Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

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POSTHUMAN SUBJECTIVITIES
IN EARLY BRITISH FANTASY FICTION:
JONATHAN SWIFT AND LEWIS CARROLL

Şafak HORZUM

Ph.D. Dissertation

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Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Doç. Dr. Alev KARADUMAN** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

Şafak HORZUM

To all posthuman subjects of the planet...

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ABSTRACT

HORZUM, Şafak. *Posthuman Subjectivities in Early British Fantasy Fiction: Jonathan Swift and Lewis Carroll*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2022.

Fantasy literature breaches the great divide between dualities, making marginalised and disempowered nonhuman beings much more audible, visible, and intelligible. In fantasy, the human gets stripped of its so-called superiority and is guided to attain a more-than-human subjectivity at the end of the fantastic journey. In parallel with the character of fantasy fiction, posthumanist theories interrogate the notion of the human as the zenith of the universe, the reliance on and parameters of rationality, and the agential capabilities of subjects other than the human. Criticising the liberal humanist notion of anthropocentric subjectivity as continuously structured in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this study combines the discourses of canonical fantasy fictions and contemporary posthumanist theories. In this context, this dissertation aims to investigate the notions of the human, subjectivity, and agency in three British fantasy fictions on the bases of posthumanist theories: Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) and Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (1865) and *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871). About the coalescing characters of posthumanism and fantasy fiction, the first chapter proposes the adoption of fantasy narratives as an effective medium to convey the cautionary message by posthumanist philosophies. In line with this, discussing the Enlightenment philosophers' discourses on the human nature and subjectivity, the second chapter positions Jonathan Swift as a proto-posthumanist satirist and analyses his *Gulliver's Travels* as the first and best example of satirical fantasy fiction in the eighteenth century. The third chapter evaluates the possibilities of new traits of human subjectivity in the nineteenth century as well as Lewis Carroll's posthumanist ideas, and scrutinises his *Alice* series as unique examples of fantasy narratives that concentrate on the formation of the heroine's posthuman subjectivity. While the dissertation commences investigating the cautionary and satirical aspect of fantasy fiction to blur the boundaries between the human and nonhuman realms, it resolves to give an insightful and illustrative account of the posthumanist tendencies inherent in the genre as well as its pioneering examples.

Keywords: Fantasy Fiction, Posthuman Subjectivity, Jonathan Swift, Lewis Carroll, *Gulliver's Travels*, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, *Through the Looking-Glass*

ÖZET

HORZUM, Şafak. *Erken İngiliz Fantezi Kurgusunda Posthüman Öznellikler: Jonathan Swift ve Lewis Carroll*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2022.

Fantastik edebiyat, marjinalleştirilmiş ve güçsüzleştirilmiş insan olmayan varlıkları çok daha sesli, görünür ve anlaşılır hale getirerek, ikilikler arasındaki büyük ayrımı ortadan kaldırır. Fantezi kurgusunda insan, sözde üstünlüğünden sıyrılır ve fantastik yolculukların sonunda insandan daha başka ve fazla olan bir öznelliğe erişmeye yönlendirilir. Fantastik kurgunun karakterine paralel olarak, posthümanist kuramlar, evrenin zirvesi zannedilen insan kavramını, rasyonelliğe olan güven ile rasyonelliğin değişkenlerini ve insan dışındaki öznelerin eyleyicilik yeteneklerini sorgular. On sekizinci ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıllar boyunca yapılandırılmış liberal hümanist insanmerkezci öznellik kavramını eleştiren bu çalışma, kanonik fantezi kurgularının söylemlerini çağdaş posthümanist kuramlar ile birleştirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, insan, öznellik ve eyleyicilik kavramlarını posthümanist kuramlar temelinde şu üç İngiliz fantezi kurgusunda araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır: Jonathan Swift'in *Gulliver'in Gezileri* (1726) ile Lewis Carroll'ın *Alice Harikalar Diyarında* (1865) ve *Aynanın İçinden* (1871). Posthümanizm ve fantastik kurgunun birleşen karakterleri hakkında olan ilk bölüm, posthümanist felsefelerin uyarıcı mesajını iletmek için fantezi anlatılarının etkili bir araç olarak benimsenmesini önermektedir. Bu minvalde, Aydınlanma filozoflarının insan doğası ve öznelliği üzerine söylemlerini tartışan ikinci bölüm, Jonathan Swift'i proto-posthümanist bir hicivci olarak konumlandırmakta ve *Gulliver'in Gezileri* eserini on sekizinci yüzyıldaki taşlamalı fantezi kurgunun ilk ve en iyi örneği olarak incelemektedir. Üçüncü bölüm, on dokuzuncu yüzyılda insan öznelliğinin yeni özelliklerinin olanaklarını ve Lewis Carroll'ın posthümanist fikirlerini değerlenip *Alice* serisini, kahramanın posthüman öznelliğinin oluşumuna odaklanan benzersiz fantezi anlatılarının örnekleri olarak irdelemektedir. Bu tez, insan ve insandışı alanlar arasındaki sınırları bulanıklaştırmak için fantazi kurgusunun ikaz edici ve taşlamalı yönünü incelemeyi amaçlarken, türün doğasında zaten var olan posthümanist eğilimlerin yanı sıra öncü örneklerine dair derinlikli ve örneklemli bir açıklama sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Fantezi Kurgusu, Posthüman Öznellik, Jonathan Swift, Lewis Carroll, *Gulliver'in Gezileri*, *Alice Harikalar Diyarında*, *Aynanın İçinden*

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INTRODUCTION

As of the third decade of the twenty-first century, the world is passing through increasingly turbulent times due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution,[1] the Sixth Mass Extinction,[2] and global climate change. Humanity—as well as other earthlings—faces an assemblage of overwhelmingly overlapping natural-cultural phenomena. Turbulences arising from all those interrelated and phenomenal events have finally led us to rethink ourselves as humans, the notion of the human as the zenith of the universe, the reliance on and parameters of rationality, and the agentic capabilities of subjects other than the human. It would be naïve to claim that these questionings belong only to the late twentieth century and to the twenty-first, as they began long ago despite the human's unwillingness to question itself and its self-endowed values as well as to abdicate from its isolationism and its imaginary throne over its others. Nonetheless, these inquiries, now joining the mainstream rather than being simple narrative outcasts of history, have recently reached a tipping point of some collective movement for the sake of planetary justice. The time is now, synchronising with the posthuman paradigm shift.

Stories were and still are the pioneering arbiters of such subversive challenges of turbulent threats, especially fantasy stories which bring the human and the nonhuman, the living and the dead, the real and the imagined together. These stories connect all to one another, just as in the current status of existence. Fantasy literature breaches the great divide between dualities, making 'commonsensically' marginalised and disempowered entities much more audible, visible, and intelligible. In fantasy, the human gets stripped of its supposedly pristine and untouched nature and acquires something more than its usual collectivistic identity. Fantasy fiction acts as a species leveller, an equaliser of becomings

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[1] The Fourth Industrial Revolution, in other words Industry 4.0, refers to the enmeshed condition of the current systems of high-tech hardwares, software systems, and biological bodies. It is "a term coined at the Hannover Fair in 2011 to describe how this [enmeshed condition] will revolutionize the organization of global value chains" (Schwab 7).

[2] The Sixth Mass Extinction corresponds to the contemporary era of the extinction of species in the world. Mat T. Wilson explains that "1 out of every 1 million species became extinct per year prior to human existence"; however, today "1 out of 1,000 species is becoming extinct. This rise in the rate of extinction is attributed in part to anthropogenic activities" (505).

in more-than-human, albeit fictional, ecosystems. It makes the celebration of multiplicities possible, restores the right of complex existence to non/humans, and makes the human see that the notions of power, agency, and subjectivity are far more nuanced and layered as opposed to the dualistic patterns lullabied for quite some time. With fantasy narratives, we[3] come to understand that we have multiple attachments and, therefore, multiple stories.

In this continuum, this dissertation aims to investigate the notions of the human, subjectivity, and agency in three British fantasy fictions on the bases of posthumanist theories: *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) by Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) and the *Alice* series (1865, 1871) by Lewis Carroll (1832–1898). Problematising the above-mentioned anthropocentric values, posthumanisms appose several disciplines, approaches, and theories so as to unravel newer understandings and configurations of the ethical, ontological, and epistemological positions of beings in the universe. In a similar vein, providing alternative realities to the factual world of liberal humanism as well as challenging the 'enlightened' human multiple times, fantasy fiction also attempts to realign the story-telling capabilities of humans and nonhumans in alternative spaces. Swift's and Carroll's fantasies were written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and yet they contain inquisitive subversions of the anthropocentric discourses of their times parallel to the contemporary posthumanist discussions. For these reasons, this study applies a critical posthumanist approach to these canonical literary texts of fantasy. It takes its cue from the following analogy drawn between the fantasy genre and posthumanism as a set of theories that challenges the long-established Enlightenment ideals as to what it means to be human: Both fantasies and posthumanisms assert that existence is a journey in constant changes and that humans and nonhumans are not clashing certainties of this journey, but companions in perpetuity.

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[3] The "we" of this dissertation is a rhetorical convention in order to invite and enable readers to build an identification with the dissertation's perspective. This "we" does not exclusively refer to a certain group to which I belong, but rather an ideal reader: the academic, general, educated reader who is curious about what the (post)human means in today's world and what ties there are between human and nonhuman subjectivities in fantasy fiction.

The purpose of this study is to illustrate a non-conventional subjectivity of the human as produced in fantasy fiction. During this illustration, I will employ posthumanism as the critique of liberal humanist positionings of the human subject. In the conventional sense, the human subjectivity is envisioned as the anthropocentric self-image of *Homo sapiens* in the entirety of one's relations in hir[4] social circles during hir social and individual life processes (Staeuble 418–19). This envisioning, for most of the time, includes a web of relational interpretations of humans, who are accepted to be active participants of communication and hence deemed capable of influencing a person's social and individual identity in specific contexts. In the western construction of modern human subjectivity, a balance between one's reason, feelings, and morality is argued to be of a significant weight because this "triadic model of human nature – cognition, emotion and will" – (Staeuble 425) is enriched in many sub-fields of subjectivity formation such as religion, gender, race, and politics. As it is clear, all these formative sub-fields are connected solely to human-centred concepts and institutions. It might be true that human is always accompanied by innumerable nonhuman beings in these anthropocentric platforms of subjectivity construction; however, these nonhumans are considered not to go beyond their literal and metaphoric uses, functions, and affects during this construction process of self-image.

When conceived as a process of becoming, human subjectivity is separated from this conventional concept of self-image that is macroanalytically perceived. Nevertheless, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari assert, human subjectivity, as well as all other more-

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[4] This dissertation is a gender-conscious text. For this reason, I will move beyond the aporetic binaries of "s/he" and "his/her" and use gender-neutral pronouns "ze, hir, hirs, hirself" when the subject in question, regardless of hir human or nonhuman status, possesses no gender assignment or gendered significance in relevant contexts of discussions. More significantly, I claim that the gender-neutral pronouns "ze, hir, hirs, hirself" are to be utilised in posthumanist discussions in order to eliminate concerns about gender binarism as an offspring of liberal humanism. Posthumanist theories oppose the dualistic Cartesian thinking and concepts; therefore, they argue for a nonbinary positionality of beings. Just as nonbinarism is one of posthumanism's main characteristics, it is also adopted by the non-normative multiplicity in fantasies. In this respect, I would have preferred to use "it" instead of "ze," but I reserved "it" for the non-gendered nonhuman because my dissertation's discussions are built upon nonhumans to a great extent. Likewise, I would have chosen "them" instead of "hir," yet the notion of multiplicity is an integral part of my discussions regarding the plurality of subjectivities. To make these distinctions clearer, I use gender neutral pronouns in the posthumanist trajectory.

than-human subjectivities, is "populated" (9). This multiplicity of subjectivity requires microanalyses of individual actors of this "assemblage" (Deleuze and Guattari 8) and the inter- and intra-relations of the elements of this assemblage of multiplicity. Since any component's dynamism "necessarily changes" the subject "in [hir] nature as it expands its connections" during its dynamic actions (Deleuze and Guattari 8), "the so called micropolitical dimension" of becoming is recognised "as a contextual, experiential and circumstantial site where subjects [of this assemblage] are situated and produced" continually (Semetsky 213). To reiterate this deconstructive and non-conventional perspective, I agree with Deleuze and Claire Parnet in their claim that "one changes no less than the other[s]" during one's relations in this assemblage of subjectivity" because the space-time of constant communicative actions in one's becoming "is filled with a new type of affects" (70). Accordingly, I claim that these constant communicative actions that formulate a posthumanist subjectivity can best be witnessed in fantasy fiction.

In its attempt to analyse posthumanist subjectivity, this dissertation takes fantasy literature works, namely Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* and Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There*, from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[5] The main reason for putting these works under critical surveillance in this study lies in the fact that fantasy fiction is accepted to begin in the age of Enlightenment, which perfectly fits into the scope of the discussions regarding the elaboration of posthumanist subjectivity in contrast to the critique of the conventional humanist one. Both authors' works are contained within the examples of several genres such as travel literature, satirical black humour, and utopia; that is why their crisscrossing features appeal to the definitions of the fantasy while they gather seemingly improbable aspects of fantasy literature in their unique worlds. This assemblage of fantastic landscapes, transformations, and becomings supports the thesis of this dissertation by disclosing heterogeneous elements in forming posthumanist subjectivities of titular characters, Gulliver and Alice.

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[5] The authoritative versions of both texts are accepted as the Norton Critical Editions, which are known with their precise correctness in providing excellence in literary scholarship. Hence, I use these editions in this dissertation.

While analysing the non-conventional self-formation of the protagonists and other fantastic characters, I will operate a methodology of diffraction rather than a mere contextual cause-effect technique. Donna Haraway is the first theorist to introduce diffractive methodology in her chapter "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Innapropriate/d Others" in 1992. In physics, diffraction refers to optical phenomena in which lights diffract and produce nonlinear rays when they encounter an obstacle in their course. Haraway takes this notion of physical optics and reappropriates it as a methodology for cultural and literary studies in order to showcase the cartography of differences among several beings in relation and their effects on a larger scale. For her, a "diffraction pattern does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the *effects* of difference appear"; therefore, diffractive methodology becomes more than a "replication, reflection, or reproduction" of analysed texts (Haraway, "Promises" 300; italics in the original). Later in her 2003 article "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter" and her 2007 monograph *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*, Karen Barad undertakes the concept of diffraction and elaborates on it further. Barad expands on this phenomenon as it is "unique to wave behavior" like the behaviours of water waves, sound waves, and light waves (*Meeting* 28). She believes the extension of this methodology provides "a transdisciplinary approach that remains rigorously attentive to important details of specialized arguments within a given field, in an effort to foster constructive engagements across (and a reworking of) disciplinary boundaries" (*Meeting* 25). As both of these feminist scholars do, I will attempt to read the above-mentioned fantasies diffractively in themselves to better portray differences in non/humans and the effects of these differences on several beings in their continual becoming processes. Rather than a binary-oppositional, static way of approaching the texts in a classical and linear causality, this dissertation will find out diffractive ways to expose differential relationalities and productive images of selves-in-progress.

This study consists of three chapters apart from Introduction and Conclusion parts. Introduction contains the statements about its aim, research scope, and methodology. Chapter 1 is composed of discussions concerning theoretical and literary backgrounds. Divided into two main parts, Chapter 1 firstly surveys the theoretical background of

posthumanisms and secondly provides the link between the theory and the fantasy genre by forming a literary springboard for the analyses of the texts in the second and third chapters. The first part establishes the theoretical base of the posthuman turn as the new paradigm of non/human subjectivities. This part opens with an explanation of what posthumanism is and how it attempts to appropriate the dualism into which the world is divided, followed by a discussion of the problems of the concept of the 'human,' pinpointing its discontents. These discussions then lead to the place that the animal turn holds in posthumanisms, presented as a survey of the origins of human-animal studies, with interrogations of animal rights and liberation movements. Underlining the human-centred inclination of these movements, critical animal studies use deconstructive methods in Western narratives to locate the roots of nonhumans' stigmatisation as the 'other' of the human. It is, thus, argued that the textual emphasis of deconstruction cannot be separated from the corporeal face of real life. Then, the material turn is given as a concomitant of the intricate permeation of real and textual meaning-making processes. As this dissertation grounds itself on the challenging notions of subjectivity, agency, and reality, Bruno Latour's concepts of nature-culture and agency, Haraway's material-semiotic actors as well as metaphors of cyborg and companion species, and Barad's notions of agency, intra-action, and agential realism are discussed in detail. Finally, the narrative agency of matter is visited in the conceptualisations of Turkish scholars, namely Serpil Oppermann and Başak Ağın, in the posthumanities. The second part of the first chapter demonstrates how fantasy literature is embedded with posthumanist elements from its creation process to its effects on the reader. In doing so, it offers a new understanding of the interrelated and fantastic creativity of these narratives among the writer, the audience, the work, and the real world. Then, the tension between literary realisms and the fantasy is discussed in relation to the origins of the fantasy. To highlight the ever-present fantasy works, the stigmatisation of the fantasy genre is surveyed from the Classical era to the twentieth century. In the end, this part suggests that fantasy is the literary embodiment of the material-discursive entanglements of our lives on Earth.

In line with the discussions presented in Chapter 1, the second and third chapters are organised in a manner to discuss the posthuman subjectivities through material-discursive enactments of human-nonhuman characters. Divided into three sections, Chapter 2 starts

with the discussions about human subjectivity in the long eighteenth century. The first section discusses the collective construction of a pseudo-stable human self by the Englightenment philosophers like Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751), David Hume (1711–1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), with brief introductions from their works on human nature. In the second section, the author Jonathan Swift as a satirist and fantasy writer is analysed within the posthumanist predicament. Swift is positioned as a posthumanist author in relation to his anti-racist and anti-humanist stance in his prose and verse works. After this posthumanist recalibration of the satirist, the analysis of *Gulliver's Travels* begins with the discussion of Gulliver as the representative of the human in the eighteenth century. His concentration on learning (especially new languages and cultures) during his travels is observed as one of the characteristics of the Enlightenment human. In this observation, his self-reflection and self-definition carry significant weight as the human is the only species that defines its own species (at least in the anthropocentric discourse). Therefore, his reliance on rationality, tool-making, use of technology as well as making meaning out of 'newly' discovered/encountered environments is discussed in relation to the posthumanist challenges to the Enlightenment philosophers' arguments on the human. Swift, in his satirically playful description of the human through the protagonist, is argued to question human nature in this work. While doing so, he also applies the definitions of other species like the Lilliputians, Brobdingnagians, and other nonhuman or human-like communities during Gulliver's travels around the world. In this respect, the notion of nonhumanisation is coined and illustrated in the work's hybridisation of human and nonhuman characters through the titular hero's four journeys. The nonhumanisation and hybridisation praxes are argued to guide Gulliver to a posthuman subjectivity at the end of the work.

Chapter 3 starts with the nineteenth-century perspective of human nature and the influences of scientific and utilitarian perspectives in the Age of Industrialisation. Retaining the tripartite organisational structure in the previous analysis, this chapter first discusses the new qualities of human nature and subjectivity as shaped by the time's inaugural post-Kantian philosophies and sciences by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

(1770–1831), Karl Marx (1818–1883), John Stuart Mill (1806–1883), and Charles Darwin (1809–1882). Following the brief discussion about new understandings of the human subjectivity, the author Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) as a fantasy writer is discussed as a posthumanist writer in relation to his perspective in his essays and other fantasy works as well as the *Alice* books. In the third section, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and its sequel *Through the Looking-Glass* are analysed in terms of the protagonist's journeys to found her posthumanist subjectivity in two fantasy lands. Carroll's fantasies share intermingled relations with the posthumanist discourse just like Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* does. They imagine material miniature non/humans leaping from tables to escape, plants uprooting themselves to wander in search of new lands, and many nonhuman animals and enlivened material entities performing parts in so-called anthropocentric activities. This series offers the potential to destabilise the hierarchies of un/real beings, which can be scrutinised in the frame of posthumanism's concerns with existential and informational instability while simultaneously accommodating that very subversion in a manner to carry hegemonic attitudes of human dominion in the fantasy worlds too. In Alice's magical encounters in Wonderland, Carroll attempts to erase the boundaries between human and animal and thus challenges the sense of human superiority in a way to nonhumanise the protagonist. A similar attitude of nonhumanisation is, as seen above, in Swift's titular character too, which indeed shows the pattern of the fantasy's enmeshment with the posthuman purpose in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The highly-employed anthropomorphism in Wonderland is scrutinised with respect to hybrid subjectivities at play in fantasies. While Alice is subjected to many seemingly humanoid characters in her journey from the rabbit hole to the coppices of the fantasy lands, her transformation into a posthuman being is given in her material-discursive dialogues with the fantastic animal and material characters. It is, for the moment, seen that Jonathan Swift and Lewis Carroll are ardent problematisers of the notions of subjectivity and agency. In their problematisations of the human, nonhuman, animal, matter, reason, science, and technology, they give hints of other possible convergences on the planet. That is why Gulliver's and Alice's encounters with several species illustrate Baradian material-discursive becomings of all agentic beings.

In the Conclusion, the coalescence of fantasy fiction and the posthumanist theories are discussed with the deductions about the posthuman subjectivity portrayed and analysed in the three fantasy works. Then, the cautionary and posthumanist character of fantasy literature is proposed under five elements of this literature-theory union. As the first element, the perspective change is argued to be indispensable and integral in shifting the liberal humanist perspective in the narratives of imagination. Nonbinarism and materiality as the second and third elements are central to understanding the human's enmeshment with the nonhuman outside Cartesian dualism and the representationalism. The next one is claimed to be the 'from-within' approach of both fantasy fiction and posthumanism as they subvert the realist notions of our relationality with the outer world and beings. Finally, the element of the journey is interpreted as a metaphor for the constancy of our ontological and epistemological becoming(s).

What follows in the first chapter is presented in a rhizomatic pattern, explaining and discussing the significance of relevant terms and concepts that are put into use in the second and third chapters while analysing *Gulliver's Travels* and *Alice* series, respectively. These terms and concepts are knitted together chronologically and diffractively. As a result, this dissertation narrows its discussions, coming from a wider angle to specific subjects, from the worldview to the construction of subjectivity. Therefore, the study carries "all the ingredients"[6] (Hafiz 48) to turn our understandings of fantasy narratives into a celebration of the multiplicity of non/human subjectivities, which are voiced in both Swift's and Carroll's texts. In decoding these voices, the (de/re)constructed and refashioned terms and concepts of posthumanisms in the following chapter bear utmost importance because they serve as a framework for this dissertation.

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[6] This study resonates with the following lines by the Persian Sufi poet, Hafiz (1316–1390), whose works are in a similar trajectory with the ontological and epistemological concerns of the posthumanist thought. Having voiced the current global understanding of posthumanist performativities and agentic enactments of humans and nonhumans alike in his poem "To Build a Swing" hundreds of years ago, he tells the reader: "You carry all the ingredients / To turn your existence into joy, / / Mix them, mix / Them!" (Hafiz 48).

CHAPTER 1

POSTHUMANISM AND FANTASY FICTION

This chapter, in order to establish the foundations of the literary analyses in the second and third chapters of this dissertation, delves into the theoretical and literary discussions regarding posthumanism and fantasy fiction, respectively. Hence, it is arranged in two main sections. Divided into two sub-sections, the first main part primarily deals with the posthuman theories that question the notion of the liberal human. In this questioning, posthumanism is introduced as a set of theories from the late twentieth century to the present. Following this, the second sub-section examines the discontents of the human, which consist of the nonhuman in all its multiplicity, the ontological and epistemological situatedness of the non/human beings, the concept of (absolute) alterity, the animal and material turns, the deconstruction of Cartesian dualisms, and agencies of the nonhuman and the narrative. The latter main part discusses fantasy fiction in the posthumanist framework since I argue that the posthumanist predicament can best be employed and illustrated in fantasies rather than realist fiction. In this respect, the posthuman potential of fantasy fiction is analysed in opposition to realist fiction and then exemplified in literary works, which can be listed under fantasy literature, from Antiquity until the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, this chapter aims to combine the forces of posthumanist theories and fantasy fiction so as to make sense of humans' relationalities with nonhumans on their unique ways of reaching posthuman subjectivities.

1.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1.1. Posthumanism

Having sprung in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the concept of posthumanism problematises the universal superiority of the human clearly described in the famous

Great Chain of Being.[7] Such a symbolic structure as humanism has long maintained the supremacy of the human over its others—be that animal, vegetative, material, or cybernetic—and continually formulated the meaning-making mechanisms and value systems dominantly based on that presumably prime human. However, this self-endowed supremacy has weakened as certain developments in sciences and technologies stimulated a breakdown in the kernel of the human and inaugurated a problematisation process over the concept in the twentieth century. The incredibly rapid development of military technologies during the two world wars, for instance, has led humanity to examine its own hubris, which resulted in extensive social and environmental devastations. Despite that, techno-scientific innovations and developments have still accumulated with a high impetus and been inseparably incorporated into humanness, especially after the latter half of the twentieth century. For example, high-tech devices and systems such as prosthetic implants, plastic surgeries, and electronic chips have increasingly taken their places in human bodies and gained recognition in socio-political spheres.

In a broad sense, then, the key features that characterise the beginning of the inquiry into the notion of the human involve a disenchantment with the greedy essence of the human on the one hand, and an endeavour to improve its living conditions and to extend its lifespan on the other. In contrast to the techno-scientific developments for humans by humans, biologists, zoologists, and cognitive ethologists have also proven that "those features we take to be uniquely human – altruism, consciousness, language – are also properties exhibited by animals" (Nayar 3). In the same vein, the agency of the nonhuman matter—in addition to the human one—has been acknowledged and vocally articulated to participate actively "in the world's becoming" (Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity" 803). Such recent alterations in understanding nonhuman beings have paved the way for a new understanding of the human. Hence, this problematisation process has brought

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[7] The Great Chain of Being is the "conception of the nature of the universe that had a pervasive influence on Western thought" from the Hellenistic philosophy to the "philosophies during the European Renaissance and the 17th and early 18th centuries" ("Great Chain of Being"). This chain has always presented a hierarchical structure of earthlings—all forms of life and matter on Earth—and even otherworldly or celestial beings. Originating in the philosophies of Plato (c. 428/7–348/7 BCE), Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and Plotinus (c. 204/5–270) in the Antiquity, this conception has prioritised the position of the "Man," with a deliberate capitalisation, over almost all the other beings in the cosmos just as the heavenly/Abrahamic religions have asserted.

about a new configuration of the human as "non-exceptional" and re-determined its place in the cosmos, blatantly exposing the human's taken-for-granted dependency on, relationality and interconnectedness with the nonhuman others. The posthuman has, thus, become "a key term to cope with an urgency for the integral redefinition" (Ferrando, "Posthumanism" 26) of such "an incoherent concept" and meaning as the human (Clarke and Rossini xiii). It weaved a cobweb of reactions to the human-centred character of humanism and the hierarchically superior position of the human in this system.

In the academic sense, the terms "posthuman" and "posthumanism" first emerged in Ihab Hassan's article "Prometheus as the Performer: toward a Posthumanist Culture? A University Masque in Five Scenes," published in 1977. Referring to the similar concerns about the speculative entanglement of the human and technology in the framework of postmodernism, Hassan prophecies that "five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism" (843). This prophetic statement relates to the ongoing discussions that an apocalyptic end for humanity is on the horizon and that the post-apocalyptic needs to be identified as the posthuman. Such defamation concerning the discussions of 'the extinction of humanity' remains ungrounded for years, especially when the registered population of the human species is about to reach eight billion. Yet again, this misuse becomes understandable as numerous cybernetic scenarios over-fascinate some technophilic futurists with the idea of downloading/uploading the mind to a computer or of having human intelligence exist without the life support systems of a human body. The corpus of science-fiction texts like Marvin Minsky's *The Society of Mind* (1985) and Hans Moravec's *Mind Children* (1988), for instance, leaves no space for the materiality of the human body (Hayles 1–5; Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism* 116, 214). Illustrations of "corporeal-physiological fluidity, ontological liminality and identity-morphing" in such works have installed super-human bodies and "organic-inorganic hybrids within the cultural [and literary] imaginary" (Nayar 2). In the key text of posthumanism *How We Became Posthuman* (1999), N. Katherine Hayles defies this misconception by re-describing the posthuman subject as "an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction" (3). A basic comparison between the projection of the

posthuman in the cybernetic scenarios mentioned above and the one proposed by Hayles reveals that bio-genetic technologies in this age of advanced capitalism have triggered "a perverse form of the posthuman" (Braidotti, *Posthuman* 7), bringing forth the "dark twin" (Ağın, *Posthümanizm* 25) of posthumanism: transhumanism.

Transhumanism structures itself in the notion of the human's progressiveness firmed in the Enlightenment, which readily makes it reliant on the hierarchy among species and human exceptionalism. For the sake of human enhancement, it aspires to surpass material-discursive limitations of humanness by means of sciences and technologies, its two main stands.[8] Transhumanism focuses on advanced technologies that strengthen the human's privileged position in the order of beings. The transhuman is a cybernetic perception of a superior human that has emerged, and continues to emerge, in tandem with digital cultures and hyper-techno-sciences. While the transhuman is the notion of the emergent human among the techno-evolutions of the contemporary advances, the posthuman for the transhumanists is the 'super' model to be reached at the end of these techno-cyber emergences. Therefore, such kind of an ultra-humanism, perpetuating the Cartesian mind-body distinction, is inevitably accompanied by "techno-reductionism" (Ferrando, "Posthumanism" 28) as it heavily relies on one's capacity and capital to reach technologically-enhancing tools. On the other hand, posthumanism, in the sense of the critique of liberal humanism, attempts to overcome "human primacy" and not to replace it with "other types of primacies" (Ferrando, "Posthumanism" 29). Unlike the elevation of the human's progressive evolution in the transhuman discourse, the posthuman paradigm criticises anthropocentric viewpoints, and values and "participates in re-distributions of difference and identity" (Halberstam and Livingston 10) among

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[8] In "Transhumanist Declaration" that an international group of authors crafted in 1998, there are eight articles outlining the principles of transhumanism, and some of these articles explicitly underline the centrality of human enhancement: "1. Humanity stands to be profoundly affected by science and technology in the future. We envision the possibility of broadening human potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our confinement to planet Earth. 2. We believe that humanity's potential is still mostly unrealised. There are possible scenarios that lead to wonderful and exceedingly worthwhile enhanced human conditions. . . . 5. Reduction of existential risks, and development of means for the preservation of life and health, the alleviation of grave suffering, and the improvement of human foresight and wisdom should be pursued as urgent priorities, and heavily funded" ("Transhumanist Declaration").

humans and nonhumans, the discriminations between which the humanist discourse has long postulated.

Posthumanism, engendered out of the postmodern deconstruction of the human, is situated beyond the notion of binary oppositions that gained popularity after the proposal of the distinction between the mind and the body in the course of reaching the truth by René Descartes (1596–1650). If measured through the spectacles of the standards of his own time, Descartes is "the cross-roads from which modern paths of thought diverge. He was the forerunner of [Isaac] Newton and [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibniz on the one hand, and of David Hume and Immanuel Kant on the other" (McCormack vi). Not possessing a real history of sciences before him but a few contemporaries like Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639), Descartes introduced progressive doubt about and a daring critique of the Aristotelian, Thomist and Scholastic schools of thought instead of slavishly submitting to authorities in thinking as well as in acting. On the other hand, Descartes is professed as the leading authority in charge of the offences against the white man's others[9] during the modernity due to his reliance on reason and the concomitant relations of this to/in the history of humanity.[10] For Descartes, the mind (or the soul in the Aristotelian sense) and the body (the extension in the Cartesian sense, which is identical to matter) are two distinct elements in the universe, and only the human has the embodied mind that can be

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[9] Otherness here contains racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, classist, ethnocentric, colourist, ageist, speciesist and religion-based presumptions as well as several other unnamed cognates of discrimination.

[10] Such Anti-Cartesianism is not only a phenomenon of twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The earliest critique of Cartesianism—this term is introduced into the English language by Henry More (1614-1687), a Cambridge Platonist, in 1662—includes Descartes himself when he opposes the appropriation of some of his principles into natural philosophy by the Dutch philosopher, Henricus Regius (1598-1679). Due to precarious theological overtones of Cartesian mechanistic physics, Louis XIV of France (1638-1715) prohibited his teachings in the country. The reason was that Descartes's views on the capacity of mind flared up the discussions between the ones in favor of the rule of the philosophical tradition since the Antiquity and the ones favoring the autonomous status of one's own reason in pursuit of truth. Among his critics in the eighteenth century, Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and Voltaire (1694-1778) take attention with their oppositions. In the nineteenth century, Descartes was a crucial subject-matter of heated discussions between Catholic monarchists and secular republicans. *Being and Time/Sein und Zeit* (1927) by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) instigated the twentieth-century criticism in the vein of Anti-Cartesianism (Schmaltz et al. 28–30).

differentiated with the faculties of sensation, imagination, and intellect. Based on this, he asserts the first principle of his philosophy, the outstanding *cogito* reclamations that "*I think, therefore I am*" in *Discourse on the Method* (1637) and that "*I am, I exist*" in the "Second Meditation" of *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) (*Discours* 51, 53; *Meditations* 21; italics in the original). This distinction between thinking and extended substances (the mind and the body, in other words) qualifies the alterity of the nonhuman since it describes them as a variety of *automata*/machines and disqualifies the nonhuman from reason, rationality, subjectivity, and hence, agency.

Similar apotheoses of the human enable humanity to create its own norms like intellectual ability, anthropocentric physiology, consciousness, and rationality. These norms, then, formulate "the marker of normalcy" and construct a sense of "compulsory humanity of the human" (Nayar 2). The posthuman, at this point, accentuates that the human is possible and existent because the nonhuman accompanies it. Francesca Ferrando, with an emphasis on mediation, rearticulates the posthuman "as both a reflection on what has been omitted from the notion of the human and a speculation about the possible developments of the human species" in relation to alterities in its environments (*Philosophical Posthumanism* 23). To describe what posthumanism is further, she adds its main features as "post-exclusivism," "post-exceptionalism," and post-centrality (Ferrando, "Posthumanism" 29–30). Posthumanism is a post-exclusivism as it brings many seemingly separate, contradictory parties together and leads them to reach a reconciliation. The posthuman theories are post-exceptional since they do not pose to be totally new discourses, but rather stimulate "the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about what being human means" (Hayles 285). Erasing artificial and contingent divisions between the human and nature (nonhuman animals, material entities, and the like), they critically undermine the idea of human exceptionality. Posthumanisms are post-centralising in the terms that they recognise "not one but many specific centers of interest" because their centres are "mutable, nomadic, ephemeral" and their viewpoints are "to be pluralistic, multilayered, and as comprehensive and inclusive as possible" (Ferrando, "Posthumanism" 30). Moving beyond the anthropocentric focus, the posthuman celebrates the relationalities of beings and becomings that constantly co-constitute one another.

Although this inclusivity predominantly characterises the inter- and multi-disciplinary facets of the posthuman turn, there are claims to divide posthumanism into three sub-branches. The first of these is critical posthumanism, which has developed with its focus on the field of literary criticism. Crucial to its proliferation is *How We Became Posthuman* by N. Katherine Hayles, who criticises the technophilic and technophobic appropriations of cybernetic worlds in fiction. The second one, cultural posthumanism, has quickly escalated with the cultural studies' embark on the posthuman condition, especially after the publication of Donna J. Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" in *Socialist Review* in 1985. Finally, following these two streams and being established with *The Posthuman* by Rosi Braidotti in 2013, philosophical posthumanism positions itself as "an onto-epistemological approach, as well as an ethical one, manifesting as a philosophy of mediation, which discharges any confrontational dualisms and hierarchical legacies" (Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism* 22). It is evident in the explanations of these variations, posthumanism stands as a monistic approach to all the substantial ideals of Western humanism that emerged in the seventeenth century. For that reason, I think this attempt at proliferating sub-branches is redundant, especially when posthumanism tries to be all-inclusive against the dualistic divisions of liberal humanism. Otherwise, what these three branches try to achieve might shadow what posthumanism claims as a single umbrella term. In its holistic form, posthumanism already poses a nonbinary challenge, but not a threat, to the dualistic conceptualisation by the Anthropos. Life as it was, as it is, and as it will be, is more complex and dynamic than the pairs with all participants in it.

1.1.2. The Discontents of the Human

This dissertation cautiously grounds itself on inherently problematic concepts of the 'human' and the 'nonhuman' in a posthumanist trajectory. In doing so, it is aware of three main grammatical insinuations the word carries. Firstly, the singularity of the term cannot give the due justice to what the 'nonhuman' semantically corresponds to in all its multiplicity. The 'nonhuman' encompasses immeasurably various beings. These beings share truly few common features in appearance other than their situatedness in opposition to the human. Their most agreeable common feature is their categorisation as the human's

'others' while this human defines and positions itself over all of them. Secondly, the 'non' prefix of this negatively-defined word posits a challenge to the conventional anthropocentric reading of the world. Nonhuman-oriented approaches shed light upon the unnoticed—but already present—intersections of the interrelations among species as well as things. Thirdly, the term 'nonhuman' needs a conscious and cautious approach because the root of this compound might grammatically reconfigure the centrality of the human. Attending the prefix 'non' rather than emphasising the word 'human,' the compound decentres its root by cumulatively referring to a multiplicity of alterities regardless of an anthropocentric valuation. For these reasons, this dissertation does not differentiate the nonhuman as animal, plant, or thing because this non-exclusivism allows all those numerous beings to converge and communicate with one another for a more inclusive unravelling of posthumanist concerns. Should 'human' favour exclusivism, 'nonhuman' stands for inclusivism.

The notion of the 'nonhuman' needs further caution because it carries the risk of substantiating a binary split between the humankind and everything else, which serves as the long-reigning and principal foundation of anthropocentrism in all its hierarchical forms. Anthropocentrism, as a systematic structure of beliefs and practices that privilege and centre the human in all its relations, shapes all the fields of life from culture, religion, and law to philosophy, scholarship, and kinship. One might claim that an anthropocentric discourse is perfectly normal for humans because, after all, 'matchless' advances across sciences, arts, cultures, and technologies have been the humankind's so-called 'achievements.' Yet again, all such provisions do not necessarily produce only heavenly outcomes but also tend to deliver devastating consequences.[11] This dissertation is also

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[11] For instance, the current geological epoch is defined as the "Anthropocene" due to the "major and still growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere" (Crutzen and Stoermer 17). Defined as the total sum of the human impact on nature, this term does not specify the negativity (or positivity) of the human activities, and thus, makes a vague and misleading valuation of the human supremacy. While discussions regarding the Anthropocene focus on the human's responsibilities and connections to the environment and the nonhuman, there are also critiques of this term as it has reaffirming connotations with the human's exceptional position in the world rather than a call for upending it. To eliminate the 'anthropos' in Crutzen and Stoermer's term, many scholars offer alternatives. Andreas Malm, Jason Moore and Donna Haraway among others suggest the term "Capitalocene," drawing attention to the ties between economic and socio-political contexts. "Plantationocene" is another term collectively produced in a conversation at

aware of the difficulty of the disposability of anthropocentrism and finds it a biologically acceptable viewpoint for humans, just as various other alternatives are possible as in the case of arachnocentrism for spiders, caninocentrism for dogs, equinocentrism for horses, felinocentrism for cats, and myrmecocentrism for ants. Nevertheless, being cultured in anthropocentrism does not necessitate the ignorance of the exploitation of all the more-than-human beings and entities. On the contrary, this renders its analyses, critiques, and re-appropriations in literary and cultural texts imperative and expedient as practised in this dissertation. In the same vein, posthumanisms, as seen in the previous sub-section (1.1.1.), provide multiple non-anthropocentric fronts with regard to the human's relation to its 'others' in every form, acknowledging ethical, ontological, and epistemological—as well as socio-political and cultural—systems in which humans, nonhumans, and matters entangle. Therefore, the posthuman paradigm shift calls for the urgency of a post-anthropocentric perspective to relocate multi-species justice and to articulate the multivocality of different and yet connected beings and becomings of the universe.

To bring the delayed justice to the nonhuman, two basic turns emerged in the posthumanities: the animal and the material turns. The animal turn began with the animal-centred research and projects of most disciplines (like history, anthropology, psychology, and literary criticism) in the last quarter of the twentieth century. As Harriet Ritvo explicates, nonhuman animals are "the latest beneficiaries of this increasingly inclusive or democratic trend" (404) in the academe where the labour movement, civil rights movement, and women's movement, all originating in the nineteenth century, rendered the class, race, and women studies possible in a more sustained professionalism. These inclusive and democratising movements gained great impetus in the last decades of the twentieth century. Thus, they finally challenged the long-living anthropocentrism of Euro-centric understanding of nonhuman animals as entertainment, research and wildlife entities, pets, workers, food, and cultural and textual beings.

Aarhus University in October 2014. Haraway assembles all these three terms under the title of "Chthulucene" ("Anthropocene" 160).

Contemporary discussions on the animal question coincided with the animal liberation movement in the post-war era, especially in the 1970s, when the Australian philosopher Peter Singer published *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals* (1975) and in the 1980s when the American philosopher Tom Regan launched *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983). The 'rights' of animals emerged as a concomitant of arguments concerning animal welfare[12] that underlined the liberation from and the elimination of the cruel treatment of farm, research, and other similarly-commodified animals. This liberation/rights[13] movement endeavoured to protect these animals and to enhance their living and 'working' conditions.

The philosophical foundation that led to Singer's and Regan's notions of animal liberation/rights resided in Jeremy Bentham's (1748–1832) famous statements in his 1780 work, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Bentham questions what the distinguishing line between the human and nonhuman animals in terms of ethical consideration is:

> What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? [T]he question is not, Can they *reason*? [N]or, Can they *talk*? [B]ut, Can they *suffer*? (311; italics in the original)

Nonhuman animals who can suffer, then, show an 'interest' in keeping away from the sense of suffering. From Singer's utilitarianist vantage, this capacity to suffer and to avoid any suffering, as Cary Wolfe points out, "means that such beings have a right to have those interests protected, to be regarded morally as ends in themselves" (33). However, one disturbing aspect of this approach is its establishment on the 'interests of beings and/or animals.' This aspect is directly associated with Bentham's "calculable process" in Jacques Derrida's words ("Force of Law" 24), which problematically stems from the

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[12] Animal Welfare Science as a recent multidisciplinary scholarship has been founded with the research focus on animal welfare by behavioural and cognitive ethologists in the late 1980s.

[13] For a detailed discussion between the uses of animal 'liberation' and animal 'rights, see Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?".

human-centred calculation of a being's pleasure level during an (inter)action. Therefore, these claims follow the track of the anthropocentric calculation of interests if the other-than-human species are to be included in the moral and ontological valuation parameters. And such a track falls into the trap of speciesism which the animal rights movement tries to avoid in no small measure.

This problem with the animal rights movement arises from the reduction of nonhuman animals to some sort of human being with limited moral consideration due to their nonhuman capacities. However, the lives of all beings "don't have to be the same to be worthy of equal respect," as Stephen Zak argues, because "[o]ne's perception that another life has values comes as much from an appreciation of its uniqueness as from the recognition that it has characteristics that are shared by one's own life" (70). Assuming nonhuman animals as one single species without any diversity and then categorising and treating them altogether as 'an' other of the human definitely erase each species' intrinsic and universally individual values under the generic name of 'animal.'[14] Nonetheless, Zak recalls that nonhuman "animals are not simply *rudimentary human beings*, *God's false steps*, made before He finally got it *right with us*" (70; italics added).

Undoubtedly, the animal rights social justice movement and its activists enabled nonhuman animals to gain representational rights in the human-animal interactions

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[14] To give an example, T. S. Eliot (1888-1965) opposes this overgeneralising nomenclature and draws attention to other possibilities for one species—in this case, *felis*—in his poem "The Naming of the Cats" (1939). Winking at the Mad Hatter in Lewis Carroll's *Alice* series, Eliot playfully explains the difficulty of cat-naming as cats "must have THREE DIFFERENT NAMES" (line 4; upper cases in the original). Those names are either sensible (daily or historic) human names such as Peter, James, George, Bill, Plato and Electra (7–12), or unique and "more dignified" names like Munkustrap, Quaxo, Coricopat, Bombalurina and Jellylorum (14–19) which inspired individual names of spectacular felines in Andrew Lloyd Webber's Broadway musical *Cats* (1981). The third category, "The name that no human research can discover" (23), however, remains unknowable because only the cat is vested with this "Effanineffable / Deep and inscrutable singular Name" and "will never confess" it (30–31, 24). Eliot also grants speech ability—allegedly a definitive and distinctive characteristic of the human—to the animal, referring to a probability of nonhuman speech that is unutterably utterable or 'effanineffable' in his wording. As an address to the problem of nonhuman personhood, the act of speech in nonhuman animals as well as inanimate matter has shown an attractive spot of celebration in literary and media productions which keep the momentum of liquid modernity of anti-anthropocentrism at a tipping point.

represented in legal institutions and policies. The new laws certainly helped the betterment of several procedures related to many, even if not all, nonhuman animals in human-centred ecosystems. The fight for this cause still continues. On the other side, the animal 'rights' trajectory of the human-animal studies begs such questions: "Can we discover responsibility and reciprocity in relations among human beings and animals? Or is our responsibility merely a construct or hypothesis based upon either rights of animals or calculated utility-values in terms of human advantage?" (Dallery 250). This 'rights' trajectory, then, perpetuates the dominant anthropocentric discourse by underlining "those self/Other distinctions that ran us into trouble in the first place" (Birke and Parisi 68–69). While these areas try to ensure the welfare of nonhuman animals through the tricky concept of rights with a sense of anti-speciesism, they also extend the dichotomic boundaries of 'human' and 'animal' and reinforce the liberal humanist hierarchy of beings.

Moving the focus beyond the 'rights' interests of nonhumans in life, Tom Regan criticises Singer's utilitarianism and underlines the fact that each and every species (as well as an individual in one species) has an "inherent value" (236). More than "mere receptacles" of human calculation and valuation, these beings "have value in their own right, a value that is distinct from, not reducible to, and incommensurate with the values of those experiences which, as receptacles, they have or undergo" (Regan 236). Emphasising the intrinsic value of every species in an ecosystem as Regan does, Gregory Bateson takes the discussion in the direction of the human's relationship with its environment and toward the environmental problems originating from the disrupted balance of this relation. He affirms that "if an organism or aggregate of organisms sets to work with a focus on its own survival and thinks that that is the way to select its adaptive moves, its 'progress' ends up with a destroyed environment" (451). In line with Regan's approach to animals' intrinsic value independent of human evaluation and determinism, Bateson highlights the need for an 'obligation' and 'compulsory' symbiosis between a species and its environment: "If the organism ends up destroying its environment, it has in fact destroyed itself. And we may very easily see this process carried to its ultimate *reductio ad absurdum* in the next twenty years. The unit of survival is not the breeding organism, or the family line, or the society" (451). As foreseen in Bateson's words and mentioned

in the Introduction, the planet Earth and its inhabitants are currently undergoing the Sixth Mass Extinction since humans were too late to act and come to terms with their environments and companion species. Despite being in love with the act of domineering whatever is around, the organism Anthropos is only a part of a greater network of beings. Stressing this network aspect of ecosystems, Bateson decisively argues that "[t]he unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment" (451). Every species is able to survive with symbiotic adaptation. On this account, as many angles of human-animal studies assert, it is imperative to recognise the indispensability of one side—human or nonhuman—or the falsity in the elevation of the human over the nonhuman because ecosystems do not follow such kind of a trajectory in their becomings.[15]

Such biocentric approaches, which are based on biodiversity and destined to serve human survival, eventually lead the human-animal scholarship to a kind of "soft anthropocentrism" (Luke 82). On the flip side, posthumanism avoids bio-reductionism and attempts to situate interactive non/human species and emergent assemblages on a "*flat ontology*" in Manuel DeLanda's terms (51; italics in the original). In this posthumanist flat ontology, one organism is not superior to another since posthumanist philosophy is aware that all beings are connected to one another and built upon—as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari would remind us—a thousand plateaus of relationalities since the very beginnings of existence.

In their arguments, certain thinkers assessing the human-animal relations in the Anglophone tradition bring accusations against the continental philosophers and stretch the animal question to the aporia of ethical vegetarianism/veganism and animosity (and, thus, leading the issue both to a dead end of mere intellectual and linguistic hedonism— light-years away, hyperbolically, from the socio-cultural and material realpolitik of the

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[15] The recognition of inherent values of other beings or the desire for nonhuman rights does not necessarily mean to invite nonhumans to invade humans' lives at the expense of the human's annihilation. Correspondingly, Tim Luke asks "will we allow anthrax or cholera microbes to attain self-realization in wiping out sheep herds or human kindergartens? Will we continue to deny salmonella or botulism micro-organisms their equal rights when we process the dead carcasses of animals and plants that we eat?" (82).

day—and to a rat race[16]). The posthumanist trajectory of the animal turn, nevertheless, problematises this essentialist core of the above-mentioned fields of human-animal studies. Stressing the indispensable side of narratives in the human's historical relations with the animal, the scholarship of critical animal studies makes use of deconstruction to pinpoint these problematic relations. It is well-known that Western philosophy has historically denied subjectivity to animals. Even if nonhumans are granted 'subject' positions in their relations with other beings (especially humans), these are only literary and symbolic representations that do not go beyond anthropomorphising. The act of anthropomorphising in narrative practices, to some extent, supports the desire to appropriate the animal according to the human cultural and symbolic meanings since, this way, they do not pose a threat to human subjectivity.

Drawing attention to this challenge directed at the hierarchical contest between humans and nonhumans on historical and narrative levels, Jacques Derrida problematises the human-animal relations and deeply delves into the matter of uniqueness of each species in his inaugural work "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)" (1997). This long essay draws an extensive analogy between animality and humanity by challenging the anthropocentric worldviews and philosophies. Thus, it commences the field of critical animal studies that goes beyond the rights/liberation discussions and aligns with posthumanist concerns. Derrida's analogy starts with his personal experience of his cat gazing at his naked body, which brings a sense of shame due to the implied consciousness in the cat's gaze and the sense of escape from that 'conscious' gaze. When the human's eyes meet with the animal's eyes, the awareness of being watched without his consent creates an epiphany, a moment of realisation of a human's inherent animal side. Here, the eyes of the animal function as the reminder of the human's animality (objecthood), "humanimality" as coined by Carrie Packwood Freeman (12), or the probability of the human's being precisely like an animal that is always naked and in no need of any apparel at all. Clothing is just a sign of the human's supposed distinction from all the other species

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[16] Firmly believing that an 'either/or' methodology will lead both to another binary, out of which I struggle to think and act, and to no affirmative and inclusionary point, I do not intend to join these races in this dissertation, in which I embrace an approach of consensus among intentionally close arguments rather than a hierarchy of them.

in the world since it is the outcome of constantly developing human technologies. Derrida states the importance of one's awareness of being naked by stating that "the property unique to animals and what in the final analysis distinguishes them from man, is their being naked without knowing it" ("Animal" 373). Besides, the eyes of the animal have another function, which presents the animal's 'humanity,' the animal's potential to be the autonomous and active part of a relationship with a human. Concerning the capability of reason, the human is always considered to be the active part of interactions with animals. However, in this case, the animal's gaze situates the human in a passive mode, and the active part (subject) of that interaction becomes the animal, for it has not needed the human's self-introduction or self-presentation before it. "Nudity is nothing other than that passivity," explains Derrida, "the involuntary exhibition of the self. Nudity gets stripped to bare necessity only in that frontal exhibition, in that face-to-face" ("Animal" 380). Hence, deconstructing the hierarchical positions of humans and nonhumans in the humanist philosophy, this analogy emphatically underlines the subjecthood of the animal that is utterly independent of a human's interference yet also connected to other beings around the animal subject: That is just like the human's subjecthood.

The peculiarity and familiarity of nonhuman subjectivity cannot be regarded as a new phenomenon since it has always already been there. It did not become apparent only in twentieth-century personal experiences like Derrida's. It was apparent, waiting to be attended even in the cosmogonic narratives of religions.[17] The attempt to create a distinction between the human and the animal dates back to the classics and their re-emergence and entanglement with the Christian theology in the Renaissance as the concept of humanism. Renaissance humanism brought forth the primary anthropocentric hierarchy of species, the Great Chain of Being. According to Christianity (actually all the heavenly religions, yet specifically Biblical narratives in the case of Western

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[17] Religions—be they in the West or East—are always powerful arbiters of philosophical and scientific schools of thoughts and experiments. For that reason, many problematisations and deconstructions have to return to the religious texts for better sociological analyses of anthropocentric concepts and meaning-making processes. Since the European socio-political structures and philosophies have been influenced by Judaism and Christianity, the theological foundations of this anthropocentric worldview require attention for the argument of the human's self-awareness of the possibility of being as naked as an animal, or the human's animal and the animal's human sides.

philosophical schools), the rivalry for superiority between humans and animals began with the case of the consumption of the forbidden fruit. The temptation of Eve by a serpent is accepted as the starting moment of the problematic hierarchy among beings because the animal here is presented as the tempter figure, the woman is the weak-willed one, and the man is the deceived, or the noble victim. Just after the consumption of the forbidden fruit, the sense of shame of one's nudity emerged, and the urge to cover their genitals with fig leaves overwhelmed Adam and Eve because, at this moment, they became aware of an Other, with a deliberate capitalisation. God's subsequent structuring of men over women and men over animals is, thus, the source for structuring Cartesian binary oppositions (which is surely not separate from the Biblical doctrines) such as good and evil, male and female, and truth and lie.

Reminding a finer point on this Fall narrative, Derrida expounds that the creation of the Other for the human happened before the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. In Genesis of the Old Testament, the creation of the universe is narrated to be in seven days. The fifth day consists of the creation of "great sea creatures and every living thing that moves, with which the waters abounded, according to their kind, and every winged bird according to its kind" (*The Holy Bible*, Gen. 1.20-23). The sixth day, then, is the time of the creation of the first humans, Adam and Eve. Such an order of creation sounds problematic in itself because it shows that the animal ontologically precedes the human. The animal's existence and, therefore, its identity are formed before the formation of the human. Nonetheless, the superiority of the human, specifically the man, is reassured with the naming moment. The male human is given the duty of naming each and every species by God in order for the human to have authority over the animal. Here, the naming issue expounds on the question of identity. Once a species has a name, it begins to have an existence in the presence of the name-giver, or, in other words, the human. The name epistemologically precedes a being's identity, and the identity precedes that being's survival even after its death since only the name is regarded to be sufficient for the onto-epistemological existence of that being—be it a plant, an animal or a human (Derrida, "Animal" 379). Once humans exist later than animals, the need to differentiate humanness

from different beings brings the consciousness of constructing an other for the human.[18] This way, the Other is consciously created by the human, and this subordinate other has turned out to be the animal.

There is one more crucial issue, other than the naming, during the time before the Fall: the equality of all the species in terms of their nakedness as well as their subjectivities. Humans and animals were naked in the same way, and humans did not feel a sense of shame. This lack of awareness about being as naked as an animal indicated a lesser degree of anthropocentrism. However, it does not eliminate the othering process for the animal by the human. Despite animals' gazes at the humans in the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve did not feel any sense of either shame or escape. All those primordial situations of animality and humanity are the fundamental sources of the hierarchical envisioning of anthropocentrism since religions—monotheistic or polytheistic—have shaped the political human for quite a long time. As the creation myths in religions have encouraged the centrality of human ascendancy in cosmogony, it is essential to handle such narratives in a deconstructive manner to better understand the problem of the hegemonic distinction

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[18] The questioning of androcentrism has brought forth an amalgam of feminisms, environmental concerns, and the widespread acceptance of nonhuman bodies. This amalgam has had powerful reflections in the literary world, which can be observed, for example, in Ursula K. Le Guin's (1929-2018) short stories. Le Guin, as a multiple award-winning, fantasy 'legend' of world literature, alludes to the biblical origins of this questioning in her remarkable short story "She Unnames Them" (1985). The narrator whose name she herself never articulates—but is clear from both the story and the reference to the primordial 'She' in the Bible—reverses the process of Adam's naming all nonhuman animals. Reminding the reader of the autonomous positions of these animals most of which already "accepted namelessness" and "ignored their [man-given] names" (Le Guin 593), Eve converses with numerous animals and realises that most of them, like yaks, cats, insects, and all the sea animals rejected their taxonomic nomenclature and parted with "all the Linnaean qualifiers" (594). Without hinting at an answer to whether naming issue has already prepossessed her or animalistic self-confidence has triggered her awareness, she cannot, "in all consciousness, make an exception for herself" (594) and remands her name, as if the name gained tangibility, back to Adam who is indifferent and too busy trying to assemble the parts of the key to the Garden of Eden. Eve's demand for a more inclusive experience points to the phallogocentric essence of 'god-given' uneven power relations between the human and the nonhuman. Therefore, she recognises the rightful subjectivity of each species to name themselves generically or individually without human intervention—a process to which she herself is no exception. Just like T. S. Eliot's focus, Le Guin also critically draws on the felinocentric perspective in "She Unnames Them." I presented a paper entitled "Posthumanist Nonhuman Agency in Ursula K. Le Guin's Short Stories" about a more detailed discussion regarding the androcentric inquiry in Le Guin's fantasy stories at the "15th International IDEA Conference: Studies in English" organised by Hatay Mustafa Kemal University, Hatay/Türkiye, between May 11 and 13, 2022.

between humans and animals. The gaze of the animal allows the human "to see and be seen through the eyes of the other" and shows "simply the naked truth of every gaze" in the above instances (Derrida, "Animal" 381). The nakedness or bare materiality of truth implies the uncivilised, animalistic side of the 'rational' human. That is basically why naked truth is never granted its true value (as in the case of the celebration of tool-making—clothing here—of the human over 'invention-lacking' worlds of animals). Such a portrayal, in a way, demands a deconstruction of anthropocentric meta-narratives putting the human on the pedestal and subjugating all nonhuman beings to its service. Calling the issue of autonomous subjecthood into question, critical animal studies on track of posthumanist paradigms reconfigures human-nonhuman relations and strips away the Cartesian reliance of Eurocentric philosophies on 'reason.'

To deepen the non/human subjectivity discussion concerning 'otherness' in the frame of human-nonhuman relations before plunging into the arguments about the material turn and the agency of materiality, the concept of alterity possesses a crucial space in the posthumanist discussions. The notion of nonhuman alterity has been frequently visited since the second half of the twentieth century by many philosophers. Studies in the posthumanities especially seek their "coordinates . . . by expanding the more general concept of alterity" (Marchesini 162). In these visits, alterity is first grounded on the notion of reason, or—to put it better—the lack of reason. In his historically specific analyses of forms of madness in *Madness and Civilization* (1972), Michel Foucault discusses how madness is perceived as a form of losing one's humanness alongside hir[19] rationality. Blurring the boundaries of a subject's intentionality, agency and linearity in one's (inter)actions, madness, as Foucault states, stands specific "to man, to his weaknesses, dreams, and illusions" and "reflects . . . all the forms, even the most remote, of the human imagination" (*Madness* 16, 29). In this sense of weakening and disappearing rationality in a human, madness is associated with unleashed animality in the human. As observed in the previous sub-section, "Posthumanism," the concept of the liberal human rests on the willful, able, and reasonable human, which would altogether estrange and push the mad person into the realm of nonhumans. For this reason, human's irrational

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[19] Please see the footnote 4 on page 3.

other is subjected to the "'inhuman' practices of confinement" (Foucault, *Madness* 75). The fear of the nonhuman animal insinuates itself into the liberal human's anxiety of non-centrality and non-exclusivism among earthly beings: "The animal in man no longer has any value as the sign of a Beyond; it has become his madness, without relation to anything but itself: his madness in the state of nature. The animality that rages in madness dispossesses man of what is specifically human in him" (Foucault, *Madness* 73–74). Foucault's historically-bounded conception of alterity falls into the scholarship of posthumanism in terms of problematising the liberal human's practices of "violence and exclusion" directed at "those deemed mad [nonhumans]" (Jonas 588). This way, it is demonstrated that nonhuman alterity is not bound to biological animals and material beings, but inclusive of humans whose subjectivities are excluded from societies because of their levels of 'intelligence.'

In the standard Cartesian (de)valuation of a human being, it is seen that the elevation of the mind has inhabited an enduring stronghold. That is the underlying reason for the primary Foucauldian interpretation of 'mindlessness' in outcasting the human as the nonhuman in socio-political and ethical spheres of life. Nevertheless, there is a broader world of others for *Homo sapiens*, which underlies the radical, super-historical conception of alterity. The super-/non-historical aspect of the otherness of the other is related to one's perception of the other because once the other becomes the object of observation and research, it ceases to be an other for the observer and researcher, who—after facing the alienation effects between hirself and the other—gets gradually familiarised with that other. In this radical deconstruction of the notion of alterity, Derrida makes an extensive differentiation between the levels of non/human otherness. He, in many texts, names the "absolutely other" as the *arrivant* (Derrida and Stiegler 13) that is beyond one's[20] expectation and comprehension. It means "the neutrality of *that which* arrives, but also the singularity of *who* arrives, he or she who comes, coming to be where s/he was not expected, where one was awaiting him or her . . . without expecting *it* [*s'y attendre*], without knowing what or whom to expect" (Derrida, *Aporias* 33; italics and

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[20] In the discussions about alterity, I will impersonally use 'my' adjective and 'me' pronoun in place of 'one' in order to illustrate clearly the presence of this 'one' in front of whom the other is situated.

brackets in the original). Derrida, here, explains that the *arrivant* or the absolute other is unknowable before the human's encounter with it. The human subject that will encounter this other is fully unaware of the physiological and psychological characteristics of this other. In this regard, any attempt to understand and know the absolute other is a kind of transformation of that other into the form of the familiar, the known. In order for this absolute other to arrive or to present hirself to me, there has to be a timeless and unconditional call, "a 'come' that opens and addresses itself to someone, to someone else that I cannot and must not determine in advance, not as subject, self, consciousness, nor even as *animal*, god, or person, man or woman, living or nonliving thing" (Derrida and Stiegler 12; italics added). That is, the subject of this encounter is indeed constantly exposed to the arrival of an absolute other. The human is always waiting for an unknown future—*l'avenir* in Derrida's saying. Simply living is the condition of this encounter with the *arrivant*. Only under those circumstances can this encounter happen, and can the familiarisation or domestication process begin. The notion of alterity, therefore, encompasses both an (absolute) other non-cognisable with available concepts and ideas and an (ordinary) other[21] in my recognition by correlating categories and concepts with that other within the capacity of my knowledge.

When the *arrivant* appears, it resists my comprehension and categorisation or does not fit into any known set of concepts. At this moment of uncanny obscurity, my consciousness starts an anagogical process to define the *arrivant*. To incorporate the other into my consciousness as a somewhat familiarised entity, I would compare the newcomer's features with other beings with which I have had relationalities so far. This attempt at familiarisation is the procedure to neutralise the absolute other. This process begs one question: Is a complete—a hundred per cent—neutralisation or familiarisation of the *arrivant* ever possible? No. It is out of the question as my cognition cannot share the other's experiences or cannot grasp the other's ego, nature, character or subjectivity: "The other as alter ego signifies the other as other, irreducible to *my* ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego" (*Writing* 125; italics in the original). The

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[21] If one expects a knowable other's arrival, ze assumes a stance for the arrival of this cognizable other with the help of hir foreknowledge of this other's identity. However, one's stance within such a circumstance of familiarity is conditional.

alter ego—because it has its own independent form—is completely and, perhaps, forever isolated from my subjective cognizance and involvement. The other, as well as any animate or inanimate entity, has hir own noumenal[22] world unattainable by me or any outsider whatsoever, even mostly by hirself (just as the unattainability of my noumenal world). Therefore, contrary to the other's "victorious assimilation" and "assimilatory reduction" into the "the same" by my ego (Derrida, *Writing* 124), my recognition of and respect for the other's separateness and singularity construct a basis for alterity. The nonhuman becomes both similar and irreducible to the human, like and unlike the human's similarity and irreducibility to the nonhuman.

Shifting the hubristic subject's position in its relations with its others, historical and super-historical aspects of alterity posit a posthumanist union, "a relationship of mutual supplementarity" (Jonas 594). "Indeed, our very existence," as Italian posthumanist philosopher Roberto Marchesini notes, "depends on openness, because without hosting alterity . . . humans would be 'sterile'" (161–62; italics removed). To recap these perspectives on nonhuman alterity, Marchesini clarifies two senses of the term: Alterity means

> (1) other entity, separate, alien, foreign, divergent, term of comparison, background from which to emerge; (2) referent, or capable of referential action; a dialogical polarity able to provide a contribution-orientation for expression and for the construction of identity. Here we find hidden the double contribution of alterity to identity: (a) as an other entity, it permits reflection, or a self-recognition able to define the contours of identity; (b) as a bearer of references, or of external

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[22] For Immanuel Kant, rational entities possessed "special intelligible beings (*noumena*)" or appearances "apart from the sensible beings or appearances (*phaenomena*) that constitute the sensible world" (*Prolegomena* 66). Because Kant mainly dealt with the universal human's taste of art, this noumenal aspect was unique to humans as they had the sense of subjectivity, the capacity to use 'I' pronoun. Unlike phenomena—the outside appearances that could be experienced by senses, the noumenal part of a human was hidden, unattainable, unknowable since, for Kant, "we do not know and cannot know anything determinate about these intelligible beings at all, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions refer to nothing but objects of possible experience, hence to mere beings of sense" (Kant, *Prolegomena* 67). In the posthumanist frame, noumenal capacity is not limited to the human, but expanded to every being and thing. That is why the notion of agency, which will be explored soon, holds a particularly powerful place in the posthumanist and new materialist discussions as well as studies on nonhumans. Also, Kant's contributions to the understanding of the human subjectivity and human-animal divide is further discussed in the first section of the following chapter.

contributions that orient and sustain development, it permits an evolutionary path to
identity. (162)

Nonhuman alterity is both outside and inside the human subject's identity. Outside, it provides the platform for the liberal human to distance itself and to purify its existence from all the other beings. The liberal human feels 'contaminated' with its togetherness with the nonhuman. Inside, nonhuman alterity insistently reaffirms the constant material-discursive enactments of human-nonhuman beings on one another. It enables the emergence of chimerical identities and plural subjectivities. This vital spiral of alterities confirms that "we [humans] have greater or lesser degrees of kinship and common experience with [nonhumans that are] . . . complexly interrelated with human culture" (Vint 8).

These deconstructive readings of religious narratives and non/human alterities stir the ontologically and epistemologically problematic relations between humans and animals. Materiality surrounds both sides of this grand dichotomy and unites the opposed sides in the corporeal-discursive interconnectedness or "mesh," to borrow Timothy Morton's term (*Ecological Thought* 15). To acknowledge the complex relationality between bodies as well as matter and meaning, scholars in the fields of posthumanities have introduced the material turn, reassessing the fixed and passive perception of matter. The material turn brings the focus on the matter; that is, the body (in all its multiplicity). Rejecting the arguments that everything is either a linguistic construct or a cultural one, new materialist thinkers and philosophers deconstruct the Cartesian binaries that define non/human relations as well as human exceptionalism. Denouncing the human-centred belief of subjectivity, they contend that all the beings—be they organic or inorganic, biotic or abiotic—are dependent on their material parts, their physicality. Just like their cognitive and intuitive sides, the somatic features of the beings determine new forms and natural-cultural occurrences. Matter, both in its singular form encompassing everything in this space-time and in its plurality embracing each being without favouritism, remains to be a ball of inextricable knots made up of multiple non/humans. The components of these knots have their own agencies that gather to expose new processes, meanings, and emergences. Therefore, these new materialist theories function just like posthumanism, abandoning representationalist and anthropocentric valuations.

This kind of merger between the cognitive and the somatic inevitably evokes the concept of nature-cultures. In the philosophical journey to redefine human/nature relations in modernity, Bruno Latour states that "[a]ll of culture and all of nature get churned up again every day" (*We* 2). By looking at the eternally interactive crossroads of sciences, technologies, and societies, he argues that subject and object positionings of humans and nonhumans—as well as their hierarchical status in their relations with one another—rely on arbitrary discussions of their distinction. The human subject does not represent the hard and fixed verification point against which the nonhuman object is tried: Nonhuman matter is "in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society" (Latour, *We* 55). From this vantage point, Latour offers his concepts of "quasi-objects" and hence "quasi-subjects," which are "in between and below" these two ontological 'certainties,' "at the very place around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able to come to terms with them" (*We* 55). In the same vein, nature and culture cannot be reduced to the either one, or cannot be elevated over the other. "Cultures," he affirms, "do not exist, any more than Nature does"; that is why the two can only exist together as "natures-cultures" (Latour, *We* 104). While sciences and technologies might proceed to function by "*bracketing Nature off*" (Latour, *We* 104; italics in the original), their practices fall short in the face of worldly facts:

> All natures-cultures are similar in that they simultaneously construct humans, divinities and nonhumans. None of them inhabits a world of signs or symbols arbitrarily imposed on an external Nature known to us alone. None of them – and especially not our own – lives in a world of things. All of them sort out what will bear signs and what will not. If there is one thing we all do, it is surely that we construct both our human collectives and the nonhumans that surround them. (Latour, *We* 106)

In this simultaneous construction, one cannot be excluded from the other. In this nature-culture continuum emerge "collectives" or "assemblages" in Latour's terms. These collectives comprise different beings in some sort of harmony. The multiplicity in a collective is the defining characteristic of this multiplicity's heterogeneity. Abandoning "the bracketing off of Nature" (Latour, *We* 106), such local or global, micro or macro collectives "are all alike" in terms of distributing "both what will later, after stabilization, become elements of Nature and elements of the social world" (Latour, *We* 107). These

destabilising productions of natures-cultures activate seemingly dichotomous operations at the same time.

The natural-cultural collectives, "multiplying the hybrids, half object and half subject" (Latour, *We* 117), provide a variety of identities that are prone to gain new identities after their encounters with new/other natures-cultures. These relationalities between beings as well as the endless configurations between the social and the natural, the human and the nonhuman, and the subject and the object underlie Bruno Latour's Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). In the ANT, natural-cultural collectives assemble ontologically different actors. These "actors," as Latour calls them, act upon and modify each other in their engagements. In these trials of the collective's actors, one actor corporeally and semiotically influences other actors' epistemological, socio-political, and material conditions. Giving "non-humans a type of agency that is more open than the traditional natural causality" (*Reassembling* 10), Latour honours nonhuman beings and entities by also calling them—like humans—"actant" which he derives from semiotics (*Politics* 237); thus, he eliminates the ontological and epistemological gap between the non/human. To elaborate on the constant changes in bodies, Latour points out the human body's and mind's metamorphic character:

> Morphism is the place where technomorphisms, zoomorphisms, phusimorphisms, ideomorphisms, theomorphisms, sociomorphisms, psychomorphisms, all come together. Their alliances and their exchanges, taken together, are what define the *anthropos*. A weaver of morphisms – isn't that enough of a definition? The closer the *anthropos* comes to this distribution, the more human it is. The farther away it moves, the more it takes on multiple forms in which its humanity quickly becomes indiscernible, even if its figures are those of the person, the individual or the self. (*We* 137; italics in the original)

As stated in the excerpt, humans are in constant and simultaneous relations with nonhumans in the forms of technological devices, nonhuman animals, cosmic energies, religious doctrines, ideas, and societies. In these entanglements of relations, collectives as well as subject-object unities as in natures-cultures "*extend* the repertory of actions through a *longer* list than the one that had been available up to now" (Latour, *Politics* 76; italics in the original). The human-nonhuman assemblages in the ANT affirm the agentic

powers of both parties on a horizontal angle and illustrate new realities, hinting at the posthumanist subjectivities.

A similar redrawing of the human-nonhuman relations appears in the work of the feminist theorist Donna J. Haraway. Haraway's seminal works like "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s,"[23] *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs People, and Significant Otherness* and *When Species Meet* bring forward several key components of what constitutes the basis for the current set of posthumanist theories altogether. Through her metaphor of the cyborg, she groundbreakingly reclaims an "illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism" in a rhetorical and political manner of "irony" and "blasphemy" ("Cyborg" 119, 117). "A cyborg," as Haraway opens it up, "is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" ("Cyborg" 117). In her first definition, she shows that she already shatters the boundary between the organic and the inorganic, the moving and the inert, and the real and the fictional. This way, she blurs the boundaries of supposedly separate bodies listed above. Haraway draws our attention to the contemporary high technologies humans engage with and underscores this somatic transgression of the human body by stating that "we find ourselves to be cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, and chimeras" ("Cyborg" 143–44). As "theorized, and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism" (Haraway, "Cyborg" 118), humans have these transgressive chimera bodies. Touching on the timely manner of cyborgification of the Cartesian body, she adds:

> If belief in the stable separation of subjects and objects in the experimental way of life was one of the defining stigmata of modernity, the implosion of subjects and objects in the entities populating the world at the end of the Second Millennium— and the broad recognition of this implosion in both technical and popular cultures— are stigmata of another historical configuration. (*Haraway* 242)

In the twentieth century, such hybridism brings out new possibilities for the understanding of the human body that has always already been a mesh of microbic,

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[23] This work is later updated and reprinted with a new title "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 20th Century."

bacterial, and other organisms. "[I]n the wombs of technoscience," there have always been "chimeras of humans and nonhumans, machines and organisms, subjects and objects" (Haraway, *Haraway* 242). The cyborg, in other words, is the posthuman body. It is the outcome of bodily formations that are constantly emerging and acting upon one another.

Harbouring many contradictory concepts and entities within itself, the cyborg problematises the notion of objectivity and stability of a body. Claiming that "[e]mbodiment is significant prosthesis" (*Simians* 195), Haraway explains the transformative and communicative capabilities of bodies: "[B]odies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their *boundaries* materialize in social interaction" (*Simians* 200–01; italics in the original). In all their material and social interactions, bodies "shift from within" in a "very tricky" way and thus generate new meanings and bodies (*Simians* 201). As human corporeality has long stood for "power and identity" (Haraway, "Cyborg" 146), the cyborg image creates an unsettling sense of disintegrating human uniqueness, the decomposition of the supposed embodiment of perfection among the worldlings. This image can be argued to have fascinated the transhumanist attempts to reach an ultra-human status in the first place. Yet, "both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships," cyborg metaphor "suggest[s] a way out of the maze of dualisms" (Haraway, "Cyborg" 147). Haraway, in all her texts, challenges the androcentric and anthropocentric views of binarism and replaces these views with co-operative, simultaneous formulations, combinations and conceptions of the material and the semiotic. For this reason, she defines all sorts of bodies—regardless of their attachment to the human—as "material-semiotic actor[s]" (*Simians* 208) that take an "active part" in corporeal (re)productions.

In addition to breaching the human/nonhuman binary in terms of somatic notions, Haraway also investigates the relations between humans and their environments. Rather than nourishing the anthropocentric rift stemming from the nature/culture divide, she adopts Latour's coinage and usage for these dichotomic notions as "naturecultures" since "[f]lesh and signifier, bodies and words, stories and worlds: these are joined in naturecultures" (*Companion* 20). There is no pristine, untouched nature without human

interference just like there is no culture lacing nature's participation. Just as cyborgs living in contradictions, humans and nonhumans—culture and nature, so to say— co-emerge together; they are "emergent historical hybridities [dependent on each other] actually populating the world" (Haraway, *Haraway* 300). Naturecultures, coined "to decentre [thinking human subjects] from our ontological, ethical-political and cultural stories" (Potter and Hawkins 39), carry Haraway's discussions of non-anthropocentrism toward her concept of "companion species." To explicate this concept, she first draws attention to the chimerical human body:

> I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent [*sic*] of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent [*sic*] of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm. I am vastly outnumbered by my tiny companions; better put, I become an adult human being in company with these tiny messmates. (*When* 3–4)

In that sense, she emphasises the posthumanist aspects of entanglement and co-emergence with beings' mutual influences on one another. That is why, drawing on Bruno Latour's work, she claims that "we have never been human and so are not caught in that cyclopean trap of mind and matter, action and passion, actor and instrument. Because . . . we are bodies in braided, ontic, and antic relatings" (*When* 165). Just like cyborgs "unfaithful to their [militaristic, patriarchal and capitalist] origins" (Haraway, "Cyborg" 119), the existences of such companionships also move beyond the prescribed, imagined and assumed boundaries. Humans and nonhumans are on the same horizontal axis, co-constitute each other both materially and semiotically, inscribe their own and unique characteristics on one another, and bear new naturalcultural embodiments.

While such entanglements of the material and the semiotic hint at the agentic capacities of other-than-human materialities, Latour's and Haraway's conceptualisations also resonate with Andrew Pickering's concept of the "mangle," by which the conventional understanding of causality is reformulated. Mangle strongly echoes Latour's concepts of collective or assemblage and reiterates "the constitutive, intertwining and reciprocal interdefinition of human and material agency," thus "subvert[ing] the black-and-white distinctions of humanism/antihumanism and moves into a posthumanist space, a space in

which the human actors are still there but now inextricably entangled with the nonhuman, no longer at the center of the action and calling the shots" (Pickering 25–26). Human agency is mostly regarded as disciplined, controllable, and observable—at least in the praxes of science studies; yet again, the unruly and unexpected agencies of the human accompany the indeterminate and limitless agencies of the nonhuman.

Bearing in mind Latour's, Haraway's, and Pickering's undertakings that paved the way for a new understanding of the material and the discursive, the companionship of the human-nonhuman agencies is further expanded in the work of Karen Barad, the physicist and feminist scholar. Barad takes the studies of posthumanist materiality quite a few steps forward and protests linguistic and social constructivisms and representationalism before the animal and material turns. Stating that "[l]anguage has been granted too much power," she draws attention to many discourse-based turns in humanities:

> The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every "thing"—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural representation. . . . Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter. ("Posthumanist Performativity" 801)

Centring "matter" into her paradigm-shifting conceptualisations of reality and agency, she builds her theoretical novelties on the scholarships of Judith Butler's performativity, Haraway's material-semiotic togetherness as well as the metaphors of cyborg and companion species, Latour's actor-network agencies, and many others. Among these influences, the Danish Nobel laureate quantum physicist Niels Henrik David Bohr (1885–1962) plays a significant part in terms of Barad's defining methodology of diffraction or diffractive reading of texts, concepts, and ontologies. Criticising the conventional "causal relationship between . . . discursive practices/(con)figurations . . . and specific material phenomena" ("Posthumanist Performativity" 814; italics removed), Barad provides a corrective of the concept of agency. "Agency," she argues, "is not an attribute but the ongoing configurings of the world" and "is a matter of changes in the apparatuses of bodily production" ("Posthumanist Performativity" 818, 826). This way, she underscores that agency is not a notion unique to humans, intentionality and causality: Neither humans

nor nonhumans "possess" agency as a tangible tool to trigger certain actions. It happens on its own within and during endless encounters of entities in assemblages, for "*agency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has*" (Barad, *Meeting* 178; italics in the original). It does not follow a linear line of cause-and-effect relations. However, it thrives in a mangle of nonhuman-human collectives that mostly unintentionally (outside the traditional understanding of intention) act upon one another in material as well as semiotic manners.

Put differently, the agency does not indicate "interactions" that assume the relations between independent beings/entities/elements existing separately and uninformedly from one another. Yet, such divided existence is never possible, as seen in the above discussions of Latour, Haraway, and Pickering. Naturalcultural entities are always entangled with each other. For that reason, Barad introduces her neologism "intra-action" which "*signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies*" (Barad, *Meeting* 33; italics in the original); in other words, a multiplicity of agencies among several beings in a mangle/collective/assemblage or life in short work and emerge together. This kind of intra-active agency follows a posthumanist path in terms of understanding the relations, the world and nature "*that we* [as a part of these] *seek to understand*" (Barad, *Meeting* 26; italics in the original). The posthumanist pattern of intra-activities proposes new meanings, materialisations, and becomings to be caught in the human's comprehensions of phenomena in constant metamorphoses around. Therefore, in need of situating the ontological, epistemological, and ethical grounds of relations in the universe, Barad proposes "a theory of knowledge and reality whose fundamental premise is that reality consists of *phenomena* that are reconstituted in *intra-action* with the interventions of knowers": agential realism ("Agential Realism" 15; italics in the original). With an "ethico-onto-epistemological" core that "provides an understanding of the role of human *and* nonhuman, material *and* discursive, and natural *and* cultural factors in scientific and other social-material practices" (Barad, *Meeting* 90, 26; italics in the original), agential realism emphasises that nonhumans have much more significance in the occurrences, happenings and emergences of phenomena in society, the world and the universe than

we[24] believe or think. The realities, in which 'we' humans and 'they' nonhumans survive, experience life, and engage in relations with one another, are just glimpses from unending emergent intra-actions of this agentic realism.

This posthumanist performative challenge opens up a variety of spaces for new interpretations of almost any narrative that literary scholars intra-act with.[25] Everything—regardless of their species, molecular structures, or anthropocentric taxonomy—has its own narrativity or layers of layers of its own onto-epistemological textuality. In these complex relations of becomings, literary tales find a place for themselves as well. With regard to this fact, the agency in the material turn takes one more step—this time toward the realm of literature and fiction—and engenders "narrative" agency that focuses on the narrative dimensions of non/human co-emergences in agential realism (Iovino and Oppermann, "Theorizing" 451). In their introduction to *Material Ecocriticism*, Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann argue:

> Framed as material-discursive encounters, literary stories emerge from the intra-action of human creativity and the narrative agency of matter. Playing together, *this* shared creativity of human and nonhuman agents generates new narratives and discourses that give voice to the complexity of our collective, highlighting its multiple and "fractal" causal connections and enlarging our horizon of meanings. In other words, narrative agency and human creativity coemerge in new and more complex levels of reality. Here human and nonhuman players produce narrative emergences that amplify reality, also affecting our cognitive response to this reality. ("Introduction" 8; italics in the original)

These posthuman narrative agents proceed in constant webs of relationalities with multiple other posthuman agents, and they do this without any human/nonhuman intentionality. Or at least, it is more complex than what we simply understand of it. Narrative agency of matter means not to "enhance human qualities in fictive or material

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[24] Please see the footnote 3 on page 2.

[25] In the new materialist dimension of posthumanism, there are other metaphors and concepts from several theorists like "object" and "thing" in Bill Brown's thing theory (3–5), Jane Bennett's embark on "vibrant matter" and "assemblage" (2–14, 20–38), Nancy Tuana's "viscous porosity" (193–94), Stacy Alaimo's "transcorporeality" ("Trans-Corporeal Feminisms" 238), Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology (8–14), and many more. Such concepts will be introduced when they are used with discussions in the main chapters.

domains," but to mark "the vitality, autonomy, agency, and other signs that designate an expressive dimension in nonhuman entities" (Oppermann 30). Such material and semiotic togetherness create stories; for that reason, Iovino and Oppermann introduce the phrase "storied matter" ("Introduction" 2) to highlight that all the matter has multiple stories of its own and that "the meanings it conveys are not separated from us" ("Introduction" 8). In this material-ecocritical stance, they "use [the] human lens as a heuristic strategy aimed at reducing the (linguistic, perceptive, and ethical) distance between the human and the nonhuman" ("Introduction" 8). Although these multiple points of view emphatically rest on humans' perspectives, this "heuristic strategy" attempts to dislocate the anthropocentric approach in a way to subvert it to the advantage of the nonhuman.

Referring to a necessity of a "reader" and hir "participation in the world's 'differential becoming' . . . and [thus] crafting further levels of reality" (Iovino 77), the narrative agency is seen to rely on the human's perspective to tell the tale of matter. To eliminate this direct interference into material narrativity from a human observer/reader, Başak Ağın coins the concept "mattertext." Drawing on Haraway's and Latour's use of "naturecultures" ("Animated Film" 29), Ağın explains that the mattertext is "an agentic tool that triggers change on the body, just as our carbon footprints, 'written' on the atmosphere, or a viral code that is inscribed into the DNA"; however, "[s]uch inscription does *not essentially activate the involvement of a human form of existence. Nor does it require the literal or metaphorical interpretations of a human agent.* In fact, the human is only one of the many catalyzers at work in enacting both matter and text" ("Erratum" 383; italics added). When the human is outside the combination of some material entity, that matter still has its own textuality. Matter, then, can and does exist outside the anthropocentric parameters of meaning-making processes and practices. When the human is included in a mattertextual interpretation, ze only witnesses a new becoming because the mattertext "is always in the making" and, "as all posthuman bodies and texts are," exists "in a constant flux of becoming" (Ağın, "Erratum" 384).

Through this kind of narrative agency and mattertextuality, this dissertation seeks to position its approach to the fantasy genre in the frame of posthumanist subjectivities, and specifically to the analyses of Jonathan Swift's and Lewis Carroll's texts. Primarily

showcasing such narrative powers as well as the agentic capacities of the nonhuman animal and matter, these texts, I argue, bear the signs of their predecessors in the literary sense. In other words, both *Gulliver's Travels* and the *Alice* series display the agentic/narrative powers that reside within the animal and matter, following the footsteps of even the earliest examples of the fantasy genre, that is, myths, fairy tales and folk narratives. To this end, what follows presents a discussion of fantasy literature, providing a literary background for the analyses that the second and third chapters will offer. Nonetheless, considering that this dissertation intends to specifically illustrate how Swift's and Carroll's works are lenient to posthumanist readings of subjectivities, the focus will be on the posthuman-material agencies and subjectivities that are inherent in fantasy literature in general, rather than surveying the entire fantasy or novel genres in their social contexts or historical development.

1.2. FANTASY FICTION

This dissertation, bringing together fantasy fiction and posthumanism, primarily concentrates on the nature of human/nonhuman relations, their mutual sociality, and posthuman subjectivities as reflected by fantasy narratives. Both the posthumanist view and the fantasy are interested in what it means to be a subject, how agency functions in life, and "what it means to communicate with a being whose embodied, communicative, emotional and cultural life . . . is radically different from our own" (Vint 1). Then, the main proposition of this study is that the fantasy, in a posthumanist framework that challenges the notion of anthropocentrism, has a long history of being about and intra-acting among the subjectivity, alterity, and co-emergent relationship of humans and nonhumans. A posthumanist perspective of the fantasy offers innovative ways to consider the fantasy fiction's own engagement with such intermingled unions of beings in which the human has always been shaped by its others and *vice versa*.

Fantasy contains many nonhuman beings and a variety of perspectives on the nature of our existence. That is why it provides a perfect platform to re-evaluate the challenges of recent theoretical and philosophical views on the human's place on Earth and relations with other worldlings. Such a reconsideration does not leave us in an abyss of blurred

boundaries and uncertainties; on the contrary, it proposes new ways of thinking, being, becoming, and knowing. Reserving the proliferation of new horizons, fantasy invites both its creators and audience into a realm of *arrivant*s, in whose space-times one might easily encounter the overlooked entanglements and enactments of beings as well as the outcomes of these material-discursive processes. Barad, while clarifying her agential realist undertaking in relation to quantum entanglements, offers a metaphorical journey which fantasy exactly offers to its parties, too: "The path is not singular or straightforward, each step takes place on many entangled levels, the full intricacy of which will remain beyond the horizon for the reader who refuses to join the journey" (*Meeting* 249). Besides, if the fantasy's creative force is enforced to the limitations of the real, this means limiting the potential of new projections and emergences. Hence, regardless of our realisations and intentions, bodies and subjectivities keep their constant co-operations in these journeys of life and fantasy.

In a similar way to Barad's use of the term, Lucie Armitt employs the metaphor of horizon to describe the in-between and hybrid nature of fantasy literature: "Horizons," in the literal sense, "trace the point at which sea strives to become air but fails to be either" (*Fantasy* 5). Even though the horizon can be located in mathematical precision, its elusiveness spotlights its very character of unreachability: When it is approached, the horizon retreats. Just like the horizon empirically experienced in life, fantasy literature expands beyond imagination with all its nonhuman subjectivities. In its metaphorical sense, the horizon implicates the fictional and the absolute other to come into be(com)ing in fantasy fiction. To that end, the horizon of the fantasy delivers a multiplicity of worlds, beings, and becomings "not necessarily known through the senses, or lived experience" (Stewart 44). Fantasy as a genre remains "probably more complex than the physical history of the human race, and as complex as the history of human language" (Tolkien, *Monsters* 121), resisting oversimplification. Its complex web is shaped, as J. R. R. Tolkien states in his essay "On Fairy-Stories," by three ever-active channels: "*independent evolution* (or rather *invention*) of the similar; *inheritance* from a common ancestry; and *diffusion* at various times from one or more centres" (*Monsters* 121; italics in the original). The body of this genre stands out as a mesh of the past, the present, and the future; the real, the unreal, and the imagined; and the human, the nonhuman, and the superhuman.

The whole fantastic body formed by all those ingredients reveals "the interchanges and interconnections between various bodily natures" and resonates with Stacy Alaimo's "trans-corporeality" (*Bodily Natures* 2). Fantasy fiction is parallel to the posthumanist view of the human as "the very stuff of the messy, contingent, emergent mix of the material world" (Alaimo, *Bodily Natures* 11). In fantasy, the continuous transference among different channels of narrativity makes the existence of "a horizon of becoming[s]" (Braidotti, "Theoretical Framework" 52) designed by the critical posthumanities.

Despite the omnipresence of such a horizontal axis, the combination of the philosophical, ethical, and existential parameters in fictional narratives is premised upon the binary separation of the human from the nonhuman, and the real from the imagined. Fantasy fiction violates this separation more than any other genre since its foundations are closely tied to the nonhuman's and the imaginative's performativities on us from a non-anthropocentric vantage and on a nonlinear causality. Thus, nonhuman fantasy characters widen the scope of agency, proliferating as parts of our everyday life. Perhaps because of the violation of dichotomous oppositions and the joint performativity of narrative and material bodies, fantasy is most stigmatised as being "on a kind of vertical trajectory" arising from its engagement with "airy-fairy" things rather than "grounded" plot elements (Armitt, *Fantasy* 1). That is why it is set against the canon of literary realisms structured on a mimetic, 'faithful' representation of the real world. As claimed by both Plato (c. 428 BCE–c. 347 BCE) and Aristotle (c. 384 BCE–c. 322 BCE), mimesis theory takes the nature as the divine and primary creation, and the literary works should be the secondary creation by copying and representing this primary creation. However, the concept of mimesis, as Armitt argues, "implies a documentary relationship between the world and its fictions, in the process of endowing fiction with *a false sense of truth*" (*Fantasy* 2; italics added). Emphasising the artificiality of artistic creation and fiction-writing, Lilian R. Furst reviews the primary attempt of literary realism:

> The realists' insistence on equating truth with illusion means that they could achieve their aims only on the level of pretense [*sic*], by prevailing upon their readers to accept the validity of their contentions and to believe without reservation in the reality of the fictive worlds they created. They were remarkably successful in doing

> so because they were able largely to conceal the literariness of their practices. In a sense, therefore, the realist novel can be seen a prodigious cover-up. (9–10)

Fantasy scholars resist this equation between truth and fiction, emphatically arguing that all literary practices of writing belong to the realm of imagination. Therefore, it is an overall generalisation that narrative realism offers the depictions of the world as it is, "because it is a construct of words selectively shaped by the artist's creative mind" (Furst 11). It is worth mentioning, nonetheless, that, in the posthumanist framework, the imaginative part cannot overshadow the artist's bodily experiences in the material world since all hir material entanglements offer new semiotic creations that are reflected in hir creativity. In this sense, the supposed 'direct' link between the real and realism alludes to "the commonalities of human experience" (K. Hume 5) and is no more or less than the one between the real and fantasy; "fiction is fiction is fiction" (Armitt, *Fantasy* 2). As seen in discussions concerning narrative's realistic ties in life, fantasy in literature is basically the main source of writing and reading.

Nevertheless, the attempts to differentiate between genres of literature have followed different pathways. Fantasy, when perceived as a distinct genre, is customarily limited to the common derogation of its unrealistic or fantastic elements. Several attempts to define the fantasy genre fall short due to disregarding the inclusiveness of the genre that correlates with the real, empirical world. There is an exhaustive list defining what fantasy fiction is, ranging from utopian and dystopian writing, allegory, romance, and folktale to "fable, myth, science fiction, the ghost story, space opera, travelogue, the Gothic, cyberpunk, magic realism" (Armitt, *Fantasy* 1). William R. Irwin grounds the fantasy on its "overt violation of what generally accepted as possibility" (x) and, just as Louis Vax and Brian Attebery agree, points at a literature dealing with supernatural beings such as werewolves, vampires or degenerate human beings (K. Hume 13). Stressing the fantasy characters' awareness of the reversal of the real and normal, Erik S. Rabkin claims the root of the fantasy as the "diametrically contradicted" viewpoint employed in the narrated world (8). For Tzvetan Todorov, the fantastic narrative world should first pose as the real, and then disturb the reader's hesitation toward this perceived reality of the fantastic; thus, fantasy cannot be stigmatised as an allegorical reading of socio-political events, but it can be accepted as a "poetic" interpretation of life (33–34). Todorov leaves fantasy to dangle

between hesitations of an either/or perspective, leaving the perception of the genre to the choice of the reader and excluding other constitutive elements of the fantasy. Refuting Todorov's element of doubt, Irwin establishes fantasy in its presentation of "the persuasive establishment and development of an impossibility, an arbitrary construct of the mind with all under the control of logic and rhetoric" (9). Despite these attempts to situate the genre into rationality and consciousness (of either the writer or the reader), the fantasy is "interested in the nocturnal portion of our existence, in . . . chimeras; in non-rational manifestations" (Marcel Schneider qtd. in K. Hume 15). So, any claim of rationality is irrelevant when it comes to the realm of the fantastic. If the fantasy and irrational entities and narratives are one side of the binary opposition, they are followed in literary texts by other elements like nonhumans, supernatural beings, and imaginary entities. In terms of the content, elements, characters, time-space, and worlds, fantasies are posthumanist constructions of supposedly binary entities that are simultaneously at work in those stories.

These exclusionary perspectives about the fantasy genre draw fantasy fiction to the periphery. In stark contrast to such almost-isolationist views, Kathryn Hume schemes multiple relationalities at play in fantasy fiction. In her scheme, Hume divides the elements of these relationalities in the fantasy into four realms: world-1 (the world experienced by a fantasy writer), author, audience, and world-2 (the world experienced by the fantasy audience) (K. Hume 10–12). Although she follows quasi-linear and reciprocal paths to explain the interactive agencies of these four realms,[26] I will introduce the intra-active and nonlinear narrative agencies at work 'among' the four realms.

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[26] In a similar diagram, Timo Maran refers to the texts incorporating the natural environment's components and interrelations with the human as "nature-text" (280–81). Nature-texts, for him, consist of "nature writing . . . as an aesthetical expression of the appreciation of the foreign semiotic spheres of nature" (Maran 288). That is why he pinpoints nature essays as the ideal works of the nature-text. However, as it is seen in Latour's, Haraway's, and Barad's discussions in the second sub-section of this chapter's theoretical part, nature and culture are not two separable entities, or they have never been so. In order to reach an ecosemiotic ground to interpret the human's relationality with nature, the exclusion of literary narratives is redundant. For this reason, fantasy in terms of the genre's narrative agentic capacity, falls into the categories of Iovino and Oppermann's "storied matter" and Ağın's "mattertext."

The author's relation with the world-1 determines the author's sense of the real as well as hir departure from reality. On this first level, the intra-actions between the author and the world-1 enable the emergence of manipulated and distorted be(com)ings of the fantasy: "a classical example of this process being the fantastic centaur made by joining the realistic givens of man and horse" (K. Hume 11). Such intra-actions offer new alternative realities to consensus realities in fantasies. Although these alternatives are sometimes regarded as "insight or insanity, mysticism or muddle" (K. Hume 12), these creations of the author's agential-realistic relations with the world-1 establish the material-semiotic utterances of the fantasy work. As K. Hume pinpoints, "[a] romance needs marvels; satire calls for caricature and distortion; a saint's life demands miracles; science fiction needs galactic travel or other pseudo-scientific novelties" (12); a fantasy comes out of such entangled horizons of both the real and the unreal. In addition, the audience's understanding and acceptance of what is plausible in life and fiction permit the existence and formation of the fantasy. As the reader's intra-active relations with the world-2 open new possibilities for the interpretation of the fantasy, the fantasy is then shaped by the world-2 in a manner that the real is replaced by the unreal, and the empirical by the hypothetical. Only such a mangle of connections can support the (re)production of the fantasy genre in a posthumanist nonbinary universe of human-nonhuman, truth-lie, and real-imagined combinations. To give an example, religious texts, their doctrines, and humans' practices of these doctrines in this universe go beyond a mere reading/writing practice, by forcing the meaning-making and living-being-becoming mechanisms to revolve around and (re)create new consequential realities.[27] In Tolkien's expression, "behind the fantasy real wills and powers exist, independent of the minds and purposes of men"[28] (*Monsters* 116). Fantasy fiction, hence, puts alienation and familiarisation, the cognitive and corporeal, and the presence and absence into intense dialogues and require their togetherness.

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[27] For these consequences, one might think of the Crusades of the middle ages or the 'civilisation-spreading' age of discoveries.

[28] Tolkien uses the words "man" and "men" to refer to "human" and "humans," unfortunately in a liberal humanist manner.

Considering all those intra-active elements and platforms in fantasy literature, K. Hume gives an all-inclusive and brief explanation of the genre: "*Fantasy is any departure from consensus reality*, an impulse native to literature and manifested in innumerable variations, from monster to metaphor. It includes transgressions of what one generally takes to be physical facts" (21; italics in the original). To portray these departures from consensus reality, what follows gives a brief chronological order of how narrative features manifest the fantasy and its various elements in different literary eras. As "a higher form of Art, indeed the most, nearly pure form, and so (when achieved) the most potent," the fantasy starts out by "arresting strangeness" (Tolkien, *Monsters* 139) and giving meanings to natural phenomena in myths. Then, it provides a basis to form a union for some clusters of communities sharing the same or similar ideals. Finally, the fantastic attempts to establish its place in the literary canon by oscillating between the modern human and its ever-present others, which have become more visible with advanced techno-science. However, it will be seen that there are systematic interrogations into the 'heretic' nature of the genre in all these phases.

The validity of the fantasy began long ago with the Classical philosophers. Plato, for instance, censors poetry in *The Republic* (c. 375 BCE) because poets were thought to be under the Muses' influence and to be caught in an irrational frenzy to create their works; this state of irrationality would remove the person from the pure reality at least twice. Besides, the act of mimesis is not so reliable for Plato as "the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of the things he imitates. His imitation isn't serious" (Plato, *Republic* X.602b). Arguing against the egoistic and incoherent acts of Greek divinities, he regards the fanciful, unrealistic, and nonhistorical pieces as "something trivial" able "to corrupt good people" and to lead toward acts of "disgrace" (Plato, *Republic* X.603b, X.605b). His pupil, Aristotle, is not so harsh against poetic creativity, especially in epic poetry and drama. While describing the elements of plot structure in a tragedy in *The Poetics* (c. 335 BCE), Aristotle states that the plot and its elements like characters and their aims, speeches, and acts should be "by the rule of either necessity or of probability" (XV.1454a6). His exception for *Deus ex Machina* can only be valid for events that "lie beyond the range of human knowledge" because these actions are "irrational" and belong to the inhuman (Aristotle XV.1454b7). In the Classical resistance to the fantasy elements,

the typical attitude is against the truthfulness of the mythical creatures and events employed in the literary works. For those philosophers, myths do not abide by the rules of the real since they only have symbolic meanings, and hybrid beings like gorgons and chimaeras provide humans with more devastation than heroic relief.

As the cosmological and cosmogonic explanations of certain natural phenomena and ideas for the ancient peoples, myths are certainly beyond the mere pleasures of the fantasy. They necessitate, at least for the people of those past times, a blind belief in themselves against the perils of the environmental nature and human nature. Moreover, myths "assert values that cannot be validated scientifically, and the stories they tell are most decidedly not verifiable – creation, activities of the gods, the deeds of semi-divine beings and culture heroes" (K. Hume 33). Despite the objections against the reality of the events and beings narrated in mythic stories, the fantastic holds a significant portion in the classical texts like *The Iliad* (c. 8th century BCE) and *The Odyssey* (c. 8th–7th century BCE) by Homer, because the fantastic monsters provide a common ground for the humanity to stay together in the face of threats to their shared ideals. In the Old English epic poem *Beowulf* (c. 11th century CE), for example, the warriors of King Hrothgar unite in the mead hall Heorot to stand against Grendel. The monstrous creature does not only create a collective consciousness for the Danes but also provides a universal gravitational force to attract a foreigner to the hall, Beowulf, to fight against the doom of the human. Similar fantastic demonic figures fill the medieval narratives; interestingly, they are not hindered by the idea of the real. Quite the opposite, they provide a heroic ideal, a basis for the conveyance of the plight of the human in the mythic or Christian order.

This perspective shift in the fantasy's employment to construct a solid ground for the sake of the human as well as the authority is based in *The Bible*, especially in the Old Testament. Alongside the cosmological and eschatological narratives, the religious tales enable the use of allegory in non-religious English texts like dream-vision poems and romances in the middle ages. Especially in Arthurian romances, the chivalric ideal for the union of a people under a heroic figure like King Arthur is knitted in close connections with fantastic nonhuman or hybrid creatures. On a different scale, medieval writers like William Langland (c. 1330–1387) and Geoffrey Chaucer (c. 1343–1400) punch holes in

the unrelenting authorities of the royalty and the Church with the reality-bending employment of dreams and the satirical use of fantastic characters and plot elements in their works like Langland's *Piers Plowman* (c. 1370–90) and Chaucer's *The House of Fame* (c. 1374–85), *The Legend of Good Women* (c. 1380), and *The Canterbury Tales* (c. 1387–1400). Contrary to Plato's view of divine frenzy, the dreams in medieval Europe are accepted as a form of divine revelation for the writers who smartly make use of all critical commentaries in their imagined lands, albeit the strong reluctance of the administrative and religious authorities. In addition to the fantasy's 'enabling' effect on such matters, women who have almost no space in the literary production find their voices through their use of fantastic dreams, as in the cases of Julian of Norwich (1342–c. 1416) and her *Revelations of Divine Love* (1373), and Margery Kempe (c. 1373–1438) and her *Book of Margery Kempe* (c. 1436–38). Thus, the fantastic of this era is the venture of resisting the monarchic and theocratic systems as well as escaping the Christian patriarchy.

Fantasy breaks the limitations of the centre. It gives voice to the silenced. Similar allegorical uses of the fantastic entities continue in Renaissance England. It is quite well known that William Shakespeare (1564–1616) extensively uses fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (1595/96) and *The Tempest* (1611) to restore true love and bring justice to the desperate. His contemporary Christopher Marlowe (1564–1593) also employs the fantasy figures of demons and breaks the linear time-space sequence with magic in *Doctor Faustus* (1592) as a demonstration to free the overambitious titular protagonist from the newly emerging liberal humanist vigour of apotheosis. In the search for the human's place in the universe, Renaissance writers extend their integration of the fantasy into their works. This search transforms into the metaphor of "quest" in the utopian travels of Sir Thomas More (1478–1535) and Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), respectively, in *Utopia* (1516) and *The Blazing World* (1666). Yet again, "the secularization of literalmindedness" and the dismissal of the unreal emerge as "a mingling of Protestant and scientific seriousness" (K. Hume 7), one of which relies on the interpretation of the New Testament that insists on realistic narratives and mostly excludes any other mode of writing, and the other on the 'enlightened' status of the rational human.

History does not abstain from repeating itself. The Puritanical distaste prevailing in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is overcome by the machinations of the neo-Classical understanding in the literary productions. Alexander Pope (1688–1744) cleverly integrates myths and fairies into his *An Essay on Criticism* (1711) and *The Rape of the Lock* (1712). In this era, Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) rises with his work *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), in which he employs almost all the elements of the fantasy to illustrate the ills of the rational human. Nonetheless, what encompasses the nature of fantasy comes from the English Romantic movement. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) divides the realms of the imagination into two as "primary" and "secondary" in *Biographia Literaria* (1817). He regards the primary imagination as "the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM" (*Biographia Vol. 1* 295–96; capitalisation in the original). Then, the secondary imagination becomes "an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the *kind* of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation" (Coleridge, *Biographia Vol. 1* 296; italics in the original). In this separation, Coleridge emphasises the combined existence of the two spheres of imagination by means of their reciprocal agentic plays. He picks "fancy" as a separate agentic force in the process of these two, as fancy— synonymous with fantasy—has "no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites" (Coleridge, *Biographia Vol. 1* 296). Realising that the real-life also has barely fixed notions, the Romantic writers experience nature and nonhumans in their novelistic attitudes toward the function of the fantastic. *Songs of Innocence and Experience* (1789) by William Blake (1757–1827), *Lyrical Ballads* (1798) by William Wordsworth (1770– 1850), *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* (1798) and *Kubla Khan* (1816) by Coleridge, *Manfred* (1816–17) by George Gordon, Lord Byron (1788–1824), and "Ozymandias" (1818) and *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) by Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) are just a few examples to the epitomised use of the fantastic and the fantasy in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. With "wilful paradoxes" (Armitt, *Theorising* 30) offered by the author and the "willing suspension of disbelief" (Coleridge, *Biographia Vol. 2* 6) expected and provided by the reader, human-nonhuman interactions and their hybrid becomings are reintroduced at length.

The fantasy, providing recovery, escape, and consolation to its readers (Tolkien, *Monsters* 138), carries a weightier significance after the rigorous industrialisation periods from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The enforced dependence on the logical, rational, 'human' aspects of literary realisms is bent further with the creative narratives of the entangled playfulness between the real-life and the fantasy worlds in the Victorian era. Meditating on this sense of entrapment felt by the modern human, Matthew Arnold (1822–1888) elegantly reflects the conditions of both the modern worldlings and the fantasy genre in "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" (1855): "Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born" (lines 85-86). Arnold criticises the loss of faith in the human's rational and progressive motivations by saying that "The kings of modern thought are dumb, / Silent they are though not content" (116–117) and voices the desire for the arrival of the future, *l'avenir*, just as the epic hero Achilles' "ponder[ing] in his tent" during the Trojan war in *Iliad* and "wait[ing] to see the future come" (115, 118), to bring the demise of this demi-god hero. As seen in these lines, instead of "progressive things like factories, or the machine-guns and bombs that appear to be their [these factories'] most natural and inevitable, dare we say 'inexorable', products" (Tolkien, *Monsters* 150), people would embrace the silence and serenity of escapist fantasies. Often, when the familiar is alienated, recovery begins as the human permits the real to cease and the fancy to commence. In envisioned lands, the human can escape from industrial life and its toils. As a consolation, the fantasy offers a happy ending, a well-deserved resolution after a long journey seriously undertaken in the company of nonhuman others.

The fantasy audibly gains its final element in the twentieth century, after acknowledging the human's consistent unity with its animal and material others: the fantastic materiality. Calling the source of this element "the anatomical trauma," Armitt remarks on the changing course in locating fantasy literature from "a group dynamic" that would utter certain communities' problems toward an individual adventure as a naturalcultural "anomaly" (*Fantasy* 207). In today's world, it is quite common to observe the materialisation of the fantasy's "narrative sophistry" making "nonfact appear as fact" (Irwin 9). In this sense, the subversive nature of fantasy fiction has become more resilient to the "ideologically significant gesture" of marginalisation and no longer "an embrace

of madness, irrationality, or barbarism" (Jackson 173, 172). Being the black sheep of the literature family, the fantasy continues—and, hopefully, will keep—puncturing holes in the humanist cocoons of narrativity. This way, they offer transcendental journeys into other lives and other possibilities rather than appearing simply autobiographical and historical manifestations of the human. Fantasy stories transcend communities of the like-minded, eliminate the sense of perpetual frustration evoked by the real, and maintain elusive space-times for manifestations of our entangled becomings (with). As an ethico-onto-epistemological glue, the fantasy cuts across the frontiers built by the anthropocentric thinking and doing, unveiling the artificiality of binaries in a posthumanist performative understanding of the world and its inhabitants.

CHAPTER 2

POSTHUMAN SUBJECTIVITY IN JONATHAN SWIFT'S *GULLIVER'S TRAVELS*

This chapter explores how the eighteenth-century human subjectivity is argued to be stable and how this rhetoric is subverted in the time's satirical fantasy, *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) by Jonathan Swift (1667–1745). For a systematic analysis of this exploration, it is divided into three sections. First, problematising the fictional sense of a stable human subjectivity, it discusses the Western and British natural philosophies in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that attempt to provide answers to the question of what a human is. Secondly, the author is analysed as an ardent satirist of liberal humanism in the early eighteenth century. In his works, he is argued to employ a proto-posthumanist discourse to shatter the illusion of the anthropocentrism of the British discourse over the white 'man's' others. In the final part, *Gulliver's Travels* as a fantasy narrative is scrutinised in detail to explore the protagonist's journey of deconstructing his liberal humanist subjectivity and reconfiguring himself as a posthumanist subject. In these steps, this chapter aims to present that the human is always already entangled with hir nonhuman others as seen in Swift's fantasy written at the peak of the Enlightenment.

2.1. HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

A stable subjectivity of the human generally fits into a fictionally uniform tradition, presented or assumed as if there were a flow of "unbroken continuity in the Western tradition" (Murray 8). However, this assumption is ungrounded since the human self was embroidered piece by piece in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and each piece of the stable human subject was added by an individual Enlightenment author-thinker. This era[29] was once the epoch of the redefinition of the (hu)man and human nature as well

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[29] This era includes the late seventeenth century as well as the eighteenth century. Some sources prefer to call this period "the long eighteenth century" since the adjective of this term refers to the acceptance that the era and the Enlightenment mentality in England started with the Glorious

as social and cosmic orders after multifarious scientific and geographical discoveries that had begun in the fifteenth century. Taking its power from the middle classes that began to emerge in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the idea and praxis of (liberal) humanism in Britain were established on the rising concepts of the individual and the constitutionalism, which came out of the English Revolutions like the Commonwealth (1649–1660) in the aftermath of the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution (1688). In this regard, the concept of human was first centred around a gendered form by the outright acceptance of the "Man" as the measure of any existence and area in life. Hence, the human gradually began to be characterised as a free, self-contained, autonomous, ordered, knowing, social, political, and moral subject.

From a posthumanist perspective, this was an Enlightenment 'project' to create a (gendered) species identity that was positioned over all its heterologous others—be they natural or fabricated. This collective Europe-based project of the formation of human subjectivity was supported by the thinkers of the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751), David Hume (1711–1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).[30] From the vantage of the twenty-first century, however, this era looks more than what it apparently aimed at. In this sense, the Enlightenment period has been brought under a myriad of critical reassessments in terms of the valuation of the hu/man, which has therefore necessitated some redefinitions of the privileged (and usually male) human subject in relation to its human and nonhuman others. As the writings of the above-mentioned Enlightenment figures collectively support the concept of liberal human subjectivity and reinforce its spread in all areas of

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Revolution in 1689. Accordingly, the long eighteenth century ended when Queen Victoria ascended the British throne in 1837.

[30] Aware of the fact that the significant contributions by these thinkers cannot be confined in the limits of few pages in this sub-section of the second chapter, I concentrate on introducing their seminal ideas on the human nature and subjectivity. This way, their influences on the literary productions of the eighteenth century can be discussed in a contextual as well as theoretical manner. The reason of choosing these philosophers and scientists lies in the facts that their views highlight the Englightenment mindset and that they can be traced in Swift's life and works to a certain extent.

life such as arts, sciences, and politics throughout Britain and Europe, this part of the second chapter will reflect upon the arguments on the human nature of these philosophers, interrogating what the human subjectivity meant and how the human was differentiated from the nonhuman in that era.

At the onset of the emergence of philosophies concerning human and human nature, a focus on the indispensability of sensory pleasures in intellectual discussions draws attention. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his seminal work *Leviathan* (1651) can be regarded as the primary example of this view. The title of this influential book foregrounds the anthropocentric attitude towards the unfamiliar nonhuman beings since the position of such a chimerical biblical figure as the leviathan[31] signals the pioneering distinction between human and nonhuman. Drawing a parallel between the nonhuman wildlife and the human nature outside the civil society, Hobbes describes the human's natural life and status in his work as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (I.13.par. 9) because "every man is enemy to every man" in a place without social order (I.13.par. 8). Hobbes derived this image of chaos from the dominant medieval and early modern images of nature, "a densely forested landscape" (Tavares 164), in which humans could presumably lead such chaotic and brutish 'natural' life. Considering the accounts of the 'newly discovered' Americas and their tropical forests, Hobbes establishes his human concept on the figure of the "savage people" living in these new areas who "have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner" (I.13 par. 11). This illustration of the forest as "the realm of anarchy, shadows and the inhuman" would be so influential in the socio-political spheres of life that this realm and the likes would be translated into the "landscapes opposed to the human and the social by virtue of the scientific objectification of nature," specifically during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; furthermore, this view of alterity would lead to a massive praxis of deforestation since these woodlands are seen as natural resources just "to be rationally domesticated and subjected by human knowledge and power" (Tavares 163). This Hobbesian concept of the human would become one of the leading discourses to further yet-to-come ecological imperialism, in which any being, particularly non-Europeans,

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[31] Leviathan as a nonhuman entity refers to the Biblical sea serpent, which is claimed to have its origins in the Ancient Near Eastern mythologies (Van Bekkum et al. xviii–xix).

non-whites and nonhuman animals, that lived in these areas would automatically deserve the same subjugation of the 'civil man.'

Owing to this perception of natural habitats and their inhabitants, Hobbes claims that humans in their natural state are devoid of civil organisation. Social order, which Hobbes sees compulsory for the human and non-existent in nature as explained above, cannot be achieved by the natural status of the human, but only by the human's wilful compromise to have a social contract, with which humans waive some of their freedoms and natural rights in return for state order, protection, and legal rights (Hobbes I.14 par. 9-17). Influenced by the conflict-ridden philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes situates the human thoroughly in binary oppositions such as nature/culture and savage/civil which, for him, are always already in constant conflict. While the human refers to a capacity for negotiations based on (Cartesian) reason, the nonhuman points at a savage, passion-driven, hazardous leading of life. When the state of nature is aligned with conflictual illustrations of dualities, the human (culture) is ultimately positioned in opposition to the nonhuman (nature). However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, Hobbes' argument on the human's negotiation ability for the social contract can be viewed as self-contradictory as his proposition of an ultimate monarch at the head of the state for the sake of a peaceful, organised, and lawful life reduces the non-ruling common population to a weak-willed, anarchic community—such as those savage people in tropical forests—at the mercy of their monarchic shepherd (Hobbes I.20 par. 3).

Rational decision-making and negotiation capacity, nevertheless, are not sufficient to become the main determiners or nexus of the definitions of human and human nature according to other thinkers of the time. Some philosophers attribute human subjectivity to the human's conscious experience and morality. While philosophising on the main characteristics of human and human nature, for instance, John Locke (1632–1704) states that the law of nature is not based on the Hobbesian understanding of "war of every one against every one" (Hobbes I.13.par. 8). Locke establishes his argument of the human's natural status on some strong senses like fear of vulnerability and desire for protection in *The Second Treatise of Government* (1689) (*Two Treatises* II.9.par. 123). Both of these senses can be comforted by means of experience, especially discursive experiences based

on the human's language skills in addition to material ones. Moreover, breaking away once more from rationalist thinking (of Descartes and Hobbes), he argues that humans do not come to life with an already loaded rationality. Their minds are rather formed by their life experiences which lead to a kind of individualism. As discussed in detail in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), such a formation necessitates "consciousness" as the key proponent of being a human. For Locke, human consciousness elevates thinking over remembering (*An Essay* I.4. par. 20), whereas our knowledge is limited to our conscious experience (*An Essay* II.1. par. 19). Within these parameters, one can construct a sense of self, a perception of identity, or a human subjectivity: A person "is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness" (Locke, *An Essay* II.27. par. 9). For him, humans, unlike their nonhuman counterparts, are able to transform sounds into words and words into ideas by means of their intelligence and consciousness (*An Essay* III.1. pars. 1-5). Locke's emphases on both the human's conscious perception of "different times and places" (*An Essay* II.27. par. 9) and the anthropocentric production of words and ideas call for the human consciousness of species history. In this sense, the human as an autobiographical being keeps records of its own experiences as well as those of its own society's. Discursive practices validate human life and subjectivity since they stand out as the products of human intelligence and consciousness which is not available, for Locke, to the nonhuman beings—at least within the parameters and standards of his time.

Another aspect of being human is argued to have morality, moral judgment and ethics. As the pioneering founder and defender of sentimentalism, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) is one of the moralist philosophers opposing the rationalist Hobbesian view of a hedonist anarchic human. Human nature, for Shaftesbury, is composed of innately good and altruistic feelings for other humans. Not resembling either Hobbes' hedonistic and animalistic lives or Locke's conscious and possessive individuals, Shaftesbury's humans living in their sentiments depend on moral qualities like sociability, virtue, and benevolence. In this regard, he writes in "The Moralists; a Philosophical Rhapsody," "[n]o sooner are Actions view'd, no sooner the *human Affections* and *Passions* discern'd (and they are most of 'em as soon discern'd as felt),

than straight *an inward* Eye distinguishes and sees *the Fair* and *Shapely*, *the Amiable* and *Admirable*, apart from *the Deform'd*, *the Foul*, *the Odious*, or *the Despicable*" ("Moralists" 415–16; italics in the original). As in this excerpt, he brings together the aesthetically pleasing and the morally appreciated while judging what constitutes a 'proper' human. Established on "the harmony of 'the aesthetic trinity of beauty, truth, and virtue'" (Mounsey 19), this kind of analogy would lead to a distorted parallelism in sentimentalism: "the misshapen body was the index of inner moral failings" (Turner 36). This parallelism establishes not only the dominant idea that the physical disability could only be a reflection of dissolute morality in a human being but also the ableist approach— "physiognomy, the pseudo-science of judging a person's character based on the shape of his or her body and face" (Gabbard 89). Extending this parallelism, Shaftesbury views humans as both self-contained and social entities, for whom balance and harmony between the private and the social should come before pure rationality. Such an association becomes so powerful that "new moral panics" like "self-pollution" begin dominating the public, private, and political spheres of life simultaneously (Turner 37). To that end, believing in the union of public welfare and personal morality, Shaftesbury states that "morality and good government go together. There is no real love of virtue, without knowledge of public good" ("*Sensus Communis*" 72). Such an analogy of private actions and public welfare would bring anomalies of associating socio-political problems and environmental catastrophes with the supposed immorality and physiological inabilities of a certain—mostly non-normative—community in one society. For that reason, the connection between one's morality and physicality essentially leads to an ableist perspective of liberal humanism. In this reductionist view which—despite its abusability—brings morality into the equation, anyone with a natal or an acquired disability falls under the category of a being less than a human subject.

Moral responsibility in one's actions is also associated with the will of the human subject and the causality of actions. David Hume (1711–1776), for instance, argues in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) that actions "are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some *cause* in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil" (*Enquiry* 8. par 29; italics in the original). For D.

Hume, our actions are accompanied by human rationality and will, which, to a certain extent, participate in the causalities and courses of those actions. As an empiricist, D. Hume defines worldly phenomena according to his perception of atomism, the invisible and indistinct particles consisting of matter in the universe. In his atomistic view, phenomena are the results of mechanistic transformations and interactions that never cease. In this respect, a human cannot have a "continuous self" as there are atomistic cuts in whatever ze[32] perceives and experiences; a human subject cannot then consciously feel the "existence" and "continuance" of hir 'self' in existence (D. Hume, *Treatise* I.VI.iv.251). At this point, the human mind needs to make associations out of the unordered formations and to experience and define an ordered form of mechanistic material sensations. For him, the human perception is based on "a nominalist and fragmentary self-experience" as well as "a psychological mechanism to account for the 'illusion' of self-continuity and wholeness of the experienced world" (Murray 14). Due to his empirically challenging notion of the self, D. Hume's position among the Enlightenment philosophers is controversial. Some critics argue that he was also dissatisfied with his earlier ideas, and he was carried away with the common ontological question and arguments on the concept of the self (Swain 142–43). Accordingly, his views on the communication of beings' views and emotions in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40) received revisions from some contemporary critics of liberal humanism, for whom the empiricist was aware of the imperfection of human rationality and existence. In another essay, echoing the fragmented nature of self, D. Hume states that the human "falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man; yet the latter difference is so considerable, that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment" (*Essays* 82–83). Despite the androcentric claims of superiority and exceptionalism, humans, for him, are just another animal species that may fall short of comprehending the material phenomena around them, even with their reasons. Undermining the Enlightenment ideas of rational and irreplaceable humans further, he insists that "the life of man is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster" (*Essays* 583). In the light of these provisions, the Humean notion of human subjectivity is seen to demonstrate that human

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[32] Please see the footnote 4 on page 3.

agency is neither the sole determiner of meanings and events in the natural world nor the sole mediator of cause-effect relations and interactions of materialities.

As opposed to the Humean subject's limited apprehension of the atomistic and materialist universe, the notion of transcendental subject in possession of the universal mind that can collect, connect, and process knowledge is soon proposed by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Introducing this unitary, self-contained sense of the human that is claimed to make sense of the world through knowledge and judgment, Kant defines human consciousness as unified but not fragmented. One of the rare Enlightenment thinkers who could differentiate religion-based sensibilities from scientific-rational thinking (just as he did the same in his concepts of noumenon and phenomenon), Kant relies on the "supreme principle of morality" rooted in reason (*Grounding* 103) and therefore argues humans to be rational and dutiful creatures that can possess "pure practical reason" for moral judgements (*Religion* 3). To confirm these judgments, he claims the concept of conscience to be an indispensable part of the moral apprehension process: Conscience, for Kant, is innate in the human and "the moral faculty of [anthropocentric] judgment, passing judgment upon itself" because the moral judge of phenomena "must be sure that it [the moral decision] is not wrong" (*Religion* 174). The intrinsic existence of reason, morality, senses, and conscience in a human being perfects the androcentric self in his philosophy. This combination also distinguishes the human from nonhuman others. While defining his ethics in *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), he explains this combination by stating that humans hold a particular place among beings on the Earth due to this union of supreme faculties and that humans cannot be used as a means to an end since they are ends in themselves. He, then, distinguishes the experience of knowledge into two: "phenomena" which consist of every kind of things humans are able to experience, perceive, or think about, and "noumena" which are things-in-themselves humans never directly and entirely access and experience. The only subject-in-itself that the human can access is the self, and this can be actualised via self-consciousness (*Critique* B306–07). Kant names this "always changing" consciousness of the self as "transcendental apperception" (*Critique* A107). With this aspect of the human's constant becoming with its capacity for morality, he underlines the human "as a free being" that is "completely and essentially different . . . from the beasts" and points at the human's agentic

subjectivity in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (*Conflict* 131). Arguing that none other than humans could possess such a self-consciousness, Kant strips nonhumans of agency in their interactions with other beings and their environments.

Despite the focus on the anthropocentric subjectivity of the liberal, enlightened human that is constructed upon symbolic language and abstract reasoning, some philosophers of the Enlightenment era incorporate the notions of animality, objecthood, and sensibility into humanness. For instance, Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, (1707–1788) draws an analogy between humans and animals in the concept of the great chain of being in *Natural History* (1749–1804). In this encyclopaedic collection, the French naturalist underlines the indispensability of the aspect of motion in beings and distinguishes the upper echelons of this chain by virtue of a being's ability to contact its surrounding subjects and objects. The human "holds the first rank in the order of nature," he asserts, and arrays that

> brute animals hold the second, vegetables the third, and minerals the last. Though we are unable clearly to distinguish between our animal and spiritual qualities; though brutes are endowed with the same senses, the same principles of life and motion, and perform many actions in a manner familiar to those of man; yet they have not the same extent of relation to external objects; and, consequently, their resemblance to us fails in numberless particulars. (Leclerc 5)

The human's sociability and apparent relationality with its surroundings elevate it to one level higher than the beast. Such an assertion seems curious since, for Leclerc, the human is not so different from the animal in terms of its taxonomical kind, but only in terms of the degree of its relations with other beings, which are quantitatively assumed to be more than the animal's. According to the naturalist, "the whole powers of nature are united" in the animal, be it a human or beast: "He wills; he determines; he acts; he communicates, by his senses, with the most distant objects; his body is a world in miniature, a central point to which every thing in the universe is connected" (Leclerc 6). Aware of the limitedness of the human's perception and understanding of the nonhuman animal, he explains that humans cannot access "the internal qualities of animals as we have of our own"; in other words, "it is impossible to know what passes within animals, or how to rank or estimate their sensations, in relation to those of man" (Leclerc 361). Then, some

intelligible judgment can only be deduced from both sides' comparative scientific observations. Despite the human-animal similarity in his analogy based on the Cartesian understanding of existence in motion and the Kantian thing-in-itself, the dominant notion of the human as the microcosm of the universe in this era is evident in Leclerc's words.

Taking this animalisation to a radical materialist level, Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751) uses the Cartesian "soullessness" concept of nonhumans in *Man a Machine* (1747) and likens the human to "a self-winding machine, a living representation of perpetual motion" (32). Because he extends this notion of the lack of soul to humans, La Mettrie associates the self-valuation of the Anthropos with its own mechanical inventions. Nonetheless, he does not reduce the human to a calculable, automatic abstraction, either. He argues that, as the human body is further examined through autoptic practices, the human is not a pure materialisation of the divine on Earth. For La Mettrie, the human body is a "well-enlightened machine" like an "immense clock, constructed with so much artifice and skill" (59, 69). Resonating with the atomistic idea of matter, his question of the human leans on the assumption that "the entire universe contains only one single diversely modified substance" (La Mettrie 76).

The final figure undermining the human's proud exceptionalism is again David Hume. Based on the self's recognition of emotions and cognitions of others, the faculty of sensibility as the new component of the human depends on his principle of "sympathy" as the ultimate "quality of human nature" to "sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own" (*Treatise* II.I.xi.316). Hume, then, extends this principle of human nature to animals because "*sympathy*, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men" (*Treatise* II.II.xii.398; italics in the original), building a bridge between the long-fictionalised binaries. Paying attention to the vitality of nonhuman beings and entities, he acknowledges nonhuman agencies at work, yet in non-affirmative terms: "We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed from us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent to those ills, with which we are continually threatened" (D. Hume, *Natural* 33). In the negative sense, this perspective

would lead to the enclosures of nature and the engendering of nonhuman alterities, just to be imprisoned into the limited anthropocentric comprehension for centuries. In the positive sense, the incorporation of sensibility into the (now obsolete) concept of humanity not only underscored the aspects of civility and compassion for others in D. Hume's time, but also expanded the scope of civil and compassionate attitudes from humans to animals.

As seen in these attempts to define human subjectivity, the human does not have a stable identity that streams for ages with the same characteristics. On the contrary, the attempts of these philosophers of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries demonstrate how fluid human subjectivity has always been. Situated across a non/human other defined within a binary pattern, the human is oftentimes segregated from its taxonomical relatives and confined in special realms of its own. All these attempts, though, are noteworthy and valuable, for they were trying hard to detach themselves, the meaning of life and universe, and the place of Anthropos from the more oppressive scholastic worldview of the long middle ages. To a certain extent, we[33] owe these thinkers our discussions of posthumanisms and new materialisms as they paved the way for a more equal envisioning of the worldlings. Yet again, this appreciation does not mean to deny their shortcomings and misconceptions, which have led to devastating consequences of race-, species-, ethnicity-, and gender-based discriminations of the following ages.

At this critical point of understanding, other forward-looking writers like Jonathan Swift demand further analysis by virtue of their early and visionary corrections to the shortcomings of the Enlightenment ideals of the human subject. Swift, as a thinker and a satirist, stands out as one of the earliest figures opposing the self-contained imagery of the human. Rather, what is meaningful in his opposition emerges as his incorporation of literary fantasy into his proto-posthumanist style. For this reason, my conditioning of him as an author of posthumanist mind needs a justification, which can be supported by both

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[33] Please see the footnote 3 on page 2.

his biographical discussion and the exemplification from his anti-discriminatory literary corpus in the following section.

2.2. JONATHAN SWIFT AS A POSTHUMANIST SUBJECT

Jonathan Swift has been acknowledged as a great satirist and the father of dark humour in English from the mid-eighteenth century until today. Biographical studies on the author have encountered significant difficulties to pinpoint correctly his perspectives, the fundamental turning points in his career, and the correlation between his works and life.[34] These difficulties stem from a variety of voices, which he provides as objectively as possible, in his works and the distance that he puts between his own ideas and satirical fictions (McMinn 14–15). Although his early years and family lineage remained unknown or doubtful for over two centuries after his death, Irvin Ehrenpreis'[35] meticulous research clarified the shadowed early years of the satirist in the mid-twentieth century and provided what is known about him today. In what follows, I also benefit from these up-to-date biographical sources to re-view Swift from a different angle in the framework of this dissertation. In a posthumanist attempt, I aim to make justice to Swift and his work *Gulliver's Travels* concerning human nature and subjectivity, firstly by looking at how his early years influenced his future careers as a political writer and a satirist, and secondly by providing a correction to the influential liberal-humanist prospects about his recognition and reputation as an 'irrational' person or a madman.

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[34] Here, a biographical survey is required to shed light upon Swift's perspectives and works, especially *Gulliver's Travels*. John Updike writes the significance of biography studies as such: "The life of a writer, which spins outside of itself a secondary life, offers an opportunity to study mind and body, or inside and outside, or dream and reality, together, as one" (Updike). "To the disinterested reader," he claims, "literary biography" seems "purely a bane" (Updike), or rather just "gossip" (McMinn 14).

[35] Ehrenpreis is an authority on Swift and eighteenth-century British literature, who taught in several universities in the US and Europe. One year after his death in 1985, the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, Germany—his last workplace—founded the Ehrenpreis Centre for Swift Studies as a research institute in his honour. In August 2021, I was also awarded the Ehrenpreis Centre's "Jonathan Swift Travel Grant" for a month-long research of the scope of this chapter at the University of Münster.

Swift was born to his parents of English descent in Dublin on November 30, 1667, eight months after the death of his father Jonathan (Ehrenpreis, "Swift's Father" 497–98). His life was influenced by both the family-relative-acquaintance dramas and the political instability during the Restoration era. As an instance of the domestic instabilities in his formative years, during the travels of his mother, Abigail, between Dublin and England, he either remained with his nurse or was kidnapped by her (Ehrenpreis, *Mr Swift* 27–31). Having graduated from the Kilkenny School near Dublin in 1682, Swift continued his education at the Trinity College, Dublin, only to leave Ireland and his master's degree uncompleted due to the spread of the upheaval of the Glorious Revolution of 1689 (Ehrenpreis, *Mr Swift* 34–56). Moving to Moor Park in Surrey, he began working as the secretary of Sir William Temple, who is interpreted to fill in the role of an absent father for Swift (McMinn 17). Writing his early poems and developing his literary formation here, the satirist-to-be received his master of arts degree from the University of Oxford in 1692. Soon he decided to join the clergy and was ordained as a priest in Ireland in 1695. Not satisfied with his new position as well as the fact of being distant from literary and political centres, he re-claimed Sir Temple's service and remained there even after Temple died in 1699.

The eighteenth century set the ground for Swift's political, clerical, and literary services to the public. In 1700, he was appointed to his second clerical position, the vicar of a small parish, Laracor, near Dublin. The quiet days in these clerical positions enabled him to pen down his first pamphlets and fictions. Addressing a power of balance in politics in the context of the Tories' impeachment of the Whig government, his first noteworthy political pamphlet, *A Discourse of the Contests and Dissensions Between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome*, was published anonymously in 1701. Having attained his Doctor of Divinity degree at Trinity College, Dublin in 1702, Swift revealed his identity as the author of the pamphlet to some influential Whig ministers and dedicated his tri-partite set of satire consisting of *A Tale of a Tub*, *The Battle of the Books*, and *The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* to Lord John Somers (1651–1716) when this set was published in 1704. While seeking potential patrons to attain a profession in London, the Laracor vicar was appointed to "negotiate the remission of government taxes . . . upon the church" in 1707 (McMinn 20). In these negotiations with the Whigs with whom he

had previously worked, Dr Swift found out that the Whigs were only bargaining for "legal toleration for non-conformists" in return for pardoning the tax of the Irish church (McMinn 20). As a man of clerical principles, he denied this bargain and ended his closeness with the Whigs. In a second negotiation—this time with the Tories who returned to power after the 1710 elections, the taxes were remitted, and the vicar began his profession as the party writer and propagandist of the Tory party (Ehrenpreis, *Dr Swift* 393–400). In this decade, Swift's friendships with significant literary figures like John Arbuthnot (1667–1735), Henry St. John (1678–1751), Thomas Parnell (1679–1718), John Gay (1685–1732), and Alexander Pope (1688–1744) also began. These men constituted the Scriblerus Club and actualised several political-literary projects together. Unlike his experiences in the Club, his alliance with the Tories did not accomplish his desire to be appointed to a clerical position in England both because of the fall of the Tory administration in 1714 and due to Queen Anne's dislike of the vicar and his satirical style in *A Tale of a Tub*. In the same year, he was appointed as the Dean of the St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin and returned to Ireland for good (Ehrenpreis, *Dean* 1–3). "Swift's self-image as a public servant," as Joseph McMinn states, was "betrayed and disappointed by a corrupt, irrational political system" during his years of several services in England (17). Until his death on October 19, 1745, he would continue his clerical and literary services in Ireland for Ireland—if not for the betterment of the species called 'human.'

Dean Swift's political experiences in England matter in order to make sense of further biographical claims made after his death which influenced several generations. All these claims, which hypothesise a sort of madness and centre all discussions around it at certain times and according to particular agendas, support *ad hominem* attacks and hinder an accurate portrayal and understanding of the author and the proto-posthumanist potential of his works. For example, even after over half a century of the Dean's death, Francis Jeffrey (1773–1850), a lawyer and the literary critic and editor of *The Edinburgh Review*, chastises Swift for changing parties. "In public life, we do not know where we could have found any body," the editor writes about the Dean in the September 1816 issue of *The Edinburgh Review*, "who had openly deserted and libelled his party . . . and joined himself with men who were treacherous" (316). Accepting himself as an undependable critic of the satirist's works and disregarding "his merits as a writer," Jeffrey unhesitantly

continues to state "that he was despicable as a politician, and hateful as a man" (316).[36] In another instance, Thomas Babington Macaulay, another Whig partisan and historian, (1800–1859) attacks Swift in an 1833 issue of the same magazine by portraying the satirist as "the apostate politician, the ribald priest, the perjured lover,—a heart burning with hatred against the whole human race,—a mind richly stored with images from the dung-hill and the lazar-house" (qtd. in Berwick 56). As claimed by these two sentimental attempts of assassinating the satirist's character, the author's life and works could only be the blasphemous results of an absolute hatred of *homo sapiens*, but nothing else.

Keeping in mind the hegemonic influence of sentimentalism and its gradually-dominating belief in human benevolence, I argue that Swift's misanthropy is related to these over-sentimental critics' dissatisfaction with the satirist's attacks on the fictionally-pumped hypocritical argument on the 'innate' goodness of the human kind. When this dissatisfaction is combined with the anxiety of revelation of truths regarding the racist, inhumane, and capital-oriented practices of the ruling parties—be it Whig or Tory—(especially in several policies regarding Ireland and Irish people), Swift is occasionally situated at the bullseye of the political dartboard by either side. For instance, although Shaftesbury's sentimental moralism takes its roots in a belief in human's innately benevolent nature (as mentioned in the first section of this chapter), this sentimental attribute becomes the primary source of the Enlightenment's signature characteristic, which is the pride in humans' actions thanks to 'his' reason. Christopher Fox aptly interprets this transformation of values and ideals in the eighteenth century: "this first medieval sin became the main modern virtue and the cornerstone of the new individualism" (3). Fox's statement clarifies why Swift attracts so much hatred and criticism from the time's thinkers, critics, and philanthropists: The Dean meticulously exposes the mistakes in what these people fiercely hold dear and satirically ridicules these values that encourage liberal humanist praxes.

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[36] It is also a great irony, I have to say, that Jeffrey abandoned his Tory views and joined the Whigs at a certain point in his legal career.

In a similar fashion, Swift's satire depends on the traditional presumption about human nature. This traditional view of the human, for Claude Rawson, describes human beings as "a prey to subversion and unhappiness from within," since they "are by mental constitution restless, irrational and unsatisfied, congenitally prone to false needs and driven to supererogatory and destructive satisfactions" (3). For the Dean, humans pursue unrealistic, self-centred, and unsatisfactory goals in their lives that the humans complicate themselves. This complication eventually creates a self-damaging subject. Although Swift's critical stance against human nature evokes the Hobbesian savagery of 'man vs man in nature' at first look, it is more about the restlessness of the mind—"a radical perversity of the human mind" (Rawson 5). He clarifies his perception of this restlessness in his "Thoughts on Various Subjects": "A Wise Man endeavours, by considering all Circumstances, to make Conjectures, and form Conclusions: But the smallest Accident intervening, . . . doth often produce such Turns and Changes, that at last he is just as much in doubt of Events, as the most ignorant and unexperienced Person" ("Thoughts" 700). As seen here, while Hobbes' idea of human savagery is situational, contextual, and dependent on a premise of an uncivil human, the satirist's concept of the human mind points to a condition of constancy in which the "spontaneous motions" of the mind first tend to "free-thinking" and then to "political and religious subversiveness," "immorality" as well as "intellectual disorder and clinical insanity" (Rawson 5). In order to eliminate the human's self-sabotage, Swift argues that "our thoughts, as they are the seeds of words and actions, . . . ought to be kept under the strictest regulation" ("Some Thoughts" 707). For him, unrestricted thoughts and their uncurbed expression in print or in public have provocative effects on many people. This communicable aspect of free-thinking emerges as the primary reason for the need of a strict regulation. In this frame, he is accepted as an Augustan writer who follows the tradition of the classics and explores the boundaries of reason and rationality by re-calibrating what rationality is and how much humans are capable of it.

Swift re-interprets this capability in his letter to Alexander Pope on September 29, 1725: "I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of that Definition *animal rationale*; and to show it should be only *rationis capax*. Upon this great foundation of Misanthropy (though not in Timons manner) The Whole building of my Travells is

erected" ("Swift" 676). Unlike Timon of Athens,[37] who inspired many British writers like William Shakespeare (1564–1616), Thomas Middleton (1580–1627), and Thomas Shadwell (1642–1692) as a legendary misanthrope, Swift actually argues himself to be someone who indeed likes and appreciates some individuals but does not expect much from the humankind in general. In this respect, he refutes a rational animal—*animal rationale*—definition for the human but prefers his re-definition of an animal capable of reason—*rationis capax*. In another letter to Pope on November 26, 1725, he explains his concept of the human subject further: "I do not hate Mankind, it is vous autres [*sic*] who hate them because you would have them reasonable Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always rejected that Definition and made another of my own" ("Swift" 678). As hinted in his expression, the intelligentsia of the Enlightenment might have been expecting a lot from humankind, especially in these formative years of liberal humanism. However, at the peak of an ontological and epistemological re-emergence and re-conceptualisation of the human subject in this era, Swift consistently questions the ethical credibility of the foundation upon which this image of the human is built.[38]

While situating him in a posthumanist frame, I argue that there are two main reasons which make Swift a misfit in the realm of proliferating liberal humanism. The first one is his political and social attitude against colonial and racial practices. In this respect, it is crucial to re-consider his endeavours for the protection of the Irish and for the amendment of the English policies, which engender the basis of his heroism and appraisal in several circles of politics and literature. Despite his reluctance to return to Ireland in the first decade of the eighteenth century, his earliest work protesting English colonial attitude toward Ireland, "The Story of the Injured Lady" (1707/1746), is written upon the Act of Union between England and Scotland, which gives no right of parliamentary representation to the Irish until the end of the century. Among many of his pamphlets and writings like this protest work which denounces the white man's supremacy, the

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[37] For further discussion about the fictionality of Timon, see A. MacC. Armstrong's article entitled "Timon of Athens – a Legendary Figure?," in which all the written sources about Timon are given and put into dialogue with one another.

[38] In this respect, Swift is well-known and continues to be appreciated as a satirist of Christo-hetero-patriarchal politics of Britain and Europe, who had no fear to speak up against the injustice and ills in his lifetime.

collection of *The Drapier's Letters* (1724–25) draws attention. In this collection, he assumes a persona of a middle-class tradesperson—specifically a draper as in the title of the letters—and rebukes William Wood the ironmaster's fraudulent receipt of a royal patent to introduce a new copper coinage for Ireland because a legal affirmation to protect the actual value of copper half-pence in Ireland is absolutely denied by the British authorities. Despite the fact that Wood's scheme is related to his own personal gains as an ironmonger, the British royalty's and administrators' indifference toward the Irish calls for justice kindles a matter of anti-colonial sentiments and hence an issue of national sovereignty (Ehrenpreis, *Acts* 66–75). Swift's involvement in the already heated discussions on this matter provokes these anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments once he writes these lines in the fourth letter: "The Remedy is wholly in your own Hands; and therefore I have digressed a little, in order to refresh and continue that *Spirit* so seasonably raised amongst you; and to let you see, that by the Laws of GOD, of NATURE, of NATIONS, and of your own Country, you ARE and OUGHT to be as FREE a People as your Brethren in *England*" ("Drapier's" 66; italics and capitalisation in the original). Although these lines directly refer to Ireland's constitutional rights, it continues to be interpreted as "a revolutionary, at least a rebellious, call to national action" (McMinn 24). In return, the writer of these letters is accused of treason to the English parliament. A bounty hunting to identify that person with sufficient legal proof is started by Robert Walpole, the time's prime minister, only to fail in the face of tight solidarity protecting the real author. Irish people's appreciation of these attempts by Swift soon levels the satirist up to the status of a national hero.

The posthumanist nature of the author's writings and life can also be observed in his much-contested and much-appreciated stance in Ireland. The scene of Swift's return to Dublin from London, where he went to deliver the manuscript of *Gulliver's Travels* for publication, in late 1726 appears quite impressive when his relations with the London circles are thought:

> In his return to Dublin, upon notice that the ship in which he sailed was in the bay, several heads of different corporations, and principal citizens of Dublin went out to meet him in a great number of wherries engaged for that purpose, in order to welcome him back. . . . The boats, adorned with streamers, and colours . . . made a fine appearance; and thus was the Drapier brought to his landing-place in a kind of

> triumph, where he was received on shore by a multitude of his grateful countrymen, by whom he was conducted to his house amid repeated acclamations, of *Long live the Drapier*. The bells were set a ringing, and bonfires kindled in every street. (Sheridan 225–26)

Such a scene of celebratory welcoming does not correspond well with harsh attacks on Swift's self, career, and writings. What is noteworthy in his elevation to a figure of national significance is that, even in this successful defence of the Irish and their economy, the Dean protects his partiality toward all parties in this coinage Wood-fraud. In this sense, it is apt to remember posthumanism's challenges to "the all-pervasive tendency in human thinking that 'Man' is and should be at the centre of all inquiry" (Bartosch 137). Similarly, Swift's works do not hesitate to challenge both pervasive tendencies of the white man's practices and the mistakes of his non-privileged and non-conforming others. In the first letter, he puts the blame for submitting to the rule and policies of the English on the Irish: "It is your Folly, that you have no common or general Interest in your View, not even the Wisest among you; neither do you know or enquire, or care who are your Friends, or who are your Enemies" ("Drapier's" 38). Likewise, he criticises his fellows in Ireland in "A Modest Proposal" (1729), in which the brutality of the Anthropos is disguised as an act of benevolent human nature. Gradually situated as the protector of Ireland, the satirist speaks for this country which failed to protect itself against the English colonial rules and practices and was subjected to ethnic, racial, and religious segregation for long.

The second reason for the Dean's posthumanist alignment resides in some of his so-called 'scatological' and unorthodox poems. His verse works like "The Beasts' Confession to a Priest" (1732–33) and "A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed" (1734) contribute to anti-Swift Enlightenment discourse, which doubts the presence of sound rationality in him. In "The Beasts' Confession to a Priest," Swift criticises Aesop (c. 620–564 BCE) for "libelling the *Four-foot* Race" since his fables are "false in Fact" and "so absurd" ("Beasts' Confession" 567; italics in the original). In the disguise of moralistic tales for—mostly younger—human beings, Aesop's tales indeed promote an othering process toward nonhuman animals, and he consciously underlines this misdeed when he claims

> Creatures of ev'ry Kind but ours
> Well comprehend their nat'ral Powers;
> While We, whom *Reason* ought to sway,
> Mistake our Talents ev'ry Day[.] ("Beasts' Confession" 567; italics in the original)

Reminding the reader of his *rationis capax* definition, the poet calls the human "A Creature *bipes et implumis*" which translates as 'two-legged and full-footed.' He is thought to have derived this definition from Diogenes the Cynic (c. 4th–5th centuries BCE), whose statement in Latin expresses that "*Homo est animal bipes, implume, erecto vultu*" (Swift, "Beasts' Confession" 567n*), as originally written in Greek in *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* by Diogenes Laërtius (c. 3rd–4th centuries), meaning in English 'Man is a two-legged animal, full-footed, with an erect face.' Just like the Cynics, Swift does not trust the sentimental and well-intentioned human nature, especially in political matters. Therefore, he ends his poem by satirically arguing that Aesop "the Moralist design'd / A Compliment on Human-Kind" since he claims that, despite their status higher than humans, "Beasts may *degen'rate* into Men" ("Beasts' Confession" 567; italics in the original).

In addition to delving into human-animal relationality, the Dean also deals with a Harawayan cyborg in another poem, "A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed," in which the nightly routine of Corinna—the persona in the poem—after her performance in Drury Lane is juxtaposed with the assumptions of natural beauty. During this routine in her room, she "Takes off her artificial Hair," picks "out a Crystal Eye" from her eye socket, and draws out "Plumpers," which "serve to fill her hollow Jaws" and a "Set of Teeth" from her mouth ("Beautiful Young Nymph" 539). Defying all conventions of female beauty, Corinna stands as a striking assemblage of human and nonhuman materialities. "Her public identity consists," as Anthony W. Lee affirms, "of a fluid hybridity, an interactive exchange between her natal biological ontology and various artificial technologies" (58). Unlike a unitary view of the human that excludes all nonhumans while defining its subjectivity, Swift in this poem demonstrates the possibility of constructing a new identity with the help of prosthetics and might be argued to refute an image of some transhumanist endeavour. As seen in these two poems, his approach to nonhuman animals

and materialities differs from the shared liberalist and sentimentalist perspectives of putting everything in use for the sake of the human's benefits in the eighteenth century.

To the discussions over his political affiliations, these artistic productions also contributed to his image of a madman or a misanthrope. Especially his later years of poor health are interpreted to be one of the sources of the attack from the 'enlightened' people. To protect him, his friends took action and enabled him to be declared *non compos mentis*—of unsound mind and memory—in 1742 (Fox 4). Only in 1861, Prosper Ménière, a French neurologist, was able to diagnose that Swift had Ménière's Disease throughout his life; this clarification, especially the severity of this disorder in his old age, provided "a rational explanation" and an excuse for his 'eccentricities' for all the parties (McMinn 15). Yet again, this fact is treated as a foundation of the anti-Swiftian arguments about how/why such a learned man cannot be in the Enlightenment mindset and how/why he cannot support this novel image of the 'man.'[39] Besides, his unconventional works and personality traits prepared the grounds for the anti-Swift camaraderie that posed the Dean himself as a cautionary tale of misanthropy, which would eventually lead to a painful, disdained end as an act of divine providence. Indeed, this twisted perspective, as discussed in the previous section, belongs to what sentimentalism and its moral platitudes have long dictated and equated: physical decay is the sign of mental and moral deterioration.[40] Nevertheless, his critical approach to the collective eighteenth-century organisation of life and institutions around some dignified concept of 'human reason' suffices today to position him as a proto-posthumanist author. "As a satirist," Fox points out, "Swift delighted in puncturing inflated claims to purely altruistic acts" (6). Therefore, he cannot be situated as an epitome of misanthropy but as a champion of the rejection and correction of the liberal human that is the newly emerging concept of the human whose value is positioned above every other being and matter. For this reason, I claim he

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[39] Added to his illness, the collection of Swift's ironical use of humour and satirical attitude made many people incapable of distinguishing between Swift the writer and his works.

[40] For detailed discussions regarding this sentimental belief, see John Beynon's Masculinities and Culture (27), George L. Mosse's *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (79–80), and my article entitled "Emperyalist Erkekliğin Çöküşü: Joseph Conrad'ın *Lord Jim* Romanında Erkeklik Çıkmazı" (154).

achieves the gradual portrayal of a human subject's posthuman-becoming best in his renowned fantasy, *Gulliver's Travels*.

2.3 *GULLIVER'S TRAVELS*: A CHIMERICAL HYBRIDISATION OF SUBJECTIVITIES

Fantasy literature provides an abundance of unusual beings in various forms and sizes. These beings appear as either animals, objects, or plants displaying human characteristics, or literary humanoids with slight differences from the human. For this reason, fantasy fiction has become the central locale of humans' ceaseless interest in depictions of fictional species in several sizes. Transforming the familiar into the unfamiliar, fantasies introduce new meanings and satirical spectacles since they distort the sense of stable reality and assault the 'human' understanding of the 'norm'al, 'expected,' and 'proper.' Fantasy literature's characteristic of adaptability forces the human's social and biological realities—"our sense of what is proper" (Garland-Thomson 162). Considering that these (un)familiar creatures go beyond the limitations of binary thinking, this bounty brings the posthuman potentiality in the fantasy's illustrations of the human and the more-than-human. Petit forms like fairies, elves, hobbits, pixies, dwarves, and Ewoks[41] mostly evoke a sense of delight and adoration, whereas grand figures such as giants, trolls, dragons, golems, and ents usually leave appalling impressions and a sense of discomfort. Employing this versatility of grotesque and unfamiliar embodiments in *Gulliver's Travels*, Swift playfully challenges the human bodymind through diminutive and voluminous imageries of similar bodyminds. In doing so, he addresses the inner eye of the reader visualising these fantastic curiosities during the reading process and reinvigorates the respective senses of staring, observing, familiarising and domesticating

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[41] I must note that not all of these figures evoke same feelings for the audience because the fantasy genre employs creative liberty in the portrayal of nonhuman beings and the fantasy writers vary in depicting one fantastic creature. This variety refers to the fantastic multiplicity of nonhuman and/or humanoid races. For example, Tolkien's elves are always tall, fair and elegant while Rowling's elves are small, wrinkly and servile. As another instance, fairies like Tinker Bell in Neverland and pixies at Hogwarts have different physical and personality characteristics. In addition, Ewoks in the Star Wars universe are also known to be a wild, barbaric species that could consume human(oid)s.

the absolute and ordinary alterities, which are discussed in detail in the first chapter of this dissertation.

"The modern world . . . is ocularcentric" (25), Rosemarie Garland-Thomson claims in her monograph, *Staring: How We Look* (2009). Stressing the embeddedness of matter and meaning, she concentrates on the multi-scalar relationality conveyed through eyes and the act of staring which "is an ocular response to what we don't expect to see" (3). In the same vein, staring is the most common action practised in Swift's novel because characters stare to observe and understand when ordinary things become insufficient to address the oddities they encounter. Entwining the organ with the mind, staring as "a conduit to knowledge" (Garland-Thomson 15) carries everyone involved in this fantasy toward a posthumanist engagement with unfamiliar human and nonhuman alterities. Nevertheless, this was not the case in the eighteenth century when the act of observing changed from mere witnessing to an objective scientific inquiry. This was a milestone in making the human's planetary connections more scientifically and technically meaningful as the rise of rationalism brought a myriad of entities to be observed in mostly microscopic styles. Following this, the concept of individual perspective became prevalent as it was the primary tool for representing the naturalcultural phenomena and depicting their realities, especially in natural and life sciences. However, the observer's perspective was positioned in the early modern era as "a gatekeeper of knowledge regarding [any] scene depicted, shutting down the possibility of competing knowledges that might emerge from the multiple points of view" (Garland-Thomson 27–28). Despite this reductionist perception of the early modern onto-epistemological quandary, Swift as a rationalist and neoclassical author defies the singularised supremacy of the 'white,' European, androcentric envisioning of the human.

What is expected from readers of *Gulliver's Travels* is not an identification with a number of distinct humanoids, things, and animals, but rather a critical observation from Gulliver's point of view. Swift demands an almost scientific inquiry of worldly multiplicities. In doing so, the novel releases a chronological journey of a human being's becomings with those multiplicities, which eventually gives birth to a curious posthuman subjectivity. These continuous becomings after several encounters with the other-than-

humans provide a wide platform for the interrogation of the concept(s) of the human(ity) and its place in the rhizomatic web of relations in the world. The fantasy travelogue of the protagonist enables the satirist to portray one of the first Enlightenment challenges to the rationality-centred human that was newly but firmly enrooting in the continental philosophy back then. Keeping in mind that Swift was one of the representative authors of the neoclassical literature that heavily relied on the observation and mimetic representation of the human nature and the concept of the restraint use of reason, one would assume that he would not plunge into a proto-posthumanist portrayal of non/human subjectivity. Yet, that is not the case at all. He brings a critique to the human from within. It is this unexpected character of the author that makes his works convenient for the proliferation of human-nonhuman enmeshment. Reaching beyond the known universe, Swift conjoins a multiverse, so to speak, through Gulliver's visits to different naturecultures.

For this reason, the Dean desires his characters and readers to resort to this "interrogative gesture that asks what's going on and demands the story" (Garland-Thomson 3). He would not like any reader to identify with his characters, perhaps exclusive of the hero, because the protagonist offers a mutability in his journeys in the anthropocentric imageries of what is left outside the human. To undermine the Enlightenment philosophy of human superiority in nature that is discussed in the first section of this chapter, Swift resorts to the versatility of size in Books I and II of *Gulliver's Travels*. For instance, the author's purpose of disturbing the image of the human as an ultimate being at the top of a hierarchy is studied by the biologist John Tyler Bonner in his book, *Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whale* (2006), discussing the significance of size in life forms. As Bonner argues in length, the scale of a biotic body stands as the principal determiner of the physical, social, environmental, and temporal aspects of that being. Embodiment matters in one's relationality in the universe. One's lifespan, interactions, daily habits (as in digestion and discharge), communication capacities (like hir use of voice), and many features are determined by hir material volume. In this respect, observing Gulliver's 'objective' depiction of the Lilliputians is noteworthy:

> As the common Size of the Natives is somewhat under six Inches high, so there is an exact Proportion in all other Animals, as well as Plants and Trees: For instance, the tallest Horses and Oxen are between four and five Inches in height, the Sheep an Inch and a half, more or less; their Geese about the bigness of a Sparrow, and so the several Gradations downwards, till you come to the smallest, which, to my sight, were almost invisible; but Nature hath adapted the Eyes of the *Lilliputians* to all Objects proper for their view: They see with great exactness, but no great distance. (*GT* 47; italics in the original)[42]

With these detailed mathematical and physical calculations, Swift adopts the number twelve as a multiplier in Books I and II and illustrates everything in them in twelvefold ways. The proportion of the miniature nation abides by the natural laws as all the other nonhuman entities around them are diminished on the same scale. The writer conveys this rationalisation of the size equation through the diminutive populace's arduous mathematicians who calculate that the titular human hero exceeds the humanoid "in the Proportion to Twelve to One" (*GT* 37). We can observe the consistency of this ratio in his consumption equal to the daily allowance of 1728 (12^3) Lilliputians. Swift's reliance on such "scientific axioms" sums up the conventional position of the author as an "objective and withdrawn" observer and deliverer of social, political, and moral events (K. Hume 37). This writing convention stands out as the most apparent and emblematic quality of the flourishing realist fiction then. Yet, the satirist's realism fails in the face of contemporary sciences.

To foster this realistic account further, the tiny humanoids could have been explained to reach maturity at the age of twelve—much earlier than the human. In another instance, one of the schemes to kill Gulliver mentions starving him to death because his size affects "the rate at which [his] internal motor runs, that is, [his] metabolism" (Bonner 119). As a voluminous being in Lilliput, he needs more energy, and only a reduced rate of his metabolism offers an opportunity for his demise. However, Swift's illustration of the unreal fails at the biological impossibility of the Lilliputians to see the microscopic world better since they have fewer eye cells than a human and cannot hence see much smaller beings either (Bonner 72–77). Otherwise, a "Lilliputian micro-biologist would not need much of a microscope to help her see microbes" (Bonner 14). Additionally, the miniature

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[42] For the sake of brevity, *Gulliver's Travels* is abbreviated as *GT* in parenthetical references.

humanoid's circulatory system (racing heartbeat) should have enabled hir to reach superspeed movements, "as rapid as a blink" (Bonner 124); yet, this is not the case in Swift's narrative. Bonner finally refutes the literary realism attempted in the novel by referring to sound frequencies in different-sized beings: Due to their pettiness, "the Lilliputians have smaller vocal chords[, and] their voices will be high and squeaky, and they would talk with great rapidity, so much so that it might be difficult for Gulliver to hear and understand them" (33). As seen in this size-based biological argument, meaningful communication between two parties has never been a reliable option.

If the rationalisation of the scale in the realist depictions does not correspond to much of the reality, one wonders, what does Swift's toil in detailing the size versatility in the Books I and II edify, then? Does it convey a different message, except for a metaphorical reading of what a human does before his peers that are minimised or magnified under some microscopic or telescopic vision? My answer to such questions builds on Swift's response-able character—in Harawayan and Baradian senses—that could not abstain from harshly satirising ethically irresponsible events in his lifetime (as in the case of *Drapier's Letters* between 1724 and 1725). Swift uses proportionality in the novel to pinpoint the exclusionary perspective of the human subject and the inclusionary character of nature. He puts familiar but also strange figures next to the human subject. This way, he explores the boundaries and relations between the non/human other and the human, and upturns anthropocentric hierarchies by teasing out the complexities embedded in those boundaries and relations.

Then, I can argue that ocularcentrism, or the appeal of the size versatility to the imagining eye of the reader, in *Gulliver's Travels* functions to encourage the emergence of the posthuman potential in the text. In Swift's portrayal of a subject's posthuman core, multiple bodies or body parts intermingle with one another to make sense of the ongoing phenomena occurring around the staring, observing, and imagining eye. This intermingling renders the engendering of novel webs of information about subjectivities in a constant course of "material vibrancy" (Bennett xiii) possible. Bodies and knowledge permeate one another in this vibrancy and thus constitute multi-scalar bodies in the "viscous porosity" (Tuana 188) between those be(com)ings in fusion. The following

analyses of Books I and II, as the Introduction of this dissertation has explicated, will adopt a diffractive methodology in its attempt to discuss the posthuman subjectivity of Gulliver. When a comparative analysis is used in unfolding his ever-emergent posthuman becoming, it has the risk of swaying simply toward a dualistic reading of dwarves and giants who can be thought of as some satirical portrayals of certain people in Swift's time. Rather than being entrapped by the humanist quandary, my reading will try to operate outside the dualistic comparative methodology and argue that the hero's subsequent encounters with different beings reconfigure his identity as a (post)human. Therefore, I will diffractively scrutinise the Lilliputians' attempts to position Gulliver as a less-than-human being from the first moment of their encounter to the last as well as his struggles to preserve his human identity.

When the protagonist wakes up to discover "several slender Ligatures across my [his] Body, from my [his] Armpits to my [his] Thighs," he soon perceives "a human Creature not six Inches high, with a Bow and Arrow in his Hands, and a Quiver at his Back" and "at least forty more of the same kind" on and around him (*GT* 17).[43] Astonished at the scene of somewhat familiar—but also disturbingly alien—humanoid species, he fights against his enforced immobilisation. Gulliver's loud roars and struggles to get loose present an assessment of powers between two parties, a human being and diminutive humanoids. As he states, it is easy for him to "break the Strings, and wrench out the Pegs that fastened my [his] left Arm to the Ground," and loosen "the Strings that tied down my [his] Hair on the left Side" (*GT* 18). Without hurting himself, Gulliver measures his strength with his attempts to get liberated and realises the power imbalance and his superiority, upon which he states: "I had reason to believe I might be a Match for the greatest Armies they could bring against me" (*GT* 18). When the diminutive soldiers walk "backwards and forwards on my [his] Body," he is "often tempted . . . to seize Forty or Fifty of the first that came in my [his] reach, and dash them against the Ground" (*GT* 20).

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[43] This act of overpowering a bigger being by a group of smaller entities that are interested in protecting their local, regional existence and well-being in the face of global movements is called the "Lilliput Strategy" by labour activists Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello (9).

However, his curiosity encourages him to lie quiet and wait for the right time to attain his freedom.

A symbol of the prevalent mindset in eighteenth-century Britain, the gigantic hero's curiosity for the unknown, the undiscovered, and the not-yet-conquered retains him in a non-resistant, obedient, and observant status. Pushing humanity for further geo-techno-scientific advances, this worldview of discoveries and inventions established the "Man," "the prime fiction of the Renaissance" (Manes 25), at the centre of the cosmos after the Copernican heliocentrism, as opposed to geocentrism, was launched in the sixteenth century. Refuting the geocentric perspective supported by classical and religious authorities, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) proved that human was able to employ a dialectical scientific method for the cosmic phenomenon and prove the proposed hypothesis on the grounds of scientific inquiries, observations, and a rational methodology at the dawn of modernity (Carman 16–17). Then, regarding curiosity as a virtuous act for the enhancement of the human's knowledge and capability without the boundaries of some strict authority, "modernity validates the eye's hunger for new and strange sights" (Garland-Thomson 48). "Curiosity," as Garland-Thomson asserts, "prompted explorations, commencing the mobility that is a defining feature of modern era" and oriented modernity "toward the future rather than the past" (48). Gulliver's inherent curiosity, "naturalizing and authorizing [his] movement to expand limits of the known universe" (Garland-Thomson 48), pays off because, in return for his "submissive Behaviour," "these diminutive Mortals" serve him a good amount of food and beverage, shout for joy, and dance upon his breast (*GT* 20).

Despite his restricted body, Gulliver satisfies his curiosity about these diminutive humanoids by his act of staring—observing—for the sake of knowledge. In the beginning, such a vantage puts Gulliver into the shoes of a scientist who closely examines wondrous organisations of some unknown species that capture both his attention and his physical existence. Holding his 'enlightened' self-esteem at a higher level than these humanoids, the protagonist positions himself as the superior. Also, the Lilliputians' reactions stiffen his sense of superiority over them. At the disposal of Gulliver's monstrous power, they seem like unharmful beings that solely employ intriguing mechanisms. Contrary to his

assumption of being in control of this pseudo-scientific observation, the little people's servitude has an entirely different purpose. The Lilliputians who assume themselves as the ultimate superior entity in their own environment have the same curiosity to investigate this curious, monstrous, and massive being that has washed their homelands ashore. For the sake of further scientific inquiries, they have slyly infused some "soporiferous Medicine" into Gulliver's liquor (*GT* 22) in order to carry him like a chattel, or rather a sort of unexpected shipwreck loot that has washed ashore, to his new prison-home.

The Lilliputians' initial capture of the hero at the seashore is the first act of his nonhumanisation[44] before the little humanoids. At first, this scene of immobilisation recalls humans' capture of big, wild animals. Subsequent showers of arrows and little bombs falling on his body are the Lilliputian instruments to tame so huge a beast like Gulliver. Being stripped of his conscious agency to communicate and to come to terms with these little humanoids, the traveller gets gradually nonhumanised. The second case of his estrangement from the notion of the human is his spectacular transportation to the metropolis by a superb wooden vehicle, which five hundred carpenters and engineers built, and which fifteen hundred miniature horses pulled (*GT* 21–22). After being treated like a wild beast, he now becomes a property of a humanoid species, which, in the eighteenth-century humanist framework, is inferior to the human in terms of both its size and affect.

Already twice removed from the concept of the human, Gulliver takes a long time to realise that his humanness is undermined multiple times. The Lilliputians quarter him in "an ancient Temple, esteemed to be the largest in the whole Kingdom . . . [and now] applied to common Uses" (*GT* 22), and confine him there by "locking fourscore and eleven Chains" to his "left Leg with six and thirty Padlocks" (*GT* 23). This entrapment

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[44] Here, nonhumanisation, as a part of my own conceptualisation, refers to the process of the deconstruction of the human as the superior being and then the re-positioning of that human as a nonhuman or other-than-human entity. This definitive process ought not to be confused with the word 'dehumanisation' since the latter term carries a historical (over)weight which is associated with interhuman or human-induced cruelties and sufferings. Hence, two words are used according to this differentiation throughout this dissertation.

again recalls the capture and imprisonment of a wild animal or a dehumanised criminal. From the Lilliputians' perspective, it becomes clear that the hero is stripped of his rational actions alongside his subjectivity. His treatments in such nonhumanising ways are just the beginnings of his polymorphic self that will go under several challenges and changes throughout his journeys in all four Books. The more he interacts with other beings, the more Lemuel Gulliver will be entangled with less-human and nonhuman others—even to the point of the emergence of his ultimate posthuman subjectivity. In Book I of these entanglements, he is forced to comprehend his statuses of animalisation and objectification through these initial examples, which will only be furthered in his prison and the Lilliputian capital, Mildendo. Soon after his transportation to the temple, visits from "prodigious Numbers of rich, idle, and curious People" (*GT* 26) accompany Gulliver's scene of confinement. He is transformed into an object of staring. This transformation is directly connected to the eighteenth-century mindset that glorified the exhibitions of "living curiosities" (Bogdan 26) like the titular character.

Beginning from the seventeenth century when "the quickening eagerness for knowledge . . . would lead to the Enlightenment and eventually to museums and other exhibitions catering to all classes of society" (Altick 5), scientific curiosity, inquiry, and observation mostly went astray. Even at the time of medieval church exhibitions of the relics of some significant religious figures, humans valued them economically, culturally, and spiritually to make better senses of the world they lived in. To give an example, they visited clerical museums to see holy and naturalcultural curiosities just to receive healing or amendment in return for their visits. In turn, they sustained the finances of churches by making donations (Altick 5–7). This system of valuation strongly supported a paradoxical paradigm of nonhuman and human valuations: The human's elevated and exceptional status above all the other beings was further embellished with religious, political, and other ideological causes. This embellishment turned the properties of such ideologically significant people (such as holy knives, bodily parts, old clothes, and the like) into objects of veneration (which were believed to define or enhance one's goodness, welfare, and morality) after the death of their owners much more valuable than those people. At this rate, the properties/objects or relics of certain dead people came to be more esteemed than the exceptional human, rising above the human in the hierarchy of beings. From the

posthumanist vantage, such a valuation of objects or objectification of humans posits a positive onto-epistemological alignment of human and nonhuman. On the ethical grounds, though, they seem problematic as these objectifications only serve the ambitious liberal (and the present-era neo-liberal and hyper-capitalist) ends of the Anthropos.

Such object-oriented valuation changed its foci in the age of discoveries and relied, this time, on secularised naturalcultural curiosities that were gradually sustained by newly flourishing sciences and technologies. Soon, as Richard D. Altick explains in *The Shows of London* (1978), "English ships began to explore remote regions of the world and bring back tales and objects testifying to the existence of places and races formerly undreamed of, or at best merely the subject of unverified rumor" (7). As the moralising or purifying influence of the clerical relics was removed away from the object-oriented valuation, freak shows or exhibitions of bodies and beings unfamiliar to the European eye began to satisfy "the people's innate hunger for marvels" just for the marvel's sake (Altick 7). Other than the upper-class virtuosi with genuinely scientific motives, several uneducated working-class people alongside the bourgeoisie frequented the whereabouts of these unfamiliar non/humans. As in the freak shows in London fairs in the eighteenth century, a shared sense of wonder erased social distinctions among "prodigious Numbers of rich, idle, and curious People" (*GT* 26) and created a carnivalesque atmosphere in Lilliput too: "[T]he quality and the rabble, the cultivated and the ignorant mingled to see the latest marvel" (Altick 36). Amid "the Malice of the Rabble" (*GT* 25), Gulliver experienced the maltreatment of the uneducated and savage diminutive folk who came to the temple to content "their innate relish for the sensational, the mysterious, and the grotesque" (Altick 36). Some among his audience "had the Impudence to shoot their Arrows at me [him] as I [he] sate on the Ground by the Door of my [his] House, whereof one very narrowly missed my [his] left Eye" (*GT* 25). Gulliver's nonreactive attitude during these Lilliputian freak shows actually brings forth the first perspective shift both for Gulliver and in the narrative. Swift, here, provides a microcosm of the London population and the human attitudes in a vividly dehumanised way. Resorting to either the Lilliputians or the titular hero, the author portrays ethically responsible actions in the cases of such moments of cruelties and de-/non-humanisations.

Gulliver's merciful approach to the little humanoids from the very beginning is one illustration of these responsible actions. When "six of the Ring-leaders" who attacked and shot arrows at him were seized and bound by the Colonel's order and delivered in the man-mountain's "right Hand," his treatment of these miniature mischievous people hints at his humorously didactic character: Gulliver "took them all in my [his] right Hand, put five of them into my [his] Coat-Pocket, and as to the sixth, I [he] made a Countenance as if I [he] would eat him alive" (*GT* 25). Though shocking at first sight, this cannibalistic frightening is followed by Gulliver's forgiving of the trembling captives' misdeeds, "cutting the Strings" around their hands, and setting them free on the ground (*GT* 26). The Lilliputian soldiers and people perceive "this Mark of [his] Clemency" (*GT* 26) as a favourable judgment of an agentic subjectivity so much so that he gradually gets respected as an individual in this alien space and begins communicating with the diminutive royalty and courtiers. The protagonist is gradually transformed from an alien being to a familiar persona in the land of Lilliput. For this reason, his absolute alterity dissolves as much as he utilises an opportunity to display his 'benevolent' and 'rational' self before the diminutive folk. For instance, by proving his ability of speech and learning their language, the gigantic human gradually regains his agentic self as understood by the Emperor's asking him to "swear a Peace with him and his Kingdom" (*GT* 27). After such displays, these humanoids finally recognise his powers and abilities, and he is treated as a subject in legally-binding negotiations. The familiarisation process continues with a bodily investigation on, or rather an inventory survey of, Gulliver. Rather than dozing him off or anaesthetising him as they did in his grand transportation, the Emperor requires his "Consent and Assistance" (*GT* 27) for the Lilliputian soldiers to search his clothes from top to toe. To a certain extent, this scene shows one of his restoration moments from being an outright nonhuman to an agential being in his four-step process of posthuman hybridisation.

While Gulliver's hybridisation refers to his often-restored humanness with the acts that require decision-making processes as a subject, it also refers to his ongoing objectification in this land. Gulliver is treated as an unexpectedly looted national property as the Lilliputian officers inspect and inventory his exterior and interior apparel. Construed as a sort of inanimate machine ready to be dismantled which resembles La Mettrie's figure of

the mechanistic human, he strips his clothes and turns up his pockets. The minuscule officers map out, first, the surface of this bulky machine, and then, his interiors under meticulous scrutiny. Here, his pockets and fobs—in general, his clothes—are perceived as extended prostheses of a machine. Yet, Gulliver as an autonomous subject subtly rejects this objectification by preserving his privacy and hiding his "two Fobs, and another secret Pocket" in which he had "some little Necessaries that were of no consequence to any but" himself (*GT* 28). Reading the notion of privacy associated with pockets—especially in relation to women's lives, Ariane Fennetaux states that "privacy is an elusive notion that is linked but not equivalent to a series of related categories such as the private sphere, intimacy, secrecy, interiority, and subjectivity" (310). Disconnected from a "solipsistic subjectivity," the protagonist's attempt to preserve his privacy by keeping his inner pockets unsearched showcases a mutually constitutive relationship "between interior and exterior, between self and other" (Fennetaux 310). Thus, his hidden pockets sheltering "personified tokens of affection" (Fennetaux 330) like his "Silver Watch" (*GT* 28) become the locus where the human subject closely meets and entangles with the nonhuman object in intellectual and affective ways. Presenting "a metaphorical extension" (Fennetaux 327) of his subjectivity, the non-inventoried pockets tell a personal narrative of a posthuman subjectivity having emerged from the coalescence of the subject and the object.

During this survey, we see that Gulliver as an automaton of La Mettrie's philosophy is metaphorically dissected into a number of smaller quantifiable parts. He "took up the two Officers in my [his] Hands, put them first into my [his] Coat-Pockets, and then into every other Pocket about me [him]" (*GT* 28). Already familiar with his surface appearance at the moments of his immobilisation at the shore and his transportation to the temple, the Lilliputian authorities now get familiar with the interior of this less-known being. That is why they employ an autopsy, which was actually a praxis of specific rules in Europe since the sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century, autopsy performance used to be conducted "often open to public, not only to show, but to teach and learn" the secrets (Gulczyński et al. 169) with which a body was embedded before it was removed into closed laboratories. Similarly in the novel, the results of this autoptic inventory survey are soon displayed to the Lilliputian ruler, royalty, courtiers, soldiers, and commoners,

who are all present in the minuscule audience. This scene recalls the conventional eighteenth-century public autopsy openings where "the spectators should sit . . . according to their social status and prestige" (Gulczyński et al. 169). Always practised on a dead body, the autopsy here is performed on a living being indeed for the sake of preserving a healthy community against any risk of pathogenic contagion that might stem from a foreign being. However, during the Lilliputian survey, Gulliver's preservation of hidden pockets underlines the fact that any being—living or non-living—is imbued with unreachable, undecidable, and hidden aspects defining that being's subjectivity. This "noumenal" side in Graham Harman's conceptualisation (resembling the Kantian notion, but also applied to beings other than humans) offers "no literal access" (Harman 204) to the intrinsic agency of the subject under scrutiny. In this sense, relations between Gulliver and the Lilliputian are, as Harman would contend, "incidental in the life of things" and in the unfolding of further events in the narrative, "rather than the stuff of which they are constituted" (259). That is to say, human and nonhuman subjects in their mutual communications can "interact with and affect their societies[, environments,] and political systems" without leaving "any trace" (Harman 259) of their apparent qualities. Despite the Lilliputian efforts of employing observational, objective, and scientific methods to know Gulliver as a complete entity, they fail to attain the whole of his agentic capabilities in this survey.

The protagonist's evasion of this autopsy and deflection of the diminutive authority's perception of his true self reflect his stance as an autonomous subject. Yet, Swift's insertions of constant translations of the Lilliputian language quickly provide, once again, a method of nonhumanisation for Gulliver if we happen to accept him as the nonhuman and the diminutive folk as the 'real' and 'defining' human species in the first Book. Besides, these translations from Lilliputian to English function as a rhetorical defamiliarisation tool for the reader. Before further analysis, it would be meaningful to cite this lengthy inventory:

> In the right Coat-Pocket of the *Great Man Mountain* . . . after the strictest search, we found only one great Piece of coarse Cloth, large enough to be a Foot-Cloth for your Majesty's chief Room of State. In the left Pocket, we saw a huge Silver Chest, with a Cover of same Metal, which we the Searchers were not able to lift. We desired it should be opened, and one of us stepping into it, found himself up to the mid Leg in

a sort of Dust, some part whereof flying up to our Faces, set us both a sneezing for several times together. In his right Waistcoat-Pocket, we found a prodigious Bundle of thin white Substances, folded one over another, about the bigness of three Men, tied with a strong Cable, and marked with black Figures; which we humbly conceive to be Writings, every Letter almost half as large as the Palm of our Hands. In the left there was a sort of Engine, from the Back of which were extended twenty long Poles, resembling the Pallisado's before your Majesty's Court; wherewith we conjecture the *Man Mountain* combs his Head, for we did not always trouble him with Questions, because we found it a great Difficulty to make him understand us. In the large Pocket on the right side of his middle Cover [Breeches], . . . we saw a hollow Pillar of Iron, about the length of a Man, fastened to a strong piece of Timber, larger than the Pillar; and upon one side of the Pillar were huge pieces of Iron sticking out, cut into strange Figures, which we know not what to make of. In the left Pocket, another Engine of the same kind. In the smaller Pocket on the right Side, were several round flat Pieces of white and red Metal, of different Bulk; some of the white, which seemed to be Silver, were so large and heavy, that my Comrade and I could hardly lift them. In the left Pocket were two black Pillars irregularly shaped: we could not, without difficulty, reach the top of them as we stood at the bottom of his Pocket. One of them was covered, and seemed all of a piece: But at the upper End of the other, there appeared a white round Substance, about twice the bigness of our Heads. (*GT* 28-29; italics in the original)

Writing such a long description of objects on the hero, which were obviously trivial for the eighteenth-century readers but intriguing for the Lilliputian humanoids, Swift invites everyone into a game of know-what. Thus, he forces the limits of language in describing our relationality to the ones who are alien to our lives and worlds. In addition to demonstrating language's intricate connection to materiality, the author provides the zones of contact between the human and the nonhuman in this inventory report. From clothing, iron and silver machines of eighteenth-century engineering to paper and ink works, the survey presents the more-than-human formation of what a human is. The dissected Gulliver, from the Lilliputian vantage, is part clothe, part machine, part animal, and part human. As a whole, though, he or his body becomes a sum of all these matters.

The tongue-in-cheek description of the guessing game given above also hints at the epistemological senselessness of anthropocentrism. "Language has been granted too much power," claims Karen Barad, underlining the Nietzschean subversion of the belief that "the subject and predicate structure of language reflects a prior ontological reality of substance and attribute" ("Posthumanist Performativity" 801, 802). Swift's handling of the "questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality . . . to matters of practices/doings/actions" (Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity" 802) in the early

eighteenth century appears quite thought-provoking in terms of voicing the representationalist tendencies of liberal humanist thoughts that would flourish in the twentieth century. As can be seen in the above block quotation, specific definitions and perceptions in one local natureculture are not equal to the ones in another local natureculture. Since what is meaningful and ordinary in the natureculture of the Lilliputian region might come to mean quite the opposite in Great Britain, I can claim that the materiality of a being finds its many-layered meaning in its multi-scalar relationality to its local/regional environment and surroundings. This way, Swift articulates the inseparability of epistemological, ontological, and (of course in his satirical tone) ethical responsibility in one's be(com)ing.

The onto-epistemological union manifested through Gulliver's subjectivity and relations constitutes the basis of his selfhood formation in those journeys. This manifestation can still be traced in ways that the Lilliputians nonhumanise him in the aftermath of this rigorous anatomical survey. Despite the detailed description of the tools and their uses, the Lilliputians struggle to understand their functions at first sight. Indeed, Swift depicts this land as a miniature country esteemed in its techno-scientific advances, and mechanical and mathematical precisions. On his day of capture, Gulliver observes the Lilliputians to be "most excellent Mathematicians," to have "arrived to a great Perfection in Mechanicks by the countenance and encouragement of the Emperor, who is a renowned Patron of Learning" (*GT* 21). Just as stated in the above discussion about Gulliver's transportation, they have a quick mind to produce new inventions in line with their needs and make immaculate calculations of that required invention. As is often the case in the real world, technological inventions have always had closely knitted relations with warfare strategies like destruction and defence. "Necessity or not," as Lissa Roberts points out, "war was the mother – as well as the child – of much invention in Renaissance and early modern Europe. And that invention was as much mental as material" (1). The Lilliputians' use of mechanics and sciences remains in this logic as well. Therefore, they show a great interest in the protagonist's demonstration of his sword and guns.

Gulliver, drawing a contrast to the Lilliputian technological advances, proudly performs the full extent of the tool-making capacity of the human (according to the eighteenth

century standards) when the Emperor orders him to show his scimitar and how to use his pocket pistols. Unfamiliar with such military tools, the minuscule troops give "a Shout between Terror and Surprize" at the sight of his dazzling "Scymiter" and fall down "as if they had been struck dead" after his gunshot performance (*GT* 30). Despite using the technologically advanced mechanical instruments for the purpose of their military superiority over their neighbour Blefuscu, the Lilliputians seem to be distant from the modern human's tools such as pocket watches, gunpowder, and guns. Instead, unable to grasp the mechanisms and functions of these objects, they prefer to objectify Gulliver as one of their military instruments. In parallel to their unfamiliarity, the hero's subjecthood is exposed with his hyper-consciousness about and attachment to these techno-scientific objects invented by humans. Despite being the greatest human in Lilliput, he feels insufficient and helpless without his "Silver Watch," gold, telescope, and pistols (*GT* 28). At this 'object'ively-weakened status, Gulliver loses his drive to reach liberty and becomes a merely huge body (without any conscious agency) obedient to his detainer.

In this state, the hybridisation of his subjectivity enforced by the Lilliputian authority continues in his becoming a playground for the Lilliputians: "I [he] would sometimes lie down, and let five or six of [the Natives] dance on my [his] Hand. And at last the Boys and Girls would venture to come and play at Hide and Seek in my [his] Hair" (*GT* 31). Even in his playground status, Gulliver cannot abstain from infantilising these diminutive humanoids in his observation notes. In spite of the derogatory tone, this rhetoric becomes a discursive way of reclaiming and preserving his subjectivity. However, his objectification and militarisation as a myriad of Lilliputian war tools are exposed in detail with the "daily" visits of the "Horses of the Army, and those of the Royal Stables" (*GT* 33). In an attempt to boast about the human's engineering skills and to show his knowledgeable background in European technologies, Gulliver builds an exercise ground out of wooden sticks and his handkerchief. On this drilling plain he has invented, the Lilliputian armed officers mounted on their horses and "performed mock Skirmishes, discharged blunt Arrows, drew their Swords, fled and pursued, attacked and retired"; his subjectivity receives appraisal when the Emperor regards this training ground and performance as "the best Military Discipline" (*GT* 33). Once again, his subjectivity is restrained when the Emperor "desired I [he] would stand like a *Colossus*, with my [his]

Legs as far asunder as I [Gulliver] conveniently could" (*GT* 35; italics in the original). This statue-like condition prepares the troops to draw up "in close Order" and march under him "with Drums beating, Colours flying, and Pikes advanced" (*GT* 35). In fact, all this military performance illustrates a simulation of a military operation that the Emperor and his governors plot against Blefuscu in secrecy. Until the Emperor gives the man-mountain back his 'limited' liberty in Lilliput, the question of whose subjectivity is superior in such a habitat is explored with mutual underminings. The superior subject's trying to exert its power over the other is illustrated like a series of interplays between the human and the humanoids in Book I. In this sense, Gulliver's—actually a human's—being defined by another semi-human or nonhuman being emerges as a critique of the notion of the eighteenth-century human. Because the human believes itself to be the ultimate species to name, define, and control everything else, the same human makes, due to 'his' species-centred pride, less than observing the other species that define and control the human. Questioning the concept of human in his time—the prime of the Enlightenment, Swift paints a Gulliver that becomes more than human throughout the four steps of his journeys of posthuman hybridisation.

The author develops Gulliver's becoming of a slavish colossus in the agreement between the protagonist and the Emperor. The agreement treats him as a biotic nonhuman entity that remains at the disposal of the Lilliputians like a slave just to be used in the wartime for the benefit of the miniature country: Lemuel Gulliver "shall be our [the Lilliputians'] Ally against our Enemies in the Island of *Blefuscu*, and do his utmost to destroy their Fleet, which is now preparing to invade Us" (*GT* 36; italics in the original). In return for the services of this organic machine like a robotic slave, he will be fed with a rigid number of "a daily Allowance of Meat and Drink sufficient for the Support of 1724 [1728] of our Subjects" (*GT* 36–37); not more or less. As a subjugated monstrous being, Gulliver evokes the concept of "golem"—"an artificial human," or animated anthropomorphic being, "made from clay" (LaGrandeur 63) in the Jewish folklore based on the conventions of the Jewish Cabala. In the early modern European understanding, the golem is associated with "automata" in "its subhuman status," implying "a servile status" (LaGrandeur 67). As Kevin LaGrandeur explains its significance in this age, the conception of the golem as an artificial servant for the deeds of humans points to the

"holiness and wisdom" of its creator, the human (67). Having a limited capacity for reason, agency, and hence subjectivity, Gulliver the colossus merely signifies "a great physical strength" which symbolises both the supreme power and the advanced techno-scientific potency (yet with a touch of magic in the process) of its human master (LaGrandeur 68). Then, the hero as a colossal golem in Lilliput serves "as a bodyguard" (Sherwin 17) for its diminutive master who has created him with the above-detailed nonhumanising practices.

In this regard, Gulliver is commissioned with a mission: the destruction of the Blefuscu fleet. Nonetheless, what makes the main character more than a golem is his decision-making mechanism to change the course of the events as he likes them. Almost achieving the Emperor's mechanical dream of possessing a crane, he puts the human's engineering skills at work and invents a primitive lifting hook of a modern crane from "a great Quantity of the strongest Cable and Bars of Iron" by binding their "Extremitys into a Hook" (*GT* 42). Then, Gulliver fastens hooks to the prows of fifty great men of war on the seaside of Blefuscu and pulls them to the port of Lilliput. Such a grand victory—perhaps even more significant than the Elizabethan defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588—becomes possible only with Gulliver's total capacity, as an adult human experienced in the British and European warfare, in his technical use and military prowess. In this victory, he becomes "a prosthetic extension" of the Lilliputian Emperor; that is, "enhancements of the [Lilliputians'] limbs, senses, or faculties by which" the Emperor "can enhance his dominion" (LaGrandeur 71) over his greatest enemy, Blefuscu. In a posthuman liminality of the golem and the human, the protagonist becomes, as LaGrandeur would agree, "less and yet more than human" (72) at the same time. Swift, here, acknowledges the non-fixed status of the human in the eighteenth century, which is illustrated sometimes as an animal, often as a mechanical object, and intrusively a human. For him, there are no clear-cut distinctions between these categories of beings because, as seen in these examples, they constantly co-constitute one another at their (un)expected contact zones and engender a posthuman subjectivity every time they interact and intra-act.

When read in a contextual manner, this illustration of the conflict between Lilliput and Blefuscu offers Swift's critique of the British socio-politics of colonialism, expansion strategies, and imperialist attitudes. Expanding this vitriol further, the Dean unfolds the Lilliputians' schemes to dispose of Gulliver since the hero also poses a threat as a creature "less and yet more than human" (LaGrandeur 72). The diminutive nation's methods of discarding the polymorphic titular character resonate with the British racist treatment of non-white communities. Acknowledged as a burden on the nation due to his gargantuan eating, drinking, and defecating, Gulliver is impeached after his "wholly desperate and deplorable" act of extinguishing the fire in the royal palace (*GT* 46). Despite protecting the palace and its inhabitants from burning and destruction, his method of putting the fire out by means of discharging his urine over the building and whoever is in and around it causes the 'anti-humanist' or anti-Gulliver party's eyebrows to rise. Through the help of a Lilliputian insider, the captive hero learns the three possible methods of his elimination discussed at the court: 1) "setting fire on [his] House at Night" and shooting him on the face and hands "with poisoned Arrows"; 2) strewing "a poisonous Juice on [his] Shirts" to cause him to tear his own flesh; and 3) putting out his eyes and gradually lessening his nourishment to the extent of his 'natural' death by starvation in order to prevent the problematic removal of the carcass and skeleton of his dead body (*GT* 57–59). These verdicts underscore the paradox of the golem mirroring the contradiction of the human's status between a 'pantocrator' being and a being dependent on hir own inventions. Gulliver as a gigantic military instrument is both beneficial for and threatening to this miniature community. Added to this, his conscious subjecthood multiplies this paradoxical condition brought by the man-mountain.

In all these proposals of Gulliver's elimination, Swift refers to the narratives of biblical and mythical heroes: Samson and Hercules. The first proposal recalls the mythical story about Hercules' murdering Nessus the Centaur, who attempts to rape his wife Deianeira, with an arrow soaked in the poisonous blood of the Lernaean Hydra. Reminding us of the continuation of this mythical story, the second one mentions the painful death of Hercules due to wearing a shirt tainted with the poisoned blood of Nessus. And the final proposition relates the protagonist to the biblical hero, Samson, who derives his power from his hair. One cannot help associating the narrator-hero, who was attached to the ground with

strings knotted around his hair at the very beginning, with Samson whose hair is cut and whose eyes are gouged out by the Philistines. If we consider that Hercules and Samson are two versions of the same persona as argued by Gregory Mobley (5–12), the Lilliputians perceive Gulliver almost like a demigod with superhuman capabilities and strength despite all their nonhumanisation and dehumanisation practices. Furthermore, they fear that this superhuman being might act as an arbiter of justice against their overreaching ambition to rule over all the lands by subduing their neighbours such as the people of Blefuscu. His association with a dangerous godlike power as well as nonhuman animalistic figures like hydra and centaur affects the miniature folk in a more negative and aggressive way to destroy him, rather than reminding them of their place in the universe as in many golem tales. Including this last aspect of divinisation, I claim that Lemuel Gulliver is well situated in all the layers of the great chain of being which is supposed to elevate the human's status in comparison to the other nonhuman entities. That is to say, Swift shatters the anthropocentric hierarchical alignment proposed by the great chain of being by situating the titular human into all its layers, and replacing it with a horizontal relationality among these bodyminds. In doing so, the author shows that Gulliver as the representative of the eighteenth-century human embodies the divine, human, animal, and material beings in the singularity and multiplicity of his body and mind.

Despite Swift's attempt to polymorphise the titular hero, Gulliver struggles to remain within his comfort zone of humanness. At the very beginning of his accounts of unforeseen and unlikely travels, he fashions himself as a person of life sciences due to his profession as a surgeon. Added to this mind-centric and man-dominated career at the time, his character as a pseudo-philosopher and a bibliophile presents a typical persona from the Enlightenment intelligentsia who spent their free time "in reading the best Authors ancient and modern, being always provided with a good number of Books" (*GT* 16). Gulliver's self-fashioning critically employs a representationalist perspective of the human who learns indigenous peoples' languages thanks to his "great Facility by the strength of my [his] Memory" (*GT* 16). The narrator-hero relies on the characteristics of the human based on language ability and rationality; this reliance, then, becomes his main motive for situating his proud 'humanness': 1st) when he is "tempted . . . to seize Forty or

Fifty of the" Lilliputians "and dash them against the Ground" (*GT* 20); 2nd) when he feels satisfied upon being asked to "swear a Peace with" the Lilliputian Emperor and his kingdom (*GT* 27); 3rd) when he outsmarts the diminutive soldiers during his physical survey; and 4th) when he puts some anthropocentric engineering skills into practice in order to show human's mechanical and technological capacity. In all these four actions to restore his human status while he is continually nonhumanised by the diminutive folk, he reclaims the fact of being the most rational and ablest being in that land despite his singularity or being the only one of his kind.

In his attempt to further assert his human subjectivity, Gulliver narrates Lilliput as if it were a collection of flower beds rather than a state of several settlements: "The Country round appeared like a continued Garden, and the inclosed Fields, which were generally forty Foot square, resembled so many Beds of Flowers" (*GT* 23). Once Lilliput is considered a garden, the little people can be likened to monocultural insects of this garden. Hence, Gulliver's account of the knighthood ceremony, which is one of several performance shows in Lilliput, carries the undertones of an insectoid community. The people who want to be distinguished by the Emperor, "advancing one by one, sometimes leap over the Stick," which the Emperor horizontally holds in his hands, "sometimes creep under it backwards and forwards several times" (*GT* 33). Here, a community of insects is portrayed to leap and crawl around twigs for a hierarchical positioning in their swarm. I argue that the allusions to insect and swarm can be read as Swift's conceptualisation of a proto-code of conflict for warring communities and battle strategies. In *Swarming and the Future of Conflict* (2000), John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt explain that, "seemingly amorphous," swarming is "a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions" and that it works best "if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units" (vii). As a "dispersed" but also "internetted" community (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 8), the Lilliputians have already proved their insectoid swarming while capturing Gulliver on the shore. Then, this ceremony turns into a process of materialisation of these diminutives, especially in their military and engineering technologies. Swift through his hero, thus, clouds the humanness of the miniature folk by nonhumanising them as well.

The insect allusion can be viewed in the Enlightenment notion of the great chain of beings. Gilbert White (1720–1793), in this case, is a noteworthy parson-naturalist and ecologist, especially in terms of pioneering "the development of ecological consciousness" (McKusick 25) back then. In his landmark work *The Natural History of Selborne in the County of Southampton* (1789), White refers to the great chain of being and writes about the significance of the agency of diminutive nonhumans in this chain. For the parson-naturalist, no matter how "insignificant" and small these creatures in the lower ranks of the great chain, they have the capacity to be both "mighty in their effect" and impactful "in the œconomy of Nature" (White 213). Taking earthworms as an extensive example in his explanations, White primarily refers to the earthworms as part of the food chain that minor beings support with their materiality. Although this food-chain perspective might sound anthropocentric and be based on a pragmatist structure, the parson-naturalist insistently underlines the peculiar physiological formation of worms as "hermaphrodites" as well as their venereal proclivity during mild weather conditions (White 213–14). White takes these nonhumans as subjects in their own rights that enjoy life and celebrate their existence. With a similar motive, Swift, regularly directing Gulliver's narration in an insectoid way, might be argued to draw attention to the significance of all the elements of the great chain of beings. However, what I claim is connected to the posthumanist potential of the great satirist and his work.

As seen in the sized-based biological discussion above, the insect-like account of the Lilliputians is also proven by Bonner's assertion that Gulliver, with his 12^3 ratios, would actually not be able to "hear and understand" these little people (33). Similarly, Braidotti, in her book *Metamorphoses* (2002) on the materialist theory of becoming, approaches "insects as indicators and figurations of the decentring of anthropocentrism" and argues that insects "exacerbate the human power of understanding to the point of implosion" (*Metamorphoses* 149). Incapacitating us to decode their buzzes and other noises, these miniatures "exercise the same immense sense of estrangement as dinosaurs, dragons or other gigantic monsters" (Braidotti, *Metamorphoses* 149). In this regard, the Lilliputians are there to estrange us from the reality of the human's domination on the Earth, to point at the fact that mostly unseen nonhuman entities can easily immobilise this 'prime' human, and to provide a corrective to the Enlightenment pride of 'being' human rather

than becoming 'more-than-human.' Because of this posthumanist vision in *Gulliver's Travels*, the Lilliputians as insects imbricate the human(-like) and the nonhuman, dislodge Gulliver the human subject from his "naturalistic foundations," and finally deliver a significant blow to the concept of 'human nature' (Braidotti, *Metamorphoses* 152). For Swift, we live in posthuman environments full of unfamiliar beings all the time and hence are just not aware of, able to hear, sense, smell, or comprehend each and every inhabitant of these posthuman environments.

To foster the posthumanist attitude in his work, the satirist employs another estrangement technique while describing what the human is through Gulliver's narration. The satirist once inflates a possible pride out of being human when the captive hero goes through his options to escape from the results of his impeachment at the Lilliputian court. Reassessing his power just as in the moment of his captivation on the shore, he states that "the whole Strength of that Empire could hardly subdue me, and I might easily with Stones pelt the Metropolis to pieces" (*GT* 60). Although he immediately deserts this option, he evidently is proud of his size-based superiority in this domain of beings. Gulliver consciously and subtly preserves his observational and passive status, giving his sense of pride between the lines of his narrative. He has actually become the ultimate patriarch[45] in this society, by preserving, advancing, directing, and herding the Lilliputians in many instances. In other moments, on the other hand, Swift does not avoid turning the tables on the human and satirises the vanity, superfluousness, and superciliousness of the Anthropos. Adding an ironic and comic tone to the narration, he achieves this satire by spotlighting the geographical ignorance of the Lilliputian Emperor whose dominion is "about twelve Miles in Circumference" and is believed to extend "to the Extremities of the Globe" (*GT* 36). "Delight and Terror of the Universe," the Emperor is given the title of "Monarch of all Monarchs, taller than the Sons of Men; whose Feet press down to the Center, and whose Head strikes against the Sun" (*GT* 36). Keeping in mind that Gulliver's world is

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[45] In Gulliver's scene of standing like a colossos for the drills of the Lilliputian troops, it is humourously given that his androcentric pride of being a huge 'man' relies on the portrayal of sexual prowess. When the soldiers march under and between his legs, "some of the younger Officers" could not avoid "turning up their Eyes"; and since his "Breeches were at that time in so ill a Condition that" these soldiers "afforded some Opportunities for Laughter [at] and Admiration" for Gulliver's well endowments (*GT* 35).

too many times larger than the diminutives', that there are only two monarchies in this territory and that Gulliver's presence cancels the Emperor's image of grandeur, these lines merely refer to the real-world patriarchal monarchs and their not only anthropocentric but also chauvinistic discourses, particularly in Europe. If this Lilliputian vain boastfulness is upturned, Swift can be argued to underline the lack of reality in the human's supremacy over its nonhuman others that were, in our case, able to restrict "the *Man-Mountain*" for a long time (*GT* 36).

Swift's last critique on anthropocentric discrimination in the Book I culminates in Gulliver's escape from Lilliput upon the Lilliputians' desire to bring the people of Blefuscu under slavery. The conflict between two diminutive folks stems from a rather insignificant, humorous disagreement on which end of an egg a person should break before ze eats it. While the Lilliputians—out of a personal whimsical experience in the past—became the Small-Endians, the dissenters of this practice followed the 'old' tradition of breaking the big end and founded their new country Blefuscu as the Big-Endians (*GT* 40–41). Perhaps due to such a meaningless reason, or out of his beliefs in the abolition of slavery—which would be realised in Britain over a hundred years later after the publication of *Gulliver's Travels*, Gulliver protests: "I would never be an Instrument of bringing a Free and Brave People into Slavery" (*GT* 44). This moment signals the first steadfast opposition of the protagonist and results in his impeachment due to the allegations of high treason and disrespect for the Lilliputian royalty. The fact that Gulliver is easily discarded by the royal council proves his status as a mere object of destruction, whose subjectivity, agency, and opinions are unwelcome as long as they do not serve the 'grand' aims of the proud Lilliputians. Even the proposed methods of killing Gulliver and disposing of his body, in parallel to his objectified status, contribute to his corporeal and organic image "rather than a cultural or social" one (Stewart 67). Thus, as an object of the stare, the titular hero is "exposed to judgment, appropriation, [and] abrupt dismissal" (Garland-Thomson 59). However, as Derrida also exemplifies this in the looks of his companion cat—which is discussed in the second theoretical sub-section of the preceding chapter, the acts of eyes are reciprocal; the act of looking/staring/gazing contains the power to both discredit and validate the existence and subjectivity of the looked/stared/gazed. Caught in between his several conditions of becoming animal,

object, and human, Gulliver's subjecthood is both degraded and acknowledged by the diminutive gaze.

Only after the Emperor's advisors' verdicts about the protagonist's death, which have complicated Gulliver's status further in Lilliput, does he decide to get into action. He reclaims his rational thinking and subjectivity. He abandons his playtime and stops treating the little humanoids as if they are his toys. His determinate actions also reveal the fact that he accepts the diminutive folk's rationality and agency. These humanoids are capable of many actions, sometimes even beyond the humans'. In this regard, he makes use of his tool-making capacities by creating an almost full-fledged ship to return to his home country after he escapes to Blefuscu (*GT* 63–65). For a vessel which "Fortune . . . had thrown . . . in his way," he engineers "two Sails . . . by quilting thirteen fold of their [the Blefuscudians'] strongest Linnen together," makes "Ropes and Cables," turns a "great Stone" into an anchor, and greases his vessel with "the Tallow of three hundred Cows" within a month's time (*GT* 64). All those actions can be listed under the category of the causes of the human's superiority over its others as a being able to combine natural and cultural resources for the sake of creative technologies. With such comparisons throughout the first voyage, Swift employs a dialectical methodology to draw the boundaries around what defines a human and what distinguishes that human from the surrounding beings. In the second voyage, the author introduces an encompassing method to evaluate these inquiries. This method follows a more rhizomatic pattern since it requires some lived experience with diminutive humanoids, new experience with gigantic humanoids, and the liberal human viewpoint. In this three-dimensional perspective, the following voyage to the land of Brobdingnag furthers his perspective of posthuman subjectivity.

With a subtle reference to Odysseus' encounter with Polyphemus the Cyclop in his journey back to Ithaca from Troy in Homer's *Odyssey* (c. 8th century BCE), Gulliver meets another race of humanoids who appear "as tall as an ordinary Spire-steeple, and took about ten Yards at every Stride" and speak "in a Voice many degrees louder than a speaking Trumpet" (*GT* 72). Upon this encounter with the absolute other in terms of physical greatness, he is "struck with the utmost Fear and Astonishment" and

immediately begins to downsize his own image as a helpless creature (*GT* 72). Gulliver's amazement and horror here is the deconstruction of the ontological and epistemological appropriation of Protagoras' (c. 490 BCE–c. 420 BCE) assertion that "man is the measure of all things" (Plato, *Theaetetus* 152a) by early modern philosophers. Protagoras' claim, first in the Renaissance and then in the Enlightenment, was transformed into a norm of the human existence on the Earth. The hero's responses toward these enormous humanoids as well as his astonishment with other rational humanoids in Book I stem from a sense of disillusionment with the myth of the human's singularity as the measure of all things. "Staring," as Garland-Thomson also states, "offers an occasion to rethink the status quo" (6), and Gulliver is quick to rethink especially after his relations with the Lilliputians.

In Books I and II of *Gulliver's Travels*, Swift plays with the time's scientific discoveries and understandings. Why the satirist consults on these scientific practices can be viewed in the sciences' attempt to philosophise on nature. With the Scientific Revolution, "a mechanical view of the world" demanded "a mathematical conception of [physical] nature" (Sharpin 57). Therefore, the researchers who tried to make sense of physical phenomena through scientific axioms established the belief and confidence in the mathematical conception of natural philosophy as well (Sharpin 60–61). Isaac Newton's (1642–1724) publication of *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* in 1687 became the zenith of these praxes. As in Newton's work, "precision-manufactured devices like the telescope, the microscope, the refined glass prism" (Bender 40) were used widely in experiments and observations for the sake of "correcting [humans'] infirmities and extending their empire" on the European and planetary scales (Sharpin 93). Thus, the combination of sciences and natural philosophy became the essential tools for the liberal human's establishment of centrality. D. Hume voices his belief in this combination in *A Treatise of Human Nature*: "We must . . . glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world" (*Treatise* xiii). One point in his support for this methodology needs closer inspection: "Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other human comprehension" (*Treatise* xiii–xix). As

seen in his claim, these scientific experiments can be used to better human understanding of the natural world as well as hir own species. Such developed understanding would lead to a heightened sense of self in dominating the human's others that were apparently unable to perform such scientific and mathematical experiments.

As much as setting standards for a viewpoint in realist envisioning of physical life, the tools for scientific experiments also enabled the proliferation of a sense of doubt about the human's singularity in the universe. Marjorie Nicholson directs the questions born out of this doubt in *Science and Imagination* (1962):

> In the picture of Man as in the picture of Nature that emerged during the early period of the microscope, there was dualism. Optimism and pessimism were combined. . . If microscopical dissection had proved that plants were much like animals and animals much like man, did they not also show the reverse? Was man but another animal, like in his destiny as in his structure? Was he too an automaton, a mere complex of parts, a "little world made cunningly," acting only by mechanical laws? Below him the long scale of nature stretched away indefinitely, perhaps infinitely; but what of his place in that scale? (227)

In a prompt manner, Swift attempts to provide answers to such questions of his time. Through microscopic evaluation of the Lilliputians, he establishes a mathematical precision multiplied or divided by twelve. In doing so, he undermines the exceptionality of the human subject in the face of "microscopic" beings as the novel "bends the progressive scientific optimism of the realist novel toward a darkly hilarious pessimism" of the fantasy fiction (McGurl 413).[46] Likewise, he employs a telescopic approach to the Brobdingnagians within the same mathematical formula just to extend this bending of the human's non-realist perception of the self. Just as in Galileo Galilei's (1564–1642) space observation, the telescopic comprehension of the universe "testified to the hitherto unknown *range*, as well as the beautiful contrivance, of God's creation" (Sharpin 147; italics in the original) or of universe's beings. That is; if Gulliver is twelve times larger than the Lilliputians and twelve times smaller than the Brobdingnagians, this means that "even this prodigious Race of Mortals might be equally overmatched in some distant part

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[46] As a reverence to this possibility of infinite beings in proportion by Swift's microscopic perception in the first book, Robin A. Weiss pens an article on HIV as if it was written by Lemuel Gulliver; see Weiss's "*Gulliver's Travels* in HIVLand."

of the World, whereof we have yet no Discovery" (*GT* 73). This probability of infinite calculations in the narrative forces the human-reader to a sense of humbleness in hierarchising hirself over non/human others.

In this respect, Gulliver's description of the Brobdingnagian farmer who "considered a while with the Caution of one who endeavours to lay hold on a small dangerous Animal in such a manner that it may not be able either to scratch or to bite him" (*GT* 73) sounds quite humble as he defines himself as a small dangerous insect or animal. Unlike the swarming insectoid diminutives in Lilliput, he is merely one of his own kind in Brobdingnag and therefore unable to perform a collective/swarming action. For this very reason, Gulliver fears he would be dashed "against the Ground" as humans "usually do any little hateful Animal which we [they] have a mind to destroy" (*GT* 73). However, the farmer is soon convinced that he is "a rational Creature" (*GT* 74); what proves his rationality, Swift narrates, is the protagonist's courteous manners as well as his linguistic efforts before the farmer and seven other giants near him. In portraying what construes rationality, the satirist resorts to the Hobbesian and Lockean notions of human subjectivity here, first with actions of civility and then with communication efforts due to the titular hero's fear of vulnerability and desire for protection. Although the Brobdingnagians have not seen "any little Creature that resembled" Gulliver in their fields before (*GT* 74), they are quick to recognise his subjectivity and personhood to some extent.

The recognition that Gulliver is *rationis capax* does not mean that he will completely be treated like a human subject by these gigantic humanoids. For instance, upon seeing him, the farmer's wife "screamed and ran back" as she assumes him to be "a Toad or a Spider" (*GT* 75). His posthuman subjectivity is put into motion once again and his nonhumanisation is advanced as soon as he is introduced to more of these people. During this process, the most striking event appears as his status as a doll and a pet. On his first day in the farmer's house, he is irresponsibly and insensitively treated by the farmer's "youngest Son . . . of about ten Years old" (*GT* 75). Swift likens the boy's gesture to the ways "how mischievous all [human] Children among us naturally are to Sparrows, Rabbits, young Kittens, and Puppy Dogs" (*GT* 75), directly criticising the maltreatment

of pets by children. Only after he has experienced a near catastrophe with the Nurse's one-year-old infant who assumed Gulliver "a Play-thing . . . [and] seized me [him] by the middle and got my [his] head in his mouth" (*GT* 76) is he introduced to his permanent caregiver in Brobdingnag. The Nurse's nine-year-old daughter, whom Gulliver calls his "*Glumdalclitch*, or little Nurse," (*GT* 80) appropriates the infant's cradle for him to sleep at night and makes "seven Shirts, and some other Linen of fine Cloth" (*GT* 79). From that moment onwards, Glumdalclitch acts as if she had a new doll to play with or as if she was practising motherhood duties at an early age. In addition to her arrangement of new clothes and living spaces, she can "dress and undress" him and teach him their language in a patient and caring manner (*GT* 79–80). With some parental instinct, she even names Gulliver "*Grildrig*," which means "*Mannikin*" in English and is used by all the Brobdingnagians (*GT* 79–80). As seen in Book I, he is lucky to preserve his name among the Lilliputians despite several nonhumanisation cycles. Here, on the other hand, he gets once more isolated from his primarily human identity as Lemuel Gulliver and gets reconfigured as a doll-thing with a new name among physically superior species.

Glumdalclitch, in her miniature designations, creates a space for both herself and Gulliver the toy. Her primary creative space is the prototype baby-house out of the cradle. Baby-houses, or dollhouses as they were called after the 1850s (F. Armstrong 24), date back to the mid-sixteenth century in Britain and Europe as one of the first recorded surviving examples is a baby-house "filled with expensive miniatures" which Queen Anne gave "to her godchild Ann Sharpe in 1700" (Rabb, "Johnson" 284). The early baby-houses were quite "elaborate and expensive," especially because "social class is the greatest source of difference" in such kinds of games and hobbies that compel the player or hobbyist to spare leisure time during hir work and social lives, provide some space in hir residential areas, and afford costly materials like silk and linen for miniature furniture in the baby-house (F. Armstrong 28–29, 37). Not many could financially manage to possess all these necessities as the baby-house is regarded as a "staple of the traditional, bourgeois nursery" (McAra 41). Yet, this did not stop the creative industries to construct these miniature houses with several materials like simple wood sticks, old pieces of clothes, and some pebbles and stones (F. Armstrong 37–38; Rule 62–64). Glumdalclitch's case is not so different from these creative improvisations. Here, the function of this primitive house is

more significant than what it is made out of. For children, dollhouses meant "an empowered world in which [they] alone could function without adults" (Fromberg and Bergen xii). It would not be wrong to assume that Glumdalclitch practised some daily chores of the domestic sphere by means of such an objectified human as Gulliver in it as it became custom for girls to do so in the upcoming years of the eighteenth century (Barnes 252–53).

The full-fledged dollhouse gets realised in all its structural, artistic, and fashionable functions and details when Gulliver is purchased from the farmer by the Queen of Brobdingnag "at a good Price" like "a thousand pieces of Gold" (*GT* 84). Susan Stewart explains that "the dollhouse," like fashion(able) toys and dolls, "was originally . . . an adult amusement" (61). The costly structure and interior of this product, as argued by other critics above, could usually be afforded by upper-class women. Melinda Alliker Rabb exemplifies this aspect with the late-seventeenth-century Dutch dollhouse of Petronella Oortman (1686–1705): The baby-houses "resembled cabinets of curiosity, with sections/rooms filled for display; like these cabinets, they were a costly hobby for rich and often childless adults" (*Miniature* 44). In a similar manner, dolls or manikin toys belonged to those adult women who dressed them in the latest fashions in miniature spaces full of the latest model clothes and furniture at a size suitable for the doll/toy.[47] The protagonist's residence with the Queen reflects the full extent of this baby-house fashion of the time. When Gulliver is accepted into the royal service together with Glumdalclitch as his "Nurse and Instructor" (*GT* 85), the "Queen commanded her own Cabinet-maker," who is "a most ingenious Artist," to build "a Box that might serve me [him] for a Bed-chamber, after the Model that *Glumdalclitch* and I [he] should agree upon" (*GT* 87). Once the historical accounts of these baby-houses and their furniture are analysed, it becomes highly clear that Swift employs the twelve-to-one scale in a

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[47] In the American historical account of the exported eighteenth-century toys, "fashion dolls [that] were dressed by milliners and dressmakers of London and Paris" are argued to be dispatched to overseas "colonies to display the latest styles" of the coloniser cultures (McClintock and McClintock 70). Such deliveries set the latest fashion in the settlements away from the motherland.

conscious manner, but not in an arbitrary way. Nancy Akre clarifies this mathematical formulation:

> The tradition of verisimilitude has been a guiding principle of miniaturists from the beginning, and this has imposed certain imperatives on the makers of true miniatures. . . . [T]here has always been the inviolable necessity of scaling down the measurement of the objects to be copied. . . . A scale of one inch to a foot has been widely used for at least several centuries for miniature rooms and their furnishing – so widely used as to be almost standard. (10)

As one foot is equal to twelve inches, Gulliver's calculation of the miniatures and the gigantics in Books I and II relies on the real-life examples of similar dolls and baby-houses in this scale (Rabb, *Miniature* 45–47; Akre 45). It is apparent that Swift is highly informed about the material—as well as scientific/intellectual—culture of the early-eighteenth-century London circles.

The hero's treatment as a mechanical toy is augmented with the Queen's interrogation of his other abilities. She asks whether he "understood how to handle a Sail or an Oar, and whether a little exercise of Rowing might not be convenient for [his] Health" (*GT* 99). For the giant majesty, such conversations with her new lively clockwork provide opportunities to explore the features of this toy. For Gulliver, on the flip side, these instances prepare some platforms for him to extend his proud androcentric subjectivity to these humanoids. Hence, he acts quick to accept the Queen's offer to "contrive a Boat," and her "Joyner . . . by [his] Instructions in ten Days finished a Pleasure-boat with all its Tackling" (*GT* 100). All these miniature constructions for the sake of embroidering the living space of her doll become prestigious projects for the Queen. She is quick to contrive another project "to make a wooden Trough" where Gulliver would row for entertainment. The small-scale crafts allow the Queen as an adult female humanoid, in Deborah Varat's words, "to cherish adorable miniature house wares, to obsess over decorating decisions, to position and reposition the inhabitants, and in general, to lavish attention on a microcosm of this realm newly imbued with social cachet" (147). But they allow him to present his engineering skills once again—after his mechanical and creative constructions in Lilliput—before the superior humanoid subjects. Both sides' demonstrations of their subjectivities do not rely on an objective scale of evaluation. What Gulliver has been

proud of in Lilliput is reversed here in Brobdingnag, and a new perception of one's centrality or superiority in the universe is established outside the notions of reason, size, language, and species. Therefore, this constitutes an environment and an atmosphere in which it cannot be anticipated when one could turn into an object, an animal, a pet, or a doll under certain circumstances.

True to their purpose of exhibiting a household's values and wealth, dollhouses provide "a stage, with actions frozen at a particular moment" (F. Armstrong 38). For this reason, they are away from the chaotic domestic and outside problems of their owners. Creating a sense of distance with an omnipotent perspective, they carry little risk of discomfort and disturbance (Traugott 136–37). Despite the accommodationist opportunities of these miniature houses, the owner and/or the observer cannot get involved in the interior world of these fabricated realities; they are "trapped outside the possibility of a lived reality of the miniature" (Stewart 66). Gulliver's case is the opposite. His experience as the miniature being among the giants proves the contrary as he is a living doll and open to any threat coming from the outside in Brobdingnag. Perhaps due to his fear of being crushed by these giants or due to his adaptability to the baby-house environment (or both), the protagonist instinctively acts like a doll and guarantees his soundness and safeness in a place that could momentarily turn into a hostile habitat. He performs civil behaviours to gain the farmer's and the royalty's trust, respectively. Performing such stunts under pressure must have been so forceful for a human like Gulliver since he would define these acts as "Fopperies" later (*GT* 82).

The hero's civility remains dysfunctional in his encounters with nonhumans in Brobdingnag. As if engendering a rivalry to demonstrate their agencies, nonhuman animals as the representatives of the natural world there enable the protagonist to actualise his subjectivity on several levels. His first encounter is with the rats in the farmer's house. On his first day there, he is attacked by two rats "of the size of a large Mastiff, but infinitely more nimble and fierce" (*GT* 78). Using his "Hanger," he could "rip up his [one rat's] Belly before he could do me any Mischief," wound the other "on the Back," and make it fear its fatal end and "Escape" bleeding (*GT* 78). The rats which would normally pose no such threat to a human being become a skirmisher, a cause of death-or-survival

situation for Gulliver. Similarly, "a huge Frog" slips into his toy-boat trough, hops "over [his] Head, backwards and forwards, dawbing [his] Face and Cloaths with its odious Slime" (*GT* 101). In the meanwhile, all he could do is to balance his boat to avoid falling into the water and drowning as well as to bang the frog "with one of [his] Sculls" (*GT* 101). Reading a rodent and an amphibian in Gulliver's adventures in Brobdingnag cannot be just for the sake of satirical humour. Swift employs the famous classification of species of his time while orchestrating these nonhuman counterparts of his human hero. In an age of rising classicism, Aristotle's essentialist taxonomical scheme along with its scholastic re-arrangement in the medieval era can be interpreted as the primary method of making sense of nonhuman beings until *Systema Naturæ* (1735) by Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778). In this *scala naturae*, rodents and amphibians are situated on the lower level of living beings (Hodos 1212–13). In the middle plains reside avian species and hairy quadrupeds (Slaughter 33–35). Swift does not hesitate to visit all these categories. Levelling up the category of nonhumans, the author poses a challenge to the human subject.

The third encounter with nonhuman animals happens with "a small white Spaniel belonging to one of the chief Gardeners" in the palace (*GT* 97). As detailed in length in Haraway's conceptualisation of companion species, the playful companionship of dogs is regarded "as simply spending time peaceably hanging out together," which normally "brings joy to all the participants" (Haraway, *Companion* 38). In Brobdingnag, Gulliver as a pet is played out by a physically superior dog that, "following the Scent, came directly up, and taking me in his Mouth ran straight to his Master, wagging his Tale, and set me gently on the Ground" (*GT* 97). Although Swift's choice of narrating the spaniel's behaviour as gentle and "so well taught" seems anthropocentric, it cannot be denied that the titular human's subjecthood is once again shattered as a play-thing for a dog. There seems almost no area or being for Gulliver to dominate or to act in this land. Swift, for example, quickly drops him to his neck "in the hole" of "a fresh Mole-hill" and leads him to break his "right Shin against the Shell of a Snail" (*GT* 97). If the human's "upright posture and bipedal gait" are accepted as "outstanding features of human nature" in the evolutionary history of hominids (Hewes 687), Gulliver falters to put this ability on the ground and in the environment of the gradually familiarised landscape into stable uses.

Bipedalism is associated with the object manipulation abilities of the hominid species which are classified just below the humans. In this sense, Leslie C. Aiello interrelates this biological adaptation with the *Homo sapiens*' so-called "unique" aspect of language as well as the species' cognitive evolution and larger brain size. An improved capability of object manipulation thanks to bipedal locomotion might be related to "advanced hand-eye co-ordination and an associated increase in neural circuitry" (Aiello 279). Such relationalities bring socio-cultural formations of humans as collective communities. In these encounters with the nonhuman, Gulliver has little advantage. In one instance when he catches "a Linnet . . . somewhat larger than an English Swan" for his dinner, he receives "so many Boxes" from its "Wings on both Sides of [his] Head and Body" (*GT* 98). Such a normally trouble-free action still confounds this human and reminds him of his vulnerability against the Brobdingnagian nonhumans. In the next instance, he is not as lucky as in catching a bird. In a manner to mirror the relationality between a species' biological journey and "distinctive" characteristics, Swift spares the final encounter for a monkey. In the protagonist's narration, "the greatest Danger . . . in that Kingdom" comes from "this frolicksome Animal" that "view[s him and his baby-house] with great Pleasure and Curiosity, peeping in at the Door and every Window" (*GT* 101). Later it becomes clear that this ape has taken Gulliver "for a young one of his own Species," gently stroked his face, taken him away from the dominant species of that world—possibly dangerous Brobdingnagian humanoids—and fed him (*GT* 101–102). Although these moments are told to be violent for Gulliver, the monkey seems to take care of a being similar to his own kind. However, this scene might be informed by the "rape-ape" travel narratives of the time, which deliver the accounts of primates raping or copulating with humans so that several new species like pygmies are speculated to flourish out of these forced or voluntary unions (L. Brown 236–38). These travel accounts challenge not only the monogenistic human population as in Adam and Eve's case but also "the assumption of human superiority and uniqueness" since they propose a primitive theory of evolution. Seldom do these challenges remain uncorrected. The hero's abduction by an ape, to elaborate this correction, sets events into motion to showcase the gigantic humanoid's irrational fear and subsequent solution/cruelty, so much so that the monkey "was killed" with the order of the majesty "and an Order made that no such Animal should be kept about the Palace" (*GT* 102). In addition to his position to those nonhuman animals,

Gulliver as a human is shown to be below the Brobdingnagian humanoid in the *scala naturae*. He is a subject who has very few options but to subjugate himself to this superior being.

As Steven Millhauser writes in his prose poetry, "the mystery of the miniature" evokes the sense of a divinity that creates, owns, and orchestrates hir creations while that divine being also becomes hir "own creature" in that very miniature world (135). This way, the human who owns, designs, or creates the dollhouse both frames a world of hir own desires and reconfigures hir subjectivity in an utmost idealism. Gulliver cannot escape such desires of Glumdalclitch and the Queen who have "the fascination of the mountain view . . . at a single glance" (Millhauser 131). Besides his pethood and toyhood in the little girl's world and the court, Gulliver has another significant attribute that is minimal in Lilliput but magnified in Brobdingnag: freakhood. Again consulting his time's exhibitions of several human and nonhuman beings that the white man met in other parts of the world and brought home, Swift criticises "the culture of exhibition" at the crossroads of trade, racism, speciesism, and sciences (Kareem 104). In his early days in the farmer's house, people in the neighbourhood spread the news that Gulliver's farmer-master "found a strange Animal in the Fields about the bigness of a *Slacknuck*, but exactly shaped in every part like a human Creature" (*GT* 80). As seen in his narrative, the hero has already accepted his inferior status before the 'real' human figure of the Brobdingnag and downgraded himself to the status of an animal. Because this creature can "speak in a little Language of its own," learn their language, and walk "erect upon its two Legs, some neighbours advise the farmer "to shew [Gulliver] as a Sight upon a Market-Day in the next Town" (*GT* 80). Upon "the Advice of his Friend" (*GT* 81), the farmer and Gulliver soon begin their "road show in the farmer's box" (Stewart 87). The diminutive human in the land of the oversized gets announced as such: "a strange Creature to be seen at the Sign of the Green Eagle, not so big as a *Splacknuck* (an Animal in that Country very finely shaped, about six Foot long) and in every part of the Body resembling an human Creature, could speak several Words, and perform a hundred diverting Tricks" (*GT* 81–82). This scene resembles the announcement of "new importations" from the discovered and colonised lands to the city and town fair like the Bartholomew Fair held in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Altick 35–36). The crier hired to advertise this rare

living curiosity helps a crowd of "the quality and the rabble, the cultivated and the ignorant" gather around the exhibition area (Altick 36).

To satisfy the hungry gaze of the curious folk and to create a new source of income for the farmer, Gulliver is "placed upon a Table in the largest Room[s]" of several inns during his road show (*GT* 82). In these performances, he talks to Glumdalclitch to show his linguistic ability, acts in courteous manners, and demonstrates his war skills by using straws as pikes. During these performances, he is exposed to cruelly enthusiastic attitudes of some less-educated and mischievous people and children who throw "a hazel Nut direct at [his] Head"—at the size of a pumpkin (*GT* 82). The farmer, "finding how profitable [Gulliver] was like to be," extends this road show to the several significant cities all over the country and exhibits him for ten weeks (*GT* 83). As Altick explicates, Gulliver's performances directly reflect the "tricks actually done by lower primates on show in London" as well as "the most authentic particulars we have of show-business practices" of the time (35). Although such cruel treatments cannot be ethically acceptable in any part of the life and sciences, the Royal Society's similar activities at the end of the seventeenth century "spread interest in science beyond the elite circle of the virtuosi"; therefore, a public impression that "no heavy erudition was necessary to share in the pleasures of scientific demonstration and speculation" began to pervade the whole society (Altick 12). For the general public, this might have turned into a game of guess-what rather than an intellectual exchange rooted in genuine scientific motives. However, the practice of snatching nonhuman and human animals from their native lands just for the sake of satisfying the wonder-hunger of the white 'men' would signal the arise of colonialist, speciesist, and racist practices at best.

Swift satirises both these nonsensible practices of freak shows of the era as well as the pethood and toyhood in Book II. In all these satirical accounts, Glumdalclitch's grief over the decision to display Gulliver as a freak to earn quick money draws attention. Laying him "over her Bosom" and falling "a weeping with Shame and Grief," the girl expresses her concerns about the vulgarities that are sure to follow in these performances and may harm her living pet (*GT* 81). At this moment, she mentions her memory of a dear lamb that her parents "pretended to give her" the previous year; however, the lamb, "as soon

as it was fat," was sold to a butcher. Her grief shows that Glumdalclitch as a child was "severely traumatized by her parents' actions, for pets are never supposed to be eaten" (Kelly 333). Listening to her, the protagonist also learns the condition of being a pet or an animal as "husbandry"—also given with the profession of the father—"relies upon livestock's utility" (Jaques 33). Under the ownership of a superior being in Brobdingnag, Gulliver transforms from an insect to an animal, from a pet to a freakish performative creature. This shift to commodification points to the economic value system of the liberal human: a nonhuman being is deprived of subjectivity and has value as long as it is fat enough for human consumption realistically or metaphorically. Only after several weeks of hard work and travel would he be purchased as a doll by the Queen so that he would experience another level of nonhumanisation. His rapidly changing modes of ownership undermine his subjectivity based on liberal humanist ideals. Glumdalclitch's sentimental attachment might remind us of Swift's playful adaptation of Shaftesbury's approach to human nature as innately good. But it also underlines the hypocritical actions of exploitations conducted under the disguise of sentimental benevolence. Through these nonhumanising transformations, Gulliver's perspective gets enhanced toward a posthumanist understanding of naturecultures, and he begins using his posthuman potential to critically scrutinise the concept of the human. Recalling his actions in Lilliput, he confesses that "human Creatures are observed to be more Savage and cruel in Proportion to their Bulk" (*GT* 72).

Before transforming into a clockwork toy in the court, Gulliver's treatment as a pet relies on the Queen's "human curiosities" (Bogdan 25–26). Out of her surprise "at so much Wit and good Sense in so diminutive an Animal," she gives "great Allowance for [his] Defectiveness in speaking" and shares her new pet with the King and her maid of honours (*GT* 85). Gulliver's becoming a pet, and later a doll, does not change his freak status to a great extent. The King, to give an example, "was strongly bent to get [him] a Woman of [his] own size, by whom [Gulliver] might propagate the Breed" (*GT* 116). The hero's revolt against such an approach of scientific experimentalism voices Swift's critique of the treatment of nonhuman animals as mere curiosities in that era: "I should rather have dyed than undergone the Disgrace of leaving a Posterity to be kept in Cages like tame Canary Birds, and perhaps in time sold about the Kingdom to Persons of Quality for

Curiosities" (*GT* 116). The King's scientific curiosity to see the reproduction process of the species *Homo sapiens* also mirrors the protagonist's scientific curiosity in Lilliput where he "took six Cows and two Bulls alive, with as many Yews and Rams, intending to carry them into [his] own Country, and propagate the Breed" (*GT* 64). The King's proposal sounds disgraceful for Gulliver; however, he also had the same mind to have "a good Bundle of the Natives" of Blefuscu (*GT* 64) just to make them reproduce as part of a bunch of curiosities from foreign lands.

During his days in the palace, Gulliver subtly attempts to reclaim his liberal human subjectivity by means of his witless collection of oddities. In addition to his formation in the natural philosophies of the early seventeenth century, his professional careers as a surgeon and a navigator nourish him as a "man of science intent on forming a collection" of his own in Brobdingnag (Altick 13). In London, it was common to see such people of scientific interests commission several people that would visit newly discovered lands. Arthur MacGregor quotes an advertising account of James Petiver (1665–1718), a herbalist and apothecary based in London:

> I humbly entreat that all practitioners in Physick, Sea-Surgeons or other curious persons, who travel into foreign countries, will be pleased to make collections for me of whatever plants, shells, insects &c they shall meet with, preserving them according to directions that I have made so easie as the meanest capacity is able to perform, the which I am ready to give to such as shall desire them. (156)

Both for himself and for such people as Petiver, the diminutive hero seems willing to make collections out of Brobdingnagian materials. He first makes a comb from "forty or fifty of the strongest Stumps of Hair" and "a piece of fine Wood" (*GT* 104) when the King gets shaved. Via this comb, he attempts to turn the tides of his nonhumanised subjectivity and transforms a part of the King into an object. Similarly, thanks to his "Mechanical Genius," Gulliver makes "a neat little Purse about five Foot long" for Glumdalclitch from "the Combings of Her Majesty's hair" (*GT* 104). Among Gulliver's witless collections, there is also "a Corn that [he] had cut off . . . from a Maid of Honor's Toe," which he would get hollowed into a Cup and set in Silver upon his return to England, "a Footman's Tooth . . . about a Foot long and four Inches in Diameter," and "the Breeches . . . made of a Mouse's Skin" (*GT* 122–23). The more the protagonist gets

used to the absolute alterities in Brobdingnag, the more he grasps every opportunity to reclaim his human subjectivity. He gradually objectifies the parts or wholes of the ones around him. He is aware that when he returns to his home country one day, these collections created out of the "abnormal, the strange, the rare, the exotic, the tour de force" will appeal to the public's "indiscriminate sense of wonder" (Altick 8). He seems willing to turn into the Brobdingnagian farmer in London.

"Size and scale" in Swift's narrative "yield embodied metaphors" (Rabb, *Miniature* 52) for the liberal human's problem of subjectivity and centralised place in the world. The fantastic imagery in *Gulliver's Travels* serves the investigation of the human's self-centralised cognition. The differentiation in the scales of the humanoids—as well as of the titular hero—in the first and second Books tests Gulliver who carries the symbolic professions of the Enlightenment natural philosophy first as a surgeon and then as a navigator. As given in Locke's and Hume's separate notions that attach experience to the sense of reality and the formation of human subjectivity, Gulliver is groomed within the parameters of the time's scientific realism which is challenged by the fact that "represented objects exist, constrain, and act independently of their representations" (Schaffer 279). Lockean and Humean conceptions of realities that get detached from nonhuman entities and become exclusive to human perception establish, as Barad would also consent, "the representationalist belief in the power of words [i.e., anthropocentric speech capacity] to mirror pre-existing phenomena . . . as well as traditional realist" axioms ("Posthumanist Performativity" 802). Clearly, the representational thought is fed by these epistemological positions; however, in a new materialist perception, ethical and ontological positions cannot be discarded from the multi-scalar relationality of our perceptions and hence realities. Human subjectivity as well as their realities are subject to constant change as we have seen in Gulliver's case so far. In this regard, Barad emphasises that "'each of us' is part of the intra-active ongoing articulation of the world in its differential mattering" (*Meeting* 381). In Lilliput's and Brobdingnag's diffractive matterings, Gulliver's subjectivity is ceaselessly articulated by the material-discursive practices of these humanoids. Thus, the hero begins demonstrating the entangled nature of ethico-onto-epistemology, or "the inseparability of . . . the nature of being, knowing, and valuing" (Barad, *Meeting* 409n10). The protagonist gains a polymorphic character,

and all of his nonhuman transformations exist simultaneously in the first two journeys. Such a polymorphism makes him a posthuman hybrid since the definitive authority is not Gulliver himself, but either the diminutive humanoids or the gigantic ones.

The third voyage gives a significant contrast to the first two in terms of problematising Gulliver's subjectivity. He respectively visits Laputa the flying island, Balnibarbi and its capital Lagado, Glubbdubdrib the magical island, Luggnagg with immortal unfortunates, and Japan. During his visits to these landscapes, seldom does his liberal human subjectivity encounter challenges. Unlike his overarching and vulnerable physiological and cognitive positions in the previous journeys, he preserves a character that employs scientific observation towards the novelties he comes to meet. The first voyage to the floating island of Laputa proves significant in questioning the heavily-relied reason of humans. There, he observes "a Race of Mortals so singular in their Shapes, Habits, and Countenances" who have corporeal disfigurations: "Their Heads were all reclined either to the Right, or the Left; one of their Eyes turned inward, and the other directly up to the Zenith" (*GT* 133). These people "are so taken up with intense Speculations, that they neither can speak, nor attend to the Discourses of others" as long as they are not warned by their companion bodies, the flappers (*GT* 134). According to the critics, Swift holds a cynical approach in Laputa to the scholars in his time, especially the ones in the Royal Society of London. In addition to satirising the over-fascinated scholars of his time, he criticises the superstitious common folk who could not stop speculating about life, nature, and the universe without a comprehensive understanding of these disciplines. In *An Essay on Criticism* (1711), Alexander Pope summarises this condition in his masterfully-crafted heroic couplets:

> A little learning is a dangerous thing;
> Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
> There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
> And drinking largely sobers us again.
> Fired at first sight with what the Muse imparts,
> In fearless youth we tempt the heights of arts,
> While from the bounded level of our mind,
> Short views we take, nor see the lengths behind;
> But more advanced, behold with strange surprise
> New distant scenes of endless science rise! (Pope 215–224)

Keeping in mind that London had no shortage of spaces of social interaction and communication like coffeehouses since the middle of the seventeenth century, we can deduce that Pope and Swift denounce people with a "little learning" who could easily drown in "shallow draughts" (Pope 215, 217). In such spaces, learned people, scholars, and common folk "were in daily touch with" one another; and these areas gave "meeting-place[s] for social intercourse and gossip; . . . serious and sober discussion on all matters of common interest" (Ellis 29). With these provisos in mind, I observe that the Dean as a people person himself also embraces a satirical attitude towards the intellectual gap between those two camps—the learned and the common. The subjectivity of the enlightened 'English man' was desired to be dominant and definitive whereas the self of the common was deprived of compulsory socio-economic means to acquire this enlightenment. At the crossroads of this dilemma, Swift wonders for us all: Who would define the British subject? Who would be the enlightened human? The ideal, or an average mixture in mediocracy?

The people of Laputa illustrate possible answers, circumstances, and events to these questions. The Laputans master theoretical sciences and revere philosophical speculations. The common people run after daily errands and mischievous deeds to deceive the wishful thinkers of Laputa and exploit the riches of the land of Balnibarbi. Before the scenery of such a society, it must be noted, Gulliver stands in a new identity: he is 'both less and more' than an anthropocentric liberal human subject, entangled in the subversive inquiries into the nature of being human and becoming with nonhumans. Due to this new posthumanist identity, although having ceaselessly complained that he "could never drive the least Conception" of "Ideas, Entities, Abstractions and Transcendentals" into Brobdingnagian humanoids' heads (*GT* 113), the hero criticises these Laputan's fondness of the abstractions as well as their fear of theoretical calculations that paralyse their regular lives. "[U]nder continual Disquietudes, never enjoying a Minute's Peace of Mind," the Laputans fear the Earth's being "absorbed or swallowed up" by the sun due to the planet's continual approaches to the star (*GT* 138). This fear reflects the widespread phobia in the early eighteenth century when Newton's theory of light and Robert Hooke's (1635–1703) wave-theory on the interpretations of sun-spots became popular, and the limited human knowledge led to miscalculations and misunderstandings in society (Patey

818). Other than the fear of absorption by the sun, they worry about the possible destruction of the humanity by "the Tail of the last Comet . . . which they have calculated [to happen] for one and Thirty Years hence" (*GT* 138). This one comet refers to Halley's comet—"the first comet whose period of return was definitely predicted, with resultant great excitement both to literary and to scientific imagination" (Nicolson and Mohler 312). The thirty-one year in the future refers to the year 1757 as *Gulliver's Travels* was published in 1726; Swift's calculation refers to the calculations of the discoverer of the comet, Edmond Halley (1656–1741), who claimed that the comet's period is around seventy-five and a half years and would return in 1758 (Halley 21–22). The scientists rejoiced in Newtonian and Halley's observations whereas laypeople, "then as now, grasped the main point, but neglected the careful mathematics" (Nicolson and Mohler 313) because they only focused on the issue of gravitation which meant for them a probability of either the drift of the Earth into the sun or the collision of the comet into the Earth. In the light of these speculative reactions, the Laputans seem to be the answer to Swift's questions above.

Departing from Laputa, Gulliver is introduced to a worse situation: Lagado, the capital of mainland Balnibarbi. On the mainland, houses are "strangely Built" and "out of Repair" without the parameters of any proper architectural and mathematical calculation (*GT* 147), people are dressed in "Rags," and either "Corn or Grass" were not raised in its soil (*GT* 148). According to Munodi, a great lord and Gulliver's host in Balnibarbi, all these inhabitable conditions began "about Fourty Years ago" when "certain Persons went up to *Laputa* . . . [and] came back with a very little smattering in Mathematicks, but full of Volatile Spirits acquired in that Airy Region" (*GT* 149). These lines present a common concern depicted in Pope's lines above about "a little learning" of the "intoxicated brains." Upon their return, the Balnibarbians "fell into Schemes of putting all Arts, Sciences, Languages, and Mechanicks upon a new Foot" (*GT* 149). At the top of these schemes comes the foundation of the Grand Academy of Lagado. Especially this academy in the heart of the capital, referring to the Royal Society of London, becomes a scene of parodic satire of both laypeople and some researchers and their experiments as published in *Philosophical Transactions*, the official journal of the Royal Society. Traditionally, many scholarly papers that were indulged in mathematical and scientific speculations and

calculations were published in the journal, along with rejoinders by other researchers which demonstrate errors in the original papers (Nicolson and Mohler 306–07). Gulliver observes the re-performances of some published experiments during his tour of the Academy. In his observations, he undertakes the role of either a Brobdingnagian humanoid or a "seventeenth-century layman" who would have an attitude "toward the 'uselessness' of physical and mathematical learning" (Nicolson and Mohler 304–05). Through Gulliver's observations, Swift examines the extent of a possible utopia based on the liberal humanist establishment of sciences and learning of human nature and natural habitats.

The satirist primarily addresses the master-mind and inspirer of the Society, Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (Purver 22–23). It is well known that the Society centred its researches and developed three metaphorical methodologies by Bacon: "the passive observer of nature, the active manipulator of nature, and the uncoverer of hidden powers" (Lynch 173). In his advocacy of induction in organising intellectual disciplines, Bacon emphasises a particular point to show collective activity and effort to develop a consistent theory based on "*Experimenta lucifera*, experiments of *light*" rather than "*fructifera*, experiments of *fruit*" in *Novum Organum*/*The New Organon* (1620) (Bacon XCIX). The experiments of light mean the theories that are most ideal for human nature's technological and scientific productions, or fruits. These experiments, for Bacon, are important because "they never miss or fail" in "discovering the natural cause of some effect" (XCIX). In much resemblance with the Salomon's House in Bacon's scientific utopia *New Atlantis* (1627), the Grand Academy of projectors in Lagado parodically exemplifies "a Project for extracting Sun-Beams out of Cucumbers" for eight years (*GT* 151). With this project and several similarly ludicrous experiments in the Grand Academy, Swift ridicules the Baconian approach that led to a number of curious experiments in the Royal Society (Nicolson and Mohler 328–29). The author is not obviously against scientific or technological experiments, practices, and their individual or collective implementations. He is against the dualistic positioning of sciences as he is aware of the impossibility of the division between theory and practice. The fact that "Bacon's countenance was dual, and reached back to the distant past just as it looked forward to a philosophically advanced future" (Lewis 389) would only nourish a system

based on capital and the elite intelligentsia. For this very reason, Swift consults Aristotelian conceptions and attacks the Cartesian thought of Bacon in his "Battle of the Books" (1704): "Aristotle, observing Bacon advance with a furious Mien, drew his bow to the head, and let fly his arrow; which missed the valiant Modern [Bacon], and went hizzing over his head. But Des Cartes it hit" ("Battle" 144–45). His account of Aristotle's vengeful arrow quickly slays Descartes but gives a warning to the followers of the Baconian methodologies by slightly wounding him (Lewis 388–89). Likewise, in this third voyage, Swift employs a cautious warning against the hierarchical stratification of scholarships based on their functionality, utility, and servitude in the human's favour. His visionary philosophy points to an assemblage of all disciplines that function in correspondence to one another, referring to a posthumanist, transversal, and transdisciplinary future.

Gulliver's final journey to the land of Houyhnhnms displays the complementary stage of the hero's nonhumanisation and posthuman subjectivity. The surgeon-navigator who has set out as a proud man from one enlightened European country is differentiated from his species-centric titles, attributions, and habits one last time among the brutes. It is seen that he has been exposed to the diffractions of scale, matter, and integrity in Lilliput and Brobdingnag. At the third step of his journey, his emergent capacities of a posthumanist selfhood are tested before the ruling binarism. In the final stage, dominant discourses in Swift's time that define what a human being is deconstructed through his exchanges with the Yahoos and the Houyhnhnms. In each plane of four journeys, he has (been) diffracted away from his liberal human self to a more other-than-human becoming. It is curious to observe that "Gulliver awkwardly and often inappropriately represents his membership in a variety of communities"; he adapts to several habitats: "He proudly celebrates his standing as a nardac of Lilliput, . . . and, after his last voyage, trots and whinnies to assert his presumed Houyhnhnm superiority" (Oakleaf 12). He poses to be a member of a 'lesser' humanoid community despite his humanist hubris. However, as seen from the analyses above, he fits in none of these communities of humanoids of different dispositions. He likes to be in the centre of these species' attention spans and therefore feels to fit in them despite all the nonhumanisation praxes. Gulliver the human loves to be at the centre regardless of being defined and treated like an animal, object, mechanical

clockwork, or else. Yet in the Houyhnhnms land, he accepts his nature as inferior to the brute race, as a Yahoo domesticated by the nobler horses. The balance between the human and the nonhuman established by the satirist in this final plane can be accepted as the culmination of his proto-posthumanist endeavours to expose the fictionality of human identity and to re-configure the Enlightenment discourses of human nature.

Throughout the exposition and re-configuration in Book IV, two species—Houyhnhnms and Yahoos—are used as "the Mirror of scorn and pity towards Man" (Tolkien, *Monsters* 125). As Tolkien also argues in "On Fairy-Stories," nonhuman animals in fantasy stories become the real "heroes and heroines" since "the animal form is only a mask upon a human face" (*Monsters* 117). The Houyhnhnms might be described as animals in full physiological detail, which illustrates the author's critique of the realist and language-dependent convention of the eighteenth-century scientist. Likewise, the Yahoos are given as animals in an alienation attempt to see *Homo sapiens* from a different angle. However, neither of them are mere illustrations or representations of either animals or humans. Similar to Tolkien's arguments, they amalgamate two opposite sides of a duality under one mask to lay bare the human's sense of phobia towards the nonhuman others. In this respect, satirical fantasies reference truths beyond their illustrated setting, characters, and events. To operate in an effective and functional manner, they rely on their reader's building interconnections between fictions and realities in particular contexts. Swift, in *Gulliver's Travels*, does more than satirising the socio-political and philosophical issues of his time. He engages with the material-discursive concepts of hierarchies in nature, the validity of binaries such as positive/social sciences and non/human, and the separability of body/mind. He utilises the theme of "animal vengeance" (Blount 24) to examine the common grounds of non/humans and delves deep into what kind of reality the human subject is constituted in.

Swift postulates that the language-based representations of reality and self—as practised and promoted by natural sciences—are imbued with lies and imagination, the exact accusations directed to fantasy fiction in the age of formal and scientific realism. Houyhnhnms are able to perceive truth without consulting any linguistic composition. They have discarded language as the indicator of a proper subjectivity. When Gulliver

composes a dictionary of the brutes' communication methods, the master horse regards his attempt as incomprehensible since truth and rationality cannot be enclosed by written and spoken words (*GT* 198–99). In this frame, Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr. also believes that, "in its most fundamental sense, the myth of the Voyage to the Houyhnhnms is a myth about true knowledge" (214). Taken as true knowledge, the hero's accounts first show a diffractive becoming of a human subject with nonhuman beings around him. Then, they alert the reader about the real-world circumstances of becoming with the other, nature, and nonhumans during the human's interactions with them in a constancy of relationality. Through this paradoxical pattern, Swift combines the material world and the representationalist discourse to exhibit that one constitutes the other, that textuality cannot be situated over the materiality, and that subjectivity is not bound to an anthropocentric meaning-making mechanism.

Such dualities of matter and text, body and mind, and self and other are vividly portrayed in Gulliver's meeting the human's doppelganger, the Yahoos. In the account of the hero's first encounter with "several Animals in a Field," Swift estranges readers from a quick association of the Yahoos with humans:

> Their Shape was very singular, and deformed. . . . Their Heads and Breasts were covered with a thick Hair, some frizled and others lank, they had Beards like Goats, and a long ridge of Hair down their Backs, and the fore-parts of their Legs and Feet, but the rest of their bodies were bare, so that I might see their Skins, which were of a brown buff Colour. They had no Tails, nor any Hair at all on their Buttocks, except about the *Anus*, which, I presume, Nature had placed there to defend them as they sate on the Ground; for this Posture they used, as well as lying down, and often stood on their hind Feet. (*GT* 189)

Upon his observations of these creatures, Gulliver finds them "disagreeable" and feels "so strong an Antipathy," "full of Contempt and Aversion" (*GT* 189–90). In addition to the underlying satire of the contemporary scientist who could miss the obvious in his ignorance to identify a group of human beings, Swift subtly refers to a kind of Hobbesian condition of sinful Adamic sensuality as dictated by the religious doctrines based on the scripture. If the Enlightenment and the philosophical and techno-scientific developments accompanying it are positioned against the religious conditioning of the human body and life, the human subjectivity here is given by contrasting its two forms, Gulliver and the

Yahoos as two clashing parties. On one side, the protagonist is presented as an ambitious follower of new information all around the world, full of civilities even under dire circumstances, in his "best suit of Cloaths . . . with a small Bundle of Linnen" (*GT* 188). On the other side, the apish Yahoos are introduced in full nudity, with uncivilised manners of springing and leaping on trees like simians. This picture of the Yahoos devoid of clothing, reasonable manners, and cleanliness refers to the condition of the primordial human couple according to some critiques because "the stigma of original sin is impressed upon the body of the human being through the persistent stimulus of an unreasonable sensuality" (Bonaiuti and La Piana 163). In this biblical portrayal, as detailed by Derridean deconstruction in the first chapter, the Cartesian dualism of body and mind is exemplified. It can be seen that this duality falsely veneers the mind to define a human being. The body in its particularity and totality cannot be disposed of in making sense of humans. Swift, as Stacy Alaimo would contend, makes "a manifestation of how transcorporeality demands more responsible, less confident epistemologies" (*Bodily Natures* 22).

Such a sensual and scatological imagery might seem grotesque without posthumanist lenses. Hence, it becomes a cause of prosecution in Lilliput when Gulliver urinates over the palace to extinguish the fire. Conversely, the gross reality of being human is a matter of criticism in Brobdingnag when Gulliver feels quite uneasy upon seeing the court ladies discharging: "Neither did they at all scruple while I was by to discharge what they had drunk, to the quantity of at least two Hogsheads, in a Vessel that held above three Tuns" (*GT* 99). Likewise, these ladies place him "on their Toylet directly before their naked Bodies" to tempt him or set him "astride upon" their nipples "with many other Tricks" (*GT* 99). Equally, he witnesses the most ancient student's project "to reduce human Excrement to its original Food" among several other studies at the Grand Academy of Lagado (*GT* 152). Furthermore, unclean and violent human nature is amplified in Gulliver's first quarrelsome encounter with the Yahoos who, "getting hold of the Branches behind leapt up in the Tree, from whence they began to discharge their Excrements on my [his] Head" (*GT* 190). These scatological satires voice the demand for a series of revisions to anthropocentric and scientific perspectives. In addition, by testing the boundaries of imagination and wonder, they undermine the value of realism portrayed

in fiction as well as in the sciences of the time. In this sense, Swift relies on the power of fantasy; for, "through this magnified detail," the author "points out the vile facts of human life" and "challenges man's complacent view of himself and life about him through the presentation of facts that have been ignored or unexamined" (J. N. Lee 104). Detailing biological discharge moments, he uses the modern scientific discourses to weaken the dominant discourse itself. If the human and its productions are tested in the face of its mimetic precision of nature and natural machinations around/of humankind, these facts demonstrate the impolite, uncivil, embarrassing—yet highly natural—moments of the human condition. Taken to a level of confrontation, this verisimilitude employed in sensual and scatological descriptions manifests the indispensability of the human's corporeality and upends the mind-centric verticality.

In her critique of the binarist onto-epistemology, Alaimo articulates that "[h]umanism, capitalist individualism, transcendent religions, and utilitarian conceptions of nature have labored to deny the rather biophysical, yet also commonsensical realization that we are permeable, emergent beings, reliant upon the others within and outside our porous borders" (*Bodily Natures* 156). As also witnessed in the above-detailed discussions, the early eighteenth century encompasses all these aspects to separate the human from the fact that it is also an animal. As a revolt against this separation, Swift provides grotesque nudity of the Yahoos in an attempt to complement "a philosophical recognition of the 'trace' of the animal within the 'human'" (Alaimo, *Bodily Natures* 156). In this regard, the human's transcorporeality "which denies the human subject its sovereign, central position" (Alaimo, *Bodily Natures* 16), or the instinctive sensuality in human's sinful condition, is exemplified during Gulliver's bath time in a stream when "a young Female *Yahoo*, . . . enflamed by Desire, . . . came running with all speed, and leaped into the Water[, and] . . . embraced me [Gulliver] after a most fulsome manner" (*GT* 225). Already disgusted by the irrational and animalistic lifestyle of his relative species, Gulliver feels threatened and violated as such a copulation attempt is against his will, against what he has been taught as a rational being. For this reason, his heightened sense of identity gets shattered and he is forced to accept the reality: "I could no longer deny, that I was a real *Yahoo*, in every Limb and Feature" (*GT* 225). The protagonist feels so disappointed and abhorred at humanity's violence, greed, pride, and ambition that he decides to become a

member of the Houyhnhnm community and even become a Houyhnhnm, a nonhuman animal, but willingly and consciously this time. He keenly observes that the falsity of the human's reason-based discourse is not actually centred around reason, truth, and reality, but rather around pragmatic concerns of the ruling parties or the dominant societies. He states that "the Use of Speech was to make us understand one another, and to receive Information of Facts; now if any one *said the Thing which was not*, these Ends were defeated" (*GT* 202). This way, he complements his nonhumanisation and posthuman subjectivity.

In its nature, devices, and deeds in the name of progression—in which *Homo sapiens* vocally takes pride, humanity looks barbaric and cruel in its comparisons in Brobdingnag and in the Houyhnhnms land. Upon Gulliver's account of newly developed war mechanics in Europe, the Brobdingnagian King is "struck with Horror" and appalled at how the 'human' "could entertain such inhuman Ideas" (*GT* 112). Under the light of the hero's anthropocentric discourse, the King concludes that "the Bulk of your [Gulliver's] natives" are "the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth" (*GT* 111). Here, he is put into a position of an insectoid being just as he does to the Lilliputians. After his experience in the final stage, he resolves to embrace a non-exclusionary subjectivity. "By conversing with the *Houyhnhnms*, and looking upon them with Delight," he imitates "their Gate and Gesture" and speaks in "the Voice and manner of the *Houyhnhnms*" (GT 235). When he thinks of the "Human Race in general," he begins considering them as "*Yahoos* in Shape and Disposition, only a little more civilized, and qualified with the Gift of Speech, but making no other use of Reason, than to improve and multiply those Vices, whereof their Brethren in this Country had only the share that Nature allotted them" (*GT* 234). He might be displeased with his human physiological features, but he also takes great pleasure in his resemblance to the horses. The demonstration of Gulliver's porous identity as a human-animal-object in unfamiliar naturecultures becomes a common denominator of the human's "strange strangeness" in Timothy Morton's words (Morton, "Thinking" 275; italics removed).

To conclude, *Gulliver's Travels* provides an extensive subversion of the common understandings of human and human nature in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Gulliver's interactions with several kinds of humanoids and nonhuman animals portray the indefinite entanglements of life, the constant relationality between beings regardless of their materiality and species. In these entanglements, the hero experiences that one can only be configured within the conditions of non-linear causality of one's (inter)actions. In his interactions, he is seen to be defined in iterative and novel ways by the nonhumans; and this becomes Swift's distinctive ability as the satirist to convey the true nature of being human *rationais capax*. In this respect, the author deals with some scientific insensibilities that mirror the Society's unnatural efforts under the name of progression because these efforts "not only worked to justify human enslavement, global imperialism, and colonization," but also "created a sensational desire to behold" a new superior self of the human (Wardi 519). Playing with these insensibilities, both Swift and Gulliver play with the anthropocentric perspectives and highlight that "[w]ho we are can shift into focus by staring at who we think we are not." (Garland-Thomson 6). Thus, this chapter has analysed Swift's humorous novel with concerns about what exactly constitutes posthuman subjectivity in fantasy fiction. Criticising liberal humanist approaches of the era and attempting to correct them, *Gulliver's Travels* is shown to become a shared story of humans and nonhumans in the course of evaluating true subjectivity.

CHAPTER 3

POSTHUMAN SUBJECTIVITY IN LEWIS CARROLL'S
ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND
THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

This chapter examines how the unstable and constantly 'evolving' nineteenth-century philosophies and sciences bring new characteristics together with the so-called stable human subjectivity in the time's children's fantasies, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (1865) and *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871) by Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, or Lewis Carroll as he is known with this penname. To have an organised examination, I divide my arguments into three sections here. Primarily, nineteenth-century understanding of human nature and self is discussed with the brief introductions of the time's philosophers' and scientists' innovative contributions to defining the concept and extent of the human. In the subsequent section, Carroll is analysed as an author of proto-posthumanist stance in his approach to life. His views on animal welfare and subjectivity are evaluated in his opposition to the liberal humanist practices at the peak of industrialisation. His use of illustrations in his works, some of which are included in the analysis here, is argued to be a cross-over element of transmedia literature. Finally, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass* are analysed in detail to uncover the protagonist's journeys toward her becoming a posthuman subject. Thus, this chapter intends to spotlight that humans can only thrive together in their relationality with nonhuman others as observed in Dodgson's fantasies.

3.1. HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Having discussed the eighteenth century as the epoch of the forebears identifying the distinctiveness of the human subject, the previous chapter has directed the route of this

dissertation to the era of practical[48] approaches built on these forebears in the nineteenth century. As clarified in the discussions about the human nature in the eighteenth century philosophies, the human subjectivity is proven to be an outcome of a fictionally uniform tradition. The liberal humanist definition of the human as a subject is therefore not a universal totality that could not especially embrace certain groups or individuals. The nineteenth-century praxes of placing the human subject around the Enlightenment ideals of free will, self-containment, and autonomy bring a complicated situatedness for the species since there is no longer a simple understanding of the Anthropos thanks to the post-Kantian developments in several branches of life and social sciences. In addition, focusing on the portrayal of social realist narratives, the Victorian era reveres a commonsensical agreement on not concentrating on the individual but the social in its literature. For this reason, my discussions in this section are limited to four post-Kantian thinkers of the nineteenth century to navigate the idea of the time's subject: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) as a transition-period philosopher moving beyond the Kantian dualistic understanding of the human, Karl Marx (1818–1883) as he adds the economic dimension to the human nature, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) as the spokesperson of the utility-based approach toward the nonhuman environment, and Charles Darwin (1809–1882) that sets the tone of the future studies in several areas of life sciences.[49]

The human's potential for the notion and reality of perpetual becoming, or change, in other words, is one of the cornerstones that draws a distinction between the human and the nonhuman. The experience of constant change is primarily related to the recognition of the human's self-consciousness by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as discussed in the

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[48] These practical approaches refer to the philosophical, socio-political and scientific practices in the nineteenth century which are built upon the philosophies and theories introduced in the eighteenth century.

[49] I am aware that these authors cannot be discussed in their full contexts within this brief section. For this reason, this part serves to introduce their ideas on the nature of human subjectivity that might have traces of influence for the author and his works to be analysed in this chapter. I also know that there are several other influential philosophers in the nineteenth century such as Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), August Comte (1798–1857). However, their standpoints fall either out of my scope or become effective after the publication of Dodgson's works.

first section of the previous chapter. Unlike D. Hume but very much similar to Shaftesbury, Kant is indulged in the idea that the human has a moral responsibility toward the beings and environment around hir,[50] not only other humans. Although this idea seems to be altruistic for the human, it highlights the human-animal distinction in liberal humanism because it is established on the precondition that the Anthropos is superior to other beings due to hir skills like reason, morality, and consciousness. In this context, Kant's reliance on these skills nominates the human species "as a free being" and nonhuman beings as means to anthropocentric ends (*Conflict* 131). This showcases the foundation of the Kantian epistemology and ethics: "ethics is only about how we treat other people" and "there is no ethical dimension at all to how we treat mere things" as well as nonhuman beings (Harman 67).

In the nineteenth century, there were many oppositions to Kantian philosophy, which continues to dominate the understanding of the natural world and draw criticism even today. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), in spite of being influenced by Kant's distinction of faculties such as reason and understanding of beings in his early years, became one of his early critics in his works like *The Phenomenology of Mind* (1807), *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817/1830), and *The Philosophy of Mind* (1817). He first finds the Kantian faculty categorisation problematic as it reduces the living organism, mostly the human, into "a confusing motley of inter-actions" rather than "a living unity" (Berry 130). This divisive understanding of faculties necessitates two conditions of acceptance that individual entities are first "not lifeless things but restless active processes" and second, that they have to get into 'inter'-action with one another in order to perform a meaningful act (Hegel, *Phenomenology* 332–33). Rather than an abstract envisioning of natural processes and the essence of life that might be found in Kant's transcendentalism and D. Hume's empiricism, Hegel recognises the natural world as an organism in itself, acting harmonically though separated into several—mainly three—units, and refuses to anatomise the human mind a "mechanical collection" as this would be a "shallow and superficial mode of observation" (Hegel, *Philosophy* 189, 337). In this regard, he takes one body as a whole in itself and argues

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[50] Please see the footnote 4 on page 3.

that all bodies, regardless of their species and material distinctions, stand in a relationality of attraction and repulsion (Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature* §269). As "nature is essentially [a] process" for him (Brinkmann 137), his idea of "self-referentiality" of a subject (Hegel, *Science of Logic* §19) can be regarded as not so different from the Kantian stance, yet he is viewed to remain close and influential to the subsequent philosophers of nature and evolution.

The notion of the human subject as an organic whole is amplified with the addition of a new element: the ability of material-economic judgment of one's value. In this line, the most influential figure in the nineteenth century is Karl Marx (1818–1883), who is influenced by Hegel's views on the state and politics. In his understanding and theory of human nature and subjectivity, as he declares in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) with Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), Marx brings out communism and anti-capitalism as new value systems in his writings as he defends that the economic and political structure of society acts as the main determiner of the nature of that society as well as of individuals in it. Especially criticising the course of imperialist premises of liberal economies during and after the Industrial Revolution, he states in the "Preface" to *A Critique of Political Economy* (1867) that it "is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" ("Preface" 425). Thus, he draws attention to the indispensability of an individual's constant relations with other humans within the context of a community as, he claims, "the real nature of man is the totality of social relations" (*Selected Writings* 83). This presupposition of the existence of other humans in the formation of one's subjectivity does not allow a competition of value structures between humans and nonhumans as Marx already references the reification and commodification of nonhuman beings and entities as they are perceived to be at the service of the capital owner. Likewise, his critique of the bourgeoisie also portrays humans as not excluded from the process of dehumanisation and nonhumanisation either. One essential distinction which he makes about human nature is that humans are "*active* beings" and, by nature, they are "different . . . from other animals" because they "*produce* [their] means of subsistence" (Stevenson et al. 198; italics in the original). In a system of organised production, then, humans rely on their ability to make value judgments, of which nonhumans are incapable.

The use value of material entities and living beings might indicate a rational human subject that could determine the financial as well as the ontological worth of those entities and beings, according to Marxist philosophy. For this reason, it might be argued to oppose the rising principle of utility in the Victorian era. As seen in the work of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), *Utilitarianism* (1863), which follows Jeremy Bentham's model, modern utilitarianism can be considered as another offspring of liberal humanism nourished by Cartesian dualism, Humean empiricism, and Kantian transcendentalism. Moving beyond the principle of pleasure for humans, Mill foregrounds the distinctive characteristic of the human as "intellect" and frames his ideas around it:

> Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base. . . . It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. . . . And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. . . . (Mill 56–57)

As seen here, the principle of intellectual utility requires an outright acknowledgement of the non/human duality upon which the use value of utilitarianism is improved. In this regard, the utilitarianist subject clashes with the communist subject with competing value structures. However, these structures do not permit the ontological presence of nonhuman others to develop within their circles.

It can be understood from the above discussions regarding the new characteristics of the human subjects such as 'non-mechanical materiality,' value judgement, and the principles of pleasure and intellectual, as discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2, that the philosophy of human nature is formed around a completely different spirit. In the second chapter, I have argued that the eighteenth-century philosophers of human nature formulate their views both against the theological schools before the Enlightenment and around the ideas of early modern thinkers like Descartes and Hobbes. Understandably, this formulation is followed by the proliferation of new scientific and philosophical scholarships in the nineteenth century. For instance, the ground-breaking developments in the areas like biology and psychology quickly gain critical and academic support in order to make sense of the global conflict between individuals and societies since "human conflict . . . seems

to involve something darker in human nature than mere economic competition" and begs us to "look elsewhere . . . for deeper insights into the problems" of the liberal humanist subject (Stevenson et al. 204): theories of evolution.

Recalibrating the zeitgeist of the time with the publication of *On the Origin of Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871), Charles Darwin (1809–1882) made the greatest contribution to the understanding of human nature and subjectivity until then. His studies in these two seminal works modified even the average person's worldview of the self and nature. Unlike Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) who claimed a ladder of progressive evolution, orthogenesis, in *Zoological Philosophy* (1809), Darwin argued for the existence of a "branching evolution" rather than "a teleological march toward greater perfection" (Mayr, "Darwin's Influence" 80). To a great extent, he made sure that sciences, especially biology, incorporated historicity and hence narrativity. Simultaneous with and independent of Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), Darwin proved the concept of evolutionary biology through "Natural Selection" in which some individuals of a species would fail or thrive to survive under some set of certain circumstances in the natural environment (Darwin, *On the Origin* 50, 63–65). So, the ontological continuity of a species was mostly understood to rely on its interactions with its environment which might act and change interdependently on or independently from that species. The Darwinian theory of evolutionary biology and natural selection brought the greatest blow to the exalted position of 'man' from the scientific circle as this new perspective attempted to equalise the human's position with the animal's (Mayr, "Darwin's Impact" 319).

Within this framework, it becomes clear that humans' endeavours to shape and re-form their environment do not guarantee their survival; the contrary is imperative. Different from their imagery in the religious presupposition of the primordial couple, humans are to adapt to their environment in order to survive, just as animals do. "What is gone in Darwin's work, and what is maintained in creationism" Erica Fudge aptly emphasises, "is the sense of a static nature, with humans on the top rung. . . . Evolutionary theory proposes in place of this a nature constantly in flux, with no fixed point of perfection" (20). Despite the purely scientific state of Darwin's evolutionary biology and his claim

of no perfection in the entangled processes of evolutionary ladders, it is some sociologist-philosophers like Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) who appropriate the Darwinian model to politics and societies and develop the idea of social Darwinism. This idea would definitely lead to the elimination of technologically less improved, or primitive, communities to get erased from the history of humanity or to be subdued for the sake of their 'evolved' white 'European' cousins (Stevenson et al. 252–53). Perhaps most close to Spencer's evolutionary society, he states:

> Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence consequent on his rapid multiplication; and if he is to advance still higher he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would soon sink into indolence, and the more highly-gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men. . . . (Darwin, *Descent of Man* 403).

Aware of several scenarios that might have led to the evolution of the modern human, Darwin is aware of the speculative nature of his discussions on the human's lineage from apes in his work. To the above expression, therefore, he quickly adds: "Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest part of man's nature is concerned there are other agencies more important" (Darwin, *Descent of Man* 404). After the release of his ideas, these "other agencies" have been interpreted in social dimensions and applied to the cultural as well as the socio-political arenas of human and natural lives—not so remote from the Kantian differentiation of humans from nonhumans. That is to say, the Darwinian theories are appropriated into areas of racial supremacy, sex/gender discrimination, and capitalist establishments more quickly than into natural sciences.

As can be understood from these expressions of the above philosophers and scientists, these fields that have paved the way for the twentieth-century human are today known to have formed the bases of several discriminatory cognates and offspring of abused and misused liberal humanism. Raymond Corbey, while analysing the human-animal distinction from a more social perspective, summarises that "human nature has partially been shaped by the selective pressures of cultural behaviours and culturally fabricated

elements of the environment" (192). These selective meaning-making mechanisms underline the "beast in man" or human animality as "a forceful, omnipresent metaphor" in the socio-political, literary, and cultural spheres of the nineteenth-century life in Britain, organising "races, classes, manners, bodily parts, city topography, and political metaphors in terms of high and low and acceptable and unacceptable" (Corbey 79). Human in terms of hir nature or subjectivity is a collective project of several people that attempted to make sense of hir position in the middle of naturalcultural processes and events. Any of the above names' contributions cannot be denied their scientific and edifying values in the contemporary sciences. Yet again, what I have observed and discussed so far does not suffice to overlook their misconceptions or shortcomings in the face of developing sciences and hence an acuter sense of what we[51] are and where we stand.

At this integral moment of appreciation, one fantasy writer of the nineteenth century, Lewis Carroll, demands a critical analysis in terms of his views to provide corrective suggestions to the superficial divide between the human and nonhuman. Dodgson, as a mathematician and author, becomes a forerunner of advocates arguing for the equal alignment of species and does not abstain from voicing his opinions either in his essays or his fantasies. He invites the reader to several journeys of one's soul's transgressions to the realm of the other, illustrating a posthumanist probability of be(com)ing (with) the more-than-human. For that reason, I situate him as a person of posthumanist principles and justify this idea with some biographical details and examples from his other works before I move to analyse his fantasy series, *Alice*.

3.2. LEWIS CARROLL AS A POSTHUMANIST SUBJECT

Born on January 27, 1832, in Daresbury, Cheshire, as the eldest boy of eleven children of his family of clergies, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson was arguably influenced by the occasion of three workers' signing their names on a window glass when his family resided in Croft-on-Tees in 1843 (R. Wilson 21–25). His perspective on the mirrored/reverse

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[51] Please see the footnote 3 on page 2.

image of writing which began to develop at the age of eleven was manifested in his interest in the reversal of viewpoints in his most celebrated works of *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass* (Douglas-Fairhurst 28). After his education full of hardships and bullying at Rugby School (1846–1849) and before moving to Oxford in 1850, he dealt with two mathematical problems of time—a hemispherical problem about the location of the start of the day and a choice about two clocks—which were appealing to scientific circles then and in the following years (R. Wilson 34–37).

From the posthumanist perspective, these mathematical problems point to an understanding of a non-anthropocentric conception of temporality in Dodgson's works. For Lewis Carroll—as his pen name after March 1856,[52] temporal boundaries are not determined by the presumably sovereign human species and their calculations. In illustrating this conception, he introduces a notion of nonhuman temporality on the very first page of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* when the Rabbit takes "a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket" and looks at it (7; italics removed; see fig. 2). This proposition of a nonhuman temporality is further amplified in Alice's fall down the rabbit hole, during which she has "plenty of time . . . to look about her" (*AAW* 8).[53] Here, this fall reveals to the reader that what will happen in the later pages of the fantasy narrative will happen outside the anthropocentric terms of temporality as well as spatiality. The fantastic Wonderland has its own time, space, agency, reality, and subjectivity.

Dodgson often makes use of such a posthuman temporality when he wants to deconstruct the anthropocentric subjectivity and blur the boundaries of the human and the nonhuman. One example is Alice's participation in the mad tea party of the March Hare and the Hatter. When the heroine wonders about the mysterious function of the Hatter's watch which "tells the day of the month, and doesn't tell what o'clock it is" (*AAW* 54), he explains that it is "always six o'clock now," "always tea-time" and, therefore, they have "no time to wash the things between whiles" (*AAW* 56). There seems to be no temporal

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[52] Both surnames—Dodgson and Carroll—are used interchangably throughout the chapter to avoid repetition.

[53] To make a distinction between two *Alice* novels, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* is abbreviated as *AAW* and *Through the Looking-Glass* as *TLG* in parenthetical references.

progression for the Hare and the Hatter, but paradoxically time passes for them too. This scene recalls Harry Harootunian's notion of temporality, which is a reality of "non-contemporaneous contemporary," or "a present filled with traces of different moments and temporalities, weighted with sediments" (476). The always-already messy tea table and the endless sleep talks of the Dormouse at the party seem to be recollections or re-occurrences of past events whereas Alice's temporal reality is at present. The similar enmeshment of different sections of time is witnessed at the trial of tarts when these three companions declare three different dates: It is the fourteenth of March for the Hatter, the fifteenth for the March Hare, and the sixteenth for the Dormouse (*AAW* 86). And interestingly enough, all of them are accepted and recorded in the minutes. Another example of posthuman temporality is given in *Through the Looking-Glass* during the breathless running of the protagonist alongside the Red Queen when they try to reach the other side of the chess-board fields (123). Upon noticing they arrive nowhere despite their attempt, the girl comprehends that the looking-glass beings "live backwards" (*TLG* 148) and that time does not only flow in a linear manner there as it is perceived by the humans (*TLG* 124–25). Time in Carroll's fantasies, unlike the anthropocentric temporality in Victorian narratives depicting human progress, portrays the posthuman potential of "the existence of separate temporalities existing alongside each other" (Clemens and Casey 63). The human/real time and the nonhuman/fantasy time operate at the same time in the human child's journeys. In line with this temporal operation, Alice could hardly ever witness the beginning or end of a scene either in Wonderland or in the looking-glass world. Echoing an epic hero's journey, her entrance into each setting happens in *medias res*.

Fitting into the spirit of his time of constant alterations in all the realms of life, the author is known to be fascinated by the thought of renewal and perpetual change. His diary entry on November 30, 1881, the day of his retirement from his Mathematical Lectureship at Christ Church, Oxford University, reads as follows: "There is a sadness in coming to the *end* of anything in Life" since "Man's instincts cling to the Life that will never end" (qtd in. Jagger 96; italics and capitalisation in the original). Carroll enjoyed the sense of incompleteness and complicatedness in paintings—compared to the ones "sealed with varnish"—and riddles (Douglas-Fairhurst 17). In almost all of his fictional works, it is

common to see the practice of not finishing the sentences or leaving them in the middle or in the air for the reader to speculate on the lines further. Both *Alice* books are full of these examples, which will be analysed in the context of the protagonist's journey of posthumanist subjectivity in the following pages. His works reflect this style of the author dedicated to the notions of beginninglessness and endlessness so much that they "switch from the straightforwardly transparent to the puzzlingly opaque with the ease of a spinning coin" (Douglas-Fairhurst 18). His life follows a similar line with his philosophy of temporality, especially the mystery of his complicated and broken relations with Alice the real and Alice the fictional.[54]

Carroll began the formation of *Alice* stories in the company of the Liddle sisters in 1862, when Darwin's theories, three years after the publication of *On the Origin of Species*, reverberated in the scientific and socio-political circles in Britain. While many Victorians were trying to make sense of the novel evolutionary sense of the natural world, the author could "be assumed . . . [to have felt] fairly positively towards Darwin" (Woolf 191) and had the foresight to grab and exploit it in his fantasy narratives. According to Morton N. Cohen, Dodgson "approached Darwin and *The Origin of Species* in his usual measured way and added to his library no fewer than nineteen volumes of works by Darwin and his critics [as well as] five works by Herbert Spencer, the founder of social evolutionary philosophy" (350). With these preoccupations in mind, the author began combining the little stories created to entertain the Liddle sisters, especially Alice who had pestered him to "write down the story for me [her]" (Cohen and Green 24). He did so; in a way, he also liberated a young girl from the man-dominated world of private and public spheres of the Victorian setting. He not only gave an impetus to the imagination of the young children's liberation from the adult world's anxieties but also assembled youngsters and nonhuman

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[54] The development of the friendship between the author and Alice Liddell (1852–1934) has been at the centre of several investigations as well as the break of this friendship; all these inquiries have led to further questions capable of shadowing Dodgson's personality and integrity. Likewise, his fondness on photographing three Liddle sisters frustrates several critics due to their elusive and sexual suggestiveness although the background of these photographs is known to be an innocent family-like gathering. Such a frustration recalls the Queen of Hearts exclamation during the trial of tarts in Wonderland: "Sentence first—verdict afterwards" (*AAW* 95), referring to the public opinion and a possible case of defamation in the aftermath of Dodgson-Liddle speculations.

material and animal beings together outside the constraining boundaries of the world of realities.

The popularity of the *Alice* series ought not to limit the author's proto-posthumanist perception of the world and his advocacy of nonhumans' well-being in the nineteenth century. Dodgson's most significant work on the treatment of animals or animal rights is his pamphlet *Some Popular Fallacies about Vivisection*, printed for private circulation in 1875. As the title of the pamphlet suggests, he philosophises on the fallacies supported by the scientific and political circles at the time and pinpoints the contradictory natures of these fallacies. He mildly commences that "man has an *absolute* right to inflict death on animals, without assigning any reason, provided that it be a painless death, but that any infliction of pain needs its special justification" (Carroll, *Some* 4; italics in the original). Contrary to this mild start, the next fallacy is about the misconception that "man is infinitely more important than lower animals" (Carroll, *Some* 4; italics removed). Taking the "rightful" idea further, Carroll comments on the selective reasoning of vivisectors who "pre-suppose the axiom that human and animal suffering differ *in kind*" (Carroll, *Some* 5; italics in the original). Pre-voicing his argument in the "Preface" to *Sylvie and Bruno*, he equates vivisectors with hunters who inflict pain on nonhuman animals for the sake of their self-centric or anthropocentric goals. He protests the fallacy that "the prevention of suffering to a human being does not justify the infliction of a greater amount of suffering on an animal" and argues that human and nonhuman pains are equal in kind; he contends that the contrary perspective can only be viewed under the category of "the evil" (Carroll, *Some* 12–13). Before finalising his radical pamphlet, he gets passionate in his address to everyone and asks: "O my brother-man, you who claim for yourself and for me so proud an ancestry—tracing our pedigree through the anthropomorphoid ape up to the primeval zoophyte—what potent spell have you in store to win exemption from the common doom" (Carroll, *Some* 15; italics removed)? Here, Dodgson refers to the Darwinian concept of the evolution of the human from other animals—particularly apes—and emphasises that all life should be regarded equal on the grounds of the evolutionary idea of animal life. On the ethical and ontological grounds, he notes that death for the animal subject of vivisection is a blessing for that nonhuman for which suffering eventually comes to an end. Yet, the scientist that causes the pain

remains morally crippled, having "lost his own soul in the process" and continuing "to live with deadened sympathies that he will then pass down to future generations" (Ayres 57). Carroll's work reflects the increasing concerns and advocacies about animal welfare in the late nineteenth century. In this respect, he blurs the dualistic boundary between human and nonhuman animals, gathering them under only one umbrella of beings.

In the "Preface" to *Sylvie and Bruno* (1895), another fantasy work in the fairyland, Carroll expresses his concerns about hunting as a sport in Britain. "One other matter," he begins, "may perhaps seem to call for apology—that I should have treated with such entire want of sympathy the British passion for 'Sport'" (Carroll, *Sylvie* xx). He speaks thoughtfully of the situations in which "some 'man-eating' tiger" jeopardises a human being (Carroll, *Sylvie* xx); in such situations, this would not be a sport but a must to preserve oneself in the face of danger. However, he pities "the hunter who, at ease and in safety, can find pleasure in what involves, for some defenceless creature, wild terror and a death of agony" (Carroll, *Sylvie* xx) because the perfect human being for the author would not practice such cruelties on harmless animals but resort to a sense of love for all creatures for the creation's sake. The human's true purpose in life, for him, is "*not* pleasure, *not* knowledge, *not* even fame itself, 'that last infirmity of noble minds'," but "the development of character, the rising to a higher, nobler, purer standard" (Carroll, *Sylvie* xx; italics in the original). Thus, in his final fantasy series, he conjures up the transparent and superficial boundaries that the Anthropos draws around to elevate hir own species for hir own sake.

One final remark in Dodgson's posthumanist standpoint in his works emerges as the transmedia character prevalent in these works thanks to the author's collaborations with several illustrators of his time. Transmedia storytelling, as Colin B. Harvey argues, is "*relational*" in depicting "the relationship between a transmedia articulation" like Sir John Tenniel's (1820–1914) drawings in both *Alice* novels "with the wider storyworld in question, and by extension the wider culture" (2). Two different types of media, namely the narrative and the illustrative, conjoin to augment the influence of Carroll's stories. Surely, these novels can only be viewed as the primitive examples of transmediality which basically refer to stories delivered through/across multiple media according to

Henry Jenkins (para.9) because in the twenty-first century, transmedia storytelling encompasses the television, cinematic and gaming franchises of a narrative as well as many other advertisement materials and events related to that narrative. Also nominated as one of the ancestors of this new storytelling methodology (Freeman 5), Dodgson is known to have paid utmost importance to conveying "the best illustrations he could obtain for his readers, at any cost" (Cohen and Wakeling xv). This is why he collaborated in his books, mostly for children, with several artists of his time such as Henry Holiday (1839–1927) in *The Hunting of the Snark* (1876), Arthur Burdett Frost (1851–1928) in *Rhyme? and Reason?* (1883), and Harry Furniss (1854–1925) in both books of *Sylvie and Bruno* (1889/1893). Accordingly, I also make use of Tenniel's illustrations in *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass* in order to analyse and discuss the posthumanist portrayals of more-than-human subjectivities in this chapter.

With these concerns challenging the dominant ideologies and methodologies of the Victorian literary world, Lewis Carroll cannot be categorised as a simple writer of children's fantasies. It is clear that he aims for more than what is presented in his works just as he does in his riddling poems and so-called nonsense literary problems. He multiplies the meanings in his characters' journeys in several fantasy lands and thus liberates their quests for a more-than-human understanding of the world—as well as his works—from the control of one literary form. In this respect, many critics accept that *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* signifies "the turning point at which fantasy and imagination banished dry didacticism" (L. C. Roberts 360). For this reason, I claim that Dodgson accomplishes the agential relationality between humans and nonhumans in his illustrative journeys of constructing posthuman subjectivities, especially in his best-known fantasies, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There*.

3.3. *ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND* AND *THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS*: JOURNEYS OF BECOMINGS TOWARD POSTHUMAN SUBJECTIVITY

Both *Alice* books are ontologically and epistemologically complex works. Due to the language plays and imageries of nonconventional creatures in them, they prove to have sophisticated worlds in which children could hardly delight; in this respect, adults are considered to enjoy these fantastic complexities in Alice's journeys. Just as in *Gulliver's Travels*, readers are expected either to identify with the protagonist or to preserve their observational distance to scrutinise the events unfolding during the journey. It can be argued, therefore, *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass*, contrary to commonsensical opinions, seem difficult to portray children's stories that convey moralistic and didactic messages to their supposed audience—children. Rose Lovell-Smith states that both novels "do not teach lessons about kindness to animals, as animals in children's stories often did" ("Animals" 386). When the titular hero encounters a mouse at her entrance to Wonderland, she asks it "Où est ma chatte?" to the Mouse (*AAW* 18), inquiring in French if the little animal knows where her cat Dinah is. Advancing her offensive question of the cat that is "such a capital one for catching mice," she thinks that the Mouse would "take a fancy to cats" if only it befriends them (*AAW* 18). Then, she keeps narrating that "a nice little dog, near [their] house, . . . kills all the rats" (*AAW* 19). When she is among the birds like "a Duck and a Dodo, a Lory and an Eaglet," she cannot help herself praising Dinah's predatory skills (*AAW* 19, 25). In another instance, Alice takes a baby from the Duchess and later realises that it has transformed into a piglet; "If you're going to turn into a pig, my dear," she says upon noticing that she is babysitting a piglet, "I'll have nothing more to do with you," and soon she leaves the baby animal into the forest (*AAW* 48). One certainly expects a child to be more thoughtful and compassionate toward the vulnerabilities and sensibilities of such animals like mice, birds, and piglets. Nonetheless, Alice continues to hold onto some kind of crass attitude almost until the latter half of *Wonderland*. She learns at a small pace how to have a posthuman subjectivity surrounded by nonhuman and humanoid beings in fantasy lands.

In this journey of the formation of posthuman subjectivity, Alice is shown that there are no natural clear-cut boundaries between humans and animals. So, there cannot be a matter of superiority based on either side's ontological features. Once among "a queer-looking party that assembled on the bank—the birds with draggled feathers, the animals with their fur clinging close to them, and all dripping wet, cross, and uncomfortable," she is amused at the speech ability of those animals as "it seemed quite natural to Alice to find herself talking familiarly with them" (*AAW* 20). This sense of familiarity stems from the facts that they are all fluent in a human language and that they are able to get into long arguments with the heroine. However, the referents in their language do not correspond well to what she is used to. They often get confused on the use of subject and object pronouns like "I," "it," and "they" in their arguments (*AAW* 21–22). Such confusions indicate how unstable linguistic meaning can be, why language cannot be the sole determiner of one's subjectivity, and what determines the boundaries for some kind of hierarchical alignment among beings. When thought under the Cartesian dualities of body/mind and animal/human, these moments blur the boundaries between those dualities as the othered beings and notions associated with body subvert the rational and linguistic meanings of the presumable superior being and hir notions. To re-construct new ways of relationality between those supposedly clashing binaries, Carroll orchestrates a Caucus-race for this party. The course of the race is quite uncommon as it is "a sort of circle" and everyone takes their positions "along the course": "they began running when they liked, and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over" (*AAW* 22). The outcome of the Caucus-race is unlike what one would see in such running competitions: "*Everybody* has won, and *all* must have prizes" (*AAW* 22; italics in the original). First of all, the course of the race is seen to be nonlinear, indicating that a nonlinear causality is outside the parameters of Wonderland. Secondly, if a champion is not created out of such competitions, it can be assumed that a hierarchical thinking can be replaced with a sense of joyful equality. Lastly, everybody can have prizes—in our case from Alice—and none could be excluded from this assemblage of beings. The protagonist takes "out a box of comfits" from her pocket and hands "them round as prizes" (*AAW* 22); she cannot exclude herself from the group as the gift-giver because she has already become a member of this Wonderland group and joined the race as well. Besides, she cannot be positioned as the judge or superior being to hand out prizes. Although the

gift comes from Alice herself, the Dodo presents her with an "elegant thimble" and they all cheer up (*AAW* 22; see fig. 1). The humour in this scene relies on its simplicity, its remoteness from any anthropocentric ambition, and the celebratory atmosphere of doing, being, and becoming together.

Fig. 1. The Dodo giving a prize to Alice (Carroll, *AAW* 23).

Alice, among nonhuman animals of Wonderland, is introduced to the notions and performances of fairness and is driven to reflect upon the nature of winning over one's others although she confesses to finding "the whole [Caucus-race] thing very absurd" (*AAW* 22). Another instance happens when she enters the Queen of Hearts' garden and joins the royalty and courtiers to play croquet. Just like everything else in Wonderland, this game proves to be quite peculiar: "Alice thought she had never seen such a curious croquet-ground in her life: it was all ridges and furrows: the croquet balls were live hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes, and the soldiers had to double themselves up and stand on their hands and feet, to make the arches" (*AAW* 64). Resonating with his critique of the abuse of animals in the previous section of this chapter, Dodgson playfully depicts a fantastic scene of the misuse of animals for human pleasure in this sports event.

Alice struggles to command her flamingo which tends to "twist itself round and look up in her face, with such a puzzled expression" or her hedgehog which is inclined to uncurl from its ball formation and crawl away from her (*AAW* 64). Just like "an enormous puppy" playfully chasing the heroine at the beginning (*AAW* 31), these animals in the croquet seem to be "intruder[s] from the 'real' world" (Crutch 19) because they do not act like the talking animals of Wonderland, but rather the othered animals of the real world (Lovell-Smith, "Animals" 405; Lovell-Smith, "Eggs" 42), which continue to be othered even in the fantasy land. The flamingo's 'conscious' questioning look at Alice and the hedgehog's escape from her recalls Derrida's discussion regarding the animal subjectivity that is discussed at length in Chapter 1. "How can an animal look you in the face?" he asks and then answers that it is "asking you [the gazed person] to *respond* to me [the gazing animal]" (Derrida, "Animal" 377; italics in the original). Added to these interrogative looks, the Queen's order "Off with his/her head!" throughout the game makes Alice "feel very uneasy" (*AAW* 65); she is aware that there is a number of unfair actions not only against the attendants but also against the 'live' tools used for the croquet on the royal grounds. She begins "looking about for some way of escape, and wondering whether she could get away without being seen" and finally declares that "I don't think they play at all fairly" (*AAW* 65). As for these revolting expressions by the human child, Zoe Jaques argues that "Alice rather misses the point of unfairness here, as she is aggrieved by the Queen's cheating" in the game (52); nevertheless, I find Jaques's argument disagreeable because Alice's tendency to see Wonderland inhabitants from a posthumanist lens has improved to a great extent from the start of her journey. The Queen's cheating can only be a tipping point for the heroine to react against.

The posthumanist potential of the *Alice* books is given by the anthropomorphism employed in the verbal and illustrative depictions of nonhuman animals. The anthropomorphic illustrations and depictions of the nonhumans provoke a complex concept of posthuman hybridity. This posthuman hybridity is discussed in relation to Gulliver's transformation into a tool, an animal, and a clockwork toy in the previous chapter; however, what *Gulliver's Travels* lack is amplified as the somatic hybridity of fantastic becomings in these fantasy lands. From the beginning to the end, Alice encounters a rabbit that walks on his two hind feet, uses a watch, and wears a waistcoat

(see fig. 2); an extinct bird, Dodo, that, in its illustration by Tenniel, is depicted with human hands holding a walking stick (see fig. 1); "a large blue caterpillar . . . with its arms folded, quietly smoking a long hookah" and sitting on the top of a giant mushroom (*AAW* 33; see fig. 3); a fish-footman and a frog-footman whose only animal features are their faces; some avian jury members with human hands at the court of justice of the King and Queen of Hearts that wear full-bottomed wigs and robes; flowers with tiny human faces as in Tenniel's supporting drawing (see fig. 9, *TLG* 118); the walrus that is shown to wear shoes and a tuxedo in Tweedledum and Tweedledee's poem "The Walrus and the Carpenter" (*TLG* 137–41; see fig. 8); and the White Queen's transforming into "an old Sheep, sitting in an arm-chair, knitting, and every now and then leaving off to look at her through a great pair of spectacles" (*TLG* 151; see fig. 4). All these literary and artistic

Fig. 2. The rabbit checking his pocket watch in his waistcoat (Carroll, *AAW* 7).

depictions complement each other in terms of exposing animals' challenges to humans. In Fudge's words, animals "are both similar to and different from us" (7), and this is exactly the challenge itself. Although humans share certain characteristics with animals, they are unable to access the full character of animals as a great majority of the nature of an animal species always remains inexplicable and out-of-reach. Using the term "animal" in its singularity cannot deny the inherent "multiplicity of nonhumans" (Fudge 161), which I have discussed in detail in Chapter 1. In this viewpoint, the humanisation of the above-mentioned animals can only call for a sense of familiarity with the absolute other as indicated by the Derridean concept. For this very reason, Dodgson embellishes his narrative with Tenniel's supportive illustrations of the hybrid creatures.

More significantly, the humanisation of animals makes it easier for Alice to act and be acted within the terms of nonhumans in the fantasy lands of both works. This humanisation is presented as the main reason for Alice's decision to pass through the rabbit hole as, "burning with curiosity," she is amazed at the sight of "a rabbit with . . . a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out of it" (*AAW* 8; see fig. 2). Her amazement at this semi-familiar embodiment results in her posthumanisation, specifically animalisation or nonhumanisation, process. Coming across several nonhuman animals and material entities as well as humanoids in Wonderland, she sets off her journey to comprehend that being a human does not provide a shortcut to the understanding of nature, nonhumanity, and hence the domination of these. For instance, in parallel to Gulliver's physical changes in Swift's novel, the reversal of size in her corporeality leads to a matter of entrapment by the spatiality of Wonderland. The "long, low hall" where she has fallen through the rabbit hole and the doors around the hall (*AAW* 9) act as trapdoors to contain the heroine before her introduction to the indigenous residents and habitats of Wonderland. Her passage through "a little door about fifteen inches high" with the help of "a tiny golden key" can be possible with her "shut[ting] up like a telescope" (*AAW* 9–10). This moment signals the start of Alice's constant myopic and telescopic visions and transformations in Wonderland while she is trying to accommodate several strange events and to make sense of unfamiliar entities there. In a magical manner that might have been an inspiration for the Room of Requirements which "is always equipped for the seekers' needs" at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry (Rowling, *Order of Phoenix* 343), the hall

answers to the protagonist's wishes. Upon her desire to pass through the little door that leads to "the loveliest garden" of "bright flowers" and "cool fountains," the hall brings out "a little bottle" around whose neck "a paper label with the words 'DRINK ME' beautifully printed on it in large letters" is hanging (*AAW* 10; capitalisation in the original). Having drunk the liquid in the bottle, she finds herself "shutting up like a telescope" and getting at "the right size for going through the little door into that lovely garden" (*AAW* 11).

The protagonist is aware that her somatic metamorphosis changes her perception of the self and her surroundings to a certain extent. From her encounters and interactions with nonhuman animals, it is understood that she is ontologically and epistemologically in a web of self-interrogations about her human identity. Within this web, Alice has clearly approached those animals like the Mouse and the birds without a moral quandary due to

Fig. 3. The Caterpillar looking at Alice while smoking a long hookah (Carroll, *AAW* 34).

her lack of ability of good moral judgement. That is why she is wanting in ethical considerations of nonhumans' non-anthropocentric values and meanings. Almost in a manner to upturn the situation in favour of animal subjects, Carroll diffracts Alice's pattern of asserting her opinions over animal others and subverts her subjectivity by means of the problematisation of humanness by these animal others. For instance, the Caterpillar repetitively voices the question "Who are *you*?" (*AAW* 34, 35; see fig. 3) that has haunted Alice from the moment she has fallen through the rabbit hole. This ontological question recalls the gaze of Derrida's cat whose eyes become the medium of inter-species relationality and lead the deconstructionist philosopher to scrutinise the animality of the human. Here, the Caterpillar becomes "the animal-questioner as *animal*" (Jaques 47; italics in the original) to whose question Alice's response is quite noteworthy:

> "I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I *was* when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then."
> "What do you mean by that?" said the Caterpillar, sternly. "Explain yourself!"
> "I ca'n't explain *myself*, I'm afraid, Sir," said Alice, "because I'm not myself, you see."
> "I don't see," said the Caterpillar.
> "I'm afraid I ca'n't put it more clearly," Alice replied, very politely, "for I ca'n't understand it myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing." (*AAW* 34; italics in the original)

The protagonist reveals that she has basically been an ordinary human child before her travel to Wonderland that morning; yet later, she has, voluntarily or not, experienced a series of mutations in her body and consciousness as many as her encounters with animals and material others. In this respect, she cannot explain her current self and resorts to explaining the complete metamorphosis of the butterfly larva in front of her. To make her condition clearer to the Caterpillar, she states "when you have to turn into a chrysalis— you will some day, you know—and then after that into a butterfly," and directs her question of relatability "I should think you'll feel it a little queer, won't you?" (*AAW* 34– 35). The answer that the Caterpillar would not feel queer "a bit" at all (*AAW* 35) reveals Alice's comprehension of the distinction between animal consciousness and human consciousness of the transformation of one's subjectivity. The nonhuman seems more welcoming to what entails its ontological and epistemological metamorphoses than the human other. For that reason, the protagonist acknowledges that she is in a state of a

continual becoming at the time of this conversation with the Caterpillar, with whom she is going through another sequence of becoming (with) in Deleuze-Guattarian and Derridean senses.

The interrogative conversation between the Caterpillar and Alice also presents a situation of one's acceptance into a new environment. Derrida, while discussing the Algerian diaspora's condition in France during the 1950s and 1960s, problematises the notion of one's acceptance into a different environment and names this as "hostipitality" in his namesake essay in 1999. The concept is amalgamated from the two words "hostility" and "hospitality" which are both rooted in the Latin word *hospes* which means both host and guest/stranger/foreigner. The double meaning of the Latin root provokes a dialectical pattern between the relations, relationality, and situated positions of the human and nonhuman in the liberal humanist tradition (Derrida, "Hostipitality" 3–7). In Anne Dufourmantelle's invitation to respond to the foreigner question, Derrida explains the dualistic laws of hospitality in the universal and Western senses: the singular "law" of hospitality is simple: the host sets no conditions to accept an other into hir environment if that other is in need. Nonetheless, the plural "laws" of hospitality are the contrary: The other is required to provide a number of preconditions and conditions such as accepting the order in the host's territory and hence revealing hir identity and background to the fullest (Bowlby 33, 35). For the hosting side, the stranger's subjectivity, origins, name, and species matter since these determine the 'kind' of hospitality to be provided. In liberal humanism that was fostered in the eighteenth century and was later practised in its full capacity in the nineteenth century, the human is seen to be the 'hosting' side as 'he' positions 'his' species as the determiner of beings' values as well as the ethical considerations about everything, mostly in 'his' own species' favour. Therefore, recalling the Derridean discussion of nomenclature in the biblical creation in Chapter 1, this interrogation scene of Alice's name and identity—'who she is'—provides a complete reversal of the positions of the ultimate subjects on the Earth. The nonhuman is presented as the wise, all-knowing, meaning-making, and interpreting-interrogating subject of Wonderland, where the human is gradually transformed into the nonhuman of liberal humanism. In this transformation, she has been stripped from her 'proud' Anthropos identity, shown to falter in her use of speech, naming, and identifying abilities (Ağın,

"Tracing" 5). As seen in the attitudes of all the nonhuman beings in Wonderland, the human is well-known for hir destructive actions toward the nonhuman and natural environment. For this reason, these nonhuman animals prepare her for the so-called 'nonsensical' world or living conditions of this fantasy land. The "birth" of the human's new identity is "the first act of hospitality" in Dufourmantelle's words; just like the maternal-biological birth of a baby, Alice's birth is "offered to, not by" the hosting body—the nonhuman residents of Wonderland (Dufourmantelle 17). The Mouse's, the birds', rabbit families', and the Caterpillar's hospitalities are the "precondition" to Alice's life there because "the body," in our case the body of Wonderland in its totality of its animal and material residents, usually "does not accept any form of unrecognized otherness" as the human child; however, her fall through the rabbit hole starts "a process of differentiation that has made . . . her an other" and her presence there epitomises "an act of trespassing" (Dufourmantelle 17) which the human could experience in the face of the nonhumans positioned on an axis different from the human-favouring hierarchy of anthropocentrism.

As seen in the above discussions, Alice's encounter with the butterfly larva showcases the fantasy genre's transformative character that exposes the human subject to unfamiliar entities. In such fantastic expositions, the hero is gradually brought to an understanding of several agencies at work that shape her subjecthood. The exchange between the Caterpillar and Alice prepares the protagonist for a mesh of more-than-human realities implicated by, to borrow Barad's expression, "the agential possibilities and responsibilities for reconfiguring the material-social relations of the world" (Barad, *Meeting* 35). Accepting that she is no longer "the center around which the world turns" and not "an individual apart from all the rest" (Barad, *Meeting* 134), the protagonist stops acting as the measure and definer of everything around her and ceases her crass judgmental and careless attitude toward the Caterpillar. This way, she is informed about what she needs to grow to her regular size. Upon learning that one side of the mushroom will make her "grow taller" and the other side "shorter," Alice breaks off some from both sides of it and begins experimenting with her new somatic measure (*AAW* 40). Before delving further into her experimentation, Alice's confusion with the "sides" of the mushroom needs a brief scrutiny. The Caterpillar's response about eating from either side

"[o]f the mushroom" to shift one's corporeal volume makes the little girl think of lines or edges in plain geometry. In that regard, she looks "thoughtfully at the mushroom for a minute, trying to make out which were the two sides of it; and, as it was perfectly round, she found this a very difficult question" (*AAW* 40; see fig. 3). In her case, two sides refer to the dominant binary mindset in the Victorian era, and the roundness implicates a sense of borderlessness. The Caterpillar's answer "side" normally references a line segment between two vertices of a polyhedron. However, one must remember that geometry, as well as time and space, in Wonderland works in its own peculiar way. This peculiarity blows light strikes at the beginning of the first book whereas it becomes more prevalent in the sequel. The deconstructive nature of roundness relies on the nature of a cell wall that is able to perform osmosis in order to enrich its interiority. The mushroom hints at a porous structure, just as our material-discursive "viscous porosity" in Nancy Tuana's description of material relationality among beings (Tuana 194). The fluidity that the shape of the fungus provides gives an account of Barad's "agential separability," rejecting "the geometries of absolute exteriority or absolute interiority" and opening "up a much larger space that is more appropriately thought of as a dynamic and ever-changing topology" (Barad, *Meeting* 176–77). The mushroom-based corporeal transformation of the protagonist, just like her metamorphoses in the beginning, underlines "a matter of *exteriority within* [Wonderland] *phenomena*" (Barad, *Meeting* 177). Hence, Alice's subjectivity continues to get dynamically reconfigured in and by both material and discursive actors.

The material-discursive alteration in Wonderland necessitates a complete shift in the human's subjectivity. In this account, Alice's experimentation with the mushroom accelerates the illustration of this subjectivity shift. Exclaiming first that her "head's free at last" (*AAW* 41), she finds out that only her neck grows extremely tall, able to "bend about easily in any direction, like a serpent" (*AAW* 41). Having reached the top of a tree thanks to her super-long neck, she is directly challenged by the resident of that tree, a large pigeon that flies "into her face" and beats "her violently with its wings" while loudly calling her "Serpent" at the same time (*AAW* 41). The Pigeon unhesitantly labels Alice as a serpent at first sight and begins questioning her and demands her to prove it wrong:

> "Serpent!" screamed the Pigeon.
>
> "I'm *not* a serpent!" said Alice indignantly. "Let me alone!"
>
> "Serpent, I say again!" repeated the Pigeon. . . . (*AAW* 41; italics in the original)

The bird's desire to protect its eggs and offspring from serpents enables it to make a connection between her long neck and the avian predator. With her new grotesque neck-dominated body, the little girl is seen as a familiar other or enemy by the pigeon. Therefore, she is readily reduced to becoming a reptile and Alice responds "indignantly" since her dignity of being a human is wounded. This wound primarily stems from her helplessness of being named by a nonhuman animal, which is quite contrary to Adamic nomenclature detailed in Chapter 1. Secondly, her humanistic features are subverted by the mushroom and the pigeon as she does not momentarily have proper human proportions. To reclaim her human identity, she keeps rejecting the bird's suggestion that she is a serpent and finds herself in both a self-confrontation and an examination before the bird:

> "But I'm *not* a serpent, I tell you!" said Alice. "I'm a—I'm a——"
>
> "Well! *What* are you?" said the Pigeon. "I can see you're trying to invent something!"
>
> "I—I'm a little girl," said Alice, rather doubtfully, as she remembered the number of changes she had gone through, that day.
>
> "A likely story indeed!" said the Pigeon, in a tone of the deepest contempt. "I've seen a good many little girls in my time, but never *one* with such a neck as that! No, no! You're a serpent; and there's no use denying it. I suppose you'll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!"
>
> "I *have* tasted eggs, certainly," said Alice, who was a very truthful child; "but little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do, you know."
>
> "I don't believe it," said the Pigeon; "but if they do, why, then they're a kind of serpent: that's all I can say."
>
> This was such a new idea to Alice, that she was quite silent for a minute or two, which gave the Pigeon the opportunity of adding "You're looking for eggs, I know *that* well enough; and what does it matter to me whether you're a little girl or a serpent?"
>
> "It matters a good deal to *me*," said Alice hastily; "but I'm not looking for eggs, as it happens. . . ." (*AAW* 42; italics in the original)

As seen in this dialogue, the heroine gets into an ontological doubt of what exactly she is due to her corporeal mutability. The Pigeon animalises her due to the mushroom-enhanced mutation and Alice attempts to figure out what distinguishes humans from

animals or vice versa. Although sounding offensive to the bird, her attempt is formed upon the consumption of both humans and animals—i.e., eggs. As Jaques also affirms, critics have had the tendency of associating the consumption metaphor of such "girl-serpent hybridity" with "the Genesis narrative, with Alice operating as a kind of Eve" or Lilith figure (47). However, just as in Swift's satirical fantasy, this interrogation of human subjectivity is related to the reversal of perspective, recalling the influence of Darwinian theories on the author. Being a nonhuman animal or thing does not necessitate direct subjection to human needs in both *Alice* books because the condition of nonhumanness is not "the condition of being potentially utilizable or consumable by others"—especially humans; on the contrary, it is a condition of posthumanist entanglement in which networks among several non/human entities "reach beyond the domain of the human" (M. P. Lee 488). In this respect, being reconfigured as an animal "matters a good deal" (*AAW* 42) to the protagonist as the diminutive liberal human.

In the sequel of *Wonderland*, Alice experiences a similar case of identification as a predator. After her companionship with the Gnat in the looking-glass train, she finds herself in "an open field" near the wood of namelessness (*TLG* 132). She hesitates to get into the wood since it is the place "where things have no names" and she wonders "what'll become of *my* [*her*] name when I go in" (*TLG* 132; italics in the original). Her emphatic question about the possibility of losing her name is equated with the loss of one's identity. Similar to and unlike the Adamic nomenclature, the little girl forgets both her proper name and species name after having stepped into the wood. Her concern that somebody would give her a new name and that "it would be almost certain to be an ugly one" stems from both her anthropocentric pride and her desire to choose the name for her own self. Such a remark reminds me of Eve's and other creatures' distaste for being named by Adam as depicted in Le Guin's short story "She Unnames Them" as well as of Eliot's poetic description of "effanineffable" names of felines in "The Naming of the Cats."[55] Interestingly, she is afraid of being robbed of her name as some creature could get her "old name" (*TLG* 132) as this signals a loss of the subject's identity as in the case of Mary Shelley's (1797–1851) Victor Frankenstein whose surname has generally been associated

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[55] Please see the footnotes 13 and 17 on pages 20 and 26, respectively.

with the creature, which he has created and never named, and has thus led to a reversal of human-nonhuman or subject-object identities. Then, the wilderness for her points to a loss of anthropocentric markers like spatiality because in the forest she first forgets the words "wood" and "tree trunk" and attributes a subjectivity to the tree by questioning what the tree calls itself (*TLG* 133). She states: "Then it really *has* happened, after all! And now, who am I? I *will* remember, if I can" (*TLG* 133; italics in the original). Although this state of namelessness provides an opportunity for her to go through a journey of a posthumanist subjectivity in a faster manner, she holds hard to her human self. In this sense, this forest recalls the Hobbesian nature where savagery and animality prevail as I discuss in the second chapter—so much so that, through the trees, "a Fawn [comes] wondering by" and looks "at Alice with its large gentle eyes, . . . [not] at all frightened" (*TLG* 133). Akin to her dialogue with the Pigeon, the conversation between the human child and the young animal exposes the problem of humanimality:

> "What do you call yourself?" the Fawn said at last. Such a soft sweet voice it had!
> "I wish I knew!" thought poor Alice. She answered, rather sadly, "Nothing, just now."
> "Think again," it said: "that wo'n't do."
> Alice thought, but nothing came of it. "Please, would you tell me what *you* call yourself?" she said timidly. "I think that might help a little."
> "I'll tell you, if you'll come a little further on," the Fawn said. "I ca'n't remember *here*."
> So they walked on together through the wood, Alice with her arms clasped lovingly round the soft neck of the Fawn, till they came out into another open field, and here the Fawn gave a sudden bound into the air, and shook itself free from Alice's arm. "I'm a Fawn!" it cried out in a voice of delight. "And, dear me! you're a human child!" (*TLG* 133–34; italics in the original)

The protagonist is seen here to recognise the nonhuman subjectivity as well as rationality when she asks help from the Fawn in remembering her identity. Once again, she is guided by the animal through both the forest and the namelessness. Carroll is concerned with the human-naming practice and therefore the utilitarian approach toward animals in both of these books. While narrating these concerns, he draws a sharp distinction between two sides and illuminates what entails the liberal humanist discourse and its dualism. In the Pigeon's case, he distorts the girl's human physicality; yet, he distorts her mental stability and blurs her self-consciousness only to be cleared by the nonhuman's navigation. In both

cases of nonhumanisation, she is by no means devoid of language, nor are the animals. Yet, the human language serves the animal, not Alice.

Almost mirroring these cases of her ostracisation by the Pigeon and the Fawn, Wonderland provides the literal nonhumanisation of a baby human. A little more conscious and in a little more command of her somatic changes thanks to her experimentation with the mushroom 'sides' after her encounter with the Pigeon in the first book, Alice brings "herself down to nine inches high" to observe and approach the Duchess's house (*AAW* 42). Her entrance into the kitchen introduces very few significant characters in the second half of the first book such as the Cheshire Cat and the Duchess, who will be discussed in the subsequent pages in detail. The baby the Duchess is nursing then is seen to be "sneezing and howling alternately without a moment's pause" for no apparent reason (*AAW* 45). When the Duchess signs a lullaby, the protagonist also witnesses that she gives the baby "a violent shake at the end of every line" of the lullaby, and tosses it "violently up and down" (*AAW* 46, 47). It can be suggested that the Duchess of Wonderland, which is filled with nonhuman standards and ethico-onto-epistemological configurations, is intolerant of the human baby since she is incapable of deciphering the reason for its cries or disturbance. For this reason, she acts quickly to transfer the little one to Alice as she "must go and get ready to play croquet with the Queen" (*AAW* 47). Under ordinary circumstances, such an act of deserting a baby to a stranger would be unacceptable; however, when the baby is situated outside the nonhuman terms, it becomes acceptable as it does not fit into the nonhuman standards of Wonderland due to its species. Yet, Carroll is swift to confuse the reader in this case. When Alice carries it out "into the open air," she sees that it commences transforming: "Alice looked very anxiously into its face to see what was the matter with it. There could be no doubt that it had a *very* turn-up nose, much more like a snout than a real nose: also its eyes were getting extremely small for a baby: altogether Alice did not like the look of the thing at all" (*AAW* 47–48; italics in the original). She finds out that it is a piglet now and immediately stops caring for it, releasing it into the curious nature of Wonderland as she has "nothing more to do with [it]" (*AAW* 48). This scene provides the clear picture of how humans construct their others—significantly nonhuman others—in the liberal humanist orders. This act is "a failure of sympathy" in Garland-Thomson's expressions, "a sentiment crucial to middle-

class decorum" (68). The nineteenth-century understanding of human nature, as discussed earlier, is basically constructed upon the sentimental notions of the middle-class philosophers and rulers as this socio-economic class is the hegemonic determiner of the Victorian era. To denounce inferior/nonhuman beings, "particularly those meek enough not to challenge your position, violates the spirit of benevolence that was essential to [this] middle-class identity" (Garland-Thomson 68). As the little representative of the Victorian upbringing, the protagonist violates this notion of benevolence toward the so-called inferior piglet. This violation is again structured in the human-centred valuation of existence or human-determined standards of beauty. The human's attitudes toward nonhuman or semi-human beings in fantasy fictions range "from delightful to spiteful" (Garland-Thomson 161) and the heroine's approach to the grotesque transformation of the baby falls into the spiteful category just as in the case of the Pigeon: "If it had grown up, . . . it would have made a dreadfully ugly child" (*AAW* 48). In such instances, it becomes difficult to locate human subjectivity or to distinguish the human from the animal.

From a different vantage point, such transforming animals point at the human's utilitarian approach toward animals. As Jaques also argues, Dodgson makes use of common domestic animals and/or recipes in its depiction of these transformations and sub-narratives (47–50). The first instance is the case of the baby-piglet, whose value is "vexing and unclear" (Jaques 48). Other than their medical use in techno-surgeries of xenotransplantation in the contemporary world, the domestic and commercial uses of pigs indicate the animal's significance as a food source in the human world. In the industrialised environment of Victorian England, animals for food began to be "processed like manufactured commodities" and this fact would estrange and reduce animals from the Cartesian soulless machines to mere material entities to be used and abused for the sake of the increasing human population (Berger 13). In Alice's case, animals have selective meanings. As long as she builds a connection with them as in the case of her pet Dinah, she can understand and empathise with them. However, if she encounters them for the first time and unless she connects to them as nonhuman individuals contained in themselves, she cannot approach them in a sympathetic manner. Her crippled experiences are seen in her words toward the Mouse and the birds at the beginning of her journey. Her

perspective is limited to her knowledge of pigs as food, "pork, bacon, sausage" (Adams 59). Due to her limited view, the baby-piglet transformation acts as an epiphany to distort her reality of the nonhuman world one step further.

Fig. 4. The White Queen and Alice in a shop (Carroll, *TLG* 152).

Carroll's resistance to mere imagination of nonhuman animals as food is sustained in the second book as well. When the White Queen turns into a sheep, she constantly rubs her eyes to confirm if she really interacts with a sheep that is formerly the White Queen: "she was in a little dark shop, leaning with her elbows on the counter, and opposite to her was an old Sheep, sitting in an arm-chair, knitting, and every now and then leaving off to look at her through a great pair of spectacles" (*TLG* 151; see fig. 4). Alice's sheep is utterly different than Glumdalclitch's lamb in *Gulliver's Travels*. As discussed in the second

chapter, Glumdalclitch's parent "pretended to give her" a dear lamb which was only sold to a butcher "as soon as it was fat" (Kelly 333). Younger than and unlike Glumdalclitch, Alice is expected to perceive and approach the Sheep-Queen as a subject other than a traditional source of food. Just as autonomous objects and their "thingish alterity" in the Sheep's shop, the Sheep-Queen reflects pure animal alterity to Alice (M. P. Lee 497). The third example of the animal-as-food narrative is given in the sub-narrative of the Mock Turtle, which is only depicted by Tenniel's illustration and shown to have the head and hooves of a calf and the body of a turtle (see fig. 5). The Queen of Hearts in Wonderland introduces this hybrid fantastic animal as "the thing Mock Turtle Soup is made from" (*AAW* 71). This dish is an imitation of the turtle soup that "could be an elaborate ritual of prestige and taste" (Ching 80) because it "required systems of trade and communication, transport, monetary exchange and knowledge of cooking techniques that came together

Fig. 5. The Mock Turtle telling Alice and the Gryphon its story (Carroll, *AAW* 73).

at that historical moment to create that particular experience" (Kirkby et al. 3). In parallel with the liberal humanist practices of expansion and colonisation, the soup is believed to be exported from the South Atlantic region and/or the West Indies in the seventeenth century (Clarkson 115–18). Again on the same plane as racism, this practice relied on the speciesism and near extermination of green sea turtles, "the most expensive, status-laden, and morally contested feat of eighteenth-century English cuisine" (Mandelkern, para.1). In the nineteenth century, the dish experienced a transformation to "appeal to a rising middle class" and the turtle was "substituted by a large calf's head with the skin on" (Ching 83). In its journey through three centuries, the meal was renowned as an English food "although none of [its] ingredients had in fact originated in England" (Ching 87). Thought under the light of Carroll's vivisection essay, the section of the Mock Turtle in Wonderland obviously criticises the brutal exploitation of colonised animals, lands, and cultures in the history of British expansionism. As colonialism and racism are cognates of speciesism in the liberal humanist tradition, Dodgson can be argued to have aimed to distress the destructive consumption of animals. The fantastic Mock Turtle "exists *only* as a recipe" whose "ingredients" in Tenniel's illustration (Jaques 48) upend Alice's perception of the relationality between humans and animals.

The nonhumans start to become "a spanner in the workings and self-identifications of the dominant [human] culture" when they begin to talk in fantastic moments of fiction or in fantasy narratives as in the case of the Mock Turtle, because, as explored in Ursula K. Le Guin's short stories, "the talking-animal story has the potential to subvert" (Baker 125). The Mock Turtle sounds as if he was in an existential sorrow whereas it is all about "his fancy, . . . he hasn't got no sorrow" (*AAW* 72). Even before meeting this hybrid creature and his mock sorrow, Alice is guided to realise by the Gryphon that one's sounds do not correspond to what ze feels or in what sentiment ze wants to express hirself in the human terms. In the account of his autobiographical story, he subtly refers to the English tradition of the real turtle soup, stating that he "was a real Turtle" once (*AAW* 72). In this narrative of his childhood and school years "in the sea" with their master, "an old Turtle" (*AAW* 72), it is obvious that this hybrid animal is conscious of his subjectivity. As Derrida explores the matter of subjectivity in relation to the autobiographical animal—the human—in his famous essay, autobiography requires an awareness of the self ("Animal"

389–90). In a similar manner, autobiography, with its "language, interests, and lures," accompanies a species-specific sense of history that is also claimed to be particular to the human species (Derrida, "Animal" 393). In Wonderland, it is possible to see "a transformation in process, an alteration . . . in the being-with shared by man and by what man calls the animal" (Derrida, "Animal" 393) through this historical account by the Mock Turtle: The Mock Turtle's transformation as a communicative recipe is an animalistic account of Alice's transformation from the moment of her fall through the rabbit hole.

The Mock Turtle's account of his school days toward the end of the first book underlines Alice's transformation as well as the appropriation of her language in a manner to empathise with the nonhuman. In the account of the Lobster-Quadrille dance at the school under the sea, the Mock Turtle questions her if she knows the dance: "'You may not have lived much under the sea—' ('I haven't,' said Alice)—'and perhaps you were never even introduced to a lobster—' (Alice began to say 'I once tasted——' but checked herself hastily, and said 'No, never') '——so you can have no idea what a delightful thing a Lobster-Quadrille is'" (*AAW* 76)! The personification of lobsters and the turtle-calf hybrid as dancing in a quadrille creates a sense of estrangement from the regular consumption-based relation between the human as the eater and the animal as the food. The protagonist eventually understands this alienated sense of realities in Wonderland, pays attention not to see lobsters as mere food, and avoids completing her lobster-tasting experience in the above quotation. Since she has difficulties differentiating between traditional domestic animals like pigs, sheep, and lobsters as food and a novel fantastic animal subject of Wonderland, she feels obliged to orient herself in the animal/Wonderland mindset. When the Gryphon and the Mock Turtle demonstrate the lobster-quadrille dance with the heroine's participation, they also sing about an exchange between a whiting and a snail. Alice's reaction to the song draws attention to her struggling orientation to the nonhuman perception:

> "Thank you, it's a very interesting dance to watch," said Alice, feeling very glad that it was over at last: "and I do so like that curious song about the whiting!"
> "Oh, as to the whiting," said the Mock Turtle, "they—you've seen them, of course?"

> "Yes," said Alice, "I've often seen them at dinn——" she checked herself hastily.
> "I don't know where Dinn may be," said the Mock Turtle; "but, if you've seen them so often, of course you know what they're like?"
> "I believe so," Alice replied thoughtfully. "They have their tails in their mouths—and they're all over crumbs." (*AAW* 78–79)

Here, the protagonist, unlike the nonhuman hybrid duo, cannot identify the whiting as autonomous subjects. She can only see them as "common food fish, sold with its tail tucked into its mouth . . . and served, in Alice's experience, breaded" (*AAW* 79n3). To a certain extent, she has to be credited due to self-censoring her words, stopping in the middle of the word "dinner," but she needs further improvement toward envisioning animals under a more-than-food spectacle. In this fantasy land, there emerges a huge difference between "I see what I eat" and "I eat what I see," of which the Hatter reminds her (*AAW* 53). Her struggle in dissociating animals from matters to be consumed is the manifestation of a "rupture or abyss" between matter and discourse, nature and culture, humans and their multiple others; it is the clash between humans' identification of "we" or "I" and the compression of their multiple others into a singularity of "animal" or "nonhuman" (Derrida, "Animal" 398). In this regard, while highlighting Alice's attempts to situate animal subjectivities at a place separate from her own subjectivity, Carroll draws attention, to borrow Derrida's statement, "to difference, to differences, to heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures" of the animal/nonhuman "as against the homogenous and the continuous" of the human ("Animal" 398).

Alice as "the universal devourer" in Wonderland (Massey 78) finds herself tested by the nonhumans' challenges to her language and meaning-making practices. Subverting the presupposition that "speech or reason, the *logos*, [and] history" constitute the "list of properties unique to man" (Derrida, "Animal" 373; italics in the original), Wonderland's creatures transform not only somatically, but also linguistically. With these fantastic beings, Carroll demonstrates that "the language of representation" in fiction can take on "agency, . . . letting words betray her appetite" (Talairach-Vielmas 50). What the Mouse's autobiographical "tale" can mean its physical "tail" for her (*AAW* 23); or the Mouse's negative expressions with "*not*" drive her to search for some "knot" in its tail (*AAW* 25). Similarly, for the Mock Turtle, "porpoise" can alternate with "purpose" (*AAW* 79), or he

can call his master "Tortoise" because the master "taught us [them]" (*AAW* 73). When the metaphoric expressions are literalised in fantasy fiction, the inflated superiority of the human who always prides hir existence over the others with hir distinction of this speech ability gets exposed as well. Alice's human identity is thus entrapped in the "inescapable physical presence of words" by these nonhumans (Massey 89). In this upturned environment of Wonderland, the protagonist becomes a posthuman subject with talking nonhuman animals and hybrids. She learns how to see like an animal. As in Derrida's experience of seeing himself through his companion cat's gaze, Alice begins seeing herself through those animals' eyes. This new perspective undermines the ontologically higher positioning of the European human over its others. She understands the significance of negotiation between these others and appreciates the fact that an interactive exchange between differing sides does not necessitate some dualistic conditioning. Rather, these interactions between different beings might lead them to diffractive patterns of becoming(s).

In addition to those anthropomorphised animals that contribute to Alice's posthuman becomings, fantastic animals like the Gryphon—a fantastic creature "with the head and wings of an eagle and the body of a lion" (*AAW* 71n7; see fig. 5)—and the Cheshire-Cat take on the role of a guide in her journeys. One of the best well-known legendary chimerical hybrid creatures of fantasies as well as heraldries is "griffin, gryfin, or gryphon, as it is variously termed by old writers" (Vinycomb 148). Derived from the bestiaries and introduced to English heraldry in the late thirteenth century (Woodcock and Robinson 65), gryphon belongs to the "world of unreality grown up in the mind of [hu]man from the earliest times" (Vinycomb 149). It became popular in the early modern era under the light of a similar liberal humanist understanding of the beings on Earth. As it is believed that social hierarchy ought to follow the natural hierarchy, the symbolic usage of animals to indicate the socio-economic wellbeing of certain royal and noble families follows a similar idea: There are "equivalent [hierarchical beings] among animals and plants" (Vernot 112). "Among beasts the lion is king," Nicholas Vernot points out and adds, "among birds the eagle" (112). In this regard, the Queen of Hearts' approach to the Gryphon in Wonderland draws attention to the mythical beast's servitude to the royalty when the Queen commands it to "take this young lady to see the Mock

Turtle, and to hear his history" (*AAW* 71–72). Such a creature obviously fascinates a child like Alice, just as seen in the excitement of the third-year Hogwarts students meeting the hippogriff, which is an offspring of a male griffin and a female horse (Puttock 71), in Rubeus Hagrid's course "Care of Magical Creatures" (Rowling, *Prisoner of Azkaban* 87–88). Similar to J. K. Rowling's depiction of the nobility of the hippogriff that demands a constant "eye contact" with the approaching human who needs to bow before the creature as a sign of respect (Rowling, *Fantastic Beasts* 38), the Gryphon preserves its non-inferior position before the heroine and does not let her ride it on their journey. Instead, it explains some complicated expressions by both the Queen and the Mock Turtle and accompanies her to the Queen's court until the end of her journey.

Alice's other companion is the Cheshire-Cat, which she first encounters in the kitchen of the Duchess's house. From the very first moment of its introduction, the Cheshire-Cat is seen to be "grinning from ear to ear" (*AAW* 45; see fig. 6), which looms over the whole Wonderland narrative as an inquisitive, all-knowing gesture of the animal. The origins of the proverbial expression "grinning like a Cheshire-Cat" do not have anything to do with Alice's fantastic companion cat because, in Donald J. Gray's footnote, it is explained that this proverb goes back to the late eighteenth century when a cheese-making company in Cheshire formed their cheese "in the shape of grinning cats" (*AAW* 45n3). Her second encounter with it coincides with her moment of releasing the baby-piglet while "Cheshire-Cat [is] sitting on a bough of a tree a few yards off" (*AAW* 48). Their first dialogue is proven to be a phenomenal one in literary history and popular culture:

> "Cheshire-Puss," she began. . . . "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
> "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
> "I don't much care where——" said Alice.
> "Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
> "——so long as I get *somewhere*," Alice added as an explanation. . . .
> "In *that* direction," the Cat said, waving its right paw round, "lives a Hatter: and in *that* direction," waving the other paw, "lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad."
> "But I don't want to go among mad people," Alice remarked.
> "Oh, you ca'n't help that," said the Cat: "we're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad." (*AAW* 49; italics in the original)

The madness the Cheshire-Cat refers to actually encompasses the desire and courage to move outside the traditional humanist notions of living, being, and knowing. However, this meaning cannot easily be deduced from its manners and words. In his works on madness, Michel Foucault explains that "madness and non-madness, reason and unreason are confusedly implicated in each other, inseparable as they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in relation to each other, in the exchange that separates them" (Foucault, *History of Madness* xxviii). Such association with the notion of madness surely frightens Alice who tries to avoid approaching the so-called mad Hatter and March Hare. For her, the absolute other reason is madness, which would be mostly followed by the confinement, isolation, and ostracisation of the mad. Yet again, Carroll plays with the concepts here. What the human Alice understand from madness may utterly be different from what the nonhuman Cheshire-Cat means in its linguistic appropriation. It is certain that Dodgson's observation of unreasonable outcasts is reflected in the cat's words. Its answer to the girl's question of how it knows she is mad "You must be, . . . or you wouldn't have come here" (*AAW* 49) reflects the "itinerant existence . . . of the mad" (Foucault, *History of Madness* 9). Additionally, madness in the nineteenth-century standards means being less than human as "the madman had replaced the leper, the mentally ill person was now a subhuman and beastly scape-goat; hence [Alice's] need to protect" herself from against any connection to it (Foucault, *Madness* vii). Despite her efforts, she cannot help herself from accepting the nonhuman rationality of Wonderland and finds "a grin without a cat" after the Cheshire-Cat vanishes meaningfully ordinary (*AAW* 51).

Its third appearance is during the Queen's croquet game when Alice begins criticising the unfairness within the game. As if it was an authority figure like a judge, she complains that she does not observe "they play at all fairly" (*AAW* 65). When the King of Hearts asks her who she is talking to, she is seen to have accepted it as a friend of hers and gains the King's dislike of the situation. His dislike can be argued to originate from the fragmented appearance of the cat since, as merely detailed in Tenniel's illustration, the Cheshire-Cat presents itself as a sum of head without the rest of its body on the croquet ground. Disturbed by its impertinence, the King orders it "don't look at me like that!" (*AAW* 65; see fig. 6) and demands the Queen to "have this cat removed" (*AAW* 66). The

Fig. 6. The Cheshire-Cat grinning over the courtiers (Carroll, *AAW* 67).

cat's gaze over the court and at the King has a pictorial precedence to Derrida's account of his cat's gaze. The gaze of the nonhuman animal holds a mirror to the human who is quite conscious about hir mis/deeds. As the King is aware of the whimsical beheading orders as well as the absurdity of the game—not to mention the abuse of animals during it—in the meanwhile, he does not want to face the ethical interrogation and subsequent judgement of the cat head. Unlike Derrida's experience of physical nudity before his car, the royalty experiences an ethico-ontological nakedness before the nonhumans like flamingos, hedgehogs, and the cat, "before even seeing [themselves] seen by" these nonhumans (Derrida, "Animal" 380). They are forced into a state of passivity, they feel a lack of agency in their actions, and they experience a kind of involuntary exhibition of their own selves. While the desire to behead the cat comes from its impertinent manner of seeing their minds and souls in a naked manner, the court feels more disturbed about the cat's all-knowing and mocking grin. The Cheshire-Cat's mockery is amplified in the

discussion of the Queen, the King, and the executioner who argues that "you couldn't cut off a head unless there was a body to cut it off from" (*AAW* 66). Reminding us of the guilty conscience of the vivisecting scientist that Carroll mentions in his essay, the bodiless head of the animal looms over the humanoid courtiers of Wonderland.

Alice builds a novel posthuman subjectivity in her fantastic journey in the company of several nonhuman animals in Wonderland. However, resembling Gulliver's multiple becomings in several fantastic countries in Swift's fantasy, the formation of the heroine's posthuman-becoming continues in the looking-glass world of *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There*. Carroll's attempt to show that a human being enters multiple phases of becoming and this is a never-ending journey of emergence with whatever/whoever surrounds that human being. The human's every encounter with human, animal or material beings instigates a unique process of interaction and intra-action, and that human gains a new posthuman subjectivity with each and every one of these encounters. Instead of a rabbit hole to fall through, Dodgson employs a mirror as a passage to the fantasy land in this novel. The materiality and meaning of this entryway appear highly different from the naturally strange environment of Wonderland for two reasons. Firstly, mirrors are literally known to reflect the narcissistic nature of humans, being the product of culture, society, and etiquette. Second, mirrors are metaphorically— and psychoanalytically—known to reflect one's innermost hidden identity which may host unnameable desires and past traumas of that person.

It is the second in Alice's situation. When she is "up on the chimney-piece" standing before the mirror, the looking-glass starts "to melt away, just like a bright silvery mist" and she finds herself past "through the glass . . . into the Looking-glass room" (*TLG* 109). Almost paying homage to Carroll's use of reflexive tools, the most notable mirrors of the fantasy world belong to twentieth-century fantasy fictions. One of them is the Mirror of Galadriel in Tolkien's Middle-Earth as introduced in *The Fellowship of the Ring* (1954), the first of *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy. Unlike an ordinary mirror, it is made up of "a basin of silver, wide and shallow," to be filled with "water from the stream" in Lothlórien; the Mirror of Galadriel is explained to show "[m]any things" that the Lady of Lórien wants to reveal or "what [the looker] desire[s] to see. But the Mirror will also show things

unbidden, and those are often stranger and more profitable than things which we wish to behold. What you will see, if you leave the Mirror free to work, I [Galadriel] cannot tell. For it shows things that were, and things that are, and things that may be" (Tolkien, *Lord of the Rings* 371). It is seen that it has its own agency that cannot be totally controlled by any human or humanoid being. The other instance is the Mirror of Erised in the Room of Requirements at Hogwarts, introduced as "a magnificent mirror, as high as the ceiling, with an ornate gold frame, standing on two clawed feet" (Rowling, *Philosopher's Stone* 152). When Harry Potter looks at himself in the mirror, he can "see no reflection" but "his family, for the first time in his life" (*Philosopher's Stone* 152). The headmaster of the school, Albus Dumbledore, later explains how it functions: "It shows us nothing more or less than the deepest, most desperate desire of our hearts. . . . However, this mirror will give us neither knowledge or truth" (*Philosopher's Stone* 157) (157). In her analysis of an episode in the twenty-first-century British science-fiction television series *Black Mirror* (2011–2019), Başak Ağın also draws attention to the transfigurative aspect of the "'black mirror' as a pre-photographic optical gadget" in the title because these tools "can be considered to be the first devices to offer a virtual reality experience" ("'Memory Remains'" 152). *Through the Looking-Glass* seems to be the forerunner of such mirrors, subverting the human's self-consciousness and thus challenging the human identity while acting on its own reflexive terms. Although they are expected to reflect what is before them, they rather diffract and, in Donna Haraway's words, map "where the *effects* of differences appear" ("Promises" 300; italics in the original) in one's relationality with hir environment.

The dissolution of the materiality of the looking-glass above the chimney-piece signals the establishment of a transformation of Alice's words and imagination into reality. "The very first thing" Alice does is to check if there is a fire in the fireplace on that side of the room (*TLG* 109–10). Confirming that there is a lively fire, she finds herself at ease thinking that the looking-glass world is another part of reality. Additionally, the other distinguishing characteristic of this world is given in its fantastic reality: nonhumans are alive, act on their own, and live within the reverse rules of this fantasy land. The reverse reality is soon given with "a book lying near Alice on the table," in which Carroll's famous poem "Jabberwocky" is printed. Originally the poem consisted of a single stanza

when it was published under the title of "Stanza of Anglo-Saxon Poetry" in *Mischmasch*, the handwritten periodical by the author, in 1855 (Lucas 503–04). When she tries to read the full version of the poem, she thinks that "it's all in some language I [she] don't know" since it is actually "a Looking-glass book" and printed in a reverse way and needs a mirror to be read properly (*TLG* 113–14). This aspect of backwards writing becomes a common element of mirrors that I exemplify above as Rowling also uses a sentence engraved on the frame of the Mirror of Erised which reads "Erised stra ehru oyt ube cafru oyt on wohsi," but is actually an anagram, with the spaces, punctuation, and capitalisation rearranged, of 'I show not your face but your heart's desire' (Rowling, *Philosopher's Stone* 152). This technique in fantasy works functions as an alienation effect for the careful reader and hints at the reversal and extraordinariness of the material.

In the poem, the Jabberwock is depicted only with "[t]he jaws that bite, the claws that catch" and "with eyes of flame" (*TLG* 114–15). Carroll's limited description of the antagonist in the poetic lines proves his reliance on Tenniel's mastery of illustration. Even today, any critic or reader of the poem and the monster has to rely on this collaborative attempt of the author and the illustrator in order to visualise what kind of a being the Jabberwock is (see fig. 7). Tenniel draws a monstrous figure with enormous claws and feet, flying before a young boy with wide dragon-like wings, and interestingly wearing a waistcoat. This last cultural addition to this picture distances the monstrous beast from the world of animals and positions it near the human world as it almost represents anthropocentric evil. As also portrayed in the picture, the innocent child figure is expected to fight against the villains of the adult world. Nancy Goldfarb aptly describes "Jabberwocky" as "a portmanteau poem, packing two distinct meanings into a single work": It may seem "explicitly about a boy's initiation into manhood" with his defeat of the monster, but it also foreshadows "an initiation into the frightening thicket of language" (87). As the boy's entrance into the male adult world, Alice's position in this room is in an initiation ceremony of the fantasy land. Together with the boy's experience

of the nonsense words in the first stanza and triumph in the others, she is, to some extent, relieved from a sense of eerie and riddling anxiety of this new world.

Fig. 7. Tenniel's depiction of the Jabberwock and the boy (Carroll, *TLG* 115).

The reassurance of this welcoming scene is supported by another element of caring and compassion: the murder of a monstrous being in the face of danger. Examples of death—either in natural death or in murder—are rarely employed in both *Alice* books. On account of this observation, one of the two instances of murdering nonhumans in this fantasy requires our peculiar attention. As stated in the first section of this chapter, Dodgson does not always prioritise the existence of animals over humans: "I can heartily admire the courage of the man who, with severe bodily toil, and at the risk of his life, hunts down

some 'man-eating' tiger" (*Sylvie* xx). As implied with the waistcoat in the illustration, the humanistic Jabberwock is the only evil nonhuman character in the whole series. As discussed in Chapter 1, the human is the only being in the natural environment that needs clothing, and Tennial could not have drawn the beast in this cloth without a purpose. The same equation of 'evil' and 'human clothing' is seen in Swift's depiction of Houyhnhnm's depreciation of Gulliver's waistcoat (*GT* 200–201). In addition to the pictorial meaning, Carroll undermines the time's poetic tradition in a radical manner: He imitates and parodies the common practice of reviving Anglo-Saxon poetry in the nineteenth century. In an attempt to redefine and establish an identity of Englishness in literature during the Victorian era, many poets and critics were in search of relating their poetic and critical works to the Old English tradition (Jones 2–8). So, what begins "as a parody of current philosophical scholarship" in "The Jabberwocky" "appears to be another obscure 'relic of ancient poetry', a quasi-heroic narrative poem in which, as in *Beowulf*, a fabulous monster is slain" (Houghton 319n11). Just like Beowulf's defeat of Grendel, the young boy in the poem defeats Jabberwock in defiance of his community. The clear distinction of the author's animal advocacy is based on this rational distinction of survival. The rational line is "the practice of evil, and hence, in a sense, the inhuman that is the distinctive mark of the human in the animal kingdom" (Baudrillard 35). Dodgson as a humorous satirist can be viewed as a critic of the semi-abortive and ethnicist endeavour of 'Anglo-Saxon'isation as this endeavour would co-opt new literary pieces into the nationalist tendency that felt threatened by the multicultural effects of colonised lands and nations of the British Empire. In a manner to clarify "the toxicity of the present" as "both natural and inevitable," the revival of Anglo-Saxon poetry-writing signals the supremacy of the "homogeneous, exclusive, and (usually) white" man attached to "the past as an origin that explains a toxic present" (Jones 273). However, with a twist in the welcoming scene to the posthumanist landscape of the looking-glass reality, the author makes Alice and the reader/critic realise that everything is founded on possible responses to ethical concerns and ontological anxieties. Hence, the chimerical monster is slain by the innocent child who leaves the uncanny forest victoriously.

The second example acts as the mirror of such ethical concerns employed in the encounter of the young boy and the Jabberwock: the consumption of the Oysters by the Walrus and the Carpenter as detailed in the poetry told by Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The poem opens with another uncanny portrayal of atmospheric event: "The sun was shining on the sea / . . . And this was odd, because it was / The middle of the night" (*TLG* 137; see fig. 8). Although it is known that the Walrus lives near the Arctic regions, the locale of the events in the poems is not given and the sun's shining at night acts as a foreshadowing of dire events to follow. The odd couple that is portrayed to have dressed in tuxedoes walks "close at hand" in a weeping mood on a shore by the sea; in the meantime, they come across some Oysters whom they invite to walk together (*TLG* 138–39). Young Oysters in dozens are immediately lured out of their beds and join the couple. After a mile of walking, when the Oysters get "out of breath" and tired, the Walrus and the Carpenter suddenly begin eating "every one" of them (*TLG* 139, 141). Alice is seen to be confused at this end of the poem as she could not decide whom to blame for this excessive consumption of the Oysters. At first, she sides with the Walrus "because he was a *little* sorry for the poor oysters"; at another moment, she decides to "like the Carpenter best" because he eats fewer oysters than the Walrus (*TLG* 141; italic in the original). In the


Fig. 8. The Walrus and the Carpenter on their quest for a dinner (Carroll, *TLG* 138).

book, the protagonist seems to be not so interested in the frightened expressions and deceitful deaths of the Oysters. She just concludes that the Walrus and the Carpenter "were *both* very unpleasant characters" (*TLG* 141; italic in the original). For an early advocate of animal rights like Dodgson, this ending should have proved disturbing; that could be the reason, as Jaques also pinpoints, why he re-writes the ending of this poem in the theatrical version of *Through the Looking-Glass* (57). On the stage, the ghosts of the Oysters bring divine retribution to this unpleasant couple. Cited in Roger Lancelyn Green's notes, the first oyster "sit[s] upon [the Walrus's] chest" and the second one begins "stamping on [its] chest" repetitively (Carroll, *Diaries* 446–47). For the author, this ending must have been more fulfilling and appropriate for the second and final case of murder in the whole *Alice* series. The union of two predators blurs the boundaries between humans and nonhuman animals, referencing the core of suffering felt by the innocent creatures. The excessive predatory consumption by either species is criticised with a dominant question of ethics regarding animal consumption here.

Carroll might have skipped a proper ending and lesson for Alice in the novel version of the looking-glass world; however, he initially adds one more chapter entitled "The Wasp in a Wig" which was intended to be at the end of the eighth chapter (Carroll, "Wasp" 209). Although left out of the print edition due to the author's desire to shorten the book upon Tenniel's advice, this chapter presents the growth in the protagonist's maturing posthumanist subjectivity. After she leaves the White Knight, she hears "a deep sigh" coming "from the wood behind her" and observes that "[t]here's somebody *very* unhappy there" ("Wasp" 210; italics in the original). Instead of jumping over the fence and moving on to the next episode of her journey, she wonders about the source of this unhappy voice and gets surprised to see a wasp. Just like the editor of the Norton critical edition, many critics think that the Wasp symbolises the poverty of the working classes; however, it is also noted that, unlike bees, wasps are among the least favourable creatures of the nonhuman animals (Jaques 60) and they are among the least storified beings in literature. Despite that, Alice learns what disturbs the Wasp: he wears a wig—although not illustrated by Tenniel, depicted in the insect's complaints—which does not fit his head (Carroll, "Wasp" 211). The Wasp insults the protagonist during her attempts to help him when she tries to read some news from a paper, or even when she offers assistance to

move the Wasp away from the wind against any rheumatic pain in the wind. Martin Gardner, the editor of *The Annotated Alice*, underlines that

> there is no episode in the book in which she treats a disagreeable creature with such remarkable patience. In no other episode, in either book, does her character come through so vividly as that of an intelligent, polite, considerate little girl. It is an episode in which extreme youth confronts extreme age. Although the Wasp is constantly critical of Alice, not once does she cease to sympathize with him. (288)

Her posthumanist subjectivity is tested by the Wasp and, just one step before becoming the third queen of the looking-glass world, she is seen to be victorious at embracing the grumpy comments of the old insect. From the Wasp's point of view, Alice seems a foreigner in the naturalcultural reality of that fantasy world as she has a peculiarly shaped head and jaws (Carroll, "Wasp" 213). The insect's portraiture of the little girl, in this

Fig. 9. Alice's exploration of living flowers (Carroll, *TLG* 118).

sense, resembles the Pigeon's interrogation of Alice's species in Wonderland and the Fawn's recognition of her being a human in the looking-glass forest.

In the mirrored world, Dodgson introduces a little girl who has forgotten to have developed a more posthumanist subjectivity in her previous journey in Wonderland. She has first patronised the flowers—the Tiger-lily, the Rose, and the Daisy—after entering the garden of live flowers when she is outspokenly criticised by them: "If you don't hold your tongues, I'll pick you" (*TLG* 119; see fig. 9)! She cannot tolerate their speech ability and opinions as much as their plurality, especially when they know better where to go ahead on her journey. But in the kingdom of nonhuman animals, material beings, and humanoids like Humpty Dumpty, she learns to be compassionate enough even toward a wasp. That is exactly why she finds "something very heavy, that fitted round her head" after seeing the White Knight off: "a golden crown" (*TLG* 189, 190). At the end of the *Alice* series, the author highlights the importance of fair, if not equal, and compassionate treatment of all beings, and Alice finally merits coronation. Receiving some advice from the Red and White Queens on the nature of the looking-glass world after being declared a queen, she stands "before an arched doorway, over which were the words 'QUEEN ALICE' in large letters" (*TLG* 197), just to enter a presumably enchanted palace of hers. In the doorway, she partakes in an ecstatic moment when she hears "a shrill voice . . . singing":

> To the Looking-Glass world it was Alice that said
> "I've a sceptre in hand, I've a crown on my head.
> Let the Looking-Glass creatures, whatever they be
> Come and dine with the Red Queen, the White Queen, and me!" (*TLG* 198)

This song sounds to echo a complete posthuman Alice from the future as it emphatically ends with "me" pronoun and reflects her consciousness of the lack of difference in the values of "creatures." While I claim this to be a ground for the display of horizontal relationality in this fantasy world, I am aware that it might sound paradoxical to witness a coronation of the child human. On the surface, this coronation might lead one to think of the possibility to commence a novel hierarchy among the looking-glass beings. Under the surface, it is a biting satire to portray the characters of royalty in human forms—just

like the Red Queen, the White Queen, and the White King—because only humans are seen to be devoid of a rhizomatic relationality between all the beings in their environments. Throughout the journey, animals, plants, and material beings are always already enmeshed in this understanding of the agency of assemblage, as in Bennett's sense of the world. Therefore, humans are in need to be encouraged in this understanding.

Fig. 10. The leg of mutton making a little bow (Carroll, *TLG* 200).

The posthuman potential of the heroine, I have to claim, is not a complete accomplishment or realisation of posthumanist subjectivity at the end scene of the banquet thrown in honour of the new queen. Around the table of this feast, she sees "about fifty guests of all kinds" who have accepted Alice the prospective posthumanist subject's invitation in the stanza above: "some were animals, some birds, and there were even a few flowers among them" (*TLG* 199). Soon, the Red Queen introduces anthropomorphoid foods around; the first one is "a leg of mutton" in a dish (*TLG* 199). As vividly illustrated

only in Tenniel's drawing (see fig. 10), the food gets up and makes "a little bow to" the third queen as an act of courtesy (*TLG* 199) even though Alice fails to notice such an act as a demonstration of the agentic subjectivity of a nonhuman matter and tries to slice the leg like some mere food. She is slightly behind her fantastic posthuman becoming as she attempts a similar act of devouring when she is introduced to "a large plum-pudding"; then, the Red Queen who seems to portray a doppelganger to the new queen's prospective posthumanist persona feels obliged to explain that "it isn't etiquette to cut any one you've been introduced to" (*TLG* 199). At this stage, Alice misses the humbling meaning of her coronation and mistakes her crown as a symbol of a vertical hierarchy, at the top of which she sees herself. In this fantasy narrative, Carroll's task, to borrow Haraway's words, "is to make kin in lines of inventive connection as a practice of learning to live and die well with each other in a thick present" and "to make trouble, to stir up potent response to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled waters and rebuild quiet places" (*Staying* 1). Alice's anthropocentrism is the troubled water of her own tears in which she struggles not to get drowned after her fall through the rabbit hole in Wonderland. Dodgson, in his accounts of two separate fantasy lands, takes her by hand and brings her to adopt her eventual posthuman self. With this sense of posthuman subjectivity in her consciousness after getting out of the looking-glass world, she feels preoccupied and obsessed with the sounds of animals like Dinah's kittens and chess pieces in her room. Her transition from the fantasy world to the real one does not resemble her soft awakening from Wonderland dream since this will be more instrumental to lead her to Carroll's ultimate goal.

To recapitulate, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass* extensively subvert the social realist concerns of the Victorian literature while they try to navigate a course of posthuman becoming for the heroine. During this navigation, Alice is first observed to be a self-centric child who does not pay attention to her words in her encounters with the nonhumans. And this is valid for the beginning of the two novels, which means the Wonderland experiences do not situate this human within the parameters of posthumanist subjectivity. Therefore, at the end of two journeys, she appears so close to attaining some sort of posthumanist becoming. Whether she becomes successful in this attainment or not is left a mystery by Carroll. What the author does is present the probabilities in the real world by offering a microscopic or telescopic vision to the reader

as well as Alice in order to understand the rationality and perspectives of other-than-human beings. While doing so, Dodgson resorts to anthropomorphic illustrations by Tenniel because the union of two media can better convey his message throughout these narratives. Thus, this chapter has scrutinised Carroll's playful novels with the concern about how one can achieve posthuman subjectivity in fantasy literature. Re-evaluating the new evolutionary directions in natural and social sciences, both *Alice* books are demonstrated to converge the interactions between humans and nonhumans to explore the boundaries of the self.

CONCLUSION

Today, the world goes through unprecedented challenges like rapid extinctions, destruction of remaining natural reserves, and pandemics, all of which are mere outcomes of naturalcultural entanglements of humans and nonhumans. Our current state in the middle of such challenges calls us to action, at least in intellectual and contemplative ways, if not in deliberately activist involvements. In this crux at present, I cannot help but remember what Dumbledore advises Harry at the close of his fourth year at Hogwarts: "the time should come when you have to make a choice between what is right, and what is easy" (Rowling, *Goblet of Fire* 628). The headmaster's memorable words caution us to make our choices based on not the relative difficulties or simplicities of the circumstances we[56] experience, but the ethical dimensions of the events in which several beings inter-act as the agents of a web of intricate relations. This dissertation embarks on this cautionary vein of fantasy literature and claims that the present time is filled with the imperative to re-configure our understanding of the self and the world within the parameters of the posthumanist perspective. Criticising the liberal humanist notion of anthropocentric subjectivity as continuously structured in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this study combines the discourses of canonical fantasy fictions and contemporary posthumanist theories and proposes a diffractive analysis of approaching the established literary works from the vantage of novel theoretical arguments. By scrutinising the fantastic journeys of the protagonists, Gulliver and Alice, in *Gulliver's Travels* and the *Alice* series in a non-conventional manner, the dissertation provides a complementary contribution to the critical posthumanist scholarship in an attempt to narrow the rift between the theoretical research and the critical practice in this area. As such, this conclusion intends to extend final remarks about the posthumanist subjectivities in the fantasy narratives in accordance with the arguments presented in this study.

Reviewing the discussions made in each chapter will help us recall the diffractions followed throughout. This dissertation underlines that new theories can be applied to the canonical, yet marginal, narratives although the tendency lies with our efforts to read texts

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[56] Please see the footnote 3 on page 2.

through their contexts and concurrent philosophies. In this line, the above-mentioned works that were written during the Enlightenment and Industrialisation eras are assembled together with today's theories on human nature and its relations with nonhumans, which started to be systematically contemplated in the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The strength of such an assemblage is that two different methodologies, contextual and theoretical, can be employed to make sense of literary works. Correspondingly, the first chapter about posthumanism and fantasy fiction offers an affirmative solution to bridge the gap between sophisticated philosophies and imagined worlds. In the chapter, we come to the resolution that posthumanism has never meant the celebration of the end or extinction of the human species. Rather, it warns us against this possibility of self-eradication if we rely on the transhumanist predicament and forget about our intricate relations with the more-than-human beings and environment. Fantasy fiction is proposed as an effective medium to convey this warning, as this genre contributes to bridging the human and nonhuman realms, blurring the ontological and epistemological divide between them. In this regard, fantasy fiction can lay bare the strength of literature in helping both academic and non-academic circles (re)consider their ethical commitment to the well-being of the world. In parallel with these arguments, the second chapter questions the idea of a stable human subjectivity through the lens of various philosophers who are considered to be the founders of this idea. Taking the Enlightenment figures' attempts to philosophise on nature and the human, it analyses Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* as the first and best example of satirical fantasy fiction in the eighteenth century. The narrative gives an opportunity for several fictional and realistic characters to come together and interact with one another, during which the protagonist's intra-actions lead him to accept his identity as a posthuman being in a horizontal relationality with others around him. Encouraging us to see the superficial human-animal divide, as well as nonhumanity in the human, Swift's titular hero is seen to be in a constant state of nonhumanisation and hybridisation as an animal, object, insect, apparel, or a human. Finally, in line with what I call the 'nonhumanisation process,' the third chapter considers the possibilities of new traits of human subjectivity in the nineteenth century when sciences are seen to influence natural philosophy to an irreversible extent in terms of our understanding of the world and our place in it. Then, it investigates Lewis Carroll's two works, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through*

the Looking-Glass, as unique examples of fantasy narratives that concentrate on the formation of a character's self at the peak of social realism.

Fantasy literature, including the three novels in my analyses as the pioneering examples of the genre, incorporates the complexities of the conundrum of human supremacy over nature and other nonhuman beings. As seen in the second and third chapters, fantasy fiction in the modern sense of the term is replete with components which feature, if not predict, the concerns of the posthuman condition. These concerns are best illustrated in the elusive and suggestive worlds of fantasy literature. This does not mean to deny the narrative illustration of the potential posthuman subjectivities in realist fiction; there are several examples and research on that trajectory. However, the so-called qualities which distinguish humans from nonhumans such as speech, consciousness, and rationality can best be employed and applied in the depictions of nonhuman and humanoid species in the fantasies. The unreal characters of the genre are embellished with these anthropomorphic aspects so that they can blur the boundaries of anthropocentric dualities in their vocal and material-discursive challenges to the human characters in the narratives. This way, they become more visible and audible to the human senses. Thus, their potential agential roles in the world's becoming are better revealed, comprehended, and appreciated.

While accommodating these concerns, fantasy fiction does not assume a stagnant position toward them; rather, it struggles to bring the clashing binaries into a kind of parliament to let them express their individual problems and, hence, reach some kind of reconciliation for the greater good. The parliament filled with entities that would be normally expected to keep silent in front of humans certainly creates a sense of delight and amusement for the reader. This delight and amusement is only to be followed by a tension of power struggles for the reader who, in the imaginative world of the fantasy, has set out to question the anthropocentric 'project' about the presumption of hir[57] species' oneness and uniqueness. In this respect, I have taken two model writers' works that tend to be categorised in children's literature or as children's fantasy because these works need a recalibration of their genres as 'fantasies for adults' when the young

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[57] Please see the footnote 4 on page 3.

audience of the genre is observed and expected to overlook the above-mentioned inherent qualities.[58] Both Swift and Carroll upset the overarching human gaze and enable animals to turn their heads and look the human protagonists straight in the eye, as in the case of Derrida. At these moments, perspectives change, the human is upended, and the animal is voiced to a degree that disturbs the apotheosis or sanctity of human rationality. When all these subversions are brought together before the immature reader, the philosophical concerns of the genre become undermined and (over)shadowed. For instance, when we survey abridged versions of *Gulliver's Travels* and the *Alice* series, we face the disturbing fact that editors or publishers make a selection of chapters or parts in books not to disturb the intended younger audience (Smedson 75–100), diminishing the total effect of the fantasies to reach their posthuman potentialities. These selective readings obviously lead to the defamation of either the authors or their works, if not even both, to the extent of labelling them human haters, nonsensical works, and the like.

Advocating fantasy literature's abundance in containing posthumanist philosophies, I propose in this dissertation five elements which determine the entangled nature of imagined non-realist worlds of fantasy and the posthuman predicament. All these elements, as I have argued in the preceding chapters, point to the purgation of the subject's liberal humanist thinking, being, and knowing, and then to the reconstruction of a posthuman subjectivity on a re-adjusted plane of ethico-onto-epistemology. As the first element, the perspective change is of utmost importance in fantasies, since the introduction of legendary, mythical, and brand-new species into the works provides telescopic and microscopic visions to reconsider our positionality in the universal chain of beings. We, humans, tend to have a telescopic vision of the nonhuman inhabitants and their workings of the world around us. Our attention spans are usually limited to what we are concerned with at that moment of contemplation. However, fantasies give an opportunity to the vocality and appearance of the microscopic world we tend to overlook.

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[58] In problematising the child-adult tension of the intended audience of the fantasy corpus, we can take both old and new examples of literary and mediatic fantasies such as *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1900) by L. Frank Baum (1856–1919), the *Peter Pan* series (1904–1911) by J. M. Barrie (1860–1937), *The Smurfs* (1958–...) by Peyo (1928–1992), the *Harry Potter* series (1997–2007) by J. K. Rowling (1965–...), and the *Avatar* series (2005–2015) by Michael Dante DiMartino (1974–...) and Bryan Konietzko (1975–...).

In them, the human is invited to reconsider unseen realms of diminutive beings and systems as Gulliver and Alice do in the face of the dwarfish Lilliputians, insects and plants like the Gnat, the Caterpillar, and the talking flowers. On the flip side, our telescopic vision is bereaved and disqualified while the encounters with gigantic beings like the Brobdingnagians are imagined. Only then do we recall our self-inflated value in the universe. This way, the escapist nature of fantasy fiction lets us escape from the overwhelmingly self-centric and human-valued systems and living styles of the world we inhabit. Yet, the direction we willingly escape towards leads to the lands brimming with fantastic appearances of posthuman concerns. Suspending the principle of reality, fantasies train humans in posthumanist thinking.

As much as the reversal of perspectives in fantasies appears as a dialectical and therefore dualistic attempt to deconstruct the binary thinking in liberal humanism, non-binarism as the second element develops the recognition of the non-singularity of the human and the multiplicity of beings in both the real and the imagined lands. Indicating truths beyond their illustrated settings, the fantastic novels operate in an effective manner to invalidate the Cartesian dualisms and their concomitant relatives of discrimination. As observed in the second chapter, from the eighteenth century onwards—if not even earlier, the view of the human as a savage outside the borders of civil life puts a barrier on hir symbiotic adaptation to nonhuman nature. This perspective is not limited to the anthropocentric abuse and misuse of the environment and its abundant natural resources since it is stretched to the domination and colonisation of non-white communities under the disguise of civilisation and democratisation in European rationality. Hence, it brings the European, white, Christian, male human's legalisation to subjugate unfamiliar others in a self-advantageous manner. That is to say, posthumanism is not a mere interest in the welfare of nonhuman animals and matters. It is not a set of rituals to attain a spiritual higher self and insight into the ongoing events of the universe. Nor are we cultists of a secret organisation. What I am and what I endeavour to see and discuss is established against the misused and abused premises of liberal humanist thought that have led to several devastating ceremonial incidents such as sexist, racist, colonialist, religionist, and ableist practices. Speciesism is just one angle of these incidents, and perhaps the latest one the academia could systematically indulge in. Therefore, the non-binarism of fantasy

literature gives us the account of the mini-narratives between those binaries, and these mini-narratives are the realistic accounts beyond the white/black, good/evil, and human/nonhuman separatism. Rationalisation in the Western philosophies has not only reduced our human variation but also erased the particularities of our identities and life journeys. As much as our complexities and variations, our understanding of the self and the others has been smoothed out. The unfamiliar spatiotemporality of fantasy lands permits us to estrange ourselves from the statistical phantom of the 'average man' as "the common denominator against which we are measured" (Garland-Thomson 30). Participating in the pluralistic dialogues between appearances and realities within the fantasy narratives, we are liberated from the abstract, statistical ideals of being, knowing, and valuing. Thus, material-discursive concepts in fantasies build a bridge between the long-fictionalised binaries which are solubilised by the fantastic beings' posthumanist potentials.

Materiality emerges as the third element in the material-discursive envisioning of fantasy through posthumanist philosophy. Fiction, or literature in general, is regarded as the mimesis of the realist world and human nature. For this reason, the literary world is assumed to have imagined realities and hence to lack materiality other than the printed pages and bound books. This lack seems to amplify this nonmaterial assumption further with the introduction of digital screens and books for reading which has changed the printing sector irreversibly. Notwithstanding this perspective, the posthumanist character of narrativity rises on the author's and the reader's—separate and combined—relationalities with the material world. No matter how symbolic, metaphoric, and representational the language is in the fantasy works—actually in all literary pieces, the narrativity has connections that cannot be ruptured from the material world. It is, from the posthumanist vantage, an enterprise that accumulates on the human's material-discursive enmeshment with the nonhuman beings and nature. To demonstrate this superficial divide between textuality and materiality, which Ağın's concept of "mattertext" also problematises, this study has delved into the novels by an eighteenth-century author who is classified under neoclassicism (and rationality) and a nineteenth-century writer in the Victorian era when socio-political concerns outweighed the subjective, individual ones. Their mimetic representations are not mere textual

happenings. They bring their critiques from within. This striking nature of fantasy makes the posthuman potential abundant in the problematisation of reason-based delusions. In fantasy narratives, the material world and the representationalist discourse exhibit that one constitutes the other, that textuality cannot be situated over materiality, and that subjectivity is not bound to an anthropocentric meaning-making mechanism.

In problematising our relationality with the nonhuman, the posthumanist core of fantasy fiction reveals its fourth element as its 'from-within' approach. In the modern understanding of the human greatly nourished by the ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there exists a notion of 'alterity' as detailed in the first chapter. This notion, in spite of its multiplicity, functions as a singularity against which the human measures hirself and positions hir subjectivity over these othered bodyminds. Nonetheless, the posthumanist thought nestles these others by invalidating their alterities. Creating a carnivalesque setting, it argues that what we used to call 'other' actually belongs to the 'centre' and reclaims these marginalised others back into the grand assemblage. In doing so, the posthumanist nature of fantasies differs from the characters of other realist fictions, artistic movements, and philosophical schools, which give evasive, romanticised, guided responses to or hold sentimental, idealised positions against the missteps of liberal humanism. Rather than building its concerns upon fragmented touches with reality, it makes contacts and apprehensions in a wholesome and holistic manner. Recalling the articulation by Georges Jacques Danton (1759–1794), in Karl Georg Büchner's (1813–1837) play about the French Revolution (1789), *Danton's Death* (1835/1902), that the "revolution is like Saturn, it eats its children" (Büchner 1.5.20), I claim that the posthumanist attempt—not just limited to the fantasy—acts as a revolutionary movement that devours the parental elements which have come up to engender it. It is built upon several protests against the representationalist and humanist discourses, among which the poststructuralist methodology of deconstruction takes the lead. While subverting its own constitutive instruments, it incorporates these ingredients into its own body so as to recalibrate them. This recalibration does not propose a totally new ideology to forget about the past philosophical, theoretical, and scientific movements. Rather, it attempts to show that our understanding of spacetimematter, in Barad's terminology, needs repair and rectification as it has not obviously aligned well

with the cosmic spacetimematter. And this attempt contains not different ingredients, but only the readjusted versions of the same. In doing this readjustment, the posthumanist endeavour does not rely on representation and demonstration as if it was an adjudicator. It does not belong to the philosophies or ideologies of the major Western tradition, but it is a means of bridging the gaps left by each of these strategies. It thus depends on scientific proof to make sense of our relationality and rhizomatic connections. Just as the previous two chapters have reposed their analyses upon their contextual philosophies and sciences, posthumanism leans back against the scientific improvements in such fields as ethology and quantum physics that have proliferated since the latter half of the twentieth century. These new physical and metaphysical axioms help us make sense of our 'real' nature, subjectivity, and position in our entanglement with the universe. Coterminous with this multidisciplinarity, the posthumanist fantastic, as showcased in my study, has always already come 'from within.'

The final element of this more-than-human and mattertextual union is the theme of journey in almost all the narratives in fantasy lands. The familiar and the strange meet one another in those journeys, exploring and undermining each other's borders and essences mutually. They tease out the artificial divides embedded in these restrictions and cores. Throughout these explorations and acts of teasing, the myth of the human's singularity as the measure of all things is shattered. Reinvigorated by this subversion, the hero—as well as the reader—is expected to reach a posthumanist comprehension of subjectivity at the end of the journey. Theoretical discussions contend that the humanist subject is actually a posthumanist subject without the limitations of hierarchical stratification. As seen in the analyses of the novels, fantasies could turn someone into an object, an animal, or a clockwork under certain circumstances during hir relational interactions with the ones around. Their coalescence to liberate the subject from dualistic chains allows the posthumanist self to roam free and participate in the existence, knowledge, and value of other beings. In their journeys of becoming posthuman, the heroes of the fantasy fiction, outside the humanist quandary, polymorph and fuse into one another. In a carnivalesque atmosphere, they celebrate their hybridisation and constant becomings.

As a final remark, fantasy literature's portrayal of posthumanist concerns become more understandable and widespread when other media platforms such as drawings, moving pictures, and online tools are used. In Swift's work, we can only witness a map added to the beginning of the novel in order to guide the reader throughout the hero's travels. That is why his work cannot be directly associated with the transmedia aspect of the fantasy. In Carroll's works though, we witness that the fantasy narrative is supported by Tenniel's vivid illustrations of nonhuman beings. These drawings assist the reader in visualising and comprehending the full extent of those fantastic beings when Dodgson does not describe them in the series. In line with the methodology of bringing together several media to deliver the posthumanist message, fantasy fictions are inclined to be used in the twenty-first-century television and cinema sectors. The main reason behind this inclination is that these fantasies themselves invite people to produce their more illustrative and engaging forms in other media—*Gulliver's Travels* and the *Alice* series are not exceptions. In doing so, they pave the way for the interdisciplinary study of literary and filmic productions,[59] which precisely suit the inter- and multi-disciplinary character of posthumanist studies.

In short, it can be concluded that fantasy fiction's power to render the unreal possible provides a platform to demonstrate the narrative agency of the nonhuman others. In this demonstration, readers have willingly got involved in the challenges posited by fantastic creatures against the liberal humanist sense of the hierarchy of beings. As discussed in all the chapters, horizontality is demanded by both the theory and the literature in this dissertation. Accordingly, the elusiveness and unreachability of the horizon in the material world gets reversed in the imaginative world of fantasy literature since the posthumanist condition does not follow a dream of an unreachable horizontal relationality between humans and their nonhuman others. On the contrary, it insists on the fact that we have always already been posthuman. Similarly, I insist and assert that fantasy fiction has revealed our posthuman subjectivity and condition—and still continues to do so. The only quality it demands is a change in our perspective, a vestibule in our apprehension of the

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[59] Tolkien's (1892–1973) *Hobbit* (1937) and *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy (1954–55) and Rowling's (1965–...) *Harry Potter* series (1997–2007) and *Fantastic Beasts* pentalogy (2016–...) can be taken as examples to be studied in this vein.

outer world. This change has the power to guide us to overcome our arrogance and re-evaluate our relations with other beings. In the fantasy's guidance through which we face our demons, epiphanic and cathartic moments are sure to follow for the formulation of our posthumanist subjectivity. In this regard, this study offers an opportunity to study canonical and non-canonical fantasies produced in the same or following centuries within the theoretical framework of the posthumanities.

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APPENDIX 1. ORIGINALITY REPORT

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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Ph.D. DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Date: 29/06/2022

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Şafak Horzum
29.06.2022

Name Surname:	Şafak Horzum
Student No:	N15148547
Department:	English Language and Literature
Program:	English Language and Literature
Status:	☒ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alev Karaduman

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İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 29/06/2022

Tez Başlığı : "Erken İngiliz Fantezi Kurgusunda Posthüman Öznellikler: Jonathan Swift ve Lewis Carroll"

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 187 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 26/06/2022 tarihinde şahsım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 3'tür.

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Şafak Horzum
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DANIŞMAN ONAYI

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1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
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Şafak Horzum
29.06.2022

Name Surname:	Şafak Horzum
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Program:	English Language and Literature
Status:	☐ MA ☒ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

APPROVED.

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alev Karaduman

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