



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

**A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INVOLVEMENT IN
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PROCESS AS A NORMATIVE POWER**

Hünkar Özgü ALICI

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2017

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KABUL VE ONAY


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Yrd. Doç. Dr. Taylan Özgür KAYA (Başkan)



Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar GÖZEN ERCAN



Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA (Danışman)

Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylım.

Prof. Dr. Sibel BOZBEYOĞLU


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- Serbest Seçenek/Yazarın Seçimi

18 /07/2017



Hünkar Özgü ALICI

ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandıđım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadıđımı, yararlandıđım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, Yrd. Do. Dr. Ayře mr ATMACA danıřmanlıđında tarafımdan retildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

Hnkar zg ALICI


To my beautiful family with love

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ABSTRACT

ALICI, Hünkar Özgü. *A Critical Overview of the European Union's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution Process as a Normative Power*. Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2017.

Since the 1970s, the European Union's distinctive characteristics have created a lively debate among International Relations (IR) scholars on its role concept and identity in international politics. In this framework, the concept of normative power was coined to explain the international profile of the Union on the basis of its founding norms and principles. In the post-Cold War era, dramatic changes in the international system have forced the Union to accelerate its initiatives to establish an effective foreign and security policy. With the end of the Cold War, the Union's effectiveness in these fields has been questioned by scholars. The Union's actions and policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have particularly been at the center of discussions. To shed light on this, this thesis undertakes to present a critical perspective on the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process as a normative power. To provide a clear theoretical ground, the Union's identity and profile in international politics are analysed from a constructivist point of view. In accordance with the arguments of the constructivist school of thought, this thesis addresses the Union's international identity and its impact on foreign policy, and outlines the concept of normative power. After an examination of the Union's foreign and security policy evolution and its objectives in its neighbourhood policy, the study proceeds to an analysis of the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process. In order to present a comprehensive and critical conceptual basis, Ian Manners's triple analysis method, which is based on examining the Union's principles, actions and outcomes arising from these is used. The main argument of this thesis is that because of the lack of consistency in the policies of member states, the Union cannot portray an effective actor profile in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Keywords

European Union, Identity, Constructivism, Normative Power, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

ÖZET

ALICI, Hünkar Özgü. *Normatif Bir Güç Olarak Avrupa Birliği'nin İsrail-Filistin Çatışma Çözüm Sürecine Dahil Olmasına Eleştirel Bir Bakış*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2017.

1970'lerden itibaren, Avrupa Birliği'nin kendine özgü karakteri Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenleri arasında, Birliğin uluslararası politikadaki rol kavramı ve kimliği üzerine hararetli bir tartışma yaratmıştır. Bu çerçevede normatif güç kavramı, Birliğin uluslararası profilini, kurucu norm ve prensipleri temelinde açıklamak için ortaya konulmuştur. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde uluslararası sistemdeki köklü değişiklikler, Birliği etkin bir dış politika ve güvenlik politikası kurmak için faaliyetlerini hızlandırmaya zorlamıştır. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte, Birliğin bu alanlardaki etkinliği akademisyenlerce sorgulanmıştır. Birliğin İsrail-Filistin çatışmasına yönelik eylem ve politikaları özellikle tartışmaların merkezinde olmuştur. Buna ışık tutmak için, bu tez Birliğin İsrail-Filistin çatışma çözüm sürecine bir normatif güç olarak dahil olması üzerine eleştirel bir bakış açısı taahhüt etmektedir. Açık bir kuramsal temel sağlamak için, Birliğin kimliği ve uluslararası politikadaki profili sosyal inşacılık perspektifinden analiz edilmektedir. İnşacı düşünce ekolünün argümanları doğrultusunda, bu tez Birliğin uluslararası kimliğine ve dış politikası üzerindeki etkilerine değinmekte ve normatif güç kavramının ana hatlarını belirtmektedir. Birliğin dış politika ve güvenlik politikası gelişimini ve komşuluk politikasının amaçlarını inceledikten sonra çalışma, Birliğin İsrail-Filistin çatışma çözüm sürecine dahil olmasının analizi ile devam etmektedir. Kapsamlı ve eleştirel bir kavramsal temel sunabilmek için Ian Manners'ın Birliğin prensipleri, eylemleri ve bunlardan doğan sonuçlarının incelenmesine dayanan üçlü analiz metodu kullanılmaktadır. Bu tezin temel argümanı, üye devletlerin politikaları arasındaki uyum eksikliği sebebiyle Birliğin İsrail-Filistin çatışmasında etkili bir aktör profili sergileyemediğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Avrupa Birliği, Kimlik, İnşacılık, Normatif Güç, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik politikası, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, İsrail-Filistin Çatışması

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEC	Central Elections Commission
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EDC	European Defence Community
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
EUBAM RAFAH	European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point
EUEOM	European Union Election Observer Mission
EUPOLCOPPS	EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
PEGASE	Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio- Economique (European Mechanism of Support to the Palestinians)
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
REDWG	Regional Economic Development Working Group
WEU	Western European Union

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU)¹ has aimed to have a common foreign and security policy since its establishment. In this regard, the Union has accelerated its efforts to improve its efficiency and credibility in international affairs mainly after the Cold War. Throughout this process, the Union has frequently underlined its objectives that include the preservation of peace and democracy and improving its political and economic cooperation with the third countries. In this regard, the International Relations (IR) literature has witnessed a fruitful debate on the actorness of the Union as the latter's distinctive characteristic has come to be commonly accepted by IR scholars.² The Union's attempts and actions in the fields of foreign and security policy have led to the concentration of arguments and critiques on the issue of actorness. In order to explain/understand the Union's actorness, several concepts and definitions have been used since the 1970s. In this regard, the concepts of "civilian power", "soft power", "military power" and "normative power" were introduced by scholars to clarify the Union's actorness in international politics.

The end of the bipolar system introduced new issues to the international agenda including new forms of terrorism, ethnic and regional conflicts and environmental issues. As a result of these dramatic developments, traditional IR theories were questioned and new approaches were introduced to the debate. These new approaches criticized the state-centric arguments of the mainstream approaches and took other actors/agents/groups into consideration to better understand international affairs. Consequently, the late 1980s witnessed the rise of the constructivist approach that underlined the importance of ideational factors in world politics and challenged traditional theories' premises regarding the international system's characteristics. Constructivist scholars argued that the agents'/actors' behaviors and identities emerge in the social interaction process and shape the international political environment. In contrast to traditional theories, constructivists underline the significance of the

¹ Hereafter, the term "the Union" will be used to refer to "the European Union", "the European Economic Community" and "the European Community".

² It has been commonly argued by scholars that since the Union can be classified neither as a traditional intergovernmental organization nor as a state, it should be treated as *sui generis* by considering its identity and non-traditional character. In the following chapters of the study, the Union's distinctive characteristics will be examined in detail.

correlation between the concept of identity and foreign policy practices of actors. Moreover, they consider identities as filters that shape actors' actions.

In accordance with the developments both in the international system and in the IR literature, the concept of normative power began to have broad repercussions and was used to explain the actorness of the Union in international politics. Ian Manners, the scholar who coined this concept, argues that the Union acts in world politics in accordance with its founding norms, values and principles which are defined as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. He claims that the Union, by acting in accordance with these founding principles and norms, has the capability to shape "the understanding of normal"³ in world politics. To clarify his arguments he presents the existing founding treaties, declarations, foreign policy practices of the Union and gives, as examples, the abolition of death penalty and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. As a response to the increasingly vocal critiques of the concept of normative power Europe, he suggests to test the normativeness of the Union by examining three steps: *principles, actions and outcomes*. In other words, he argues that by analysing the Union's principles (legal basis and official statements) and actions (foreign policy practices), the Union's normative nature can be seen.

In addition to the lively debate on the issue of the Union's actorness in international politics, the Union's actions towards some international crises caused intense discussions among IR scholars. The Union's inconsistent and ineffective position in these international conflicts (including, but not limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Yugoslav War and the Gulf War) caused great suspicion over the effectiveness and normativeness of the Union. Particularly in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been at the top of the international agenda since 1948, the Union's foreign and security policy practices have led to many criticisms both among scholars and on the part of the conflicted parties.

The Union's direct and official involvement in the conflict can be traced back to the 1970s, a period that witnessed the beginning of the Union's efforts to improve its foreign and security policy. Although its first clear statements were made in the 1970s,

³ Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, p. 239.

even before that the Union had considered the region as an important part of its foreign policy agenda because of its historical ties with the region. Increasing violence among the conflicted parties and its political and economic consequences obliged the Union to get involved in the conflict. Through its involvement, the Union both sought to preserve political and economic stability in the region and aimed to increase its political prestige in international affairs. Yet, because of several internal and external factors, the Union could not reach its stated goals. In this regard, the intergovernmental nature of its decision making procedure on the fields of foreign and security policy, diverging interests among the member states and the lack of consistency can be seen as the internal determinants of the Union's lack of effectiveness. In terms of external determinants, the geopolitical conditions during and after the Cold War, diversifying interests between the Union and the United States (US) and the breakout of regional and international crises can be listed.

Accordingly, the main goal of this thesis is to contribute to the existing literature on the actorness of the Union and effectiveness of its foreign and security policy. By examining its effectiveness as a normative power in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the thesis aims to present a critical and comprehensive account of the Union's role in and contribution to world politics. At this point, the study seeks to address a critical question: To what extent has the Union, as a normative actor, acted effectively in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? There are also secondary questions to be addressed in the thesis:

- Does the Union act as a *global* normative power in world politics? If not, what are the main reasons behind this failure to project its normative basis?
- To what extent has the Union managed to develop a common and effective foreign and security policy?
- What are the internal and external factors behind the Union's ineffectiveness in the case of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict?

To this end, the qualitative research method will be used in general terms. By using discursive analysis, primary and secondary sources will be examined. To this end, relevant, books and articles, founding treaties of the Union, its official statements, declarations and speeches/arguments of official representatives of the Union will be

analysed. In order to draw a clear theoretical and conceptual framework, a critical constructivist approach will be adopted. By following Manners's triple analysis process, particularly in the third chapter, the study aims to present a critical perspective on both the actorness and normativeness of the Union in international affairs.

This thesis composes of three main chapters. After this introductory part, the first chapter lays out the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. In the first section of the chapter, the main premises of the constructivist approach are outlined and the study proceeds with an analysis of the concept of identity. By presenting a clear picture through these analyses, the study examines the main concept of the thesis, normative power. In this regard, the constructivist scholars' (e.g. Nicholas Onuf, Emanuel Adler, Alexander Wendt, Ian Manners, Thomas Diez, Nathalie Tocci and Jutta Weldes) arguments are used to sort out the subject matter. After the analysis of the concept of normative power, the last section of the chapter presents the critiques of the concept. The overall aim of this chapter is to provide a clear understanding on the actorness of the Union and question its "normative" nature from a critical point of view.

The second chapter of the thesis examines the evolution of the Union's foreign and security policy and of its neighbourhood policy under three separate sub-headings. After analysing the efforts of the Union to establish an influential foreign and security policy from the 1950s up until 1990, the next section continues with the Union's post-Cold War initiatives. As part of this section, founding treaties, declarations, official statements of the Union are examined. The last section presents the establishment and objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The overall aim of this chapter is to question the effectiveness of the Union's foreign and security policy and its neighbourhood policy.

The third chapter focuses on the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this part, Manners's triple analysis process is used as a method to provide a clear understanding of the involvement of the Union in the conflict. In order to clarify the conceptual and methodological framework of the chapter, the triple analysis process is presented in a table, outlining its main features. The first section of the chapter analyses the first period of the Union's involvement in the conflict that is the early 1970s to the end of the Cold War. Since the main aim is to examine the Union's involvement in the

conflict, the research will be limited to an analysis of the Union's principles, actions and the outcomes of these. The next section proceeds with the examination of the Union's involvement in the conflict in the post-Cold War era by following the same three-step process. In this regard, official statements, declarations and multilateral-bilateral efforts of the Union will be under scrutiny. On the whole, this chapter aims to reach a critical understanding of the Union's actorness in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by presenting its weaknesses and strengths as a party involved in the conflict resolution process.

The conclusion aims to present comprehensive concluding remarks on the issue of the Union's actorness in world politics and its consistency in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is believed that an analysis of the arguments on the actorness of the Union in international politics and of its foreign and security policy evolution from a critical constructivist point of view will provide us a clear vision to answer the main research question of the thesis: To what extent has the Union, as a normative actor, acted effectively in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

CHAPTER 1

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity not only introduced new actors in world politics, but also brought about new issues, such as ethnic conflicts, new forms of terrorism and environmental issues which had not been on the international agenda during the Cold War. In accordance with these dramatic political changes, the Union aimed to increase its influence on issues of foreign policy and introduced itself as the defender of international norms and rules. In this period, IR scholars intensively focused on understanding and explaining the Union's *sui generis* characteristics and its impact on world politics.

This period was also marked by the rise of the constructivist approach in IR that posed a critical challenge towards mainstream theories on issues of identity, national interest and the features of the international system. The concept of identity has been used among critical scholars, including constructivists, to understand foreign policy objectives and actions of the Union particularly since the 1990s. From a constructivist point of view, the concept of identity is closely associated with the concept of interest and comprises of several determinants including historical experiences, demographical and geographical conditions, traditions, language, ethnicity, religion etc. In this regard, it is possible to state that international actions of the Union have both internal (identity) and external (wars, conflicts, economic-political crises) determining factors. The Union acts in international affairs in accordance with its identity and interests that are socially constructed in a process of interaction.

At this point it will not be wrong to state that the outbreak of the Yugoslav War and the ensuing dissolution of Yugoslavia, an ethnic conflicts which can be described as a small scale world war, were one of the major factors that forced the Union to be a more

effective actor in world politics.⁴ In this regard, the Union focused its initiatives on strengthening its political, economic and military presence by signing the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon, and developing new institutions and programs “to make the EU more efficient and transparent, to prepare for new member countries and to introduce new areas of cooperation”.⁵

The developments in the post-Cold War international environment not only increased questions over the Union’s effectiveness and capabilities to prevent or end these kinds of international and regional crises, but also brought about new terms to define the actorness of the Union. These included the term “normative power”⁶, as well as the reawakened notion of “civilian power”⁷ which brought about suspicion towards the Union’s foreign policy aims as scholars began to question whether it is a “*mission civilisatrice*”⁸. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, discussions on the issues of actorness and identity of the Union in international politics have accelerated among IR scholars and have created lively debates on the “unique” characteristics of the Union. However, recent discussions over the Union’s identity in international affairs have clustered around the concept of normative power Europe which seeks to describe the Union as a “norm promoting” actor.

Since the main aim of this thesis is to present a critical perspective on the Union’s involvement into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process as a normative power, this chapter aims to provide a deeper understanding of the concepts of European identity and normative power from a constructivist point of view. When we consider the relationship between the concepts of interest and identity and the arguments on the

⁴ With the end of the Cold War, ultra-nationalist/radical voices in Yugoslavia increased, which accelerated the dissolution of the country. The post-1990s developments in international affairs led to tragic consequences as in conflicts among small Balkan countries. For more information about the dissolution of Yugoslavia see: Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2003; Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *The Balkans Beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2008; Kate Transchel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia: Conflict in the Balkans*, Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 2007.

⁵ European Union, EU Treaties, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm, (Accessed on 30 June 2016).

⁶ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, pp. 235-258.

⁷ François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, in Max Kohnstamand Wolfgang Hager (ed.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Community*, London, Macmillan, 1973, p. 19.

⁸ Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, “‘This is my EUtopia...’: Narrative as Power”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, November, 2002, pp. 767–792.

Union's actorness in international affairs, examining off the concept of identity is believed to be necessary in order to clarify and understand the Union's actions as a normative power. While doing this, discourse analysis will be used as the method. In this analysis official documents and statements where the Union defines its own identity as a normative power, norm promoter will be highlighted. Thus, in order to provide a theoretical and epistemological ground for the examination of normative power Europe, the first part of this chapter begins with the examination of the constructivist approach and proceeds with an analysis of the concept of identity. In the second section, the concept of normative power Europe will be analysed after presenting its predecessors' assumptions, including civilian power and military power, in order to draw a clear picture. After defining the notions of "norms" and "normative", the section proceeds with the various dimensions of the normative power Europe approach, and presents the normative basis of the Union by examining its official documents. This section aims to present Manners's arguments and claims to provide a clear ground for the next section in which critiques on the notion of normative power Europe are handled. The last section examines the critical perspectives towards the normative power Europe approach by categorizing these critiques into four groups: the first group of critiques regard the unclearness and the weakness of the concept of normative power Europe; in the second group of critiques, the Union's lack of "normative" tendencies in some specific regions will be handled by questioning whether the Union's external initiatives are mainly derived from normative principles or from strategic interests; the third group of critiques are about the geographical limits of the concept of normative power Europe that bring about the question of whether the Union is a "regional normative power" instead of being a global normative power and finally, the limitations of the Union's actorness is analysed through a process-oriented approach which involves presence, capability and opportunity.

In accordance with these, the aim is to clarify the main concept of the thesis, normative power, by exposing its theoretical and epistemological grounds. At the end of this comprehensive analysis, the study seeks to provide a clear conceptual framework for the following chapters that will analyse the evolution of the Union's foreign and security policy and neighborhood policy, as well as its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process.

1.2. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF “NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE”: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND IDENTITY

Due to the distinctive characteristics of the Union, traditional IR theories were not willing to define it as an actor in world affairs.⁹ However, with the structural changes in the international system, the constructivist approach emerged and questioned the mainstream scholars’ arguments asserting that the Union has considerable influence with its distinctive foreign policy instruments, such as signing Stability and Association Agreements, implementing political or economic sanctions towards third parties in world politics.¹⁰ In opposition to mainstream theories’ arguments, the constructivist approach defines “actorness” as “a function both of external opportunities and internal capabilities” which are the agent’s resources and political intentness.¹¹ In this regard, constructivist scholars argue that, by virtue of the integration of European countries, the Union’s capabilities have been increasing at both the regional and the international levels.¹²

The usefulness of the constructivist approach derives from its explanatory power in relation to the normative dimensions of the Union’s identity in international affairs, including its capacity as a norm promoter that is the “capability to change the understanding of normal in world politics”.¹³ When the foundation process of the Union, its structural evolution over the years and its self-identification in official documents are examined, as these are also frequently used in normative power Europe studies to present the Union’s normative characteristic and criticize the “normative

⁹ Roy H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, p. 12.

¹⁰ European Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/about/index_en.htm, (Accessed on 22 November 2016); European Commission, Enlargement, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm, (Accessed on 22 November 2016).

¹¹ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 29; Anastasia Chebakova, "Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: A Constructivist Approach", *The Maturing European Union*, ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference, Edmonton, Alberta 25-27 September 2008, p. 6.

¹² Chebakova, "Theorizing the EU", p. 6.

¹³ Manners, "Normative Power Europe", p. 239.

nature” claims, it becomes clear that constructivism provides a wider analysis of the Union’s actorness.

In a similar vein, discussions on the identity of the Union have increased particularly with the growing role of the Union in the international arena since the end of the Cold War.¹⁴ This term can also be associated with the ascent of the constructivist approach in the IR discipline.¹⁵ In this regard, since constructivists highlight the importance of subjectivity and ideational determinants in world politics, IR scholars have intensively studied the growing influence and the *sui generis* character of the Union from a constructivist point of view by focusing on the concept of European/EU identity.¹⁶ Since the Union’s actorness has been at the centre of these discussions, the clarification of the concept of identity is significant to understanding the reasons and consequences of the Union’s internal and external actions.¹⁷ Accordingly, the main reason behind applying the constructivist approach is that the highlighted issues in constructivism, which were ignored by mainstream theories during the Cold War, are believed to allow us to examine and understand the identity and in turn the foreign policy actions of the Union in world politics.¹⁸

On the issues of actorness and identity of the Union, IR scholars mainly apply the constructivist approach, which also provides a theoretical ground for the arguments

¹⁴ Yosef Lapid, “Culture Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory”, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp. 12-14.

¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change International Politics”, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 48; Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory” in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, Routledge, 2002, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring, 1992, p. 399; Ronald L. Jefferson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security Policy”, *The Culture of National Security*, 1996, pp. 34-36; Zeynep Arkan, “‘Via Media’ vs. the Critical Path: Constructivism(s) and the Case of EU Identity”, *All Azimuth*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, p. 23; Alexander Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 5, December, 1998, pp. 103-107.

¹⁷ Alasdair R. Young, “The European Union as a Global Regulator? Context and comparison”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 9, 2015, pp. 1234-1236;

¹⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2 January, 1998, pp. 324-325; Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change International Politics”, pp. 48-49; Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, p. 280.

regarding the concept of normative power Europe.¹⁹ As a consequence of the growing impact of the Union in world affairs after the Cold War, scholars have offered different descriptions for the Union's identity and global role. While some of them introduced the Union as a "Kantian miracle"²⁰ and a "vanishing mediator"²¹, others, such as the then Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens, defined the Union as an "economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm"²² as a response to the Union's actions during the Gulf War. In this regard, the examination of the concept of identity from a constructivist point of view will clarify the issue of the actorness of the Union in international politics since many constructivist scholars and the Union itself utilize the term "normative power" in order to explain the current situation.

1.2.1. Constructivism

In the simplest term, it is possible to state that in the wake of enormous changes in the international system in the late 1980s, constructivists aimed to focus on issues that had been ignored by mainstream theories. In other words, they highlighted the importance of ideational factors and the subjectivity of world politics. Instead of accepting the agents/actors' and international system's features and characteristics as given, constructivists argued that the existing social environment shapes the agents' behaviors and identities, and in a similar vein, agents' actions shape the international political environment.²³ In this regard, Nicholas Onuf who introduced this new approach to the IR literature argued that "human beings are social beings and, we would not be human but for social relations"²⁴. In addition to that, Emanuel Adler argued that the interaction

¹⁹ Anna Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power' in International Relations: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges", *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, Vol. 18, 2015, p. 112.

²⁰ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York, Vintage Books, 2004, p. 135.

²¹ Ian Manners, "The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 174.

²² Mark Eyskens, Former Belgian Foreign Minister, 1991 in Craig R. Whitney, "War in the Gulf: Europe; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity", *The New York Times*, 25 January 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html>, (Accessed on 07 October 2016).

²³ John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn, 1998, p. 856.

²⁴ Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual", in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert (eds.), 1989, p. 58.

between agents and the structure is dynamic and can change during the process.²⁵ Alexander Wendt, who is one of the pioneers of the constructivist approach, argued that, unlike traditional theories' "security oriented conceptions of state interests"²⁶ in an anarchic system, constructivism holds that "anarchy is what states make of it".²⁷ In other words, Wendt claimed that neo-realists' arguments regarding the nature of the international environment as a self-help system are not correct; rather the international system is the product of our making and is shaped in a process of interaction.

In contrast to mainstream approaches, concepts of norms, rules, values are considered as important determinants of international relations, and besides states, international organizations are also seen as significant international actors.²⁸ Taking into consideration the new political environment in the aftermath of the Cold War, constructivists see that cooperation is possible among international actors, and they highlight the importance of ideational and normative elements such as norms and international rules, in this process.²⁹

One of the most significant assumptions of the constructivist approach is about how it views reality. From a rationalist/positivist point of view, the international political environment can only be explained via scientific methods that present the external and observable reality.³⁰ On the contrary, reflectivist/post-positivist scholars underline the inter-subjective nature of social reality and use non-positivist such as discourse analysis, to understand world affairs.³¹ Post-positivist scholars, at this point, explain the reason for not applying scientific methods, in the first place, by underlining the importance of

²⁵ Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, 1997, p. 322.

²⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it", pp. 400-405.

²⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it", p. 395.

²⁸ Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground", p. 329; Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn", pp. 344-346.

²⁹ Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground", p. 323.

³⁰ Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, p. 8 cited in Arkan, "'Via Media' vs. the Critical Path", p. 24; Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer, 1998, p. 171.

³¹ Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground", p. 328; Peter L. Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Penguin, UK, 1991, pp. 26-29; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil "Revisiting the 'National': Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?", in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Lynne Rienner Pub., 1996, p. 121.

interpreting social reality.³² Jutta Weldes underlines the importance of the interpretation process in foreign policy making and argues that “before state officials can act for the state, they need to engage in a process of interpretation in order to understand both what situation the state faces and how they should respond to it”.³³

It is necessary to note that constructivism has diversifying arguments within itself and can be divided into different categories. According to one of the well-known categorizations, it can be divided into two approaches: conventional and critical constructivism.³⁴ While conventional constructivists advocate that ideational elements have influence on states’ actions, they also share the arguments of mainstream theories about understanding reality by using scientific methods.³⁵ According to Wendt and John Gerard Ruggie, the constructivist approach is ontologically different from mainstream theories although containing positivist epistemology in itself.³⁶ Contrary to conventional constructivists, critical constructivists have common arguments with post-positivist approaches such as post-structuralism, feminism and post-modernism.³⁷ Critical constructivists mainly use discourse analysis in order to understand international relations.³⁸ They also highlight the discursively constructed nature of interests.³⁹ While mainstream theories, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, argue that states’ interests and identities are given; critical approaches, such as post-structuralism and feminism, highlight the transformation and construction of identities and interests of agents in a

³² Ole Wæver, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 164; Samuel Knafo, “Critical Approaches and the Problem of Social Construction: Reassessing the Legacy of the Agent/Structure Debate in IR”, *The Centre for Global Political Economy*, University of Sussex, Working Paper No.3, June, 2008, pp. 4-7; Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism”, pp. 171-172.

³³ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, pp. 276-277.

³⁴ Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground”, pp. 322-323; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 191-192; Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn”, pp. 327-328.

³⁵ Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn”, p. 328; Buzan and Hansen, “The Evolution of International Security Studies”, p. 194; Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The politics of reality*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2004, pp. 6-7.

³⁶ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”, pp. 879-880; Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation”, pp. 102-103; Zehfuss, “Constructivism in International Relations”, p. 251.

³⁷ Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, September, 1989, pp. 239-241; Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 71-72.

³⁸ Buzan and Hansen, “The Evolution of International Security Studies”, p. 198; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3, September, 1993, p. 302.

³⁹ Buzan and Hansen, “The Evolution of International Security Studies”, p. 198; Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, p. 277.

social interaction process.⁴⁰ In other words, constructivists argue that identities and interests are entities that are socially constructed. It can be concluded that the methodological similarities of conventional constructivism with mainstream theories led to the labeling of the conventional wing as the “middle ground” between positivist and post-positivist approaches.⁴¹

One of the most notable divergences among these two constructivist approaches are their distinct approaches to the concept of identity. Conventional constructivists argue that particular identities occur in particular circumstances and these particular identities create particular interests and actions.⁴² On the other hand, critical constructivists mainly focus on the question of *how* some identities provide the grounds for specific external actions of agents.⁴³ Addressing *how-questions* is one of the characteristics of the critical constructivists that distinguish them from conventional constructivists, who mainly focus on *why-questions*.⁴⁴ According to Jutta Weldes, Wendt assumes identities and interests of states as the products of inter-state interaction, an approach that undermines, however, the impacts of internal determinants, such as the “political and historical context”, that cannot be disregarded.⁴⁵ In other words, Weldes criticizes Wendt for approaching states from a “typical realist fashion” that views states as “black

⁴⁰ Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground”, pp. 322-323; Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning”, p. 554; Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, p. 393; Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation”, p. 102; E. Sare Yilmaz, “Political Identity Building in the EU: A Constructivist Approach”, *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2014, pp. 63-64.

⁴¹ Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground”, p. 322, Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change”, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3, Summer, 2001, p. 553; Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, London, New York, 2010, p. 62; Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1989; Karin M. Fierke, “Constructivism”, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, (eds.), *International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 172.

⁴² Buzan and Hansen, “The Evolution of International Security Studies”, p. 197; Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, pp. 279-280; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, p. 397; Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity A Dangerous Liaison”, in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2006, p. 94.

⁴³ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, pp. 279-280; Weber, “International Relations Theory A Critical Introduction”, pp. 62-63.

⁴⁴ Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction”, pp. 302-303; Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, p. 283.

⁴⁵ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, p. 280; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security”, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, 1996, pp. 11-12.

boxes”.⁴⁶ Contrary to Wendt’s and conventional constructivists’ arguments on identity and interest formation, Weldes underlines the importance of the socially constructed nature of these two concepts through internal and external interactions, and notes that national interests are legitimized during the “process of their construction”.⁴⁷

It is argued here that a constructivist approach that builds on the linguistic processes at play in the construction of the identities and interests of actors would be fruitful in analysing the international presence and actorness of the Union as a novel kind of international actor. Therefore, instead of envisaging a causal relationship between the identity/interests and foreign policies of the actors, this thesis will apply a discourse analysis approach in its attempt to shed light on the main reference points and norms that serve as the building blocks of the Union’s identity and its foreign policy in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1.2.2. The Concept of Identity

As it was stated above, one of the significant assumptions of the constructivism is that identities of agents are constructed and transformed in a process of interaction.⁴⁸ In other words, they are not something new or given rather they are socially constructed.⁴⁹ It is also possible to see the definition of the concept as similar to the usages of

⁴⁶ Weldes, "Constructing National Interests", p. 280.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 280-281.

⁴⁸ Buzan and Hansen, "The Evolution of International Security Studies", pp. 198-201; Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security", p. 12; Yosef Lapid, "Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New Direction", in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (eds.), *Identities, Borders, Orders Rethinking International Relations Theory*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines, Vol. 18, Minneapolis, London, 2001, pp. 2-3; Neil Harvey, "The Political Nature of Identities, Borders, and Orders: Discourse and Strategy in the Zapatista Rebellion", in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (eds.), *Identities, Borders, Orders Rethinking International Relations Theory*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines, Vol. 18, Minneapolis, London, 2001, pp. 252-253.

⁴⁹ Ronald L. Jefferson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security Policy", in Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 1996, pp. 33-34; Weldes, "Constructing National Interests", pp. 280-282; Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 2009, p. 146; Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 29.

Anderson's "imagined communities"⁵⁰ and Ernest Gellner's "inventing nations"⁵¹ in the constructivist school of thought.

On the other hand, from a constructivist point of view, identities can be seen as lenses or filters that designate *how* actors should/can act and set out their foreign policies.⁵² Due to this correlation between identities and actions, the dynamic nature of identities also influences interests and foreign policies of actors. Distinctions among groups/agents/states create different types of identities as a consequence of the interaction between agents.⁵³ In this regard, Iver B. Neumann argued that "the self and the other merge into one another".⁵⁴

It can be stated that the concept of identity became a popular analytical tool among IR scholars particularly after late the 1980s, a period during which the international political structure changed.⁵⁵ With the rising in the popularity of the constructivist approach, scholars began to pay close attention to the concept of identity since mainstream theories did fail to explain ongoing events and changes in international affairs.⁵⁶ In a similar vein, no substantial approach had dealt with European identity until the end of the Cold War.⁵⁷ Accordingly, constructivist approach became one of the most referenced theoretical ground that provided a clear understanding of European identity and its relationship to the external actions of the Union.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, New York, 1991, p. 6.

⁵¹ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, Widenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964.

⁵² Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", p. 31; Weldes, "Constructing National Interests", p. 282.

⁵³ Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", p. 29; Weber, "International Relations Theory A Critical Introduction", p. 66; Zehfuss, "Constructivism in International Relations", pp. 40-42.

⁵⁴ Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 36.

⁵⁵ Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security", p. 1.

⁵⁶ Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", p. 29; Zehfuss, "Constructivism in International Relations", pp. 40-43; Whæver, "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy", pp.20-21.

⁵⁷ Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power'", p. 112; Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", pp. 32-34; Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.151; Wæver, "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy", p. 25.

⁵⁸ Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power'", p. 112; Yılmaz, "Political Identity Building in the EU", pp. 64-65; Lene Hansen, "Introduction", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic states*, Routledge, 2002, p. 7.

Wendt argues that identities consist of several norms, values and international rules, and allow actors to answer the question of “who am I- are we”.⁵⁹ While providing the characteristics of “we”/self, they also define the “others” by drawing a distinction between the self and the other.⁶⁰ By underlying the importance of the interpretation of social reality and its impact on the construction of identities in a process, constructivists argue that boundaries between the self and the other are reflections of this interpretation process.⁶¹ Accordingly, the Union establishes relations with third parties in accordance with its identity by drawing a border between itself and its others.⁶² Some scholars claim that the integration process is one of the most determining factors that shape the Union’s identity.⁶³ In addition to this, the enlargement issue, which is seen by scholars as the Union’s most successful political instrument is also strongly tied to the identity construction process as it expands the Union both geographically and demographically.⁶⁴ The enlargement of the Union draws various types of boundaries between the member states and the rest of the world politically, religiously and ethnically.⁶⁵ As a consequence of every enlargement process, the Union embraces new identities, which implies the enhancement of the European identity itself.

In the first place, it can be stated that many scholars use the concepts of “European”, “Europe” and “the European Union” interchangeably to define a single identity, while

⁵⁹ Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, p. 419; Manners, “The ‘Difference Engine’”, p. 4; Skolimowska, “The European Union as a ‘Normative Power’”, pp. 115-118; Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010, p. 788.

⁶⁰ Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it”, pp. 397-399; Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.8, No.2, 1994, p. 385.

⁶¹ Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference”, p. 36; Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”, p. 94; Neumann, “Uses of Other”, pp. 33-36; Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, pp. 281-283.

⁶² Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to difference”, p. 28; Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, p. 283.

⁶³ Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, pp. 152-154; Yılmaz, “Political Identity Building in the EU”, p. 57; McLaren, “Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration”, pp. 70-73.

⁶⁴ Yılmaz, “Political Identity Building in the EU”, p. 57; Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference”, p. 41; Nathalie Tocci, “The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor”, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008, pp. 25-27.

⁶⁵ Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p. 154; Yılmaz, “Political Identity Building in the EU”, p. 57.

others claim that these have different meanings and contents.⁶⁶ However, the argument of this thesis is in line with the former assumption and takes into consideration the constructivist approach's arguments. In line with this, it is argued here that the identity of the Union is a combination of several (constructed) historical, political, geographical factors. In other words, geographical borders of the Union, or the limitations of its influence, existing nationalities, previous historical experiences, adopted norms and values should be considered together while analysing the identity of the Union.

The constitution of the European/EU identity is a consequence of several internal and external determinants that reformed the Union's identity.⁶⁷ In this regard, German unification can be counted as one of the dramatic internal events that affected the evolution and development of the European identity since it had political and economic impacts on the Union's integration process.⁶⁸ Discussions on the European identity began to increase among scholars with the emergence of several internal and external events. For instance, some scholars argue that rising numbers of refugees and migrants brought new identities into the Union that directly or indirectly caused the transformation of the European identity in the aftermath of the Cold War.⁶⁹

When official documents of the Union are examined, the correlation between the European identity and external actions becomes clear.⁷⁰ For instance, the Declaration on European Identity of 1973 can be seen as a pioneering initiative in order to legitimize

⁶⁶ Brigid Laffan, "The European Union and Its Institutions as 'Identity Builders'", in Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 96; Arkan, "'Via Media' vs. the Critical Path", p. 30.

⁶⁷ Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", p. 31; Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power'", p. 123; Hansen, "Introduction", p. 9.

⁶⁸ Martin J. Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 120-128; Lauren M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 25-28.

⁶⁹ McLaren, "Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration", pp. 136-138; Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference", pp.28-29; Gemma Scalise, "The Narrative Construction of European Identity: Meanings of Europe 'from below'", *European Societies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2015, p. 598; Brian Greenhill, "Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008, pp. 343-347; Ian Manners, "The 'Difference Engine': Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union", *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute*, 2001, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁰ Kai Hebel and Tobias Lenz, "The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2016, Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 473; Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy Power Seeking in a Globalized Era*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, p. 88; Ben Tonra, "Constructing the CFSP: The utility of a cognitive approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 734-735.

the European identity which was followed by several other official documents.⁷¹ In the 1973 Declaration, the nine members of the Union stated:

[t]he European Identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.⁷²

The Nine also underlined the significance of shared norms, values and culture of the Union as the parts of the European identity:

[t]he Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice-which is the ultimate goal of economic progress-and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity.⁷³

Another important document was a report prepared by Leo Tindemas on the issue of European identity to the European Council in 1975. Tindemas stated in his report:

The aim of European Union should be to overcome the age-old conflicts which are often artificially maintained between nation States, to build a more humane society in which along with mutual respect for our national and cultural characteristics, the accent will be placed more on the factors uniting us than on those dividing us.⁷⁴

Subsequently, the 1985 Adonnino Reports, the Dooge Report and the 1993 De Clercq Report followed this initiative and highlighted common arguments on the issue of identity, objectives and culture of the Union. The Dooge Report underlined the interactive relation between the political actions of the Union and its identity:

Europe's external identity can be achieved only gradually within the framework of common action and European political cooperation (EPC) in accordance with the rules applicable to each of these. It is increasingly evident that interaction between these two frameworks is both necessary and useful. They must therefore be more

⁷¹ Federiga Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview", in Federiga Bindi (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 21; Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?*, England, Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 76-77.

⁷² Document on the European Identity, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, http://aei.pitt.edu/4545/1/epc_identity_doc.pdf, (Accessed on 07 October 2016).

⁷³ Document on the European Identity.

⁷⁴ Leo Tindemas, "Report on European Union", *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76, http://aei.pitt.edu/942/1/political_tindemans_report.pdf, (Accessed on 07 October 2016).

closely aligned. The objective of European political cooperation must remain the systematic formulation and implementation of a common external policy.⁷⁵

It was highlighted in the Adonnino Report that the European Council should adopt “measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world”⁷⁶. In addition to that the De Clercq Report also remarked the correlation between the constituted European values and identity:

There are however a number of values commonly shared by Europeans: the rejection of war; the fight against poverty and unemployment; protection of the environment; Human Rights, freedom and democracy; the wealth and diversity of European culture. These values could form the basis of a European identity.⁷⁷

Furthermore, European Security Strategy describes the Union as “inevitably a global player”, a “credible and effective actor”, and underlines the Union’s commitment to “building a better world”.⁷⁸ The Strategy notes:

[t]he violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development [...] Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies.⁷⁹

In this context, the European Security Strategy is one of the important documents to present the identity of the Union as a normative power portraying it as a global actor that acts in order to preserve peace and stability both within and beyond its borders:

It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.⁸⁰

It can be concluded that from a constructivist point of view, in order to understand the Union’s foreign policy practices it is necessary to consider the impact of identity on

⁷⁵ Ad hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs, “Report to the European Council, Brussels, 29-30 March 1985, http://aei.pitt.edu/997/1/Dooge_final_report.pdf, (Accessed on 07 October 2016).

⁷⁶ Ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe, “European Council meeting at Fontainebleau Conclusions of the presidency”, 25-26 June 1984, http://aei.pitt.edu/992/1/andonnino_report_peoples_europe.pdf, (Accessed on 7 October 2016).

⁷⁷ Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community, March, 1993, http://aei.pitt.edu/29870/1/DE_CLERCQ_REPORT_INFO_COMM_POLICY.pdf, (Accessed on 07 October 2016).

⁷⁸ European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, p. 1, (Accessed on 01 July 2016).

⁷⁹ European Security Strategy, p. 1.

⁸⁰ European Security Strategy, p. 7.

interests. In other words, the identity of the Union, which is mainly motivated by normative concerns (values, norms, rules), can be clearly seen in official documents of the Union. In the next part of this chapter, the concept of normative power Europe will be examined in detail to shed light on this dimension.

1.3. ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

Following the end of the Second World War, attempts to stabilize Europe accelerated with the establishment of a series of communities and institutions. Although one of the most influential reasons behind the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community was the desire to achieve economic stability, preserving peace and political stability was also aimed by the members of the Union. After the Cold War, the political atmosphere changed fundamentally and the arguments of state-centric approaches were questioned. At the same time, there were various debates about the Union's identity in international politics. As a global and regional actor, the Union has been described as a "civilian power", a "soft power" and a "normative power" over the years.

Since the study aims to present a critical perspective on the concept of normative power Europe, it will be helpful to briefly analyse early discussions on the Union's actorness to provide a clear background for the analysis of normative power arguments and to build a bridge between early and recent critiques of the concept of "normative power Europe".

1.3.1. Early Discussions on the Actorness of the Union

The *sui generis* characteristic of the Union "requires the construction of new conceptual categorizations to fit the case of the EU and to explain its international role."⁸¹ To this end, IR scholars have been in search of new definitions. The emergence of civilian and normative power approaches mainly derives from this pursuit of seeking new ways to describe the Union's identity.

⁸¹ Richard Whitman, "The Fall, and Rise of Civilian Power Europe", Australian National University, National Europe Centre, Paper No. 16, 2002, p. 3.

It can be stated that the emergence of the concept of normative power can be traced back to the time when François Duchéne categorized the Union as a civilian power.⁸² According to Duchéne, the EC/EU can be described as “a group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force”.⁸³ In this regard, it can be stated that in Duchéne’s definition, economic power is the main objective of civilian power vis-à-vis military capabilities. In the mean time, Duchéne adds a normative dimension to his description of the Community as an *idée force* that sets up a substructure for the normative power approach in his argument.⁸⁴

Hedley Bull was one of the scholars who criticized the notion of civilian power. He considered this notion as a contradiction in terms, because “the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”.⁸⁵ In other words, the Union’s lack of military capacity was compensated by other states’ military power. Adrian Hyde-Price contributed to Bull’s observations and stated, “To put it bluntly, the European Community was a classic example of a free rider, benefiting from the security provided by others”⁸⁶.

Johan Galtung put forward a critical argument on the Union’s actorness soon after and stated “Ideological power is the power of ideas”.⁸⁷ He explained that ideological power is “powerful because the power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient” with the impact of social interaction (media, culture, etc).⁸⁸ He argued that the Union’s aim is to recreate “a eurocentric world, a world with its center in Europe” and “a uni-centric Europe, a Europe with its center in the West”, and characterized the then EC as *Pax Bruxellana*.⁸⁹

⁸² Duchéne, “The European Community”, p.19.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

⁸⁵ Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, in Loukas Tsoukalis, (ed.), *The European Community –Past, Present and Future*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 151.

⁸⁶ Adrian Hyde Price, “From Civilian to Military Power: The European Union at Crossroads?”, CIDEL Workshop Papers, Oslo 22-23 October 2004, p. 5.

⁸⁷ Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, No. 1. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1973, p. 33.

⁸⁸ Galtung, “The European Community”, p. 36.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

With the end of the Cold War, Joseph Nye contributed to the debate by introducing the “soft power” concept. Nye defined soft power as one that is based on “cooptation, multilateral cooperation, institution building, integration and the power of attraction”.⁹⁰ Nye asserted that with the end of the bipolar system, “the ability to change behaviors of states” would become the main determinant of being a “power” in world politics in the place of having capable traditional resources.⁹¹ With the acceleration of the Union’s attempts to develop a military capability, discussions gained new momentum. Some scholars began to criticize such attempts of the Union, defined these new initiatives as a “departure from the Union’s civilian power concept”⁹² and stated that having armed forces might cause suspicions in the international arena towards the Union since it might be understood as a sign of an attempt to execute the Union’s interests just like nation states.⁹³ Yet, at the same time, some scholars including Stelios Stavridis asserted that the militarization of the Union would strengthen its civilian power.⁹⁴ Stavridis gives the complexity of the post-Cold War security atmosphere (such as ethnic conflicts and terrorism) as a reason and adds that in the framework of the new world order’s security problems, developing of a military power is a necessity.⁹⁵

Before analysing the concept of normative power, it is necessary to note one of the most comprehensive categorisations of the Union’s actorness and role contribution in world politics. By considering the Union’s identity objectives and official statements, Taylan Özgür Kaya provides a clear and useful account, and highlights seven role conceptions for explaining the Union’s actorness. In this categorisation, conceptions of “force for good, force for international peace, security and stability, promoter of values and norms, developer, promoter of effective multilateralism, partner for the UN and builder of effective partnership with key actors” are stated as significant roles of the Union in

⁹⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 5 cited in Nathalie Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners” in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who Is A Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 2, http://aei.pitt.edu/32609/1/48_Who_is_a_Normative_Foreign_Policy_Actor.pdf, (Accessed on 30 June 2016).

⁹¹ Nye, “Soft Power”, p. 5.

⁹² Karen E. Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2000, p. 12.

⁹³ Smith, “The End of Civilian Power”, p.24.

⁹⁴ Stelios Stavridis, “Militarizing the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2001, p. 47.

⁹⁵ Stavridis, “Militarizing the EU”, p. 49.

world politics.⁹⁶ All these role conceptions are strictly part of the Union's identity, and are helpful in critically analysing the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, the "force for good" conception is a clear self-definition example by the Union.⁹⁷ In this regard, the Union explicitly underlines its foreign policy objectives and responsibilities towards third parties in order to preserve peace and security in international affairs. The then High Representative Javier Solana expressed the Union's responsibility for the global common good in his speech as: "The EU has a responsibility to work for the 'global common good'. That is a fitting way of describing the EU's global role and ambition".⁹⁸ Kaya underlines this role conception should not be understood as "altruism" since the Union's foreign and security policy is derived from several material and moral (normative) interest and concerns just like other international actors.⁹⁹

When we analyse the role conception of "partner for the UN" together with the conception of "builder of effective partnership with key actors", it becomes clear that the Union, as an entity which is constructed on several universal norms, seeks to support the universal norms and principles within the United Nations (UN). As we will see in the following chapters, both in the analysis of the Union's foreign and security policy and in its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this role conceptions are reaffirmed in most of the official documents of the Union. Taking these role conceptions into consideration will be fruitful for the critical analysis of the conceptual framework of the thesis and the Union's involvement in the conflict as a normative power.

As a result, it can be stated that the emergence of new approaches on the actorness of the Union particularly began after the 1970s and gained momentum with the end of the

⁹⁶ Taylan Özgür Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. 5. No. 17, p. 107.

⁹⁷ Helene Sjursen, "'Doing Good' in the World? Reconsidering the Basis of the Research Agenda on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy", *RECON Online Working Paper*, September, 2007, p. 5; Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", p. 111; Lisbeth Aggestam "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Javier Solana, "Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy", 24 January 2005, Brussels, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/83461.pdf, (Accessed on 10 July 2017); Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", p. 110.

⁹⁹ Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", p. 111; Lisbeth Aggestam "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, p. 8.

Cold War. The Union's actorness has been diversely defined and as a result, several concepts and role conceptions are introduced by scholars. The analysis of these concepts makes clear that, role conceptions are strictly connected to the Union's identity which is constructed on several universal norms and principles according to the scholars of the normative power concept. From this point, the study proceeds with the examination of the recent approach on the actorness of the Union, with a focus on normative power Europe.

1.3.2. Definition of the "Ideal Type"¹⁰⁰

A great majority of discussions on the identity of the Union gather around the concept of normative power ever since Manners coined the term in 2002. There are also sub-debates under this title in the literature that pertain to the definitions of the notions of "norm", "normal" and "normative". At this point, before analysing the concept of normative power and Manners' relevant arguments, it is necessary to make a reference to the terms of "normative" and "norm".

According to Daniel S. Hamilton, "norms are generally understood as standards of appropriate behaviour".¹⁰¹ He underlines that appropriateness is a subjective concept.¹⁰² Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink assert that norms spread through three stages: the first stage is the "birth" stage where the "supporter/creator" of the norm tries to gain the others' belief in the norm; in the second stage, the "norm leaders" are followed by more "followers" and rings of the chain expand; the last stage is internationalization during which "norms acquire a taken for granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate".¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Tuomas Forsberg, "Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 6, November, 2011, pp.1183-1204.

¹⁰¹ Daniel S. Hamilton, "The United States: A Normative Power?", in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008, p.78.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organization*, 1998, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 895-905; Hamilton, "The United States: A Normative Power", pp. 79-80.

On the other hand, while analysing the “normative foreign policy actor” concept, Nathalie Tocci begins with the clarification of the term “normative”, which is divided into two strands: *neutral* and *non-neutral*.¹⁰⁴ In the first manner of the term, Tocci explains that “normative” from Manners’s point of view refers to “normal” in international politics.¹⁰⁵ This meaning of the term brings “a sense of standardization and the expectation of non-deviance, rather than a moral imperative”.¹⁰⁶ However, using the term “normative” in this sense also evokes classical power conceptualizations that used this term in the meaning of “normal” to legitimize certain actions in international politics.¹⁰⁷ In this regard, Tocci argues that ambiguity of the term might cause us to consider the Union also as nation states whose foreign policy road maps are mainly motivated through their interests.¹⁰⁸

Regarding the second interpretation of the term “normative”, where the term denotes “good” or “ethical”, Tocci argues “Doing so is not only problematic in and of itself, but would also lead us back to a definition of normativity which is inextricably tied to power and power-based relations”.¹⁰⁹ In other words, this usage of the term brings up several questions on the Union’s actorness since the meaning of “good” is flexible. To give an example, when the main case of this thesis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process, is considered, it can be stated that, since the Union has different historical experiences with these two parties, involvement of the Union into any political or economic, situation pertaining to these parties might be understood differently. In this regard, the European Countries’, particularly Germany’s, bitter memories regarding the Second World War, and the mandatory rule of the UK in Palestine after the First World War can be noted as the reasons of this diversified perceptions of the conflicted parties towards the Union.

¹⁰⁴ Nathalie Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners”, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰⁵ Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy”, p. 4; Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 239.

¹⁰⁶ Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy”, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Helene Sjørusen, “Doing ‘Good’ in the World? Reconsidering the Basis of the Research Agenda on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy”, *RECON Online Working Paper*, September 2007, http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_0709.pdf?fileitem=50511934, pp. 5-7, (Accessed on 03 July 2016); Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy”, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy”, p. 4; Sonia Luccarelli and Ian Manners, *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 202-205.

1.3.3. Dimensions of the Concept of Normative Power

With the impact of the dramatic changes in the international system in the early 1990s, the notions of “civilian power” and “military power” had to be reconceived by scholars that study the Union’s identity and external relations. More specifically, the IR literature witnessed the opening of a new debate. Ian Manners contributed to this debate as he redefined the role concept of the Union as a normative power that “has the ability to shape the conception of normal in international relations”¹¹⁰ by using universal norms which are also the foundational basis of the Union.¹¹¹

Manners traced his arguments regarding the normative power concept back to Duchéne and Galtung’s contributions, and argued:

[t]he central component of normative power Europe is that the EU exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way.¹¹²

More specifically, Manners re-conceptualized the Union’s actorness from civilian and military power to normative power that underlines ideational determinants of the Union.¹¹³ He asserts that the Union’s main distinction from other international actors mainly derives from its three features: its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution.¹¹⁴ First of all, as a consequence of the outbreak of a bloody world war, “Europeans were committed to pool sovereignty in order to curb nationalism”¹¹⁵, and they realized the importance of cooperation to rebuild and preserve peace.¹¹⁶ Secondly, by combining supranational and national types of governance, the Union transformed itself in a different way from other “Westphalian” type of actors. Finally,

¹¹⁰ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 252.

¹¹¹ Ian Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2008, p.46.

¹¹² Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 242; Galtung, “The European Community”, pp. 33-35.

¹¹³ Helene Sjursen, “The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power: How can this be?”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, p. 236.

¹¹⁴ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 240-242.

¹¹⁵ Sjursen, “The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power”, p. 242.

¹¹⁶ Fraser Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2007, p. 23; G. Pınar Tank, “The CFSP and the Nation-State”, in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, pp. 12-13.

according to Manners, the Union is founded on a political-legal basis that was accomplished by several treaties.¹¹⁷

Manners states “The most important factor shaping the international role of the Union is not what it does or what it says but what it is”.¹¹⁸ In other words, while the notions of civilian and military power share the features and rules of the same traditional order which is the traditional Westphalian order, the main distinctiveness of normative power Europe mainly derives from its ontological logic.¹¹⁹ To clarify the concept, Manners underlines six distinctive dimensions of the normative power concept that set it apart from civilian power.

First of all, according to Manners, Hanns Maull and Duchéne’s arguments both overrate “direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities, especially economic ones”.¹²⁰ Maull, who contributed to Duchéne’s arguments on civilian power and re-emphasized the concept, stipulated that if a state does not apply military force primarily, but rather deploys economic instruments and cooperates with other states to deal with international or regional problems, then it can be classified, in line with Duchéne’s argument, as a civilian power.¹²¹ However, Manners underlines that, whereas normative power emphasizes the diffusion “of norms through imitation and attraction”, civilian power mostly highlights the importance of “non-military or economic resources, objectives and strategies”.¹²²

From Manners’s point of view, the second distinctive dimension mainly hinges upon the argument that, while the concept of the Civilian Power Europe has a “neocolonial attempt to ‘civilise’ the world” or “mission *civilisatrice*”¹²³, the normative power Europe tries to “escape civilizing missions by countering the neocolonial discourses”.¹²⁴

¹¹⁷ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 252.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

¹²⁰ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 238;

¹²¹ Hanns Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5, p. 92; Duchéne, “The European Community”, p.19.

¹²² Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 175-176.

¹²³ Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.33, No.3, 2005, pp. 617 and 629

¹²⁴ Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, “‘This is my EUtopia ...’: Narrative as Power”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No. 4, November 2002, p. 782.

Thirdly, Manners claims that, while civilian power is utilized “for the benefit” of the self in the first place, the concept of normative power Europe stresses “the cosmopolitan nature of EU normative power, in particular through ‘a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world’” in contrast.¹²⁵ Manners explains the forth distinctive dimension by emphasizing that the civilian power approach’s acceptance and pursuance of the Westphalian order, “contrast strongly with the normative power approach of transcending the ‘normal’ of world politics through an emphasis on world society”.¹²⁶ Fifthly, Manners argues that, in the civilian power approach the concept of power is limited to “relations between agents, even if multilateral, non-military, legal relations”. On the contrary, the concept of normative power Europe “reflects the structural elements of international relations” and indicates that these elements have changed since the Union came to the international arena as a new kind of player.¹²⁷ Finally, Manners presents the question “what is normative about civilian power” in the post-Cold War era? He underlines that the normative power approach provides an opportunity for existing studies about the Union to transcend “neo-colonial approaches”.¹²⁸

According to Manners, the Union’s normative basis “predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”.¹²⁹ In this regard, to understand the normative “nature” of the Union, he suggests examining the official records and treaties of the Union and arrives at five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination sustainable development, and good governance) which are developed through these official documents that comprise the *acquis communautaire*.¹³⁰ To give an example, the Lisbon Treaty illustrates the normative basis of the Union as follows:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the

¹²⁵ Manners, “The European Union”, p. 176; Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 241.

¹²⁶ Manners, “The European Union”, p. 176.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 177.

¹²⁹ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 242.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 242-243.

Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.¹³¹

Manners adds that diffusion of these founding norms is executed through some specific diffusion methods, which are: contagion, informational, procedural, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter.¹³² In this regard, to analyse Manners's arguments on normative power Europe, the study proceeds with the analysis of the Union's "normative basis" by referring to the official documents of the Union.

1.3.4. Normative Basis of the European Union

According to Manners, the main normative principle of the Union is *sustainable peace*, which addresses the importance of preserving peace both within the Union and beyond its borders.¹³³ Promotion of peace is highlighted in several foundation Treaties of the Union. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty reaffirmed that: "The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples"¹³⁴. The Treaty portrays the basis of the Union's external relations as follows:

The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.¹³⁵

The second EU principle is defined as *freedom*, a principle developed within the treaties.¹³⁶ The EU supports this principle with the articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and also promotes it with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.¹³⁷

The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction

¹³¹ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1-1a, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf>, (Accessed on 05 July 2016).

¹³² Manners, "Normative Power Europe", p. 244-245.

¹³³ Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the EU", p.48.

¹³⁴ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2-1.

¹³⁵ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 7a-1.

¹³⁶ Manners, "Normative Power Europe", p. 242.

¹³⁷ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 6.

with appropriate measures, with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and prevention and the combating of crime.¹³⁸

As the third normative principle of the Union, Manners puts forward *consensual democracy*.¹³⁹ This norm was first introduced with the 1970 Luxembourg Report, which stated that only democratic states were accepted as the member of the Union: “A united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments”.¹⁴⁰ This principle’s origin can be traced back to the 1957 Rome Treaty that aimed “to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts”.¹⁴¹ Manners states that there are “at least three ways in which democracy is to be promoted”.¹⁴² First, the provisions on democratic principles set out in Article 8; second, the solidarity clause whereby the Union and its member states aim to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist attack; and third, enlargement and accession as well as neighbourhood and development policies”.¹⁴³ Article 8(a) of the Lisbon Treaty indicates:

1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.

2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.

Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.

3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.

4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.¹⁴⁴

Manners points out the principle of *human rights* as the fourth normative principle.¹⁴⁵

The 1973 Declaration on European Identity, 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of

¹³⁸ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 3-2.

¹³⁹ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 50.

¹⁴⁰ 1970 Luxembourg Report, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/4/22/4176efc3-c734-41e5-bb90-d34c4d17bbb5/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 05 July 2016).

¹⁴¹ Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 27 May 2017).

¹⁴² Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 50.

¹⁴³ Ibid.; Treaty of Lisbon, Article 8.

¹⁴⁴ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 8-a.

¹⁴⁵ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 51.

the Community on Human Rights and 1991 Resolution of Council on Human Rights and Democracy and Development are displayed as the legal grounds of this principle. These documents highlighted the universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, the supranational rule of law and social solidarity.¹⁴⁶ The Treaty of Lisbon stated:

The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.¹⁴⁷

The rule of law is asserted as the final core normative principle of the EU, a principle that has great importance in ensuring stability and the accomplishment of other norms.¹⁴⁸ Article 10(a)-1 highlights the legal ground of the Union's external actions under the title of General Provisions on the Union's External Action:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.¹⁴⁹

Despite the prevalence of Manners's arguments about the significance of the normative power concept in IR and European studies, there has been increasing critiques on his assumptions among scholars. While some of these scholars highlight the question of whether the Union premediates these norms in its external action for the "global common good" or to secure its interests which are justified by applying norms and values.¹⁵⁰ Another group of scholars question Manners's arguments on the ground of the "normative results" of the Union's external policy, raising the question of to what extent the Union's external actions aim to bring normative results in world politics.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 6-2.

¹⁴⁸ Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the EU", pp. 51-52.

¹⁴⁹ Treaty of Lisbon, Article 10a-1.

¹⁵⁰ Thomas Diez, "Normative Power as Hegemony", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2013, pp. 202-202; Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", pp. 110-113.

¹⁵¹ Nathalie Tocci (et.al), "The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor", in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008, pp. 33-41; Hamilton, "The United States: A Normative Power?", pp.78-79.

As a response to increasing critiques on the methodological dimensions/weakness of his assumptions, Manners suggests a tripartite analysis of the concept that involves examining *principles, actions* and *impact/outcomes*.¹⁵² According to him, in the first part, “the Union’s founding principles”¹⁵³ should be examined, a task we fulfilled above. In this stage, the legal ground of promoted principles and the Union’s consistency can be analysed.¹⁵⁴ In the second stage, Manners suggests concentrating on the Union’s actions which are executed to promote its norms at the international level and on “how the EU promotes its constituting principles as actions and policies in world politics”.¹⁵⁵ Manners underlines the importance of engagement with the third parties in the Union’s actions that are put into practice via association agreements, accession procedures and the European Neighbourhood Policy.¹⁵⁶ In the third part of the tripartite analysis, Manners suggests considering the “impacts and outcomes of EU actions”¹⁵⁷ which are executed to promote the Union’s foundational principles in world politics.¹⁵⁸ In the following section, critiques on the concept of Normative Power Europe are categorized in three groups.

1.4. CRITIQUES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

The most notable critiques on Manners’s normative power Europe approach can be clustered into four groups. The first group of scholars that underline the weakness of the Normative Power Europe concept, examine the concept’s appropriateness under the conditions of the rising development of military capabilities. The second group of

¹⁵²Ian Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the Critical” in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 226-247; Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 46.

¹⁵³Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 55; Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives”, p. 233; Ian Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power in Global Politics” in Hubert Zimmermann, and Andreas Dür, (eds.) *Key Controversies in European Integration*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 196-197.

¹⁵⁴Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives”, p. 233.

¹⁵⁵Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 57; Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives”, p. 235.

¹⁵⁶ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 58; Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives”, p. 236.

¹⁵⁷ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the EU”, p. 58.

¹⁵⁸ Manners, “The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives...”, p. 237.

critiques most specifically gather around the questions of whether the Union acts out of “normative” concerns or its actions are motivated by member states’ interests, and of whether the normative power concept is a “politically suspicious camouflage for European imperialism”.¹⁵⁹ The third group of critiques mainly concentrates on the geographical limits of the normative power Europe as they suggest to rename the concept “regional normative power Europe”¹⁶⁰ and underline the inefficiency of the Union’s norm promotion power worldwide. In the final group, in order to present the limitations of the concept, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler’s *process-oriented approach* that involves the elements of opportunity, presence and capability is examined.¹⁶¹

1.4.1. The Lack of Conceptual Clarity

In the first group, we see that some scholars highlight the analytical weakness of the normative power concept. For instance, Michelle Pace argues that the concept of Normative Power Europe is a “semantically ‘empty’ notion” since some of the Union’s external actions’ are inappropriate to be classified as successful examples of normative power.¹⁶² On the other hand, Helene Sjørnsen claims that the concept of normative power and the Union’s external actions complete each other.¹⁶³

Adrian Hyde-Price also asserts that developing a critical approach towards the normative power concept is not as easy as it seems, since the concept is believed to reflect the Union’s basic principles and norms: “The problem here is that when the object of study is seen as embodying the core values one believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance”.¹⁶⁴ However, many scholars have widely criticized

¹⁵⁹ Forsberg, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 1184.

¹⁶⁰ Henrik Larsen, “The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External Perceptions: The Missing Link”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2014, p. 908.

¹⁶¹ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 2

¹⁶² Michelle Pace, “The Construction of EU Normative Power”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 5, 2007, p. 1060.

¹⁶³ Helene Sjørnsen, “What kind of Power?”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 170-171.

¹⁶⁴ Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: a Realist Critique”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2006, p. 218.

Manners's insistence on the Union's "novel" characteristic as a normative power and asserted that the Union is not a unique actor that has a normative ground and agenda because other international actors also have normative aims and actions in world politics.¹⁶⁵ At this point, Diez suggests that to understand a normative power both as normative and a power in world politics, "the extent to which the spread of universal norms plays a role as an aim as well as the means of the projection of power"¹⁶⁶ should be analysed. In this regard, Manners adds two determinants as he suggests examining that the examination of "whether the exercise of normative power transcends or reinforces the status quo of iniquitous and historically determined power and justice in world politics" and "whether the exercise of normative power transcends the source of that power".¹⁶⁷ He argues that these dimensions might help classify the Union as a normative power by emphasizing its distinctness from traditional types of powers.¹⁶⁸ By highlighting the importance of the "cosmopolitan legal system", Sjursen comes up with a different suggestion to categorize a power as a normative power:

I have suggested that a strong indicator of the EU as a 'normative' or 'civilizing' power would be linked to what kind of legal principles its external policy is based upon. [...] Pointing to the distinction between multilateralism and cosmopolitanism, I have proposed that a focus on strengthening the cosmopolitan dimension to international law would be a strong indicator for a 'normative' or 'civilizing' power. This would also be consistent with the suggestion that one might think of a 'normative' power as one that breaks with what we understand by the 'traditional' foreign policy practice of great powers. In this sense, a 'normative' power would be one that seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign equality. It would be a power that is willing to bind itself, and not only others, to common rules.¹⁶⁹

Tocci also underlines the lack of any objective indicator to categorize a "normative foreign policy actor" and asserts that the EU does not always "carry" normative interests on its agenda.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others", p. 614; Aggestam "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?", pp. 3-7; Forsberg, "Normative Power Europe", pp. 1190-1192.

¹⁶⁶ Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others", p. 620.

¹⁶⁷ Manners, "The European Union as a Normative Power", pp. 170-171.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹⁶⁹ Sjursen, "The EU as a 'Normative' Power", p. 249.

¹⁷⁰ Tocci (et.al), "The European Union", pp. 25-26.

In addition to the critiques on conceptual weaknesses, the Union's rising military initiatives are also believed to create a discrepancy regarding the Union's normative power visual aspect. To give an example, Sjursen argues "The establishment of military capabilities is often seen as signaling the EU developing towards a state-like entity and, as a result, possibly losing some of the particularities that are assumed to make it a 'normative' power"¹⁷¹. In other words, she highlights that the increase in military capabilities might cause the Union to turn into an "ordinary" power in world politics. Jan Zielonka was one of the scholars who noted that the "military turn of the EU" would damage its "distinctive" characteristic in international affairs.¹⁷² On the contrary, Richard G. Whitman and Jennifer Mitzen are the two scholars who argue that developing a military capability would not weaken the presence of civilian dynamics/nature of the Union "because its collective identity as a civilizing power is anchored in intra-European foreign policy routines that permit deliberation and reflection".¹⁷³ Diez contributes to the debate providing a middle ground between these two groups of scholars as he states "Normative power is not the opposite of military power, as Manners rightly insists [...] yet the more normative power builds on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of power, because it no longer relies on the power of norms itself".¹⁷⁴ Annika Björkdahl also believes that by developing a military force, the Union may pave the way for promoting its norms in crisis conditions.¹⁷⁵ Last but not least, Ana E. Juncos also argues that initiatives to develop a military did not undermine the deployment of the Union's normative power in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that its policies are mainly based on civilian instruments; military instruments were only applied to strengthen non-military efforts of the Union.¹⁷⁶ Considering the arguments of these scholars, it can be concluded that the concept of normative power does not mean the rejection of military power; rather the

¹⁷¹ Sjursen, "What kind of Power?", p. 171.

¹⁷² Jan Zielonka, "Constraints, Opportunities and Choices in European Foreign Policy" in Jay Zielonka (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 4-7.

¹⁷³ Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, capabilities and Ontological Security", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, p. 275.

¹⁷⁴ Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others", pp. 620-621.

¹⁷⁵ Annika Björkdahl, "Normative and Military Power in EU Peace Support Operations" in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 105-109.

¹⁷⁶ Ana E. Juncos, "The EU's post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina:(re) Integrating the Balkans and/or (re) Inventing the EU?", *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2005, p. 101.

Union can/should channelize its “material” instruments, when it is necessary, to improve the efficiency of its norms and principles.

1.4.2. The Lack of “Normative” Intention

In the second group of critiques, we see that scholars mainly concentrate on the question of whether the Union’s external actions were/are motivated by strategic interests or by its norms and values, and underline the “geographical” limits of normative power Europe by highlighting the absence of the membership prospect in some regions. Let us begin with the discussions over the convenience of the normative power approach in understanding the Union’s foreign affairs. The emphasis of the normative power Europe approach on the Union’s international role/profile as a norm promoter and its rejection of traditional state-centric order have attracted realists’ criticisms. To give an example, Hyde-Price, as one of the representatives of the realist perspective, brings forward the idea that the Union “acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of its members”¹⁷⁷ and it “serves as an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through using power in a variety of forms: political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion”.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, Hyde-Price highlights the dramatic changes that took place since the end of the Cold War and illustrates the importance of permanence of stability in Eastern Europe for members of the Union.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, he notes the instrumentalisation of the EU by “its most influential members” to fulfill their ‘long term strategic and economic interests’ in third parties particularly, South Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries.¹⁸⁰

Related to Hyde-Price’s arguments on the sources of the Union’s motivations in its external relations, there has been a large spectrum of studies that have put forward the idea of the precedence of the Union’s economic, security, energy and political interests in its foreign policy agenda. Scholars give the examples of the Union’s policies towards

¹⁷⁷ Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe”, p. 220.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 227.

¹⁷⁹ Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 242; Galtung, “The European Community”, pp. 33-35; Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe”, p. 227.

¹⁸⁰ Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe”, pp. 106-107.

the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Mediterranean and South Caucasus by highlighting the contradiction between the Union's principles and its actions regarding normative power Europe approach.¹⁸¹

Furthermore, scholars underline the contradictions between the requirements of the normative theory and actual practices in world affairs, and present some issue areas such as the Union's "human rights policy", "arms export" and "conflict resolution" as the examples of prioritization of the Union's (material) interests.¹⁸² As it was mentioned above, besides these critiques, there are also various scholars who interpret the Union as a normative power in world politics by giving the examples/actions of the abolition of death penalty and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to prove the "normativeness" of the Union and describe Normative Power Europe as a "credible utopia".¹⁸³

In this context, Diez contributes to the debate by suggesting a concept of hegemony that "combines norms and interests".¹⁸⁴ To examine Manners's normative power Europe portrayal, he handles the notion of normative power by focusing on the Union's normative aims, its normative means, and the efficiency of this concept.¹⁸⁵ Diez presents some specific cases which stirred up critiques on the Union's normativeness. In this context, the Union's relations with Russia and its policies towards certain regions are interpreted as signs of the clash of interests (mainly in terms of energy security) in those regions/countries.¹⁸⁶ Another critical example in this regard is the Union's policies towards Africa which also involve humanitarian interventions and are believed

¹⁸¹ Juncos, "The EU's post-Conflict Intervention", pp. 99-100; Pace, "The Construction of EU", pp. 1059-1061; Diez, "Normative Power as Hegemony", pp. 195-196; Karen E. Smith, "The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: 'Foreign Policy' with an Ethical Dimension?" in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 187-188.

¹⁸² Smith, "The EU, Human Rights", pp. 186-189; Thomas Diez and Michelle Pace, "Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation" in Richard G. Whitman (ed.) *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 212-215; Diez, "Constructing the Self", p. 631.

¹⁸³ Manners, "Normative Power Europe", pp.245-252; Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, "Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2007, pp. 438-439

¹⁸⁴ Diez, "Normative Power as Hegemony", p. 194.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁸⁶ Hubert Zimmermann, "Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and Russia's WTO Accession", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2007, pp. 814-815.

to be attempts to enhance/preserve “geostrategic” interests of the Union.¹⁸⁷ According to Diez, the Union’s policies towards the Middle East during the recent uprisings can be regarded as the main challenge to the concept of normative power Europe.¹⁸⁸ In addition to the inconsistency between theory and practice, the Union’s actions towards the region are even seen as hypocrisy since it supported anti-democratic authorities in those countries in order to keep the migration flow away from the Mediterranean coasts and to protect oil supplies.¹⁸⁹ At this point, Diez leads us to ask the question whether the Union acts *only* through its normative concerns or there are other (politically, economically, historically) motivations of the member states in those regions. In accordance with these arguments, Mark Pollack argues that describing the Union with “pure” normative power characteristics does not explain some of its external activities; thus, the Union should be considered as an international actor whose actions derives from both norms/values and its interests.¹⁹⁰

1.4.3. Geographical Limits of the Concept of Normative Power

The final group of critiques mainly highlight the difficulty of norm promotion in some regions in which the Union cannot put the membership card on the table. Regarding this point, it has been widely argued that the absence of membership prospect does limit the efficiency of normative power Europe. For instance, Emma J. Stewart argues that the Union’s activities are limited in the South Caucasus because of the absence of membership promise.¹⁹¹ Schimmelfenning and Scholtz also underline that the membership card is the major determinant in border countries and has significant impact on the promotion of the Union’s principles.

¹⁸⁷ Catherine Gegout, "EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International Actor", *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 8, No. 3-4, 2009, pp. 403-407.

¹⁸⁸ Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony”, p. 197.

¹⁸⁹ Pace, “The Construction of EU Normative”, pp. 1042-1044.

¹⁹⁰ Mark A. Pollack, “Living in a Material World: A Critique of ‘Normative Power Europe’” in Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), *Key Controversies in European Integration*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 202-204.

¹⁹¹ Emma J. Stewart, “Mind the Normative Gap? The EU in the South Caucasus” in Richard G. Whitman, (ed.) *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 81-82.

[t]he offer of membership is the only reliable EU incentive for promoting democracy in the European neighbourhood; none of the incentives short of a credible association perspective has been sufficiently significant to be counted upon as an effective instrument of democracy promotion.¹⁹²

In accordance with this group of critiques, the Union's Neighbourhood Policy towards third parties, which will be analysed in the next chapter in detail, can be counted as one of the significant indicators of the limits of its normativeness. According to many scholars, the Union's most effective foreign policy tool is the "membership card" that allows the Union to stabilize prospective member countries, politically and economically by using its values and several legal obligations.¹⁹³ However, in some countries where the Union cannot use membership as a foreign policy tool, a neighbourhood policy was launched towards "those third countries"¹⁹⁴ in order to improve diplomatic and economic cooperation.¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, a "ring of friends" was created that can be basically interpreted as "partnership without membership" and/or as "less than full membership but more than associate partnership".¹⁹⁶

The Union has aimed to improve/preserve democracy, economic stability and to strengthen cultural ties with these countries since 1995. Yet, it is difficult to identify the neighbourhood policy as a successful foreign policy initiative as anti-democratic regimes, economic crises, human right violations and several political, economic and social problems are still seen in those countries.¹⁹⁷ In the light of this, it has been

¹⁹² Frank Schimmelfennig, and Hanno Scholtz, "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange", *European Union Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008, p.207.

¹⁹³ Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, "National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, March, 2010, p. 270; Othon Anastasakis, "The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a more Pragmatic Approach", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4, December, 2008, pp 366-368; Arnhild Spence and David Spence, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam", p. 54; Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood Stabilization, Integration and Partnership", in Roland Dannreuther (ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, Routledge, 2004, pp. 13-15.

¹⁹⁴ European Union External Action, European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP Countries, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en, (Accessed on 22 November 2016).

¹⁹⁵ Sevilya Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions*, Winter, 2005, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Karen E. Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, 2005, p. 763; Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 10; Oliver Schlumberger, "The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March, 2011, p. 140.

commonly argued among scholars that the lack of membership commitment is one of the major reasons for the failure of the Union in those countries. In other words, the Union's inefficient initiatives towards the third parties can be presented as the geographical limits of its normativeness and this brings up the question of whether the Union is a regional normative power.

1.4.4. “Opportunity, Presence and Capability”

Bretherton and Vogler introduced a process-oriented approach to provide a better explanation of the actorness of the Union. They explained that there are two main reasons behind developing this approach: firstly, the Union is, itself, established in a process and secondly explaining its actorness necessitates the examination of several determinants including internal and external factors which have considerable influence on the construction of its actorness.¹⁹⁸ In this regard, they developed a triple analysis that involves examining the Union's opportunities, presence and capability in its external relations. The usage of this approach in the thesis, however, is quite different from that of Vogler and Bretherton. While Bretherton and Vogler developed this approach to clarify the issue of the Union's actorness and global contribution, we will apply this approach in order to present a more critical and realistic account of the Union's normativeness.

Bretherton and Vogler define the first step of their approach, opportunity, as “the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction”.¹⁹⁹ They underline the dynamic nature of this process as a result of which the Union constitutes its actions and brings changes to its identity.²⁰⁰ By focusing evolution of the international environment after the 1980s, they present a “cause and effect relation” which provides a basis to understand the changes in the discourse and the identity of the Union. In this context, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the 2003 War in Iraq and the enlargement wave of 2004 are displayed as significant turning points which both

¹⁹⁸ Bretherton and Vogler, “The European Union as a Global Actor”, p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

reconstructed its identity and also brought new roles and responsibilities to the Union.²⁰¹ As previously argued, changes in international system has brought about new security challenges and opportunities for the Union. When the arguments of constructivists and Bretherton and Vogler are taken together, it becomes clear that both the identity and the foreign policy objectives of the Union are the products of a social interaction process during which the Union has been granted new roles and challenges.

As the second step of their approach, Bretherton and Vogler examine the presence of the Union in international affairs by identifying two interconnected elements: first, the identity and the character of the Union in world politics and secondly, its policies' outcomes in its foreign policy.²⁰² They define the presence as “the ability to exert influence externally; to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others”.²⁰³ At this point, when their arguments are considered with Manners's arguments, it can be noted that both side have similar perspectives on the Union's actorness in world politics. In other words, on the one hand, Bretherton and Vogler underline the significant increase of the Union's political and economic influence in international affairs.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, Manners adds a normative dimension to this influence of the Union and highlights its capability to “change the understanding of normal” in world affairs.²⁰⁵ Although we share these scholars' arguments on the basis of the Union's growing influence in world politics, our main aim is to question the outcomes of this “presence” of the Union and to analyse the other side of the coin. In line with this purpose, the thesis presents a critical perspective regarding the Union's presence in world politics in the third chapter in which the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is specifically examined.

Capability is defined as the final step of Bretherton's and Vogler's approach. They illustrate this process as “the ability to formulate effective policies and the availability of appropriate policy instruments”.²⁰⁶ In other words, their focus is to build a bridge between the Union's presence and the opportunities, and to examine the Union's foreign

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 27.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

²⁰⁵ Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, p. 239.

²⁰⁶ Bretherton and Vogler, “The European Union as a Global Actor”, p. 29.

policy practices. Their approach on actorness comes from Gunnar Sjöstedt's argument that classified four main conditions:

- a) Shared commitment to set of overarching values
- b) Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relation to external policy
- c) The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies-captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence, where:
 - consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the Member States of the EU;
 - coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies.
- d) The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments-diplomacy/negotiation, economic tools and military means.²⁰⁷

As a result of this description, it can be argued that despite its constructed and legitimised identity and foreign policy objectives, the Union does not demonstrate a consistent political standing. Rather, it is possible to observe its incapability to channel "ideas and events"²⁰⁸ simultaneously and, to present an effective political presence. The Union's political standing and actions towards some international events, such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demonstrate that, in spite of its agreed foreign policy objectives made explicit its founding treaties, the Union could not close the increasing gap between its rhetoric and foreign policy practices.

To conclude this section, it can be argued that soon after Manners introduced the concept of normative power Europe, the IR literature has witnessed a fruitful debate on the issues of actorness and identity of the Union in international politics. Critiques on Manners's assumptions can be classified mainly into four groups, which highlight/focus on the absence of a clear conceptual description, arbitrariness of norm promotion in world affairs, geographical limits of the normative power concept in terms of being influential and having sanction power worldwide, and the increasing gap between the actorness objectives of the Union and outcomes of these policies in several international crises.

1.5. CONCLUSION

²⁰⁷ Gunnar Sjöstedt, *The External Role of the European Community*, Vol. 7, Gower Publishing Company, 1977 cited in Bretherton and Vogler, "The European Union as a Global Actor", p. 30.

²⁰⁸ Bretherton and Vogler, "The European Union as a Global Actor", p. 24.

Particularly after the Cold War, the Union's actorness and identity in international relations have been widely discussed among IR scholars. The Union's international identity has been diversely described as "civilian", "soft" "military" and recently as a "normative power". With the contributions of Ian Manners in the beginning of the 2000s, discussions on the identity of the Union have mostly clustered around the normative power Europe approach that defines the Union as a "norm supplier" that has "the capability to change the understanding/practices of normal" in international affairs.

While portraying the Union as a normative power, Manners primarily focuses on three "distinctive" features of the Union which are its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution. In other words, from Manners's point of view, the Union was already founded on norms and principles and it strengthened its this distinctive structure over the years. However, as many scholars argue, having these features is insufficient to give the Union a different "label" from other international actors that also have both normative and strategic interests.

As a response to Manners's arguments, it can be said that having 'visible' normative dimensions (legal and political structure) does not mean the Union *always* acts on the basis of these normative principles in world politics rather than on collective and individual interests. According to Manners, to clarify the concept of normative power, three indicators should be analysed: principles, actions and impact. In this regard, many scholars argue that, when the constructed principles and the Union's external activities are examined, it can be concluded that, in terms of both the efficiency of norm promotion in third countries and the actions' source of motivations, a clear picture cannot be drawn so as to label the Union as a normative power. To clarify their critiques, scholars give the examples of the Union's external relations with some specific regions and countries as signs of the other face of normative power Europe. While some of them describe the Union's external initiatives and policies that impose "normative" conditions on third countries as camouflaged state-centric practices, others point out the inefficiency of the Union to promote peace and stability in conflicted-regions by giving the example of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, almost all scholars agree on the credible impact (capability) of the Union's economic power worldwide which brings up another criticism regarding the identification of the

Union: whether the Union is “an economic giant but a political dwarf” and “a giant in normative terms, but a dwarf in practice”²⁰⁹. If the foreign policy practices of the Union are examined, it would not be wrong to label the Union as politically insufficient.

In terms of applying the normative power concept in its relations with third countries, it is clear that the Union has the sufficient legal infrastructure and as well as political and economic capabilities. However, as it was presented under the title of geographical limitations of normative power Europe, inefficiency of the Union beyond its borders raises the question of whether the Union is a regional normative power. In the light of these theoretical and conceptual analyses, in an attempt to clarify questions and critiques on the Union’s identity, the next chapter of this study will examine the evolution of the Union’s foreign and security policy and its neighbourhood policy.

²⁰⁹ Zielonka, “Constraints, Opportunities and Choices”, p. 11; Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Boulder, London, 1999, pp. 508-517.

CHAPTER 2

A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the Union has been trying to become an important foreign policy actor in world politics. In this regard, a wide range of initiatives have been planned. The existence of the “Soviet threat” and fears of being occupied by the Soviet Union were the major driving forces during the Cold War that shaped Europeans’ foreign policies both individually and collectively. The fall of the Iron Curtain not only changed the international political environment, but also created new security priorities and threats for the Union. This atmosphere paved the way for the Union to become a strong international actor to set out an effective foreign and security policy. The outbreak of a world war in the Balkan Peninsula, in Yugoslavia, was one of the major factors that forced the Union to accelerate its initiatives to establish an effective foreign and security policy. In this new security environment, the former Soviet threat gave its place to new threats and security concerns, such as political and economic instability, ethnic conflicts, increased migration, organized crime, human rights violations and terrorism.

In the meantime, besides the Union’s desires to be known as a credible and an effective international actor, the events of the early 1990s, including the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing ethnic conflicts and the Gulf War, raised the questions of to what extent the Union acts effectively towards such an international crisis and to what extent the Union follows a “normative” way in the face of these international crises.

Because of unsuccessful consequences of its attempts in these regions, the existing gap between “capabilities and expectations” became even deeper for the Union.²¹⁰

Incompatible and inconsistent positions/actions of the member states towards such international crises became one of the major driving forces for the Union to create an effective foreign and security policy structure in the 1990s. The subsequent efforts to this aim could eventually be put into practice with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the launching of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the Maastricht Treaty could not solve all foreign and security policy problems for the Union. For this reason, the Union continued its attempts to effectively reiterate its foreign and security policy. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty was signed in 1997. The Treaty aimed to reform the existing foreign and security policy structure of the Union and added new dimensions and objectives to prepare the Union for possible international crises.

Accordingly, in the 1998 Saint Malo Summit, the Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence was issued and the Common European Security and Defence Policy was established. This Policy added a military dimension to the CFSP, with a view to reiterating the Union’s political and military credibility in world politics. The signing of the Nice Treaty in 2001 was the next attempt of the Union to deepen and strengthen its foreign policy decision making process and prepare for the next enlargement wave that involved the Central and Eastern European countries. However, the terrorist attacks towards the US on September 11, 2001 shocked the world and brought new security challenges and concerns, together with the urgency of having more capable and effective foreign and security policy as recognized by the Union.

The entry into force in 2007 of the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty, was the last step for a more affective Union as external actor. The Treaty revolutionized the existing political and economic structure of the Union, creating a post entitled “High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and External Policy” as well as the European External Action Service.

²¹⁰Michael E. Smith, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 69; Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1993, pp. 305-328.

In addition to its initiatives to create a more influential foreign and security policy, the Union also attempted to improve its relations with the third countries which became the new neighbors of the Union after the enlargements of 1995 and 2004. In this regard, the Union started a comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy that would involve political, economic, security, and socio-cultural cooperations and announced the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003. There are various reasons behind this initiative of the Union. In this regard, the emergence of a power vacuum after the Cold War, and the new security based concerns of the Union can be cited as the major driving forces behind the establishment of the ENP. After several attempts, it is still open to discussion to what extent the Union managed to reach the intended goals by establishing this Neighbourhood Policy.

This chapter aims to present a clear understanding on the issues of common foreign and security policy of the Union and its neighbourhood policy by handling the issue under three main sections. In the first section of the chapter, the Union's initiatives to improve its effectiveness in the areas of foreign and security policy from the 1950s to 1990 will be analysed by considering the particular features of this time period that had a significant impact on this process. The chapter proceeds with the examination of the post-Cold War initiatives of the Union to establish a common foreign and security policy. A comprehensive analysis of the Union's founding treaties and articles that aimed to make significant changes within the structure of the Union, will be presented as we will also dwell on the dramatic international events of the period and their impacts on this progress. The last section of the chapter aims to address the creation of the European Neighborhood Policy as present one of the most significant external policy initiatives of the Union towards third parties.

As it has already been highlighted in the previous chapter, the discussions on the Union's actorness and identity in world affairs have been at the center of the IR literature since the end of the Cold War. By considering the arguments of scholars who depict the Union as a "norm promoter"²¹¹ and as an international actor that "has the

²¹¹ Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, p. 239.

capability to change the understanding of normal”²¹² in world affairs, this chapter aims to analyse the evolution of foreign and security policy of the Union. To provide a critical perspective towards the arguments that “the Union is a global normative power” or “always normative power”²¹³, Ian Manners’s three indicators (principles, actions, outcomes) will be used to evaluate the normativeness of the Union’s foreign and security policy. In this regard, official documents of the Union (principles) and reactions towards some international crises (actions) will be analysed.²¹⁴ After analysing the Union’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process in the next chapter, we will reach the third step (outcomes). By analysing these issues, the chapter aims to present a clear basis for understanding the evolution and objectives of the Union’s foreign and security policy, and to answer the questions of whether the Union have managed to play a significant role in international affairs, and if not, what the major reasons behind this failure are and to what extent the Union can be described as a normative power by considering its existing foreign and security policy structure.

2.2. ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY FROM THE 1950S TO MAASTRICHT

The desire to have a more effective and credible foreign and security policy has been one of the top priorities of the Union for a long time.²¹⁵ In this regard, several plans and strategies, including the Pleven Plan, the Fouchet Plans and the Luxembourg (Davignon) Report, were developed (though unsuccessfully) as the first initiatives of the Union to strengthen its foreign and security policy. Despite the significance of these initiatives for the Union, they could not be put into practice, which caused frustration among the member states of the Union. The significance of these initiatives mainly stemmed from the desire to become a credible international actor. At this point, in order to draw a clear picture of the evolution of the Union’s foreign and security policy of, the

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Nathalie Tocci, “The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor”, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008, pp. 25-26.

²¹⁴ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, p.46.

²¹⁵ Kaya, “Identifying the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy Roles”, p. 107.

analysis will begin with the first attempts of the Union to improve its foreign and security policy from the 1950s up until 1990.

2.2.1. Plans for a European Defence Community and European Political Community

The driving forces behind the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) can be traced back to the 1950s during which the international political environment was considerably shaped by the relations between the US and the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ In other words, the existence of a common threat, the Soviet Union, facing the US and Europe was the major determining factor that forced the Union to take required measures. In this political and security environment, the US's thesis was based on the prevention of the Soviet influence in Europe by creating a military flank to the existing structure of the Union which was part of the US's containment policy against the Soviet Union.²¹⁷ However, member states of the Union had different ideas on this issue as the US was aiming to insert West Germany in NATO. France, having security concerns regarding Germany historically, was hesitant about the rearmament of Germany since such a move could evoke a lack of confidence among the member states of the Union.²¹⁸ Because of France's previous experiences with Germany, the then President of France, Charles De Gaulle, gave support to the German rearmament plan under the condition that it would be implemented under a European institution.²¹⁹ This fear of awakening German militarism led France to launch the initiative of the European Defence Community (EDC) based on the Pleven Plan.²²⁰ The Pleven Plan was approved by the

²¹⁶ Christopher Hill and Karen Elizabeth Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, Routledge, 2000, pp. 2-16.

²¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 15-16; Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 40-41.

²¹⁸ Federiga Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview", in Federiga Bindi (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, Brookings Institution, 2010, pp. 13-14.

²¹⁹ Josef L. Kunz, "Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1953, pp.276-277

²²⁰ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach", in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds.), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 95-96.

French Cabinet and the National Assembly on 24 October 1950.²²¹ Treaty of European Defence Community was signed in 1952 and aimed to put the European Coal and Steel Community and the EDC under a common roof.²²² The European Defence Community Treaty (Paris Treaty) was signed on 27 May 1952 by six European countries which were France, Belgium, Italy, Western Germany, and Luxembourg and the Netherlands.²²³ Article 1 of the Treaty stated:

By the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties institute among themselves a European Defense Community, supranational in character, consisting of common institutions, common armed Forces and a common budget.²²⁴

The establishment of the EDC was crucial for reaching a full cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy. However, ironically, France failed to ratify the treaty because of the fears of German rearmament and loss of national sovereignty.²²⁵ Despite diversified opinions among member states on the issue of the establishment of a supranational foreign and security policy cooperation, initiatives were continued with the announcement of the Fouchet Plan.²²⁶ In 1961, the first Fouchet Plan issued by the French Foreign Minister Christian Fouchet, suggested regulations to formulate a common foreign and security policy and founding a secretariat in Paris to accomplish political cooperation that would be carried out by the foreign ministers of the member states.²²⁷ The Fouchet Committee would be founded to discuss this French proposal suggesting the establishment of a European Political Union to develop and improve a common foreign and security policy.²²⁸ However, member states did not agree on the foundation of such a political entity that would weaken their national sovereignty.²²⁹ The second Fouchet Plan, proposed by France, took into consideration the hesitations of

²²¹ Martin J. Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 65.

²²² Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", pp. 15-16.

²²³ Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", pp. 40-41.

²²⁴ European Defense Community Treaty, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/1/5201.pdf>, (Accessed on 03 September 2016), p. 167.

²²⁵ Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", pp. 40-41; Neil Winn and Christopher Lord, *EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State: Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 20-21.

²²⁶ Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", pp. 40-41.

²²⁷ Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 16; Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?*, England, Pluto Press, 2002, p. 49.

²²⁸ Smith, "European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?", p. 50; Draft Treaty of the First Fouchet Plan, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_treaty_fouchet_plan_i_2_november_1961-en-485fa02e-f21e-4e4d-9665-92f0820a0c22.html, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²²⁹ Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 47.

the member states; yet, this attempt also remained inconclusive because of the diversity in the member states' perceptions.²³⁰ To give an example, while the Netherlands and Belgium were supporting to involvement of the UK in such a cooperation, France was not willing to include the UK since it wanted to remain as the leading actor in the Union and the integration of the UK could also increase the influence of the US in the Union.²³¹ As a result of uncompromising interests of the member states the Fouchet Plans could not be agreed upon.²³² However, France and West Germany signed the Elysée Treaty on 22 January 1963 whereby the two countries' heads of government and foreign ministers agreed to strengthen cooperation in the areas of defence and culture between these two European countries.²³³

After the resignation of de Gaulle, France continued its initiatives to improve cooperation on the issues of foreign and security policy.²³⁴ In 1969, at the Hague Summit, member states of the Union voiced their willingness once again and set out to negotiate on the issue of the enlargement road map as well as other political and economic issues of the Union.²³⁵

On 27 October 1970, the Luxembourg Report, also known as the Davignon Report was drafted at the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers.²³⁶ The Davignon Report was one of the subsequent efforts of the Union that sought a way to make progress in the harmonization of foreign policies and to organize the required attempts for the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).²³⁷ The creation of the EPC can be traced back to this report. It cited the objectives of the EPC as follows:

- To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly;

²³⁰ Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 47.

²³¹ Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 18; Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", pp. 68-70.

²³² Michael Smith, "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-modern Policy Framework?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, p. 566.

²³³ Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", p. 68.

²³⁴ Winn and Lord, "EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State", p. 22; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", pp. 71-72.

²³⁵ Smith, "European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?", pp. 66-67; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", pp. 71-72.

²³⁶ Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", p. 43.

²³⁷ Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 18; Smith, "European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?", pp. 67-68; Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", p. 65.

- To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.²³⁸

There were several internal and external driving forces behind the foundation of the EPC. Internally, the planned future enlargements necessitated the improvement of political and economic cooperation among the existing member states.²³⁹ As an example for the external dynamics, the breakout of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and its political, economic consequences can be asserted.²⁴⁰

On 23 July 1973, the subsequent Copenhagen Report was drafted at the Copenhagen Summit. The Copenhagen Report reaffirmed the objectives of the Luxembourg Report and aimed to bring changes to the functioning of the EPC.²⁴¹ It was stated in the Report that the EPC founded “a new procedure in international relations and an original European contribution to the technique of arriving at concerted action”.²⁴² The Nine also displayed their will to act in harmony in international affairs for the future of the Union:

Europe now needs to establish its position in the world as a distinct entity, especially in international negotiations which are likely to have a decisive influence on the international equilibrium and on the future of the European Community. In the light of this it is essential that, in the spirit of the conclusions of the Paris Summit Conference, cooperation among the Nine on foreign policy should be such as to enable Europe to make an original contribution to the international equilibrium. Europe has the will to do this, in accordance with its traditionally outward-looking mission and its interest in progress, peace and co-operation. It will do so, loyal to its traditional friends and to the alliances of its Member States, in the spirit of good neighbourliness which must exist between all the countries of Europe both to the east and the west, and responding to the expectations of all the developing countries.²⁴³

Importance of consultation among member states was clearly underlined in the Report which stated:

[i]n several fields, the Member States have been able to consider and decide matters jointly so as to make common political action possible. This habit has also

²³⁸ Luxembourg Report, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/4/22/4176efc3-c734-41e5-bb90-d34c4d17bbb5/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²³⁹ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 67.

²⁴⁰ Dedman, “The Origin and Development of the European Union”, p. 112.

²⁴¹ Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 94; The Copenhagen Report, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/8b935ae1-0a38-42d4-a97e-088c63d54b6f/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²⁴² The Copenhagen Report.

²⁴³ Ibid.

led to the “reflex” of co-ordination among the Member States which has profoundly affected the relations of the Member States between each other and with third countries. This collegiate sense in Europe is becoming a real force in international relations.²⁴⁴

Another significant initiative of the Union that demonstrated the Union’s will for a united voice in international politics was the adoption of a document on European identity in December 1973.²⁴⁵ There were some critical factors behind the creation of this document. Taking into account the political environment in the world in the early 1970s, it can be stated that the Union and the US had different perspectives on the case of Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.²⁴⁶ In order to put their common will against the US’s attempts to make bilateral dealings with the member states and the UK, the member states asserted “The Europeans possessed a common identity and a unique contribution to bring to the management of international affairs based upon common interests and related to a European civilization composed of a variety of cultures but upholding common values, principles and concepts of life”²⁴⁷. The Declaration stated:

[t]he Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe. Defining the European Identity involves:

- reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community,
- assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this,
- taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.²⁴⁸

Moreover, under the title of the Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a United Europe, the declaration asserted:

[t]he European Identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, pp. 76-77; Keukeleire and Delreux, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 43.

²⁴⁶ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 71.

²⁴⁷ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 77.

²⁴⁸ Document on the European Identity, http://aei.pitt.edu/4545/1/epc_identity_doc.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe, thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union.²⁴⁹

In the light of these underlined objectives of the document, it can be seen that the significance of the document mainly comes from its articulation of a “common identity” that underlined the political and cultural ties among the member states. As it was highlighted in the previous chapter, the Union’s existing identity is a consequence of several historical, political, economic developments. By underlining the identity objectives, the Union also asserted its foreign and security policy objectives.

Following the 1970 Luxembourg Report and the 1973 Copenhagen Report, the London Report was issued as the third report that further established and revised the EPC.²⁵⁰ The foreign ministers of the ten member states of the Union drafted the Report on 13 October 1981 and highlighted the need for “a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the members of the European Community is greater than ever”²⁵¹. The Ten emphasized the importance of cooperation among member states in foreign policy issues and of the emergence of a “commitment to consult each other before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives”.²⁵² Moreover, they also launched a crisis mechanism, which is included in the Report:

The Political Committee or, if necessary, a ministerial meeting will convene within forty-eight hours at the request of three Member States. The same procedure will apply in third countries at the level of Heads of Mission. In order to improve the capacity of the Ten to react in an emergency, working groups are encouraged to analyse areas of potential crisis and to prepare a range of possible reactions by the Ten.²⁵³

In addition to this, the Report also stated:

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 114.

²⁵¹ The London Report, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/1/18/869a63a6-4c28-4e42-8c41-efd2415cd7dc/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

[i]f necessary, and if the Ten so agree, the Presidency, accompanied by representatives of the preceding and succeeding presidencies, may meet with representatives of third countries.²⁵⁴

The subsequent Stuttgart Declaration which is also known as the Solemn Declaration of June 19 1983, added a new dimension to the EPC's activities, which was "the political and economical aspects of security".²⁵⁵ To be prepared against unexpected developments in international affairs, it was stated in the declaration:

[i]n order to cope with the increasing problems of international politics, the necessary reinforcement of European Political Cooperation must be ensured, in particular by the following measures:

- intensified consultations with view to permitting timely joint action on all major foreign policy questions of interest to the Ten as a whole;
- prior consultation with the other Member States in advance of the adoption of final positions on these questions. The Heads of State or Government underline their undertaking that each Member State will take full account of the positions of its partners and give due weight to the adoption and implementation of common European positions when working out national positions and taking national action;
- development and extension of the practice by which the views of the Ten are defined and consolidated in the form of common positions which then constitute a central point of reference for Member States' policies;
- progressive development and definition of common principles and objectives as well as the identification of common interests in order to strengthen the possibilities of joint action in the field of foreign policy;
- the political and economic aspects of security; increased contacts with third countries in order to give the Ten greater weight as an interlocutor in the foreign policy field;
- closer cooperation in diplomatic and administrative matters between the missions of the Ten in third countries;
- the search for common positions at major international conferences attended by one or more of the Ten and covering questions dealt with in Political Cooperation;
- increasing recognition of the contribution which the European Parliament makes to the development of a coordinated foreign policy of the Ten.²⁵⁶

As it can be seen from the articles of the declaration, the necessity of a single voice in foreign policy and the concept of "joint action" are underlined to increase the credibility and effectiveness of the Union in international issues.

After analysing the initiatives of the Union, including many colloquies, reports and declarations, from the 1950s to 1987, it became clear that the main goal was the improvement of the European integration at the political, security and cultural levels.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Solemn Declaration on European Union, http://aei.pitt.edu/1788/1/stuttgart_declaration_1983.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²⁵⁶ Solemn Declaration on European Union.

However, besides the initiatives and cooperation efforts, it is hard to conclude that the Union reached its goals in the areas of foreign and security policy as this was quite a slow process. As stated above, there were different determinants that decelerated this integration process. These can be cited as the distrust among member states, superiority and priority of national interests and international crises. The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 was the next attempt of the Union to strengthen cooperation in the field of foreign policy.

2.2.2. The Single European Act

The SEA, which was the first significant revision of the Rome Treaty, was signed by twelve members of the Union on 17 February 1986 and came into force on 1 July 1987.²⁵⁷ The reason behind the conclusion of the SEA was the desire to ensure the accomplishment of the internal market and the provision of a cooperation mechanism between the European Parliament and other community institutions.²⁵⁸ In other words, the SEA redefined the roles and duties of the European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission within the EPC. According to this new formulation, the leading role was assigned to the Council, assistance in all issues was defined as the role of the Parliament, and finally, the minimum right to be informed was prescribed as the role of the Commission.²⁵⁹ Title 3 imposed an obligation on the member states, as it stated, “in order to increase their capacity for joint action in the foreign policy field, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually developed and defined”²⁶⁰.

As it can be understood from the title “Single” Act, this document was articulated to formalize the EPC and the Communities under the same legal framework.²⁶¹ As a consequence of this innovation, Simon Nuttall argued that the Community now had a de

²⁵⁷ Marit Sjoavaag, “The Single European Act”, in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 23.

²⁵⁸ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, pp. 137-138; Sjoavaag, “The Single European Act”, p. 23.

²⁵⁹ Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 24.

²⁶⁰ The Single European Act, Title 3, Article 30-2(C).

²⁶¹ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 92; Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 24.

facto second pillar (and would gain with Maastricht, a third).²⁶² Under Title 3 of the SEA, the need for the member states to consult on the foreign policy issues was highlighted and affirmed in order “to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementations of joint action”.²⁶³

2.3. ESTABLISHING A “COMMON” FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

With the end of the bipolar system a new political and security environment was created not only for the member states of the Union but also for all international actors. The Soviet threat, which shaped the foreign policy priorities of the Union until 1990 left its place to new security challenges, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, migration and political-economic instability in the post-Cold War era. In this political and security environment, the emergence of some international crises made the Union accelerate its initiatives for an influential foreign and security policy structure. In this regard, the outbreak of the wars in Yugoslavia and the First Gulf War can be identified as the two major international crises that forced the Union to revise its existing institutions.²⁶⁴ It will be useful to examine the Union’s actions towards these two international crises not only to ensure a critical introduction for the analysis of the “common” foreign and security policy of the Union, but also to provide a better understanding of the main case study of this thesis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.3.1. “The Road to Maastricht”²⁶⁵

²⁶² Simon Nuttall, *European Political Cooperation*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 249 cited in Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 138.

²⁶³ The Single European Act, Title 3, Treaty Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy, Article 30(2), http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/972ccc77-f4b8-4b24-85b8-e43ce3e754bf/publishable_en.pdf, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

²⁶⁴ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 168.

²⁶⁵ Taylan Özgür Kaya, *The Common Foreign and Security Policy: The European Union’s Quest for Being a Coherent and Effective Actor in Global Politics*, MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, June, 2004, p. 60.

On 2 August 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq.²⁶⁶ Although, the member states of the Union censured the invasion and called for “an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces”, they could not pursue a common position towards this crisis because of divergent national interests of the member states.²⁶⁷ On 4 August 1991, the imposition of sanctions and of an embargo both on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait, and on military equipments to be sold to Iraq was decided at the Political Committee’s convention in Rome.²⁶⁸ During the crisis, the Western European Union took part in the imposition of a naval embargo. However, the vessels used in this operation were not being controlled by a single European institution; rather these vessels were deployed under the flags of member states because of the divergent interests of the member states.²⁶⁹ Because of multiple discrepancies among the member states’ visions towards the crisis, the Union’s reaction cannot be regarded as an example of an effective foreign policy. The hostage-holding of the Europeans in Kuwait and Iraq by Saddam Hussein was the peak point of the instances when member states acted individually in accordance with their national interests.²⁷⁰ At an EPC ministerial meeting held on 21 August 1990, the representatives of the member states demonstrated “their acute concern and indignation at the restrictions on the freedom of movement of nationals of the member countries and at the inhuman treatment inflicted on some of those nationals. They warned Iraq of the grave consequences that would inevitably ensue were their safety to be placed at risk”.²⁷¹

In the light of these developments, it is possible to state that, because of the predominance of the national interests, it is hard to identify the portrayed attempts of the Union as a successful example of “single” and effective foreign policy practices. However, based on the lessons learnt from this crisis, the Union pursued its initiatives to strengthen its foreign and security policy.

²⁶⁶Patrick Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2012, p. 40.

²⁶⁷ Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 32; Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 168; Kjell A. Eliassen, “Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Policy Agenda”, in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 5.

²⁶⁸ Spence and Spence, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam”, p. 48; Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 132.

²⁶⁹ Esther Barbé, “Spanish Security Policy and the Mediterranean Question”, in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 151.

²⁷⁰ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 330.

²⁷¹ Western European Union Ministerial Meeting, on 21 August 1990, Paris, <http://www.weu.int/documents/900821en.pdf>, (Accessed on 03 September 2016).

Another dramatic international event was the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent ethnic/nationalist conflicts among the small Yugoslav republics, which made things harder for the Union due to several political, economic and security reasons. In the wake of these wars, the region not only became a place where some of the worst crimes against humanity were committed but also illustrated the Union's weakest link, that is a effective foreign and security policy towards such international crises.²⁷²

According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, the Union had two conflicting fears over their security: the first one was the fear of integration since the supranational characteristic of the Union threatens the existence of the nation-state at European level; the other was the fear of fragmentation.²⁷³ When the Europeans weighed up these two fears, it became clear that the fear of fragmentation posed greater danger to the security and political-economic stability of Europe.²⁷⁴ Due to this fear, European integration was used as a tool to promote regional stability and peace.²⁷⁵ Buzan and Wæver put forward John J. Mearsheimer's 'fragmentation scenario' that the wars in the Balkan Peninsula might knock on Europe's door creating a great power struggle among European states once again in the post-Cold War era.²⁷⁶ According to Mearsheimer, during the Cold War, the deterrent force was the existence of a nuclear threat that prevented the emergence of regional/internal conflicts among the Europeans.²⁷⁷ Buzan and Wæver clearly summarize this 'fear' argument: "The Balkans has served as Europe's ghost reminding it of the risks of war, and defining Europe's own identity in terms of no longer being susceptible to internecine war".²⁷⁸ Because of all these security concerns, the Union began to reinforce its attempts in the form of several political, economic and military preventative steps to eliminate the risk of war in its neighbourhood.

²⁷² Anders Wivel, "The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor", *JCMS*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005, p. 400; Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", pp. 176-179.

²⁷³ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Powers and Regions, The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.367.

²⁷⁴ Buzan and Wæver, "Powers and Regions", p. 367.

²⁷⁵ G. Pinar Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", in Kjell Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, London, Sage, 1998, p. 13.

²⁷⁶ Buzan and Wæver, "Powers and Regions", p. 356.

²⁷⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp.5-52.

²⁷⁸ Buzan and Wæver, "Powers and Regions", pp. 556-557.

During the early days of the conflict, it is possible to identify the Union's position as maintaining the existing political structure of Yugoslavia since a united and stable Yugoslavia with democratic institutions would be better for the Union. Because of that the Union saw the approval of independence movements in these republics as a threat to the stability in the region that might create a domino effect.²⁷⁹ Accordingly, a foreign ministerial level meeting was convened in 1991 and it was stated at this meeting that regarding the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the members of the Union would not act individually. However, in the following days, when Germany recognized the independence of these two states acting in line with the public opinion, it became clear that the members of the Union did not act in accordance with this collective decision.²⁸⁰

When the general situation is considered, it is seen that while Denmark, Belgium and Italy were supporting Germany's decision; France, the UK and the Netherlands were opposing the independence of these countries since they thought the recognition of these states might spill over to the whole region.²⁸¹ However, the political situation in the region did not evolve as the Union had planned at the beginning of the crisis. Instead, due to internal (the continuing process of the Maastricht negotiations) and external (the rising of the tension in the conflicted region) pressures, the Union had to change its position to one of considering the recognition of these states.²⁸²

Another disagreement on the issue of the Yugoslav Wars was the member states' diversified positions and opinions on military intervention.²⁸³ In this regard, while France was seeking to send a peacekeeping force, other member states rejected this proposal. The opponent group was led by the UK, which was reluctant to get involved in a long term hot conflict.²⁸⁴

As a result, although in the early days of the conflicts the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, argued that "it is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the

²⁷⁹Annemarie Peen Rodt and Stefan Wolff, "European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, p 417; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 358.

²⁸⁰Dedman, "The Origin and Development of the European Union", pp. 136-137.

²⁸¹Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 32.

²⁸²Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 26; Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", p. 179.

²⁸³Dedman, "The Origin and Development of the European Union", pp. 137-142.

²⁸⁴Michael Clarke, "British Security Policy", in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, pp. 142-143.

Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav Problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else”, at the end of the day it was the Americans who ended the wars.²⁸⁵ The intended actorness could not be demonstrated by the Union because of the lack of cohesion among the member states.

With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new political and economic issues, such as German unification, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, paved the way for an effective common foreign and security policy on the part of the Union.²⁸⁶ However, as it was stated above, there were various ideas about the establishment of a single roof for foreign and security policy issues. For instance, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were demanding stronger foreign policy cooperation. On the other hand, the UK, Denmark, Greece and Portugal were supporting the idea of the reformulation of the EPC without changing the main foundations and were unwilling to alter the intergovernmental nature of the EPC.²⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the pursuit of a common foreign and security policy continued. At the Rome European Council of the 14-15 December 1990 the heads of state and government stated:

The common foreign and security policy should aim at maintaining peace and international stability, developing friendly relations with all countries, promoting democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and encouraging the economic development of all nations, and should also bear in mind the special relations of individual Member States.²⁸⁸

On the issue of security and defence, the member states once again had different perspectives.²⁸⁹ To give an example, the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal were reluctant to create a European security and defence entity, since NATO was still on the centre stage and were supporting to pass the defence mission to the US.²⁹⁰ As the opposing group, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium supported the idea of founding a European security and defence system. Holding the middle ground on this issue,

²⁸⁵ Dedman, “The Origin and Development of the European Union”, p. 138; Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 153.

²⁸⁶ Karen E. Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 2, April-June, 2000, p. 14.

²⁸⁷ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 152.

²⁸⁸ The European Council Rome, 14-15 December 1990, http://aei.pitt.edu/1406/1/Rome_dec_1990.pdf, (Accessed on 04 September 2016)

²⁸⁹ Smith, “The End of Civilian Power”, p. 15.

²⁹⁰ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 186.

Germany was supporting both the presence of NATO in Europe and the establishment of a security and defence mechanism among the member states.

These developments explicitly revealed that the Union, which introduces itself as the “defender of democracy and the rule of law” and as an actor that acts towards international issues to “provide peace and prevent conflicts”, was not an effective actor that acts with a single voice. These two international crises demonstrated that in order to overcome such issues the Union needs to take required political and military measures.

2.3.2. The Maastricht Treaty

In accordance with the changing international atmosphere after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Union needed to improve its existing foreign and security policy dynamics. In this new geopolitical order, the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993. This was the Treaty that gave the name of “European Union” to the European Community. With the entry into force of the Treaty, a three pillar structure was created. According to this pillar system, the European Community would remain under the first pillar with its supranational nature; the CFSP would be under the roof of the second pillar that had an intergovernmental character and a new Justice and Home Affairs pillar would be created with an “intergovernmental nature”.²⁹¹

Article A and C underlined that “this Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen”²⁹² and that “the Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the *'acquis communautaire'*”.²⁹³

²⁹¹ Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, pp. 177-178.

²⁹² Treaty on European Union, Title I, Article A, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>, (Accessed on 04 September 2016).

²⁹³ Treaty on European Union, Title I, Article C.

The EPC was, now, replaced by the CFSP as it was stated in Title V of the Treaty.²⁹⁴ The objectives of the ensured common foreign and security policy are listed in Article J(1)-2:

The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.²⁹⁵

With the purpose of strengthening and increasing the Union's effectiveness on foreign and security issues, the determined responsibilities of the member states were drawn by the Article J(1), J(2) and J(1)-4. According to Article J(1)-4:

The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.²⁹⁶

The Treaty also identified two new concepts, "joint actions" and "common positions" that aimed to improve the effectiveness of the CFSP.²⁹⁷ It was guaranteed by Article J(3) that joint actions shall be determined by the European Council. The Treaty also committed the member states to such joint actions, as the following paragraph of Article J stated "The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority",²⁹⁸ and "joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity"²⁹⁹. The Treaty stressed that "Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall

²⁹⁴ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.

²⁹⁵ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-1(2).

²⁹⁶ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-1(4).

²⁹⁷ Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 152.

²⁹⁸ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-3(2).

²⁹⁹ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-3(4).

ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions”³⁰⁰ “acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament”³⁰¹.

On the issues of security and defence, it was stated in Article J(4)-2:

The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.³⁰²

With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the member states of the Union introduced a considerable number of innovative measures to become a more effective international actor in world affairs.³⁰³ The new instruments of the CFSP, namely joint action and common positions, are two significant innovations that imposed an obligation on the member states. It will not be wrong to say that the reforms introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was a turning point/opportunity for the member states as they committed themselves to the declared changes and duties both internally and externally. However, despite all these developments, efforts were not enough to attain the desired goals in foreign and security policy practices.³⁰⁴ The Bosnian War was the most significant and tragic example that demonstrated the Union was still too inefficient to play an important mission in a crisis situation.

After signing the Treaty, in order to clarify the “common interests” areas/regions of the CFSP, the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 was convened.³⁰⁵ In this regard, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean were identified as the most important regions for the Union’s interests. According to the Report:

The following paragraphs identify, in accordance with the European Council’s mandate areas in which joint action vis-à-vis selected individual countries or groups of countries would appear to be, in a first phase, particularly beneficial for the attainment of the objectives of the Union.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁰ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-2.

³⁰¹ Treaty on European Union, Title XVII, Article 189b.

³⁰² Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J-4(2).

³⁰³ Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 175.

³⁰⁴ Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy”, p. 561.

³⁰⁵ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 161.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

Since the case study of the thesis is the examination of the Union's involvement into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process, we should refer to the Report's "Middle East" section that emphasized:

The Middle East has been one of the constant preoccupations of the Community and its Member States. The instability which has been a permanent feature of this region affects international security and the interests of the Union, the most important of which are to ensure the stability of the area and a relationship of cooperation and dialogue. Within the framework of the objectives set by the Union, the following domains are potentially open to joint action:

- development of systematic action to support the process of negotiations launched by the Middle East Conference in Madrid on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council which should lead to a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question;
- ensure the Union's active involvement in the peace process;
- making efforts to persuade Israel to change its policy regarding settlements in the Occupied Territories and to persuade Arab countries to renounce their trade boycott;
- support moves towards regional integration;
- ensure the full compliance by the countries of the region with the relevant treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms control, including those on nonproliferation, and with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
- the foreign policy aspects of the fight against terrorism and the illicit traffic in drugs.³⁰⁷

As it can be understood from the article, the Middle East is one of the top priority areas for the Union both politically and economically. Ensuring the peace and stability in conflicted areas of the region, in Israel and Palestine for instance, was specifically underlined. However, neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the Lisbon Report could complete the missing parts of the CFSP of the Union, since the implementation of decisions was still problematic. In order to complete the unfinished missions of the Maastricht, it was stated in Article N(2) of the Maastricht Treaty:

[a] conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 167; European Commission, "The Lisbon Report", June, 1992, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-92-3_en.htm, (Accessed on 04 February 2017).

³⁰⁸ Treaty on European Union, Title VII, Article N(2).

2.3.3. The Amsterdam Treaty

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999. The Treaty amended the Maastricht Treaty with the purpose of reinforcing the integration process in the fields of foreign and security policy.³⁰⁹ The driving reason behind the Treaty can be stated as the unsuccessful foreign and security policy of the Union during its previous experiences in Bosnia and Iraq.³¹⁰ The Amsterdam Treaty aimed to improve consistency in the external activities of the Union. In this regard Article C of the Treaty stated:

The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.³¹¹

In order to improve the consistency and the effectiveness of the areas of foreign and security policy, Article J(6) stated:

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.³¹²

Under Title V, the Treaty clarified the objectives and guidelines of the CFSP, presented the identity objectives of the Union:

The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

³⁰⁹ Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy", p. 34; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 168.

³¹⁰ Esben Oust Heiberg, "Security Implications of EU Expansion to the North and East", in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 187; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy", p. 169.

³¹¹ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article C, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT&from=EN>, (Accessed on 04 September 2016).

³¹² Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J-6.

- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.³¹³

In accordance with these identified CFSP objectives, The Treaty also revised the instruments of the CFSP, which were defined as “common strategies, joint actions, common positions and strengthen systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy”³¹⁴:

- The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article J.1 by:
- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
 - deciding on common strategies;
 - adopting joint actions;
 - adopting common positions;
 - and strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.³¹⁵

The Article clarified that common strategies would be agreed upon by member states “in areas where the Member States have important interests in common”³¹⁶. On the other hand, the adopted “joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required”³¹⁷. The concept of common positions indicated “the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature”.³¹⁸

One of the significant provisions that was introduced by the Treaty was the creation of the post of the High Representative for CFSP in order to improve the cohesion and visibility of the Union in the international arena. According to Article J(16) of the Amsterdam Treaty:

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when

³¹³ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J-1.

³¹⁴ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 102; Keukeleire and Delreux, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 51.

³¹⁵ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J-2.

³¹⁶ Ibid., Article J-3.

³¹⁷ Ibid., Article J-4.

³¹⁸ Ibid., Article J-5.

appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.³¹⁹

In addition to this, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was introduced by the Treaty “in order to ensure full coherence with the Union’s external economic and development policies”.³²⁰ The tasks of the unit were:

- monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
- providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future ;
- providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;
- producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.³²¹

In the areas of security and defence, by adopting “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” missions, the Union integrated the Petersberg Tasks, which was adopted on 19 June 1992, and the operational capacity of the CFSP was improved.³²² The outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1998 and the Union’s initiatives to take it under control both caused criticism regarding the CFSP and the credibility of the Union and created disappointment once again among the Balkan countries.³²³ In other words, it will not be wrong to state that without the involvement of the US as a military power, the Union was incapable of solving such a security problem near its borders. Nevertheless, when the Union’s initiatives (mostly civilian measures) towards the Kosovo War were compared with the early 1990s experiences of the Union in the Bosnian War, it became clear that the former experience is more successful than the former.³²⁴ The Union also announced the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which is regarded as “the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at

³¹⁹ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J-16.

³²⁰ Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

³²¹ Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

³²² Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 169; Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 35; Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 232.

³²³ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 254; Patrick Müller, “EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict”, pp. 6-7.

³²⁴ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 196; Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, pp. 34-37.

strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity”.³²⁵

As a consequence of the war, the Union accelerated its initiatives to take more responsibility both politically and militarily to provide security and stability in the region.³²⁶ One of these initiatives was the political transformation of the region through Stability Pacts intended to foster peace, democracy and economic prosperity.³²⁷ Besides these preventative and transformative civilian measures, the failure of the Union in this case revealed the need for an effective military power.³²⁸

During this period, in order to improve the efficiency of the CFSP, the member states of the Union attempted to add a military wing. At this point, one of the critical events that was as influential as the Balkan “fiasco” and speeded up the attempts for a military flank was the governmental change in the UK, a country that had previously been unwilling to support the establishment of a European military force. With the accession of Tony Blair’s labour government in the UK, the environment changed and one of the significant problems within the Union disappeared.³²⁹ In areas of security and defence, rising criticisms towards the Union among the its citizens regarding the failure in the Balkans can be thought as domestic pressure.³³⁰

As a consequence of these developments, on 3-4 December 1998 France and the UK issued a Joint Declaration on European Defence at the Saint-Malo Summit whereby a bilateral political ground was created to improve the military capability of the Union.³³¹

The Heads of State and Government of the two countries agreed on the following:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important

³²⁵ Stability Pact for the Southeastern Europe, “About the Stability Pact”, <http://stability-pact.org/>, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³²⁶ Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 233.

³²⁷ Stability Pact for the Southeastern Europe, “About the Stability Pact”.

³²⁸ Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it Does?”, p. 254; Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 170.

³²⁹ Hill and Smith, “European Foreign Policy”, p. 196; Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 36; Keukeleire and Delreux, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 52.

³³⁰ Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 35.

³³¹ Simon Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security From EDC to CFSP*, Oxford, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 313; Wivel, “The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States”, p. 400.

to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.³³²

The subsequent colloquy was the Cologne European Council on 3-4 June 1999, which resulted in a declaration on “Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”.³³³ It was stated under this title:

[i]n pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg tasks’. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.³³⁴

The aim of creating a common European security and defence policy was explained as follows:

The aim is to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defence. This requires a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. Decisions to act would be taken within the framework of the CFSP according to appropriate procedures in order to reflect the specific nature of decisions in this field. The Council of the European Union would thus be able to take decisions on the whole range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis situations. The European Union is committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU.³³⁵

This summit paved the way for more concentrated debates over the Common European Security and Defence Policy in Helsinki in 1999 and in Santa Maria da Feira in 2000,

³³² Joint Declaration of the British-French Summit at St. Malo, 4 December 1998, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration.%20Saint-Malo.%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³³³ Keukeleire and Delreux, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 53.

³³⁴ Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, “European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”, 3 and 4 June 1999, http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/presidency_conclusions_cologne_european_council_3_and_4_june_1999-en-cddd5ebb-2ed9-4ec1-95e9-faaf352f9860.html, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³³⁵ Ibid.

which added a military capability by integrating the WEU into the Union.³³⁶ The Union undertook its first military operation in Macedonia in 2003, known as the *Concordia* operation that aimed to preserve peace among armed parties.³³⁷ Although the operation can be described as “militarily light”, the operation owed its significance mainly to the fact that by undertaking such a “military” operation, the Union had the opportunity to observe the effectiveness of its external military mission, which was executed by a “collective” decision of the member states.³³⁸ The second military operation was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004: Operation *Althea*’s main objectives were providing peace and security in the region and supporting the country on its path to European integration, both politically and economically.³³⁹

2.3.4. The Nice Treaty

As a conclusion of the Nice European Council in 2000, the Nice Treaty was signed. The Treaty included new provisions in the field of foreign and security policy.³⁴⁰ The European Council aimed to handle the unfinished parts of the Amsterdam Treaty in Nice.³⁴¹ In the field of foreign and security policy, Article 17 of the Treaty emphasized:

[t]he common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so

³³⁶ Helsinki European Council Declaration, “Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”, 10-11 December 1999,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#e, (Accessed on 05 September 2016); Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, http://aei.pitt.edu/43325/1/Feira_Council.pdf, (Accessed on 05 September 2016)

³³⁷ Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/COUNCIL%20JOINT%20ACTION%202003%2092%20CFSP.pdf>, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³³⁸ Annemarie Peen Rodt and Stefan Wolff, “EU Reactive Crisis Management in the Western Balkans”, March, 2007, pp.16-19, http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/Documents/Mirico/EU_reactive%20crisis%20management%20WEB.pdf, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³³⁹ European Council, Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/autres/bosnia/bosnia%20en.pdf, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³⁴⁰ Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, p. 36; Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 233.

³⁴¹ Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 233.

decide. [...]The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.³⁴²

Under the legal framework of the Nice Treaty, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (replacing the Political Committee), the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff were made permanent.³⁴³ Article 25 of the Treaty affirmed:

[w]ithout prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.

The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation, without prejudice to Article 47.³⁴⁴

The Nice Treaty articulated the concept of “enhanced cooperation”, which was previously used as “closer cooperation” in Articles J(4)-5, K(7) and the Declaration on Western European Union of the Maastricht Treaty.³⁴⁵ In this regard, Article 27 of the Treaty was formulated with the purpose of extending enhanced cooperation in the CFSP. According to Article 27:

[e]nhanced cooperation in any of the areas referred to in this Title shall be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall respect: the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy; the powers of the European Community, and consistency between all the Union’s policies and its external activities.³⁴⁶

In view of these changes introduced by the Nice Treaty, it can be concluded that, besides the (re)formulated provisions, the Treaty did not overcome the Union’s

³⁴² Treaty of Nice, Article 17, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_nice.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

³⁴³ Peen Rodt and Wolff, “EU Reactive Crisis Management”, p. 13; Smith, “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation”, p. 234.

³⁴⁴ Treaty of Nice, Article 25.

³⁴⁵ Treaty on European Union, Article J-4(5).

³⁴⁶ Treaty of Nice, Article 27.

structural foreign and security policy problems, which brought the need for further efforts to make the Union a more effective actor in international affairs.

2.3.5. The Lisbon Treaty

Immediately after the signing of the Nice Treaty, a dramatic international event happened and caused significant changes in international relations. On September 11, 2001 a terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, attacked the US. The Union soon after announced their solidarity with the US against terrorism.³⁴⁷ Accordingly, in order to deal with internal (political integration and enlargement process) and external (international crises) issues, the Heads of State and Government of the member states convened in Laeken, Belgium in December 2001 and issued the Laeken Declaration of December 15, 2001.³⁴⁸ In the Presidential Conclusion of the Laeken European Council, the urgency of achieving the goals that were not finalized with the Nice Treaty was noted and several critical titles were handled, including the issue of bringing the Union closer to its citizens.³⁴⁹ The Declaration on the future of the European Union explicitly asserted the growing role of the Union in international affairs together with the significance of its constructed norms and values in its relations with third countries:

[t]he eleventh of September has brought a rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them. What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to

³⁴⁷ Fraser Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2007, pp. 91-95.

³⁴⁸ Dedman, "The Origin and Development of the European Union", p. 174; Peen Rodt and Wolff, "EU Reactive Crisis Management", p. 11.

³⁴⁹ Dedman, "The Origin and Development of the European Union", p. 174; The Laeken European Council, Presidency Conclusions, "Declaration on the Future of the European Union", Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, http://aei.pitt.edu/43344/1/Laeken_2001.pdf, (Accessed on 27 May 2017).

countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.³⁵⁰

The Declaration stressed that “The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses”.³⁵¹ In addition to the underlining of the Union’s normative basis, the Declaration’s importance mainly comes from its clear description of the Union’s actorness that identified it as more than “an economic and technical collaboration”.³⁵² The improvement of both civilian and military capabilities, as well as the decision making process to act coherently towards international crises and the constitutionalisation of the existing treaties were the main titles that were discussed at a Convention in Brussels, in 2002.³⁵³ As such, the Laeken European Council served as a meeting that set out an action plan for the Union to complete its political integration process. The Declaration aimed to fulfill the required steps (on the issues of the fulfillment of political integration, improvement of common security and defence policy, and of foreign policy) before the Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004.³⁵⁴

Subsequently, the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which aimed to increase the efficiency of the CFSP and of other titles listed in Laeken, was agreed on by consensus and presented to the European Council in 2003.³⁵⁵ The preamble of the Treaty stated:

Europe is a continent that has brought forth civilisation; that its inhabitants, arriving in successive waves from earliest times, have gradually developed the values underlying humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason,

Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, the values of which, still present in its heritage, have embedded within the life of society the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law,

³⁵⁰ The Laeken European Council, Presidency Conclusions, “Declaration on the Future of the European Union”.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.; Peen Rodt and Wolff, “EU Reactive Crisis Management”, p. 11; The Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 24-25 October 2002, Brussels, http://aei.pitt.edu/43348/1/Brussels_Oct_2002_1.pdf, (Accessed on 27 May 2017).

³⁵⁴ The Laeken European Council.

³⁵⁵ Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003XX0718\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003XX0718(01)&from=EN), (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.³⁵⁶

As can be seen in this paragraph, the Draft Treaty underlined the identity of the Union that is constructed in a process and has a normative dimension, including preserving freedom and respect for human rights.³⁵⁷ On the issues of common foreign and security policy, Article 15 ensures:

Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.³⁵⁸

In accordance with this, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. With the Treaty, a new post, the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, was created in order to stimulate coherence in foreign policy issues and to fill the gap between the supranational and intergovernmental institutions of the Union.

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe emphasized in the first place:

[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.³⁵⁹

On the issues of foreign and security policy, the Treaty stated:

[t]he Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.³⁶⁰

A European External Action Service was introduced by the Treaty in order to improve efficiency of the Union in its external relations. According to the Declaration on the Creation of a European External Action Service:

[t]he Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., Title I, Article 2.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., Title III, Article 15.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., Title I, Article I-2.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., Title III, Article I-16.

of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a European decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.³⁶¹

However, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe never came into force because of the referendum results in the Netherlands and France. A simultaneous development was the announcement on 12-13 December 2003 of the European Security Strategy, which was analysed in the first chapter of the thesis. The purpose of the Strategy was to create a single vision within the Union in international affairs. The Strategy also identified “key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU”, which are categorized into five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.³⁶²

As a consequence of the consensus among the member states of the Union, on 19 October 2007, the “Draft Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community”, also known as the Lisbon Treaty, was proposed.³⁶³ The Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007.

The objectives of the Union’s external actions were defined in Article 10(A) of the Treaty as follows:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph.

³⁶¹ Ibid., Chapter II, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article III-296.

³⁶² European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf>, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³⁶³ Steven Blockmans and Ramses A. Wessel, “The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty Make the EU More Effective?”, *Centre for the Law of EU External Relations*, CLEER Working Papers, January, 2009, p. 8.

It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.³⁶⁴

One of the significant innovations that were brought about by the Lisbon Treaty was the announcement of a new section created as an integral part of the CFSP and entitled "Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy", in other words the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). According to Article 10:

[t]he common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. [...] The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties.³⁶⁵

Another significant dimension of the Lisbon Treaty was that the Union was granted legal personality in foreign affairs, as stated in Article 46(A) of the Treaty. In addition to that, the pillar structure disappeared with the Treaty. A new High Representative position, which would ensure coherence among the institutions and the member states of the Union and represent the Union "at international meetings, such as the United Nations",³⁶⁶ was instituted. Article 28(A) confirmed:

The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.³⁶⁷

Moreover, the Article also emphasized the rule of "unanimity" in defence issues, as it stated:

[d]ecisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council

³⁶⁴ Treaty of Lisbon, "General Provision on the Union's External Action", Article 10-A, http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19, (Accessed on 05 September 2016).

³⁶⁵ Treaty of Lisbon, "Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy", Article 10-C.

³⁶⁶ European Union External Action Service, "High Representative/Vice President", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3598/high-representativevice-president_en, (Accessed on 27 May 2017).

³⁶⁷ Treaty of Lisbon, "Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy", Article 28-A.

acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State³⁶⁸.

In the light of these developments, it is possible to note that the Union's foreign and security policy remained intergovernmental despite all efforts.³⁶⁹ When the Arab Spring began in 2011, the then High Representative of the Union, Catherine Ashton, stated that "it was like flying an airplane while we are still building the wings and somebody is trying to take the tailfin off at the same time".³⁷⁰ On that note, it can be concluded that the efforts to ensure and improve an influential foreign and security policy is an ongoing process.

2.4. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

With the 2004 enlargement that mainly included Central and Eastern European countries, the Union had to face a wide variety of new security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and illegal human trafficking.³⁷¹ Amid this new political and security environment, relations with new neighbors became one of the highest external priorities in order to preserve stability within the borders of the Union.³⁷² The Union's neighboring countries were identified in the 1992 Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, as Central and Eastern European countries, the Balkan and the Middle East countries, which were labeled the near abroad.³⁷³

The Union launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership- a chain of comprehensive initiatives at political, economic, socio-cultural levels, towards North African and the Middle Eastern countries- a region that is labeled the Mediterranean- in 1995.³⁷⁴ By

³⁶⁸ Ibid., Article 28-A(4).

³⁶⁹ Helene Sjursen, "The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 8, 2011, p. 1069.

³⁷⁰ Philippe Beauregard, "Taking Flight or Crashing Down? European Common Foreign Policy and International Crises", *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2016, p. 375.

³⁷¹ Sevilya Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions*, Winter, 2005, p. 4; Michelle Pace, "Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2007, p. 659.

³⁷² Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy", pp. 757-758.

³⁷³ European Council, Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/li1_en.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

³⁷⁴ Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 10.

introducing this new external policy, the Union aimed to establish closer and stable relations with these countries in the post-Cold War era by promoting “democratic institutions” and strengthening the rule of law and civil society.³⁷⁵ The member states of the Union and the Mediterranean countries convened at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and agreed on a declaration which is known as both the Barcelona Declaration and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. By adopting this Partnership, the representatives of the member states of the Union and the Mediterranean states announced their “will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history”, and stressed “the strategic importance of the Mediterranean”.³⁷⁶ Since an effective regional partnership necessitated a comprehensive outlook on numerous cooperation levels, the participant states highlighted the significance of “sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity”,³⁷⁷ and thus agreed on founding an economic and financial cooperation area that would be ensured through a free-trade area. According to the Declaration, this economic partnership would be based on “the progressive establishment of a free-trade area; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas and a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners”.³⁷⁸

It is commonly acknowledged that the prospect of the EU membership is the most successful foreign policy tool of the Union to promote peace, stability, democracy in its neighbourhood.³⁷⁹ Although the Union launched these comprehensive partnership

³⁷⁵ Barcelona Declaration, 27-28 November 1995, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016); Oliver Schlumberger, “The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March, 2011, p. 140.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., “Economic and Financial Partnership: Creating an Area of Shared Prosperity”.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, March, 2010, p. 270; Othon Anastasakis, “The EU’s Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a more Pragmatic Approach”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4, December, 2008, pp 366-368; Spence and Spence, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam”, p. 54; Antonio Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood Stabilization, Integration and Partnership”, in Roland Dannreuther (ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, Routledge, 2004, pp. 13-15; Kaya, “Identifying the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy Roles”, p. 113.

initiatives towards the region to improve its relations with these countries, it was quite uneasy for the Union to ensure the envisioned progress due to the lack of membership commitment.³⁸⁰ Accordingly, a “ring of friends” was created that can be basically interpreted as “partnership without membership” and/or as “less than full membership but more than associate partnership”.³⁸¹ It was stated in the ESS:

[i]t is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.³⁸²

However, despite its partial economic success, the Barcelona Declaration cannot be interpreted as a progressive attempt involving political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions.³⁸³ Because of its failure to build strong cooperation in intended areas (political, economic, socio-cultural cooperation), the Union began a new initiative, “the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy”, in order to promote political and economic stability in the region, an aim that constituted the foundation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).³⁸⁴ In addition to this, one of the major reasons behind the announcement of Wider Europe can be interpreted as the Union’s security concerns that mainly increased after September 11.³⁸⁵ By adopting this new policy, not only stability but also the spread of European values in these countries were aimed for.³⁸⁶ The “Wider Europe Initiative” was adopted by the Union and approved by the European Council in 2002. Under the title of “The Enlarged Union and Its Neighbors”, the Presidency Conclusion of 2002 stated:

[t]he enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. This presents an important opportunity to take forward relations with neighboring countries based on shared political and economic values. The EU remains

³⁸⁰ Kahraman, “The European Neighbourhood Policy”, pp. 4-5; Keukeleire and Delreux, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 56.

³⁸¹ Kahraman, “The European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 3.

³⁸² European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”.

³⁸³ Kahraman, “The European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 11.

³⁸⁴ Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 759.

³⁸⁵ Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “Profiles: A ‘Ring of Friends’? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 9, No.2, Summer, 2004, p. 242.

³⁸⁶ Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 758.

determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the EU.³⁸⁷

The Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy was launched with the official name of “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors” in March 2003.³⁸⁸ Highlighting the 2004 enlargement’s potential influence on the Union’s foreign policy at political and economic levels, the document stated that the Union should establish close partnerships with its prospective neighbours:

The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in enhancing relations with the new neighbors. Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours.³⁸⁹

Two major objectives were stated in the document in order to ensure close cooperation with the neighbors of the Union over the medium and long term:

To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours. To anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform.³⁹⁰

The announcement of a new type of policy towards the Mediterranean was mostly an indicator of security-based concerns of the Union in its new neighbourhood.³⁹¹ The evolution of the Barcelona Declaration to the Wider Europe Policy was mainly the consequence of the imperfections of the former initiative. Thus, the Union’s pursuit of a more comprehensive and efficient strategy continued and “The European

³⁸⁷ Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 2002, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

³⁸⁸ Commission of the European Communities, “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, Brussels, 11 March 2003, https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016); Fulvio Attinà “European Neighbourhood Policy and the Building of Security around Europe”, in Fulvio Attinà and Rosa Rossi (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economical and Social Issues*, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med” Department of Political Studies, 2004, pp. 16-20.

³⁸⁹ Commission of the European Communities, “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, p. 3.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁹¹ Kahraman, “The European Neighbourhood Policy”, pp. 15-17.

Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” was announced on 12 May 2004.³⁹² The Strategy Paper expanded its geographical coverage and included the South Caucasus region, encompassing Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.³⁹³ Russia did not accept the offer to be part of the ENP; rather it decided to continue its relations with the Union on a bilateral framework.³⁹⁴ Croatia and Turkey were also not included in the ENP since they were potential candidates.³⁹⁵

The Strategy Paper not only expanded the borders of the neighborhood policy but also launched new concepts, which are “joint ownership”, “added value” and “monitoring”.³⁹⁶ The concept of “joint ownership” was introduced as follows:

[j]oint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues. There can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country.³⁹⁷

According to the Strategy Paper, “the ENP brings added value, going beyond existing cooperation, both to partner countries and to the EU” since, besides its highlighted economic and socio-cultural cooperation areas, the ENP also aimed to construct a bridge between the Union and the participants to deal with other problems via bilateral cooperation.³⁹⁸

³⁹² Commission of the European Communities, “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, Brussels, 12 May 2004, [http://aei.pitt.edu/38132/1/COM_\(2004\)_373.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/38132/1/COM_(2004)_373.pdf), (Accessed on 06 September 2016); Roberto Aliboni, “The ENP in the Mediterranean: Evaluating the Political and Strategic Dimensions”, in Michele Comelli, Atila Eralp and Çiğdem Üstün (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean Drawing from the Lessons of Enlargement*, Ankara, Middle East Technical University Press, 2009, p. 16; Derek E. Mix, “The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy”, *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, 2013, p. 71.

³⁹³ European Union External Action Service, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

³⁹⁴ European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, p. 7.

³⁹⁵ Croatia became the member of the Union in 2013, for more information see:

https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en, (Accessed on 06 September 2016); European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, p. 7.

³⁹⁶ European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, pp. 7-9.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

The subsequent development was the announcement of the ENP in 2004 with the purpose of enhancing the relationship among participants and creating “stability, security and well-being” in the neighborhood of the Union. The ENP aimed to create partnerships in various issue areas that included political, security, economy, transportation, environment, energy, research and innovation.³⁹⁹ In order to strengthen the ENP, “Strengthening the ENP”⁴⁰⁰ and “A Strong European Neighborhood Policy Communication”⁴⁰¹ were drafted in 2007. By adopting these documents, “the crucial importance of the ENP to consolidate a ring of prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the EU’s neighborhood” was reaffirmed.⁴⁰²

The then Commission President, Romano Prodi said, in his speech at the sixth ECSA World Conference, “We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter”.⁴⁰³ In other words, the Union was suggesting a relationship with those countries on the ground of “all but institutions”.⁴⁰⁴ To conclude it can be displayed that the Union’s policy towards the region aimed to preserve economic and political stability that were essential for the Union’s interests and to build a comprehensive relationships with those countries. In terms of efficiency and credibility of the Union it is difficult to identify the policy as a successful foreign policy initiative since the region still suffers from various political, economic, and socio-cultural problems ranging from anti-democratic regimes, organized crime, terrorism, domestic conflicts to poverty and poor health/education conditions. The

³⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁰⁰ Council of European Union, “Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy”, 19 June 2007, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011016%202007%20INIT>, (Accessed on 06 September 2016); EU Neighborhood Library, “Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy: Presidency Progress Report”, 18-19 June 2007, <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/strengthening-european-neighbourhood-policy-presidency-progress-report-june-18-19-2007>, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

⁴⁰¹ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy”, 5 December 2007, [http://aei.pitt.edu/38883/1/COM_\(2007\)_774.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/38883/1/COM_(2007)_774.pdf), (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

⁴⁰² Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy, p. 2; Elena Baracani, “The EU and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of Democratization in the framework of Neighbourhood Policy?”, in Fulvio Attinà and Rosa Rossi (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economical and Social Issues*, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med” Department of Political Studies, 2004, p. 55.

⁴⁰³ Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm, (Accessed on 06 September 2016).

⁴⁰⁴ Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 763.

asymmetrical nature of this partnership is also one of the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of this policy.⁴⁰⁵

2.5. CONCLUSION

Founding an effective foreign and security policy has been on the top of the Union's agenda since the 1950s, a process that was accelerated with the end of the Cold War. However, regarding the objectives and characteristics of this intended common foreign and security policy, the member states of the Union have not reached a common vision because of differentiated national interests, historical experiences and of the existing international political and security environment. National interests of the member states, which are part of their identity, have explicitly affected the evolution of the Union's foreign and security policy process. Since it is uneasy to separate these two concepts, interests and identity, it can be argued that the establishment of an effective common foreign and security policy has not yet been fully achieved by the Union where the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making process still prevails. Factors ranging from diversified national interests and identities to historical experiences and differences in political and military powers of the member states each have a considerable impact on the Union's ineffective foreign and security policy practices.

Soon after the end of the Cold War, the outbreak of wars in the Balkans and the Middle East dramatically demonstrated the weakness of the Union to present a permanent and effective solution for international crises. As it was stated above, differing perceptions of the "big three", namely the UK, Germany and France, have been the major cause behind the failure to construct a common position in international affairs. At this point, it is necessary to note the recent developments in the UK. At a referendum held on 23 June 2016, the British people decided to leave the Union as they argued that the supranational characteristic of the Union weakens their national sovereignty.⁴⁰⁶ The decision was due not only political reasons but also to several economic and social

⁴⁰⁵ Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 19.

⁴⁰⁶ For more information see: CNN, "Brexit", <http://edition.cnn.com/specials/uk-referendum>, (Accessed on 09 September 2016); The Economist, "Brexit", <http://www.economist.com/Brexit>, (Accessed on 09 September 2016); Brian Wheeler and Alex Hunt, "All you Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU", BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887>, (Accessed on 09 September 2016).

factors.⁴⁰⁷ This development also shows that it is still an ongoing process for the Union before it reaches a point where it can act effectively without prioritizing national interests.

Regarding the creation of the ENP, which was a policy formulated to improve the relationship between the Union and its new neighbors in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement, the Union sought to create a comprehensive cooperation ground involving political and economic arrangements, and social and cultural collaborations. However, at the end of the day, it is hard to conclude that the political and economic conditions in the neighbouring countries improved after the adoption of this policy. As it was addressed above, one of the major driving forces behind this initiative was the security concerns of the Union in the post-Cold War era. Regarding this point, one of the main criticisms towards the ENP was that, due to the asymmetrical characteristics of the relations and the security-based focus of the Union, the ENP can be thought of as a “friendly Monroe Doctrine”.⁴⁰⁸ In other words, the consequence of this “ring of friends” analogy demonstrates that the Union’s political, economic, and security oriented concerns, rather than the aim of preserving peace and democracy in these countries, were the actual driving force behind this policy initiative.

To sum up, a comprehensive analysis of the Union’s foreign and security policy demonstrates that, despite all efforts since the 1950s, the Union could not completely become an effective foreign and security policy actor in world politics due to several internal and external reasons. There are still intense discussions on the extent to which the Union acts as a normative power and performs a leading or an effective role when an international problem arises. This lack of effectiveness created not only disappointment within the Union but also in its neighboring countries. Although the Union is mostly known as the biggest aid donor, in humanitarian crises, its effectiveness in the fields of foreign and security policy has been criticized among scholars since the early days of its establishment.

⁴⁰⁷ The Economist, “Brexit”; Asa Bennet, “100 Reasons Why Brexit was a Good Thing”, The Telegraph, 30 September 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/30/100-reasons-to-embrace-brexit/>, (Accessed on 04 February 2017).

⁴⁰⁸ Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, “Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008, p.531.

In accordance with the analysis of the Union's role conceptions in the previous chapter, it can be noted that actorness of the Union has been portrayed in various concepts such as "force for good", "force for international peace, security and stability" and "promoter of its values and norms". Yet, when we consider the arguments of Bretherton and Vogler who set the framework of actorness through three elements: opportunity, presence and capability, it becomes clear that the Union, despite its identified foreign and security policy objectives, has not yet materialised these objectives into successful practices. Rather, the political standing of the Union in some international crises raises suspicions towards its capability and credibility on the path to preserving these objectives in international affairs.

In light of these points, the next chapter will analyse the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process in an attempt to assess both the normativeness of the Union and the effectiveness of its foreign and security policy in such a prolonged international crisis.

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: PRINCIPLES, ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an unresolved crisis that has been on the top of the international agenda since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In order to put an end to the ongoing conflict, several steps have been attempted at both the regional and the international levels. Continuing tension in the region has been seen by the Western countries mainly as a threat for the economic and political stability. Resolution of the conflict has maintained its importance for the Union due to economic, political and security oriented reasons. In this regard, the Union has attempted several initiatives. Among the reasons for these initiatives, it would be wrong to neglect the Union's historical ties with and responsibilities towards the two parties. Concordantly, the "British mandatory rule"⁴⁰⁹ in Palestine from 1922 to 1948, and the tragic events during the Second World War, namely the Holocaust, can be given as evidence for the historical closeness of the Union to the region.⁴¹⁰ The dramatic changes in the region that caused political and economic turbulences have significantly affected the Union's foreign policy agenda during the Cold War. Thus, economic and political stabilization of the region has been a top priority objective of the Union's foreign policy. In this regard, the first official declaratory step of the Union came in the aftermath of the 1973 War.⁴¹¹ Since then, the Union's involvement into the conflict increasingly continued.

⁴⁰⁹ For more information about the British mandatory period see: William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, Fourth Edition, 2009, pp. 164-167; Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 75-78.

⁴¹⁰ Anders Persson, *The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1971–2013: In Pursuit of a Just Peace*, Lexington Books, London, 2015, p. 72; Haim Yacobi and David Newman, "The EU and the Israel–Palestine Conflict", in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds.), *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, Cambridge University Press 2008, pp. 175-176; Taylan Özgür Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap-İsrail Uyumazlığı'ndaki Üçüncü Taraf Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. 10, No. 38, p. 71.

⁴¹¹ Costanza Musu, *European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 32-33; Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap-İsrail Uyumazlığı'ndaki Üçüncü Taraf Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi", p. 71. 6-24 October 1973 Arab-Israeli War/Yom Kippur War/October War is the third major Arab-Israeli War that began with Egypt and Syria's attack to Israel in

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Union was able to play an autonomous political role in the region. Yet, these initiatives demonstrated both the lack of coherence among the member states of the Union and the supremacy of trans-Atlantic relations for them. The member states' diversified interests and their political, economic and historical relations with the conflicted parties limited the Union's ability to act in collaboration. By increasing its financial aid to the Palestinian refugees via the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) since the 1970s, the Union aimed to prevent the emergence of humanitarian crises in the region.⁴¹² Since the declaration issued in Venice in 1980 on Palestinians' right to self-determination, the Union has maintained this objective in its subsequent initiatives and official statements.⁴¹³ With the end of the Cold War, the new geopolitical conditions made the Union follow the American-led initiatives. This was not only because the Union had been busy dealing with its political integration process, but also because of the dominant position of the US in new political era. With the announcement of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the Union became part of the Oslo peace process and was involved in the economic development of Palestine as a delegation of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG).⁴¹⁴ In addition to this, by establishing new regional neighbourhood policies, the Union aimed to strengthen its bilateral political and economic relations with the countries in the region with the purpose of creating a stable and secure region in accordance with its political and economic interests.⁴¹⁵ The Union improved its political role with the co-sponsorship status in the Madrid Conference in 2002.⁴¹⁶

order to recapture the lands that they lost in the 1967 War to Israel. For more information see: Claude Faure, *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Culture, History and Politics*, Thomson Gale, 2005, pp. 35-37; Ian J. Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History*, Reaktion Books, 2009, pp. 130-136; BBC News, "1973: October War", 6 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7381358.stm, (Accessed on 12 May 2017); Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003*, Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 16-21; Cleveland and Bunton, "A History of the Modern Middle East", p. 371.

⁴¹² Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money*, Routledge, 2008, p. 88.

⁴¹³ Nathalie Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard*, Routledge, 2007, p. 101.

⁴¹⁴ Le More, "International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo", p. 88.

⁴¹⁵ Rouba Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document, No. 328, May 2010, pp. 11-13.

⁴¹⁶ Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", pp. 20-21.

Since the establishment of “the Quartet”⁴¹⁷, the Union has become involved in several initiatives both bilaterally and multilaterally. In spite of its historical ties with and geographical proximity to the region, the Union’s effectiveness, in terms of being productive and devising an effective foreign policy towards the conflict, has been questioned by the countries of the region and by IR scholars. In this regard, this chapter aims to present a clear understanding of the Union’s actorness in the conflict and to answer the following questions: To what extent has the Union demonstrated a common and an independent position towards such an international crisis? What are the major driving forces behind the Union’s involvement in the conflict? To what extent has the Union managed to contribute to the resolution of the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

By assessing the arguments of the Union’s actorness, mainly on the basis of the normative power Europe concept, the chapter aims to present clear answers to these questions. As underlined in the first chapter, Manners, who introduced the concept of normative power, suggests three steps to judge and understand the Union’s normativeness: principles, actions and outcomes.⁴¹⁸ In this context, the chapter aims to analyse the Union’s involvement in the conflict resolution process by dividing the process into two main periods: firstly, the Union’s involvement in the conflict between the years of 1970-1990 will be handled and in the second part, the Union’s political and economic involvement into the conflict since the end of the Cold War will be analysed. In each part, Manners’s triple process will be applied to clarify the effectiveness of the Union in such an international crisis. In order to lay out the conceptual and methodological framework of the chapter, elements of the triple method, namely the Union’s official documents (principles) of the Union, its actions and the outcomes of these actions are presented in the Table 1 across two main periods:

⁴¹⁷ The Quartet was created in 2002 in Madrid Conference and includes the US, the Union, the UN and Russia. The establishment and objectives of the Quartet will be analysed in the following sections of the chapter in detail.

⁴¹⁸ Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, p.46.

Table 1: Conceptual and Methodological Framework of Chapter 4

	Principles	Actions	Outcomes
First Period (1970-1990)	<p>1973 Brussels Declaration</p> <p>1973 Copenhagen Declaration</p> <p>1977 London Declaration</p> <p>1980 Venice Declaration</p> <p>1989 Madrid Declaration</p>	<p>Financial Support to the Palestinians via UNRWA</p> <p>Euro-Arab Dialogue (failed)</p>	<p>The Union, for the first time, mentioned and recognized the self-determination rights of the Palestinians in this period. It did not display an effective and dominant foreign and security policy, but rather got involved in American-led initiatives such as Camp David.</p>
Second Period (Post-1990)	<p>1991 Madrid Conference (Oslo Process)</p> <p>1999 Berlin Declaration</p> <p>2002 Madrid Conference (Quartet)</p> <p>2006 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council</p> <p>2009 Brussels Declaration</p> <p>2012 Declaration by the High Representative on Middle East Peace Process</p>	<p>Delegation status in REDWG to control the financial aid flow to Palestine</p> <p>1995 EMP</p> <p>1996 Special envoy post was created</p> <p>Co-sponsorship status in the Quartet</p> <p>2004 ENP</p> <p>EUBAM (border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing point)</p> <p>Provided financial aid to the Palestinians via REDWG and MEDA programmes.</p>	<p>In this period, the Union mainly joined multilateral initiatives such as the Oslo Process and the Quartet.</p> <p>The Union developed the EMP and ENP to improve bilateral political-economic relations with the conflicted parties. (failed to reach its goals)</p> <p>It could not demonstrate an effective and consistent foreign and security policy</p>

3.2. FIRST PERIOD OF THE UNION'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: 1970-1990

As mentioned above, the Union began to concentrate on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mainly after the 1973 October War. However, since the establishment of the EEC with the 1957 Rome Treaty, the developments in the Middle East started to arouse interest.⁴¹⁹ As a consequence of the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Algerian Liberation War between the years of 1954-1962, European countries perceived Israel as a strategic ally and a representative of the Western values in the region.⁴²⁰ The Europeans' sympathy towards Israel had different reasons, ranging from security and economic concerns to moral responsibilities as Germany had tragic memories with Jews.⁴²¹ Therefore, from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 onwards, Germany has provided considerable economic and diplomatic support to Israel.⁴²² A decade after the Rome Treaty, the EEC faced the first indication of the diversified interests among the member states when "the 1967 War"⁴²³ broke out.⁴²⁴ During the war, while Germany and Holland were supporting Israel, France applied an embargo to the country.⁴²⁵ This division among the member states neither constituted the last one nor ended the Union's initiatives towards the crisis; rather, the Union focused on the issue intensively after the

⁴¹⁹ Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 71-72; Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 7.

⁴²⁰ Bichara Khader, "The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2013): Soft Diplomacy and Hard Realities", *Brussels, MEDEA*, 2013, p. 2, http://www.moc.pna.ps/elibrary/khader_eu_palestine_1957_-2013_general.pdf, (Accessed on 01 April 2017).

⁴²¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How much of an Actor?", *European Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2008, p. 113; Le More, "International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo", p. 91; Sharon Pardo, "Integration without Membership: Israel and the European Union", *Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 37-39

⁴²² Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", pp. 181-182.

⁴²³ 5-10 June 1967 Arab Israeli War/Six-Day War is the second major war between the Arabs and the Israelis. For More information see: Faure, "Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 33-35; Rabinovich, "Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003", pp. 9-16; Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 72-73; BBC News, "1967: Six-Day War", 6 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7381322.stm, (Accessed on 12 May 2017).

⁴²⁴ Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", p. 154

⁴²⁵ Khader, "The European Union and the Palestinian Question", p. 4

1973 War. In this regard, the Union tried to improve its political impact in spite of its lack of a manoeuvre capability under the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War.⁴²⁶

3.2.1. Analysis of the Union's Official Statements: Principles

The main characteristic of the Union's foreign policy in this period can be defined as a rising interest in the crisis as the Union supported the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 242.⁴²⁷ The Resolution adopted after 1967 War, stated:

- a.) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- b.) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.⁴²⁸

In the aftermath of the 1973 War, the Brussels Declaration was issued regarding the UN Resolution 242. The Nine member states of the Union stressed, for the first time, "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" in an official document:

[t]he forces of both sides in the Middle East conflict should return immediately to the positions they occupied on October 22 in accordance with Resolutions 339 and 340 of the Security Council. [...] They declare themselves ready to do all in their power to contribute to that peace. They believe that those negotiations must take place in the framework of the United Nations. [...] They consider that a peace agreement should be based particularly on the following points: (1) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. (2) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967. (3) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. (4) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁶ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", pp. 32-33; Patrick Mueller, "Europe's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process: The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2013, pp. 24-25.

⁴²⁷ Elena Aoun, "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 8, October 2003, p. 291; Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 106; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 97.

⁴²⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 242, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242\(1967\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242(1967)), (Accessed on 01 April 2017).

⁴²⁹ European Political Cooperation, Brussels Declaration, November 1973, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5576/1/5576.pdf>, (Accessed on 01 April 2017).

Despite diversifying national interests and past experiences with the conflicted parties, the member states were sharing a common concern: the oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 War.⁴³⁰ The Declaration issued as a result of the utilization of oil as a weapon by the Arab states, was a sign of change in the foreign policy of the Union, mainly towards a pro-Arab direction. In the same year, a summit was convened in Copenhagen and representatives of Arab states participated in the Summit. The Nine underlined “the importance of entering into negotiations with oil producing countries on comprehensive arrangements [...] and stable energy supplies to the member countries at reasonable prices”⁴³¹. In addition to this, the Document also highlighted the “nature of European identity” and the importance of cohesion among member state policies:

The nine countries affirm their common will that Europe should speak with one voice in important world affairs. They adopted the declaration on the European identity, which defines, with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind, the principles which are to underlie their action.⁴³²

In 1974, the Foreign Ministers of the Union officially announced the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which increased the tension in transatlantic relations.⁴³³ The driving motivation behind the Euro-Arab Dialogue was the economic concerns/interests of the Europeans, while the Arab side was hoping to guarantee political support of the Union against Israel.⁴³⁴ On this issue, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, stated in 1974 that “The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years.”⁴³⁵ It was France’s desire to establish an independent foreign policy for

⁴³⁰ Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 4; Michelle Pace, Peter Seeberg, and Francesco Cavatorta, “The EU’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical Inside-Out Approach”, 2009, p. 15, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michelle_Pace3/publication/45432501_The_EU%27s_democratization_agenda_in_the_Mediterranean_A_critical_inside-out_approach/links/5461dc430cf2c1a63c002169/The-EUs-democratization-agenda-in-the-Mediterranean-A-critical-inside-out-approach.pdf, (Accessed on 01 April 2017); Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, pp. 75-77.

⁴³¹ The Copenhagen Summit Conference, Copenhagen, 14-15 December 1973, http://aei.pitt.edu/1439/1/copenhagen_1973.pdf, (Accessed on 27 May 2017).

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 34; Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute”, p. 297; Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 76-77.

⁴³⁴ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 76; Gerd Nonneman, “The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe”, in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), *Analyzing Middle Eastern Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, Routledge, 2005, p. 32.

⁴³⁵ Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1974, cited in Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 35.

Europe apart from the US's geopolitical interests that brought about political dispute with the US.⁴³⁶

The subsequent attempt of the Union was the announcement of the London Declaration of 1977 in which the Union reasserted “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians”:

[a] solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the States of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.⁴³⁷

The Euro-Arab Dialogue continued until 1979 when the American-led Camp David agreement was signed.⁴³⁸ With the invitation of the then US President Jimmy Carter, Israel and Egypt made an agreement and the Camp David accords began. Accordingly, the parties decided on two agreements: while the first one was about establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, the latter pertained mainly to the Palestinian problem and provided for the Palestinians autonomy in West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁴³⁹ However, the second agreement could not be put into practice since it was not interpreted as full independence by the Arab side and Israel continued its illegal settlement activities in the Occupied Territories.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁶ Khader, “The European Union and the Palestinian Question”, p. 9; Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 72-75.

⁴³⁷ The European Council, London Declaration, London, 29-30 June 1977, http://aei.pitt.edu/1410/1/London_june_1977.pdf, (Accessed on 01 April 2017).

⁴³⁸ Yacobi and Newman, “The EU and the Israel–Palestine Conflict”, p. 177.

⁴³⁹ Mueller, “Europe's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process”, p. 25; Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute”, p. 291.

⁴⁴⁰ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, pp. 39-40; Khader, “The European Union and the Palestinian Question”, p. 8; Occupied Territories include the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, the West Bank and the East Jerusalem that are captured by Israel after the 1967 War. For more information see: Faure, “Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 336; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “OHCHR in Occupied Palestinian Territory”, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/OPT.aspx>, (Accessed on 12 May 2017); Bickerton, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, pp. 119-123; Institute for Middle East Understanding, “What are

The Union, on the other hand, reluctantly supported the American initiative, but the member states, particularly France and the UK, were willing to start an initiative for the region independently from the US's geostrategic attempts.⁴⁴¹ In accordance with this plan of the Union, a joint resolution was issued at the meeting of the Council in 1980.⁴⁴² The Heads of State and Governments of the member states reaffirmed “the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East” and “the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”.⁴⁴³ The significance of the Venice Declaration mainly comes from the statement that identified the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinians for the first time in an official document:

The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned and thus to the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.⁴⁴⁴

The member states of the Union also noted “the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai” and explained that “the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East [...] these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law”.⁴⁴⁵ The Declaration is still seen as a milestone in the Union's foreign policy on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since it prominently emphasized

the Occupied Territories?”, 21 December 2005, <https://imeu.org/article/what-are-the-occupied-territories>, (Accessed on 12 May 2017).

⁴⁴¹ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, pp. 40-42.

⁴⁴² European Council, Venice Declaration, 12-13 June 1980, http://aei.pitt.edu/1393/1/venice_june_1980.pdf, (Accessed on 02 April 2017).

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

that the “Palestinian problem is more than a refugee problem”, rather concerns the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”.⁴⁴⁶

In 1989, a year after the announcement of the “Declaration of Independence of Palestine”⁴⁴⁷, the Union issued the Madrid Declaration, which explicitly stated that “the PLO should participate in this process” and reaffirmed the resolutions included in the Venice Declaration.⁴⁴⁸

The Union continued its initiatives throughout the 1980s and issued declarations to stress the urgency of peace and stabilization in the region. Particularly after the outbreak of “the First Intifada in December 1987”⁴⁴⁹, the Union increasingly issued statements on the issues of legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the illegal construction of settlements in the Occupied Territories by Israel. As a response, the Union was intensely criticized by the Israelis for being pro-Palestinian.⁴⁵⁰ The principles of the first period of the Union’s involvement into the conflict can be summarized as follow: first of all, from the beginning of its official involvement, the Union sought to preserve peace and stability in the region in accordance with the UN Resolutions. The declarations of the Union explicitly stressed the “legitimate rights of the Palestinians” and “Israel’s right to exist”. Due to the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War and the member states’ diversified interests in the region, the Union’s official statements could not go beyond reaffirming the “urgency of peace” in the region.

⁴⁴⁶ Altunışık, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict”, p. 106; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, p. 101; Yacobi and Newman, “The EU and the Israel–Palestine Conflict”, p. 182.

⁴⁴⁷ The Declaration of Independence of Palestine was approved by the Palestinian National Council in 1988 that was a reaction towards the Israeli actions and a clear sign of the rejection of UN Resolution 242 that provided legitimate ground for the existing of the state of Israel. For more information see: Gregory S. Mahler and Alden R. W. Mahler, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader*, Routledge, 2010, pp. 185-188; Ian J. Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History*, Reaktion Books, 2009, pp. 162-164.

⁴⁴⁸ European Council, Madrid Declaration, 26-27 June 1989, <http://aei.pitt.edu/1453/>, (Accessed on 02 April 2017); Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 85.

⁴⁴⁹ Intifada/uprising that was begun by the Palestinian people against to the Israeli actions in the occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank. For more information see: Claude Faure, *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Culture, History and Politics*, Thomson Gale, 2005, pp. 186-188; Bickerton, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, pp. 158-162.

⁴⁵⁰ Khader, “The European Union and the Palestinian Question”, p. 10; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, pp. 102-104;

3.2.2 Actions and Outcomes

The declared statements of the Union in the period of 1970-1990 are still considered as the basis of its vision on the issue of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the 1970s, the Union has mainly underlined two core issues that have been essential to put an end to this conflict. In the first place, the Union aimed for “a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel”.⁴⁵¹ The second issue highlighted in its declarations is the importance of democracy, human rights and international principles that are deemed as vital for an effective solution.⁴⁵² In addition to this, the Union frequently underlined the need for withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Territories since the construction of settlements in the Territories is explicitly identified as illegal in accordance with the Geneva Convention.⁴⁵³ When we consider these two core issues together with the role conceptions which we have noted in the first chapter, the initiatives of the Union, in this period, can be classified under the role conceptions of “partner for the UN” and “the provider of development aid”. By providing financial aid via the UNRWA and supporting the UN Security Council Resolutions, the Union sought to increase its political presence in the region.

The first economic agreement between the Union and Israel was signed in 1964.⁴⁵⁴ In addition to this, the Union signed a cooperation agreement that established a bilateral free trade zone with Israel in 1975.⁴⁵⁵ With the signing of the agreement, the Union and Israel began to strengthen their economic relations, which eventually increased the rates of imports and exports. From that time on, the Union aimed to improve political, economic and cultural relations with Israel both to ensure political dialogue on the issue of the conflict resolution process and to build new relations particularly after the tragedies of the Second World War.

⁴⁵¹ European External Action Service, Middle East Peace Process, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, (Accessed on 04 April 2017).

⁴⁵² Nathalie Tocci, “Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, *Ethnopolitics*, 2009, Vol. 8, No. 3-4, p. 388.

⁴⁵³ Tocci, “Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality”, p. 388. For more information see: The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Section 3, Occupied Territories, https://www.loc.gov/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-IV.pdf, (Accessed on 04 April 2017).

⁴⁵⁴ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp.71-72.

⁴⁵⁵ Pardo, “Integration without Membership: Israel and the European Union”, p. 39.

As a result of the 1967 War, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula (in Egypt) and the Golan Heights (in Syria), as a result of which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees and many civilians lost their lives.⁴⁵⁶ The Union was incapable of going beyond condemning Israel's rising illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories and actions towards the Palestinians.⁴⁵⁷ In this context, two main reasons for the Union's ineffectiveness can be identified as follows: On the one hand, some of the member states (Germany and the Netherlands) were the biggest supporters, politically and economically, of Israel and some of them (France, in particular) provided technical and military support until the 1967 War. After that, their policy towards Israel began to change and they even placed an arms embargo on Israel.⁴⁵⁸ On the other hand, in addition to the lack of coherence among member states, the Union had been established only one decade ago and was institutionally incapable of implementing an effective political or military action to put an end to the ongoing Israeli actions. Thus, while it will not be wrong to recognize the Union's positive influence by way of being vocal about the self-determination rights of the Palestinian people, it also needs to be acknowledged that the Union could not play an effective role due to both internal inadequacies and the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War.

As it was stated before, the launch of the Euro-Arab Dialogue was motivated by different interests and expectations of the parties. The Union was trying to build a political channel to protect its economic existence as the member states of the Union realized that they were heavily dependent on the oil produced in the region. On the contrary, the Arab states were hoping to receive the Union's economic and political support against Israel's actions. The Arab states' coming to Brussels was mainly a gesture of goodwill that aimed to put an end to the oil crisis and its political consequences. However, the Union could not really channelize the Arabs' willingness to ensure and improve the Dialogue, which would strengthen the Union's position in the region, and in turn, would ensure a Upon the initiation of the Camp David process by the US, the Union neither refused to be part of the initiative nor tried to compound its

⁴⁵⁶ Beverley Milton-Edwards, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, A people's War*, Routledge, 2009, p. 78; Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", pp. 103-104.

⁴⁵⁷ Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 72-73.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 12; Le More, "International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo", p. 92.

collective power through a European oriented initiative. The Arab side demanded the Union to terminate their free trade agreement with Israel and wanted the Union to accept the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the Euro-Arab Dialogue. However these requests were not accepted by the Union because of several internal (some member states' crucial relations with Israel and their concerns about trans-Atlantic relations) and external (mainly stemming from the Cold War geopolitical conditions and the US's strategic plans over the region) reasons.

Particularly after the War of 1973, the pro-Israeli voices within the Union, including even Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, began to criticize Israel's mushrooming settlements in the Occupied Territories that naturally caused tension with Israel and indirectly with the US.⁴⁵⁹ With the victory of the right-wing Likud Party in Israel in 1977, a party known for its arguments against the Union's policies towards the region, the Union's relations with Israel began to face new tensions.⁴⁶⁰ The new Israeli government was mainly supporting the US's more active role in the conflict instead of the Union's involvement. The new political setting in Israel caused the Union to reconsider its perspective as it increased pro-Palestinian voices within the Union.⁴⁶¹

When the policies and actions of the Union towards the region from 1980 to 1990 are considered, it is hard to identify the Union as an effective political actor, partly because the member states of the Union mainly followed policies on the basis of their own national concerns and partly because the Union was highly dependent on American-led strategies.⁴⁶² In this regard, in the case of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Union could not (or did not) present a strong attitude except for condemning the Israeli occupation.⁴⁶³ In addition to regional developments, the Union was facing new internal

⁴⁵⁹Emad Gad, "Egyptian-European Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation", in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), *Analyzing Middle Eastern Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, Routledge, 2005, p. 66; Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", pp. 100-101.

⁴⁶⁰ Bickerton, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", p. 141; Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003*, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 18; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 37.

⁴⁶¹ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", pp. 37-38; Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", pp. 181-184.

⁴⁶² Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", p. 17; Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap-İsrail Uyumazlığı'ndaki Üçüncü Taraf Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi", p. 72;

⁴⁶³ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 40; Roland Dannreuther, "Europe and the Middle East: Towards A Substantive Role in the Peace Process?", *Occasional Paper*

developments. The newly elected government in France brought to power Francois Mitterrand, who was mainly known for his pro-Israeli vision and leaned towards the Camp David process, acting in contrast to previous French policies towards the region.⁴⁶⁴

As a consequence of the First Intifada in 1987, the Union, and even the public opinion in Europe, began to approach the conflict from the perspective of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. In the late 1980s, as a result of the failure of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and of the major changes in the international system, such as the reunification of Germany in 1989 and the end of the bipolar system, the Union was in search of new initiatives that would strengthen its political presence and effectiveness in the region, and also reinforce its autonomous role. To this end, after the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Union made an agreement with the GCC countries in 1988. The agreement would create a secure trade zone for the Union which was heavily dependent on oil and was not willing to be fully reliant on US policies in this regard.⁴⁶⁵ Yet, both the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the agreement with the Gulf States were not the initiatives that can be identified as the cornerstones of the Union's policies towards the region. These initiatives neither created a secure political and economic buffer zone for the Union to improve its political influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor ended the duality within the Union. Instead, they caused suspicion on both the Israeli side and the Palestinians. While the Israelis saw the Union as pro-Palestinian and preferred the American support, the Palestinian perspective on the Union mainly underscored its ineffectiveness and weakness to employ political and economic measures towards Israel.

Consequently, the Union attempted to ensure, by issuing several declarations and establishing new agreements with the two parties, a leading role for itself mainly out of economic concerns. The Venice Declaration of 1980 can be considered as the milestone of the Union's perspective on this conflict. The Union provided remarkable financial

Series, No. 39, p. 5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/7383/doc_7401_290_en.pdf, (Accessed on 18 April 2017).

⁴⁶⁴ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 40.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 41; Nonneman, "The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe", p. 37.

support to the Palestinian refugees via UNRWA.⁴⁶⁶ In the period between 1970 and the late 1980s, the Union witnessed both dramatic internal changes (enlargement processes and institutional transformations to create a more sufficient policy making system) and also international and regional challenges (the Cold War geopolitical conditions and conflicts/crises in the region). These external developments can be counted as the reasons for the Union's ineffectiveness that impeded the Union to develop an autonomous position towards such an international crisis.

3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE UNION'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR

The Union's actions and foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1970s can be described as being more active in comparison with its actions in the 1980s. This was mainly due to the revival of the Cold War atmosphere after a short break of the *détente* period.⁴⁶⁷ Thus, the 1980s presented two main obstacles for the Union: First of all, it was a time when the Union lost its maneuver capability in international matters to the US once again, which ultimately led to the reinforcement of the Union's image as unreliable among the region's conflicted parties. Secondly, the Union was still in a political integration process, as it founded the EPC in 1970 to improve its effectiveness in foreign policy issues and to ensure coherence among its member states. In addition to this, the Union was also trying to construct a "European identity" that would unite the member states around the same purposes, strategies and methods.⁴⁶⁸ The priority of the trans-Atlantic relations created new gaps between the Union's rhetoric and its actions, making the Union, with its insufficient institutional structure, politically bound up with the US.

⁴⁶⁶ European Union External Action Service, "Middle East Peace Process", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁴⁶⁷ Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 77.

⁴⁶⁸ Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation", pp. 136-137; Hill and Smith, "European Foreign Policy: Key Documents", pp. 92; Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", p. 43.

The fall of the Iron Curtain also brought about new political dilemmas and obstacles for the Union. In the face of the outbreak of the First Gulf War and other regional international crises in the 1990s, the Union undertook to improve its effectiveness in foreign policy matters. The signing of several treaties and the establishment of new posts and institutions, as examined in detail in the second chapter, were the initiatives undertaken by the Union to get out of the shadow of the US and to act effectively. In this regard, the study will first analyse the principles of the Union towards the conflict by way of scrutinizing its official documents and then will proceed with the examination of the Union's actions and their outcomes.

3.3.1. Analysis of the Principles of the Union in the Second Period

With the end of the Cold War the US became the only figure that can be labeled as a superpower. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essential for the US administration to demonstrate this vision.⁴⁶⁹ Accordingly, the US convened an international conference in Madrid in 1991 and brought the conflicted parties together to put an end to this conflict.⁴⁷⁰ While the Conference was officially led by the US and Russia, which was invited as the co-sponsor; the Union was only charged with conducting the REDWG.⁴⁷¹ The Union was explicitly tasked with the financial matters, as an observer alongside the UN and the GCC, rather than being included in political issues which illustrated that the Union was seen insufficient for managing such a political role by the US.

In addition to Israel and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan were also included in the Conference.⁴⁷² The PLO was not invited as the representative of the Palestinians and

⁴⁶⁹ Maurizio Carbone, *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid*, Routledge, 2007, p. 40; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 2.

⁴⁷⁰ Gad, "Egyptian-European Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation", p. 74; Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", p. 182.

⁴⁷¹ Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", p. 182; Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 8.

⁴⁷² Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", pp. 46-48.

joined the Conference as part of the delegation of Jordan.⁴⁷³ During the multilateral talks, which were initiated in 1992 in Moscow, the Union was charged with chairing the REDWG while the US and Russia were responsible for more critical issues, such as Arms Control and Regional Security.⁴⁷⁴ While multilateral talks were proceeding, Yitzhak Rabin who recently came to power from the Labour Party in Israel, and Yasser Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. This declaration was the end result of a set of secret talks initiated by Norway and was therefore known as Oslo I or Oslo Accords.⁴⁷⁵ The parties agreed on the following:

[i]t is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognise their (Israel and the Palestinian Authority) mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.⁴⁷⁶

The Declaration of Principles set forth a process to achieve final peace among the conflicted parties. The aim of the negotiations was stated in the beginning of the Agreement:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.⁴⁷⁷

In accordance with the agreed timetable, the highlighted statements in the Declaration of Principles were as follows: Israel's withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, transfer of authority after the withdrawal, a five-year interim period upon the withdrawal, redeployment of Israeli military forces and elections after the

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p. 48; Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict", pp. 107-108; William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Brooking Institution Press and University of California Press, Third Edition, 2005, p. 310.

⁴⁷⁴ Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict", p. 108.

⁴⁷⁵ Quandt, "Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", p. 327.

⁴⁷⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements", 13 September 1993, Washington D.C., <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Declaration%20of%20Principles.aspx>, (Accessed on 12 April 2017).

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

redeployment.⁴⁷⁸ The Gaza-Jericho Agreements (Cairo Agreement) were signed on May 4, 1994. The Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the transfer of some internal powers and responsibilities to the Palestinians.⁴⁷⁹

With the signing of the Interim Agreement (Oslo II) on September 28, 1995, the parties agreed on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Palestinian centers of population, the election of a Palestinian Council and the division of the West Bank into three areas.⁴⁸⁰ However, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by a Jewish extremist had a domino effect on some crucial issues. Firstly, this tragic event brought the peace spirit into disrepute. Secondly, Benjamin Netanyahu, who explicitly criticized the peace process, came to power in Israel and resurrected the mistrust that radicalized both communities, making it impossible to put an end to the conflict.⁴⁸¹ Throughout Netanyahu's term in office (May 1996-May 1999), the peace process decelerated as he was trying to retard withdrawal of Israel.⁴⁸²

Throughout the peace process, the Union did not have an important task, except for organizing financial assistance to Palestine. After the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, an international conference was convened in Washington on September 1, 1993. The conference involved 46 donor nations that committed 2.4 billion dollars as financial aid to Palestine's development within five years (1994-1998).⁴⁸³ To organize the flow of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, an ad

⁴⁷⁸ Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", p. 104; Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 8; Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 95.

⁴⁷⁹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Main Points of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement", 4 May 1994, Cairo, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Main%20Points%20of%20Gaza-Jericho%20Agreement.aspx>, (Accessed on 12 April 2017).

⁴⁸⁰ Quandt, "Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", pp. 334-335; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", pp. 54-55. In accordance with the Interim Agreement the West Bank was divided into three areas. For more information see: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Main Points of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip", 28 September 1995, Washington, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/The%20Israeli-Palestinian%20Interim%20Agreement%20-%20Main%20P.aspx>, (Accessed on 12 April 2017).

⁴⁸¹ S. Mahler and W. Mahler, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", p. 26; Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", p. 101.

⁴⁸² Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", p. 101; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 58.

⁴⁸³ Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 7; Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 108; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 55.

hoc Liaison Committee, which included the Union as a member, was established.⁴⁸⁴ In this regard, the Union pledged to supply 700 million European Currency Units (ECUs) for the financial development of the Palestinians.⁴⁸⁵ During the REDWG's meetings in 1993, the Group agreed on the Copenhagen Action Plan that involved 35 projects in different areas.⁴⁸⁶

While the Union continued its initiatives and responsibilities within the peace process as a member of the REDWG and an observer of the process, it launched a comprehensive policy towards the Mediterranean region in an effort to increase the radius of its actions. In accordance with this goal, the Union launched the Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP) in 1995.⁴⁸⁷ The main objective of this initiative was to consolidate the current peace process and to improve the Union's political existence by providing a variety of cooperation fields covering political, economic and socio-cultural relations with the countries of the region.⁴⁸⁸ By launching this new external policy, the Union aimed to improve its relations with the countries of the region and to ensure a stronger "European" position for itself independent from the US oriented initiatives towards the region. By promoting "democratic institutions" and strengthening the "rule of law" and "civil society", which are the core principles that the Union was founded on, the Union planned to have an influence both on the regional developments and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁸⁹ By adopting this Partnership, the representatives of the member states of the Union and of the Mediterranean states announced their "will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and

⁴⁸⁴ Le More, "International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo", pp. 37-38; Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 129.

⁴⁸⁵ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 55.

⁴⁸⁶ Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 108; Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 8.

⁴⁸⁷ Annette Jünemann, "Security-Building in the Mediterranean After September 11", in Annette Jünemann (ed.), *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, Frank Cass, 2004, p. 4; Michelle Pace, "The EU as a 'Force for Good' in Border Conflict Cases?", in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds.), *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 215-217.

⁴⁸⁸ Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 119.

⁴⁸⁹ Barcelona Declaration, 27-28 November 1995,

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf, (Accessed on 06 September 2016); Oliver Schlumberger, "The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March, 2011, p. 140.

solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history” and stressed “the strategic importance of the Mediterranean”.⁴⁹⁰

As it was stated above, during the term of Netanyahu, the peace process decelerated remarkably.⁴⁹¹ Despite Netanyahu’s efforts to delay the process, the first Palestinian elections were held in 1996 to elect a president for the Palestinian National Authority and the members of Legislative Council.⁴⁹² Although redeployment in Hebron was scheduled in the Oslo II to be put into practice in 1996, because of the reluctance of Netanyahu, this step could be completed in January 1997 only a couple days after the signing of the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron.⁴⁹³

The Wye River Memorandum on October 23, 1998 was the second agreement during the Netanyahu administration whereby the parties promised to complete the previous arrangements of the Oslo II.⁴⁹⁴ The Memorandum prescribed further redeployment of Israel and scheduled three steps for the execution.⁴⁹⁵ The acceptance of the redeployment terms of the Memorandum caused a rise in opposing voices against the Netanyahu administration that later announced to suspend the Memorandum. This, in turn, elicited reactions from both the international community and the Palestinian Authority.⁴⁹⁶ The loss of a vote of confidence for the administration within the Parliament (Knesset) ended Netanyahu’s term. Ehud Barak from the Labour Party came to power following the elections of 1999 in Israel.⁴⁹⁷ As a response to the Israeli administration’s attempt to suspend the Memorandum, the Palestinian Authority signaled the unilateral announcement of a Palestinian State. This caused concerns within the Western parties to the peace process since such unilateral initiatives were

⁴⁹⁰ Schlumberger, “The Ties that do not Bind”, p. 140.

⁴⁹¹ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 58.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁹³ Le More, “International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo”, p. 10; Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 14; Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 60. For more information about “The The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron” see: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron”, 17 January 1997,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/protocol%20concerning%20the%20redeployment%20in%20hebron.aspx>, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

⁴⁹⁴ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 121.

⁴⁹⁵ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Wye River Memorandum”, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/The%20Wye%20River%20Memorandum-full.aspx>, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

⁴⁹⁶ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 61.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 61-62; Le More, “International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo”, p. 158.

seen as harmful to the whole peace process.⁴⁹⁸ Upon this development, the Union adopted the Berlin Declaration in 1999, which re-expressed the former arguments of the Union on the basis of the self-determination rights of the Palestinians.⁴⁹⁹ The Berlin Summit reiterated the following points:

The Heads of State and Government of the European Union reaffirm its support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, to reflect the principles of “land for peace” and ensure the security both collective and individual of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In this context, the European Union welcomes the decision by the Palestinian National Union and associated bodies to reaffirm the nullification of the provisions in the Palestinian National Charter which called for the destruction of Israel and to reaffirm their commitment to recognize and live in peace with Israel. However, the European Union remains concerned at the current deadlock in the peace process and calls upon the parties to implement fully and immediately the Wye River Memorandum.

The European Union also calls upon the parties to reaffirm their commitments to the basic principles established within the framework of Madrid, Oslo and subsequent agreements, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. It urges the parties to agree on an extension of the transitional period established by the Oslo agreements.⁵⁰⁰

Calling for the continuation of the peace negotiations, the Union reaffirmed that the self-determination rights of the Palestinians should be gained within the framework of the negotiations:

The European Union urges both parties to refrain from activities which prejudice the outcome of those final status negotiations and from any activity contrary to international law, including all settlement activity, and to fight incitement and violence.

The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfillment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The

⁴⁹⁸ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 61.

⁴⁹⁹ Le More, “International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo”, p. 90; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, p. 101.

⁵⁰⁰ The European Council, “Presidency Conclusions of 24-25 March 1999 Berlin Summit”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ber2_en.htm#partIV, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above.⁵⁰¹

After the Barak government came to power and committed to continue the peace process with the Palestinian Authority and withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 425, the conflicted parties relaunched the peace negotiations.⁵⁰² By signing the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on September 1999, the two parties committed to implement the agreed statements since the Interim Agreement dated September 1993.⁵⁰³ The Memorandum also scheduled a time-table for the finalization status of the negotiations by September 1999 and for further redeployment of “Israeli forces in the West Bank and the transfer of areas to Palestinian control in several phases, to be completed by January 20, 2000”.⁵⁰⁴

On July 11, 2000, an American-led meeting in Camp David was convened to handle the most problematic issues of the peace process, including the Palestinian refugees and the final status of Jerusalem.⁵⁰⁵ The Parties could not reach a final agreement in the Camp David Summit, which was led by the then US President Bill Clinton. Nevertheless, “a Trilateral Statement was issued defining the agreed principles to guide future negotiations”⁵⁰⁶. In accordance with the agreed Statement, the parties declared:

- 1) The two sides agreed that the aim of their negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
- 2) The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.
- 3) Both sides agree that negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement and they undertake to

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² For more information see: United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, 19 March 1978, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/425\(1978\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/425(1978)), (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

⁵⁰³ Le More, “International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo”, p. 113; Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 16.

⁵⁰⁴ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum”, 4 September 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20sharm%20el-sheikh%20memorandum-%20main%20points.aspx>, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

⁵⁰⁵ Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 17; Quandt, “Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, p. 365; Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 63.

⁵⁰⁶ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David”, 11 July 2000, Camp David, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20middle%20east%20peace%20summit%20at%20camp%20david-%20july%202000.aspx>, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

create an environment for negotiations free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.

4) The two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of negotiations and that their differences will be resolved only by good faith negotiations.

5) Both sides agree that the United States remains a vital partner in the search for peace and will continue to consult closely with President Clinton and Secretary Albright in the period ahead.⁵⁰⁷

With the eruption of the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa) in 2000, the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the peace process faced another challenge.⁵⁰⁸ The parties, once again, could not meet on a common ground at the Camp David Summit and the outbreak of the uprising in Palestine made the international community, particularly the US, take further steps to preserve the existing “peace table”.⁵⁰⁹ Under these circumstances, the then US President Clinton organized a meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh, in October 2000 and invited Egypt, Jordan, the UN and the Union, in addition to the conflicted parties, namely Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The establishment of a commission that would be entrusted with giving advice to the conflicted parties was the major outcome of the Summit. It was decided that the US Senator George Mitchell would administer the Commission consisting of the Union’s CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, Foreign Minister of Norway Thorbjørn Jagland, US Senator Warren B. Rudman and President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel.⁵¹⁰ In its conclusion report, also known as the Mitchell Report, the Commission underlined that:

The Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence. [...] In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual

⁵⁰⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David”, 25 July 2000, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2000/Pages/Trilateral%20Statement%20on%20the%20Middle%20East%20Peace%20Summ.aspx>, (Accessed on 13 April 2017).

⁵⁰⁸ Nonneman, “The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe”, p. 29; Yacobi and Newman, “The EU and the Israel–Palestine Conflict”, p. 177; The Second Intifada/Al-Aqsa erupted in 2000 right after the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. For more information about the Second Intifada see: Faure, “Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 29-30; Bickerton, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, pp. 185-186; Rabinovich, “Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003”, p. 153; S. Mahler and W. Mahler, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.; Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute”, p. 289.

⁵¹⁰ Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, p. 64.

understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful negotiations.⁵¹¹

On 21-27 January, 2001, just before the Israeli general elections, another meeting was convened in Taba, Egypt, to make a final peace agreement.⁵¹² There were no delegations present, except for the conflicted parties. The aim was to resolve issues that were unresolved at Camp David. The joint statement was made on 27 January, and the Union was charged by the two parties to prepare a “non-paper”.⁵¹³ Following several meetings with the two parties, the special envoy of the Union to the Middle East, Ambassador Miguel Angel Moratinos prepared the paper that “draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees, and security in order to find ways to come to joint positions”.⁵¹⁴ The conclusions of the Taba Summit owed their significance mainly to the underlined high priority issues (Jerusalem, refugees, the capital of the countries) that had never been opened to discussion.⁵¹⁵ For instance, the Paper stated:

The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the 4 June 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine. For the first time both sides presented their own maps on the West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. [...] Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to discuss an Israeli request to have sovereignty over those Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after 1967, but not Jabal Abu Ghunaym and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev. [...] The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: Yerushalayim, capital of Israel, and al-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern, namely that East Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine. [...] Both sides stated that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and just solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references that could facilitate the adoption of an agreement. Both sides suggested, as a basis, that

⁵¹¹ Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report “Mitchell Report”, 30 April 2001, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/mitchell_report_2001_en.pdf, (Accessed on 14 April 2017).

⁵¹² Khader, “The European Union and the Palestinian Question”, p. 14; Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 19.

⁵¹³ University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies, “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001)”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, Spring, 2002, p. 81.

⁵¹⁴ University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies, “The Taba Negotiations”, p. 81.

⁵¹⁵ Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, p. 19.

the parties should agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194.⁵¹⁶

After the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the European Council met in Seville on 21-22 June 2002 and issued a declaration. The Union once again explicitly stated that a permanent peace solution should be mediated by the whole international community:

The crisis in the Middle East has reached a dramatic turning point. Further escalation will render the situation uncontrollable. The parties on their own cannot find a solution. There is an urgent need for political action by the whole international community. The Quartet has a key role to play in starting a peace process. [...] A settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation. The objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end result should be two States living side by side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours. In this context, a fair solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The reform of the Palestinian Authority is essential. The European Council expects the Palestinian Authority to make good its commitment to security reform, early elections and political and administrative reform. The European Union reaffirms its willingness to continue to assist in these reforms.⁵¹⁷

The outbreak of the Second Intifada and the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 have created dramatic changes both in the region and on the international agenda. The Bush Administration in the US focused on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to create a secure zone in the region after the terrorist attacks. For this purpose, a meeting was convened (for the Quartet) in 2002, in Madrid with the participation of the representatives of the UN, the Union, the US and Russia.⁵¹⁸ The main objective of the Quartet was to reach a permanent two-state solution that would be planned in accordance with the Madrid Peace Conference of 1999 and with the involvement of the international community.⁵¹⁹ It was revealed at the Joint Statement:

⁵¹⁶ University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies, “The Taba Negotiations”, pp. 81-85.

⁵¹⁷ Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council”, 21-22 June 2002, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf, Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵¹⁸ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 94; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, p. 157.

⁵¹⁹ Mueller, “Europe’s Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process”, p. 29; Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, pp. 64-65.

The Quartet took stock of the results of the ongoing consultations with the parties on the elements of a three-phase performance-based and goal-driven roadmap to realize the vision expressed in President Bush's June 24 speech of two states-Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign, and democratic Palestine-living side-by-side in peace and security. The Quartet commended the constructive spirit that characterized its discussions with all parties. The Quartet, based upon a common understanding on the content and goals of this process, made substantial progress toward finalizing a roadmap for presentation to the parties in the near future. The Quartet agreed to further intensive work to develop a credible and effective monitoring mechanism. In the meantime, the Quartet calls on the parties to carry out as rapidly as possible their responsibilities to restore calm, pursue reforms, and improve the humanitarian situation-steps that will lead to a political process culminating in Palestinian statehood.⁵²⁰

However, at this point one significant initiative of the Union should be highlighted. Even before the US President Bush's speech and the Joint Statement of the Quartet, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer presented to the Foreign Ministers of the Union a "seven-point plan" reaffirming the previous statements (1980 Venice Declaration) of the Union on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on the basis of a two-state solution within the pre-1967 borders in accordance with the related UN Security Council Resolutions.⁵²¹ On 17 September 2002, the Quartet and the Danish Presidency of the Union launched a three-phase "road map" that took into consideration Fischer's seven-point plan.⁵²² The Road Map described the first phase as follows:

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as

⁵²⁰ Office of the Quartet, "Joint Statement by the Quartet", 20 December 2002, <http://www.quartetrep.org/files/server/statments/quartet-dec-2002.pdf>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017); George W. Bush, Speech on the Remarks on the Middle East, 24 June 2002, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73320>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵²¹ Benedetta Voltolini, *Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Routledge, London and New York, 2016, p. 53; Sharon Spiteri, "Germany to Present Seven-Point Plan on Peace", *Euobserver*, 9 April 2002, <https://euobserver.com/news/5826>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵²² Altunisik, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 111.

security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.⁵²³

The second phase of the plan concerned the establishment of a Palestinian state and the required steps the Palestinians should take to this end:

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state. Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003.⁵²⁴

The final phase of the plan envisaged to reach a final solution as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations:

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.⁵²⁵

After the announcement of the Road Map, the Union adopted a new initiative towards the Mediterranean region and developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004.⁵²⁶ The main objective of this Policy was “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation”.⁵²⁷

⁵²³ A Performance Based-Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 56; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, pp. 116-117.

⁵²⁷ Commission of the European Communities, “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, Brussels, 12 May 2004, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_117717.pdf, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections brought political and economic isolation to the Palestinians and the newly-elected government was boycotted by the international community including the co-sponsors of the Quartet, the US and the Union.⁵²⁸ After the elections, the Union adopted another declaration in accordance with the latest developments in the region. It was stated in the Presidency Conclusion of the Brussels European Council that:

As set out by the Quartet, the Hamas-led Palestinian Government needs to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements and obligations. The European Council remains concerned by the security situation in Gaza and the West Bank. It condemns the violence against Palestinian civilians. It condemns the launching of Qassem rockets against population centres in Israel. It reminds both parties of their responsibility to protect civilian lives. It calls on the Palestinian Authority to take action to improve security and prevent terrorist attacks on Israel. It reiterates its condemnation of extra-judicial killings. It calls on all parties to refrain from violence and to exercise restraint.⁵²⁹

In 2007, the then US President Bush announced the Annapolis Peace Conference, which sought to bring the conflicted parties together to discuss the peace negotiations on the basis of a two-state solution.⁵³⁰ The co-sponsors of the Quartet declared their “strong support for the November 27 Annapolis Conference”⁵³¹ and they “welcomed the commitment of the Israeli and Palestinians leaders to launch bilateral negotiations toward the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and the realization of Israeli-Palestinian peace”.⁵³²

⁵²⁸ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 123-124; Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, pp. 120-121; Yaacov Bar and Siman Tov, “Dialectic between Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution”, in Yaacov Bar and Siman Tov (eds.), *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management*, Palgrave Macmillian, 2007, p. 31.

⁵²⁹ Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council”, 15-16 June 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³⁰ United Nations General Assembly, Press Release, 29 November 2007, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10663.doc.htm>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017); Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 146.

⁵³¹ Quartet Statement Preceding the Annapolis Conference, 26 November 2007, <https://www.procon.org/files/QuartetStatementPrecedingAnnapolis.pdf>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³² Ibid.; European Commission, “Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Occupied Palestinian territory and support to the Palestinian people 2008 – 2013 Final Report”, Vol. 2, May 2014, p. 9, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/palestine/evaluation-cooperation-eu-palestine-1327-annex-201405.pdf>, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

Aside from the issued joint statements, the Conference ended without producing an agreed document to bring peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In November 2007, the Union set out, in an EU Action Strategy for Peace in the Middle East, “a range of ways in which the EU can support the peace process, including Palestinian state-building assistance and comprehensive conflict resolution on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative”.⁵³³ The Joint Paper, prepared by the EU High Representative Javier Solana and the EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, highlighted the goals of the Union:

Comprehensive peace in the Middle East is a strategic objective for the European Union. Any lasting and just settlement to the conflict should be based on the principle of land for peace, relevant UNSC resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Roadmap and previous agreements reached between the parties. The EU considers that the present opportunity should not be missed and is ready to take its responsibilities, in accordance with the vital European interests involved. The EU is therefore committed to supporting current efforts in a serious and substantive way, offering a comprehensive and coherent contribution to the process, including during the crucial implementation period. The European Union calls on all other interested parties to support the current process, bearing in mind the high cost of failure for everyone involved.⁵³⁴

In addition to this, the Union committed to:

- Support the Parties in their bilateral efforts;
- Support the US Government in its current facilitation efforts;
- Ensure the active involvement of the Quartet in the run-up to the international meeting and in its follow-up;
- Continue cooperation with Arab partners in advancing the Arab Peace Initiative.
- Sustain its high levels of support to the region and accompany the political process with a shift to post-conflict support in due time.⁵³⁵

The Union re-expressed its perspective on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the 2009 Brussels Declaration, which noted:

The Council of the European Union is seriously concerned about the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process. The European Union calls for the urgent

⁵³³ European Union External Action Service, “Middle East Peace Process”, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³⁴ European Union External Action Service, “Middle East Peace Process”, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³⁵ European Union External Action Service, “Middle East Peace Process”, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

resumption of negotiations that will lead, within an agreed time-frame, to a two-state solution with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. A comprehensive peace, which is a fundamental interest of the parties in the region and the EU, must be achieved on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the Madrid principles including land for peace, the Roadmap, the agreements previously reached by the parties and the Arab Peace Initiative. [...]The European Union will not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties. The Council reiterates the EU's readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of peace agreements, and will continue the work undertaken on EU contributions on state-building, regional issues, refugees, security and Jerusalem.⁵³⁶

The UN General Assembly addressed the status of Palestine in its Resolution 67/19 on December 4, 2012, and decided:

[t]o accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice.⁵³⁷

On 29 November 2012, just before the adoption of the UN Resolution, the Union issued a declaration regarding the “non-member observer State status” of Palestine and affirmed that:

The EU has repeatedly expressed its support and wish for Palestine to become a full member of the United Nations as part of a solution to the conflict. The EU has also consistently worked to advance the Palestinian Authority's state-building efforts under Prime Minister Fayyad. It will continue to do so. Recalling the Berlin Declaration of March 1999, the EU reiterates its readiness to recognize a Palestinian State when appropriate. [...]The EU reaffirms its position that clear parameters defining the basis for negotiations are key elements for a successful outcome, together with the avoiding of unilateral measures and acts on the ground which undermine confidence and the viability of the two-state solution.[...] The European Union will work actively, within the Quartet and with international partners, in support of efforts to bring about substantive negotiations in the coming months.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁶ Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process”, Brussels, 8 December 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/wgme/dv/200/200912/20091216councilon081209_en.pdf, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³⁷ United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the United Nations”, 4 December 2012, <http://palestineun.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/67-19-Status-of-Palestine.pdf>, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

⁵³⁸ European Commission, “Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the Middle East Peace Process”, 29 November 2012, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-12-470_en.htm, (Accessed on 15 April 2017).

Since the end of the Cold War, the Union adopted declarations unilaterally and was at the same time involved in multilateral initiatives to produce a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In comparison to the Union's policies and actions towards the conflict during the first period of 1970-1990, the post-1990 initiatives of the Union towards the conflict illustrate that, in this period, the Union prominently lost its autonomous action capability and preferred to join multilateral initiatives to provide a solution to the crisis with the support of the international community. Until the creation of the Quartet in which the Union was able to gain the status of the "co-sponsor" of the peace negotiations, the Union could not become an effective political player in the negotiations. Rather, it remained under the US's shadow and became involved in REDWG to contribute to the efforts to provide financial assistance to Palestine. Although co-sponsorship in the Quartet relatively improved the Union's political image in the region, it was hard to label the Union as an active and effective political actor. Consequently, the Union pursued its first period arguments in its official statements. Three main points can be cited with regard to the principles pursued by the Union in the second period: First of all, the Union supported the establishment of two states in the region within the pre-1967 borders and in the framework of adopted agreements and the UN Resolutions. Secondly, a permanent solution should be reached through multilateral negotiations, rather than unilateral actions. And finally, by launching the neighbourhood policy, the Union sought to improve its political, economic relations with the region to increase its political presence both in the region and in the peace negotiations. To provide a more comprehensive understanding on this issue, the following sections will analyse the Union's actions and the outcomes of these actions in this regard.

3. 3. 2. Actions and Outcomes

While the Union presented a relatively more consolidated political position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1970s, this was mainly because of the geopolitical conditions of the détente period. The post-1990 initiatives of the Union cannot be considered to be independent and effective actions due as the Union became involved in American-led initiatives to find an internationally approved solution to the conflict.

With its involvement in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the Union became part of the peace negotiations, which was, however, limited to the membership in the REDWG. With the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), the Union's economic role in the peace negotiations began to crystallize. In this regard, Table 2 shows the international financial assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between the years of 1993 and 1997:

Table 2: International Financial Assistance to West Bank and Gaza Strip (1993-1997)

	Pledges		Commitments		Disbursements	
	Amount Million \$	%	Amount Million \$	%	Amount Million \$	%
Arab Funds and countries	455	12.5	444	14.7	208	11.3
EIB	300	8.2	90	3.0	-	-
European Union	358	9.8	358	11.8	254	13.9
European countries	1257	34.6	1219	40.2	692	37.8
Japan	265	7.3	265	8.8	231	12.6
United States	500	13.7	312	10.3	270	14.8
World Bank group	273	7.5	261	8.6	99	5.4
Various	229	6.3	80	2.6	76	4.2
Total	3.639	100	3.030	100	1832	100

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/med/951403_en.pdf, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

In the mid-1990s, the Union channelized its financial support to Palestine in particular and the region in general via different programs and institutions. Firstly, the Union, as a delegation in the peace negotiations, provided financial support to the Palestinians via the established Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and committed to provide 500 million ECUs to the Palestinian people between the years of 1994-1998.⁵³⁹ With the announcement of the Barcelona Process, the Union established an individual policy towards the Mediterranean region and coordinated the MEDA programme, the flow of financial aid to the countries of the region.⁵⁴⁰ During the MEDA I period (1995-1999) the Union committed to provide 111 million Euros and paid approximately 59 million Euros. In the second period of MEDA (2000-2006), it provided a financial aid of 486,4 million

⁵³⁹ Al-Fattal, "The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory", p. 8.

⁵⁴⁰ For more information about the MEDA Programme see: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/ALL/?uri=URISERV:r15006>, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

Euros to the West Bank and Gaza.⁵⁴¹ The amounts of financial aid provided by the Union during the MEDA I and MEDA II periods are presented in Table 3:

Table 3: EU Commitments and Payments during MEDA programmes.

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Mediterranean Neighbourhood Countries : Commitments and Payments (€million)																					
	MEDA I			MEDA II																	
	1995-1999		% P/E	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2000-2006		% P/E	
	E	P		E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P		
Bilateral Cooperation																					
Algeria	164,0	30,2	18	30,2	0,4	60	5,5	50,0	11,0	41,6	15,8	51,0	42,0	40,0	39,4	66,0	28,2	338,8	142,3	42	
West Bank and Gaza	111,0	59,0	53	96,7	31,1	---	62,2	100,0	80,3	81,1	60,3	72,5	93,3	80,0	93,3	92,0	65,9	522,3	486,4	93	
Egypt	686,0	157,0	23	12,7	64,4	---	62,5	78,0	25,7	103,8	56,9	159,0	150,6	110,0	132,8	129,0	202,5	592,5	695,4	117	
Jordan	254,0	108,4	43	15	83,7	20	10,9	92,0	49,7	42,4	46,9	35,0	50,6	58,0	43,1	69,0	60,6	331,4	345,5	104	
Lebanon	182,0	1,2	1	---	30,7	---	2,0	12,0	5,7	43,7	24,1	18,0	40,9	27,0	27,4	32,0	50,7	132,7	181,5	137	
Morocco	660,0	127,5	19	140,6	39,7	120	41,1	122,0	102,3	142,7	102,4	151,8	157,7	135,0	212,7	168,0	261,5	980,1	917,4	94	
Syria	101,0	0,0	0	38	0,3	8	1,9	36,0	8,5	0,7	10,1	53,0	18,2	22,0	25,0	22,0	26,9	179,7	90,9	51	
Tunisia	428,0	168,0	39	75,7	15,9	90	69,0	92,2	92,5	48,7	69,3	22,0	74,0	118,0	79,1	71,0	89,4	517,6	489,2	95	
Total bilateral	2.586,0	651,3	25	408,9	266,2	298	255,1	582,2	375,7	504,7	385,8	562,3	627,3	590,0	652,8	649,0	785,7	3.595,1	3.348,6	93	
Regional Cooperation	471,0	222,5	47	159,8	51,8	305,3	62,7	29,4	78,3	110,0	111,9	135,3	173,8	144,6	128,1	167,7	105,4	1.052,1	711,9	68	
TOTAL	3.057	874	29	568,7	317,9	603,3	317,8	611,6	454,0	614,7	497,7	697,6	801,1	734,6	780,9	816,7	891,1	4.647	4.060	87	
Ratio P/E					56%		53%		74%		81%		115%		106%		109%				

Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

The Union's humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people significantly increased at the beginning of the 2000s with the influence of the eruption of the Second Intifada. The European Commission stated:

[s]ince 2000, the European Commission has provided a total of €700 million in humanitarian aid to help meet the basic needs of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In Gaza, the main areas of intervention are health, water and sanitation, food (vouchers) and livelihoods, with a clear focus on emergency preparedness and response. In the West Bank, the Commission supports a multifaceted response to demolitions and evictions, ranging from material to legal assistance to those families most exposed to the listed protection risks. The European Commission is also supporting humanitarian action coordination through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴¹ European External Action Service, "MEDA figures", http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

⁵⁴² European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Palestine, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east-north-africa/palestine_en, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

Following the invitation of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission (CEC), the Union decided to deploy an EU Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) which was scheduled for 25 January 2006, on 21 November 2005.⁵⁴³ The Union stated that its main objective was “to give the Palestinian society a chance to hold meaningful and credible elections, to provide democratic legitimacy to the Palestinian Parliament on the road to statehood”.⁵⁴⁴ The then Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner explained the significance of the Union’s mission in the election:

Free and fair elections are essential steps on the way to a viable Palestinian State as foreseen in the Road Map. Impartial observation can help create confidence in the democratic process and highlight areas where further improvements are necessary. By working with the Palestinians in this way, the EU is helping to lay the foundations for a modern accountable administration and a more peaceful future for the Palestinian people.⁵⁴⁵

Within the Mission, the Union deployed 42 Long Term Observers and 167 Short Term Observers.⁵⁴⁶ In addition to the observation, the Union also provided significant amount of financial support throughout the elections. The Commission stated that during preparation for elections some 17 million Euros had been allocated since 2003: 3 million Euros of this budget was destined for the EUEOM.⁵⁴⁷

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections was a great surprise for the international community, and opened a new page in the relationship between the Union and Palestine.⁵⁴⁸ Following the 2006 Palestinian elections, the Union called on Hamas to

⁵⁴³ European Commission, “EU Election Observation Mission for Palestinian Elections”, Press Release, Brussels, 21 November 2005, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-1449_en.htm, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report, “Presidential Elections of West Bank and Gaza”, 9 January 2005, <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/eueom/pdf/missions/finalreport5.pdf>, p. 2, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

⁵⁴⁷ European Commission, “EU Election Observation Mission for Palestinian Elections”; Taylan Özgür Kaya, *Analysis of the Role of the European Union as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor in the Post-9/11 Era: The Middle East Peace Process*, PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, March, 2010, p. 152.

⁵⁴⁸ European Commission, “Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the occupied Palestinian territory and support to the Palestinian people 2008 – 2013 Final Report”, Vol. 2, May 2014, p. 9, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/palestine/evaluation-cooperation-eu-palestine-1327-annex-201405.pdf>, (Accessed on 16 April 2017); Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 123.

“disarm, renounce violence and terrorism and recognize Israel’s right to exist”.⁵⁴⁹ The Union temporarily suspended the direct financial assistance to Palestine and the creation of a mechanism was agreed on by the Quartet to ensure the delivery of this aid:

[o]n 9 May 2006 the Quartet addressed the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian Territory and asked the European Union to propose a ‘Temporary International Mechanism’ to ensure direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinians. The mechanism was subsequently developed under the patronage of European Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Its establishment was endorsed by the European Council and the Quartet for a period of three months. This mandate has been extended four times. The current mandate ends on 30 September 2007’.⁵⁵⁰

The Commission explained the contribution of the Union to the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) as such:

[i]n 2006 the European Commission made available a total of €107.5 million to the three TIM windows. In 2007, the EC allocated an additional €150 million for Windows II and III. Window I – €10 million for essential supplies and running costs of hospitals and health care centres; Window II – €75 million for the uninterrupted supply of essential public services including energy utilities; Window III – €172.5 million in support of vulnerable Palestinians, through the payment of social allowances to public service providers and the poor. In addition to its support to the TIM, €12 million were allocated by the EC for technical assistance and capacity building to the Office of the President.⁵⁵¹

By creating the TIM, the Quartet aimed to block off Hamas’s access to financial aids. On February 1, 2008 the TIM was reformulated and replaced by the Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l’Aide Socio- Economique (PEGASE) which would “run for the next three years. Based on the Reform and Development Plan of the Palestinian Authority”, this mechanism would “channel assistance to four key areas: governance, social development, economic and private sector development, and public infrastructure”.⁵⁵² The following table presents the evolution of the financial aid provided by the Union to Palestine. Table 4 shows that, in spite of political and

⁵⁴⁹ Peters, “Europe and Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: The Urgency of Now”, p.524; Pace, “The EU as a ‘Force for Good’ in Border Conflict Cases?”, p. 214; Musu, “European Union Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process”, pp. 75-77.


⁵⁵⁰ European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/factsheet-tim-occupied-palestinian-territory-200706_en_7.pdf, (Accessed on 16 April 2017); Tocci, “The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard”, pp. 120-121; Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 129-130.

⁵⁵¹ European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, Temporary International Mechanism (TIM).

⁵⁵² European Commission, Press Release, PEGASE, 25 January 2008, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-94_en.htm, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

economic boycotts of the international community, the Union continued its economic support to the Palestinians via other channels.

Table 4: Evolution of EU Commitment to Palestine (1995-2009)



Source: Rouba Al-Fattal, “The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory”, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document, No. 328, May 2010, p. 73.

Since the establishment of the “first contractual” relations with the Palestinian Authority in February 1997 with the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, the Union aimed to improve political and economic relations with Palestine, and parallel to this, it signed, in 2005, the European Neighbourhood Action Plan.⁵⁵³ For the same purpose, the Union and Israel signed the Association Agreement on November 20, 1995, which entered into force on June 1, 2000, replacing the 1975 Cooperation Agreement.⁵⁵⁴ However, Israel’s trade/economic relations with the Union witnessed one problematic issue, which was the marketing of

⁵⁵³ Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - Brussels, 24 February 1997, 6023/97 (Presse 50) C/97/50.

⁵⁵⁴ European Commission, Trade, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/>, (Accessed on 16 April 2017); European External Action Service, Delegation of the European Union to Israel, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/eu_israel/political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

goods produced in the Occupied Territories by the Israeli companies.⁵⁵⁵ Until 2003, Israel did not accept to label the origins of the products and did not fulfill the Association Agreement's related protocol.⁵⁵⁶ The "rules of origins" problem was solved by signing a technical agreement with Israel in 2004.⁵⁵⁷ According to the EU-Israel Technical Arrangement:

Products produced in the Israeli settlements located within the territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967 are not entitled to benefit from preferential tariff treatment under the EU-Israel Association Agreement. [...] In accordance with a 'Technical Arrangement' concluded by the EU and Israel, the postal code and the name of the city, village or industrial zone where production conferring originating status has taken place appear on all proofs of preferential origin issued or made out in Israel.⁵⁵⁸

The table below shows the Union's financial commitments to the Palestinians in different fields between the years 2000 and 2015:

⁵⁵⁵ Tocci, "The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard", pp. 120-121; Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 117; Le More, "International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo", pp. 53-55; Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 66.

⁵⁵⁶ Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, "EU-Israel Association Agreement", 21 June 2000, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146089.pdf, (Accessed on 17 April 2017).

⁵⁵⁷ Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 66; European Commission, "EU-Israel Technical Arrangement", https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/rules-origin/general-aspects-preferential-origin/euisrael-technical-arrangement_en, (Accessed on 17 April 2017).

⁵⁵⁸ European Commission, "EU-Israel Technical Arrangement", https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/rules-origin/general-aspects-preferential-origin/euisrael-technical-arrangement_en, (Accessed on 17 April 2017).

Table 5: EU Financial Commitments to Palestinian People between 2000-2015

EU Financial Commitments to the Palestinian People 2000 to 2015																	
Estimated breakdown by programme / sector	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2000-2015
Direct and Indirect Financial Support (1)	90,00	40,00	140,00	102,00	90,25	76,00	141,75	370,00	258,00	219,10	210,90	217,20	93,80	168,70	170,25	178,00	2.565,95
Institutional Building (2)/Governance programmes	1,90	2,71	27,75	10,00	8,00	8,40	12,00	5,67	14,00	12,00	32,30	34,95	27,45	13,00	13,00	10,00	233,03
Infrastructure Development/Water sector	7,70	0,00	1,93	0,00	0,00	40,55	0,00	0,00	37,00	18,00	21,00	22,00	18,00	20,00	18,50	10,00	214,68
Direct Support to the Private Sector	3,00	0,00	15,40	15,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	22,00	11,00	11,00	11,20	11,00	10,50	10,00	120,10
UNRWA	83,76	90,07	71,43	91,85	103,27	97,26	111,81	100,55	120,00	177,37	104,56	142,39	146,01	158,02	98,95	130,00	1.827,28
Humanitarian Aid, Food Aid, Food Security, Food Facility (excluding UNRWA)	4,68	9,13	52,81	34,94	36,98	36,78	69,60	59,21	43,76	57,15	43,64	42,63	47,75	27,00	21,50	20,00	607,56
East Jerusalem initiatives	0,00	0,14	5,00	0,75	0,00	1,80	0,00	2,00	2,00	4,50	6,00	8,00	8,00	8,00	10,00	10,00	66,19
Support to civil society (i.e. Partnership for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy, NSA, Civil Society Facility, etc.)	28,07	2,62	6,58	16,36	15,78	16,28	8,43	11,35	11,45	6,51	14,82	10,70	15,44	11,30	8,00	6,50	190,19
CFSP actions, Rapid Reaction Mechanism, Instrument for Stability (excluding UNRWA)	6,19	3,81	5,00	0,00	0,95	3,80	6,40	14,50	8,70	9,27	10,20	26,65	13,72	10,51	9,92	9,50	139,12
OVERALL TOTAL	225,20	148,48	325,90	270,90	255,23	280,87	349,99	563,28	494,91	525,90	454,42	515,52	381,37	427,53	360,62	384,00	5.964,10

Source: The Table was sent/prepared by Shadi Othman via e-mail, Communication & Information Officer The Office of the European Union Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA)

The then EU High Representative Catherine Ashton explained that “the ultimate objective of the EU's financial assistance remains the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security”⁵⁵⁹. In this regard, the Union has been making great effort to provide financial aid to the Palestinian people especially in the post-1990 era. Leaving the “high-politics” issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the US led the Union to focus on the economic dimension of the peace negotiations. On this basis, the main strategy behind the establishment of the EMP and its descendent ENP was to provide the Union with more political visibility and effectiveness through bilateral agreements with the countries of the region. However, some dramatic events, such as the assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel in 1995, decreased the efficiency of the peace negotiations and indirectly overshadowed the logic behind the creation of the EMP. Accordingly, the Union created a new post, and appointed Miguel Angel Moraines, the former ambassador of Spain to Israel, as special envoy to give further political visibility to the Union in the region by assisting and contributing to the

⁵⁵⁹ European Commission, Press Release, “The EU announces assistance package for development in Palestine during Prime Minister Hamdallah's visit to Brussels”, 9 September 2013, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-825_en.htm, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

implementation of the terms of the ongoing negotiations.⁵⁶⁰ Although the victory of the Labor Party in Israel in 1999 and the Camp David Summit of 2000 revived hopes to find a definitive solution to the conflict, initiatives of the international community remained inconclusive once again due to the eruption of the Second Intifada in Palestine.

In the beginning of the 2000s, with the membership of the EU High Representative Javier Solana to the Mitchell Commission, the Union sought to improve its political presence in the peace negotiations. However, another external development, the victory of the Likud Party in Israel, blocked off the negotiations. As a consequence of the lack of progress in the peace negotiations, the Union's initiative towards the Mediterranean, the EMP, also became ineffective, which is why the Union aimed to renovate its policy and launched the ENP in 2004.

By adopting joint action plans, the Union sought to build effective bilateral relations with both conflicted parties and aimed to preserve stability through commitments. However, these commitments did not work partly because of the complexity of applying a "carrot and stick" policy to the parties, and partly because of the American dominance in the region.

After the signing of the Israel-Palestine Agreement on Movement and Access in 2005, the Council agreed on the following:

[t]he EU should undertake the third-party role proposed. It therefore decided to launch the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah crossing point, code-named EUBAM Rafah, to monitor the operations of this border crossing point. The operational phase of the Mission began on 24 November 2005. On 10 November 2008, the Council extended the mandate of the mission until 24 November 2009⁵⁶¹.

⁵⁶⁰ European External Action Service, "Former Special Representatives", http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/background/eu-special-representatives/former-special-representatives/index_en.htm, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

⁵⁶¹ European Security and Defence Policy, "EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM RAFAH)", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090325%20FACTSHEET%20EUBAM%20Rafah%20-%20version%2010_EN.pdf, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

The Union, for the first time, deployed military support to help control an area out of concerns for Israel's security.⁵⁶² In the aftermath of an invitation by the two conflicted parties, the Union's Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point, namely EUBAM Rafah, was deployed on 30 November 2005 with the purpose of monitoring "the operations of the border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt".⁵⁶³ From its deployment to June 2007, approximately 450.000 people used the crossing point.⁵⁶⁴ By undertaking such a security mission, the Union, for the first time, assisted in the preservation of security in the region. Although Israelis would have preferred the US to undertake this mission, because of the unwillingness of the US, the Union undertook its first notable ESDP task which improved the Union's presence in the region.⁵⁶⁵ Taking into account of its significance, this mission can be classified as a clear example of the role conception of "force for international peace, security and stability". Although in the aftermath of Hamas's gaining control over Gaza the Rafah crossing point was closed in 2007, the Union has extended its mandate until 30 June 2018.⁵⁶⁶

EUBAM has maintained its full operational capability despite the Hamas take over in the Gaza Strip. On 13 June 2007, the EUBAM Head of Mission declared a temporary suspension of operations at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP). During the 18 months that the EUBAM monitors were present at the terminal a total of 443 975 passengers crossed through RCP.⁵⁶⁷

Another initiative of the Union in Palestine was the establishment of a Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) on January 1, 2006, in order to:

- Support the Palestine civil police reform and development
- Strengthen and support the criminal justice system
- Improve prosecution-Police interaction.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶² Musu, "European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", p. 74.

⁵⁶³ European Union External Action, European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah, <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/en/node/5048>, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ Persson, "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 103-104.

⁵⁶⁶ European Union External Action, European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah, <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/en/node/5280>, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

⁵⁶⁷ European Security and Defence Policy, "EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM RAFAH)", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090325%20FACTSHEET%20EUBAM%20Rafah%20-%20version%2010_EN.pdf, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

⁵⁶⁸ European External Action Service, EUPOL COPPS, <http://eupolcopps.eu/en/content/what-eupol-copps>, (Accessed on 16 April 2017).

The EUPOLL COPPS was the second mission of the Union in Palestine with the purpose of “strengthening law and order” and improving “security in the occupied Palestinian territories”.⁵⁶⁹ Throughout the mission, the Union provided both technical assistance and training to the Palestinian police to strengthen their capacity to preserve democracy and the rule of law in the territory.⁵⁷⁰ By undertaking this mission, the Union also contributed to committing the Palestinians to the Road Map responsibilities:

The European Union, as part of the Quartet, is committed to assisting and facilitating the implementation of the Roadmap, which lays out reciprocal steps by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution building fields, that will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.⁵⁷¹

Today, the EUPOL COPPS “is working with the key Palestinian Criminal Justice Institutions (CJIs) in developing a coherent legal framework”.⁵⁷² In the light of these efforts of the Union, it can be concluded that both the EUBAM Rafah and the EUPOL COPPS added a security dimension to the Union’s civilian presence in the region. Although these initiatives of the Union support the role of the Union as a “force for preserving peace and security”, because of several internal and external reasons (the victory of Hamas, the continuing political integration process of the Union, perceptions of the conflicted parties, etc.) the Union could not achieve all its stated objectives in the region.

In sum, the post-Cold War era, the Union explicitly and frequently underlined the need for the establishment of two independent states in the region. When judged on its rhetoric, it is possible to conclude that the political efforts of the Union sought to provide an internationally accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The beginning of the 1990s also witnessed an increased pace in the political integration of Union. As it was already examined in the previous chapter, the signing of several significant agreements (from the 1993 Maastricht Treaty to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty), the

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁰ Persson, “The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, pp. 100-101.

⁵⁷¹ European Council, Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories”, 14 November 2005,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/palestinian_territories_oj_/palestinian_territories_oj_en.pdf, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

⁵⁷² European External Action Service, EUPOL COPPS, Strengthen and Support the Criminal Justice System, <http://eupolcopps.eu/en/node/1128>, (Accessed on 13 July 2017).

introduction of new foreign policy instruments (joint actions, common positions and common strategies) and the creation of new posts within the framework of the CFSP (High Representative of the Union, Special Envoy of the Union to Middle East) were the attempts of the Union to transform itself into an effective foreign policy maker in world affairs. While undertaking these initiatives, the Union has brought to the forefront the norms, values and principles that the Union is founded on and aimed to be influential in its neighborhood by promoting these norms and principles.⁵⁷³ However, in spite of its economic and political engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Union remained most of the time a declaratory actor rather than being an active player.

Three main reasons for the Union's ineffectiveness can be identified. First of all, despite all frameworks and institutions built to act effectively, the Union remained intergovernmental in its foreign policy and could not yet overcome the lack of political coordination among its member states. Individual actions and initiatives of the member states are the major reasons behind the Union's lack of political visibility in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, not only during the post-Cold War period but even before that, the Union and the US frequently had diversified strategies and interests in the region, which eventually led the Union to prioritize the trans-Atlantic relations and to contribute to the established peace initiative by playing second fiddle.⁵⁷⁴ In other words, the US's foreign policy objectives and interests towards the region determined the Union's foreign policy direction towards the conflict and the Union had to act having regard to the US's red lines. Finally, the dramatic developments in the region and in the conflicted parties, including governmental changes and regional crises created new agendas and priorities. In spite of all these, it cannot be concluded that the Union's declaratory policies have never been productive or influential; the Union contributed to internationalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict even before the US mentioned the self-determination rights of the Palestinians.

3. 4. CONCLUSION

⁵⁷³ Kaya, "Identifying the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Roles", p. 119.

⁵⁷⁴ Yacobi and Newman, "The EU and the Israel-Palestine Conflict", p. 174; Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap-İsrail Uyumazlığı'ndaki Üçüncü Taraf Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi", pp. 77-78.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most longstanding disputes on the international agenda. The Union's involvement in the conflict dates back to the 1970s when differing arguments regarding its actorness in international affairs emerged. Several factors, ranging from the need for political and economic stability to historical and cultural ties to the region urged the Union to become involved in the conflict.

The geopolitical conditions of the Cold War provided the Union with a relatively more autonomous political space to act unilaterally, which, however, changed with the resurgence of the Cold War in the 1980s. The 1980 Venice Declaration, which implicitly addressed the self-determination rights of the Palestinians and a two-state solution, was a milestone in the Union's foreign policy towards the conflict and still has considerable influence on the actions of the Union.

After a relatively pro-active political position during the 1970s and 1980s, the Union lost its unilateral action capability with the end of the Cold War as the US was rising as the world's only superpower and intended to assert its strong presence in the Middle East. Accordingly, the Union became involved in the American-led peace negotiations in the 1990s and took part in the groups that were mainly charged with the economic development of the Palestinians. The foreign policy pursued by the Union during the crises implicitly demonstrated the disunited position of the member states and increased questions over the actorness and supranationality of the Union. The lack of coordination among the Union's member states in both the bipolar and the unipolar world orders can be seen as the major reason behind its ineffective position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the co-sponsorship position in the Quartet allowed the Union to increase its visibility as a political actor. The Union mostly remained an economic supplier. The eruption of the Second Intifada and the subsequent developments in terms of the governmental changes in the conflicted parties caused the erosion of the peace negotiations and increased the radical voices on both parties. Therefore, neither the Union nor the Quartet could manage to bring about a final peace agreement.

In the light of these analyses, it can be concluded that the Union has been a party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict even before the 1970s, when the British mandate and the subsequent dramatic events of the Second World War are considered. In addition to this, the Union has significant economic and security oriented interests in the region. In order

to create for itself a stable neighbourhood, the Union highlighted the importance of democratization and liberalization as processes that could end this longstanding dispute, and tried to establish strong bilateral political and economic relations with the conflicted parties. However, neither its bilateral policies towards the region (the establishment of the EMP/ENP) nor the multilateral initiatives (the Oslo Process and the Quartet) could bring about a permanent solution in the region.

In this analysis, the evolution of the Union's involvement in the conflict was presented in two main sections. In order to present a clear picture of the actorness of the Union, Manners's "triple process" (principles-actions-outcomes) was used to examine the normativeness of the Union. Based on this triple analysis, it can be concluded that the Union has not yet been an effective political player profile due to several internal and external reasons. In this regard, the intergovernmental nature of the decision making procedure in the fields of foreign and security policy, inconsistencies of the member state policies and the ongoing political integration process can be cited as the internal elements that limited the efficiency of the Union. In terms of external factors, the dominant position of the US in the region mainly after the Cold War, the outbreak of several dramatic international events (the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Yugoslav War, the Gulf War, the September 11 attacks etc.) and the perspectives of the conflicted parties towards the Union can be listed. In addition to these elements, as it was underlined in the first chapter of the thesis under the title of *Critiques on the Concept of Normative Power Europe*, lack of membership prospect limited the Union's effectiveness vis-à-vis the conflicted parties, leading us to reconsider whether the Union is a *regional normative power*. Based on this triple analyse, it is hard to identify the Union's actions towards the conflict as *always* motivated by normative concerns as its economic, energy and security concerns were also in play.

CONCLUSION

As a consequence of the “reincarnation” of the international political and economic system with the fall of the Iron Curtain, traditional IR theories’ assumptions began to be questioned. In this period, the constructivist approach distinguished itself from the mainstream IR theories by highlighting the importance of ideational determinants, such as norms, values, culture, religion and language, which are constituted as a consequence of the social interaction process and shape the agents/actors’ actions.

The period that saw the rising popularity of the constructivist approach also witnessed the intensification of the debate on the actorness and effectiveness of the Union in world affairs. During this period, the question of “What kind of power is the Union?” has been on the top of the IR agenda. Accordingly, a wide range of arguments and concepts have been introduced to explain the role and contribution of the Union in world politics. In the framework of the normative power concept, scholars underline the significance of the Union’s founding norms and principles for its foreign and security policy actions. Moreover, they argue that the Union, through its principles and values, has the capability to shape the international political atmosphere.

However, the arguments developed by the scholars regarding the concept of normative power were criticized by some IR scholars who questioned the normativeness of the Union and its effectiveness in international political issues. These critiques focused on four main factors: the unclearness of the concept, the lack of normative intention in the Union’s actions, the concept’s geographical limits and the increasing gap among three core elements: presence, opportunity and capability. As a response to growing critiques, Manners suggested a triple analysis process (principles-actions-outcomes) that would help to understand the normative nature of the Union. In accordance with Manners’s method, the thesis aimed to present a critical perspective on the Union’s global role by examining its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process.

The analysis of the Union’s official documents present two consequences. On the one hand, the explicit identity references in these documents provide a legal ground for the Union to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. On the other hand, we see

that the Union is not *always* capable of putting these normative objectives into practice because of several internal and external reasons. This situation illustrates the limitations of the concept of normative power, since the Union could not use the “opportunities” provided in the international system to improve its political presence in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was accepted as one of the major reasons for the Union’s growing interest towards the region because of both its geographical proximity to the region and its historical ties with the countries in the region. The 1973 War between the Israelis and the Arabs created an unstable political and economic atmosphere for the Union. In this conjuncture, the Union sought to preserve political and economic stability in the Middle East. Yet, due to the inconvenient geopolitical conditions of the Cold War and its ongoing political integration process, the Union could not initially present an effective political position. The situation in the post-Cold War era created new obstacles (regional and international conflicts) and opportunities (the Union’s involvement in the Oslo peace process and the Quartet) for the Union. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Union pursued its first term goals, which were supporting the establishment of two states, living side by side in peace in the framework of the UN Resolutions, and the preservation of peace, democracy and human rights in the region.

Although the Union remained under the shadow of the US particularly during the Oslo peace process, it began to improve its political influence and prestige with its co-sponsorship status in the Quartet. Yet, the analysis of the Union’s current involvement in the conflict demonstrates that, in spite of its all efforts to build an effective foreign and security policy structure, the Union could not transform itself into an influential political actor in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This thesis had three main objectives. First of all, by presenting the most highlighted arguments on the international role and identity of the Union, it aimed to provide a clear conceptual ground for future research from a critical constructivist point of view. In accordance with the arguments put forward by Manners, the Union’s normative basis was examined. The analysis of official documents of the Union illustrated that the underlined norms and principles are presented as the founding basis of the Union. However, it is believed that having core principles and norms is not enough for the

Union to be labeled as a normative power or at least an influential one. Foreign and security policy practices of the Union, on the other hand, present an ineffective profile. If the concept of normative power means pursuing normative objectives and goals at solely the rhetorical level, then the Union can be seen as a normative power. Yet, when we consider the foreign policy practices of the Union, it can be concluded that the Union does not *always* act in a normative way. In fact, the member states of the Union mostly seek to preserve their national interests in highly important foreign and security policy issues.

The well-known examples presented by the normative power scholars to prove the Union's effectiveness as a normative power in world affairs are the abolition of death penalty and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. On these issues, the Union is undeniably successful. However, it is necessary to ask at this point whether the Union always and primarily acts in accordance with its normative nature and offers definitive solutions to critical and dramatic international problems. In this regard, it is often argued that the Union's position and actions towards certain tragic events (the Yugoslav War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.), as a result of which thousands of civilians lost their lives and millions of them became homeless, should be examined. According to the World Bank data, more than twenty million people are refugees in all around the world, while the numbers in Gaza and the West Bank are approximately five million.⁵⁷⁵ Consequently, it is obvious that the number of people who lost their lives as a consequence of the death penalty is a lot fewer than the number of people who lost their lives during wars and under forced migration conditions.⁵⁷⁶ In this regard, this study argued that the "normativeness" of the Union can be better assessed by looking at these tragic numbers and at the Union's political standing towards these dramatic events.

Secondly, this thesis analysed the evolution of the Union's foreign and security policy and its neighbourhood policy. Based on this examination, it can be concluded that the Union has sought to become a credible and effective international actor throughout its evolution process. The post-Cold War environment made the Union accelerate its

⁵⁷⁵ The World Bank, "Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?end=2015&start=1990&view=map>, (Accessed on 02 June 2017).

⁵⁷⁶ Keukeleire and Delreux, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", p. 140.

initiatives to build an effective foreign and security policy. The Union explicitly and frequently specified in its official documents its foreign and security policy objectives, which include preserving peace, democracy and human rights in the world. Despite all its efforts, the intergovernmental characteristic of the decision making process on the issues of foreign and security policy remained as the main obstacle for the Union. The diversified interests and unilateral actions of the member states are the key reasons behind this lack of coherence on the part of the Union as a collectivity in world affairs.

In addition to the lack of coherence among the member states, it is difficult for the Union to promote democracy and stability, which are the two of the Union's major foreign policy objectives in third countries without the prospect of membership. This situation limits the Union's political influence beyond its borders. In other words, despite all efforts (EMP/ENP) to improve its political and economic visibility externally, including in the Mediterranean countries, the Union did not reach its goals as its commitment has been "less than full membership more than associate partnership".⁵⁷⁷ It can be concluded that the Union, founded as a consequence of longstanding wars among the European states, is a successful example of a peace building process. However, the member states of the Union have not committed themselves to establishing a supranational foreign and security policy cooperation due to fears of loss of sovereignty, causing a longstanding deadlock. Thus, it is no surprise that despite all its efforts to establish a common foreign and security policy, it is still an ongoing process for the Union to become able to speak with one voice in international politics.

Finally, by analysing the Union's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the thesis aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of both the international profile and the effectiveness of the Union in international matters. In this regard, it can be stated that both in the first period (1970-1990) and in the second period (since 1990), the Union has aimed to preserve peace and political-economic stability in the region. During the first period, the Union demonstrated a relatively more autonomous political position than in the second period. After the 1990s, on the other hand, the Union had to, or preferred to, become involved mainly in American-led initiatives because of the US's

⁵⁷⁷ Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 3.

leading role in world politics. In these American-led initiatives, the Union's role was limited to its membership in REDWG whereby it managed the financial aid flow to the Palestinians rather than handling security issues. The Union eventually gained an equal political status in 2002 with the Quartet. However, neither the Union nor the international community could present a permanent solution to the ongoing conflict due to several internal and external reasons. The longstanding mistrust among the conflicted parties and increasing influences of the Israeli and Palestinian right-wing parties can be considered as the internal reasons for this failure. On the other hand, diversified interests of the co-sponsors of the Quartet (the Union, the US, Russia and the UN) and the outbreak of new international crises (the September 11 attacks, the Arab Spring, etc.) caused periodic political gridlocks in the resolution process.

All in all, three main factors can be put forward as reasons behind the Union's ineffective political standing in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the lack of coherence among the member states, the lack of normative reasoning in the Union's foreign and security policy actions and the lack of supranationality in the foreign and security policy decision making.

The recent development within the Union particularly in the form of Brexit and the French Presidential elections increase the questions regarding the overlaps between the Union's foreign policy objectives during the conflict and their achievement in the near future, as the Union seeks to carry out a more independent policy from the US.⁵⁷⁸ Yet, it is obvious that as long as the foreign and security policy issues remain a taboo for the member states, the Union may be expected to play secondary roles in world politics.

⁵⁷⁸ Uri Savir, "Israel Pulse", *Al-Monitor*, 2 April 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/israel-eu-palestine-two-state-solution-trump-middle-east.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter, (Accessed on 4 April 2017).

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APPENDIX 1. ORJİNALLİK RAPORU



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS/DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih: 18/07/2017

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: A Critical Overview of the European Union's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution Process as a Normative Power

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 137 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 17/07/2017 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 16 'tür.

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- 2- Kaynakça hariç
- 3- Alıntılar hariç/dâhil
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Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

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Adı Soyadı: Hünkar Özgü ALICI
Öğrenci No: N14124216
Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Statüsü: Y.Lisans Doktora Bütünleşik Dr.

Tarih ve İmza

18-07-2017

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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

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Student No: _____ N14124216
Department: _____ International Relations
Program: _____ International Relations
Status: Masters Ph.D. Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Associate Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ömür
ATMACA

APPENDIX 2. ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU

 <p>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU</p>
<p>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Tarih: 18/07/2017</p> <p>Tez Başlığı / Konusu: A Critical Overview of the European Union's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution Process as a Normative Power</p> <p>Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır, 2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir. 3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir. 4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir. <p>Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurulları ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.</p> <p>Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Tarih ve İmza 18.07.2017 </p> <p>Adı Soyadı: Hünkar Özgü ALICI Öğrenci No: N14124216 Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Statüsü: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y.Lisans <input type="checkbox"/> Doktora <input type="checkbox"/> Bütünleşik Dr.</p>
<p>DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA</p> <p>Detaylı Bilgi: http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr Telefon: 0-312-2976860 Faks: 0-3122992147 E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr</p>



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Student No: N14124216	
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Program: Uluslararası İlişkiler	
Status: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Masters <input type="checkbox"/> Ph.D. <input type="checkbox"/> Integrated Ph.D.	

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

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