



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

English Language and Literature Programme

IN-BETWEENNESS IN MATTHEW ARNOLD'S POETRY

Uğur Ergin KÜÇÜKBOYACI

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2019

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
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
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
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for my guardian angels, Günseli & Ayşenur,

and

to our wholly beloved,

M. Reşit Küçükboyacı (1945-2002)

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ÖZET

KÜÇÜKBOYACI, Uğur Ergin. *Matthew Arnold Şiirinde Aradalık*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2019.

Bu çalışma Matthew Arnold'ın şiirlerinde aradalık kavramını aidiyet ve ritüel kavramları ile olan paradoksal ilişkisi çerçevesinde ele alarak parçalanmışlık ve arada kalmışlık bilincinin şiirde açıkça gözlemlenebilmeye başlandığı Victoria dönemi İngiliz şiirinde tartışmaktadır. Matthew Arnold'ın şiiri ve şiire genel yaklaşımı Victoria dönemi şiiri açısından aradalık ve parçalanmış bilinç özelliklerinin ön plana çıktığı bir alandır. Arnold'ın "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Strayed Reveller", "The Forsaken Merman", ve "Empedocles on Etna" adlı şiirleri bu tez bünyesinde yukarıda belirtilen çerçeve içerisinde tartışılmak üzere seçilmiştir. Bu şiirler aradalık ve ritüel kavramlarının birbirleriyle olan etkileşim süreçlerini paradoksal ve sorgulayıcı bir içyapı yardımıyla yansıtmaktadırlar. Bu içyapı mitolojik, masalsı ve folklorik özellikleri ile şiirlere konu edilen şiir kişileri aracılığıyla insan doğasının sınırlılığı dolayısıyla hissedilen sürekli bir aradalık ve sıkışmışlık duygusunu yansıtmaktadırlar. Bilinmezlik duygusu ve insan bilincinin öte kavramı ile kurduğu ilişki Arnold'ın şiirlerinde aradalık ve sıkışmışlık duygularının temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bunun yansımaları şiir sanatının iç dinamiklerine mitolojik hassasiyetleri çerçevesinde yaklaşan Matthew Arnold'ın adı geçen şiirlerinde aradalık kavramına yöneltilen içsel bir sorgulama olarak önce çıkmaktadır. Bu tez, aradalık kavramını on dokuzuncu yüzyılın son çeyreği ile hız kazanmaya başlayan dil, aradalık, ve ritüel odaklı disiplinler arası çalışmalar çerçevesinde Victoria dönemi şiirinin aradalık ile kurduğu ilişki bağlamını da gözeterek kendi iç paradoksları ile tartışmaktadır. Sonuç olarak görülmektedir ki Arnold'ın seçili şiirleri ritüel duygusunu barındırmakla birlikte artık ritüel düşüncesi ile bağlarını koparmış bilinç yansımalarını çözümsüz ve süregelen, sadece insana özgü sonsuz bir aradalık veya arada kalmışlık durumunu sorgulayacak ve sorgulatacak şekilde bir öz-farkındalık çerçevesinde yansıtmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Matthew Arnold, Aradalık, Victoria dönemi İngiliz Şiiri, Ritüel, Arada kalmışlık

ABSTRACT

KÜÇÜKBOYACI, Uğur Ergin. *In-betweenness in Matthew Arnold's Poetry*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2019.

This study concentrates on the inherent, yet paradoxical relationship surrounding the concept of in-betweenness and human ritualization within Matthew Arnold's poetry, which is a characteristic example of the fragmentary and in-between poetics of Victorian poetry. Matthew Arnold's poetry, being among the chief representatives of the period, demonstrates this paradoxical relationship especially within his four major poems, "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Strayed Reveller", "The Forsaken Merman", and "Empedocles on Etna". These poems display the fragmentary and in-between characteristics of the phenomenon known as ritualization, however, by presenting representations of a non-ritualized, rather than a successfully ritualized consciousness, they draw attention to the inner-workings of in-betweenness as a mechanism of self-questioning and self-awareness. In-betweenness, in this regard, becomes observable in the non-integrative and incomplete ritualization and identification process represented through self-reflexive poetic portrayals and manipulations of mythic-poetic figures such as the Scholar-Gipsy, the Forsaken Merman, the Strayed Reveller, and Empedocles, voiced within the in-between settings, moods, and self-reflexive dramatic structures of the poems discussed. This dissertation relates Arnold's poetry to that of the concepts of in-betweenness and human ritualization, arguing that Arnold's personas within the poems demonstrate their non-integrative and non-indulgent relationship with their environment and mythic subject-matters through representations of the self-questioning of their own in-betweenness and failed sense of ritualization. As a result, a self-aware and critical consciousness emerges in Arnold's poetry within the broken relationship between in-betweenness and human ritualization, which makes use of the detached and fragmented Victorian poetics as its characteristic, yet unique mode.

Keywords

Matthew Arnold, In-betweenness, Victorian Poetry, Ritualization, Betwixt and between

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INTRODUCTION

MATTHEW ARNOLD'S POETRY AND VICTORIAN IN-BETWEENNESS

Matthew Arnold's poetry has been the source of considerable interest throughout the decades that established him as "one of the three pinnacles of Victorian verse [...] frequently ranked alongside Browning and Tennyson" (Collini 2). Especially after the Second World War, Arnold, in Collini's words, had been "retrospectively canonized" (qtd. in Caufield, *Overcoming Matthew Arnold* 61). Furthermore, "with the slow waning of the high theoretical age" pushing towards a more pluralized twenty-first century (Caufield, "Poetry is the Reality" 259), a diversity of scholarly responses to Arnold's poetry became prominent in demonstrating the relevance and importance of his poetry for the contemporary interdisciplinary experience. The majority of these approaches have been acknowledging a feeling of incompleteness, detachment, or loss as the fundamental veins running through Arnold's poetry. However, on closer inspection Arnold's poetry also reveals a network of retrospective representations of intellectual alienation, a self-consciousness of division and in-betweenness that govern and motivate a poetically-oriented, self-reflexive, problematic and critical outlook towards human experience. In this regard, Arnold's poetry indulges in reflections of in-betweenness, also using in-betweenness as a critical structure to demonstrate relations between human ritualization and the concept of in-betweenness as an essential cultural mechanism of interrogation, which allows for a self-awareness for the human mind to question its cultural and existential surroundings.

Accordingly, this study aims to evaluate representations of in-betweenness in Arnold's "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Forsaken Merman", "The Strayed Reveller", and "Empedocles on Etna" towards demonstrating Arnold's poetics of in-betweenness as part of a greater and more complex network of human investigation, revolving around studies of human ritualization and the role of in-betweenness regarding ritual structures, both as a mechanism of social integration, but also as an instrument of critical detachment and existential questioning. In-betweenness, in this context, can be defined as a double-edged, problematic, paradoxical, yet necessary mechanism of orientation for

the human mind to maintain and also question a sense of place and order within the world. Facilitating a critical awareness for a more fragmented and sceptical consciousness, in-betweenness draws attention to the temporality of human existence and experience by simultaneously providing an inquisitive window to the past and the present, enabling an inner gaze into the historical and structural relationships between poetic creation and human ritualization, as well as its own dynamics. Arnold, in this sense, uses his poetic creations to typify a similarly self-observant, critical, and sceptical consciousness of the in-between, where Arnold's diverse voices self-reflexively recognize, and make use of their own in-betweenness to question the paradoxical relationship between poetic creation, in-betweenness, and the dynamics of human ritualization. These poetic voices, by continually keeping to the in-between, and by remaining detached from any kind of integration within their own settings, display an isolated yet self-conscious presence, which do not allow for a comforting, or assuring ritualization as an identification with their surroundings. Arnold captures these voices amidst their own personal crisis, and further employs them to question a broader existential crisis, where a non-ritualized and detached consciousness, as exemplified by Arnold's personas, reveals the inner dynamics of in-betweenness in its paradoxical state, both as a distancing and synthesising structure for the human mind.

In-betweenness has often been seen as the source-structure for meaning-making mechanisms, such as poetic creation and human ritualization. Furthermore, it has been identified by its numerous commentators, for instance by Arnold Van Gennep and Victor Turner, as an inherent part of the cultural systematics of human ritual, which provides a positive and constructive mechanism for the creation and survival of human cultures throughout history. Taken as a theoretical concept, in-betweenness has often been referred to in relation to ritual as the basic transformative structure of human societies, operating within and further depending on a kind of crisis human ritual brings forward through rites of "status elevation", or "status reversal" (Turner, *The Ritual Process* 166-167). Ritualization brings forward an awareness of a crisis of belonging, and in doing so, attempts to resolve it by integrating or re-integrating its agents into a ritual structure, where these ritualized agents identify with their surroundings and feel that they belong in the order of their worlds. Thus, ritualized agents maintain a sense of security, purpose, and belonging within their own environment. However, when

ritualized agents do not familiarize or identify themselves within the ritual structure, they tend to get defamiliarized through an incomplete, refused, or questioned process of ritualization, which makes the inner operations of in-betweenness and human ritualization more observable and self-consciously perceivable.

In-betweenness in such double crisis brings processes of changing roles, or status into closer observation, where a broken sense of ritualization leads to a disturbing and alienating sense of in-betweenness, thereby leading ritual participants to a questioning of the dynamics surrounding their own existence, and the ritual structure. The Victorian poetic scene, especially in its involvement with a broken and in-between poetics, instead of an integrative, fixed, and participatory one, demonstrates a similar sense of in-betweenness, scepticism, self-observation, and a crisis of detachment. Shifting towards in-betweenness as an interiorized representation of a new kind of poetics, this newly emergent divided consciousness questions itself within a non-participatory mode in relation to the multitudinousness of the new and the old worlds it is surrounded by. In that context, in-betweenness is also used as an analytical tool to make sense of, and represent changing human experiences within this new world regarding the relationship between the human mind and the perception and recreation of its shifting cultural surroundings regarding the past. Arnold's poetry, in this regard, offers an exemplary model, where in-betweenness is utilized by way of a broken ritualization within the mind. A divided, in-between poetic consciousness becomes observable through the use of settings, moods, dramatic structures, and various meta-fictional, or self-reflexive associations within Arnold's poetry between the speakers of the poems and the mythological figures invoked throughout.

Especially "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Strayed Reveller", "The Forsaken Merman", and "Empedocles on Etna" demonstrate the kind of in-betweenness associated with a broken sense of ritualization and self-reflexivity, which lays bare deeper mechanisms regarding poetic creation, in-betweenness, and ritualization. These poems are exemplary, because they make use of in-betweenness within a tighter relationship with ritualization, displaying a disturbing and more self-conscious sense of in-betweenness as compared to other poems. As a result, they provide a more unified structural model underlying in-betweenness and human ritualization. Moreover, these poems reveal in-betweenness as

a literary matrix of doubling dichotomies between participation and non-involvement, which is amongst the defining characteristics of Victorian poetics. Accordingly, these poems can be seen as employing a characteristic Victorian sense of fragmentation, self-consciousness, division, and in-betweenness. Therefore, to put Arnold's case in perspective, it is first necessary to outline a variety of approaches to Arnold's poetry which conventionally place it within the context of the poetics of Victorian in-betweenness. Then, Arnold's poetry can be better discussed in terms of in-betweenness, because common links regarding the operation of a Victorian poetic consciousness of in-betweenness, division, and secondariness would have been formed. Furthermore, such connections would make it possible to relate Arnold's poetics of in-betweenness to later theoretical developments concerning the place of in-betweenness within human ritualization.

Arnold's poetry is the product of, as much as a distinctive contribution to a specific Victorian poetic consciousness which situates itself between reflections of Romantic idealizations of unity, and a split modern consciousness, operating on fragmentation, disorientation, and secondariness. Viewed through this perspective, Arnold's poetry has been frequently identified in terms of a division inside the mind that cannot reconcile feelings of loss, as in loss of origins, with acts of reflection, like memory, poetry, and representation. As a consequence, a deep sense of failure and secondariness can be seen pervading Arnold's poetry, expressed through atmospheres of insecurity, in-betweenness, and inertia. That is why, for John D. Rosenberg, "[Arnold's] most moving poetry is, paradoxically, about failure – the failure of poetry to sustain itself in a post-Romantic world [where] [t]he keynote [...] is its vulnerability" (149). Noting the divide from the securities of Romanticism, like that of unification with nature, participation with the sacred imagination, or direct involvement with God, a sense of homelessness has also been discussed in Arnold's poetry in relation to secondariness and vulnerability, the sources of which have been further identified as failure, a failed sense of participation, and nostalgia by several of Arnold's keen critics.

Such views usually underline a contrasting poetic consciousness in Arnold between two opposites, as in longing for a return to origins, and a realization that such a longing can never be fulfilled. According to this approach, not only the realization of emotional loss,

but also the sober recognition of the deeper nature of a divided self, governs Arnold's poetry. One such classification has been William A. Madden's, where Madden argues that "[a] Stoic note is present [in Arnold's poetry] while the nostalgic note can still be heard [,] and occasionally two different moods appear side by side" within an exclusive movement of the mind that is characteristic of Arnold (50). Madden's approach is revealing in the sense that the mind acting upon itself creates division and alienation. Thoughts clash, not with the actual emotion itself, but rather with other thoughts regarding the meaning of such emotion, and in turn produce an overwhelming feeling of in-betweenness and secondariness in Arnold's poetry. As a result, a detached, divided, and secondary perspective presents itself, where an inquisitive consciousness broods over the issue of dividedness on one side, and a futile longing for a sense of the real, unblemished, committed, and thoroughly involved emotions persists on the other. Although confusion and futility pervades much of Arnold's poetic atmospheres, as in "The Forsaken Mermaid" or "The Strayed Reveller", the poetic intellects of Arnold's personas are unyielding, hovering over the source of their own in-betweenness and dividedness in concealed intellectual debate. This is presented through a detached, regressive, but also a deeply concerned understanding of irrecoverable nostalgia. According to Madden, this unique quality, the keeping record of an exclusive two-way conversation with the heart and the mind in Arnold arises from a "nostalgia represent[ing] the initial desolating phase of loss and dislocation during which the dominant emotional impulse is retrospective. As the name implies, the poems of nostalgia give voice to a poetry of memory; looking back to a time of prelapsarian innocence and order, they are haunted by the pathos of innocence and order lost" (50).

Certain expressions which have so far been used to reflect upon Arnold's poetry, like those of failure, vulnerability, nostalgia, loss, dislocation, a retrospective impulse, and a poetry of memory have also been associated with melancholy, secondariness, and in-betweenness, which were quite characteristic of the Victorian age. For instance, as David G. Riede observes, Arnold's poetry was suffering from the same seizure Victorian Hamletism suffered in its inertness, ambiguity, in-betweenness, and melancholy, precisely because it was this kind of fragmented and alienated double consciousness that made Victorian poetry possible in the first place, as "the melancholy of Hamletism was caused by the incompatibility of the infinite Romantic self with the

bounded Victorian ‘character’” (*Allegories* 16). Such incompatibility has often been seen as the main motivation of fragmentation in Arnold’s poetry, taking place within the limits of the human mind as a dialogue of discrepancy between Romantic and Modern elements, which produces a sense of secondariness and in-betweenness. Accordingly, as Riede further states, Arnold’s poetry, in line with the dominant mood of the age, has traditionally been viewed as the product of “[an] intensifi[ed] melancholy divid[ing] the mind more emphatically against itself and, more, [representing a] Victorian melancholy of melancholy [that was] poetically productive rather than disabling” (*Allegories* 2). So, as Riede’s evaluation demonstrates, an especially self-conscious, detached, and sober melancholy develops in Arnold’s poetry, where [t]he dialogue of the mind with itself, as melancholy, [becomes] the site of [such] artistic production” (*Allegories* 19).

One other approach stresses Arnold’s preoccupation with emotion, and how such emotions are produced, kept, and transmitted to other readers or generations by way of poetic expressions. Associating the art of poetic creation and the transmission of poetic expressions with the in-betweenness and temporality human experiences, Arnold focuses on an anxiety surrounding the fragility of human memory and its relationship to human experiences reflected as emotions. There are two sides to the question of how feelings of in-betweenness operates through emotion in Arnold, and these sides are thickly entangled with each other. Is it the poetic influence that makes for such in-betweenness possible as an emotion in the first place, or is it the overwhelming sense of in-betweenness of past memories which produces the need for in-between poetic expressions in the first place, or both? Arnold’s poetry stands in-between these two seemingly opposite poles without taking any sides. Although emotions are highly valued, this paradoxical stance creates a feeling of anxiety within Arnold’s poetry, which is then questioned as to its relationship with self-observant thought and human ritualization. For Kirstie Blair, “Arnold’s poetry [...] draws its agonizing over feeling and affect from a combination of the high valuation of emotion— located and experienced in the heart [,] and the fear that such emotion is now lost” (148).

Such feelings of loss and anxiety are mainly due to temporality and loss of origins, as in the loss of no longer attainable past experiences or emotions, viewed through a fragmented retrospection which dwells on the dichotomy of the past versus the present

as the ultimate representation of in-betweenness. Thus, poetic consciousness becomes alienated from the past and the present alike, focusing more on the constant in-between state of human affairs within the world. Nevertheless, Arnold's poetic voices keep looking for a sense of belonging, even in the process of alienation and inertia, where the movement is inward. Pointing towards a rather central issue in Arnold's poetry, namely the secondariness and in-betweenness of relating human experience to other generations, Blair focuses on the problematics of reference and emotion in Arnold, further directing attention to a dichotomy between intellectual considerations and personal feelings:

[Arnold's] poetry asks questions about faith, feeling, and faith in feeling which contemporary religious thinkers were debating. Should faith be based on an emotional heartfelt apprehension rather than intellectual assent? Where do our emotions and feelings come from and can we trust them? If faith is reliant upon feeling, how can it be expressed and conveyed to others, or is it necessarily personal and incommunicable? (148)

Although Arnold's poetry has been seen by its various commentators as the poetry of failure, of vulnerability, nostalgia, loss, displacement, or melancholy, Matthew Arnold's poetry disguises its preoccupation with the paradoxical nature of poetic reflection under cover of alienation. Such a disguise is also demonstrative of a problematics of secondariness, and self-reflexivity, where a contrast is formed between the mind as secondary, and the emotion as primary. A sense of perpetual in-betweenness, situating itself between thought and feeling emerges in the process. However, it is only the secondariness of the mind that Arnold's poetic personas keep inhabiting. Within this secondary dialogue of the mind with itself, experiences of Arnold's personas are situated as neither here nor there, excluded from actual involvement with their worlds. These experiences are reflected upon in direct or indirect ways as being situated on the threshold of a non-participatory and highly self-observant human consciousness on the one side, and an overwhelming yearning for participation and identification with the world as ritualization on the other. Similar views have been put forward by Stefan Collini and Ruth ApRoberts regarding the secondariness, self-consciousness, and self-reflexivity of Arnold's poetry, where in-betweenness is associated with reflections upon feelings of secondariness, and viewed as a major source for themes of anxiety in Arnold's poetry.

Collini, in his influential study on Arnold, notes that “the dominant note of Arnold’s best poetry is reflection [...] because his poems nearly always are, even if not explicitly, second-order reflections on the nature or meaning of certain kinds of experience, rather than expressions or records of that experience itself” (27). Arnold’s “The Strayed Reveller” has often been treated as such a demonstration, where a primary emotion, like belatedness, is thrown in contrast to an intellectual discussion of belatedness in poetry, where the reveller, although he seems to have given up the craft of poetry long ago, still probes the depths of what it means to be a poet with Ulysses in Circe’s portico. The reveller seems unable, or rather uncaring towards feeling the poetry. Still, he cannot help but muse on the subject: what does it entail to feel poetry, anyway? Going back to Kirstie Blair’s assessment of emotion in Arnold’s poetry, the conveying of emotion through faith, this time faith in poetry is presented as a problem. This kind of an in-between, undecided motivation forms the backbone of Arnold’s poetics, and can be traced in Collini’s observation, along with the writings of Arnold’s other notable critics, like Ruth ApRoberts.

ApRoberts refers to Collini’s remark in complementary terms when she identifies an umbrella theme, a major concern for Arnold’s poetry that is “particularly premonitory: the theme of Vocation. Obviously a great many of the poems are in the class of poetry-about-poetry, most especially about the role of the poet” (2). Also for ApRoberts, “[i]t is developed in “The Strayed Reveller”: the poet is the ‘divine bard’, *vates*; he is, moreover, something of a *poète maudit*, a kind of martyr to art who, endowed with godlike vision, is nevertheless doomed to suffering beyond the normal lot of humanity” (4). In such a meta-fictional reading, the question of how the poet is shaped by the kind of poetry he reads, and in turn how the poet further shapes other generations becomes an important intellectual question to consider. The reveller presents the art of poetry as a problematic and paradoxical meta-art occupying the secondary realm of human experience, which is then juxtaposed against the realm of the original experience of suffering and emotion. The lines: “—such a price / The Gods exact for song; / To become what we sing.” (ll. 232-34), uttered by the strayed reveller gives away the poems meta concerns by presenting the inner paradox of poetry.

ApRoberts further stresses this meta-quality in Arnold, this time by noting the twisted intertextuality of Arnold's scholar-gipsy as a poetic persona: In Arnold's poem, the mythic figure of the scholar-gipsy is referred to as having been in pursuit of "[t]his new lore [which] is literally thought-transference, [...] suggest[ing], rather, the power of the gipsy's imagination, potent to influence the minds of his fellows" (12). ApRoberts seems to suggest that, "thought-transference" also accommodates the art of poetry. Since the art and act of poetic creation also influences people and their personal yet culturally structured imaginations to make sense of the world, the poetic act becomes primary over thought. In another sense, ApRoberts seems to suggest that poetry is the cradle of imagination, which has been capable of influencing and shaping many minds, and Arnold self-reflexively demonstrates this self-revealing poetic creation, as Moldstad further observes, that "[i]n adapting the tale of the scholar-gipsy from *The Vanity of Dogmatizing*, [Arnold] preserve[s] the story but quite alter[s] its spirit in context. [...] His mythical scholar represents a confidence in the imagination [...] that is crucial for the poet, and [Arnold] identifies with him" (159).

Just like Arnold, the speaker in the poem self-consciously and self-reflexively urges himself to read once more the well-known tale of the scholar-gipsy, further emphasizing the eternal in-betweenness of the mysterious scholar-gipsy, both as a poetic figure of his own imagination, and a historical reference. The scholar-gipsy's fabled experience of the perpetual in-between is put in contrast with those of mortal men: "The generations of thy peers are fled, / And we ourselves shall go; / But thou possessest an immortal lot, / And we imagine thee exempt from age / And living as thou liv'st on Glanvil's page, / Because thou hadst—what we, alas, have not!" (ll. 155-160). Upon reading these lines, the speaker is almost tempted to ask what lore or power did the original scholar-gipsy actually possess? Could it be the mind-influencing power of poetry? Since the scholar-gipsy never fully achieves or reveals this power, the figure of the scholar-gipsy becomes a metaphor of the perpetual, yet strangely inspiring state of the in-between for the speaker. Having become a symbol for the necessary condition of the poetic in-between, encompassing the inner dynamics of both the poets and their art, the speaker uses the legend of the scholar as unveiling the process of poetic creation and poetic influence, where the scholar-gipsy's literary and non-existent presence, is shown to affect

contemporary generations to think about the nature of their own in-betweenness as made possible by the in-betweenness of the poetic act of literary creation.

Without attempting a definition of poetry, both “The Strayed Reveller” and “The Scholar-Gipsy” along with the two complementary poems mentioned above covertly engage the ambiguous nature of the art of poetry, standing in-between the problem of experience as original feeling, and secondary ways of relating that experience as poetry. As part of this concealed scrutinizing, emotions and characters are also summoned from the past, but made to fit into Arnold’s poetics of in-betweenness. They are for the most part cut off from one thing or the other, say, alienated from poetry as in *Empedocles* and “The Strayed Reveller”, or in retreat from society and spiritually exiled as in “The Scholar-Gipsy”, or “The Forsaken Merman”. These are all products of an established sense of secondariness and in-betweenness felt by Arnold’s personas, where the larger ideas behind such estrangement are all encompassing for any discussion of the origins of either poetry, myth, or literature. A consciousness of reflection leading to division, suffering, crisis, and feelings of in-betweenness, which is quite often related to being cut off from origins emerge in Arnold’s inquisitive and self-conscious poetics, as future discussion on individual poems will try to demonstrate.

Collini and ApRoberts’ attention to meta-reflection further underlines a particular brand of self-consciousness in Arnold’s poetry, which, in turn, fortifies the question of reflection, especially opening the Victorian poetic practice into question as a venue of retrospective reflection. Arnold’s poetry, in this sense, must also be situated within its Victorian framework, where reflection, unlike its Romantic predecessors, was chiefly understood in terms of division and plurality, as an awareness of a self-questioning, doubling, and a fictionalizing consciousness of retrospection and representation, instead of a Romantic devotion towards efforts seeking to join genuine reflections of human memory with an eternal or singular spiritual reality. That is why Victorian poetics has been labelled by many of its commentators as non-participating, and in-between, especially by Isobel Armstrong, whose seminal work, *Victorian Poetry* (1993) provides a paramount reference point to this kind of double consciousness, where such crisis does not merely refer to, but also creates reflections of its own, “making the act of representation a focus of anxiety” (6).

For Armstrong, “[t]he Victorian period has always been regarded as isolated between two periods, [and] seen in terms of transition. It is on the way somewhere. It is either on the way from Romantic poetry, or on the way to modernism. It is situated between two kinds of excitement, in which it appears not to participate” (1). This is a remarkably illustrative analysis, in which Victorian poetry is implied as supposed to be going towards a destination, but it is nevertheless unable to move in either direction. It is immobilized and apathetic. It is very much in-between. What it can do, however, is to evoke, reflect, refer, divide, polarize, pluralize, question, and recreate, and in doing so, acknowledge its own existence in the process. These are also quite fitting descriptions for the main engagement of Arnold’s different personas, voiced as a consciousness of in-betweenness throughout Arnold’s poetry.

Others have been directing attention to this Victorian discourse of immobility, division, and in-betweenness as well. For instance, Joseph Bristow argues that “Victorian poetry began in a vacuum” (4), where “[a] multiplicity of styles and remarkable formal innovation distinguish the Victorian poets but their work can appear directionless” (3). This was due to a gap between the Romantic understanding of identity and ideal, and the Victorian preoccupation with “polarity [which] can be seen as a symptom of the *loss* of identity of both the writer and his art” (Bristow 4). In questioning fixity and fixed identities, the Victorian poet had been characteristically dividing identity into character or voice, and the art of poetry had been undergoing decentralization where reflection played a major part. What Bristow points towards as loss and creative apathy, was the product of “a fractured Victorian culture”, and in turn produced more fragmentation in poetry as sides were “pulling in different directions [with] classicism on the one hand, and metaphorical ingenuity on the other” (2). From Slinn’s perspective, this is mainly due to “[a] growing sense of flux in all things [...] lead[ing] to a discourse of self which is characterised by division and displacement. Temporality and process become more problematic in poetic structures while unity becomes increasingly dialectical – unity as difference” (2).

Regardless of polarized and fractured trends in poetry, a growing consciousness of history and alienation as influential mechanisms both defines and unites Arnold’s poetry with the Victorian poetic struggle in terms of severed ties, lost connections, newly-

established ones, and in-betweenness. In what Carlyle had called “a world vacant” (93), although the Victorian world was filled with scientific inquiry and religious debate, there was indeed, as Bristow called it, a “vacuum” (4), and this was causing an upset in the balance between religion and literature, which produced a sense of emptiness. Relations between the human mind and everything else, like religion, literature, class, gender, culture, art, and science were being questioned, leading to new definitions. As John P. Farrell observes, in the wake of all scientific, religious, and literary controversy, “the emergence of modern scepticism” had produced a distinctive consciousness of the modern intellectual wanderer who was in-between the historical, and the uncertain, “most concisely formulated in the famous lines [of Arnold] which image man as ‘Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born.’” (“Matthew Arnold’s Tragic Vision” 107).

Instead of providing solace, scientific inquiry along with the swiftly changing modes of industrial production had widened the gap between Romantic considerations and modern discord, producing a peculiar Victorian insecurity. As J. Hillis Miller remarked: “[t]he lines of connection between [the Victorian world] and God [had] broken down, or God himself [had] slipped away from the places where he used to be” (2). In this short-circuit of a lost connection, oneness, not only with God or nature, but with everything else was in question, and no longer seemed possible. A desperate sense of disorientation and in-betweenness becomes one of the defining characteristics of the age. Also quoting from Arnold’s “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse”, Miller’s acknowledgement of such in-betweenness as a suspended self-conscious interval is, again, quite insightful, since within this gap, “God [could] only be experienced negatively, as a terrifying absence. In this time of the no longer and not yet, man is [caught] ‘Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born.’ His situation is essentially one of disconnection: disconnection between man and nature, between man and man, even between man and himself” (Miller 2).

Amongst all such detachment, Arnold’s themes of retreat in poetry also turn inwards and employ a retrospective and interiorized method of poetically oriented intellectual scrutiny regarding the literary and the religious-ritualistic modes as representations of in-betweenness. In this sense, Arnold’s poetic personas become the epitome of inward

alienation, where disconnection and secondariness is not only deeply felt by the alienated consciousness, but also questioned by the same inner gaze from within the greatest vacuum of all, the confines of the human mind. Arnold's many metaphors touch upon this inward intellectual estrangement, such as the metaphor of the exterior and historical battlefield slowly being covered in darkness in "Dover Beach", where the speaker is heard observing: "And we are here as on a darkling plain / Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, / Where ignorant armies clash by night" (ll. 35-37). The historically darkened plain also works as the metaphor for the depths of the interior and personal human psyche, where the ignorant clash can also be taken as the clash of literary reflection of a past experience versus the actual but no longer attainable original experience, as in a ritualistic or religious identification, signifying the poetic experience of the threshold. The clash results in an inescapable feeling of being caught in-between two armies, neither of which are able to properly identify the other. Being accompanied by perpetual estrangement, the constant battle between the human mind and human emotion can be likened to Arnold's metaphor of the night battle, where poetic reflection becomes confused with the original experience, constantly floating within Arnold's poetry as in a state of lost origins, because the origins of the actual experience can neither be found here, within the emotion as reality, nor there, within poetic reflection as metaphor.

As suggested by Miller's analysis stated above, the clash of the human mind with itself allows for a questioning of origins, but cannot help with the overwhelming personal feeling of disorientation and in-betweenness, resulting in a double Victorian poetics of insecurity and the interval. This interrupted and in-between period is no longer regarded as temporary in poetry, or guaranteed to be resolved by God or nature, but is largely and constantly motivated by looking into the inner-workings of detachment, as in Arnold's intellectualizing inward focus (Miller 2-3). Vulnerable, undefined, in-between, and wandering, this kind of estranged consciousness was nurtured by conflict. It was not only a disconnection, but also an uncomfortable doubling regarding the Victorian poetic scene. As a direct result of division, the Victorian encounter was a conflicting one, both with the eternal and the historical itself. Leading to a "tragic confrontation" in Farrell's words ("Tragic Vision" 107), the conflict was no longer between the cosmos, the creator, and the noble soul. It was, instead, between the historical process and a

cultivated but disoriented individual. The tragic dimension had shifted, because “[i]n the tragedy of former ages, finite man [was] made to confront a moral order that [was] the will of an eternal authority. In the nineteenth century the tragic confrontation [was] to be not with eternity but with history” and the historical self (Farrell, “Tragic Vision” 107). Arnold’s many figures and voices in his poetry, such as the reveller, the scholar-gipsy, the merman, or Empedocles embody such a conflict between the historical self and its origins, but being threshold figures, they rather reflect the tension between the two, instead of participating in one dimension or the other. This results in, and further strengthens a constant feeling of detachment and in-betweenness within his poetry, which most of Arnold’s critics featured so far also consider as a characteristic Victorian attitude towards the human mind as a cultural, historical, and psychological construct, rather than the result of divine creation.

A confrontation with the historical, in this sense, was to lead this emergent Victorian consciousness of disconnection into recognizing, and then questioning the problem of the self as a cultural construct. Although estranged, fragmented, and dispirited, the self was still a major concern. Looking at the blind rush of the Victorian age, Arnold famously diagnosed the situation in the 1853 Preface to the poems, where he observes a retreating and restless conception of the self in crisis, because “the calm, the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity have disappeared: the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement, of Hamlet and of Faust” (i). For Arnold, the self is a major and modern problem governed by division and inner reflection that feeds on retrospective considerations. John P. Farrell refers to Arnold’s phrase as a “ready-made term for the critical analysis of [Arnold’s] own poetry” (“Breaking the Dialogue” 1), because Arnold’s poetry does indeed hear the modern problem of secondariness, division, and in-betweenness, further striving to make others hear it, too. Farrell complements such a view by observing that “[Arnold’s] passage points in two different directions: inwardly, to a heart of darkness where thought moves in a wearying, dispiriting dialectic; and, outwardly, to an audience of witnesses who understand and recognize-‘hear’-the dialogue of the mind with itself” (“Breaking the Dialogue” 1).

Both the inward and outward projection of such doubts and thoughts, as Farrell points out, does not only confirm Arnold's preoccupation with reflection and in-betweenness, but also testifies to the relevance and importance of Arnold's poetics of in-betweenness for the modern age and onwards, because, as Ruth ApRoberts also notes:

Arnold's nineteenth-century crisis has become our norm; his "wandering between two worlds" seems less a diagnosis of the Victorian malaise than a statement of the human condition. His great symbols— the two worlds, the Sea of Faith, the ignorant armies' clash by night— are so successful that they have become almost too overriding as keys to "the Victorian Age" and to our own as well. They tyrannize over our minds, as it were, so that we see ourselves in their terms. (2)

Seeing one's own self and situation in a fractured mirror, as if through a metaphor within somebody else's poetic expression, and recognizing the essence but being unable to cross the boundary—going beyond the mirror and uniting with that reflection—form the basic anxieties of Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness. Arnold's famous metaphors of the mind, and the two worlds hold clues as to the nature and projection of the self, because they inherently entail an othering and doubling question that opens the self, or the problem of the 'I' to question. Similar to the mythic figures in his poetry, the Arnoldian lyrical but concealed 'I' recognizes itself as a historical construct, which is perpetually in-between the past and the present. Divided and governed by the limits, and the cultural baggage brought forward by the mind, this broken lyrical voice makes use of in-betweenness as a state of contemplation and awareness regarding human experiences. In this respect, Arnold's inwardly alienated, displaced, and wandering 'I' can be seen as a self-conscious, restless, and in-between example of the Victorian poetic practice, where, according to Valentine Cunningham, the lyrical 'I' becomes exposed to experimentation, and the self—more than ever, arises as an area of dispute:

Who is *I*? Who speaks when the text says *I*? Whose *I* is it? Who are we meeting and hearing when we hear, or overhear, the 'lyrical I' speaking? What, in fact, is an *I*, a *self*? What is it to *be*; to be self-conscious; to imagine being, and one's own being; to try and see oneself, one's selfhood, in the mirror of a poem; to try out, to assume, selves in a poetic text? The old Hamletian, Protestant-era I-problematics on which the Novel was founded, and which got such vigorous renewing in the poems of the Romantic period, get continued with refurbished vigour, and renewed anxiety, in the writings of the Victorian period – before being passed on into early modernist, and modernist, times, as *the* question. (189)

Cunningham places the problem of the self as the result of a poetic doubling, a productive crisis of self-consciousness and in-betweenness that divides the self into secondary reflections by further opening the dynamics of its existence to question. In this sense, the Victorian poetic self was deliberately and continuously kept in-between, and inquired into as a venue for poetic exploration. In such an entanglement, as J. Hillis Miller observes, “[t]he ideal world still exist[ed], but only as a form of consciousness, not as an objective fact. The drama has all been moved within the minds of the characters, and the world as it is in itself is by implication unattainable or of no significance [due to] the imprisoning of man in his consciousness” (12). Also for E. W. Slinn, “[i]n Victorian poetry the desire for a reality beyond representation persists, but a greater emphasis on the ironic ambiguities in the double role of consciousness intrudes and persists equally forcefully” (1). Arnold’s personas and their characteristic voicing as figures of constant in-betweenness pertain to the kind of ambiguous interiorized imprisonment Miller underlines above, as they indirectly engage with the double role of poetic alienation and poetic identification from within a removed space of the non-participatory in-between.

This double role, of both questioning and creating a divided consciousness that turns upon itself for self-examination had become the defining characteristic of the Victorian divide. According to Riede, within this divide “[t]he sense of lost splendour” reigned supreme, and the participatory Romantic image was “displaced by a more limited sense of the possibilities of poetic language, and particularly by an allegorical mode that acknowledge[d] the gap between language as the dress of thought and the imageless deep truth, the melancholy deeps of things” (*Allegories* 34). In this regard, Arnold’s poetry can be considered as the exploration of in-betweenness within the mind itself, which becomes a separate and unique state of mind, where a discourse of division focuses on the ambiguity of poetic reflection as a doubling and distancing element. Observation of the self as a cultural construct takes precedence over the observation of exterior natural phenomena, where the natural world and the human mind’s secondary and halted involvement in it are perpetually questioned through an awareness of in-betweenness as an alienating, but central mechanism of interrogating the self as an exile from the older world of participation, harmony, and involvement.

Further enhancing the poetic divide between the natural and cultural influences, Richard Cronin asserts that “Victorian poets often record an awareness that in the act of composition they experience a sense of being divided from themselves. The lyric ‘I’ is for them a compound rather than a simple subject” (28). Armstrong, too, indicates that “the displacement of the aesthetic realm into secondariness force[s] the poet[s] to conceptualise [themselves] as external to and over and against what comes to be seen as life. A crisis of representation both engenders and is engendered by this act of division. There [becomes] a multiple fracture, as it were, for life itself, [...] established as a condition of estrangement” (6). Such alienation produces not only a fractured self, but, above all, the questioning of the self as an existential problem, hence Browning’s experimentations with the dramatic monologue and psychological states of mind, or Arnold’s elegies and narrative poems that continually look back and turn inwards.

Arnold epitomizes the Victorian intellectual fracture between the buried, or personal self and the numerous mythic selves of the past by trying to inquire into that ever fleeting sense of temporality and personal in-betweenness along with the questioning of the dynamics behind poetic creation as an inescapable invocation of the past. In this regard, as Joseph Bristow argues, Arnold characterizes a detached gaze into the inner dynamics and contradictory nature of Victorian poetics, where the “self [was] both personal *and* dramatic— and it is this multiple identity of the poet that marks out a Victorian difference from Romanticism” (6). Also, the self has now become very self-conscious, and, especially in Arnold, disturbed about this peculiarly modern “crisis of representation” Armstrong underlines (6). Therefore, Arnold’s poetic voices are constantly and characteristically wandering and wondering the in-between settings, moods, and dramatic structures they are caught within, indirectly expressing, or oozing out fundamentals of modern alienation. If Arnold’s “The Scholar Gipsy” or “The Strayed Reveller”, or other poems that dwell on the cultural dynamics of poetic creation and intellectual reflection are read as poetic structures which induce in-betweenness as a mechanism of self-awareness, it would become clear that they make use of estrangement and in-betweenness as a modern entanglement with the fractured and self-conscious Victorian mirror, where “Victorian poetics begins to conceptualise the idea of culture as a category and includes itself within the definition. To be modern was to be overwhelmingly secondary” (Armstrong 3).

There are certain conclusions to be drawn from such commentary that characterize the kind of Victorian poetics as Victorian in-betweenness, which Arnold's poetry also springs from. First, is that the Victorian poetic mind was dwelling in vacated premises, and it was exposed to its own loneliness as "[c]losure, teleological purpose, bec[a]me less certain as the means of controlling meaning, [where] speakers increasingly reveal their attachment to acts of representation, to a fractured lyricism which proposes the self as a factitious construct" (Slinn 2). Secondly, inside this lost unity, or "terrifying absence" (Miller 2), retrospection, reflection, vocation and invocation as in the inner questioning of summoning distant pasts in poetry become increasingly dominant, and form an alienated, in-between, and retrospective poetic consciousness which is obsessed with the dead and the resurrection of the past (Attentive readers of Victorian verse would agree that the sheer presence of elegies drenched in the mythological or historical past, and the elegiac mode being prevalent throughout the century proves this point). Thirdly, poetry becomes self-conscious and self-reflexive; not only realizing, but also making use of what Cunningham calls "the problematics of reference" as the very definition of Victorian in-betweenness itself (6).

For Cunningham, a particular interest in the Victorian poetic scene has been developing towards secondariness, where deixis serves as the governing body of Victorian poetics: "Victorian poetry is not just deictic, it's omni-deictic. *Deixis*, the linguistic action of pointing towards, pointing out, things in the non-verbal world (things of all sorts, not just objects and items, but events, persons, feelings), *this, that, there*, is what this poetry luxuriates in. Victorian poetry refers" (5). In the act of referring, and thus reflecting upon such references, a double consciousness, a division between an ontological yearning and an epistemologically oriented doubtful viewpoint is created. In this regard, what Armstrong calls "the double poem" becomes the end-product of a reflexive and divided consciousness, pointing towards its own inner mechanisms:

The double poem is a deeply sceptical form. It draws attention to the epistemology which governs the construction of the self and its relationships and to the cultural conditions in which those relationships are made. It is an expressive model and an epistemological model simultaneously. Epistemological and hermeneutic problems are built into its very form, for interpretation, and what the act of interpretation involves, are questioned in the very existence of the double model. (13)

According to Cronin, such a self-reflexive, divided, and epistemological model serves as the primary preoccupation of the age, where “the Victorians characteristically produced [such] double poems, [and these poems] offer themselves at once as the medium through which the reader is invited to gaze at the world”, where both the readers and the poem simultaneously become “the objects of that gaze” (28). Consequently, an ontological yearning for the origins of a primary experience such as ritualizing the self into a credible origin becomes counter-posed against the manipulative epistemological models of in-betweenness as secondary poetic references. Finally, it should be noted that, whether it was the “melancholy of melancholy” that divided and produced this new detached self-consciousness, or doubled consciousness as Riede argued (*Allegories 2*), or that it was the deictic process of reference and reflection, as Cunningham sets forth, the Victorian poetic practice was quite busy with itself, trying to deal with reflection, secondariness, and dividedness from within an in-between vantage point that offers a unique position to look at the past and the present simultaneously. Not only was the past questioned, but also created a new, to fit a growing modern consciousness which felt insecure and out of place. This dialectical and paradoxical structure of Victorian poetics, according to Slinn, also serves as the background to an awareness of an existential struggle to make sense of one’s surroundings, because in such an experience

[p]oets, speakers, subjects face a terrifying prospect in Victorian poetry: they speak in order to establish the presence of their authority; they argue for their place in the scheme of things in order to establish the self, if nothing else, as a viable centre in which to locate value and meaning. Yet the moment they speak, they commit the self to inevitable division, to a textual disjunction which ironically challenges their authority in the very act of attempting to establish it [...] through that very process of division, the self is brought into existence as subject, constituted through difference. (2)

All such critique informs Arnold’s poetry as well. In a similar manner Slinn and Riede proposed, Arnold’s poetic creations emerge out of a discourse of division within the mind that realize their own alienation. As Madden has argued, this divided consciousness is inquisitive and self-aware. Situating itself in-between a detached intellectual understanding of nostalgia and contrasting feelings clinging on to the originality of emotion, Arnold’s poetic representations of in-betweenness feed on the

fragility of personal, emotionally infused memories, and the dynamics of cultural retrospection as a constant source of poetic invocation. Consequently, the act of representation, especially the art of poetry as retrospective reflection, becomes questioned from within an alienated and in-between poetic consciousness in Arnold's poetry, which is both self-conscious and self-reflexive, as Collini and Ruth ApRoberts amongst others previously noted. But what is often overlooked is that, such discussions of the alienated, in-between, doubling, and secondary nature of Arnold's poetics has critical ties to the study of in-betweenness which is also inherent to the idea of human ritualization. In-betweenness, in this regard, is understood as a paradoxical mechanism of association and dissociation with the world within human ritualization, which can paradoxically create a self-awareness of the ritual structure as well as inducing a state of self-forgetfulness, where participation and detachment operate within contesting senses of in-betweenness.

If ritualization becomes successful, a consciousness of participation and involvement rules over detachment and estrangement, leading to the maintaining of a social order, acknowledgement of a personal sense of security, and a sense of wholeness and continuity. When ritualization is left incomplete, or questioned from within, a process of estrangement and questioning takes over, where relations between the ritual structure and its operations become interrogated, and re-structured from within the same in-between space, which paradoxically allows successful or failed senses of ritualization at the same time. If Victorian poetics of in-betweenness can be seen as exemplifying the non-participatory and inquisitive kind of broken ritualization referred to above, where a self-conscious re-structuring took place regarding the fragmented Victorian poetics, it should also be noted that such fragmentation was not devoid of a counter-part and an anti-theses, which can best be observed in the in-between relationship Victorian poetics establishes with the re-structuring controversies surrounding Victorian religious discourse. The paradoxical relationship between faith and doubt, in this sense, becomes central to the poetics of the age, and can be principally observed in Arnold's involvement with the characteristic Victorian zeitgeist of the demystification, of both faith and doubt in Victorian religious discourse, where a dichotomy between faith and doubt defines and re-defines limits, further paving the way for Arnold's antithetical

poetics of in-betweenness within his poetry. The Victorian context of religious dispute, religious and evolutionary discourse, and the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of the science of religion, in this vein, informs Arnold's poetry in relation to the conception and employment of boundaries, as Arnold's use of the limit underlying a self-awareness of liminality and in-betweenness becomes a testimony to the in-betweenness of the dialogue between the poetic and the religious discourse of the Victorian age. Friedrich Max Müller and Arnold are notable for their contributions to such a dialogue, where the importance and centrality of the limit for human consciousness becomes established, and starts emerging into a distinct field of study, opening the way for modern studies of in-betweenness.

MATTHEW ARNOLD AND IN-BETWEENNESS WITHIN VICTORIAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE: THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

A critical juncture between science and religion is embodied in the Victorian intellectual struggle to reconcile a secular type of discourse with a religious and traditional one. Consequently, a secularizing and scientific outlook gets directed towards the culture of Victorian religion, forcing a re-evaluation of religious discourse, and re-negotiating a place of origin for the religious experience. Arnold and Müller's efforts, in this sense, can be counted amongst the unique Victorian endeavour to reconcile a secular outlook with that of an essentially poetic and religious one, where both men argued that poetic expressions concerned with mankind's involvement with their own existence and the past inherently involved a religious understanding of the in-betweenness of human experience. In their view, a scientific and secular outlook was necessary to discover the essentially religious and poetic roots of human language, where an overwhelming sense of in-betweenness had led mankind to consider his own involvement with the world, which was defined and structured by an understanding of the limit. Both Arnold and Müller understood the limit as necessitating the connection humanity established with a concept of the beyond, where the discovery of mankind's own in-betweenness had resulted in religious systems of orientation for humanity within the world.

Arnold and Müller belong to the turbulent atmosphere of Victorian intellectual and cultural life, as scientific and religious discourse were both seeking a definitive origin

for humanity's place within history, neither fully succeeding, and thus further contributing to a general public feeling of in-betweenness, which was already in the air by the 1860s regarding Victorian cultural and religious life. Observable in the Victorian public's fascination with issues concerning scientific developments as well as their moral and existential implications, oppositions between material progress, scientific discovery, and spiritual chaos brought about a crisis of the human spirit, which can be seen as forming an atmosphere of constant debate regarding the natural sciences and their cultural interpretation. This tension between seemingly contradictory forces, such as science and religion cloaked within a self-defeating dichotomy between faith and doubt can be said to define the Victorian era at its core. As John Gardiner observes "[b]y the time of Victoria's death [...] the term Victorian sat like some awesome monolith, staring modernity in the face with a sphinx-like countenance. Only those who got closer could see this inscrutability for what it was—a mass of contradictory impressions and details" (4-5). Arnold was amongst the scrutinizing intellectual crowd with Friedrich Max Müller, who dared to attempt a closer inspection of the controversial religion or poetry question in relation to the poeticity and linguistic origins of the Biblical origins of human culture, and their combined thought can be observed as focusing on the riddle and main contradiction of the Victorian sphinx: how to reconcile scientific discourse with that of the religious and the poetic.

The new approach seeking to bring together scientific studies of language and religion was coined by Friedrich Max Müller in the factious decades of the 1850s and 1860s, where Müller "sought to launch a new branch of the human sciences—the 'science of religion'" (Wheeler-Barclay 38). It was also through this new avenue that tensions between theological, evolutionary, and cultural perspectives were sought to be further explored and resolved. Given that the Victorian public was very much interested and influenced by religious and scientific controversies and discoveries, it has almost become commonplace to relate the growth of this newly developing interdisciplinary field of interest to that of religious discontent and controversy crawling underneath the skin of Victorian society. According to Gardiner, filled with dissent between Catholic and Anglican tendencies, religious issues were taken quite seriously by the average Victorian, where "religion was something over which friendships could be broken and lifelong rifts made" (7). Mark A. Smith further notes that a similar rift had been forming

within intellectual and religious circles between views on how to interpret the Bible and how to approach Biblical history and its rituals, as in the Eucharist, resulting in a clash between the Orthodox and Tractarian sympathies regarding symbolic or literal understandings of religion (340-341).

Depending on one's affiliations, another major issue was what to do with the English church, which had become a political and cultural Victorian institution with its unorthodox bishop-theologians having influence over fragmented congregations. Luke Ferretter locates the heart of this crisis both inside and outside the church, where "the Church of England had been forced for the first time to face the challenges of natural science and of German biblical criticism, call[ing] into question the traditional basis of faith in the historical truth of the Bible" (640). As Ferreter further acknowledges, the church was pushed into declaring war on its own members, because, apart from Darwin's *Origins* of 1859, and "the geology of the first half of the century cast[ing] doubt on the historical accuracy of the book of Genesis", only a year later came another scandalous publication, "the *Essays and Reviews* of 1860, written by six clergymen and a layman [with the] authors set[ting] out to end the silence in the Church of England over questions of biblical criticism that had been disturbing educated Christians at least since George Eliot's translation of David Friedrich Strauss's *Life of Jesus* in 1846" (640). The reception of *Essays* were scandalous and disturbing for conservative church circles because of its emphasis on and acceptance of the literariness of the Bible, which came from within the church instead of non-religious liberals outside the church, who were accustomed to treat the Bible as a creative but spiritual work rather than an accurate account of human history.

Prosecutions based on accusations of heresy regarding *Essays* served only to increase the publicity of the major idea German Biblical criticism, also known as Higher Criticism has been known to be promoting since the late eighteenth-century, emphasizing poeticity, creativity, and the literary influences in the scriptures without being bogged down by its literal and traditional interpretations. With the broadening Victorian scholarship, the question of the Bible was moved to the forefront of a number of disciplines ranging from theology and comparative philology to the study of myths, poetry and literature as "the higher criticism presented the revolutionary practice of

studying the Christian scriptures as the collected poetry and mythology of an ancient, primitive people—as a mythical, rather than a strictly factual, record” (LaPorte 6). Referring to Jowett’s contributing central piece to the *Essays*, “On the Interpretation of Scripture”, LaPorte duly notes that it “present[ed] a later and fuller articulation of the idea that religious inspiration lies in a text’s literary qualities, rather than its divine origins. In 1860s Oxford, this idea was as revolutionary as it had been in 1780s Jena, and in the 1860s it generated far more widespread discussion” (7).

Whatever the sources and outcome of such intellectual hunger and publicity, the Victorian reading public was not easily sated, and doubt still lingered both ways. As Ferretter explains, “[a]lthough the theory of evolution was well integrated into Christian thought only two or three decades later, Darwin’s work cemented in the popular mind the conviction that ‘science’ contradicted ‘religion’” (640). Not only the popular, but also the Victorian intellectual public was forced at every turn to choose sides between science and religion, and those who stood in-between like Arnold and Müller became even more interested in issues regarding poetic language, scientific method, and religion, because no one side seemed to be satisfactory on its own. Because of such diversity of dispute, discovery, curiosity, and obstinacy, as Collini notes, “[t]he passions of the Victorian reading public could be stirred by religion as by no other subject [;] it was a society in which a new work of Biblical exegesis could be a best-seller, and where volumes of sermons and theological tracts far outsold novels and other genres” (Arnold 93). According to LaPorte, “Biblical scholarship at this cultural moment had a wider circulation than ever before, both within and beyond the universities. *Essays and Reviews* went through twelve editions between 1860 and 1865, [s]imilar sensations [following] in Colenso’s *Pentateuch*, and Ernest Renan’s *Life of Jesus (La Vie de Jésus)* (1863)” (6).

Arnold occupied a distinctly visible part of this scene, who was himself an in-between figure engaging in wide intellectual exchanges with poets inside and outside the clergy, men of letters, men of politics, education, and science beyond count, most notable amongst them being Tennyson, Browning, and A. Hugh Clough (McGann 149), Keble and Newman (Cronin 174), T. H. Huxley (Ferretter 640), and as Arnold playfully refers to them in *Literature and Dogma*, the “Archbishops of York” (32), or “the bishops of

Winchester and Gloucester” in *God and the Bible* (12). It was during these exchanges that, “[c]onsistently challenging the dominant (materialist and, in his estimate, spiritually barren) ideologies of his era, [Arnold] gradually emerged as the preeminent intellectual authority of late Victorian England” (Harrison, *Victorian Poets* 103). For E. D. H. Johnson, Arnold was only equalled by Tennyson and Browning as “the poets who touched their period at the greatest number of points” (xi). According to David DeLaura, Arnold achieved this by his unique in-between stance towards issues regarding science and religion:

Arnold's strategy is complex. Against orthodox Christians he argues that the notion of a Personal God is unintelligible and unverifiable [...] Against the rationalizing philosophical Liberals (whose positivism he accepts) he argues, nevertheless, that the masses need emotional and imaginative support for the practice of morality, and that this can only come from the Bible, considered as a comforting and uplifting poetic testimony to *righteousness* [...] as verified through the whole of man's history (*Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England* 105-106).

Within such an ambience of religious and cultural commotion, a new point of reference was also on its way to establishing itself as a newly emerging scientific field which made the origins of human language its chief focus. Resembling an oxymoron, the science of religion was beginning to be pronounced more and more by poets, clergymen, and philologists alike. This new science intended to be an exchange between the historical method, religious instinct, and a historical-linguistic understanding of the past, where “the relationship between this cultural upheaval and the creation of a distinct field of discourse [...] variously known as the ‘science of religion,’ ‘comparative religions,’ or the ‘history of religions’ [would] flourish in Britain from about 1860 up to the early years of World War I” (Wheeler-Barclay 1-2). Arnold would not be able to see it in full bloom, but still, having contributed extensively to issues of scientific methodology and religion within this controversial milieu, his ideas and outlook regarding poeticity, metaphor, and the shaping power of the poetic mode for human progress would inform later developments on the study of anthropology, language, and ritualization established in theory and fieldwork during the twentieth century. In this regard, not only was Arnold to become influential for the modern age, he was himself influenced by the philologically motivated developments of the 1860s and onwards, which came to be generally known as the science of religion.

Matthew Arnold was very much interested in the new developments and controversies surrounding the spiritual, scientific, and cultural crisis that the Victorian age experienced. Arnold was an authentic contributor to the atmosphere of intellectual debate, mainly revolving around discussions of the literariness and poeticity of the Bible. Arnold was also a believer in the importance of poetry and the poeticity of the Bible for human progress, since both poetry and religious instinct created awe and filled a void no other human construction could fulfil. The poetic and the religious instincts were interrelated in Arnold's view, which a scientific and literary understanding of past cultures, like the Hebrew, the Hellene, and the Biblical versions of human history would prove to emphasize through the use of metaphor and anthropomorphization. Therefore, in much of his efforts, Arnold can be seen arguing for the centrality of metaphor for the human experience, striving, as Lionel Trilling has expressed, to "cut beneath all the over-growths of religion", because Arnold believed that it was because of the misunderstood place of metaphor and anthropomorphization that faulty supernatural reflections of various historical human experiences came to be misrepresented through a misleading and literal understanding of religion and religious history (318). According to Trilling, Arnold regarded anthropomorphization useful and necessary because it was practical for mankind to maintain existential purpose and focus, where Arnold believed that

man can act best when he believes in a universe which in some way is acting with him, when he has the notion of a friend, a Paraclete, a helper in the scheme of things. And since man's mind is of such sort that it tends to imagine this helper, since it can even be proved that man acts more effectively when he cultivates the belief in this aid, surely he [will] have faith in its existence and [...] conceive of a world with meaning, that meaning being moral (318).

As Trilling suggests, the Arnoldian critical project shows the cultivation process of anthropomorphization as a crucial idea relating the historical development of human civilizations with a religious understanding originating from the abstraction of morality through poetic creation. In-betweenness, in this respect, plays an essential role, because it is only through this feeling of in-betweenness and uncertainty that mankind was able to give himself the idea that there was something or someone beyond his own worldly existence. It was only through mankind's recognition of his own transience, limits, and

in-between state that he was able to question his own existence. In Arnold's understanding, these two forces, the reality of in-betweenness which triggered a mechanism of awareness and beckoned a moral involvement with the world, and the respective anthropomorphization of such in-between human experiences within the world were only made available by the poetic mode employed practically by influential human civilizations. Therefore, as Ruth ApRoberts also suggests, that Arnold's chief focus on the culturally constructive properties of poetic language as "vocation" (2-5) becomes inherently connected to Arnold's insistence on, and understanding of a "poetry-religion continuum", where Arnold, according to ApRoberts, was looking for "a realm where poetry and religion [were] undifferentiated. 'Poetry' and 'Religion' [Arnold] might have written in the margins of Butler's *Sermons*, are fictive entities unravelling what is really a harmonious whole [and] this focal sense of continuum guides the developing idea of vocation in the poems" (*Arnold and God* 7).

Although "[f]or many Victorians poetry and religion were so closely associated as to be scarcely distinguishable" (Cronin 174), Arnold did not take it for granted. As Arnold was maturing into the cultural climate of religious dispute, which was revolving around issues regarding science, poetry and/or religion, he took an active and systematic interest in pursuing the depths of the issue. What Arnold often refers to as the *zeitgeist*, a combination of approaches to the inquisitive religion versus science dispute, occupied a core position in Victorian intellectual discourse (Wheeler-Barclay 3). The *zeitgeist à la mode* was getting to the bottom of the religion question and its origins, not only in natural philosophy or Darwinian evolution, but also in the origins of poetic language, which Müller's newly emerging science of religion was mainly interested in. Arnold was thoroughly involved with this particular *zeitgeist*, and became an active participant of the scene by publishing his concentrated essays in book form, addressed to the issues of literariness, poeticity, and religion in question. The most notable are *St. Paul and Protestantism* (1870), *Literature and Dogma* (1873), and *God and the Bible* (1875).

It is through these writings that Arnold, in Basil Willey's words, takes an inquisitive, in-between stance, and emerges as "the found[er] of Anglican modernism [where] he came under fire from two sides: from the orthodox, who accused him of infidelity, of turning God into a 'stream of tendency' and of substituting vague emotion for definite belief;

and from the infidels, for clinging to the church and retaining certain Christian beliefs of which he had undermined the foundations” (3). Despite being labelled as a troublemaker, Arnold’s sole concern was to unravel unnecessary mystifications surrounding true religious instinct, which he thought resided within essential questions regarding the nature of analogy and human nature. In *St. Paul and Protestantism*, Arnold can be seen demonstrating his method, as demystifying as usual, engaged as Newman, Keble, or Friedrich Max Müller with that same question of what to do with the sacred or the poetic word – God’s or otherwise. Referring to Joseph Butler’s *Analogy* of 1736, Arnold argues against useless dogma which had already become obsolete by Victorian times with the inquisitive and critical spirit of the age:

The Analogy, the great work on which such immense praise has been lavished, is, for all real intents and purposes now, a failure; it does not serve. It seemed once to have a spell and a power; but the *Zeit-Geist* breathes upon it, and we rub our eyes, and it has the spell and the power no longer. It has the effect upon me, as I contemplate it, of a stately and severe fortress, with thick and high walls, built of old to control the kingdom of evil;—but the gates are open, and the guards gone. (*St. Paul* 344)

Arnold, here, demonstrates the zeitgeist in his own unique disillusioning and practical way, trying always “to see the object as in itself it really is” (*Essays in Criticism* 1) without clinging dogmatically to the chains of the past, yet still looking in retrospect. Arnold’s method can be observed as trying, first, to understand the problem, and if possible, find a logical explanation for the failure. Finally, Arnold would move on to replace the failed mechanism of dogmatic analogy with poetry, as he famously quotes in Latin, “Relicti mergimur et perimus, visitati vero ergimur et vivimas”, providing his own translation as “Left to ourselves, we sink and perish; visited, we lift up our heads and live” (*Literature and Dogma* 21). This visitation for humankind, as Arnold saw it, had always been poetry; it was poetry and a participatory sense of in-betweenness which became poeticized within a sense of discovery and morality, giving life and endurance to earlier and influential civilizations. As Arnold understood it, only through poetry and the poetic mode was mankind able to connect to the greater realities of the world from within his own constantly in-between situation, but to realize the importance of this in-betweenness, the inner-workings of the art of poetry and the poetic mode had to be understood first for how and why it functioned for humanity. According to

Arnold, poetry is “that root and ground of religion, that element of awe and gratitude which fills religion with emotion, and makes it other and greater than morality, the *not ourselves*” (*Literature and Dogma* 229).

As can be seen through his observation on Butler, Arnold’s general method was quite utilitarian, which is a quality shared with the reigning Victorian zeitgeist. Commonly found together with the Victorians’ fixation with the past and the conviction that it needed to be reutilized through retrospection, Arnold’s method of looking closely into the past is a characteristic Victorian stance of the in-between, which also underlines a specific consciousness of time that many Victorian intellectuals similarly pursued. According to Jerome Bump, although many Victorians seemed to be obsessed with progress and the future, those who were concerned with the humanities and the natural sciences were exclusively preoccupied with the past and what it revealed for the cultural dynamics of the present:

Like us, [Victorians] inherited a faith in “progress,” reinforced by the advance of science and technology, and thus a perception of time as homogenous, linear, and unrepeatable. [...] However, instead of placing their faith in this movement toward a better future, many Victorians in the humanities, arts, and religion [...] thought they could reach their goals by going backward rather than forward in time. [T]he goal was to break through linear time into a cyclical, reactualizable time and/or into an eternal presence. (27)

In this regard, Arnold’s preoccupation with the past emerges as an effort to locate timeless realities and the processes of their discovery, like that of morality. Arnold believed that the discovery of cultural and natural dynamics surrounding religion and poetic language could then be used to make sense of the absurdities of the present, like a personified concept of God, or the miracles associated with Jesus Christ. For Arnold, the main question was to unearth the governing idea behind the historical process which led to a universal process of anthropomorphization. The process demanded going back to the fabled roots of human civilization in which the eternal presence, the *not ourselves* was expressed exclusively through words describing an awareness of limits, in-betweenness, and otherness. This could only be found in humanity’s relationship with the origins and historical development of his own language. In Arnold’s view, as the original use and context of human language changed, “the primitive sense [...] faded away [,] the figure was forgotten”, and original concrete concepts such as breath or

growth which emphasized an observable presence became a mere shadow of themselves and were turned into hollow abstractions signifying non-existent and supernatural things such as heaven or hell (*God and the Bible* 78-79). Arnold argued that, as the Old Testament gave way to the versions of the Disciples of Christ's teachings, words describing righteous conduct and physical human actions regarding moral behaviour had lost their original associations. These expressions had been morphed into mythologized, supernaturally magnified, and anthropomorphic concepts as in "found[ing] religion on prediction and miracle, guarantee[ing] it by supernatural interventions and the coming of the Son of Man in the clouds, consummat[ing] it by a banquet with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in a city shining with gold and precious stones" (*Literature and Dogma* 338).

According to Arnold, this was to lead towards false understandings resulting in fantastic or metaphysical considerations which were taken too literally, hence distorting humanity's essential relationship with true religion and religious sentiment. In Arnold's words, it was only through the exploration of "our old resource", human language, which was primary over all other sciences and distorted religions, that humanity would be able to decipher his own physical transience and poetic in-betweenness, having historically and perpetually been caught between the abstract and the concrete. Thus, the study of language and the poetic mode along with its associations with the production of human culture would enable the human mind to come to an awareness of the relationship between abstraction and the concrete facts of human existence. Exterior and physical contact with the world, and interior and mental contact with one's own feelings and thoughts made humanity realize this connection between abstraction and physical being, which Arnold regarded as the ultimate reality of human life, the in-betweenness of human existence which made social living, and the conception of poetry and art possible (*God and the Bible* 71-75).

In other words, it was only through realizing this seemingly incompatible relationship between abstract concepts and humanity's concrete and physical involvement with the world that humanity came to recognize and make use of the sustaining power of poetry as a visitation, since only the poetic mode allowed the human mind to be at two separate places at the same time. Poetry was not only a visitation which was received, but it also

made possible the very act of visiting, and keeping the past alive—which was otherwise impossible—by facilitating an awareness of the in-between and passage-like quality of human existence. Within such in-betweenness, the past and the present continually associated and dissociated with each other through the use of the poetic mode as visitation. In Arnold's view, since the ancients recognized things only by their active presence and involvement with the real world, like breath or growth, active and observable presences such as breath and growth were gradually named and personified into the concept of God as the most active presence in the world. This was the perfect example of how poetry worked in the real world. Religious and poetic sentiments came with the recognition of physical actions which were not of mankind's own making, like the flowing of rivers, or the rising and the setting of the sun, which caused a recognition of temporality, in-betweenness, and otherness for early humanity (*God and the Bible* 76-79). Just like the physical world, humanity was also in continuous passage, caught in-between birth and death, and continually involved with the physical realities of the world. Thus, action and movement defined all other abstract concepts, such as virtue and duty, because their existence was only observable by their perceived presence as moral and influential factors in human life. They existed, and as Arnold considered it, they were there from the beginning; they stood forth as realities of the world although they were poeticized realities, and they did not exist separately from mankind on their own (*God and the Bible* 80).

As Arnold saw it, these actions came to be observed and expressed through poetic language that was inherently emphatic, and aroused an effervescence through action, participation with the world, involvement, and movement. Arnold illustrates this structure further, where he focuses on the transformation process of language as having basically evolved from verbs as words designating participatory physical action, as in being part of a greater reality: "For when men wanted strongly to affirm that action or operation of things, that image of their own life and activity, which impressed itself upon their mind and affected them, they took [...] primitive verbs and used them emphatically" (*God and the Bible* 80-81). As can be observed, Arnold's expressive and associative view of poetic language works on the premise that humanity, by acquiring an awareness of the in-between—first in the concrete operations of nature and later in the use of human language—came to a realization that continuity regarding human

existence was only possible through employing the same model of the passage, as in passing from one physical state to the other like growth, to the poetic creation of a mythology of eternal life which guaranteed continuous being and existence above all else. The notion of the limit, in this regard, becomes essential to Arnold's understanding of human existence, and can be considered as the prerequisite for revealing humanity's relationship to the creation of its own mythologies of existence, like the belief in an after-life. Arnold's views seem to suggest that, without a recognition of in-betweenness and the notion of being limited, or being surrounded by limits, humanity would not have been able to orient himself within the world, and further feel the need to overcome these limits by way of poetic creation or the creation and preservation of myths and stories, giving existence shape and meaning in the form of a culture of religion, participation, and involvement with the world. It was only through the recognition of the limit that humanity became introduced to the idea of "the *not ourselves*", as Arnold continually keeps referring to in his religious prose, which was religious in essence by continually pointing towards the beyond, because it involved a perception of a greater reality as morality, and resulted in an ordered sense of existence allowing for further awe and discovery for humanity.

In Arnold's own words, the perception of the limit, and the conception of the beyond, as in "the *not ourselves*", were first and foremost religious in origin, and made human orientation and progress possible in the first place. Arnold, in *God and the Bible*, tries to make it clear that mankind's awareness of himself comes from conduct through emotionally and physically observable realities of the world inspired by awe, which is then encoded in the poetic process. Conduct towards others, towards one's own self, or conduct towards the world are interactions with limits, both with the physical, emotional, and narrative realities of human existence, and the limited nature of these interactions point towards a perpetual beyond-ness of the beyond, because

history of things show us that happiness, at which we all aim, is dependent on righteousness. Yet certainly we did not make this to be so, and it did not begin when we began, nor does it end when we end, but is, so far as we can see, an eternal tendency outside us, prevailing whether we will or no, whether we are here or not. There is no difficulty, therefore, about an Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness. (34)

Arnold was suggesting that, the ancients of the world had personified righteousness as an eternal reality, giving it the name of God, because it was a powerful and orderly reality, which enlightened them, and was perceivably active both in their interior and exterior worlds. With the means immediately available to them, this presence was acknowledged within the human mind, and helped ancient societies in the orientation of ideas, customs, and social practices, since Arnold believed that “the spirit of man should entertain hopes and anticipations, beyond what it actually knows and can verify, is quite natural. Human life could not have the scope, and depth, and progress it has, were this otherwise” (*Literature and Dogma* 76-77). Arnold was, above all, interested in the verifiable facts of human existence. Language in its poetic operations and religion in its social and philosophical contexts to human existence were verifiable and basic facts of human orientation within the world, since they were common for human existence, and have been in existence from the beginning of human civilization. Therefore it was imperative that these verifiable and observable realities of human existence be studied scientifically within their historical progress. Arnold’s efforts at religious criticism which forms an important part of Victorian religious discourse should be seen within this framework, which privileges the recognition of in-betweenness as a mechanism of existential awareness over blind, or dogmatic choosing of sides regarding science or religion.

Arnold’s approach, discussed so far, is also highly reminiscent of the method employed by Friedrich Max Müller in approaching the problem of religion from a language oriented perspective, especially becoming influential in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. If Arnold’s “first principal or first anti-principle”, as Caufield puts it (67), was to deal primarily with the verifiable part of human culture, Müller’s research employed the same perspective by revealing a larger network of philologically verifiable studies of ancient languages that concentrated on the primacy of physical experiences and the linguistic involvement with the world over myth, religion, or ritual. Similar to Arnold’s agenda of demystification, the new science of religion was setting out to question the origins of human language and myth within scientific linguistic theory, rather than supernatural biblical versions of God’s creation in distorted theological tracts. Instead of creating yet another area of conflict, as the name suggests, science of religion sought to reconcile and explore the dynamics of human conduct within the natural world, and if

possible, unearth the origins of the objective and subjective worlds in which humanity was now living in the modern age through feelings of secondariness and dividedness. Because of its reconciliatory organization, in Marjorie Wheeler-Barclay's words

[t]he science of religion should be seen as an effort to explore the pluralism and participate in the religious experiment without allowing scientific naturalism or any other new would-be orthodoxy to shut down investigation before it had even begun. Amidst controversies over evolution, biblical criticism, and the authority of the churches in education, cultural life, and politics, this new scholarly enterprise functioned as an alternative locus of discourse about religious issues. Far from promoting an antireligious or materialistic agenda, the science of religion provided an opportunity for traditional Christians, radical scientists, and everyone in between to talk about religion without becoming immediately bogged down in fractious polemics (14).

It was around this nexus of interdisciplinary approaches focusing on the problem of myth within a broader concept of religion that Friedrich Max Müller's theories started to gain prominence. Arnold's insight into the religious origins of poetic language, and his views on the linguistic origins of religious and poetic abstraction provided this far should be understood within the larger framework described as the pluralistic late Victorian "religious experiment" described above by Wheeler-Barclay (14). The so-called religious experiment undertaken by Müller's science of religion also made use of the notion of in-betweenness, and, as Müller employs it in his theories of language, highlights an organic bond existing between the conception of the limit, in-betweenness, and the notion of the beyond observable in nature and natural phenomena. This organic bond, or rather the break in this organic chain, as Müller understood it, was responsible for the creation, and later on, the misunderstood notion and function of the myths.

In-betweenness can be seen as embedded in Müller's understanding of the relationship between mythology (poetic statements regarding nature and existence), and the process of poeticizing human actions perceived within the physical world. Müller, a fellow of Arnold from Oxford, shared Arnold's views regarding the primacy of physical involvement with the world as language over myth, superstition, and ritual. As Marjorie Wheeler-Barclay observes, Müller and Arnold corresponded with each other, exchanging parallel views regarding the importance of a scientific and historical approach to the problems of religion, the roots of poetic language, and the necessity of

religious sentiment “to enlarge the intellectual horizons of [...] English readers and to stimulate their imaginative sympathies” because Arnold and Müller believed this to be “the only way to remedy the bitter divisiveness of religious debate” surrounding Victorian society (67).

Müller, usually credited for baptizing the new science of religion, was originally a scholar of Sanskrit. Seen by many as a pioneer and a major influence responsible for establishing links between the study of mythology and language, in its simplest form, “Müller argued that what we know as myths were originally poetic statements about nature, especially the sun, made by the ancient Indo-Europeans [...] However, their poetry was subsequently misunderstood by later generations of the cultural groups they conquered”, as these statements got dissociated from their original involvement with the cultural context, where the participatory quality of the root-verbs disappeared into abstraction (Bell, *Ritual Perspectives* 3-4). In Jerome Bump’s view, Müller was amongst a number of Victorian “radicals” like Hopkins and Pusey, who understood religious discourse as a “palimpsest, [where] [t]he basic assumption was that the fundamental truths of the human life experience (unlike those of science and technology) had been discovered thousands of years ago, and the project of the humanities or religion was to translate them into terms accessible to the current population” (28). Müller, however, further believed that the only way of unearthing layers of religious debris was to understand and to uncover the inner-workings of human language, because in his view “conscious perception [was] impossible without language” (*Growth of Religion* 38), and that the palimpsest quality of humanity’s religious involvement with the world would only be discovered and deciphered by going backwards, and looking into the numerous pasts humanity was involved with.

Müller’s emphasis on the centrality of in-betweenness for the production of myths and culture has its roots in the recognition of limits, the sensation of awe, and the perception of the *beyond-ness of the beyond* regarding sensual perception of natural limits and the operation of the limit within the physical world with its philosophical implications regarding the creation of myths. For Müller, the perception of the beyond contained a religious and instinctual understanding which was naturally perceived and admitted alongside the main “stream of religious development, [where] there were many other

streams and rivulets, all starting from the observation of natural phenomena, and all ending with the recognition of powers beyond nature” (*Anthropological Religion* 77). In this sense, the existence or the perception of a notion of the beyond originates in nature, and becomes central to Müller’s theory as the notion of the beyond gets interiorized and embedded within human consciousness.

Müller developed his theories on the perception and naming of “*tangible, semi-tangible, intangible objects*” (*Natural Religion* 150) as primal processes responsible for sense perception. In Müller’s view, *tangible* objects were complete in themselves, containing no mystery, and accordingly requiring no explanation, like stones, shells, or wooden logs, which were immediately perceived by the senses to their full extent. These possessed no theogonic capacity at all, because they only pointed to their own fullness of being. What he called the *semi-tangibles*, and *intangibles* however, were not perceived thoroughly, as in rivers, trees, the earth, and mountains, because these contained the element of the beyond within them. A tree was both visible and invisible, with its roots going deep into the earth, and it contained a hidden essence inside the bark “which, for want of a better name, we call its life [...] A tree, therefore, has something intangible, something unknowable, something infinite in it [as] it presents to us something infinite under a finite appearance” (*Natural Religion* 151). Mountains, the earth, and rivers also belonged to this class, because they marked boundaries, and shrouded things that were beyond immediate perception. For Müller, this class along with the intangibles such as the sky, the stars, the moon, or the sun exclusively contained a “theogonic capacity, because they [had] in themselves from the beginning something going beyond the limits of sensuous perception” (*Natural Religion* 148).

Müller argued that the *tangibles* as “the first class lent itself to no religious development—for fetishism or the worship of stones and bones is a retrogressive, not a progressive religious development—the second class has supplied ample material for what we call *demi-gods*, [river nymphs or dryads] while the third class contains the germs of most of the *great gods* of the ancient world [like the sun, or the dawn]” (*Natural Religion* 154). In Müller’s classifications, the beyond, or the perception of the beyond as something overwhelming and awful laid the foundations for religious idealizations and worship, and it presented itself under a certain condition, which was

the realization of boundaries, a recognition of a sense of constant in-betweenness, and a consciousness of the seen limit operating synonymously with the unseen. This perception of the limit went both ways and manifested itself first by the perception of space, and later by the perception of time, and finally by the perception of cause. Müller explained the limit in relation to the horizon, which was a common enough concept for all humanity to observe regardless of time:

If we perceive the horizon, we perceive at the same time that which hems in our sense from going beyond the horizon. There is no limit which has not two sides, one turned towards us, the other turned towards what is beyond; and it is that Beyond which from the earliest days has formed the only real foundation of all that we call transcendental in our perceptual as well as in our conceptual knowledge, though no doubt it has also been peopled with the manifold creations of our poetic imagination. (*Natural Religion* 123-124)

For Müller, “what applies to space [also] applies to time. As we cannot perceive and therefore conceive anything in space without something beyond, we cannot perceive or conceive anything in time without a something beyond, a before and an after. Here, too, imagination has stretched its view as far as language will carry it” (*Natural Religion* 124). According to Müller, there was a third manifestation of the seen limit operating through the unseen, which was intimately related to early humanity’s perception of space and time in relation to cause and causality:

Closely connected with the infinite, as it is postulated in space and time, is a third infinite, namely, that of cause [...] There are some strong-minded philosophers who hold that a world is possible in which there is no cause and no effect, and in which two and two would not make four. But wherever that *Erehwon* may be, in our sublunary world [,] as we can never shake off the chain of causality, we shall always be forced to admit not only a beyond beyond all beyonds, but also a cause beyond all causes. (*Natural Religion* 123-124)

Perception, according to Müller, meant nothing without cause, space, and time all of which necessarily made use of the concept of the in-between, since the perceiver was perpetually situated between limits and the perception of a continuous sense of the beyond. Consequently his theories were based on the formation of language as the inevitable outcome of the perception of these limits within nature, which were later adapted through a participatory model by the users of language to associate themselves with the kind of participatory reality the sense of the beyond made available. This

knowledge was encoded in poetic statements which were ritualized into mythologies to preserve this connection between nature and mankind. As centuries passed, so did the mythology encoding such knowledge passed on to other generations of individuals who also participated in similar realities by way of acting through, and using the inherited participatory verbs and models in the world, describing and also embodying processes such as birth or death, growth or decay, or night and day. These were primarily represented by verbs that solidified action, provided a sense of continuity, and guaranteed existence as in the belief of an after-life. Müller traced the origins of these words reflected in overwhelming similarities and connections between root-words of Sanskrit, Greek, Celtic, Germanic, and many other languages generally known as the Indo-European group (ApRoberts 161-162, Wheeler-Barclay 46-47). Müller, especially in *Natural Religion*, argued that root verbs originally designating physical actions like “digging, rubbing, crushing, pounding, cutting, gathering, mixing, sprinkling, burning” lost their original associations with natural operations of the physical world through time, and acquired abstract qualities “by means of generalisation, specialization, and metaphor, [and were] made to express the most abstract ideas of our advanced society” (366). As this organic chain was broken and the original associations of language with physical involvement and participation with the world grew obscure, so did the sense of in-betweenness grew into a concept represented by angst, instead of discovery, assurance, and comfort. In-betweenness, which has been a constructive, concrete, and existential tool facilitating a sense of discovery, continuity, and security for humanity became abstract, and led to a more modern sense of in-betweenness as a bewildering state of imprisonment and anxiety rather than a necessary space for actual human participation with the world.

Müller’s theories were criticized in his own time by W. D. Whitney, T. H. Huxley, C. Darwin, and others on grounds that it was too idealistic, “suggesting a purely non-physical or mental origin of articulate language as opposed to [...] interjectional and onomatopoeic theories [...] which see language in Humean terms as a reaction to external impressions. Yet Müller insisted, too, [...] that the science of language is a ‘physical’ science that develops according to natural laws” (Davis and Nicholls 91-93). In James W. Fernandez’s view, there were two distinct perspectives resulting in two

different kinds of conflict regarding Darwinian orientations and Müller's expressive models:

Müller's struggle confronted by the Darwinian Revolution to maintain the categorical distinction between animal nature and human culture and Huxley's struggle, participating in if not confronted by the Late Victorian Moral Imagination, to bring these categories into a relationship of productive and ameliorative tension. For Müller, [...] humans possessed as animals did not a spark [...] the evidence of which [was] seen in the gift of language. For In the Beginning, after all, Was the Word. For Huxley the human was a creature in struggle between categories, between the State of Nature and the State of Art, between the Cosmos and Society, between creaturehood, on the one hand, and the artificial, horticultural capacities of colonization and civilization on the other. (13)

Both views outlined by Fernandez point towards the already changed sense of in-betweenness by Victorian times, which comes to be seen as a bed of struggle rather than a seedbed for creative and participatory human involvement with the world. The symbiotic relationship between poetry and religion was in question with issues concerning the fictional elements within the Western Bible. The consequences, at least for Victorian poetry and onwards to the moderns, were significant in terms of in-betweenness. As the private sphere of existence and experience gained prominence due to lost confidence in the Biblical narratives, private isolation came to be prioritized over the social and participatory older model which Müller also emphasized. A growing "sense of secondariness" took over, where "an extraordinarily self-conscious moment of awareness in history [...] evolved [into a] poetic form [,] which not only ma[de] possible a sophisticated exploration of new categories of knowledge in modern culture but also the philosophical criticism adequate to it" (Armstrong 15). In-betweenness within the changing Victorian perspective can be seen as promoting the kind of philosophical and analytical inquiry into the workings of a more self-conscious poetry as well as a more self-conscious questioning of religion and the religious instinct in relation to poetry. In this regard, it will be argued that Arnold's poetry demonstrates the kind of inquisitive and imprisoned in-between Müller's theory of the perception of the beyond underlines as the result of the breaking-off of the organic chain between participation with the world and the human mind's physical involvement in it, leading towards a secondary and detached self-questioning of the human mind by the human mind.

According to Müller, natural orientation of humanity with the physical world was full of encounters with the limit and the concept of the *beyond-ness of the beyond*. A river, a mountain, a tree, or the sky presented the infinite within the finite, perpetually situating mankind in-between these limits, but also providing mankind with the idea or curiosity to cross-over those limits, or at least figure out ways of transcending the beyond, whether metaphorically or physically. Müller wrote that, “[i]n all these precepts the infinite preponderates over the finite, and the mind of man is driven, whether he likes it or not, to admit something beyond the finite. [W]e see and feel it. In feeling the limit, we cannot help feeling also what is beyond the limit, we are in the actual presence of a visible infinite” (*Natural Religion* 153-154). Arnold’s poetic voices, in this regard, can be seen as trying to overcome their own interiorized sense of the perpetual in-between, but instead of welcoming the in-between as a process of integration, they are rather left adrift, where Arnold uses the concept of in-betweenness as a mechanism of awareness in its broken state, rather than allowing his characters full integration into their own accustomed settings.

The importance of Müller’s approach for Arnold’s poetic discourse is that Arnold’s personas feel this limit, although, not necessarily in physical terms, but often within their own minds as they uncomfortably contemplate the nature of poetry, of participation versus non-participation with their world, of reflection versus actual involvement with the world, where the nature of song, mythology, and in-betweenness itself is indirectly questioned in its various manifestations. The limit, for Arnold’s poetic voices, allow for an inquisitive in-between state by facilitating a broken, non-functional dialogue with the past which is buried in a non-integrative ritualization of broken and adrift myths, such as the scholar-gipsy. In such a context, a dichotomy between thought and action emerges, as thinking about the past is never compatible with living and getting involved in the present within the poems. In this regard, Arnold’s characters can often be observed as excluding the present from their own personal experience, or not participating in the actual moment, but rather choosing to digress into the past, abandoning the present in search of their own perpetual in-betweenness.

When Müller's theory of the limit is applied to Arnold's poetry, a curious picture emerges. If Müller was right in claiming that "[t]here is no limit which has not two sides, one turned towards us, the other turned towards what is beyond" (*Natural Religion* 123), the beyond for Arnold's characters makes itself known as only the beyond that is projected inwards. The dialogue of the mind becomes a dialogue with the inner beyond, which is only concerned with reflection, where settings, moods, and dramatic structures within the poems employ the in-between as a self-conscious visitation and questioning of the past with its relation to poetry, myth, memory, or song. These are all reflections on secondariness and in-betweenness, as can be observed chiefly in "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Forsaken Mermaid", "The Strayed Reveller", and "Empedocles on Etna". The voice evoking the legend of the scholar-gipsy seems more interested in the legend than the actual lore of the gipsies or the original scholar-gipsy himself. Similarly, there is no actual Margaret in "The Forsaken Mermaid", but a contemplated version of her in the mermaid's enchanting song, which the mermaid himself continuously lives in. And again, if Arnold's reveller can be faintly heard saying that, "we become what we sing" ("The Strayed Reveller" ll. 233-34), then the mermaid and his song can be observed as the perfect embodiment of melancholy "dividing itself against" the textual-poetic nature of self-prescribed melancholy, as Riede noted before (2). The reveller stands in-between the Bacchanalian wilderness and Circe's palace, committing to neither poetry nor the religious procession but his own intoxication, whereas Empedocles wanders in-between actual friends and self-inflicted intellectual oblivion, since he can no longer believe and participate in human company or become involved with the benefits of intellectual alienation as a poet-philosopher.

The dynamics behind the conception of these Arnoldian representations of broken ritualization, and the sense of suffering through self-awareness such an understanding of the in-between brings about are also observable within the study of in-betweenness as a central modern concept for human ritualization and orientation within the actual modern world. Just as Victorian poetic-religious discourse as exemplified by Arnold and Müller was committed towards unearthing the dynamics of in-betweenness as a necessary tool of perception for humanity, so is the modern approach determined in pointing out the centrality of in-betweenness as a mechanism of self-awareness and questioning for the structuring and re-structuring of both ancient and modern societies which have been

undergoing a similar palimpsest of human ritualization throughout history. To this end, Victor Turner's assessment of in-betweenness can be taken as demonstrative of the inner paradox of the in-between, both as a structuring and reconciliatory mechanism for the creation and maintenance of human cultural systems, and also the demolition, re-structuring, and re-organization of such systems, which, in the process, pushes these systems into a self-questioning of their own dynamics by their ritualized and non-ritualized participants. It will be argued, that Arnold's similarly structured non-ritualized, and in-between figures in his poetry also point towards the paradoxical nature of the in-between, as it stands out as a mechanism of self-questioning brought forward by a crisis of participation with the in-between, rather than a mechanism of social or personal integration resolving the crisis by way of allowing an involved and participatory poetics to take hold.

IN-BETWEENNESS AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

Having developed his theories on Arnold Van Gennep's theory of the "limen" (margin or threshold) regarding the liminal phase of transition / initiation rites, such as "social puberty", or "betrothal and marriage" (Van Gennep 65, 116), Victor Turner classifies in-betweenness in terms of ritual as a mechanism that encompasses both "structure and anti-structure" (*Ritual Process* 94-96). Turner argues for the centrality of Van Gennep's theory for the study of in-betweenness within human ritualization and human culture, because it encompasses participation and detachment as inherent in the tripartite *structure / anti-structure / and structure* (once more) model, where "transition [is] marked by three phases: separation, margin (or *limen*), and aggregation" (*Ritual Process* 94). In this respect, in-betweenness in human ritualization, as embodying, and further enabling the maintenance of a belief system, becomes both the structure and the paradoxical structuring *anti-structure*:

The separation phase comprises symbolic behaviour signifying the detachment of the individual or the group from an earlier fixed point in the social structure [.] During the intervening *liminal* period, the characteristics of the ritual subject (the *passenger*) are ambiguous; he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state. In the third phase (reaggregation or reincorporation), the passage is consummated. The ritual subject [re-enters] a relatively stable state [with] rights and obligations [...] of a clearly defined *structural* type. (*Ritual Process* 94-95)

In-betweenness in successful human rituals, as Turner considers it, perpetuates continuity and participation in a social and sanctified order by reintegrating “threshold people”, or the “liminal *personae*” into the continuous phase of “cultural space” (*Ritual Process* 95). However, in-betweenness can also induce an inquisitive state of mind for the ritual participant, especially when left incomplete, which allows a questioning of structural, emotional, or narrative bonds with the past and the present. In Turner’s view, such a state causes anxiety, division or separation to be used as an analytical tool, where these “entities” of the margin are made to question the structure of the social and temporal matrix they are in, since they “are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between” incomplete social and personal states of being, which are commonly symbolized by transition metaphors around the world: “Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon” (*Ritual Process* 95).

According to Turner, the symbolism of culturally constructed human rituals as rites of passage utilizes the concept of in-betweenness or liminality as tools for the analysis of the same cultural structure which produced them in the first place. Turner states that, “[w]e are presented, in such rites, with a *moment in and out of time*, and in and out of secular and social structure, which reveals, however fleetingly, some recognition (in symbol if not in language) of a generalized social bond that has ceased to be and has simultaneously yet to be fragmented into a multiplicity of structural ties” (*Ritual Process* 96). What Turner calls multiplicity and fragmentation are intrinsic to human ritualization as they emerge out of the in-between structure of the continuous, structuring, but briefly discontinued and suspended act of passage itself from one social and personal state to the other.

Turner reveals this continuity further in *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*, pointing towards the liminal period in rites of passage, where “the passengers and crew are free, under ritual exigency, to contemplate for a while the mysteries that confront all men, [like] their personal problems, and the ways in which their own wisest predecessors have sought order”, and these initiates are free to “explain away”, or deeply question their relations to the past and the present, only to return from it and be part of the community structure once again as successful ritualization demands (242). For Turner,

this is, and has been very crucial for the development of critical approaches to the human sciences, because “[i]n liminality resides the germ not only of religious *askesis*, discipline, and mysticism, but also of philosophy and pure science”, as was the case with “such Greek philosophers as Plato and Pythagoras” and their relation to “the mystery cults” (*Dramas* 242). In Turner’s evaluation, a broken or dissected sense of ritualization is as crucial for humanity as a complete and integrative sense of a fulfilled ritualization, because a broken sense employing in-betweenness as a mechanism of self-questioning would often lead to further discovery and progress by setting in motion an unsettled and inquisitive perspective. In this respect, a broken sense of ritualization highlights in-betweenness as a necessary space for self-questioning and self-reflexivity, which are also observed in Arnold’s poetry through similarly structured in-between settings, mood, and dramatic relations between the speakers and the broken relationship they try to establish with a poetic and mythic past.

In tune with Turner, Catherine Bell, in her extensive study, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, argues that human ritualization enables the use of in-betweenness as a tool for cultural analysis, where the observance of an essential dichotomy between “thought and action”, as in detachment and identification, defines human ritualization as “a type of functional or structural mechanism, [which] reintegrate[s] the thought-action dichotomy” into a unified social (cultural-narrative) and private (emotional-experiential) sphere of human experience by way of enabling a social, coherent, and continuous cultural existence for humanity (Bell 20). Be that as it may, the questioning divide implicit between the narrative and experiential modes ritualization contains implies an inner crisis, and also opens up the ritual structure itself to question, where in-betweenness once again motivates the kind of structural analysis Turner points out above. Especially when observed by others than the ritual participants, who are required to complete their integration as opposed to the observers who are obligated to remain detached and in-between to better make sense of the cultural dynamics of the ritual structure itself, the crisis relocates between those who participate and those who observe from a distance. Arnold’s poetic voices are employed within a similar relationship between participation and detachment, making use of this in-betweenness to further question their own in-between status from a distanced perspective represented by a crisis of the mind, which is constantly isolated from full involvement with the world. As

a result, the crisis of awareness does not get resolved, because a constant but indirect dialogue of the mind continuously turns upon itself, preventing a successful ritualization and integration into the specific surroundings of the personas, which are themselves represented in terms of in-between settings, moods, and dramatic structures.

According to Bell, a crisis between participation, detachment, and observation is inherent to the concept of in-betweenness as employed by ritualization as a structure, because successful ritualization welds together the broken parts of the very mechanism of ritual discourse itself, where crisis, opposition, and division is necessary. Without a crisis of the in-between, there would be no human ritualization possible, where “[e]xamples include the ritual integration of belief and behaviour, tradition and change, order and chaos, the individual and the group, subjectivity and objectivity, nature and culture, the real and the imaginative ideal” (*Ritual Theory* 16). As Ronald R. Grimes underlines, a parallel paradoxical structure of opposition and reintegration within in-betweenness shows itself in how religion, and thus, participation in ritualization comes to be structured and questioned, observable in the dichotomy of “[e]xperiential-personal processes (e.g., experiencing feeling, encountering, praying, being healed, being possessed, undergoing a revelation) [as opposed to] [m]ythic-historical, or narrative-temporal, processes (e.g., telling stories, reciting, naming, remembering, recording, transmitting)” (197). If the process of poetic creation surrounding, including, and further shaping ritualization as a consequence of the in-between is concerned within this frame, two modes of being in the world emerge. The first shows an ontological concern, where being in the world is acquired through emotional encounters as in feeling and experience. The second mode is the epistemological, surrounding the very phenomena of being in the world by transmitting, coding and encoding ways of acting in the world by way of story-telling, or poetic creation. In all such opposing pairs, epistemologically constructed mythic-narrative modes clash with ontologically and personally perceived temporal-experiential modes, and Arnold’s poetry exemplifies this clash, interiorizing and problematizing the relations between experiential and narrative modes of being in the world. In-betweenness, in this sense, becomes a concealed tool of analysis for Arnold’s poetic voices within the poems, as well as being represented through settings, general moods, and structural relations between the speakers of the poems and the

mythic narrative presences evoked within, such as the invocation and covert questioning of the legend of the scholar-gipsy by the speaker in “The Scholar-Gipsy”.

For Grimes, “[r]itual is not only in the mind or the imagination, even though it can be both mindful and imaginative. If an action is purely mental, it is not ritual even though mental processes clearly underlie ritual action” (195). In Grimes’ model, a sense of in-betweenness arises out of the very structure of ritualization, where thinking about the world and being involved with the world are merged into ritual action, giving a sense of security and participation, and helping ritual agents overcome their overwhelming sense of in-betweenness. However, when integration does not take place, a doubtful, doubling, secondary, and inquisitive consciousness emerges, which can also be seen as questioning relations between the origins of ritualization and the relations it implies with mental processes such as the creation of stories and how the narrative mode operates within the world, becoming a self-reflexive consciousness directed towards the in-betweenness of human experience. One such relationship can be found in the way Arnold’s poetry operates within the confines of its speakers’ own minds, as they constantly associate and disassociate with the described modes. Being part of the uniquely non-participatory, divided, and dissociative Victorian poetic discourse emphasized earlier through Armstrong’s double model (1, 6), Arnold’s poetry embodies the alienated double-mode as a mode of discontinuity through its non-participating, and detached poetic voices, while interrogating the grounds of human experience as an in-between mode of being and thinking in the world. By doing so, Arnold’s poetry uses in-betweenness as a means of meta-analysis, as the poetic personas and the relationships they establish with the past constantly and covertly display a broken, non-functional, and non-integrative ritualization, which further strengthens an overwhelming sense of in-betweenness. This crisis of a broken identification directs its inquisitive gaze upon the paradoxical structure of human ritualization and in-betweenness, where a detached consciousness reveals the paradoxical dynamics of poetic creation as well as human ritualization.

Underlying conscious and unconscious mechanisms of ritual thinking and “ritualization” throughout human history, which have been shaping human perceptions of the real and the literary alike, Bell argues that in-betweenness has been a central

factor, where ritualization as an “interpretive endeavour requires, and assumes, that activity encodes something, [where] the assumed existence of such a ‘something,’ the latent meaning of the act, [...] devalues the action itself, making it a second-stage representation of prior values”, but also producing altered and newer versions of both the thought and the action in the process to be encoded and interpreted for later ritual observers (*Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* 45). From such a perspective, Victorian poetry is also one such endeavour that both recreates and interprets the world as an interiorized activity; yet, assuming a secondary, in-between state, enacts the past by employing its own characteristic distortions, such as self-consciousness and the deictic endeavours referred to earlier by Cunningham. In this regard, Arnold’s poetry, being amongst chief representatives of Victorian poetry, makes use of a broken sense of ritualization by pointing out the very need for reference within its own self-reflexivity, as all things need to refer to that obscure *something*, whether as God, or evolution, or mythology, or poetic language as origins. Arnold’s poetics of in-betweenness, then, emerges as a process which makes use of in-betweenness in its broken and non-integrative state, questioning the very concept of the origins, rather than attempting to offer an explanation. Taking in-betweenness as an analytical means for a self-conscious observation and questioning of a self-conscious Victorian poetics, Arnold’s poetry makes use of acts of reflection and enactment, which are then problematized through an opposition between participation and intellectual detachment regarding its speakers. A struggle between referring to the past and animating that past within the present becomes its central preoccupation. Such an approach has been central to Arnold’s thought, as it has been shown earlier in Arnold and Müller’s views regarding the importance of poetic expression and interpretation for human culture. Similar interests have been directed to the issue by later contributors from various orientations such as Mircea Eliade, Victor Turner, Roy Rappaport and others. However, these associations have seldom been questioned in relation to Matthew Arnold’s poetry.

Accordingly, this study proposes to discuss Arnold’s poetry as a collective representation of in-betweenness, which makes use of the threshold between intellectual detachment and participation with the world as a paradoxical mechanism of self-questioning and self-reflexivity. Constantly being involved in representations of alienation within the in-between, and further seeking to question the function of poetic

alienation as an inquisitive force that shapes real human experiences, it will be argued that Arnold's poetry displays a mode of broken ritualization and a perpetual sense of in-betweenness, which makes use of the paradox of the in-between to direct attention towards larger issues concerning human culture, such as the dynamics of poetic creation and human ritualization. Failure and division, in this sense, become necessary, because together they create the required conditions for the alienation of thought from thought-making processes, such as poetic creation, and an awareness of a crisis related to the fragile memories of the past. Arnold's way of structuring such a dichotomy shares the characteristics of the in-between discourse of ritualization, collectively branched within its modern coinage under the title of ritual studies. Having its origins in the late nineteenth-century advances on comparative philology, religion, anthropology, and the study of myth, the study of in-betweenness in ritualization has been gaining a wider interest since the last decades of the twentieth-century, as Catherine Bell duly observes:

In the last twenty years a number of diverse fields have found ritual to be an important focus for new forms of cultural analysis. Besides anthropologists, sociologists, and historians of religion, there are sociobiologists, philosophers, and intellectual historians who have turned to ritual as a "window" on the cultural dynamics by which people make and remake their worlds. The result has been a relatively broad and interdisciplinary conversation known as "ritual studies."
(*Ritual Theory Ritual Practice* 3)

As there can be no ritualization without a concept of the in-between, in line with such interdisciplinary responses, this study aims to present another opening for the study of literature, arguing for the relevance of studying Matthew Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness in revealing the importance of a broken sense of ritualization for the self-reflexive discourse of human ritualization and in-betweenness. Since the process of making and remaking worlds, as Bell had put it, is distinctly observable within Victorian poetics, and it also involves a transforming process for the individuals, stories, practices, and meaning-making mechanisms that influence our own modern society, Victorian poetry offers a unique window into the study of in-betweenness as a tool for cultural and literary analysis. Being a unique representative of the Victorian involvement with poetic creation, Arnold's poetry, especially "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Strayed Reveller", "The Forsaken Mermaid", and "Empedocles on Etna" provide an exclusive perspective in terms of in-betweenness into the significance of liminality

or in-betweenness for the study of the experiential and narrative modes commonly employed within the production of human cultures by poetic creation and ritualization. These poems have been chosen to discuss in-betweenness as a poetic discourse, represented through the discursive moods, settings, and dramatic structures within the poems. If Susan Stewart is right in claiming that “[p]oetry sustains and transforms the threshold between individual and social existence”, and that “[p]oetic making is an anthropomorphic project, [where] the poet undertakes the task of recognition in time—the unending tragic Orphic task of drawing the figure of the other—the figure of the beloved who reciprocally can recognize one’s own figure—out of the darkness” (1-2), then Arnold’s poetry can also be regarded as an effort at trying to recognize the very dynamics of such figuring out by making use of in-betweenness as a tool of cultural and personal self-awareness.

Taking place within similar boundaries of the in-betweenness of simultaneous poetic recognition and creation, as Susan Stewart notes above, thinking about the world and the actual in-betweenness of human existence is put in contrast with human ritualization in Arnold’s poetry, where actual involvement with the world and participating in it becomes counter-posed against the inquisitive in-betweenness of poetic creation and poetic questioning. Although Arnold’s poetic characters do recognize the difference between these two planes of individual and social experience, they cannot actively participate and function in the world of the poems, which is the world of poetic creations and secondariness. If poetry, indeed, “sustains and transforms the threshold between individual and social existence” (1) as Stewart states, Arnold’s poetry can be said to renegotiate this transformation by way of questioning the relationship between cultural transformation and in-betweenness with regard to the functions of poetic creation. In other words, Arnold’s poetry interrogates “the cultural dynamics by which people make and remake their worlds” (Bell, *Ritual Theory...* 3) by appealing to one of culture’s most ancient structures, which is the relationship between poetic creation, in-betweenness, and human ritualization.

The main discussion will be oriented around the recognition and use of in-betweenness as a mechanism of cultural interrogation represented in the employment of a broken ritualization in Arnold’s chosen poems, continually putting the described modes of the

experiential against the narrative by way of engaging in settings, moods, and a dramatic structure, all of which emphasizing and further questioning the concept of in-betweenness as a paradoxical mechanism of identification and detachment. It will be argued that, in-betweenness provides a means to become aware of a broken sense of ritualization, as exemplified through Arnold's poetry, which brings about an inquisitive consciousness regarding human existence in the sense that Turner has noted, further allowing an analytical gaze into the dynamics between the temporality of human experience and the poetic mode employed in sustaining this continuity for those who come to study the relationship between poetic creation, in-betweenness, and ritualization. The following chapter will include the discussion of in-betweenness as a cultural discourse, constantly associating and dissociating with the experiential and mythic-historical modes seen within the ontological and epistemological dynamics that make human orientation possible in the world. The concluding chapter will discuss Arnold's poetry in the light of theories and approaches featured within this study, as the self-conscious use of in-betweenness as a mechanism of cultural awareness would disclose that an overwhelming poetics of self-reflexivity and in-betweenness underlie the structural relations between settings, moods, and dramatic structures within Arnold's poems sampled out for this study. It will be argued that, although Arnold's poetry seems broken, distant, and alienating due to its Victorian involvements, it still employs an intellectual gaze directed discursively towards an awareness of the beyond, which makes use of the concept of in-betweenness in its broken, inquisitive, and inwardly alienating structure, foreshadowing the modern existential crisis regarding the constant in-betweenness of the modern individual, still searching for *an* origins, if not *the* origins within a state of perpetual in-betweenness.

CHAPTER I:
DYNAMICS OF IN-BETWEENNESS AND RITUALIZATION
IN ARNOLD’S POETIC DISCOURSE

1.1. IN-BETWEENNESS AND CRISIS IN RITUALIZATION

We think by feeling. What is there to know?
 I hear my being dance from ear to ear.
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.

[...]

This shaking keeps me steady. I should know.
 What falls away is always. And is near.
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.
 I learn by going where I have to go.

(Theodore Roethke, “The Waking”, 1953).

These things, Ulysses,
 The wise Bards also
 Behold and sing.
 But oh, what labour!
 O Prince, what pain!
 [...] —such a price
 The Gods exact for song;
 To become what we sing.

(Matthew Arnold, “The Strayed Reveller”, 1849).

Arnold and Roethke, two poets belonging to totally different worlds separated from each other by more than a century seem to be concerned with a similar feeling of in-betweenness, which puts the ontological human crisis as being in the world versus the epistemological, as learning how to *know* and knowing how to *become* gets entangled with each other within the same world. Roethke’s speaker, by claiming that being can be heard dancing from ear to ear insists that feelings define how one thinks. Still, one must find out for one’s own self, since *being* also desires to know. Arnold’s strayed reveller is also concerned with the same crisis, as he converses with Ulysses regarding the true origins or nature of poetic involvement with the world. The strayed reveller points towards another kind of knowing which involves a paradoxical relationship between knowing and being, which is only found in poetic creation. The reveller declares that, just like the Gods, the poets are also prone to seeing things without actually being present in the exact moment of the action, observing things clearly from a

distance without getting physically involved. But unlike the Gods, the poets cannot stay indifferent, and they have to pay a heavy toll for such a gift, as they are influenced, moved, and changed by what they have come to observe and know, thus being transformed by the process.

In-betweenness, in this context, emerges as a state of crisis between how to know and how to emotionally and physically get involved with the world. Ritualization, as a process of integration for human meaning-making mechanisms such as poetic and cultural production, helps to overcome this crisis by making use of in-betweenness, and bringing together these two problematic modes of the narrative versus the experiential. Ritualization uses narratives to enable human agents to identify with their own surroundings. As Roy Rappaport explains, metaphor, narratives, and poetic statements act as the keystone of human ritualization, constituting a “*middle-order meaning*”, and forming a bridge extending towards a “*high-order meaning*, [which] is grounded in identity and unity”, resulting in “the radical identification or unification of self with other” (71). It is through the use of metaphor towards “participation [with] high-order meaning” in ritual that “meaning stops being referential, [and] becomes a state of being” (73). For Rappaport, this is the process by which ritualization “establishes, guards, and bridges boundaries between public systems and private processes”, making ritualization “*the basic social act*” for the construction of meaning, thus enabling human survival (138). Ritualization, in this sense, can be defined as a social and personal process of identification with a greater, and overwhelming social and personal reality or presence, simultaneously pointing towards a beyond both inside and outside the mind of the human participants who recognize and ritualize an event, a historical reference, an idea, or a feeling similar to what Arnold called “the *not ourselves*”. Ritualization makes use of in-betweenness to achieve its ends. As ritualization succeeds, a sense of unity and involvement provides a sense of continuity, belonging, and security because this greater presence of otherness comes to be controlled through ritualization and identification. However, if failed, a broken sense of ritualization reveals more than a complete and unified structure, where the sense of in-betweenness becomes strengthened, detached, and left unresolved, thereby necessitating a fuller perspective, and an analytical mode to examine ritualization as a key cultural mechanism for human orientation in the world.

In a parallel understanding with Rappaport, Catherine Bell emphasizes human ritualization as a key process of association, both with the past and the present, taking place between the subjects as participants or observers and the objects as the textual or story-related components of ritual, where those who are in-between transform into “ritualized agents”, whether by believing in poetic statements about the world, or creating new ways of enabling their own personal and social ritualization as a “strategic way of acting in the world” (*Ritual Theory* 7-8, 124, 141). To such an end, ritualization creates seemingly stable, yet inherently dynamic and subjective traditions by “traditionaliz[ing] and renegotiat[ing] the very basis of tradition (*Ritual Theory* 124), because human involvement with the world is “situational, strategic, apt to misrecognize the relationship between its ends and its means in ways that promote its efficacy, and it is motivated by what can be called ‘redemptive hegemony,’ a construal of reality as ordered in such a way as to allow the actor some advantageous ways of acting” (Bell, *Ritual Perspectives* 81). In other words, ritualization creates new systems of meaning and new realities by making use of the statements or poetic structures of the past, which are themselves references to other pasts and other poetic references, such as creation myths, or a belief in an afterlife.

Ritualization, then, becomes visible as a mechanism of immense proportions, where the process overwhelms the thing itself, as well as the one who conceives it, whether as participant, consumer, or observer. As Grimes also points out, “[o]ne needs the eyes of Alice to navigate the underground terrain of a ritual”, or the process of human ritualization in general, because

[r]ituals that survive have deep cultural roots reaching down and across to other domains, subverting what may on first glance appear to be impenetrable boundaries. [Ritual] has depth in itself. Rituals point elsewhere; they defer, hedge, stash, and quote. Almost every ritual [...] has something of the fantastic or impenetrable about it. Whether enacting or studying it, you enter a door that leads to another door, through which you see an image reflected in a mirror reflecting another mirror. (230)

A constant sense of a crisis within the in-between, as Grimes has shown, is embedded in the inner workings of ritualization as a meaning-making and meaning-maintaining mechanism, which constantly points beyond itself, further concealing its own distortive operations and restructured subject material. Tradition, in this regard, becomes a hollow

word. As Bell further observes, “[t]radition, of course, is not created once and then left to its own momentum. Tradition exists because it is constantly produced and reproduced, pruned for a clear profile, and softened to absorb revitalizing elements” (*Ritual Theory* 123). As a result “[t]here is undoubtedly reason to debate whether traditionalizing is a way of ritualizing or an effect of ritualizing” (Bell *Perspectives* 148). In Bell’s view, ritualization serves “the appeal to a more embracing authoritative order that lies beyond the immediate situation” (*Perspectives* 169), where the major illusion is that by seemingly redeeming the individual from the weight of the past, and reincorporating the subject into the rhythms of the present, ritualization uses the exact mechanism of the beyond-ness of the beyond in re-creating and maintaining the ritualized agent within a hegemonic structure:

[A]gents of ritualization do not see how they project this schematically qualified environment or how they re-embody those same schemes through the physical experience of moving about within its spatial and temporal dimensions. The goal of ritualization as such is completely circular: the creation of a ritualized agent, an actor with a form of ritual mastery, who embodies flexible sets of cultural schemes and can deploy them effectively in multiple situations so as to restructure those situations in practical ways. (Bell, *Ritual Perspectives* 81).

The essential concept within ritualization and in-betweenness seems to be the limit, and humanity’s relationship with boundaries that perpetuate a constructive crisis which is continually weaved in new threads, presented and seemingly resolved in new contexts in relation to human existence within history. The limiting temporality, or limitedness of human existence makes itself known as a major concern, both for those who live in the in-between world of ritual, and for those who observe in-betweenness as ritual from a detached analytical perspective, such as Arnold, Müller, and Turner. As they have shown, to feel the limit is also to suffer from it within the liminal phase of ritualization, resulting in the angst and thus necessitating a quest for knowledge and discovery. Even in a purely geographical sense, the idea and practice of a pilgrimage would embody both modes of existing within the world, as experiential becomes related to the narrative and the mythical. Seeing and feeling the world through wandering and wondering about it fulfils a hunger for nostalgia, which seeks authenticity, purpose, wholeness and continuity within the idea and practice of a pilgrimage. However, participating in the

limit or the liminal condition within a pilgrimage, and being bewildered by it are two different things.

As Arnold's poetic discourse will show, the questioning of the limit and its conditioning of a perpetual inquisitive in-betweenness are conceived and admitted through a recognition of an inner crisis between representation and actual involvement with the world in Arnold's poetic constructions, but to transcend it, Arnold's personas seem powerless, and forlorn, wandering in-between pleasant memories of long forgotten times and the crushing weight of the realities of the present, unable to participate in one dimension or the other. Arnold's personas, in this sense, resemble an affinity towards a model proposed by Mircea Eliade as the *nonreligious man* of early modern and modern times, as Eliade notes that:

[t]he perspective changes completely when the sense of *the religiousness of the cosmos becomes lost*. This is what occurs when, in certain more highly evolved societies, the intellectual elites progressively detach themselves from the patterns of the traditional religion. The periodical sanctification of cosmic time then proves useless and without meaning. The gods are no longer accessible through the cosmic rhythms. The religious meaning of the repetition of paradigmatic gestures is forgotten. But *repetition emptied of its religious content necessarily leads to a pessimistic vision of existence*. (*The Sacred and the Profane* 107)

Eliade argued that religiosity was embedded within the very structure of the cosmos, where participation with *being* was the key. Once this sense of participation was lost, the sense of belonging was also lost with it, and “[w]hen it [was] no longer a vehicle for reintegrating a primordial situation, and hence for recovering the mysterious presence of the gods, [existence became] *desacralized*, cyclic time bec[ame] terrifying; [perceived as] a circle forever turning on itself, repeating itself to infinity” (*The Sacred...* 107). Such an observation sits perfectly well with Arnold's poetic atmospheres and personas, where the past is evoked tirelessly but by quite tired, encircled, and ennui-ridden characters, such as the reveller, the merman, or the voice invoking the scholar-gypsy, who can no longer participate or become actively involved with their own present. It is as if these characters cannot move on; they are caught in-between a repeating circle of continuous in-betweenness and reference that can only go inwards, within the divided consciousness of that same voice or persona. A dialogue of the limits of the mind with itself, as Arnold saw it, certainly pertains to the kind of desacralized modern existence

Eliade refers to. But to enlarge the notion of Eliade's *nonreligious man*, and connect it to the divided consciousness of the in-between, Eliade's approach needs further discussion.

Eliade argued for the central place of myth for the process of ritualization, where rituals and processes of ritualization such as birth or death were "dependent on the myth, since it is the story that assures people of what they are doing in the ritual is what was done in that primordial age when the gods, heroes, or ancestors ordered the cosmos, created the world, and established divine models for all subsequent meaningful activity" (Bell, *Ritual Perspectives* 11). This is intimately connected to the perception of limits and the acknowledgement of the beyond as the perception of continuity and infinity as Müller proposed, because mankind wanted to be a part of continuity and the rhythms of the cosmos by participating and reintegrating himself in the beyond, as Eliade argues above. Once the limit gets turned inwards, as it was also the case with the preoccupations of Victorian poetry, it becomes an interval. This kind of a divided and non-participatory poetics, as Armstrong has noted (1, 6), no longer contains the kind of movement in the historical sense, which is to say that it no longer acts in the present world, but becomes obsessed with the idea of reflection and the ghosts of the past.

Similar to Turner's view on the key position of in-betweenness for cultural analysis, Eliade also argues that, even a broken sense of non-participation or broken ritualization with the world contains clues for assessing a change of consciousness, such as the kind of consciousness of abandonment and relocation Miller and Armstrong proposed for the characteristic poetics of Victorian times (Miller 2, 3, 12, Armstrong 3, 6, 13). In Eliade's words, a "confused and almost indefinable feeling" which comes to be represented by the interiorized and alienated consciousness of modern in-betweenness in art also contains the germs for "the memory of a debased religious experience" (*The Sacred...* 152). Eliade argued that a religious, participatory, and existential consciousness has been ruling the minds of early humanity before such religious experience got corrupted, and turned into the individualist, non-participatory, and self-referential closed circle it came to represent with modern times. In Eliade's understanding, humanity in its origins started with the perception of *being*, a consciousness that saw and felt its surroundings including the stone, the animal, the sun,

the dwelling place, and its own presence of the human body to be in connection with each other, which were all considered sacred because they were present in the world as having already been created. For Eliade, the perception of the beyond starts with the recognition of being in the world as a sacred reality requiring participation, as “the man of the traditional societies [was] admittedly a *homo religiosus* [living in] communion with the sacred” (*The Sacred...* 14).

The term Eliade introduced as a *hierophany*, was simply a “manifestation of the sacred reality [...] the manifestation of something of a wholly different order, a reality that [did] not belong to our world, [yet was perceivable] in objects that [were] an integral part of our natural ‘profane’ world” (*The Sacred...* 11). Since humanity did not create the stone or the animal, but found it already there, it was “not a veneration of the stone in itself, a cult of the tree in itself. The sacred tree, the sacred stone [were] not adored as stone or tree; [but] worshipped precisely because they were *hierophanies*, because they show[ed] something that [was] no longer stone or tree but the *sacred*, the *ganz andere*” (*The Sacred...* 12). Eliade starts *The Sacred and the Profane* (1959) by referring to Rudolf Otto’s *The Sacred (Das Heilige 1917)*, where Eliade was re-emphasizing the importance of Otto’s method as focusing on the “irrational aspect [...] of *the religious experience*, [not as] an idea, an abstract notion, a mere moral allegory, [but] manifested as a terrible *power* [defined by Otto as] ‘wholly other’ (*ganz andere*), something basically and totally different. It is like nothing human or cosmic; confronted with it, man senses his profound nothingness, feels that he is only a creature” (Eliade, *The Sacred...* 9-10). Faced with this overwhelming otherness, for Eliade, *homo religiosus* had to find a way to cope with this experience by participating and becoming a part of this vast and astounding presence. Therefore,

archaic societies tend[ed] to live as much as possible in the sacred or in close proximity to consecrated objects. The tendency is perfectly understandable, because, for primitives as for the man of all pre-modern societies, the *sacred* is equivalent to a *power*, and [...] to *reality*. The sacred is saturated with *being*. (*The Sacred...* 12)

In Eliade’s view, sacredness was equal to a power, which was also equal to existence as participation, “enduringness and efficacy”, where “opposition[s] between *real* and *unreal* or *pseudoreal*” did not exist, “but we find the *thing*”, and so “religious man

deeply desire[d] *to be*, to participate in reality, to be saturated with power” (*The Sacred...* 12-13). Whether the central place of the sacred is kept intact or trivialized; whether it is broken or out of reach, it is Eliade’s anchor to an ontologically based understanding of *homo religiosus*, where the religious man constructs sacred space along with sacred time, and finally sanctifies its own existence within the cosmos by sanctifying his own body. When “man conceives of himself as a microcosm [,] he finds in himself the same sanctity that he recognizes in the cosmos” (Eliade, *The Sacred...* 165). Eliade’s key term, here, is the notion of the centre, which is the ultimate manifestation of the sacred, presenting itself in space, time, and existence itself. As “religious man experiences interruptions [and] breaks in it; some parts of space [become] qualitatively different from others. [...] [T]his spatial non-homogeneity finds expression in the experience of an opposition between space that is sacred—the only *real* and *real-ly* existing space—and all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it” (*The Sacred...* 20). This notion is very similar to Müller’s understanding of the limit, presented above as stretching both ways, going out from one’s own physical being towards the physical world, and also moving back inside human consciousness, which tries to orient itself within its own limited environment.

For Eliade, “the non-homogeneity of space is a primordial [...] religious experience that precedes all reflection on the world. For it is the break effected in space that allows the world to be constituted, because it reveals the fixed point, the central axis for all future orientation, the *axis mundi*” (*The Sacred...* 21). This divide is both the primal condition for cosmic being, and the paradigmatic model for the creation of myths, because nothing can come into being, and perceived as a being without this divide, or without this reference point that separates and acknowledges human existence from other cosmic levels. That is why myth always starts by how a *thing*, or a cosmic *being* began, or came into existence. In Eliade’s view,

[w]hen the sacred manifests itself in any hierophany, there is not only a break in the homogeneity of space; there is also revelation of an absolute reality, opposed to the non-reality of the vast surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the world. In the homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible and hence no orientation can be established, the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a center. (*The Sacred...* 21-22)

As Eliade makes it clear, the fixed point also brings about the conception of the in-between as a primal condition of existence. Eliade's notion of the center as the fixed point, in this context, is the prerequisite for the sacredness of space, "possess[ing] existential value for religious man; for nothing can begin, nothing can be *done*, without a previous orientation—and any orientation implies acquiring a fixed point" (*The Sacred...* 22). Since the cosmic world revealed order, and not chaos, Eliade concludes that for any world to be recognized and "*to be lived in*, it must be *founded*— and no world can come to birth in the chaos of the homogeneity and relativity of profane space, [where] the center [becomes] equivalent to the creation of the world" (*The Sacred...* 22). In this regard, myths were not merely stories, but an active testimony to existence and in-betweenness, a fixed point of reference which required participation for establishing and keeping the vital bond with the beyond, the *wholly other*, or *ganz andere*.

According to Eliade, "the very structure of the cosmos ke[pt] memory of the celestial supreme being alive. [And since] no world [was] possible without verticality, [...] the *celestial sacred* remain[ed] active through symbolism" (*The Sacred...* 129). Eliade's conception of verticality, or rather the symbolism of in-betweenness associated with it revealed more to humanity regarding his own existence, because "[a] religious symbol [.] even if it [was] no longer *consciously* understood in every part, [still spoke] to the whole human being and not only to the intelligence" (*The Sacred...* 129), and myths, in this respect, acted as the guardians and guarantors of being and meaning, of human and divine existence in a revelatory and participatory cosmos by emphasizing a necessary in-between space. As Eliade explains, "[this] is at once thirst for the sacred and nostalgia for being [.] By all his behavior, religious man proclaims that he believes only in being, and that his participation in being is assured him by the primordial revelation of which he is the guardian. The sum total of primordial revelations is constituted by his myths" (*The Sacred...* 94-95). In-betweenness in Eliade's treatment is a precursor to nostalgia and a participatory human consciousness, which seeks to unite with its sacred origins.

In Eliade's treatment of the religious origins of humanity, "the appearance of life is the central mystery of the world. Life comes from somewhere that is not this world and

finally departs from here and goes to the beyond, in some mysterious way continues in an unknown place [...] Human life is not felt as a brief appearance in time, between one nothingness and another; it is preceded by a pre-existence and continued in a post-existence” (*The Sacred...* 148). For what Eliade refers to as the nonreligious or profane man, which is also suggestive of a consciousness of fragmentation regarding Victorian poetics, such a guarantee of continuity does not hold. In such a non-participating consciousness, as in Arnold’s poetic voices, a vital connection with the world, with being, and the reality of an original purposeful existence becomes blurred, and in-betweenness comes to represent an inquisitive bewilderment rather than an assuring sense of belonging and participation.

In Eliade’s words, “through the re-actualization of his myths, religious man attempts to approach the gods and to participate in being; the imitation of paradigmatic divine models expresses at once his desire for sanctity and his ontological nostalgia” (*The Sacred...* 106). As for the profane man, such ontological nostalgia gets transformed into an epistemological nostalgia, where certainty and how to live in the cosmos gets replaced by uncertainty and how to know within an abundance of cultural reference and counter-reference pervading and further fragmenting modern existence. The modern consciousness seeks to transcend the beyond by abandoning it for the kind of fragmentation, individuation, and interiorized experiences preferred by the modern non-participatory mode of existence. As Eliade points out,

religious man [...] regards himself as *made* by history, just as profane man does; but the only history that concerns him is the *sacred history* revealed by the myths—that is, the history of the gods; whereas profane man insists that he is constituted only by human history, hence by the sum of the very acts that, for religious man, are of no importance because they have no divine models (*The Sacred...* 100).

In such a context, Arnold’s poetic personas mentioned earlier are worth serious consideration. If Eliade’s conceptualization of the change in such ontological versus epistemological models of human experience holds true, then Arnold’s poetic creations can be observed as displaying the characteristics of neither the sacred, nor the profane models; instead, they seem to occupy an in-between ground, a bewildered state of the threshold, where connections with a credible ontology have admittedly been lost, but

the search is being continued nevertheless. Arnold's reveller is a strayed reveller, but a reveller still, who enjoys Circe's wine instead of the Bacchanalian procession, and who still probes the intellectual depths of the inner paradox of poetic creation. And Arnold's merman, although he is forsaken by forces out of his control, continues to dwell within his own song, most probably self-recited within the depths of the merman world with or without his offspring, stressing the self-reflexive and self-conscious properties of the poem's song-form in the process. In spite of all uncertainty, reflection, and existential anxiety, such characters still seem to be looking for a fixed point of reference to cling to. As for the speaker in "The Scholar-Gipsy", he can be heard calling out to the shepherd or the scholar-gipsy, but he does not participate in the pastoral, nor does he physically seek the hybrid figure of the scholar-gipsy, or the physical locations he was rumoured to visit in the countryside. Instead, the speaker tries to satisfy an almost impossible yearning, a yearning to connect with the world and become one, not with the actual gipsy lore, or the actual quest to physically seek the scholar-gipsy, but to connect with the reflection, or the legend of the scholar-gipsy without moving a muscle. He is obsessed with the scholar-gipsy lore, which is nothing but a reflection upon another distant reflection originating from another literary text. As the structure of the poems will also reveal, a relationship with reflection versus being involved with the world, and contemplations regarding the dynamics of existence surrounding the mythic figures become established through representations of in-betweenness amongst the speakers and the mythic subject material invoked within.

Most possibly having not thought of Arnold's poetry, Eliade's considerations pinpoint to the very nature of the problem of secondariness and in-betweenness portrayed especially in Arnold's "The Scholar-Gipsy" and "The Strayed Reveller", where Eliade counts the act of reading as an act of detachment along with the cinematic arts as being amongst the profane myths of modern man: "[R]eading includes a mythological function, not only because it replaces the recitation of myths in archaic societies [,] but particularly because, through reading, the modern man succeeds in obtaining an 'escape from time' comparable to the 'emergence from time'" pattern of mankind's earlier myths of completion, which granted identity and a sense of belonging to the early humanity (*The Sacred...* 205). In such a comparative model, the presence of self-reflexive poet-philosophers and the art of poetry often dissected in Arnold's poetry

stands at the threshold between identification or rejection as an unsuccessful attempt, failing both at an escape or an emergence. Even the decisive suicide committed by Empedocles at the end stands as somewhat vague, inviting ambiguity and in-betweenness, rather than salvation from or a protest against in-betweenness.

Eliade's observation is crucial in locating a similar in-betweenness regarding Arnold's poetry, because it sets two different modes of being against one another. Myths, according to Eliade, were the religious man's practical solution, a rational way of associating with the cosmos by guaranteeing an emergence, or a deliverance out of profane time. Religious man participated in the universe by adjusting to its rhythms, referring to an exact beginning, a fixed point; and by enacting such rhythms, maintained continuity of his own being and meaning, overcoming his own existential crisis by reconciling the narrative and the temporal-experiential modes of being within the enactment of myths. However, having abolished the gods, and with the added burden of history and loneliness placed amongst his shoulders, modern man, Victorian or otherwise, seems to have chosen an escape from the crushing weight of this existential crisis by preferring to live in a secondary and removed existence of reference, as in constantly referring to the past and recreating numerous pasts within their own present by way of poetic creation. As Eliade refers to it, "[w]hether modern man 'kills' time with a detective story or enters such a foreign temporal universe [,] reading projects him out of his personal duration and incorporates him into other rhythms, makes him live in another 'history'" (*The Sacred...* 205). For the religious man, there is only one history in which he participates, as for the profane or nonreligious man, there are preferable and secondary alternatives. But what happens to the man in-between? Eliade does not specifically refer to this sort of man, but emphasizes the importance and centrality of a consciousness of the state of the in-between both for the participatory or non-participatory modes of human existence. Rather hinting towards a state of lost connections, or lost origins that still carry the essence of the original participatory mode, Eliade suggests that involvement with the world and participation with *being* itself in the cosmic sense forms the basis for human ritualization, where in-betweenness can be observed within both the sacred and the profane modes of being in the world.

Religious man, as Eliade would have it, has priority in the employment and fashioning of a constructive and participatory notion of in-betweenness as an existential model, because his model is the primary one which establishes all other models. By participating in the sacred, religious man or *homo religiosus* was looking to preserve, and also take part in continuity within the universal order of things through involvement with movement as a passage. Thus, voluntarily keeping this model of the passage, or integrative in-betweenness alive, ancient humanity participated with the greater reality, or presence of the cosmos, which guaranteed continuity, and the maintenance of being within the proximity of sacredness, order, and existence. As the most obvious example, Eliade refers to rites of death which are common for an understanding of such a passage as continuity, rather than the cessation of existence. In Eliade's words,

[T]he man of the primitive societies has sought to conquer death by transforming it into a *rite of passage*. [...] In short, death comes to be regarded as the supreme initiation, that is, as the beginning of a new spiritual existence. [...] Generation, death, and regeneration [as rebirth] were understood as three moments in a single mystery, and the entire spiritual effort of archaic man was exerted to show that there must be no intervals between these moments. One cannot *stay* in one of the three. Movement, regeneration continue perpetually. Man constantly re-performs the cosmogony [as] the paradigmatic making [,] in order to be sure that he is making something well (*The Sacred and ...* 196-197).

As for the non-religious man, although he was the descendant of *homo religiosus*, such an understanding has been lost, and further replaced by various escapisms that favoured aesthetic or withdrawn intervals, like that of the aesthetic distancing and fragmentation observable within Victorian poetics, rather than continuity. The sacred, according to Eliade, already contained within it the notion of the limit, where “[t]he sacred reveal[ed] absolute reality and at the same time ma[de] orientation possible; hence [the sacred] *founds the world* in the sense that it fixes the limits and establishes the order of the world” (*The Sacred...* 30). Every ancient hierophany in Eliade's terminology, whether it was the sky or the mountain referred to earlier, demonstrated this limit by first creating a point of reference, a fixed point in space. This notion of the fixed point already contained within it the concept of the limit and the beyond, especially in the vertically oriented construction of the cosmos as opposed to the horizontal spread of human presence in the geographical world. There is a striking parallel here with what Müller proposed more than half a century prior to Eliade's treatment, as Müller's discussion of

the *semi-tangibles* (rivers, mountains, natural boundaries) and *intangibles* (the sky, stars, the sun, cosmic boundaries) cited previously would testify to humanity's orientation owing its existence to the very concept of the limit and the perception of the in-between as pointing towards the perpetual beyond.

Going back to Müller's conceptualization of the infinite perceived through the finite, Wheeler-Barclay refers to Müller's model of the limit as being caused by the very discomfort and crisis that establishes the limit in the first place: "To clarify the point, Müller asked his audience to consider how our eyesight 'breaks down' at the horizon; we cannot 'perceive' what lies beyond, yet in some way we sense its existence, we 'suffer' from it. This poetic reference [...] tend[ed] to obscure an important feature of Müller's theory" (57). Müller wrote, that "[w]hen our eye has apprehended the furthest distance which it can reach, with or without instruments, the limit to which it clings is always fixed on the one side by the finite, but on the other side by what to the eye is not finite, and what may be called indefinite or infinite" (*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* 37). Both Müller and Eliade strongly underline the importance of the limit, and the acknowledgement of in-betweenness for the recognition of the existential crisis humanity came to understand in its foundational role. As Müller observed, "[i]n perceiving the infinite, we neither count, nor measure, nor compare, nor name. We know not what it is, but we know that it is, and we know it, because we actually feel it and are brought in contact with it" (*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* 38, Wheeler-Barclay 57).

In Müller's view, not only natural phenomena, but man as a living and thinking organism, and mankind as a mysterious entity also contained that same notion of the beyond, both as the object and the subject, which was structured in a similar way with the same infinite embodied within the finite, perceived through the acknowledgement of natural boundaries. This kind of otherness was analogous to that terrifying quality already present in the perception of the 'wholly-other', or *ganz andere* in the sense Eliade and Otto used it. According to Müller,

the infinite was not discovered behind the veil of nature only [...] Man looked upon as an object, as a living thing, was felt to be more than a mere part of nature, more than a river, or a tree, or an animal. There was something in man, whether it was

called breath or spirit or soul or mind, which was perceived and yet not perceived, which was behind the veil of the body. (*Natural Religion* 155)

As Müller emphasized, in-betweenness was not only perceived in nature, but also recognized within the human consciousness, once the gaze which was once directed to nature got turned inwards. Similar to Eliade's emphasis on the centrality of in-betweenness for human orientation in the world, Müller also considers in-betweenness as a mechanism of awareness which first necessitates a crisis, because it causes suffering, and then provides a strategy to deal with the realities of existence, or being within the world by constantly allowing association and dissociation with the world through human ritualization. In this respect, in-betweenness emerges as a central cultural mechanism for humanity, whether through integration or non-integration of the kind of sacred or profane perceptions of human existence Eliade classified as being separate from each other, resulting in contesting modes of human ritualization and identification with the world. However, as Eliade makes it clear, a divided, non-participatory, and fragmented modern consciousness still carries with it a sense of the original sense of participation, or in Müller's formulation, a sense of suffering and discomfort, which makes itself known only through the questioning of the in-between. The recognition of the human mind's own in-betweenness, as Müller also notes above, becomes yet another area of exploration, which is also Matthew Arnold's strongest preoccupation within his poetry.

As Cunningham also notes, Victorian poetry, with its doubting origins in the Victorian cult of religious, evolutionary, or poetic insecurity, eases into the kind of detached and confused consciousness similar to Eliade's understanding of the modern and fragmented human psyche, where "nothing snaps cleanly", and the "paradoxical condition of the unsaying-saying" results in various representations of hesitancy, "over citing, speaking and telling, [while] narrative confidence gets squeezed out under the weight of the collapse of the old Grand Narratives, especially the Judaeo-Christian one" (463). Although Arnold's personas in his poetry are not hesitant to refer or tell, they are nevertheless hesitant to participate in the kind of involved attitude Eliade notes as being the characteristics of the successfully ritualized and successfully ritualizing harmonious consciousness earlier humanity used to shape their worlds. Through either physical

participation and involvement with the world, as seen in older mythopoeic and theogonic links demonstrated by Müller and Eliade, or by creating an aesthetic and reflective poetics of detachment from it by way of employing a broken, double-coded mythology of abandonment, as Armstrong's model of "the double poem" (13, 375) suggests, the problem of human ritualization stands at the crossroads of ontology and epistemology, where in-betweenness rules both the participatory and non-participatory modes of consciousness, which has also been noted by David Cave:

As *homo religiosus*, the human being recognizes his or her thirst for meaning and transcendence. The archetype of 'authenticity' signifies an ontology rooted in concrete history, in experiments and experiences. And though these experiences pass and change, it is in concreteness that the real is found. [...] The real may not always be understandable, but it is never sterile (194).

Cave, here, does not only point toward humanity's understandable obsession and need for a credible origins, or a fixed point of reference, but also stresses the very quality of the factualness of the real, whether conceived through ontological or epistemological models. The real presents itself forward, and makes itself known through human involvement with the world. Even in its non-participatory, or detached modes, the reality of in-betweenness perceived through the study or the experience of human ritualization creates an awareness of the dynamics surrounding human ritualization and the central place of in-betweenness to be used as a tool for cultural analysis. Cave relates an anecdote from C. J. Bleaker, which would serve as the perfect example to illustrate the self-manifestation of the kind of crisis human ritualization and the study of in-betweenness inherently involves. In one of his scholarly visits to India, a splendid white cow grazing inside the holy grounds of a Hindu temple catches the attention of the world renowned scholar of religions, Rudolf Otto. Wanting to get a closer look, Otto heads for the temple, but a loud bell rings, and he is first warned, and finally denied entrance. Otto then gives a faint ironic smile, perhaps, having forgotten that writing and knowing about ritual or religion is not the same thing as believing in it, or being allowed to participate in it (182-183).

Similarly, as man cannot participate in the past without the fantastical help of a time machine, another kind of participation is necessary, which can only be achieved through the use of language, and an awareness that a crisis inherently surrounds human

ritualization. In this regard, association or dissociation with the past, the present, or the world in general through first-hand or second-hand experiences becomes the ultimate problem for human orientations within the world. The modes may differ, as in Grimes's experiential versus the narrative modes (197), or Rappaport's realms of the "middle-order meaning", constituting the world of metaphor, and thus allowing for the path towards the participatory "higher-order" realm of ritual, where "meaning stops being referential [and] becomes a state of being" (71-73). But the reality of life still stands as posing and imposing a problem of the limits, underlining a crisis by constantly pointing towards the dichotomy of the in-between. Even the anecdote Cave offers becomes the representation of a reality used to reflect upon, and discuss another reality, where, as Grimes noted earlier, the study of human ritualization looks into "an image reflected in a mirror reflecting another mirror" (230), because the origins of human experiences are always in flight. Being in close proximity to the limit, always feeling the limit, yet never being able to cross *the* boundary, as Cave further explains, "[i]n other words, humans and societies are limited in their capacity to extend into other domains. So is a hermeneutics limited in its ability to extend the interpreter's range of experiences. A person, by default, is limited to certain religio-cultural experiences and is kept from others" (183). In this regard, human ritualization emerges as a structure, making use of the in-between as its central pillar, embodying, and at the same time, employing the limit as both a mechanism of participation and crisis, whether in its ontological or epistemological considerations.

Following up on models given by Turner, Bell, Grimes, Rappaport, Eliade, Müller, and others, human ritualization materializes as a structure of renewal, but also as a structure of crisis, utilizing in-betweenness as a mechanism of awareness that continually points towards the incompatibility of the narrative and experiential modes employed within human existence. Ritualization does more than to simply act as an antidote for the crisis of existence. By continually calling into question its own cultural or natural existence, human ritualization also accommodates the study of the very modes that create and sustain the idea of in-betweenness in the first place. The deeper and more subversive mechanisms of ritualization can only be observed through the acknowledgement of the in-between with the questions it raises regarding the origins of human culture, social being, a collective sense of belonging, and a hunger for an ontological nostalgia. In this

regard, nostalgia becomes, if not a broken link, a shifting one for the non-participatory modern consciousness, because, as Carl Olson also observes, this kind of consciousness is concerned more than ever with “religious crises that involves an awakening to an awareness of the absence of meaning” (99). Olson further notes that Eliade’s model of the profane consciousness arises out of the sacred, just as the Victorian poetic consciousness arises out of the Romantic, where “[h]uman beings feel torn apart and separated from perfection and that which is powerful and utterly different than themselves. Thus the human condition [...] is characterized by dissatisfaction, forgetfulness of a timeless [and] mysterious unity” resulting in the “ontological fissure and disaster” which creates the need to resurface a secondary theology of nostalgia, “a paradoxical state in which contraries exist in unity” (100).

Although Olson does not specifically discuss Victorian poetry, when considered in this light, Arnold’s poetic struggle to confront the experiential as well as the narrative modes of the in-between, as it will be shown in the coming chapter, stands out as an exploration of the paradoxical reality of the in-between, where Arnold’s personas covertly question their own relation to a past which they can never participate in, save through the relationship established with the mythic or narrative figures who no longer live in the present. As Andrew Greeley also notes, a sense of a sacred loss, or an overwhelming feeling of incompleteness surrounds humanity’s need for the telling of stories, because, especially “religious stories [are] predictive of other stories. Our relationship to the ‘Other’ [is] predicative of our relationships to others, both intimate and distant” (52). In a parallel vein, Arnold’s poetic creations seek to ritualize their own existence through establishing a relationship with the distant yet familiar mythic presences of the past, however, they can neither fully associate, nor completely dissociate themselves from these narrative presences, thereby perpetually inhabiting the in-between in an anxious state of intellectual contemplation. As Cave also states, “insofar as myth refers to and participates in other worlds of meaning beyond a given society to worlds of other times and places, myth [becomes] more than a function and creation of society”, and it carries with it a “paradigmatic, existential, and ontological weight” (68). Arnold’s personas can be said to continuously point towards this disturbing crisis of uncertainty, where in-betweenness becomes utilized as a mechanism of self-awareness, and self-reflexivity.

As Bell has noted, when kept intact, or even broken, human ritualization does function through crisis, and only by creating and maintaining its own crisis that it survives, because human rituals do not

build community by simply expressing sentiments of collective harmony; they do it by channelling conflict, focusing grievances, socializing participants into more embracing codes of symbolic behavior, negotiating power relations, and, ultimately, forging images by which the participants can think of themselves as an embracing unity. [...] [T]he physical and symbolic language of ritual is invoked, consciously or unconsciously, as a medium that can embrace real-life contradictions while still orienting people toward ideals (*Perspectives* 235).

However, to adopt this view of ritualization in its integrating and orienting structure would be difficult regarding Arnold's poetry, because, as it will be argued, Arnold's poetry operates in the opposite direction with its non-participatory mode. This mode is both distant and distancing, making use of the exact crisis which ritualization and in-betweenness also operates from, namely by constantly putting the experiential-temporal mode against the narrative-mythic. Resolutions do not occur in Arnold's employed modes; instead, an in-between perspective is offered, observing the modern crisis of in-betweenness and its scars from a distance. Exploring the rift between leftovers or sediments of a mythic-authentic past and an abandoned present, it will be argued that Arnold employs in-betweenness as a tool of analysis, made available by the structure and dynamics of human ritualization, where the consciousness of the non-participating human condition is observed within the interiority of the human mind as the outcome of broken human ritualization.

1.2. ARNOLD'S POETICS OF DISTANCE, IN-BETWEENNESS, AND BROKEN RITUAL

Philip Drew, in "Matthew Arnold and the Passage of Time" has suggested that anyone willing to get acquainted with Arnold's poetry would eventually have "to meet the blunt question, 'You say that Arnold writes superbly in some poems, and that in others he offers us an argument of great subtlety and importance, but does he ever do both at once?'" (201). Whether Arnold writes with technical finesse or not at every turn is not a concern of this study, but the second part of Drew's question is of importance, because, it points to the argumentative side of Arnold's poetry, where, in Drew's view, Arnold's

poetry presents the reader with a sophisticated vital argument of the origins of mankind's connective nature. Drew locates the case as being hidden within the relationship between Arnold's portrayal of nature, where nature is "what man is not, imply[ing] the incompleteness of man" observable in Arnold's memorable imageries like the sea, the countryside, or melancholy use of landscape, as "[n]ature is unified, especially the sea, but man is isolated, at which Arnold grieves" (205). Perhaps, a more suitable question, at least for the purposes of this study, would be to ask whether this argument on alienation is resolved or not, and if not, how to connect such detachment with the kind of a failed sense of human ritualization and in-betweenness as a non-functional and broken mechanism of self-awareness, which gets stripped of its integrating and reorienting nature.

The key point, if not the argument, would be to consider whether or not participation is involved within what Drew calls Arnold's use of "the equivalence between time and place", where "helpless despair" shows itself through "the inevitable ebbing away of Time, [where] the countryside becomes a vast clock [...] swallowing [...] human hopes [as] poetic inspiration [...] drie[s] up" (208). In Drew's view, the argument Arnold poses is to question if even the remotest possibility exists in overcoming the modern detachment of humanity from its primary connection with the cosmos, personal memory, and time, which seems very unlikely to happen, because Arnold's poetry "contrast[s] [...] the firm physical imagery" with that of the "modern man", where modern man is infected and "marked by vague, widely-applicable *classes* of experience", since "all that the world has now to offer us is a 'store of sad experience'" (209). In this regard, Drew's observation becomes highly suggestive of the conflict or dichotomy between Grimes' proposed modes of the experiential-personal clashing with the mythic-narrative modes of ritualization, in which, Collini's observation underlining the secondariness of Arnold's poetry also finds its place. As "the second-order reflections" of Arnold's poetry are never about participating with the actual experience itself, Collini has argued that they are rather concealed questions and expressions regarding reflection, addressed towards, and compiled through secondary means (27). Therefore, a circular, "desperate, eternally self-defeating desire to escape from this unending round of intellection, from being the prisoner of [one's own] consciousness"

gets transformed into one of Arnold's most memorable expressions of the modern experience, becoming "the dialogue of the mind with itself" (Collini 27).

A similar view has been expressed by Anthony H. Harrison, where the elegiac nature of Arnold's poetry reveals a non-participatory consciousness of "lost love or lost faith", divided forever from their natural counterparts, where "love is drained of its eroticism, and faith of its asceticism" (*Victorian Poets* 29). Both love and faith, when thought in terms of human activity, are actions that require participation, whether as the worship of a loved one, joining in bodily ways or otherwise, or the worship and practice of withdrawal, which seeks to become one with the ultimate spiritual reality by way of renouncement. However, as Arnold's commentators suggest above, it would be hard to argue for a participatory mode in Arnold's poetry, because the mode Arnold employs is not one of continuity but rather an uncomfortable sense of in-betweenness and discontinuity, where the thought-action dichotomy between thinking about the world, and participating within it by becoming part of a greater reality, such as love, faith, time, or a peaceful and harmonious cosmic existence is not overcome. Instead of participating in "cosmic time" through continuity, as Eliade's previously discussed conception of profane time suggests, Arnold's poetic characters are caught in-between distant, pleasing, yet no longer approachable times and the now desolate, worldly places haunted only by past and incomplete memories, culminating in the reflective, secondary, and melancholic-nostalgic quality of Arnold's poetry.

A counter view, arguing for the reconciliatory nature of Arnold's poetry, has been suggested by Dwight Culler, where Culler notes that "[t]he central feature of Arnold's world is a river which the poet unabashedly calls the River of Life or of Time" (3). According to Culler, Arnold's poetry demonstrates a similar flow of the experience of humanity, by "denot[ing] historic time, [and] [m]ore frequently, [...] the life of the individual" symbolized by "three distinct regions" as Arnold's poetry makes use of landscape imageries of the threshold, like "the Forest Glade, the Burning or Darkling Plain, and the Wide-Glimmering Sea", which are "separated from one another by some kind of 'gorge'" (4). These symbolic regions, for Culler, represent "childhood, maturity, and old age or death, [where] the first is a period of joyous innocence when one lives in harmony with nature, the second a period of suffering when one is alone in a hostile

world, and the third a period of peace in which suffering subsides into calm and then grows up into [...] the joy of active service in the world” (Culler 4, Collini 27).

In Culler’s view, Arnold’s strategy is deliberate, and has its roots in the “thesis-antithesis-syntheses” model of history popular in Arnold’s day, understood as the continuous clash of “organic periods [of] faith and imagination” with those of the sceptical, “mechanical or critical periods”, restarting the “threefold pattern” all over with the “incorporated epoch”, which Arnold was so fond of in his criticism (4-5). Therefore, Culler contends that “[t]he third phase of Arnold’s myth is the phase of reconciliation, first, with the self and then with the world. The river joins its various streams and then it merges with the sea, ending in undramatic fashion as “a moment of inward illumination” (16). Although Culler notes that Arnold’s use of the threshold metaphors involve a “still point”, as “the moment of stasis, far above and yet plumbing far below the world’s surface”, this in-between period is functional and transitional in making it known to the human psyche that there is “a subterranean river”, a “silent and strong [...] buried life” of the universe, where the greater reality of being can be felt (15). Culler’s observation is quite reminiscent of Otto’s *ganz andere* (the wholly other), and highly evocative of Turner’s previously featured model of the liminal phase of ritualization, utilizing the threshold as an activator of awareness and integration. However, this study would tend to argue more towards interpretations of a rather incomplete, or non-indulgent mode of awareness, and not of participation (uniting/becoming one with), being dominant in Arnold’s poetry of in-betweenness, because, as Cave’s formerly noted anecdote concerning Rudolf Otto would remind us, that being awake to certain realities is not the same thing as being able, or being allowed to participate or overcome them.

If “the dominant note of Arnold’s best poetry” is indeed “reflection” and not the actual experience itself, as Collini argues (27), then another paradoxical question emerges as to the nature of such reflection: Can reflecting on a reality, whether the *ganz andere* or not, be considered on the same level as an experience of it? And where does poetry stand in this endeavour? The majority of the previously cited professional *experiences* of Arnold’s poetry would testify to its “paradoxical” and “vulnerable” nature focusing on “failure” rather than union (Rosenberg 149), where “a nostalgia” arising from

“dislocation [...] give[s] voice to a poetry of memory [...] haunted by the pathos of [...] order lost” (Madden 50), or an “intensifi[ed] melancholy divid[ing] the mind [...] emphatically against itself” resulting in a twice removed “melancholy of melancholy” (Riede, *Allegories* 2). Could these interpretative experiences, then, be considered as the reality of, or the realities behind Arnold’s poetics?

Perhaps, it would be more suited to direct attention to the meta qualities and the self-reflexivity of Arnold’s poetics concealed under the theme of “vocation”, or the “poetry-religion continuum”, as Ruth ApRoberts has noted (2, 7), because such a meta approach would be more demonstrative in underlining the practical side of Arnold’s poetry, which, as Grob also argues, is the presentation of “a secondary realm of human existence in which consciousness can imagine its wishes fulfilled, but [...] does so in such a way that its transparent unreality, its status as mere wish-fulfilling dream, is clearly evident” (135). However, all such critique would still lead back to the original question of the modes Grimes, Bell, Turner, and Rappaport observed, which is also posed above by Drew as the constant battle between “vague, widely-applicable *classes* of experience” (209), where narrative and experiential modes converse, converge, convert, and then separate, only to reunite again, as they have been locked in an eternal contamination of mythology, religion, and worldly action, represented through the palimpsests of human language and ritualization.

In this regard, even Culler admits to “the airs and floating echoes of our true or buried self” emanating from Arnold’s poetry, where “Arnold’s poems mark the moments at which such echoes come” as consciousness stands aside from “[a] surface self and communes with his own soul, [where] the one is religious, the other naturalistic” (15-16). As Culler further notes, “one is to be gained by effort, the other without any effort at all”; since the natural mode is “a cyclical movement [,] a stage in the world-process”, it does not require accomplishment, but the religious mode, consisting of the urge towards discovery of the self and the world, demands awareness and participation regarding the ultimate purpose of existence (15-16). Nonetheless, as Collini also notes, it is hard to reconcile such a feeling of unity with what happens in Arnold’s poetry; since nothing much happens, and only references of fragility to broken symbols as vessels for an emotion or feeling of perpetual in-betweenness float about, where there

are only distant echoes represented through “a set of symbols on to which man’s travails and hopes are transposed”, which are “never immediately at one with man, nor [...] infused with a deeper life of [their] own”, turning Arnold’s poetry into “that of emotion recollected indoors” (30). Thus, the reader is only illuminated in a secondary way, by “the light” which is “a little too clinical”, where “the yearned-for transforming emotion [...] can only be reflected upon and not experienced” (Collini 28).

In that vein, the dichotomy between thought and action becomes primarily a problem caused by the in-betweenness of reflection against actual and temporal human experience. Armstrong refers to its origins in Arnold as arising from an inner contradiction in Arnold’s poetry as to the matter of expressive language, which prioritize “inner experience” over “language and metaphor”, but since both arise out of “psychological states, [an] ‘allegory of the state of one’s own mind’ simply returns one to the inner subjectivity of the self, because the outer shell of language is merely the equivalent of subjectivity” (176-177). Therefore, experience gets mixed up with metaphor and reference, and reference with experience within the dichotomy of the “inner and outer” modes of experience and expression in Arnold’s poetry (Armstrong 177). In such a context, Armstrong contends that Arnold “is continually aware of the *results* of its over-reflective, alienated conditions [as] the poet of cultural displacement”, because Arnold is able to realize “the psychological stress it engenders”, where crisis turns into “isolation”, making him “hyperconscious of the intruding footsteps” within his own poetry, as the use of “culturally dislocating forces” are represented through “heavy [...] territorial reference, [such as] the boundary or limit of field, sea, land, European mountain, [...] desert [or] the subaqueous world” (202-203).

Making use of readings offered by Culler, Drew, Grob, Collini, Armstrong and others who either point towards the problem of reflectivity or the meta-concerns involved in the process regarding Arnold’s poetry, it should become evident that amongst the main issues underlying Arnold’s poetry is the in-betweenness of human experience located amongst thought-action dichotomies concerning the experiential and the narrative modes of being and participating with the world. This “liminoid” situation, as Turner coins it (*Dramas* 16-17), causes unease and discomfort for Arnold’s poetic characters, yet also reveals a deeper inner mechanism for the modern reader to gaze upon his own

incompleteness by employing a mode of division and secondary reflection. Turner regards the “liminoid” as separate from the “liminal” in the sense that the *liminal* is the integral part of the traditional structure of ritual which seeks completion, whereas the *liminoid* can only be experienced in “post-industrial” revolutionary and voluntary modern modes of adaptation, in which there is a continuous tendency to escape from closure, where, “to be either [the] agents or [the] audience [of ritual] is an *optional* activity” for the modern participant / observer (*Dramas* 15-16). As a result, the “liminoid [...] symbolic activity” (15) becomes a crucial mechanism, of both association and dissociation, a continuous familiarization and defamiliarization, where “yesterday’s liminal becomes today’s stabilized, today’s peripheral becomes tomorrow’s centered” (16).

Catherine Bell has also been suggesting a parallel structure, but only by highlighting the internal paradox of human ritualization, where ritualization may not always be “approached as a means to create and renew community, transform human identity, and remake our most existential sense of being in the cosmos” (*Perspectives* 264). Since the ritual structure is open to abuse, rites, especially in their modern or capitalist contexts may not always “work as a type of social alchemy to transform good intentions into new instincts or weave the threads of raw and broken experiences into a textured fabric of connectedness to other people and things” (264). Regarding the pervasive nature of ritualization, Bell’s remark interprets the phenomenon as capable of going both ways, especially when the dynamics of ritualization, due to their correlative involvement with each other as the narrative versus the experiential, prevent “scientific detachment”, where familiarity is continually broken and re-established as “ritual theorists, experts, and participants are pulled into a complex circle of interdependence”, because theory changes how people ritualize, and new ways of how people ritualize, or newly discovered ways of how people have been ritualizing, changes the focus or mode of the theories involved (265).

On the other hand, ritualization may also act as a stimulant of recognition pointing towards the central role of the in-between within the process, which can then be used to make sense of both the literary dimension and its accompanying physical functions, as in the narrative-mythic modes of experience in the world being set against physical

participation within the moment through the experiential-personal, unravelling a greater structure, whether this is the inner-workings of social life, the selfhood of the individual, or that very mysterious, yet verifiable *ganz andere*. Hence, it is no surprise that Rappaport also describes ritualization as the process resembling a “remarkable spectacle”, where “*the unfalsifiable supported by the undeniable yields the unquestionable, which transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the conventional into the correct, the necessary, and the natural*”. This structure is the foundation upon which the human way of life stands, and it is realized in ritual” (405). Similarly, Turner also recognizes the fundamental logic of ritualization, as being formed within a “consciousness, which should lead anthropologists into extended study of complex literate cultures where the most articulate conscious voices of values are the ‘liminoid’ poets, philosophers, dramatists, novelists, painters, and the like” (*Dramas* 17).

Signifying the importance of “liminoid analogues” residing in the subtle ways of how the poetic, dramatic, or plastic arts work, Turner gives priority to “modern arts and sciences”, as opposed to more “serious genres of symbolic action” such as “ritual, myth, tragedy, and comedy” that are “deeply implicated in the cyclical repetitive views of social process” (*Dramas* 16). In Turner’s view, because of the lack of “obligation” and “constraint from external norms” in *liminoid* rituals, “a pleasurable quality [...] enables” agents of ritualization “to be absorbed more readily into a consciousness of individuality, where “pleasure, thus becomes a serious matter”, as forming and enabling a questioning and meaning-making mechanism of its own (16). Again, this process of the individual being turned into the pleasurable ritualized agent goes both ways, as the threshold between the mythic-narrative and the temporal-experiential is incessantly crossed and re-crossed within what Turner has baptized as the *liminoid*, moving backwards and forwards within the interplay of changing social ideologies and its counter attitudes. In such a context, a self-awareness and an appetite towards cultural discovery are motivated. As Storey observes, “*film noir*” or “Shakespeare” or any other cultural heritage easily becomes an intellectual commodity which is apt to transgress “the border” between a cultural-narrative, and temporal-personal experience, as in the example of “*film noir* start[ing] as despised popular cinema and within thirty years [,] becom[ing] art cinema” (9). Because of the preferred nostalgic value attached to it by those, in Fiske’s words, who are engaged in “a fruitless exercise [of] nostalgia”,

seeking, yet failing to find “the authentic”, the process is essential for human culture, thus continually keeps producing culture crowds that continually search for the “authentic” by constantly looking into the past, and “bemoaning the loss of the authentic” in the present (Fiske 27, Storey 9).

However, akin to Turner’s above argument of the “liminoid consciousness” as the exercise of seeking and transforming the nostalgic, especially by employing modes common to ritualization, the study of in-betweenness can be seen to reveal the cultural dynamics behind the quest for this illusory sense of the authentic, where this quest becomes relocated within the fragmented consciousness of a modern and disoriented consciousness, also exemplified within Arnold’s broken poetics of in-betweenness. As it stands, the views provided on the relationship between human ritualization and in-betweenness so far singles out ritualization as a mechanism that contains and re-negotiates both modes of the experiential-personal, and the mythic-narrative modes which allow for a critical vantage point for the analysis of human culture. If the dynamics of in-betweenness and ritual creation can be seen to reflect upon each other as the ritualization process itself, they both emerge as ways of talking about the past and the present, involving contesting strategies of participation towards something overwhelming, whether in myth, or history. Arnold’s poetic voices, in this regard, also make use of the in-between to question the relationship of the human mind with that ever-fleeting sense of the authentic.

If Marjorie Garber is right in affirming that the essential human condition as poetic creation depends on the reciprocal transgression of boundaries between the narratives of the past, and the experiences of the present, since “[t]he act of writing is a sleight of hand through which the dead hand of the past reaches over to *our* side of the border”, then, “the uncanny connection between Shakespeare’s propensity to write ghosts and his continuing capacity to write *us*” (xxvi), can also be observed in the way Matthew Arnold’s poetry engages the structure of human emotions as well as the secondariness of human intellect, continually operating within the pregnant and creative in-between common to human ritualization and poetic creation. Perhaps, Arnold’s poetry can be considered, not as a ‘sleight of hand’, but rather as a sleight of the mind, which continues to speak inwardly with *us* the moderns, and also making and facilitating *us* as

the moderns, sustaining *our* sense of modern detachment through its many ghostly characters like the strayed reveller, the scholar-gipsy, Empedocles, the forsaken merman, or the mysterious Marguerite of long lost Switzerland. This is to suggest, that the boundary is crossed both ways; as Arnold himself travels in the Cumnor Hills of his Oxford youth within “The Scholar-Gipsy”, his readers also travel, each in their unique, yet similar hillsides of human perception and recollection, being in pursuit of their own scholar-gipsies, or their own mermen of the deep sea caverns. After all, what is poetry, but “the recognition” of the self through the other, an intention where “the poet *intends* toward another, even if the other is the poet apprehending the work in a later time and other space”, and since that very “intention proceeds in time, the objectification of the other is also subject to transformation” (Stewart, 1-2, 12). It is for this reason that Stewart defines the poetic process as “the *repetition* of an ontological moment and the *ongoing process or work* of enunciation by which that moment is recursively known and carried forward” (15). In that regard, poetic voice becomes the definitive ingredient, both in poetic creation and ritualization, making both the communion with the past and the communication with the present possible amongst contending modes of human experience from within the boundaries of the in-between.

1.3. POETIC VOICE AS THE INVOCATION OF THE IN-BETWEEN

Being “a form of verbal representation”, poetry has an “aural dimension”, which “evokes aspects of aurality in production and reception [...] even in its written form” (Stewart 60). Necessitating division from the self and the moment, “personification is *voiced* in poetry [,] tak[ing] place not merely as a presence but as the condition under which the person appears, [and within which] language proceeds [and] we recognize each other as speaking persons” (Stewart 104-105). This is to say, that the written poem is coded within the same physical limits, measures, and rhythms of articulation, just as within human ritualization, which the recipient decodes the thought and its accompanying emotion in another time; and within such relationship is established, both an experiential real-time communion with the present, and a mythical-abstract synchronic communication with the past and the present.

Stewart calls this “lyric possession”, which comes to be hidden amongst “the long history of the use of words, the legacy of generations of the dead and the somatic

memory of living speakers, [through] which our voices are spoken through, [yet] we are bound to hear more than we meant to say” (143). Underneath the cloth of poetry is the idea of ritualization, where the dead are continuously animated, either by being repossessed, or by simply being evoked to serve the purposes of the present. Poetic association with the world is of the same fabric as ritualization, since “poetic form made of language relies on rhythm and musical effects that are known with our entire bodies, carried forward by poets [,] and carried over by listeners receiving the work [,] the poem always [stays] manifold”, hence the “unending task of recognition” (12). In Stewart’s exposition, Eliade’s participatory model of the religious man also finds its equivalent. According to Eliade, ancient humanity maintained this link between poetic myth and ritualization, and the structure enabled him to “make and remake” himself through participation with cosmic time, not by trying to escape from it, but abiding by its cosmic structure, thus “emerging” out of it anew in every phase of life’s journey (*The Sacred...* 205). This does not mean, that the archaic man was not open to change, but because “archaic man acknowledges no act which has not been previously posited and lived by someone else, some other being who was not a man”, his continuous existence is structured around “the ceaseless repetition of gestures initiated by others” (*Cosmos and History* 5).

The important thing to note here is that, the *others* are the dead heroes of the past; whether as renowned poets or warriors or kings, they all fall under the same category of the ancestral archetype who did participate “*ab origine*”, in the time of origins with the cosmic creators, where meaning (ontology of being) and continuity permanently reside (*Cosmos and History* 5-6). This is, again, the product of a similar constructive dichotomy Rappaport has termed as being formed within the realm of “high-order meaning”, in which “meaning stops being [merely] referential, and becomes a state of being”, which is simultaneously objective and subjective within a hierarchy of subjectivity and irrationality (73). Or, in Otto and Eliade’s terminology, it would translate to the quest of finding the permanence of *being* and meaning to be interrelated, which is only observable through the acknowledgement of “the irrational” (*The Idea of the Holy* 59, *The Sacred...* 9-10).

Relying on a parallel model, Turner also finds within the liminal stage of ritual structure, that the phase of emergence and integration only becomes possible through the acknowledgement, or probing of the irrational in-between, as participants are allowed to gaze into the past and question both worlds, being in-between the past and the present; “dead to the social world, but alive to the asocial world” (“Liminal to Liminoid” 59). The ‘asocial’ world (mentioned earlier by Turner as the womb or the night), is the world of the formless expanse; an uninterrupted space without the fixed point of reference, which Eliade discusses as “the formless fluidity of profane space” (*The Sacred...* 63), as seen in examples within world mythologies through the archetypal “watery chaos that preceded Creation” (42), or “the darkness” as “the non-manifested” area of chaos, presented in symbols of immersion, like the aquatic or marine imageries of the deep (79). The imagery of the plunge or immersion finds its most famous Western representation in the metaphor of the river Lethe, countered by the river Mnemosyne, where “forgetfulness is a necessary part of the realm of death, [as] the dead are those who have lost their memories” (*Myth and Reality* 121).

However, there are a few exceptions, like Tiresias, and the “Orphico-Pythagorean” traditions of the sacred bards (*Myth and...*121-122), where, referring to J. P. Vernant, Eliade writes that the bard “inspired by the Muses has access to the original realities [of] the foundation of this World”, and there arises the connection between the mythic-ontology of the past, and the participatory ontology of the present (120). Within this model, the poet symbolically undertakes the same journey of the descent into the underworld, seen in motifs like Orpheus and Odysseus by simply evoking the dead through poetry “in order to learn” and be part of what the dead has sought to know (Vernant qtd. in *Myth and ...* 120). Thus, the poetic process becomes an involvement with the beyond. In such an exchange, Mnemosyne makes it possible for the bard to make “contact with the other world, [presenting] the possibility of entering it and freely returning from it, [within which] the past appears as a dimension of the beyond”, but still, it is a dimension one must return from (Vernant qtd in Eliade 120-121).

Eliade and Turner’s models shown above, of the dead-yet-living conception of the mythopoeic in-between, then, suggest the same kind of dichotomy Susan Stewart’s approach to the poetic process puts forward through its emphasis on “lyric possession”

through the voiced-ness of the poetic process, as Stewart, although without mentioning Eliade or Turner, illustrates perfectly as “the most profound aspect of poetry’s relation to vision”:

The relation between invisibility and visibility – between infinite silence and darkness on the one hand and beholding on the other – is the relation [best observed through the] cliché of the blind poet, [which] we must take seriously—for the poet beholds the other and at the same time creates the conditions for beholding, seeing without needing to see. The poet is summoned by another and in turn summons another into presence (146).

Comparable to Stewart’s analysis of the continuous voiced-ness of the poetic process from within what Turner has called the liminal phase of the “betwixt and between” (*Ritual Process* 95), David Nowell Smith also argues for the central importance of voice in poetry, not only as a physical concept, but more so as the very definition of the in-between; a space required, and thus continually kept open for the creation of sound and concept alike. Smith notes, that “voice” is, above all, “marked by its constitutive condition of ‘between’ [...] or *medium*” (42), where “[v]oice is only more-than-language by being already bound up in the structures of language itself”, which “also implies that *language* is always more-than-language, [and] that voice is always more-than-voice” (29). Building on Giorgio Agamben’s distinction between *phone* and *gramma*, which, in Smith’s view, considers “voice as *place* for the taking place of language”, the art or rather the medium of poetry becomes the definitive intermediary between the inner perception of human selfhood and the outer sensing of the physical world (31). In-betweenness, in this regard, becomes a prerequisite for the poetic act as well as the poetic utterance. Smith further notes that, especially in *Language and Death*, Agamben can be observed arguing for the constant in-betweenness of the poetic act, where poems accentuate the same linguistic in-between by “continually suspending the sound-sense opposition, [where] poems render audible not *phone* but rather the suspension itself” (31).

Agamben, in the same book, has argued that even the word ‘muse’ originates from the same uneasy suspension process, as the word “*Muse* is the name the Greeks gave to this experience of the ungraspability of the originary place of the poetic word”, where the in-between and mysterious experience of the origin-less-ness of the poetic word results

in the “invention of the Muses”, thereby allowing for expressions such as being “possessed by the muse” to stand in for the actual experience itself (*Language and Death* 78). This experience of the perpetual in-between, “necessarily escapes whoever tries to speak it”, and, according to Agamben, leads Plato to conclude that poetry, or “the meaning of the most beautiful song” lies within the demonstration itself; “that poetic words do not originally belong to people nor are they created by them” (78). Agamben believes that poetry “contain[s] an element that always already warns whoever listens or repeats a poem that the event of language at stake has already existed and will return an infinite number of times” (Agamben 77, N. Smith 31). Therefore, bordering Agamben’s approach, Smith argues that “we grasp voice not as ‘origin’ but rather as matrix of the continuing vectors through which the impulse into language is continually figured, configured, transfigured (47). Victorian poetics, as has been shown previously, also makes use of a similar self-conscious transfiguration within its own peculiar in-between stance, where Arnold’s poetry specifically displays the relationship between poetic figuration and transfiguration within its own self-conscious configurations of the in-between.

Because voice, especially in poetry, has this distinctive and inherently divisive quality which separates thought from action, or the physicality of sound from the narratives of the combined letters, Smith contends that voice “indicates the current state of our inner life, but more fundamentally indicates the very fact that we *have* an inner life” (49). However, by such indication, poetic voice paradoxically “set[s] up our sense of interiority, [but] nevertheless remains strangely external to us, something we register each time we perceive our own voices” or hear ourselves speaking towards that unfamiliar *other* in recordings, or in readings, as our divided *selves* come to a crisis, both familiar to the other, yet also quite foreign (Smith 50). Smith also agrees that, with Heidegger comes the vision of “our exposure to this abyssal voice” being utilized “as a kind of metaphysical primal scene: confronted with the ‘nothing’, we cannot avoid raising the question of the meaning of being. Questioning, in other words, starts as a giving-oneself-over to voice”, taking place within the confines of the in-between (69).

As Agamben further argues in his 2014 lecture, “Resistance in Art”, given at the European Graduate School, the poetic act involves a surrender but also a resistance

towards closure, a giving-in to one's own *impotentiality* which negates any kind of fixity, without which there can be no potentiality and thus, no basis for creative action. Drawing on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Deleuze's use of 'resistance' as the main function of language, Agamben finds the poetic process as forming the basis of all human production (as *poiesis*). Agamben, noting Aristotle's observation that humanity is not biologically coded for a preordained work-specific purpose, and thus born into a "constitutive work-less-ness", suggests that human beings can only realize their "potentiality" through their "impotentiality", due to their lack of predetermined orientation towards an *ergo* or *praxis*, as "man was born [...] without the work", which results in a "poetics of inoperativity". For instance, as the carpenter is defined by carpentry, or the shoe craftsman with the craft of making shoes, "man as such" does not have this predetermined craft and biological code from birth, but only the potentiality of endless possibility, thus impotentiality, which is by nature and definition unrealizable acts of potentiality (33:34 – 35:44).

In Agamben's view, the inoperative biological code of humanity allows for adaptation and survival, providing continuity through discontinuity, as "compared to animals, man remains forever in a potential condition, so that he can adapt himself to all environments" and all activities, "but no *one* activity can define him (37:50 – 38:17). Therefore, Agamben finds "theory, and contemplation" through "inoperativity", to be the constituent of the "true human praxis", where language and poetry, which is the ultimate form of inoperative contemplation, "opens [all human practice] to a new possible usage". After all, Agamben asks, "what is poetry if not inoperation in language and on language that deactivates and renders inoperative the usual communication and information functions of language in order to open it to a new possible use" (39:40 – 41:50). There is a notable connection here with Rappaport's approach prioritizing the poetic and symbolic mode in ritualization discussed earlier, where Agamben makes the same emphasis on the importance of symbolic in-betweenness and discontinuity as forming the basis for all senses of continuity regarding human survival and adaptation.

In Rappaport's view, "it seems abundantly clear that representations appearing in ritual" are able to evoke "emotion" as well as "cognition", since from "time immemorial [,] ritual places themselves" can be observed as being "embellished by art", or the sacred

places and structures themselves are constituted by art, as their very presence or erection onto the earth surface demonstrate the entanglement between religious instinct and art (385). Accordingly, there emerges an undeniable similarity between art and religion, in which their mutually “evocative qualities and effects” can be observed within the in-between spatial and temporal relationship concerning “[a]rt and aesthetic experience [...] stand[ing] midway between thought and experience” (Rappaport 385-86). Therefore, Rappaport concludes that “if art and ritual, and art *in* ritual, are successful they construct ‘sentiments’ out of the inchoate stuff of vital experience on the one hand and objects of discursive reason on the other (387). For both the thought, or the discourse and dichotomy of thought-experience to exist, a shapeless and unfinished medium is necessary, standing out as the poetic in-between, which Agamben notes as the ultimate expression of in-betweenness observable within physical human involvement with the world and one’s own use of language.

In a similar vein, Arnold’s personas also make use of their own inoperativity in drawing attention to the significance of the inherently broken quality of the in-between, displayed through settings and moods which prevent a successful sense of ritualization and identification. These representations are further enriched within similarly inoperative dramatic structures which paradoxically signify in-betweenness as an inherently divisive stimulant for the creation of poetic voice as a self-conscious reference and a means of poetic invocation. The invocation of mythic-historical, and in-between poetic figures or settings displayed within a broken relationship with the past in Arnold’s poetry, such as the merman, the scholar-gypsy, Empedocles, or the strayed reveller all point towards the secondary and evocative nature of poetic voice employed indirectly as poetic reference, further questioning a poetic confrontation between the past and the present either through allowing an indirect questioning of the settings, or a direct questioning of the characters’ own emotional relation to their physical or mental surroundings.

In Agamben, the centrality of the perpetually ‘inchoate’ poetic experience finds a suitable expression in the nature of poetic creation, as it has been definitive for humanity’s relationship with detached and self-reflexive abstractions focusing on impotentiality and in-betweenness. Agamben believes that self-reflexivity and in-

betweenness are the keys to understanding the “confrontation that has always been under way between poetry and philosophy [.] Both seek to grasp that original, inaccessible place of the word, which, for speaking man, is the highest stake” (*Language and Death* 78). But it is only in poetry that this gap between thinking and doing, or detachment and re-association is both realized and recognized. According to Agamben, “[p]oetic language takes place in such a way that its advent always already escapes both toward the future and toward the past. The place of poetry is therefore always a place of memory and repetition”, which is bound to turn upon itself (*Language and Death* 76). In other words, the poetic enterprise becomes the embodiment of the creative and speculative in-between, summoning the past into the present as a venue of self-exploration, self-reflexivity, and identification. Just as it is observable in all noteworthy poetry all around the world, the poetry of Donne and G. M. Hopkins, for Agamben, is the embodiment of the self-reflexive process upon which the art of poetry becomes a self-commentary on the mother tongue of their own poetry, involving “the contemplation of the English language” (42:25 – 30), where “great poetry does not simply say what it says, but also says the fact that it is saying it”, which demonstrates at the same time, “the potentiality and impotentiality of saying” (32:18 – 38).

The word *resistance*, then, acquires its original poetic meaning as the suspension of, or the stopping of any act of annihilation or closure, as in to “hold out against”, instead of directly oppose by force as in launching a counter attack. Originating from the Indo-European root-verb “sta”, and morphing into the Latin *sisto/sistere* (to *stand*), which denotes first and foremost a condition of *stasis*, poetic voice as creation demonstrates that very resistance simply by *being* there, or *sta*-nding in the very in-between. Agamben concludes that the poetic process, first of all, makes the condition of its own stasis known, as “poetry is the suspension and exposition of language, [where] poetry is suspended and exposed in the poem, like painting is suspended and exposed in the painting” (32:40 – 33:20). In Agamben’s understanding, the poetic process by its very own nature is self-reflexive, since “to be a poet means to be fully and helplessly delivered to one’s own impotentiality”, where the artist is “completely abandoned” to poetry’s own indecisive, yet highly pregnant stasis, its own “impotentiality” (18:02 – 18:25).

If this is poetic creation at its essential operation involving a continuous crisis, a mechanism of summoning the voiceless and invisible past from within the visible and voiced in-between, as Stewart suggests above, or the paradoxical and simultaneous surrender and resistance of the self towards poetic voice as the eternal transfiguration of the in-between as Smith and Agamben argues, the act of beholding seems to be the constant in the act and art of poetry. The unseen poets of the art, act, or craft, as in the endless procession of reflecting upon the voices of other poets, seem to be caught within a process of being continuously “visited”, in Arnold’s words, from the poetic worlds beyond (*Lit. and Dogma* 21). Cannot this continuous visitation be considered as the suitable metaphor for both being possessed by the past, and also taking possession of the past and the present at the same time? Given that Agamben, Rappaport, Stewart, and Smith’s responses towards different formulations of the poetic mode in question suggest an affirmative answer, the crisis surrounding poetic voice as invocation and ritualization seem to share similar dynamics with that of the constantly pregnant state of the in-between, thus ceaselessly operating within a dichotomy simultaneously containing an epistemology and an ontology of division, detachment, and belonging. Despite the fact that memory and the mnemonic device of poetry allows the bard to return freely from the depths of Lethe’s archetypal realm as Eliade indicates above, the larger question, especially for Arnold’s poetry within the multitudinousness of the Victorian poetic practice remains: What would happen if the journey is left incomplete, and no longer involves the accustomed mode of returning to life, as in completing the progress into the next phase of integration in Turner’s or Culler’s tripartite structure/anti-structure/structure model, thereby resulting in, as J. D. Rosenberg has noted, “the paradox of failure” in Arnold’s poetry (149)? Would Arnold’s broken sense of ritualization and in-betweenness still reveal a cultural mechanism of self-awareness, common to ritualization and the evocative qualities of poetic creation as suggested by the variety of approaches covered so far?

A possible answer has been suggested by Cunningham, which lies in the secondary and in-between journey of Victorian poetry into the land of the dead with its obsession with elegy, mourning, and death; after all, what is Victorian poetry, but “a school of surviving lonely hearts”, within which “poets and poems are commonly widowed, literally and metaphorically, [...] where they keep finding themselves: post-mortem;

ghosted, ghostly, left behind” (331-332). And Arnold, having been bestowed upon the title of “Wordsworth’s widow” by Quiller-Couch, takes his place amongst the literary funeral processions of the age, where, as Drew notes, “the jibe is unfair enough to be funny and true enough to be damaging” (200). However, its truth also points towards a greater poetic reality of the age, where Arnold was not alone in his melancholy-mourning and isolation. Since the old world and its ghosts no longer came to visit the fast-changing Victorian world, the Victorian poetic mode pays them a visit, however, never making the journey back home in one piece. Hence, the divided nature of the Victorian poetic discourse arises, according to Armstrong, where the confrontation, especially in Arnold and Clough, “between isolation and involvement, [...] the ideal and the real, being and knowing” results in “tighten[ing] their hold rather than loosen[ing] their authority” towards a resolution, in which “[a] strategy for dealing with experience begins to take precedence over the particularity of experience itself” (169-170). Thought comes to orbit experience, rather than penetrate into experience as a wholesome entity, thus failing in the “attempt to close the gap between the reflexive self and the world” (Armstrong 170).

As Cunningham argues further, the journey back home, or the return from the Victorian underworld is so loathsome and full of hesitation, that the period’s dominant form, the elegy, likes to keep its conventions in dark, secluded places such as the graveyard, the cavern, or in literary sources of the past and the poetic tradition itself. Since the art of poetry becomes a self-reflection upon *the* medium itself, it is the most suitable place to dissect its ins and outs, where the dead and the lost dwell in song and myth, and the self-reflexive meta-exercise turns into the eternal convening of “a dead poets’ society”, where, not just anyone, but “fellow-members of the household of writing” are tirelessly sought and evoked (Cunningham 336). This is no longer “a visitation” in the Arnoldian sense, but a counter-haunting and hunting, since it is no longer the past that haunts the present, but the present is both hunting for the past, and thus haunting the poets of the past, in Cunningham’s words, within “ghostings upon ghostings upon ghostings” (391). What better way is there to define the meta-poetic process as the ultimate and continuous embodiment of in-betweenness, as the past gets ritualized into the present, although incompletely and in a non-integrative fashion by Arnold, bringing forth and clothing the mythic dead with the intellectual concerns of the Victorian in-between? The

combined narrative-experiential memory of the past lives within the present through the invocation of past poetic voices and the unsuccessfully ritualized voices of in-betweenness in Arnold, not to mention the mythic figures as being portrayed through the same inquisitive and voiced in-betweenness displayed by the speakers of the poems. Taking into account the described modes of division regarding Victorian poetry, it would be hard to argue for the kind of “emergence out of time” archetype Turner, Eliade, Culler and others have pointed out, since there is no *emergence*, at least for Arnold’s poetry, but only *immersion* into the kind of poetic, divisive, and self-reflexive in-between so many of Arnold’s cloaked poet-philosopher voices within his poetry demonstrate and make audible to its own readers.

The self-reflexive, in-between, and meta-concerns of the Victorian poetic practice expressed above by Cunningham and Armstrong also underline Stewart’s earlier point concerning the infinitely “manifold” nature of the poetic structure, where “the task” of poetic creation has been referred to as being inherently a process of “unending recognition [...] in time”, where the other, whoever or whatever that other may be, is always pursued (Stewart 1-2, 12), and in its broken modern condition, never caught. The poetic process, especially in connection with its ritual dimension may seem self-defeating, as Agamben amongst others also points towards, but it is never without its fruits. Even the poetic in-between yields results, as noted by so many of its ritual oriented scholars like Grimes, Bell, and Rappaport, or put forward by its numerous other anthropological, religious, philosophical, or poetry-oriented commentators such as Turner, Eliade, Stewart, and Agamben. The in-between space *voiced* through division, works, if not to secure comfort and deliverance from the existential void, then to provide an awareness and a means to assess one’s own already ritualized and in-between situation in life by holding the many sided mirror of *homo mysterium* to one’s own face. Because the Victorian intellectual effort engages, in Cunningham’s words, the exact shattered mirror-like structure of change and distortion in its social and literary fabric, poetry is not exempt from “*mutatis mutandis*, again and again [observed] in the busy Victorian presentation of self and art in the mirror of earlier characters and selves classical, medieval, old fictional whatever. The grand prosopopoeitic game played over and over”, where, if not modern, “proto-modernist [...] plights and perplexities” regarding distance, division, and detachment show themselves (462).

If the Victorian intellectual scene can be regarded as the venue which involves the modern beginnings of the struggle, both with the inner structures of ritualization and in-betweenness as the constant interplay of the poetic process and the ontological concerns of human beings, as Müller and Arnold's works suggest, the Victorian poetic scene can also be regarded as its side locale, where, in Nowell Smith's words, the seeds of modern anxieties such as detachment and hesitation are sowed, as "the establishment of the liberal, interior subject in modernity, can also be linked to the shift from oral to literate cultures, where poetry ceases to perform the same ritual functions as before", thereby becoming detached and more self-conscious (103). Adapting Rappaport's contemporary conclusion for the end of the twentieth-century to that of Victorian times, if the Victorian world can be seen other than the peculiar place where only "*homo economicus*, that golem of the economists into which life has been breathed [through] coerciveness" dwells, "[or] the obsessive focus on reproduction attributed to individuals by evolutionary biologists" rules supreme, a more vital perspective for human survival also emerges, as the Victorian poetic and intellectual struggle provides the setting for the questioning of a ritualized and poetic exploration into the in-betweenness of being, which is "that part of the world through which the world as a whole can think about itself" (Rappaport 461).

Mathew Arnold was very much interested in *that* part of the world, where the physical world was not only the world of *homo economicus*, or *homo sapiens*, but also the home of *homo religiosus* and the domain of *homo poeticus*. As the earlier chapters tried to demonstrate Arnold, Müller, and Eliade's essentially religio-poetic concerns regarding the poeticity of human experience in its Victorian and modern contexts, thereby aiming to further establish links towards the modern study of in-betweenness and ritualization, this chapter has been an effort directed at the inner and common paradox of broken ritualization and in-betweenness, which has been identified by its specified critics as taking place within and through the in-between poetic structures shared similarly by ritualization and poetic invocation. Being amongst the chief representatives of the characteristic self-reflexivity and aesthetic secondariness evident in the Victorian poetic considerations, Matthew Arnold's poetry offers the in-between space and the in-between questioning voice as the medium to arrive at an awareness of the poetic paradox, where a failed sense of ritualization pervades feelings of joy or unity, yet is

still able to trigger a broken sense of belonging towards the paradox of the divided and essentially alienated nature of the human condition itself. In consequence of perspectives offered by Turner, Rappaport, Eliade, Bell, Grimes, Stewart, Smith, Agamben, and others on the conflicting, yet also sustaining dynamics of ritualization and in-betweenness, the following chapter will discuss Arnold's poetry within previously explained dynamics of the in-between as necessitating a self-awareness, resulting in a broken sense of ritualization that can be utilized to unmask, if not to better understand the far-reaching self-reflexive and meta-concerns of the aesthetically fragmented in-between space of the distinctive Victorian poetic voice and outlook.

If Nowell Smith is right in claiming that the study and the practice of poetry through the poetic voice is “not simply a ‘figuring *as*’” observable in its qualities of “proto-verbal effusion, as possession by language [and] initiation into language— but also a ‘figuring *through*’”, involving our physical, yet highly in-between, temporal, and “sonic world [...] mak[ing] conflicting demands on our own voicing, a voicing at once necessarily finite and yet always bound up in that tacit plurality”, then the act, craft, or art of poetry requires an awareness of the in-between, an “attend[ance] to its configurations, to the patterns of its self-configuring”, which are “necessarily ec-static, necessarily medial: voice only becomes ‘voice’ as outside itself, other to itself” (137). Smith concludes that poetry as both voice and figure revolves around “the effacement and decentrings of a singular subject”, which is the human subject, and further asks the question: “Can we grasp this linguistic time, beyond noting its ecstasies, its decentrings, [and] its constitutive multi-directionality?” (162).

Similarly, striving to argue for the illuminative yet decentred dimension of the ritualistic in-between being implicit in Arnold's poetry, this study will now make the attempt of noting and discussing the *ekstasis* (interval, suspension), as in its original figurative meaning involving rupture, stasis, or displacement. As the etymology of the word *ekstasis* suggests, ‘standing outside oneself’, or ‘a removal to elsewhere’ involves, again, the same kind of inner division Arnold's poetry employs, where “from an existential perspective, *ekstasis* refers to the constant movement and transformation that is existence” (Schmidt 117). It will be argued, that the in-between modes concerning Arnold's poetry are also representative of the nature of such movement, since

movement also involves the process of being removed elsewhere, whether in poetry towards the past through time as Stewart has suggested, or in physical motion through overcoming spatial limits as Müller had proposed. In accordance, the following discussion of the poems will attempt to reveal Arnold's ekstasis-tic voicing of broken ritualization, and the self-revelatory nature of the poetics of in-betweenness implicit in his poetry by focusing on its liminal, non-integrative, and paradoxically static structure.

**CHAPTER II:
REPRESENTATIONS OF IN-BETWEENNESS
IN ARNOLD'S POETRY**

**2.1. REPRESENTATIONS OF IN-BETWEENNESS IN
"THE SCHOLAR-GIPSY"**

Probably being the most prominent amongst Arnold's readily recognizable poetic figures, the mythic, transcendent, yet spectrally wandering scholar-gipsy can be seen as the definitive liminal figure in Arnold's poetry. As Nathan A. Scott also observes, "however dogmatically the New Positivism may deny that man has any capacity for genuine transcendence, the fact of the matter remains that we are creatures who seem destined to be *liminars*" (4). In Scott's exposition, the human condition itself as involving a continuous passage from birth to death is defined to be the ultimate liminal reality. And in Arnold's "The Scholar-Gipsy", not only the evoked figure or legend of the scholar-turned-scholar-gipsy becomes the ultimate representation of the kind of perpetual human in-betweenness Scott underlines, but the mnemonic summoning of the mythic figure by the speaker of the poem also emphasizes the relationship between human ritualization and the invocation of the mythic figures of the past humanity has come to associate with, thereby stressing its essentially poetic liminality, or rather its ceaselessly *liminoid* condition of in-betweenness.

If it can be properly recalled, Turner has been emphasizing the importance of the relationship between the liminal and the liminoid, where "the liminoid poets [and] philosophers" (*Dramas* 17) of post-industrial human societies have been playing a crucial role for contemporary culture, because it was only through the kind of self-reflexivity their perspective offered, that modern humanity was able to perceive the essential role ritualization and in-betweenness have been playing in the construction of modern human cultures and societies. For Turner, "[t]he liminoid is more like a commodity—indeed, often *is* a commodity, which one selects and pays for—than the liminal, which elicits loyalty and membership [.] One *works at* the liminal, one *plays with* the liminoid" ("Liminal to Liminoid" 86). In consequence of Turner's view, a curious dichotomy between the liminal and the liminoid arises, and further imposes a

more bizarre question, which can also be seen at play within “The Scholar-Gipsy”: If human life is the predestined liminal state which demands continuous work, and offers no escape other than ritualization and an awareness of the in-between, can the dynamics underlying in-betweenness be considered as providing or necessitating an analytical perspective, where the question leans more towards considering the role of the liminal within the liminoid? If that is the essential question, an in-between space, mode, or voice is needed to stress the kind of “flow” Turner has been emphasizing, since

ritual (including its liminal phase) in archaic *theocratico-charismatic* [...] societies [through] religious drama provided the main cultural flow-mechanisms and patterns. But in those ages in which the sphere of religious ritual has contracted [...] a multiplicity of (theoretically) non-serious [...] genres, such as art and sport (though these may be more serious than the Protestant ethic has defined them to be), have largely taken over the flow-function in culture. (“Liminal to Liminoid” 90)

Therefore, it can be argued that the kind of poetry which counter-poses these two modes of the liminal and the liminoid against each other would be more implemental towards revealing the contradictory, divisive, yet necessarily ritualistic orientation, and the essential flow of the human condition regardless of the historical epoch it belongs to. In Scott’s view, “Turner is most eager to remark [...] the wrongheadedness of regarding liminality as a merely negative state of privation: on the contrary, as he argues, it can be and often is an enormously fruitful seedbed of spiritual creativity”, as it is exactly the crisis of ritualized in-betweenness resulting in “the troubling ambiguities [...] the liminar [faces,] that there is born in him a profound hunger for *communitas*” (5). Even if this hunger is left unsatisfied, the awareness of such hunger, as it persists eternally in “The Scholar-Gipsy”, can be influential towards facilitating the awareness of its own speaker towards his own broken ritualization, or perpetual in-betweenness, as can also be seen operating within a similar structure in various other representations of Arnold’s poetry.

Not only in Arnold’s “The Scholar-Gipsy”, but also in “The Strayed Reveller”, “The Forsaken Merman”, and “Empedocles on Etna”, that a sense of broken ritualization unsuccessfully tries to associate the past and the present, revealing the inner dynamics of in-betweenness itself at work. Allowing for the contemplation of the problematic relationship between the personal experiences of the individual and the more

encompassing dynamics of the mythic-narrative mode as the only possible medium for signification and human expression, the conceptual in-between emerges as a creative and sustaining prerequisite that inhabits and makes possible both modes of experience. Therefore, it should become no surprise that these poems operate, at least on two levels, and through a process of distancing and crisis, just as the ritualization process also involves; where on the one hand the experience of the poem's speaker gets linked indirectly to the experience of its subject material, and on the other, the speaker's experience is counter-posed against, and directly but discontinuously linked to a mythical, folkloric, or no longer attainable mythic figure of loss and non-participation, most readily observable in "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Forsaken Mermaid", "Empedocles on Etna", and "The Strayed Reveller". Even unsympathetic commentators of Arnold's poetry, such as Gabriel Pearson observes the multi-levelled and distanced structure of Arnold's poems, where, through the distance thus introduced, Arnold "inserts a third kind of poetry. He urges the Gipsy to 'fly our paths' and [...] puts distance between dream and reality" (238). In Pearson's view, Arnold operates through "the perpetual, extra-historical vantage-point", where one is able to recognize "an attitude [or] a disposition to watch yourself being watched as one who watches while pretending unawares of being watched" (228). Such a view strikingly corresponds to the in-between or liminal phase of ritualization discussed earlier in Turner's tripartite structure, where the ritual subject both watches himself, watches his own history and doubts, and also is watched by the already ritualized and ritualizing masters who judge the participant and allow integration to take place on a social bases.

The metaphor of watching, or the act of watching, in this sense, is also central to Arnold's poetry. Especially when considered through a dichotomy between thinking and doing, the verb 'to watch' lays bare the dichotomy of the in-between itself, since it is neither participation in the moment, nor exclusion from it. Compared to the verb 'to pass by', as Turner's model of the ritual passenger discussed earlier suggests, *watching something by* implies, and thus becomes the clear-cut expression of stasis, non-involvement, and the epitome of a distanced poetic involvement in Arnold's poetry. The speakers are often the watchers-by, whereas the mythic-folkloric figures evoked within the poems are the perpetual passers-by, like the scholar-gipsy or the strayed reveller, frozen in their liminal state, allowing others to observe their non-participatory distance.

In this regard, the “third kind of poetry” Pearson alludes to becomes the speaker’s own combined experience of both self-consciously watching himself speaking by, and also trying to watch or imagine scholar-gipsy-like figures indifferently and incessantly passing by. The speaker’s own temporality becomes juxtaposed against poetic stasis through the in-betweenness of the poetic image thus invoked. Consequently, a distanced and non-participating consciousness further underlines the speaker’s own distance, yet also provokes a paradoxical involvement with the poem’s central in-between and non-integrative image, which is the scholar-gipsy. Being part of the distanced Victorian poetics, Arnold’s poetry, as Stacey Johnson also notes, tends to pose as “a poetry that seems to be overheard [...] without destroying the poet’s intense self-consciousness (8). And as such, a distancing and defamiliarizing self-consciousness gets transferred to the speakers as the implied or intended targets, who come to be regarded as a kind of fellow-poet, if it is permissible that all poetic voices are bound to consider themselves at one point or the other as poets of their own voiced condition. In Scott’s view, Arnold’s speakers, by bearing witness to this multi-levelled poetic distancing, become aware that “the poet” is not only “the professional versifier but anybody who, finding himself required to express an *o altitudo!*”, goes in search of ways to deal with personal experience as opposed to narrative figuration, as they would also realize that the poetic mode is the only means “[b]efore the surplusages of meaning thronged within the familiar realities of nature and history”, where a “reckoning with that mysterious fecundity and plenitude of the world” is continuously needed and thus sought (Scott 51).

Starting with “The Scholar-Gipsy”, Arnold makes this threefold distancing, and interiorized act of watching known by presenting the poem’s speaker in the very in-between position of sitting down in observation and inward contemplation. As the speaker declares that “Here, where the reaper was at work of late [...] Here will I sit and wait” (ll. 11-16), a sense of suspended stop-motion emerges. Even if the speaker has been physically moving towards his preferred “Screen’d [...] nook” (l. 21), which is in itself another physical landscape representation of the in-between, the speaker’s intention towards immobility and contemplation, a willingness to sit down and get absorbed in thought can still be observed between the lines where he calls out to the shepherd as “Go, for they call you [...]” and “Come Shepherd, and again begin the

quest” (ll. 1-10). When the speaker finally settles down, if not already having settled down, declares that his “[...] eye travels down to Oxford’s towers: / And near me on the grass lies Glanvil’s book— / Come, let me read the oft-read tale again:” (ll. 30-32). In such a setting, a broken and non-integrative ritualization is already present with the speaker’s choice of sitting down, motionless, between the shepherd, the countryside, and his own reflections musing over the myth of the scholar-gypsy, rather than an active pursuit intended to locate the rumoured settings, which the scholar-gypsy has been known to inhabit within the countryside.

What is more significant than the suspension of physical exterior movement here, lies in the inward relationship between the speaker’s relationship to his own mythic subject material, which is represented by the physical but also interiorized gaze of the speaker towards Glanvil’s book, and his physical, exterior, and probably emotive gaze towards Oxford. There is, however, a third gaze, which is directed towards the speaker’s own in-betweenness, which galvanizes both the physical and the referential gaze into the speaker’s own musings, and is revealed through the speaker’s concern with the already epitomized figure of the scholar-gypsy, who was no longer the scholar, and never the complete gypsy, but the mythic figure who stayed eternally in-between as the scholar-gypsy in Glanvil. Curiously enough, there never was an enviable scholar-gypsy in Glanvill to begin with, since, as Moldstad suggests, Glanvill’s figure was the “suspect”, representing the imaginative faculty with a potential to “deceive” (159), and not the representative of eternal poetic (imaginative) glorified truth Arnold would use him for. However, Arnold, by engaging in the kind of Turner-esque liminoid playfulness, invents “the dim romantic figure” (S. Johnson 60), or rather gives the task to the speaker of the poem to fashion the image of “a lasting personification of the alienated artist” from Glanvil, which would also act as presenting “lines of conflict between the individual and society” (E.D.H. Johnson 200).

As E. Dudley Hume Johnson further notes, by creating distance between temporal-physical experience and narrative-literary experience, Arnold “achieves a complete disassociation between the two halves of the divided awareness [...] in peripheral relationship to the workaday world” (200). The pastoral setting of the poem, its physical reality involves the Shepherd attending to his flock, representing the hustle-bustle

mundane world of physical limits, but the speaker stands, or rather sits in-between the physical and the mental, turning inward, longing to collect his own emotions and thoughts represented through the emotions evoked by the combination of the external landscape and the interior narrative-world, not of the gipsy-lore, but the scholar-gipsy lore, as there is a tremendous difference between them. As the poem unfolds, it becomes clear that the speaker's imagination is busy with the scholar-gipsy's narrative, and not the mysterious gipsy-lore, or the pastoral landscape of Cumnor Hills.

Later on in the poem, the relationship between what is at the center and at the periphery of human experience becomes entangled with the similarly distanced, and seemingly one-way exchange between the speaker and the scholar-gipsy, as the speaker transfixes the scholar-gipsy's own longing for "[...] the spark from Heaven to fall" (l. 120) onto his own spiritual existence, and his own already failed ideal of a hopeful and poetic quest to find that spark, which is put in contrast to the perpetually spark-searching scholar-gipsy. The mythical scholar-gipsy is never reported to have found the spark, because, as the speaker also realizes, that finding it would mean the termination of the quest, and betray the whole idea of a liberating in-between for the speaker, which is by implication, still gives the speaker a hollow sense of identification with the mythic figure of the scholar-gipsy. But the 'spark' of a highly self-reflexive and self-conscious kind, it seems, had already fallen on Arnold, if not the poem's speaker. Being recalled from the beyond, or rather invented from the margins of Glanvill *and* Glanvil's pages (as it is spelled by Arnold's speaker in the poem), the speaker conjures up his own version of the eternal scholar of in-betweenness (no longer scholar, and quite unlikely to turn gipsy) to sustain his own inner dialogue with ritualization, invocation, and the in-between. Later exchanges between the speaker and his imagined scholar-gipsy take on the form of a paradoxical and imaginary quest, where the speaker, having contemplated the various settings the scholar-gipsy has been rumoured to visit, also considers the temporality of human experience within the world. The scholar-gipsy is above the average lot of humanity, since he is kept forever in-between by the circulation of his own poetic legend, searching for the precious spark for heaven to fall, which mortals would never be able to experience within their temporal and experiential condition.

Therefore, the speaker urges the scholar-gipsy to remain uncontaminated by the pervasive modern influence, and keep to preserving his status of the perpetual in-between, which can also be thought in terms of an incessantly ritualized passing-by imposed on the scholar-gipsy by the speaker to give hope to all potential by-standers (watchers) like himself. Since mortals “fluctuate idly without term or scope, / [...] each half lives a hundred different lives; / Who wait like thee, but not, like thee in hope” (ll. 167-170), the presence of the scholar-gipsy is a welcome source for an inexhaustible hope for the speaker, which the scholar-gipsy installs within the speaker by spectrally roaming the countryside in legend as he always did, “Still nursing the unconquerable hope, / Still clutching the inviolable shade” (ll. 211-212). However, the scholar-gipsy is continually warned by the speaker to keep to the shadows, and avoid contact with “this strange disease of modern life, / With its sick hurry, its divided aims / [and] plunge deeper in the bowering wood” (ll. 203-207). The bower, here, is another imagery which contributes to the setting and the general mood regarding the use of in-betweenness. Because only if the scholar-gipsy is kept within an impenetrable bower that the scholar-gipsy’s mythic and perpetual *ab origine* wandering, or his continuously in-between, undefined, constantly fleeting, suspended, and ‘wholly other’ existence that such hope would become possible for the world of mortals. Compared to his own limited capabilities of watching, and his preordained mortal status of the passer-through, Arnold’s human speaker encourages the scholar-gipsy to keep to the eternal advantage of his own already ritualized in-between. The scholar-gipsy, in this sense, stands for the idealization of in-betweenness itself, as he is both permanent and changeable, both true and untrue—if one takes into account the process of how Arnold has changed him.

Never staying for long in one place, the scholar-gipsy is deathless in his perpetually in-between symbolic form, which is the ‘neither-nor’, or ‘the formless expanse’ continually escaping a fixed point, as Eliade would have called him, or the ‘betwixt and between’ in Turner’s phraseology, or the ‘potentiality within impotentiality’ as Agamben might have liked to discuss him, or yet the ultimate embodiment of ‘the recognition of the other’, as Stewart might have regarded him. The analogy can be multiplied, and distorted, since both the scholar-gipsy and the distorted, and culturally appropriated atmosphere of Glanvill’s original source live in poetic expression and cultural memory first, and personal memory second. Being continuously vulnerable to

taste, discourse, or ideology, the spark that never falls within the perpetual in-betweenness of language seems paradoxically to guarantee continuity through discontinuity, as the scholar-gipsy, accidentally meeting two of his former colleagues, reveals that the secret “to rule [...] the workings of men’s brains; and to bind them to what thoughts they will”, even the “Gipsy crew” needed “Heaven-sent moments for this skill!” (ll. 42-50). But has not this already happened within the poem itself? Has not Arnold bent his own speaker’s will towards accepting the scholar-gipsy as a benevolent figure of hope rather than the original figure of the questionable imagination Glanvill had originally intended? The affirmative answer to the question would certainly reveal the larger concerns of the self-reflexive qualities and the multidimensionality of Arnold’s philosophically oriented and self-conscious speaker within “The Scholar-Gipsy” and other sampled poems.

Even for those who would tend to reject an affirmative answer to Arnold’s case, the speaker insists that he is not self-delusional, announcing “But what—I dream! Two hundred years are flown / Since first thy story ran through Oxford halls” (ll.131-132). Just as Agamben has argued earlier, the speaker points to his own poeticity, since he himself is also entombed within the poem alongside the scholar-gipsy. Thus, the speaker, as befits the self-conscious and noteworthy poetic voice, covertly ‘says that he is saying it’ in the kind of poetic-linguistic contemplation Agamben has been suggesting. A double, if not a triple self-consciousness is at stake here, considering the speaker as both the reader of Glanvil in the poem, and the poet-creator fashioning a distorted counter image of the scholar-gipsy for himself and the modern reader from Glanvill. As the speaker’s relationship to the utilization of the scholar-gipsy as an intertextual figure in Glanvill and Glanvil becomes more obvious, the viewing distance and its multidimensionality deepens. In Antony Harrison’s view, Arnold’s intertextual gypsy represents “an ideal Other” (“Matthew Arnold’s Gipsies” 105), and for J. Bristow, the image “is a version of the Arnoldian poet who wishes to be a part of society and yet wants to survey its scene from a cautious distance” (352). In both views, a distance, whether towards an idealized otherness, or an intended deeper scrutiny regarding conflicting modes of human existence (narrative versus experiential) presents itself. Even the concept of in-betweenness as a ritualized alienation is thrown into

consideration, since it is the only mechanism that provides such watchful distance, which is represented through the perpetually in-between presence of the scholar-gipsy.

Although, as Stacey Johnson remarks, the scholar-gipsy is “a figure alien to pastoral”, which, in this sense, can be regarded as an anomaly and thus peripheral to the form, it nevertheless operates as the central imagery of the poem, as “the gipsy who exists in the poet’s imagination exists also, through the power of that imagination, in ours, and for the time we may be willing” to join in on the line, where Arnold’s poet includes *us* within his poetic prophecy as “*we* [also] imagine *thee* exempt from age” (59). In such a context, a mutuality and multi-directionality emerges, as Madden also observes, that there becomes established “[an] implicit [...] dual sense of longing and frustration. One feels both in the Scholar-Gipsy and in the poet-narrator a frustrated desire to penetrate the ultimate and unattainable meaning of life, and to discover the means of expressing it” (68). But only by the distance he keeps that the scholar-gipsy is able to remain as a symbol of hope, as E. D. H. Johnson also suggests, that “[i]n his wanderings about the countryside, he is most often to be found where some rural activity is afoot. Yet his role remains that of keenly observant, but uncommitted spectator” (201). In Madden’s view, “his life must remain a perpetual quest [...] to continue his wanderings ‘pensive and tongue-tied’” (68). Be that as it may, the tongue-tied and uninvolved silence of the scholar-gipsy does not necessarily point towards a negativity, but a pregnant possibility and plurality towards the not-yet completed quest. It is as if the “phantom” scholar-gipsy inhabits a continuous expectant dream-time of his own, intersecting with the world by constantly traversing the threshold, and “in the meantime, remain[ing] elusive: in and out of the public eye and the social world, glimpsed on occasion by maidens, farmers, housewives, and possibly even by [the] ‘dreaming’ speaker” (Harrison, “Arnold’s Gipsies” 109).

As Ruth ApRoberts has remarked before, “the Scholar-Gipsy’s withdrawal may be taken as a withdrawal into poetry itself” (13), and since this main concern is evident in Arnold’s poetics, which is observable in his preoccupation with meta-poetic qualities such as “vocation” and the self-reflexive “class of poetry-about-poetry” (2), it should not be surprising that “Arnold’s sense of levels of consciousness [becomes] so often a theme in the poetry” as well (207). In ApRobert’s words, Arnold’s “expressionist

perspective, which by resting weight on symbol, myth, and fable rests on metaphor (subsuming all three) the distinctively human response to the world. *Poesis* in this context replaces *mimesis*” (221). Perhaps, for a similar reason, Riede also notes Arnold’s stylistically intertextual poetry correspondingly, within which before the trained eye, appears a picture of “a literary never-never land” (*Betrayal of Language* 142), most often twice-removed, and at times, like “The Scholar-Gipsy”, thrice-removed from the real world. In Stacey Johnson’s view, “The Scholar-Gipsy” “is included among Arnold’s elegiac poems because it celebrates an ideal which can live only in poetic moments, only in the imagination as it is stirred by longing” (61). And the essential ingredient allowing such poetic moments to exist can be sought within the relationship between ritualization and the contesting modes it employs as the narrative versus the experiential, as both structures need and thus operate from within a definitive dichotomy of in-betweenness. The kind of relationship which the invocation of the mythic scholar-gipsy emphasizes with the limit and the beyond has also been suggested through Müller’s pattern, the beyond-ness of the beyond, where ‘gipsy lore’, and ‘the scholar-gipsy lore’, become one and the same: the capability to influence the minds of others through the use of a ritualized and poetic in-between. The beyond, whoever, whatever or wherever *that* or *there* is, has to stay *perpetually* beyond, and continuously kept behind and beyond for any orientation to be possible within the human world. A final passage from “The Scholar-Gipsy” would help illustrate this argument better.

Thou waitest for the spark from Heaven: and we,
 Vague half-believers of our casual creeds,
 [...]
 For whom each year we see
 Breeds new beginnings, disappointments new;
 [...]
 Ah, do not we, wanderer, await it too?

Yes, we await it, but it still delays,
 And then we suffer; and amongst us One,
 Who most has suffer’d, takes dejectedly
 His seat upon the intellectual throne;
 And all his store of sad experience he
 Lays bare of wretched days;
 Tells us his misery’s birth and growth and signs,
 And all his hourly varied anodynes.

This for our wisest: and we others pine, (ll. 171-191).

If we take the speaker at face value, his message is clear enough: human existence is fragile, and bound within constant suffering of beginnings anew and failings anew, as if in a Beckettian play, and the best of our poets or playwrights can do nothing but pass on this ‘sad store of experience’, almost in a manner of passing down numbing medicine. However, on a deeper level, the speaker also seems to direct attention to the conflicting process of the accumulation of such, if not all kinds of ‘stores of experience’. And therein lies the inner paradox hidden amongst the speaker’s words, which is the paradox of ritualization through the in-between act of poetic invocation. If there was no wait, and if there was to be no anxiety, and no in-between status regarding ‘the spark from Heaven to fall’, would experience and thus expression be possible? If the in-between did not exist, then, there would also be no such longing possible towards the knowledge or pursuit of that spark; hence no quest, no symbol, and no meaning. It is only through the existence of the concept of beyond-ness, the concept of the limit or limited-ness, or the experience of in-betweenness that poets are able to come up with scholar-gipsies, or strayed revellers. The speaker, although seemingly distressed, certainly seems to be aware of this pre-requisite situation, since at the end of the poem, after urging the scholar-gipsy to always keep to the in-between, the speaker’s own mind lets go of the scholar, and abruptly starts sailing with the Tyrian trader. After the lines “Then fly our greetings, fly our speech and smiles! / As some grave Tyrian trader, from the sea,” (ll.231-232), for exactly eighteen lines to the end of the poem, the Tyrian trader, and thus the speaker’s imagination both take their time drifting in the “Aegean isles”, until the speaker decides to land the Tyrian where “Shy traffickers, the dark Iberians come;”, and allows the Tyrian to undo “his corded bales” (ll. 249-250). Within his own digression, the speaker seems to forget about the scholar-gipsy.

It is not the scholar-gipsy that relocates to the Iberian fantasy, but it is the speaker’s drifting mind along with his unfinished new symbol, the Tyrian. Whether deliberate or not, there seems to be a subtle play, or strategy at work here. If the argument suggested earlier can be recalled, where to be *the beyond*, *the beyond* has to *stay* or *kept* perpetually beyond, then the ending of “The Scholar-Gipsy” should not be surprising, or puzzling at all, because, due to his very own ambiguous quest-status, the scholar-gipsy cannot relocate, only the speaker’s mind can. For the scholar-gipsy to *be* the scholar-gipsy, he has to keep inhabiting the in-between itself, thus perpetually represent the

beyond as the other and othering presence, who has to stay behind and beyond. When the scholar-gipsy's quality of timelessness or time-defiance is considered within this frame, then it makes sense that the scholar-gipsy has to stay behind and keep continually passing-by within his own in-betweenness, which is a moment simultaneously "in and out of time" as Turner noted (*Ritual Process* 96). In this respect, even in its broken, discontinuous, non-integrative, or unfinished ending, the poem seems to suggest a heavily self-conscious, and continuous reference to an act of broken ritualization, which Agamben has noted above as resulting from the 'work-less-ness' disposition of the human endeavour, and thus, allowing for the 'poetics of inoperativity' making possible the very process of *poiesis* itself.

The poetic process as both creation and negation utilizes ambiguity as a must to counter finality, and oblivion. Poetic language, as Susan Stewart observes, needs the acknowledgement of otherness to operate and counter such teleological annihilation, either through touch, sight, hearing, or figuration as in *poiesis*, since language "exists before our individual existence: language, a made thing made of our own nature, is at the same time our vehicle of individuation" (3). And since the physical senses of a human being and one's personal experiential nature are limited by one's own temporal existence as life-span, the narrative mode, or *poiesis* as figuration forms the bridge between the past and the present, the narrative-spans and life-spans of countless individuals getting entangled in one hectic spin. Therein lies the dichotomy between knowing and doing, and also un-knowing and un-doing, because, when language and poetry is used, it simultaneously fixes the past and liberates the present, or vice versa, where "we literally bring light into the inarticulate world that is the night of preconsciousness and suffering" by continuously fashioning ourselves a self and an 'other' to repeatedly define and escape our own in-betweenness (Stewart 3).

When "The Scholar-Gipsy" is examined within the necessary and constructive ambiguity of the in-between referred to above, "a complicated meditative process overwhelms a simple narrative one so that the reader *in* the poem loses all contact with the scholar-gipsy while the reader *of* the poem becomes increasingly confused [...] and nearly dispossessed" (Farrell, "Action and Performance in Arnold's Prose" 128-129). Such dispossession on the reader's or the speaker's part may not be all that confusing or

negative a thing at all, when approached along the lines suggested here. If the distancing, dispossessory, and adrift ending of the poem can be considered as a self-conscious poetics emphasizing a philosophical centrality for in-betweenness, then the ending would be complementary to its distancing philosophy, and make more sense, rather than invite distraction. If Magritte's 1929 painting of the infamous non-functional pipe in *The Treachery of Images* can be instrumental in displaying function, concept, and experience all at once within its own peculiar distanced in-betweenness, so can Arnold's three-way paradox between the myth of the scholar-gypsy, the speaker's invocation of the scholar-gypsy from Glanvil, and the original conception of the fictionalized figure of the scholar-gypsy in Glanvill can be instrumental in assessing the paradoxical dynamics of in-betweenness at work regarding ritualization in acts of poetic creation, such as Arnold's self-reflexive and self-conscious "The Scholar-Gypsy".

There is one conclusive perspective on the function and logic of Arnold's way of moulding the Scholar-Gypsy as the ultimate figure of in-betweenness, which would be complementary to the self-conscious and self-reflexive references suggested above. In G. Wilson Knight's view, Arnold's Scholar-Gypsy "lives with something more than the immortality of a literary creation, 'living as thou liv'st on Glanvil's page', enjoying an 'immortal lot' and 'exempt from age' precisely because he has left the world with 'powers' untainted. We may call him the 'eternal undergraduate'" (55). Knight points towards the 'something more', or 'something other than' quality of the Scholar, because his eternal energy and youth along with his time-defying hunger for learning are befitting for the undergraduate, who also represents, in Knight's words, "the essence of true learning; the opening of the mind, the wonder, the intuition of fields unexplored" (56). According to Knight, Arnold's choice for choosing youth as a representation of the in-between is deliberate, since the Scholar is not an Oxford don, but a "glad perennial youth", who is "more than a renegade from the established tradition", as if he is the "sentinel on the heights [...] the presiding genius, [the] guardian spirit [...] of the university", and "one who is eternally immature" (56).

This is a crucial point linking the constant immaturity of the Scholar with the essential needs of the in-between, which consists of the emptied, and potentially kept space required for any kind of voicing to take place in the pursuit of knowledge, as Smith has

previously suggested, that poetry like any other kind of knowledge, “demands” that it be “voiced” within the in-betweenness of voice (162). And Arnold’s Scholar-Gipsy seems to be continuously fulfilling such a request by his very own in-between, non-integrative, and non-finalized presence, required for any quest regarding intellectual questioning and appetite, since there could be no attempt for knowledge without the appetite, and for there must be an appetite, one must keep some empty space in one’s intellectual stomach. Arnold’s “The Scholar-Gipsy”, in this sense, can be seen as the playground of the liminal, where, to employ Turner’s terms, the imagery of the Scholar-Gipsy works within and also because of the liminal, yet also comes out of the liminoid and further plays with the liminoid itself as the natural state of ritualization and the in-between. If Turner is right in claiming that “yesterday’s liminal becomes today’s stabilized, today’s peripheral becomes tomorrow’s centered” (*Dramas* 16), then Arnold’s Scholar-Gipsy can also be given credit for exposing the liminal’s conscious or unconscious schemes in becoming the liminoid, where Glanvil’s liminal becomes the liminoid of Arnold’s speaker, and the speaker’s liminoid becomes *our* liminal, whether as Arnold’s cathartic or identifying readers, or as Arnold’s disapproving and distanced critics. The distance is also *there* between the liminal and the liminoid, as Arnold’s imagery of the Scholar-Gipsy illustrates in all its subtlety.

2. 2. REPRESENTATIONS OF IN-BETWEENNESS IN “THE STRAYED REVELLER”

A similar entanglement between the experiential and narrative modes can also be observed in Arnold’s “The Strayed Reveller”, since the poem’s suspect subject matter, is again, the dynamics behind a broken sense of ritualization and in-betweenness. Disguised as a dramatic poem, “The Strayed-Reveller” does very little in terms of dramatic action. Besides the Youth’s drinking, Circe’s offering of wine, and Ulysses’ entrance upon being called out by Circe, nothing much happens which can be considered as action, not to mention dramatic action. Being comprised of exchanges between its three personas as The Youth, Circe, and Ulysses, the bulk of the dialogue is given to The Youth, who, similar to the speaker in “The Scholar-Gipsy”, is found within a physical threshold, which is the portico of Circe’s “smokeless, empty” (l. 45) palace, separating the wilderness and the interior of the complex.

Not only the Youth's physical surroundings, but also his mental state is another representation of the in-between. Having already strayed in, and having intoxicated himself with Circe's wine until the evening hours, the Youth is found by Circe between drink and sleep. The Youth introduces himself as a Bacchanal, a fellow reveller of Iachhus, and Circe, helping him to more wine, calls out to Ulysses to come quick and "see what the day brings" (l. 74) as the Youth falls asleep. It is only with Ulysses' entrance that the third and the most obvious use of the in-between is introduced, as Ulysses starts suspecting that the Youth may be a poet, and addresses the Youth as "Thy voice is sweet. / It may be thou hast follow'd / Through the islands some divine bard, / By age taught many things [...] / And heard him delighting / The Chiefs and people / [...] and learned his songs / Of Gods and Heroes" (ll. 116-123). Even Ulysses' welcome address seems to suggest another kind of in-betweenness on the Youth's part, since, for Ulysses, the Youth is too young to be a fully-fledged poet, but something in-between. Having "learned" some of the songs of an older and proper poet does not seem to satisfy Ulysses, but he nevertheless honours and hails the Youth. However, once the Youth abruptly and with quite poetic-mystic authority declares that "The Gods are happy." with the full-stop at the end, he seems to assert his authority as a former poet, who is qualified enough to speak of the way of the gods and the poets. Unfortunately Ulysses or Circe never get the chance to express their views as the poem concludes without giving them a say, with the long and again cloaked 'what is poetry' and 'who to believe' kind of exposition the Youth makes all by himself.

Before dealing with the self-reflexive, and in-between liminal-liminoid play regarding the Youth's final poetic enunciation, a few points about the dramatic structure and the general atmosphere surrounding the poem need mentioning. First, is that the dramatic structure is not completely useless, but serves several important functions. According to Colleen Romick Hammers, the dramatic form creates distance between the reader and the Youth, as "the multiple voices and perspectives distance us from the reveller, [also] forc[ing] us to see the reveller in context and thus remain somewhat sceptical about him" (42). The context, here, can be seen as multi-layered; consisting of the characters and what they traditionally represent on the one hand, and the physical environment and what it represents on the other. Although, as Leon Gottfried has remarked, that "its central action is slight and heavily overlaid with decoration" (404), the poem's dramatic

mode still makes use of its classical heritage, as Circe and Ulysses, despite being a little strayed towards the modern distorted condition themselves, continue to act as perpetrators of conflict regarding dialogue and situation, thus effecting the main arguments of the Youth regarding the nature of poetic vision.

Circe does not change the Youth into a hog, but nevertheless seduces him with wine, complicating things and further influencing the interpretation for the ending of the poem, where the Youth, having said his piece, would ask for more wine to see more “eddy forms” (l. 294), putting the reader in an in-between situation as whether to agree or disagree with him because of the wine and despite the poetry, or despite the wine and because of the poetry. As Dorothy Mermin notes, “[s]he may not be the Homeric enchantress who turns men into beasts, but she is daemonic rather than divine”, serving Arnold’s purposes rather than Homer’s or her own (736). Similarly, Ulysses facilitates the poetic crisis with his remark on the implied role of the poet as the ‘delighter’ of men, heroes, himself, and the gods. Being “a man of action” (S. Johnson 102), or “the figure of heroic action” (Madden 125), the mythic figure of Ulysses still represents and favours the tradition itself, since he seems to prefer a one-to-one correspondence with experience and story-telling, where old age and a more experienced poet, probably having lived through battles and having seen heroes is more preferable and qualified than a youth listening to the songs of the older bard. Once again, the matter of being twice, or again in the case of the Youth’s final exposition on the art of poetry, thrice removed from experience takes center stage in “The Strayed Reveller”, which will become epitomized with the staggeringly self-reflexive punch line for the poet’s paradox, becoming also the paradox for poetic in-betweenness: “—such a price / The Gods exact for song / To become what we sing” (232-234). Who makes who, here? Is it the stories which make the poet, or is it the poet who makes the stories, or is it the Gods of indifference who have let such a paradox come into being in the first place? The questions hang in mid-air.

Adding to the dramatic effect and the paradox of the poetic act is the physical atmosphere, and the way it is structured through the Youth’s descriptive start of the poem, explaining how he rose “When the white dawn first / [...] came breaking [...]”, and grabbing his “vine-crown, [...] fir-staff”, joined the procession of Iacchus” (ll. 24-

39). However, there is no indication whatsoever why he strayed into the courtyard of Circe's palace, or what Circe's palace was doing there in the first place, or whether if he even knew or not, that there was supposed to be Circe's palace there, as he only mentions that, as he moved through the wilderness, he saw Circe's deserted-looking palace: "Down the dark valley;— I saw / On my left, through the beeches, / Thy palace [...] / The court all silent, / The lions sleeping; / On the altar, this bowl." (ll. 42-49). This suggests either one or more of two ways; that first, it may be that Circe's palace was well hidden for centuries or millennia and that the Youth finally came across it one day, or that the Youth, being alien to Circe's island, but being familiar with her myth, accidentally happens upon Circe and her palace, which seems unlikely since he is not a shipwrecked sailor, but a Bacchanal living in a hut in the same island, and rising early for the ritual of Iacchus, probably on a regular basis. But who is the alien, here? It gives the feeling, that one of two parties, either Circe, her palace, and Ulysses are transported there as if by magical means, or the Youth has jumped space and time to meet the classical legends. The abrupt appearance of both Circe's palace and the reveller's strayed condition contribute to the sense of in-betweenness permeating the poem. But allowing for such ambiguity, similar to the effects of the dramatic structure referred to above, also creates the same kind of distancing for the reader, giving the feeling that something fake or playful might be happening within this in-between physical space, which is neither the Bacchanalian wilderness, nor the interior of Circe's palace complex; neither the Classical times, nor the modern times, but a portico suddenly coming into being, suspended beneath the feet of unlikely characters coming together, which creates an in-between, out of place setting.

In Jane Wright's view, all this is deliberately done to emphasize a dichotomy between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of human existence, referring to an ambiguous but original beginning, since Arnold names the Bacchanal "not merely 'a' youth but 'The Youth'", further making Circe ask 'Whence', instead of 'where', and the Youth identifying "with 'the white dawn first', by which he must mean that he exists at the beginning of the world, or sometime after Milton" (402). According to Wright, the repetitious beginning and ending of the poem with the same lines given to the Youth, "Faster, faster, / O Circe, Goddess, / Let the wild, thronging train, / The bright procession / Of eddying forms, / Sweep through my soul!" (ll. 1-5, 292-297), is also

proof that “time has its own symbolic logic” compared to the similarly operating physical atmosphere, where “[t]he Youth is at a perpetual beginning [,] that befits not only his age but also the fact that he is a figure of Arnold’s, written into a setting borrowed from Homer’s *Odyssey*— a figure ‘making it new’— and, in turn, his final words [...] reinforc[ing] that sense of timelessness” (402). Similar to the freshness of the *Scholar-Gipsy*, Arnold again chooses the Youth to be the central symbol for what David Trotter has called Arnold’s “hidden ground” most readily observable in his lyric and elegiac modes, where, Arnold is trying to show that “poetry [...] makes this recovery of a true pace possible, not by the gay and radiant exterior of language, but by the hidden ground within, [revealing] procedures of self-recognition” (526). Following a similar path with that of Trotter’s comprehensive remark, “*The Strayed Reveller*” tends to focus more on the perpetual in-between that such hidden ground continually displays, especially by featuring a broken sense of ritualization, and further pointing towards the inner paradox of poetic expression by setting thought-action dichotomies upon each other, such as the narrative and experiential modes.

Having established the strategic importance and in-betweenness of the dramatic structure in comparison to the physical atmosphere surrounding “*The Strayed Reveller*”, the liminal and the liminoid with regard to the Youth’s concluding exposition on poetry, which is in many ways similar with the meta-concerns of “*The Scholar-Gipsy*” becomes more discernible. Just as in the discussion regarding the centrality of the *Scholar-Gipsy* for the unravelling of the poetic paradox, here, the liminal and the liminoid becomes employed in a similar fashion. Turner has classified the liminal as belonging to the actual life-experience, which requires work, questioning, and submission to mortality, and which, in one way or another ends in symbolic integration towards new phases of the demands of physical life-spans of individuals who live in a society. Since human beings are not islands, and that they are born into a culture of existing norms, languages, and literatures, the liminoid uses the liminal phase of the in-between structure of ritualization, but by leaving it incomplete, or only integrating fragmentary elements, the liminoid cannot help but display its own self-reflexive, discontinuous, and playful nature, enabling continuity within discontinuity, while engaging in an escape from the integrative-liminal and mortal side in the cultural life of individuals and societies (“*Liminal to Liminoid*” 89-90). Always employing the in-betweenness of the narrative

versus the experiential modes, the liminal or the liminoid are first and foremost agents of poetic discourse, where they quite often get intermingled. And as Jerome J. McGann points out,

poetry is a discourse deploying a form of total coherence—and thereby a hope of coherence— within the quotidian world, which is dominated by various forms of relative incoherence. No other form of human discourse manages to do this, which is paradoxical since poetic forms are in another important respect fundamentally unstable and incommensurate, letting us sense or to imagine more than [we] know (9).

In other words, it is only through the illusion and manipulation of total coherence that poetic discourse draws attention to the incongruities of the world, often seen through the presence of the sense of limitedness in both the ideas and the experiences of ritualization or the in-betweenness of poetic agents. In the case of the Youth, the realization of a sense of in-betweenness is there, but as his dialogue unfolds, the essential, and thus prerequisite instability of poetic expression seems more to dwell on the circularity of the liminoid-ness of the poetic act, rather than its integrative liminal model which Ulysses seems to favour with his one-to-one correspondence theory. But, as Stacey Johnson also observes, the Youth will make the argument stand in-between the experiential and the narrative, leaning more on the mythic-narrative as “the more purely inspirational [...] and what might be called the emphatic theory of ‘The Strayed Reveller’ (104).

Having started posing as the eminent authority on the psychological well-being of the Gods by declaring “The Gods are Happy.”, the youth, then starts using his sweet voice and takes his time describing who the Gods see and how, ranging from Tiresias “Sitting, staff in hand, / [...] His old, sightless head: Revolving inly” (ll. 135-141), to the Centaurs, Scythians, Heroes, and “The Happy Islands” (ll. 143-206). As the Youth exclaims, “The Gods behold them” (l. 201), the kind of beholding is not, again, specified or fully developed, but rather left to its own, as if implying an understanding, both on the part of the Gods and the Youth towards watching indifferently and without getting involved. The Gods, the Youth tells us, only watch happily or indifferently from their divinely removed distance. However, since this is the Youth, and not the Gods speaking, Tiresias’ situation is especially noted as ‘revolving inly’. Since he has no

sight, Tiresias the blind seer-poet is therefore bound to circulate and keep in motion the stories within his head, and depend on experiences he knew thus, not by sight, but by the interior imaginings of the mind within his own in-betweenness. As the Youth will move forward in his treatise, what Susan Stewart previously has referred to as “the cliché of the blind poet” will become realized in “The Strayed Reveller”, where the Youth will summon “The wise Bards” (l. 208), and in turn they will summon others into *our* presence, just as in Stewart’s formulation, where, through beholding, “the poet is summoned by another and in turn summons another into presence” (146).

As the Youth provides a counter-poetics to that of Ulysses’, it becomes clear that the price for involvement in the poetic mode, is steep indeed, and is paid in actual suffering and involvement in the experiential and existential mode of living: “These things, Ulysses, / The wise Bards also / Behold and sing. / [...] They too can see / Tiresias:— but the Gods, / Who give them vision, / Added this law: / That they should bear too / His groping blindness, / His dark foreboding, His scorned white hairs; / Bear Hera’s anger / Through a life lengthen’d / To seven ages.” (ll. 207-222). Therefore, the Youth, here, is assured that the toll one must pay to dabble in poetry is “To become what we sing.” (l. 234). But how to take such a statement? Does the Youth mean that the poetic engagement with the world, as in reading the poetry of others will eventually lead the poet to emphatically share in the experience of others, or is it that the poet, having no other choice but to live, recite, and die, just as in the stories he tells and he was told, is bound to suffer, because there is only one life where the heroes and the poets and the non-poets all live in a combined and confused world of poetry and suffering? The Youth seems more inclined towards the second view, where the poets live among their contemporaries, where “They see the Heroes / Near harbour:— but they share / Their lives, and former violent toil, in Thebes” (ll. 254-256). Yet, there may still be a third way to interpret the Youth’s cryptic poiesis, if the metaphor of Tiresias is observed more closely.

If Tiresias’ ‘groping blindness’ can be taken as the ultimate liminal metaphor for the perpetual in-betweenness of the human condition shared by poet and non-poet alike, where the question of who made who weighs equally heavy for all, then what Stewart has noted as the dichotomy between “visibility and invisibility” culminating in the act

of poetic creation out of the darkness, can be seen as the only way to overcome the blindness implicit in human existence, because the poetic mode offers the unique lenses of “seeing without needing to see” (146), which the Youth seems to be quite aware of. The question of poetry, for the Youth, stands on a very slippery ground, and especially now that, towards the end of his long exposition, he has become somewhat intoxicated and under the influence. But again, one may have difficulty in judging its cause justly, since both poetry and wine might have played their part, as both have the power to intoxicate. In-betweenness, in this regard, gets relocated into the relationship between poetry and wine.

Upon admitting hearing “these things” from Silenus (l. 269), the Youth tells Ulysses his own recent experience of the poetic in-between, since he has been drinking wine but also considering ‘these things’ on Circe’s portico, “Sitting on the warm steps, / Looking over the valley, / All day long, have seen, / Without pain, without labour, / Sometimes a wild-hair’d Maenad; / Sometimes a Faun with torches; / And sometimes, for a moment, / [...] The desir’d, the divine, / Belov’d Iacchus.” (ll. 270-281). Now, is this because of the wine, or because of the poetic sensibility of the Youth, that he was able to *see* such things? Furthermore, what theory of poetry would such vision correspond to? Although E.D.H. Johnson regards the Youth as no more than “a willing loiterer in Circe’s palace” who “can sing only when intoxicated by the magic wine”, and thus becoming “the prisoner of his own self-infatuated imagination” (167), there is more to the poetic loitering of the Youth, since it is not a mundane one but a more intellectual kind of loitering, where the dynamics behind the poetic act are being contemplated rather than drunk and put away. Johnson seems to disregard that imagination can never be self-infatuated, since it needs reference and previously established poetic expressions to ‘infatuate’ itself to begin with, whether there is wine present or not.

Madden identifies two poetic attitudes towards human existence in “The Strayed Reveller”, which the Youth seems to weigh against each other. First is “the detached Olympian mode”, indifferent and removed towards human suffering, and second is “the emphatic, involved mode of the Romantic bards”, who pay the price of such involvement with “inevitable pain” (125). However, as Trotter and Pearson have pointed out earlier, there is often a concealed third ground or perspective in Arnold’s

poetry, which, in the case of “The Strayed Reveller” gets represented with the kind of blurred and intoxicated presence and dialogue of the Youth. In Dorothy Mermin’s words, “[t]he gods see a static, comfortable world, poets one of time and pain [,] but only the poets see before and after and interpret what they see” (737). This is all very well, but what does the Youth, or the speaker in “The Scholar Gipsy” see? How these Arnoldian poetic voices of the in-between, including the Merman and Empedocles, *voice* the in-between forms the third kind of seeing in Arnold’s poetry. As Gottfried points out, the Youth is also the strayed reveller, “desiring ‘movement and fullness’, although he seems partly to realize that something more is needed, that great art cannot be all pleasure, all intoxication” (407). And since the prominent identity of the Youth is his strayed condition of the in-between reveller, as the poem’s title unmistakably makes evident, a more developed recognition of the word ‘intoxication’ along with the reveller’s cult relationship to wine and poetry would reveal more clues towards the strategically blurred views of the Youth. This contextual relationship to Dionysus or the worship of Bacchus, which several of Arnold’s critics seem to have missed, is crucial for a fuller understanding of the liminal-liminoid kind of seeing, which Arnold often employs in his poetry.

When one thinks of Dionysus, even those who have become acquainted with the mythological figure might overlook the fact that Dionysus is not only the god of wine, transformation, theatre, excess, and regeneration, but first of “ecstasy” or *ekstasis*. Bacchus or Dionysus is the god of ‘stepping out of one’s self’, of division, and the awareness that such division has taken place; as one discovers for one’s self that one’s intoxicated state is a *removed* and an *immersed* state at the same time, and is not the same as one’s sober state. Few would call Dionysus the god of Arnold’s in-between, but many have noted his threshold existence in mythology, since he belongs to the class of liminal deities. But more importantly, as Walter Friedrich Otto remarks, many also miss the central Dionysian “epiphany” of appearance, since he is first and foremost “a god of paradox”, therefore “any study of him will inevitably lead to a statement of paradox and a realization that there will always be something beyond, which can never be explained adequately in any language” (xix).

And if Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* can be brought into the picture, the poetic paradox of the Strayed-Reveller would find its proper context. For Nietzsche, "the Apollonian Greek [...] could not conceal from himself that he too was inwardly related to these overthrown Titans and heroes" of the past, who were seen as the treacherous perpetrators responsible for excess and the loss of primal unity, thus the Apollonian knew, "[d]espite all its beauty and moderation, [that] his entire existence rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, which was again revealed to him by the Dionysian" (12). In Nietzsche's consideration, both worlds of the Apollonian and the Dionysian on their own were limited, but it was only through "the ecstatic sound of the Dionysian festival [that] knowledge bec[a]me audible, even in piercing shrieks, [and] [t]he muses of the arts of [Apollonian] 'appearance' paled before an art which, in its intoxication, spoke the truth. The [Dionysian] wisdom of Silenus cried 'Woe! woe! to the serene Olympians'" (*Birth of Tragedy* 12). As Nietzsche's approach also suggests, the germs of knowledge, it appears, can only be found within the intoxication, or the bewildered state of the in-between, just as Turner has suggested.

The Youth's, or since his real identity is once more secured, the Strayed-Reveller's poetic intoxication gains new levels, as both poetry and ritualization are brought into focus. Turning from unsympathetic to hostile, and alluding to Arnold's preoccupation with ignorance, Pearson thinks that "[i]t is worth remarking how much unknowledge or ignorance is a theme of Arnold's poetry", since there is too much insistence, regarding the poetry, on expressions like "the unknown, the blind, or the ignorant armies", not to mention Sohrab, Hoder, and Merope, "celebrat[ing] a positive orgy of ignorance" (238). What Pearson seems to neglect, however, is the human condition itself, as many of Arnold's poetic voices struggle with, and voice through its narrative counter-part, which almost too often presents itself within the poet's self-engagement with the poetic act. Does not knowledge require ignorance to exist in the first place? If one is not aware that one is ignorant, therein lies the real enemy of knowledge, and none of Arnold's poetic voices celebrate ignorance, but perhaps they do question its paradoxical nature in the kind of relentless intellectual orgy Pearson detests. The Youth's effort, in this sense, can be seen as the very attempt directed towards the kind of ignorance which might show itself in modern reincarnations of Ulysses' supposed one-to-one correspondence of poetic vision, which may easily fall into the error of disregarding the centrality of

paradoxical blindness to that of poetic practice. The same can also be considered for the structure of ritualization, where both the poetic and the ritual communion can be observed as being dependent on the kind of metaphorical centrality of human blindness and ignorance to that of ritualization. As Agamben and Stewart both find the paradox of being creatively sightless, or potentially impotent to be central and inherent to the human condition, poetic creation and ritual creation become acts of sustenance and continuity, instead of negation and discontinuity (Agamben, “Resistance in Art” 33:00-42:00, Stewart 146, 328-329). Because poetry and ritualization share the physicality of movement, music, meter, silence, and utterance, and since it is only through the poetic act and expression that narratives can both be realized (as in recognition in time), and also *realized* and ritualized (as execution in body or space), a deeper perspective would concern itself with how to address this inner paradox, whether through the art or craft of either poetry or ritualization. Arnold’s Strayed-Reveller, in this sense, does not fall behind entertaining such a paradox, as the ending of the poem will surely demonstrate.

“The Strayed-Reveller”, similar to the ending of “The Scholar-Gipsy” ends in a non-integrative, discontinuous manner, where the Strayed Reveller does not return to his Bacchanalian procession, just as the Speaker had not returned from his inward Tyrian musings in “The Scholar-Gipsy”. The Youth, having confessed his daily indulgence of wine-infused poetic contemplation to Ulysses, starts to feel the cosmos in all its vibrations: “Ah cool night-wind, tremulous stars! / Ah glimmering water— / Fitful earth-murmur— / Dreaming woods!” (ll. 282-285). It is only then, that this effervescent universe becomes clouded with the presence of the *dramatis personae*, where the reveller acknowledges Circe and Ulysses for the last time: “Ah golden-hair’d, strangely-smiling Goddess, / And thou, prov’d, much enduring, / Wave-toss’d Wanderer! / Who can stand still? / Ye fade, ye swim, ye waver before me. / The cup again!” (ll. 286-291). However, there seems to be a very subtle trick with the words ‘proved’, and ‘much enduring’. Certainly, Ulysses is the many times proven hero who had suffered and endured many episodes of pain before making it to Penelope. But Ulysses also has a figurative purpose, which represents a certain poetic tradition, just as the above discussion relating him to the one-to-one experiential poetic vision has emphasized. In that regard, really, ‘who can stand still’ against the transforming powers of poetry and circumstance? As Arnold had firmly expressed in “The Study of Poetry”, poetry has

always been an instrument of change, that “there is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve” (*Essays* 2). Very similar to that of Cunningham’s remark concerning the essential characteristic of the Victorian poetic practice, the powers of “*mutatis mutandis*” now become possessed by the Youth, as the strayed reveller holds the mirror of “the grand prosopopoietic game” (462) against the faces of his distant readers, where poetry does not only change what needs to be changed, but does so in such self-reflexivity that participation within in-betweenness becomes questioned.

As Stewart notes, poetry *participates* “—at this moment, in this place, with this voice, and so serves [as] a form bearing witness to individuation and universality at once. Poetry [as] ‘individual expression’ is both to return to the threshold where individuality becomes intelligible to others”, and also to one’s own self, where explorations of all kinds take place: “The beholding, pointing, hailing, and delineating of [mutually] deictic gestures [...] precedes the appearance of the subject” (328). With regard to “The Strayed Reveller”, such mutuality becomes expressed through the in-between attitude of the Youth towards poetic creation, which is continuously shown through the strayed and disoriented state, both of the dramatic structure and the dubious setting of the poem as discussed above, and also through the continuously blurred dialogue the ex-reveller engages in. As Jane Wright observes, the Youth is only one of Arnold’s many poetic-scholarly devices, which lays bare “literature’s capacity to offer readers an experience that is both in and out of time”, as befits Arnold’s own poetic agenda, since “great poetry, for Arnold, was poetry in touch with deep feeling, yet also detached from it” (402). The intellectual detachment of the Strayed Reveller, in this sense, can both be observed in the way the whole of the poem is structured with its subject matter and form. As Mermin further observes,

[t]he pictorial surface is [...] rich; the actors are static and sculptural and neither suffer nor sweep past the reader; the movement is circular, not linear; the evil-doings of Circe, Ulysses’ hardships past and to come, and the Reveller’s future (which will surely bring pain) are only hinted at. The poem thus oddly seems to condemn itself. Actually, however, it fits none of the three categories of visions, since its subject matter is that of almost all Arnold’s poems: ideas about life and art, not life itself (738-39).

In Gottfried's view, since this is not the reveller but the wayward reveller, "[i]f the reveller is strayed, his lyric speeches must be approached with some caution", because although "rich in description, [and] finely evocative, [...] they are not unified, they reveal no particular sense of subordination of parts to whole" (407). In fact, they reveal no subordination to any of the contemplated poetic modes at all, but only to indecision and in-betweenness, which seems to be a statement in itself, directed towards the essential condition of all poetic activity regardless of variety. And, as Gottfried also suggests, "using the indirect means of irony and allegory" (406), especially in their broken and dissociative functions, seems to emphasize an inherent creative absence regarding the art of poetry, rather than impose upon the reader or the poem a false sense of continuity. Collini is of a similar mind, when arguing that "at the heart of Arnold's lyrics and elegies, there is a sense in which what they register is absence rather than loss. That is, they mourn the fact that the poet—but also we, fellow victims of history and the corrosion worked by its attendant self-consciousness—have never really known, can never know" (44). In this regard, knowing and doing, thinking and acting are presented as unresolved dichotomies, represented once more in tropes such as watching history go by, and participating in the act of seeing and being within the moment of in-betweenness as experienced by Arnold's personas who fail to ritualize themselves into their own environment.

The Youth enables the reader to take notice of his own peculiar in-between state and space, that the dichotomy has to be left unresolved for any kind of poetic moment to emerge, and this seems to be the main concern of "The Strayed Reveller". Circe and Ulysses take over the role of the illusory, yet eternal mythic by-passer from the Scholar-Gipsy, where the recognition of the other is once again emphasized through the otherness of the human subject both to his personal-experiential and mythic-narrative modes of structured environment. As Trotter has shown, for any "mode of recognition" to take place, "the discovery and appropriation of a blank space in the order of things, a space uncontaminated by imposed meanings" has to be established (527). And it is in the playing-in-between dramatization of the Strayed Reveller that the liminality of human existence gets once again caught-up within the liminoid-ness of the Reveller's confused and confusing poetic stand, since his not-too-convincing wandering and all-too-convincing wonderings point more towards the nature of the liminoid, or what

Riede has called “the never-never land” of poetry (142), than the temporal condition of the liminal and integrative realm of a successfully ritualized in-betweenness where loose ends get tied in the end.

2. 3. REPRESENTATIONS OF IN-BETWEENNESS IN “THE FORSAKEN MERMAN”

A complementary example to the kind of boundary experiences shown in “The Strayed Reveller” and “The Scholar-Gipsy” can also be found in Arnold’s “The Forsaken Merman”. The figure of the merman, being another representation of the primal and thus authentic-mythic guardian of *ab origine* existence, is the central figure of Arnold’s poem. Having its origins in the watery-creation stories ranging from the accounts of the Mesopotamian deities like Oannes, to the Hindu, Greek, and Norse sources like Vishnu, Neptune-Triton, and Aegir-Eagor (Wood 39-40, Eliade, *Patterns* 205-206), the myth of the merman was already an over-used fantasy by Arnold’s own times. As Herbert Wright and Howard W. Fulweiler among others suggest, that Arnold was most likely influenced by one or more of the numerous story-forms regarding the merman story already in circulation, existing in Danish and German sources in ballads and prose, where the original stories, if they themselves were ever the originals, sympathized with the merman-wife’s perspective, rather than the merman, and on occasion, even demonized the merman (91-94, 208-209). Since the zeitgeist surrounding the Victorian poetic scene liked to indulge in the deictic creative act of reference and palimpsest too often, as Bump and Cunningham has suggested (28, 5), Arnold’s effort to revitalize the merman myth, and write his own poetic sense of the in-between over its already palimpsest-ed existence can in itself be seen as an interior play of the liminoid form.

Similar to “The Scholar-Gipsy” and “The Strayed Reveller”, it is again the structural qualities that build upon the literariness, and the universal liminality of the merman’s experience, which are thrown in contrast to the physically in-between state of his surrounding world that becomes of importance in “The Forsaken Merman”. The Merman’s world, by its very own nature is a liminal world, which is the aquatic world of the in-between, being neither completely land, nor completely water, neither the sky nor the underworld, but corresponding to the “formless expanse” in Eliade’s

terminology. The sea-cavern in which the Merman and his children are said to dwell, in this respect, becomes a twice removed representation of the in-between within the in-between aquatic world of the Merman and his kin. According to Eliade, this formlessness of the water-world also “symbolizes the whole of potentiality; it is *fons et origo*, the source of all possible existence [;] it *precedes* all forms and *upholds* all creation, where immersion in water symbolizes a return to the pre-formal” (*Patterns* 188). Arnold’s Merman, in this sense, belongs to this constantly and potentially-pregnant water-world, and thus to the ancient lineage of hybrid, in-between personifications such as Thetis, Proteus, Glaucos, Nereus, Triton, and Neptune, all “displaying in their appearance their connection with water, having the bodies of sea monsters, or the tails of fishes”, who are always physically portrayed as actualizing the in-between both in their bodily forms and within their narratives; and such liminal creatures, “more than any other gods [,] live outside time and history” (Eliade, *Patterns* 203-204). There is one other double-sided essential quality that the poeticized world of Arnold’s Merman also shares with its familial archaic representation of the in-between, observable in the embodiment of a medial physical rhythm already embedded in the musical and also narrative construction of the poem, which strengthens bonds between its physical in-between structure and conceptual terms represented through its narrative.

As Eliade further acknowledges, the water-world is the ultimate expression, where the inherently “rhythmic nature of this re-engulfing of all things by water and their emergence—a rhythm which is at the root of all the geographical myths” of both physical and narrative mediality can be readily observable, thus its definitive essence as being the constant interplay between form and erosion cannot be disputed. Again, by its very nature, water fills in and falls back, advances then evacuates, gives, and takes away, or to use Arnold’s imagery from “Dover Beach”, the “turbid ebb and flow” (l. 17) peculiar to the element of water is built in, both in its physical function within the physical world, and also in its conceptual and abstract function within its symbolism. When, or rather *whence* “The Forsaken Merman” is read, even by today’s poor standards of reading, its built-in rhythmic ambiance and musicality can be observed to be capable of making a statement towards the ambiguity of time; both engulfing, but at the same time constantly creating, recreating, and separating the individual from the moment, giving out the sensual feeling that one is but a pebble always getting rounded

within this unintelligible world of perpetual in-betweenness. Having a fundamentally homely, but also curiously alien quality, it would not be out of place to suggest that with its constant association and disassociation with time, the poem arouses feelings of home and of exile at the same time within its own physical and narrative structure.

Accompanied by this lulling physical quality, which puts the reader in-between a state of sleep and a half-consciousness of about-to-dream, “The Forsaken Merman” rocks its reader back and forth within its alternating cadences, where even the notion of absence melts into the motions of a forgetful trance. However, this is not a comfortable, or sedimentary sway, but rather a more intellectual swing, using the land-sea imagery for its own purposes, which would reveal itself by penetrating the backdrop towards the usual Arnoldian world-mind dichotomy. As usual, Arnoldian dichotomies between thinking, feeling, and doing would require the presence, and not the participation of an entombed literary figure of the passer-by within the narrative. In this case, Arnold changes the roles, and turns his perpetual by-passer into a human figure of Margaret, allowing the Merman his own voice to become the eternal watcher-speaker of his own grief. Therefore, the representation of the Merman’s ‘othered’ being is thrown in contrast to that of his own song, which also acts as another kind of ‘othering’, where his own song takes the merman’s self-being out of his own self, as if stepping out from his own self into the formless in-between state of his aquatic world of the constant flux and reflux. From this perspective, the song of the Merman arises as the in-between hidden or immersed ground from within which the poem proceeds; since the poem is actually made up of one entire song with supposedly varying time-frames, rather than the actual experience of the Merman or Margaret depicted within the specific moment of the poem.

Norman Friedman divides “The Forsaken Merman” into three distinctly structured narrative time-frames, beginning with the opening of the poem as the first part, where the Merman, at the end, convinces his children that “She will not come though you call all day; / Come away, come away” (ll. 1-29). The second part is where the Merman recalls the events of the previous day, in Friedman’s words, “when their mother heard the Easter bells ringing from the church, and decided she had to return for the good of her soul” (422). The Merman encourages, but also urges her “[...] to come back to the

kind sea-caves” (l. 61) once her prayers are done, but she never returns from her “white-walled town” and “little grey church” (ll. 25-26). The final part ends the poem, in Friedman’s interpretation, with the Merman “foreseeing the consequences of his wife’s desertion”, thinking that she will have “a heavy heart”, as well as they will have eternal “resentment” towards her regarding her desertion; thus the failed familial mission of the persuaders returns to the depths with the father Merman calling his children down to their now forlorn sea-cave (422).

There is no denying that the poem is, indeed, making mention of three distinct phases of one separation, which is told in the first person by the Merman reciting the story of the separation to its highly suspect children audience, where the human mother/wife’s dilemma between her faith and her familial bonds along with everything else is characteristically thrown into opposition with whatever remains at hand once Margaret leaves for the town church. This is to say, that it is equally possible to read the poem as one complete song, and not necessarily taking place in the present, and not addressed to the actual presence of the children, too. Since there are no dramatic interruptions as was present in “The Strayed-Reveller”, the preserved integrity of the poem puts emphasis on the fact that the song is the Merman’s own song which is sung by the merman, and so it appears very likely that the Merman can very well be pictured as singing it alone in the timeless, or out of time realm of his own aquatic in-between existence, possibly within the watery depths somewhere, or at a specific place closer to shore, or even within his own personal in-between space of the sea-cavern. According to Fulweiler, “[a]s in so much poetry of the Victorian age, the age of the dramatic monologue” shapes all kinds of interpretations, and even allows for the word of interpretation to gain depth, so “[the] point of view in ‘The Forsaken Merman’ becomes revealing”, in the sense that the Merman’s song juxtaposes, at least two situations against each other; “the pathos of the merman’s hopeless plight” gets set against “the guilt associated with Margaret’s faithlessness” (209). But this is only the beginning. Starting from faith, the situational and also philosophical paradoxes of the poem puts Margaret’s fictional choice in the thick of things, since the question is never asked, but *voiced* as to what should, or would be the priority in faith? Faith towards family and responsibility? Faith towards faith? Faith towards loved ones? But what about the responsibility towards faith? Faith towards one’s own choice, whatever the outcome may be? What role does salvation or

damnation play in this continuously off-balanced ebb and flow of conflict? What to choose—the natural world over the religious, or the spiritual over the sensual? Arnold certainly seems to have turned the tables into a whirl here, without actually laying a finger on a single table.

In such multi-polarization of social and personal commitments, as Stacy Johnson observes, “neither Arnold nor the reader is obliged to choose [...] between Margaret’s and the merman’s worlds, it is possible to appreciate the demands of both, as it is to accept the terms of the conflict and its dramatic resolution in irresolution” (25). But there is no one conflict here. As it is customary for Arnold to keep things in fragments, even the conflict between Margaret and the Merman can be seen as already internally fragmented even before it becomes a conflict amongst two souls belonging to different worlds. If the conflict is one of choosing one’s own society over love, then there is no actual conflict in the poem, since the choice has already been made, and no one seems to know exactly when and why. Having no background to this love’s development or underlying motive, the reader is only allowed to hear and guess, as there is only the Easter chimes of the church bell, recalled indistinctly by the Merman as “The far-off sound of a silver bell?” (l. 34). Perhaps the indistinct remembering of the bell-chime can also be regarded as signifying, but also blurring time as well as memory, since the Merman keeps asking the children, “When did music come this way? / Children dear, was it yesterday? / Children dear, was it yesterday / (Call yet once) that she went away?” (ll. 46-49) The question is asked again, when the Merman, as if taken over only by time-amnesia, remembers that “She smiled, she went up through the surf in the bay. / Children dear, was it yesterday? / Children dear, were we long alone?” (ll. 62-63). It seems that the Merman is only able to recall the event, and not the exact passage of time, thus provoking suspicion on the part of the reader as to the exact dramatic setting and also the actual time-frame of the poem. The reader may feel compelled to ask: ‘Is this really taking place in the *now* of the poem with the children present? Perhaps the children have already grown into their own mermanhood or mermaidhood, since the poem emanates that kind of a time-blur, rather than clearly giving a fixed and assured time. There is only the Easter festivity in the air, which is more of an atmosphere rather than the concrete now of the poem.

Friedman refers to “The Forsaken Merman” as “not a successful Modernist poem, for even though Arnold deals thus paradoxically with the suppressed life of the subconscious, he does not do so with any sharp awareness of what he is doing” (427). It appears that, in Friedman’s concern, the Modern is idealized as the successful demonstration of a sharpness towards the awareness of what one is doing in art, where Arnold’s poem fails because “[t]he real terms of the conflict are thus not clear. Paganism vs. Christianity? Eros vs. Civilization? Family Responsibility vs. Salvation of the Soul? Whether regarded either from a Romantic, Victorian, or Modern point of view, the picture remains unfocused” (427). It has never been the aim of this study to argue for the modernity of Arnold’s poetry, however, the ‘unfocussed’ or the blurred lines of the boundary which seem to disturb Friedman *is* the very means of how Arnold looks at the modern in-between and the blurred individual, where the contrast and conflict has been moved to the interior divided consciousness of the Merman’s in-between. Does not the blurred, unfocused, or indeterminate structure of the poem make a statement towards the modern human condition? Reminding Agamben’s previously cited comment regarding his poetics of inoperativity on the matter of the self-reflexivity of successful poetry, does not the unfocused lens say to itself, and also to the one who beholds the lens: ‘Hey! I am unfocused’, thus giving voice to its own incompleteness? Viewed through a similar approach as that of Agamben, or Stewart, Arnold’s “The Forsaken Merman” can become more revealing towards the poetic and ritual structures of the in-between which the poem inhabits by its adrift, unfocused or blurred ambiguities rather than sharp contrasts between conceptual opposites.

The above stressed point would become clearly visible, when considered with the land and sea imageries of the poem, which would also strengthen the argument that this is the Merman’s point of view, his own Whitmanesque song of himself mirroring the Merman’s own mental strife onto the reader’s own pause, the reader’s own urgent in-betweenness. As Fulweiler also notes, the limited, dull, “mechanical and formalized ‘murmur’ of folk at their prayers” resonating through Margaret’s cruel town are counter posed against the wide and all-encompassing world of ancient and wise beings, “a reality undreamed of by the surface-bound townsfolk as the ‘great whales come sailing by’, their all-seeing eyes open in their eternal circumnavigation of the world” (211). The town’s “windy shore” (l.26), “the narrow paved streets, where all was still”,

(l.70), “the windy hill” where the “little grey church” (l. 71), stood with “the graves” and the “small leaded panes” (74-75) are contrasted with all the magnificent bounty, and the distant, uninvolved, eternally observant, yet also erotic and maternal wisdom of the undersea world, where “A ceiling of amber, / A pavement of pearl.” (ll. 118-119) adorns the “Sand-strewn caverns, cool and deep, / Where the winds are all asleep; [...] Where the sea-snakes coil and twine, / Dry their mail, and bask in the brine, / Where great whales come sailing by, / Sail and sail, with unshut eye,” (ll. 35-44).

The latter is the world of the Merman, where there is “color, imagination, life, love, and the hidden and mysterious meaning of the world”, whereas the town rumbles on towards a futile existence with “a monotonous and colorless whirring, whizzing, humming, murmuring, praying behind walls and shut doors, and among grave stones” (Fulweiler 211). However, at the end of the poem, it becomes very suggestive that, perhaps not the Merman’s own world, but his own unspoiled connection with it seems to have been ruined thanks to Margaret, since now he is bound with the separate existence of the *concept* of Margaret, save the *person* of Margaret, which brings suffering as the double-reality of the Merman’s life, almost as if suffering *because of* and *despite* Margaret has now become his sole unwilled responsibility. Although Margaret has cruelly let go of the Merman, the memory of Margaret will not let go of the Merman, and the Merman, being determined and also now that he is inevitably bound not to let go of Margaret’s memory, makes it clear that he will keep visiting the place and the experience “When sweet airs come seaward / [...] Up the creeks we will hie; / [...] We will gaze, from the sand-hills, / At the white, sleeping town; / [...] And then come back down. / Singing, ‘There dwells a loved one, / But cruel is she. / She left lonely for ever / The kings of the sea.’” (ll. 128- 143). The Merman’s final words make it clear that he will no longer get involved with Margaret as a person, but only as the reminder of a person, since he does not indicate anything about calling her once more, or telling the children to call to her once more. Just the opposite of a physical participation happens at the end of the poem, where the Merman is now condemned within his own distant and distancing song of sorrow, which he seems intent on singing forever without getting involved in the physical action of calling out to Margaret, or uniting with her ever again.

However, considering the poem's physical and repetitive musical qualities, which Stacy Johnson also admits to as embodying "an irregular rhythm, with subtly irregular rhyme, suggesting at once the movement of wave upon wave and the echoing sound of a sea voice" (84-85), there may also be a blurred and concealed ending to the poem, which can circularly impregnate the merman-song's potentiality with its impotentiality, to borrow Agamben's terms. It is not a remote possibility that the Merman has got *himself* lulled to forgetfulness by his own song, which would make him liable to forget, perhaps, his final conviction that he would never get involved with Margaret again, and observe from a distance. Thus, by singing his own sorrow to himself, he would re-live the experiential-personal moment in the poetic-narrative moment of his own song. However, since it is obvious that songs can, and most of the time do start over, again and again, because songs having a deep impression on the listener often tend to get put in a loop mode, the Merman's own song can also be considered within this repetitive frame, forming no exception. It is in the nature of the song to be repeated. Therefore, such continuous half-awakened, half-conscious, unsure but insisting physical repetitions of the Merman on the question "Children dear, was it yesterday?" displays strong proof that connects the song-peculiar and in-between physicality of the poem itself with its in-between narrative and emotional content. What is a song, or a poem, for that matter, but the forgetfulness of a remembrance and a remembrance of a forgetfulness? If there was no forgetfulness, and also the repetition and recollection of this forgetfulness in new ways, would there be remembrance, song, or poetry? The sea, the waves, the musical rhythms of the Merman's repetitive song, in this sense, can also be considered as being complementary to the conceptual doings and un-doings embedded within the nature of song and poetry, which can easily connect the ending of the poem to that of its beginning, as if the Merman puts it on a loop, and each time remembers, lives, forgets, and remembers the experiential and the narrative emotions aroused by his own repetition.

When approached from these unconventional trenches, Arnold's poetry, in this instance "The Forsaken Merman", seems to offer more *because* its lens is broken, blurred, or unfocused. At the end, what would faith itself entail? Does not faith also require both forgetfulness and remembrance? Does not ritualization and the narrative mode it employs depend on the very existence of the repetitious dichotomy between forgetting

and remembering? Being highly suggestive of what Turner has called the liquid or eclipsed metaphors, such as “the womb”, “bisexuality” or the kind of “invisibility” which the “eclipse of the moon or the sun” embodies by its Janus manifestation, and which only becomes perceivable from within the in-between as the process of showing and un-showing only takes place within the liminal—all these suggest the very in-between and multi-directional ground of “The Forsaken Merman”. Because “The Forsaken Merman” comes full circle, turning upon itself, and perhaps “oddly [...] condemn[ing] itself” just as Dorothy Mermin has suggested for “The Strayed Reveller” (739), the odd condemnation of the Merman’s song also involves ourselves within its own problematic liberation, since there is no such thing as liberation considering human existence, but only boundaries which one lives or passes through. Without the play of the liminal with the liminoid, without the curious in-between space language and poetry introduces to this experience, or introduces through its very own ‘betwixt and between’ condition, there would be no way of becoming aware of such a passage, and no way of theorizing about, or making assessments on one kind of poetry or another.

In “The Forsaken Merman”, then, the play of the liminoid makes itself apparent within the relationship between the Merman’s own liminal love-condition, and the liminoid play of his own song, as the dynamics behind the creation of his own song discussed above reveals, first the necessary opposition, and then the inevitable entanglement of the experiential-liminal and narrative-liminoid modes, once again, preying upon each other. Even though narratives and ritualization require a crisis, they do so by constantly emphasizing the in-between space required to make such crisis known to the human mind. Similarly, the voicing of the Merman and his song in a circularity constantly draws attention to its own in-betweenness. The songliness of human existence gets represented in Arnold’s “The Forsaken Merman” as a repetitive and emotional pause, just like the physical imageries of the in-between and the medial rhythms it employs, which further keeps open a continuous poetic space of the in-between for the examination and assessment of its own pause. The Merman’s incomplete ritualization of his own suffering, in this regard, continually moves in and out of the song, which, by repeatedly associating and disassociating with the emotional realities of the poem, results in a discontinuity, a non-integrative, yet also continuously re-ritualized potentiality that is paradoxically but continuously kept open to further ritualization. The

Merman's song of himself keeps the paradoxical process alive, as it is only through the poetic paradox of the in-between that human emotions, similar to those of the Merman, can be kept ventilated and recirculated through other narratives, which further ventilate and make bearable the human condition.

2. 4. REPRESENTATIONS OF IN-BETWEENNESS IN "EMPEDOCLES ON ETNA"

When Empedocles' name comes up in Arnold's poetry, the human condition materializes into the kind of uncommitted, disoriented, but disturbingly self-conscious darkened nostalgia Empedocles displays throughout *Empedocles on Etna*, and it does so with the kind of stoicism and inner division Madden has associated with Arnold's characteristic nostalgia of detachment, where "occasionally two different moods appear side by side" (50). The so called nostalgic and the stoic moods concerning *Empedocles*, in this respect, are materialized and further multiplied by the dramatic structure of the poem, which presents Callicles and Pausanias as voicing, or rather acting as the embodiments of counter perspectives to that of Empedocles' intellectual disillusionment concerning the essential and overwhelming incompatibility of human experience with that of the interiority of human thought. In Empedocles' plain statement, the very definition of this dichotomy between thought and action is the human condition, which "[...] we feel, day and night, / The burden of ourselves— / Well, then, the wiser wight, / In his own bosom delves, / And asks what ails him so, and gets what cure he can" (I. ii. 128-132). This is Empedocles' diagnosis of the situation, where humanity is burdened, not only with its own being, but more so with what to think about the situation of its own being, and its own consciousness of *being*, which are surrounded, not by purpose but by randomness and nonsense. The only cure possible in Empedocles' grim outlook, lies in the process of first taking notice of the situation, not by stepping out of one's self as in joyful ecstasy, but to step further into one's self without self-delusion, fear, or exaltation, which, in its disguised form, is yet another kind of detachment and stepping-out, with only the exterior analogy turned inside out.

However, even this stepping-in cannot save the one who perceives the paradox of existence to its fully fragmentary nature, as Empedocles clearly states in Act II, because

once knowledge is achieved at the cost of emotion and experience, there would be no going back to the world of pristine innocence, of blissful ignorance and youth; the journey is always one way, and one way only. Once self-consciousness is achieved, the individual is forever fragmented, and such fragmented anxiety troubling Empedocles is foreshadowed in the exchange between Pausanias and Callicles in the first act, as Pausanias unsuspectingly relates to Callicles, that Empedocles now “[...] lives a lonely man in triple gloom,” (I. i.124), even giving up on his powers of legendary resurrection through song—having once resurrected Pantheia by the sheer power of his poetry, but now “[...] he has laid the use of music by” (I. i. 83), and has embarked on his self-inflicted exile towards the summit of mount Etna.

Callicles chides Pausanias because of his misplaced superstition, since this Pantheia was not really dead, but has suffered a fit, a “trance” (I. i. 136), and being unconcerned with society, Empedocles would let all believe, “Gape, and cry *wizard* at him, if they list” (I. i. 139). It is better understood later, that Pausanias, although being a close friend to Empedocles and being concerned with his dark mood, is also following him around in order to learn the magical secret of this legendary resurrection. As Callicles’ dialogue further reveals, Pausanias is indeed in pursuit of this knowledge, but Callicles, although being much younger than Pausanias, is more perceptive of Empedocles’ true source of suffering, since he suspects that “‘Tis not the times, ‘tis not the sophists vex him; / There is some root of suffering in himself, / [...] Which makes the time look black and sad to him” (I. i. 150-153). Callicles further cautions Pausanias to stop with the miracle nonsense, and avoid further annoying Empedocles, lest he becomes enraged and gets totally out of hand, urging Pausanias to lead him by the pleasant views of the mountain to “[...] keep his mind on praying on itself, / And talk to him of things at hand and common,” (I. i. 156-158). Having been startled by Callicles’ insightful and thorough attitude, Pausanias scorns the young poet in return, since he is just “[...] a boy whose tongue outruns his knowledge” (I. i. 161), and bids Callicles to do his part to always stay out of sight behind Empedocles, and as Pausanias had instructed Callicles before, to sing for Empedocles, hoping that Callicles’ godly, romantic-heroic songs would calm Empedocles. Exchanges between Callicles and Pausanias also inform the reader that Empedocles knew and adored the talent of young Callicles from days of old. Callicles gladly agrees, because following Empedocles was also his own original intent, hoping

to help Empedocles overcome his misery, and perhaps, as he confesses to Pausanias, to discover the reasons why Empedocles had such a mysterious grip on him: “[Empedocles] knew me well, and would oft notice me; / And still, I know not how, he draws me to him, / [...] But I would serve him, soothe him, if I could,” (I. i. 57-75).

This brief summary-frame of motive and narrative intent is necessary, because it reveals the function of the dramatic structure, where individual characteristics of Pausanias and Callicles become representative of different kinds of pursuits, if not different kinds of error of judgement, or misapprehension of knowledge, directed both towards life *as is*, and towards life in poetry. For Paul Zietlow, “Pausanias reflects the vain human longing felt in every age for secret, supernatural knowledge [and] Callicles’ songs express the classicism of the Greek golden age [,] withdraw[ing] in the end into the Hesiodic past” (255). In Collini’s view, Pausanias, although a little Machiavellian, is “a more robust, active figure”, and, being a physician “who lives in the world of action”, forms a contrast with that of Callicles, whose songs are about “living entirely in the realm of the aesthetic, a position Empedocles moodily regards as incompatible with increasing maturity” (35-38). Especially Callicles is noteworthy, as Arnold portrays him as the aspiring young poet following in the footsteps of Empedocles who is the legendary older poet and polymath— once Apollo’s darling “votary” (II. 220). As Stacy Johnson notes, Callicles not only plays the part of the poet in nature, but also stands in a similar existence to the Strayed Reveller, because Callicles has also “strayed [...] from the feast below”, but this time endowed with a mission (107).

The feast was held by Peisianax, where Callicles received many praises, “Almost as much as the new dancing-girl.” (I. i. 35), but this time Arnold reverses the stray-action away from the in-betweenness of Peisianax’s feast, and into the forest glen, where Callicles mirrors the act of straying too much, or too literally into nature. His physical surroundings being the mythical forest glade, and later on the serene mountainside, his songs continuously make use of its romantic surroundings and keep straying into Olympus and its well-known associated myths. Empedocles can no longer associate himself with such magical surroundings, as his lines tend to focus on the mind itself rather than nature. Thus, it is only through “the eyes of Callicles [that] there is always an ultimate relationship between the landscape, the gods, and men; for him, even when

it is frightening, the landscape is particular, not allegorical [.] The contrast between philosopher and poet is revealed in this way [as] two modes of seeing and feeling about man's surroundings" are encountered by the reader (S. Johnson 111). However, there is no actual interaction between Empedocles and Callicles; their dialogue is established through the playing of the harp, and by the contrast their songs display against each other. This emphasizes a rather removed and distanced relationship between Callicles the poet, and Empedocles the self-exiled poet-philosopher. Without ever getting a last chance to speak to his admired poet face-to-face, Callicles is unable to meet Empedocles in person one final time, since he is persuaded by Pausanias the physician to hide in the shadows, and perform his poetry from a distance for Empedocles' own well-being. There is no indication at the end of the poem that Callicles ever finds out about the death of Empedocles, since Empedocles disappears into the crater, leaving no dead body behind. He simply vanishes, which is in itself a powerful statement towards the ambiguity of the in-between final setting of the poem.

Thus, ironically, one may wonder at the end of the poem; what would Pausanias or Callicles think about Empedocles' disappearance, since the poet is definitively dead only to the reader. Furthermore, various possible scenarios plague the ending, which deepen the implications of the narrative choice regarding Empedocles' disappearance. For instance, if Callicles were to be allowed within the presence of Empedocles, would things have gone a different way? Would Callicles have succeeded in persuading, or perhaps preventing Empedocles from his lethal jump into Etna's crater? This is an important point to consider, as it stresses, and further throws in contrast the vital connection between human beings and communication, as the human enigma is structurally comprised of, and dependant on, both the narrative mode as in time-defying poetry or songs, and personal experiences as in time-bound physical interaction. Both modes require the sharing of the same temporality and spatial dimensions, as well as sharing connection and insight through the poetic and linguistic dimensions of the past and present alike, with a combination of past narratives and the exchange of personally oriented first-hand experiences being momentarily turned into exchanged stories in the there-and-then and the here-and-now.

Being denied this choice, Empedocles, although stern and committed to the end, is also denied the personal interaction of a younger poet-friend, who might have persuaded him through his poetic words combined with personal care and admiring action. Callicles is also denied this chance, since, perhaps Empedocles would have found it positive and worthwhile to educate young Callicles further, providing a living model for Callicles to learn from, instead of the romantic models of the idealized song, or the superstitious and vulgar one-to-one correspondence regarding the functional nonsense Pausanias seems to favour through his fascination with resurrection, which Callicles already seems to be aware of. There is, however, a third possible scenario in which the outcome of events culminating in Empedocles suicide leans heavily towards being the only interpretation offering the only possible hope for Callicles, since Callicles would then be able to keep his hope, and perhaps in time, discover and judge for himself the agonies and suffering which self-consciousness brings to the poet. Or again, maybe Callicles, just by *not* becoming influenced by Empedocles, would be able to stay happily on his own path of romantic idealization, having never have to face the curse of self-reflection, or any kind of distanced or fragmented reflection whatsoever.

In this respect, the multi-layered construction of the dramatic structure, which thus allows for different possibilities to be considered, can be observed to bring a life-oriented depth, and not just intellectual and self-reflective depth to the poem. The characters of Pausanias and Callicles serve, at first to establish, and then to strengthen the inner argument, or rather the inner dichotomy of Empedocles, which is again, the dichotomy between thought and action. Since Empedocles can no longer properly ritualize his own existence—whether through poetry, through social commitment, or by reintegrating himself into the commitment he has once shown towards Apollo, he takes the only path available. As Linda Ray Pratt, drawing attention to Durkheim’s model of ‘egoistic suicide’ refers to Empedocles as falling under Durkheim’s classification of both the anomic and the egoistic, since “those with a strong sense of individualism tend to be egoistic suicides; those with a fragile sense of attachment to the community are more likely to be anomic. Frequently, the two categories overlap” in Empedocles’ character (“Empedocles, Suicide” 79). Durkheim has defined the egoistic suicide as “a condition of melancholic languor”, preventing the individual to attend to “public affairs, useful work, even domestic duties”, where the person drifts towards “indifference and

aversion. He is unwilling to emerge from himself [,] becom[ing] self-preoccupied” as “self-observation and self-analysis [,] this extreme concentration [...] deepens the chasm” separating the individual from communal existence (*Suicide* 242, Pratt 79).

Although being quite poignant in its observation, Durkheim’s model is concerned with the physical, and not the aesthetic poetic action of Arnold’s poem. Apart from the socially unmotivated roots of Empedocles’ action, Arnold’s focus seems to be more on the intellectual side, pointing towards the inherently inescapable quality which makes everyone the prisoner of their own minds at one point or the other, rather than an individual case of physical or social suicide. As James Longenbach observes, “Arnold understands the difference between myths and fictions” (845), and this is most readily observable in the portrayal of Empedocles as “a persona trapped in the troubled space between culture and consciousness, [where] Empedocles realizes that the dilemma is his own even as he blames the age; he understands that his claim of historical ultimacy is undermined by a long history of similar claims” (848). Empedocles is so self-conscious, that he is able to read his own situation with reference to the act of reading itself. What would the act entail? It would need a reference point in time, a spot, similar to the previously discussed ontology of being, regarding Eliade’s “fixed point of orientation” (*Sacred* 22), since it is this being and presence in time and space that makes all existence and all reading possible in the first place.

Empedocles knows himself to be neither myth, nor fiction, but something in-between. Comparing himself with the cosmos and the stars, Empedocles declares that “I alone / Am dead to life and joy, therefore I read / In all things my own deadness” (II. 320-322). Earlier, Empedocles, upon hearing Callicles’ song making a literal reference to the entrapment of Typhon beneath Etna (Typho in the poem) has also shown that he understands Callicles, too, but unlike Callicles, Empedocles further understands the difference between myth and fiction, wearily announcing that “He fables, yet speaks truth. / The brave impetuous heart yields everywhere / To the subtle, contriving head; / [...] These rumblings are not Typho’s groans, I know!” (II. 89-95). Again, this self-knowledge does not guarantee being, as Empedocles is quite aware of. Near the end of his final disappearance into Etna’s crater, his introspection deepens: “Slave of sense / I have in no wise been; but slave of thought?— / And who can say:— I have been always

free, / Lived ever in the light of my own soul?— / I cannot! [...] But I have not grown easy in these bonds— / But I have not denied what bonds these were!” (II. 391-398). Is it possible to free one’s self from reflection, or from the curse of reading, both in its actual narrative form and also in its metaphorical dimension filling in for sensual observation? The mirror of life is inherently fragmented into reading and doing, reflecting upon and acting, just as Empedocles had sung in reply to Callicles in the first act, “A cord the Gods first slung, / And then the soul of man / There, like a mirror, hung, / [...] Hither and thither spins / [...] A thousand glimpses wins, / And never sees a whole;” (I. ii. 80-86). In Longenbach’s view, Empedocles is also “conscious that he has created the gods himself”, therefore concluding that Arnold’s portrayal of Empedocles as “a self-conscious fiction is as potent a killer as is a reified myth” (851). In other words, Arnold’s Empedocles lays bare the very process of the liminal-liminoid play between myth and fiction, because, if myth is taken to be the central mechanism, as Eliade considers it, and as Callicles sings of it, then what to make of Empedocles’ own mythical essence being turned into the fiction of Arnold’s poem? What becomes of Empedocles now, myth or fiction? If there will be insistence on a separation between myth and fiction, as Longenbach puts it, Empedocles self-defeatingly gives the answer by demonstrating the counter-question: “But what happens when the fiction shows itself to be as powerful as the myth?” (853).

If nothing else, Empedocles seems to be in possession of this knowledge of the mirror-like, but also eventual quality of human existence, that all along, he has been moving in the only direction available, both in poetry and in life, which ends in the eternal physical passage into nature itself, as being dissolves “To the elements it came from / Everything will return. / Our bodies to earth, / Our blood to water, / [...] But mind?...” (II. 333-338). The three little dots of uncertainty following Empedocles’ question mark at the end of Empedocles’ presently quoted statement unveils Empedocles’ own inner reflection upon his “triple gloom” Pausanias has been suggesting in all his ironic ignorance. However, Pausanias lacks the self-consciousness required to notice that the gloom entails a tripartite structure of mirroring nature, and also being mirrored by people, and also mirroring that one is being mirrored by the poet-people, both of the past and the present. In its physical references, there is no problem with death or the mirror. People die, and mirrors get faded and broken. It is the reflection which is the

real problem, as it is both traceable yet also untraceable, always employing the beyond within the beyond. Empedocles is quite aware of this impasse, and seems to imply that physical decay and transformation is easily observed and understood, but what of the nature of poetry and the nature of the mind? What becomes of the mind once the poet dies? What becomes of poetry? This poetic-reflective uncertainty above all else seems to be the cause of Empedocles' self-conscious suffering, or his "curse of reflectiveness" (Collini 27), because, as various passages stressing the relationship between experiential and narrative modes discussed so far will make it clear, that Empedocles has understood the paradox of poetry in its comfort as well as at its discomfort. Poetry is comfort, just as Callicles sings, that "The lyre's voice is lovely everywhere! / In the court of Gods, in the city of men, / And in the lonely rock-strewn mountain glen," (II. 37-40). Poetry unites, and can penetrate anywhere and everywhere. However, it is also because of poetry, that suffering is loosed upon the world, because it penetrates *everywhere*, as Empedocles, upon hearing Callicles sing for the first time in the first act, indulges to warn the reader, taking up the theme "*in a solemn manner on his harp*" (aside, I. ii. 77-78), reclaiming the role of the wise poet, and singing in reply to Callicles' song, that "[...] we are strangers here; the world is from of old. / [...] Born into life we are, and life must be our mould. / [...] And, when here, each new thing / Affects us we come near; / To tunes we did not call our being must keep chime. / [...] We measure the sea-tides, we number the sea-sands; / [...] We search out dead men's words, and works of dead men's hands; / We shut our eyes, and muse / How our minds are made," (I. ii. 182-329). For Empedocles, then, the poetic paradox seems to be somewhere in-between "dead men's words, and works of dead men's hands;" (I. ii. 327), where poetry further complicates things; rather than showing the way out, poetry draws the poet further in, estranging him from life and participation, since the poet is burdened with the knowledge that "works of dead men" are simultaneously poetic statements *and* physical statues, spatial-temporal buildings *and* mythic-narrative ideas which like to pose as concrete buildings at the same time. But what makes and un-makes the mind? That is the infernal question vexing Empedocles.

Just as every other poet-philosopher, Empedocles is helpless against this paradox. Yet, also being highly conscious of it, Empedocles also welcomes the poetic paradox which requires the presence of the beyond, both in its physical and poetic dimensions. It is

almost like the heroic paradox, where the infinite fame can only be achieved through, and *because of* the finite capacity of the heroic labourer, which is very suggestive of Müller's previously cited ideas regarding the limit. It is the mortality, or the limitedness of the hero, along with the synchronically finite-infinite appearance of the poetic expression that allows for suffering and recognition at the same time, thus allowing for any voice or heroic echo to keep resonating behind and beyond, and immortalize the hero along with the poetic expressions associated with the specific heroic endeavour. And, as Cedric H. Whitman has shown, the hero almost always dwells, not within, but "at the limits of human society", where, in Charles Segal's exposition, the invention of the gods, if not the already existing condition of the beyond allows the hero a confrontation with "the ultimate questions of life in the largest terms", since the hero is both the friend, but also the enemy of the Gods (3).

The paradoxical embodiment of the hero's in-betweenness, in Segal's view, lies in the acceptance and braving of this in-between condition. Because the heroic condition demands that the hero should be "unprotected by religious orthodoxy or dogmatic faith, [the hero] experiences the deepest sense of self in isolation and suffering, and refuses to constrict the greatness of his nature and ideals to suit convention and so-called normality" (*The Heroic Paradox* 3). Commenting on C. H. Whitman's work, Segal's words on the in-betweenness of the heroic paradox is as better a definition as any regarding Empedocles' condition, since Empedocles is the Sicilian poet-hero, admired by friends and enemies alike due to his stubborn commitment to the margins, as Callicles and Pausanias, in the first act, keep reminding the reader. If, as Agamben argued, to be a poet *is* to be alone ("Resistance in Art" 18:02-18:25), since it requires the abandonment of definite space, time, and also an abandonment of definite self, then Empedocles can be seen as the personification, both of this desperate mood, and also of this poetics of desperation. Empedocles no longer wants to be alone in poetry, thus he addresses Apollo, "Take thy bough, set me free from my solitude; / I have been enough alone!", but the problem is not that simple, as Empedocles has been in realization of this fact for a long time, and continues in the paradoxical passage, further questioning the situation:

Where shall thy votary fly then? back to men?—
 But they will gladly welcome him once more,
 And help him to unbend his too tense thought,
 And rid him of the presence of himself,
 And keep their friendly chatter at his ear,
 And haunt him, till the absence from himself,
 That other torment, grow unbearable;
 And he will fly to solitude again,
 [...] and many thousand times
 Be miserably bandied to and fro
 Like a sea-wave, betwixt the world and thee (II. 218-231).

As the above passage also demonstrates, the essential condition for Empedocles materializes within his own in-betweenness; no longer the poet, no longer the philosopher, but what to become? Because ‘ridding one’s self from the presence of one’s self’ is always double edged, and paradoxically included in ‘that other torment’, which is ‘the absence of one’s self’, where solitude and communion are two sides of the same coin. The liminoid-play shows the coin in its spin-motion, which allows the realization of the liminal paradox to be central for the human condition. And without a sense of belonging, which can be achieved through a successful integration by way of ritualizing one’s self into the kind of communion and solitude both of which Empedocles has deserted, ritualization stays adrift, just as Empedocles’ non-emergent but all-immersive mood and final action testify towards. Empedocles descends into Eliade’s formless expanse, and becomes formless again. This is not a simple death of a philosopher, or the heroic death of a poet-hero, or the suicide of an egoist, but an intellectual statement made in a bodily way towards the act of creation itself, both in its physical and poetical roots. It is almost a suspension, or rather an interruption within the process of continuous song-making, where the poet-philosopher decides not to *sing*, or *be* anymore. The in-betweenness of Empedocles, is perhaps resolved, but *our* own paradox of the liminal-liminoid in-between is once more assured of its continuity.

In Zietlow’s view, “paradoxical inconsistencies” within the dramatic structure, as well as within the dialogues, continually point towards such an interruption, both in structural and conceptual terms: “Empedocles seeks isolation, yet he must deal with two friends [...] [b]efore he can dwell on his private crisis, [...] and while he mediates alone, his musings are interrupted by the voice of another. He is simultaneously isolated and involved, and so are Pausanias and Callicles” (254). The movement and relocation,

both of the characters and the setting also suggest a flux in space as well as time, but this flux is continually interrupted. Callicles' songs relocate the consciousness towards Olympian wholeness. Empedocles' response with his harp brings the reader back into fragmentation, to "this charr'd, blacken'd, melancholy waste", where Empedocles wants to find himself "Alone!—" (II. 1-2). This is not a calm setting, but rather the fragmented mirror of a setting, just like the consciousness of its fragmented protagonist, interrupted at all times. As Pratt suggests, "the image of the self as a mirror which catches only fragmented images as it whirls in the wind is the reality of the self in the new social and scientific order which contains the individual but does not address him" (86). Similarly, Arnold's reworking of Empedocles contains the individual as a human being, also addresses him, but cannot address him further or solve the problems of reflection, because it would require a successful process of ritualization which Arnold's Empedocles fails, or rather chooses to resist. It is not because Empedocles is ignorant of the paradox of ritualization and poetry, but just *because* he knows the structure to be impermeable and all engulfing, he decides to step out of it.

According to Eliade, Empedocles as the mythic-historical personage embodies within its own myth structure the very idea of the effectiveness of poetry against forgetfulness, since "Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others believed in metempsychosis and claimed that they could remember their former lives. 'A wanderer exiled from the divine dwelling,' Empedocles said of himself, 'in former times I was already a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird, a mute fish in the sea' [...] And further: 'I am delivered forever from death'" (*Myth and Reality* 122). As Eliade further explains, the ancient Greeks regarded memory in two ways:

1. That which refers to primordial events (cosmogony, theogony, genealogy)
2. The memory of former lives, that is, of historical and personal events. Lethe, 'Forgetfulness' has equal efficacy against the two kinds of memory. But Lethe is powerless in the case of certain privileged persons: 1. Those who, inspired by the Muses [...] succeed in recovering the memory of primordial events; 2. Those who, like Pythagoras or Empedocles, are able to remember their former lives. These two categories of privileged persons overcome 'forgetfulness', which is in some sort equivalent to overcoming death" (123).

Arnold's Empedocles, when compared to Eliade's mythic source, can still be seen as retaining the appreciation of both the primordial-elemental nature of existence, and its

poetic and memory-infused counter-part. Poetry or the poetic mode, as Arnold's Empedocles also sees it, plays the central role in recovering the experiences of the past, and more so, it enables the creation of new ones. However, unlike Eliade's Empedocles, Arnold's Empedocles has had enough of the immortality of poetry, so in turn, seeks the comfort of true forgetfulness, rather than the keeping of futile remembrances, which irredeemably stay within the moments of his past days, where he roamed with Parmenides in his youth, when "[...] neither thought / Nor outward things were clos'd and dead to us, / [...] A flute-note from the woods / Sunset over the sea; / [...] The village-girl at her wheel!" (II. 235-256). But as Arnold's Empedocles makes it clear, these are no longer attainable moments, and Empedocles knows this all too well, since eternal remembrance is also another form of eternal bondage. So, Empedocles is content that "it hath been granted me / Not to die wholly, not to be all enslav'd. / I feel it in this hour! The numbing cloud / Mounts off my soul; I feel it, I breathe free! / Is it but for a moment?" (II.405-409). The last line is intriguing, in the sense that it brings an ambiguity to the atmosphere of the end, as one cannot be sure if Empedocles was satisfied with the transience of the final moment where he 'breathes free' just for a moment, or disillusioned with it since it lasted only a moment. His final impatience and aroused spirit, addressing the volcano as "Ah! Boil up, ye vapours! / [...] Rush over it again," (II. 410-415) seems to be equally ambiguous and also paradoxical, since, having tasted the moment of volcanic 'numbing' just a moment ago, he appears to be instantaneously determined to go back on his previous rejection of past moments; Empedocles sounds all too willing to return back to that exact moment of volcanic enlightenment or sensual delight, or better, all too welcoming towards being forever immersed in it. But again, the reader has no way of knowing for sure, since those who jump into volcanoes don't live to tell the tale, which is, perhaps another way of looking at the thought-action dichotomy surrounding the narrative of Empedocles and the experiential modes it is concerned with.

In the context of Empedocles' final journey into the unknown lava lake, the metaphors of watching and passing-by mentioned earlier regarding the Scholar-Gipsy, the Merman, and the Strayed Reveller again comes to be realized within Callicles' final absence from the scene, as he calmly keeps on playing his Olympian lyre down below the rocky crown of Etna. Pausanias and Callicles personify the suspecting but

unknowing watchers, whereas Empedocles moves into the realm of the perpetual passer-by, if not the specifically reserved region of the mythic in-between of the volcanic dipper-by, returning forever to the potentiality of an existence. Despite all metaphorical ingenuity, Empedocles ceases to *be*, returning to formlessness, and in doing so, provides a repetitive poetic model which can be evoked and reworked for generations to come. There is both distance and closure, nostalgia and rejection, alienation and dramatic irony embedded within Empedocles' final action, since Empedocles' end is only revealed to the reader. Even the concept of nostalgia collapses onto itself, becoming double edged: 'Did Empedocles finally make his way home?', and if so, 'Where did Empedocles return?' This is both the told and the untold state of the song of Empedocles which Arnold captures within its moment of in-betweenness. A very close structural similarity with the distanced in-between lies within the construction of Odysseus's own narrative in the Homeric epic tradition. The distance already embedded within the concept of *nostos*, the sea journey of the return home, which in its etymology suggests the preconditioned distanced-ness, again, requires the presence of the song to measure and make that distance known. As Gregory Nagy explains, "For Odysseus to live out the master myth of his own heroic life, he must have a *nostos* or 'homecoming' [,] however, his *nostos* must be more than simply a 'homecoming': it must be also a 'song about a homecoming'. The *kleos* or epic glory of Odysseus depends on his *nostos*, that is, on the song of his homecoming, which is the *Odyssey*." (69). Nagy further notes that the notion of the unbridgeable distance forms the backbone of Greek myth, without which there would be no epic world:

The mythology of epic heroes must distance itself from the present by holding on to a remote past far removed from the world of listeners hearing the glories of heroes. To hold on to such a past, [a firm conviction must be established and maintained] that such an age does not exist any more. It must privilege what is past over what is present, and it must remake that past [into the kind of perpetually unavailable sacredness so many of the myths demonstrate] (80-81).

Although Arnold's and Arnold's fictional Empedocles' worlds, for that matter, are no longer anchored in the epic, they still carry echoes of the same distant and distancing anxiety which is both connected and yet separated from the concept of home, where physical distance is also measured in poetical terms. In Zietlow's interpretation, the physical distance between Empedocles and Callicles is also the poetic distance that

propels the whole poem forward in a similar manner, as “[t]he sense of gaps unbridged that is confirmed in Callicles’ final song pervades the whole poem, [since] Empedocles is dead, [and] off in the distance the Muses sing, while in the foreground Etna smolders and seethes at the core” (254). The songliness of Empedocles’ experience is left incomplete for Callicles and Pausanias, whereas his *nostos* towards Etna is complete, immortalized in Arnold’s composition, and kept off within the similar and literally unapproachable far away land of Etna’s cosmic hunger. This other world is indifferent towards what is human, but humanity cannot stay indifferent towards the presence of this other world.

In other words, it is once more shown that the indifference of the universe exists alongside the hereditary ignorance, and also the built-in curiosity of its inhabitants, like that of Pausanias and Callicles’ well-intended or miscalculated follies towards Empedocles’ end. The rift between Empedocles and Callicles has existed before Empedocles’ death, as was portrayed through their incompatible modes of poetic voice, but the chasm has deepened with Empedocles’ final descent into the fiery element. Even in his purposeful disappearance, this seems to be one factor which Empedocles has not bothered to consider, which has to do with those who are left behind like Callicles and Pausanias, the observers of the current myth-life. Being the poet, the burden of the representation of human existence and myth-life falls on Callicles. On the one hand, the separateness of Callicles from such an oblivious ending as welcomed by Empedocles, and his undisturbed unawareness, both of Empedocles’ final disappearance and the real torments haunting Empedocles provides a hope towards continuity. On the other hand, his underlined status as a capable poet who will be most liable to suffer the same consequences Empedocles recognized and braved, also plagues the expectations of the reader towards a crisis of cyclical discontinuity. Callicles being a poet of the same calibre, the reader can foresee, that, given time, a similar doom is most likely to hang over Callicles’ head, too. This is to suggest that Callicles’ singing unawares at the end of the poem is most likely to return the poem to where it had originally started, perhaps only this time within another time-frame and with recognizable yet also unrecognizable *dramatis personae*.

It is not that hard to see Callicles standing on the very spot Empedocles once stood, or better, to picture a not-yet-named poet devising some way to immortalize Callicles only within a generation or two later, once Callicles becomes the new Empedocles. Or perhaps, another never-will-be-named poet would choose to rework or parody Callicles as the last romantic crusader-poet who has seen Empedocles, who has been seen seeing Empedocles, and who also has been heard having seen those who have seen Empedocles performing for the ancient sage, and yet, Callicles might still stay somewhat Callicles. The train of seeing and hearing would always be there, although the same passengers most probably would not, and poetic symbols such as Empedocles and Callicles would go on pointing towards the very in-between ground that allows for such train of thought to be realized in the first place. This may be reminiscent of the way of the liminoid feeding on the liminal, but in essence, it seems more like the outcome of the insatiable appetite of the literary humanoid always looking for fresh pastures of literary green, or blue, or pink to gnaw on. As hunger, and perhaps the ritualization of such hunger is an essential motivation, both in its physical and metaphorical dimensions, it is quite suggestive that this hunger needs an empty stomach, and Empedocles provides both the hunger and the vacated premises, perhaps not so much for the satisfaction of the hunger, but at least for the demonstration that such intellectual hunger is part of the definitive human condition.

Similar to the hunger metaphor, as Herbert R. Coursen notes, the irony “enforced” by the second act of Empedocles “is that man cannot stop dreaming, cannot choke his response to beauty. [...] Empedocles is trapped between the philosophy which tells him to expect nothing and the beauty which implores him to desire everything” (578). Poetry allows for this desire to exist, as it is made clear by the songs of Callicles. But to reach the depths of poetic alienation, as Empedocles strived for, it is imperative that one must philosophise between the role of the poet and the philosopher, suffering the experience of being divided, both from one’s own self, and from the others, which is also the inner paradox of poetry. Self-discovery is as necessary as self-forgetfulness, as Pratt further suggests, that “[i]n trying to rescue ‘the timeless’ from time, Arnold charts the psychological and cultural trauma of the self’s discovery that its place in the universe is but a point on a plane in time through which an infinite number of lines may be drawn” (88). As there can be no rescue without entrapment—just as no memory

without forgetfulness, the point in time, whether this is the Scholar-Gipsy, the Merman, the Reveller, or Empedocles is bound to be entrapped and rescued an infinite number of times. Poetry allows for the rescue, as well as it perpetuates the imprisonment of the rescuer. Arnold's Empedocles is, at its basic operation, the laying bare of this mechanism, where those who watch become implicated rescuers, as those who are the passers-by act the parts of the imprisoned, who are illusorily kept there, waiting for new ghosts to point towards the ever-present consciousness of the in-between.

Callicles and Pausanias are given the role of the watchers-by; although they are the contemporaries of Empedocles, and participate in the same moment as Empedocles, the spatial and temporal exile Empedocles imposes on himself prevents both Callicles and Pausanias from intervening in the present moment of the poem. An in-between space is created for all dramatic characters, where the integrative and the non-integrative parts are displayed in a disarray, as Callicles and Pausanias represent integration, whereas Empedocles represents a detached, and a broken sense of ritualization towards the self, towards the world, and towards the poetic practice itself. Although being unable to comprehend it fully, Pausanias experiences the in-betweenness of Empedocles' detachment first-hand, where, like Callicles before him, Empedocles almost scolds Pausanias in the first act for getting involved in the world's illusions too much. Pausanias with his obsession of magic, spells, healing, and resurrection is on the wrong path in Empedocles' view, therefore he evades Pausanias' request to give him insight into Pantheia's story, because, Empedocles declares that the only spell is the mind: "Mind is the spell which governs earth and heaven. / Man has a mind with which to plan his safety; / Know that, and help thyself." (I. ii. 28-30). Empedocles is very practical in his advice, but also fits Callicles' previous description that he just does not want to indulge himself in either knowledge, or the social concerns that may be of importance to others, thus he cuts it short with Pausanias, sufficing to announce, that "[...] Life still / Leaves human effort scope. / But, since life teems with ill, / Nurse no extravagant hope; / Because thou must not dream, thou need'st not then despair" (I. ii. 423-427). The paradox of the mind emerges as the seat of both dream and despair, which one must choose wisely to keep to the safe side in life, lest dreams easily become despair, but the despair of self-consciousness does not transform into a dream, since it is

an unpleasant awakening, but an awakening still. Knowing this truth, and getting oriented accordingly is Empedocles' advice to Pausanias' magic-mongering.

Empedocles, through his self-questioning, epitomizes the mind's inherent and perpetual dilemma, the inner-voicing of the distance, and the continuous suspension of the human psyche by the human psyche. Detachment, in this sense, arises both as the precondition, but also as the curse of the mind's own in-betweenness. As Rowen suggests, "psychic confusion" is the trademark of Arnold, but this confusion entails a significant quality of the self-conscious distance, where "Empedocles sees man as being perpetually divided from himself, polarized into 'some bondage', [but also] feels himself to be so thoroughly enclosed in the mental life" (Rowen 355). Therefore, Empedocles' main concern becomes, not only his own mental life of the in-between, but the mental life of humanity's in-betweenness with its consequences for human emotion and experience. The following passage demonstrates this concern clearly:

But mind—but thought—
 If these have been the master part of us—
 Where will *they* find their parent element?
 What will receive *them*, who will call *them* home?
 But we shall still be in them, and they in us,
 And we shall be the strangers of the world,
 And they will be our lords, as they are now;
 And keep us prisoners of our consciousness,
 And never let us clasp and feel the All
 But through their forms, and modes, and stifling veils.
 And we shall be unsatisfied as now,
 And we shall feel the agony of thirst,
 The ineffable longing for the life of life
 Baffled for ever: and still thought and mind
 Will hurry us with them on their homeless march, (II. 345-359)

In Empedocles' bitter statement, which has an inner intensity that easily draws the reader into the emotional in-betweenness of the mind's own "life of life", there is also the cold and numb detachment which observes the mind as object as well as the subject at a greater distance than that of Callicles. There is a paradoxical moving in and moving out kind of motion in Empedocles' statement. Rowen, in arguing for the importance of "the symbolic value" of Callicles' relationship to landscape in his songs, notes that "the distance between object and idea, between the material and metaphysical levels, is always quite wide, suggesting that the ideas have been grafted on by the workings of the

poet's intellect, rather than being spontaneously present within his sense of the things themselves". In a complementary mode, the passage quoted above displays Empedocles' own emotional involvement in and intellectual detachment from the matter of the mind, and his own unsatisfactory experience with the inner paradox of the mind. Unlike Callicles, Empedocles retains his power of empathy, despite being alienated so much from the world and those it contains, whereas Callicles' relationship, as Rowen also agrees, seems more mechanical and memorized, rather than felt and improvised. Here is a passage from Callicles' song, just after Empedocles plunges into Etna:

Not here, O Apollo!
 Are haunts meet for thee.
 But, where Helicon breaks down
 In cliff to the sea,

Where the moon-silver'd inlets
 Send far their light voice
 Up the still vale of Thisbe,
 O speed, and rejoice. (II. 421-428)

Callicles' mechanical and counterfeited voice can be heard within the poetry he thus starts singing. It is only towards the very end that Callicles' singing assumes a solemn movement and a solemn mood, referring to Apollo and the nine muses, "—Whose praise do they mention? / Of what is it told?— / What will be for ever; / What was from of old. / First hymn they the Father / Of all things; and then / The rest of immortals, The action of men." (II. 457-464). The hierarchical consideration of Callicles is evident, as he gives the priority to "the Father / Of all things", and later on comes the rest of the godly entourage, and finally the action of men. In sharp contrast to Empedocles' secular and humanity oriented perspective of the margins, Callicles does not step out of bounds. But the same indifferent attitude, which also plagues Empedocles becomes apparent in Callicles' last lines concluding the poem, "The day in his hotness, / The strife with the palm; / The night in her silence, / The stars in their calm" (II. 465-468). There is no 'life of life' here, no involved reflection but only one-to-one observation prescribed by the Apollonian serene truth; thus, no mystery, but only the indifference of life ends the poem, whereas in Empedocles' passage given above, contradiction and paradox run aplenty.

What, really, does ‘the life of life’ entail? Can there be life without the mind? But Empedocles is already aware of the fact that there is life in the elements, too; however, they are born whole, without the mind: “They were well born, they will be well entomb’d” (II. 337). But man? “But mind?...” (II. 337). Therefore, Empedocles knows the mind to be the problematic place where the mind, with its inseparable and continually active agent, which is thought, is all powerful, time-defying and impermeable against all, yet powerless against itself. There is no going out of it, as “we shall still be in them, and they in us” (II. 349), so mind and thought “Will hurry us with them on their homeless march,” (II. 359). As the situation stands thus, the ‘life of life’ makes its presence known, but continually escapes expression, because it is admittedly a longing, but manages to stay “ineffable” (II. 357). It is *in* the utterance, it is *in* the voice, but it is also continuously *beyond* the utterance, and *beyond* the voice, making the unspeakable speakable, yet defying all attempts to finalize what Empedocles calls ‘the life of life’. This is also the life of poetry and in-betweenness as ritualization, where Susan Stewart correspondingly points out, that

Poetry is encountered with and through our entire sensuous being as we summon our memory and imagination. When we enter by means of reception into the poet’s intention, we, too, are involved in making—participating both actively and passively in the process into form. [...] By means of the incantatory, the poet acknowledges in the work’s very being this inevitable paradox of human life: that we actively pursue an *eidōs* or fixed image of the human and at the same time passively long for its dissolution. [...] It is the figure of poetic making who most fully and tragically represents the duality of this human desire for representation (329).

When viewed in this light, Empedocles’ insistence on ‘the life of life’, and his solemn awareness that the *eidōs* or idea of such life-of-life being always in flight seems to be well ahead of its time, putting emphasis on the poetic origins of life, rather than the biological randomness popularized in Arnold’s day. In Nowell Smith’s interpretation, “voice in poetry becomes a work of animation, comes to work at the animations it channels, only we grasp it as the locus for an experience of linguistic *time*” (162). Hence, Empedocles’ or Arnold’s insistence, or in Pratt’s terms, the futile attempt to “rescue the ‘timeless’ from time” (88) paradoxically suffers from, but also desperately needs to sustain future attempts towards, perhaps not so much as the sense of an ending, but a sense of the dynamics behind what makes a human being. Arnold’s Empedocles

demonstrates this attempt in the way he establishes himself apart from everything else, trying to rescue himself from time, yet paradoxically becoming, once again, timeless and also time-less himself. In this regard, his failed ritualization, his conscious non-integration back into the Apollonian tradition he seems to have grown out of, or his will not to integrate himself into any tradition or time at all, lays bare the parts of the broken ritualization through his very own in-betweenness before the eyes of its modern gazer.

As a final effort to bring together Arnold's poetics of in-betweenness and the non-integrative ritualization of self-consciousness most readily observed in "The Scholar-Gipsy", "The Strayed Reveller", "The Forsaken Merman", and "Empedocles on Etna", Tracy Miller's interpretation of the speaker's stand point in "The Scholar-Gipsy" appears to be the perfect frame of reference. Encompassing the poems discussed so far within its own employed metaphor of the act of watching, T. Miller poses the expectation to see some other-worldly (literary-legendary) *being* pass, or appear by, against the speaker-observer's own state of 'being seen' by the reader within the poetic narrative structure of Arnold's Scholar-Gipsy. The in-between represented with and within the poetic self-awareness inherently surrounding the subject matter and form of all the poems covered thus far becomes clearly illustrated in T. Miller's use of the word, "vigil". Tracy Miller, referring to the pastoral beginning of the poem suggests that the "speaker's resolution to remain 'here'—keeping vigil for the Scholar-Gipsy" along with the repetition of the word 'Here' twice, "echoes one of the conventions of the pastoral: its insistence on its own place-boundedness". For T. Miller, the pastoral tradition's, "deictic 'here' [...] orients readers in a consolatory pastoral landscape", moving the readers *and* the one who is mourned, back into life, rather than release him into the realm of forgetfulness and death (151).

As T. Miller further notes, "the way the word 'here' gestures towards [,] orient both poet and reader within the tradition of the pastoral but alter and expand this tradition to signal the particular place of the myth of the Scholar-Gipsy—a place that might be revisited for solace not only textually but through the kind of pilgrimage (both real and imaginary) the speaker enacts (151-152). It is in this key observation that the in-between perspective of 'the vigil' finds its various representations in the poems discussed so far. As argued throughout the discussion, Arnold's sampled poems feature,

both the *act* of keeping vigil and the human expectation and *idea* of keeping vigil represented within the relationship between those who keep watch over the mythic-textual figures continually appearing and disappearing within the poems as perpetual passers-by, as has been the case with the mythic figure of the Scholar-Gipsy and Empedocles, and those who keep watching the ones who hold vigil, like the Merman and the Strayed Reveller, thus focusing more on the human expectation to keep vigil, or the dynamics behind the idea of the vigil, as in keeping one's eyes and senses open for the unusual activity of communion with a literary figure who is bound to stay within the beyond.

One such unusual activity has always been the act of poetic creation, where the act of keeping one's eyes and senses open has been embedded in the self-conscious art of poetry, since it does employ a similar devotional 'watching' as the kind of vigil which is continually immersed in collective and personal memory. As has been the case with the Merman's self-observant vigil over his own broken heart and personal consciousness, or the Strayed Reveller's disoriented thoughts regarding the gods who appear to be less vigilant than the poets, the art of poetry is primarily presented as an act, in which the act and the idea of seeing is continually set loose upon the act of keeping watch or keeping awake. This poetic act is paradoxical, yet inevitable, which only appears to be recognizable and achievable through a ritualization process, where the observers, or those who keep vigil, ritualize their wonder into the kind of expectation which can never be fulfilled. In this regard, reconciliation, or what Rappaport has called the realm of the "high-order meaning" (73) where ritual succeeds through participation and integration within the liturgical existence is never reached, although the anxiety of this incompleteness is deeply felt. Instead, a bitter self-consciousness presents itself through the recognition of an in-between and non-integrative state of existence, similar to what Turner has specified as the pregnant space and consciousness of the "threshold people", the state of the "betwixt and between", within which "*a moment in and out of time*" (*Ritual Process* 95-96) becomes continually negotiated and renegotiated by the ritual agent through the agent's own fragmented existence, simultaneously projecting a fragmented self to the past and the present.

None of Arnold's poems considered so far display an integrative quality towards the past or the present; rather, they stay as recognitions of their own in-betweenness, which are oriented within the in-between space of their own liminoid existence, since their existence depend chiefly on the existence of previous myths and narratives, such as the Scholar-Gipsy, the Merman, the Reveller, and Empedocles. It is only through the self-conscious and anxious play between the liminal states of the watcher-speakers who keep vigil, and the liminoid narratives of the perpetual by-passers who are the objects of that vigil, both for the speakers in the poetry and the readers of Arnold that the inherently broken and paradoxical relationship between seeing and doing, thinking and acting becomes observable. If Turner is right in claiming that "in liminality resides the germ not only of religious *askesis*, [...] but also of philosophy and pure science" (*Dramas* 242), it should also be admissible that the 'germ' which provides insight into the religious instinct along with scientific detachment has been incubating inside the poetic and the ritualistic modes for a very long time.

When examined in this light, the non-integrative endings of the poems reveal more than they seem to obscure. The speaker's drifting mind at the end of "The Scholar Gipsy" neither denies nor fully realizes the existence or the consciousness of the gipsy-scholar of legend, but busies himself with the idea of the in-between mythic figure, further trying to figure out what to do with this idea and embodiment of in-betweenness who perpetually haunts his vision. The Strayed Reveller urges the minds of his own audience, Circe and Ulysses, but also the minds of his distant and nebulous readers to stray along with him, as he materializes the debate between poetic seeing and worldly feeling into the metaphor of Tiresias, where, as Stewart has also noted in a different context, "the cliché of the blind poet" (146) becomes the avatar for the poetic argument and act of 'summoning' itself, because, above all, the art and act of poetry involves and is also involved in the act of beholding. The suspended reveller, however, can no longer be part of the Bacchanalian creed, choosing to stay within the threshold consciousness of Circe's wine, thus, ending the poem in the familiar, or rather defamiliarizing manner of the neither-nor; neither the reveller, no-longer, or perhaps *never* the poet, which seems to have become customary for Arnold's moods, settings, and personas. The Merman, on the other hand, is forced to become his own poet and his own audience, trapped within seeing and feeling his own desolation in the mirror of his own broken

song, both in physical rhythm, poetic imagery, and the inner emotional loop of personal suffering. Having once suffered, the Merman, now, can never go back, but only move within the loop of continuous forgetfulness and remembrance of the multi layered consciousness of emotional suffering which the poem's enchanting in-between rhythms and the constantly in-flux undersea setting implies.

"Empedocles on Etna" starts abruptly, and within the kind of physically and mentally suspended mood a liminal consciousness entails; the setting is "*A pass in the forest region of Etna*" where a chance encounter between Callicles and Pausanias motions the events forward (I. i 1-30). However, the *in medias res* opening of the poem also becomes a reflection of its chief protagonist's betwixt consciousness of existence; a self-exile who is no longer poet-philosopher, but a recently-declared man-hater, Empedocles is neither the practical and socially committed man of fame he once was, nor the completely ascetic hermit choosing to *live* in exile, but the personification of the restless and in-between mind who is caught among sense and thought within the confines of his own mind, finally, in a very ambiguous way, decides to return to formlessness. As Empedocles does not simply kill himself, but plunges into Etna, which Eliade refers to as the realm of primordial undecidedness and chaos, where the "homogeneity and relativity of profane space", where there is no "fixed point", and no "axis mundi" (*Sacred and* 21-22), Empedocles' final action ends with the physical obliteration of his body, mind, and consciousness. However, the poetic dialogue he indirectly engages with Callicles, and the self-ruminations on the nature and inner paradox of the mind does not disappear into Etna's crater, but remains resonating within the poem's own in-between structure, as the act of watching over Empedocles on Pausanias or Callicles' part becomes unsuccessful, but the poetic act itself is once again thrown in opposition with Empedocles' own way of seeing, rather uncomfortably, the interior paradox of his own mind, and further, the reader is made to watch from a distance what happens, how it happens, why it happens, and judge for himself. Does Empedocles become one with himself inside Etna? No one is allowed to find out for sure, since this is life as poetry, being not twice, but thrice removed from its own reality—quite immoral indeed in Platonic terms, where, similar to the actual human condition, there is no prologue or epilogue, only the constant passage into the unknown. But there is a difference, and perhaps a priority within the poetic act and the poetic

mode as opposed to the physical, and sensual-temporal human condition. It is only in the poetic moment and poetic space made available through the poetic act that such a moment of human experientiality can be questioned, again and again, by generations of readers and participants who are physically bound within a biological duration, but otherwise left to their own creative paradox of the potentiality of the impotentiality Agamben focuses on.

Susan Stewart asserts that the recognition of the in-between is the precondition for the art of poetry, since it is only “[o]n the threshold of the poem, subjectivity emerges and disappears, is fulfilled only as it articulates our unfinished struggle toward fulfilment. The incantatory—that poetry created in a state of possession [goes] beyond the will of the speaker”, where the physical rhythms as well as the poem’s own manipulation of memory are recognized as neither the speaker’s own original making who is supposedly imprisoned within the poem, nor being under control of the current reader-speaker’s own volition. Therefore, Stewart concludes that the poetic act “provides the most full or ‘true’ account of the fleetingness of the human countenance and the complexity of the human figure subject to time and suffering” (329). Similarly, Jerome J. McGann suggests that “poetry [...] must not be imagined as occupying a world elsewhere. The impulse to move ‘anywhere out of the world’ to enter a ‘poetic’ space redeemed from time and the agencies of loss, is simply [to enter into the] by now familiar, vacant lot.” (246) In McGann’s view, poems are not “representations [but] *acts* of representation”; they are neither “mirrors”, nor “lamps, they are social acts—readings and writings which promote, deploy, and finally celebrate those processes of loss which make up the very essence of human living” (246).

In the frame thus presented, Arnold’s poems discussed up to this point deploy a similar poetic logic at work by continually denoting the very in-between poetic space the poems are created out of, utilizing dichotomies between detachment and participation, most readily seen in the poetic entanglement of Arnold’s characters with the paradoxical poetic act of seeing without seeing. Watching, being watched, seeing, and not being able to fully see the beyond, in this sense, become acts and also representations of a broken or non-integrative ritualization, where the no-longer ritualized subjects keep wandering the in-between ground of the poetic act itself. Although Eliade has suggested

that the profane consciousness would be most likely to emerge within such in-betweenness, it would be misleading to regard and locate Arnold's characters inside Eliade's profane myths of the modern, because they neither belong to the profane, nor participate in the sacred. According to Eliade, by the intellectual detachment of "the elites" of modern culture, traditional foundations of ritual and myth becomes distorted; since participation gets forgotten or forsaken, "[gods] become no longer accessible through the cosmic rhythms", where empty repetition "leads to a pessimistic vision of existence" (*Sacred and* 107). However, Arnold's featured poems, chiefly by *staying* within the in-between underline the very condition and anxiety Eliade directs his reader's attention towards. Because it is the exact liminal-liminoid play Arnold self-reflexively shows within his meta-engagement of poetry, that the structure Eliade objects with regard to fragmentation and non-participation becomes a mechanism of self-awareness in Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness. Arnold's sampled poems, in this respect, lay bare the covert yet corresponding mechanisms of ritualization and the paradoxical relationship between poetry and in-betweenness by drawing attention to the dynamics behind ritualization and poetic creation suggested and discussed above within the poetic representations of Arnold. In so doing, these poetic reflections expose themselves in the act of poetic creation and poetic participation by inhabiting the non-integrative in-between, motivating a state of awakening and awareness, which also turns the concept of participation on its head, as there would be no integration or participation without first a cessation of participation, a stepping out of, or stepping into the moment, as it is only by the non-participatory quality of the in-between that the act of poetic participation and creation clearly shows the poetic in-between, being simultaneously at work with the ontological and epistemological concerns of Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness.

CONCLUSION

Victorian poetry occupies a significant space within the flow of English poetry, as it tends towards being no-longer Romantic, and not-yet fully Modern. In the simple fact of its situational and circumstantial position, it becomes the literal incarnation of the in-between, where, Arnold's Empedocles "revolves Plato's mirror about his [own] universe, [as he becomes] terrified at the discontinuity revealed: It is the fragmentation of the soul, not of the world, that is disclosed" (Starzyk 16). Fragmentation and disorientation, in this regard, relocate within Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness as a broken dialogue of the mind with its own in-betweenness, focusing on the interiority and non-participatory reflectiveness of the mind as opposed to a sense of active involvement and successful ritualization with the world. As the Victorian poetic kaleidoscope shows fragmented images of numerous mythic and historical pasts which come together and then separate, Arnold uses similar images to stress the relationship between human ritualization and an overwhelming sense of in-betweenness, directing attention towards the paradoxical relationship between poetic creation and human ritualization.

Arnold, placing his faith in poetry, and directing his doubt towards religious dogma and blind ritualization, holds a unique position in the Victorian poetic scene, because his religious prose, as has been shown in previous chapters, is targeted against the literal and dogmatizing interpretations of Biblical narratives, which, in Arnold's view contained the timeless yet obscured poetic element. Although, as Arnold sees it, "the religious language of the human race is in truth poetry", humanity has been misled into believing what was never there, like the actual existence of angels and horned devils, and yet, poetry was always there, preserved in the very approximation of the relationship of humanity to those of its physical and abstract surroundings. In Arnold's view, "while men imagine [language] to be adequate; [they miss the point that] it is *thrown out* at certain realities which they very imperfectly comprehend" (*God and the Bible* xivi). Consequently, Arnold explored this relationship between approximation, ritualization, and the dynamics and centrality of poetic creation for human involvement with the world.

As Arnold's poetry shows, because man can think forever, but can act only to a conceived, but also inconceivable end, this paradoxical condition of mankind's own in-betweenness and incomplete or limited comprehension also brings with it an awareness, where the divisive and double-sided characteristic of the Victorian outlook finds its expression within the in-betweenness of what Armstrong has called the double poem: It is "the double poem, [that] turns on the utterance of a subjectivity which is reversed into the dramatic objectivity of phenomena for investigation" (375). For Arnold, the phenomena to be investigated within his own poetry stands out as the dynamics behind human ritualization and in-betweenness, displayed through a broken sense of ritualization, which another venue of investigation came to analyse within a broader association with the origins of poetic language and religious instinct.

Being part of this new inquisitive venue of the Victorian *zeitgeist*, both Arnold and F. Max Müller directed their efforts towards demystifying the mythic-narrative grounds on which traditions of dogmatic understandings of relations between religiosity and human consciousness were built upon. In their view, it was the relationship between unfalsifiable human actions and interactions with the physical world and the world of human conduct that accounted for the physicality of human language, because human language did not simply represent abstractions which were never there, but acted upon the realities of observable and verifiable actions in creative ways. Therefore, as Müller and Arnold argued, that anthropomorphization played a key role in making recognizable how human beings and the physical world mutually *acted* upon each other. As has been noted in previous chapters, the relationship and also the play between such abstraction and physical action defined in terms of the mythic-narrative and the experiential-personal modes, also became of concern to the modern interdisciplinary field of ritual studies in the modern age.

Within the broad frame of multi-disciplinary academic interest, positions regarding the play of the poetic-narrative and experiential-temporal modes, as Bell, amongst others like Eliade, Rappaport, Grimes, and Turner has pointed out, came to be negotiated within the similar in-between ground Victorian poetics in general, and Arnold's poetry in particular had already been pointing towards, and operating from. Just as Arnold "was always watching for the point at which the path of the poetic is altered by the

hands of history” (Farrell, “Continuous Life” 280), the study of ritual has been looking into the dynamics behind the same transformative phenomenon of the poetics of ritualization, within what Bell classified as the “interrelated sets of oppositions” already implied within thought-action dichotomies as: “(1) the vertical opposition of superior and inferior, which generates hierarchical structures; (2) the horizontal opposition of here and there, or us and them, which generates lateral or relatively egalitarian relationships; and (3) the opposition of central and local, which frequently incorporates and dominates the preceding oppositions” (125).

Arnold’s poetry, as has been discussed in relation to the selected works, displays these oppositions, but does not resolve them. In turn, these poems reveal their own in-betweenness comparable to those of the mythic-folkloric figures or voices Arnold summons from the past. These figures are not divorced from the speakers who voice them; even if they are voicing their own betwixt situations, like the Forsaken Merman, Empedocles, or the Strayed Reveller, they are still situated within a particular master voice, who, like them, questions the same in-between which itself arises from. This meta-poetic, or religious-evocative quality, as has been noted by ApRoberts as “vocation”, and the “poetry-religion continuum” (2-5, 7), has close ties to that of invocation and ritualization as the summoning of, or entering into a ‘wholly other’ consciousness, not necessarily in metaphysical or supernatural terms, but more so through the acknowledgment and renegotiation of the liminal, or the in-between status of one’s own experiential and narrative being. Just as the structure of ritualization needs stories, and thus employs the poetic mode to incorporate its agents into a unified sense of the in-between, the act and art of poetry also makes use of the same dynamics of in-betweenness and human ritualization, and Arnold makes an emphasis on its self-conscious, non-integrative, and broken quality. Although in-betweenness can be utilized as a mechanism of ritualized participation, a broken ritualization creates more awareness with its non-participatory mode because it pinpoints to an existential suffering which allows an inner gaze into the act of reflection. As Jerome McGann notes, “[b]eing an event of language, the poetic ‘makes representations,’ as one might say of persons that they ‘represent themselves’ in certain ways, [which] calls attention to poetry’s mediated character—that in a crucial sense poetry’s representations are self-representations” (82). In McGann’s view, “of all forms of communication, the poetic

alone entails the *whole* of what is true; [...] all the details, and all the forms through which those details are known, remain conceptually free, remain open to their own discovery” (92). As it stands, since the poetic process comes attached with its own subjective blueprint, it does pose a danger to the survival of integrative ritualization, because it exposes the ritual process as well. Because ritual is more of a social, sinister, and ideological phenomenon in its application than that of poetry, theorists of ritual, like Rappaport, often draw attention to the importance of a legitimation crisis, which ritualization continually brings forth and conceals. Arnold’s poetry, in this context, works against such cloaking, because by its own immobility it points to this inner paradox of the in-between, where the voices, or songs, or histories of various mythic characters are invoked, and they are summoned so that their own voices can also be questioned, too. By operating in this fashion, and pointing towards its self-reflexivity and referentiality, Arnold’s poetics, as C. D. Blanton also observes, “entails a poetic doubling, a return of poetic language that plunges the act into contradiction. [...] [T]he hybrid structure of Arnold’s double text [...] produce[s] an arrhythmia, a second order of formal determination that simultaneously exceeds and enables the emergent critical system of his prose” (759).

Arnold’s poetry of in-betweenness, by featuring human existence as something both personal and non-personal stresses the paradoxical depths of the poetic and narrative in-betweenness of human existence and experience, which gets entangled within human ritualization. Although by displaying it in a broken, out-of-rhythm, or non-integrative ritualization, Arnold shows a broken ritualization caught red-handed within its own in-between ground, where in-betweenness as a mechanism becomes visible only through its broken and fragmented quality. McGann strongly stands against “the idea that poems are simply verbal structures”, and therefore, similar ideas striving to diminish or undermine the centrality of the poetic act “has to be emphatically discarded. Poems are materialized in far more complex ways [as] discourse production operates [...] both in options taken and in options refused, and [also] in the circumstantial networks which [surround the poem] in the first place” (126). If Arnold’s poetry accomplishes nothing else, it succeeds in bringing forth the operations of such giving and taking McGann points towards, and the circumstantial space or network of the poetic act becomes realized as the same spatial and temporal dimension which the idea of in-betweenness

implicit within Arnold's sense of broken ritualization as an unrealized act also operates from.

Going back to Bell's previously proposed classification of the categorical oppositions involved within the thought action dichotomies surrounding successful ritualization, Arnold's poetry can be observed as to detach itself from any of the sides in any of Bell's vertical, horizontal, or central grouping of thought-action dichotomies. Neither the speakers, (the watchers of the mythic-figures passing-by), nor those who are summoned from the past are presented as superior and inferior in the poems; although the past figures are continually admired and yearned for, the moment is all that counts, and the moment is the moment of the in-between in Arnold's poetry, which every voice summoned participates equally in the same betwixt confusion. The horizontal 'here and there', or 'us and them' dichotomy is presented in all its relativity, because the self-conscious and *in medias res* quality of the poems, by continually drawing attention to their own in-betweenness and their own referentiality again prevents any decisive and prioritizing stand to be taken either in the direction of here, or there, or us and them. As to the central and local, which Bell identifies as dominating all other dichotomies (125), it is the very concept of centrality that Arnold's poems challenge and confront, as it should be clearly observable in the way the speaker in "The Scholar-Gipsy" deals with Glanvil's or Glanvill's source, or in the way Arnold blurs the watcher-seer dichotomy by taking the spotlight from Margaret and giving it to the song of the Merman as "The Forsaken Merman". Or still, the same peripheral *there-and only there*-ness implied in the way Empedocles throws himself into Etna, or the Dionysian *ekstasis* being dissected only to reveal the heart of in-betweenness as the poetic concept inside the dialogue of the Strayed Reveller, who is neither central, nor local, but only alien to what he has been saying all along—these are not expressions or the embodiments of closure, but of the inquisitive and gestating in-between Turner has been highlighting as the necessary and aesthetically, as well as socially questioning and productive space of the in-between.

Arnold's poems engage in paradoxical relationships with the past, where commitment to the past or the present does not take place. As Helen E. Nebeker further notes, the strength of Arnold's poetry cannot be found in its commitment to this side or that side

of any argument, but in the way the poems, most easily “The Scholar-Gipsy” engages in paradox. In Nebeker’s interpretation, “beginning with the title itself where scholar and gipsy, seemingly antithetical and yet juxtaposed, are joined in one personage” (56), the paradox game really takes hold once it is understood that the Shepherd, the Speaker, and the invoked figure of the Scholar-Gipsy are “really two men (and both sides within each man merge, over-lap again as you will see if you try to separate the two sides). Paradoxical paradox” (57). The striking honesty, according to Nebeker, can be found within the illusory way Arnold deals with his figure: “In reality, his only function seems to have been to provide material for a story in a book which in turn provides material for the monologist to muse over. The Scholar-Gipsy [...] has singleness of purpose—at the same time [the speaker] emphasizes that this boy *has not lived*.” (60) Nebeker, by underlining the literariness and the self-consciousness of Arnold’s poem towards its own subject material, concludes that the poem, above all else, confirms that no such possibility exists as “singleness of purpose in his age or in any age. ‘One aim, one business, one desire’ is an illusion”, but ironically, just as in this age or in any age, “[t]he world wants miracles, not wisdom!”, and, according to Nebeker, this has been the most self-conscious contribution of Arnold’s poetry for the study of in-betweenness in poetry and the individual’s relationship to the act of poetry, regardless of space and time (60-61).

Having discussed Arnold’s poetry, perhaps through the kind of arrhythmia Blanton has suggested in reference to Arnold’s own critical mind which continually arrests the poetic or the intellectualizing moment in its own heart-beat, following conclusions regarding the in-betweenness and the kind of non-integrative and broken ritualization surrounding Arnold’s poetry need to be made. First, is that Arnold’s poetic voices, and his particular conditioning of these voices between acts and representations of thinking and doing, seeing and watching, knowing but being unable to get involved, or participating but being unable to know, all point towards the essentially time-defying dynamics of in-betweenness implicit within human ritualization, which still take place within the contemporary world. Constantly being painted anew and sold off in all sorts of ‘strategic’ and cultural endeavours, various modern forms of human ritualization makes use of the same in-between Arnold’s poetry has been questioning to sustain its own existence. Secondly, although Arnold’s poetic representations seem depressing,

broken, alienated, and detached from the kind of happiness or contentment one might find in a successful and unifying ritualization, they reveal more than any blind ritual action by dismantling the relationship between the poetic-narrative modes and the temporal-personal experiences, where a non-integrative process of ritualization lays bare the poetic dimensions behind in-betweenness within human ritualization.

Arguing for reconciliation in the poetry of Arnold would be to miss the point, because examined closely, Arnold's poetry would reveal a broken hammer, rather than a ceremonial one used to nail morality or truth into the masses. Arnold's poetry is never about surface moral values, or how to improve them, but rather it is concerned with *being* itself, and the deeper intellectual mechanisms that connect the origins of human morality to being. For Arnold, although such mechanisms no longer function in the modern world, they are still of importance for the greater truths they reveal about humanity's relationship to the literary and the poetic. In this sense, Arnold's poetry can be likened to Heidegger's metaphor of the hammer regarding *Da-sein*, and the modes of being in the world. As Heidegger considers it, "the world of *Da-sein* is a *with-world*. Being-in is *being-with* others" (*Being and Time* 112). Apart from actual conduct with contemporary people, poetry and literature provides another mode of being in the world, in which every reader would experience a different kind of *Da-sein*. Thus, individuals would be living in a world, both with actual others, and with those from past lives reflected in history, literature, or poetry, just as it is reflected in Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness. For Arnold, poetry is this hammer. Whether the hammer is "ready-to-hand" in a functional way, as in what poetry does, or "present-at-hand" in a purely conceptual consideration used in revealing its own in-betweenness, "[i]n each case, the question is less what the thing is than how it comes to be revealed" (Botha 38).

A non-functional or malfunctioning hammer would better reveal this relationship between human beings, the objective world, and the subjective and abstract world of poetry and poetic creation, interiorized human thought, and fairy-tales of the past, which Arnold calls *aberglaube* (*Literature and Dogma* 61-78, 274-309). If one was to dismantle these poetic statements, they would still reveal their logic, and how they came to be misunderstood. This was the kind of reverse-anthropomorphization Arnold was concerned with. Terry Eagleton had once declared "Arnold [as] a self-confessed

philistine or member of the middle class; [but] also something of a maverick among his venal, coarse-minded confrères” (*Culture and the Death of God* 126). Eagleton, considering Heidegger’s hammer argument elsewhere had stated that “when the hammer breaks, when we cease to take it for granted, its familiarity is stripped from it and it yields up to us its authentic being. A broken hammer is more of a hammer than an unbroken one. [For] Heidegger [...] art is such a defamiliarization” (*Literary Theory* 56). Arnold was indeed considered unorthodox by those who opposed him on grounds of religion; he was blamed for trivializing the Bible, especially in *St. Paul and Protestantism*, through his sceptical discussions of religious superstition, like the miracles, and further criticized for discrediting accounts of the disciples as misunderstandings (Machann 100-126). However, Arnold was seeking to uncover the inner-workings of what he considered to be a failing Western religion. Although misunderstood for millennia, just like the broken hammer, a failed religion, for Arnold, would still display its own inner network underlying humanity and universal belief, which could then be used to recover the true religious instinct for humanity. And for Arnold’s poetry, although it is fragmented, seemingly broken, and very much in-between, it is possible to see a similar concern; perhaps not aiming to fix what is broken, Arnold’s poetry achieves more by laying bare the parts of a broken human consciousness as the unresolved dichotomy between thought and action, between the art of poetry and the already defamiliarized human condition from that of involvement with its natural and religious surroundings.

Although Arnold had given up writing poetry as he was busying himself with the religion question, he had not given up on poetry, as his religious prose would testify to. Instead, Arnold was targeting links between religion, poetry, and the dynamics of human existence, focusing on the duality of human experience as a simultaneous exchange between living in the world, and thinking about it. In this regard, Graham Harman, in his object-oriented philosophy, also points towards the dual function of the Heideggerian hammer, which Arnold had been considering similarly for poetry in his criticism. For Harman, “[a]fter all, the functioning pragmatic tool is present for human praxis just as the broken tool is present for human consciousness” (*The Quadruple Object* 54). Arnold’s poetic creations, in this sense, can be observed as considering the nature of a broken link between human ritualization and poetic reflection, which is also

paradoxical in nature, questioning an estranged human consciousness observed within the Victorian milieu. In so doing, Arnold's voices of the in-between also interrogate and reflect upon their own self-reflexivity and broken, non-participatory quality just as the Heideggerian hammer, revealing more within their broken status, and showing more regarding the paradoxical involvement of humanity with ritualization, poetry, and an inquisitive sense of the in-between through a philosophical understanding of loss, dislocation, and constant in-betweenness surrounding human existence.

Arnold's poetry of in-betweenness reveals a paradoxical outlook to the acts of poetic creation and human ritualization, where Arnold displays the concerns of an intellectual poet, not only committed to the aesthetics of the art, but also attached to its practical uses and philosophical significance as well. Arnold's personas, by revealing their own in-betweenness, point towards a broader cultural and intellectual context of the human condition, where a broken sense of ritualization lays bare the paradoxical relationship between poetic creation, human ritualization, and intellectual detachment. Collini argues that, Arnold "is an intellectual poet, [and] with only a little unfairness, an intellectual's poet. [...] Beyond this, Arnold has become an inescapable, if also oddly nebulous, presence in modern intellectual life" (2-3). Arnold's poetry reveals and also demands an intellectual and interdisciplinary approach. The poems discussed so far reflect upon the intellectual concerns of Arnold as giving priority to the paradoxical relationship between detachment, ritualization, and in-betweenness, where a modern sense of fragmentation and bewilderment also points towards our own age, in which poetry seems to matter less and less. To borrow Cunningham's words, Arnold, being a prominent member of the Victorian "dead poets' society" (336) offers a unique perspective for the contemporary experience into the inner paradox of in-betweenness and broken sense of ritualization surrounding an awareness of how not to become a dead poet, and continue living in a Dead Poets Society, which, after all, was more or less the same thing humanity has been doing ever since realizing that there was a connection between ritualization, in-betweenness, and poetic creation.

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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 04 / 03 / 2019

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Date: 04/03/2019

Thesis Title: **IN-BETWEENNESS IN MATTHEW ARNOLD'S POETRY**

My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
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25-01-2019

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Approved

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Reis

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Tarih: 04/03/2019

Tez Başlığı : MATTHEW ARNOLD ŞİİRİNDE ARADALIK

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 160 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 04/03/2019 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % -1- 'tür.

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25.01.2019

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Anabilim Dalı: İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI

Programı: İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI

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Ph.D. DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

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