placing particular focus on the transformational approach, elaborate on the use of hard and soft power during different stages of large-scale conflicts, and the impact of them on the

transformation of conflicts.

2.4.1. Conflict, Its Stages and Power Politics of Parties

In general terms, conflict is defined as the manifestation of perceived incompatibility of goals (Fisher, et al., 2000, p. 4). In order to talk about conflict, there should be observed a covert difference between goals pursued by two or more actors. Presence of difference is crucial but not enough. The difference between goals should be incompatible and this incompatibility needs to be perceived by parties. Finally, the manifestation of incompatibility makes latent conflict surface. Johan Galtung (1996) describes the conflict in his triangular models of conflict, violence, and peace. According to Galtung, attitudes/assumptions, behavior and contradiction/content constitute the vertices of the triangle of conflict. He sees conflict as a dynamic structure in which actors hold changing attitudes and demonstrate behaviors in favor of their interests (pp. 71–72).

Seeing conflict as a dynamic structure hardly belongs merely to Galtung. Edward Azar, the author of *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice*, established a wider understanding of conflict by abolishing the rigid border between interstate and intrastate conflicts, including various elements of conflict structure in the analysis and directing the focus of conflict research towards latent incompatibilities, which had been overlooked before. Azar's work alarmed the IR scholars, especially those in the peace and conflict research, to pay more attention to the conflicts previously regarded as settled. In this sense, recurrence of the violent phase of a settled dispute is very likely when the underlying causes linger. Within communities, in which a particular group is being suppressed, prevented from accessing basic needs, and lacks recognition, participation and well-being, persists a delicate situation that is possible to turn into a violent conflict.

The conflict structure passes several stages starting from the emergence of difference ending in reconciliation at best. Conflict escalation and de-escalation model below shows different phases of conflict:




Figure 1: Conflict escalation and de-escalation (Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse, 2011, p. 13)

First three stages are the pre-conflict phase when the parties determine their goals and form the perception of their counterpart(s). Generally close to the end of this phase the parties strive to augment their power, especially material resources associated with hard power. This stage is typical for the passive use of hard power in the forms of threats, say, 'flex their muscles'. Simultaneously parties start searching for powerful allies to use their power capacities as well. This is when soft power kicks in. The side of the conflict with more soft power is anticipated to be supported by more subjects. Nevertheless, absolute support taken by merely one side is rare as sides of the conflict may have soft power more or less over various countries. Furthermore, the secondary parties and allies involved in conflict act according to their interests and identities. Soft power may affect those interests and change their attitudes. For example, Hitler's Nazi Germany had probably more soft power in relation to Italy and Japan, thus they were fighting on the same front.

With the outbreak of violence, the conflict passes to the crisis phase. This phase consists mostly of direct exercise of hard power. To be clearer, the conflict contains institutional use of violence and it becomes an armed conflict. In its climax, the conflict becomes a war, involves more than two parties, the death toll mounts to more than a thousand per year, and the whole population of the parties gets affected detrimentally. Despite the decisive character of hard power in this phase, parties should consider maintaining their soft power capacities in order to keep their allies and sustain the legitimacy of their actions. Irregular use of hard

power may result in disastrous consequences as Nye describes the decline of U.S. soft power after its violent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan (2004, p. 14).

The crisis may be terminated with a ceasefire, but it is barely sufficient for a durable peace. The next post-conflict stage involves negotiations between parties as a result of mediation efforts. This phase is an exceptionally important time in terms of the transformation of conflict.

2.4.2. Transformational Approach to Conflict

At the heart of the transformational approach is how conflict is seen. Lederach (2014) suggests that in order to understand the very essence of conflict and achieve peaceful transformation, we first should change the way we see conflict. He suggests that one should use different lenses to be able to both see the big picture and focus on the details that form it. Transformational approach involves a number of necessary components and actions that have been neglected and undermined before. Taking into his years of experience in the field, Lederach defines conflict transformation as follows:

Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships (2014, p. 8).

First of all, the uniqueness of the transformational approach is that it regards conflict as a drive of change. Peace practitioners are advised to “envision and respond” to conflict rather than avoiding it by transforming the destructive energy of the conflict into constructive change. Second, conflict is a process consisting of numerous differing phases as what Lederach names “ebb and flow”. Peacebuilding efforts should be expended throughout all these phases, not only in post-conflict settings. These efforts, however, are supposed to differ according to the requirements of the circumstances. Third, conflict is a natural element of social life and it brings “life-giving opportunities”. Conflict allows individuals and groups to reconstruct unjust structures. Fourth, transformation is a long and creative process. It requires a planned set of actions and situational adjustments,

rather than immediate but fragile solutions. In this sense, both major and minor changes play significant role for nonviolent transformation of conflict. Fifth, this approach regards eliminating violence and securing justice equally important. Without eradicating all types of violence, including direct, structural and cultural, and providing justice for victimized groups and individuals, a durable peace is unlikely to be built.

The transformational approach suggests five transformations (Miall, 2004, pp. 9–10) that would bring positive peace⁷: 1) Transformation of context happens far beyond the borders of the conflict. It is basically about the effect of major global shifts, such as the end of the Cold War, the rise of extremism or far-right movements. Technological developments are of this kind of transformation that may pave the way for more transparency and communication opportunities. 2) Transformation of structure affects the relationship between the parties of the conflict. For instance, the end of slavery caused a considerable decline in interracial conflicts. The structure should be transformed, in particular, if it contains structural violence, injustice, discrimination, inequality and other violations of human rights. 3) Transformation of actors provides exceptional chances for durable peace. Actor transformation includes changes in attitudes and behaviors of parties. This often happens because of external or internal pressures or constraints. Actor transformation is also observed in the form of power politics. Use of hard power becomes either costly or the actors become determined that the use of soft power will be more viable. 4) Transformation of issues is based on changes in positions of actors. These changes take place as a result of compromises reached in negotiations. For example, the tense relations between countries bordering with the Caspian Sea were transformed as a result of mutually agreed convention. Previously, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan had a

⁷ Galtung (1996, p. 3) distinguishes positive and negative forms of peace. Here the word negative should not be understood literally. Negative peace is the absence of direct violence, use of force and other coercive methods between conflicting parties. Ceasefire and initial peace agreements are generally examples of negative peace. For example, in spite of several peace accords between Israel and Palestine, the armed clashes still persist. On the contrary, positive peace is possible with the provision of justice, rule of law, reconciliation, erosion of all kinds of violence and grudges. Positive peace embraces the transformational approach to conflict and can be reached with a well-planned curriculum, agreed strategy with the parties and strong foundations.

dispute of oil reserves under the Caspian seabed and the conflict had escalated to the point that the parties cut the diplomatic ties and deported each other's citizens (Rahimov, 2018). As the issue was transformed into agreement the conflict gave its place to reconciliation. Constructive steps towards issue transformation contribute to the party's soft power. 5) Transformation of individuals encompasses changes both on grassroots and leadership levels. This can happen in two directions. First, the way people think can be transformed with pieces of training, info-sessions and media coverage for civil society, and with negotiations for high-level leadership. Second, the change of leadership may contribute to the peace process if the new leaders are more eager to peaceful decisions.

2.4.3. Hard Power as a Barrier to Peaceful Transformation of Conflicts

The transformations in various aspects and levels cause changes in power politics, which may tell a lot about the future of conflict. Use of military power in coercive means leads to the protraction of the conflict. Superiority in military power allows the actors to perpetrate violence against their opponents. The perpetual violence hinders the peaceful transformation of conflict. For instance, the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan had four-day deadly clashes over the occupied Azerbaijani territories, Nagorno Karabakh in early April 2016. The ongoing peace process since 1994 had a serious injury as both parties had to give dozens, if not hundreds of casualties. Although the two sides had experienced some minor break-downs of the ceasefire, the so-called April War was the worst among them considering its deadly impact on negotiations (BBC News, 2016; Shiryev, 2016).

Hard power is one of the factors that leave the parties in a security dilemma. Conflicting parties keep under surveillance the opponent's military power. They seek to increase their military capacities insofar that each party expects a possible attack from the other. Use of hard power in the means of threats puts a barrier to the transformation process. In this regard, five beliefs are suggested to propel groups toward conflict. Superiority, injustice, vulnerability, distrust, and

helplessness are found to be the most frequent beliefs that create conflict between individuals and groups (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Superiority beliefs are typical to radical nationalists and fascist as they regard themselves as superior to other nations. For example, Nazis' belief in their racial superiority was one of the underlying causes of the World War I. Injustice is another common belief when a group perceives inequality or other types of unjust structure that trivializes the existence of the group. When this belief arouses and the members of a group are mobilized around it, a situation for civil war emerges in inter-state conflicts. Vulnerability is a prevalent belief among relatively smaller groups such as ethnic minorities. People who believe that their existence or inherent culture hangs by a thread, they resort to hard power in order to ensure their survival. Distrust is often observed between the parties of a settled conflict with deep-rooted causes. In most cases, these causes fail to be addressed, and thus the parties are led by grievances, black propaganda of the counterpart and other embedded tendencies that fuel distrust. Finally, helplessness leaves groups in a stalemate in which they search for powerful allies and substitute their power lack with others'. These beliefs may be transformed with the use of soft power. In this regard, I will discuss both parties' and mediator's soft power.

2.4.4. The Effect of Soft Power as a Facilitator of Transformation

The primary and secondary parties and mediators may resort to both hard and soft power. Hard power is hardly handy in an attempt to build a durable peace due to the reasons I listed above. Therefore, scholars in the peace research field suggest that the use of soft power may be more effective to reach reconciliation (Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse, 2011, p. 22). A reference to Kenneth Boulding's (Three faces of power, 1989) impressive book on power is given. Exchange power and integrative power are put as forms of soft power versus threat power. Exchange power (p. 27) is a means of persuasion by bargaining and offering attractive compromises. Exchange power may have an implicit impact on the course of the conflict when the parties come to realize that agreement may bring several benefits that otherwise would not be possible to

reach. For example, as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agree on the division of the Caspian Sea instead of conflicting, there emerge new opportunities for cooperation in the transportation of Turkmenistan's oil and gas resources through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan's pipelines to the global market, which in turn would diminish its dependence on Russia. Integrative power (p. 29), on the other hand, suggest the possibility of working together on the underlying issues to get mutually accepted long-term solutions. This type of power was one of the foundational factors in the creation of the European Union's ancestor the European Coal and Steel Community.

Soft power is mainly the power over opinion, and change of opinions causes a change of attitudes and behavior. Therefore, a well-thought-out soft power strategy will create notable opportunities for transformation of large-scale conflicts in theory. For the sake of practical knowledge, I will draw a detailed analysis of the Taiwan conflict and projections of transformation based on the integrative and exchange soft power of parties.

CHAPTER 3: THE CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the seventy years of conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)⁸ – the de facto ruling government of the Taiwan island. The actual conflict broke out following the end of World War II as a result of the Civil War between the nationalist Kuomintang government and communists in China. In the wake of the defeat by the communists led by Mao Zedong, the Kuomintang supporters under Chiang Kai-shek had to flee to Taiwan in order to relief from the loss of control over the mainland China and continue the fight to regain the rule. However, later on, the clash over the control of the Chinese domain turned into a struggle to survive and ultimately to be recognized as an independent state. The conflict has experienced several escalations and armed clashes, but the U.S. military support to the ROC has made it impossible for the PRC to reintegrate the island with mainland China so far.

In order to comprehensively grasp the quiddity of the conflict, I will start with a brief description of the historical background of the conflict, discussing its underlying causes, and delving into the issues with reference to international law. Next, I will list the primary and secondary actors, the current situation, and the turning points that led to the persisting status quo. In this regard, the positions, interests, and needs of the parties will be scrutinized in chronological order in order to make sense of the major shifts in the policies of both parties toward the conflict, and each other. Finally, I will map the regional context and geopolitics regarding outsiders' interests and positions on the conflict, and exogenous triggers and constraints.

3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

⁸ In this text, 'China', 'mainland China', 'the mainland' refer to the PRC, and 'Taiwan', and 'the island' refer to the ROC.

Taiwan's earliest inhabitants are suggested to arrive on the island from modern-day China or Southeast Asia long before the emergence of the Chinese civilization. However, it is a matter of debate whether the very first inhabitants were the ancestors of today's Aborigines who make up a small portion of the total population of the island with slightly more than %2 (The Executive Yuan, 2016). Some scholars discuss that the roots of currently living Aborigines come from Japan or Northern China, whose generations moved to the South and settled in Oceania and Southeast Asia, and that the Taiwanese Aborigines originally came from Northeast Asia. Others, on the other hand, analyzing DNAs concluded that the Aborigines of Taiwan are Australasian descendants (Davison, 2003; Copper, *Taiwan : Nation-state or province?*, 2009).

The first mention of the island in the written history can be found in the Chinese sources as "the land of Yangchow" (Copper, 2007, p. xix). Although the Chinese expeditions discovered the island before anyone else, they barely kept it under control. Only a certain number of the mainland inhabitants moved there in pursuit of better conditions and resources (Davidson, 1903). As the island failed to take the Chinese dynasties' attention until the late Middle Ages and was considered by the Chinese rulers to be out of the Chinese domain, the influence of early Chinese civilization was next to none on the island and its residents. Copper indicates that the first use of the word Taiwan in the Chinese records dates back to the fifteenth century, although there had taken place vast migration from Southeast China to the island throughout the previous two centuries (2007, pp. 10-11).

The Western empires, on the contrary, found the island so beautiful that it was named as "Ilha Formosa" (Goddard, 1966, p. xvii), which means beautiful island. Although the Portuguese were the first among Europeans to see the island, it was colonized by the Dutch as they could make an agreement with the Chinese emperor accepting to leave the Pescadores. According to this agreement, the Dutch settlements were established on the island soon as 1624 (Copper, 2007, p. 12). The Dutch colonialism lasted until 1662 when Zheng (or Cheng) family taking formal permission from the Ming dynasty of China took over the control of

the island after nearly two years of fight with the Europeans before being defeated by the Manchu dynasty in 1683 (Davison, 2003, p. 17).

Long (1991) arguably claims that the roots of the current conflict over Taiwan date back to 1683, when "the last truly 'Chinese' dynasty" (p. 11) came to an end on the island and the Chinese immigrants of the island lost their resistance against the Manchu rule. Zheng family promoted Chinese culture, established Chinese administrative style and made way for the sharp rise of Chinese people on the island. The last ruling member of the Cheng family made several unfortunate attempts to take back the rule of mainland China and reestablish Ming dynasty. Therefore, the struggle against the Manchus on Taiwan is described as the fight of Chinese people for their survival (Copper, 2009, p. 34). Chinese control over the island after 1683 was only formal to a degree. The corrupt representatives of the mainland were generally ethnic Chinese with no interest in the development and well-being of the island, which in turn, gave impetus to several upheavals and rebellions. However, this fact could not prevent its flourishing. Formosa was providing mainland China and Japan with sugar and rice. Along with the sharp development of agriculture and trade, the island could attract both regional empires and European powers, especially after the First Opium War (Goddard, 1966). Mainland China's interest in ensuring control over Taiwan increased in the late nineteenth century as the southeast part of the country experienced serious rebellions, and thus, Taiwan constituted a strategically important spot. Consequently, the island was officially given the status of province in 1887 (Copper, 2007).

The reforms before the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 failed to prevent Japan from annexing the island in perpetuity in accordance with the Shimonoseki Treaty. Japan's historic victory in the war brought Japanese rule over the island until 1945. Ping-hui (2006, p. 2) divides this period of Japan colonialism into four distinct stages as assimilation (1895-1919), integration (1919-1930), differential incorporation and coercion (1930-1937), and subjugation and mobilization of the human resources to take part in the war (1937-1945). Manthorpe (2005) highlights the remarkable role of the five-month Taiwanese Republic of 1895 in

the formation of the identity of the island despite the evidence that the Republic was neither a well-established entity nor did it encompass the whole territory and population of the island. The short resistance against the Japanese role was turned down by not only the Japanese military, but its long-term strategy to learn the culture, lifestyle, and other significant factors to consider for consolidating power on the local population of the island and making a profit from the economy. Moreover, although Japan provided a limited length of education, thousands of young people could find a chance to continue their studies in higher education institutes in Japan. One of the notable features of the Japanese rule was that the idea of unification with mainland China was kicked out of agenda among the local Chinese people of the island. The economic development of the island was much greater than that on the mainland, and thus, the Taiwanese people would regard unification as a threat to their welfare (Manthorpe, 2005, p. 172).

Having said that, Taiwanese intellectuals, particularly those who achieved to get a university education in Japan, had shown interest in both Chinese and Japanese culture and modernity. Ping-hui (2006, p. 5) points out that those intellectuals could successfully incorporate both and resort to one of them according to the demand of the time. To be clearer, for example, when they needed to protest Japan's colonial policies, the uniqueness of the Chinese culture and its humanistic elements were employed in the discourses. In contrast, for a successful development model, the Japanese economy and education were taken as the exemplary. Moreover, the new generation of the educated youth sought to build ties with their peers and public figures on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

3.2.1. Chinese Civil War, 1945–1949

In 1911, the last dynasty of the Chinese Empire collapsed and China entered a period of turmoil which was known for the rivalries to take the rule and the recurrent armed clashes. Following the death of Yuan Shikai, the president of the newly proclaimed Republic of China, in 1916 Sun Yat-sen, the Head of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party sought to handle the presidency. However, his

leadership was challenged by the so-called Warlords and the newly established Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Soviet Union provided support for both parties at that time. Later on, Sun acknowledged the communist threat and sought to remove them from the government, and his successor Chiang Kai-shek spent tremendous efforts to establish an organized military for preventing internal and external threats. Consequently, in 1927, the contradiction between the right and left wings of the KMT, and between KMT and CCP turned into armed conflict. CCP gained notable support from the rural north and could organize both the intra-party program and the movement of peasants, whereas, KMT failed to during the so-called Northern Expedition which was aimed at the unification of China (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987).

During the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937-1945, the parties of the conflict made an agreement to fight against the Japanese army in a union, and thus the National Revolutionary Army of KMT and the Red Army of CCP were incorporated in the Eighth Route Army (or the 18th Army Group) (Sasagawa, 2015). While the united army advanced over the Japanese army, KMT and CCP could find no middle ground for the future of united China. Although the two parties initially seemed to be inclined to a coalition in the immediate aftermath of Japan's surrender as Chiang and Mao had a personal meeting, they nevertheless pursued incompatible goals without any will to compromise (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987).

Following Japan's surrender to KMT, the Japanese forces remained in the northern part of China, where the CCP forces were accumulated. During the one-year period after the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union's army swept the Japanese Army in Manchuria, allowed the CCP troops to spread in the freed Manchuria, and handed remaining Japanese equipment and arms to the CCP forces (People's Liberation Army, PLA) in spite of Chiang Kai-shek's opposition. Lynch (2010) argues that Chiang's victory over Japan was mainly won thanks to the U.S. and that his army was poorly organized although he had been one of the most talented commanders of the century. Moreover, Chiang's commanders were not as loyal as those of Mao's. Mao was also supported by the massive

majority of peasants who had suffered from Manchus and Japanese rule for decades. Communists employed “tactically defensive but strategically offensive” (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987, p. 56) warring technique. To be clearer, Mao’s Mass Line Strategy was based on the goals to spread his control over more territories, diminish the number of the KMT forces by persuading them to change their side, and fight only when the PLA forces had absolute predominance in number. Consequently, in view of the fact that Mao’s troops exceeded the number of KMT forces by 1948 (Gittings, 1967, p. 18), it was doubtless that the Communists would take the rule soon. The Communist forces had held four major military campaigns that caused Chiang Kai-shek to lose nearly 1.4 million troops and control over mainland China. Subsequently, Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China on October 14, 1949 (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987, p. 59).

3.2.2. Kuomintang’s Escape to Taiwan

Taiwan (Formosa) is suggested to have suffered the least from the maleficent outcomes of World War II. When attacking Japan, The U.S. political and military leaders left out the island due to a number of reasons. Although Taiwan was mostly inhabited by the ethnic Chinese, the population was either supporting Japan in the war or was indifferent in terms of China. Therefore, the U.S. had fears that in case of an attack on Taiwan they would face strong resistance by the local Chinese and guerilla war. This battle would backfire on the U.S. interests as the U.S. was supporting China against Japan, and a protracted guerilla war would be terribly costly. By and large, the U.S. decided not to invade the island, instead a handy of missile attacks were launched in an attempt to sweep away the military bases and equipment (Copper, 2009).

Cairo Declaration of 1943 played a decisive role in the future of Taiwan. The U.S., the U.K., and China represented by Chiang Kai-shek agreed on the post-war status of the territories under Japan colonialism stating that “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China” (“The Cairo Declaration”,

November 26, 1943). The Cairo Declaration and relinquishing Taiwan by the Japanese forces in favor of the Republic of China were once again affirmed by the U.S., the UK, and China in the article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, which approved Japan's surrender ("The Potsdam Declaration", July 26, 1945).

Following the surrender of Japan and the evacuation of the Japanese people, including military forces, on October 25, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek sent his representative and military to the island to replace Japan order, and establish the ROC rule there. Although the Communists possessed abundant power in hands, Mao was concerned with taking the rule on the mainland, and thus, Taiwan was left out of his interest back then. Copper points out that there was no one consensus ad idem among the Taiwanese people with respect to mainland China and the ROC rule (2009, pp. 42–43). The KMT representative and the governor of Taiwan, Chen Yi attempted to publicly announce that the Taiwan island is a part of the Republic of China, but the statement faced a serious objection by the allies on the basis of the fact that there had been no signed agreement about the status of the island. Especially the U.S. defended that the Taiwan issues should be solved later when a formal peace agreement is signed (Manthorpe, 2005).

Chen established purely military administration on the island, without taking into consideration any civil aspect. The corruption, collapsing economy, and the violent behavior of the KMT commanders and soldiers caused serious insurgencies and rebellions in Taiwan as of 1947. Numerous bloody clashes took place between the rebels and the military forces of the KMT making the way for the killing of thousands of civilians, which is known as the February 28 or 228 massacre (Copper, 2009, p. 44) or Er Er Ba in Chinese sources (Copper, 2007, p. 118). The incident resulted in the murders of not only ordinary civilians but ideational leader, public figures and other individuals who played a significant role in the development of the Taiwanese society. It should also be noted that many civilian Chinese people, particularly those who did not speak Taiwanese, were killed during these incidents by the Taiwanese (Copper, 2009).

Since 1948, according to Manthorpe (2005), Chiang Kai-shek had been preparing Taiwan as a place where the KMT might escape to in case of defeat by the

Communists. To be clearer, Chiang made efforts to reconstruct Taiwan's economy by putting a ban on the export of food and other goods. Simultaneously, a vast number of mainlanders left for the island, who were basically the supporters of the KMT. Prior to his retreat to the island, Chiang Kai-shek resigned from his post as the president of the Republic of China on January 21, 1949. Moreover, Chiang transferred as much financial and other resources as he could to the island together with his supporters and loyal armed forces (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987, p. 59). On December 15, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek retreated from the mainland with his 1,5 million supporters to settle on the Taiwan island, reconstruct the army and continue his fight against Mao's Communists. Chiang's ultimate goal was to regain control over all of the Chinese territories under the name of the Republic of China. The mainland, whereas, was the People's Republic of China already, and thus Chiang's ROC was confined to the borders of the Taiwan island (Copper, 2007).

Until the outset of the Korean War, there had been a period of uncertainty among the islanders about their future since Japan's surrender and the first arrival of the KMT. They were apparently against the Communist rule, and reluctant to mobilize to extirpate the KMT from the island. In addition, the allies had taken or destroyed almost all military bases and equipment when Japan surrendered. Therefore, the local Taiwanese did not have the power to fight against the KMT rule, and the majority accepted the KMT rule because of the ethnic proximity (Davison, 2003).

3.2.3. The Seventh Fleet

The similar uncertainty and ambivalence were also present among the U.S. officials with regard to the future status of the island. The winner of the Civil War was Mao Zedong, who possessed abundant material and human resources. The U.S., for this reason, wanted to establish relations with the Communists in order to prevent them from becoming a powerful ally of the Soviet Union. According to President Truman's statement on January 5, 1950, although the U.S. acknowledged that "Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the past 4 years the United States and other Allied Powers have

accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island”, it was not on the U.S. agenda to provide any support to the KMT, nor did it desire to be involved in the Chinese Civil war, provided that “the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the island” (US-China Institute, 2014).

The U.S. indifference towards the Taiwan issue, however, persevered until the outbreak of a war between the USSR and PRC backed communist North Korea and the South. Previously, the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the U.S. upon Japan’s defeat – agreed to divide the Korean peninsula temporarily across the 38th parallel following the evacuation of the Japan forces. On June 25, 1950, the North forces crossed the line and attacked south (Flint, Kozumplik, & Waraksa, 1987, p. 69). Under these circumstances, the U.S. had to interfere with the clashes in order to inhibit the Communist threat from penetrating towards the south.

To put the intervention on a legal basis, the U.S. called for a UN Security Council emergency session. Accordingly, on June 25, 1950, the members of the UNSC discussed the crisis and adopted the Resolution 82 which recognized the attack as “a breach of peace” and called the members of the UN not to support North Korea (United Nations Security Council, 1950a). As North Korea furthered its attack, the UNSC assembled again on June 27 and adopted the Resolution 83, which indicated that “urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security”. The resolution, furthermore, recommended the member states to provide military support to South Korea according to “the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations” (United Nations Security Council, 1950b).

Achieving to build the legal basis for an intervention, the U.S. aimed at two goals, as Manthorpe (2005, p. 195) puts it. First, to protect Taiwan from a possible PRC invasion was of utmost importance considering the U.S. interests in the Pacific region. Second, the U.S. officials took into account the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had been seeking a chance to start a new war against mainland China. If it was a case, the U.S. would be drawn in a war with Mao Zedong. Therefore, the U.S.

intervention was thought to contain ROC, as well. Consequently, President Truman decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, and thereafter Taiwan became one of the crucial spots of the so-called containment policy against Communism (Garver, 2015). The presence of the U.S. forces in the waters of the Taiwan strait guaranteed the future survival of Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China in spite of the recurring claims and threats posed from the other side of the strait by the People's Republic of China. The conflict between the PRC and the ROC governments have experienced numerous escalations ever since. I will illustrate the timeline of the conflict in the following section.

3.2.4. Cross-Strait Relations and the United States after the Korean War

The off-shore island constituted utmost importance for both of the parties to the conflict. In August 1954, Chiang Kai-shek lodged troops on the strategically critical Matsu and Jinmen islands along with the installment of military bases. Considering the immediate proximity of these islands to the mainland, the PRC officials launched several bombardment attacks on the Nationalists' forces despite the U.S. warnings. The same year on December 2, the ROC and the U.S. signed Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty. However, the U.S. hesitated to take action against the PRC in order to avoid a renewed war with the mainlanders. With this in mind, the escalation of the PRC attack had left no choice for the U.S., but act on behalf of the ROC. Accordingly, Congress adopted the Formosa Resolution, which allowed the U.S. army to defend Taiwan. President Eisenhower had been offered a few time to use nuclear weapons against the PRC. Considering the real possibility of a war, the Soviet Union endeavored to convince the PRC to ease. The First Strait Crisis was settled considerably as the PRC and the ROC and the U.S. agreed to negotiate and cease the military operations (Department of State Office of the Historian, 2018c).

The second crisis took place in 1958, which caused the killing of nearly one thousand soldiers in total from both sides. Both the ROC and its supporter the U.S., and the PRC employed more advanced and destructive capabilities in

artillery, naval and air clashes. This crisis was a continuation of the first crisis as its underlying causes had not been addressed. The security concerns and the desire to obtain control over the Taiwan strait provoked the parties (Halperin, 1966). Despite the notable decrease in the scale and frequency of the clashes, the tensions lasted until the normalization of relations between the U.S. and the PRC.

Close to the end of the 1960s, the U.S. political leaders sought rapprochement with the PRC in order to finalize its war in Vietnam. The U.S. acknowledged that without an agreement with the PRC government, leaving Vietnam would be regarded as a failure. President Nixon resorted to the Pakistani leader Yahya Khan's help in building amicable relations with mainland China. Yahya Khan, who had a close relationship with both parties, performed as a facilitator of the rapprochement. The process was accompanied by the acceptance of the PRC government to the UN as the official representative of China, which had been held by the ROC government since 1946. The ban on the travel to China for the U.S. citizens was lifted in 1971 and within the so-called Ping Pong Diplomacy, the sportsmen of both countries visited each other's country for a match. In 1972, President Nixon paid a visit to the PRC and met Mao Zedong (Department of State Office of the Historian, 2018b). During these meetings, Mao Zedong signed a joint communique with president Nixon in Shanghai on February 27 (Department of State Office of the Historian, 2018a), and later on September 29 with Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018), and the status of Taiwan has remained a topic of heated debate ever since.

3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT

This section will first illustrate a comparison of parties with regard to their hard power resources in order to provide the evidence for the argument that hard power is not a decisive factor in the cross-strait relations. Next, based on the onion model, I will outline parties' positions, interests, and needs. Subsequently, the regional context, the U.S. involvement and its current position as a secondary party will be elaborated. Finally, I will discuss the issues related to international

law.

3.3.1. Parties of the Conflict

The primary parties of the conflict are the People's Republic of China, which controls mainland China, and the Republic of China, the authority that rules the Taiwan island. The conflict initially started as an inter-party dispute between the nationalists and the communists to obtain the rule of China, and the defeated side – the KMT, had to retreat to the island preserving country's former name – the ROC, while the winner – the CCP proclaimed the creation of the PRC. The historical background will be outlined more detailed in the following parts. The conflict is now a de facto interstate conflict per se, as both sides meet all the criteria to be considered as a de facto state. However, since the ROC government is not de jure recognized by most UN members, and is not a UN member, the conflict is regarded as an intrastate conflict.

It should be acknowledged that there exists an obvious asymmetry between the two regarding their material and human resources. Within this asymmetrical structure, the nature of relationship obliges their needs to be undermined. Although Taiwan and Taiwanese people have to experience relatively more disadvantages in various domains from daily life to national identity and global politics, mainland China has to deal with security issues on regional and global levels. Considering unmet needs, identity struggle and asymmetrical relationship between China and Taiwan, the conflict can be regarded as a protracted social conflict. Although Azar (1981) used this term for the conflicts in underdeveloped Third World, I suggest that the theoretical framework fits to the Taiwan conflict to the degree that one side struggles to build up a national identity and receive recognition, while the other attempts to ensure its security and superiority. In the following parts, analysis of parties with reference to their resources, positions, interests and needs shows that the pervasive inequality and incompatibility between parties have made the conflict protracted.

3.3.1.1. The People's Republic of China: Peaceful Rise?

In 1949, Mao Zedong clinched the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and proclaimed the People's Republic of China on October 1. The contested KMT rule in mainland China had come to cease with the defeat and retreat to the Taiwan island. During the 70 years of the communist regime, the PRC has achieved enormous economic development, and become one of the greatest global powers. Most of the successes of the PRC arose from Deng Xiaoping's reforms as he shifted the Chinese communist economy toward the market economy, and incorporated socialism and capitalism. He established a capitalist economy under the control of the Communist Party (Moak & Lee, 2015, p. 91). Today's PRC is the second largest economy, and the most populous country with a population of more than 1.3 billion people (The World Bank, 2019). However, Moak and Lee (2015, pp. 1–2) assert that the PRC's economy is most probably much bigger than the reported statistics of the GDP due to the unveiled sources of income, especially in rural regions and relatively small towns. The gradual economic growth allows the PRC government to give loans to other countries, and these loans become an instrument of leverage in the long run, and the PRC derives both financial and political benefits (Fifield, 2018; Gul, 2019; Mantesso, 2018).

Although China's rise is known to the larger public and consistently supported by the statistical figures, there is a fierce debate within political and academic circles, particularly in the West, whether this rise is peaceful. Yue (2008), in this sense, argues that China's economic rise is accompanied by the rising investment in the military. Moreover, although China remains far from military involvement in the distant regions, it plays a certain role by either providing arms, investing money, or building strong trade ties. Yue also indicates that China's domestic authoritarian political system and the U.S. led international political economy are the factors that might have detrimental effects on China's peaceful rise.

Stjepan Bosnjak (2016), on the other hand, refers to the ongoing regional conflicts over the control on the Pacific islands and the South China Sea in terms of China's peaceful rise. He claims that China's rise is peaceful insofar as it holds the dominant position in those conflicts, that is, in case of any threats to China's

interests in the aforementioned regions, the PRC leadership will resort to non-peaceful means. For instance, the PRC military tests missiles in the Pacific repeatedly to demonstrate its power to defend its interests by the use of military capacity. It is also discussed that China confidentially works on nuclear missiles to enhance its long-distance attack and defense capabilities (Jeong-ho & Chan, 2019; Zhen, 2019).

China's established alliances are another factor that clouds its peaceful rise articulations. As the U.S. did not agree to provide support to the nationalists during the Civil War, they turned to the Soviet Union for a helping hand. Simultaneously, the communists were also benefitting from the USSR support. This tendency remained unchangeable despite the rapprochement efforts made by the U.S. leadership. Although the Russian Federation is not regarded as a superpower like its ancestor, it still poses a considerable challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security. In this regard, Russia's alliance with the second largest economic power may result in devastating consequences for the Western bloc. In addition, China's close ties with Iran constitutes a major threat to the U.S. perception of security in the Middle East. Consequently, China's rising economic and military power may result in what Gallarotti (2011) calls the "power curse", which gradually causes weakening and destruction of the country's power.

3.3.1.2. Taiwan: An Unrecognized Giant

Taiwan is an island with a population of 23,5 million people inhabited over a territory of almost 36 km² (CIA, 2019). The island has been home for the ROC government since 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland. The country is known under various names, such as Chinese Taipei and the Republic of China on Taiwan, among other states and by international organizations. Despite the authoritarian rule and scarce resources, Taiwan's economy, with the financial and material aid provided by the U.S., experienced rapid development, as of the 1960s particularly. Taiwan's progressive capitalist economy has recorded a multidimensional development, which resulted in a welfare state typical to the Western developed states. In this regard, Ku (1997) distinguishes three basic

directions of the modification of the market forces in a welfare state:

First, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain 'social contingencies' (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services (pp. 2–3).

The estimated gross domestic product per capita for 2019 on Taiwan is USD 25,229 (Statistical Bureau, 2019), which is roughly three times more than that of mainland China. Along with its economic miracle, the Taiwanese government has established a strong military. According to the Global Fire Power (2019), the Taiwanese army is ranked 22 among 137 countries' armed forces. Despite its technologically advanced military equipment, Taiwan lags far behind the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Holmes (2019) argues that the ROC army used to outperform the PLA in terms of quality until recently, but the PRC leadership has achieved enormous developments in its weaponry thanks to the huge military spending in recent years. The PLA, therefore, is ready to vanquish the Taiwanese forces for its quality and quantity. The only trouble for the PLA would be a guerilla war against the islanders in the thick forests and mountainous regions of the island.

The ROC military is eminently dependent on the U.S. support and arms sales. For instance, the total amount of the agreed arms sales to Taiwan for 30 years since 1980 had been more than USD 21 billion (Arms Control Association, 2012). The Pentagon has assessed Taiwan's defense capability several times and presented numerous reports to the Congress in order to provide the required arms to Taiwan. Although the U.S. presidents have had some concerns about the provision of weaponry to Taiwan with regard to the relations with the PRC (Kan, 2014), the U.S. has remained as the sole guarantor of the military balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In addition to the USD 330 million arms import from the U.S. in 2018, the ROC government has recently requested the U.S. to provide air and naval military equipment in order to be able to prevent a possible mainland attack (Jennings, Pressured by China's military updates,

Taiwan asks US for more weapons, 2019a). It should be noted that in spite of Taiwan's continuous enhancement of its military strength and the U.S. support to this process, the PRC military is considerably stronger than its rival as it is ranked 3 in the GFP (2019) review.

3.3.1.3. Positions, Interests, and Needs of the Primary Parties

The onion model is employed to demonstrate the differences between parties' positions, interests, and needs. The onion consists of three layers: Positions – what parties publicly pronounce they want – constitute the outer layer; Interests – what parties desire to achieve for their parts – make up the middle layer; And needs – what parties cannot compromise – form the core. This model of analysis of parties allows understanding the current dynamics of the conflict and its transformation potential.

The PRC position towards the Taiwan island has seen no big changes since the outset of the conflict; it is seen as a part of China governed by the PRC. The negotiations between the parties brought about the so-called 1992 Consensus as both sides accepted that China is one, Taiwan is a part of it, and that the solution should consider this fact (Albert, China-Taiwan relations, 2018). Today, the political leaders of the mainland refer to this agreement as a basis of any resolution alternatives. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have addressed a speech called Message to Compatriots in Taiwan several times since 1949. The latest address was articulated by Xi Jinping on January 2, 2019 (China Daily, 2019). Hsiao (2019) asserts five chief points in Xi's speech: Firstly, the parties should collaborate in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict and unification of the mainland and the island. Secondly, the most viable option for the resolution is One China, Two Systems. Thirdly, the Taiwanese side should be loyal to the agreement that approved one China. Fourth, the two sides should strengthen the economic partnership and institutionalization as a prerequisite for reunification. Fifth, the people of the two sides should be reunified socially under the same identity. Despite these five points that constitute the peaceful formula of reunification, Xi did not eliminate the possibility of the use of

force if the Taiwanese side seeks independence.

The ROC position has been relatively complex and changing as the ruling party did not remain the same as that on the mainland. While the nationalist KMT party sought the rule over not only the island but also the mainland, the Democratic Progressive Party leadership has pursued Taiwan's independence. In this regard, the Taiwanese identity has been promoted since 2000. The cross-strait policies of the first president from the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), Chen Shui-bian created tense relations with the PRC, economic stagnation (Tan A. T., 2017), and finally government corruption, which paved the way for Chen's trial and imprisonment (Branigan, 2009). Although during his election campaign, Chen avoided emphasizing the possibility of independence referendum (Lijun, 2001), he had long been known for his keen advocacy of Taiwan's independence. In 2003, Chen attempted to convince the legislature to ease the legal procedure of a referendum for independence, which faced opposition from not only the PRC but also Taiwan's closest ally, the Bush administration (Bradsher, 2003). Four years later, during the next presidential election campaigns, Chen proposed the Taiwanese people to vote for independence and to be represented in the UN under the name Taiwan, as well (Ramzy, 2007).

After the eight years of presidency between 2000 and 2008, Chen Sui-bian from the DPP was replaced by the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 elections. Contrary to his predecessor, Ma sought normalization of the relations with mainland China. Based on the One China policy, he established closer economic and political ties with the PRC. Ma's cross-strait policies followed the Three No's strategy as Gopalakrishnan and Standing put, "no declaration of independence from China, no unification with China, and no use of force to resolve differences across the Strait" (2012). As a result of rapprochement, in 2014, a PRC minister, Zhang Zhijun visited Taiwan for the first time (The Guardian, 2014). A year later, the leaders of the two sides, Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou hold official negotiations in Singapore (BBC, 2015). This had been the first meeting between the leaders of the conflicting countries since the beginning of the conflict. Ma's presidency brought not only warmer social relations with the PRC as direct flights and

touristic visits were allowed, but also economic and political dependency (Matsuda, Cross-strait relations under the Ma Ying-jeou administration: From economic to political dependence?, 2015).

The over-dependence from the mainland and the danger to lose sovereignty perceived by the Taiwanese people led to the defeat of the KMT candidate in the 2016 elections. Wu (2017) lists three reasons why Ma lost his popularity among the voters: Firstly, the Taiwanese people, especially those from the young generation, see themselves as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese. Therefore, the rapprochement with the mainland engendered dislike among the mass public. Secondly, Ma's economic policy is believed to enlarge the income gap between the poor and the rich and thus made him lose among politicians. Finally, Ma lost his popularity among his supporters from the KMT because of his retirement reforms. However, Ma's chief miscalculation is discussed to be the close relations with the PRC government, which caused insecurities among the islanders.

The current president of the ROC, Tsai Ing-wen, governing the country since 2016, has been known to favor the status quo despite spending efforts for independence. However, her party seeks more decisive actions. Moreover, in the latest local elections, the DPC lost to the KMT, which advocates negotiations with the PRC, and thus is supported by the mainland (Wu & Lin, 2019). The positions of the ruling party and the people of the island have some evident contrasts. The 2018 survey conducted among the Taiwanese people in order to unveil their attitude toward the mainland, and the ROC and PRC governments' cross-strait policies presented rather pro-PRC results. For instance, %44.6 of the respondents said that the PRC's attitude toward the Taiwanese people is friendly, while %62.8 reported that its attitude toward the ROC government is unfriendly. Moreover, the Taiwanese people favored the status quo (%83.4) with a relative majority (%31.1) being indifferent between independence and reunification. A significant portion of the respondents refused to accept the statement that the PRC poses a threat to Taiwan's peaceful existence (Mainland Affairs Council, 2018).

The interests that the parties of the Taiwan conflict overstep the cross-strait

relations. For the PRC, according to Feng (2004), Taiwan is of vital importance for four reasons. First of all, the PRC leadership sees Taiwan as the last Chinese soil under the influence of others. This cast of mind comes from the historical background of colonialism in China. As the PRC leadership perceives, they have regained the control over all Chinese soil, except Taiwan. Therefore, the PRC sees the annexation of Taiwan as the ultimate goal. Secondly, Taiwan would pose a serious threat to the CCP's legitimacy in case of any independence attempt. Therefore, the mainland's fundamental interest is to maintain the status quo at worst and to achieve unification at best. Thirdly, Taiwan's strategic significance had come to the fore following the Korean War. Nowadays, it is discussed that the U.S. and Japan regard Taiwan as leverage against the PRC administration. In this regard, the PRC leadership states that in case of any military deployment of outsiders on the island, the PRC holds the right to use force. Finally, Taiwan may constitute a matter of conflict between the PLA and the PRC administration. To be clearer, if the PRC leadership hesitates to use force when the ROC takes action for independence, there can be a confrontation between the military and civic leaders on the mainland.

Apart from the political interests, there are economic interests of the PRC towards Taiwan. The Taiwanese investment and companies have a lion's share in the mainland's economy. Taiwan's cutting-edge technology products are highly demanded on the mainland. This demand, doubled with the strategy to make Taiwan economically dependent on the mainland, forced the PRC to let Taiwanese firms operate there, and to establish trade links with the island in the early 1990s (Stratfor, 2018). Although Taiwan's investment in and export to the mainland have seen a slight decline since 2016 due to the trade war between the U.S. and the PRC, the PRC had received Taiwanese investment of USD 140 billion by 2014 (Jennings, 2019b), and USD 78 billion in 2017 (Xinxua, 2018). Moreover, the mainland is the destination for roughly %40 of Taiwan's export (Stratfor, 2018). By enhancing the island's economic dependency on the mainland, the PRC aspires to isolate the ROC government both politically and economically.

For Taiwan, on the other hand, it is also of significance to keep the status quo in terms of its national interests. It is worth to note that Taiwan's economy and political system have transformed to a degree that its reintegration to the mainland promises nothing but regression. As mentioned above, the GDP per Capita, life standard, market conditions and other economic indicators on the island are far ahead of those on the mainland. Moreover, the democratic transition starting from the 1980s (Tan, Yu, & Chen, 1996), emergence of democratic institutions that contributed to the smooth transition process (Tien & Cheng, 1997), and gradual evolution of the Taiwanese identity (van der Horst, 2016) have made the island different from the mainland despite the historical connections. Taken all into account, it is of interest to the Taiwanese administration to maintain the uniqueness of the island at any cost. Strengthened socio-economic relations with the PRC, in this term, is a double-edged sword for Taiwan. To be clearer, Taiwan takes a huge profit from economic cooperation with the PRC. Mainland China is the biggest market on the planet, and home to millions of cheap labor. Having said that, over-dependence puts a barrier on Taiwan's struggle to be recognized as an independent state. In addition to this, social ties, intensified visits, and rising interaction bring the commonalities into view.

A further point to be considered is the needs of the parties to the conflict. The PRC's chief needs with regard to the conflict are connected to security. The protraction of the conflict with Taiwan means the protraction of conflict with the United States. It is observed that, in the event of any threat from the mainland, the U.S. takes warning measures, such as sending warships to the Taiwan strait lately (Ali, 2019). Although the U.S. does not own any military base on the island, the Taiwanese officials repeatedly mention that they can allow the U.S. to use the island "for humanitarian or regional security operations if they aligned with Taiwan's interests" (The National Interest, 2019). Added to this, Taiwan conflict is a threat to China's regional security needs in the Asia-Pacific region.

For Taiwan, alternatively, the presence of the conflict with mainland China constitutes a threat to its survival needs. The Foreign Minister of the ROC also

admits that the island would be easily invaded by the PRC if the U.S. did not support Taiwan (Rivers, Jiang, & Westcott, 2018). Moreover, as Taiwan's economy performs considerably better than the mainland's, the Taiwanese people's well-being is another need considering the future of the conflict. Finally, the identity needs have also a stake in the cross-strait relations, as Taiwanese people tend to identify themselves as more Taiwanese rather than Chinese. For instance, in 2018, participated in the survey conducted by Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University (2019) in Taiwan, more than %54 of the respondents reported to identify themselves as Taiwanese, while only %3,5 regarded themselves as Chinese.

3.3.2. The Regional Context and the U.S. as a Secondary Party

Although the U.S. had exhibited its position on Taiwan conflict during the Korean War, and following crises in the strait, the U.S.-Taiwan relations took legal validity according to the Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed in 1979 by the U.S. Congress. This document was issued in order to guarantee that the U.S. would continue to provide support to Taiwan, although the U.S. policy toward the conflict experienced a shift as the PRC government, instead of the ROC, was recognized as the sole legal entity that rules China according to the Joint Communiqué between the U.S. and the PRC in 1979 (U.S. Department of State, 2018). With the former document, the U.S. took the responsibility to protect the island against any military attack, or other forms of coercion by the mainland China, by providing Taiwan "with arms of a defensive character", and keeping "the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" (American Institute in Taiwan, 1979).

The rapprochement with the PRC was of strategic importance for the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s in order to win the Cold War. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, the U.S. policy toward Taiwan and mainland China saw a substantial change. Previously, the U.S. accepted to gradually diminish the arms sales to Taiwan according to the Joint Communiqué signed with the PRC in 1982 (U.S. Department of State, 1982). Klintonworth (2001) argues

that the U.S. changed this policy in 1992 by selling 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan. The total cost of these trade exceeded the previous years' arms sales. It is discussed that the sale of aircraft was a response to the provision of similar aircraft to the PRC by Russia.

Rising overt U.S. support to Taiwan mounted with the provision of the U.S. visa to the then ROC president Lee Teng-hui in 1995. This was perceived by the PRC leadership as the breakdown of the agreed One-China policy. Lee's visit to the U.S. deteriorated the Sino-U.S. relations to the degree that another Taiwan Strait Crisis took place in 1995-1996. The third crisis in the strait had taught the PRC administration that the U.S. could change its Taiwan policies against any agreement signed between the U.S. and the PRC, and thus could pose a serious threat to China's security. As a result of the crisis, both sides realized their goals: The PRC once again demonstrated that it would prevent Taiwan from being independent at any cost, and the U.S. accomplished its role as the guarantor of Taiwan's survival (Ross, 2000).

The U.S. Taiwan policy has not seen radical changes since Donald Trump took the presidency. Ohara (2018) asserts that Trump administration avoids any U.S. direct involvement in the overseas conflicts unless they threaten the country's national interests directly. In this regard, the U.S. is concerned with the PRC more in terms of economic rivalry, rather than military. The PRC, whereas, is aware that it is incomparable with the U.S. with regard to the military strength. For both sides, therefore, a military clash seems undesirable for the time being. Trump confines the U.S. existence as Taiwan's supporter with the provision of arms and occasional expedition of warships in the Taiwan Strait.

To the day, the U.S. administrations have put out statements on the Taiwan issue that "please neither Beijing nor Taipei and leave each anxious about American intentions. Many observers believe, with some justification, that this American ambiguity is part of a strategic design to deter either side from misbehaving", as Richard Bush (2016, p. 267) indicates. The strategic ambiguity of the One-China policy of the U.S. allows it to deepen relations with Taiwan to the extent required to deter China. This course of policy has not changed during Trump's presidential

term either. Chen (2019) argues that Trump's policy-making has made two distinguished trends. First, Trump follows the similar route as the previous U.S. presidents as he reassures the PRC that America's One-China policy remains, with denial of Taiwan's formal independence, despite his more supportive and radical statements. Second, Trump's general political style has left tremendous uncertainty among both the PRC and ROC policy-makers.

In general, Taiwan's importance for the U.S. stems from several factors. Above all, Taiwan is an exemplary modern democracy built with U.S. support. The U.S. regards Taiwan as a model for other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, the island possesses a competitive economy, cutting-edge industry, and constitutes a transport hub in a region that is encircled by some of today's greatest economies. Thirdly, considering the presence of other conflicts over the Pacific islands, and water disputes in the South- and East China Seas, it is of vital essence for the U.S. to have an ally like Taiwan in the immediate proximity. Last, but not least, the U.S.-PRC competition, in the economic and military spheres, renders Taiwan indispensable for the U.S.

3.3.3. 'One China' Policy and International Law

The political status of Taiwan is a controversial issue. Some people believe that Taiwan is an integral part and province of China, so the PRC government should be recognized as the sole legal authority. Others defend the opposite by claiming that only the ROC government can be regarded as the legal authority over the mainland and Taiwan. The subscribers of these two views support the One China approach. The third position indicates that Taiwan and China are two separate entities (i.e. nation states), and thus, other subjects should recognize Taiwan's independence and approve its integration to the UN system. I will scrutinize each position highlighting arguments with reference to the sources of international law.

Before all, it should be noted that international law has numerous lacking points per se. The chief sources of international law – international agreements and conventions, international customs, and common principles of law – fail to

regulate all and specific cases. Moreover, except treaties and conventions, in most cases, the subjects are not bound by international law. Although conventions perform as a guideline for interstate relations, most of them do not enforce any sanctions as there is no single governing body that regulates the relations between all subjects of the international system. In addition to this, international law is discussed to be "out of date" and "Eurocentric" (Suter, 2004). In short, international law seems weak in terms of its applicability and efficacy. Having said that, the subjects of international relations tend to act according to international law in order not to be denounced by the international community, and to be sanctioned.

The Taiwan case posits a huge challenge for international law for its complexity and historical ambiguity. The current legal situation remains hitherto in favor of the PRC. Clough argues that the main legal drawback that disadvantages the ROC position is that it claims recognition over mainland China, over which it lacks control. This is, however, inconsistent with the criteria for being recognized as an independent entity in terms of territorial sovereignty. What is more, the PRC government threatens to cut all ties with the states which builds official diplomatic relations with the ROC government, and thus, an absolute majority of the UN members have de jure recognized the PRC as the legal authority (1993). Moreover, Taiwan's claims on the mainland were disregarded by its closest allies, that is, the U.S. and Japan. To be clearer, the U.S. signed Shanghai Communique with the PRC government, in which it was stated that the U.S. acknowledges that the mainland and Taiwan should remain as "One China". Recognizing the PRC government as the official authority of China and building diplomatic relations with it, the U.S. indirectly admits that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. Japan signed a similar communique with the PRC in the same year, as well (Ku J. , 2014b).

Chan (2009) argues that the Treaty of Taipei signed between Japan and the ROC in 1952 recognized the territorial integrity of "the State of China" and ROC's authority on it, not only on Taiwan. However, this treaty was signed during the application of martial law on Taiwan (1949-1987), and as Japan recognized the

territorial integrity and the PRC as the sole government of China in 1972 by the Joint Communiqué, the Treaty of Taipei had become “null and void”, because “The PRC government has become the lawful and effective government of the State of China in its entirety, including Taiwan, with its exercise of authority and sovereignty over the State” (p. 462) and “the Chinese Nationalist government ceased ... to be the lawful and effective government of the State of China” (p. 465) as of October 1, 1949.

Julian Ku (2014b), in this sense, recommends that Taiwanese government should seek independence, rather than control over the mainland for several reasons, including security issues. First of all, in case of any attempt to regain the island with the use of force by the PRC, the ROC government may resort to the support from the international community under R2P, as R2P applies to the UN members only. Contrarily, maintain the status quo Taiwan will be considered as a part of China and thus any military action between the PRC and ROC armed forces will be an internal issue, that is, preventing secession (2014a).

On the other hand, Michal Thim places an emphasis on Taiwan’s de facto statehood as it meets all the criteria for being regarded as an independent state, with “territory, people (that even elects their government by democratic means, although that is not a requirement for sovereignty), government, armed forces, and it maintains relations with other states” (2014). The communiques signed by the U.S. and Japan are suggested not to delegatize the ROC government as they avoid to mention who is the official government of China, and they acknowledge the integrity of China and respect to the PRC stance, but not an acceptance of this stance. Furthermore, Thim (2014) argues that UN membership is not a prerequisite for statehood as Taiwan is recognized by a number of UN member. However, Tim's argument lacks accuracy in the sense that those states who recognize the ROC government see it as the official government of the whole China, not only of the Taiwan island (Horton, El Salvador Recognizes China in blow to Taiwan, 2018). Thim (2014) concludes with the argument that Taiwan's status is a political matter, not legal and that the military assistance given by the U.S. or Japan would be legal in case of any PRC attack. Turton and Benedictus

(2014) are also among those who defend the de facto statehood of Taiwan refusing to accept Taiwan as a part of China. They translate the aforementioned communiques as the “strategic ambiguity” policy of the U.S. towards Taiwan. That is why, they argue, it is incorrect to see Taiwan as a part of PRC’s China. Rather the U.S. and Japan policies towards Taiwan repeatedly emphasize that Taiwan’s status is not settled.

CHAPTER 4: SOFT POWER, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE TAIWAN CONFLICT

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the role of soft power, that the parties of the Taiwan conflict own and cultivate, in cross-strait relations and the transformation of the conflict. To do so, I will first explore the PRC's and the ROC's soft power resources, and other power resources that contribute to their soft power. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge that although most research dedicated to the relationship between the use of soft power and the course of the Taiwan conflict has extensively elaborated on the PRC's soft power, Taiwan also owns and uses a great deal of soft power. The analysis of the sources of soft power will include not only the sources mentioned by Nye but also Zheng and Zhang's dynamic approach (2012) as the hard sources are discussed to perform as soft power at times and/or in relations with certain subjects. Next, I will illustrate the transformation trends, especially having been observed since the late 1980s. A comprehensive understanding of the transformation of the conflict requires to evaluate the transformations taken place at all levels mentioned above, namely context, structure, actor, issue and individual levels. Finally, I will draw my conclusion – the use of soft power creates more space for the transformation of conflict – based on the assessment of these two phenomena.

4.2. CHINA'S SOFT POWER

When the notion of soft power was first coined as early as 1990 and gained popularity among Western scholars and politicians in the following decade, the concept was not welcomed in the same way in China. It was first deemed that soft power is a social construction of Western discourse in order to redress their violent actions (Deng, 2009, p. 65). Although the use of the term in the discourse and of soft power itself in Chinese politics was unacceptable according to the Chinese understanding at the time, the ongoing political transformations around the globe made soft power an imperative for the PRC administration. The

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War signaled a new era in world politics. The PRC had become the only powerful communist state that would be able to threaten the capitalist bloc. The bloody Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 worsened PRC's image worldwide. Moreover, China's continual growth in economic and military terms was perceived as a threat to global security. Although those leading the country had continuously articulated that the so-called Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004) promised China's peaceful rise, those in the West kept their doubts. In the light of these trends, China had to generate a set of policies that would change its demonized image into a peaceful one in order to emerge as a desired partner (Deng, 2009, p. 66).

It is noteworthy to mention that the IR studies and foreign politics in China had been under the overwhelming influence of the Marxist-Communist ideology, and thus had not been affected by the current trends of the time by the 1980s. Therefore, the acknowledgment of the importance of soft power could only be possible as a result of the changes in IR teaching and research. The Chinese understanding of international relations was shaped, particularly after the 1980s, thanks to the developments in International Relations as a field in China. Wang (2002) highlights the newly established IR faculties and educational programs at the leading Chinese universities during that decade. Moreover, the CCP stance was in favor of raising the youth's awareness of international affairs. To this end, more than 50 research institutes had been established and nearly 20 academic journals had been published by the end of the 1980s (Wang J. , 2002, p. 76).

It is pointed out that the first mention of soft power within academic circles dates back to 1993 when Wang Huning, a well-known Chinese politician and scholar, published his article "The culture as a national power: Soft power" (Aukia, 2014). Wang was not the only person who regarded the Chinese culture as the chief source of the country's soft power. Despite the belated understanding of its importance, the ancient Chinese culture had been referred to in the Chinese political domain for millennia, as Ding (2010) argues. Ancient Chinese rulers and thinkers realized the importance of culture as a source of soft power long before it was understood by their Western counterparts. The philosophical streams like

Confucianism in ancient China are also regarded as the source of the idea behind the conception of soft power (Ding, 2010, p. 262).

In general, the conception of soft power in the Chinese political discourse shows several differences from the Western conceptions. For instance, Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu (2008) argue that soft power is defined in China as “intangible, non-quantifiable, non-material or spiritual power at the most abstract level” (p. 427), and in more specific terms as “the ability to persuade others with reason and to convince others with moral principles” (p. 427). Moreover, soft power in the Chinese context is discussed to apply not only to the entire country but also regions individually.

The interest toward soft power in China saw a rapid increase during Hu Jintao administration. It is suggested that soft power was one of the main topics of discussion during a seminar held by the political bureau of the CCP in May 2004 (Cho & Jeong, 2008, p. 456). In 2007, the term soft power was included in an official document in China for the first time as the head of the party, Hu recommended to augment China’s soft power by enhancing Chinese culture. Following this directive, the place of culture in China’s domestic and foreign policy and discourse has seen a rapid rise (Zhang, 2010). In 2011, the CCP leadership reiterated that China should strengthen its soft power by promoting “overall prosperity of cultural undertakings and sound development of cultural industries” (UNESCO, 2013) in the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee.

4.2.1. Chinese Culture, Language and the Confucius Institutes

Chinese culture had been referred to as the chief source of China’s soft power by Chinese scholars and politicians when the term soft power entered the lexicon of these circles (Glaser & Murphy, 2009). As the cultural exchange among nations experienced a remarkable rise as a result of globalization and development of information and communication technologies (Mackay, 2004), Chinese culture passed the borders of its immediate neighborhood and was placed in the focus of global interest. Despite its naturally rising popularity following the opening of

the country after Mao Zedong (Gill & Huang, 2006), Chinese leadership sought to complement it by promoting the Chinese culture in various means.

One of the directions that China promotes its culture is higher education. China improved its higher education within Project 211 and Project 985 in order to reach world standards and attract foreign students (China International Student Service). According to the Ministry of Education (2019), China hosted “a total of 492,185 international students from 196 countries/areas” and “63,041 international students (12.81%) received Chinese government scholarships” and more than 600 thousand Chinese students left the country to pursue higher education in overseas universities making China the biggest source of international students. According to the laws and rules designated in 2017 with regard to the international students in China, they should be taught Chinese culture, history, and customs along with their degree requirements (China Power, 2017). Today, at least 14 universities in China are ranked among 500 best universities around the world according to The World University Rankings (2018).

The Chinese language is another channel of communicating culture to others. In order to establish a commonly spoken and understood language, the PRC leadership has attempted to implement language reforms several times. This is discussed to serve to the end that all people speaking different accents of Chinese can be integrated under a language umbrella. Putonghua, the official language of the PRC, is a simplified and standardized version of Mandarin (DeFrancis, 1984). Along with the reforms, the PRC sought to promote and teach the Chinese language as the second language in other countries (Riva, 2017). Aslan (2010) argues that starting from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the proclamation of the PRC, the Chinese language teaching restarted following the opening policy of Deng Xiaoping. Making Chinese a globally spoken language thus became a part of the state policy. For instance, in 2006, Hu Youqing, a deputy of the National People’s Congress told in an interview that teaching Chinese to foreigners “can help build up our national strength and should be taken as a way to develop our country's soft power” (Zhigang, 2006). Chinese has been promoted around the world by the National Office for Teaching Chinese

as a Foreign Language known as Hanman in Chinese since 1987 (Gil, 2008). Being spoken by nearly 1 billion people as the native language, Mandarin Chinese was ranked 2 in the Power Language Index 2016, which takes into account other criteria such as geography, economy, communication, knowledge and media, and diplomacy (Chan K. L., 2016). Teaching Chinese to foreigners therefore is “of strategic significance to popularize the Chinese language and culture throughout the world, to enhance the friendship and mutual understanding as well as the economic and cultural cooperation and exchanges between China and other countries around the world, and to elevate China's influence in the international community” (Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2009).

Another institutionalized tool to promote Chinese culture and language around the globe is non-profit public Confucius Institutes (CI) of the PRC, which have been established by Hanban since 2004 (Zhou & Luk, 2016). These institutes are the Chinese analog of the British Council of the UK, Goethe-Institut of Germany, Alliance Française of France, Cervantes Institutes of Spain, Svenska Institutet of Sweden (Albert, China's big bet on soft power, 2018), and Yunus Emre Enstitüsü of Turkey. CIs are regarded by researchers and analysts as one of the main policy instruments of the PRC to cultivate its soft power and influence (Lahtinen, 2015; Luqiu & McCarthy, 2018; Torres, 2017; Zanardi, 2016; Zhou & Luk, 2016). The PRC demands the countries and institutions, in which the CIs operate, not to establish similar arrangements with Taiwan according to its One China principle (Lai, 2012a). As of 2018, there are 548 CIs, and 1193 Confucius Classrooms worldwide (Statista, 2019). Zanardi (2016, p. 435) argues that the PRC needs this kind of institutions due to the fact that China is a relatively young nation despite its civilizational history of millennia as the PRC was proclaimed in only 1949. This new nation, therefore, needs to be understood correctly by the world. In the world that the reality is what is socially constructed and what people make of it, CIs are of utmost importance along with the popular media channels that the PRC owns.

4.2.2. 'Anti-Hegemonic Soft Power': Peaceful Rise, Multilateralism and Good Neighborhood Policy

One significant source of the PRC's soft power is its policy to complement the country's economic growth with an effective foreign policy. Nye (2012) argues that while China's authoritarian political system is denounced by the Western democracies, it is perceived as a successful model for developing third world countries. In this regard, the PRC leadership highlights the cultural values and its sui generis political system as a response to the criticism of the West (Aslan, 2010).

In order to boost its soft power and influence in the international arena, the PRC has established various foreign policy tools in recent years. For instance, Bell (2009) points China's behavior toward territorial disputes. It is shown that the PRC tends to solve disputes through negotiations, rather than the use of force. The PRC resorts to the resources associated with hard power in order to project its soft power by building a peaceful international image. As a matter of fact, China contributes a great deal to the peacekeeping efforts of the UN. As the second largest financial contributor, China also provides 2479 personnel for the different peacekeeping missions of the UN (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2019). Moreover, the PRC has offered huge emergency aid packages to the regions suffered from natural disasters including the U.S. (Bell, 2009).

The PRC employs its economic resources to project its influence within the regional and international organizations. China's soft power policy within this direction has fundamental differences from that of the U.S., Kivimäki (2014) argues. He suggests that by using soft power, while the U.S. administration aims at transforming others' political and economic system into one similar to that of the U.S., the PRC seeks cooperation and a deeper understanding of China. This is what stands as the basement of China's multilateralism. Kivimäki puts the Chinese Dream articulated first by president Xi Jinping against the American Dream: The U.S. wants "to impose hegemonic values and dreams on other sovereign countries". The PRC, however, desires to integrate others' dreams and

values with the Chinese Dream and “to have domestic Chinese aspirations accepted by the international community” (2014, pp. 431–432). The PRC advocates anti-hegemonism and equality of all subjects of international relations. Instead of helping to rebuild societies according to the Chinese culture and values, the PRC’s chief desire is to achieve a desirable perception of China. For doing so, Kivimäki (2014) suggests, “China’s peaceful rise does not need the societies of other countries to change or that the people of other societies share Chinese values and admire China’s culture”, and accordingly “Chinese soft power aims at affecting their [other countries’] preferences with regards to, for example, selling oil to China, rather than with regards to Confucian values” (pp. 435–436).

China’s soft power, in Western conception, has seen a slight decline in recent years according to various opinion polls. Pew Research Center found that China was regarded favorable mostly in the Middle East, Africa, and some parts of Asia, while the Americans changed their attitudes negatively. A comparison of the U.S. and Europe public opinions show that China holds a stronger image in the latter (Devlin, 2018). China’s declining soft power in the U.S. seems to be caused by the ongoing trade war between the two economic giants. President Trump’s repetitive anti-China discourse has an aggravating influence on public opinion of China. Despite this, China managed to stay on the list of the 30 countries with the most soft power in the last four years (McClory, 2018). Moreover, it should be taken into account that these opinion polls and rankings are conducted according to the Western conception of soft power, and that China employs a soft power strategy with its own unique features aimed at, particularly, Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia. When discussing if China’s soft power policies are effective, one should consider the ultimate goals of these policies, rather than the country’s image and favorability. I will assess the outcomes of China’s soft power policy with regard to Taiwan in the following sections.

4.3. TAIWAN’S SOFT POWER: DEMOCRACY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY

Taiwan also owns a broad range of soft power resources and cultivates soft power in its own way. Wang and Lu (2008) call attention to Taiwan's political system. Started in the 1980s, Taiwan turned to democracy as a legacy of the so-called founding father, Sun Yat-sen, while those on the other side of the Taiwan Strait embraced nationalism (South China Morning Post, 2011). As the martial law was abolished in 1987, and the first direct elections of the president in 1996 was just a beginning of Taiwan's democratic transformation (Davison, 2003). Today Taiwan posits a model of democracy not only for the neighboring region but for other states around the world. According to the Democracy Index 2018 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019), Taiwan ranked 32, preceded by Belgium and followed by Italy. Democracy and human rights are seen as the main sources of Taiwan's soft power along with peace, love and high technology, according to the former Vice President Anette Lu (Lee S. , 2005).

Rawnsley (2012) discusses that Taiwan's soft power strategy has seen several shifts due to the domestic political changes in the last two decades. The KMT and the DPP attached varying importance to the different sources of soft power. While the nationalists regarded culture as the chief asset to promote the country around the globe, the Democrats benefited from the democratic political values. Although there is a consensus between the two about the significance of culture in the cultivation of soft power, the question remains what culture to promote. Opinion polls show that the Taiwanese people are not unanimous about their identities and attitudes toward the mainland (Mainland Affairs Council, 2018). In this circumstances, it has become an object at issue whether to appear as the protector of the genuine traditional Chinese culture (Rawnsley, *Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan*, 2012) or to promote a unique Taiwanese identity and aborigine culture (Wang & Lu, 2008).

Other than these sources, Taiwan is discussed to have soft power capability that has won hearts and minds since the country realized the Taiwan Miracle with an incomparable development pace. The highly developed free market economy, cutting-edge IT companies, world-class higher education institutes, social

stability, and welfare are the domestic factors that allow Taiwan to take advantage of its charm offensive (Wang & Lu, 2008).

Not being recognized by the international community, Taiwan, compared to the mainland, has relatively fewer chances to cultivate soft power and public diplomacy in other countries on a governmental level. Currently, the ROC has official diplomatic relations with only 17 states mostly in East Asia and Pacific, and Latin America and Caribbean (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2019). However, it is a mutual interest of Taiwan and its economic partners to build non-official ties through economic and cultural representative offices. Within a constrained international environment, Taiwan should resort to nongovernmental organization activities in order to gain more recognition and support, Kim (2018) suggests. Taiwan can benefit substantially from the NGO network in overseas if the government establishes a comprehensive national program to enhance NGOs and increase the number of volunteers around the globe. Moreover, Taiwan should familiarize others with its development model and provide aid programs through international NGOs in order to cope with global challenges such as poverty, environmental issues, and social problems.

4.4. SOFT POWER IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: HOW SOFT POWER TRANSFORMS THE CONFLICT

China's soft power policies play an important role in the formation of cross-strait relations in several ways. Above all, it should be noted that on the international level, China uses its hard and soft power together to prevent other states from recognizing the ROC and building an official relationship with the island's government. It is challenging, of course, to identify the degree to which hard or soft means are more effective in this policy, but it can be said that China has achieved this goal. To the date, most countries refuse to build official diplomatic relations with Taiwan because they do not want to worsen their relations with China. The PRC appears as a strong economic partner for developed countries and source of developmental aid for developing countries. Particularly, China's good neighbor policy is aimed at neutralizing those in the Asia region who see

China as a threat and transform China's image into a favorable partner. These resources and policies have a considerable impact on Taiwan, as well (Sutter, 2004). Moreover, the PRC leadership seeks to cultivate soft power on Taiwan with the intent of shaping public opinion of the mainland in Taiwan toward a favorable image of the PRC. With doing so, the PRC believes that the unification of the two can be possible as the Taiwanese people would vote for pro-China actors of the domestic politics of the island.

Taiwan's soft power strategy with regard to the mainland is the opposite of the PRC's: First of all, the Taiwanese government endeavors to attract more economic partners and strengthen the U.S. support in order to lessen the economic dependence from the PRC. Over-dependence on the mainland in the economic terms is seen as the chief constraint on Taiwan's journey toward independence. Taiwan's leading companies are discussed to operate in the PRC due to the lower skilled labor cost, developed supply chains and the largest market on the globe. This thick connection, in turn, has given the PRC leverages to make use of to influence Taiwan's domestic politics. According to Stratfor (2018), the presidential elections in 2012 were exposed to the PRC's latent interference through economic ties. Secondly, the Taiwanese administration seeks political recognition by the global powers and representation in the international organizations through the use of soft power, which would, in turn, safeguard Taiwan's survival. This is discussed to be more important than establishing economic partnerships in the sense that the mainland threatens the island a military action in case of overt independence claim (Tsang, 2017).

4.4.1. Context Transformations

The ongoing political and economic changes in the global and regional contexts have had a notable impact on the course of the Taiwan conflict. This kind of major shifts occurs under the influence of a number of various factors. Soft power, among others, owned and cultivated by great powers is one of these crucial factors. One of the notable shifts in the global political context was the admission of the PRC to the UN as the sole representative of China on October 25, 1971.

Besides, the PRC gained veto power as it became a permanent member of the UN Security Council (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, 1971). The PRC's admission was a result of the long-lasting political transitions and rising support to the PRC. During the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC was recognized by not only the developing nations that gained independence newly but also some developed states such as the UK and France. Moreover, the domestic pressure on the U.S. foreign policy, particularly on its fight against communism, had made an imperative to find an ally from the communist bloc. Consequently, the U.S. administration acknowledged the necessity of building relations with China. To this end, in 1971, President Nixon sent his security advisor Henry Kissinger to the mainland with a secret assignment (US-China Institute, 2011). Kissinger's China visit and meetings with the CCP leadership paved the way for Nixon's visit in 1972 and initiated détente with the PRC, which ended in the recognition of the PRC as the official government of China and brought about the end of official diplomatic ties with the ROC government in 1979. Tenenbaum (2011) evaluates this shift in international relations as a transformation of the world order from bi-polar to tri-polar as the PRC had become another important player in the game. Whereas obtaining a chair in the UN and its Security Council was arguably a byproduct of the rise of the PRC's soft power, it also helped China's soft power further ascend as it was a remarkable diplomatic victory of the PRC administration.

Another vital context transformation that had a significant impact on the Taiwan conflict was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union had left the U.S. as the mere hegemonic power without any equal rival. Robinson (1996, p. 1341) discusses that the end of Cold War was a threat to Taiwan's existence – at least, those in Taipei had such insecurities – as there occurred a possibility that the U.S. would move forward the rapprochement with the mainland and thus compromise on the Taiwan issue. Moreover, Taiwan had been abandoned by its historical allies, namely Saudi Arabia and South Korea. However, it should not be forgotten that the PRC was on the rise to becoming a new global competitor. According to Robinson (1996), besides America's interest in containing the PRC not to become another Soviet Union, Taiwan had its impact on the U.S. policymaking in certain directions. Along

with economic and military aspects, the Taiwanese administration enjoyed diplomatic and cultural influence had been established for decades on the U.S. public and political elites. Thanks to this influence, Taiwan has managed to keep the U.S. support with the help of Taiwan supporters within the country.

Economic dimension in the ongoing transformation of the context came to the fore with the global economic crisis, or as it is called the Global Recession, that started in the U.S. and quickly spread worldwide in 2008. While other leading economic powers had taken serious damage from this crisis, the PRC managed to keep and even slightly raise its annual GDP growth rates. Moreover, contrary to other developed countries where the levels of the foreign direct investment (FDI) had seen notable fall, China received enough investment to sustain its development pace. In spite of the substantial decline in Chinese export, the country began to recover no later than 2010 when its rivals were still staggering (Li, Willett, & Zhang, 2012).

Under these circumstances, Asia had become the center of the global economy as “the global financial crisis not only shook the global development structure but also shifted the global economic balance of power”, as Larus and Wu (2010, p. 12) suggest. In the emergence of this trend, China's multilateralism and good neighborhood policy played an important role as the PRC helped its neighbors to resist the crisis through free trade agreements and regional organizations (Huang & Soong, 2016). The PRC's rising economic power and tight engagement with the neighboring countries to tackle the crisis boosted its soft power on Taiwan, as well. It should be noted that, in 2008, the change of rule from the pro-independence DDP to the pro-reconciliation KMT as a result of the presidential elections in Taiwan was another factor that pushed the island toward the mainland. Insofar as the global financial crisis hit the island's economy due to the decline in the demand to the Taiwanese exports in the U.S. and China, especially to high-tech goods which would bring enormous income to the country, the ROC leadership had to turn to the mainland to restore the economy (Chow, 2009).

Consequently, in 2008 the PRC and the ROC started to negotiate a free trade agreement that would help Taiwan's economy halt the pernicious effects of the

crisis by increasing the amount of the cross-strait exchange. According to Larus and Wu (2010), the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010 was the most crucial step toward the transformation of the conflict since the end of the Chinese Civil War. With ECFA, Taiwan expected to amplify its export to the mainland without any trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas and attract direct investment from there. Moreover, President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT sought reconciliation with the PRC through economic cooperation despite the opposition by the DPP members in the parliament. Rather than the economic benefits, the PRC leadership had more political interests in signing this agreement with Taiwan. ECFA was calculated to enhance Taiwan's dependence on the mainland, and thus give more leverages on the ROC to the PRC (BBC News, 2010).

4.4.2. Structure Transformations

The structure of the cross-strait relations has seen substantive transformations as of the mid-1980s. In 1987, recognizing the public interest to visit the mainland and private interest to do business in the biggest market of the globe, the ROC government lifted the ban on the visits from the island to the mainland in order to allow the ethnic Chinese people of the island to visit their relatives on the mainland. Although being limited to only family visits via a third country, this decision was a kick-start to the cross-strait exchange of the ordinary people which would later pave the way for the Mini Three Links policy. With this policy, the two sides agreed to allow some connections between Kinmen of Taiwan and Xiamen of China in 2001 (Chen C.-M. , 2010, p. 421).

The interaction between China and Taiwan had been a problematic issue in both sides' political circumstances. In order to regulate cross-strait relations and build semi-official contact, the ROC government established the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1991 with the purpose to "entrust a private intermediary body to exercise public authority to address issues arising from cross-strait exchanges" (Straits Exchange Foundation, n.d.). A nongovernmental body was of utmost importance as the Chinese administration refused to hold official, government-

level talks with the ROC. In response to this development on the island, the PRC administration set up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to institutionalize the exchange across the strait in December 1991. These bodies were aimed at enhancing the cross-strait exchange and subtle intergovernmental dialogue. After some eight years of dialogue, the relations worsened and semi-official negotiations broke in 1999 as a result of Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui's attempts to draw "two-state theory" forth (Matsuda, 2015, p. 5).

The PRC, nevertheless, maintained the dialogue with the leadership of the KMT along with other opposition parties in Taiwan, and in 2005, the two sides established the KMT-CCP Platform. Despite the pro-independence stance of the ruling DPP, the Chinese government was eager to continue talks behind the doors to advance the cross-strait exchange. This platform was thought to serve to both sides' interests with its four chief mechanisms as follows: Talks between the leaders of the CCP and the KMT in order to accelerate reconciliation; Trade and Economic Forum was aimed at increasing the amount of trade and enhance economic ties across the strait; Engagement of the parties' regional branches would allow the civil society to be informed about and involved in the process; and Mechanism aimed at protecting Taiwan's trade interests was established to provide fair competition (Huang W.-H. , 2015, pp. 108–109). Consequently, visits from the island and transport of goods between the two sides started to be conducted through charter flights (André, 2014). The PRC's constructive position toward this exchange augmented its soft power and image among the Taiwanese people, and thus, Matsuda (2015) suggests, they regarded the KMT rule more favorable compared to the radical position of the DPP, in terms of economy of the island.

Between 2008 and 2016 the structure of relations saw its most remarkable transformation as Ma Ying-jeou from the KMT won in the presidential elections in Taiwan and the KMT took the rule after 8 years of DPP administration. André (2014) argues that the change of the ruling party was partly caused by the activities of the KMT-CCP Platform. This institution was arguably established not

to cast the interests of the civil society in both parties, but rather to shape their desires in favor of reconciliation and minimize their will for Taiwan's independence. President Ma was a strong proponent of reconciliation with the mainland and he took important steps for the sake of rapprochement. The rapprochement further developed as regular flights between the mainland and the island were agreed to start as of July 2008 (The New York Times, 2008).

4.4.3. Actor and Issue Transformations

Actor and issue transformations are interconnected, and thus should be analyzed with reference to each other. Actor transformations encompass the changes in attitudes, behaviors and power politics of the parties as Miall (2004) puts:

Actor transformations include decisions on the part of actors to change their goals or alter their general approach to conflict. This would include decisions to seek peace or to initiate a peace process. They also include changes in leadership, often crucial to the securing of transformation in conflicts. Also included are changes in the situation of the public constituencies and supporters of the respective political leaders (p. 10).

Friedman (2007) presents a detailed comparative analysis of the PRC position on Taiwan during Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and subsequent leaders. Based on the popular discourses and then CCP leaders' opinions, he suggests that Mao Zedong never actually wanted to annex Taiwan or use force against the U.S. military but “keep a civil war alive” (p. 122). Instead, Mao sought to manipulate Chinese public opinion, achieve mobilization for the sake of the Great Leap Forward. For fueling the nationalist sentiments among Chinese people, Mao could create and make people internalize the demonized image of Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S., his supporter. This propaganda also helped Mao to present China as “the leader of the world camp of revolution” (pp. 122–123).

The position of the PRC during Deng administration was “very different from Mao's policy of maintaining an atmosphere of military conflict” (Friedman, p. 124). Deng Xiaoping followed a considerably softer policy toward Taiwan. As the main priority of Deng's foreign policy was to convince others about China's peaceful rise, the relations with Taiwan were based on subtle mutual consent to enhance

economic ties. Along with the change of leadership in the CCP, China experienced serious turmoil in 1989 as Chinese people strived for democracy and freedom in Tiananmen. While the Western democracies questioned their relations with the PRC, the Taiwanese government sought to benefit from the economic partnership with the mainland. Friedman (2007) argues that Deng administration was also eager to let Taiwanese firms and investment enter China in order to support economic reform. The normalization of relations can be rooted from the rising soft power of the mainland in Taiwan and vice versa. However, changing international – fall of the Soviet Union, end of the Cold War – and domestic – Uyghur and Tibet issues – contexts had made the PRC administration take more serious measure about Taiwan. During Jiang Zemin (1989–2003) leadership in China, the cross-strait relations saw its most troublous phase since the Chinese Civil War. Chen and Wu (2017) suggest that the Chinese leaders experience two, transition and consolidation, periods during their rule. For Jiang, the transition period lasted between 1989 and 1996 as he was under the influence of Deng and the CCP. Since 1997, with Deng's death, the consolidation period of Jian's rule had started. For Hu Jintao (2003–2012), these two periods were 2002-2005 and 2006-2012 respectively. According to Chen and Wu (2017), the two periods with regard to Taiwan are characterized as follow:

As reflective of the general secretary's power position, the CCP's Taiwan policy tends to limitedly reciprocate Taipei's positive signals or aggressively retaliate Taipei's negative signals when the general secretary is in power transition; and the CCP's Taiwan policy tends to actively reciprocate Taipei's positive signals or limitedly retaliate Taipei's negative signals when the general secretary is in power consolidation. The difference between the two modes of responses is a reflection of the weaknesses/ strengths of the general secretary's power position (p. 137).

It can also be deduced from Chen and Wu's study that the more the PRC leaders are free in decision making, the more they are influenced by Taiwan's soft power, and thus they would tend to show more interest in the peaceful transformation of the conflict. China's soft power, on the other hand, has even greater implications for Taiwan's mainland policies and actor transformation on the island.

Emerging as a modern democracy and experiencing direct presidential elections since the late 1990s, Taiwan has seen actor transformations as a result of the

change of the ruling party. In order to construe these transformations, one needs to look to the reasons behind the sociopolitical trends that led people to vote for the KMT and the DPP candidates. Among other external and domestic factors, the opinion of the Taiwanese people of the PRC, its influence on the island, and Taiwan's relations with the mainland is arguably a significant component that dethroned the KMT at the beginning of the third millennium and caused the mutual replacement of the KMT and the DPP every eight years.

The opinion polls conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (2019) illustrate major trends among Taiwanese people. Firstly, I will shed light on the changes in the national identity of the Taiwanese since the beginning of the 21st century. In the first half of the century's first decade, the Taiwanese people identified themselves more as "both Taiwanese and Chinese". However, thanks to the DPP's identity policies during these years, the percentage of those who regarded themselves as "Taiwanese" was on the rise and caught the former in 2005. Later on, the number of the latter has been on the rise with insignificant falls from time to time until 2014 when the share of "both Taiwanese and Chinese" identification began to rise. The most recent data (2018) showed that 54.5% of the respondents see themselves as Taiwanese, while 38.2% as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Appendix 4).

Secondly, it is of importance to illustrate people's opinion on cross-strait relations. People on the island have been more inclined to the status quo of the cross-strait relations. Although there has been a decline in the number of people who preferred maintaining status quo indefinitely and maintaining status quo and deciding later in recent years, a notable upsurge is observed in the number of those who favored moving toward unification while maintaining status quo. On the contrary, fewer people have felt that moving toward independence is favorable as of 2015 (Appendix 5). In 2018, out of 7 options, the most respondents (31.1%) chose "maintaining the status quo and deciding on independence or unification later", followed with "maintaining the status quo indefinitely" (22.3%) and "maintaining the status quo and unification later" (16%) (Mainland Affairs Council, 2018).

Thirdly, people's party preference should be elaborated. According to the poll, it is clear that the Taiwanese people had been mostly apolitical in terms of their support to the parties until the end of the 20th century as the country had been ruled by the same party without direct elections. Following the missile crisis in 1995-96, people showed more engagement with politics, particularly, thanks to the rising activism of the DPP. More people expressed support to the DPP during Chen Shui-bian's first term (2000–2004) compared to the KMT. However, the percentage of the KMT supporters surpassed that of the DPP as of 2004 and the popularity of the KMT lasted until 2013. Starting from 2017, the number of KMT supporters have been outdistancing the DPP backers, whereas the percentage of the people with expressing no support to political parties are on the rise (Appendix 6).

Discussing the current trends, it is obvious that the Taiwanese people have not recorded a radical change of mind about the future of the island. Two decades ago, Rigger (1999) wrote that "most ordinary Taiwanese do not desire a concrete resolution... the ideal future is the present, the status quo. Their goal is...one that will allow Taiwan to continue to imagine itself as Chinese while continuing to enjoy political autonomy". The ruling political parties in Taiwan, therefore, lose in elections inasmuch as they follow a policy that would deviate the cross-strait relations from the status quo. Under these conditions, as Morris (2019) argues, "the once pro-status quo party has become more polarized, fielding radical candidates who are close with Chinese officials, while the once radical pro-independence party has had to fill in the vacuum, becoming more pro-status quo".

In short, actor transformation in terms of the Taiwanese leadership position toward the mainland has been noteworthy. While Chiang Kai-shek and his successor claimed to be the ruler of both the island and the mainland, the first democratically elected president Lee Teng-hui came to realize that it was more important to keep the status quo and take some steps for reconciliation with the PRC. It should be noted that this policy shift had been effected partly by China's rising soft power. This influence has been persisting in a rising tendency since the establishment of direct cross-strait links. Today, China's soft power can be

traced within the election campaigns of the leading parties in Taiwan. Despite the DPP's radical pro-independence position since 2016, the KMT is discussed to come up with a proposal of "cross-strait peace agreement" (Aspinwall, KMT's cross-strait peace treaty idea sparks controversy in Taiwan, 2019) and the DPP seems agreeable as long as the agreement is supported by the people in a referendum. That is to say, the presidential elections in 2020 may be accompanied by a referendum, which would bring a serious transformation of the conflict.

According to Miall (2004), issue transformations "concern the reformulations of positions that parties take on key issues at the heart of the conflict as well as the way in which parties redefine or reframe those positions in order to reach compromises or resolutions" (p. 10). These transformations occur as a result of transformations in other dimensions from context to individual. Therefore, the sociopolitical trends discussed above should be read as a part of issue transformations.

The key issues in Taiwan conflict are Taiwan's political status, cross-strait exchange, and format of negotiations. The political status of the island has been the thorniest problem between the parties. According to the 1992 Consensus, the PRC and the ROC agreed that there is only One China. Ever since, however, both sides have interpreted the Consensus in their own ways. A recent study (Wang, Wu, Yeh, & Chen, 2019) showed that Taiwanese people do not have a uniquely correct understanding of this agreement. They either think that the Consensus implies that "Taiwan and China are two separate countries" or "ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification". Moreover, despite this ambivalence about the meaning of the Consensus, an absolute majority regard it favorable. This state of ignorance about the 1992 Consensus has allowed both the DPP and the KMT administrations to manipulate public opinion. Until the current president Tsai, the Taiwanese leaders have accepted it with varying interpretations, while Tsai refuses to. But, as Taiwanese citizens associate status quo with the Consensus, Tsai's refusal to embrace it will arguably work against her in the

upcoming elections. Should the KMT candidate win in the vote, the new administration will probably turn back to the Consensus and interpret its implications in a traditional KMT way.

Unlike this, the cross-strait exchange has witnessed more notable transformations, particularly in the last three decades. Starting with indirect investment and transforming into the exchange of goods, services, and direct investment, the economic exchange across the strait has forged a certain level of interdependence, which nowadays causes insecurities on the Taiwanese side. For instance, in 2014, a large group of people held a nearly three-week demonstration against Ma Ying-jeou's mainland policies claiming that Taiwan was becoming more dependent on China and this threatens Taiwan's security. The so-called Sunflower Movement was followed by a serious decline in Ma's popularity and the KMT loss in the presidential elections of 2016 (Matsuda, 2015, p. 31). Cross-strait economic exchange, however, is of utmost importance for Taiwan as the mainland is the leading importer of Taiwanese goods.

The flow of human, capital, and goods intensified not only the material but sociocultural exchange. That is, people, books, movies, songs, and other information transporters traveling across the strait have been transforming the other side's public opinion and social environment. Prior to the latest presidential elections in Taiwan, there were nearly 42 thousand Chinese students enrolled in Taiwanese higher education institutes. This number has been in decline since 2016 falling to around 30 thousand in 2018 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2019). The Chinese leadership follows a policy that would attract Taiwanese students to the mainland and prevent Chinese students from leaving the country for the island. In this sense, Leung and Sharma (2018) argue that the PRC administration provides Taiwanese students with equal rights and opportunities with their Chinese peers such as scholarships, the same admission procedure, and job opportunities later on. Moreover, only the most successful school graduates used to be admitted to Chinese universities before, but as of 2017, all Taiwanese applicants are assessed on the same basis with the mainland candidates. These developments have encouraged more Taiwanese students to join the brain drain

across the strait toward the mainland. China is also interested in the movement of academics and professionals of various fields from Taiwan to the mainland in order to establish and enhance ties. Several tempting measures have been taken to keep Taiwanese citizens in China, including the provision of residence permit. Consequently, these steps have created serious concerns in Taiwan. Those in Taipei regards this brain drain as a threat to Taiwan's economy and sustainable development (Chen-ju, 2018; Chen-wei, 2018). On the other hand, the PRC is also concerned about the Chinese students who seek education in Taiwan in terms of their changing worldview and fervor for democracy and freedom. They are discussed to become unwilling to go back to China. If they happen to return, they share their experience in Taiwan, which can cause trouble for the authoritarian political system of China (The Economist, 2019).

One of the unresolved issues between the two sides of Taiwan Strait is the format of negotiations. The cross-strait talks had been conducted between the ARATS and SEF for years. During Ma's presidency, it is suggested that these two bodies managed to sign 23 agreements "designed to facilitate cooperation in multiple areas, including transportation, tourism, judicial assistance, trade, investment and safety" (Chen & Cohen, 2019, p. 5). The normalization of the relations hit the peak in 2015 when the top level leaders from both sides – Xi Jinping of the PRC and Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan – met for the first and last time since 1945. Although this meeting is discussed to be more of "symbolism, not substance" (Huang C. , 2015), one should acknowledge the importance of the possibility of the top leaders' encounter. This meeting exhibited that if both sides demonstrate a willingness for reconciliation and compromise, high-level talks can take place. However, the DPP's pro-independence stance and Xi's renewed pro-military discourse minimize the chances for official talks. The PRC refuses to recognize Taiwan as a country and accept the government-to-government format, and thus the Taiwanese administration rejects to join the direct talks.

4.4.4. Individual Transformations

Individual transformations refer to "personal changes of heart or mind within

individual leaders or small groups with decision-making power at critical moments” (Miall, 2004, p. 10). Individual transformations occur more in those people who have had direct contact with the other side of Taiwan Strait or have sufficient intellectual capability that would lead them to see the big picture. In this sense, tourists, exchange students, academics and educators are the most influenced groups by the cross-strait exchange and they own considerable transformative power.

The PRC citizens had been exposed to the state propaganda which had blurred their views on Taiwan and Taiwanese people. On the other side of the strait, Taiwanese people had been told various stories about the history and the owner of the Chinese domain. As the travel ban was abolished between Taiwan and the mainland, millions of people have got a chance to visit the other side and see the reality. It is suggested that cross-strait tourism may be beneficial for future reconciliation in terms of the recognition of the cultural similarity on the opposing sides of Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the touristic exchange is expected to diminish the misconceptions and transform mindsets among Chinese and Taiwanese people (Guo, Kim, Timothy, & Wang, 2006). A recent study carried out by Pan, Wu and Chang (2018, p. 28) revealed that “compared with Chinese citizens who have never visited Taiwan, tourists visiting for the first time are more likely to favor peaceful negotiation and a slow pace of change as a way of resolving the cross-strait confrontation”.

Although tourists make up the largest group of people who experience individual transformations, Chinese students seeking education in Taiwan and Taiwanese students in China are subject to change of perception, as well. It should be noted that Taiwanese students may show more resistance to the unification option after studying in China where authoritarian rule lingers. However, their image of the enemy across the strait evolves into a consanguineous society where they reach affordable and quality education. Needless to say, Chinese students in Taiwan are more prone to change of attitudes as they spend a few years in a modern democracy that offers equality, liberty and other inalienable human rights. Whether Taiwanese or Chinese, individual transformations of those students will

play an important role as they are future decision-makers. Along with their influence on students, the academicians and teachers are likely to contribute to the transformation of conflict as they get more opportunities to learn about the other side of the conflict with the intensification of cross-strait exchange. Academic works published by insiders that involve research on the conflicting societies across the strait can help those societies increase mutual understanding and eliminate misconceptions embedded in third-party approaches. Moreover, educators are suggested to perform as the “transformative intellectuals” as they are able to shape individuals’ worldviews and collective memories (Hung, 2018).

4.5. XIAMEN–KINMEN: QUINTESSENCE OF TRANSFORMATION

Kinmen County is a group of islands under the ROC control, which is the closest Taiwanese land to the mainland, namely the port city of Xiamen. During the Second Strait Crisis in 1958, Kinmen had been heavily bombed causing hundreds of death toll. In 2008 – 50 years after the crisis – the former ROC president Ma Ying-jeou visited the island and expressed his hopes about cross-strait peace by saying “50 years have been wasted. Let us transform Kinmen's image from a 20th century killing field into a 21st century peace square... Kinmen and Xiamen will be doors of reconciliation, doors of peace and doors of cooperation across the Taiwan Strait” (Taiwan Today, 2008).

Xiamen and Kinmen are interconnected with multiple ties. In 2018, a pipeline that provides the island with drinking water was inaugurated (Horton, Once a Cold War flashpoint, a part of Taiwan embraces China’s pull, 2018). Prior to that, the residents of the island had been suffering from the water shortage. Although the ROC is concerned that the water supply from the mainland should not make the island dependent on the PRC, the mainland water meets nearly one-third of the demand (The Strait Times, 2018).

The links between two sides had been established within the Three Mini Links policy that encompassed transport, post, and trade. In addition to the water

pipeline, it is expected that there will be built two new links, namely electricity, and bridge. The Magistrate of the County, Yang Cheng-wu has repeatedly emphasized that Kinmen should not be a part of antagonistic politics, rather it should develop economically, build friendly ties with the mainland and promote peace (Huei-min & Yen, Fujian, Kinmen ties lauded by county magistrate, 2019). The building of a bridge between Xiamen and Kinmen is aimed at boosting tourism by increasing the number of mainland tourists. It is projected that the cross-strait exchange between Kinmen and the mainland will reach 2 million visitors in 2019. The county officials have been working on various measures that would attract more tourists from the PRC (Huei-min & Yu-chen, 2019).

Now Kinmen has become an open-air museum of the war between the PRC and the ROC with its anti-landing barricades along the shores of the island, Peace Memorial Park, and dozens of other symbols that exhibit the scars of the bloody clashes. However, people on the Kinmen island do not possess animosity toward the PRC anymore. They are discussed to regard the mainland as the main supporter of the island's development and wellbeing. The island has become an exemplary for the future transformation of the Taiwan conflict as a professor told to Nick Aspinwall (2018) of the Diplomat: "Kinmen should become a bridge of peace between Taiwan and Mainland China".

CONCLUSION

The intersection of the 80s and 90s of the last century brought about tremendous global change. The end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the new conflicts and numerous other developments signaled the expiration of the bipolar world order and caused ubiquitous uncertainty. As the former order was over and the world entered a phase of reorganization, political leaders, as well as IR scholars, began to question existing theories given that the aforementioned developments had not been anticipated. Under these circumstances, Constructivism emerged and took its shape as a separate IR theory.

Constructivist turn in IR theory was based on and referred to the social factors within and among states, which had been neglected. Constructivism called a halt to the statist, invariable and materialist view of international relations. Instead socially constructed, constantly changing and more ideational approach was proposed. The anarchic structure of international relations is nothing more than what is made of it. That is to say that the states adopt certain identities and interests according to how they conceptualize others. These identities and interests are suggested to gradually change, so are power politics.

Although introduced by Joseph Nye – a neorealist scholar, I discussed that the concept of soft power can be best explained with a constructivist approach due to the abovementioned characteristics of this theory. Not only soft power but the transformational approach to conflict is likely to be understood should we put a stronger emphasis on the social dimension, continuous change of interests and power politics. Consequently, this thesis examined the role of soft power in the conflict setting and its impact on the transformation of conflict. The research aimed at drawing a theoretical framework that would depict the relationship between the use of soft power and conflict transformation. Moreover, I applied this framework to the Taiwan case. To this end, I attempted to answer the following research questions: Does increasing use of soft power make the way for conflict transformation? In what direction has the Taiwan conflict been

influenced by the increasing use of soft power by the parties? To what extent does the use of soft power instead of hard power by the PRC and Taiwan affect the future of the conflict between them?

In order to answer the first question, Chapter 2 scrutinized the concepts of soft power and conflict transformation. It was found that none of these concepts has a universal definition, nor are they accepted by everyone. Being essentially contested concepts, they require the elaboration of various approaches as what is done in Chapter 2. The analysis showed that parties to conflict use different power sources in different means. To be clearer, the same power resource can perform as hard and soft power with regard to the subject it is cultivated on, or at different times. Moreover, I discussed that it is of importance to assess the perception of the power resources and policies by others as a source/policy may be regarded as hard power by some actors, while some others may consider it as soft power. Next, the chapter focused on the stages of conflict and the consequences of power policies of parties. It was demonstrated that as parties opt for soft power rather than hard power, there occurs more space for the peaceful transformation of conflict. The possession and use of soft power make parties attractive to each other and encourage them to collaborate instead of competing. It is also important to note that soft power has a number of limitations with regard to its impact on the transformation of the conflict. First of all, soft power is relatively less controllable. While hard power is mostly dependent upon its owner rather than the recipient of the influence through hard power, soft power is determined by the perception of others. Secondly, for a subject, it is unlikely to lose a great deal of hard power in a short span of time, but this can be the case for soft power. Finally, the results of soft power policies are hardly measurable. In spite of all of these limitations, soft power is suggested to contribute to conflict transformation, particularly in the information age.

Chapter 3 presented an analysis of the Taiwan conflict. 70 years of separation brought the space required for conflict transformation, which was absent during the Chinese Civil War. However, this separation caused bigger incompatibility of goals, as well. Starting with a brief description of the historical background of the

conflict, I discussed its underlying causes and delved into the issues with reference to international law. Next, I listed the primary and secondary actors, the current situation, and the turning points that led to the persisting status quo. In this regard, the positions, interests, and needs of the parties were presented in chronological order in order to make sense of the major shifts in the policies of both parties toward the conflict, and each other. Finally, I illustrated the regional context and geopolitics regarding outsiders' interests and positions on the conflict, and exogenous triggers and constraints.

Chapter 4, being the main part of the thesis, introduced soft power resources and policies of the PRC and ROC. Based on both conventional and dynamic approaches to soft power, I highlighted both hard and soft power resources that cause soft power effect. Subsequently, I illustrated the transformation trends on all five levels, namely context, structure, actor, issue and individual, the role of soft power in these transformations. Consequently, I presented the Xiamen–Kinmen relationship as a successful case for the future transformation of the conflict.

In conclusion, the main contribution of this thesis is that it is an attempt to generate a middle-range theory that examines the relationship between two concepts, soft power and conflict transformation, with a constructivist approach. The middle-range theories are discussed to be constituted from propositions that can be drawn from observable trends in a specific context. My general proposition was that the use of soft power in conflict settings forges transformation of conflict, as it was observed in Taiwan case. In addition to the proposed theoretical framework, Taiwan conflict was analyzed on a transformational dimension that had been studied insufficiently before. This study has been one the earliest attempts to examine the role of soft power in conflict settings and its impact on peaceful transformation. It can be drawn from the study that the third parties involved in various peace processes may encourage the parties to opt for soft power instead of hard power, particularly military power. By doing so, the parties may receive support from other subjects and international organizations. Moreover, effective use of soft power by parties is likely to enhance confidence

and improve relationship between them. In short, the framework established within this study may pose a starting point for further research and reference for mediation work.

The thesis has certain limitations, as well. The main limitation of the study, in this regard, is the lack of data and measurement tools. The lack of data stems from two reasons. First, the author faced a language barrier as some important resources contained data only in Chinese, Second, due to the PRC's political system, not all information required for the research is available. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, soft power is hard to measure and is a rather descriptive concept. Both soft power and conflict transformation are highly specific to the context. Therefore, this study should be regarded as a starting point for further research on the topic. The proposition presented in this study requires further tests in different contexts.

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APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

	HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS
HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES <u>Peace Studies</u> DEPARTMENT	
Date: <u>15.08.19</u>	
Thesis Title: <u>Soft Power and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Taiwan</u>	
My thesis work related to the title above: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people. 2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.). 3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity. 4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development). 	
I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.	
I respectfully submit this for approval.	
Name Surname: <u>TURAL ISMAYILZADA</u> Student No: <u>N16122 153</u> Department: <u>Peace Studies</u> Program: <u>Peace and Conflict Studies</u> Status: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MA <input type="checkbox"/> Ph.D. <input type="checkbox"/> Combined MA/ Ph.D.	Date and Signature <u>15.08.19</u> 
<u>ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL</u>	
<div style="text-align: center;">  Asoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Önsay (Title, Name Surname, Signature) </div>	



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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Barış Çalışmaları ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 15.08.19

Tez Başlığı: Yumuşak Güç ve Çatışma Dönüşümü:
Taiwan Sorunu Bağlamında

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, mülakat, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: TURAL ISMAYILZADA

Öğrenci No: N161 22 153

Anabilim Dalı: Barış Çalışmaları

Programı: Barış ve Çatışma Çalışmaları

Statüsü: Yüksek Lisans Doktora Bütünleşik Doktora

15.08.19

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

Doç. Dr. Murat Çiğdem
(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)




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APPENDIX 2: ORIGINALITY REPORT

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<p>HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF <u>Peace Studies</u></p>	
Date: <u>15.08.19</u>	
Thesis Title / Topic: <u>Soft Power and Conflict Transformation:</u> <u>The Case of Taiwan</u>	
According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options stated below on <u>15.08.19</u> for the total of <u>106</u> pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is <u>.8</u> %.	
Filtering options applied: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Approval and Declaration sections excluded ✓ 2. Bibliography/Works Cited excluded ✓ 3. Quotes excluded ✓ 4. Match size up to 5 words excluded 	
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I respectfully submit this for approval.	
Date and Signature	
Name Surname: <u>TURAL ISMAYILZADA</u>	<u>15.08.19</u> 
Student No: <u>N16122153</u>	
Department: <u>Peace Studies</u>	
Program: <u>Peace and Conflict Studies</u>	
Status: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Masters <input type="checkbox"/> Ph.D. <input type="checkbox"/> Integrated Ph.D.	
<p><u>ADVISOR APPROVAL</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">APPROVED.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">  Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Örsay (Title, Name Surname, Signature) </p>	



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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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Barış Çalışmaları ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih: 15/08/19

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: Yumuşak Güç ve Çatışma Dönüşümü:
Taiwan Sorunu Bağlamında

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 106 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 15/08/19 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turmitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı % 8 'tür.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç, ✓
- 2- Kaynakça hariç ✓
- 3- Alıntılar (hariç) dâhil
- 4- 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: TURAL İSMAYİLZADA
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
15.08.19

DANIŞMAN ONAYI


UYGUNDUR.

Doç.Dr. Murat Önsay
(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)


APPENDIX 3: THE CODETERMINATION OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESS




APPENDIX 4: CHANGES IN THE TAIWANESE/CHINESE IDENTITY OF TAIWANESE



APPENDIX 5: CHANGES IN THE UNIFICATION – INDEPENDENCE STANCES OF TAIWANESE



APPENDIX 6: CHANGES IN THE PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF TAIWANESE



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