



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

**DRIVING FORCES BEHIND TURKEY'S MEDIATION EFFORTS:
TEHRAN DECLARATION**

İmdat ÖNER

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2014

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DECLARATION

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KABUL VE ONAY

İmdat Öner tarafından hazırlanan “Driving Forces Behind Turkey’s Mediation Efforts: Tehran Declaration” başlıklı bu çalışma, 09.11.2014 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak Kabul edilmiştir.



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
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To Tuba and Ali Kerem

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ÖZET

ÖNER, İmdat. Türkiye'nin Arabuluculuk Rolünde Sahip olduğu Motivasyonlar: Tahran Deklarasyonu Örneği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2014

Bu tezin amacı, Türkiye'nin Brezilya ile birlikte sonuçlandığı Tahran Deklarasyonu sürecinde izlediği arabuluculuk/kolaylaştırıcılık perspektifinden hareketle, Türk Dış Politikasında kaydadeğer şekilde artış gösteren ve dış politika aracı haline dönüşen arabuluculuk faaliyetlerinin altında yatan ana motivasyon kaynakları incelenmektedir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde giderek önemi artan arabuluculuk ve çatışma çözümü, devletlerin dış politika hedeflerine ulaşmak için kullandığı bir enstrümana dönüşmüştür. Söz konusu devletlerin, arabuluculuğu dış politika aracı olarak kullanmalarında hiç şüphesiz bazı motivasyonlar etkili olmaktadır. Bu motivasyonları genel olarak, ulusal çıkarların korunması, uluslararası arenada yumuşak güç gösterisi/uluslararası prestij arayışı ve dış politikada insani değerler ve etik sorumluluk taşıma şeklinde üç grupta toplamak mümkün görünmektedir. Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın odaklandığı temel araştırma sorusu ise şu şekilde ifade edilebilir: Türkiye'nin motivasyon kaynakları, uluslararası arenada arabuluculuğu dış politika aracı olarak kullanan arabulucu devletlerin sahip olduğu yukarıda sözü edilen motivasyon kaynakları ile örtüşmekte midir? Tezimizde, Tahran Deklarasyonu perspektifinden hareketle Türkiye'nin arabuluculuk çalışmalarının yukarıda bahsi geçen motivasyonlarla örtüştüğü sonucuna erişilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Arabuluculuk, Türkiye'nin Arabuluculuğu, Tahran Deklarasyonu, İran Nükleer Müzakereleri,

ABSTRACT

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The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the main motives behind the rising mediation efforts of Turkey as a policy tool of Turkish foreign policy. Mediation and conflict resolution in IR has transformed into an instrument for states to reach foreign policy aims. Particular motivations play influential roles in the efforts of those states that use the mediation as foreign policy tool. The main motives behind mediations can be categorized in three groups: saving national interest, presenting soft power and seeking international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral obligation in foreign policy. In this framework, the focus of this thesis is to understand that whether there is a similarity between the Turkey's main driving forces behind its peace efforts, particularly in Tehran Declaration, and the motivations seeking by profound mediator states. At the end, taking into consideration the Tehran Declaration, I have reached the conclusion that Turkey's main motivations are in line with other mediator's motivations.

Key Words: Mediation, Turkey's mediation, Tehran Declaration, Iran Nuclear Talks.

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INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts, ethnic and sectarian tensions or power struggles of various sorts within countries have come to the fore. Conflicts have important local, regional and global costs. To this end, easing tensions before they evolve into conflict or, if conflict breaks out, containing it while addressing the root causes has gained additional significance. In this framework, third party intervention and mediation studies which address their peaceful resolutions arise as important studies in international relations.

States who play leading role in international relations, attach utmost importance to the any conflicts in their regions as well as its beyond. In recent years, states aim at maximizing their potential benefits and minimizing its destructive consequences of conflicts. The resolution of those conflicts in a peaceful way is within the priorities of states. For this reason, playing a third party role in the conflicts present opportunities for those states intending to decrease the costs of crisis emerging in the region. The eagerness to solve the crisis via playing mediator role has turned into a part of states' foreign policies.

The incentives that foster states to use mediation as part of their foreign policy based on some driving motives. Reviewing the literature on motivations for mediator states, it can be found out that states show eagerness to be mediator in order to save their material interest in the conflict region, vow its peacemaker role and present soft power foreign policy to the international community as well as embrace humanitarian and moral dimension of peacemaker role. In the first chapter, those motivations will be elaborated in a detailed way by referring to the comprehensive debates.

This thesis will elaborate the main motivations of Turkey in its mediation efforts in the light of abovementioned framework. The research question of this thesis is:

- Which motivations that mediators pursue (interest oriented policy, seeking international prestige and pursuing a humanitarian obligation) led Turkey to get

involved in the mediation process of Iran's nuclear deal, in particular Tehran Declaration, signed by the facilitation of Turkey and Brazil?

Turkish foreign policy has gained political will to pursue peace attempts in the neighboring regions and beyond. Turkey has hosted the Middle Eastern, Eurasian and African leaders as well as high-level officials from conflict regions and tried to promote the positive climate for the solution of conflicts in various geographies. Turkey currently tries to focus on the differences between countries in conflict through confidence-building measures and by acting as a mediator and facilitator for the solutions to chronic regional problems. Ankara has started to use mediation tool more frequent in its foreign policy agenda in the last decade. Although it has considerable eagerness to mediate in a broad areas of crisis from Afghanistan to Palestine, from Sudan to Kyrgyzstan, Turkey's efforts have been addressed in a narrow studies so far. One of the latest peacemaker attempts of Turkey was Tehran Declaration in which Turkey is interested to be mediator between the international community and Iran. In this thesis, the period that Turkey has involved in the nuclear deal process of Iran between 2005 and 2011 will be analyzed.

The conflict and confrontation on Iran's nuclear programme between Iran and international community will be test case to understand Turkey's mediation motives. The reason of choosing the Iran's nuclear program and Tehran Declaration is that Iran's effort to develop its nuclear programme is one of the matters of concern for international community and Tehran Declaration is one of the considerable concrete results of Turkey's mediation efforts in recent years.

International community consider that Iran aims at producing a nuclear weapon through its program although Tehran denies it and claims it as a solely for peaceful purposes. The emergence of this conflict has led a concern in the region and affected negatively the countries located in the region. Turkey, one of the countries located in the region, has felt the negative consequences of instability in this geography. Therefore, Turkey has aimed at actively involving in the facilitation/mediation process of current dispute between Iran and the West.

The number of scholarly works on Turkish mediation is very limited despite its ever increasing popularity. Moreover, the issue of Turkish mediation efforts has not been dealt in detail in the previous studies and those studies are lack of a sound theoretical basis about the Turkey's main motivations. To this aim, this study aims at fulfilling a void by focusing on the main motivations of Turkey's mediation efforts. The study focusing a current international conflict, Iranian nuclear program, will contribute to the academic discussions through the main motivations behind Turkey's mediation efforts which has drawn the attention of the international community.

In the thesis, firstly, literature review and theoretical framework will be presented. Moreover, third party intervention and mediation concepts will be discussed. Following the concepts, it will be underlined that what the main motivations are behind mediation activities of leading mediators as a theoretical background. Furthermore, to enable a discussion of Turkey's role in Iranian nuclear crisis, in second chapter, a historical background and previous mediation efforts over the nuclear issue of Iran will be given. Third chapter presents the findings reached through the analysis of interviews and literature review on the Turkey's motivation during the facilitation process of Tehran Declaration.

The methodology of the thesis has been based on academic literature, official resources articles, documentaries, publications of the relevant international organizations and daily news as well as semi-structured interviews. Firstly, various forms of documentary information were analyzed which include academic articles, evaluations of the topic and the books written on the issue.

The secondary sources are the reports of the research institutions, the books of academicians and experts that were published recently on the subject, the news and commentaries of some newspapers, magazines and news agencies. Those sources have been analyzed in a detailed way.

In order to complement those sources, interviews were conducted with high level foreign policy makers of Turkey as well as leading academicians in this field. Interviews with 13 people including academicians and high level officials were held. The academicians are Fuat Keyman, Professor of International Relations at Sabancı University, Mehmet Akif Okur, an expert on Middle East and Iran at the Ankara Strategy Institute, Mehmet Özkan, expert on Iran and researcher at the SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research). The figures who have been conducted interviews are mostly keen on Iranian nuclear issue, particularly in Tehran declaration, as well as Turkish Foreign Policy.

The high-level officials have been selected with a systemic way to reach the right authorities who would give the necessary information and views about Turkey's motivation on Tehran Declaration. Interviews were held with officials who have followed the issue directly in Tehran and Ankara while the negotiations on Tehran Declaration have been continuing. Moreover, in the interviews, the target group includes officials who were directly involved in the decision making processes. The evaluations and reports of these leading figures mostly contributed to the decision-making process of Turkey in those times. An interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs' advisor, Prof. Mesut Ozcan who is at the center of decision-making of Turkish foreign policy, has been held.

Since there were some challenges during research to contact with the authorities of other states' officials, the officials were limited solely with Turkish diplomats. Firstly, there were some difficulties to reach the relevant persons that would help efficiently to hold interviews about Tehran Declaration. Secondly, because of the author of this thesis profession, as a Turkish diplomat, the officials who have taken active roles in the process can hide necessary information or manipulate some realities. These drawbacks led to hold interviews with merely Turkish officials.

The semi-structured interview format has been used to give the interviewees an open channel to explain the issue better. Some questions on the issue enclosed in Annex were prepared to understand the main motivations of Turkey in the mediation process. While

preparing those questions, it has been tried to focus on main debates on the issue. The literature review on Iranian nuclear issue and Turkey's approach helped to select the main questions. These semi-structural interviews provided opportunity to open discussion.

In the next chapter, the literature review will be provided and tried to be explained main theoretical framework of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AND MEDIATION

Conflict has been a common part of relations among persons, groups or states throughout the human experience. Bercovitch and Houston assert that conflict is one of the most pervasive - and inevitable- features of all social systems, simple or complex they may be and irrespective of their location in time and space.¹ All interactions which keep opposite sides involve the risk of conflict and crisis. Conflict as part of all social systems takes its place in the international relations as well. In international relations, conflict has never been diminished or disappeared between nation-states or within states.

International actors have intervened somehow to those conflicts by taking one or more of three possible actions: unilateral, bilateral, or third-party interventions.² The unilateral mode includes an attempt to win over the opponent through violent struggle or it may involve withdrawal or avoidance. The bilateral mode offers some form of bargaining and compromise. This type mostly focuses on the negotiations between two opposite sides to bring an end to disagreement. Lastly, the third-party mode argues the intervention of a third party not directly taking part in the conflict to prevent or reduce the tensions between parties in a way.

Indeed, third party interventions find expression in all societies and all human interactions in past and present. When the persons, groups or states are unable to resolve

¹ Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, *Journal of Peace Research*, 1996 p. 23; and "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," by Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston. Bercovitch J and DeBrouen K. 2004 "Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process. *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004 p. 147-170 - Bercovitch J. 2004. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict, Beyond Intractability," Eds. Guy Burgess, Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted 2004. p. 23

² Ronald J. Fisher. "Methods of Third-Party Intervention." *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. 2002 p. 35

their conflict, the intervention of a third party is a possible way out to break the impasse. In this chapter as well as in this thesis, third party and conflicting parties concern the “states” who are the main players in international relations.

Whereas mediation is considered as an extension of the negotiation process whereby an acceptable third party intervenes to change the outcome of a particular conflict; the third party, with no decision making authority is there to assist the disputants in their search for a mutually acceptable agreement. I will explain herewith the third party intervention and then move to mediation theory in a detailed way.

1.1.1 THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

Third-party involvement or intervention is a form of conflict management with the purpose of finding, proposing, negotiating or enforcing a settlement to a conflict.³ Third parties who are not a party to the conflict may reduce tensions between disputant parties. According to Fisher, third parties may play a facilitative and diagnostic role, helping conflicting parties to understand their problem more clearly and assisting them in their efforts to construct agreements or restructure their relationship.⁴ Third parties according to Young are actors which become significantly involved in a conflict without total identification with either of the parties.⁵ According to Sandole, a third party intervention is an attempt to facilitate processes leading to quite different, albeit potentially interrelated outcomes.⁶ In short, third party involvement can be regarded as a strategy to encourage or impose an agreement that conflicting parties are unable to do by themselves.

Third party intervention can take different forms like following: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping. Bercovitch claims that "The more traditional ways are listed in Article 33 of the United

³ Patrick M. Regan, "Third Party Intervention and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 46, No. 1, February 2002 p. 46

⁴ Ronald J. Fisher, "Third party consultation as a method of conflict resolution: A review of studies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27. p. 301-334.

⁵ Young Oran, *The Intermediaries: Third parties in international crises*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967 p. 65

⁶ Daniel Druckman and Sandra Cheldelin, Fast, L.; and Clements, Kevin (Eds.), *Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention*, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 49

Nations Charter, which enumerates such peaceful methods as negotiation, consultation, mediation, facilitation/conciliation and arbitration.”⁷

Bercovitch defines some of those peaceful methods as:

1. ‘Facilitation / Conciliation’: the mediator holds a less active role than in mediation, basically trying to lead the conflicting parties to starting direct negotiations.⁸
2. ‘Consultation’: incorporates problem solving "through communication and analysis" by facilitative means by a third party.⁹
3. ‘Arbitration’ is unlike mediation and it has "non-coercive" and "inherently political" character,¹⁰ this method uses judicial procedures and ends with the return of a verdict by the third party the conflicting parties have to accept.¹¹
4. ‘Power mediation’: a strategy builds on the functions of mediation and it involves a third party using coercion or some kind of leverage during the mediation process.¹²

Fisher and Keashly present a categorization of third-party interventions, which is composed of the following six processes: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping.¹³ Each of these types has its own characteristics and each may be appropriate to different conflicts. Fisher and Keashly developed a classification of primary methods of intervention and produced a six-fold typology.

1. Conciliation: the third-party provides an informal communication line between parties to identify the issues, decreasing tension and promoting direct interaction, usually in the form of negotiation.
2. Consultation: the third-party facilitates creative problem-solving through communication and analysis.

⁷ Jacob Bercovitch. "Mediation and International Conflict Resolution: *Analyzing Structure and Behaviour*" in D. Sandole, ed. *The Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. 2009, p. 25

⁸ Jacob Bercovitch. "Mediation and International Conflict Resolution: *Analyzing Structure and Behaviour*" in D. Sandole, op. cit. p. 41.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. p.43

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ronald J. Fisher, "Third party consultation as a method of conflict resolution: A review of studies." op. cit., p.7.

3. Pure Mediation: the third-party facilitates a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information, and the suggestion of alternatives.
4. Power Mediation: includes pure mediation and use leverage or coercion in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments. It may also engage the third-party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement.
5. Arbitration: the third-party renders a binding judgment arrived through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing positions and then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just.
6. Peacekeeping: the third-party makes available military personnel to monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between disputants, and may also conduct humanitarian activities designed to restore normalcy.

In this thesis, Turkey's mediator role can be classified as "pure mediator" in the negotiation process in Iran's nuclear deal. During the negotiation process, reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information, and the suggestion of alternatives were Turkey's main instruments rather than coercion and leverages.

This part of the thesis provides a theoretical perspective of the mediation as a part of third party intervention in the peace processes.

1.1.2 MEDIATION

Mediation, one of the third party interventions aiming at resolving crisis or reducing tensions, takes more its place in international field and attracts attention among academicians and foreign policy makers. The reason of choosing mediation is the fact that international community is more prone to the mediation having a peaceful nature and states use mediation as a foreign policy instrument.¹⁴ Merrills points out that "the settlement of disputes is a basic institutional objective and as a result the Secretary-General and his regional counterparts are often engaged in providing good offices and mediation. In certain situations non-governmental organizations can act as mediators."¹⁵

¹⁴ Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy" *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4. 2003, p. 92

¹⁵ J. G Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement* 5th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 54

According to Bercovitch and Fretter, mediation has proved to be the most popular form of contemporary conflict resolution, present in nearly 60 percent of international disputes between states while nearly half of all post-Cold War crises were mediated by third parties.¹⁶ Academic works show that mediation is the most commonly used technique of intervention in interstate disputes, accounting for more than one-fifth of all third-party actions between the end of World War II and the turn of the century.¹⁷

To understand mediation better, we need to know the concepts, context and the parties. In this part, I will try to explore mediation and its dimensions within the current debates.

1.1.2.1 The Definition of Mediation

Mediation field is an interdisciplinary study which attracts attentions in psychology, political science, law and international relations. Therefore, there is no one single universally accepted definition of mediation. Mediation is described as a political process in which conflicting parties agree to accept one or more third actors who are not party to the conflict, who enjoy the trust of the disputants, and who are considered potentially supportive in overcoming the deadlock triggered by a stalemate in the conflict.¹⁸ It is one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution and has been used extensively worldwide by different groups such as individuals, states and NGOs to bring about durable peaceful resolution to the conflicts.

While definitions and approaches to mediation vary, it is the intervention of a third party in the dispute of two or more parties, for the purpose of improving the nature of interaction between the disputants.¹⁹ Oran Young offers a definition of mediation as “any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself.”²⁰ On the other hand,

¹⁶ Jacob Bercovitch and J. Fretter. *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003*. Washington, D.C.:CQ Press, 2004. p. 48

¹⁷ Frazier Derrick V. and William J. Dixon. “Third-party intermediaries and negotiated settlements, 1946-2000”. *International Interactions* 32(4) 2005 p. 385-408.

¹⁸ Hans J. Giessmann and Wils Oliver, “Conflict Parties’ Interests in Mediation,” *Berghof Policy Brief*, No. 1. (Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, September 2009), p. 6-7

¹⁹Kressel, K., and D. Pruitt. *Mediation Research*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1989 p. 187

²⁰ Young Oran. “The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises.” Princeton, NJ: 1967. Princeton

Skjelsbaek emphasizes not only its role in fostering agreement between disputing parties, but also in reducing conflict between them by describing mediation as "efforts by third parties to prevent the eruption or escalation of destructive conflict behavior and to facilitate a settlement which makes renewed destructive behavior unlikely."²¹ According to Bercovitch, IR considers mediation as a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group or state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking authority of law.²²

Mediation differs from other forms of third party interventions in some ways. Firstly, unlike military intervention, which involves force to help one side win or economic sanctions, which encourage peace through limiting financial interactions, mediation must be voluntarily acceptable to both disputants.²³ Secondly, unlike arbitration which presents a binding form of third-party interventions, mediation does not require an advance commitment to accept an outcome.²⁴ Thirdly, as Bercovitch claim the intertwining of the parties' interests, the mediators' interests, and the overall interest of changing the course of outcome of a conflict is one of the unique features of mediation.²⁵

There is a need for a climate that would lead the mediation to emerge. Bercovitch claims that mediation is likely to occur when (1) a conflict has gone on for some time, (2) the efforts of the individuals or actors involved have reached an impasse, (3) neither actor is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute, and (4) both parties welcome some form of mediation and are ready to engage in direct or indirect dialogue.²⁶ According to Beardsley, for mediation to occur, three conditions must be

University Press. p. 47

²¹ Kjell Skjelsbaek. 1991. "The UN Secretary- General and the Mediation of International Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1) p. 104

²² Jacob Bercovitch, "The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations." *In Mediation in international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management*, edited by Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, New York: St. Martin's, 1992. p. 1-29.

²³ Beardsley C., Quinn D., Biswas B. and Wilkenfeld J., "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2006): p. 58-86

²⁴ Gent S and Shannon M. "The effectiveness of international arbitration and adjudication: Getting into a bind." *Journal of Politics* 72(2) (2010) 366-380.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 370

²⁶ Jacob Bercovitch. "The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations." op. cit., p.45

met: (1) the disputants must agree to work with a mediator; (2) the disputants must find a mutually acceptable third party; and (3) the third party must be willing to become involved in the conflict.²⁷ Mediation with its voluntary and non-binding nature aims to bring an end to conflicts posed by ethnic, regional and international reasons.

1.1.2.2 History of Mediation

Mediation as an interdisciplinary study has found its place in early history. Fisher claims that religious leaders, community elders, and at times, special intermediaries have all played the role of mediator in their various efforts to deal with potentially destructive disputes in their respective collectivities in history.²⁸ According to Melin, the first recorded mediation efforts occurred in 209 B.C., when Greek city-states helped the Aetolian League and Macedonia produce a truce in the first Macedonian war.²⁹ Moreover, Bercovitch points out that mediation goes back to the very back in history and give example of reference from Bible (ca. 2000 BC) and Homer's Iliad (ca. 750 BC) and Sophocles' Ajax (ca. 500 BC), Ancient China, Greek city-states as well as Renaissance diplomacy.³⁰ Princen asserts that mediation examples can be seen in history in nineteenth century, Great Britain and Russia at various time facilitated discussions between Persia and Ottoman Empire by attempting to impose a solution on the parties.³¹ Susskind and Babbitt consider that mediation method examples have been observed since 1945, attempted in two thirds of the conflicts among the nations of Africa and Latin America and 80 percent of the conflicts in the Middle East.³² Gulliver asserts that the practice of settling disputes through intermediaries has had a rich history in all cultures, both Western and non-Western.³³ Mediation is an effective mechanism

²⁷ Kyle Beardsley. *The Mediation Dilemma*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2011. p. 35

²⁸ Ronald J. Fisher. "Methods of Third-Party Intervention." *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. 2000. p. 86

²⁹ Molly M. Melin "When States Mediate." *Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs* 2(1) 2013. p. 78-90

³⁰ Jacob Bercovitch. "The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations." op. cit., p.56

³¹ Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 18.

³² Lawrence Susskind and Eileen Babbitt. "Overcoming the obstacles to effective mediation in international disputes". In *Mediation in international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management*, edited by J. Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin, 1992 p. 30-51.

³³ Philip Gulliver, *Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York: Academic Press,

for the settlement of international dispute and is recognized as such by international law. The 1856 Declaration of Paris was one of the early international agreements that encouraged member States to settle their maritime disputes by mediation. The Second Hague Conference of 1907 recognized the right of neutral states to acts as mediators in international disputes.³⁴

The United States for example served as mediator between Bolivia and Chile in 1882 and between Russia and Japan in 1905. The UN served, though unsuccessfully, as a mediator in the dispute between Israel and Palestine in 1948. In 1966, the Soviet Union mediated the border clashes between India and China. The UN Secretary-General has resolved some other international disputes, like for example the dispute between Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian, through mediation.³⁵

Mediation has become more popular following the end of Cold War when states have started to pursue more freely foreign policy. Kleiboer suggested that international mediation became an important topic after the end of the Cold War in the field of international relations due to its refreshed visibility in that era.³⁶ Zartman and Touval also claimed that the collapse of bipolarity has discharged states from the kind of limits previously imposed by superpower rivalry and allowed them to engage in mediation more freely.³⁷

Bercovitch claims "The challenges of the post-Cold War era, with its increased risks and uncertainty, the change to many of the accepted rules of the game, and the proliferation of intense ethnic and other identity-based conflicts and non-traditional security threats, will no doubt require us to resort to mediation even more often than we

1979), p. 30-31

³⁴Frank Dodd, 'The Work of the Second Hague Conference', *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Feb., 1978), p. 294-303

³⁵Richard Neil. "A Mediator's Mission". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring, 1991. p. 119-121

³⁶Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 1996. Vol: 40 No:2, p. 360-390

³⁷William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post Cold War Era" in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, p. 445-61.

have in the past. Mediation may well be the closest thing we have to an effective method for dealing with conflicts in the twenty-first century."³⁸

The UN Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 recognized the positive contribution of mediation.³⁹ Therefore, in order to strengthening its mediation capacity, the UN established the Mediation Support Unit of its Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA).⁴⁰ In this direction, The Group of Friends of Mediation, which is co-chaired by Finland and Turkey, has been established under the framework of UN. It aims to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to generate support for the development of mediation. The group currently consists of 40 member states, the United Nations and seven regional organizations and other international organizations.

In sum, mediation history goes back to the early history; however, its popularity is higher than ever. International community attaches more importance to mediation because of its peaceful nature. Moreover, mediation gains an institutional structure under the UN framework.

1.1.2.3 Motives for Mediators

Maintaining international peace and security that international community seeks to succeed is key goal for mediation. States or other actors devoting their efforts for mediation, seeks different advantages. The desire to make peace and realize their own self-interest is the primary motivation for states. According to Zartman, states are motivated by both defensive and offensive interests considering the mediator role.⁴¹ Defensive interests include promoting international stability and protecting the mediating nation's foreign interests. States have a tendency to mediate to prevent rival powers from intervening in conflict and expanding their influence over region or

³⁸ Bercovitch Jacob, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays*. London; N.Y.C.: Routledge, 2011. p. 66

³⁹United Nations. *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004.

⁴⁰Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses to the Fifth Committee on the 2008-2009 Budget, 25 October 2007 see: <http://http.www.un.org/Depts/dpa/peace.html>

⁴¹ Saadia Touval and William Zartman, "Mediation in international conflicts"op. cit, p. 124

conflicting states. When states are motivated by defensive interests, mediators often have expectations in achieving particular outcomes, like increasing its influence, resources and power.⁴²

On the other hand, taking into consideration the offensive interest, states mediate conflicts in order to extend and increase their own influence. Successful mediation can lead states to take the gratitude of other nations.⁴³ States are eager to gain a prestigious position as the outcome of their foreign policies. They may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict or by gaining the gratitude (and presumably the political goodwill) of one.⁴⁴

Mediators engage in mediation and expand resources because they expect to resolve a conflict and gain something from it. For many actors, mediation is a policy instrument through which they can pursue some of their interests without arousing too much opposition.⁴⁵

Princen brings another debate to the relations between the interest and mediation. According to Princen, mediator can be a "neutral" or "principal" mediator depending on its interests.⁴⁶ Mediators have their own interests, directly or indirectly. In some conflicts, mediator may have direct interests, whereas in others mediators have indirect interests. In addition, while principal mediators have interests in the disputed issues and can bring resources to the dispute settlement process; neutral mediators neither have an interest in the outcome of the dispute nor have the resources that can be used to offer inducements.⁴⁷

If a third party has no direct or indirect interests in a conflict, then it can be called as "neutral mediator". The neutral mediator wants to see an agreement reached or a peace

⁴² Ibid p. 127.

⁴³ Ibid p. 128.

⁴⁴ Jacob Bercovitch, ed, "*Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation.*" London: Lynne Rienner, 1996. p.145

⁴⁵ Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy" op. cit. p. 92

⁴⁶ Thomas Princen. op. cit. p. 19.

⁴⁷ Meliha Altunışık & Esra Çuhadar, "Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2010, s. 378

achieved. It can carry messages, set up private meetings or conduct training sessions. In all these activities, it influences the interactions between disputants and affects the settlement of dispute. On the other hand, if the party has indirect interest, it can be called as "principal mediator". According to Princen, principal mediator can bring resources to bear and use its bargaining power offering positive and negative incentives where necessary.⁴⁸

In sum, principal mediators have interests in the conflicts and can bring resources to the dispute settlement; whereas neutral mediators neither have an interest in the outcome of the dispute nor have the resources that can be used to offer inducements. To protect its national interest and gain a prestigious position may be given an example for rewards and motivators of Turkey in Tehran Declaration case. The motivations for mediators will be addressed in a detailed way in next section to explain Turkey's main motivations behind its mediation efforts.

1.1.2.4 Power of the Mediator

Power in mediation literature is linked with leverage which is ability to make an impact on a conflict. The leverages of mediator are known as money, status, expertise, access and prestige.⁴⁹ Mediator's power comes from its reputation and authority as well as its reward and punishments for the disputants.⁵⁰ A powerful mediator is seen as one who has political, military and economic resources. Third parties try to influence the parties and use persuasion as a tool to find an agreement. They can also alter the power balance and affect the behavior of the parties through using incentives and punishments. This kind of strategy might create badly designed agreements that are likely to fail.⁵¹ Those powers are also called as carrots (rewards and incentives) and sticks (punishment and ultimatums).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹Jacob Bercovitch, "Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation."op. cit. p. 54

⁵⁰Dean Pruitt & Peter Carnevale. Negotiation in social conflict. Buckingham, England: Open University Press. 1993. p. 32

⁵¹ [William Zartman](#). "The dynamics of escalation and negotiation, In *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts*", I.W. Zartman, G.O. Faure (eds) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2005. p. 3-20

Zartman and Touval consider that mediators have five sources of leverage. First and most common is persuasion, the ability to revise parties' perceptions of the risks and costs of conflict and the feasibility and desirability of settlement. Second is the ability to extract an attractive proposal out of each side in negotiations. Third, mediators may threaten to withdraw from negotiations. Such threats assume that the parties still believe that mediated negotiations offer the best likelihood of the most favorable outcome. Fourth, mediators may use sanctions to worsen one or both parties' situation, and so to increase their motivation to settle. And finally, where relevant resources are available, the mediator may offer incentives to one or both sides.⁵²

Turkey and Brazils has used the persuasion in the conflict between Iran and the West on the nuclear program by asserting the costs of conflict and the way outs to tension. While the West tried to use sanctions and punishments to stop Iran, Brazil and Turkey attached importance to some leverage that would lead Iran to come to negotiation table. This will be analyzed in a detailed way in the Second Chapter.

In next section, the core theoretical framework is presented that mediation is carried out by states as a part of their foreign policy.

⁵²Saadia Touval and [William Zartman](#), "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era" op. cit. p, 447.

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIATION AS PART OF FOREIGN POLICY

The current debate in conflict resolution as well as mediation presents a new opportunity to integrate them with IR study as part of it. Nimet Beriker introduced a new framework and a model for articulating the foreign policy behavior of international actors and the analytical and practical tools that the conflict resolution field and peace studies traditions offer.⁵³ According to Beriker, the field of conflict resolution together with its neighbouring fields, the peace studies and diplomacy fields, could provide concrete tools for daily formulation and execution of liberal foreign policy in which cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes involve. Facilitative mediation as part of third party role in which actor mediates with the aim of helping parties to find their own solutions is presented as a sample of liberal foreign policy tool to end the conflicts.

⁵⁴

Moreover, having focused more on the relation of mediation and international politics, Touval claims that "Considering that within the mediation is foreign policy perspective, mediation serves as a means toward achieving certain primary foreign policy goals, the transformations of goals and means merits examination".⁵⁵ He approaches to mediation as part of foreign policy rather than mere study within the context of international politics. Touval's approach to mediation as part of foreign policy which leads experts to bring the debate from a limited perspective of techniques in influencing dynamics to the broader framework of strategic action within the international domestic political systems.⁵⁶

Taking a closer look at the literature on mediation and foreign policy, the number of study rises in the subject in recent years.⁵⁷ In the said studies, the mediation is considered as part of states' foreign policies that Touval claims.

⁵³ Nimet Beriker. Conflict resolution: the missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice, in: J.D. Sandole, S.Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste&J. Senehi (Eds)Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (New York: Routledge) 2008. p. 23-45

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Saadia Touval. "Mediation and Foreign Policy" op. cit. p. 92

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 93

⁵⁷ See the "Qatar's foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism", Lina Khatib, "International Peace Mediation: a new crossroads for the European Union", Antje Herrberg, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy",

In this part, it will be pointed out main motives for the states while mediating as an extension of foreign policy. Having looked for the literature review, it can be reached that states have tendencies to be mediator in conflicts due to three leading motivations in overall in line with their foreign policy. National interest as very part of foreign policy is one of them that motivate states to play mediator role. Introducing their soft powers to the world and aiming to hold an international prestige through peace efforts is another source of motivation for states. Lastly, the pursuit of humanitarian and moral values in foreign policy encourages states to embrace mediator role in today's world. Those motivations will be explained in the framework of literature review.

1.2.1 Material Interest Oriented Mediation

Mediation as an independent activity simply focuses on how the mediator influences the relationship between the disputants and how it ends with. Through the alternative conceptualization of Touval which sees the mediation as part of foreign policy, the ultimate aims and main motivations of states to mediate in a conflict comes forefront. Therefore, the effectiveness of mediation is not limited to ending the conflict, but, it is related to the extent to which the mediator satisfies the foreign policy objectives which motivated it to adopt such a role.⁵⁸ The foreign policy objectives might be the expansion of the mediator's geographical influence, securing its region and the advancement of the world order. To this end, mediator does not only aim to bring an end to conflict, it also intends to reach its foreign policy goals by intervening into conflict.

In this mindset, for mediator states the effectiveness can be assessed as a secondary consideration, subordinate to the mediating state's primary domestic and foreign policy concerns and its interests. Touval asserts that if we view mediation as part of foreign policy, then mediator's choices of strategies and tactics are assumed to derive from the mediator's primary political goals, both domestic and international.⁵⁹ The interests of states lead them to choose right strategies following during the mediation process.

Mehran Kamrava

⁵⁸ Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy" op. cit. p. 92

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Mitchell elaborated motives for mediators with the rewards: rewards they receive from involvement and the costs incurred from getting involved in a particular manner or not getting involved at all.⁶⁰ The rewards a mediator receive can be in four arenas: rewards from affecting the conflict itself, rewards from affecting the regional environment, rewards from affecting other third parties involved in the conflict, and rewards from affecting one's own constituency.⁶¹

According to Mitchell, mediator's interests are the rewards that can be classified into 5 categories: Material, influence, support, security and status or reputational rewards.⁶²

- *Material rewards* involve increase of previous transfers of goods and resources between other parties and the intermediary, or the denial of goods and resources to others.

- *Influence rewards*, which can include tangible benefits, such as base rights, rights to information or of passage, and less tangible goods such as promises of future support, greater wishes of the intermediary, a decline in reliance upon a rival of the intermediary and greater openness to the goods, information and personnel of the intermediary. In short, it is greater interdependence between the intermediary and the other party.

- *Support rewards*, if influence rewards involve an increase in the intermediary's ability to have an effect on other party, rewards of increased support involve a benefit that takes the form of active help, and approval for the future actions of the intermediary.

- *Security rewards* are the intermediary's ability to eliminate the overt conflict via settlement agreement. The achievement of local peace and stability, plus an enhanced perception of security, is often a benefit that arises unambiguously from playing the intermediary role

- *Status or reputational rewards* which take place after a successful mediation and bring expectation that the intermediaries naturally take up the mediator's role.⁶³

⁶⁰ Christopher Mitchell. "*The Motives for Mediation*" in C. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), *New Approaches to International Mediation*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1988, p. 29-30. Christopher Mitchell, Op. Cit. p. 29

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 37

⁶² Christopher Mitchell, Op. Cit. p. 29

⁶³ Ibid.

Touval claims that large states often create the opportunity to mediate and use the mediation as a vehicle to protect or promote their own interests.⁶⁴ He gives the example of US mediation attempt between Israel and Egypt in Cold War period. He asserts that:

*"The mediation derived from a broad perspective of international politics and US strategies in combating the Soviet Union. Among the interesting questions that this case raises is the choice of mediation as a means for removing the Soviets. It also suggests that in evaluating the outcome of the initiative it is appropriate to ask not only whether it helped to end the Egyptian-Israeli war, but also whether the mediation contributed to ending the Soviet military presence in Egypt."*⁶⁵

Considering those foreign policy goals, states aim at reaching material interest like security and stability.

Bercovitch agrees with Touval and argues that interest usually intertwines with other, less altruistic, motivations. He asserts that the official representative of a mediator state may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict or by gaining the gratitude and presumably the political goodwill of one or both protagonists. (e.g., the frequent efforts by the United States to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict)⁶⁶

Touval and Zartman claim that mediation by small and medium-sized powers is also motivated by self-interest.⁶⁷ Such concerns and interests include the possibility that a conflict may spill over into the mediator's territory; the attempt to promote norms that tend to enhance the mediator's own security. Small and medium-sized power states which have less leverage and inducements may use mediation to intervene to the conflicts in order to protect their interest.

In the literature, the interest oriented mediators are introduced that states are motivated for mediation to realize their foreign policy goal rather than merely altruism. Lina

⁶⁴ Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy" op. cit. p. 92

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Bercovitch, J. "Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation.", op. cit. p. 59

⁶⁷ Touval, S. and I. W. Zartman. op. cit. p. 41.

Khatib gives an example that “Qatar's mediation in near abroad is derived from the motivation of the maintenance of its own security and stability, countering Iranian influence in the Middle East, in particular in the Gulf and desire to expand its influence as a regional player, particularly vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.”⁶⁸

Another striking example of interest oriented mediation is the efforts of Saudi Arabia. Kamrava claims that one of the ways to ensure the Saudi Arabia's involvement and centrality to regional issues is mediation. According to him, mediation is the best strategy to address the Kingdom's security concerns. Saudi mediation is motivated by the dynamics such as balancing various regional security options and enhancing both the international and the domestic legitimacy of the Kingdom's leadership.⁶⁹

Third parties pursuing a mediator role gain various benefits from mediating. As Princen argues that principal mediators with interests at stake in the conflict can benefit from striking their own deals with the disputants. By shaping the distribution of the issues or goods in dispute, they improve their utilities. Many third parties also simply benefit from peace, especially if the conflict produces negative externalities that others in the region and international community must bear.⁷⁰

As a conclusion, mediation in foreign policy is a rational and preferable tool for states to fulfill their foreign policy interests. Although the interests and expectations of mediators vary, the ultimate motivation of states to be mediator is to reach their foreign policy interests.

1.2.2 Mediation for Soft power and International Prestige

Apart from interest oriented mediation, states may attach importance to mediation so that they can carry out their soft power foreign policy through the mediation. Mediation aiming at seeking to decrease tensions is indeed a proper tool for soft power of states. The increasing importance of soft power in today's international scene motivates states

⁶⁸ Lina Khatib. "Qatar's foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism" *International Affairs*, Vol. 89 no. 2, March 2013 p. 417-431.

⁶⁹ Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy". *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (2013): 1-19. Elsevier Ltd. Web. 18 Sept. 2013. Vol. 57, N^o 1. p. 26

⁷⁰ Princen, T. op.cit. p. 32

to focus more on mediation. Furthermore, mediation provides a prestigious status to states as peace promoter. Mediation efforts can bring benefits to individual states by allowing them to develop international reputations as "good citizens" who are able to stand above realpolitik calculations and step in to bring peace to conflict zones.⁷¹ Mediation can help constitute a positive image which serves to its soft power before the international community.

The concept of "soft power", which Joseph Nye introduced in the 1980s, refers that alternative power frameworks involves in international relations differing from economic and military power. According to Nye, there are three ways to achieve one's goal: threatening the other party and going to war if necessary; "buying out" the other party; and persuading the other party through the use of "soft power." Soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments."⁷² The credibility of state and the ability to persuade others form the core of soft power. These elements also provide legitimacy to the use of power which differs from coercion and military tools. Soft power is one of the prominent tools of liberal international relations theory offering set of tools namely multilateralism, economic interdependence, relative gains and democratic peace.

Mediation which foresees the peaceful settlement of dispute is a significant example of soft power which would be pursued by states in their foreign policies. Mediation arises as one of the central tools for enhancing states' soft power and global image. States aim at increasing its prestige and global image in world politics through mediation by intervening unresolved conflicts.

The mediator provides a framework and facilitates the solutions, but there is no substantial suggestion or binding result. This 'soft' character of mediation could help the 'soft power' of the states on the world stage. Diplomatic practices that emphasize

⁷¹ Michael Greig & Paul F. Diehl. *International Mediation*. Cambridge: Polity. 2012. p. 143

⁷² Joseph S Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004. p. 65

ideals and utilize soft power have become more prominent due to the need for political legitimacy.⁷³

According to Zartman, mediation is also a suitable foreign policy tool for medium scaled states and small states that lack other foreign policy tools and mechanisms.⁷⁴ According to Zartman and Touval, small and medium sized power may also wish to enhance their influence and prestige through mediation. Mediation's soft character serve as a policy tool for even small and medium scaled states.⁷⁵ For example, while Norway has limited hard power capability in international relations, it relies on its ability to facilitate dialog between conflicting parties and mobilize international support for peaceful settlements of conflicts. The Norwegian approach can be summarized as 'the soft power of a small nation'.⁷⁶

On the other hand, trying to create a common foreign policy, EU aims at utilizing mediation as part of soft power of its foreign policy. Antje Herrberg claims that "working towards realizing the soft power potential of the EU as a civilian actor in this field, requires a full, and not a superficial understanding about the enormous value added that a structured, systematic approach in mediation could bring."⁷⁷ She also points out that the use of this 'soft' instrument in an adequate and systematic fashion could indeed add weight to the 'soft' power of the EU on the world stage.

In the light of foregoing, "soft" character of mediation helps the soft power of states in which its importance gradually increases in the eyes of international community. States may prefer to involve in conflicts as mediators to develop and introduce their soft power mechanisms and acquire their international prestige as peacemakers.

⁷³ Kristian Stokke, "The Soft Power of a Small State. Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices of Norway's Peace Engagement", Forthcoming in the PCD Journal. 2010. p. 23

⁷⁴ William Zartman, *Negotiations as a Mechanism for Resolution in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1999. p. 76

⁷⁵ Saadia Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) p. 445-461.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Antje Herrberg, op.cit.p,5

1.2.3 Mediation as Moral Obligation

In addition to other aspects of it, mediation has also a moral and humanitarian dimension apart from other types of foreign policy tool. Bearing in mind this feature, some of the mediators attempt to mediate who have a humanitarian goal which includes mere altruism to stop the bloody war or end unresolved conflicts. According to Bercovitch, a desire to prevent escalation of a conflict, limit its potential for expansion, and promote peace can be important motivating forces for mediation.⁷⁸ Third party mediator sees the ongoing conflicts and tensions as a source of humanitarian concern required to intervene by a party form outside.

Third party conflict management efforts to help mitigate and stop an ongoing conflict are often seen as altruistically motivated.⁷⁹ According to Touval, the public as well as the officials engaged in mediation perceive the activity as a moral obligation.⁸⁰ He also touches upon the peacemaking features of mediation and consider that the peacemaking is morally desirable. His assumption contributes to the morality and ethics discussion in foreign policy making.

In recent years, the debates on the ethics and moral values have taken much place in foreign policy literature which raises questions to the low profile of ethics in foreign policy makings of nation states. The interest in ethics and its relationship to foreign policy is clearly growing in the world.⁸¹ Michael Hammer makes a definition for ethical foreign policy that - in the sense of a policy which defines the principles and practice of international relations based on the respect for human rights, international obligations, transparency and accountability - encompasses a whole range of areas of activity in which the state is involved internationally.⁸² He also emphasizes that in addition to the efforts needed to rebuild trust and strengthen international frameworks to secure the

⁷⁸Jacob Bercovitch,. 2002. "Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context." *In Studies in International Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 3-24.

⁷⁹Greig J. Michael & Diehl Paul F. *International Mediation*. Cambridge: 2012 p.248–263

⁸⁰Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy" op. cit. p. 95

⁸¹Gelb Leslie H. and Rosenthal Justine A., 'The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus', *Foreign Affairs*. 2003. p. 45

⁸² Hammer, M., 'Democracies and armed conflict: towards defining an ethical foreign policy', Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, Review 33, <http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts33/hammer.htm> p. 76

realization of rights and responsibilities, states need to develop processes of policy making and oversight to help ensure that external policy is based on ethical principles.⁸³

Even in large states, the ethic and moral concern has been a crucial matter to legitimate their foreign policies. Those states give more importance to moral and ethic values while keeping their self-interest as well. Morality, values, ethics, universal principles - the whole panoply of ideals in international affairs that were once almost the exclusive domain of preachers and scholars - have taken root in the hearts, or at least the minds, of the foreign policy.⁸⁴

The rise of moral and ethic norms in foreign policy is a sign of a change in international relations. MacDonald and Patman point out that:

*"While moral concerns have rarely been the main driving force of foreign policy making, the broadening of horizons during the past two decades through the end of the Cold War and deepening globalization have begun to erode the conventional wisdom that there is a stark juxtaposition between ethics and interests. Moreover, if this trend continues, it raises the possibility that elements of morality and interests may converge in a re-defined concept of national interest in the new world of the twenty-first century."*⁸⁵

Elazar Barkan also contributed to discussion in *The Guilt of Nations*:

*"No longer does the brute and immediate existential need for security form the sole legitimate justification or motive in formulating foreign policy. Instead, opposition to genocide, support for human rights, and the fear of being implicated in crimes against humanity (even by inaction) have become practical, not merely lofty, ideals. These ideals increasingly shape political decisions and the international scene."*⁸⁶

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, op. cit. p. 35

⁸⁵ David B. MacDonald, Patman Robert G., and Betty Mason-Parker (eds) *The Ethics of Foreign Policy* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. p. 79

⁸⁶ Barkan Elazar, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices*. New York, 2000. p. I,

For states, the responsibility to look after the peace and well-being of world emerges as the part of moral foreign policy. To this end, states try to intervene the conflicts and instabilities with moral foreign policy understanding. While moral norms and ethics have increasingly filled the gap in international relations, mediation carrying a moral aspect is able to add a positive value to the ethical dimension of foreign policies of states. Turkey, assert its peace efforts in the context of humanitarian foreign policy,⁸⁷ can be given an influential example. The decision-makers of Turkey define its role addressing solutions to the crisis its region as an extension of its humanitarian foreign policy.⁸⁸ Therefore, humanitarian and moral obligation can be source of motivation for state to seek for mediator role.

Taking these points into consideration, mediation as a foreign policy tool serve to fulfill their interest, contribute to soft power and international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral foreign policies of states. States who attempt to mediate can act with one or more than one of those motives. In third chapter, I'll analyze Turkey's peace efforts in Iran's nuclear program from the aspects of these motivations.

⁸⁷Ahmet Davutoğlu. "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects" *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 2013, 41:6, p. 867

⁸⁸ Ibid.

2. CHAPTER 2

NEGOTIATIONS/MEDIATIONS ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND TURKEY'S ROLE

Iran's nuclear program has turned into an international issue and attracted the attention of international community. Iran's uranium enrichment activities led international concerns after it was revealed in 2002-2003 that it did not declare some of its nuclear facilities as part of its obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The core of the problem with its nuclear program is Tehran's insistence on continuing with enriching uranium without allowing enhanced safeguards that would help the IAEA verify its compliance with the Treaty. Uranium enrichment is a critical technology that could allow Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon should Tehran decide enriching uranium above 90% (It already reached 20%). Lack of transparency with the nuclear program and Iran's discourse on uranium enrichment only reinforce suspicions on its intentions.⁸⁹ The disclosure of the violations of IAEA nuclear safeguard standards by Iran became a concerning issue for the survival of the NPT regime.

Iran's nuclear program has been a cause of concern for the international community after the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities was revealed in 2002 and 2003. Since then, suspicions raised about Tehran's intentions with its civilian nuclear program: Tehran signed (in December 2003) but does not implement the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreements. It also does not implement the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.⁹⁰ That is why, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could not carry out enhanced verification inspections to verify Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This has created concerns due to lack of transparency. The most serious issue is Iran's uranium

⁸⁹ Şebnem Udum, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Why is it a Serious Challenge to the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime?", Conference Paper, 23rd International Symposium on Science and World Affairs, August 3-10., 2011, London, UK.

⁹⁰ *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreements and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, Report by the Director General to IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.

enrichment program, which could allow Iran to develop highly enriched uranium to manufacture a nuclear weapon, should a political decision is made in that regard. Tehran argues that uranium enrichment is its “inalienable right,” so it will not halt its program. Coupled with lack of transparency, this insistence only fuels worries and suspicions over Iran’s real intentions.

Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program to urge Iran to more transparency as well as the UN Security Council resolutions on the suspension of the uranium enrichment program did not produce tangible results. The international community and particularly the United States considers Iran’s policy as a tactic to buy time for attaining a nuclear bomb. The way it is treated by the West, seems to have made Iran less reconciliatory.⁹¹

As a party to the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Having clandestinely developed an enrichment program and other nuclear activities for over 18 years, Tehran violated its NPT obligations. Upon referral by the IAEA Board of Governors, the Security Council passed four resolutions urging Iran to stop enrichment until its peaceful intentions can be fully established. As a measure to enforce the Security Council resolutions, economic sanctions were imposed on Iran. However, Iran continues to deny that its nuclear activities are for the development of a nuclear arsenal, yet there is fear among the international community that once Iran is able to highly enrich uranium it will be both able and tempted to build nuclear weapons.

The current situation challenges the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which rests on the triple pillars of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology. The regime is based on a two-tier system: It endorses equality among the “great powers” (the nuclear-weapon states-NWS), and

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 99

inequality between “great powers” and “small powers” (NNWS). The officials of Iran assert its desire to be considered as a first-tier state, thus, challenging this “critical balance.” In addition to that, the prospect of a nuclear Iran could create proliferation tendency in its immediate region and beyond, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the UN, NPT and the regime as a whole.⁹²

Articles III and IV of the NPT regulate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. NNWS have the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and their facilities will be under the safeguards of the IAEA to verify that they are in compliance with the Treaty. In return, nuclear-weapon states gave the commitment to non-nuclear-weapon states for complete disarmament, and agreed to share nuclear technology with them for civilian uses.⁹³

Having an international dimension, the Iranian nuclear program is also one of the most sensitive issues in Turkish-Iranian relations. The outcome of Iran’s nuclear program will have significant implications not only for bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran but also for the two countries’ relations with their neighbors and allies.

In this part, the historical background of Iran’s nuclear program will be presented with a view to understand the Turkey’s peace efforts towards Iranian nuclear program. Following the background, facilitation efforts of Turkey will be introduced with main features. Lastly, Turkey’s stance towards Iran’s nuclear program will be touched upon.

2.1 THE HISTORY OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

2.1.1 Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran

Iran’s first acquaintance with nuclear science and technology goes back to the years when the United States intensified its assistance to Iran in the economic, military and technical fields, including nuclear science and technology.⁹⁴ The US assistance can be attributed to increasing US interests in the Middle East, particularly “the strategic value

⁹² Udum, op. Cit.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Kenneth M. Pollack. *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America*. New York: Random House, 2004. p. 124

of the oil reserves” and “the necessity of containing Soviet expansionism.”⁹⁵ In the aftermath of World War II, Iran, along with Turkey was listed by the US as a country politically close the West and to be protected against Soviet expansionism. This regional atmosphere was accompanied by domestic economic problems in Iran throughout the 1950s, which resulted in economic, military and technical assistance to Iran during President Henry Truman's presidency. The US assistance to Iran was provided during Eisenhower's Presidency period as well. It was called as “Eisenhower Doctrine” as a response to the need to strengthen the “Northern tier” of non-Communist Middle Eastern countries facing Soviet threat by strengthening them economic assistance and military guarantees.⁹⁶ Through the "Atoms for Peace" program, two countries started negotiating a cooperation agreement for the manufacture of peaceful nuclear energy, which would open the Iranian market to US investment in Iranian nuclear industry.⁹⁷

Due to the intensifying relations, the US and Iran signed the “Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms” in 1957 after a period of negotiation of about two years.⁹⁸ In 1967, Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which has been one of the Iran's chief nuclear facilities, was opened in Tehran University.⁹⁹ The scientific infrastructure of Iran was steadily growing with hundreds of Iranian students attending universities in Western European countries as well as the United States, and technicians mastering their skills in traineeship programmes abroad.¹⁰⁰

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened to signature in July 1968 after decade long negotiations. Iran became one of the first signatories of the NPT and the Majlis ratified the Treaty in February 1970, which

⁹⁵Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West," *Middle Eastern Studies* 2007. Vol. 43 No.2. p. 223-245.

⁹⁶Pollack. Op cit. 125

⁹⁷Steven Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003) p. 27

⁹⁸Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran', Department of State Bulletin, No.36, 15 April 1957; cited in M. Sahimi, 'Iran's Nuclear Energy Program. Part V: From the United States Ordering Iran Uranium Enrichment Technology to Suggestions for Creating Catastrophic Industrial Failure', *Payvand's Iran News*, 22 Dec. 2004, p.2, <http://www.payvand.com> (accessed 14 October 2013)

⁹⁹Mohammad Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Program Part I: Its History," *Payvand*, October 2, 2003, <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html> (accessed 13 October 2013)

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

entered into force in March 1970. By signing the Treaty, Iran gained the right to make nuclear research, produce nuclear energy and obtain necessary technology and equipment for peaceful purposes without any discrimination in accordance with the NPT.¹⁰¹

Reinforced by Iran's ratification of the NPT, the US-Iran in cooperation in the nuclear field gained momentum during the Nixon administration. Nuclear cooperation continued during Carter's Presidency, who signed an agreement with Iran, giving it "the most favored nation" status, and the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement, which was aimed to manage of transfer of nuclear material to Iran in 1978.¹⁰²

The eruption of the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and following oil crises created further incentive for the Shah to accelerate the nuclear program. As a regional development at the time was the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries that erupted in 1973 and the subsequent oil crisis that led to boost in Iranian economy.¹⁰³ It has facilitated the Iran's efforts towards nuclear programme.

2.1.2 Iranian Nuclear Program after the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran

Iran's nuclear program and projects underway came to a halt with the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Overthrowing of the Shah and return of Imam Khomeini from exile in February 1979 brought a dramatic end to US-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear field as well as in other areas. The US-Iranian relations underwent dramatic changes with the Iranian Hostage Crisis, as a result of which Iran came to be regarded as a "hostile" country rather than a US ally.¹⁰⁴ The hostage crisis between Iran and the US which lasted for 444 days and led to broke of diplomatic relations of two countries changed image of Iran dramatically in the West. The US not only broke the bilateral nuclear agreements, but also engaged in a "policy of denial," where it encouraged European

¹⁰¹“Iran's Nuclear Program,” *Newsweek Online*, *ibid.*)

¹⁰²Kibaroglu, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁰³ Arzu-Celalifer Ekinçi, *İran Nukleer Krizi*. Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2009. p. 23

¹⁰⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power.” *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 2006) p. 207–232.

states to break their deals with Iran and discouraged other countries from transferring any nuclear technology to Iran.¹⁰⁵

The first Supreme Leader of Iran, Imam Khomeini, started an anti- Westernization and "anti-modernization" project in both domestic and foreign policy. This was also evident in the nuclear field. While the 90 % of the Bushehr-1 reactor and the construction of 50 % of the Bushehr-2 facility were complete by the Revolution, the clerical regime rejected to continue with the military and technological modernization after the Revolution.¹⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, all nuclear facilities were left to degradation, all AEOI projects were canceled, the Bushehr was proposed to be transformed into a grain mill and a massive brain drain of nuclear scientists occurred.¹⁰⁷

Iraq-Iran war has added another dimension to the Iranian nuclear programme. The first attempts to resume the Iranian nuclear program are the result of the eight-year-long Iraq-Iran War, which implied the possible advantages of modern military and nuclear technologies for Iran during the war.¹⁰⁸ Iraq had bombed Iran's civilian population, nuclear facilities and industrial cities during the war, leading to a great damage on the part of Iran.¹⁰⁹ Facing the destruction caused by war, the clerical regime soon realized that the possession of modern military technology and the possession of nuclear weapons would have discouraged Iraq to engage in a war with Iran.¹¹⁰ During the Iraqi-Iran War, IAEA's inspection problem first arose, when secret Iraqi nuclear facilities were discovered.¹¹¹

In addition to war between Iraq and Iran, by resuming its nuclear program, Iran was planning to meet the domestic demand for energy through nuclear energy and to export oil to other countries.¹¹² While the population was rising rapidly, the oil production

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ekinci, op. cit. p. 32.

¹⁰⁷ Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power." op. cit p. 222.

¹⁰⁸ Ekinci, op. cit p. 38

¹⁰⁹ Fariborz Mokhtari, "No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context." *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2005) p. 209–229

¹¹⁰ Kibaroglu, op. Cit. P. 223.

¹¹¹ Ekinci, op.cit, p. 45

¹¹² Ibid.

decreased, leading to a rise in domestic consumption. At the same time, with nuclear power production Iran could export highly profitable oil to the European markets which would increase its reserve in dollars at the end.¹¹³

Iran resumed its nuclear program in mid-1980s after Iraq's attacks with chemical weapons and massive air strike on ports and oil refineries in the Persian Gulf.¹¹⁴ Unable to get the expected assistance from its former European partners, Iran turned its face to the East. Iran signed a nuclear agreement with Pakistan in 1987, according to which 39 Iranian nuclear scientists could have the chance to advance their nuclear skills on Pakistani facilities and reactors.¹¹⁵ Iran also turned to China and Russia as viable alternatives for nuclear assistance and cooperation. From mid-1980s to early 1990s Chinese-Iranian nuclear cooperation developed in different areas. China has attributed the development of Iranian nuclear program.¹¹⁶

In sum, while the US encouraged and assisted Iran's nuclear program before the Islamic revolution, after the fall of Shah it continuously claimed that Iran had enough hydrocarbon resources, therefore, its eagerness for nuclear energy should have been approached with suspicion.¹¹⁷ On the basis of this approach, the US intensified its efforts in 1990s to prevent Iran from getting technical and technological support to resume its nuclear program. As the Iranian nuclear issue rose to the international community's high agenda it became even more difficult, albeit not impossible, for Iran to procure sensitive material from its previous suppliers.

2.1.3 The Disclosure of Undeclared Nuclear Facilities in 2002

International interest in Iran was heightened dramatically in the summer of 2002, when the existence of two nuclear sites was revealed by an exiled Iranian resistance group.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Mokhtari, op.cit. p. 212

¹¹⁴Mark Fitzpatrick, "The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes", "Introduction", *Adelphi Papers*, Vol.48, No. 398, p. 14.

¹¹⁵ Kibaroglu, Op. cit., p. 225

¹¹⁶ Mokhtari, Op. cit., p. 219.

¹¹⁷Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West", op. cit., p. 235.

¹¹⁸ New Information on the Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime's Nuclear Program, Remarks by

This was an important breakthrough that the international community realized that Iran had built or was building everything needed to produce enriched uranium, which could fuel nuclear weapons as well as nuclear reactors. These facilities showed that despite the pressure of the US sanctions and efforts to prevent supply of sensitive material and technology, Iran made considerable progress in the field of acquiring uranium enrichment and plutonium production capability. After the revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear facilities namely the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz in 2002, this country's nuclear program has occupied international community's agenda as one of the issues of primary concern.¹¹⁹

According to the EU-3, built of clandestine facilities, allegations with regard to possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program and its ambitions to possess enrichment and fuel cycle capability indicate that Iran's nuclear program is not of exclusively peaceful nature. The US and its European partners are also of the view that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons capability would trigger nuclear arms race in the Middle East which would undermine the international non-proliferation regime. Their assessment that after manufacturing nuclear weapons Iran would pursue more assertive role in the Middle East to torpedo the peace efforts also constitutes another reason for containing Iran's nuclear ambitions.

After the revelations, the US claimed that Iran's efforts to build uranium enrichment facility at Natanz were clear indications of Iran's intentions to develop nuclear weapons and breach of the NPT. Having called Iran to stop all activities related to uranium enrichment and sign the Additional Protocol (AP) which would allow the IAEA make short notice inspections, Washington also wanted referral of Iran's nuclear dossier from the IAEA Board of Governors to the UN Security Council with a view to take punitive actions against Iran's breach of its obligations.¹²⁰

Alireza Jafarzadeh, *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, August 14, 2002: [/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02](#)(accessed 13 October 2013)

¹¹⁹ Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West", op. cit., p. 235.

¹²⁰ Pollack, op. cit. p. 255

The need to strengthen the IAEA's inspection authority resulted in the introduction of the Additional Protocol in 1998. The Additional Protocol provides IAEA with the authority to do inspections on a state's nuclear sites or other sites where nuclear activities are supposed to be performed without prior notification. However, the introduction of the Additional Protocol has not wholly eliminated the inspection challenges as its signature is voluntary.¹²¹

Iran had declared its liability to the non-proliferation regime by ratifying the NPT in 1970. Accordingly, the IAEA had the authority to inspect and monitor Iran's nuclear activities to ensure that all nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only. The Iranian nuclear crisis following the revelation of formerly undeclared Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002 was an undeclared facility crisis, as Iran had not notified IAEA of the Natanz and Arak facilities as a part of its responsibilities specified by the safeguards agreement. As a result, IAEA attended the issue through its visits to Iran and its inspections of both facilities. On 12 September 2003, the IAEA Board passed a resolution calling Iran to provide “accelerated cooperation and full transparency”. The report expressed ‘grave concern’ for Iran's failure to give assurances to the IAEA that there are not undeclared nuclear activities in Iran and constituted an ultimatum to Iran calling it to increase cooperation with the IAEA and provide detailed information about its nuclear activities by the end of October 2003.¹²²

By September 2003 the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) started in to initiate a diplomatic process to resolve the issue. Involvement of the EU-3 changed the course of the diplomatic efforts positively. On 21 October 2003, after intensive negotiations, the Foreign Ministers of EU-3 and Iranian Foreign Minister issued a joint declaration announcing that Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program in exchange for access to advanced European technology.¹²³ However, the suspension deal subsequently

¹²¹ Ibid. p. 256

¹²² International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" *Resolution adopted by the Board*, GOV/2003/69, p. 2.

¹²³IAEA, ‘Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU foreign ministers’, Tehran, 21 Oct. 2003, URL <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtm (accessed 13 October 2013.)

broke down, making it difficult for the EU to move forward with Iran, at least in the short term.

2.1.4 Negotiations, Sanctions and Nuclear talks

Iran's moderate and pragmatic foreign policy approach underwent changes in the post-2005 period. This period is identified first by an uneasiness on the part of Iran voicing its demands to restart the temporarily suspended nuclear program and then by an outright confrontational attitude towards the international community when the hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power.¹²⁴ The emergence of a hardliner political leadership in Iran under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad got worsened the reviving hope of a negotiable solution for the Iranian nuclear issue. When the hardliners gained dominance in the Iran's parliament in 2005, they raised their concerns that reformists were risking Iran's national interests by the pursuit of such a soft foreign policy strategy with the international community for the settlement of the nuclear crisis.¹²⁵

On August 5, 2005, the EU offered a package of incentives for Iran to stop its enrichment activities. The agreement assured Iran with supply of fuel over the coming years and called Iran to make a “binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors”.¹²⁶ According to the proposal the EU-3 would also expect Iran to stop construction of its heavy water research reactor at Arak. Moreover, the agreement envisaged cooperation between the EU-3 and Iran in a number of areas such as non-proliferation, regional security and combating terrorism in addition to the economic and technological cooperation.¹²⁷

¹²⁴Pollack, op.cit, p. 254–5.

¹²⁵ Shahram Chubin, "The Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program," United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer Website, April, 2, 2001, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program>. (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹²⁶ Ekinci, Op.cit, p. 65

¹²⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" *Resolution adopted by the Board*, GOV/2005/64, 11 August 2005, p. 2. (accessed 13 October 2013)

Iran, however, stated in its response that the proposal of EU-3 was “a clear violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT, Tehran Statement and the Paris Agreement of November 15, 2004”.¹²⁸ Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at Esfahan nuclear facility on 8 August 2005 regardless of warnings of the Western countries that such a move could lead to referral of Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council. The IAEA, on the other hand, adopted a resolution on August 11, 2005 expressing serious concern for Iran's notification that it has decided to resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan and urged Iran to “re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities”.¹²⁹

Ahmadinejad regarded the EU as acting under the command of the United States and IAEA, who were, in Ahmadinejad's words, “bullies determined to prevent Iran's progress and advancement.”¹³⁰ As a result, President Ahmadinejad declined the EU's new incentive packages offering economic cooperation and security guarantees, resumed uranium enrichment activities, and “adopted a more belligerent posture towards the EU, the IAEA and the United States.”¹³¹ Since Ahmadinejad's coming to power in late 2005, Iran has also ignored the international warnings to stop the enrichment program, either in the form of UN sanctions or U.S. military strikes.¹³² Eventually, the Iranian nuclear dossier was transferred to the UN Security Council in February 2006.

Given Iran's reluctance to permanently suspend its uranium enrichment despite the incentives proposed by EU-3, the US finally convinced the international community to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. UN Security Council passed four rounds of sanctions against Iran for not suspending its nuclear activities.

- July 31, 2006: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 demands that Iran halt uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities within a month.

¹²⁸“Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement proposed by EU-3/EU”, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0508/doc03.htm#iran>. (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹²⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran” *Resolution adopted by the Board*, GOV/2005/64, 11 August 2005, p. 2.

¹³⁰ Kamrava, “Iranian National Security Debates: Factionalism and Lost Opportunities,” *ibid. op. cit.* p 96.

¹³¹*Ibid.* p. 97

¹³²*Ibid.* p. 98

- December 23, 2006: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 imposes sanctions on Iran for failing to comply with international demands to halt enrichment.
- March 24, 2007: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 broadens the sanctions after Iran fails to halt enrichment.
- March 8, 2008: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803 add further sanctions after Iran fails to halt enrichment.¹³³

The first one was passed in December 2006 and required all UN member states to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear-related technology, goods and materials to the Iranian territory.¹³⁴ The second one was passed in March 2007 and sought to prevent other states from dealing with several nuclear, chemical and industrial entities as well as several individuals and organizations associated with the Revolutionary Guard Corps and Bank Sepah, who were supposed to be actively involved in the ballistic missile development program.¹³⁵ The third round was expanded by the EU to include a freezing of bank accounts in various European capitals and the introduction of new restrictions on trade.

In the summer of 2008, a significant change in long-standing US policy occurred. While the US had previously opposed sending a US representative to even preliminary discussions with Tehran until it stopped enriching uranium, the Bush Administration sent a senior envoy to international talks.¹³⁶ Undersecretary of State William J. Burns joined a meeting in Geneva between the European Union's High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs Javier Solana and top Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. The IAEA published a report on Iran's nuclear program on 15 September 2008, according to which the IAEA verified the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, the Agency was also reported not to have made any progress on its

¹³³Glen Kessler. "History lesson: 10 years of negotiating positions between Iran and world powers." November 24, 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/24/history-lesson-10-years-of-negotiating-positions-between-iran-and-world-powers/> (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹³⁴ See "UN Security Council Resolution 1737," International Atomic Energy Agency Website, December 27, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹³⁵ See "UN Security Council Resolution 1747," International Atomic Energy Agency Website, March 24, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf. (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹³⁶ Glenn Kesler, "American Envoy to Join Iran Talks," Washington Post, 16 June 2008. (accessed 13 October 2013.)

alleged studies and other outstanding issues, emphasizing Iran had continued enrichment related activities despite the Security Council decisions.¹³⁷

Arising from this context, Resolution 1835 was adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 September 2008. The resolution did not adopt further sanctions against Iran, but called on Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the previous resolutions, and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors.¹³⁸

In the meantime, Iran and the P5+1 (The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia and China) restarted talks, during which the IAEA's proposal to supply Iran with nuclear fuel for its research reactor was discussed. In the end, Iran rejected the deal and put forward a counterproposal, which was dismissed by the IAEA and the United States as inconsistent with earlier negotiations. Following the breakdown of negotiations, Iran informed the IAEA that it would begin enriching some of its low-enriched uranium to 20%.

Following the former failing efforts, on 17 May 2010, Brazil, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement in which Iran agreed to export half of its LEU (Low-enriched Uranium) stock (1,200kg) to Turkey as a confidence-building measure, in return for 120kg of 20% enriched uranium for use in its medical research reactor.¹³⁹ The deal, however, was not accepted by Western countries, which saw Iran's agreement to the removal of 1,200 kg of LEU from its territory.

In October 2010, the P5+1 extended another invitation to Iran to discuss its nuclear program, but did not accept Iran's request for Turkey or Brazil to attend.¹⁴⁰ Talks resumed on 6 December 2010 in Geneva, during which the P5+1 requested assurances

¹³⁷ IAEA Board Report, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provision of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2008/38, (accessed 13 October 2013)

¹³⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 1803, S/RES/1835, (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹³⁹Resolution 1929 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on 9 June 2010," UN Security Council, (S/RES/1929(2010), (accessed 13 October 2013.)

¹⁴⁰"World Powers Propose Nuclear Talks with Iran in November" *Politico*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 14 October 2010.

that the Iranian nuclear program remained peaceful and Iran requested that international sanctions be lifted.¹⁴¹ Diplomats convened for the next round of talks in Istanbul, Turkey in late January 2011. The talks broke down due to Iran's insistence on lifting of all economic sanctions as a precondition for substantive discussions on its nuclear program.¹⁴²

Following the failure of Tehran Declaration, the negotiation process on Iran's nuclear program was suspended. The UN adopted Resolution 1929 in response, which enacted further sanctions against Iran. A week after the UN Resolution, on 16 June 2010, Iranian Vice-President and Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran was planning to design a new research reactor.¹⁴³ In December 2010, in a note from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the IAEA, Iran announced that it had not suspended enrichment activities, pointing out that it had implemented the Additional Protocol voluntarily for more than 2.5 years as a confidence building measure, despite it not being a legally binding instrument.¹⁴⁴

On July 23, 2010, EU presented an even hardened package of sanctions against Iran. The sanctions package targets banking and oil and gas sectors. As far as oil and gas sector is concerned, the sanctions prohibit the transfer of any material or technology that can be used in refining, exploration and the production of liquefied natural gas.¹⁴⁵ As for the banking sector, there will be a closer control on Iran-connected banks operating in the EU and bank transfers to and from Iran, including freezing of previously unsanctioned Iranian banks.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹Karim Sadjadpour, "Examining the P5+1 Iran Talks in Context," *Middle East Progress*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 December 2010.

¹⁴²Steven Erlanger, "Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program End with no Progress" *The New York Times*, 23 January 2011. (accessed 13 October 2013)

¹⁴³"Nuclear Weapons-2010 Developments" Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke2010.htm> (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁴⁴ Erlanger, "Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program End with no Progress" op. cit. p. 213

¹⁴⁵ Ian Traynor, "EU to Introduce New Iran Sanctions," *Guardian Online*, June 15, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/15/eu-sanctions-iran-nuclearprogramme?INTCMP=SRCH> (Accessed 3 October 2013).

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

On January 21-22, 2011, following a December meeting in Geneva, the P5+1 meets with Iran in Istanbul, but the two sides do not arrive at any substantive agreement. Iran's two preconditions for further discussions on a fuel-swap plan and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment and the lifting of sanctions, were rejected by the P5+1.¹⁴⁷

On 10 August 2012, President Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, expanding sanctions against Iran.¹⁴⁸ The law includes a ban on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and other shipping services to vessels of entities involved in proliferation.¹⁴⁹ The European Union also tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran, prohibiting the import, financing, insurance, and brokering of Iranian natural gas, and banning the supply of vessels to transport or store Iranian oil. The EU banned the provision of ship-building, flagging, and classification services to Iran's ships, as well as the sale of graphite, aluminum, and steel.¹⁵⁰

In March 2012, the EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, announced that she had “offered to resume talks with Iran on the nuclear issue.”¹⁵¹ On 14 April, 2012, Iran and the P5+1 countries met in Istanbul to re-open discussions about Iran's nuclear program. The talks lasted two days and were described as constructive, with the two sides reportedly refraining from confrontational rhetoric, and agreeing to hold another round of talks in May 2012 in Baghdad.¹⁵² On 23 May 2012, the second round of new P5+1 talks with Iran was held in the “Green Zone” of Baghdad, Iraq.¹⁵³ In an attempt to build on the momentum from the Istanbul talks, both sides went to Baghdad with specific

¹⁴⁷“Fact Sheets: Iran Proliferation” Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran> (Accessed 7 October 2013)

¹⁴⁸“New Sanctions Against Iran: President Obama Signs the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012” <https://www.skadden.com/insights/new-sanctions-against-iran-president-obama-signs-iran-threat-reduction-and-syria-human-righ>(Accessed 3 October 2013).

¹⁴⁹Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, (16 October 2013)

¹⁵⁰“U.N Nuclear Watchdog Can't Break Impasse with Iran,” Global Security Newswire, 22 February 2012.

¹⁵¹“Statement by European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” *PRNewswire*, 6 March 2012, www.prnewswire.com.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵²Muhammad Sahimi, “Diplomats: First Round of Nuclear Talks 'Positive,’” *Tehran Bureau*, 14 April 2012.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵³Ibid.

proposals on key issues. They “offered to refrain from imposing further United Nations sanctions against Iran.”¹⁵⁴ For its part, Iran signaled a willingness to halt the 20% enrichment if the move were met with lifting of some of the current sanctions, such as those imposed against its oil industry and central bank. The P5+1 position is that an end to 20% uranium enrichment and greater transparency must precede the lifting of any sanctions currently in place, rather than happening simultaneously. Iran has insisted that its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium be recognized by the P5+1. Media reported that Iran's five-point proposal included non-nuclear issues, such as regional security, but no further details were publicly available. The parties were once again unable to agree on substantive actions.¹⁵⁵

Following the U.S. presidential elections in 2012, reports appeared indicating that the Obama administration would seek to build a bilateral negotiation channel with Iran.¹⁵⁶ Russia's chief negotiator in the P5+1, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, said Moscow would be open to direct U.S.-Iran talks.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile, other sources point to an ongoing debate within Iran's national security establishment about whether to engage directly with the United States.¹⁵⁸

The end of the Ahmadinejad era brought with it the rise of Hassan Rouhani to power with a new hope for negotiations with the Western powers paving way to diplomatic solution over Iran's clandestine nuclear issue. The election of Hassan Rouhani in the June 2013 Iranian presidential elections signaled a shift in Iranian nuclear negotiations. In his first press-conference, president-elect Rouhani, who served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005, indicated intent to ease tensions with the international community and increase the transparency of the nuclear program.¹⁵⁹ In his inaugural address, President Rouhani put priority on “elevating Iran's position based on national

¹⁵⁴Paul Richter, “Hope Fades for Quick Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks.” *Los Angeles Times*, 24 May 2012.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵⁵Sahimi Muhammad, "Iran and 'Divided' P5+1 Exchange Proposals to End Nuclear Standoff," *Tehran Bureau*, 24 May 2012.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵⁶Slavin Barbara and Rozen Laura, "US Considers Offering 'More for More' to Iran," *Al Monitor*, 12 November 2012, www.al-monitor.com(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵⁷Blitz James and Clover Charles, "Moscow urges direct US-Iran talks," *The Financial Times*, 11 November 2012.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵⁸Joby Warrick, "Iran locked in internal debate over whether to talk to U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 13 November 2012.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁵⁹"Iran's Rouhani Vows to Work to Lift Sanctions," *AFP*, 4 August 2013. (Accessed 3 October 2013)

interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions” further signaling his intent to resume negotiations with the P5+1.¹⁶⁰

Following Rouhani's coming to power, the first round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 was held in Geneva from 15-16 October, 2013. The U.S. Department of State issued a background briefing on the negotiations on October 16 which described the talks as having encompassed “detailed technical discussions at a level they had not before.”¹⁶¹

On 23 November 2013, after intensive negotiations in Geneva, Iran and P5+1 announced that they had reached an agreement on a joint plan of action, including interim steps over the next six months and elements of a longer-term, comprehensive solution. The interim phase places significant limitations on Iran's enrichment program: Iran agreed to suspend enrichment over 5%; convert half of its current stock of 20% enriched material to fuel for Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and downblend the other half to 5%; keep the amount of 5% LEU stable by converting newly enriched material to oxide, and not install new centrifuges at any of the enrichment facilities, except where they replace the damaged ones.¹⁶² Iran also committed "not to make any further advances" at the IR-40 research reactor under construction at Arak: no fuel or heavy water is to be transferred to the reactor site, and the reactor will not be commissioned in the next six months. In return, the P5+1 will provide limited sanctions relief: the United States and EU will suspend sanctions on Iran's petrochemicals exports and trade in gold and precious metals; suspend sanctions on Iran's auto industry; license the supply of spare parts for Iran's civilian aviation, and "establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs." UN Security Council will refrain from imposing any further sanctions for the duration of the interim phase, and the United States and EU will also not impose new unilateral nuclear-related sanctions. Finally, the

¹⁶⁰ Roberts Dan and Borger Julian, "Obama holds historic phone call with Rouhani and hints at end to sanctions," *The Guardian*, 27 September 2013. (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁶¹ Senior Administration Official, "Background Briefing on P5+1 Negotiations," U.S. Department of State Background Brief, October 16, 2013, www.state.gov (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁶² "Joint Plan of Action," concluded between China, France, Islamic Republic of Iran, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States, Geneva, 24 November 2013, via: www.cnn.com.

P5+1 and Iran agreed to establish a Joint Commission, which would also work with the IAEA, to monitor the implementation of the interim steps.

To sum up, the history of nuclear talks goes back to 2002-2003 when it was revealed that Iran had failed to report some of its nuclear activities to the IAEA. Tehran signed the Additional Protocol, but was not implementing it. The inspections under the protocol are very significant to realize any undeclared nuclear material or activity. Indeed, Iran had briefly implemented the protocol after negotiations with the EU-3 (the UK, France and Germany) in 2004. Nuclear talks continued with the EU-3 until June 2006 when the United States, Russia and China joined them to form the P5+1. The main discussion in these talks has been over uranium enrichment. They have demanded Iran to halt its enrichment program, and Iran responded with the argument that it was its “inalienable right” under the NPT.¹⁶³ In 2009, a nuclear swap agreement was proposed to find a middle ground, and on this basis in May 2010, Turkey, Brazil and Iran signed the Tehran Declaration. Shortly after that, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose sanctions on Iran, hence the agreement was shelved. Sanctions have been hurting Iran's economy, and the P5+1 are proposing to ease them in response to the steps Tehran would take with its nuclear program. The Geneva negotiations have revived hopes for possible cooperation between West and Iran. On 23 November 2013, in Geneva negotiations, Iran and P5+1 announced that they had reached an agreement on a joint plan of action, and add a positive momentum to a comprehensive solution.

2.2 TURKEY'S FACILITATION IN IRAN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Since the revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear activities, the nuclear issue has also become a significant subject in Turkish-Iranian relations. While Iran's ongoing ambition on nuclear program creates tensions with the West, Turkey has attempted many times to be mediator to solve this crisis which directly affects its interest. Turkey encouraged the parties to take an affirmative position in the negotiation process. Although its efforts to solve the crisis in early process has failed in a number of times, Turkey continued to urge Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap

¹⁶³Richter Paul, “Hope Fades for Quick Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks.” *Los Angeles Times*, 24 May 2012. (Accessed 3 October 2013)

agreement, and continuously talked to the officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA. Within the framework of its policy as a facilitator, Turkey encouraged the parties to take a constructive position in the negotiations.

Since 2002, with the advent of the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has shifted its role toward Iran's nuclear program. It moved first from an observer to a facilitator, then to a mediator, however, its candidacy for mediator role has not been approved by Iran as well as the US. In this part, Turkey's mediation attempts will be emphasized in line with the historical development in Iran's nuclear program.

In February 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency declared that Iranian nuclear activities are going beyond the peaceful aims. P5+1 warned Tehran to stop its uranium enrichment. Until 2006 negotiations continued between Iran and P5+1 (UN Security Council Permanent members and Germany) but in December 2006, UN Security Council adopted the resolution calling for sanctions on Iran because of the non-progressive situation in talks.¹⁶⁴

Turkey has dealt with the Iranian nuclear issue since 2006 in the process particularly that Security Council has adopted two resolutions on 23 July and 23 December 2006 and the last of which noted that "Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696"¹⁶⁵ When negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were blocked in May 2006 due to Iran's rejection of the P5+1 offer, Turkey announced its willingness to take an active role in helping to pursue a diplomatic solution in which the reasons of it will be discussed later. In that year, a number of high level visits were realized between Turkey and Iran to discuss a possible solution on the basis of the P5+1's incentive package offered Iran in June 2006.

The number of Western officials visiting Ankara to discuss the issue throughout 2006 was a well indication for Turkey's increased efforts towards facilitation on a peaceful

¹⁶⁴ Bayram Sinkaya. "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits", *Insight Turkey*, Vol: 14, No: 2, 2012, p. 146-147.

¹⁶⁵ The United Nations Security Council, *UNSC Resolution 1737 (2007)*, op. cit.

resolution for the Iranian nuclear issue. In this period, Turkey remained to inform the Western officials that its position vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear program is to act in a diplomatic way and expressed concerns about possible military dimension of the nuclear program.¹⁶⁶

Turkey's efforts were appreciated by the international community and leading figures in the process. For example, the Director General of the IAEA Mohamed El Baradei not only backed Turkey's role and underlined that Turkey is well poised to encourage a diplomatic solution but also expressed willingness of the Agency to work further on this issue with Turkey.¹⁶⁷

While Turkey was playing a facilitator role in the diplomatic process, it aimed at reaching a balance between international community and Iran in order not to create any claim that Turkey was favoring one side. Turkey preserved its status as impartial facilitator between two sides. Indeed, Turkey's contribution to Western efforts towards pressuring Iran was desirable for international community but Turkey's status as impartial facilitator could help the P5+1 more as potential asset in reviving the negotiation if it congested at one point.¹⁶⁸

Turkey's importance as facilitator was proven when the diplomatic process came to halt after the UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. With the initiative of Turkey, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union Solana and Secretary of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Jalili met in Ankara on 26 April 2007 to revive the diplomatic process.¹⁶⁹ This meeting was interpreted as Turkey's diplomatic success though it did not yield concrete results.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶"İran'ın Nükleer Programı hk." 8 June 2006. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_89---8-haziran-2006_-iran_in_nukleer-programi-hk_.tr.mfa, (Accessed 09 September 2013)

¹⁶⁷"ElBaradei Backs Turkish Role in Iranian Nuclear Row", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 7 July 2006, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=elbaradei-backs-turkish-role-in-iran-nuclear-row-2006-07-07>, (Accessed 09 September 2013).

¹⁶⁸Andreas Breitegger, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: A Reality Check", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall 2009, p. 121-122.

¹⁶⁹"İran'la nükleer gerilime Ankara'da deva aranıyor," *Radikal*, 26 April 2007.(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁷⁰Bayram Sinkaya, "İran Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye'nin Tutumu ve Uranyum Takası Mutabakatı", *Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, Cilt 2, Sayı 18, Haziran 2010, p. 68.

There was a visible change in Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue in late 2008. Escalation of the tensions between the West and Iran gaining momentum with the adoption of third round of sanctions resolution in the Security Council in March 2008 prompted Turkey to assume more active role regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Despite reluctance by the US and Iran for Turkey's mediation role, Turkish mediation was once again come to the table when Obama elected the President of the United States. From the Ankara perspective, the election of Barack Obama created new opportunity for itself to mediate between the US and Iran. In this sense, Turkey offered to mediate between the international community and Iran to bridge the confidence gap between the parties and thereby pave the way for comprehensive negotiations on nuclear issue. In November 2008, before his visit to Washington D.C. to attend the G-20 Summit, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that Turkey has been watching the relations between Iran and the US with great concern. He also raised the expectation of resolving the issue through diplomatic means by expressing readiness to mediate such diplomatic solution and saying that "We are ready to be the mediator."¹⁷¹ However, Washington declined Turkey's offer to mediate the talks between two sides. The Spokesman of the State Department Sean McCormack stated in press conference that there is no necessity for Turkey's mediation in negotiations between Washington and Tehran.¹⁷² On the other side, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi stated in press conference that Iran is not against the idea of mediating in principle but the issue and problems between Iran and the United States go beyond the usual political problems between two states.¹⁷³ The Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Bahman Huseyinpur, was not also enthusiastic about Turkey's mediation saying that "we understand Erdogan's good will and thank him. But the problems between Iran and the US are so grave that cannot be resolved through mediator."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹Turkish Leader Volunteers to Be US-Iran Mediator", *New York Times*, 11 November 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12turkey.html?scp=1&sq=erdogan%20iran%202008&st=cse>, (Accessed 10 October 2013.)

¹⁷²"Ankara'nın Önerilerine ABD'den Ret" *Hürriyet*, 20 November 2008, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10401523>, (Accessed 10 October 2013).

¹⁷³Iran accepts Turkish mediator for Obama talks", *Press TV*, 17 November 2008 <http://presstv.ir>, (Accessed 10 October 2013).

¹⁷⁴ "ABD'den Sonra İran'dan da ret", *Hürriyet*, 21 November 2008, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10414964>, (Accessed 10 October 2013).

As the Iranian nuclear issue remained unresolved, the crisis further escalated and the third round of the sanctions adopted in 2008 did not stop Iran's uranium enrichment. It became more difficult for Turkey to maintain the delicate balance between Iran and international community in the face of increasing call for it to join the international community in pressuring Iran. While the international community expected Turkey to share their concern about Iran's nuclear program and join them in isolating Tehran, Turkey continued its efforts to find a way out of this crisis while also maintaining its support to Iran's presumably peaceful nuclear activities.¹⁷⁵

The international conjuncture offered a favorable climate for taking forward the diplomatic process for a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in 2009. The Obama Administration's "new approach" towards Iran highlighted dialogue and direct negotiation with this country to find a diplomatic solution instead of maintain the confrontational and threatening rhetoric.¹⁷⁶ Unlike his predecessor, President Obama accepted to join the negotiations with Iran without any preconditions and supported direct contact with Tehran. This approach indeed not only paved the way for the P5+1-Iran negotiations in Geneva in October 2009, but also made the first contact between the US and Iran after thirty years possible. However, although the parties agreed on a fuel swap accord in Geneva and they defined the modalities of this swap in Vienna in October 2009, this accord could not be taken forward to realize fuel swap as a confidence building measure.¹⁷⁷

This conjuncture prompted Ankara which had been seeking to assume more active role in the diplomatic process. Turkey as a NATO member and neighbor of Iran played a facilitator role in the process together with Brazil. Turkey pursued neutral role by not allying herself with one of the parties during the negotiations process. Turkey maintained its contacts with the Iranian side regarding the fuel swap plan. Since announcement of ElBaradei's proposal to deposit Iran's LEU in Turkey, Foreign

¹⁷⁵ Kadir Üstün. "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions," *Insight Turkey* 12, No. 3 (2010), p. 45

¹⁷⁶ "Obama Faces Long Odds on Iran Diplomacy." [Thomas Omestad](http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/04/29/obama-faces-long-odds-on-iran-diplomacy). USNews. 29 April 2009 <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/04/29/obama-faces-long-odds-on-iran-diplomacy> (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Minister Davutoğlu paid visits to Tehran and his Iranian counterpart visited Ankara five times with the aim of discussing the fuel swap plan.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, Prime Minister Erdoğan's official visit to Iran in October and President Ahmedinejad's participation to the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC) Summit in Istanbul provided Turkey with valuable opportunity to convey the messages directly at the highest level in such a critical period.¹⁷⁹ During his visit, Prime Minister Erdoğan reiterated Turkey's support to Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and underlined that Turkey is against nuclear weapons in its region. He also stated that possible solution to Iranian nuclear issue should respect Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and address the concerns of the international community.¹⁸⁰

Tehran Joint Declaration

In the following days Foreign Minister Davutoğlu paid three critical visits to Brazil, Tehran and Brussels respectively with the Iranian nuclear issue on his agenda. Brazil has apparently engaged with Iranian nuclear program at this point. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim also visited Tehran in 28 April to coordinate upcoming visit of Brazilian President Lula da Silva to Tehran when he also proposed to mediate between Iran and the West together with Turkey.¹⁸¹ On May 4, 2010 Iranian President Ahmedinejad announced that they accept in principle mediation of Brazil and Turkey to revive the swap deal.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ "Turkey ready to act as intermediary over Iran." *Middle-East Online* 20 April 2009. <http://www.middle-east online.com/english/?id=38514>(Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁷⁹"Ahmadinejad suggests Iran role in atom fuel bank".*Reuters*. 11 November 2009.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/11/us-iran-nuclear-ahmadinejad-idUSTRE5AA2YD20091111>(Accessed 13 December 2013)

¹⁸⁰"Turkey Urges Diplomatic Solution for Iran's Nuclear Issue", *Fars News Agency*, 29 October 2009, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8808070602>, (Accessed 13 December 2013)

¹⁸¹"Brezilya: Türkiye ile arabuluculuk yapabiliriz", *NTVMSNBC*, 28 April 2010, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25087925/>, (Accessed 15 December 2013)

¹⁸²"Iran accepts Brazil mediation to revive atom deal", *Reuters*, 5 May 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/05/us-iran-nuclear-brazil-idUSTRE6440X320100505?Page Number =2>, (Accessed 15 December 2013).

Brazil as a far away country to the region has contributed to the mediation process of Iranian nuclear program together with Turkey. Brazil was also a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) like Turkey in 2010. Brazil's contribution to mediation shows that it takes responsibility by fitting its role as an emerging world actor. In its contribution to the Tehran Declaration, Brazil relied on soft power tools like persuasion and consensus creation and increasing visibility in global politics.¹⁸³ It can be claimed that there were some similarities between Turkey and Brazil's foreign policy approaches in those years in the light of interviews and data survey.

Brazilian President Lula da Silva paid an official visit to Tehran on 16 June 2010, which was regarded as the last chance for Iran to stop vote on new UN Security Council resolution, to discuss the bilateral issues as well as the nuclear issue. On 17 May 2010, Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Brazil and Iran accompanied by the leaders of these countries signed the Joint Declaration regarding the fuel swap.¹⁸⁴ Brazil, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement in which Iran agreed to export half of its Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) stock (1,200 kg) to Turkey as a confidence-building measure, in return for 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium for use in its medical research reactor.¹⁸⁵

Turkey thought it had achieved an important breakthrough in May 2010 when, together with Brazil, it signed a fuel-swap agreement with Iran. Under the terms of the accord, Iran agreed to ship 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey to be reprocessed in return for fuel for the Tehran research reactor.¹⁸⁶ Since October 2009, the focus was on a deal to provide fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) in exchange for the removal of 1200 kg of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) from Iran's stocks. The Turkish-

¹⁸³ Mathilde Chatin. "Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength?" Brazil Institute. 2012. p. 34

¹⁸⁴ "Iran agrees "in principle" to Brazil's mediation." *Today's Zaman*. 05 May 2010 (<http://todayszaman.com/news-209362-iran-agrees-in-principle-to-brazils-mediation.html>)(Accessed 15 December 2013).

¹⁸⁵ Resolution 1929 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on 9 June 2010," UN Security Council, (S/RES/1929(2010), 9 June 2010. (Accessed 8 May 2013)

¹⁸⁶ "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey," *BBC News*, May 17, 2010 (Accessed 8 May 2013)

Brazilian agreement was nearly identical to one that the Obama administration had initiated in.¹⁸⁷

In the Joint Declaration, Iran answered the key questions on the quantity of LEU to be removed from Iran; the place for safekeeping of the LEU in escrow; and timeframes for the proposed escrow and exchange. The Joint Declaration also underlined the strong conviction that the nuclear fuel exchange will provide an opportunity to begin a forward-looking process aimed at creating a positive, constructive atmosphere.¹⁸⁸

However, the reactions of international community were not positive to the recent peace efforts led by Brazil and Turkey. Catherine Ashton stated that “If Iran has now accepted the IAEA proposal, this is welcome, but it [the nuclear fuel swap deal] does not solve the fundamental problem, which is that the international community has serious concerns about the peaceful intention of the Iran nuclear program.”¹⁸⁹ The P5+1 voiced its deep concern over the nuclear fuel swap, which it perceived as an attempt by Iran to sidestep further sanctions without actually taking steps to address international concerns about its nuclear program.¹⁹⁰

While diplomatic efforts continued, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the United States had agreed with other Western countries on a draft resolution on further sanctions against Iran, despite the nuclear fuel swap deal. As a result, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 adopted on 9 June 2010, which demanded Iran suspend enrichment activities. It cited the risk of proliferation posed by the

¹⁸⁷ Larrabee F. Stephen and Alireza Nader. “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, National Defence Research Institute

¹⁸⁸ “Iran’s Nuclear Program” *Washington Embassy of Turkish Republic*.

<http://vasington.be.mfa.gov.tr/images/localCache/1/b15prjzpaplfysi5nz31z4qmIrans%20Nuclear%20Program.pdf> (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁸⁹ Yigal Schleifer, “Turkey’s Approach to Iran a Calculated Gamble,” *Iran Review*, 22 May 2010,

http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Turkey_s_Approach_to_Iran_a_Calculated_Gamble.htm (Accessed 8 October 2013)

¹⁹⁰ “Text: Powers Dismiss Iran Fuel Offer Before UN Vote,” *Reuters*, 9 June 2010,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/us-nuclear-iran-response-text-idUSTRE6582W120100609> (Accessed 9 September 2013)

program and noted that Iran had failed to cooperate with the IAEA. Brazil and Turkey voted against the resolution, realizing that any further sanctions would undermine the diplomacy track.

As a conclusion, Turkey remained actively involved in the negotiation process of Iranian nuclear program without an officially defined role. By the adoption of the Resolution 1929 while diplomatic efforts continued, it became clear that the West did not consider the nuclear fuel swap deal between Iran, Turkey and Brazil to be a confidence-building measure. The peace efforts led by Brazil and Turkey have failed to yield a positive result. Although the mediation and facilitation efforts of Turkey continued in following years, most influential attribute of Turkey as a mediator candidate is Tehran Declaration which was ended as a failure due to a negative attitude of international community.

2.3 TURKEY'S STANCE TOWARDS IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Turkish-Iranian relations are characterized by longstanding elements of cooperation and rivalry. Since the revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear activities, the nuclear issue has also become a significant issue in Turkish-Iranian relations. Despite Turkey's position against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its approach to the Iranian nuclear program has been different from that of the US, Israel and partly the Western countries. In this context, Turkey has been dealing with Western economic sanctions and plans for military engagement against Iran as well as the possibility of the nuclearization of a neighbor. Even though the US government demanded Turkey to collaborate to counter the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey made it clear that it would endorse neither unilateral economic sanctions nor military intervention.

Turkey's policy towards the Iranian nuclear program has focused on two main principles. First, since the NPT does not prevent peaceful nuclear programs, Turkey acknowledges that Iran has a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes. Turkey accepts Iran's claim that its current nuclear program is intended for civilian purposes. On January 11, 2011 Mr. Erdogan interviewed with *El-Kabas* newspaper when he was in Kuwait. In his speech Mr. Erdogan said that Turkey will make every

effort in order to resolve Iranian nuclear problem.¹⁹¹ This is a crucial message for the international community because Turkey clearly defended that nuclear problem can be solved by diplomatic channels. Taking into account the concerns of the international community about Iranian nuclear capacity, Turkey has also called on Iran to implement transparency measures and cooperate with the IAEA.¹⁹²

Second, Turkey believes diplomatic solution is the only viable option for convincing Iran to respond fully to the concerns of the international community. Former President Abdullah Gul had an interview with Iranian news agency *Press TV*. In this interview Mr. Gul said that Turkey supports Iran's nuclear rights and would play a constructive role in Iran's nuclear program in the future. "We want to see this dispute solved in a peaceful way... through diplomacy and dialogue," he said.¹⁹³ A broad consensus has developed among Turkish elites that any military action against Iran will have catastrophic consequences; therefore Turkish officials have taken every opportunity to express its opposition to the possibility of a military strike. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan, for instance, criticized the possibility, observing that even though the Iraq War in 2003 had accomplished nothing, the world was discussing using the same tactics against Iran. He also underlined that "We do not want any strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. This would be a grave mistake."¹⁹⁴

Turkey opposes not only military measures, but also economic sanctions, because Turkey is familiar with the challenges of the sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq.¹⁹⁵ At the same time, Turkey pays attention not to appear to support the Iranian nuclear program unconditionally, thus it repeated calls for Iran to be more transparent and to

¹⁹¹ "Turkish Leader Volunteers to Be US-Iran Mediator", *New York Times*, 11 November 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12turkey.html?scp=1&sq=erdogan%20iran%202008&st=cse>, (10 October 2013).

¹⁹²"Turkey's Energy Strategy", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-politikasi.en.mfa, (20 December 2013).

¹⁹³"Turkey no military launchpad for US". *Presstv* 10 June 2011 <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/165430.html> (Accessed 3 October 2013)

¹⁹⁴"Turkey's Prime Minister Warns Against Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities," *Inside Iran*, 30 September 2009, <http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/turkey%e2%80%99s-prime-ministerwarns-against-attack-on-iran%e2%80%99s-nuclear-facilities/> (Accessed 25 December 2013)

¹⁹⁵Üstün. Op. cit. p. 23

continue to work with the IAEA. Turkey has also stressed the importance of Iran's nuclear program remaining within the limits of the NPT.¹⁹⁶

Turkey considers that a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue is the only viable option and has been making substantive efforts. The Joint Declaration signed by Turkey, Iran and Brazil on 17 May 2010 demonstrates that diplomacy and engagement can work. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration provides a basis to give diplomacy a chance. Turkey voted "against" the new sanctions on Iran in order not to undermine the window of opportunity provided by the Joint Declaration for solving the problem on Iran's nuclear program through peaceful means.¹⁹⁷

The Turkish concern is that, should the Iranian regime decide to acquire nuclear capabilities, it would be almost impossible to reverse proliferation in the Middle East. Other states would aspire to such capabilities, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime would come to an end, and regional politics would be destabilized. This runs counter to Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East, which has encouraged stability and order.

Former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu explains Turkey's approach to Iranian nuclear issue with reference to NPT mentioning four categories of countries according to their possession of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons: a) NPT parties holding nuclear technology and possessing nuclear weapons (declared nuclear weapon-states), b) states outside the NPT but possessing nuclear weapons (non-declared nuclear weapon-states like India, Pakistan and Israel), c) NPT parties holding nuclear technology but not possessing nuclear weapons like Brazil, Japan, etc.) d) NPT parties without nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. Minister Davutoğlu makes it clear that if Iran wants to be in the second category Turkey would certainly oppose this even before anyone else including the US but Turkey would not have any problem if Iran wants to stay in the third category so long as it opens its facilities to international monitoring.¹⁹⁸ He also

¹⁹⁶Turkey's Energy Strategy", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-politikasi.en.mfa.tr (Accessed 20 December 2013)

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Davutoğlu: "İsrail ile barışma niyetimiz var", *CNN Türk*, 25 December 2010,

makes a link between ambitions to form monopoly in the area of nuclear technology and strong resistance to Iran's nuclear program underlining that even Turkey might be target of international pressure in the future for seeking peaceful nuclear technology.¹⁹⁹

Turkey believes that it can contribute to bridging the positions of both sides and building mutual confidence to avoid worst case option. The Joint Declaration also displayed that Turkey's efforts can reach positive results although this opportunity could not be seized unduly by the P5+1. In this regard, Turkey urges Iran to enhance transparency and cooperation with the IAEA, reiterates Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and defies a military intervention targeting Iran's nuclear facilities.²⁰⁰

Although Turkey was aware of the fact that it is not the major stake-holder in the Iranian nuclear crisis, Iran's and the P5+1's failure to come to an agreement to find a solution of this crisis and the tension between the parties disturbed Turkey. This is because the nuclear crisis potential to trigger other crisis in the fragile security atmosphere of the Middle East poses direct challenge to Turkey's as well as other Middle Eastern countries' stability and security. In this regard, Turkey sees itself as responsible for containing the crisis with all instruments available before it turns into war.

Turkey, as a NATO member and neighbor of Iran, played a facilitator role in the process together with Brazil. Turkey positioned neutral by not allying herself with one of the parties during the negotiations process. Turkish neutral position was critical for herself to solve the problem and prevent possible harms as an outcome of the process.²⁰¹

Turkish third party role was beyond the classical facilitator role during the nuclear swap talks. Turkish and Brazilian roles are helping communicate, compromise and

http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/12/25/Davutoglu_Israil_ile_barisma_niyetimiz_var/600736.0/index.html, (24 December 2013).

¹⁹⁹“Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu: Nükleer tekeli istemiyoruz”, *Zaman*, 25 September 2010, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1031891>, (24 December 2013).

²⁰⁰“Turkey's Energy Strategy”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-politikasi.en.mfa.tr (20 December 2013)

²⁰¹ Talha Kose, “Iran's Nuclear Program and Middle East Politics: Balance of Power and Limits of Diplomacy”, SETA Pub. No III, Ankara: 1998, p.65.

convergence between parties. Turkey has tried to be impartial and credible for both sides. To overcome credibility problem, Brazil and Turkey talked with the US officials in 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit and asked guidelines for an acceptable outcome for the mediation.²⁰²

Following the nuclear negotiations on 24 November 2010, former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu launched his regional tour, which included Bahrain and Iran. During his visit to Manama on Sunday, he said that “I want to underline that this agreement, which was reached by the P5+1 and Iran, is a positive development.” He also confirmed that “sanctions on Iran had also damaged Turkey’s economy; and therefore easing sanctions would also have a positive impact on Turkey as well as creating a constructive atmosphere whereby tensions would be reduced in the region.”²⁰³

To conclude, the nuclear deals on the Iran uranium enrichment goes back earlier than Turkey was interested in. Turkey pays more attention to the peaceful settlement of Iran’s nuclear program. According to Ankara, diplomacy is the best and unique way to solve Iran’s crisis for the sake of regional peace. In addition to this, Turkey urges Iran to act within the limit of NPT and fundamental rules and regulations of IAEA. Tehran Declaration led by Turkey and Brazil, even though the outcome is failure, is a striking example of Turkey’s efforts to contribute to the peace in region. Turkey naturally pursues some aims while undertaking facilitator/mediator role in Iran’s nuclear talks. In next part, in the light of interviews as well as data survey, it will be tried to understand the underlying motivations of which Turkey has actively embraced facilitator role in negotiation process of Iran.

²⁰² “Bad nuclear deal with Brazil and Turkey hands Iran a diplomatic coup”. *Washington Post*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/17/AR2010051703455.html> (Accessed 3 October 2013)

²⁰³ Turkey expresses support for Iran nuclear deal: ‘Iran’s nuclear activities will create a positive atmosphere in the region’ *Habertürk*, <http://www.haberturk.com/general/haber/897652-turkey-expresses-support-for-iran-nuclear-deal> (accessed 25 November 2013)

3. CHAPTER 3 FINDINGS

The incentives for mediation efforts of the states can be explained with different motivations. Referring back to the second chapter of the study, decision-makers who consider mediation as part of their foreign policies, generally motivated by their national self-interest, the aspiration of international prestige and soft power fulfillment as well as humanitarian impulses.

For the purpose and scope of thesis, Turkey's facilitation and peace efforts in Iran nuclear deal, particularly in Tehran Declaration, will be analyzed to understand Turkey's main motivations behind its mediation efforts in overall in recent years. To see the code of conduct of mediation efforts of Turkey, its overall approach during the deal of Iranian nuclear issue and path to the Tehran Declaration bears a good example. Furthermore, it will be covered that how those main motivations (national self-interest, soft power fulfillment/ international prestige seeking and humanitarian impulses) fit in Turkey's mediation in general and Iran's nuclear deal in particular.

Being one of the concrete outcomes of Turkey's mediation efforts, Tehran Declaration occupies a significant place in the eyes of international community towards Iran's nuclear program. The Iranian nuclear issue started to occupy a significant place on the world's agenda after the revelation of two clandestine facilities in 2002 but the roots of the problem go back to 1979 when Shah was overthrown with the Islamic revolution. Since those years, Iran and the West are in a impasse on which the regional stability is directly influenced. Turkey has tried to be mediator in this conflict with its mission to institute peace in the Middle East which would bring stability and peace not only to the disputed territories but also in return will enhance its own security and interests. Turkey launched its mediation efforts to find a common ground for realization of the swap deal. The Joint Declaration signed between Turkey, Brazil and Iran on 17 May 2010 was a fruitful outcome of these peaceful efforts.

To reach a more comprehensive analysis, semi-structured interviews were held with the Turkish academicians and foreign policy makers. The issue has been discussed with 3 academicians and 10 Turkish diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic and each one has been active in the process of Tehran Declaration. The diplomats were chosen from the Directorate General of South Asia (GIGY), Directorate General of Policy Planning (SPGY) and Tehran Embassy of Turkey. The academicians are the experts on the field as well as the authors who wrote a couple of articles on the Iran's nuclear issue and Turkey's peace efforts. The foreign policy makers that have been conducted interviews are the relevant authorities who follow the Iran's nuclear program and Turkey's efforts in that time. It has been tried to choose the proper authorities to hold interviews with a view to reach a valid outcome.

In those questions, it has been tried to focus on the main motivations that Turkey may follow during Tehran Declaration. The semi-structured interviews opened a channel for interviewee to present their own ideas in a flexible way and the debates over questions gave me more constructive aspect to the issue.

In addition to interviews, a comprehensive research has been made on the literature. This data survey helped to expand the arguments for each motivation.

In the light of interviews held by Turkish high level decision-makers who were in capacity to determine the policy of Turkey during the mediation process of Turkey as well as the literature review, it has been reached the conclusion that the Turkey's seeking aims by involving in the peace processes of regional and international conflicts, in the light of Tehran Declaration are in parallel with the main motivations that other leading mediators pursue. In the conflict of Iranian nuclear program, considering its mediation efforts as a foreign policy tool, Turkey has mostly pursued to save its national interests, raise its image as peace maker in the international community and soft power oriented state as well as reflect its humanitarian and moral approach in its foreign policy.

In this part, it will be tried to present general tendency of Turkey in mediation efforts from the aspects of each motivations and then shift to the inclination of Turkey's facilitative endeavors in Iranian nuclear program.

3.1 Mediation for its national material interest

As it is mentioned in previous chapters, self-interest motivates states to apply for mediator/facilitator role considering it as part of their foreign policy. Political and economic interests come forefront considering self-interest as a motivation source of states to mediate. From the perspective of Turkey in brokering the conflict on Iran nuclear issue, considering the data survey and interviews, the national interests including political, economic and energy fields mostly shaped Turkey's approach towards brokering in nuclear program.

Referring back to second chapter as Touval and Zartman claim that mediation by small and medium-sized powers is motivated by self-interest particularly on the concerns and interests including the possibility that a conflict may spill over into the mediator's territory or the attempt to promote norms that tend to enhance the mediator's own security. This is clearly relevant motivation for Turkey which have some material interest in the region.

Moreover, Mitchell's classification mentioned in Chapter I is also an effective argument to understand Turkey's motives behind mediation efforts. Turkey evaluates the rewards it receives from involvement and the costs incurred from getting involved or not getting involved at all. To this end, Turkey's material interest oriented motive can be analyzed in three parts: political, economic and energy focused interests.

a) Political interest

States near to conflictual region fears from the danger of spillover effect of the conflict to its territory. Barston claims that states may engage in mediation because the potential costs of standing by as a conflict rages on are seen as greater than the risks involved in becoming a mediator. The dangers of spill-over, particularly for conflicts that are nearby

or may directly affect a state's interests, often serve as powerful motivators for mediation efforts.²⁰⁴ Barston clearly indicates that the cost of the conflicts in nearby region trigger the states to mediate.

Aras and Gorener also touches upon the correlation between the stability of the region and playing peacemaker role, “increasing dialogue with all political actors, various mediation initiatives, undertaking facilitator and promoter roles among the states in surrounding regions can all be considered as part of a larger aspiration to formulate all-embracing policies in regional matters, with a goal of constructing a new regional stable order.”²⁰⁵

In addition to those academicians, Turkish decision-makers consider the issue in the same framework. A Turkish official state that: “If potential conflicts cannot be averted through detecting the core reasons of the problem, the crisis to emerge can necessitate much more costly and long-term measures for the region and for the whole international community. Furthermore, each conflict can trigger another tension.”²⁰⁶ It is understood that conflicts and their spillover affects both the states in the region and force them to intervene as third party.

Focusing on the negative costs of tension between Iran and international community, another Turkish diplomat claims that “due to the possibility of any conflict emerge between the West and Iran, Turkey was worried that it might have to bear a heavy burden in terms of economic loss and security problems. Rising possibility of conflict between two fronts had negative effects over Turkey and would cause proliferation of conflict through proxy wars.”²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ Barston R. P., *Modern Diplomacy*, 3rd ed. (London: Pearson Education, 2006), p. 239.

²⁰⁵ Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener. "National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 12: 1, 73-92,

²⁰⁶ “Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa> (Accessed 10 January 2014)

²⁰⁷ Interview with Turkish high-level official, from the Directorate General of South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, February 2014.

From other side, any situation that Iran would have nuclear capable may be direct threat to regional stability and balance. According to Kibaroglu and Çağlar, Turkey would be the most negatively affected country by a nuclear Iran.²⁰⁸ Therefore, Ankara felt its responsibility to become involved in the process to protect Turkish interests by proposing swap deal to Iran. According to Sokolski and Clawson, a nuclear Iran would severely complicate Turkey's security relationships with Washington, Israel, and Europe. If a new nuclear threat rises in a close vicinity of Turkish territory, Ankara will confront a series of new security dilemmas.²⁰⁹ This one is another potential security threat for Turkey because of Iranian nuclear program.

One high-level Turkish official underlined that “Turkey does not have the luxury of building a wall on its border with Iran and turn its back to its next door neighbor. Such attitude would be against Turkey's interests as well as the reality”. He claimed that the motive for Turkey to be involved in this process was the prevention of possible negative outcomes for the country and national interests.²¹⁰ Another Turkish diplomat asserts that “Turkey lives in a very difficult region in which not every country maximizes its interest in an environment of cooperation, some countries in region believe that making sure that some frozen conflicts remain best in their interest. However, those remaining conflicts such as Iranian nuclear issue are at odds with Turkey's main interests in the region.”²¹¹ Referring back to Mitchell’s classification on the motives of mediator, *security rewards* can be considered as part of Turkey’s motives on peace efforts for Iran’s uranium enrichment.

As it is seen, from the perspectives of decision makers, Turkey has concerned with the any kind of risk that would emerge in its environ, therefore, it aims at preventing possible negative effects of any conflict to its national interests. Turkish diplomats that interviews have been conducted evaluate Turkey's peacemaker role in Iran nuclear issue

²⁰⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Barış Çağlar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” Middle East Policy XV, No. 4 Winter 2008, p.59

²⁰⁹ Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (eds.) Getting Ready for a Nuclear-ready Iran, US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. p. 21

²¹⁰ Interview with Turkish high-level official, Diplomat in Tehran Embassy during the preparation of Tehran Declaration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, February 2014.

²¹¹ Interview with Turkish high-level official, Directorate General of South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, February 2014

in the context of national interest. Although not a party in the dispute between the West and Iran, Turkey is affected by the repercussions of any developments in this process. This is because any conflict with potential to trigger other crisis in the fragile security atmosphere of the Middle East poses direct challenge to Turkey's as well as other Middle Eastern countries' stability and security. In this respect, Turkey's sees itself as responsible for preventing the crisis with all instruments and policies before the conflict turns into a war. As Turkish diplomat claims, otherwise, such crisis would pose both direct and indirect challenges to Turkish national interests that Turkey cannot tolerate.²¹²

Turkey's peace efforts toward Iranian nuclear issue are based on combination of rational motivations which are directly related to its national interests. Although Turkey is aware of the fact that it is not the major stakeholder in the Iranian nuclear crisis, Iran and the West's failure to reach an agreement to find a way out of this crisis and the increasing tension between the parties disturbs Turkey. Therefore, Turkey pays attention to the use of mediation as a tool in its foreign policy mechanism to prevent direct negative effects of the conflicts in near abroad. Because of the priorities of stability of the region for Turkish foreign policy, any policy towards stability and peace is gaining utmost importance.

For those pragmatic and political reasons, Turkey's diplomatic efforts have more focused on creating an atmosphere conducive to the constructive nuclear talks between the West and Iran. Ankara's efforts are driven by a desire to continue the dialogue in order to prevent a possible American or Israeli preventative military action which would pose a serious threat to its interests.

The most appropriate solution for Ankara would be the prevention of Iran`s enrichment of uranium to the levels that can be used in nuclear arms, while the economic and political relations between Turkey and Iran continue without any damage. This possible solution motivated Turkey to participate to peace efforts towards Iranian nuclear

²¹² Interview with Turkish high-level official, Directorate General of South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, February 2014.

program. Tehran Declaration aiming at decreasing uranium level to peaceful use is a clear indication of this solution.

By brokering the fuel-swap deal, Turkey attempted to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue in order to prevent a military attack on Iran as Turkey had experienced in Iraq case. Kadir Ustun, studying on Iran's nuclear program, describes this situation as:

"Turkey has its own security concerns and does not want a nuclear arms race in the region. Turkey is all too familiar with the fallout from past sanctions, as they ultimately led to military engagement and have caused wars in the region. Iraq is a good example of this and Turkey's economy and security have suffered greatly from the destabilization created by the invasion of Iraq. Such concerns led to Turkey's involvement in the negotiations with Iran especially when the Vienna Group's (Russia, France, the US, and IAEA) efforts to reach an agreement with Iran proved unsuccessful" ²¹³

Alon Ben Meir, professor of international relations and Middle East studies at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, mentions about the threat of conflict between Iran and the West: "Turkey cannot afford the threat of regional violence that a nuclear armed Iran would produce. Playing a leadership role in curbing Iran's nuclear ambition would not only advance Turkey's foreign policy doctrine, championed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, to seek 'zero problems with neighbors,' but would also safeguard its economic and security interests."²¹⁴ Turkey fears that the conflict between West and Iran will have the same effect with Iraq and will eventually pave the way for military action. Drawing lessons from its post-Gulf War experience, Ankara believes that military action will have negative consequences for the stability in the region. Already faced with sectarian issues in neighboring Iraq, an unstable Syria, and a

²¹³ Kadir Ustun. "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions" Insight Turkey, Vol: 12, No: 3, 2010, p.21-22. http://Insight_Turkey_vol12_no3_2010_Turkeys_Iran_Policy_Kadir_Ustun.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2014)

²¹⁴ Alon Ben Meir. "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Challenge: Mediating With The Mullahs", The World Today , Vol. 66, No. 11 (November 2010) , pp. 27-28

region in transition, Turkey fears that the military action would be destabilizing and further hurt its security interests.

Bonab, expert on Middle East in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) of Iran in Tehran, touches upon another critical point for Turkey “Iran's nuclear activities may have had a paradoxical impact on Turkey's EU accession process. On the one hand, the rise of a nuclear-armed Iran may make it difficult for the EU to grant full membership to Turkey, as the EU would not want to share a border with a nuclear-armed Iran. Besides the identity issues, the EU has some concerns about Turkey's conflict-laden borders.”²¹⁵ This issue raises a larger question to another leading interest of Turkey that it has been seeking since 1950s. This also constitutes a serious threat to Turkey’s national interest in the sense that any instability in the neighbour would be risky for the membership process of Turkey to EU.

From Iranians perspective, Turkey's efforts in this case are derived from the motivations of self-interests as well. Ghahremanpour asserts that Iran wants to solve the nuclear issue directly with the great powers since mediators like Turkey tend to think of their own national interests.²¹⁶ Another Iranian professor Barzegar contends that Turkey would not act in Iran's interests because of the competition between the two countries to maximize their regional and global power.²¹⁷

2) Economic Interest

Economic interests constitute another important dimension of motivation for mediator role of Turkey. In facilitation role of Turkey pursuing the normalization of Iran's relations with the rest of the international community, the role of economic interests are more visible. Since, Turkey relies on Iran for a large part of its imported energy and has

²¹⁵ Rahman Bonab. “Turkey's Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran's Nuclear Activities”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No.3, 2009, pp. 161-175

²¹⁶ Rahman Ghahremanpour. “Iran’s View on Turkish–US Relations”. <http://encompassingcrescent.com/2011/05/irans-view-on-turkish-us-relations/> (Accessed 10 January 2014)

²¹⁷ Keyhan Barzegar. “Strategic Relationship between Turkey and Iran in the Middle East”, 1388/12/29 (2010), <http://fa.merc.ir/archive/article/tabid/62/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/52/----.aspx> (Accessed 10 January 2014)

long sought greater access to the Iranian market to lessen its large trade imbalance. Turkish-Iranian economic relations occupy a significant place in Turkey's Iran policy and drive Ankara to seek early diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.




Table.1

Source: TUIK

The figure shows the increase of economic activities between Turkey and Iran in recent years. The figure also demonstrates that the total trade volume between the two neighbors, which was \$10.229 billion in 2008 increasing to \$21.3 billion, made Turkey one of the most significant trading partners for Iran in 2012.²¹⁸

According to the Turkish Ministry of Economy, Iran was Turkey's third largest export market with a volume of \$9.9 billion in trade. In 2012, Iran was Turkey's sixth-largest supplier of imported goods, with a value of \$11.4 billion. As it is seen from the statistics, Iran is great market for Turkish economy.

From a Turkish diplomat aspect, Turkey's involvement was intended to maintain peace and stability, avoid conflict, and fend off international sanctions that would also damage Turkish commercial interests with Iran. He also continued that number of big Turkish firms avoided exporting to Iran's market because of tension between the West and Iran as well as sanctions not to harm their economic relations with the Western firms. The international pressure on Iran and the unilateral and multilateral sanctions stands as

²¹⁸ "Turkey-Iran Trade Relations 1996-2012" Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK).

obstacle before deepening and widening of Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation.²¹⁹ The isolation of Iran by sanctions from the international system therefore is conceived by Turkey as a potential danger and risk given Iran's destabilizing option in the region.

In the light of these quantitative data as well as interviews, both the negative results of any potential conflict between West and Iran as well as sanctions led by UN Security Council and the West are irrecoverable threats for Turkish economy. Turkey has felt the negative results of Iraq war and United Nations Security Council sanctions in Iraq. Ankara feels that sanctions would only delay Iran's nuclear capability to produce a weapon, not discourage its nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, any sanctions can give irrecoverable damage to Turkey's interests. Therefore, considering its economic interests, Turkey has sought to take an active role in nuclear talk as a peace promoter.

Economic sanctions are criticized because Ankara wants to improve its economic relations with Iran. Moreover, Turkey has deeply experienced the negative consequences of coercive policies aimed at Iran's oil and gas industry. However, sanctions have the greatest effect if all countries apply them. Turkish exports to Iran have also suffered, falling 66% in 2013. Turkey's booming economy has felt the effect of the tightening sanctions.²²⁰ Ben Meir claimed that the increased sanctions have already affected Turkey's \$10 billion a year economic relationship with the Islamic Republic. Refined oil exports to Iran have also dropped significantly as a result of the sanctions which Turkey cannot defy with impunity.²²¹ It can be claimed that sanctions on Iran trade that negatively impact Turkey's national interest in economic sense has opened a channel to Turkey's mediation. In this sense, economic interests of Turkey in Iran have motivated itself to intervene to the conflict.

²¹⁹ Interview with Turkish high-level official, Diplomat in Tehran Embassy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, February 2014.

²²⁰ Joe Parkinson, "Iran Sanctions Put Wrinkle in Turkish Trade," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203961204577271281095768586.html>. (Accessed 10 January 2014)

²²¹ Alon Ben Meir, Turkey And Iran's Nuclear Challenge: Mediating With The Mullahs, *The World Today*, Vol. 66, No. 11 (November 2010) , p. 27-28

According to Mehmet Ozkan, expert on Iran at SETA, Turkey's efforts seems interest-oriented and points out that “Apart from Turkey's perception of itself being the ideal mediator geographically and culturally to engage with Iran, Turkey has some clear interests in reaching the trade routes of Central Asia as well as Iran's location on energy transit routes. There is a strong interest for Turkey in Iran led it engaging with peace efforts on Iran's nuclear program.”²²²

Taking these fundamental findings into consideration, Turkish mediation efforts are therefore frequently seen as means of furthering their own specific interests in economic sense. At this point, *material rewards* which Mitchell assert as mediator's motives, can be taken as a motive of Turkey in economic sense in the mediation efforts over Iran's nuclear program.

c) Interest on Energy

Energy is indeed another important national interest for Turkey engaging to Iran. Turkey imports about one fifth of its natural gas and one third of its oil from Iran and most of the trade between Iran and Turkey focuses on energy, especially crude oil and natural gas. Energy cooperation with Iran is an important field of Turkey's quest for strengthening economic relations with this country. Turkey's energy strategy is to realize its energy security through diversification of supply sources and then to contribute to Europe's energy security through major pipeline projects, realized and proposed, which will enhance Turkey's role as an important and reliable transit country.²²³ To this end, it can be argued that in order to preserve Iran as an alternative energy supplier, Turkey intended to play facilitator role in the conflict between two sides.

The UN Security Council and the unilateral US and the EU sanctions casts shadow over Turkish-Iranian energy partnership and declines Turkey's ambitions to strengthen energy cooperation with its next door neighbor. Turkey imports 30 percent of its gas from Iran and cannot afford detached relations with a prospective market, which is

²²² Interview with Mehmet Ozkan, expert on Iran at SETA in Ankara, March 2014.

²²³ "Turkey's Energy Strategy", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-politikasi.en.mfa (Accessed 10 January 2014)

probably what would happen if Turkey chose to carry out U.S. unilateral sanctions and pressured Iran not to enrich uranium in its territory.

The day after the Geneva announcement, Taner Yildiz, Turkey's Energy Minister, predicted that if sanctions were dropped, Turkey would be able to increase Iranian oil imports from 105,000 barrels per day to between 130,000 and 140,000.²²⁴

Ben Meir, professor of international relations and Middle East studies at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, touches upon this issue, "A violent conflict in Iran would lead to far worse consequences, such as considerable instability along Turkey's borders and increased threats to its significant economic interests throughout the region, including its ability to serve as an energy corridor to Europe from the Middle East and Central Asia."²²⁵

The stability of Iran, one of the main energy providers of Turkey, is of particular importance for Ankara because of its national interest on energy. This concern has been a motivation of Turkey to actively participate to peace efforts of conflict over Iran's nuclear program. Turkey's motive can be classified as *influence rewards* including tangible benefits considering Mitchell's classification.

Apart from energy relations, Turkey was trying to defend the autonomy of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to enrich uranium for producing electricity in their own territory and strengthen the right of NNWS to develop peaceful nuclear activities.²²⁶ Turkey aims to develop a peaceful nuclear energy, and has signed a deal with the Russian Federation to build a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu, Mersin. Moreover, Ankara is also trying to conclude a deal whereby Japan would build nuclear energy facilities in Turkey. Turkey's own plans for nuclear energy have affected its mediation efforts. Ankara has opposed any proposal intended to make it difficult for NPT parties

²²⁴Joe Parkinson, "Iran Sanctions Put Wrinkle in Turkish Trade," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203961204577271281095768586.html>. (Accessed 10 January 2014)

²²⁵Alon Ben Meir, "Turkey And Iran's Nuclear Challenge: Mediating With The Mullahs", *The World Today*, Vol. 66, No. 11 (November 2010), p. 27-28

²²⁶Gurzel, op. Cilt. p. 142

to access nuclear technologies for the purpose of producing nuclear energy; they have perceived these propositions as a threat to their nuclear aspirations²²⁷

As a conclusion, Ankara has dedicated its efforts to facilitating dialogue and preventing conflict to protect its interests from the shock waves of the crisis between the West and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. Political, economic and energy-focused interests of Turkey over Iran have motivated it to embrace mediator role. Therefore, Turkey's increasing aspiration to play a constructive role as a mediator can be connected to these national interests in other type of third party role as well.

3.2 Soft power and aspiration of international prestige

In line with the interviews held by Turkish decision makers and academicians, Turkey's desire to be known as peacemakers and soft power-oriented state becomes also distinct motivation of Turkey's mediation attempts in addition to national interest.

As a rising power paradigm, soft power takes a significant place in foreign policies of states in recent years. Coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term "soft power" is the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion.²²⁸ Paying more attention to the perceptions of other states and its prestige on the eyes of others, soft power is well known with its legitimate nature in international relations. In this context, mediation described as a legitimate policy in foreign policy toolbox in former chapters, is a striking example of soft power. Similarly to the national interest, calculations of enhancing the state's prestige and influence within the international system as main components of soft power are crucial motivation for states to mediate.

Peaceful resolution of conflicts has come to the fore as an important dimension of Turkey's diplomatic efforts. To this end, mediation efforts in regional conflicts are one

²²⁷ Sinan Ulgen, "The Security Dimension of Turkey's Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy and Non Proliferation Policies," in "The Turkish Model for that Transition to Nuclear Power," Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), December 2011, p. 138—139, <http://www.edam.org.tr/EDAMNukleer/edamreport.pdf>.

²²⁸ Joseph S. Nye. "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics". Public Affairs. 2004. p. 34

recent influential source of Turkey's soft power. Undertaking responsibility in peaceful resolution of conflicts in neighboring region stands as one of the central tools for enhancing Turkey's soft power and regional and global image. In the last decade, Turkey has widely operated as peacemaker for resolutions of conflicts and introduced Turkish foreign policy as a regional peace promoter. Turkey embraced the role of impartial mediator in several regional issues; the attempt to initiate dialogue with Hamas in 2005, the peace talks between Syria and Israel in 2008, the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008 and the ongoing efforts of Ankara to mediate between Iran and the international community regarding the nuclear issue.

As one of the dimension of peaceful foreign policy, these mediation efforts of Turkey are presented both as a cause and effect of Turkey's growing soft power.²²⁹ The diplomatic practices that emphasize ideals and utilize soft power have become more prominent in international relations due to the need for political legitimacy. To this end, playing an impartial mediator role in the conflicts, Turkey aims at enhancing the legitimacy of its foreign policy that in turn contributes to its soft power policy.

The points need to be recognized as peaceful foreign policy behavior of Turkey is that Turkey has prioritized diplomacy rather than war or the use of force in settlement of disputes. Moreover, Turkey's position has been based on the use of diplomacy in an efficient way to help resolve disputes and conflicts by directly intervening the conflicts as third party. Ankara aims to promote its regional peacemaker role and give more priority to democratic legitimacy in international relations.

In the process of mediation in Iran nuclear program, Turkey's diplomacy in the negotiations of the fuel-swap agreement and overall facilitation process was intended not only to protect its national interest, which would take damage by conflict, but also to consolidate Turkey's position as a influential country in resolving disputes in order to raise its status in the eyes of the international community. Tolga Demiryol, studying on soft power, claims that “Turkey seeks for a prestige and influence deriving from its soft power by undertaking mediator role. Ankara considered its role as a mediator in the Iran

²²⁹ Tolga Demiryol. “Poverty of soft power: evidence from Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East”. *European Journal of Research on Education*. 2013. p. 24-32

nuclear crisis both a source and an indication of Turkey's growing soft power. By playing an active role in the resolution of regional conflicts, Ankara hoped to raise its image as a responsible and impartial leader that solves problems by developing initiatives and forming broad coalitions with all relevant actors.”²³⁰

Some Turkish foreign policy makers evaluate Turkey's role in the Iran case as a part of its soft power capabilities and tendency to become a regional mediator. A Turkish diplomat claims “in line with its economic and democratic transformation as well as its enhanced soft power capabilities, Turkey has a growing presence as mediator in global affairs. Pursuing an active mediation policy with the soft power capabilities is a noteworthy aspect of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has utilized this capacity in Iranian nuclear issue as rising mediator in international affairs.”²³¹ Another Turkish diplomat asserted in a confidential interview that Turkish mediation efforts in Iran nuclear program serve the purposes related to “its trademark as peace promoter”. Turkey is seeking to constitute for itself the “image of an experienced mediator as an honest broker as well as a wise player interested in peace and stability both in its immediate neighborhood and beyond.”²³² As an important peacemaker in nuclear deal between Iran and the West, Turkey is perceived to be an honest broker and created a positive image that it proactively makes efforts.

Prof. Mesut Ozcan, the chairman of Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed that Turkey is still in a process of development to be an influential mediator in line with its “soft power policy”. According to him, in Tehran Declaration sample, Turkey has clearly utilized the natural attributes of its soft power both as a source and outcome of it through mediation.²³³

²³⁰ Ibid. p. 27

²³¹ Interview with Turkish high-level official, Directorate General of Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 3, 2014.

²³² Interview with Turkish high-level official, Directorate General of South Asia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 3, 2014.

²³³ Interview with Mesut Ozcan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 3, 2014.

Turkish academicians also make considerable reference on Turkey's inclination to be known as mediator role as one of the main pillar of motivations behind the peacemaker role in Iran's nuclear program. M. Akif Okur, professor in Ankara Strategy Institute, asserted that Turkey has used diplomacy as the most legitimate way in Iranian nuclear program to prevent a potential crisis in the region. It showed its soft power by laying out its contact with both the West and Iran. Although Turkey has hard power deficit as people have clearly witnessed in further development, mediation has met its deficit through its active contribution to the peace efforts to the conflict.²³⁴

Prof. Fuat Keyman from Sabancı University, expert on Turkish Foreign Policy and mediation, also attaches importance to Turkey's inclination to be regional mediator player as part of its active role in Iran nuclear issue. He asserts that Turkey also wished to consolidate its position as a strong regional player in resolving disputes and showed its willingness in Tehran Declaration.²³⁵

According to Dr. Aylin Gurzel, working on Iranian nuclear program, like Brazil, Turkey desired to raise its status in the eyes of the international community through its active involvement in the international efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, she also thinks that while all these factors contributed to its stance, however, Turkey's principal motivations were its past nuclear non-proliferation policy and its future prospects as a regional mediator.²³⁶

According to Assoc. Prof. Tarık Oğuzlu, studying on Turkish Foreign Policy, “mediation efforts will increase Turkey’s soft power, which is getting stronger in the Middle East. Turkey's new foreign policy, which doesn't ignore regional problems, perceives neighbor's problems as its own problems and proposes regional integration, will gain a lot of ground. Turkey's successful mediator role in the termination of crisis between Iran and the West will be evaluated as the success of its continuing rhythmic diplomacy and multidimensional foreign policy. Turkey's recently growing soft power

²³⁴ Interview with M. Akif Okur, Central Asia and Middle East Research Institute, Ankara, March 5, 2014

²³⁵ Telephone Interview with Keyman Fuat, Ankara, March, 5 2014

²³⁶ Aylin Gürzel. “A Turkish Perspective of the Swap Deal in Iran: Lessons Learned,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Special I issue, Summer 2012. p. 32

will be seriously affected by the Iran crisis.”²³⁷ He points out that any accomplishment in Tehran Declaration would bring a valuable prestige to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's facilitation efforts to persuade Iran to halt its enrichment activities would have a positive impact on the its soft power and indeed its rising soft power motivated Turkey to involve the process.

From an Iranian perspective, this idea is supported in that Siamak Kakaei claims that Turkey wants to prove that it can take on an international mediation role in order to show its value to the West.²³⁸

As it is seen, Turkey's tendency to become a regional player and present its soft power is one of the crucial motivator for Turkey's facilitation in Iran case. At the most basic level, mediation helps cultivate an image of Turkey as an honest broker interested in peace and stability in the region. This brings Turkey a more visible profile, enhanced stature and international prestige. Aiming at resolving the region's serious problems with dialogue and peace efforts increases the country's prestige in the Middle East as well as international arena. Through its mediator role, Turkey is in search of prestige, the gratitude of disputing parties, reputation benefits and larger aspirations for soft power within the region.

3.3 Motivation by Humanitarian and Moral Values

As mentioned in previous chapter, humanitarian concerns and moral values are gaining more importance in states' foreign policies. In this context, mediation is optimal policy tool to embrace humanitarian concerns in foreign policy decision making process. Mediators are not completely isolated from humanitarian concerns although other motivations dominate the mediator's behavior. Bercovitch and Kadayifci claim that

²³⁷Tarık Oğuzlu, “An Evaluation of the Turkey-Brazil-Iran Agreement in the Context of Turkish Foreign Policy”. ORSAM, No. 36 (November 2009), p. 5.

²³⁸ "Turkish Mediation Between Iran and the West: A Dream for Mounting Diplomatic Weight," Iran Review, 28 July 2008
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Turkish_Mediation_between_Iran_West_A_Dream_for_MountingDiplomatic_Weight.htm (8 May 2014)

some mediators have a genuine humanitarian interest; whereas others may have strategic interests when mediating.²³⁹

Together with the value-based and humanitarian political narrative, Turkey is committed to engage more with humanitarian diplomacy. According to Davutoğlu,

“One of the key explanatory principles of Turkish foreign policy – probably the most significant one in this period – is “humanitarian diplomacy”. Turkish foreign policy has increasingly adopted this quality of humanitarian diplomacy. On the one hand, this new stance underscores our endeavors to find solutions to crises, in particular within our region. On the other hand, it is a perspective that embraces the whole of mankind and aims to shoulder the responsibility of dealing with the full range of issues occupying the minds and consciences of mankind. Turkish foreign policy has adopted the approach of humanitarian diplomacy to tackle both regional crises and issues and challenges in the wider framework.”²⁴⁰

Considering mediation as part of humanitarian diplomacy and responsibility carried out by Turkey, Davutoğlu claims that Turkey will continue to contribute to all peace processes in the most effective manner.²⁴¹ This shows a clear mentality of Turkish decision maker how Turkey intends to embrace humanitarian and moral motivations while mediating.

Turkey actively endeavors in peace efforts by creating awareness to conflicts that have direct effect on global peace. According to a Turkish diplomat, "no one underestimates Turkey's humanitarian intentions while taking active role in facilitation process of Iran to bring an end to the conflict which goes to the war. Any war in this region not only would affect's interests but also cause number of death and casualties for human of this region." And he also points out that "garnering prestige and visibility are not the only

²³⁹ Bercovitch, J, & Kadayifci-Orellana, A S. “Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution.” *International Negotiation*. 2009 Vol.14 No.1 p.175-176

²⁴⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu “Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 41:6, (2013) p. 865-870

²⁴¹ Ibid.

driving forces behind Turkey's mediation efforts, but also humanitarian and moral motivations are determinant in the process of facilitation led by Turkey. The diplomat maintained “We're only interested in peace, acting with altruism and they come to us because we don't have any other agendas or ulterior motives rather than peace.”²⁴²

This reality is supported by Bayer and Keyman and they state that “the Turkish experience has not been based purely on an attempt to augment power and influence but, more importantly, on attempts to contribute to the creation and advancement of a human-focused norm for a better and more stable world.”²⁴³ Keyman claimed that Turkey's efforts need to be seen as one of the key “global humanitarian actors of world politics”.²⁴⁴ Keyman also contributes to debate that the recent Turkish contributions to conflict resolution and mediation need to be considered within Turkey's contributions to global security.²⁴⁵

The vision of reaching a regional and global peace and stability prompted Turkey to involve in peace process of Iran nuclear program. Candar claims that “Turkey considers integrating Iran into the international system as the most constructive endeavor in achieving global peace.”²⁴⁶ In addition to other motivations, Turkey also aims at bringing a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue to avert any tragedy that the populations live in the region would face. From some aspects, Turkey recognized the need of institutions to solve the dispute and avoid violence and sanctions that would cause damage to Iranian population; it recognized the sovereign rights to nuclear peaceful activities.²⁴⁷

Although humanitarian and moral approach to mediation is supported by some academicians and diplomats, there are some counter arguments to it. Mehmet Akif

²⁴² Interview with Turkish high-level official, Directorate General of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 7, 2014.

²⁴³ Reşat Bayer and Fuat E. Keyman, “Turkey: an emerging hub of globalization and internationalist humanitarian actor?” *Globalizations* 9 (2012): 73-90

²⁴⁴ Interview with E. Fuat Keyman, Ankara, March 2014

²⁴⁵ Interview with E. Fuat Keyman, Ankara, March 2014

²⁴⁶ Cengiz Çandar. “Turkey’s “Soft Power” Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World” SETA Policy Brief.

http://file.dc.setav.org/Files/Pdf/SETA_Policy_Brief_No_38_Turkeys_Soft_Power_Strategy_Candar.pdf

²⁴⁷ Interview with Turkish official, Directorate General of South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 7, 2014.

Okur, Professor in Ankara Strategy Institute, studying on the Turkey-Iran relations, points out that national interest are more forefront than moral concerns in facilitator role of Turkey in Iran nuclear case, although Turkey attaches importance to the humanitarian dimension of ending conflicts. He continued that changing regional dynamics and fragile environment of region motivated Turkey to take an active stance in issue.²⁴⁸ This shows the reality that national interest comes first compare with humanitarian motivations.

A Turkish diplomat also claims that in an environment that realist policies shape the decision, Turkey cannot act solely with moral and ethic foreign policy concern. Therefore, Turkey's peace efforts in Tehran Declaration cannot be read through the humanitarian motivations.²⁴⁹

In the light of interviews and data survey, it can be claimed that having a lower profile among motivations of Turkey's mediation, moral and humanitarian values have also played a role in shaping Turkey's mediation process.

As a result, Iran nuclear program is a delicate issue which has potential to lead the region to conflict in which all states taking place would affect. Turkey as one of them aimed at solving crisis in a peaceful manner by mediating between the West and Iran. In this process, I have reached three important motivations behind Turkey's mediation. Firstly, Turkey as a neighbor of Iran having great commercial and political relations, aimed at safeguarding its national interest in political and economical sense. Secondly, gaining a soft power in recent years Turkey desired to show its legitimate soft power and to raise its intention to be regional mediator. Lastly, Turkey claimed that it cares humanitarian concern and moral values in its foreign policy. To substantiate those aims, mediation has become an influential tool in its foreign policy.

²⁴⁸ Interview with M. Akif Okur, Central Asia and Middle East Research Institute, Ankara, March 5, 2014

²⁴⁹ Interview with Turkish official, Directorate General of Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, March 7, 2014.

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis was to find out the main motivations behind the rising peace efforts of Turkey as a foreign policy tool in Turkish foreign policy. The motivations that other mediators pursue were tested over Turkey in the mediation process of Iran's nuclear deal, in particular Tehran Declaration, signed by the facilitation of Turkey and Brazil.

In this thesis, the conflict and confrontation on Iran's nuclear programme between Iran and West and Israel has been test case to understand Turkey's mediation motives. Iran's effort to develop its nuclear programme is a matter of concern for international community. The US and its allies consider that Iran aims at producing a nuclear weapon through its program although Tehran denies it and claims it as a solely for peaceful purposes. The cost of this conflict has caused a cost in the region and affected negatively the countries located in the region. Turkey as one of the countries in the region has felt the consequences of the any instability raised in this geography. Therefore, Turkey has actively involved in the facilitation process of current dispute between Iran and the West.

The thesis starts with the assumption that there are three leading motivations that other mediators follow in their peace efforts: saving national interest, presenting soft power and seeking international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral concerns in foreign policy. I searched that to what extent those motivations are relevant for Turkey's ones.

The findings of this research indicate that those motivations are also proper to understand Turkey's rising efforts in mediation in conflicts of various regions, particularly in Tehran Declaration. National interests, aspiration to soft power and seeking international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral approaches motivated Turkey to facilitate in Tehran Declaration.

Turkey devoted its efforts by facilitating dialogue and preventing conflict in Iran to protect its interests from the shock waves of the crisis between the West and Iran over

the latter's nuclear program. The interests of Turkey in Iran's nuclear deal have been categorized in 3 groups, namely political, economic and energy-oriented interest. One of the main motivations of its mediator role is to maintain its own political security and stability against any negative effects of conflicts. In addition to that, since Turkey has some commercial interest in the region and important economic ties directly with Iran, any conflicts or sanctions against Iran constitutes a threat to Turkey's economic interest. Lastly, as an increasing energy seeker in the region, Turkey provides some important part of its energy supply through Iran. In line with this, Turkey aims at stabilizing its environ and decreasing tensions to save its interest in other third party roles in different regions as well. Therefore, given the outcome of findings, it can be claimed that one of the main motivations of its mediator role is national interest.

Beyond political and economic interests, aiming international prestige and using the opportunity to present its soft power, Turkish foreign policy utilized mediation as a foreign policy tool. Turkey with its evolving foreign policy has adopted more soft power tools in recent years. Economic interdependency, zero problem policy with its neighbors as well as peaceful settlement of disputes are well known parameters of its new foreign policy. In this occasion, mediator role and active participation to the peacemaking efforts in its region and beyond have been an important figure in soft power oriented Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Turkey's efforts in Tehran Declaration exemplifies Turkey's goal to gain a visible status within international community through its foreign policy framework as well as a chance to present its soft power to the region and beyond. Turkey considered this issue as an opportunity to act as a global player and achieve the construction of bridges between Western powers and the developing world as a way of strengthening its prestige and reputation. Turkey's mediation were intended not only to avoid sanctions that would damage Turkey's political and commercial interests with Iran, but also to the desire of the Turkey's decision-makers to establish the country as an influential actor in the shaping of the world order. In addition to the concern on international image of Turkey as an intermediate power, the need to present its soft power abilities urges Turkey to embrace mediator role.

Turkish foreign policy has focused more humanitarian diplomacy and ethics in recent years. Turkey's growing humanitarian activities and aids to least developed regions are a relatively new aspect for its foreign policy. There are several significant elements in the Turkish model for engagement with Africa in the humanitarian field. Turkey has used more and more humanitarian and idealist approaches and tools to promote its new moral foreign policy. To this end, moral and humanitarian concerns also motivated Turkey to pursue mediator role in the Iran nuclear issue. Turkish foreign policy aims to preserve humanitarian causes in its structure while bringing humanitarian aids to the less developed part of the worlds. Preventing the war or the conflicts that would give damage to the humanity are also concerns for Turkish foreign policy makers. Therefore, mediation is one of the best ways for itself to follow a humanitarian foreign policy paying attention to the peace in the world and region. However, in the light of interview held with decision-makers, comparing to other motivations, the last one has a low profile.

Taking into these considerations, Turkey's motivations to undertake a mediator role is in the same line with other leadings mediators in the world. National interests are inevitable part of foreign policies; therefore, it also constitutes the basis of Turkey's mediation motivation. International prestige and soft power are other crucial elements for Turkish mediation. Moral and humanitarian concerns also led Turkey to embrace a mediator role in the Iran nuclear issue. These above-mentioned motivations are visible in the other peace efforts of Turkey in the various conflicts.

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Radikal

Reuters

Tehran Bureau

The Financial Times

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USNew

Annex-I

The questions extended to interviewee are as follows:

- What roles do mediation and conflict resolution play in the overall formulation and conduct of Turkish foreign policy?
- Could we evaluate Turkey's mediation efforts from the view of Touval's famous approach "mediation as part of foreign policy"? Does Turkey undertake mediator role solely for its foreign policy objectives?
- Which motivators play influential role in Turkey's mediation efforts?
- Do you believe that Turkey undertakes mediator role to fulfill its national foreign policy interest and goals rather than altruistic reasons?
- What is the role of soft power in Turkey's pursuit for mediation in its foreign policy?
- Do we mention about the role of soft power for Turkey in facilitation process of Iran nuclear deal and to what extent?
- Have Turkey considered to develop its soft power in the region through active participation to peace process in Iran's program?
- To what extent humanitarian goals play a role in Turkey's mediation efforts in overall?
- Can we discuss Turkey's efforts with Brazil in the Iran's nuclear program from the perspective of humanitarian and moral foreign policy perspective?
- What is the interest of Turkey to take part in Iran's nuclear facilitation?
- Do we mention about any other motivations source for Turkey's active involvement in Tehran Declaration?

