Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

English Language and Literature

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF AND OTHERS IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *THE WAVES*, JOSEPH CONRAD'S *LORD JIM*, AND FORD MADOX FORD'S *THE GOOD SOLDIER*

Hakan YILMAZ

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2017

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KABUL VE ONAY

Hakan YILMAZ tarafından hazırlanan "The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*" başlıklı bu çalışma, 06.06.2017 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Doktora Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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o **Serbest Seçenek/Yazarın Seçimi**

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

To my family and my significant Other

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ÖZET

YILMAZ, Hakan. "Virginia Woolf'un *Dalgalar*, Joseph Conrad'ın *Lord Jim* ve Ford Madox Ford'un *İyi Asker* adlı Romanlarında Özne ve Başkalarının Görüngübilimi (Fenomenolojisi)." Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2017.

Bu tezin amacı, özneyi başkaları arasında dünyada konumlandıran görüngübilimin (fenomenoloji) İngiliz modernist romanı ile doğrudan örtüşen özne yaklaşımlarından faydalanarak, Virginia Woolf'un *Dalgalar* (1931), Joseph Conrad'ın *Lord Jim* (1900) ve Ford Madox Ford'un *İyi Asker* (1915) adlı romanlarında, özne kavramını ve anlayışını, öznenin öznelerarası ilişkilerinde ve bu ilişkiler doğrultusunda incelemektir. Görüngübilimin özneyle ilgili önerdiği çeşitli kavramsallaştırmaları temel alan bu tez, öznenin imgeleminde başkalarının inkâr edilemez etkisi ve önemi olduğunu göz önünde bulundurarak özne ile başkaları arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinde durmaktadır. Öznenin dünyaya fırlatılmış olmasını vurgulamasıyla, seçilen romanların her biri, bu ilişkilerin özne üzerindeki doğrudan etkilerinin farklı bir yönünü öncelemekte ve araştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Woolf'un *Dalgalar* adlı romanında hergünkü kendi-olma (herkes-benliği) ve başkaları aracılığıyla artan öz farkındalık, Conrad'ın *Lord Jim* adlı romanında başkaları için sorumlu etik benlik ve Ford Madox Ford'un *İyi Asker* adlı romanında başkaları vasıtasıyla kimlik oluşumu ve öznenin varlığının gerekçelendirilmesi incelenmektedir. Sonuç olarak, modernist romandaki özneyi ayrık ve kendi başına gören geleneksel yaklaşımlar karşısında, bu tezde incelenen her bir romanın, bütünüyle dünyada olan ve ayrılmaz bir şekilde başkalarıyla iç içe olan bir özne tanımı sunduğu tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler

Görüngübilim (fenomenoloji), modernizm, öznelerarasılık, özne, başkaları, Virginia Woolf, Joseph Conrad, Ford Madox Ford, *Dalgalar*, *Lord Jim*, *İyi Asker*, öz farkındalık, herkes-benliği, etik benlik, kimlik

ABSTRACT

YILMAZ, Hakan. "The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves,* Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*." Ph.D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2017.

The aim of this dissertation is to inquire into the conception and understanding of the self as explored in and through its intersubjective relations in the works of three canonical modernist novelists, namely, Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* (1931), Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1900), and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier* (1915). It draws upon the insights provided by phenomenology whose main concern for the subject as situated in the world among others squarely overlaps with that of modernist fiction. Building upon the various conceptualizations of the self offered by phenomenology, it further focuses on the self-other relations with a keen eye for the undeniable impact and significance of others in the way the self is conceived. With their emphasis on the subject as thrown into the world, each of the selected novels foregrounds and explores a different aspect or dimension of the self which directly bears on its relations with others. In this respect, the selected novels are respectively examined with regard to average everyday self (they-self) and heightened self-consciousness through others (*The Waves*), ethical self as response-able for others (*Lord Jim*), and identity formation and self-justification through others (*The Good Soldier*). Therefore, against the traditional approaches to the self which is regarded as isolated and unhitched in modernist fiction, it is argued that each novel studied in this dissertation presents an account of the self as bodily situated in the world and as inextricably entangled with others who are revealed to be an integral constituent of the self.

Keywords

Phenomenology, modernism, intersubjectivity, the self, others, Virginia Woolf, Joseph Conrad, Ford Madox Ford, *The Waves*, *Lord Jim*, *The Good Soldier*, self-consciousness, they-self, ethical self, identity

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INTRODUCTION

This study aims at critically examining the conceptualization of the self or subject as inextricably entangled with others, as respectively configured in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* (1931), Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1901), and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier* (1915). It draws upon the insights provided by phenomenology which offers a theoretical background or basis for various self-other relations. In addition, it further scrutinizes the encounters between the self and others which affect the subject's self-conception and self-understanding and through which the self makes sense of itself. In this respect, it argues that the understanding of the self as a subject cannot be severed from its relationality. The presence of others not only provides a perspective on the self from the outside by causing self-directedness, self-introspection and ultimately heightened self-consciousness, but also reveals the self to be intertwined with others whose ways of being are adopted by the self. Therefore, each chapter is concerned with exploring a different phenomenological dimension of the self or being a self in relation to others and with analyzing how the characters in the selected novels come to see themselves in the (at times absent) presence of others and how their self-understanding is fundamentally molded by others.

Phenomenology as a Philosophical Discipline

Phenomenology as a distinct type of philosophy came into being exactly at the turn of the twentieth century with the publication of Edmund Husserl's (1859 - 1938) magnum opus *Logical Investigations* published in 1900 - 1901. With this work, Husserl paved a new path for modern philosophy by both challenging the prevalent ways of doing philosophy and introducing rather a different methodology that would help describe and understand phemonena as they appear to consciousness in perception. Wrathall and Dreyfus write that "[p]henomenology began as a discernible movement with Edmund Husserl's . . . demand that philosophy take as its primary task the description of the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness" (2). Concrete experience, or experiencing per se, was an inevitable point to which phenomenologists turn so often.

The previous schools of philosophy before the twentieth century such as the Neo-Kantian tradition[1] were seen inadequate to describe human experiences as lived. Therefore, phenomenology prioritizes the experiences themselves as opposed to the ideas that can be inferred from reason, that is, through rationalist thinking. Accordingly, it "was seen as reviving our living contact with reality, and as being remote from the arid and academic discussion of philosophical problems found in nineteenth-century philosophy, for example in the Neo-Kantian tradition" (Moran 5). Husserl argues for the essences of experiential phenomena as intuitively conceived and known. In the second edition of *Logical Investigations* (1913), Husserl states that his understanding of

> *pure phenomenology of experiences in general*, [2] has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analyzable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human and animal experients in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. (*Logical* II 166)

In other words, what Husserl propounds is oriented more towards being attentive to the experiences as intuitively conceived and known at the time of experience than empirically observing them through reasoning. This is because, as Husserl continues to explain, "phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must *describe* in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition . . ." (*Logical* II 166). In this regard, Husserl puts emphasis on the intuitive conception of experiences as they are lived.

Phenomenology as a word simply means the study of phenomena and, particularly, attending to conscious experience *per se*. In this sense, the emphasis lies on the description[3] of experience and of how it occurs. As David Cerbone points out, this philosophical discipline "invites us to stay with . . . 'the experience itself,' to concentrate on its character and structure rather than whatever it is that might underlie it or be causally responsible for it" (*Understanding* 3). Disregarding the causes of experiences, it tries to gain access to what sorts of essential structures consciousness inherently has and unconditionally follows in experiencing phenomena. Dermot Moran asserts that it "emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer" (4). However,

consciousness is not completely passive in experiencing phenomena and should not be regarded as simply absorbing any phenomenon it encounters as does a sponge soak up water.

On the contrary, consciousness is active and, more importantly, intentional[4] – a term that Husserl borrowed from the German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano (1838-1917)[5] and made it an integral part of his philosophy. Barry Smith and David Smith note that "[w]e grasp in phenomenological reflection that consciousness is *intentional* in the sense of *being directed towards an object*: consciousness is consciousness *of* something. The phenomenologist attends to acts of consciousness and to the objects they 'intend' *just as* we experience and intend them" (11). In this sense, experiencing itself necessarily involves an object (physical or not) and, thus, objects form an indispensable part of experiences simply because consciousness is always already conscious(ness) *of* something. In other words, an essential feature of consciousness is its object-directedness. This is the reason why "[t]he phenomenological tradition has seen intentionality to be the defining, and even exclusive, feature of experience, and so phenomenology can be characterized as the study of intentionality" (Cerbone, *Understanding* 4).

Moreover, intentionality brings about a myriad of possibilities of experience which would be impossible to imagine without an intended object because an object is always already presented to, or manifests itself to consciousness perspectivally, that is, from a first-person perspective. David Smith argues that "the very essence of consciousness includes this first-person character: we each experience it in our own case; we know it as we experience it from our first-person point of view" (56). Put differently, phenomenology not only attempts to delineate the conditions of possibility for a specific experience to be the experience that it is, but also focuses on the first-personal givenness of the experiences.

With its exclusive concern with phenomenon which etymologically derives from the Greek word *phainomenon* meaning that which manifests or shows itself or appears (Sokolowski 13), phenomenology foregrounds consciousness or the subject as that to which/whom phenomena appear. On this premise, it deems subjectivity as the point of

departure for any sort of knowledge that can ever be attained. There is always the factor of the subject in experiencing that annuls the possibility of achieving a fully detached, disinterested, and objective approach to the perception of phenomena. The phenomenological insights into subjectivity and thus being a self will form the basis of the arguments that will be proposed in this dissertation in relation to the understanding of the self, and, as an inevitable consequence thereof, of others. Phenomenologists immediately realized the importance of others in affecting self-conception and self-understanding, and accordingly took up and explored the issues of the problem of others and of the interminable relation between the self and others from various angles (co-existence, conflictual encounters, ethical encounters, identity formation, etc.). Since the self is never an isolated being completely cut off from others, the exploration of its self-understanding would be incomplete without taking into account the manifold intricate relations between the self and others.

The Conception of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

The central facet of Husserl's phenomenology takes a transcendental turn (under the influence of Kant's transcendental philosophy) with the conception of the self or ego as the identical subject of all perceptual acts and experiences that consciousness has in a temporal horizon. In other words, experiences are not passively received by consciousness but rather actively constituted by an ego that transcends experiences. Kant's much quoted dictum reads: "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations" (246) – without which, Kant argues, the various representations, i.e. perceptions, would not hold together and be united. Kant further remarks that

> [t]he thought that these representations [perceptions or intuitions] given in intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein . . . i.e., only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious. (247-48)

If the multifarious perceptions given to consciousness in intuition are to relate to each other and are to be intuited in the first person, it is a must that there is an underlying "I" to whom such numerous perceptions can be given and by whom they can be coalesced together.

The influence of Kant's transcendental ego as the unifier of experiences, and more significantly, as the condition of possibility for experiences to be given, is conspicuous in Husserl. As Husserl puts it, "I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as 'subject' of the acts and states" (*Ideas* II 103). The contents of intentional acts, that is, experiences, might vary from one experience to another. The subject, however, remains selfsame in each and every act.[6] Husserl lays special stress on its identicality: "[t]he Ego seems to be there continually" (*Ideas* I 132). In other words, Husserl contends that the self to whom experiences are given appears to be the fundamental underlying element which does not disappear at all. Simon Glendinning postulates that it "is presupposed in all my experience of the world (including my embodied or 'objectivated' self in the world)" (52). Therefore, the primary existence of an ego is, for Husserl, essential to any experience.

Husserl characterizes this underlying ego as identical across experiences and argues that it "is the identical subject functioning in all acts of the same stream of consciousness; it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them . . ." (*Ideas* II 112). Husserl pays allegiance to Kant by asserting that "[a]ll of them [perceptions/experiences] . . . [belong] to the one stream of mental processes which is mine . . . In Kant's words, The '*I think*' *must be capable of accompanying all my presentations*" (*Ideas* I 133). Therefore, Husserl presents an account of the self as transcendentally functioning above the unity of the stream of consciousness, and acknowledges that there is something "peculiar, floating above many experiences" (*Logical* II 86).

On the other hand, however, unlike Kant's rejection of the possibility of grasping the ego as an object through reflection,[7] Husserl holds that it has, by essence, the capacity to grasp itself as an object of reflection. It, by its nature, possesses the possibility of an "originary self-grasp," a "self-perception" (Husserl, *Ideas* II 108). Klaus Held writes that "[i]n my intentional, lived experiences, I am directed toward objects-in-the-world, but I can also make my own ego an object of my reflection" (29). In this respect, Husserl diverges from Kant by repudiating the role of the ego as a purely formal principle for the unity of consciousness. As David Carr puts it, "for Husserl it is in no

way correct to assert that the pure Ego is a subject that can never become an Object . . ." (185-86). Instead, Husserl refashions it as that which can be given in inner perception or reflection. The crucial factor in grasping the self, however, lies in its temporal constitution. Consciousness emerges out of the given experiences as that which has the same self across time: "I am and I was the same, I who endure and 'hold sway' in this or that conscious act . . ." (Husserl, *Ideas* II 109). Nevertheless, the only way for the ego functioning in all sorts of conscious acts to recognize itself as identical is viable by virtue of its own temporal self-constitution, or rather, its time-consciousness.[8]

The temporal structure of perception is brought about by means of its tripartite form, namely, retention-primal impression-protention.[9] John Drummond duly points out that "by virtue of retention, which holds on to (retains) elapsed phases of consciousness and protention which anticipates yet-to-come phases, the perceiving that occurs now appears as having a temporal extent that emerges out of prior appearances of the same object and runs off into yet-to-come appearances of that object" (214). The temporal nature of perception as bound by such tripartite structure enables the phases to be experienced not as fragmented but rather unified in the flow of consciousness. Otherwise, without such inner time-consciousness, "our experience of the sequence would be discrete and staccato . . . The sense of a continuous flow would never arise for us . . . We and what we experience would be nothing but momentary flashes, momentary presences, momentary exposures" (Sokolowski 135). Hence, it is because inner-time consciousness has the structure of retaining, intending, and protending the moments that one can have a sense of flowing time.

Husserl's analysis of the structure of inner time-consciousness as such is not only an investigation of consciousness of temporal objects *per se*, but also an account of its temporal self-manifestation. In other words, any consciousness of an object, event, experience or an act of perception manifests itself as being conscious(ness) of having these experiences and perceptions – which can be called pre-reflective self-awareness. Husserl's investigation of the structure of time-consciousness is "an analysis of the structure of the prereflective self-manifestation of our acts and experiences" (Zahavi, *Self-Awareness* 71). The essence of a perceptual act as being conscious of itself underscores the pre-reflective, that is, immediate and unthematized, dimension of any

perceptual act at each and every moment. As Richard Cobb-Stevens states, "[o]ur intentional acts are directed towards objects but the self-awareness that accompanies these acts is not objectifying" (44-45). If consciousness did not have an implicit pre-reflective awareness of itself, one would not be able to have an act of perception – simply because nothing would appear to consciousness which is not self-aware.[10]

Each and every intentional act is governed by a non-thetic self-consciousness which posits that it is implicitly aware of itself as intending. In Husserl's understanding, "[e]very act is consciousness of something, but there is also consciousness of every act. Every experience . . . is immanently 'perceived' (internal consciousness), although naturally not posited, meant (to perceive here does not mean to grasp something and to be turned towards it in an act of meaning)" (*On the Phenomenology* 130). Husserl adds that such perception of an experience itself is ultimately different from positing it as an object in reflection. Instead, Husserl painstakingly cautions that he means, by "to perceive," not objectifying the experience, but rather unthematically being conscious of it.

The structure of inner time-consciousness remains indispensable to such pre-reflective self-awareness, though. David Smith notes that "[t]he most basic form of 'self-consciousness,' in the sense that consciousness includes a consciousness-of-itself, is the form of time-consciousness" (*Husserl* 213). If it were not for one specific component of this structure, namely, retention, it would not be possible to have pre-reflective self-awareness across time. It would simply result in being unthematically self-aware in the narrow present moment and then forgetting that one was so the next moment. If experiences did not have a temporal dimension to them, they would not hold together as a sequential unity. The temporal flow that underlies all perceptions and experiences, therefore, appears to be (that which enables one to be) pre-reflectively self-aware.

Husserl's ideas on intentionality and pre-reflective self-consciousness are further taken up, appropriated, and even radicalized by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 - 1980) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 - 1961). Akin to Husserl's rendering of consciousness as pre-reflectively self-aware, Sartre dwells upon the pre-reflective nature of consciousness as such and, to a great extent, elaborates on it. He contends that all perceptual acts are

always already self-conscious. In other words, consciousness is necessarily aware of itself as experiencing and perceiving. As Dan Zahavi states, "[a]n experience does not simply exist, it exists for itself, that is, it is given for itself, and this self-givenness is not simply a quality added to the experience, a mere varnish, but on the contrary constitutes the very mode of being of the experience" ("Thinking" 274). In this respect, experiences are given to consciousness which is non-thetically, that is pre-reflectively, aware of such first-personal givenness of these experiences, or simply of experiencing itself.

Perceptual acts and experiences are "fully experienced by us, and understood in a tacit and incipient way [and] we do not objectively know them as such" (Jopling 122). Such first-personal givenness of experiences involves an implicit reference to an awareness of the self that has the experience simply because experience is given to the experiencer in an immediate way and conceived instantaneously as one's own experience, i.e., as *mine*. Experiencing itself necessarily entails an implicit yet inevitable self-reference. Sartre argues in *Being and Nothingness* that "the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge" (lii). Sartre, therefore, considers self-awareness as the condition of possibility for any conscious act to occur.

Similarly, Merleau-Ponty regards pre-reflective self-awareness as integral to any perceptual act but emphasizes the contemporaneity of self-consciousness and the revelation of the world through perceptual acts. According to Merleau-Ponty, "[t]he consciousness of the world is not *based* on self-consciousness: they are strictly contemporary. There is a world for me because I am not unaware of myself; and I am not concealed from myself because I have a world" (347). In other words, Merleau-Ponty finds concurrent consciousness of the external world and (pre-reflective) self-consciousness so as to emphasize the firm relationship between the self and its situatedness in the world. Merleau-Ponty's idea of contemporaneity of intentional consciousness and self-consciousness is a further step ahead that of Sartre's conception. Sartre assigns an essential and fundamental role to pre-reflective self-awareness without which, he argues, consciousness of an external thing would not be possible whereas Merleau-Ponty renders them reciprocal and contemporary without privileging one over the other. Martin Dillon writes that "[t]he presencing of a phenomenon requires a

distantiation, a space between the here of perception and the there of the phenomenon; and there has to be an awareness, albeit tacit, of the here for the there to appear as such" (103). Every perception, or act of consciousness, is accompanied by self-consciousness, and simultaneously makes one aware of oneself because s/he perceives, or is conscious of something external. As Merleau-Ponty contends, "[a]ll thought of something is at the same time self-consciousness, failing which it could have no object. At the root of all our experiences and all our reflections, we find, then, a being which immediately recognizes itself, because it is its knowledge both of itself and of all things . . ." (432). This implicit pre-reflective self-awareness, thus, constitutes an essential feature of the conscious self. In effect, the self recognizes itself in an unthematic way as situated in the world through which it is both aware of itself and of the world.

Sartre illustrates such implicit self-awareness by providing an example where he finds inevitable the subject's awareness of itself in experiencing or perceiving an object as follows: "This [self-consciousness] is a necessary condition, for if my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious – which is absurd" (*Being* lii). Indeed, Sartre's attitude towards the unconscious is pretty dismissive considering the stress he places on the significance of self-awareness in founding any experience; he simply deems absurd the consciousness of an experience of which consciousness is not aware. In other words, if one is not to be aware of having conscious acts which are first-personally given, s/he cannot know whether s/he is having any act of consciousness, either.

It should be noted that Sartre originally uses the phrase "*conscience (de) soi*" in French which is verbatim translated as "consciousness of oneself." However, Sartre deplores the inadequacy of language in conveying the nature of such tacit self-awareness and admits the French grammatical necessity of using "de," i.e. "of" which makes the impression as if consciousness takes itself as its *object* or as if consciousness's awareness of itself is the same as its awareness of an object in the external world. Hazel Barnes states that "[e]very intending act is positionally aware of the object it posits and nonpositionally aware of itself as awareness. Sartre distinguishes the two by putting the

second ‘of’ in parentheses: Consciousness of an object is also consciousness (of) itself” (18-19). Put differently, so as to avoid falling into such a pitfall of characterizing self-consciousness as similar to object consciousness, Sartre places “de” in parentheses to refrain from giving the impression that consciousness’s relation to itself is similar to its relation to objects. Nonetheless, English translation as “self-consciousness,” in effect, gives the meaning proper as intended by Sartre, and annuls any potential subject-object relation to be formed.

In addition, similar to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre contends that “[c]onsciousness of self is not dual” (*Being* lii) in that it does not take itself as its object to reflect upon. Instead, there is “an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself” (*Being* liii). In other words, the self has an immediacy to itself which is non-thetic and non-reflective. It is this pre-reflective awareness of the self which allows one to have implicitly self-aware acts of consciousness. Furthermore, “this spontaneous consciousness of my perception is constitutive of my perceptive consciousness” (Sartre, *Being* liii). Therefore, such immediate (pre-reflective) awareness forms an essential component of one’s perceptive consciousness in that perception of an external object would not be possible without an awareness of one’s act of perceiving.

The relation between consciousness and its being conscious of itself is, by nature, different from the one between the knowing subject and the known object in that everything in the external world is given, or rather appears, to one’s consciousness perspectivally, namely, from a certain angle. Nevertheless, the self is not perceived in such object-intentionality. As Michael Kelly remarks, “[p]re-reflective self-awareness resists subjugation to the object-intentionality model of knowing that can only reflectively grasp the subject as an object” (117). In this regard, every perception of an object in the external world occurs as *mine*, as happening to *me* and as *my* experience – which forms the positional (perspectival) intentional consciousness. Consciousness intends and posits its object from a specific angle or locale by virtue of its distance or closeness to its object. However, on the other hand, the self does not perceive itself from a different external perspective. Leo Fretz notes that “[a]s consciousness of an object, [consciousness] is a *positional* consciousness, while as consciousness of itself it is *nonpositional*” (74). The self is the very point of view on the world and cannot be

aware of itself from a detached point of view as it does an external object. Thus, although experiencing self cannot simultaneously experience itself as it does an external event or object – which is positional, its perceiving act entails a non-positional consciousness of the perceiving self: "[e]very positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself" (Sartre, *Being* liii).

It is, therefore, evident that the characterization of the self as pre-reflectively self-conscious is an essential component of self-recognition, self-understanding, and self-evaluation. It is because, for both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is pre-reflectively self-aware that it can have intentional acts through the accumulation of which the self emerges. Moreover, by virtue of reflection which is made possible by pre-reflective self-awareness, the self can critically turn back upon itself. On reflective plane, consciousness takes itself as its object and can reflect on its previously lived experiences. Therefore, these two levels of consciousness, pre-reflective and reflective, are complementary and at the same time essential for self-conception.

Self-Understanding as a Form of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

Husserl's philosophical approach was not so welcome by his most prolific student, namely, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) who gave a new direction to phenomenology and challenged Husserl's phenomenological approach. In effect, to Heidegger, Husserl seems to have exclusively dealt with the workings of consciousness and conscious acts, that is, how consciousness intends, perceives and relates to external objects or the world in general. In addition, Heidegger even further charges modern philosophy with foregrounding subjectivist approaches by placing reflective self-awareness in the center:

> since Descartes and above all in German idealism the ontological constitution of the person, the ego, the subject, is determined by way of self-consciousness. It is not sufficient to take the concept of self-consciousness in the formal sense of reflection on the ego. Rather, it is necessary to exhibit diverse forms of the Dasein's [human being][11] self-understanding. (*Basic Problems* 174)

Indeed, given Descartes' maxim where "I am" presupposes "I think," i.e. I can reflect or think on a particular thing, Heidegger's position against modern philosophy is conceivable in that he unhesitatingly dismisses any conception of the self as that which

can be understood simply through reflection. Instead, he painstakingly argues for a more primordial self-consciousness, or rather what he calls self-understanding which can be revealed through a close-up analysis of existence and its manifold possibilities.

Heidegger's interest in the ontological problems of embodied existence led him to disregard Husserl's work which he found too subjectivist and too Cartesian. Wrathall and Dreyfus remark that "Heidegger rejected Husserl's focus on consciousness and, consequently, much of his basic phenomenological method. For Heidegger, the purpose of phenomenological description was not to discover the structures of consciousness, but to make manifest the structure of our everyday being-in-the-world" (3). In a sense, in diametrical contrast to Husserl's attempts to delineate and disclose the workings of consciousness, Heidegger tried to bring the subject back into the world and to evaluate the subject as belonging to a web of worldly relations.[12] Moreover, his critical view of Husserl also led him to charge Husserl with falling into the same fallacy of extreme subjectivism, or even solipsism, as did Descartes. Husserl's focus was particularly on the pure description of an experience as lived and conceived by consciousness. Hence, "[a]fter Husserl, phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Lévinas saw Husserlian phenomenology as the apotheosis of modern subjective philosophy, the philosophy of the *cogito*, and rebelled against it" (Moran 16). They thought that Husserl's philosophy carried strong undercurrents of Cartesian thinking with its special emphasis on the *cogito* as in Descartes' (in)famous dictum *cogito ergo sum* and thus felt the need to pave their own paths.

For Heidegger, phenomenology deals with "*being*" and "above all with the being (the experience and behavior) of man, and with the different ways . . . [of] this human experience and behavior (a matter of our relations to others, to the surrounding world, to tools and equipment, to history) . . ." (Smith and Smith 10). Human beings are always already tangled up in a world, and in order to denote the being of human beings, Heidegger coined the term Dasein – which literally means being there in German: *Da* (there) and *sein* (being). As he puts it in his magnum opus *Being and Time* (1927), "Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it" (12/32). Put differently, it has the ability to raise questions as regards its being and existence, and to

make its being an issue for itself. In this sense, Heidegger places the question of being at the heart of his philosophy which he claims has been long forgotten since the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, and revivifies it by putting forward a being, that is, Dasein so as to indicate its being as existing and situated in the world. In effect, this being can be roughly considered as the human embodied self in the world. The idea behind this concept, therefore, puts a pivotal emphasis on the human being's worldly existence and on its relations with the world. Heidegger remarks that "[t]he 'essence' ['Wesen'] of this entity lies in its 'to be' [Zu-sein]," that is, in its existence (*Being* 43/67). Given the emphasis laid on existence, a person's experiences gain meaning only through such involvement (*qua* existing) with the world, and by the same token, human beings make sense of themselves as well as their world only through being a part of such relations.

Heidegger calls the way Dasein exists ordinarily in its daily habitual relations with the world its "everydayness" or "averageness." In other words, as opposed to a distinctive special way of existing, it, just like others, is entangled in the web of the worldly relations in such a manner that its being is revealed as ordinary and average as reflected in its dealings with the world which are basically similar to those of other Daseins. According to Heidegger, this being

> should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is . . . a positive phenomenal characteristic . . . We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein '*averageness*' [*Durchschnittlichkeit*]. (*Being* 44/69)

It should be noted, though, that it is because Dasein's ordinary mode of being is its average everdayness that Heidegger draws attention to the fact that the inquiry into the question of being should start with this aspect of Dasein. As Charles Guignon duly notes, "[w]e start out from a description of ourselves as we are in the midst of our day-to-day practical affairs, prior to any split between mind and matter. Our inquiry must begin from the 'existentiell' (concrete, specific, local) sense we have of ourselves as caught up in the midst of a practical world . . ." (6). Dasein's being is marked by a fundamental average everydayness which is manifest in the routine practical affairs that it has in the world. This is inevitable since it is always already situated in the referential

totality of the world, and is mostly directed to the world in an ordinary fashion. Hence, Heidegger's ontological approach begins from existence in its most primordial manifestation, namely, its average everydayness.

As a part of his inquiry, Heidegger introduces the concept of "being-in-the-world" as one of the fundamental elements or structural features of Dasein. As he simply states, "[b]eing-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein . . ." (*Being* 58/84). This feature denotes that Dasein is always already a worldly being instead of an enclosed entity: It is one with the world. In other words, it cannot be thought of without a world where it belongs and with which it is familiar. Heidegger argues that

> [the things] stand in a functionality-totality, which is understandable only if and when something like world is unveiled for us. This led us to the concept of the world. We tried to make clear that world is nothing that occurs within the realm of the extant but belongs to the 'subject,' is something 'subjective' in the well-understood sense, so that the mode of being of the Dasein is at the same time determined by way of phenomenon of the world. We fixed being-in-the-world as the basic determination of existence. (*Basic Problems* 174)

In effect, the world appears, or rather is disclosed in the particular way of such functionality-totality which designates a web of functions and relations that make the world meaningful.

Heidegger develops his idea of Dasein within what he calls "care" (structure) which pertains to the referential functionality-totality of the world: "[T]he primordial being of Dasein itself [is] care" (*Being* 131/169). Its existence is marked by certain fundamental elements that are related to concern, care and solicitude[13] all of which are pertinent to its relations with the world and other Daseins in terms of care. David Cerbone states that "Da-sein is a being for whom things *matter*, that Dasein's everyday activity is marked by various modes of *concern* for the tasks in which it is engaged and by various modes of *solicitude* for the others whom it encounters" (*Heidegger* 57). The world always already appears *as* having a function: for instance, a table always comes forth *as* something to sit at, to write on, and a pen *as* something to write with; hence Dasein's mode of care or concern for the world. Unless one reflectively pays attention to describe, for example, a table, one never thinks of it as that which is made of timber and consists of four legs. That is, the things Dasein encounters in the world never appear as

raw material or substance because its relationship with the world is immersed in the network of functionality-totality, or referential totality.

This is also precisely why Heidegger characterizes Dasein's being as "care," that is, engaging with the world not in a cognitive or theoretical way (such as attending to the object's properties and qualities) but rather in a concerned manner, that is, in relation to one's purposes and goals. He puts stress on the indispensability of Dasein's being-in-the-world whose structure he defines as care in relation to the world: "Dasein, when understood *ontologically*, is care . . . [and] its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern" (*Being* 58/84). As an upshot of its being as care, things in the world show up in relation to Dasein's purposes: some things matter to it and hence light up while others do not. Therefore, care and being-in-the-world constitute its essence and are manifest in its engagement with the world.

Dasein's essence lies in its relations (which are characterized by care) with the world into which it is thrown. In this respect, it can be revealed to itself only as a being that exists in the world. As Dermot Moran asserts, "[h]umans are always already caught up in a world into which they find themselves thrown, which reveals itself in moods, the overall nature of which is summed up by Heidegger's notion of 'Being-in-the-world' . . ." (*Introduction* 13). For Heidegger, making sense of the surrounding world can be possible only through inhabiting that world, namely, by being and existing in the world: "[Dasein] exists fallingly as something that has been thrown" (Heidegger, *Being* 412/465). In this regard, it necessarily inhabits the world and exists as always already having a world into which it is thrown. If one were to be detached from the world in some magical way, the world would lose all its significance and meaning for him/her because everything in the world gains meaning by virtue of his/her being a part of the relations.

Timothy Clark argues that "to exist means to have, to be in, a world – *always already*. The human self is not some enclosed inner realm on the one hand facing an outer world on the other. *Dasein* is simply '*Being in the world*' . . ." (18). It always already finds itself in situations and contexts which signify something for it. Since things appear, or show forth themselves in relation to its purposes, certain things it perceives stand out

among others and seem relevant for it. As Heidegger writes, Dasein "has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world,' and falls into it concernfully. As care – that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown – this entity has been disclosed as a 'there'" (*Being* 406/458). In other words, its being is revealed as being there in the world in the mode of taking care of or attending to it in an average manner, i.e. fallingly. Thus, the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world can be disclosed in its dealings with the world framed by its care structure which indicates the sum total of the different modes of its being-in-the-world.

The analysis of Dasein's being that has been engaged with thus far is essential for working out the ways of exploring its self-understanding and the understanding of its world because "world-understanding is at the same time an *understanding-of-itself* by the Dasein . . ." (Heidegger, *Basic Problems* 175). By virtue of its existence as entangled in a web of meaningful relations, it pre-reflectively understands its world without any need to deliberate or reflect (that is, without any explicit reflective engagement on its part). Heidegger characterizes its comportment (implicated in its care structure) to the world as understanding which basically corresponds to a form of pre-reflective self- and world-awareness (proposed by Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty) and emphasizes its practical engagement with the world and others. Scot Rousse writes that "human practical identity is . . . manifest in the habits and style of our pre-reflective absorption in the world . . . This ability to deal with the world is not adequately explained in terms of a reflexive self-relation . . . [but in terms of] 'pre-reflective self-*understanding*'" (100). Indeed, Dasein already knows how to deal with and go about its world without reflective consciousness – which can be illustrated in one's daily activities such as walking, writing, reading that are performed without being *explicitly* conscious of them. In other words, it possesses the basic know-how as regards how to comport itself, and this knowledge derives simply from its being and situatedness in the world.

Heidegger contends that "this self-understanding of the everyday Dasein depends not so much on the extent and penetration of our knowledge of things as such as on the immediacy and originality of being-in-the-world" (*Basic Problems* 171). Indeed, his emphasis on the immediate knowledge of the world pertains to Dasein's pre-reflective

self-understanding. In its dealings in the world, it is fully yet pre-reflectively absorbed in its tasks and actions to be performed or completed. As Cerbone puts it, a person's "orientation toward his situation is one of understanding . . . in a thoroughly non-thematic way" (*Heidegger* 61). Dasein's orientation towards its environment, in this respect, is that of self-understanding and, consequently, of world-understanding. Therefore, its relationship with the world (including situations, events, objects) is strictly characterized by its pre-reflective awareness of itself and, more significantly, of how to comport itself towards its environment. It comports itself and projects itself upon a myriad of possibilities offered by its thrownness into the world. It need not reflectively ponder upon these possibilities; instead, it is already pre-reflectively aware of itself and its possibilities, and thereby conducts itself accordingly. Thus, its comportment towards the environment or the world in general always already embodies an implicit awareness of itself.

Embodied Consciousness as Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

Merleau-Ponty calls attention to another crucial aspect of the understanding of the self or subject, that is, embodiment which Heidegger's account of Dasein takes for granted but never elaborates on. He exclusively dwells upon the bodily aspect of perception and the self as that which is the foundational element in its interaction with the world.[14] The role embodiment plays in perception is not a *mere* aspect of it since Merleau-Ponty already envisions perception as that which cannot be realized without embodiment, thereby attributing a fundamental role to it. In other words, perception is always already bodily in essence. Similar to Heidegger's conception, phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, should aim at understanding of human being and the world through an understanding of their "existence" and "facticity" (vii). Both of these terms implicate an empirically and factically situated existence of human being in the world. As far as the relation between consciousness and embodiment is concerned, Merleau-Ponty like Heidegger systematically rejects the legacy of Cartesian dualism which characterizes the self/mind as *res cogitans* (thinking immaterial substance) and the body as *res extensa* (extended material thing). As Martin Dillon puts it, "psyche, anima, soul, spirit, ego, consciousness are worldly phenomena . . . there is no immaterial, invisible, immutable soul substance or *res cogitans* temporarily resident in the body and

animating it . . .” (102). Instead, the self is always already embodied, and thus it is impossible to make a mind-body distinction.

In developing his theory of embodied consciousness or self, Merleau-Ponty adopted some of Husserl’s thoughts on the body and built upon them as he developed his own approach to consciousness. According to Moran, “[d]rawing on Husserl’s investigation of the manner in which consciousness is both enabled and inhibited by its corporeality, Merleau-Ponty explored the relation of consciousness to the body, arguing for the need to replace these categories with an account of embodied human being in the world” (13). In a sense, he tried to overcome such dualism between mind and body by asserting that human beings are basically embodied beings and make sense of their environment through their bodies. His ontological approach makes clear that “organisms, conscious or not, just by being alive, are already woven into their environments . . .” (Carman, *Merleau-Ponty* 132). The embodied self is in a sort of primordial bond with the world which, in effect, emanates from its *de facto* existence and facticity in the world. Wrathall and Dreyfus state that Merleau-Ponty “extended Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world to a study of our bodily experience of the world in perception” (3). Therefore, he amalgamated and furthered the ideas proposed by Husserl and Heidegger and brought a new perspective by emphasizing the necessity of embodiment in the self’s inextricable relations with the world and others.

The body is the indispensable component in the realization of perceptual acts. As Taylor Carman points out, “my body constitutes my perspective on the world, and a perspective *on* the world cannot be understood as an object merely occurring *in* the world. . . . my relation to my body is structurally unlike my relation to anything else to which it affords me perceptual access” (*Merleau-Ponty* 102). Perception is brought about by virtue of its inextricable entanglement with the body which constitutes a fundamental component of the perceiving self. Unlike any other object in the external world, writes Merleau-Ponty, “my body is constantly perceived . . . [and] does not leave me” (103). In other words, my body is always already with me, and I am my body. The body as the zero point is that which constitutes my perspective on the whole world. As regards the relevance of the body in perception of the world, Husserl states that the body is “the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, out of which

the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses" (*Ideas* II 61/56). However, unlike Husserl's conception as such, for Merleau-Ponty, the body "is not a thing I identify myself with only by recognizing it as the bearer of my sensations; it is a permanent primordial horizon of all my experience" (Carman, "The Body" 214). In this respect, one is almost always aware of his/her embodied nature as the reference point of the acts of perception, not simply as the receiver of sensory stimuli.

Similar to Heidegger's self-understanding which is subtended by a pre-reflective attunement to the world, such awareness in daily routine is not characterized by an explicit self-awareness. Instead, one is pre-cognitively and pre-reflectively aware of one's bodily existence in relation to his/her possibilities and accordingly projects or comports him/herself towards them. In Merleau-Ponty's understanding, "there is an immediate equivalence between the orientation of the visual field and the awareness of one's own body as the potentiality of that field . . ." (239). Such implicit and non-thetic awareness of one's possibilities (such as the acts of moving, grasping, walking, etc.) in the world is viable through one's embodied being-in-the-world. Therefore, such embodied existence as characterized by Merleau-Ponty, similar to Heidegger's conceptualization of self-understanding, points to pre-reflective, or even unreflective awareness of bodily existence and possibilities of the self in the world.

Moreover, the body's anticipation of the possibilities of experience and self-accommodation accordingly constitutes what Merleau-Ponty terms "the body schema" (55, 239, 270-74). The body schema "is an organizing structure contained in one's body that presents one with a unified understanding of one's body, which is experienced as a unified whole . . . [It] moreover provides one with a pre-reflective, immediate knowledge of the position of one's body parts" (Brey 50-51). Shaun Gallagher conceptualizes the body schema as "a system of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring" (24). Taking into account the attunement of the body to the world, Taylor Carman emphasizes the harmonious relationship between the body and the world which is enabled by the body schema. The body schema "is the notion of an integrated set of skills poised and ready to anticipate and incorporate a world prior to the application of concepts and the formation of thoughts and judgments. This kind of embodied poise or readiness . . . consists in a kind

of noncognitive, preconceptual 'motor intentionality'" (Carman "The Body" 219). Put differently, the body schema is the very structure that renders possible the pre-reflective engagement with one's own surroundings and the world in general.

In most of our daily activities, the body schema enables one to handle things without the need to think out the ways of performing a particular task. According to Merleau-Ponty, "[i]n perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, we are given over to the object and we merge into this body which is better informed than we are about the world, and about the motives we have and the means at our disposal for synthesizing it" (277). In other words, before one even attempts to reflectively focus on a movement, or an action, step by step, the body schema allows him/her to comport him/herself without paying a reflective attention to the action or movement in question. This is because if one tries to carry out an action by thinking out each step of it (such as trying to figure out how the fingers move during typing at the computer), one will fail to type as fluently as one would in unthematized pre-reflective manner.

The bodily existence opens the self to a whole perceptual field toward which it has a bodily orientation that allows it to engage with the world through its bodily movements and capacity without positing its own body reflectively. That is, the self, as an embodied being, has an understanding of the world through the medium of its body – which enables it to immediately respond to and actively participate in the world. By virtue of the body schema that involves a wide range of bodily skills and orientation, the embodied self is able to go about the world as it normally does with putting almost no thought to it. The body schema "means that my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not . . . a *spatiality of position*, but a *spatiality of situation*" (Merleau-Ponty 114-15). The embodied human being is polarized toward the world in terms of the tasks, projects, situations, etc. Such orientation invites the body to act upon the world, and the understanding of such invitation of the world *per se* demonstrates the implicit awareness (as opposed to Gallagher's rendition of the body schema as having no awareness) of the possibilities of the body. Therefore, the body's anticipation of the possibilities opened up in the world as well as self-accommodation in accordance with such possibilities form the basis of the body schema.

Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of the body schema as such shares a common basis with Heidegger's idea of Dasein's "understanding" in that the latter indicates Dasein's know-how about the world and about how it, as an embodied being in the world, comports itself towards the world. Nevertheless, there prevails a slight difference between the two in terms of their different foci: Heidegger's "understanding" is oriented more towards the world (especially the ready-to-hand entities of which Dasein has an implicit understanding as regards how to use and engage with them) than Merleau-Ponty's notion of "the body schema" whose focus is on the body and its relation with the world. In Merleau-Ponty's formulation, the body schema is, in a sense, "the anchoring of the active body in an object, the situation of the body in face of its tasks" (115). Even in simplest tasks like "holding my pipe in my closed hand," there is no discursive arrangement or preparation of the body so as to bring about the action or movement (Merleau-Ponty 115). In this sense, there is a spontaneous bodily configuration in relation to the object in question – which is pre-reflective and non-cognitive and thus is enabled by the body schema.

Similar to Dasein's comportment of itself to the (possibilities in the) world in Heidegger's thought, the body (or bodily existence) for Merleau-Ponty already accommodates itself to the surrounding world and features the (different) possibilities of the external world: "[M]an is . . . a subject destined to the world" (xii). As a bodily subject, the self perceives the world through its body whose sense of spatio-temporality allows it to pre-reflectively and unthematically adapt to, or rather understand, the things, situations, and the world in general – which echoes Heidegger's idea of "understanding" of Dasein.[15] As Daniel Primozic asserts, "our conscious existence . . . is rooted in a pre-conscious, pre-reflective *motility* – the body-subject" (18). Characterized by a pre-cognitive awareness of bodily existence situated in the world, the body-subject possesses the know-how of conducting itself in its environment. Therefore, one forms an indivisible relationship with the world so much so that one need not thematically reflect on how to comport itself in the world.

Considering the insights provided by Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, it is possible to state that Merleau-Ponty's thought fills in the gaps left by the previous phenomenologists. On the one hand, Husserl's conception of pre-reflective self-

awareness along with that of Sartre is more focused on consciousness and on how it is at the same time self-consciousness (with the latter of which Merleau-Ponty, too, concurs). On the other hand, Heidegger proposes a very different conception or entity, that is, Dasein and deals with its ontological existence without allotting enough space to the discussion of embodiment. In this regard, the exploration of the insights of these major phenomenologists makes it possible to conceptualize their ideas regarding the issues of pre-reflective self-awareness and self-understanding and, in the case of Merleau-Ponty, the essentiality of embodiment in our taken-for-granted perceptions by consciousness. However, the conception of the self further needs to take into account the role of others because the world into which the self is thrown and in which the self makes sense of itself is fundamentally an intersubjective world which the self necessarily shares with others. Therefore, one needs to account for the presence of others in order to fully understand what it means to be a self. Others disclose themselves at the heart of the self and in how the self comes to perceive as well as understand itself. In this respect, the analysis of the self in its various dimensions (average everydayness, heightened self-consciousness, ethical self in the face of others and identity formation through others) would remain incomplete without an in-depth analysis of self-other relations.

Situated Self and Average Everyday They-Self

The positions of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger conceive of the self as embodied and situated among others in the intersubjective world. Merleau-Ponty, for instance, sets out to critique the alleged problem of other minds by assigning a pivotal role to embodiment in the perception of others. The bodily nature of the self holds, for him, the center stage for any understanding or conception of a human being in that embodiment constitutes the core of a human being or Dasein as being-in-the-world. The fundamentality of the body – not as conceived in Cartesianism but rather as, what Husserl calls, *Leib* (the living or lived body) and what Merleau-Ponty calls apparently with Husserl in mind, *le corps propre* (the living body, the lived body, or the body proper)[16] – appears to be the key element in both being a self and being able to encounter other human beings. The conception of a disembodied self as the only possible premise beyond doubt which culminates in Descartes' "Sixth Meditation" has

haunted modern philosophy since its inception. Descartes' dualistic approach to the mind and the body[17] seems to be the fracture point where the problem of other minds ever arose in all its fullness in the history of philosophy. The problem of other minds is, as Lawrence Hass puts it, "a distinctly *modern* philosophical problem, forged in the fires of Descartes' Second Meditation" (102).[18] Such Cartesian dualism conceives of the body as material and separable from the mind (immaterial substance) – the latter of which might exist independently of its body. This conception, therefore, inevitably led to the irreconcilable incongruity between the immaterial interiority (the mind) and the material externality (the body). As a consequence of this incongruity originates the metaphysical problem of how such interiority (the mind) is able to know or perceive others whose exteriority is sensible while their interiority remains inaccessible.[19]

Similar to Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger finds modern philosophy too obsessed with the subject-object dualisms and accordingly with the bifurcation between the self and the world/others. For this reason, he attempts "to outgrow the tradition of subjectivity begun by Descartes. This tradition has [grounded] all meaning in the activity of an individual transcendental subject, with only a derivative place for the public world . . ." (Dreyfus "The Priority" 121). Unlike such subjectivist approaches, he takes for granted the world and the existence of others without any recourse to constitutional analyses, that is, without any attempt to trace the existence of the world and others to a subject who constitutes them. On the contrary, as Moran says, "Heidegger wanted to employ phenomenology as the proper mode of access to the phenomena of concrete human life, factical life . . . a way of thinking about human nature that remained faithful to the *historical, lived*, practical nature of human experience" (*Introduction* 227-28). Therefore, Heidegger simply situates the human being, or more appropriately Dasein, in the public or intersubjective world as practically dealing with it and going about its own business in it. [20]

Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger's discontentment with the traditional modern philosophy – which is disposed to understand the question of existence in terms of knowing, viz. epistemology[21] – emanates from the tradition's context-free examination of beings and entities in isolation. One example, for Heidegger, would be Husserl's rigorous multi-layered examination of the self's relation to others. Heidegger disapproves of Husserl's

emphatic approach based on pairing through the proximity of bodies and bodily behaviors between the ego and the alter ego (thus the other)[22] because of Husserl's context-free examination which is stripped from all its background significance. Such attempts assume that "I [the self/ego] am a *worldless* being which somehow has to get outside of itself in order to find the world [and others]" (Large 40, emphasis added). Hence, while the philosophical tradition takes its cue solely from the subject, Heidegger chooses to situate Dasein as always already embedded in a public world.

In the face of the tradition, and especially unlike Husserl, Heidegger's approach to the problem of others minds significantly deviates from the mainstream. According to Harrison Hall, "Heidegger seems to have gotten the other minds problem backwards – taking it as obvious that we are in the midst of an intersubjective or 'public' world and struggling with the question of how (in some sense) we come to know ourselves (given intersubjectivity, how to find an 'I' or individuate myself)" (247). This is subversion as well as reversal of the epistemological problem of other minds which, for Heidegger, can arise only on the basis of traditional ontology that interprets human beings as mere entities in the world. Such ontology must be simply, in Heidegger's words, "destroyed" [Destruktion] (a precedent of Derrida's *déconstruction*) and supplanted by an investigation into the being of Dasein (*Being* 20-27/41-49). In other words, Heidegger simply finds such epistemic issues misguided.

His confrontation with such skepticism issues forth from his criticism that the traditional philosophy equates Dasein's being[23] with that (being) of entities in the world. Put differently, Dasein is taken to be simply another object or entity in the world. Such epistemic problems can arise only if one takes it as a mere *res extensa* (extended thing) to be epistemologically investigated – which is a distorted way of looking at its being. This is because "ontology precedes epistemology" (Polt 80) – which entails the reversal of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* into *sum* and only then *cogito*. As Heidegger puts it, "[i]f the '*cogito sum*' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic [investigation] of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The '*sum*' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that 'I am in a world'" (*Being* 211/254). In other words, existence comes before knowing or thinking, unlike Descartes' formulation.[24]

Therefore, Heidegger "shift[s] the focus of the epistemological tradition away from [the] conception of the human being as an unmoving point of view upon the world" (Mulhall 39). Therefore, as Mulhall further states, Heidegger attempts to change the traditional rendition of the human being as an isolated spectator trying to get in touch with the external reality because "exclusive reliance upon the image of the spectator has seriously distorted philosophers' characterization of human existence in the world" (39).

Similarly, Merleau-Ponty extends such problematization of the tradition to the objective sciences and considers problematic the understanding of the body by the objective sciences, or what he calls "the objective thought" (*la pensée objective*)[25] so as to demonstrate the failure of the objective sciences to account for the bodily lived experience. Julian Kiverstein writes that "[o]bjective thought is Merleau-Ponty's term for philosophical views that take reality to be composed of objects with determinate properties that enter into regular, law-like causal relations" (46). The objective disinterested perspectives of the objective sciences are conducive to the perpetuation of the body as a purely material thing (almost to the extent of inertness) and as operating through a mere mechanical relation of causation between nerves and stimuli. Merleau-Ponty contends that the objective definition of an object holds that it "exists *partes extra partes*" and "consequently it acknowledges between its parts, or between itself and other objects only external and mechanical relationships . . ." (84). Accordingly, for him, the conception of the body as yet another mere object as such will necessarily "translate the functioning of the body into the language of the *in-itself* and discover, beneath behavior, the linear dependence of stimulus and receptor . . ." (84). However, this is an unacceptable position in that the body does not function through a web of purely mechanical processes. Rather, it has an extreme complexity which cannot be mapped out into the objective third-person perspective because the objective approach can do nothing but fail to account for the experiences as they are lived and conceived in the living body (Merleau-Ponty 87).[26] The body is not simply a passive bearer or receiver of sensations and stimuli; on the very contrary, it constitutes the horizon of any possible experience to be given. That is, the body is the active agent that is the condition of the possibility for comporting oneself towards the world and others. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty finds such objective dissection of the body and experiences to be

"merely the abstract schema of the perceptual event" which does away with the latter's lived nature (408).

Moreover, the objective thought – "whose traditional task consists, precisely, of the reduction of experience to simple formulas; that is, the establishment of formulas about the causal undirectionality of the given phenomena" (Flores-Gonzalez 189) – fails to illuminate how the external reality is experienced. As Heidegger's account has incontestably shown earlier, the everyday world shows up in certain ways and appears meaningful, or simply matter in relation to human beings, and the world is necessarily organized around the embodied beings[27] in relation to their projects and daily engagement with the world. In addition, one does not make sense of the world in terms of objective spatiality and distances. Rather, as Charles Taylor puts it, the world is unfolded from and towards the embodied being in terms of its being "far," "near," "out of reach," etc., not in terms of there being extensionally five meters in-between one's own body and a particular object in the world; therefore, a being can only make sense of the world as such if it is "an agent with the particular bodily capacities that humans have" (319).[28] Put differently, the world does not turn up as a sum of objects with their distinct properties and qualities as conceived by the objective thought.

The objective thought's rendition of the relation between our embodied nature and the world leaves much to be desired where phenomenology gains an utmost relevance with its distinctive emphasis on the priority and significance of the "*pre-objective*" (Merleau-Ponty 92) everyday experience of our bodily being-in-the-world. Therefore, the objective thought can be said to dissect the pre-objective experiences and then dissolve them into parts, qualities, properties, etc. through an objective investigation from a purely disinterested point of view – as a consequence of which it loses sight of the *lived-ness* of experiences and perceptions.

This is the reason why Merleau-Ponty rejects any such objective conception by offering a theory of embodiment which does not fall into the trap of dualism and which deems the body, not a separable addendum to the mind, but rather, the key factor which opens the self to the world and, more significantly, to others. Taylor Carman notes that, for Merleau-Ponty, "[t]he intentional constitution of the body is not the product of a

cognitive process whose steps we might trace back to the founding acts of a pure I. Rather, the body in its perceptual capacity just *is* the I in its most primordial aspect" ("The Body" 224). In other words, instead of envisioning consciousness as residing in the body just like a thing in a box, Merleau-Ponty finds it to be always already embodied without any distinction of inside and outside. One does not dwell *behind* or *inside* one's body but rather inheres *in* and *all over* one's body. Merleau-Ponty writes that

> [w]e must conceive the perspectives and the point of view as our insertion into the world-as-an-individual, and perception, no longer as a constitution of the true object [by the pure mind], but as our [bodily] inherence in things. . . . If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty. (408-09)

Embodiment has such an essential role in existence that "in the absence of [the body] there would be no other things for [perception]" (Merleau-Ponty 409). Put another way, the self, unlike Husserl's transcendental ego to which he ascribes a constituting role, does not constitute the world through its mere ability to do so; on the contrary, the self can only make sense of itself by virtue of its bodily inherence in itself and the world. It is the embodiment *per se* that opens up the possibility of perception in the first place, and the self exists in the world only by means of its bodily nature. In this respect, consciousness does not simply possess its body as an object, but rather it *is* the body itself: "we are our body" and "the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception" (Merleau-Ponty 239).

The conception of consciousness as inhering in the body dissolves the long-established mind-body dualism. Existence in and through the body in the world forms the basis of a theory of embodied *co-existence* as a (dis)solution to/of the problem of other minds. As Merleau-Ponty states, it "has to be conceived, no longer as a constituting consciousness and, as it were, a pure being-for-itself, but as a perceptual consciousness, as the subject of a pattern of behavior, as being-in-the-world or existence, for only thus can another [person] appear at the top of this phenomenal body . . ." (409). In a sense, the body seems to be the common denominator between the self and others that bind them together and make co-existence possible in the first place.

The bodily existence, far from having an explicit awareness of itself, has "a general existence" to the extent of anonymity (Merleau-Ponty 251). Perception, always already embodied in its essence and enabled by the body itself, occurs "in an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously" (Merleau-Ponty 250). The bodily perception and sensation, therefore, has a "prepersonal" dimension to it by virtue of its "sensibility" or its ability/nature to sense/feel. This prepersonal existence is possible through "a kind of bodily substratum more basic than our experience of ourselves as individuated subjects" (Carman, *Merleau-Ponty* 142-43). According to Merleau-Ponty, this is what opens up the self to the world and others because the self is geared towards and only makes sense of the world through its bodily general existence: "So, if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that *one* perceives in me, and not that I perceive" (250). Sensations, which are part and parcel of bodily perception, are lived in a prepersonal manner because any sensation ultimately refers back to a bodily existence by virtue of which sensations are possible without any need for a heightened bodily self-awareness. As a case in point, Merleau-Ponty argues that having a visual field is "to say that by reason of my [bodily] position I have access to and an opening upon a system of being, visible beings, that these are at the disposal of my gaze *in virtue of a kind of primordial contract and through a gift of nature, with no effort made on my part; from which it follows that vision is prepersonal*" (251, emphasis added). The self *qua* its embodied nature experiences sensations and perceptions prepersonally because the embodied self is, first and most of all, a sensible and, more importantly, sensitive being by essence – which does not necessitate a highly personal awareness that attends to sensations as occurring specifically to the self. Alia Al-Saji writes that sensation is "the communication and synchronization of the 'senses' within my body, and of my body with the sensible world . . ." (113). In this sense, any embodied being that has the bodily capacities of sensibility is, by default, attuned to the sensible world and, for this reason, sensation occurs at the intersection of the bodily existence and the sensible world. All of this interaction is necessarily realized on the prepersonal anonymous level. As Merleau-Ponty states, "I can see blue because I am *sensitive* to colors" (250). This sensitivity has nothing to do with a specific personal awareness; on the contrary, as he further remarks, "I experience the sensation as a modality of a general existence, one already destined for a physical world and which

runs through me without my being the cause of it . . . I am not myself wholly in these operations, they [sensations] remain marginal" (251). Although sensations remain marginal, they "would not occur unless my body were in some way adapted to [them]" (Merleau-Ponty 250). In other words, the living body is, to a great extent, anonymously attuned to the world.

If the bodily existence has such anonymity at its core, then it is this anonymity which renders co-existence possible because the perspectives of the self and others converge by virtue of such anonymous existence common to all. The self and others do not possess different and mutually exclusive private worlds within their own perspectives; rather, each and every one of them is intentionally directed to the same shared world where they are "outrun by their world" and "consequently may well be outrun by each other" (Merleau-Ponty 411). Moreover, the convergence of the perspectives of the self and others is possible only insofar as they are inextricably situated in one and the same intersubjective world: "In reality, the other is not shut up inside my perspective of the world, because this perspective [of mine] itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other's, and because both are brought together in one single world in which we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception" (Merleau-Ponty 411). That is, one's perception or experience of the world is not like a clash of private and mutually closed perceiving subjectivities; instead, as anonymous participants, the subjects experience the world as a terrain intersubjectively accessible to all who fundamentally co-exist. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty argues for a relation or connection between the self and others because they are intentionally directed towards the same world. More significantly, he emphasizes this connection between the self and others because they, through their anonymity, engage with the world in like manners – all over the bodies of whom, as will be seen in Heidegger's account, similar and corresponding intentions and behaviors can be seen as written.

In his characterization of the subject, Heidegger takes for granted his/her embodied existence as projecting him/herself towards the intersubjectively shared world along with others and sees it as an *a priori* feature of existence.[29] Taking his cue from such rendition of existence as essentially embodied and situated, he offers a threefold perspective into "being-in-the-world" which cannot be broken down into separate

components but rather should be considered as a whole. Although Heidegger engages with each of them separately, he lays stress on their interrelatedness and inextricability on the whole. The tripartite structural division includes "in-the-world," "Being-in," and the "who" of the being (average everyday Dasein) (*Being* 53/78-79). The first structural constituent, that is, "in-the-world" denotes the referential totality and the web of significances in which Dasein is inextricably ensnared. As Michael Inwood states, "Dasein and the world are not two distinct entities that can vary independently of each other. They are complementary" (37). The world never shows up in its pure materiality bereft of any relevance for Dasein. The world turns up in such a manner that it always already matters to Dasein and that the latter is always already implicitly aware of the relations in the world *qua* its understanding.

The second constituent, "Being-in," does not indicate any spatial relation, in the traditional sense, between one spatially extended thing and another like water in glass or dress in closet (*Being* 54/54). It is that, too. However, before any such objective characterization, it denotes Dasein's absorption in its world. As Hubert Dreyfus puts it, "*Being-in* (with a hyphen) is essentially distinguished from *being in* because Dasein takes a stand on itself *by way of being occupied with things*. Being-in as being involved is definitive of Dasein" (*Being-in-the-World* 43). Heidegger argues that the word "in" of being-in "is derived from '*innan*' – 'to reside,' '*habitare*,' 'to dwell' [sich auf halten]. '*An*' [of *innan*] signifies 'I am accustomed,' 'I am familiar with,' 'I look after something'" (*Being* 55/80). Thus, Heidegger does not take being-in as indicative of "insideness" (*Being* 57/82) or "a spatial "in-one-another-ness" of things present-at-hand [objectively present]" (*Being* 54/80). On the contrary, it indicates Dasein's inevitable involvement with the world.

The third component, that is, the "who" of Dasein as being-in-the-world, constitutes the core of its relation to others. Hubert Dreyfus remarks that "the 'who' of Dasein . . . cannot be understood as a substantial 'I,' with certain content in its consciousness. Dasein is not a thing with properties or a self-contained field of consciousness, but *a way of being*, and so it must understand itself in terms of what it does" ("The Priority" 123, emphasis added). Indeed, the answer to the who lies in unearthing what kind of a way of being it is. Dreyfus further notes that "Dasein, as a way of being, which is

concerned about its own being, has specific concerns only because it has always already understood itself in terms of its occupations: the roles, goals, and equipment available to it in society" ("The Priority" 123). In this respect, the question of the who situates it within the framework of the web of significances that enable it, in the first place, to understand itself in terms of the possible roles and relations opened up by this referential totality. It understands itself only amidst and through referential significations which are normatively structured by others. For example, its self-understanding as a professor is only possible and makes sense because there are students to teach. If there were no schools, universities, or classes, being a teacher would not have the same meaning as it does. Therefore, Dasein in its everydayness finds itself enmeshed in the referential totality of the public world which is not only shared with but also dominated by others.

Heidegger introduces two accompanying structural elements in relation to being-in-the-world so as to elaborate further on Dasein's relation to others: "being-with" (*Mitsein*) and the impersonal mode of existence, namely, "the they" (*das Man*) – which are "equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, *Being* 114/149). These two elements reveal it in its everydayness and averageness dictated by others – which might be called "the 'subject' of everydayness – the '*they*' [das Man]" (*Being* 114/150). The self finds its basis in the mode of average everyday existence which indicates the pervasiveness of others and ultimately explains the who of Dasein.

Heidegger brings into discussion Dasein's being-in-the-world as being-with so as to elucidate its primordial relationship with others who prominently play a significant role in the ontological constitution of its average everydayness.[30] Being-with designates "the communal dimension of Being-in-the-world" (Polt 60). Heidegger argues that a subject without a world is impossible to conceive because being-in-the-world already reveals Dasein's intertwinement with the world and entities. Likewise, it is impossible to imagine the self without others: "In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated 'I' without Others is just as far from being proximally given" (Heidegger, *Being* 117/152). Indeed, for Heidegger, a self without others is as much

inconceivable as a self without a world. However, the being of others that are encountered in the world should be made distinct from that of entities.

The being of entities is revealed primarily as ready-to-hand and useful (through their function and usability in the web of referential totality) and only derivatively (by paying attention to their objective qualities) as objectively present (present-at-hand) in one's dealings in the world. However, this is not the case in one's encounters with others. In Heidegger's understanding, "the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein of Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (*Being* 119/154). The being of others is completely at variance with that of tools and things because they do not show up as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand but rather as beings that have the kind of being of Dasein. In Søren Overgaard's words, "the other is by no means encountered as a thing," rather "I . . . encounter, not a some*thing*, but a some*one* who is 'with me' in the world" (134). That is, others are fundamentally disclosed *as* Dasein-like beings who are also in the world as circumspectly being-in-the-world. As Heidegger emphatically elaborates, "[t]hese entities [others] are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are *like* the very Dasein which frees them, in that *they are there too, and there with it*" (*Being* 119/154). In this manner, the encounter with others reveals them to have the kind of being of Dasein to whom they are manifest.

Dasein as being-in dwells in and circumspectly inhabits the very world which it, as being-with, shares with others who have the characteristics of "being-there" and "being-with." With an emphasis on the existential character of "with" and "there," Heidegger postulates that "[b]y reason of this *with-like* [*mithaften*] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. . . . Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is *Dasein-with* [*Mitdasein*]" (*Being* 119/155). In this regard, he proposes the notion of a world which is primordially intersubjective as characterized by the existential nature of Dasein and others as being-with. Lauren Freeman critically emphasizes the fact that "human beings are ontologically inseparable from the complex social interactions in which they engage and *Mitsein* is a structural, constitutive, and therefore, ontological condition for the possibility of being-with-others and existing in the world. Dasein only exists in the world as *Mitsein*" (374). Heidegger does not introduce any rift at this level

between Dasein (self) and others because the world is disclosed to them as the one in which they *are* together by virtue of their "circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world" (*Being* 119/154). According to William Large, "[t]he 'I' and the 'Other' are not two things opposed to one another. Quite the contrary, I am with others precisely because we do not stand apart from one another. I am with others because we share the same concern with the world" (54). Such conception of Dasein as a primordially embodied being absorbed in the world *with* others annuls the possibility of any problem regarding the existence of others to arise because, in doing so, Heidegger envisions, what some critics call, "*a priori* intersubjectivity" (Zahavi, "Beyond Empathy" 154) or "*trans-subjective* intersubjectivity" (Coelho and Figueiredo 199) by assigning "being-with" an existential status.

The existential structural element, being-with, permeates Dasein's being to such a degree that the factical objective presence of others is not even required to underpin it. As Hubert Dreyfus forcefully puts it, "[b]eing-with would still be a structure of my Daseining if all other Daseins had been wiped out" because being-with is what in the first place "makes possible all encountering of particular others" (*Being-in-the-world* 149). Indeed, its character as essentially being-with does not presuppose the existence of others so that being-with could be grounded in others' objective presence for it to be established. On the contrary, being-with is an existential feature, in its own right, of Dasein "even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived" (Heidegger, *Being* 121/156). Being-with is not that which comes into being with the appearance of another person as objectively present. Dan Zahavi points out that "*Dasein* does not initially exist alone, and does not first acquire its being-with the moment another turns up. On the contrary, qua its engaged being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is essentially social from the very start" ("Beyond Empathy" 154). In effect, it is able to encounter others strictly because it is existentially being-with from the very outset.

Dasein's being-with-one-another or being-with others along with its circumspect absorption in taking care of entities points in the direction of its similarity with others in its projection towards the world. Its fundamental existence as being-with situates it amidst others without differentiating it from others. Rather, it is inevitably always already lost among others in its everyday existence. It understands itself as one among

many (others) like whom it goes about its own business in the world by circumspectly taking care of things. For Heidegger, "one's basic experience of other persons is *not* that they are present, self-subsistent beings whose minds are hidden, but rather that they are *engaged*, accessible beings who share the same instruments and gathering places and function much like oneself" (Schroeder 130). As being-with, Dasein understands others as those who are themselves absorbed in the same world they share together and in the same things they deal with. That is to say, it is "concernfully" (Heidegger, *Being* 406/458) in the world the way any other Dasein is, sharing similar concerns, dealings, etc. For this very reason, there is, for the most part, no distinct self or I present in Dasein's everyday being. According to Heidegger,

> [i]n utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others,' in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. (*Being* 127/164)

Indeed, in using the newspaper or watching the news on TV to find out about the current events, Dasein is just like any other. In this sense, the way it relates to the world does not differentiate it from others; rather, it reveals it to be just like any other. Therefore, the way it deals with and handles its world is normatively structured and guided by the tyranny of (impersonal) others to such a degree that it relates to its world in the very way others do. As Heidegger writes, "Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* [*Botmassigkeit*] to Others. It itself *is* not; its Being has been taken away by the Others" (*Being* 127/164). The domination of others over Dasein is observed mostly in everyday social contexts where "we usually act . . . following the guidelines of (and keeping within the limits of) formal and informal social norms and conventions" and where "we are basically concerned with the conformity or nonconformity of our actions" (Schmid 177).

Indeed, Dasein is troubled by a "constant care as to the way one differs from them [others]" (Heidegger, *Being* 127/163). The constant care it existentially has as a part of its being-with might involve eliminating the differences between oneself and others, trying to catch up with them in the light of these differences or simply suppressing them. Heidegger calls such uneasiness on Dasein's part regarding its care or concern

about the distance between itself and others "distantiality" [*Abstandigkeit*] (*Being* 127/164). Additionally, this ever-present concern about the distance can take the opposite turn by overemphasizing (instead of eliminating) the difference between oneself and others in order to avoid conformity at all costs. However, this gesture would also count as an example of distantiality, which dictates the way one lives. In such an attempt, as Stephen Mulhall clarifies, one merely distinguishes oneself from others, this time, by "allowing others to determine (*by negation*) the way [one] live[s]" and thus measures oneself against others again (67, emphasis added). In this regard, Dasein's being-with-one-another existentially harbors this constant care about its distance (either through conformity or nonconformity) to others who determine the ways of its being in the world.

Nevertheless, these others who prescribe average way of being are not an aggregate of specific individuals who are pitted against Dasein. According to Heidegger's formulation, "[t]hese Others, moreover, are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power" (*Being* 127/164). Dasein in its everyday being-with-one-other always already surrenders to the tyranny of anonymous others by complying with their ways of being, and thereby loses itself to what Heidegger calls "the they" (*das Man*).[31] "The they" indicate "the anonymous, normative character of everydayness" which instructs Dasein in its everyday dealings with the world (Cerbone, *Heidegger* 50). Dasein in its heedful absorption in the world is not revealed to be a distinct self; instead, by virtue of its understanding itself via the normative structure of the world, it dissolves into the being of "the they." As Heidegger contends, "[t]he who is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the they* [*das Man*]" (*Being* 127/164). Hence, "the they" characterize Dasein's everyday mode of being-in-the-world and dictate its possible ways of acting, doing, handling, etc. Put differently, the pervasiveness of "the they" inconspicuously lurks behind every move it makes and every act it undertakes.

The translation of *das Man* as "the One" is linguistically more telling than "the they" in that the influence of *das Man* can be more clearly seen in the daily expressions such as "This is what *one* does and/or what *one* says in this or that situation." For instance, one simply presents one's condolences in the event of a death – because this is what one does. Fundamentally invaded by "the they," Dasein acts and speaks like others, and no matter what he does, he does it in the very way one simply does. Søren Overgaard argues that "[i]n everyday life we are essentially under the rule of convention to such a degree that we *are* 'one,' we *are* conventional – whether we choose to do what 'one' prescribes, or rebel against it. Convention has always already understood and interpreted everything for us in its own 'mediocre' way . . ." (18). Dasein's being as such is, therefore, dissolved into that of the anonymous "they" who normatively shape every dimension of its being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, "[w]e take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* [*man*] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge . . ." (*Being* 127/164). Such examples can be further illustrated. For example, "in selecting my clothes, I take care not to look unfashionable – I consult my own sense of style and propriety. But this sense of style is really not 'my own.' It is simply how *one* dresses, how *they* dress in my community – and I *am* the 'they'" (Polt 62). In this sense, Dasein's conduct in every aspect of its life is to a great extent based on "the they." However, these average ways of its bearing are not determined by some specific groups or individuals. Instead, they are normatively structured by anyone and everyone at the same time (including Dasein itself through its reiteration of the ways of "the they"), and it is not possible to trace these norms back to a Husserlian meaning-giving (transcendental) individual.[32] Hence, the influence of *das Man* permeates Dasein's everyday mode of being inconspicuously because, in its everydayness, it always already accepts the prescriptions of "the they" almost unawares.

Dasein as being-with has, as the foregoing discussion has showed, a constant care as regards the distance it has in relation to "the they," and, having already fallen to the trap of "the they," it conforms to the ways of being prescribed by "the they." Such distance-removal creates averageness in the way Dasein exists – which helps maintain the everyday order it is entangled with. As David Cerbone nicely formulates,

> [d]riven by an inordinate concern with how it 'measures up' in relation to others . . . Dasein tends in everydayness towards a kind of 'averageness' . . . We have, in everydayness, surrendered our existence to the tyranny of *das Man* [the they], allowing it to determine and evaluate the shape of our lives. By 'toeing the line' and 'going with the flow,' we fail to give proper heed to our own capacities for self-determination. (*Understanding* 57)

In effect, "the they" introduce an average way of doing anything and everything, thereby making it easier for Dasein to seamlessly go with the flow. Moreover, every such possible way of being that deviates from this averageness is inevitably "level[ed] down" (Heidegger, *Being* 128/165). The three concepts brought up in connection with "the they" (distantiality, averageness, and levelling down) insidiously encroach upon Dasein's being in such a manner that "the they" deprive, or rather disburden it of its responsibility in its everydayness. This is because its choices, decisions and judgments are already made for it by "the they" and it in its averageness simply abides by them. As a consequence of the hold of "the they" over Dasein, as Stephen Mulhall remarks, the latter "understand[s] both its world and itself in the [average] terms that 'they' make available to it . . ." (68). "The they" seize upon it to such an extent that "[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself. The '*they*,' which supplies the answer to the question of the '*who*' of everyday Dasein, is the '*nobody*' to whom every Dasein has always surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other [Untereinandersein]" (Heidegger, *Being* 129/165-66).

"The they" signify Dasein's everyday manner of being as not only being a part of it but also contributing to the perpetuation of its dominance. "The they" hold sway over every dimension of Dasein's life and helps maintain the so-called *status quo* as regards its dealings in the world both with entities and others. As Coelho and Figueiredo remark, Dasein is launched into the world without any choice and leads its life "under the control of the impersonal, *das Man* [which] is a field of possibilities that establishes and delimits the conditions of our experience and the horizon of our actions" (200). Without such prescribed (social or otherwise) manners – of which Dasein has always an implicit understanding by virtue of its "understanding" – it would not be able to move about the world the way it normally does. However, it cannot be restricted to merely social dimension: in technical terms, how to use, for instance, a hammer or drive a car is also dictated by "the they." In this respect, the positive function of "the they" lies in its

formation of the basis of intelligibility. As a result of a surrender to "the they," "we share a world that is structured and articulated by the patterns of significance that are taken for granted" (Greaves 56). There are proper uses regarding entities and appropriate manners (of speaking as well as acting) regarding comportment – all of which make the normatively structured world possible in the first place.

In Heidegger's understanding, "Dasein is for the sake of the 'they' in an everyday manner, and the 'they' itself Articulates the referential context of significance" (*Being* 130/167). Indeed, it is through the web of significances embodied by "the they" that Dasein is able to comport itself to the world. As Tom Greaves states, "[w]orldly significance is articulated . . . first and foremost by everyone. It is through this shared articulation of what is going on around us and what the circumstances are, that we are able to tackle the world" (56). Without such normative structuring, the proper working of the whole (especially social) life would be disrupted: "[i]f there were not generally accepted ways to use tools, to eat, to build houses, and – most important – to use sounds as language, there would be no society and no understanding" (Dreyfus, "The Priority" 124). Dasein partakes mostly unawares in the continuation of this regularization and standardization by simply going along with it and reiterating the ways of "the they." This is what everyone does and, for this very reason, one is interchangeable with any other and thus is no different from others.

Dasein as existentially being-with is itself a part of others without any separation: "[b]y 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too" (Heidegger, *Being* 119/154). As such, it is revealed to be not itself, but rather any one or any other. As H.B. Schmid mentions, "[epitomizing] the sphere of social normativity . . . [the they] leaves *Dasein* no chance to *be itself*. Whether *Dasein* conventionally sticks to the norms, or purposively breaks them, it always does what *one* does" (157). In Heidegger's terms, "[t]he Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self* . . ." (*Being* 130/167). The subject as the they-self, has always already been disseminated into the ways of "the they" where s/he loses its grasp on his/her own self as well as his/her own possibilities. The they-self "is a self in which one is absorbed into others. Belonging to the 'One' [the they] Dasein in itself is not

being itself. It is as part of this anonymous One that we all generally understand ourselves, our opinions, our expectations, our requirements" (Greaves 54). In a similar vein, as Heidegger emphatically puts it, the they-self indicates that "[p]roximally Dasein is 'they,' and for the most part it remains so" (*Being* 130/167). The self, therefore, understands itself strictly in relation to others. Lauren Freeman states that "selfhood presupposes a relational structure. . . . I am and can only be(come) a self within the ontic-ontological context of others" (368). "The they" shape the way one relates to the world which places him/her in a position subject to the ways of "the they." Others not only "condition one's concerns and aims . . . [but also] *constitute the self.* Most of us live an impersonal, unindividuated existence governed by the Crowd [the they]" (Schroeder 130). "The they" as such eclipse the self's contiguity with itself by making it a they-self. Nevertheless, as Heidegger cautions, its being as they-self "signifies no lessening of Dasein's facticity . . . On the contrary, in this kind of Being, Dasein is an *ens realissimum* [the most real being], if by 'Reality' we understand a Being with the character of Dasein" (*Being* 129/166). Its being in its everydayness is its most real being: this is the way everyday self *is* in the first place. Moreover, "*[t]he they is an existentiale*; *and as a primordial phenomenon it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*" (Heidegger, *Being* 130/167). Therefore, existentially, Heidegger renders the subject as initially and for the most part lost in and among "the they."

Given Heidegger's account as such, Merleau-Ponty, in his characterization of co-existence to the extent of anonymity or generality, seems more heedful than Heidegger whose concept of "the they" reduces Dasein to being a member of a mass of undifferentiated Daseins. Merleau-Ponty maintains that "although I am outrun on all sides by my own acts, and submerged in generality, the fact remains that I am the one by whom they are experienced . . ." (417). It is indeed impossible to completely erase the differentiation between the self and others. If one is committed to the notion of the anonymous existence of all, s/he runs the risk of losing the grip on the alterity of others. On the other hand, if one foregrounds the singular and private subjectivity, s/he comes across the insurmountable problem of other minds. Put another way, if one takes the self to be a constituting subject, the other will always be an object for the self; hence there will be no plurality of consciousnesses. Conversely, if one exclusively relies on the

anonymity or generality of existence, then the other's alterity is eliminated. Therefore, both ways of looking at the matter in question would fail on their own.

Instead, Merleau-Ponty suggests a midway between these two extremes. He not only concedes that the anonymity of the bodily existence is, to a certain extent, undeniable (with which Heidegger's position can be aligned) but also emphasizes the fact that experiences are unmistakably lived from the first-person perspective. Both of these aspects of existence as anonymous and at the same time first-personal contribute to the experience of others and the preservation of their alterity. In other words, on the one hand, the anonymous existence subtended by the general body schema opens the self towards the world and others and enables the link between embodied consciousnesses to be established. On the other hand, such connection is still experienced from the first-person perspective – which helps preserve the alterity of others and brings about the plurality of consciousnesses (whose ways of comportment in the world are similar) without reducing them to the sameness. The self as a consequence of the generality of its existence can easily understand the other's similar ways of belonging to the world. In this sense, as Merleau-Ponty states, "the behavior of another, and even his words, are not that other" (415). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty does not draw a sharp line between the anonymous existence and the first-person perspective of the self; rather, he proposes that human beings are different embodied beings dealing with or going about their business in the world in similar ways.

Nevertheless, Heidegger's account is more comprehensive in its treatment of the various interactions between the self and others. In addition, it provides an account of the self as situated in a public and intersubjective world from the very beginning where, as Lauren Freeman notes, "others help to constitute an essential part of who we are, who we were, and who we can become" (370). By virtue of the referential context provided by "the they," Dasein can relate to its possible ways of being. However, such projection towards one's possibilities provided by others necessitates a kind of pre-reflective understanding to seize upon and comport oneself to the possibilities of various ways of being. Although Heidegger refuses to name this sort of understanding explicitly as pre-reflective self-awareness which underlines the first-personal givenness of experiences emphasized by Merleau-Ponty, it is clear that the way Dasein comports itself to its

possibilities requires an implicit understanding of the web of relations that open up the possibilities to Dasein in the first place.

However, while the accounts offered by Heidegger and, to some extent, Merleau-Ponty shed light on the self's everyday existence where it is anonymous and lost for the most part, their treatment fall short of accounting for the possible concrete encounters between the self and others. Heidegger mostly elaborates on how others anonymously benumb the self and thus fails to explore another dimension of everyday existence, namely, the face-to-face encounters with others. On the other hand, despite his emphasis on the alterity of others, Merleau-Ponty's account does not elaborate on the concrete encounters. In this respect, *a priori* intersubjectivity proposed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty should be significantly substantiated by a consideration of such individual encounters. Such lack of engagement with concrete encounters between the self and others might be complemented by Sartre's ideas on the self-other relations which offer some crucial insights into the intersubjective encounters through which heightened self-consciousness arises and the self acquires an identity.

Concrete Encounters and Heightened Self-Consciousness Through Others

The inquiry Sartre makes into the traditional problem of other minds decidedly differs from the heretofore analyses of the perception of others. The traditional epistemological approaches to this problem are generally underpinned and, more importantly, motivated by the fundamental question of how the self comes to *know* others, or formulated differently, of how the self knows that there are other minds than its own. Since the other's mind or consciousness is not forthwith accessible to the self – a point Husserl clearly emphasized in arguing that if it were the case, the other would be simply identical to the self and would not be other – the traditional explanations attempt to demonstrate the existence of other minds through an argument or reasoning by analogy. The argument by analogy postulates the existence of others through behavioral similarities between the perceiver and the perceived, arriving at the conclusion that the other's consciousness is posited or inferred insofar as their behaviors are similar to those of the self (Detmer 95, Warnock 64-65). The crucial objection Sartre makes to the traditional approaches is that they are mostly epistemological in nature in that they take

the other as an object of knowledge. The traditional theories hold that "my fundamental connection with the other is realized through *knowledge*" (Sartre, *Being* 233) and "the problem of Others has generally been treated as if the primary relation by which the Other is discovered is object-ness; that is, as if the Other were first revealed – directly or indirectly – to our perception" (*Being* 253). In such approaches, the other arises as something to be known (object) by the knower (subject). William Schroeder states that "the effort to know objectifies what it addresses, but to objectify Others is to conceal their subjectivity" (185). For Sartre, the traditional analyses fail to capture the very essence of others, that is, their subjectivity by capturing only the other-as-object: "everything happens as if I wished to get hold of a man who runs away and leaves only his coat in my hands. It is the coat, it is the outer shell which I possess" (Sartre, *Being* 393). Instead, Sartre argues for an experience of the other-as-subject who is revealed in his/her look (*le regard*) that enables one to immediately experience the other's subjectivity without any recourse to engaging in any objectification of the other.

Similar to his rejection of the traditional approaches, Sartre also mounts a fervent critique of the theories of his two major phenomenologist predecessors, namely, Husserl and Heidegger. Much as Sartre happens to share the common point of the other's alterity with Husserl (and also Lévinas), he still posits that Husserl, nevertheless, falls short of jettisoning the epistemological dualism of the knower and the known: "[T]he only connection which [Husserl] has been able to establish between my being and that of the Other is a connection of *knowledge*" (*Being* 235). Moreover, Sartre, unlike Husserl, does not set out with a positing of a distinct self which derives from itself an alter ego; instead, as Gail Lisenbard notes, for Sartre, "our sense of self comes from outside, from the world, from others" (46) – which is an inversion of the Cartesian introspection to find oneself by looking inward. As Sartre puts it as early as in *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936), the ego is not "*in* consciousness: it is outside, *in the world*. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another" (31).

Likewise, Sartre also critiques Heidegger's dissolution of the problem of other minds as a pseudo-problem in philosophy that has been engaged with for centuries on. As previously discussed, in order to demonstrate how the problem of other minds is in fact not a genuine problem, Heidegger introduces the concept of "being-with" (*Mitsein*) as

one of the fundamental structures of Dasein as existing with others, or other Daseins. In contrast to Husserl's analyses, those of Heidegger are not so much underpinned by epistemological concerns as ontological ones since being-with is an ontological condition of possibility for Dasein to be or exist. For Sartre, "Heidegger's being-with . . . is not *knowledge*" but rather "the mute existence in common of one member of the crew with his fellows" (*Being* 246-47). In other words, Dasein, for Heidegger, is always already being-in-the-world-with-others which evinces that it need not know others because others are already implicated in its being through co-existence. However, Sartre is critical of Heidegger's ontologically essential concept of being-with in a rather playful manner by arguing that if the other's existence "still appears to us in the form of a necessity, yet it does not belong . . . with ontological necessity. If the Other's existence is a necessity, it is a 'contingent necessity' . . ." (*Being* 250). Thus, contrary to Heidegger's bestowal of an ontological status on being-with, Sartre dismisses it, as Dan Zahavi remarks, as "a contingent and factual feature that only shows up in and through concrete encounters with others" ("Beyond Empathy" 157).

For Sartre, Heidegger's conceptualization of "the they" removes the distinction among particular individuals by lumping them together which eradicates the radical alterity of others. According to Sartre, as Gail Lisenbard puts it, ". . . the basic ontological fact with which we are confronted is not the [Heideggerian] 'we,' it is the 'you and the me'" (65-66). Therefore, even though Heidegger's being-with explains Dasein's inextricable relations with others and accounts for how its being is ontologically pervaded by others from the beginning, it fails to shed light on the concrete encounters between particular individuals. In effect, Heidegger's fundamental ontology, as Lauren Freeman concedes, "leaves us with too formal an account of relationality" (369) to take into consideration the particularities of the self-other encounters, and hence his account overgeneralizes the possible Dasein-to-Dasein relations.[33]

Sartre's solution to the problem of other minds is an improvement built upon his previous remarks pertaining to self-awareness. For Sartre, self-consciousness necessarily entails one's awareness of the other because one is always already aware of oneself as visible to and potentially being seen by others. As Mary Warnock mentions,

> at one and the same time as I am aware of myself, I necessarily become aware that other people exist and are observing me. If I were not aware of this fact I should be only partially conscious of myself. I might be conscious of my plans and thoughts, but I could not be conscious of myself – of my body – putting these plans and thoughts into practice. Awareness of myself as acting is identical with awareness of myself as an object – that is, as a possible or actual object of perception to another person. Thus our knowledge that other people exist, and are conscious, is part and parcel of our own awareness of ourselves. (65)

In other words, self-awareness simultaneously involves one's visibility by others. In this sense, what sets Sartre apart from his predecessors is the fact that he does not ask how one knows others but instead questions the fundamental relation between the self and others. Moreover, he seeks this fundamental relation not in a subject-object dualism of knowledge but, to the very contrary, in the bond that holds them in relation to each other, that is, the look or gaze of the other which the self experiences as a part of its being in the world and which ultimately objectifies the self. Hence, Sartre's rendition proposes a reversal of the long-established subject-object dualism by turning the self into an object through the other-as-subject. Dan Zahavi points out that "foreign subjectivity is revealed to me through my awareness of myself qua being-an-object for another. It is when I experience my own objectivity (for and before a foreign subject), that I have experiential evidence for the presence of an other-as-subject" ("Beyond Empathy" 158). Hence, it is only insofar as one lives through such self-objectification through others that one can experience the other-as-subject.

In daily relations, one experiences the other both as a subject and also as an object. Sartre argues that the other's object-ness for the self is only "one of the modalities of the Other's presence to me," but not the fundamental relation s/he has to the self (*Being* 253). However, Sartre does not dismiss the Other's object-ness simply in favor of his/her subjectivity; instead, by explaining it, he paves the way for his analysis of the perception of the other's subjectivity. The perception of the other as an object entails a disintegration in one's perceptual field because the perceived other – even if s/he be the object of perception just like any entity in the world – is a different kind of entity that is unmistakably unlike any other object one perceives. Indeed, the perception of the other reveals him/her to be a mere object in the perceptual field of the perceiver. However, the other's presence – still as an object in the self's perceptual field – fundamentally transforms the present situation by bringing in a new point of view on the world other

than that of the perceiver. The other does not merely show up as yet another object among others but rather as, what Sartre calls somewhat equivocally, “a presence in person” (*Being* 253). In an attempt to explicate how this “presence in person” operates on a perceptual level, Sartre introduces his famous example of a man in the park and elaborates on how the other’s presence as an object in one’s perceptual field disturbs one’s hold on the world.

The perception of a man in a public park who is looking at the lawn reveals him as a perceptual object for the perceiver at first glance. However, this object is not another instance of a mere entity; instead, the man appears as an object that *perceives*, and thereby emerges as another point of view on the world which, as Sartre emphasizes, brings about “a fixed sliding of the whole universe, . . . a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting” (*Being* 255). In other words, when one apprehends the man as looking at the grass, trees, benches in the park, one “see[s] him as encountering, and as organizing differently in his world, some of the same objects that I am simultaneously encountering and organizing in mine. . . . In this sense the Other steals the universe from me” (Detmer 93). The lawn that previously unfolded from the perceiver is no longer revealed in relation to him/her; on the contrary, it organizes itself around the other that introduces his perspective in a disruptive manner. In this respect, “one is momentarily deposed: an alternative center challenges one’s hegemony” (Schroeder 181). The other as a new point of view on the world becomes the center of reference and imposes his/her own distances and relations to the objects around. As Sartre argues,

> this new relation of the object-man to the object-lawn has a particular character; it is simultaneously given to me as a whole, since it is there in the world as an object which I can know . . . and at the same time it entirely escapes me. . . . To the extent that the relation *reaches towards him* it escapes me. I cannot put myself at the center of it. (*Being* 254-55)

The other shatters one’s organization of the objects which were previously revealed in relation to the self and thereby introduces a “drain hole in the middle of [the world’s] being” or “a little particular crack in my universe” through which one’s world “is perpetually flowing off” (Sartre, *Being* 256). Nonetheless, the disturbance of one’s organization of the world upon the intrusion of the other is quickly recuperated and set

on track. This is possible because this appearance of the other in one's world still operates on the level of the other's object-ness and his/her objective relations with the world – which is not the primary relation between the self and others. As Mary Warnock notes, "[s]o far [the other] still appears as an object for me, though of a unique and evasive kind. But the key to the peculiar relation between myself and the Other is that I am an object for him. He can look at me" (76). The appearance of the other-as-object disturbs one's grip on the world, yet still it is not enough to totally displace one's supremacy over the way the world unfolds from the self. Hence, the other-as-object remains to be, what Joseph Catalano calls, "a secondary and, in a sense, *a degraded awareness of him as subject*" (165).

For Sartre, a more fundamental relation inheres between the self and others which can be located only in the possibility of being seen by others – which reveals the other not as an object but rather as a subject. Sartre contends that "[i]t is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject" (*Being* 256). In other words, it is only through the possibility of being an object for the other that one can experience the other's subjectivity. Thus, as Sartre emphasizes, the other's subjectivity is revealed in relation to the self-objectification motivated by the other because "I can not be an object for an object" (*Being* 257). In a sense, if one can feel objectified at all, it must be inevitably for a subject. Moreover, Sartre's argument posits that the attempts to have knowledge of the other necessarily turns the other into an object of knowledge and, as a consequence, fails to grasp the other in his/her subjectivity. Instead, the core of the other's subjectivity lies in his/her power to turn the self into an object – only through which one can apprehend or experience, if not know, the other-as-subject. As Sartre emphatically puts it, "[b]eing-seen-by-the-Other is the *truth* of 'seeing-the-Other'" (*Being* 257). Indeed, the self always runs the ever-present risk of being seen by the other, and the look of the other is the very thing that reveals his/her subjectivity.

The look of the other embodies "a pure reference to myself" (Sartre, *Being* 259) and as such the other pinpoints the self under his/her gaze. However, the look does not necessarily come from any determinate form of concrete physical eyes; instead, it can be manifest in as many forms as the rustling of branches, hearing of footsteps, the

movement of a curtain, etc.[34] Sartre writes that in the apprehension of the look one is implicated immediately as the point of direction of the gaze:

> What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not that *there is someone there*; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I can not in any case escape from the space in which I am without defense – in short, that I am *seen*. Thus the look is first an intermediary which refers from me to myself. (*Being* 259)

In other words, the look of the other resituates the self in relation to itself: a transformation from a pure subjectivity absorbed and lost in its activity into the self-as-object for the other-as-subject. Thus, even though one could recuperate one's disintegrated universe and internal hemorrhaging which is caused by the other's presence as an object in one's world, such hemorrhaging, with the emergence of the other-as-subject, "is not contained at all: the Other's field of experience engulfs one's own" (Reisman 84). In this sense, one loses one's control over his/her appropriation of the world insofar as the other undercuts one's grip on the world with his/her look – which reveals to the self that it is no longer at the center of the world. In effect, one starts to be aware of his/her objective embodied being. According to David Detmer, when one apprehends or experiences the look, one "obtain[s] a powerful and direct intuition both of my own embodied objectivity (my consciousness is revealed to be not only a pure point of view on the world, but also an object within it) and of the other's consciousness" (92). Therefore, consciousness which was previously absorbed in its engagement with the world in an active manner is now transformed into an object and consequently revealed as an embodied being seen by the other.

The difference Sartre's analysis of others makes *contra* the traditional epistemic approaches lies in his locating the revelation of the other-as-subject in affectivity as opposed to knowledge. As a case in point, Sartre considers the example of the affective transformation of the self that is spotted by the other while looking through the keyhole so as to explicate the nature of the intermediacy of the look that brings about the objectification of the self and at the same time reveals the other's subjectivity. Sartre's example (which can be dubbed as the voyeur example) briefly reads as follows: suppose that somebody, moved by extreme jealousy, curiosity or simply vice, looks through a keyhole to see what happens in the room behind the door and subsequently hears

footsteps in the hallway (*Being* 259). In this example, this person is alone and pre-reflectively self-conscious – which means that s/he is fully absorbed in his/her activity and that there is no distinct reflective self that inhabits his/her consciousness. As a being-for-itself (that is, absorbed in the world), this consciousness organizes the instrumental-complex – what Sartre calls "ensemble" (*Being* 259) akin to the Heideggerian referential totality – of the things in relation to itself, or more appropriately to its project of seeing the other side of the door. In order to realize his/her project of finding out what is going on behind the door, the person in question instrumentally utilizes (or comports him/herself to the world in Heideggerian diction) the door as a means of surreptitiously watching the spectacle inside the room without being seen.

At such absorbed moments, the voyeur does not take any reflective stance towards him/herself. S/he is simply absorbed in observing, that is, his/her project. Sartre argues that "[n]o transcending view comes to confer upon my acts the character of a *given* on which a judgment can be brought to bear. My consciousness sticks to my acts, it *is* my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to be attained and by the instruments to be employed" (*Being* 259). Hence, one does not reflect on what one is doing; instead, one simply does and flows in the lived moment. As Christine Daigle puts it, "[t]he voyeur who is looking through the keyhole is his deed. At this moment, his whole world is composed of himself and whatever it is that he sees in the room on the other side of the door" (74). In a sense, as being-in-the-world, one organizes the whole situation in relation to one's means and ends and, conversely, the whole situation and its meaning are spontaneously created in relation to the self engaged in activity. This entire instance happens on the pre-reflective level of consciousness fully absorbed in its engagement with the world.

However, as Sartre maintains, if one suddenly hears footsteps in the hall while being fully engrossed in eavesdropping or looking through the keyhole, one is affectively transformed: "Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being . . . I now exist as *myself* for my unreflective consciousness. It is this irruption of the self which has been most often described: I see *myself* because *somebody* sees me[35] – as it is usually expressed" (*Being* 260). Such

affective transformation one undergoes in hearing footsteps upsets the whole situation which was previously organized in relation to the self and of which the self was fully in command. The possibility of being seen at this moment objectifies the person and reveals him/her to him/herself on the pre-reflective level which has been hitherto inhabited by an impersonal consciousness fully engaged and lost in its activity.

This experience of being spotted in the act is disorienting to the extent that all the relations one establishes with regards to his/her projects are interrupted and one's mastery of the instrumental-complex as handled in relation to oneself is obliterated. As William Schroeder mentions, the original project of the self "loses its impetus; the world no longer offers a set of possible options. He now exists in a different mode: mere objectivity" (184). In other words, one is revealed, by virtue of being seen, as spatially located in the hall of a specific building and temporally at a specific time of the day. The door appears no longer as an instrument to be wielded for seeing through. Instead, for the other, the self as an object is now simply next to the door, in the hallway, bent down on his/her knees, in the afternoon of this specific day. The distances now unfold from the other and the self becomes a mere object in the other's perceptual field. The other overtakes the whole situation and recasts the ensemble (of the instrumental-complex) in relation to him/herself and introduces his/her own possibilities by annulling those of the self. In Sartre's understanding,

> [t]he Other is the hidden death of my possibilities in so far as I live that death as hidden in the midst of the world. The connection between my possibility and the instrument is no more than between two instruments [i.e. objects] which are adjusted to each other outside in view of an end which escapes me. *Both* the obscurity of the dark corner and my possibility of hiding there are surpassed by the Other when, before I have been able to make a move to take refuge there, he throws the light on the corner. Thus in the shock which seizes me when I apprehend the Other's look, this happens – that suddenly I experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities, which are now associated with objects of the world, far from me in the midst of the world. (*Being* 264-65)

The moment one is seen or one apprehends the other's look, all his/her possibilities of appropriating the instrumental-complex are dead and, more significantly, overridden by those of the other. As Mary Warnock simply puts it, "[f]or [the Other] I have no possibilities of my own making" (78). Hence, the pure subjectivity of consciousness is forced to encounter its own exteriority as an object in the world through the other.

Nevertheless, the most significant transformation that the experience of the other-as-subject brings about is the *affective* nature of this objectification of the self – which reveals a prominent aspect of one's subjectivity, that is, one's being-for-others. In the earlier example of the man in the park mentioned above, one sees another center emerging and overtaking one's own possibilities; however, one's disintegrated universe could be easily recuperated by inserting one's own possibilities – simply because this another center of the other was still an object for the observer/the self. Yet, with the advent of the other-as-subject that sees the self, the internal hemorrhaging of the self's being toward the other is unstoppable because the other-as-subject makes an object out of the self by seeing and spotting him/her in the activity and thereby revealing his/her being-for-others. In this respect, the self's being-for-itself (as lived in his/her being absorbed in activity) is radically metamorphosed into a being-for-others. For Sartre, these transformations are lived most prominently through certain feelings and emotions such as shame and pride which are unable to be aroused on their own. Instead, they arise *only* insofar as they are lived and experienced in the presence of others.

The transformation of the self from a subject into an object in the voyeur example is an affective transformation that invokes the feeling of shame. Being seen by the other, the self comes to discover itself as a voyeur and thereby recognizes itself in shame. In Catalano's words, "[t]he presence of the other-as-subject rivets and engulfs my freedom and transcendence. In his own freedom, he interprets my jealousy and turns my freedom back to me as shame. I immediately experience shame; I know that at this moment I am for him nothing but a being spying through a keyhole" (161). In this sense, the self is delivered to itself as an object having the identity of a voyeur. David Reisman states that "[d]espite the fact that the object revealed to one in the Look is not an object for oneself, one still experiences it as oneself" (83). Therefore, the image of the self as a voyeur which is attributed to the self by the other is readily recognized by the self as belonging to itself.

It should be noted, though, that in the shameful recognition of the self as a voyeur, consciousness is not reflectively directed to itself so as to become an object for itself. On the very contrary, the immediate non-reflective recognition is what enables one to go through the affective transformation of such objectification of the self. The strong

affective nature of such recognition lies in its immediacy and the powerful feelings it arouses. As Sartre succinctly puts it, "[s]hame is by nature *recognition*. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me" (*Being* 222). Such immediacy rules out the possibility of "discursive" self-preparation against the objectification: "Nevertheless I *am that Ego*; I do not reject it as a strange image, but it is present to me as a self which I *am* without *knowing* it; for I discover it in shame and, in other instances, in pride. It is shame or pride which reveals to me the Other's look and myself at the end of that look" (Sartre, *Being* 261). Furthermore, such emotions as shame and pride cannot arise on their own because the self can be ashamed of itself only as "*I appear* to the Other" (*Being* 222). In other words, given Sartre's example of the voyeur, the self feels ashamed of itself before the other simply because "the other is the one that constitutes that of which I am ashamed. I am ashamed of myself, not qua elusive first-person perspective, but qua the way I appear to the other" (Zahavi, "Shame" 216). It is the other that constitutes the self as a voyeur in spotting it peeping through the keyhole and thus one experiences shame before the other's constitution of the self as a voyeur.

However, the actual physical presence of the other is not *sine qua non*; rather, "[t]he Other . . . need not actually be present, but can be surmised. Shame can be triggered by the fact that I could be observed" (Thomas 166). Likewise, as Joseph Catalano points out, "even if [the] other is not there, our experience of shame or fear has revealed ourselves as capable of being seen. Indeed, realizing that no one is now there, we may continue to relate ourselves differently to our environment because of the sudden awareness of ourselves as visible" (164). Indeed, after hearing the footsteps, one might find out that there is factually nobody around; nevertheless, one has already experienced the objectification and realized once more his/her ever-present possibility of being seen – which will continue to inform the rest of his/her current activity. The other's objectifying (absent) presence as such enables the self to acquire a being and, in simplest terms, to become somebody with an identity (e.g. voyeur, thief, professor, etc.):[36] "I, who in so far as I am my possibles, am what I am not and am not what I am – behold now I *am* somebody!" (Sartre, *Being* 263). Indeed, the self can never determine itself as this or that without the intermediacy of others. Therefore, the dimension of the

self's being-for-others fulfills a desire of the self that aims at being someone – which it cannot achieve without others.

Moreover, the objectification reveals the self's impotency in the face of the other's judgment of the self since the other is ultimately free to make of the self whatever s/he wills. The other's freedom is thus revealed in this process because the other is free to judge the self, pin down its existence and, deplorably enough, the self cannot do anything about it: "We are dealing with my being *as* it is written in and by the Other's freedom. Everything takes place as if I had a dimension of being from which I was separated by a radical nothingness; and this nothingness is the Other's freedom" (Sartre, *Being* 262). Therefore, the objectification of the self is experienced in shame because the self is not the foundation of its own being and its identity is attributed to it or founded by others.

With the objectifying appearance of the other, therefore, comes into sight a set of attributable qualities such as being evil, thief, voyeur, vulgar, ugly, handsome, bourgeois, etc. – which the self acquires through the intermediacy of the other. For Sartre, these qualities and the like are not possible on their own: "Nobody can be vulgar all alone!" (*Being* 222). Each and every quality bears a meaning attributed to the self by the other and the self has to suffer through them since the other freely confers these determinations and qualities. As David Reisman remarks, "there are determinations that come to one from others . . . . These qualities, which arise with the existence of the other, are qualities of oneself" (106). One cannot live or intuit their ugliness, or their belonging to a certain nationality on their own; on the very contrary, such attributes are experienced only by virtue of the other: "I am unable *in any way* to feel myself as a Jew or a minor or as a Pariah" because one can be a Jew or a minor *only* for the other – and "[f]or-myself I am not a professor or a waiter in a café, nor am I handsome or ugly, Jew or Aryan, spiritual, vulgar, or distinguished" (Sartre, *Being* 524, 527). Sartre names such qualities "*unrealizables*" (*Being* 527) in that no one can realize or feel these qualities on their own without the intermediacy of the other. In effect, the existence of such attributes depends on the existence of others which is a condition of their possibility to be at all.

Therefore, unlike Heidegger's argument of being-with that designates Dasein *ontologically* a social being, the self, for Sartre, is *factually* a social self. More importantly, the self "first come[s] to know about [itself] through [its] interaction with others who act like [its] mirror" (Lisenbard 48). In other words, the self comes to be a self only in relation to others. Additionally, the self happens to be not only a mere perceptual object for the other, but also an object of value judgments and appraisals that confer a certain determination on the self by branding it as this or that. The other "is free to judge me, and I am in perpetual danger of being labelled and type-cast in some role not of my choosing" (Warnock 79). However, by simply realizing that it can look back at the other and objectify him/her in the same way the other does, the self joins the perpetual fight of objectifying and being objectified in order to eliminate the danger of being reduced to an object in the eyes of the other. After all, one can try to defend him/herself against the other's objectification by transforming the other into an object. Sartre writes that

> [e]verything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations . . . [which] must therefore be envisaged within the perspective of *conflict*. (*Being* 364)

For Sartre, the nature of intersubjective relations is not that of harmony as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty envision; rather it is one of conflict. Such conflicts between the self and others, for Sartre, form the very basis on which social co-operative relations can be only subsequently established.

In order to explicate how the conflictual relations operate, he introduces two fundamental attitudes that are deployed to confront the other. According to Sartre, as Christine Daigle points out, "I may adopt one of two attitudes in my relations with him. The first one is an attempt to transcend the Other's transcendence, i.e. to deny the Other's freedom, while the second one is an attempt to incorporate it, i.e. to try to capture the freedom of the Other. Both aim at the dissolution of the Other as such" (77). Both attitudes exhibit various ramifications on which Sartre elaborates by illustrating them with some particular cases and examples. The first attitude of denying the other

his/her freedom is prompted by the fact that "he holds the secret of my being, he knows what I *am*" (Sartre, *Being* 363). The other fixes one's being (i.e. as a voyeur) by objectifying him/her – which elicits from the self a response, or rather a counter-move which finds its expression in the denial and rejection of the other's freedom. In Sartre's understanding, "in so far as I am fleeing the in-itself which I am without founding it, I can attempt to deny that being which is conferred on me from outside; that is, I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him" (*Being* 363).

On the other hand, there is another possible way to approach the situation at hand. This second attitude implies on the self's part an endeavor to appropriate and, in effect manipulate the other's freedom without eliminating the factor of freedom. Sartre writes that "in so far as the Other as freedom is the foundation of my being-in-itself, I can seek to recover that freedom and to possess it without removing from it its character as freedom" (*Being* 363). Hence, Sartre proposes two different attitudes that the self takes up in relation to others, and he cautions against any prioritization of one attitude over the other. These attitudes follow each other in circular fashion in that the second attitude immediately follows should the first one fail. These attitudes follow each other, for Sartre, *ad infinitum*. Many conflictual situations that Sartre offers as cases in point obtain inevitably in one's daily interrelations and hence can be regarded as another significant aspect of intersubjectivity. In this respect, the concrete encounters proposed by Sartre can be evaluated as complementary to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the shared social world in which the self's comportment is similar to that of others.

The Ethical Dimension of Concrete Encounters between the Self and Others

The conflictual face-to-face encounters between the self and others, which are saturated with attempts to either transcend or appropriate the other's freedom as explored by Sartre, necessarily invite ethical investigation because they raise questions regarding the nature of the deeds or actions of the self which involve or implicate others. The presence of others, which brings about heightened self-consciousness, not only elicits a critical self-introspection but also invokes the self's responsibility for others. This is

mainly because the appearance of the other simultaneously discloses the self's response-ability. In other words, the presence of the other demands a response from the self and also reveals to the self that it is *responsive*. In the concrete encounters, such responsiveness in the self finds expression in the form of being affected and transformed by others (e.g. the look of the other). However, the encounters between the self and others that invoke responsiveness might also take on an ethical turn.

The ethical dimension of the self in relation to others is explored and investigated at great length by the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (1906 - 1995). For Lévinas, the self's engagement with the world through its free appropriation and organization of the world is called into question with the appearance of the other whose alterity and, more significantly, "face" (*le visage*) immediately take a grip of the self. In Lévinas's conception, the "face" (by extension, the whole body) of the other figures as vulnerable and exposed (*Ethics and Infinity* 97). In other words, the other's proneness to suffering as expressed in the nakedness of the skin of its face is what strikes the self in a concrete face-to-face encounter. The exposure of the other's flesh to violence and affliction compels the self to take account of the other in its dealings with the world.

Moreover, the face not only reveals itself to be silent yet expressive in conveying its defenselessness, but also is authoritative in obliging the self to comply with the instructions it silently expresses. For Lévinas, what the face expresses first and foremost is the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" (*Ethics and Infinity* 89) or "[Y]ou shall not commit murder" (*Totality* 199). The other makes a call, albeit a silent one (Lévinas, "The Paradox" 169), to the self to pay heed to the commandment expressed in and through his/her face. Such authority written on the face becomes all the more compelling given the destitution and exposedness of the other because such exposure discloses the other as open and susceptible to potential abuse and harm. It is the other's vulnerability as such that renders the self powerless or impotent in the face of the other.

The other's presence readily makes the self hear the silent call of the other that issues forth from his/her face. Accordingly, the self that hears the call is revealed to be subject to the other's demands that invoke a response from the self. Similar to the Sartrean conception of the concrete self-other encounters that affectively transform the self,

Lévinas's characterization discloses the self as a being that is fundamentally affected by the presence of others in that the self with its acts and in its relations with others finds itself responsible for others. As Lévinas argues, "[r]esponsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical relationship. Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another" (*Ethics and Infinity* 96). In other words, the self in its essence is always already an ethical self which is responsibly subject to the other.

This dimension of the self as a responsible being comes to the fore most powerfully when the other appears in a destitute and vulnerable situation. This is primarily because the plight and destitution of the other arising from his/her situation not only strike the self profoundly but also compel the self to respond to the neediness and deprivation of the other and hence alleviate the other's distress. The face of the other expresses a call for mitigation – a call which the self cannot help but hear. That is, it is a call that never falls upon deaf ears and that always reaches its destination. The other's expressive face as such "paralyzes my powers and from the depths of defenceless eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and destitution" (Lévinas, *Totality* 200). Therefore, the self cannot remain indifferent to the call which renders the self not only accountable for its actions but also fundamentally response-able and responsive to the other.

As such, others hold a significant place in Lévinas's characterization of the subject as always already bound to and responsible for them. For Lévinas, the revelation of the other as well as the encounters with the other are fundamentally saturated with ethical significance: "The epiphany of the face is ethical" (*Totality* 199). In this regard, Lévinas's approach to the concrete self-other relations provides a different outlook or offers a new angle to explore the intersubjective encounters between the self and others – which can be considered as complementary to the concrete conflictual encounters explored by Sartre.

However, given their positions which account for different dimensions of the self and its relations with others, it should suffice to say that each of these philosophers focuses on different phenomena that obtain and occur in daily life – which is the gist of phenomenology (i.e. to describe phenomena as they are). Hence, as will be argued in

the following chapters, their ideas complement each other by approaching the self-other relations from various and different angles. For instance, Sartre's insistence on conflictual relations, as Merleau-Ponty argues, are possible only on the basis of social shared background and intersubjective world (414). Indeed, conflicts can arise *only* insofar as there appear clashing views with regards to the same phenomenon or only insofar as the Heideggerian average everydayness is disrupted. For the successful operation and maintenance of one's life, one needs a routine flow of engaging with the world as expressed by Heidegger – which is another aspect of one's subjectivity and which Sartre rejects to touch upon. Furthermore, Lévinas's ethically saturated insights into the self-other relations offer another perspective on the intersubjective relations by conceiving of the self as fundamentally an ethical self – which is explored by neither Heidegger nor Merleau-Ponty. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the objective is not to find the one single approach that fares better than the others and that it would be misleading to evaluate these philosophers on an equal footing mainly because they choose to focus on different aspects of subjectivity. Therefore, in the following analyses, this dissertation will draw upon the multifarious insights these philosophers provide in order to arrive at a multi-faceted examination of the self as bound with others.

Engaging with all these phenomenological insights that offer a critical lens to explore different dimensions of the self, this study examines the conception and understanding of the self not as a detached, alienated and almost solipsistic being but rather as a situated and embodied being inextricably entangled with others in the works of three canonical British modernist novelists, namely, Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* (1931), Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1900), and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier* (1915). Expanding on the various phenomenological conceptualizations of the self, it further argues that the self is not only thrown into an essentially intersubjective world but also makes sense of itself through others who figure as an integral and crucial part of being a self in the first place. With their emphasis on the subject, each of the selected novels illustrates a different aspect or dimension of the self which directly bears on its relations with others.

The first chapter analyzes Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* by closely attending to the self-other relations with a critical eye to reveal to what extent self-conception or self-understanding of the characters is imbued with others. Elaborating on the intersubjective relations and concrete encounters, this chapter further argues that the self is, for the most part, lost among others, or what Heidegger terms, "the they," in its average everyday dealings with the world to the extent of anonymity and impersonality. However, it further takes into consideration the fact that such soothing existence embodied in the they-self might be disrupted time and again resulting in heightened self-consciousness effected through the concrete encounters with others. Therefore, against the problematic rendition of the characters as free-floating consciousnesses or detached figures, this chapter situates them within a web of intersubjective relations that fundamentally mold their self-understanding.

The second chapter concentrates on the concrete face-to-face encounters between the self and others in Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* by foregrounding the ethically charged intersubjective encounters through which the self is revealed to be essentially an ethical self in the face of others. In *Lord Jim*, Conrad draws attention to the ethical dimension of the self-other relations by situating the self in the wider intersubjective context where the self has to make ethically demanding decisions with regards to others. In this respect, this chapter critically evaluates the self as that which is not only already thrown into a binding relationship with others but also, more importantly, revealed to have an irrevocable responsibility for others.

The third and final chapter is critically engaged with the self's attempts to define itself and acquire an identity through others in Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*. It argues that the self as an embodied being is thrown into the world and its thrownness as such constitutes its contingent existence. Such contingency of the self's existence urges the self to seek ways of grounding its being by fixing its identity. However, as the self realizes, its contingency can only be remedied by others who not only acknowledge the self's existence but also possess the power to validate and render necessary the self's otherwise contingent existence by attributing an identity to it. Thus, in this novel, Ford offers an account of the self who is in a perpetual struggle to ground its being through others.

All in all, building upon the insights provided by phenomenology, this study aims at scrutinizing three different dimensions or aspects of the self-other relations as explored in Woolf's *The Waves*, Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*. Each of these novels places the self in inextricable relations with others and respectively engage with the conceptions of average everyday self (they-self) and heightened self-consciousness effected through others, ethical self as response-able and responsible for others, and identity formation and self-justification through others. Therefore, this study posits that each of the selected novels offers a different configuration of the self-other relations through which the recurrent and ever-present struggle or interaction between the self and others is played out.

CHAPTER I

THE THEY-SELF AND CONCRETE ENCOUNTERS IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *THE WAVES*

"The eyes of the others our prisons; their thoughts our cages."
-Virginia Woolf, "An Unwritten Novel"

"What does one fear? - the human eye."
-Virginia Woolf, *Jacobs's Room*

"We exist not only separately but in undifferentiated blobs of matter."
-Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*

Phenomenologists focus on the self's relations with the world and, more significantly, with others – which in turn reveal the nature of the self and help understand to what extent one makes sense of oneself in the world through others. Much as these philosophers look at the matter in question from different angles, they unmistakably share one common point: the self is inevitably bound with others. For instance, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty characterize the self/Dasein respectively as lost in "the they" and as having anonymous general existence. Heidegger's conception revolves more around the social equilibrium while that of Merleau-Ponty brings to the fore the embodied nature of existence by virtue of which one is, in effect, no different from others. Hence, Heidegger's argument that "every Other is like the next" (*Being* 126/164) is valid for both of these approaches.

On the other hand, despite their fundamental disagreements and differences, both Husserl and Sartre take their cue from the *seemingly* singular existence of the self – which is by no means to say that the self can exist without its world and others as in the Cartesian *cogito*. For Sartre, the self makes sense of itself through others. One can come to see him/herself as an object with an identity *only* insofar as there are others. Sartre emphasizes the dimension of existence where one encounters particular others and at

times experiences imagined others – the latter of which is a derivative form of concrete encounters. Each of these approaches sheds light on different aspects of existence or being-in-the-world. Therefore, this chapter will argue that Virginia Woolf presents an almost all-inclusive and comprehensive approach to the understanding of the self without stripping it of its relationality and offers an account of the self as enmeshed with and mediated through others.

Furthermore, this chapter will show that the self is not only, for the most part, lost among "the they" in average everydayness where s/he makes sense of him/herself, but also s/he gains an understanding of him/herself through conflictual concrete relations with others. In addition to socially communal as well as conflictual aspects of existence, the self equiprimordially finds itself embodied, responding to and understanding others in bodily fashion. In this respect, Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* where six "voices" speak/think will also be analyzed with regard to their self-understanding through their embodiment and intersubjective relations and it will be demonstrated that these so-called "voices" are, in fact, ultimately embodied-beings-in-the-world-among-one-another.

Adeline Virginia (Stephen) Woolf (1882 - 1941) was born into the last quarter of the nineteenth century and thus spent much of her youth in the late Victorian Age and then the Edwardian era where the strictly regulated Victorian social codes as well as values still prevailed. In "A Sketch of the Past" (1939 - 1940) – which Woolf started writing as "relief from the exacting labors imposed by the writing of the biography of Roger Fry" (Schulkind 6) and which is basically an attempt to write a memoir of her life beginning from her earliest memories she could remember – Woolf deploys the present (in her late fifties) to look back at her past and early life from a vantage point so as to "make the two people, I now, I then, come out in contrast" (75). However, she is well aware of the difficulties that any memoir writer faces as well as of the inadequacy of merely reciting the things and incidents that have befallen the subject.

Instead, she argues that giving an account of a person is not so easy as traditional memoir writers and biographers would have it; rather, the person in question, whomever it is, is too "complicated" ("A Sketch" 69) to be reduced to a series of events that might

have happened to him/her and might be used as describing him/her. For Woolf, both memoir writers and biographers “leave out the person to whom things happened. . . . So they say: ‘This is what happened;’ but they do not say what the person was like to whom it happened. And the events mean very little unless we know first to whom they happened” (“A Sketch” 65). Furthermore, she remarks that “. . . people write what they call ‘lives’ of other people; that is, they collect a number of events, and leave the person to whom it happened unknown” (“A Sketch” 69). Therefore, for Woolf, traditional memoirs and biographies, and even any account that merely finds such chronicling of lives tenable enough to describe a person, ultimately fail to account for the real person to whom things happen. In other words, Woolf shifts the focus from the events themselves to the very person *to whom* such and such things happen.

In accordance with her critique of traditional descriptions of a person which leaves out the person in question, Woolf introspectively notes in her memoir that she also left out “the most important things about her,” namely, “those instincts, affections, passions, attachments . . . which bound me, I suppose, from the first moment of consciousness to other people” (“A Sketch” 79-80). Woolf’s formulation of “the most important” things as such primarily indicates her relation to and bond with others starting from her earliest conscious moments onward. This is because being or existence is primordially and essentially co-being or co-existence: “The world of Dasein is a *with-world* [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in [the world] is *Being-with* Others” (Heidegger, *Being* 119/155). In a sense, Woolf seems to be utterly sensible of as well as attentive to her existence as entangled with others.

Being-with or co-existence denotes significantly more intricate and even insidious relations with others by virtue of the referential totality which is fundamentally constituted together with others and into which each and every single person is thrown. In this regard, being-with is not simply existing *along with* others. As Merleau-Ponty states, “. . . we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world” (413). Therefore, being-with emphasizes the fact that one is born into the referential totality of significances and involvements where one *is with* others in a mutual relationship.

Such common world embodied in the referential complex points in the direction of a more relevant and important issue – that of regulatory and normative influence of others in the make-up of the ordinary everyday existence. Reiner Schürmann asserts that

> [d]aily existence is composed of running errands, performing tasks, etc. If we are essentially absorbed in our daily existence, rather than reflecting, if we primarily give attention to the way we are involved in what is *not* within us, but outside in the world, then we are perhaps most of the time not ourselves. . . . If the self is so encountered in everyday-neutrality, then existence is somehow prescribed by the others, and not by myself. (94-95)

In other words, when dealing with and comporting oneself towards the world, one can observe others' primacy all the more powerfully. According to Heidegger, "Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids – in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*" (*Being* 119/155). So, if one finds him/herself in *what* one does circumspectively in the world, one inevitably encounters others in the same world with which one is similarly *concerned*. The nature of such encounters characterized by the Heideggerian they is not so much explicit as indirect and implicit in that what one does or how one acts is regulated and influenced indirectly by "the they," that is, indefinite others. In addition, such influence of others is neither context-free nor extra-temporal; on the contrary, everyday ways of existing and being are ultimately bound to and shaped by the social, cultural, and historical context.

Heidegger writes that "[k]nowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with . . ." (*Being* 124/161) in that self-understanding of the subject necessarily has to do with being-with. This is because being-with, as an equiprimordial element of everyday being-in-the-world, permeates one's fundamental everyday relations with others in certain ways. For instance, the self, for the most part, complies with the ways of being dictated by others. In everyday existence, ontologically, the self is so inextricably absorbed in the world in a circumspective fashion that one is, as it were, not oneself, but rather "*the* '*they*' [*das Man*]" (Heidegger, *Being* 125-26/163-64). When directed towards the world and engaged in a particular action, one is always worried about to what extent one performs well in comparison with others. As Paul Gorner mentions, "[i]n a way that is normally hidden from me the One [the they] exercises a form of

dictatorship over my possibilities of being or ways of existing" (107). Such ever-present concern brings one into submission to others in that they frame what one does in accordance with their own average ways and thereby imposing, insidiously and yet soothingly, their ways. In this sense, certain ways of doing, acting, behaving, or existing in general have been bequeathed to Dasein as soon as it is born and thrown into the world. Therefore, "the they" constitute a fundamental aspect, or as Heidegger would have it "*an existentiale*" (*Being* 129/167) of Dasein's everyday existence.

Bringing up Dasein's constitution as not itself but rather as they-self seems all the more apposite considering that Virginia Woolf has a very similar understanding of the self. As mentioned earlier, when she says in "A Sketch of the Past" that she has left out "the most important thing" about herself, Woolf immediately characterizes it as that which ultimately binds her to others.[37] Woolf's experience of others as reflected in "A Sketch of the Past" exemplifies, on the one hand, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the pervasive and dominant *they* (indefinite others) and anonymous existence respectively and, on the other hand, Sartre's notion of particular encounters between the self and others (definite others). Concrete conflictual encounters in Sartre's conception inevitably rely on a common ground, that is, a shared world where one *is with* others. Merleau-Ponty argues that "[w]ith the *cogito* begins that struggle between consciousnesses . . . For the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting the alien presences which it negates, all must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence . . ." (414). Heidegger's idea of the referential totality which is constituted by "the they" provides such a shared platform where one goes about one's daily business just like others. Henceforth, as thrown into such totality, one is equiprimordially both in a shared world and *with* others.

Similar to the emphasis Heidegger places on the domination of "the they" in everyday life, Woolf writes in "A Sketch of the Past" that there are "invisible presences who after all play so important a part in every life" (80). These invisible presences involve particular individuals such as her mother Julia Stephen (1846 - 1895), siblings and step-siblings. However, there is a more powerful invisible influence beneath such particular

concrete influences, that is, a wide range of anonymous societal forces embodied by "the they." In Woolf's words,

> [t]his influence, by which I mean the consciousness of other groups impinging upon ourselves; public opinion; what other people say and think; all those magnets which attract us this way to be like that, or repel us the other and make us different from that; has never been analyzed in any of those Lives which I so much enjoy reading, or very superficially. ("A Sketch" 80)

In a sense, Woolf's conception comes close to Heidegger's rendition of "the they" because Woolf, just like Heidegger, believes that such forces ultimately frame and shape the self in its everyday life.

Furthermore, Woolf argues that if one is to get a glimpse of a person, one has no other option than inquiring into these invisible presences that socio-historically influence the person in question. Interestingly enough, Woolf's formulation of the influence others have on the self is strikingly, yet incidentally the same as that of Heidegger, in terms of diction:

> Yet it is by such invisible presences that the 'subject of this memoir' is tugged this way and that every day of his life; it is *they* that keep him in position. Consider what immense forces society brings to play upon each of us, how that society changes from decade to decade; and also from class to class; well, if we cannot analyze these invisible presences, we know very little of the subject of the memoir; and again how futile life-writing becomes. ("A Sketch" 80, emphasis added)

Since she is looking back on her past from a temporally detached vantage point, Woolf's characterization of "they" demonstrates that she becomes more and more cognizant of the forces that dictated the lives of the individuals including her own at the turn of the century.

For Madelyn Deltoff, the individuals in Woolf's fiction are "rather relatively small figures inundated by influences that exceed the self" (50). Deltoff's position is viable in that the self which is always already necessarily bound to a specific time is characterized in line with the influences or forces of their historical situatedness that overpower him/her. Therefore, when Woolf says that "I see myself as a fish in a stream; deflected; held in place; but cannot describe the stream" ("A Sketch" 80), she

emphasizes the pervasive domination of others in and over the stream which signifies the referential context of significances articulated and ordered by "the they." As Madelyn Deltoff further argues, "'[t]he consciousness of other groups,' 'public opinion,' and what contemporary scholars call discourse ('what other people say and think') are thus part of the system (the stream) surrounding the fish of the self. The stream might also be likened to the background noise of conscious living" (51). The self is necessarily thrown into this stream where "it is not 'I,' in the sense of my own Self, that 'am,' but rather the Others, whose way is that of the 'they.' In terms of the 'they,' and as the 'they,' I am 'given' proximally to 'myself' [mir 'selbst']" (Heidegger, *Being* 129/167). Hence, one is, for the most part, bound to be a fish in the stream with others where, as Heidegger intriguingly says, "[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself" (*Being* 128/165).

Mindful of the position or rather constitution of the self as inextricably situated within the matrix of the referential totality or what she calls the invisible forces, Woolf retrospectively discerned how "the they" influenced people in her closest circle in the late 1890s and the early 1900s. For instance, she presents her stepbrothers Gerald and George Duckworth (especially the latter) as the epitomes of the Victorian ideals, norms, and standards – who were not only "opaque" and "conventional" ("A Sketch" 97) but also "consenting and approving Victorians" (147). Woolf even goes so far as to say that "[l]ike a fossil he [George] had taken every crease and wrinkle of the conventions of upper middle class society between 1870 and 1900. He was made presumably of precisely the right material. He flowed into the mold without a doubt to mar the pattern" (151). Indeed, looking back thus, Woolf could see how oppressive and numbing "the they" can be.

It should be noted, though, that Woolf does not spare herself when she conveys her observations about the turn of the century as such. She was also ensnared in the web of normative involvements just like any other person and admits that "from my present distance of time I see too what we could not then see . . ." ("A Sketch" 147). As her metaphor of herself as a fish in the stream also evinces, she admits that her reviews and articles published in *Literary Supplement* in the very early twentieth century clearly bear the marks of "the they"/the stream which emanate from what Woolf calls the Victorian

"tea-table training:" "When I read my old *Literary Supplement* articles, I lay the blame for their suavity, their politeness, their sidelong approach, to my tea-table training" (150). "The they" lay down certain ways of doing, acting, behaving, etc. which are imposed on Dasein even without any awareness thereof on its part: "the they" operate insidiously and infiltrate its being. As Heidegger points out, "[i]f Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the 'they' itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lie closest" (*Being* 129/167). Therefore, as she herself concedes in relation to her early articles, Woolf's case as a fish in the stream is not different from any other.

Similar to her early articles, even Woolf's first two novels, *The Voyage Out* (1915) and *Night and Day* (1919), could not elude the grasp of the prescriptive *they*, either. Some critics such as Harvena Richter see *The Voyage Out* as a pioneering work in some respects: "[b]efore *The Voyage Out* was written, no novelist had ever tried to describe exactly how the eye-mind experiences the object, or how the body participates in this experience" (viii). Nevertheless, many critics still regard Woolf's first two novels as following the established ways of writing (as prescribed by "the they") and thereby designating them as conventional and average. Mark Hussey argues that these two novels of Woolf's have traditional plotlines and only after *The Voyage Out* and *Night and Day* could she turn to, what Hussey calls, "the world of the painter, specially the post-impressionist" (70). In a similar fashion, Andrew McNeillie contends that "[w]hatever its [*The Voyage Out's*] (great) strengths, they are not strictly formal, still less post-impressionist; and if her second novel *Night and Day* (1919) is intensely formal, its formality is more that of *an English tea-table* than of a still-life by Cézanne" (17, emphasis added). McNeillie's interpretation as "English tea-table" apparently draws upon Woolf's critique of her early work in "A Sketch of the Past," as mentioned earlier.

Indeed, Woolf's early works seem to be shaped and dictated by the instructions enforced by "the they" which, in a sense, stifled her own voice. However, this had been the case only until she started to experiment with her writing after *Night and Day*. Henceforth, Woolf wrote numerous pieces and short stories out of which was only published a collection of eight short stories titled *Monday or Tuesday* (1921); however,

most of the remaining material remained unpublished in her lifetime only to be published posthumously in as yet another collection *A Haunted House* (1944). For many critics, these materials which represent Woolf's "transitional period between the publication of *Night and Day* and *Jacob's Room* [1922]" (Hussey 70) mark a decisive turn in her style and point in the direction of her mature experimental work.

Although her experiments from the 1920s onward might seem divergent, Woolf was primarily engaged with conveying experiences and perceptions *as they are* or *appear* – which is, in effect, very close to the premises of phenomenology. Phenomenology, in Husserl's sense, is a movement that prioritizes "go[ing] back to 'the things themselves'" (*Logical* I 168) and "offers an account of space, time and the world as we 'live' them" as well as "tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is . . ." (Merleau-Ponty vii). In other words, it inquires how phenomena appear *to* consciousness and how they are given in experience. Even in Heidegger's sense, phenomenology as "let[ting] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (*Being* 34/58) demonstrates how phenomena are disclosed by the kind of entities like Dasein itself to whom they are given. In this respect, merely by being-in-the-world, one is bound to experience and live phenomena which are simultaneously intuited or disclosed with the existence of Dasein (as in Heidegger) or with simply the subject/consciousness (as in Husserl). Woolf most famously wrote that "[t]he mind receives a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms . . . . Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall . . ." ("Modern Fiction" 106). This formulation of hers precisely falls in line with the nature of the work conducted by phenomenology, that is, investigating and describing phenomena which are necessarily disclosed through/along with a subject. Hence, one might as well argue that "[i]n Virginia Woolf, indeed, phenomenology found its novelist" (Poole 198).

In the short story collections mentioned earlier, Woolf offers some phenomenological insights by presenting and focusing on the impressions of the characters, i.e., the perceiver *as* they are received. For example, in "The Mark on the Wall" (1917), the narrator sees a mark on the wall which triggers a chain of impressions in the narrator

regarding the nature of the mark as well as other objects in the room. Similarly, in "The Kew Gardens" (1919), the impressions the narrator receives alternately from the passersby and the snail on the flower-bed are described in detail whereas, in "An Unwritten Novel" (1920), the unnamed narrator's impressions of a woman sitting opposite him/her on a commuter train are given. These experimental pieces served as a stepping stone for Woolf's later work. Susan Dick points out that the short story "An Unwritten Novel" "reflects two of Woolf's firmest assumptions about how the realist novel needed to be reformed. First, novelists must be selective. . . . Second, the choices novelists make should evolve from a shift of focus so that 'life' is conveyed not only in its external aspect, but as it is experienced" (50). Indeed, Woolf's concern with imparting life as it is lived finds expression in all of her work (and is also explained theoretically in her critical essays), albeit more emphatically in her mature work starting from the 1920s on. For Woolf, it never becomes the case that some significant or extraordinary things have to happen to the characters in order for them to be regarded as the proper subject matters of a novel. On the contrary, life is, for the most past, fraught with ordinariness, everydayness, or what she terms in "A Sketch of the Past" "moments of non-being" (70). Therefore, life in all its ordinariness might as well be a very fitting topic for fiction.

Woolf's awareness of everydayness in which one, for the most part, is lost demonstrates her understanding of average everyday existence as that which fundamentally belongs to the everyday self. In "A Sketch of the Past," Woolf distinguishes between "moments of non-being" and "moments of being" both of which are inseparable parts of everyday life. Woolf characterizes the former as those moments that are mostly unattended and unheeded. As Lorraine Sim puts it, moments of non-being "refer to a form of perception and a mode of being; the phases of life that are lived automatically and inattentively" (14-15). However, for Woolf, these moments are as important as those of being, that is, the "exceptional moments" (which are the ones mostly remembered). In Woolf's understanding, moments of being are those that strike one as "sudden violent shock[s]" and "exceptional moments . . . [that] come to the surface unexpectedly" ("A Sketch" 71).[38] There is, Woolf says, no reason why one remembers some moments while not others. Similarly, there is no reason, either, for why some moments are exceptional

enough to be etched in one's mind and to be remembered even years later while others are not. In a sense, Woolf unintentionally illustrates phenomenology especially when she says, in a tone very close to Heidegger, that "[a] great part of every day is not lived consciously" and consequently "[e]very day includes much more non-being than being" ("A Sketch" 70).

Considering the rendition of "moments of non-being" as such over against those of "being," one might clearly spot the correlation between Woolf's moments of non-being and Heidegger's conception of everydayness for both of whom such everyday experiences or moments constitute the core of existence. Woolf herself envies those novelists (she has in mind Jane Austen, Anthony Trollope, William Thackeray, Charles Dickens and Leo Tolstoy) who could simultaneously communicate both moments of non-being and being whereas she sees her own attempts at it in *Night and Day* and *The Years* (1937) as failure: "I have never been able to do both" ("A Sketch" 70). Indeed, moments of being stand out, or rather, outweigh those of non-being in her novels; for instance, there comes to mind Sally Seton's kissing of Clarissa in *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925), or Mrs. Ramsay's vision of the lighthouse while looking out the window and Lily Briscoe's final exhilarating vision at the end of *To the Lighthouse* (1927).

However, one should give more credit to Woolf than she allows for herself in that she skillfully integrates those moments of non-being into her novels out of which those moments of being Woolf cherishes arise. According to Liesl Olson, "Woolf's distinction between moments of being and non-being . . . demonstrates her awareness that the modern novel cannot represent only heightened moments of self-consciousness, but must be made up of more mundane moments that occupy our lives" ("Virginia Woolf's" 47). For instance, in *Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse* (a single day spared for each part) and *Between the Acts* (1941), the everyday lives of the characters are presented in a single typical day which is in no way significantly different from any other. Liesl Olson further notes that "[t]he novel of one day seems especially suited to capturing the experience of the everyday . . ." ("Virginia Woolf's" 46, note 21). Clarissa Dalloway, as a matter of fact, throws as yet another usual party of hers where she will host numerous important people and acquaintances on an ordinary day in June.[39] Similarly, Woolf refrains from disclosing the dates in her other novels. In *Jacob's Room*

(1922), the date of Jacob's death is not given and neither are those of Mrs. Ramsay, Andrew and Prue in *To the Lighthouse*. Instead, the dates, and time in general, are tentatively employed to denote certain phases of characters' lives and at times the socio-historical situation without being specific. This is the case in *The Waves* where the reader only witnesses the different phases of characters' lives in an array from early childhood experiences to old age.

Such handling of ordinary moments on Woolf's part not only demonstrates her conviction that much of a person's life is permeated with typical everydayness, i.e. moments of non-being but also corroborates Heidegger's assertion that Dasein is "the 'Realest subject' of everydayness" (*Being* 128/166). Moreover, Woolf herself concedes that the exceptional moments of being are "embedded in many more moments of non-being" ("A Sketch" 70). Woolf sees moments of non-being/everydayness as fundamental as those of being even if at times she seems to favor moments of being as "reality" behind appearances.[40] Makiko Minow-Pinkney argues that Woolf finds such aspects of everyday life superfluous: "On the level of fictional form, this mundane sequence is the narrativity of the realist novel which Woolf had been denouncing since 'Modern Fiction;' it is a materiality ('cotton wool') which blots out the light" (162). Likewise, Jeanne Schulkind's characterization of "the individual in his daily life" as "cut off from 'reality'" (17) has the same mistaken assumption as that of Minow-Pinkney in that moments of non-being – which are the pervasive mode of existing in everydayness – are the realest aspects of everyday being. In addition, moments of being – which denote, in Woolf's sense, "reality" behind appearances – necessarily presuppose moments of non-being in order to be revealed as moments of being. As Lorraine Sim points out, "for Woolf, the quotidian is not devalued in moments of being, nor is the cotton wool of everyday life separate from, or separable from, the numinous 'pattern' she finds behind it. Rather, these two forms of experience and modes of being are intimately related for her" (163). Woolf's extensive use of everyday moments of non-being in her fiction evinces that moments of being arise and come to the surface out of them, and the nexus of both sorts of being in Woolf's rendition is apparently the self as they-self who experiences, for the most part, moments of non-being and at the same

time is capable of having those of being. This can be observed in much of her fiction, including even *The Waves* which is *seemingly* removed from everyday life.

Woolf's *The Waves* (1931) is held in high esteem by critics as the ultimate embodiment of her experimental modernist style both formally and thematically. As the outcome of her experiments in the early 1920s and of her mature work in the second half of the 1920s, *The Waves* is both reminiscent of and at the same time different from them in various aspects. The first seeds of the novel go as far back as the late 1926 when she was finishing *To the Lighthouse*. Henceforth, with what is to become later *The Waves* in mind, Woolf started to ruminate on "invent[ing] a new kind of play . . . . [a]way from facts: free; yet concentrated; prose yet poetry; a novel & a play" (*The Diary* 3: 128) and on, what she calls, "the play-poem idea: the idea of some continuous stream" (*The Diary* 3: 139). Similarly, in her essay "The Narrow Bridge of Art,"[41] Woolf argues for a new kind of fiction:

> And it is possible that there will be among the so-called novels one which we shall scarcely know how to christen. It will be written in prose, but in prose which has many of the characteristics of poetry. It will have something of the exaltation of poetry, but much of the ordinariness of prose. It will be dramatic, and yet not a play. It will be read, not acted. . . . it will differ from the novel as we know it now chiefly in that it will stand further back from life . . . (224)

Indeed, Woolf's innovative and even subversive approach to fiction writing finds embodiment in her most experimental work, that is, *The Waves*.[42]

Woolf's unyielding concern with the strict formal problems of the novel leads some critics to regard *The Waves* as failure. As a case in point, Mark Hussey asserts that the novel's reputation as a landmark text of modernism is primarily based on its "abstruseness" and "its hostility to "common reading"" (*The Singing* 82) and that it is "an antinovel that yields very little to the processes of assimilation, memory, and comparison that constitute reading" (83). Thus, Hussey arrives at the conclusion that *The Waves* can only be an "aesthetic failure" because of Woolf's being "far more concerned with the *shape* of the book than anything else" and of her losing interest in characters, their movements and relations, and ultimately of her inability to "forge" the various experimental attempts together (82-83) as well as because of her "failure to

harmonize design and content" (89). Likewise, though on a different premise, James Naremore finds *The Waves* basically "a failure – though a highly interesting one" – in that Woolf yields to the very thing, that is, "the primacy of the self" that she attempts to deny or escape in order to convey selfless experiences (189).

However, on the other hand, there are those critics who find the formal structuring of the novel quite in accordance with its content. Besides those such as Avrom Fleishman, Alice van Buren Kelley and Lyndall Gordon[43] all of whom are mentioned by Hussey as the advocates of Woolf's achievement in *The Waves*, much recently Julia Briggs has argued in favor of Woolf's diligent working of structure and content which go hand in hand until the last chapter of the novel and emphasized her rewriting the novel for several times:

> [Woolf] rewrote her text so that the different chapters themselves formed the structure of the wave whose rhythm and sound already permeated her novel: thus chapters 1 and 8 correspond and are concerned with being, alone and together; chapters 2 and 7 are concerned with time, 3 and 6 with language and self-awareness, while 4 and 5 reach the crest of the wave at noon, and its relapse, enacting the communion supper and the death of the hero, as described in the Gospels . . . ("Writing by Numbers" 179-80; also see her *Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life* 259)

Therefore, unlike Hussey's charge, Woolf seems to attend to each and every thematic and formal detail in the novel to create an arch that culminates in the shape of a wave, thereby making a whole out of the seemingly disparate sections or episodes in the novel. This integrity is further bolstered by the fact that the rise and descent of the sun delineated in detail in the interludes respectively correspond to the characters' growing up and growing old, thereby emphasizing the unity of content and structure. Moreover, each wave that rises and falls back into water – just like each character that asserts his/her individuality and falls back into "the they" – demonstrates that all the characters in the novel are individuals, or waves, insofar as there are others, or rather insofar as they are *with* others.

Though *The Waves* is indeed extremely innovative and experimental in terms of formal and stylistic aspects and is thematically deemed as exploring the inner workings of consciousness, or what many critics simply call, "the inner life,"[44] it still manages to

convey the humdrum lives of the characters as they are inevitably entangled within everyday involvements with others. For Woolf, the self always exists in relation to others along with whom s/he is situated in the world as being-in-the-world-with-others. Each and every single component of this hyphenated structure is inextricable from each other and cannot stand on its own without the remaining parts.

Woolf's notion of the self under invisible forces, though not sketched out as rigorously as a philosopher would rather have it, comes very close to Heidegger's analysis of "the they" and they-self. In Heidegger's conception, Dasein is insidiously manipulated by "the they" and comes to interpret the world as "the they" see it fit – just like Woolf's understanding of herself as "tugged this way or that" under "invisible presences" ("A Sketch" 80). Therefore, the wave metaphor Woolf employs throughout *The Waves* is exceptionally fitting for her conception of the self. As Madelyn Detloff writes, Woolf's exploration of the self in *The Waves* demonstrates that

> the self is a singularity caught up in a system, like the ocean waves which break on the shore in the interludes that separate the chapters or strophes of the novel. Each wave is part of the sea and yet recognizable as an individual entity with a particular wavelength, crest height, and trough depth . . . (53)

The characters in the novel are affected and influenced in varying degrees by "the they." Almost unconsciously, or rather semi-consciously, they are pushed to and fro like the uncontainable waves that permeate the novel. Moreover, the novel's title is not simply "Wave" but rather "The Waves" in the plural which suggests the fluidity of waves blending into each other creating a sort of medley that both implies a mélange and yet allows for differentiation with each wave rising on its own and falling and then rising again, among others. In a sense, waves are just like Heideggerian indefinite others: not this one nor that one. Anyone, everyone and yet no one is a wave among other waves.

Although Woolf's rendition of the characters as being with others in the world situate them within a matrix where they are inextricably bound to each other in their everydayness, some critics interpret them merely as "six voices which often seem to be only one voice, unmoored from an immediate circumstantial context" (Naremore 189). They argue that "[t]he physical world of interludes is more real (more realistically

rendered) than the six voices are" (Little 55). Moreover, they maintain that everyday usual order which is deemed the hallmark of the traditional realist novel is deliberately undermined in *The Waves*. For instance, Minow-Pinkney asserts that *The Waves* "enacts a denigration of 'general sequence' both formally and thematically" (162). Another example would be the failure of Alex Zwerdling to allot a full chapter to the analysis of *The Waves* in a book on Woolf's fiction where he explores "the life of society," that is, "the whole range of external forces that may be said to influence our behavior: familial ideals, societal expectations, institutional demands, significant historical events or movements that affect our lives" (4). Instead, he simply contents himself with some occasional references to *The Waves* in the course of his rather detailed study of Woolf's fiction – which aligns him with other critics mentioned above. In this respect, the common point these critics share is that the characters or the "voices" in *The Waves* are almost regarded as unworldly and cut off from the "circumstantial context" as well as the mundane sequence – which they interpret as something Woolf strives to undermine in *The Waves*.

These critics might have been turned away from evaluating *The Waves* in light of the self's everyday involvements due to Woolf's own writings in her essays and diaries. As Liesl Olson notes, "Woolf's novels present the ordinary . . . though her essays often conflate the inner life with exceptionality, a discrepancy that suggests Woolf 's essays overemphasize dichotomies (poetry and prose, inner and outer, exceptional and ordinary) that her novels do not play out" (*Modernism* 58). For example, Woolf critically writes that she "mean[s] to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the moment whole; whatever it includes. . . . Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that dont belong to the moment; this appalling narrative business of the realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, merely conventional" (*The Diary* 3: 209). What Woolf is ultimately dissatisfied with or critical of is rather the inclusion of each and every unnecessary detail in "realist" novels than the moderate or appropriate use of externality:

> I think even externality is good; some combination of them [the inner and the outer] ought to be possible. The ideas has come to me that what I want to do is to saturate every atom. . . . I want to put practically everything in; yet to saturate. That

> is what I want to do in The Moths. It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but made transparent. (*The Diary* 3: 209-10)

Indeed, for *The Waves*, some recent studies corroborate the findings regarding the conception of the real world Alex Zwerdling locates in Woolf's other novels, as well.[45] Given this, the realistic details in the novel, though sketchy and not abundant, still manage to provide a circumstantial context where one can situate the lives of the characters. There are references to the portrait of Queen Alexandra hanging in a school on the East Coast (*The Waves* 17), to the army marching across Europe (the one and only reference to World War I in the novel) (*The Waves* 205), the unnamed public schools and universities that the male characters attend – though Louis imagines that others will go to "Oxford or Cambridge, to Edinburgh . . . or to some American University" (*The Waves* 51), Susan's life on the farm in Lincolnshire where Bernard visits her (*The Waves* 224), and the lives of other characters in London in general.

Virginia Woolf was concerned to make *The Waves* accessible to the reader and voices her worry in a letter to Ethel Smyth saying that "it is completely opposed to the tradition of fiction and I am casting about all the time for some rope to throw to the reader" (*Letters* 4: 204). Along with the above examples which function as signposts to roughly frame the work, the fictional world of characters is anchored in London which constitutes, so to speak, the backbone of the novel. As Susan Dick remarks, London holds a special place in *The Waves* as much as it does in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*: "streets and landmarks are named, and even the sounds of the city evoked, making London function in this book, as in the earlier ones, as a verifiable realistic setting for a fictional world. London is perhaps the strongest rope Woolf throws her reader" (68). For instance, there are numerous references to the Tube (*The Waves* 147, 160, 169); Hampton Court (where they dine in the second dinner party) (*The Waves* 175); a music hall which seems to be the Wigmore Hall[46] (*The Waves* 132); Oxford Street (*The Waves* 131-32), and so forth. All these glimpses of London provided by the characters in the course of the novel "reflect their sense of themselves as *grounded in a shared, solid world*" (Dick 68, emphasis added). Indeed, such tiny realistic details are more than enough to stand the novel on a firm ground considering that Woolf was anxious to put only the things that "belong to the moment" (*The Diary* 3: 209), unlike the Victorian

novelists who “seem to have left out nothing that they knew how to say” (Woolf, “Mrs. Gaskell” 341).

Likewise, recently, Pam Morris in her “Woolf and Realism” has maintained that the episodes or sections of the novel where the thoughts and speeches of characters are given not only offer realistic details but also that the metonymic descriptions in the interludes that precede the sections provide the whole framework of the socio-cultural world in which characters are embedded: “The interludes move from sea and sky, metonymies of the universe, to the house, with its table laid with plates and cutlery, as metonymies of the socio-cultural world. Yet the plates set out ready for food point metonymically to the corporal basis of cultural life . . .” (46). Indeed, Woolf makes use of such details so proportionately that the reader is not bogged down with abundant “superfluous” minutiae; rather the modest deployment thereof enables Woolf to explore moments of being as they are themselves embedded in those of non-being. Therefore, as Susan Dick argues, “[e]ven in this book [*The Waves*], in which she moves furthest away from writing ‘exteriorly,’ she could not abandon material reality, for it is an integral part of the other, more profound, reality she wished to explore” (71).

Unlike Liesl Olson’s reservations about the exploration and incorporation of the ordinary and everyday life in *The Waves* (*Modernism* 84), it can be argued that everydayness permeates this novel to such an extent that it would still manage to stand on its own even without the above realistic details. That one can indeed profitably use them to enrich the interpretation of the novel is, as a matter of fact, undeniable – especially with all the references that help situate it in the first half of the twentieth century. However, these details are on the whole mere contingencies of that specific period of time which have nothing particular to do with the subjects in the novel, and this is simply because the characters are thrown into the world. Hence, existence necessitates being in the world and has a more primordial underlying facet, that is, average everydayness which is an upshot of being-(thrown)-in(to)-the-world for the most part and whose manifestation is seen through the influence of “the they.”

As demonstrated in the discussion of the title of the novel, insofar as human beings are not *worldless* and insofar as average everydayness constitutes a fundamental part of

being in the world *with* others, one might argue that "the they" as an embodiment of averageness are, indeed, crucial in the way one comes to see him/herself among others. The self loses itself in an attempt to catch up with others and thereby be ultimately concerned with where it stands in relation to others. As Heidegger writes, the subject, "in its Being, essentially makes an issue of this [concern]" (*Being* 127/165). From very early on, the characters in *The Waves* find themselves in such concern of "distantiality," that is, to what extent they lag behind or at times surpass others. For instance, in the mathematics class at boarding school, all the children hand in their answers to the question written on the board while Rhoda fails to find any answer:

> Now taking her lump of chalk she [the teacher] draws figures, six, seven, eight, and then a cross and then a line on the blackboard. What is the answer? The others look; they look with understanding. Louis writes; Susan writes; Neville writes; Jinny writes; even Bernard has now begun to write. But I cannot write. . . . But I have no answer. (*The Waves* 15)

Even though Rhoda does not seem to understand the mathematical puzzle *per se*, she sees that the others look at the problem "with understanding." It is such understanding that Rhoda tries to catch up with.

The whole class is revealed to Rhoda as consisting of a group of students, in fact, her friends, who are responding *understandingly* to an ordinary question. As a matter of fact, there is nothing unusual in the circumstances: it is typical of a mathematics teacher to ask such questions in the class and of students to do their best at answering them. The worry Rhoda has emanates less from her inability to find an answer to the question than her failure to catch up with others in an average manner. By turning in the answers one by one, others imply a level of averageness against which Rhoda measures herself. Heidegger argues that "[b]eing-with-one-another concerns itself as such with *averageness*, which is an existential characteristic of the 'they'" (*Being* 127/164). In this regard, the very reason why Rhoda is terrified in not being able to find an answer seems to be that she is afraid of being left outside the loop: "I begin to draw a figure and the world is looped in it, and I myself am outside the loop; which I now join - so - and seal up, and make entire. The world is entire, and I am outside of it, crying, 'Oh save me, from being blown for ever outside the loop of time!'" (*The Waves* 15).

The loop as enclosing the world, therefore, signifies the totality of significances and referential involvements through which one can understandingly comport oneself towards and deal with the world. In Rhoda's case, she fails to do so in relation to the figures and numbers on the board – which are also a part of the referential complex. Emily Dalgarno argues that Rhoda can represent her subjectivity to herself through the diagram (the loop) which "draws her subject position in the code of the visible, suggesting that she herself inscribes the loop that isolates her from the world" (107). In a sense, Dalgarno suggests that Rhoda is cognizant of her own situation as someone isolated from the world, that is, basically a misfit, and that she reconciles herself to this situation by making it explicit with the diagram. However, Rhoda is utterly dejected and desperately wants to be spared being blown outside the loop. If to recall Heidegger's argument, the tendency of being-with others has at its core the ultimate concern with the distance one has between oneself and others. Accordingly, Rhoda cannot be, and is not, content with being outside the loop even if she, as Dalgarno maintains, "inscribes the loop." On the very contrary, she yearns to be included in the loop along with others.

In effect, to what extent one manages to comply with the averageness dictated by "the they" is beside the point; on the contrary, what matters is Dasein's tendency towards and yearning for it – which is an ontological component of existence. In this sense, Rhoda longs to be ordinary and hence *average*, that is, be just *like* others. As a case in point, soon after the mathematics class incident when they are back from school, Rhoda says: "As I fold up my frock and my chemise . . . so I put off my hopeless desire to be Susan, to be Jinny" (*The Waves* 20). As can be clearly seen, Jinny and Susan set the example of averageness: Rhoda does not desire to be only Susan or only Jinny, that is, a particular other; on the contrary, quite casually, either of them will do. They represent the average being-in-the-world which might be said to be manifest in, what Hubert Dreyfus calls, "'mindless' everyday coping" with one's surroundings and environment in an average way (*Being-in-the-World* 3). Nevertheless, Rhoda seems to be too self-conscious and self-introspective to deal with the world averagely as the others do.

In a much later scene, when the characters are in their early twenties and get together for a dinner party to say goodbye to their friend Percival who will leave for India, Rhoda's worry about "distantiality" is reiterated to a great extent. Although "Rhoda's

hold on ordinary reality is far more tenuous than that of the other speakers" (Dick 70), Rhoda tries hard to comport herself in an average way: "I pretend, as I go upstairs lagging behind Jinny and Susan, to have an end in view. I pull on my stockings as I see them pull on theirs. I wait for you to speak and then speak like you" (*The Waves* 107.) In addition, she reveals that the only reason she goes to meet her friends is that she desires to be included in "the general blaze of you who live wholly, indivisibly and without caring" (*The Waves* 107). The choice of her words to describe others is, indeed, telling in that Susan and Jinny in their average everydayness (such as in pulling their stockings, or everyday speech) comport themselves understandingly[47] towards the world in which they are absorbed and smoothly move about. In addition, they perform everyday activities without explicit attention, that is, with a sort of mindless coping – towards which Rhoda ultimately yearns.

Similar to Rhoda, Louis, in the Latin class, is concerned with the way he speaks which differs from the way others speak due to his distinct Australian accent: "'I will not conjugate the verb,' said Louis, 'until Bernard has said it. My father is a banker in Brisbane and I speak with an Australian accent. I will wait and copy Bernard. He is English. They are all English'" (*The Waves* 14). Like Rhoda, Louis is very much worried about to what extent he can enunciate in a manner as much average as possible. Heidegger points out that the concern with distantiality might take the form of, what he calls, "levelling down" (*Being* 127/165) – which means that, instead of merely catching up with the average with a movement upwards, one might as well suppress oneself and refuse to stand out among "the they," and thereby reducing oneself down to the average once again. In Heidegger's words, "[i]n this averageness with which it [the they] prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed" (*Being* 127/165). Put differently, the tendency to be average works both ways, namely, either upwards or downwards to the average being-in-the-world. Louis does not refrain from conjugating simply because he does not know the answer; on the very contrary, as Louis reveals, "I know the lesson by heart. I know more than they will ever know. I know my cases and my genders . . . But I do not wish to come to the top and say my lesson" (*The Waves* 14). As Michael Watts notes, "[i]n the world of the They, there is a levelling off

of distinctions and a levelling down of possibilities . . . at school, children who are 'different' are rejected until they learn to conform to the They-world of their peers" (54). Indeed, necessarily thrown into the world of "the they," Louis does his best to avoid deviating from the averageness set by "the they." It should be noted, though, that Louis's imitation is to achieve an acceptable level of averageness, not simply to emulate this or that particular person's accent – which is clearly seen in his emphatic mention of the others as all being English in the lines quoted earlier: "[Bernard] is English. They are all English." In effect, this line is quite apposite to demonstrate that there is an average way of being English which Louis not only protests but at the same time yearns for.

Just as Rhoda's concern with distantiality, starting from early childhood, lasts throughout her life, so does Louis's. When Louis becomes a successful clerk with his "cane" and "waistcoat" (*The Waves* 183), he cannot help but feel uncomfortable at a restaurant where there are other clerks like him. Louis says: "I prop my book against a bottle of Worcester sauce and try to look like the rest. Yet I cannot. . . . I repeat, 'I am an *average* Englishman; I am an *average* clerk,' yet I look at the little men at the next table to be sure that I do what *they* do" (*The Waves* 75, emphasis added). The dictatorship of "the they" prescribes the way one bears oneself towards the world in everyday activities as seen clearly in Louis's case. Moreover, it is not enough to regard oneself as being average; instead, one's constant concern with the way one differs from others outweighs one's conviction of oneself as average. Hence, one is always anxious to not only fit in the framework of "the they" but also be positive about it. Louis is apparently envious of others for their mundane abilities and smooth everyday coping with the world, and just like Rhoda, he has to watch others do it first. Therefore, any stance that Louis adopts towards his behavior is fundamentally affected by and measured against the demands of "the they."

This is the reason why Louis's actions much later in the novel are still regulated by "the they:" "Yet when six o'clock comes and I touch my hat to the commissionaire, being always too effusive in ceremony since I desire so much to be accepted . . ." (*The Waves* 141). Louis's strict attention to the proper enactment of certain actions and hence his desire for order(liness) make him "presume it will empower him to fit in, to be

'ordinary'" (Boon 68). Louis touches his hat the way *they* do; in other words, this is simply what *one* does. Therefore, instead of characterizing both Rhoda and Louis's attempts to fit in as failures, it is more fitting to regard them as always already thrown into the world of "the they" where they conduct themselves (or at least try to do) as "the they" see fit. James Naremore's rendition of Louis as having a "characteristic desire not to be seen as painfully individual or foreign" (156) and Julia Briggs' characterization of Louis and Rhoda as "tormented by a sense of social inadequacy and of alienation" ("The Novels" 77) and hence as "social misfits" (*Virginia* 249) testify to the never-ending worry one has about one's distance from others. Such worry is a fundamental component of everyday being-in-the-world and might be manifest in various circumstances and situations, such as in Rhoda's behaviors and Louis's actions and speech. All in all, the self measures and defines itself against "the they" who might simply consist of one's friends as well as of people one does not know in person (like those sitting next to Louis in the restaurant). Thus, "the they" never designate simply this or that particular person; it is rather revealed in everyday averageness through anyone and no one at the same time.

In "A Sketch of the Past," Woolf writes that she is usually intrigued by the problem of describing the moments of non-being even though "[e]very day includes much more non-being than being" ("A Sketch" 70). Moreover, she characterizes them as "embedded in a kind of nondescript cotton wool" (70). They permeate everyday life to such a degree that one does not even recognize them most of the time and thus they are mostly forgotten. As Lorraine Sim states, this image of nondescript cotton wool "surrounds much of daily life . . . [and] suggests comfort and safety" (14). Woolf further suggests that one goes about the world without almost anything left to be remembered of those moments by the end of the day. Woolf's description of such moments echoes Dasein's absorption in average everydayness which "has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'" (Heidegger, *Being* 175/219). Indeed, Woolf's rendering of everydayness bear resemblance to Heidegger's rendition of Dasein's existence as "lostness." Woolf asserts that one does not live consciously much of everyday life, rather one flows with the everyday routine: "One walks, eats, sees things, deals with what has to be done . . ." (70). One does all these things in the way *they* do.

Such moments of non-being have a numbing effect which Woolf experienced especially in the years between 1897 (from the death of Stella) – 1904 (to the death of her father Leslie Stephen) at Hyde Park Gate: "I shrink from the years 1897 - 1904, the seven unhappy years. Not many lives were tortured and fretted and made numb with non-being as ours were then" ("A Sketch" 136). The numbing effect of non-being directly emanates from the dictatorship of "the they" at the time because Woolf says Hyde Park Gate in 1900 – the street in central London near Kensington Gardens where the Stephens lived until the death of Leslie Stephen – "was a complete model of Victorian society" (147) and the household members (especially her stepbrothers, i.e, the Duckworths) were the embodiment of the codes of that society, imposing those rules on the Stephen sisters, Virginia and Vanessa.

Moreover, "the they" seem to be so numbing that Woolf resembles how they lived during those years to the preordained and almost mechanic lives of ants and bees: "If I had the power to lift out of the past a single day as we lived it about 1900, it would give a section of upper middle class Victorian life, like one of those sections with glass covers in which ants and bees are shown going about their tasks" (147). Woolf even narrates in detail one of their typical days around 1900 and, as Schulkind notes, "describes the pressures exerted by the conventions and beliefs dominant in the late Victorian, upper middle class family life of the Stephens and Duckworths at Hyde Park Gate" (16). However, one is most of the time unaware of the ways of "the they" when s/he is living in everyday manner as Woolf's example of fish which is not conscious of the stream demonstrates. Such invisible forces of "the they" are so strong and gripping that they, in Heidegger's words, "tranquilizes" (*Being* 177/222) Dasein. Everydayness presents everything to be already dealt with in this or that particular fashion which Dasein immediately takes on and contributes to its perpetuation.

According to Heidegger, the tranquilizing and numbing effect of "the they" further "drives one into uninhibited 'hustle'" instead of "stagnation and inactivity" (*Being* 177/222). One manifestation of such absorption in the world along with others seems to point in the direction of an extreme monotonous everydayness in which Dasein has lost him/herself in the hustle and bustle of everyday routine life. For this very reason, one is precluded from finding oneself. The characters' lives from childhood to middle or old

age are represented by each phase of the sun from dawn to dusk as described in the interludes which also frame their routines. Each and every interlude opens with an announcement of the position of the sun: "*The sun had not yet risen*" (*The Waves* 3); "*The sun rose higher*" (21); "*The sun rose*" (58); "*The sun, risen, no longer couched . . .*" (88); "*The sun had risen to its full height*" (121); "*The sun no longer stood in the middle of the sky*" (136); "*The sun had now sunk lower in the sky*" (151); "*The sun was sinking*" (173); "*Now the sun had sunk*" (197).

Susan Dick argues that the interludes suggest both the progress of a day and at the same time the yearly cycle with references to different seasons. However, she further states in a passing remark that "[t]he cyclical time of the natural world in the interludes is juxtaposed with the linear time that shapes the speakers' lives" (67). Seeing the episodes as linear and juxtaposed with the cyclical interludes does do justice to the deeper relation between these alternating parts in the novel, though. Considered within the framework of temporality, the linearity in the episodes as reflected in the characters' growing up and getting old cannot be denied; however, they suggest "a significant but unstated relationship to the meaning of the lives of the characters" (Hellerstein 5) and "parallel, by implication, the cycle of life experienced by the characters" (Hellerstein 45, also see 50-51). Therefore, the cyclical suggestion of the interludes holds up a mirror for the cyclical monotonous everyday lives of the characters where a day is not different from any other just like the break of the day and setting of the sun each and every single day.

The characters' everyday routines confirm how they are lost in everydayness and go about their business in an average way. Many of the characters take refuge or find comfort in their everyday routine and even the idea of stepping out of their routine strikes them as disorienting and upsetting. For instance, Bernard, for several times, refers to the flow of everydayness (in which he is entangled) variously as "the machine," "the sequence" and "the usual order" (*The Waves* 126-29). Casting Bernard's attitude to such everyday sequence as "profoundly ambivalent," Makiko Minow-Pinkney remarks that "[t]his general sequence is more often resented as something that, impeding 'the moment,' is viewed as dead matter, stifling truth and light ('cotton wool'). Even when Bernard welcomes it, he does so with an undertone of scorn or

condescension . . .” (162-63). However, on the contrary, like Heidegger and Woolf who see such everydayness as constituting a positive aspect of existence that helps maintain one’s daily engagement, Bernard clearly sees the significance of it in the way it enables him to comport himself understandingly toward the world. “The sequence” or “the machine,” as Bernard calls it, is what provides the basis of a comfortable and smooth interaction with the world in the first place. This is the reason why Bernard finds it exhausting to be left “outside the machine” (*The Waves* 129) and similarly why Louis, unable to go to university like Bernard and Neville, resents and even “env[ies] them their continuance down the safe traditional ways . . .” (*The Waves* 52).

Moreover, the tranquility “the they” offer is more than enough to cover one with the nondescript cotton wool. As Bernard says, “[a]s I let myself in with the latch-key I would go through that familiar ritual and wrap myself in those warm coverings” (*The Waves* 155). Interestingly enough, Bernard uses the very same example of “the latch” Heidegger deploys to illustrate one’s “concernful dealings” with entities encountered in the world and thereby revealed as ready-to-hand in the totality of involvements where one smoothly goes about his/her daily routine. In Heidegger’s formulation, such concernful dealing “is the way in which everyday Dasein always *is*: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch” (*Being* 67/96). Therefore, on the whole, circumspective dealings with objects, or the world in general, constitute the familiar absorption in the world where one already pre-reflectively knows how to proceed, and as an extension thereof, is tranquilized with, in Bernard’s words, “warm coverings.”

Furthermore, everyday Dasein as being-in-the-world, that is, being familiar with its world in a pre-cognitive fashion, is characterized, in Heidegger’s terms, as being-at-home: “This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the ‘they,’ which brings tranquilized self-assurance – ‘Being-at-home,’ with all its obviousness – into the average everydayness of Dasein” (*Being* 188-89/233). Indeed, one feels most “at-home” when one is fully entangled in everdayness simply because everything is laid out in advance to be easily taken up and put to use. As Bernard says in a manner similar to Woolf’s remarks in “A Sketch of the Past” (70), “[w]e are not always aware by any means; we breath, eat, sleep automatically” (*The Waves* 205). Such automaticity brings an extreme sense of

familiarity which in turn prepares the ground for feeling at-home. When he experiences exceptional moments, that is, moments of being such as the vision of (fish) fin and the drop falling, he hastily tries to resume his previous comfortable position: “Bernard’s strange detachment from the ordinary flow of life comes unsought; he wishes it would end; he cannot understand at the time what his vision of the fin means; and he disposes of it as quickly as he can, filing it away in his mind for future reference” (Graham 203).

As thrown into the world, one is simultaneously cast into the web of referential totality with which one grows familiar. This occurs on such a pervasive level that one does not even realize or recognize, for the most part, the stretch of such absorption. Bernard says that “[w]e are all swept on by the torrent of things grown so familiar that they cast no shade . . .” (*The Waves* 180, 215). As a case in point, Bernard gives the example of shaving with which he is engaged and of which he is not yet distinctly aware particularly because it becomes so familiar that he can handle it almost automatically: “Last week, as I stood shaving, the drop fell. I, standing with my razor in my hand, became suddenly aware of the merely habitual nature of my action (this is the drop forming) and congratulated my hands, ironically, for keeping at it. Shave, shave, shave, I said. Go on shaving. The drop fell” (*The Waves* 153). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “my body and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge” (277). It is this habitual and familiar dealings subtended by the body that in the first place open up the possibility of easily engaging with one’s environment and consequently of feeling at home. The body is what enables one to “‘be at home’ in that world, ‘understand’ it and find significance in it” (Merleau-Ponty 275). This is precisely the very reason why Bernard congratulates his hands which form the basis of his active involvement with the world.

In addition, pertinent to everydayness, Bernard’s metaphor of the drop forming – which recurs several times in the latter half of the novel – signifies “habitual behavior within a quotidian routine. . . . Experience generates mere habit, veiling truth; its practical comforts efface the latter’s harsh necessity” (Minow-Pinkney 165). Considering his inability to endure to be long outside the machine, it is the “quotidian routine” that allows Bernard to be “wedged into [his] place in the puzzle” (*The Waves* 180) where he moves “like a log slipping smoothly over some waterfall” (196), thereby making his life

"pleasant" and "tolerable" (215). Merleau-Ponty writes that "[h]abit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world . . ." (166). In other words, one is attuned to the world *qua* the habitual nature of embodied existence whose ways of being, behaving, acting, etc. are further prescriptively shaped by "the they" that endorse certain forms, while rejecting others. In a sense, this explains why Bernard, feeling like "an insect on top of the earth" and feeling "[the earth's] hardness, its turning movement," "[has] no desire to go to the opposite way from the earth" (*The Waves* 154). On the very contrary, he hankers after being "harnessed to a cart, a vegetable-cart that rattles over the cobbles" (*The Waves* 154), which ultimately stands for embracing what "the they" dictate and for setting out on the familiar or beaten path presented by "the they."

Just as Bernard feels at-home letting himself into the familiar world with the latch-key, so does Susan with the "usual order" of her life in Lincolnshire. Rita Felski states in "The Invention of Everyday Life" that "[e]veryday life . . . recognizes that every life contains an element of the ordinary. We are all ultimately anchored in the mundane" (16). In like manner, Susan is, in effect, very contented and at ease with her mundane life with her husband and children in Lincolnshire: "I have had peaceful, productive years. . . . I have grown trees from the seed. . . . I have seen my sons and daughters . . . break the meshes and walk with me . . ." (*The Waves* 158). Susan also reveals herself to be "early acquainted with the farmyard" (*The Waves* 159). Apparently, Susan was born and bred in the everyday life of farms and domesticity where she has "natural happiness" (*The Waves* 108, 143). As Susan remarks, all of her life revolves around the usual sequence of everyday activities peculiar to domestic life: "I pad about the house all day long in apron and slippers, like my mother who died of cancer" (*The Waves* 142). Moreover, she is "all spun to a fine thread round the cradle, wrapping in a cocoon made of my own blood the delicate limbs of my baby" (*The Waves* 142). Therefore, her everyday routine is all the more strengthened and emphasized through the metaphors of sewing: "At night I sit in the armchair and stretch my arm for my sewing; and hear my husband snore; and look up . . . and see others' lives eddying like straws round the piers of a bridge while I push my needle in and out and draw my thread through the calico" (*The Waves* 160). Susan is fully integrated and absorbed in her natural life on the farm, from which she derives natural happiness. Therefore, Susan succumbs to the grip of the

domestic routine and loses herself in the hustle of everyday life; however, most importantly, this is where she feels "at home in the large world of nature" (Hussey 9) and thus where she feels she belongs. Her everyday self is fundamentally characterized by the ways of farm and domestic life which are shaped by the standards set by others.

Likewise, Louis also recounts his routine life in which he is trapped and yet seems to be extremely comfortable. Louis associates life in general with his extreme monotony and everyday actions which can be embodied by "the they." Notwithstanding its numbing and tranquilizing effect, "the they" constantly push one to activity. Indeed, in the current of everydayness, Louis hurls himself as a clerk into the abyss of the business world where he seems to find himself by actually losing himself. As Louis says in relation to his everyday routine activities, "[b]ut now I have not a moment to spare. . . . The weight of the world is on our shoulders . . ." (*The Waves* 140). There is always something for Louis to go at and engage oneself with in the world in which he is fully absorbed: "I do this, do that, and again do this and then that" (*The Waves* 140). Recounting his everyday routine in detail, Louis brands it life: "This is life; Mr Prentice at four; Mr Eyres at four-thirty. . . . The weight of the world is on our shoulders. This is life" (*The Waves* 140). Such everyday life is where Louis just like Susan and Bernard feels most at home, and the possibility of being precluded from it disturbs him to a great extent. Like Rhoda who is terrified from being left outside the "loop," Louis as a child feels excluded from "the circle" (*The Waves* 76). As a clerk who feels the weight of the world on his shoulders, he still feels that "if [he] deviate[s], glancing this way and that way, [he] shall fall like snow and be wasted" (*The Waves* 138).

Susan Dick argues that "[t]hrough ordinary activity [Louis] is seeking to fix his place in the world and thus stabilize his fluid sense of self" (70). Indeed, Louis's work as a clerk enables him to indulge himself in the required activities of the business and thereby to lose himself in what he does: "'I have signed my name,' said Louis, 'already twenty times. I, and again I, and again I. Clear, firm, unequivocal, there it stands, my name. Clear-cut and unequivocal am I too'" *(The Waves* 138). Thus, similar to Susan's absorption in the domestic everydayness which enables her to make sense of herself as a maternal domestic figure, it is such losing oneself in the everyday world which is dictated by the ways of "the they" that brings about a sense of being "at-home" and

consequently, what Louis calls, akin to Bernard's "warm coverings," "the protective ways of the ordinary" (*The Waves* 76).

Unlike Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's rendition of existence as essentially being-with or co-existence which denotes a sense of peaceful communality, Sartre's characterization of the intersubjective relations presupposes a fundamental conflict between the self and others – a point otherwise ignored or dismissed as secondary or derivative by both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. For Sartre, conflictual encounters emanate from the fact that the self as subject / transcendence / transcending meets the other as another subject / transcendence / transcending. Each subject/consciousness transcends and rearranges the world according to his/her projects, goals and ends by manipulating his/her surroundings accordingly. The encounter of two subjects as such, therefore, leads to the clash of transcendences each consciousness brings to the world by merely existing, engaging with and re-organizing the world. As Sartre puts it, "one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the [Heideggerian] *Mitsein*; it is conflict" (*Being* 429). In other words, one either objectifies the other by appropriating and undermining and thereby turning him/her into the other-as-object, or one is conversely objectified into a self as object by the other-as-subject. In this respect, such clash necessarily constitutes the relation between the self and the other as that which is based on a fundamental conflict in-between the two.

Just as the anonymous everyday existence of the self as demonstrated above forms a significant part of being a self which is molded and shaped by indefinite others, conflict also constitutes a significant part of the self which is as essential as the average everydayness of the self. Conflicts arise for the most part from the concrete relations the self has with particular individuals, or as one might as well say, definite or particular others. Virginia Woolf herself was not only highly attentive to the ways the indefinite others infiltrated and dictated her own life at the turn of the century, as earlier mentioned, but also she was aware of the tensional nature of the encounters with particular others. In "A Sketch of the Past," she relates how she came down one evening from her room to the living room wearing a green dress which was thereupon severely disapproved by George Duckworth due to the "defiance of his accepted standards" and

"infringement of a code that meant more to him than he could admit" (151). Given such experience, for Woolf, the Heideggerian they as implicitly penetrating one's life by dictating certain ways of average living is further transported onto a whole new level of conflictual relations between certain individuals. Such concrete relations are ultimately subtended and made possible by the average everydayness in that it enables one to smoothly engage with the world and other people. In effect, Woolf herself had to confront the dictations of "the they" and at the same time face up to the particular individuals in her life.

Such conflictual relations that necessarily arise between the self and others are inevitable in that the self is not just, to use Sartre's terms, a being-for-itself (it is that, too) but, more significantly, the self has another dimension, that is, being-for-others. As being-for-itself, the self is absorbed in itself and lost in whatever activity or inactivity it might be involved without any explicit self-awareness; however, the appearance or at times absent presence of others casts the self onto another dimension where the self becomes aware that it is not solely for itself but also for others. As Christine Daigle explains, the other "informs me that I have no control over a part of myself: my being-for-others is strictly determined by others. I am an object among others and have a certain meaning in the Other's world, according to the Other's own project, and there is nothing I can do about it" (75). In this sense, one is inevitably bound to others in whose world s/he appears as an object by virtue of his/her embodied physical existence and thus is exposed to their evaluation – which ultimately leads to the collision between the self and others on various levels. The objectification the self undergoes is mediated through the presence and/or look of the other which gives rise, at times, to a painful bodily self-awareness, that is, an awareness of the self's exteriority and his/her body as seen through the eyes of the other.

In *The Waves*, tensional confrontations among the characters make the characters undergo such experiences of objectification by others. For instance, such a conflictual encounter is played out between Neville and Susan at their gathering at Hampton Court after Percival's death. Having come to the dinner party with a firm belief in himself, Neville loses his faith in himself upon encountering Susan: "I feel in my private pocket and find my credentials – what I carry to prove my superiority. I have passed. I have

papers in my private pocket that prove it. . . . These papers in my private pocket . . . make a faint sound like that of a man clapping in an empty field to scare away rooks (*The Waves* 176-77). According to Mark Hussey, "Neville's self-confidence, bolstered by his qualifications, withers before Susan" (12). Therefore, unyielding and inflexible though it may seem in the first place, Neville's perception of himself as "superior" loses its ground as soon as Susan surges on the horizon and denies Neville his self-attributed superiority. Moreover, such failure in the face of Susan evokes a desire in Neville to counteract her unrelenting presence that undermines that of his.

Recognizing that the nature of meetings and encounters among friends and people in general is that of conflict, Neville is thus resolved not only to neutralize Susan's sway over him but also to subdue her in turn – which further fuels the conflict between the two. As Neville says, "[t]here is always somebody, when we come together, and the edges of meeting are still sharp, who refuses to be submerged; whose identity therefore one wishes to make crouch beneath one's own. For me now, it is Susan" (*The Waves* 177). Michael Weinman argues that Neville, with these lines, picks up Bernard's rendition of their gathering as shock-giving a couple of pages before, and states that

> there is a 'shock' in meeting precisely because, when one truly 'meets' another, there is a confrontation, a meeting of wills in which my expression of my identity unavoidably entails the submission (the 'submergence' in Neville's image) of the other's identity to my own. Reversing the agency this means that when we meet with identity of the other, I suddenly feel the fragility of my own. (106)

Indeed, Neville's seemingly solid stance falls apart and fails him in Susan's presence, thereby revealing him to be rather vulnerable in the face of the other. Moreover, such confrontational encounters as the one between Neville and Susan inevitably bring about a sense of shock in other characters as well.

Concrete encounters directly undercut the self's smooth coping in the world. Much earlier in the novel, for example, Louis acknowledges the possible disquieting nature of meetings by saying that Rhoda hid behind the waiters and pillars in order to "put off as long as possible the shock of recognition" (*The Waves* 98). Later, Rhoda also admits how she fears "the shock of sensation that leaps upon [her]" (107) upon meeting others. In like manner, Bernard maintains that "[t]here is no panacea (let me note) against the

shock of meeting" (176). Considering that many of the characters in the novel variously touch upon as well as experience the shock-inducing nature of concrete encounters, it is not right to directly link Neville's lines to those of Bernard (as Weinman does). Nevertheless, Neville's attempt to "crouch" Susan's transcendence under his own demonstrates that "one's individual existence – far from being a product of independent self-sufficiency – requires that somebody else heed you. And, since it is always in that other person's power to refuse, the other has the ever-present potency to unmake one's very subjectivity" (Weinman 106).

In such conflictual meetings, one comes to define oneself in relation to or against others. Following Neville's thoughts, Susan says that "[y]et look, Neville, whom I discredit in order to be myself, at my hand on the table. . . . (We battle like beasts fighting in a field, like stags making their horns clash)" (*The Waves* 179). In other words, "[i]t is her difference from Neville that makes her [Susan] possible" (Boon 105) and the parameter for self-understanding in this case is once again the other. Furthermore, the tension that starts out between Susan and Neville is not deemed exclusive to them but rather regarded as necessary among friends. Generalizing the conflict for all her friends, Susan goes so far as to state that such conflicts are part and parcel of concrete encounters between the self and others: "Now we have clashed our antlers. This is the necessary prelude; the salute of old friends" (*The Waves* 180). In effect, both Susan's rendition of meeting as clash and that of Bernard as shock along with some of the other characters' concurrence[48] evince that the same conflictual encounters hold true for all of the characters and that conflict constitutes one of the essential components of intersubjective relations. In Sartre's words, "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others" (*Being* 364) because comporting oneself towards the world along with others might eventually entail a confrontation with others.

In such encounters, meeting the other leads one to lose his/her bearings because the other with his/her re-appropriation of the world overrides one's transcendence by doing away with the self's hold on his/her environment as well as by reducing the self to as yet another object to be manipulated in his/her own re-organization. Heidegger argues that others are encountered in the ready-to-hand objects that Dasein daily attends to. For example, when one enters a workshop, one can easily see how items such as hammers

and nails ultimately refer to someone who uses them for this or that particular purpose and thus immediately recognize how the whole context of the workshop is organized and appropriated by others. One's organization and appropriation of his/her immediate surroundings at will, hence, denotes one's transcendence of the world.

However, Heidegger does not see in the other's organization of the world any kind of usurpation or conflict; on the contrary, for him, Dasein always already comports him/herself towards the world along with/like other Daseins. Unlike Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty considers such appropriation by others as generating a "vortex" into which the self is plunged and which reveals the world as similarly re-appropriated but not belonging to the self (412). Put differently, although the world is the same as the one which the self earlier appropriated, the organization of the objects in its perceptual field seems strange for the simple reason that this organization is brought about by *someone else*. Moreover, although Merleau-Ponty's choice of word, that is, vortex, comes close to Sartre's rendition of such experience as creating a "drain hole," it would not be fair to align him entirely with Sartre. Instead, one might argue that Merleau-Ponty holds rather an intermediary position between Heidegger and Sartre in that he recognizes not only the similar handling of the world by the self and others alike but also the alterity of such handling carried out by the other. Therefore, as Owen Ware puts it, "Merleau-Ponty wants a social ontology to the extent that it establishes a we-subject, a genuine intersubjectivity, but not to the point that it dissolves subjectivity altogether" (507).

Merleau-Ponty concurs with Sartre's view that others have a certain disorienting effect on the self by creating a whirlpool towards which the self's grip on the world is drawn. As such, the other overthrows the self's command of his/her surroundings by implementing a gravitational force which, as it were, pulls away the world from the self's grasp. Many instances observed in *The Waves* corroborate the relentless disorientation which the self experiences and which is fundamentally effected through the other's commanding presence. In the first dinner meeting when the characters come to the restaurant one by one, Jinny's appearance at the door of the restaurant is immediately felt by other characters as displacing the current organization. Alan Thomas writes that the world, with the appearance of the other, is "structured around other centers of consciousness each of which is a 'for-itself' that transcends its own

reality just as I transcend mine" (166). Given such structuring, Jinny's presence accordingly generates, in Sartre's words, a "crack in [their] universe" (*Being* 256) by bringing about a new organization of the world which revolves around her. Her unyielding presence supplants the organization by becoming the new center. Upon seeing Jinny, Susan observes: "She stands in the door. Everything seems stayed. The waiter stops. The diners at the table by the door look. She seems to center everything; round her tables, lines of doors, windows, ceilings, ray themselves, like rays round the star in the middle of smashed window-pane. She brings things to a point, to order" (*The Waves* 99). Jinny re-appropriates the whole organization of the restaurant, thereby making the distances unfold from herself. In Sartre's words, "[w]e are dealing with a relation which is without *parts*, given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds a spatiality, which is not *my* spatiality; for instead of a grouping *toward me* of objects, there is now an orientation *which flees from me*" (*Being* 254). Accordingly, tables, doors, windows, etc. which were previously disclosed in relation to other diners are subsequently taken over and re-appropriated by Jinny who becomes the new focal point at the restaurant.

Moreover, her disorienting presence noticeably affects the other characters, too. Susan says that "[n]ow she [Jinny] sees us, and moves, and all the rays ripple and flow and waver over us, bringing in new tides of sensation. We change. Louis puts his hand to his tie. Neville, who sits waiting with agonized intensity, nervously straightens the forks in front of him" (*The Waves* 99). Like the other diners at the restaurant, Susan, Neville and Louis experience the impact Jinny's presence has on them. Neville's thoughts also confirm those of Susan: "But when you [Jinny] stand in the door . . . You inflict stillness, demanding admiration, and that is a great impediment to the freedom of intercourse. You stand in the door making us notice you" (*The Waves* 105). Indeed, as Owen Ware notes, "[a]nother consciousness is like a black hole, drawing all surrounding objects, including myself, into its undeniable gravity" (506). Moreover, Jinny is distinctly aware of her hold on others which is directly reflected on the way they behave. Jinny notices that "[t]heir hands go fluttering to their ties. They touch their waistcoats, their pocket-handkerchiefs. . . . They are anxious to make a good

impression" (*The Waves* 82-83). Hence, the presence of the other haunts the self whose bearings are accordingly remolded in relation to the center created by the other.

By re-orienting the present organization, the other's presence transcends the already established relations and as such disintegrates the self's universe of perceptual objects arranged with regard to him/her. As Sartre puts it, "there is a total space which is grouped around the Other, and this space is made *with my space*; there is a regrouping in which I take part but which escapes me, a regrouping of all the objects which people my universe" (*Being* 255). Such transcendence on the other's part is, in effect, experienced as foreign and alienating for the characters in the novel. For instance, Bernard thinks that Louis and Neville "feel the presence of other people as a separating wall" and protests that he does not "believe in separation" (*The Waves* 53). However, despite his fervent belief in oneness with others, his other remarks about others belie his insistence on being one with others. Upon leaving the school for summer holiday, Bernard sees a "traveler" get on the train and immediately characterizes his presence as "cold" and "unassimilated" (*The Waves* 53).

Indeed, the other's presence is not only unassimilated but also conducive to "a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting" (Sartre, *Being* 255). At the boarding school, both Susan and Rhoda feel exposed to such disintegration of their universe which they try hard to establish and secure, albeit to no avail. For instance, Susan dreams of going back to the fields and mixing with nature and hence being away from all the restrictions, discipline and order imposed on her by others. Like Neville's rendition of solitude as "reprieve from conversation" with others (*The Waves* 17), all Susan asks for is "solitude in which to unfold [her] possessions" (42) without being disturbed by others. All of the elements of her wish to go back to her hometown on holiday refer to a sense of desire to be away from others and thereby secure her hold on her own universe. However, she fails to do so precisely because at school "bells ring [and] feet shuffle perpetually" (*The Waves* 42). Hence, in the face of others, Susan cannot help but give in to such decentralization effected by others.

Likewise, Rhoda is susceptible to the presence of others which she finds quite devastating and even destructive. She laments that there are hours "before I can let my tree grow, quivering in green pavilions above my head" (*The Waves* 43). However, she knows that others will not allow her to do so: "Here I cannot let it grow. Somebody knocks through it. They ask questions, they interrupt, they throw it down" (*The Waves* 43). Yielding to the situation at hand, Rhoda, in the bathroom, imagines herself to be a Russian Empress addressing and waving her fist at an angry mob from a balcony. In other words, she fantasizes about herself being a fearless and defiant empress, having a firm grip on her perceptual environment where she is the central figure. Nevertheless, as Sartre notes, the appearance of the other in one's perceptual field "[steals] the world from me" (*Being* 255-56) – which is the case in Rhoda's situation. She instantly recognizes her fragility and, by extension, the fragility of her dream in the face of the other. In this respect, "[f]rom dislocated moment to dislocated moment, she lives perpetually in the fear of exposure" to others (Poole 204). As Rhoda is well aware, "[b]ut this is a thin dream. This is a papery tree. Miss Lambert blows it down. Even the sight of her vanishing down the corridor blows it to atoms. It is not solid; it gives me no satisfaction – this Empress dream. It leaves me, now that it has fallen, here in the passage rather shivering" (*The Waves* 44). In a sense, Miss Lambert's presence initiates a sort of "emptying" (Sartre, *Being* 256) in Rhoda's world, thereby shattering her seemingly secure position.

On the other hand, Bernard undergoes disorienting experiences similar to those of Susan and Rhoda in two different occasions. Towards the end of the novel, Bernard recalls how dismaying Louis's presence became when he came to the turf by the willow tree where Bernard and others sat: "Louis, when he let himself down on the grass, cautiously spreading (I do not exaggerate) a mackintosh square, made one acknowledge his presence. It was formidable" (*The Waves* 211). Louis's presence is presented as not only daunting but also as imposing itself on others. Nevertheless, Bernard does not elaborate on this encounter between himself and Louis as he does with his confrontation with Neville earlier in the novel. In the second appalling experience of the other, Bernard comes face to face with his friend Neville who comes to visit Bernard and gives him his poem to read. The confrontation between Bernard and Neville turns into a state of

conflict creating tension that undermines Bernard's authority over his world. Bernard says that "[l]ike a long wave, like a roll of heavy waters, he went over me, his devastating presence – dragging me open, laying bare the pebbles on the shore of my soul" (*The Waves* 71). The affective transformation Bernard undergoes in the presence of Neville seems to be as stifling and discomforting as those of Rhoda and Susan. With the disappearance of "that alien presence" of Neville, Bernard feels "[n]o longer impinged upon by the demands of the other" (Minow-Pinkney 158) and articulates the relief that he feels as follows: "He is gone; I stand here, holding his poem. . . . But now, how comfortable, how reassuring to feel that alien presence removed, that scrutiny darkened and hooded over!" (*The Waves* 72). Indeed, Bernard is quite anxious not to be exposed to such "unassimilated" and "disarming" "alien presence:" "How grateful to draw the blinds, and admit no other presence . . ." (*The Waves* 72). Hence, the presence of the other causes an undeniably strong pressure on the self whose sway over his/her perceptual field as well as him/herself crumbles under it.

For Sartre, one of the fundamental manifestations of the conflicts in self-other relations springs from the possibility of being exposed to the "look" of the other (*Being* 252, 257-58). The look constitutes the indispensable element of the fundamental relation between the self and the other in that it is only through the experience of falling under the other's gaze that one comes to apprehend the other's subjectivity. In addition, at one stroke, with such confrontation, the other's look undermines the self's being-for-itself and its absorption in its activity, thereby pulling away the self from its lostness in itself and imparting objectivity to it. As Mark Sacks writes, "in apprehending it [the look] I come immediately to recognize that it is *me* that is being looked at, which in turn gives rise to the appreciation of my being an object in the public world" (289). Therefore, the self not only encounters the other-as-subject by virtue of his/her look but also, more significantly, such experience of the other's subjectivity transforms the self's relation to him/herself by revoking his/her unmitigated subjectivity and consequently recasting him/her as an object.

Moreover, the other's presence, though not necessarily a physical one, becomes unbearably unsettling insofar as it is disclosed through the other's look that falls upon the self. The gaze of the other, and in some cases, as an extension of it, the face of the

other (as articulated in Lévinas's philosophy) seem so compelling as to effect an affective transformation of the self, leading to "a discovery of an aspect of my existence that is not manifested in my absorbed engagement in the world," that is, "my being-for-others" (Webber 188). Indeed, as the epigraph of this chapter evinces, "one fears the human eye" (Woolf, *Jacob's* 81) in that the look apparently has a peculiar transmuting force that casts the self from its absorbed subjectivity into a different dimension of existence where the self sustains an affective blow from the gaze of the other.

Such powerful grip of the look (and the face) seems to be in force in quite a number of the intersubjective encounters in *The Waves*, thereby demonstrating the intersubjectively-mediated affective transformation of the self as well as denoting the disconcerting factor of the gaze. For instance, both in his early childhood and in his old age, Bernard appears to be troubled by the "stare" of others which conspicuously exerts an influence on him. When it is time for Bernard to go to school and thus leave home for the first time in his life, he seems agitated at the prospect of being the center of others' gaze:

> Everybody knows I am going to school, going to school for the first time. 'That boy is going to school for the first time,' says the housemaid, cleaning the steps. I must not cry. I must behold them indifferently. . . . I must make phrases and phrases and so interpose something hard between myself and the stare of housemaids, the stare of clocks, staring faces, indifferent faces, or I shall cry. (*The Waves* 22)

A further ramification of the stare involves another transformative disclosure of Bernard's surroundings in that he even feels that the clock at the train station – which happens to be "moon-faced," hence having a face – directs its gaze on him: "Now the awful portals of the station gape; 'the moon-faced clock regards me'" (*The Waves* 22). As Sartre puts it, once one is subjected to the look, the other "is present everywhere, below me, above me, in the neighboring rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly my being-for-others" (*Being* 277). In effect, with such experience of the other, not only is the whole organization of one's universe restructured, as earlier argued, but also, as seen in Bernard's case, the world is disclosed differently to the self in the presence of the other where the look might come from anywhere and everywhere.

Towards the end of the novel, Bernard goes through a much more unsettling and unnerving experience in a concrete encounter with an unnamed man who stares down Bernard and causes him to feel utterly objectified. Bernard as being-for-itself, in the first place, retains his own organization of the world and thus could think of himself "so vast, a temple, a church, a whole universe, unconfined and capable of being everywhere on the verge of things and here too . . ." (*The Waves* 243). His centralization of the world holds only as long as he remains on the level of pure subjectivity; however, the gaze of the other undercuts his unleashed subjectivity by spatializing, temporalizing and hence transforming him into an object. The face and gaze of this stranger disconcert Bernard and pull him out of his self-absorbed manner: "Oh, but there is your face. I catch your eye. . . . Always it begins again; always there is the enemy; eyes meeting ours; fingers twitching ours; the effort waiting" (*The Waves* 243-44). According to Emily Dalgarno, "Bernard's sense of his marginal position arises as a consequence of recognizing himself as the object of the gaze of the African traveler [the unnamed man]" (118). Similarly, as Makiko Minow-Pinkney asserts, "Bernard's self is an effect of the gaze of the other" (158). Indeed, Bernard resentfully becomes aware of the objectification of his subjectivity and being an object in the eyes of the other.

After being exposed to the gaze of the stranger, Bernard says:

> I . . . am now nothing but what you see – an elderly man, rather heavy, grey above the ears, who (I see myself in the glass) leans one elbow on the table, and holds in his left hand a glass of old brandy. That is the blow you have dealt me. I have walked bang into the pillar-box. I reel from side to side. I put my hands to my head. My hat is off – I dropped my stick. (*The Waves* 243-44)

Bernard's hold over his world is immediately held in check when the other sees him. In Dalgarno's understanding, "[h]eretofore Bernard has been the agent of the gaze, but as object he feels his authority evaporate . . ." (118-19). Before the stranger's gaze fell on him, Bernard could easily go about his business with full absorption in his world; however, the steadfast look of the other transfixes Bernard spatio-temporally by situating him at a café in the evening. This experience of Bernard's recalls his encounter with the disorienting presence of Neville earlier in the novel where he feels "[t]o be contracted by another person into a single being – how strange" (*The Waves* 72). Furthermore, Bernard reveals how he is pinned down by the other's gaze as follows:

"Yet this shadow which has sat by me for an hour or two, this mask from which peep two eyes, has power to drive me back, to pinion me down among all those other faces, to shut me in a hot room; to send me dashing like a moth from candle to candle" (*The Waves* 244-45). In this regard, Bernard's pure subjectivity (being-for-itself) that has been let loose is re-contained and turned over to him as objectivity (being-for-others), as elaborated in the metaphors of being confined to a room and also of being a moth that is bound to beat against the sources of light – both of which imply a certain sense of exteriority and spatio-temporal situatedness.

Bernard can feel relief from the gripping gaze only after this man leaves the café: "Heaven be praised for solitude! I am alone now. That almost unknown person has gone, to catch some train, to take some cab, to go to some place or person whom I do not know. The face looking at me has gone. The pressure is removed" (*The Waves* 245). It is the pressure of the face, and more particularly, the eyes of the other that, so to speak, paralyze Bernard and thus exert a pressure on him, making him ultimately aware of himself as objectified in the presence of the other: "It is strange that we, who are capable of so much suffering, should inflict so much suffering. Strange that the face of a person whom I scarcely know save that I think we met once on the gangway of a ship bound for Africa – a mere adumbration of eyes, cheeks, nostrils – should have power to inflict this insult" (*The Waves* 244). In a sense, Bernard grievously recognizes the ultimate grasp and affective transformation of the other's look.

In a similar and yet much more forceful manner, Rhoda's experience of the other's face/gaze makes her lose her bearings as well as undergo an affective change. As Rhoda says, "I choose out across the hall some unknown face and can hardly drink my tea when she whose name I do not know sits opposite. I choke. I am rocked from side to side by the violence of my emotion" (*The Waves* 33). Dan Zahavi writes that the gaze need not necessarily be "critical" but "rather it is its objectifying character that is decisive" in causing an affective transformation of the self ("Shame" 217-18). For this reason, Rhoda's experiences of the look throughout the novel are, most of the time, emotionally unsettling and even repulsive for her. For instance, later in the novel, akin to the contemplative mood of Bernard, Rhoda reflects on her relations with others and her thoughts reveal how she has been deeply affected by others in numerous phases of

her life. In a resentful and pensive state, Rhoda remarks how human beings (their presence and stares) have intimidated her as follows:

> 'Oh, life, how I have dreaded you,' said Rhoda, 'oh, human beings, how I have hated you! How you have nudged, how you have interrupted, how hideous you have looked in Oxford Street, *how squalid sitting opposite each other staring in the Tube*! Now as I climb this mountain, from the top of which I shall see Africa, my mind is printed with brown-paper parcels and *your faces*. I have been stained by you and corrupted. . . How you chained me to one spot, one hour, one chair, and sat yourselves down opposite! How you snatched from me the white spaces that lie between hour and hour and rolled them into dirty pellets and tossed them into the waste-paper basket with your greasy paws. Yet those were my life.' (*The Waves* 169, emphasis added)

Rhoda's self, and her life, are laden with stares and faces of people to such an extent that even on her trip to Spain where she climbs a mountain and from where she will see Africa, she is haunted by others whose faces are still etched in her mind.

After the second dinner gathering at Hampton Court, all the characters take a walk in the gardens, stroll around and vanish two by two. Rhoda stays with Louis and, after a while, the others start to come back and their figures, coming towards Rhoda and Louis, become more and more visible. In the first place, they are merely indistinguishable silhouettes. As they advance, these silhouettes turn into unrecognizable men and women. However, as they approach, the first thing that attracts Rhoda's attention is that these figures have faces and *only then* they are disclosed as Susan, Bernard, Jinny and Neville: "They have faces. They become Susan and Bernard, Jinny and Neville, people we know. Now what shrinkage takes place! Now what a shrivelling, what an humiliation!" (*The Waves* 193). Indeed, as Roger Poole emphasizes, Rhoda's experience of herself, or rather her embodiment, "is presented as the experience of continuous physical exposure" to the gaze of the other (201). The affective transformation the other brings about is thus experienced by Rhoda powerfully as seen in her affective "shrivelling" and "shrinkage." Similar to her choking and violent emotions at the beginning of the novel, she is once more affectively vulnerable to the look of the other:

> The old shivers run through me, hatred and terror, as I feel myself grappled to one spot by these hooks they cast on us; these greetings, recognitions, pluckings of the

> finger and searchings of the eyes. They have only to speak, and their first words, with the remembered tone and the perpetual deviation from what one expects, and their hands moving and making a thousand past days rise again in the darkness, shake my purpose. (*The Waves* 193)

What terrorizes Rhoda is the fact that she is not only *seen* by others but also moved by the "greetings" and "recognitions" all of which denote a sense of being pinned down by them. For this very reason, Rhoda feels cornered and thus her resolve, whatever it may be, is broken under the "searchings of the eyes."

Like Bernard and Rhoda, Neville is susceptible to the gaze of the other, too. As Sartre's voyeur example has revealed, one is generally absorbed in his/her activity without a distinct self-awareness unless s/he notices that s/he is seen. As being-in-the-world, each and every embodied being runs the risk of falling under the gaze of the other. This is accommodated by the fact that the experience of the other cannot be undone once the other is experienced by the self. Furthermore, such primordial experience of the other constitutes the reason for the ever-present risk of being seen simply because, as an embodied being in the external world, one is inevitably visible to the other.

Similar to Bernard's memory of Louis's daunting presence on the turf, Neville's seeing Louis enter the restaurant for their first gathering discloses his vulnerability to the gaze of the other. Neville finds Louis "acrid, suspicious, domineering, difficult . . . . At the same time he is formidable, for there is laughter in his eyes. He has seen me" (*The Waves* 98). Neville reveals the reason for imputing such characteristics to Louis by simply pointing to the intimidating laughter in his eyes – to which there is more than meets the eye in that it is the possibility of the eyes full of laughter to be directed at Neville that makes Louis's stare "formidable" for him. This is because the possibility of being seen indicates "our exposure, vulnerability, and visibility" (Zahavi, "Shame" 224). This possibility is realized only a moment later when Neville says Louis has seen him. With Louis's eyes directed at Neville, Neville cannot help but acknowledge Louis's presence which is underlined by the final words of his current speech: "Here he is" (*The Waves* 98). On the other hand, similarly, Louis feels the same when Susan enters the restaurant and sees him and Neville who are forthwith moved by Susan's

stare: "When she sees us (Neville, and myself) her face assumes a certainty which is alarming, as if she had what she wanted" (*The Waves* 98).

Later in the novel, Susan's gaze becomes more unsettling for Neville than it does for Louis. At their second meeting at Hampton Court, Neville is utterly defenseless in the presence of Susan whose stare shatters and disregards all the accomplishments that Neville has achieved so far. Neville complainingly remarks:

> But your eyes, Susan, full of turnips and cornfields, disturb me. . . . [T]he clamor that proves that I have passed . . . has died down altogether, under Susan's stare (the clapping, the reverberation that I have made), and I hear only the wind sweeping over the ploughed land and some bird singing – perhaps some intoxicated lark. (*The Waves* 176-77)

Sartre writes that "I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am" (*Being* 289). Likewise, Michael Weinman asserts that "in order to be anything at all, Neville needs to be the one to whom Susan will listen" (106). Put another way, Neville needs the approval of Susan to be somebody. Given Neville's situation, however, Susan's look shatters Neville's belief in himself that he has built up thus far, thereby leaving him powerless and desolate with Susan's "green eyes fixed on [him]" (*The Waves* 178). In addition, throughout this part of the novel, there is a repetitive emphasis on the piercing power of Susan's eyes which shakes up Neville's "credentials" just like the stare of people that has earlier shaken Rhoda's "purpose."

The susceptibility that derives from such visibility brings to the fore the embodied objective existence of the self in the world among others. With the appearance of the other, being-for-itself is almost irrevocably exteriorized and thereby forced to face its being-for-others. The possibility of being seen is that which brings about the objectification and consequently exteriorization of the self into a being who has an exterior visible to all in the world. Moreover, such vulnerability to the look bestows an objective status on the self of which s/he is mostly unaware mainly because one, as being-for-itself, is lost in his/her activity. This absorption, however, lasts until the self undergoes a transformation in the face of the other's gaze. The moment Sartre's voyeur hears footsteps in the hall, he is at once transformed into a being whose being is destined for the other. All the organization of the world the voyeur has effected thus far

around him turns upside down, thereby making him lose his grip on his own universe and rendering him as yet another object amidst the world. In Sacks' formulation, one becomes, "for all that [one] might inwardly have transcended [his/her] worldly coil, an object with a specific spatio-temporal locus that the other directly observes" (287). In this respect, the look retains the potential not only to incapacitate the self's hold over the world but also to spatialize and temporalize the self, hence making out of him/her an object which is situated among other objects. In other words, the self through its dimension of being-for-others becomes a spatio-temporal object in the eyes of the other and simultaneously in his/her own eyes. Therefore, being-for-itself (pure subjectivity) is impelled to face its exteriority as an object not only for itself but, more fundamentally, for others.

The objectification effected through the other strips the self of its subjectivity and discloses him/her as a mere object even when the other's presence is an absent one. In *The Waves*, such objectification of the self takes place in quite a number of instances where the characters find themselves recast as objects. Analogous to Neville's objectification by Louis's eyes full of laughter at the first meeting, Bernard also feels himself to be merely a paltry object, among others, even when he simply thinks of Louis. In effect, "the Other, the bearer of the look, [is] given as part of the structure of the world in which I find myself" (Sacks 293), and for this very reason, the other need not necessarily be factically present. On the contrary, the other's absent presence is enough to bring about such objectification. As Bernard says,

> [s]o he sits in an office, Louis, the best scholar in the school. But I seeking contrasts often feel his eye on us, his laughing eye, his wild eye, adding us up like insignificant items in some grand total which he is for ever pursuing in his office. . . . Yes, as I lean out of the window and drop my cigarette so that it twirls lightly to the ground, I feel Louis watching even my cigarette. (*The Waves* 74)

Like Neville's fear of the laughter in Louis's objectifying eyes, Bernard's disquietude in relation to Louis emanates from being transformed into a mere object, or rather "insignificant items," to be tossed to and fro. Sartre postulates that "I cannot be an object for myself, for I am what I am . . . . Thus for me the Other is first the being for whom I am an object; that is, the being *through whom* I gain my objectness" (*Being* 270). Hence, although Bernard elaborates on the disturbance Louis causes in a much

more detailed manner than Neville does, both cases of Neville and Bernard share a common concern for the disconcerting (absent) presence of the other.

The objectification and concurrent exteriorization effected through the other's spatio-temporalizing presence, or look, further demonstrates that being seen by the other is not merely a mental act or perception, on the self's part, of being objectified or exteriorized. On the contrary, such exteriorization is affectively felt and at the same time bodily lived. The other's look triggers a painful bodily self-awareness, causing the self to undergo certain distressing experiences. Embodiment as such constitutes the point of contact not only with the world but also, more particularly, with others who could thus affectively transform the self. As Jinny says upon noticing that the gentleman sitting across her on the train directs his stare at her, "[t]he gentleman pulls up the window. I see reflections on the shining glass which lines the tunnel. I see him lower his paper. He smiles at my reflection in the tunnel. My body instantly of its own accord puts forth a frill under his gaze. My body lives a life of its own" (*The Waves* 49). Jinny's body immediately reacts to the gaze of the other. According to Mark Hussey, "Jinny . . . is at one extreme of that scale of ways in which the body can be lived; she can imagine nothing 'beyond the circle cast by my body'" (7). Indeed, as soon as the gaze of the other falls on Jinny, it evokes a certain bodily response from her and simultaneously makes her aware of her exteriority. Moreover, of all the characters in the novel, Jinny seems to be the only one who has such a strong control over and, more particularly, is one with her body in that she could easily comport herself in accordance with the situation at hand. For example, while Jinny is absorbed in a sort of daydream on the train, she notices a woman's eyes on her – upon which her body responds as follows: "But behold, looking up, I meet the eyes of a sour woman, who suspects me of rapture. My body shuts in her face, impertinently like a parasol. I open my body, I shut my body at my will" (*The Waves* 50).

However, the other characters' experience of their own bodies in the face of others is not so malleable as that of Jinny in that they are bodily affected in a much more severe manner. The concrete encounters with others in the novel are quite excruciating and torturous for many characters. For instance, Rhoda is haunted by the afflictive presence of others as people enter the ballroom as follows: "The door opens; terror rushes in;

terror upon terror, pursuing me. . . . But here the door opens and people come; they come towards me. Throwing faint smiles to mask their cruelty, their indifference, they seize me" (*The Waves* 85). Encountering them, Rhoda feels incapacitated and, furthermore, bodily exposed. Madelyn Detloff argues that "Rhoda is unable to externalize herself enough to navigate the world successfully" (54). However, Rhoda's situation is related more to her concern with her bodily objectification than her inability to externalize herself.

Upon being asked to dance with a gentleman, Rhoda does not know how to prepare herself for such a concrete encounter with the other. Rhoda says "I must take his hand; I must answer. But what answer shall I give? I am thrust back to stand burning in this clumsy, this ill-fitting body, to receive the shafts of his indifference and his scorn . . ." (*The Waves* 85). A person "is not embarrassed by his body as it is for himself, but as it is for the other" (Zahavi, "Shame" 220). In this respect, dancing with the gentleman and thereby facing the other, Rhoda is paralyzed and lives through a bodily affliction in the face of indifference, scorn and ridicule reflected in the eyes of the other and directed at her (body):

> A million arrows pierce me. Scorn and ridicule pierce me. I am . . . pinned down here; am exposed. . . . Tongues with their whips are upon me. Mobile, incessant, they flicker over me. . . . I am broken into separate pieces; I am no longer one. . . . When I have passed through this drawing-room flickering with tongues that cut me like knives, making me stammer, making me lie, I find faces rid of features, robed in beauty. (*The Waves* 85-86)

Indeed, all the metaphors Rhoda employs in this passage point to the objectification of her body and more importantly the dimension of her being-for-others. As Roger Poole notes in relation to Rhoda's case, "[e]xposedness is the key note. The body is experienced as open, exposed, threatened, surrounded, scrutinized, menaced. Rhoda is the character in *The Waves* in whom this experience . . . is particularly emphasized" (200). Feeling herself to be "the youngest, the most naked of you all [her friends]," Rhoda is to "be cast up and down among these men and women, with their twitching faces, with their lying tongues . . ." (*The Waves* 86), and is even sure that "[m]ore cruel than the old torturers, you will let me fall, and will tear me to pieces when I am fallen" (*The Waves* 187).

In the course of the novel, like Rhoda, other characters also sustain similar afflictive blows as a consequence of their exteriorization in the presence of others. For instance, early in the novel, Louis's experience of his fellows during the class hour is thoroughly saturated with bodily suffering: "Jinny and Susan, Bernard and Neville bind themselves into a thong with which to lash me. They laugh at my neatness, at my Australian accent" (*The Waves* 14). In other words, others possess the power to make the self undergo an affective transformation, and a painful and bodily one at that.

Akin to Rhoda and Louis's situation, Neville and Susan, too, are tormented by the look of the other whose unnerving impact on the self is once again channeled through the use of bodily metaphors. Neville is immensely troubled by the oppressive presence of others. Building upon the metaphors earlier used by Rhoda and Louis, Neville states that "[t]he hostility, the indifference of other people dining here is oppressive. We look at each other; see that we do not know each other, stare, and go off. Such looks are lashes. I feel the whole cruelty and indifference of the world in them" (*The Waves* 97). Such oppression caused by others and exercised upon Neville at their first meeting is shared by Susan who gives expression to her agitation through employing one of the more striking metaphors in the novel. As she spends time and talks with others at the table, Susan feels more and more bodily exposed to others and feels as if it were "undressing an old woman whose dress had seemed to be part of her, but now, as we talk, she turns pinkish underneath, and has wrinkled thighs and sagging breasts" (*The Waves* 107-08). In this regard, the other's presence/look is not only disorienting for the self, as has been argued earlier, but also, more particularly, has an undeniable force that calls forth a bodily affective transformation of the self.

Such objectification and consequently exteriorization of the self that emanate from the other's look bring about a sense of heightened self-consciousness, making the subject attend to his/her objective qualities of which s/he was not conscious previously. In effect, the transformation of the self into an exteriorized object, or rather the revelation of its being-for-others, makes the self define itself from the perspective of and in relation to others. It is the other through whom one is attributed certain qualities and thus reduced to a particular identity. As Sartre puts it, "[w]e are dealing with my being *as* it is written in and by the Other's freedom [transcendence]" (*Being* 262). In other

words, the self who is full of transcendence (transcending and manipulating the world at will) is, upon objectification, transcended by the other and thus the free flow of his/her transcendence is held in check, thereby causing the self to be surpassed by the other's transcendence.

Moreover, by virtue of being transcended, the self that has already been in the making is transformed into an object and hence can be easily defined. As being-for-itself, the self always already manipulates his/her surroundings as the center of the whole organization of the world; however, with the appearance of the other, the self is transformed into a mere object with certain objective qualities in the perceptual field of the other. In the concrete encounters with others, one is not only objectified and transcended by them but also s/he acquires a being, that is, a fixed identity which is fundamentally conferred on the self by others. Therefore, the other's appraisal of the self by objectifying him/her is the condition of possibility for the self to acquire an identity or, as it were, to become *somebody*.

As Sartre's voyeur example has already shown, the "voyeur" epithet given to the peeping person is imputable only insofar as there are others to confer such attribute on the self. Others "[are] looking at me and categorizing me as having certain fixed properties, such as being a snoop or a voyeur, on the basis of my behavior, even though I cannot know exactly what properties they ascribe to me" (Webber 188). The other's look involves an ultimate freedom to re-inscribe the self's being since it nullifies the transcendence of the self. In addition, the other's immediate appearance on the self's horizon precludes the possibility of a discursive preparation, on the self's part, against the other. Hence, the identities and qualities of the self ascribed by the other are by no means conceivable or realizable without the intermediacy of others. On the contrary, they are simply "*unrealizables*" (Sartre, *Being* 527) without others. Given the transcendence-transcended relation, the other is capable of attributing qualities that are otherwise impossible for the self to attribute on its own. This explains why the other has such a strong grip on the self in that one's being/identity is made possible and thus concretized by the other. The other holds the key to the being of the self and self-understanding because one cannot see oneself *as* the other sees him/her from the third-

person perspective. Hence, the other not only objectifies and externalizes the self but also *identifies* the self.

In *The Waves*, all the characters arrive at a self-conception as mediated through the objectifying presence/look of the other. From their childhood onward, they find their being at the disposal of others. As Dan Zahavi puts it, “I become aware that my body is something on which others bear points of view” (“Shame” 220). For example, at the beginning of the novel, upon seeing Jinny kiss Louis’s nape in the garden, Susan immediately becomes conscious of her exteriority by comparing herself to Jinny: “I looked between the leaves and saw her. She danced in flecked with diamonds light as dust. And I am squat, Bernard, I am short. I have eyes that look close to the ground and see insects in the grass” (*The Waves* 10). Jinny’s presence, and more importantly, her kissing Louis “is an event that affects all the children. The jealousy it arouses in Susan makes her perceive acutely that her body is ‘short and squat’” (Hussey 9). Indeed, it is, for the most part, in the presence of the other that one comes to an explicit realization that one has a physical body with certain definable objective qualities (Sartre, *Being* 523-24). Therefore, the appearance of the other in Susan’s world forces her to recognize herself as squat and short.

Susan lives through a much more unsettling experience of exteriorization at the first gathering with her friends where, in the presence of Jinny once again, she finds herself utterly exteriorized and attends to her qualities that are attributed by the other. As has already been discussed, in the scene where Jinny enters the restaurant and centers everything around her, the other characters already experience the disorienting presence of the other. However, such experience of the other has further implications, especially for Susan, in that she discovers her exteriorization more acutely than do the others. Susan says that Jinny *sees* them and consequently they *change*. They undergo a sort of transformation, or rather an objectification, and Jinny’s laughter and derision particularly haunt Susan: Jinny “light[s] up unsparingly my shabby dress, my square-tipped fingernails, which I at once hide under the table-cloth” (*The Waves* 99). According to Mark Hussey, “Jinny proclaims herself wholly through her actions, and she perhaps makes others uncomfortable because she reminds them that they too have bodies, which they would rather forget . . .” (7). With the presence of Jinny, Susan’s

shabby dress and square-tipped fingernails of which Susan was not even aware are now fully highlighted and brought up as the objective qualities of Susan's exteriorized being. Sartre contends that "I cannot confer on myself any quality without mediation or an objectifying power which is not my own power and which I can neither pretend nor forge" (*Being* 274). For this reason, Susan hates Jinny: "I hate Jinny because she shows me that my hands are red, my nails bitten" (*The Waves* 108).

Furthermore, such transformation caused by the other evokes particular emotions such as shame or pride through which one happens to discover his/her transformation and thus his/her qualities. Susan's almost reflexive reaction to her exteriorization, i.e. the instant hiding of her hands under the table-cloth, demonstrates how the other possesses the power to affectively transform Susan and, as a consequence of such transformation, how Susan discovers her objectification in shame. Her instant reaction of hiding her hands discloses her embarrassment with regards to her exteriorized body in the presence of the other who makes Susan see her body in a new light, thereby inducing the feeling of shame in her. As Dan Zahavi emphasizes, "I am ashamed of myself, not qua elusive first-person perspective, but qua the way I appear to the other" ("Shame" 216). Susan's experience of her body in shame bears some resemblance to Woolf's experience of her own body. Woolf mentions how she is "ashamed" of her body and, more importantly, how she could feel "ecstasies and raptures spontaneously and intensely and without any shame or the least sense of guilt, *so long as they were disconnected with my own body*. I thus detect another element in the shame which I had in being caught looking at myself in the glass in the hall. I must have been ashamed or afraid of my own body" ("A Sketch" 68, emphasis added). Indeed, given that "[s]hame in its original and primitive form is *of* oneself *before* the Other" (Gardner 127), Woolf's fear of mirrors apparently demonstrates that mirrors function as the other in reflecting her body back to her as an object.

Moreover, seeing oneself in the mirror is to adopt a third-person perspective, or rather the other's perspective, on oneself – which generates shame simply because, as an object visible to all, one is exposed to the appraisal of the other and subject to the freedom of the other. For this reason, Woolf not only associates shame with her body but also the feeling of shame haunts her throughout her life: "At any rate, the looking-

glass shame has lasted all my life . . ." ("A Sketch" 68). Such shame-inducing exteriorization caused by the mirror, therefore, operates on the same level as that which is effected by a concrete encounter with a particular other. For instance, in *The Waves*, Jinny sees her reflection in the glass in the Tube for which she is completely unprepared. Her immediate reaction to her image in the mirror is the feeling of shame mixed with pity for herself: "But look – there is my body in that looking-glass. How solitary, how shrunk, how aged! I am no longer young. . . . It was only for a moment, catching sight of myself before I had time to prepare myself as I always prepare myself for the sight of myself, that I quailed" (*The Waves* 160-61). Like Woolf's own experience, Jinny is aware that the mirror exteriorizes her as shrunk and aged and, upon seeing her image, Jinny recoils and trembles at the sight of her objectified image. There is no discursive preparation, as in Jinny's case, against the other's objectification, be it through a concrete other or derivatively through a mirror.

On the other hand, Louis also has a heightened self-awareness in the presence of others who bestow on him certain qualities which he discovers, or rather, recognizes in shame. From the very beginning, he is acutely aware of his Australian accent and even thinks that his friends laugh at his accent. At any rate, without the notion of the other, it is impossible for him to notice his accent on his own – which might be regarded as one of the unrealizables. As Mark Sacks writes, "[t]o be in a position to be aware of what I am in the first place, I must already have a conception of the other" (290). Louis's highly self-conscious disposition discloses his fear of the other who can spot his accent and thus reduce him to a certain identity. For instance, at school, all the children gather and sing prayers before going to bed, and Louis fears that his accent will give him away (*The Waves* 19). Similarly, later in the novel, Louis as an adult still maintains an augmented self-awareness in the face of the Other. On his lunch break, Louis is having lunch at an eating-shop where the continuity and rhythm of the atmosphere form an unbroken circle and harmony: "The circle is unbroken . . . Yet I am not included. If I speak, imitating their accent, they prick their ears, waiting for me to speak again, in order that they may place me – if I come from Canada or Australia, I who desire above all things to be taken to the arms with love, am alien, external" (*The Waves* 76). Louis's difference from others as embodied in his accented speech pushes him more and more

to try to "look like the rest of you" (*The Waves* 104): "I hate the others, because it is for them that I do these antics, smoothing my hair, concealing my accent . . . lest you should laugh at me . . ." (*The Waves* 104-05). Louis is apparently ashamed of his accent and his physical appearance which he comes to recognize only through the exteriorization effected by others.

Shame "involves consciousness of myself as an *object* given to the consciousness of the Other, who thereby *mediates* my relation to myself" (Gardner 127). Given this premise, Louis, for example, is even aware of his "prim and supercilious gait" which is mocked at by the charwoman and shop-boys (*The Waves* 167). Akin to Bernard's discovery of himself as an object with certain qualities in the presence of the unnamed guest (*The Waves* 243), Louis discovers some of his qualities (such as his physical appearance, i.e. rough hair, large nose, thin lips; his Australian accent; his body in action, i.e. his affected gait) as they are pointed back to him by the other. Such qualities are freely written on Louis through the other's freedom and are discovered in shame simply because they are imposed on him through objectification and as such he finds himself as an object with these qualities attributed to him, that is, not of his making. As Jonathan Webber puts it, "[s]hame presents me with the very fact that an external perspective can be taken on me, that my existence is not simply my awareness of a world but is also my appearance in the world" (188). In other words, Louis's subjectivity is returned to him, *qua* the other's freedom, as an object visible and vulnerable to the evaluation and manipulation of the other.

It is the other who points the self to explicitly see such objective attributes and this causes the self to perceive itself in a new light. Louis's awareness of his accent – which haunts him throughout the novel – would be inconsequential if he were living in Australia; however, since he is in London surrounded by English friends, he is constantly conscious and reminded of his Australian accent. This is the reason why he persistently sees himself as someone "who speak[s] with an Australian accent, whose father is a banker in Brisbane" (*The Waves* 16, also see 19, 23, 104-05) or as "a boy only with a colonial accent" (40, also see 139, 167, 182) as well as with "large nose" and "thin lips" (41). In one case, he even refers to these qualities as "certain stains" and

"old defilements" to be "expunged" and "erased" (*The Waves* 139). All of these qualities presuppose the existence of others to be attributed as such.

On the other hand, realizing the other's power to confer identity, Louis attempts to make himself feel superior by manipulating the other. For this very reason, he admits that he keeps a mistress with an accent worse than his: "I have little natural happiness though I chose my mistress in order that, with her cockney accent, she might make me feel at my ease . . ." (*The Waves* 167). Louis's choice of a mistress especially with a cockney accent based on the premises of its inferiority demonstrates that Louis is acutely aware of the fact that the feelings of superiority or inferiority are fundamentally other-oriented in that they cannot be evoked without the other. Hence, Louis's perception of himself is once again mediated through the other who, in this particular case, bestows superiority on Louis. In a sense, Louis's superiority, or rather his awareness of himself as superior necessitates another person to be superior to.

Likewise, if to recall Neville's confrontation with Susan at the Hampton Court meeting, Neville is also cognizant, like Louis, of the fact that superiority and success are relative concepts in that they are measured with regard to others. Neville's accomplishments do not count in the presence of Susan, and instead, the failure thereof evinces that such attributes as superiority or success (for which Neville assumes he has proof) are realizable *only insofar as* they are ascribed to oneself by the confirmation of the other. As Neville says,

> What then remains, when I cannot pull out my papers and make you believe by reading aloud my credentials that I have passed? *What remains is what Susan brings to light under the acid of her green eyes, her crystal, pear-shaped eyes*. . . . I talk to impress Susan. Listen to me, Susan. (*The Waves* 177, emphasis added)

Regardless of his own convictions, Neville is prone to the gaze of Susan which is more than enough to reduce Neville to the status of an object. What is left of his subjectivity is actually his objectivity as effected by Susan's look in the face of which Neville is paralyzed. Indeed, since it is in Susan's freedom to confer on Neville whatever identity or qualities she wills, Neville is mostly incapacitated in the presence of Susan. Thus, no

matter how successful or superior Neville regards himself, his achievements can only be validated through the other's approval.

The inextricable relationship between the self and others as such demonstrates how the characters' perception of themselves are fundamentally framed by others. For instance, Jinny's highly sexualized being is foregrounded in the presence of a highly maternal figure, that is, Susan who possesses "the bestial and beautiful passion of maternity" (*The Waves* 108). In this respect, as Pam Morris notes, "Susan finds a sense of self in maternity, Jinny as a courtesan" (48), and their identities are attributed to them by virtue of each other. In a similar fashion, Neville's self-awareness as "ugly," "weak" and "too delicate" – like Rhoda's not feeling up to par or seeing herself "the youngest and the most naked of you all," especially in the presence of Susan and Jinny (*The Waves* 86) – is variously heightened through Percival (*The Waves* 37, 17) or his unnamed lover (*The Waves* 150).

In the light of the seemingly disparate perspectives – which are revealed to be compatible on closer inspection – on the understanding of the self as they-self and being-for-others, it can be argued that Woolf, in *The Waves*, offers a comprehensive conception of the self. Woolf situates the self not only within a complex of insidious relations with others as embodied in the way the self conducts itself in average everydayness, but also within the nexus of concrete relations and encounters where the self comes to take an other-oriented perspective on itself. The alleged opposition and incompatibility between the conceptions of they-self (as lost, anonymous and even impersonal) and being-for-others (as heightened self-consciousness mediated through others) dissolve when the they-self is conceived as the condition of possibility for the particular conflictual encounters that trigger the self's being-for-others. The referential totality, which "the they" prescribe and into which the self is thrown, is what ultimately enables the self to comfortably comport itself in the world and tackle with daily relations. In such soothing existence, the self becomes a they-self, or an everyday average self, that is, becomes just like others, in every sense of the word.

However, this comfortable existence "the they" offer is disrupted time and again through the appearance of a concrete other which increases the self's consciousness of

itself. Encounters with others affectively transform the self and bring about a bodily self-consciousness through the objectification of the self which causes the they-self to become explicitly aware of itself. Weinman argues that "[a]ny account of what *The Waves* has to say about identity and diversity, about the problem of the many and the one, must address the dinner party scene and its central image . . . of the seven-sided flower" (94). If so, one might contend that this image of seven-sided flower – which is later transformed into a six-sided one after the death of Percival – suggests that the characters are not only bound to each other at the base of the flower as they-self, but also that each and every petal that springs from the base implies a differentiation among petals denoting self-consciousness, or rather, what Vasudevi Reddy fittingly calls, "self-other-conscious[ness]" (145). The conception of the self that this flower image implies falls squarely in line with the fundamental metaphor of the whole novel, that is, "the waves" with each and every distinct wave arising from water. In other words, water, like the base of the flower, constitutes the condition of possibility for any distinct wave (or petal) to emerge at all. With a keen eye on the seemingly irreconcilable approaches to the understanding of the self, Woolf offers, in *The Waves*, an account of the self that overrides or circumvents the pitfalls embedded in evaluating the self singularly. Therefore, her interdependent rendition of they-self and being-for-others fuses and re-inscribes as complementary the allegedly incongruous positions they might seemingly hold.

CHAPTER II

THE ETHICAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THE SELF AND OTHERS IN JOSEPH CONRAD'S *LORD JIM*

> "The real significance of crime is in its being a breach of faith with the community of mankind, and from that point of view he [Jim] was no mean traitor."
>
> -Joseph Conrad, *Lord Jim*

> ". . . that feeling of unavoidable solidarity . . . which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world."
>
> -Joseph Conrad, Preface to *The Nigger of 'Narcissus'*

The characterization of the self by phenomenologists generally focuses on the relationship it has with others. Husserl who is mostly berated for his seemingly solipsistic conception of the self, for instance, recognizes the significance of others in his discussions of intersubjectivity in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations* and in some of his posthumously published manuscripts where he introduces the notion of empathy that prevails between the self and others (Beyer par. 41-42; Zahavi, *Self-Awareness* 160-61). Those phenomenologists that come after him make others an integral part of any possible understanding of the self as seen in Heidegger's Dasein as they-self and being-with-others as well as in Merleau-Ponty's "chiasmic cohabitation of self-world-others" (Switzer 262).

Nevertheless, it is Sartre and Lévinas who, albeit from different angles, position the self in a very demanding relationship with others where the self is almost always compelled to not only fully recognize the presence of others but also, more importantly, acknowledge the full-blown alterity and thus irreducibility of others. In so doing, they inaugurate a phenomenology of alterity that makes it hard for the self to appropriate others and that situates the self and others within "an irreducible relation" (Lévinas,

Totality 79). On the one hand, Sartre's approach to self-other relations is conspicuously tinged with Hegelian clash of consciousnesses "seek[ing] the death of the other" (Hegel 113) and thus characterized at its core by the incessant power struggle between the self and others. On the other hand, that of Lévinas divests the self of all its power before others and, in a sense, subjects the self to others.

Deviating from the peaceful communal rendition of being-with-others, both Sartre and Lévinas foreground the conflictual encounters between the self and others. Through such encounters, the self not only comes face-to-face with others but also finds itself in a relationship that sets limits to its appropriation of the world. Therefore, the self realizes that the world is a place where it has to live with such limiting and binding existence of others. Furthermore, the alterity of others which has such a binding effect on the self might bring out the ethical aspects of the encounters between the self and others because the otherness of others has to be respected and acknowledged. As Dan Zahavi notes, the Lévinasian conception of the relation with others "is a relation with a total and absolute alterity . . . [and] an encounter that overwhelms me and shakes me in my very foundation . . . The authentic encounter with the Other is not perceptual or epistemic, but ethical in nature" (*Self-Awareness* 196). In this regard, the standpoints of both Sartre and Lévinas are informed by the self's encounters with others which also possess an ethical dimension – a dimension which might find its way into the heart of almost any intersubjective relation.

Within the phenomenological premises of the ethical strand of self-other relations elaborated by Sartre and especially Lévinas, this chapter aims at evaluating the self principally as that which finds itself in a binding relationship with others and thus makes sense of itself through its inexorable responsibility for others in Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1900). Moreover, by drawing upon the insights provided by phenomenology of alterity and analyzing the ethical bond the self has with others, it will be argued that Conrad's *Lord Jim* which "is undoubtedly foregrounded against the spiritual and ethical malaise of modernity" (Erdinast-Vulcan 494) opens up a space that accommodates ethical encounters between the self and others and that the self is always already ethically bound to and responsible for others. By exploring the numerous ethical intersubjective encounters among various characters such as Jim, Marlow, Jewel,

Gentleman Brown, Stein and the pilgrims, it will also be demonstrated that the self might, in turn, appear as an "other" to others, as illustrated in the case of Jim who responds to others and also is responded to by Marlow for whom he becomes the other. Therefore, in the light of his ethically saturated relations with others, Jim as the ethical self and at times as the vulnerable other will be shown to be an individual who is morally responsive to others, not a moral failure.

Joseph Conrad, born to patriotic Polish parents in 1857 at Berdichev, Poland which was occupied by Russia at the time, was christened Jozef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski. With his father Apollo Korzeniowski being a man of letters and doing many translations from English and French into Polish, Conrad grew up in a quite literary household where he developed a habit of reading at a young age; however, he could receive a five-year formal education in Cracow only after the death of his father when he was eleven and when his uncle Tadeusz Bobrowski assumed his guardianship (Allen 1; Hay 304). It was at the age of sixteen that Conrad set his mind on realizing his dream of going to sea and hence left Poland for Marseilles, France to be a seaman in 1874. For the next twenty years, he spent his life on and off at sea on French and British ships sailing to innumerable places across the world. After four-year service on French ships, Conrad joined the British merchant marine (known as the Merchant Navy today) in 1878 and served the British navies for the following fifteen years where he worked variously as second and first mates and eventually as captain during his career at sea (Allen 2; Watt "Joseph Conrad" 7). In the meantime, he applied for British citizenship and became a naturalized British in 1886 and was released from "the status of Russian subject" only in 1889 after his many appeals to the Russian Embassy in London (Najder 112, 132). His life and personal experiences at sea were to comprise the core of his fiction for the rest of his life. It was as early as 1889 that he tried his hand at writing with the first draft of a small part of *Almayer's Folly* (1895) – which was to become his first published novel and which was put aside due to his sudden decision to leave for the Congo in 1890. He suffered from "malaria and jungle gout" in the Congo which affected his health for the rest of his life and thus made him "physically unfit for life at sea, and in 1894 his career as a seaman ended" (Moser, "Editor's Note" 275; Allen 3).

The end of his career at sea, however, marks the beginning of his full-blown writing career. For this new demanding undertaking, he chose English as the medium of his writing, a foreign language – in fact his third language – to which, as Frederick Karl notes, Conrad "had painstakingly apprenticed himself . . . after Polish and French in order to write" (161; Day 397) and which he only started to learn when he was twenty-one (Bass 443; Allen 4). For the next thirty years (from 1894 to his death in 1924), Conrad exclusively focused on writing fiction in English and hence produced innumerable short stories, novellas and novels that would set the tone for the modern British fiction in the early twentieth century.

Conrad's fiction beginning to take shape at the fin-de-siècle was a game-changer for the prevailing conventional understanding of fiction at the time. In his conception of fiction, Conrad took his cue from the individual's situatedness in the world as well as from the revelation of the world to the individual through his/her "temperament:"

> Fiction – if it at all aspires to be art – appeals to temperament. And in truth it must be, like painting, like music, like all art, the appeal of one temperament to all the other innumerable temperaments whose subtle and resistless power endows passing events with their true meaning, and creates the moral, the emotional atmosphere of the place and time. Such an appeal, to be effective, must be an impression conveyed through the senses; and, in fact, it cannot be made in any other way . . . (Preface to *The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'* 58)

Conrad's choice of word, that is, "temperament" in this passage is quite suggestive in its appeal to the centrality of the subject's perception of the world which is fundamentally imbued with and, in turn, shaped by one's temperament. In this respect, there seems to be some affinity between Conrad's "temperament" and Heidegger's conception of "state-of-mind" or "mood" (*Being* 134/172) – both of which denote the disclosure of the world to the self or Dasein in a certain way. It is exactly such certain temperament-dependent disclosures that intrigue Conrad and compel him to make a connection between fiction and temperament. This seems to be mainly because the world and events created in fiction gain meaning through the impressions they leave or convey. In other words, if fiction is to have a real significance, it has to be true to the temperament-imbued perception. The only way to achieve this, according to Conrad, is to convey the

very impressions that appeal to or invoke the temperaments or moods at work in any instance of perception.

This is the reason why Conrad as a writer considers the expression and conveying of impressions in his fiction as his primary goal: "My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel – it is, before all, to make you *see*. That – no more, and it is everything" (Preface to *The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'* 59). Conrad's conviction is that fiction has to evoke and express the very impressions that an individual – by virtue of his/her being-in-the-world – receives and experiences through the senses. Moreover, he believes that this is the only way for fiction, or art in general, to "reach the secret spring of responsive emotions" (58). Conrad's characterization of sense perceptions and thus impressions as "responsive emotions" demonstrates his acute awareness of the fact that any perception of the world translates not only as a response to the world but also as being affected by the world.

The world to which one emotively responds and by which one is, in turn, affected is essentially an intersubjective one where the subject as being-in-the-world is always already "being-with" others (Heidegger, *Being* 114/149; Merleau-Ponty 406). Put differently, the world which one inhabits is a shared one that is necessarily experienced together with others. In fact, as Husserl makes clear in his discussion of the relation between the self and the world, others are enmeshed in the very constitution of the world itself: the world appears and is lived, from the beginning, as intersubjectively accessible (*The Crisis* 168, *Cartesian Meditations* 129/157-58). For Husserl, any simple perceptual act, i.e. perception of any object in the world, confirms others as the implicit yet essential component of sense perceptions. Therefore, any response to the world necessarily implies others and of this Conrad is definitely cognizant as revealed in his further elaboration on the necessity of conveying sense perceptions through impressions in fiction.

For instance, in his autobiographical work *A Personal Record* (1912), Conrad poses the following rhetorical question: "And what is a novel if it is not *a conviction of our fellow-men's existence* strong enough to take upon itself a form of imagined life clearer than reality and whose accumulated verisimilitude of selected episodes put to shame the

pride of documentary history?" (39, emphasis added). Conrad's understanding of fiction, in its simplest terms, amounts to the indispensable acknowledgement of the existence of others in the world – whose existence is correspondingly confirmed in the fictional world of the novel which, with its "accumulated verisimilitude," might turn out to be closer to – or even "clearer than" – reality than one would be willing to concede. When Conrad aspires to make the reader "hear," "feel" and, more importantly, "*see*" as he suggests in his Preface to *The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'* (59), it is apparent that what he desires is to disclose the world as a place where one is constitutionally bound *with* as well as *to* fellow-men, that is, others.

In a sense, much of Conrad's concern in his writing can be directly linked to his regard for others as well as his belief in the bond between the self and others – both of which repeatedly figure via different concepts and forms throughout his works. As Conrad remarks in his Author's Note[49] to *Almayer's Folly*, he is not only convinced that "there is a *bond* between us and that humanity so far away . . ." but also is "content to sympathize with common mortals . . . no matter where they live; in houses or in tents, in the streets under a fog, or in the forest behind the dark line of dismal mangroves that fringe the vast solitude of the sea" (x). His appreciation of such a bond between oneself and others resonates through certain concepts that he employs in order to explore and come to terms with such a bond which he believes exists among all human beings.

Three of the concepts Conrad uses which implicate others are "fidelity" (*A Personal* 16), "sincerity" and "solidarity" the latter of which figures at times as "fellowship" (Preface to *The Nigger* 58-59). All of these concepts have the undertones of loyalty, devotion, commitment and honesty *to* others. Conrad asserts that "[t]hose who read me know my conviction that the world, the temporal world . . . rests notably, among others, on the idea of Fidelity" (*A Personal* 16). Although this fidelity Conrad mentions is largely based on the necessity of committing oneself to a certain code of conduct which he himself advocates as a seaman (i.e. the ideal code of conduct at sea), it nevertheless suggests being faithful to a community, that is, a group of others who uphold the code of conduct in question.

Similarly, the concept "sincerity" frequently figures in the writings of Conrad and is about being true and honest *to* others about oneself. If Lionel Trilling's[50] definition of sincerity as "the congruence of avowal and actual feeling" (6) is tenable, one might argue that Conrad struggles to achieve this kind of "congruence" between what he really feels and what he comes to say (in and through his writings). His being true to himself, that is, not deceiving himself, fundamentally entails being true to others. By building upon the definition of sincerity provided by Trilling, Ella Ophir notes that sincerity as "[a]n ethic of honest self-presentation . . . prescribed the task of self-knowledge as the ground for truthfulness to others; it sought to strengthen social bonds by giving to public avowal the guarantee of inner conviction" and further maintains that such conception of sincerity appears as "a central concern" in Conrad's work (341). Indeed, Conrad felt compelled to achieve a "clearness of sincerity" (Preface to *The Nigger* 59) which he directly associated with the bond he shares with others.

The extent of sincerity one achieves, for Conrad, determines the degree or strength of the bond one is able to forge between oneself and others. It is in this regard that he proposes the idea of unavoidable solidarity as binding the self to others:

> . . . one may perchance attain to such clearness of sincerity that at last the presented vision of regret or pity, of terror or mirth, shall awaken in the hearts of the beholders that feeling of unavoidable solidarity; of the solidarity in mysterious origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world. (Preface to *The Nigger* 59)

In other words, Conrad argues in favor of an "unavoidable" relatedness which can be disclosed through "presented visions," that is, impressions that are sincerely conveyed. It is within this context that Conrad burdens the novelist, or artist in general, with the responsibility of expanding on the self-other relations in the form of "fellowship" and "solidarity." As he further states in his Preface to *The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'*, an artist

> speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder, to the sense of mystery surrounding our lives; to our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all creation — and to the subtle but invincible, conviction of solidarity that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts: to the solidarity in dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear, which

> binds men to each other, which binds together all humanity — the dead to the living and the living to the unborn. (58)

What Conrad emphasizes then seems to be an ultimate faith in the deeply entrenched bond that binds the self to others and knits them together. It is an ever-present unbreakable bond which he thinks has to be addressed sincerely and which finds expression in the regard or concern one has for others. Conrad believes that a novelist has the "privilege of freedom – the freedom of expression and the freedom of confessing his innermost beliefs . . ." ("Books" 7) because "[i]n that interior world where his thought and his emotions go seeking for the experience of imagined adventures, there are no policemen, no law, no pressure of circumstance or dread of opinion to keep him within bounds" (*A Personal* 14). If so, it is this kind of privilege or right Conrad as a writer assumes or wields that renders him free to earnestly express his "innermost belief" in the existence of "the subtle but invincible" relation between the self and others.

Therefore, Conrad's insistence on such concepts that emphasize the bond between the self and others ultimately implies the potential ethical relations the self finds itself in with others despite Conrad's protests to the contrary. For example, in a letter to R. B. Cunninghame Graham dated January 31, 1898, he remarks that "[t]here is no morality, no knowledge and no hope; there is only the consciousness of ourselves which drives us about a world that whether seen in a convex or a concave mirror is always but a vain and fleeting appearance" (71). His pessimistic and epistemologically concerned outlook on the concept of morality is retained in another letter to his friend Edward Garnett who was Conrad's "first literary adviser" (Watt "Joseph Conrad" 8). Conrad writes: "I still have some pretensions to the possession of a conscience though my morality is gone to the dogs. I am like a man who has lost his gods" (*The Collected* 2: 198). While Conrad seems to be determined to keep the idea of morality at bay, he is resolved to adhere to the concept of "conscience" – a term which is associated or even conflated with morality itself. Indeed, throughout his life, Conrad remains faithful to the notion of conscience as a thematic concern of his work. This concern holds him in check in the face of the utmost freedom he possesses as a writer: "Who then is going to say Nay to his [a writer's] temptations if not his conscience?" (*A Personal* 14).

Although Conrad creates a "strict morality/conscience dichotomy" by discarding morality and keeping conscience as revealed in his letters to Cunninghame Graham quoted above, Conrad's denial of morality is not a form of moral nihilism: "Conrad is certainly not endorsing an inhumane philosophy rooted in moral nihilism; as a possessor of conscience, he believes in taking personal and political responsibility for one's actions" (Lackey 21). According to Lackey, the reason behind Conrad's rejection of morality is its openness and vulnerability to manipulation: "it is such an amorphous concept that political powers can so easily exploit in order to justify some of the most heinous crimes against humanity . . ." (22). In other words, it is this manipulability of morality that, in a sense, leads Conrad to not only dismiss but also expose it in his fictional writings through such examples as the portrayal of "a charismatic political figure [Kurtz] who appropriates morality in order to justify crimes against humanity" in *Heart of Darkness* (Lackey 22). Put differently, the white colonizers deemed it their moral duty to bring civilization and morality to the indigenous people who were regarded as cannibals and devoid of morality and thus (ab)used morality as a pretext to further their interests. In this respect, morality is an easily manipulated concept vis-à-vis conscience.

Lackey's stance can be aligned with many other critics who evaluate – albeit from different and sometimes conflicting perspectives – Conrad's fiction principally in terms of the issue of morality, its existence or non-existence, and of the potential forms of morality. For example, drawing on Conrad's first collection of essays entitled *The Mirror of the Sea: Memories and Impressions* (1906), Morton Dauwen Zabel argues that Conrad offers certain moral experiences through the fictional world he creates in his novels and thus is fundamentally a novelist of moral insight (5-6). In a similar vein, the prominent British literary critic F.R. Leavis in *The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad* (1948) traces many strands of morality in Conrad's novels[51] and suggests that Conrad "does believe intensely, as a matter of concrete experience, in the kind of human achievement represented by . . . tradition, discipline and moral ideal . . ." (200). Likewise, Thomas C. Moser in *Joseph Conrad: Achievement and Decline* (1957) and Albert J. Guerard in *Conrad the Novelist* (1958), two of the most important critics of Joseph Conrad, emphasize the moral interests as

well as moral challenges presented throughout Conrad's novels. In a sense, the moral interest Conrad has seems to inform much of his work that appeared at the turn of the century.[52]

Given Conrad's epistemologically unstable fiction – mainly due to unreliable narrators – where it is, indeed, very difficult to reach absolute knowledge not only of events but also of persons, critics sometimes tend to have reservations about the extent and even possibility of Conrad's moral outlook. This is also partly because Conrad himself had a hard time in believing the possibility of reaching such certainty: "It is impossible to know anything tho' it is possible to believe a thing or two" (*Joseph Conrad's* 45). It is Conrad's exploration of such concepts as fidelity and solidarity that opens up his fiction to potential ethical considerations. For instance, Ian Watt, another very prominent critic of Conrad, in his *Conrad in the Nineteenth Century* (1979) maintains that Conrad builds on the impossibility of unquestionable objective knowledge and therefore deploys what Watt calls "subjective moral impressionism" (174) because all one can know are the impressions formed and filtered through Conrad or the narrator's perception of the world and others.

On the other hand, John G. Peters contends that although "the whole world around us is relative and uncertain" for Conrad, "consensus among human subjects concerning phenomena and consensus among members of society concerning moral values avoid the abyss of ethical anarchy and epistemological solipsism" (134-35). In a sense, Peters' emphasis on "consensus" seems to hark back to and build upon Conrad's attention to the conception of solidarity and fellowship with others – which ultimately enable Conrad to retain moral values. Similarly, Mark Wollaeger writes that "[a] skeptic himself, Conrad nevertheless remained consciously devoted to a moral perspective on life and literature" (14). The positions adopted by these critics generally point to Conrad's ambivalent yet powerful moral vision despite a few dissenting voices such as Dwight Purdy who sees "a decline . . . in his moral imagination," especially in his later works some of which he considers "morally repellent" (7).

Contrary to Conrad's protestations against morality as mentioned earlier, critics could not help but respond to numerous notable moral problems and dilemmas that permeate

his work. Indeed, it is impossible to deny Conrad's fiction one of its central themes, that is, morality which fundamentally informs the self-other relations. However, although "Conrad's narratives typically trace the consequences of moral choice" (Wollaeger 17), in this chapter, I will approach this issue of morality from a different perspective that foregrounds, not "the consequences of moral choice," but the presence of conscience that dictates the actions of the self from the beginning. This is because conscience, for Conrad, is more individualistic in that it emanates directly from the self's sense of right and wrong which would guide the self through his/her relations with others whereas morality is a social and even political conception. Conrad as a modernist chooses to emphasize the relatively more individual-oriented concept of conscience which is directly linked with the self's ethical obligation to others revealed in individual encounters between the self and others. Moreover, Conrad deploys conscience of the individual as a better means of responding to and resolving the moral ambiguities and dilemmas. Therefore, by discussing and drawing on Lévinasian and Sartrean ethics both of which place emphasis on the individual and his/her ethical bond with others, it will be argued that Conrad's *Lord Jim*, which is fraught with moral implications, presents a deeper and more fundamental understanding of self-other relations where the self is struck by the ethically binding presence of others even *before* it attempts to undertake an action that might have moral consequences.

The seeds of *Lord Jim* go back to as early as April or May of 1898 when Conrad started to pen a sketch which he entitled as "Tuan Jim." This sketch later became the point of departure for what was to be *Lord Jim* which was serialized in fourteen instalments in *Blackwood's Magazine* from October 1899 to November 1900 (Hay 290). Conrad originally conceived of this sketch to be a short story to be added to a collection of short stories he was writing at the time.[53] However, Conrad dropped his work on the sketch of "Tuan Jim" and put it aside for several months to come. As Conrad remarks in his Author's Note which he penned for the second English edition of *Lord Jim* published in 1917,

> [b]ut, seriously, the truth of the matter is, that my first thought was of a short story, concerned only with the pilgrim ship episode; nothing more. And that was a legitimate conception. After writing a few pages, however, I became for some reason discontented and I laid them aside for a time. I didn't take them out of the

> drawer till the late Mr. William Blackwood suggested I should give something again to his magazine. (5)

After setting aside the incomplete sketch "Tuan Jim," Conrad instead concentrated on writing another short story "Youth" (1898) in the summer of 1898 and then began writing his novella *Heart of Darkness* (1899) in December 1898 (Moser, "Editor's Note" 275). Both of these works intervened in his further work on the pilgrim-ship story of Jim. It was only in July 1899 that Conrad could send the first five chapters of *Lord Jim* to his publisher William Blackwood (Galen 92). Afterwards, Conrad focused on writing *Lord Jim* which he thought would run for three to four instalments but which ultimately ran for fourteen due to the interpolation of the Patusan episode to the pilgrim-ship story (that is, the Patna episode) which Conrad originally intended to be the whole story itself.

Lord Jim, which can be described as "essentially the story of one person" (Stegmaier 517), recounts the events that befall the eponymous hero, a young aspiring English seaman recruited as the first mate on the ship Patna carrying about eight-hundred Muslim "pilgrims of an exacting belief" (14) to Mecca. On their way to an Arabian port on the Red Sea, the Patna hits probably marine debris in the middle of a still night and starts to founder in the Indian Ocean. The captain and three other crew members immediately attempt to save themselves by getting a lifeboat down to the water while Jim, immobilized by the gravity of the situation, simply watches them. Ultimately, though, Jim jumps into the boat at the very last moment but immediately regrets his action. Next day, it is revealed that the ship did not sink and everyone on the ship was saved without being hurt. A trial ensues and Jim is tried for his abandonment of the pilgrims on the seemingly sinking ship. Jim feels extremely ashamed and guilty of his abandonment of the ship, and his guilty conscience follows him wherever he goes.

Marlow, the narrator in *Lord Jim*, sets the tone for the better part of the novel and frames the whole story by recounting the events that befall Jim through his received impressions of him. Marlow's first encounter with Jim during the course of the trial instills in him the urge to narrate his story and respond to Jim's situation by helping him find a job in a remote fictional village called Patusan which is probably somewhere in

the Indian or Malay Archipelago. In Patusan, Jim tries really hard to atone for his failure on the Patna and achieves heroic deeds and fame among the people of Patusan by protecting them against the local dangers. Thus, he comes to be hailed as "Tuan Jim," that is, Lord Jim. Jim's success is nevertheless short-lived because a ruthless pirate, ironically named Gentleman Brown, invades Patusan. Gentleman Brown causes the deaths of numerous people in Patusan seemingly because of an error of judgment on Jim's part – for which Jim feels conscience-stricken once again as he did for the Patna incident. Therefore, no longer strong enough to carry such burden, Jim gives in to Doramin, the chief of the villagers, whose son Dain Waris was killed by the attack Gentleman Brown and his men launched on their way out of Patusan, and Doramin, overwhelmed by his grief, kills Jim.

As is apparent from this brief summary, the central events in the novel certainly have some ethical and moral implications. If Colin McGinn is right in asserting that "[l]iterature is where moral thinking lives and breathes on the page" (vi), the issues Conrad presents in relation to Jim as a seaman in *Lord Jim* directly engage with the ethical nature of his decisions as well as pertain to his compliance, or his failure to comply, with the ideal code of conduct at sea which bears on his self-understanding. In this respect, Conrad's understanding of "fidelity" mentioned earlier not only necessitates a fidelity to such codes of conduct but also inevitably designates "an ethical norm" (Wollaeger 16). Therefore, the extent of Jim's fidelity to others by virtue of his fidelity to the ideal of conduct at sea forms the basis of ethical concerns and criticisms directed at *Lord Jim*. For instance, Susan Jones argues in a reductive manner that "[i]n spite of its complex narratorial and temporal dislocations, its confusing twists of plot and subplot, *Lord Jim* is, at its most basic level, a story of one man's failure to live up to a self-imposed moral ideal" (v). In other words, Jones seems convinced that it is simply Jim's exacting moral ideals he sets himself that make him fail.

However, instead of considering *Lord Jim* a story of an individual's failure, it is more apposite to regard it as a novel that broaches the issue of moral ambivalence. According to Joanne Wood, "the central concern of the novel is the moral ambiguity that results from our common obscurity of vision into ourselves and those around us" (57). Indeed, the access the reader has to Jim's sincere account of his jump and its aftermath during

the inquiry complicates and even problematizes any simplistic rendition of Jim as a moral failure. The very moments when Jim is about to take actions that have ethical overtones as well as repercussions have to be addressed in order to reveal that Jim's conscience, as a matter of fact, immobilizes him and holds him responsible for his actions and thus binds him to others. In other words, Jim's ethical bond with others that finds expression in his troubled conscience reveals him as responding to and therefore responsive to others, particularly their vulnerability and their call. Hence, it is Jim's response-ability and hence responsibility to others that cast him as a self fundamentally bound to others and that enable him to make sense of himself.

Such ethical concerns that bind all humanity – on which, for Conrad, "[m]an's hope rests" (Gose 137) and which requires an acknowledgement of others – are explored by both Sartre and, more importantly, Lévinas through their emphasis on the alterity of others. Sartre attempts to formulate a form of ethics to supplement his ideas in *Being and Nothingness* in a lecture given in 1945 and published as "The Humanism of Existentialism" the following year. In this lecture, through the notion of "existence precedes essence," Sartre emphasizes the existential idea of the self's ultimate freedom to choose his/her actions: "Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself" (271). However, such absolute freedom the self has in making himself is accompanied by responsibility that such freedom necessarily entails:

> [I]f existence really does precede essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. (Sartre, "The Humanism" 271)

The self's choice of any course of action in any situation renders him/her responsible not only for himself/herself but, at the same time, for others.

Such responsibility for others emanates from the fact that making or choosing oneself through certain acts which are freely performed creates a particular trajectory for similar acts that will be carried out by others. Thus, the actions the self undertakes inevitably points to a connecting bond between the self and others. As Sartre further remarks,

> [w]hen we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men. In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be. To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose . . . and if we grant that we exist and fashion our image at one and the same time, the image is valid for everybody and for our whole age. Thus, our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind. ("The Humanism" 271)

Given the responsibility one is condemned to have in the face of others, the self's ultimate freedom to choose him/herself is at one point undercut by the meaning his/her choice will have for others. In Stephen Priest's words, "[i]n choosing for myself I am implicitly choosing for others. . . . by anything I do, I am implicitly prescribing the same course of action to the rest of humanity" (192). By choosing and acting, the self inevitably sets an exemplary image for others and therefore embodies a kind of moral oughtness through his/her deeds – which ultimately oversees or curtails his/her freedom.

A similar connection between freedom and moral responsibility is forged by Lévinas who builds his philosophy on the inexorable ethical concern of the self for others. Lévinas writes that "[m]orality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent" (*Totality* 84). It is such unjustifiability and arbitrariness of the ultimate freedom which the self seemingly possesses and which is called into question with the upsurge of others on one's horizon. For Lévinas, others "put into question my freedom, my spontaneity as a living being, my emprise over the things, this freedom of a 'moving force' . . ." (*Totality* 303). In a sense, calling into question the freedom of the self by others marks the beginnings of the ethical relationship between the self and others because such questioning brings about a direct acknowledgement of the alterity of the other that rejects any appropriation by the self.

In order to further expand on the ethical bond, Lévinas introduces the notion of "face" (*le visage*) and, by extension, the whole body – through which the ethical response to the other is in the first place evoked and called forth. Lévinas uses the concept of the face as that which extends to the whole body because of its vulnerability and exposedness. In an early essay titled "Is Ontology Fundamental?" Lévinas postulates

that "it is as a neighbor that a human being is accessible – as a face" (8). For Lévinas, the face is the very place where responsibility for others originates because it not only "emerges as the emblem of everything that fundamentally resists categorization, containment or comprehension" (Hand 42) but also is revealed as exposed and vulnerable to suffering and violence. The vulnerability of the face is laid bare in its nakedness without anything to protect it. In its exposedness, it is revealed to be at the mercy of the self who is struck by the destitution of the face. As Lévinas emphasizes, "[t]here is first the very uprightness of the face, its upright exposure, without defense. The skin of the face is that which stays most naked, most destitute" (*Ethics and Infinity* 86). The face of the other compels the self to take note of the unprotected exposure and of the frail posture of the face. In other words, the face reveals the other in his/her full-blown vulnerability and destitution because the face through its frailty is potentially exposed to harm and pain. Therefore, the face of the other calls the self into question by soliciting him/her to acknowledge it, and renders him/her responsible for attending to and preventing others from any potential suffering.

As the defenselessness of the face of the other is written on its skin, its expressivity is further revealed as a language, or rather as a call, that speaks to the self. Lévinas argues that "[t]he face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that it renders possible and begins all discourse . . . The first word of the face is the 'Thou shalt not kill.' It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me" (*Ethics and Infinity* 87-89). The encounter with the vulnerability of others expressed in their face commands and shakes the self profoundly. Furthermore, the other's exposed face or skin, though extremely prone to wounds and suffering, seems to possess paradoxically the power to hold the self in check. Although, in the face of such vulnerability, one might be inclined to abuse and dominate the other, the expressivity of the other's face calls into question the self's freedom for any potential atrocious behavior that would inflict the other with more suffering. Therefore, as Lévinas puts it, "[i]n a certain way, in its silence, it [the face] calls you" ("The Paradox" 169) – which ultimately renders the self powerless before the other.

Given the call of the other that holds the self in check, the self is characterized from the very beginning as a responsible self who is obliged to hear the silent call of the other

expressed in his/her face. For this reason, the ultimate freedom the self seemingly enjoys is, as a matter of fact, a responsible freedom. This is why Lévinas characterizes responsibility as “the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity” or being a self (*Ethics and Infinity* 95). In this regard, the self is an ethical and responsible self for others.

When the positions both Sartre and Lévinas hold regarding the ethical nature of the self are compared, they can be said to present, in a sense, two different yet arguably compatible aspects of responsibility the self has for others. On the one hand, Sartre’s argument fashions any potential act of the free self as that which causes anxiety for the self concerning the ethical reverberations of the act in question for others. On the other hand, by rendering the self as that which is called upon by others, Lévinas’s position compels the self to respond to the plight and vulnerability of the other whose face directs a call to which the self cannot remain indifferent. Therefore, the self is not only accountable, despite his/her freedom, for any action s/he will perform but also responsible for being attentive to others.

Both of the aforementioned aspects of the self that bind him/her to others in various ways for various reasons are strenuously explored and treated at great length through the psychological journey of Jim or, more generally, the “psycho-moral drama” of *Lord Jim* (Guerard 397). In the first part of the novel, Jim as the chief mate of the Patna inevitably finds himself in an ethically charged situation when a derelict strikes the ship which carries hundreds of Muslim pilgrims and almost causes it to sink. The description of “the mass of sleepers,” that is, the pilgrims (*Lord Jim* 16) by the omniscient narrator – who is supplanted by the first-person narrator, that is, Marlow, starting from the fifth chapter onward – reveals their destitution and vulnerability which are inscribed in their face, skin and all over their whole body, and which seem to invite violence by virtue of their exposure:

> Below the roof of awnings, surrendered to the wisdom of white men and to their courage, trusting the power of their unbelief and the iron shell of their fire-ship, the pilgrims of an exacting faith slept on mats, on blankets, on bare planks, on every deck . . . the men, the women, the children . . . all equal before sleep, death’s brother.

> A draught of air, fanned from forward by the speed of the ship, passed steadily through the long gloom between the high bulwarks, swept over the rows of *prone bodies*; a few dim flames in globe-lamps were hung short here and there under the ridge-poles, and in the blurred circles of light thrown down and trembling slightly to the unceasing vibration of the ship appeared a chin upturned, two closed eyelids, a dark hand with silver rings, a meagre limb draped in a torn covering, *a head bent back, a naked foot, a throat bared and stretched as if offering itself to the knife*. (15-16, emphasis added)

The narrator's description is, indeed, telling in that the first impressions conveyed of the sleeping pilgrims aboard allude to the contiguity between sleep and death. Accordingly, they denote mortality and thus vulnerability as disclosed in their *face* which is closely linked with the whole body because Lévinas's conceptualization of the face does not simply confine it to the part beneath the hairline and above the neck, that is, the visage *per se*.

On the contrary, the notion of "face" extends to the whole body through the nakedness of the flesh. As Lévinas writes, the "face, the expressive in the Other (and the whole human body is in this sense more or less face), [is] what *ordains* me to serve him" (*Ethics and Infinity* 97). Similarly, in *Totality and Infinity*, Lévinas remarks that "the whole body – a hand or a curve of the shoulder – can express as the face" (262). Any part of the body can figure as the face that demands attentiveness to the exposedness of the vulnerable flesh. The description of an unnamed sleeping pilgrim cited above contains numerous references to the naked parts of the body which signify its proneness, and hence strongly resonates with Lévinas's depiction of the face: "The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence" (*Ethics and Infinity* 86). Indeed, the narrator in *Lord Jim* perceptibly tunes in to the unsettling frailty of the human flesh which is embodied in the pilgrim's "dark hand," "meagre limb," "naked foot," "throat bared" and the curve of the "head bent back" and which is "[u]ncovered, open like a city declared open to the approaching enemy" (Lévinas, *The Humanism* 63). The nudity and defenselessness of the skin not only make the other vulnerable but also evoke a certain desire of atrocity and of inflicting pain on others. In this respect, the vulnerability of the other strikes even the disinterested third-person omniscient narrator of the first four chapters who cannot help but note the call of the other.

Starting from the fifth chapter on, Marlow – Conrad's famous narrator who appears in his "Youth," *Heart of Darkness*, *Lord Jim* and finally *Chance* (1916) – overtakes the narration and presents Jim in a more intimate way through his impressions of as well as his conversations with him. In his one-to-one conversations with Marlow, Jim reveals himself to be utterly obliged to others. This is especially the case when Jim goes through the most haunting experience of his life on the Patna when the pilgrim-ship hits a wandering piece of shipwreck which causes the Patna to take on water. In the stillness of the night, it seems to him as well as the other crew members that the ship "would go down at any moment; the bulging, rust-eaten plates that kept back the ocean, fatally must give way, all at once like an undermined dam, and let in a sudden and overwhelming flood" (55). It is such urgency of the unpredictable condition of the sinking ship that places Jim in an ethically charged situation concerning the sleeping pilgrims.

Jim's words lay bare to what extent he was struck by the bulging of the iron bulkhead that holds off the water on the other side – which could at any moment sink the ship. As Jim tells Marlow:

> 'Dash it all! I tell you it bulged. I was holding up my lamp along the angle-iron in the lower deck when a flake of rust as big as the palm of my hand fell of the plate, all of itself. . . . The thing stirred and jumped off like something alive while I was looking at it. . . . Do you suppose . . . that I was thinking of myself, with a hundred and sixty people at my back, all fast asleep in that fore-'tween-deck alone – and more of them aft; more on the deck – sleeping – knowing nothing about it – three times as many as there were boats for, even if there had been time? I expected to see the iron open out as I stood there and the rush of water going over them as they lay . . . . What could I do – what?' (54, last ellipsis original)

The movement of the bulkhead under pressure caused by water anticipates an imminent catastrophe that awaits the Patna. However, what Jim thinks of in the face of such danger is not saving himself, rather those pilgrims who "flowed forward and aft, overflowed down the yawning hatchways, filled the inner recesses of the ship – like water filling a cistern, like water flowing into crevices and crannies . . ." (*Lord Jim* 13). The immediate dilemma in which Jim finds himself in the face of others is formed through his conscience as well as his responsibility for others. This is the reason why

Jim's immediate and almost unreflective concern for all these pilgrims on the Patna is simultaneously undercut by his disconcerting awareness that the Patna is short of lifeboats that would save all the passengers.

In addition, even if there were enough of them, it would not be possible to get them to the lifeboats in time considering that the bulkhead could give way at any moment and let water rush in and overflow the pilgrims. Jim's emphasis on the fact that the pilgrims were "sleeping" and hence "knowing nothing about" the situation reveals that they were, in the eyes of Jim, all the more vulnerable and prone to suffering. His concern for them is further corroborated by the fact that it is he who stands there before the iron bulkhead and expects water first to go over the sleeping pilgrims, not him. In a sense, he initiates a kind of self-effacement at that very moment because he rejects to think, in the first place, of himself even though he will be apparently overflowed, too. This is mainly because, as Lévinas says, "[f]ear for the death of the other man is my fear, but it is in no way a fear for *oneself*" ("From the One" 126) In this sense, although Jim is accused of abandoning the ship, he is in fact too much concerned about staying on the ship and saving the pilgrims.

In the face of the pilgrims liable to suffering and more significantly death, Jim seems too overwhelmed to move and thus appears to be paralyzed. This is mainly due to the hold the presence of the helpless others has on him – which becomes more and more domineering and inexorable at every passing moment. Jim not only hears "the breathing of unconscious sleepers in his ears" but also is simultaneously "overburdened by the knowledge of an imminent death" that awaits these sleepers (*Lord Jim* 54) and, more importantly, by his ultimate responsibility for them. Such responsibility is brought about by the compelling face of the other because, as Lévinas notes, "the face is authority . . . [and] a request . . . [but] [t]he face is not a force. It is an authority" ("The Paradox" 169). Put differently, the face has an authority over the self but this authority is without force in that it does not possess the power to *force* the self to act responsibly. The authority the face has is not a physical power that it can exercise over the self. On the very contrary, the face, through its expressivity, sends an authoritative request that asks for attention and makes the self feel utterly responsible for and hence attend to the other. Therefore, the authority of the face lies in its imposing destitute presence that not

only affects the self but also calls for a response from the self to such deprivation and neediness of the other.

In Jim's case, he can clearly hear the authoritative call of the pilgrims which powerfully emanates from their face and, by extension, from their vulnerable bodies that unknowingly wait for their death. By speaking to Jim's conscience, the defenselessness expressed in their face prevents him from remaining indifferent to the authority of the pilgrims' call. This call is not a call that forces Jim to respond but rather one that, in a sense, triggers Jim's conscience and demands response. Although Jim is fully prepared to meet the demand of the face, it is the unfavorable circumstances that make it impossible for Jim to answer the call for help embodied in the face of the pilgrims – which renders Jim immobile. As Marlow remarks, Jim's "first impulse was to shout and straightway make all those people leap out of sleep into terror; but such an overwhelming sense of his helplessness came over him that he was not able to produce a sound" (*Lord Jim* 54).

Acutely conscious of his inability to help and save these people in such a pressing situation, Jim even refrains from waking them up because he is fully aware that he, by doing so, will throw them all into panic and extreme fear: "Where was the kindness in making crazy with fright all those people I could not save single-handed – that nothing could save?" (*Lord Jim* 58-59). This constitutes the very reason why "he did not move. His feet remained glued to the planks" (*Lord Jim* 67) and why "[h]e stood still looking at these recumbent bodies . . . [and] surveying the silent company of the dead. They *were* dead! Nothing could save them!" (*Lord Jim* 55). It is the mortality, or impending death, signified in these bodies that causes Jim to become "motionless" (*Lord Jim* 55). Moreover, Jim not only imagines "the desperate struggles of human beings, clamorous with the distress of cries for help" but also the mere thought of it is enough to divest him of all his vitality and thus paralyze him: "I saw as clearly as I see you now that there was nothing I could do. It seemed to take all life out of my limbs" (*Lord Jim* 55).

Moreover, considering the silent expression in the face of others, others are all the more expressive and demanding in the very silence their face signifies. Lévinas argues that "silence is not a simple absence of speech; speech lies in the depths of silence like a

laughter perfidiously held back" (*Totality* 91). The expression or speech that comes forth from the face is paradoxically silent. It does not have to utter a single word simply because the expression the face assumes solicits and compels the self to act accordingly: "The being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity – its hunger – without my being able to be deaf to that appeal. Thus in expression the being that imposes itself does not limit but promotes my freedom, by arousing my goodness" (Lévinas, *Totality* 200). Indeed, the imposition the other brings about can be directly read from the other's destitution and vulnerability written in his/her face. However, by way of such imposition, the other contradictorily "does not limit the freedom of the [self]," rather "call[s] it to responsibility" (Lévinas, *Totality* 198). In other words, the presence of the imposing other calls for a freedom that obligates the self for taking responsible action.

It is the presence of such silent yet demanding expression of the face that makes it ultimately unbearable for the self because it is in fact a call to his conscience by the other to undertake responsibility. In Jim's situation, the silence pervading the scene is so intolerable that it almost suffocates him. There was "that awful stillness preceding a catastrophe, that trying silence of the moment before the crash" (*Lord Jim* 56-57). Furthermore, when the engines were stopped, the steam kept blowing off for a while, thereby making some faint noise. But "[s]uddenly the steam ceased blowing off. The noise, he remarked, had been distracting, but the silence at once became intolerably oppressive. 'I thought I would choke before I got drowned,' [Jim] said" (*Lord Jim* 55). The sound of the blowing steam momentarily diverts Jim's attention, yet as soon as it stops, all Jim has to hear seems to be the silent call of the pilgrims – which is choking as well as debilitating.

Marlow says that "[t]he only distinct thought formed, vanishing, and re-forming in his [Jim's] brain, was: eight hundred people and seven boats; eight hundred people and seven boats. 'Somebody was speaking aloud inside my head,' he said a little wildly. 'Eight hundred people and seven boats – and no time! Just think of it!'" (*Lord Jim* 55). The presence of the pilgrims whose "face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation" (Lévinas, *Totality* 201) appeals to Jim by calling him to respond to and, therefore, to relieve the nearing plight of the pilgrims who are everywhere Jim

looks at. However, this call to which he does not have the necessary resources to respond is too painful for Jim to come to terms with. He immediately spots the strong ethical demand placed upon him but is utterly troubled by his inability to save the pilgrims. As Marlow states,

> [t]wice, he told me, he shut his eyes in the certitude that the end was upon him already, and twice he had to open them again. Each time he noted the darkening of the great stillness. The shadow of the silent cloud had fallen upon the ship from the zenith, and seemed to have extinguished every sound of her teeming life. He could no longer hear the voices under the awnings. He told me that each time he closed his eyes a flash of thought showed him that crowd of bodies, laid out for death, as plain as daylight. (*Lord Jim* 66)

Jim's confidential conversation with Marlow reveals that Jim is haunted by the image of "that crowd of bodies" on the Patna, and that he profoundly desires it all to end and thus to be released from the very grasp the vulnerable and needy others have upon him. All Jim is capable of saying to himself at those moments on the Patna is "Sink – curse you! Sink!" (*Lord Jim* 63).

As time passes on the Patna, Jim becomes more and more pressed for time as to what he is going to do. While the other officers rush to get down a lifeboat and save themselves, Jim stands still and refuses to be involved with them despite their pressing protests. He cannot come to grips with and conceive how they can leave behind those eight hundred pilgrims to drown. By virtue of their freedom of choice, the other crew members choose to save themselves; however, through his hearing of the others' call that speaks to his conscience, Jim's freedom is called into question. In other words, Jim cannot act in an utterly free and gratuitous manner. As Zlatan Filipovic highlights, "[t]he other person's claim on my freedom signifies . . . the beginning of moral consciousness" (59). Therefore, it is Jim's moral consciousness triggered by the pilgrims' claim on his freedom that prevents him from joining the other crew members to help them.

Insofar as the dire circumstances on board allow, Jim tries hard to find a way to respond to the grave ethical situation at hand instead of merely letting it go. At last, all he can come up with is to frantically "cut the life boats clear of the ship. He whipped out his knife and went to work slashing as though he had seen nothing, had heard nothing, had

known of no one on board. They [the officers] thought him hopelessly wrong-headed and crazy, but dared not protest noisily against this useless loss of time" (*Lord Jim* 65). In effect, given the circumstances, it might seem quite plausible that what Jim is trying to do is a waste of time; however, when his act is evaluated from a different angle, it is not that difficult to discern the moral motivation behind his attempt. At least by getting the lifeboats onto the sea, Jim seems to implicitly think of the slight chance of survival that some lucky pilgrims would have after the ship went down. This is the best he believes he can afford for others. Therefore, in so doing, Jim demonstrates he "does not believe that his own needs and desires should take precedence over other people's. On the contrary, he sincerely affirms his responsibility for others" (Brudney, "*Lord Jim*" 267). In a sense, Jim's course of action in this instance is, at the same time, heavily informed by the responsibility that his freedom to choose entails in the Sartrean sense because his action sets an example for others.

However, this incident on the Patna is not the only call of the other that Jim hears in the course of the novel. Similar to the one on the Patna, another silent call as powerful, if not more, is made on Jim in the latter half of the novel when he meets his future wife Jewel at Cornelius' place. Cornelius is one of the officers whom Marlow's friend Stein had assigned to undertake and continue his mercantile business on his behalf at the trading post of Patusan. He is also the stepfather of Jewel, the daughter of an unnamed Dutch-Malay woman who was married to Cornelius. Jewel lives with Cornelius almost as his housemaid and takes care of him since the death of her mother. When Jim arrives at Cornelius' place, he is troubled by the way Cornelius treats Jewel because he apparently "led her an awful life, stopping only short of actual ill-usage" and "declaim[ed] filthy denunciations at her back" (*Lord Jim* 172). The grimness of the situation for Jim is beyond endurance to such a great extent that Jim wants to leave Cornelius' place at once; however, he cannot seem to do so precisely because of the unexplainable yet strong hold "the defenceless girl" (*Lord Jim* 172) has on Jim's conscience. As Marlow says,

> it seemed impossible to save her not only from that mean rascal but even from herself! It wasn't that he pitied her so much, he affirmed; it was more than pity; it was as if he had something on his conscience, while that life went on. To leave the house would have appeared a base desertion. He had understood at last that there

> was nothing to expect from a longer stay, neither accounts nor money, nor truth of any sort, but he stayed on . . . (*Lord Jim* 173)

What prevents Jim from leaving is not so much the pity he feels for Jewel's situation at the hands of Cornelius as the expressive silence of Jewel in this situation that touches his conscience and evokes a certain desire to stay there out of responsibility and thus offer help to Jewel.

Lévinas writes that "[t]he proximity of the Other, the proximity of the neighbor, is in being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute presence . . . which expresses itself. His very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow, and the orphan" (*Totality* 78). The very words Lévinas associates with the face directly bear on the destitution they express in their own right. The "Stranger," with the upper-case first letter, implies the absolute commanding presence of the other which the self cannot help but acknowledge whereas the widow and the orphan indicate the frailty and vulnerability to which the self cannot remain indifferent. Given the double-edged nature of the other as such, Jim not only yields to the "authority" and "commandment" (Lévinas, "The Paradox" 169, 175) of Jewel the Stranger which dictate him to stay, but also responds to her evocative "silence" (*Lord Jim* 172) with which she confronts Cornelius' treatment of her.

Such silence, furthermore, directs Jim's attention to, what Lévinas calls, the "infinite exigencies, that of serving the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan" (*Totality* 245). Although Marlow suggests that it is Jim's sympathy with the "defenceless" Jewel – who happens to be an orphan – that "made him hang on" (*Lord Jim* 172), it can be clearly granted that it is a more fundamental relation – an ethical one at that – than mere sympathy that startles and coerces Jim into lingering at Cornelius' place. Therefore, Jim's face-to-face encounter with Jewel in this instance is a similar experience – with the same, if not more, force and effect – to the one he had with the innumerable pilgrims on the Patna.

Similarly, in the latter half of the novel in Patusan where Jim achieves a great deal of success among "the Malays of the jungle village" who call him "Tuan Jim: as one might

say – Lord Jim" (*Lord Jim* 8), Jim encounters the vulnerable others who seek his protection from "utter insecurity for life and property" and hence from the "antagonistic forces" (*Lord Jim* 138) prevalent in Patusan. These antagonistic forces include the tyrant Rajah Allang (or Tunku Allang) and the "vagabond" Sherif Ali (*Lord Jim* 157) who terrorize the Patusan community. The vulnerability of this community in the face of these two tyrants makes Jim fully attend to the suffering of these people to which he has to respond in order to alleviate it. First, Jim overcomes Sherif Ali and drives him off the hills from where he assaults the Patusan settlers (*Lord Jim* 159, 161), and then changes the way Rajah Allang treats all these villagers who used to be regarded as "the Rajah's personal slaves" (*Lord Jim* 198). The ethical bond Jim forges with this community by helping them is made even stronger as time passes precisely because Jim feels he has to maintain the peaceful atmosphere which he helped establish for these people.

It is this fundamental responsibility the self feels for others that makes Jim not only strongly attached to but also ultimately captive to the people of Patusan. Upon his visit to Jim, Marlow observes to what extent Jim is, as a matter fact, a prisoner to these people in spite of being their leader and of his power over them. Regarding Jim's situation, Marlow notes that

> [i]f Jim took the lead, the other [Dain Waris] had captivated his leader. Jim the leader was a captive in every sense. The land, the people, the friendship, the love, were like the jealous guardians of his body. Every day added a link to the fetters of that strange freedom. I felt convinced of it, as from day to day I learned more of the story. (*Lord Jim* 157)

The wording Marlow deploys is, in fact, quite telling and significant in that Marlow could easily recognize not only the grasp Dain Waris as the other has over Jim but also the grasp of all the others in Patusan who call into question Jim's freedom. Jim's freedom is apparently ensnared by the ethically demanding presence of the others. As Sartre puts it, "man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being" (*Being* 553). Although Jim has an ultimate freedom to do whatever he wills, his free choice of actions simultaneously necessitates an inevitable assumption of responsibility.

In other words, paradoxically enough, Jim's freedom is undercut by his obligation to the Patusan community which holds his freedom in check by "adding links" to "the fetters of that strange freedom."

Commenting further on the situation in which Jim finds himself, Marlow keeps using similar wording that implies a sense of imprisonment and even slavery with a greater emphasis: "The land, the people, the forests were her [Jewel's] accomplices, guarding him [Jim] with vigilant accord, with an air of seclusion, of mystery, of invincible possession. There was no appeal, as it were; he was imprisoned within the very freedom of his power . . ." (*Lord Jim* 169). It is apparent that Jewel to whom Jim is bound since his first encounter with her at Cornelius' place is not the only other that has a claim over Jim. On the contrary, along with Jewel, each and every single member of the Patusan community has a hold on Jim's seemingly unfettered freedom which binds him inexorably to them. As Lévinas states, the other "demands me, claims me, assigns me" ("From the One" 126). Through his/her claim over the self, the other "assigns" a certain responsibility to the self which the self cannot shirk. It is such assignment epitomized in the call of the others who need Jim in Patusan that makes him readily concede that "[he is] responsible for every life in the land" (*Lord Jim* 234).

However, Jim is not the only character who has to face others and hear the call to own up responsibility for others. Marlow is another character in the novel who finds himself facing the other. Although Marlow as the narrator was generally considered by early critics as "a simple master mariner" and "a mere narrative device" (Brudney, "Marlow's Morality" 319, 332) or approached as "Conrad's alter ego"[54] (Maier-Katkin and Maier-Katkin 602), he seems to "remain an ambiguous figure – partly authorial persona, partly an ironized and unreliable narrator . . ." (Ophir 354). Nevertheless, Marlow is not just a narrator nor a technical device to place Jim's tale within a frame, especially in terms of the moral codes of the novel. He is certainly more than that because Marlow not only becomes a confidant for Jim in the course of the novel but also, more importantly, is another subject or self whose presence is integral to the story of Jim.

Marlow hears of the Patna affair before the inquiry into the Patna incident is set to start. He meets the chief engineer of the Patna at a hospital where the engineer is treated for

his delirium (*Lord Jim* 37) after this incident and hence he will not be able to appear in court. This is how Marlow hears of the upcoming trial and is interested in attending the legal proceedings where "[his] eyes met his [Jim's] for the first time at that inquiry" (*Lord Jim* 25) and where he watches Jim suffer through the unbearable burden of the inquiry.

James Chandler argues that Marlow apparently has an interest in Jim's case but the cause or origin of this interest is, in fact, enigmatically not disclosed: Marlow's "is an interest that Marlow himself characteristically avoids explaining" (853). All Marlow is willing to offer, in the first place, as an explanation of his interest in the trial is simply what he calls an "unhealthy curiosity" (*Lord Jim* 34): "Nothing mysterious prevented me from going away: curiosity is the most obvious of sentiments, and it held me there . . ." (30). However, shortly, he reveals that he feels he has rather a "secret motive of [his] prying:"

> Was it for my own sake that I wished to find some shadow of an excuse for that young fellow whom I had never seen before, but whose appearance alone added a touch of personal concern to the thoughts suggested by the knowledge of his weakness – made it a thing of mystery and terror – like a hint of a destructive fate ready for us all whose youth – in its day – had resembled his youth? I fear that such was the secret motive of my prying. (*Lord Jim* 35)

Marlow seems to admit that it is more than mere interest that attracts his attention to the affair in question and that the presence of this "young fellow," or this total stranger whom he does not know, affects and, as it were, touches him. For Marlow, "[n]othing [is] more awful than to watch a man who has been found out, not in a crime but in a more than criminal weakness" (*Lord Jim* 30). Given this conviction of Marlow, it is, in fact, unthinkable for Marlow to remain unconcerned for the appearance of the other who is to be tried before the court.

Indeed, with the appearance of the other, the self is compelled to acknowledge the fact that the other commands the self to take responsibility for the other. Lévinas contends that because of the ethical structure of the intersubjective relations, the self is situated in such a position in relation to the other that s/he can embody nothing but responsibility *per se*:

> The epiphany of the Absolutely Other is a face by which the Other challenges and commands me through his nakedness, through his destitution. He challenges me from his humility and from his height. . . . And the putting into question of the Same [the self] by the Other is a summons to respond. The I is not simply conscious of this necessity to respond, as if it were a matter of an obligation or a duty about which a decision could be made; rather the I is, by its very *position*, responsibility through and through. ("Transcendence and Height" 17)

The characterization of the self as such in the face of the other demonstrates that the self is not only summoned to respond to the plight of the other but also that the self's urge to respond is much more fundamental and primordial than a conscious deliberation to do so. In other words, by virtue of his/her position in connection with the other, the self is always already responsible. As Jim succinctly says to Marlow, "[a]ll the same, one is responsible" (*Lord Jim* 109).

Taking into account both the commandment and at the same time the nakedness and destitution of the other, the self finds that "[b]efore the Other (*Autrui*), the I is infinitely responsible. The Other is the poor and destitute one, and nothing which concerns this Stranger can leave the I indifferent" (Lévinas, "Transcendence and Height" 18). It is this very impossibility, or rather inconceivability of remaining indifferent to the other that essentially informs Marlow's relation with Jim. Marlow is intrigued by Jim and voices his concern for Jim's future after the trial because Jim looks desolate and destitute as follows:

> My talk [with Jim] was of the material aspect of his position; it had the sole aim of saving him from the degradation, ruin, and despair that out there close so swiftly upon a friendless, homeless man; I pleaded with him to accept my help; I argued reasonably: and every time I looked up at that absorbed smooth face, so grave and youthful, I had a disturbing sense of being no help but rather an obstacle to some mysterious, inexplicable, impalpable striving of his wounded spirit. (*Lord Jim* 110)

Marlow cannot help but respond to Jim's situation because he believes that his situation will become worse. Since he cannot remain indifferent to such a prospective destitution of the other, Marlow even entreats Jim to receive his help. Although Marlow at one point finds Jim's position as "hopeless" (*Lord Jim* 121), he nevertheless does his best to support and thus relieve Jim of his grim despair. For this very reason, Marlow says to

Jim: “On every conceivable ground . . . you must let me help you” (*Lord Jim* 110). In this sense, the responsibility that Marlow feels for Jim is, indeed, overwhelming for Marlow himself: “. . . it was borne upon me suddenly and with unaccountable force that should I let him slip away into the darkness I would never forgive myself” (*Lord Jim* 109). Therefore, Marlow seems to be susceptible enough to hear the silent call of Jim.

Although Jim declines Marlow’s offer of help on certain occasions, it does not absolve Marlow of his deeply felt obligation to Jim as the other. On the contrary, since the other’s hold over the self is infinite, Jim’s existence as an instance of the other troubles Marlow and compels him to act responsibly in relation to Jim throughout the novel. For instance, when recounting to his auditors how and why he with the help of his friend Stein arranged the plan for making Jim start a new life in Patusan, Marlow reveals that his urge to help Jim was profoundly precipitated by the destitution of Jim by which he could not remain unmoved. Marlow plans to return to England for a short period of time; however, before leaving, he wants to make sure that Jim will be taken good care of. As Marlow says, “I was about to go home for a time; and it may be I desired, more than I was aware of myself, to dispose of him – to dispose of him, you understand – before I left. I was going home, and he had come to me from there, with his miserable trouble and his shadowy claim, like a man panting under a burden in a mist” (*Lord Jim* 134). Marlow’s choice of word, that is “dispose of,” is quite ironic and at the same time revealing in that it carries certain connotations such as getting rid of Jim who has an irremissible claim over Marlow. However, ironically, Marlow’s almost undisclosed desire to dispose of Jim demonstrates to what extent “the I loses its hold before the absolutely Other, before the human Other (*Autrui*), and, unjustified, can no longer be powerful” (Lévinas, “Transcendence and Height” 17). Therefore, it can be argued that Jim’s “miserable trouble and his shadowy claim” over Marlow add another layer of meaning to his choice of word in that by disposing of Jim Marlow intends to set out certain favorable circumstances for Jim in which he will find comfort.

It is this very claim Jim has over Marlow that affects the latter to respond to Jim. Marlow further acknowledges his binding relation to Jim as follows: “I happened to be handy, and I happened to be touched. That’s all there is to it. I was concerned as to the way he would go out” (*Lord Jim* 135). This ultimate concern and responsibility of

Marlow's for Jim is powerfully illustrated through a biblical allusion to the story of Abel and Cain that Marlow implicitly invokes. Marlow imagines that if he does not help Jim out, the cliffs of Dover, upon his return to England, will "ask me what I – returning with no bones broken, so to speak, had done with my very young brother" (*Lord Jim* 135).[55] Hence, Marlow ultimately feels accountable not only for how Jim will fare but also for the extent to which he can help Jim fare well – because Marlow is immensely "afraid of, some day, being waylaid by a blear-eyed, swollen-faced, besmirched loafer, with no soles to his canvas shoes, and with a flutter of rags about the elbows, who, on the strength of old acquaintance, would ask for a loan of five dollars" (*Lord Jim* 135).

Marlow even finds such possible dreadful encounters – if he does not help Jim – "more trying to a man who believes in the solidarity of our lives than the sight of an impenitent death-bed to a priest" (*Lord Jim* 135). Therefore, just as Jim strongly feels the ethical bond he has with, in the first place, the pilgrims aboard the Patna, Jewel at Cornelius' place and then the whole Patusan community for all of whom he takes responsibility, Marlow seems to be similarly obliged to Jim from the very moment he set his eyes on him during the proceedings at the court. At any rate, as Marlow puts it, "one must return with a clear conscience" (*Lord Jim* 134), that is, responding to and supporting the other.

Along with Marlow who finds himself responding to the call of Jim, there are two other minor characters that are troubled by the very situation Jim is in and thus cannot continue to be unconcerned about him. For instance, Captain Brierly, or also known as Big Brierly, whom Marlow meets during the proceedings is one of the assessors, or judges, in the inquiry and is introduced as someone who is "offensively conscious of his high maritime status" and has "always done the right, indeed, more than the right thing" (Brudney, "Marlow's Morality" 324). Marlow says that Brierly "was acutely aware of his merits and of his rewards" because "[h]e had never in his life made a mistake, never had an accident, never a mishap, never a check in his steady rise" (*Lord Jim* 38). Notwithstanding the complacency Brierly[56] displays, he seems to be deeply troubled by the unfortunate incident that befell Jim and especially by the trial Jim was made to stand for his jump from the Patna. As Brierly says to Marlow in their last conversation during the progress of the inquiry,

> [w]hat's the use of it? It is the stupidest set-out you can imagine . . . Why are we tormenting that young chap? . . . What does he expect to happen? Nothing can save him. He's done for. . . . This infernal publicity is too shocking: there he sits while all these confounded natives, serangs, lascars, quarter-masters, are giving evidence that's enough to burn a man to ashes with shame. This is abominable. (*Lord Jim* 43-44)

As can be seen in Brierly's remonstrations, although he appears to be "a solid-seeming figure" (Chandler 852), he is deeply affected by the plight of Jim whose "soul writhed within him" when, during the hearing, "a question to the point cut short his speech, like a pang of pain . . ." (*Lord Jim* 23). However, although neither Marlow nor Brierly offers any explicit or satisfactory reason for Brierly's disquietude or sensitivity – which renders him a very enigmatic character in the novel, it can be surmised that it is this suffering of Jim which Brierly cannot endure any more.

Brierly is convinced that all this torment inflicted on Jim could end only if Jim goes away: "If he went away all this would stop at once" (*Lord Jim* 44). This concerned attitude of Brierly's is apparently at variance with Marlow's first impression of him as utterly "bored" with Jim's case (*Lord Jim* 39). Indeed, as Marlow later concedes – especially after his last conversation with Brierly – "Brierly was not bored – he was exasperated" (*Lord Jim* 45). The exasperation Brierly feels can be directly linked to the torment Jim is put through in the court which troubles his conscience and which he thinks could right away end if Jim goes away. Thus, feeling obliged to help Jim get rid of all this troubling distress, Brierly offers money and wants Marlow to talk to Jim to accept his offer of money that will help him go away and settle somewhere else away from the torturous experiences he had to live through. In this respect, conscience as a concept that is central to the relation between the self and the other applies to Brierly, too.

Similar to Brierly's response to Jim's suffering, there is another character in the novel, Marlow's friend Stein, who is "a wealthy and respected merchant" and "one of the most trustworthy men [Marlow] had ever known" (*Lord Jim* 122). Stein cannot remain unconcerned when Marlow mentions the situation of Jim. Given that Stein already "appear[s] benevolently ready to lend you his ear" (*Lord Jim* 122), Marlow immediately

"consider[s] him an eminently suitable person to receive [his] confidences about Jim's difficulties as well as [his] own" (*Lord Jim* 123). After Marlow recounts Jim's failure on the Patna and his subsequent denial of forgiving himself for abandoning the ship, Stein instantly diagnoses Jim as "romantic" (*Lord Jim* 128) for being obsessed with this particular act because he himself can strongly relate to Jim. As Stein reveals to Marlow, "do you know how many opportunities I let escape; how many dreams I had lost that had come in my way?" (*Lord Jim* 131). Stein further concedes that it is, in fact, very troubling and overwhelming especially when one knows which opportunities one misses: "Everybody knows of one or two [missed opportunities] like that . . . and that is the trouble – the great trouble . . . ." (*Lord Jim* 131, last ellipsis original). It is this sort of trouble Jim is in that exhorts him to respond to Jim's situation.

Stein comes up with a practical idea which he believes will alleviate Jim's burden and help him build a new life. Lévinas argues that "[t]he plenitude of power through which the sovereignty of the [self] maintains itself does not extend to the Other (*Autrui*) to conquer him, but to support him. But to support the burden of the Other is, at the same time, to confirm it in its substantiality, situating it above the I" ("Transcendence and Height" 18-19). In a sense, Stein's freedom is called into question and he inevitably feels responsible for supporting the other whose situation, or rather position, calls him to act accordingly. Therefore, Stein's practical and yet responsive solution to Jim's troubles is to send him very far away to his trading post in Patusan.

Although there is such a binding relation between the self and others embodied in the commanding face of the other – which is variously illustrated through the characters such as Jim, Marlow, Jewel, Stein and Brierly, the call that the other makes through the face is, as Lévinas repeatedly emphasizes, an "authority . . . without force" ("The Paradox" 169). In other words, the face of the other commands the self but can never force the self to act in a certain way. Despite the fact that the face authoritatively prohibits the self, "[i]t must be thought of outside the idea of force" ("The Paradox" 175). Hence, the self recognizes the authority and hears the commandment that forbids the self to inflict harm upon the other and at the same time bids him/her to support the other. Nevertheless, the self might not act in the way the face dictates. Given this

premise, Jim's jump overboard can be, to some extent, evaluated within this frame without casting him as a moral failure.

Jim's jump is generally regarded as his ultimate moral failure; however, instead of directly rendering him as such, it should be noted that, as earlier shown, he responds to the call of the naked faces and bodies of the pilgrims aboard and tries hard to find a way to save them. He realizes that there is nothing else he could do except for letting the lifeboats down into the sea – which he momentarily thinks will float after the Patna sinks and might save some lives. Even after this – when there seems nothing else to do – Jim finds himself paralyzed and stuck to the ship: "The last moment had come, as he thought, and he did not move. His feet remained glued to the planks . . ." (*Lord Jim* 67). Marlow is even surprised to hear that Jim at some point moved: "This was the first I heard of his having moved at all. I could not restrain a grunt of surprise. Something had started him off at last, but of the exact moment, of the cause that tore him out of his immobility, he knew no more than the uprooted tree knows the wind that laid it low" (*Lord Jim* 68). Jim's "passive heroism" (*Lord Jim* 65) as such confirms his inclination to lend an ear to and recognize the call of the other.

Moreover, even though Jim knows that he did whatever could be done on the seemingly sinking ship, he refuses to leave the ship until the very last moment. When he almost unconsciously jumps overboard, his action turns out extremely traumatic for Jim. As Jim reveals in his conversation with Marlow in whom he confides as regards the Patna incident, "'I had jumped . . .' He checked himself, averted his gaze. . . . 'It seems,' he added" (*Lord Jim* 69, ellipsis original). The words Jim employs along with the ellipsis are thematically and stylistically very significant not only because they demonstrate that Jim cannot remember the exact moment he jumps but also because they denote that he cannot come to terms with his act which troubles his conscience. In addition, the past perfect tense Jim uses to indicate the act of jumping along with the added "it seems" stylistically confirms that Jim is already past or has surpassed the act of which he was not fully aware when it occurred. In relation to Jim's act of jumping, Fredric Jameson argues that "[t]here is no present tense of the act, we are forever before or after it, in past or future tenses, at the stage of the project or the consequences" (264). Similarly, albeit with a greater elaboration, Susan Jones states that

> [t]he grammatical construction of Jim's confession . . . suggests a dislocation of consciousness at the very moment of action. He describes his action – 'the leap' – in the pluperfect tense, located in the distant past of his memory, while the use of the intransitive 'seems' introduces present equivocation, suggesting a sense of ambiguity about his knowledge of, responsibility for, and reluctance to 'own,' his deed. (v)

In a sense, the whole act itself seems evasive and Jim cannot fully comprehend the fact that he, indeed, jumped. The pauses symbolized by the ellipsis and the obscurity of the act of jump signified by the past perfect tense contribute to the haziness of the moment of jump which becomes utterly confusing for Jim: "'I knew nothing about it till I looked up,' he explained hastily. . . . He didn't know. It had happened somehow. It would never happen again" (*Lord Jim* 70). Therefore, Jim has difficulty in coming to terms with what he did because his almost unconscious jump signifies a shattering of his steadfast ethical responsibility to which he remained devoted until his very last moments on the Patna.

However, as soon as he realizes what he did, he immensely regrets it: "'She seemed higher than a wall; she loomed like a cliff over the boat. . . . I wished I could die,' he cried. 'There was no going back. It was as if I had jumped into a well – into an everlasting deep hole . . . .'" (*Lord Jim* 70, ellipsis original). Such a momentary and impulsive act of Jim's is almost unintentional because, as he says to Marlow, he felt the ship move while he was standing immobile. Thus, this slight movement of the ship

> managed, though, to knock over something in my head. . . . What would you do if you felt now – this minute – the house here move, just move a little under your chair. Leap! By heavens! you could take on spring from where you sit and land in that clump of bushes yonder. (*Lord Jim* 67)

Indeed, taking into consideration the circumstances on the Patna, Marlow concedes that he "would have landed short by several feet – that's the only thing of which [he] is fairly certain" (*Lord Jim* 67). In other words, Marlow acknowledges that he, too, would leap under such circumstances.

In spite of the pressing circumstances prevailing at that moment, Jim's leap, as a matter of fact, cannot be fully justified. However, Jim's sole aim in recounting the incident in

detail is not to justify his deed; on the very contrary, he needs someone, in this case Marlow, to see the whole matter from his perspective as he himself experienced it and to believe in him. As Jim tells Marlow, "[y]ou don't know what it is for a fellow in my position to be believed – make a clean breast of it to an elder man. It is so difficult – so awfully unfair – so hard to understand" (*Lord Jim* 79). Given this reasoning on Jim's part, the epigraph to the novel from the early German Romantic poet Novalis seems to be supportive of this claim: "It is certain my Conviction gains infinitely, the moment another soul will believe in it."

Moreover, if to take a closer look at Jim's words ("I had jumped . . . It seems"), it is clear that Susan Jones' reading earlier mentioned does not seem well-founded mainly because Jim does *not* shirk his responsibility for his deed nor display any disinclination to own his action. On the contrary, as soon as he is aware that he jumped, he becomes so guilt-ridden that he immediately wants to die by throwing himself off the lifeboat (*Lord Jim* 73). He wishes to die because he feels utterly responsible and guilty for leaving behind the pilgrims. This is further illustrated when Jim refuses to clear out of the inquiry and instead chooses to face the consequences of his abandonment. Although the inquiry is tormenting like "hell" for Jim (*Lord Jim* 50), he says that "I couldn't clear out . . . The skipper did – that's all very well for him. I couldn't, and I wouldn't. They all got out of it in one way or another, but it wouldn't do for me" (*Lord Jim* 51). Indeed, while some crew members could get away with their abandonment, Jim could not. It is not because Jim could not find the means to do so but rather because his conscience and his strongly felt responsibility for others deter him from doing so.

This is confirmed for the second time when the necessary resources to clear out are offered to Jim by Brierly and are readily denied by Jim. Jim responds when Marlow brings up this issue as follows:

> 'Clear out! Couldn't think of it,' he said, with a shake of the head. . . . he mumbled like a man thinking half aloud. [Other crew members] 'Went away . . . went into hospitals. . . . Not one of them would face it. . . . They! . . .' He moved his hand slightly to imply disdain. 'But I've got to get over this thing, and I mustn't shirk any of it or . . . I won't shirk any of it. . . . I may have jumped, but I don't run away

> . . . I can't afford it. I am bound to fight this thing down – I am fighting it *now*.' (*Lord Jim* 94, 82)

As can be clearly seen, Jim does *not* intend to shun or disown his responsibility for his act which he explicitly admits having committed; on the contrary, he braces himself for and bravely endures the whole agonizing trial, rejecting any offer of help that could save him from all this trouble.

Sartre defines responsibility as "consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object" (*Being* 553). By emphasizing the self's free choice of action, he further remarks that "the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since he is the one by whom it happens that *there is* a world; since he is also the one who makes himself be, then whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself, the for-itself must wholly assume this situation . . . even though it be insupportable" (*Being* 553-54). In other words, the self is always already responsible because s/he creates by virtue of his/her freedom the very situation in which s/he finds him/herself and which inevitably engenders responsibility regardless of its intolerability. Furthermore, insofar as the self acts in such a situation, s/he will be responsible for it.

Similarly, Paul Ricœur designates the moment of recognition of responsibility as that which starts with the self's contact with an other:

> I form the consciousness of being the author of my acts in the world and, more generally, the author of my acts of thought, principally on the occasion of my contacts with an other, in a social context. Someone asks, who did that? I rise and reply, I did. Response – responsibility. To be responsible means to be ready to respond to such a question. (56-57)

Given this premise, one can easily observe that Jim is already ready to respond as early as the very first moments after his jump – which can be seen in his immediate regret of his leap. In addition, a question directed to him during the trial at once prepares the ground for his facing and accepting his responsibility once again: "He was becoming irrelevant . . . He was coming to that, he was coming to that – and now, checked brutally, he had to answer by yes or no. He answered truthfully by a curt 'Yes, I did' . . ." (*Lord Jim* 23). Therefore, Jim's confusion about how he came to jump cannot be

deemed as a reluctance to accept responsibility for his impulsive act; instead, Jim can be regarded, at best, as what Guerard calls "the conscientious sinner" (154).

Edward Said writes that Conrad's works present "an atmosphere that exudes the feeling of something wrong, which has to be examined or recollected or relived or worked out" (94) and thus attempt to "interpret what, at the time of occurrence, would not permit reflection" because, "most of the time, the action that has already occurred not only troubles the present, but also calls itself to immediate attention" (88). Indeed, "the feeling of something wrong" seems to be quite strong in Jim's case considering that Jim tries to reconcile himself with the act of his jump throughout his life. This is because it is this wrong act of Jim's that exposes him to be judged by others who bestow on him the identity of coward and betrayer which he discovers in shame and finds himself utterly guilty of. For this reason, Jim does not seem to forgive himself for the rest of his life.

Moreover, although Patusan offers a myriad of chances for Jim to start over, he nevertheless cannot overcome his failure on the Patna. Even after achieving so much in Patusan, Jim reveals to Marlow that his failure still haunts him: "'I talk about being done with it – with the bally thing at the back of my head . . . Forgetting . . . Hang me if I know! I can think of it quietly. After all, what has it proved? Nothing. I suppose you don't think so . . . No matter,' he said. 'I am satisfied . . . nearly'" (*Lord Jim* 182, also see 181). In a sense, Jim's inability to come to terms with his failure and thus his guilt demonstrates that he will never be fully satisfied with himself. This might be linked with, what Hary Sewlall calls, "the existentialist conundrum," that is, the problem that existence itself entails: how to be or how to live? – the very question Stein poses in the novel (*Lord Jim* 109). However, being or existence *per se* is not something solitary or solipsistic; instead, it is always already being with others, whether it be on conflictual or peaceful terms. Therefore, such existential conundrum always involves relations with others, and especially in Jim's case, these relations take on an ethical turn from the very beginning to the end of his life.

Jim's last ethical trial in which he finds himself obligated to the other occurs when a pirate named Gentleman Brown invades Patusan along with a number of armed men in

search of food supplies and looting while Jim is away from Patusan. Since they are not many in number, Brown and his men are immediately cornered and besieged by the sheer number of the villagers. When Jim arrives, he goes to meet Brown "not very far from the place, perhaps on the very spot, where Jim took the second desperate leap of his life – the leap that landed him into the life of Patusan, into the trust, the love, the confidence of the people" (*Lord Jim* 225). It is significant that they meet more or less at the very place where Jim took a leap of faith into the community of Patusan mainly because it anticipates that there will be another leap for Jim – a moral one at that, once again. Indeed, a moral dilemma for Jim immediately ensues from the encounter between Jim and Brown in which they briefly talk about the terms they agree upon. As Brown says to Jim:

> I came here for food. D'ye hear? – food to fill our bellies. And what did *you* come for? What did you ask for when you came here? We don't ask you for anything but to give us a fight or a clear road to go back whence we came . . . . I won't ask you what scared you into this infernal hole, where you seem to have found pretty pickings. That's your luck and this is mine – the privilege to beg for the favor of being shot quickly, or else kicked out to go free and starve in my own way. (*Lord Jim* 227)

Stating that he simply came to Patusan for food, Brown notes that Jim will either fight them or give them "a clear road" to get out of Patusan without any harm done. However, Brown agrees to leave Patusan on one condition alone: he and his men will keep their weapons on their way out on the grounds that "[s]uppose they [Jim's people] say one thing to you, and do the other thing to me" (*Lord Jim* 230). After convincing Doramin, the chief of the Bugis community, to let go of Brown and his men without a fight, albeit with their weapons, Jim sends a note to Brown via Cornelius that reads as follows: "You get the clear road. Start as soon as your boat floats on the morning tide. Let your men be careful. The bushes on both sides of the creek . . . are full of well-armed men. You would have no chance, but I don't believe you want bloodshed" (*Lord Jim* 235). In this regard, Jim will let Brown go away peacefully.

This decision on Jim's part, as Marlow recounts, is quite suggestive of how he tries really hard to act in a morally right way towards the other and thus of how he feels an obligation to make the best decision for both parties involved. Although the most viable

and expedient option for his people seems to be killing Brown and his men – which could be done easily and which would make sure that no harm could be done to the people of Patusan, Jim is never disposed towards harming others. If to recall the Patna incident, Jim was terrified by the imminent death that was awaiting the pilgrims and by the impossibility to help them because at any moment the ship could sink. However, in this case, Jim is not pressed for time and thus demonstrates the ultimate care to make the right decision that would prevent any potential harm. Jim assures the community that "[e]verybody shall be safe" (*Lord Jim* 232) and that "it would be best to let these whites and their followers go with their lives" (*Lord Jim* 233) because Brown's story that he came to Patusan simply out of necessity for food is quite plausible: "there was no reason [for Jim] to doubt the story [of Brown]" (*Lord Jim* 233). Hence, there was, in the same vein, no reason for Jim to ruthlessly execute them on the unjustified grounds that Brown and his men might harm his people.

Furthermore, the destitute situation in which Brown and his men appear "with long beards and in rags" (*Lord Jim* 245) is a call for a benevolent response from Jim to their apparent vulnerability regardless of their intimidating and unpredictable presence. Matthew Calarco writes that

> [i]n encountering a vulnerable human Other, my ambitions are placed in check. I meet with a resistance that is greater than any strength I might muster in order to counter its force. Were I so inclined, I could enslave, abuse, or even slaughter this vulnerable human Other, but, paradoxically, it is the very vulnerability of the Other that *dis*inclines me to do so and gives me pause. The Other calls to me as if 'from on high,' from a location that reverses my mastery over the Other into a freely chosen ethical servitude. (66)

Indeed, Jim seems to have all the power in his hands to slaughter Brown and his men; however, he opts not to do so primarily because of the resistance the other's face displays. The face is not only "that whose meaning consists in saying: 'thou shall not kill'" (Lévinas, *Ethics and Infinity* 86) but also it indicates a neediness to be attended to: "[T]he face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all . . . . I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call" (Lévinas, *Ethics and Infinity* 89). Hence, both Brown and his men are accordingly provided with necessary resources through Jewel who sends them food (*Lord Jim* 231).

Similarly, later in the novel when Brown and his men are about to leave Patusan, Jim tells him that "[i]f you think it worth your while to wait a day outside . . . I'll try to send you down something – a bullock, some yams – what I can" (*Lord Jim* 236). This is how the other's desperate situation compels the self to attend to the other's plight no matter what the circumstances are. As Ian Watt puts it, "everything that Jim stands for makes this alternative [killing Brown and his men] impossible: the extermination in cold blood of any human being . . . would be morally offensive . . ." (*Conrad in the Nineteenth* 342). Indeed, this is exactly what Jim refrains from doing because the other calls upon him to respond and thus be responsible for the other.

Jim is "evidently anxious that some misunderstanding should not occur, ending perhaps in collision or bloodshed" (*Lord Jim* 233) and takes extra caution so that everything should run smoothly and go as planned. In fact, Brown is to play by the rules Jim sets but Cornelius who carries Jim's note to Brown stays with Brown after delivering the message and informs him that there is another way out of the river which can help him ambush the settlers of Patusan. Cornelius, therefore, steers Brown's boat through a narrow backway and helps Brown "land his men on the other side of the island opposite to the Bugis [Doramin's] camp" which is "plain from end to end before their eyes" (*Lord Jim* 239). With Brown's sign, they shoot at the people and cause as much carnage as possible, and many people including Doramin's son Dain Waris are killed.

Considering the role Cornelius plays in inflicting this slaughter, Jim's alleged moral failure[57] with regard to the situation at hand seems to be quite disputable. According to Daniel Brudney, "Jim's moral failure aboard the Patna is transparent: his moral failure with respect to Brown is not" ("*Lord Jim*" 266). Indeed, compared to his leap from the Patna which can be, to some extent, considered as an act of betrayal (which is still debatable) and thus of ethical significance, Jim's position in the Gentleman Brown case seems far less culpable. This is mainly because Jim handles the whole situation with ultimate care so that nobody should be hurt. Although Brudney further argues that Jim can be, nevertheless, held responsible for the situation because of his "bad judgment" which he thinks makes Jim liable to "moral criticism" ("*Lord Jim*" 266, also see 270), his argument falls short of accounting for the ethical bond between the self and others. Since this bond is characterized by, what Lévinas calls, a "non-indifference of one to

another . . . a responsibility of one for another" ("Useless Suffering" 86), Jim's decision to respond to Brown and his men in good faith cannot be regarded as bad judgment nor subjected to moral criticism. Brudney's proposition that Jim could have made – if not killed – Brown and his men wait until they either starve or surrender (*Lord Jim* 266) is ultimately anathema to the ethical necessity of responsiveness to the other because all such potential plans of the self are held in check with the encounter with the vulnerable and destitute other. Such hypothetical approach proposed by Brudney involves inflicting pain and causing suffering to Brown and his men through depriving them of their basic need for food – which is unacceptable given the strong hold of the ethical bond between the self and the other.

Moreover, as Joanne Wood contends, "it would indeed be hypocritical for Jim to deny Brown's simple request for a 'fight or a clear road' for him and his men, for Brown presents a forceful argument in his defense which essentially places Jim in the position which he himself had placed Marlow in years earlier" (67). Just as Marlow responded to Jim's call by listening to and trusting him during and after the trial as well as by providing him with necessary resources, Jim "must take Brown at his word because Marlow had once found the courage to do the same for him" (Wood 67). Therefore, Jim's action regarding Brown not only reveals him to be a person who consistently finds himself acknowledging and responding to the presence of the vulnerable others, but also suggests that Jim, in a sense, redeems himself of his previous "impulsive jump" (*Lord Jim* 242).

However, Jim's benevolence towards Brown and his men is apparently not reciprocated. In fact, the other does not necessarily have to reciprocate the benevolence the self shows to him/her. Lévinas writes that "the intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity . . ." (*Ethics and Infinity* 98). Indeed, instead of reciprocity, Jim finds himself face to face with the massacre caused by Brown. Although this bloodshed is not directly Jim's fault, he nevertheless assumes full responsibility since he earlier assured the Patusan community that "[h]e was ready to answer with his life for any harm that should come to them if the white men with beards were allowed to retire" (*Lord Jim* 232-33). In other words, he chooses to make good on his promise by "tak[ing] it upon his head" (*Lord*

Jim 245) and giving himself in to Doramin who shoots him through the chest: "Then with his hand over his lips he fell forward, dead" (*Lord Jim* 246). Jim's ultimate decision to own up the situation emanates from the fact that he chooses to let go Brown and his men and accordingly convinces the others to do so. In a sense, he is the one who sets the situation going in the first place. For this reason, as Sartre puts it, the self "must assume the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it . . . the situation is *mine* because it is the image of my free choice of myself" (*Being* 554). Hence, Jim not only feels guilty and holds himself responsible for the death of many Patusan natives but also does not forgive himself.

In conclusion, two very significant events in Jim's life, that is, the Patna incident and the encounter with Gentleman Brown in Patusan, try his capacity of responsibility as well as response-ability by placing him in ethically charged and morally demanding situations. In both cases, which are generally deemed moral failures by critics, Jim nevertheless succeeds not only in hearing the call of vulnerable others but also in recognizing the resistance others show to his freedom of appropriation. In this respect, Jim is fully consci(enti)ous of the hold others have over him and thereby renders himself utterly responsible for them. Consequently, it is not tenable to cast him as a moral failure; on the contrary, by putting Jim through such cases, Conrad demonstrates that someone with a conscience – both Marlow and Stein repeatedly allude to Jim's conscience – is morally alert towards others and ethically bound to them through his/her non-reciprocal response-ability. As Lévinas argues, one happens to be a "subject" to the extent of his/her unilateral subjection to others: "It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other, and I am 'subject' essentially in this sense" (*Ethics and Infinity* 98). Therefore, it can be conceded that Conrad through Jim posits that one of the fundamental aspects of existence or being a self necessitates a relation with others which is saturated with ethical significance and responsibility and hence to which the self cannot remain indifferent. Moreover, the ethico-phenomenological reading of the self-other encounters in *Lord Jim* as such not only transcends the possible interpretations made through the readings of cultural perspectives such as the colonial and postcolonial ones but also

enriches the text by contributing to the analysis of the self-other relations in their fundamental ethical saturation on the phenomenological level.

CHAPTER III

THE SELF IN THE MAKING THROUGH ENCOUNTERS WITH OTHERS IN FORD MADOX FORD'S *THE GOOD SOLDIER*

"We are all so afraid, we are all so alone, we all so need from the outside the assurance of our own worthiness to exist."

-Ford Madox Ford, *The Good Soldier*

"The essential thing is contingency. I mean that, by definition, existence is not necessity. To exist is simply *to be there* . . . Only they have tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being."

-Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*

"Shuttlecocks!"

-Ford Madox Ford, *The Good Soldier*

The self as conceptualized by phenomenologists reveals itself to be conspicuously opposed to the traditional Cartesian conception and position of the self over against the world and others. The self is not located somewhere detached from the world and others; instead, it is inextricably embedded in the world with others.[58] In simpler terms, what constitutes the self is simply its existence (*existing* or being) which is clearly indicated in the terms phenomenologists employ to designate such a being as the self. For instance, Heidegger's concepts such as *Dasein* (literally being-there) and, by extension, being-in-the-world as well as being-with immediately suggest the existence of an indissoluble integrity between existence, the world, and others. Such rendition is similarly endorsed by Merleau-Ponty as is seen in his adoption of "being-in-the-world"

which, for him, denotes the fact that "we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world" (xiv). This is the reason why, Merleau-Ponty says, one can only speak of a subject as "destined to the world" (xii). On the other hand, although Sartre's name for such existence, that is, being-for-itself, is not so suggestive as those of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it nevertheless incorporates the fact of being in the world through which the self makes (sense of) itself.

Such characterization of the self or existence as immersed in the intersubjective world further reveals the self as always already becoming or in the making. As given over to the world, the self is a being that continually becomes simply because it is "thrown" (Heidegger, *Being* 136/174) into the world and it does not have an essence to adhere to. On the contrary, it keeps making itself or attempts to forge an essence for itself by virtue of its choices and actions. Sartre famously says that "existence precedes essence" (*The Humanism* 270). In other words, existence comes before any potential attributes of essence because one, first and foremost, exists and accordingly makes choices that will form the basis and character of the self. The self is not only in the world but also its being-there-ness is fundamentally underlined by a certain desire to make itself or create an essence and hence an identity for itself – which is possible in and through existence. Therefore, if "man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself" (Merleau-Ponty xii), then s/he also knows that it is only in the world s/he makes him/herself.

Moreover, tacitly aware of its fundamentally contingent existence embodied in its thrownness, the self is plunged into a never-ending struggle for acquiring an identity on which it might ultimately base its existence. In this sense, by striving to create an identity for itself, the self simultaneously attempts to justify its otherwise gratuitous, or what Sartre calls "*de trop*" [excessive] (*Being* 84), existence. However, the path to acquiring an identity inevitably intersects with others who possess the power to bestow on the self the essence or identity it seeks. Taking into account the self's perpetual attempts to secure an identity for itself and to render its contingent existence necessary through the intermediation of others, this chapter argues that John Dowell, the first-person narrator and one of the principal figures in Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier* (1915), endeavors to justify his being-in-the-world, or simply his existence, through

others who eventually not only help him forge an identity for himself but also make sure that his justification is perpetuated. It further argues that Dowell's self-conception and identity which he desperately needs to maintain for self-justification are fundamentally marked by the intersubjective relations he forges with others in the course of the novel. In this regard, by focusing on his intricate relations with others, Dowell's sense of self will be analyzed with a view to his need for "the assurance of [his] worthiness to exist" which can only come from "the outside," that is, others (Ford, *The Good* 83).

Born in Merton, Surrey, England, Ford Madox Ford (1873 - 1939), christened as Ford Hermann Hueffer, was the first child of an English painter Catherine Madox Brown and a German music critic and author Francis Hueffer (originally Franz Hüffer before he anglicized his name) as well as the first grandchild of the Pre-Raphaelite painter Ford Madox Brown. About a year after the birth of Ford, his aunt Lucy Madox Brown (a painter herself) married William Rossetti (writer and art critic) who was the brother of Dante Gabriel and Christina Rossetti. Therefore, Ford was not only born into "an artistic and bohemian clan" but also his "relationship to significant literary figures of the day, and to the Pre-Raphaelites, was confirmed" with her aunt's marriage (Haslam ix).

Upon his father's sudden death in 1889 which left his family financially in dire straits, the hopes of Ford and his brother Oliver for receiving university education were ruined and then they started to live with their grandfather Ford Madox Brown. Out of his love and admiration for his grandfather, Ford introduced "Madox" into his name and started to publish under the name "Ford Madox Hueffer" (starting from 1919, he used "Ford Madox Ford")[59] when he was only seventeen years old (Moser, Introduction viii). In 1894, he eloped with and married Elsie Martindale whose family had objected to their marriage and then moved to the Romney Marsh area in southern Kent – an area that harbored the likes of such literary figures as Henry James, Stephen Crane and H.G. Wells (Tomlinson par. 1).

However, most of all, in 1898, Ford met Joseph Conrad in Kent which would have a lifelong artistic impact on him and shape his literary outlook. Ford not only became close friends with Conrad but also collaborated on a number of literary works during the

process of which Ford, as Sara Haslam notes, "learnt much of his craft from this difficult, admirable, demanding and great writer" (xi). Indeed, from his first acquaintance with Conrad until the break-up of their friendship in 1909,[60] Ford engaged in productive literary conversations with Conrad and they exchanged many ideas regarding impressionism and literary techniques – which was quite formative for Ford. As Max Saunders remarks, meeting Conrad "was the beginning of a decade of apprenticeship, intimacy and frustration" ("Ford Madox" par. 4). Out of the discussions with such figures as Conrad, Edward Garnett (literary critic who introduced Ford to Conrad), and H.G. Wells emerged the idea of a literary magazine, *The English Review*, which Ford founded in 1908 and to which Conrad was one of the chief contributors.[61] With his work in this journal, Ford introduced and published many young writers such as Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence and Wyndham Lewis who were to be the leading figures of modernist literature.

Ford's editorship gained him not only respect from these young writers but also reputation as one of the most prominent literary editors of the early twentieth century (Aldington 319). In the latter part of his life, with the help of Ezra Pound, Ford founded another literary magazine called *The Transatlantic Review* in Paris in 1924 and continued to publish such colossal figures as James Joyce, Gertrude Stein and Ernest Hemingway (Saunders, "Ford Madox" par. 12). Moreover, in the course of his quite long literary career (from as early as the 1890s to the end of the 1930s), Ford was very prolific and published numerous fictional works among which are, most notably, the trilogy *The Fifth Queen* (1906-1908) about Henry VIII and Katharine Howard, *The Good Soldier* (1915), and a tetralogy *Parade's End* (1924-1928). In the latter work, Ford draws upon his own experiences as an officer in the Welch Regiment in the First World War and vividly depicts the traumatic war experiences of the protagonist Christopher Tietjens by focusing on the workings of his consciousness and impressions. It was especially this latter work that made Ford immensely popular, particularly in the USA.

Against the backdrop of his literary success, though, Ford's personal life was not as bright – which eventually affected his friendships. He became estranged from his wife Elsie and "left his wife for a glamorous, rather notorious, but socially well-connected

novelist, Violet Hunt" (Moser, Introduction ix). However, his wife refused to divorce him. His affair turned scandalous when his wife saw a magazine refer to Violet Hunt as Mrs. Ford Madox Hueffer. Elsie immediately "sued for the sole right to her married name" and won the case which became "highly publicized" and which, in turn, led Ford to suffer a nervous breakdown in 1913 (Moser, Introduction x). For the rest of his life, Ford kept falling in and out of love with many women (such as the Australian painter Stella Bowen, the novelist Jean Rhys, the Polish-American painter Janice Biala) leaving one for another, and so on. However, his last relationship was with Janice Biala (starting in 1930) with whom he spent his last years until his death on June 26, 1939 in France (Haslam xi-xii).

Ford's turbulent personal life between the years 1910 - 1913, which culminated in the much-publicized scandal of his affair with Violet Hunt resulting in a nervous breakdown, "took its toll on Ford and his relationship with Hunt, but unleashed some of his best writing, especially in *The Good Soldier*" (Saunders, "Ford Madox" par.7). *The Good Soldier* is concerned with the lives of two wealthy couples, namely, the American couple John and Florence Dowell and the English couple Edward and Leonora Ashburnham. These two couples meet for the first time at Nauheim, a famous spa town in Germany, where they develop a friendship that is to last for about a decade. These two couples go to Nauheim every summer and stay there from July to September over the course of their friendship because both Florence Dowell and Edward Ashburnham apparently have "heart" problems and their summer stay at Nauheim improves their health and benefits their hearts (*The Good* 9-10).

However, it is later revealed that the American wife Florence and the English husband Edward have an affair of which the English wife Leonora was aware all the time but kept it a secret from the American husband Dowell. It is only after the deaths of Florence and Edward that Leonora "let[s] [Dowell] into her full confidence" and reveals not only the truth about their liaison but also about Edward's numerous extramarital relationships (*The Good* 77). In the light of his newly acquired knowledge through Leonora, Dowell in his narration goes back and forth and contrasts as well as interprets his impressions and experiences of the events as he experienced them in the past and as he sees them now in order to make sense of the whole situation. In this respect, *The*

Good Soldier is basically "'A Tale of Passion,' a story of seduction, adultery, and suicide told by a deceived husband" (Hynes 328) and "consists of the narrator's attempt to adjust his reason to the shattering discovery . . ." that turns upside down his previous convictions (Schorer 322).

The story is narrated in its entirety by Dowell himself who acts as the first-person narrator and imparts his gradual knowledge of the whole affair in retrospective form. Although Dowell writes down the story in which he is also involved, he is fond of imagining himself to be narrating the story to "a silent listener," and attempts to justify his reasons for telling the story "in a very rambling way" as follows:

> I have, I am aware, told this story in a very rambling way so that it may be difficult for anyone to find their path through what may be a sort of maze. I cannot help it. I have stuck to my idea of being in a country cottage with a silent listener, hearing between the gusts of the wind and amidst the noises of the distant sea, the story as it comes. (*The Good* 124)

Furthermore, Dowell explains why such "rambling way" is the most fitting medium to fully reflect life as it is lived:

> And, when one discusses an affair – a long, sad affair – one goes back, one goes forward. One remembers points that one has forgotten and one explains them all the more minutely since one recognizes that one has forgotten to mention them in their proper places and that one may have given, by omitting them, a false impression. I console myself with thinking that this is a real story and that, after all, real stories are probably told best in the way a person telling a story would tell them. They will then seem most real. (*The Good* 124-25)[62]

Dowell's explanation as such directly bears on Conrad and Ford's vigorous attempts to bring something new to the conventional fiction writing. Ford credits Conrad with developing a type of narrator such as Marlow who presents the story as it comes to his mind "without much sequence or pursued chronology" (Ford, "Techniques" 312). Indeed, as will be seen, like Conrad's Marlow, Ford's Dowell does not offer any linear narration nor proceed along a chronological path.

The characterization of the narrator with no interest in chronology is furthered by re-casting the narrator as having limited knowledge of the events that s/he is to narrate. As Ford further writes, "[w]e [Conrad and Ford] evolved then a convention for the novel

and one that I think still stands. The novel must be put into the mouth of a narrator – who must be limited by probability as to what he can know of the affair that he is adumbrating" ("Techniques" 313). Indeed, Ford skillfully employs their "new form" ("Techniques" 312, 314) in *The Good Soldier*, whose story is "put into the mouth of" Dowell, in that there is neither a chronological order to the flow of the story nor an all-knowing narrator to oversee the whole story. On the contrary, Dowell's narration presents the story through a jumbled time scheme and his knowledge of the events is apparently limited and crippled for a very long time. Dowell can arrive at a comprehensive knowledge of the events that befall himself and other characters a long time after they occur.

Such limited point of view on the first-person narrator's part is, however, compensated through the richness of vivid impressions. Accepting "without much protest the stigma: 'Impressionists' that was thrown at us [Conrad and Ford]"[63] (Ford, *Joseph* 290), Ford states that Conrad and he figured how "[l]ife did not narrate, but made impressions on our brains. We in turn, if we wished to produce on you an effect of life, must not narrate but render . . . impressions" (*Joseph* 182). With their new approach to fiction, they wanted to make the reader see the effects and impressions life makes on them in their works by remaining true to their experiences in life. Similarly, in "On Impressionism," Ford remarks that "[t]he point that I really wish to make is, once again, that – that the Impressionist gives you, as a rule, the fruits of his own observations and the fruits of his own observations alone" (274). Like Conrad, Ford is a staunch supporter of the use of impressions which consist of the artist's experience and hence the impressionistic observations of such experience. As in Dowell's narration in *The Good Soldier*, the impressions take the center stage while the dull and disinterested facts recede.

Ford further argues that literary impressionism is not just about recording the impressions of the present events or moments; on the contrary, it also aims at presenting the momentary visions or impressions reaped from recollection of a past event or a series of events. As he puts it in "On Impressionism,"

> [t]he point is that any piece of Impressionism . . . is the record of the impression of a moment; it is not a sort of rounded, annotated record of a set of circumstances – it is the record of the recollection in your mind of a set of circumstances that

> happened ten years ago – or ten minutes. It might be impression of the moment – but it is the impression not the corrected chronicle. (277)

Ford explicitly denies any chronicling or putting in order the instantaneous flashes of moments that come to mind. On the contrary, the impressions effected by recollection should be preserved as they are received and experienced along with the effects they make on the mind.

Although Ford emphasized the importance of foregrounding impressions and their subjective rendition in writing, it was not until about 1914 that Ford started to put into practice his literary instructions as such in his fictional writings. John Meixner argues that "[t]he impressionism of the Ford who wrote before 1914, then, was relatively more objective. While he pursued the aim of rendering the impressions life conveys to the senses, he gave greater weight to 'common-sense' objective modes of perception" (20). However, starting with his work on *The Good Soldier* in December, 1913, Ford eventually mustered up the courage to deploy all his knowledge about writing, as he reveals in his letter to Stella Bowen: "I had never really tried to put into any novel of mine *all* that I knew about writing. . . . So, on the day I was forty [December 3, 1913] I sat down to show what I could do – and the *Good Soldier* resulted" ("Dedicatory" 3-4). Indeed, at the time, Ford constantly brooded over the subject of writing and of how it should be done. As he further reveals,

> I have always been mad about writing – about the way writing should be done and partly alone, partly with the companionship of Conrad, I had even at the date made exhaustive studies into how words should be handled and novels constructed. ("Dedicatory" 3).

It is also, more or less, in this same period that Ford actually "showed an increased focusing on the experience of the mind itself, with its backward and forward dartings [with a] new emphasis on the subjective" (Meixner 22). The end result of these vigorous and "exhaustive" studies by Ford was *The Good Soldier* which he "always regarded . . . as [his] best book – at any rate as the best book of [his] of a pre-war period . . ." (Ford, "Dedicatory" 3).

A more relevant characteristic of impressionism, as Ford formulates it, is the emphasis he places on the revelation of the self or ego in and through the impressions themselves. By acknowledging that he, as "a self-conscious writer," knows how he conveys his "effects," that is basically impressions, Ford argues that impressionism is fundamentally about the self who receives the impressions imbued with and filtered through his/her personality as well as his/her past as a constituent of his/her personality:

> This is called egotism; but, to tell the truth, I do not see how Impressionism can be anything else. Probably this school differs from other schools, principally, in that *it recognizes, frankly, that all art must be the expression of an ego*, and that if Impressionism is to do anything, it must, as the phrase is, go the whole hog. ("On Impressionism" 271, emphasis added).

In other words, Ford establishes a strong correlation between impressionism and egotism by distinguishing the former from any other "school" of art in that it not only acknowledges its bond with the ego but also expresses the ego.

In effect, any impressionist description or expression has inevitably to do with the personality as well as temperament of the conveyor him/herself. Ford simply states that "[i]mpressionism is a frank expression of personality . . ." ("On Impressionism" 273). This simple statement of Ford's is vouched for when Ford, referring to W.H. Hudson's[64] impressionist writing, says that Hudson's descriptions in a piece of writing "will give you nothing but the pleasure of coming in contact with his temperament" ("On Impressionism" 272). In this respect, personality and temperament of an individual are interwoven into and intertwined with the impressions of his/her experiences which, in turn, reveal a more intimate view of the person or self in question.

Ford attempts to render as true as possible the richness of such multi-faceted and revealing dimensions of impressions. As he points out,

> [i]t is, however, perfectly possible that a piece of Impressionism should give a sense of two, of three, of as many as you will, places, persons, emotions, all going on simultaneously in the emotions of the writer. It is, I mean, perfectly possible for a sensitized person, be he poet or prose writer, to have the sense, when he is in one room, that he is in another, or when he is speaking to one person he may be so intensely haunted by the memory or desire for another person that he may be absent-minded and distraught. And there is nothing in the canons of

> Impressionism, as I know it, to stop the attempt to render those superimposed emotions. ("On Impressionism" 276)

Emphasizing ordinary experience of consciousness at any given moment, Ford concedes that one is almost never engaged in simply one thing. On the contrary, any "sensitized person," that is any person who is intuitive and discerning enough, can easily spot the side-by-side or simultaneous existence of numerous layers of perceptions and impressions.

It is such simultaneity of momentary experiences and their effects that Ford calls "queer effects of real life" which he presents in a very striking and telling image of reflective "bright glass" as follows:

> Indeed, I suppose that Impressionism exists to render those queer effects of real life that are like so many views seen through bright glass – through glass so bright that *whilst you perceive through it a landscape or a backyard, you are aware that, on its surface, it reflects a face of a person behind you*. For the whole of life is really like that . . . ("On Impressionism" 277, emphasis added)

Ford compares the momentary "queer effects" that arise from the individual's perception of the world to a bright glass which is the individual's point of contact with the world. This glass not only presents many radiant views of the perceptual field but also, more importantly, it has such a crystal-clear brightness that it simultaneously gives a reflection of a face of person, in fact an *other*, at the back of one's mind. In other words, an individual who is engaged in a perceptual act directed towards the world is concurrently aware of the presence of the other which is given at the occurrence of the perceptual act itself. Although Ford employs the image of bright glass in order to demonstrate the richness and intensity of impressions, this image implies much more than Ford intends. This is simply because the glass image in question apparently acknowledges the presence of others in one's world who lurk at the back of one's mind and, more importantly, whose presence in the perceptual field of the self is part and parcel of everyday life and experience.

Indeed, Dowell's impressions that he diligently conveys in *The Good Soldier* testify to his existence as not only engaged with the world but also entwined with others. Such involvement with the world and others – which is expressed through impressions and

which is, in turn, regarded as "a frank expression of personality" by Ford – reveals much about Dowell's identity as well as his relation with others which is profoundly conducive to the formation of his identity. This is mainly because, as will be discussed presently, Dowell's identity, or his attempt at constructing a justifiable identity for himself, is disclosed piecemeal in the course of the revelation of his story. This disclosure demonstrates that Dowell's existence or his endeavor to be the foundation of his existence is irrevocably bound with others who, as Dowell realizes, can provide such foundation for his gratuitous and contingent existence. Moreover, this recognition on Dowell's part prompts him to do whatever it takes to justify his existence, especially through the intermediation and manipulation of others. Therefore, Dowell's self-conception, or self-understanding, is deeply imbued with others whom Dowell needs so as to construct as well as perpetuate his identity.

The attempts at self-justification and construction of an identity for oneself through others emanate from and are conditioned by certain intrinsic qualities of the self or existence itself. In the first place, one of the fundamental aspects of the self is characterized by what phenomenologists call "facticity" (Heidegger, *Being* 136/174; Sartre, *Being* 84; Merleau-Ponty vii). Facticity figures in the title of one of Heidegger's early lectures as "hermeneutics of facticity" which indicates his concern with "a phenomenology of concrete existence" (Polt 17). Facticity basically characterizes existence as what Heidegger calls "thrownness" (*Being* 136/174). The self or Dasein in Heidegger's conceptualization finds itself always already thrown into the world where it finds itself in a certain situation and mood. In Heidegger's understanding, "[a]s being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its 'there' . . ." (*Being* 284/329). Such "thrownness" of Dasein "is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*" to the world or to its "there" (Heidegger, *Being* 136/174).

As being delivered over to the world, the self's facticity comprises the web of concrete situations and limitations into which the self is thrown and in which it prevails. As Richard Sembera remarks, facticity is "*the quality of being thrown* into a world, that is, the fact that Dasein always exists in concrete (or factual) situations in which it has to make concrete decisions concerning its existence" (118). By being thrown into the world, the self is entangled in a set of circumstances that are not of its making.

However, these circumstances in which the self finds itself make up the referential totality that renders the world meaningful for the self. Charles Guignon notes that

> Dasein always finds itself 'thrown' into a concrete situation and attuned to a cultural and historical context where things already count in determinate ways in relation to a community's practices. This prior thrownness into the medium of shared intelligibility, disclosed in our moods, makes up Dasein's 'facticity.' (8)

In other words, the self's facticity denotes certain social, cultural and historical circumstances and situations into which the self is born and in which it makes sense of itself.

The circumstances in which the self finds itself by virtue of its existence open up certain possibilities of being towards which the self can project itself. However, these possibilities are circumscribed by the extent of opportunities that these circumstances can offer. As David Couzens Hoy points out, Dasein

> inhere[s] in the world, which is to say that Dasein is not some free-floating spirit that transcends its material situation. As a projection (*Entwurf*, from the German stem 'to throw'), Dasein finds itself 'thrown' into a world, and it finds itself as already projected or 'thrown' into a situation with concrete possibilities. Possibilities that are concrete (or definite, *bestimmte*) differ from purely logical possibilities in that they come with concrete limitations. So Heidegger speaks of these limitations as Dasein's 'facticity' . . . (179)

Indeed, Dasein is bound to the world and the "material," that is, the concrete circumstances that surround it. It cannot simply transcend these circumstances at will. On the contrary, any concrete situation into which Dasein is thrown shapes, regulates and, more importantly, arranges its possibilities by enabling certain possibilities while ruling out others in accordance with the concrete limitations at hand.

These concrete circumstances that comprise facticity might also include "given determinants, such as biological, psychological, physical and historical conditions" as well as of "those brute 'facts' about us, such as the place, time and circumstances of our birth, our skin color, our socio-economic status and cultural conditions" (Linsenbard 30, 53). Such determinants of the self constitute the ineluctable facts of its existence that are not of its choice, or as Heidegger puts it, "*not* of its own accord" (*Being* 284/329).

Given the formulation of facticity as such, it is closely associated with one's social, cultural, biological and historical background that conditions the self to a great extent without a matter of choice on the self's part. If it were not the case, the self would not be bound to the world nor limited in its possibilities. Accordingly, it would freely choose and comport itself towards its possibilities. In Sartre's words, "[w]ithout facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to the world in the same way as the souls in Plato's *Republic* choose their condition. I could determine myself to 'be born a worker' or to 'be born a bourgeois'" (*Being* 83). However, the self by virtue of its facticity is bound to the limitations exercised upon its existence – which places a limit on its possibilities and choices in the world in accordance with its concrete situations and circumstances.

A significant aspect of the facticity of the self is its pure contingency in that the existence of the self is in itself fortuitous with no reason behind it to exist. The self or Dasein as thrown into the world "does not and cannot itself choose to come into existence. The 'ground' or reason for its own existence is permanently outside the sphere of its volition" (Sembera 171). Indeed, the existence of the self is not of its own choice, and additionally the self has no self-assigned ground to its existence. Sembera writes that

> insofar as Dasein *continues* to exist, it can be regarded as the ground of its own *continued* existence. Dasein can and must choose to go on living, even if the fact of its own birth permanently remains something Dasein did not itself choose. In choosing continued existence however, Dasein chooses to *accept and affirm* its nature as an individual who did *not* . . . choose to come into existence as that particular individual with that particular individual background. (171-72)

Indeed, the thrownness of the self into the world that constitutes its facticity is a contingent fact in that there is no reason or necessity for the existence of the self as thrown. In other words, the self exists without having to exist in the first place. There is no ground on which the self can base its existence. Likewise, the self is thrown into the world without having to be so. As Sartre states, "I can not doubt that I am. But in so far as this for-itself as such could also not be, it has all the contingency of fact" (*Being* 84). The self (the for-itself or Dasein) is not only aware of the fact that it exists but also of the fact that it might not have existed in the first place because there is no reason for it

to exist in the way it does. That is, the factical situation into which the self is thrown could have been wholly different than what it is. This awareness or realization on the self's part reveals its facticity and existence as "pure contingency" (Reisman 103).

This is why Sartre further remarks that "the for-itself is conscious of its facticity. It has the feeling of its complete gratuity; it apprehends itself as being there *for nothing*, as being *de trop*" (*Being* 84). By characterizing the self as gratuitous and excessive, Sartre emphasizes the contingency of the for-itself because the self is there (as in Heideggerian being-there) in the world with no reason for it to be there as such. When one becomes aware of such superfluity that permeates the self's existence, it causes the self to experience "giddiness and nausea" as well as "horror" (Merleau-Ponty 296).[65]

The horror the self is filled with in the face of its contingency leads it to search for a way to render its existence necessary. In this sense, the contingency of the self's facticity not only points to the superfluity of existence but also simultaneously invokes a certain desire in the self to make itself "a necessary, causal being" (Sartre, *Nausea* 188). Therefore, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, contingency is at the same time "the uncaused and tireless impulse which drives us to seek an anchorage and to surmount ourselves in things, without any guarantee that we shall always find them" (330-31). Indeed, the contingent existence of the self reveals a strong urge in the self to search for an anchorage in the world that would bind the self to the world. In other words, such anchorage would enable the self to affirm or justify its existence as having a sort of originary cause to be in the world. The self as having anchored itself to the world would relieve itself of the distressing awareness of its contingency. In *The Good Soldier*, Dowell's being is plagued, as will be discussed shortly, by its contingency which Dowell tries to overcome by attempting to justify his existence.

The Good Soldier, which is entirely narrated from the perspective of the first-person narrator Dowell, is basically concerned with "Dowell's struggle to understand" and, accordingly, "the events are ordered in relation to his developing knowledge, and are given importance in relation to what he learns from them" (Hynes 331). As the events unravel and are narrated in jumbled order, one not only witnesses Dowell's struggle to make sense of them but also accompanies Dowell on his journey of self-understanding

as well as self-justification. In his retrospective narration, which looks back upon his past twelve years starting from his marriage to Florence on August 4, 1901 to the deaths of Florence and Edward in the latter half of 1913, Dowell endeavors to come to terms with as well as make sense of himself and his relations with others. As Karen Hoffmann states, Dowell through his narration "articulates the anxieties that prompt his incessant revisions of his identity" (30). This is because Dowell, throughout his retrospection from the vantage point of the present, has difficulty in feeling the assurance of his identity and, consequently, in grounding his being on a certain identity – which would provide him with his *raison d'être*.

The insecurities Dowell experiences with regard to his existence are present from the very beginning of the novel. The first identity marker that Dowell discloses about himself is his nationality which is an inevitable part of his facticity: "Living, as we [his wife Florence and himself] perforce lived, in Europe and being, as we perforce were, leisured Americans, which is as much as to say that we were un-American . . ." (*The Good* 9). Dowell's assertion of his identity in the first part of the sentence is immediately undercut in the relative clause that follows it, hence creating a tension or anxiety with respect to his identity.

In fact, the uncertainty about his being is further revealed when Dowell sets out to describe himself along with Florence and the Ashburnhams (Edward and Leonora):

> Florence was a Hurlbird of Stamford, Connecticut, where, as you know, they are more old-fashioned than even the inhabitants of Cranford, England, could have been. *I myself am a Dowell of Philadelphia, Pa*. where, it is historically true, there are more old English families than you would find in any six English counties taken together. I carry about with me indeed – *as if it were the only thing that invisibly anchored me to any spot upon the globe* – the title deeds of my farm which once covered several blocks between Chestnut and Walnut Streets. These title deeds are of wampum, the grant of an Indian chief to the first Dowell, who left Farnham in Surrey in company with William Penn. Florence's people, as is so often the case with the inhabitants of Connecticut, came from the neighborhood of Fordingbridge, where the Ashburnhams' place is. From there, at this moment, I am actually writing. (*The Good* 10, emphasis added)

These lines come only a couple of paragraphs after Dowell's declaration of his being an American, and with these lines, Dowell attempts to wedge his place in the world

through his emphatic use of "myself" which accentuates his "I am," that is, his existence: "I myself am." Dowell further strengthens his position by immediately adding that he is a member of the Dowell family from Philadelphia whose history apparently dates back to the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. Dowell takes pride in the farm of the Dowell family which he inherited and which seems to be "the only thing that invisibly anchors him to the world." Dowell carries with him the title deeds of the Dowell farm which legally recognize him as the owner of the property in question. Given that Dowell and his wife live in Europe changing places throughout the year and, more importantly, away from his farm that binds him to the world, it is, indeed, quite significant that Dowell carries about him this legal document. This is because the title deeds of the farm figure as a concrete expression and affirmation of his existence. These documents, authorized by *others* who confirm Dowell as the owner of the farm, fix his place in the world and, for Dowell, possess the power to "anchor him to any spot upon the globe."

Moreover, the fact that Dowell lives in Europe with Florence and thus is cut off from his motherland gains another layer of significance in that his spatial distance from his hometown, which is one of the constituents of his past (facticity) and more importantly of his identity, symbolically indicates that he transcends and moves away from his facticity/past. Such distance from, or failure to adhere to his facticity, is further illustrated when Florence's heart problem is revealed and confines them to Europe:

> Nauheim always received us from July to September. You will gather from this statement that one of us had, as the saying is, a 'heart,' and, from the statement that my wife is dead, that she was the sufferer. . . . The reason for poor Florence's broken years [her illness] was a storm at sea upon our first crossing to Europe and the immediate reasons for our *imprisonment* in that continent were doctors' orders. They said that even the short Channel crossing might well kill the poor thing. (*The Good* 9-10 emphasis added)

> On the 4th of August, 1901, she married me, and set sail for Europe in a great gale of wind – the gale that affected her heart. (*The Good* 59)

During the voyage to Europe as well as after arriving in the Continent, the doctors (apparently arranged by Florence) as well as Jimmy (with whom Florence has an affair unbeknown to Dowell) assure Dowell that any sea voyage would be more than enough

to cause Florence's heart to fail – which, in turn, leads to their "being tied to Europe" (*The Good* 66). Their imprisonment in Europe further strengthens Dowell's severance from his past and thus demonstrates the untenability of his attempts at confining or anchoring himself to his facticity. Therefore, in an effort to negate such untenability, Dowell carries the title deeds of the farm about him wherever he goes – which serve the function of a reminder to him of his identity although he continually surpasses and moves beyond it. Sartre argues that

> [b]y the very affirmation that I *am* in the mode of the in-itself, I escape that affirmation, for in its very nature it implies a negation. Thus the for-itself is always beyond that which it is by the very fact that it is its for-itself and that it has to be it. . . . The past is the in-itself which I am, but I am this in-itself as *surpassed*. . . . The surpassed in-itself lives on and haunts the for-itself as its original contingency. The for-itself can never reach the in-itself nor apprehend itself as *being* this or that . . . (*Being* 118)

In other words, by virtue of nihilation at the heart of the for-itself or existence, one necessarily transcends one's past which is simultaneously an indispensable part of the for-itself and which is, at the same time, at a distance from the for-itself. In this regard, Dowell's past (and accordingly his identity), embodied and concretized in the form of the title deeds of the farm which recognize him as the owner, is present to him only from a distance because Dowell is aware that his facticity/past as such cannot ground his existence. Such grounding is only possible through others.

The impossibility of adhering to one's facticity/past is fundamentally caused by a feature that characterizes the self: transcendence. Transcendence is one of the basic structural elements of the self and basically denotes the incessant surpassing of its facticity. By virtue of transcendence, the self always already surpasses itself each and every moment. In a sense, transcendence fundamentally characterizes the self as that which cannot be reduced to a certain essence or essential identity. On the contrary, transcendence renders the self as ever changing, surpassing and redefining itself at every moment. As Sartre duly points out,

> in so far as it is For-itself, it is never what it is. What it is is behind it as the perpetual surpassed. It is precisely this surpassed facticity which we call the Past. The Past then is a necessary structure of the For-itself; for the For-itself can exist

> only as a nihilating surpassing, and this surpassing implies something surpassed. (*Being* 138)

Put differently, one cannot (continue to) be what s/he is or has been thus far because, through transcendence, one constantly transcends one's being or identity at every passing moment towards what s/he is not yet. However, this is by no means to deny one's facticity; instead, it is to acknowledge one's facticity (and at the same time one's past) as always surpassed or transcended because one is "at once a *facticity* and a *transcendence*" which are the two fundamental aspects of "human reality," or existence (Sartre, *Being* 56).

Such perpetual surpassing brings about the impossibility of the self (for-itself) to coincide with itself and hence acquire an identity on its own mainly because "[it]t is never what it is: it is temporal and it is free, so always in the making. As it exists, the for-itself surpasses its past and its situation. It is a project, i.e. a being that has a past as an essence but that is always transcending that past" (Daigle 45). The self *qua* transcendence surpasses its past/facticity which would otherwise bestow an essence, that is, an identity on the self and thus would enable the self to correspond to itself, that is, be in the mode of being-in-itself as full positivity and as reduced to an identity.

However, on the contrary, there is always a gap, or what Sartre calls "negation" and/or "nihilation" (*Being* 88), between the self and its identity. According to Sartre,

> [t]he being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist *at a distance from itself* as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness. Thus in order for a *self* to exist, it is necessary that the unity of this being include its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity. (*Being* 78)

In other words, the nature of the for-itself as always already transcending its past and facticity towards the future places it always ahead of its identity; hence, the condition of possibility for the existence of the for-itself is to "nihilate" itself (as in the mode of being-in-itself or identity). As Sartre further remarks,

> [t]he for-itself, as the foundation of itself, is the upsurge of the negation. The for-itself founds itself in so far as it denies *in relation to itself* a certain being or a mode of being. What it denies or nihilates, as we know, is being-in-itself. . . . What it denies or nihilates *in relation to* itself as for-itself can be only *itself*. . . . [H]ence

> the self-as-being-in-itself is what human reality lacks and what makes its meaning. . . . It is the self which would be what it is which allows the for-itself to be apprehended as not being what it is; the relation denied in the definition of the for-itself – which as such should be first posited – is a relation . . . between the for-itself and itself in the mode of identity. (*Being* 88-89)

The for-itself as negation nihilates and accordingly never corresponds to itself as being-in-itself. This is the reason why the for-itself cannot overlap with "the self-as-being-in-itself," that is, the self as coinciding with itself and hence having an identity. By virtue of its definition as transcendence and negation, the for-itself is denied access to itself in the form of identity.

There exists a breach between the for-itself and its identity the latter of which is always transcended. This gap points to a fundamental "lack" (Sartre, *Being* 86) in the being of the self in that the self as for-itself lacks an identity to hold on to. This is why the self attempts to compensate for this lack in itself by trying to justify its existence through appropriation and manipulation of the world and, more significantly, of others who possess the power to help the self remove its contingency by affirming the self's identity and thus making it a necessary being. The desire for such an attempt emanates from the lack in the self which it desperately desires to fill. In Merleau-Ponty's understanding, human existence "is the transformation of contingency into necessity by the act of taking in hand. All that we are, we are on the basis of a *de facto* situation which we appropriate to ourselves and which we ceaselessly transform by a sort of *escape* [transcendence] which is never an unconditioned freedom" (198). What Merleau-Ponty emphasizes is the fact that the self in an attempt to become necessary has to "appropriate" and build upon its situation, that is, its facticity by transcending it and hence making new meanings and identities for itself.

However, as Christine Daigle states, "I still need the Other to objectify and affirm this meaning. The Other thus complements my self, and validates the justification and meaning that I have created" (94). In other words, the self can struggle to find the anchorage it seeks through an appropriation of its facticity (the situation in which it finds itself in the world) and creation of meanings/reasons for its existence (that would render its existence meaningful and hence necessary). Nevertheless, these meanings or reasons that the self creates for its existence and situation can only be affirmed and

justified through others. Therefore, in the light of such conceptualization of the self as that which tries to justify its otherwise contingent existence and acquires an identity through others, the narrator Dowell in *The Good Soldier* can be said to be engaged in endeavors to ground his being through others who, as he is aware, have the capacity to affirm his identity. Moreover, Dowell in an attempt to coincide with itself in the mode of being-in-itself strives to reduce himself to a certain identity, that of a "nurse" or "attendant" to others – which will consequently help Dowell find a *ground* to stand upon.

The statements Dowell as well as others make about him(self) reveal to what extent he is stripped of such a firm ground on which he could base his existence. For instance, when Dowell visits Florence at her aunts' place (the Hurlbirds) before their marriage, the questions the Misses Hurlbird direct at him trouble him to a great extent. Dowell reveals that "Florence's aunts used to say that I must be the laziest man in Philadelphia. . . . You see, the first thing they said to me when I called in on Florence in the little ancient, colonial, wooden house beneath the high, thin-leaved elms – the first question they asked me was not how I did but what did I do" (*The Good* 17). In fact, the reason for the accusation of being lazy springs from the fact that Dowell as a wealthy and leisured American landowner is not engaged in any sort of work. In this respect, the question reveals to Dowell his contingency as well as makes him introspectively question himself regarding his identity – which, as Dowell understands, cannot be formed without the other's approval of what he does. Therefore, through the accusation of his being "lazy," Dowell recognizes that he needs the approval of others to be somebody and thus have an identity.

The question of what Dowell does (clearly as a job) is a question that explicitly addresses his identity. Dowell's muted response is as follows: "And I did nothing. I suppose I ought to have done something but I didn't see any call to do it. Why does one do things? I just drifted in and wanted Florence" (*The Good* 17). Similarly, later in the narration, Dowell touches upon again the same issues by stating that he was not involved in any kind of occupation which could affirm his identity:

> I have told you, as I think, that I first met Florence at the Stuyvesants', in Fourteenth Street. And, from that moment, I determined with all the obstinacy of a possibly weak nature, if not to make her mine, at least to marry her. I had no occupation – I had no business affairs. I simply camped down there in Stamford, in a vile hotel, and just passed my days in the house, or on the verandah of the Misses Hurlbird. (*The Good* 59)

The repetitive emphasis that Dowell places on his lack of occupation, business affairs as well as on his disinclination to do anything except for loitering and passing time in Stamford implies that his identity as the wealthy landowner figure which he apparently tries to hold on to starts to founder and erode in the face of purposelessness and alienation that permeate his being. As he admits, he has "a sense – what shall I say? – a sense of almost nakedness – the nakedness that one feels on the sea-shore or in any great open space. I had no attachments, no accumulations. . . . And now you understand that, having nothing in the world to do – but nothing whatever!" (22). In a sense, Dowell seems to be immensely wearied by the question of existence and the impossibility of having "attachments" which brings him to the verge of extreme apathy and indifference.

Such lack of concern on Dowell's part led him to be interpreted as a sort of "nullity" by critics. For instance, Michael Levenson argues that "[m]uch as his great wealth frees him from material need, so his *accidia* . . . frees him from the constraints of desire. He is divested of all want. . . . [which] makes Dowell a mere nullity" (383). Levenson further characterizes Dowell as nothing: "In important respects, let us recognize, Dowell *is* nothing. No 'paradigm of traits' can describe him, because there is nothing substantial to describe: no determining past, no consistency of opinion, no deep belief, no stable memory. He cannot be 'justified.' There is no accounting for Dowell" (383). Likewise, John Meixner notes that "[a]lthough Ford provides various facts about him – his Philadelphia origin and wealth, for example – these are minimal and tell us little about his motivation" and then arrives at the conclusion that "[l]onely and unrooted, Dowell is an alienated being" (158-59). Indeed, what these critics claim can be said to hold true, to some extent, because Dowell appears mostly in a passive position and does not seem to be involved in any activity whatsoever. In other words, he appears to be afflicted with lethargy.

However, from early on, Dowell is already aware of his “unrooted-ness” with no “attachments” as a consequence of which he repeatedly concedes that he has a hard time grounding his being. As Dowell’s narration advances, it becomes clear that there is, in fact, almost nothing concrete or substantial for Dowell to lean on. Dowell’s identity (“a Dowell of Philadelphia”) which he asserts on the first pages of the novel is forthwith undercut by the absence of further details about his background and identity. Such transcendence of his facticity places Dowell in a situation in which he is free to do whatever he wills (of course to the extent permitted by his situation/facticity). Ironically, he chooses to do “nothing” and remain uncommitted. In fact, until his decision to marry Florence, it is apparent that Dowell did or attempted at nothing. Michael Levenson argues that Ford through Dowell

> imagine[s] a personality virtually without attributes – subjectivity before it has assumed the articulations of character. In Dowell, Ford gestures at a nothing that precedes something in human personality, a formless, contentless, traitless self which does nothing, feels nothing, knows nothing, and which exists as a pure consciousness behind every one of its manifestations. Such a state, of course, must remain a bare ideal. Even if it can exist (which one has reason to doubt) it certainly cannot persist. Dowell collides painfully into the world, not once but continually. (383-84)

Nevertheless, instead of interpreting Dowell’s existence as mere nothingness in the form of “formless, contentless, traitless self,” it is more appropriate to regard him as someone struggling to find a reason to be or exist in the world starting with his marriage with Florence. This is why Levenson cannot further detach Dowell from the world and has to immediately re-situate him in the world into which, he says, Dowell “collides.”

It is only in and through the world Dowell can *make* himself. As the first epigraph to this chapter indicates, “[w]e are all so afraid, we are all so alone, we all so need from the outside the assurance of our own worthiness to exist” (*The Good* 83). Taking his cue in these remarks from the relation between a man and a woman, Dowell arrives at the conclusion that anybody in a relation with others has such a strong “desire” to be “supported” by others (*The Good* 82).[66] Dowell is fully conscious of the fact that such assurance of his “worthiness to exist” can only come from the “outside,” that is, the world and, above all, from others. Therefore, unlike Levenson’s argument that “[t]he movement toward Dowell is like the movement toward the Cartesian *cogito*” (385), the

movement that one can observe in the novel seems to be towards the opposite direction, that is, from Dowell himself to the world where he seeks anchorage through others.

Given the wealth and land into which Dowell was born and which constitute his facticity, it is clear that Dowell depends on them for his existence without any effort on his part. In Heideggerian terms, he is simply *being there*, that is, thrown into a wealthy landowning family situated in Philadelphia. Without any material need as such, Dowell can loaf about aimlessly without doing anything. However, it is against such background of his life that he comes to realize the mere contingency of his existence in the form of a wealthy man. His contingency is further brought to his attention by the first question the Misses Hurlbird ask him when he pays a visit to Florence: "What does he do?" It is apparently through this question – which is etched on his mind and which he still remembers even years later – that Dowell becomes fully aware of the fact that one necessarily needs the assurance from the outside.

The first step Dowell takes in his search for such assurance finds expression in his determination to marry Florence who can make him a husband and thus render him necessary. John Meixner asserts that not only Dowell's background but also his motivations are "scarcely explained at all" and accordingly that "[w]hat he originally saw in Florence is unclear" (158). However, instead of simply dismissing Dowell's interest in Florence as ungrounded, one can trace how Dowell's narration provides some clues with regard to the motivations he has for courting and marrying Florence. For instance, Dowell reveals that Florence has certain expectations and demands from a prospective husband – which she cunningly reveals piecemeal during her conversations as follows:

> Florence wanted to marry a gentleman of leisure; she wanted a European establishment. She wanted her husband to have an English accent, an income of fifty thousand dollars a year . . . But the point that came out – that there was no mistaking – was that Florence was coldly and calmly determined to take no look at any man who could not give her a European settlement. Her glimpse of English home life had effected this. She meant, on her marriage, to have a year in Paris, and then to have her husband buy some real estate in the neighborhood of Fordingbridge, from which place the Hurlbirds had come in the year 1688. On the strength of that she was going to take her place in the ranks of English county society. That was fixed. (*The Good* 60-61)

As can be seen, Florence reveals in-between the lines that she has certain conditions to be fulfilled before she consents to marriage. These details are significant in that they make Dowell measure himself regarding to what extent he is eligible for the hand of Florence.

Indeed, such eligibility seems to be very important to Dowell because, after reciting Florence's demands, he immediately remarks that he is able to provide Florence with her needs at the prospect of which he is extremely thrilled:

> I used to feel mightily elevated when I considered these details, for I could not figure out that amongst her acquaintances in Stamford there was any fellow that would fill the bill. The most of them were not as wealthy as I, and those that were were not the type to give up the fascinations of Wall Street even for the protracted companionship of Florence. (*The Good* 61)

Unlike Meixner's charge that Dowell's interest in Florence lacks motivation, it can be argued that the cause of Dowell's interest and elevation lies in what Florence can offer him in return for his services. In other words, Florence's appeal for Dowell fundamentally emanates from her ability to confer an identity, that of a husband, on him. Therefore, since Dowell as transcending his facticity is already aware of his inability to ground his being on his own, his interest in Florence can be said to issue from an underlying desire to construct an identity for himself through her (as the other) – a desire that lurks beneath and remain hidden under his seeming lethargy.

In order to forge an identity for himself, Dowell has to build upon his present situation from which he can project himself towards his possibilities. As thrown into the world, Dowell already finds himself in a situation primarily characterized by his facticity (his wealth, his leisured class, etc.). However, by virtue of his ever-present possibility of transcending his facticity towards new possibilities, the situation in which he finds himself simultaneously endows him with the freedom to surpass his situation by making choices and taking actions. In fact, as Sartre argues, "there is freedom only in a *situation*, and there is a situation only through freedom" (*Being* 489). In other words, one's transcendence can only be exercised upon a set of factual circumstances that constitute his/her situation. The direction this transcendence will take is totally up to the free choices of the self. This is why the self is variously regarded as "patterning [of] the

world" (Merleau-Ponty 520), "thrown projection" (Heidegger, *Being* 149/188) and simply a "project" (Sartre, *Being* 553).

The self as being-in-the-world projects itself towards the future on the basis of its facticity/past which, in turn, makes up the present situation the self is in. According to Sartre, "[i]n fact I am nothing but the project of myself beyond a determined situation, and this project *pre-outlines* me in terms of the concrete situation as in addition it illumines the situation in terms of my choice" (*Being* 553). The transcendence the self necessarily *is* constitutes the self as surpassing its present situation in the light of its project. In this respect, the project in simplest terms denotes "the polarization of a life towards a goal" (Merleau-Ponty 518). In other words, it indicates the projection of the self towards the world as well as its future in the process of which the self continually makes itself through its free choices. Merleau-Ponty points out that the self's "implicit or existential project . . . merges into our way of patterning the world and co-existing with other people" (520). Indeed, the patterning (*mise en forme*) of the world is a crucial part of the project the self *is* because being-in-the-world necessarily entails acting upon and hence appropriating the world (and its facticity) in accordance with its project.

The self's factical existence in the world points to its inextricable intertwinement with the world characterized by the disclosure of the world through the self's projection. Merleau-Ponty further states that

> [t]he world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are traced out by the subject's movement of transcendence. (499-500)

Such projection is made possible by reason of the self's transcendence and, therefore, remains to be an integral part of its being-there in the world. Through transcendence, the self always already projects itself towards the possibilities opened up or disclosed by its being-in-the-world. As Heidegger puts it, "any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities" (*Being* 146/185). In other words, the subject's "thrown projective Being-in-the-world"

(Heidegger, *Being* 149/188) brings about an understanding of oneself through the possibilities towards which one is projected. Dowell is too much preoccupied with the possibilities opened by his thrownness into the world.

Such possibilities are revealed only in and through the situation into which the self is thrown, and accordingly are seized upon by the self. Therefore, projecting oneself towards the world is essentially a projection towards the possibilities one's situation and facticity provide. Consequently, these possibilities are seized upon and thus constitute the self's fundamental project. However, as Christine Daigle emphasizes, the self does not have a project detached from itself but rather it is its own project:

> to say that the for-itself is a project is not the same as to say that the for-itself *has* projects. . . . By 'fundamental project,' one must understand the unity of one's life as projecting oneself toward a future. Every little project is an expression of this fundamental project. Every desire, every act, and each single tendency of the subject reveals the whole person. (46)

The self's projection towards its possibilities is not random at all; on the contrary, each and every single choice or action contributes to the realization of the fundamental project which the self *is* by virtue of its freedom. The self is ultimately free to choose the possibilities towards which it will project itself. In a sense, then, the self will attempt to justify its being through its free choices (i.e. seizing) of the possibilities present to it, and thus creating an identity and realizing its project.

Given the characterization of the self as "factically thrown existence" (Heidegger, *Being* 436/486) projecting towards the possibilities in the world, it becomes evident that Dowell's determination to marry Florence can be evaluated with regard to his projection towards his possibilities which, above all, harbor the possibility of acquiring an identity. For such acquisition, Dowell is implicitly aware that he needs the others to affirm him and his identity. This is corroborated by the fact that Dowell chooses to act upon his situation by marrying Florence instead of simply remaining an idler who has no material need. This action on Dowell's part acknowledges Florence as the other as having the power to not only attribute an identity to Dowell but also justify the identity in question.

However, ironically enough, Dowell's identity as a husband which is provided and approved by the other is immediately undercut and taken from him again by the same other, that is, Florence. This is primarily because the other is free to revoke the identity s/he attributes. As Sartre puts it,

> [t]his being which I am [through the Other] preserves a certain indetermination, a certain unpredictability . . . [because] the Other is free. Or to be exact and to reverse the terms, the Other's freedom is revealed to me across the uneasy indetermination of the being which I am for him. (*Being* 262)

Indeed, Dowell's identity as a husband, as Dowell suggests, is undermined by Florence who implicitly reveals before their marriage that "she did not want much physical passion in the affair" (60) apparently because, as she says, "I may be ill, you know. I guess my heart is a little like Uncle Hurlbird's. It runs in families" (*The Good* 63). In other words, using her alleged heart problem as a pretext, Florence implies that there will be a kind of personal distance between her and Dowell and that there will be probably no consummation of their marriage. Therefore, Dowell's desire to attain the identity of being a real husband fails in the face of the other's freedom although Dowell and Florence act as if they were a real couple.

The illusion they create as a couple provides Dowell with the identity of a husband on the surface and it is further strengthened and even confirmed when they meet the English couple Leonora and Edward Ashburnham with whom they spend time every summer at Nauheim for nine consecutive years. The affirmation of Dowell's existence as the husband figure by the others, that is, the Ashburnhams, explains "why the Ashburnhams had meant so much to him [because] [t]hey had, he implies, filled a frightening void" (Meixner 159). In fact, although Dowell's first attempt at manipulating Florence to confer the husband identity on him fails on the personal/individual level, it seems to succeed on the social level through others, that is, Leonora and Edward who confirm his identity as a husband to Florence. This is why the Ashburnhams' friendship matters to Dowell and also why he is devastated with "the breaking up of our little four-square coterie," that is, their friendship (*The Good* 11). In relation to their friendship, Dowell states that

> [s]upposing that you should come upon us . . . you would have said that, as human affairs go we were an extraordinarily safe castle. We were, if you will, one of those tall ships with the white sails upon a blue sea, one of those things that seem the proudest and the safest of all the beautiful and safe things that God has permitted the mind of men to frame. Where better could one take refuge? Where better? Permanence? Stability! I can't believe it's gone. I can't believe that that long, tranquil life, which was just stepping a minuet, vanished in four crashing days at the end of nine years and six weeks. (*The Good* 11)

In a sense, Dowell's place which is attributed to him by the other members of their "coterie" is revoked with the shattering of their "minuet." Minuet is a slow and formal ballroom dance performed in pairs – which denotes that it cannot be performed by a single person and, more importantly, that each and every party in minuet has their fixed place (and by analogy their identity) assigned to them. For this reason, Dowell cannot reconcile himself in believing that all the stability or permanence that he is accorded through his relations with others collapses: "[u]pon my word, yes, our intimacy was like a minuet . . . No, indeed, it can't be gone. You can't kill a minuet de la cour" (*The Good* 11). Similarly, he further states that this situation "broke up all the pleasantnesses that there were in my life" (*The Good* 42). Therefore, being a husband in such dysfunctional marriage where his identity as a husband is questioned and untenable is not enough for Dowell to maintain his identity.

On the other hand, along with his attempt at being a husband, Dowell tries to strengthen and thus justify his existence further with another identity, that of "a sedulous, strained nurse" (*The Good* 12) which he acquires through Florence and maintains diligently for the rest of the novel. In fact, Dowell's identity as a nurse is revealed to be his project when his identity as a husband is denied to him by his wife Florence. Given this situation in which he finds himself, Dowell chooses to transcend it by seizing upon another possibility opened up by the same situation. In other words, if he cannot maintain himself as a husband in the eyes of Florence, he can surpass this failure towards the possibility of being a nurse towards which he can project himself and thus attain an identity.

Florence mentions the fact that she has a heart problem only a couple of hours before she marries Dowell, and implies that Dowell has to care for her: "She certainly never mentioned her heart till that time. . . . [S]he just said: 'You'll have to look after me in

certain ways – like Uncle Hurlbird is looked after. I will tell you how to do it'" (*The Good* 64). From this moment onward, Florence, who has more or less adequate knowledge of heart problems due to her uncle's illness, and the doctors whom Florence arranges to become her accomplices, bestow on him the role of a nurse or attendant. As Dowell says, "I fancy that if I had shown warmth then she would have acted the proper wife to me – or would have put me back again. But, because I acted like a Philadelphia gentleman she made me, I suppose, go through with the part of a male nurse" (*The Good* 63). It is apparently the other (Florence herself) who confers this identity on Dowell – an identity which Dowell accepts no matter how much he is at times tired of tending to Florence.

Notwithstanding his occasional protests, Dowell, in fact, seems to be quite content with his new identity which not only provides him with a cause to exist but also simultaneously justifies his existence in that others need him, rendering him necessary. Hence, Dowell devotes, as it were, his whole life (until Florence dies) to looking after Florence lest her heart should fail her:

> For do you understand my whole attentions, my whole endeavors were to keep poor dear Florence on to topics like the finds at Cnossos and the mental spirituality of Walter Pater. I had to keep her at it, you understand, or she might die. For I was solemnly informed that if she became excited over anything or if her emotions were really stirred her little heart might cease to beat. For twelve years I had to watch every word that any person uttered in any conversation and I had to head it off what the English call 'things' – off love, poverty, crime, religion and the rest of it. (*The Good* 18)

Dowell is committed to keep Florence from topics that could excite her because her heart could fall victim to excitement. In this regard, Dowell is extremely cautious to keep Florence alive by paying attention to the words others utter lest they intrigue Florence's attention and cause emotional arousal in her – which can ultimately result in her death. Although Dowell does not feel love for Florence any longer, he keeps displaying such attentiveness to Florence as her nurse: "For peace I never had with Florence, and I hardly believe that I cared for her in the way of love after a year or two of it. She became for me a rare and fragile object, something burdensome but very frail" (*The Good* 68). It is the fragility of Florence as a heart patient that enables Dowell in the

first place to acquire the nurse identity and hence makes Dowell persevere to perpetuate his identity.

In a sense, Dowell attempts to render his contingent existence necessary through Florence because Florence's alleged need of Dowell can justify his contingency. Dowell wonders how it would feel to be a patient as follows: "Florence had already been taking the baths for a month [at Nauheim]. I don't know how it feels to be a patient at one of those places. I never was a patient anywhere. I daresay the patients get a home feeling and some sort of anchorage in the spot" (*The Good* 21). It is such anchorage in the world Dowell seeks and he finds it apparently not as a patient but rather a nurse. Interestingly enough, Dowell says that since he is not a patient, he has "no attachments, no accumulations" whereas patients like Florence has "anchorage in the spot" (*The Good* 22). However, such attachment or anchorage is possible only insofar as he keeps at being a nurse for which he needs others, that is, patients. Dowell says he has no anchorage and is "relived to be off duty" when they are on the train with the Ashburnhams to visit Marburg because "Florence for the moment was indubitably out of mischief – because she was talking about Ludwig the Courageous . . . [that is] she couldn't possibly be doing anything to excite herself or set her poor heart a-fluttering . . ." (*The Good* 36). Therefore, contrary to his inclination to see himself relieved or off duty, it is apparent that he still pays close attention to the conversations Florence is engaged in – which means that he tacitly maintains his project of being necessary by staying on guard and on duty for Florence.

On the other hand, Dowell's concern for Florence (due to her ability to confer identity on him) is so much so that he is not only disinclined most of the time to see Florence for who she really is but also tends to overlook or simply ignore other people's hints about her – even when the clues or indications are obvious. For instance, when Florence tells her aunts, the Misses Hurlbird, that she intends to marry Dowell, the aunts take Dowell into the parlor and try to dissuade him instead of Florence who seems already resolved to marry Dowell. As Dowell narrates, he had "a singular interview" with the aunts:

> You see, the two poor maiden ladies were in agonies – and they could not say one single thing direct. They would almost wring their hands and ask if I had considered such a thing as different temperaments. I assure you they were almost

> affectionate, concerned for me even. As if Florence were too bright for my solid and serious virtues. . . . And they carried their protests to extraordinary lengths, for them . . . . They even, almost, said that marriage was a sacrament; but neither Miss Florence nor Miss Emily could quite bring herself to utter the word. And they almost brought themselves to say that Florence's early life had been characterized by flirtations. Something of that sort. (*The Good* 61-62, last ellipsis original)

The aunts try hard not to explicitly disclose the past and "temperament" of Florence; however, since they already know that Florence has a fickle heart, they do their best to make Dowell think twice before he marries Florence: "Don't do it, John. Don't do it. You're a good young man . . . We ought to tell you more. But she's our dear sister's child" (*The Good* 62). In spite of these strong protests by the aunts, Dowell's decision to marry Florence is immutable: "I know I ended the interview by saying: 'I don't care. If Florence has robbed a bank I am going to marry her and take her to Europe.' At that Miss Emily wailed and fainted" (*The Good* 62).

Similarly, after this incident, Florence goes to her uncle's place in New York and Dowell follows her. Upon his arrival, as Dowell says, "[t]he old man received me with a stony, husky face. I was not to see Florence; she was ill; she was keeping her room. And, from something that he let drop – an odd biblical phrase that I have forgotten, I gathered that all that family simply did not intend her to marry ever in her life" (*The Good* 62). Dowell's deliberate ignorance of others' indirect indications regarding Florence points to his fundamental project of having an identity through Florence. Thus, apparently, Dowell is determined to project himself towards this possibility which is revealed with the appearance of Florence in his world.

A more obvious incident, which troubles and profoundly shakes Dowell more than the aunts' protests, occurs on their visit to the castle in Marburg with the Ashburnhams. They visit one of the rooms where Martin Luther allegedly stayed, and Florence, indicating a piece of paper (the Protest)[67] behind the glass case, starts to praise the Protestants. Florence already knows that Edward is a Protestant whereas Leonora is an Irish Catholic. Looking into the eyes of Edward, Florence says: "It's because of that piece of paper that you're honest, sober, industrious, provident, and clean-lived. If it weren't for that piece of paper you'd be like the Irish or the Italians or the Poles, but particularly the Irish . . ." (*The Good* 38). The temperament of Florence that the Misses

Hurlbird earlier mentioned starts to overtake her and, as Dowell shockingly observes, "she laid one finger upon Captain Ashburnham's wrist" (*The Good* 38). The moment of Florence's touch on Edward's hand is the breaking point for Dowell who is extremely frightened of the very thing this touch implies:

> I was aware of something treacherous, something frightful, something evil in the day. I can't define it and can't find a simile for it. It wasn't as if a snake had looked out of a hole. No, it was as if my heart had missed a beat. It was as if we were going to run and cry out; all four of us in separate directions, averting our heads. In Ashburnham's face I know that there was absolute panic. I was horribly frightened and then I discovered that the pain in my left wrist was caused by Leonora's clutching it: 'I can't stand this,' she said with a most extraordinary passion; 'I must get out of this.' I was horribly frightened. (*The Good* 38-39)

Dowell is almost frightened out of his wits and cannot even find the proper words to describe what he experiences at that exact moment of Florence's touch. He senses that something about that touch is extremely wrong, "treacherous" and "evil;" nevertheless, he refuses to see or accept it for what that touch really is.

Moreover, Leonora's remark that she cannot stand this scene disconcerts Dowell all the more: "'Don't you see?' [Leonora] said, 'don't you see what's going on?' The panic again stopped my heart. I muttered, I stuttered – I don't know how I got the words out: 'No! What's the matter? Whatever's the matter?'" (*The Good* 39). Dowell is petrified by the possibility that Leonora might reveal and name what is really going on between Florence and Edward. This is why he is utterly panicked and stammers in order to delay the revelation as long as possible – which would shatter his identity-bestowing relationship not only with Florence but also with the Ashburnhams. When Leonora eventually reveals after a short period of suspense that "[d]on't you know . . . don't you know that I'm an Irish Catholic?" (*The Good* 39), Dowell feels immensely relieved – obviously because Leonora does not make a single remark related to the touch but rather simply says that she is extremely offended by Florence's words about the Catholics. As Dowell notes, "[t]hose words [of Leonora] gave me the greatest relief that I have ever had in my life. They told me, I think, almost more than I have gathered at any one moment – about myself. I don't think that before that day I had ever wanted anything very much except Florence" (*The Good* 39-40). Indeed, Dowell's fears about

the reality of the relation between Florence and Edward are, to his heart's content, belied by Leonora's remarks.

However, the possibility that there might be an affair between Florence and Edward makes Dowell realize that Florence has a pivotal role in his life in helping him maintain his identity. The possibility of the affair (if revealed as real) runs the risk of shattering his identity as a nurse to which he adheres. This is why he desires to have Florence to himself: "For in Florence I had at once a wife and an unattained mistress—that is what it comes to—and in the retaining of her in this world I had my occupation, my career, my ambition" (*The Good* 41). In this respect, Florence as a wife and, principally, as a patient in Dowell's world is his seized possibility towards which he has to continually project himself in order to justify his existence as a husband, and more importantly, as a nurse – both of which can only be provided or conferred by the other. Therefore, Dowell strives to keep Florence as his wife and patient because she provides him with a *raison d'être*, that is, an occupation or "profession" with which he can identify and through which he can ground his being: "And the profession was that of keeping heart patients alive" (*The Good* 40). Despite and against the odds, Dowell chooses to believe in the integrity of Florence because this belief is what helps him maintain his identity.

Although Dowell manages quite well to maintain his identity which lasts for about twelve years, his worst fears are realized with the revelation of Florence's affairs, especially with Edward Ashburnham: "If for nine years I have possessed a goodly apple that is rotten at the core and discover its rottenness only in nine years and six months less four days, isn't it true to say that for nine years I possessed a goodly apple?" (*The Good* 12). Ironically enough, Dowell still keeps himself in a kind of Sartrean bad faith, that is, deceiving himself in believing that there was nothing wrong with Florence or Edward although the incident at the Marburg castle, the warnings of the Hurlbirds as well as Leonora's intimations about Edward's not being perfect "along [certain] lines" (*The Good* 71) variously point to the "rottenness" of Florence and Edward – which he simply overlooks for the justification of his existence.

For this reason, when the rottenness of his apple is revealed, it marks for Dowell "the last day of my absolute ignorance – and, I assure you, of my perfect happiness" (*The*

Good 73-74). The first blow to Dowell's ignorance is dealt when the man called Bagshawe whom Dowell meets in the lounge of the hotel recognizes Florence and tells Dowell (not knowing he is the husband of Florence) that "[t]he last time I saw that girl she was coming out of the bedroom of a young man called Jimmy at five o'clock in the morning" (*The Good* 75). Dowell is dumbstruck and remain stuck in the lounge for a long time. Later, when he goes to Florence's room, he finds her already dead with "a little phial . . . that contained nitrate of amyl, in her right hand" (75). Hence, he naturally thinks that Florence's heart failed her and consequently he cannot confront her about the issue Bagshawe mentions.

However, a second blow, which is much more powerful than the first one, breaks down Dowell completely when Leonora quite casually and rhetorically tells him a week after Edward's death that "'And isn't it odd to think that, if your wife hadn't been my husband's mistress, you would probably never have been here at all?' That was how I got the news – full in the face, like that" (*The Good* 76). In the meantime, Dowell remains silent and Leonora continues to reveal another disorienting fact: "And then she turned round to me and said without any adornment at all, for I remember her exact words: 'I think it was stupid of Florence to commit suicide'" (*The Good* 76). Unlike what Dowell thought, "that little brown flask had contained, not nitrate of amyl, but prussic acid" (*The Good* 78) and Florence never had a real heart problem.

In the face of such realities, Dowell is profoundly shaken and cannot even think of anything because all his existence was grounded upon a sick wife to whom he was a husband and more significantly a nurse. With the revelation of Florence's lies and affairs, the ground upon which Dowell's identity stands is pulled away from under his feet. Consequently, Dowell turns "cataleptic" in that his body becomes rigid, experiences a loss of sensation, and remains unresponsive to external stimuli for a while:

> And I thought nothing; absolutely nothing. I had no ideas; I had no strength. I felt no sorrow, no desire for action, no inclination to go upstairs and fall upon the body of my wife. . . . I was in a state just simply cataleptic. They put me to bed and I stayed there; they brought me my clothes and I dressed; they led me to an open grave and I stood beside it. If they had taken me to the edge of a river, or if they

> had flung me beneath a railway train I should have been drowned or mangled in the same spirit. I was the walking dead. (*The Good* 78-79)

Dowell's catalepsy is largely caused by the "several shocks" (*The Good* 86) that disintegrate his much-desired identity which he struggles immensely to establish through Florence and which consequently collapses with the death of Florence. Hence, there is nothing left for Dowell to hold on to and accordingly he has to come face to face once again with his contingent existence which he tried so hard to eradicate for the past twelve years starting with his marriage with Florence.

However, Dowell does not give up on the struggles to re-ground his being and sets out to recuperate his identity as soon as he is out of his catalepsy. He is again fully aware that such recuperation is only possible through others and, for this reason, he turns to Nancy Rufford (also known for much of the novel as simply "the girl") so as to render himself necessary. Nancy is "Leonora's only friend's only child, and Leonora [is] her guardian . . . . She had lived with the Ashburnhams ever since she had been the age of thirteen when her mother was said to have committed suicide owing to the brutalities of her father" (*The Good* 70). Furthermore, she stayed with the Ashburnhams during their last stay at Nauheim where Dowell and Florence met her. Since Nancy grew up at the Ashburnhams' place (Bramshawe Manor), they were like parents to her. Acting like a mother to Nancy, Leonora suggests, after the death of Florence, that Dowell might marry her – which opens up a range of new possibilities for Dowell to project himself towards:

> Now that is to me a very amazing thing – amazing for the light of possibilities that it casts into the human heart. For I had never had the slightest conscious idea of marrying the girl; I never had the slightest idea even of caring for her. . . . I [said] two hours after my wife's death: 'Now I can marry the girl.' (*The Good* 75, 163)

Dowell immediately projects himself towards the possibility of re-establishing his identity as a husband through Nancy – just as he did, or at least tried to do, through Florence.

Nevertheless, Dowell's aspirations are cut short because, as is revealed, Edward has fallen in love with Nancy after getting tired of Florence, and Nancy has, in turn, feelings

for Edward. Although Edward is aware of "the tabu which extended around her," he still could not help loving Nancy at the thought of which "Edward was obviously sickening" (*The Good* 80, 92). Reconciling himself to the impossibility of anything to happen between himself and Nancy, Edward sends her away to her father in India and commits suicide. Upon learning his suicide from a newspaper, Nancy literally loses her mind on the way to India (*The Good* 155-56, 162). Notwithstanding the unexpected turn of events as such, Dowell accommodates to the new circumstances by surpassing his present situation through casting himself as a nurse to this "quiescent patient" (*The Good* 156). Since Nancy is not in her right mind, Dowell "cannot marry her, according to the law of the land" (*The Good* 157). In other words, Dowell finds himself as yet another patient to look after and it is now through Nancy that he can attempt to justify his being. As Dowell self-consciously states towards the end of the novel, "[s]o here I am very much where I started thirteen years ago. I am the attendant, not the husband, of a beautiful girl who pays no attention to me" (*The Good* 157). Furthermore, Dowell even uses the money that he inherits from Florence (whose uncle left a considerable sum to her upon his death) to become a better attendant to Nancy: "All I wanted it [money] for was to be able to give Nancy Rufford a good time" (*The Good* 134).

In conclusion, as the last epigraph to this chapter suggests, Nancy's word "Shuttlecocks" (*The Good* 167), which she utters abruptly for a couple of times towards the end of the novel after she loses her mind, indicates ironically the arbitrary back and forth movement of the self or individual among others in an indifferent world. It further denotes the contingency of human existence which one can try to overcome in an attempt to justify oneself and ground his/her being through others. However, it is never a one-time affair due to the ever-present transcendence that permeates one's being. One has to continually make him/herself, or rather one is always already in the making with no closure (until death). Moreover, such making oneself is only possible through others who can attribute the identity that one seeks because, as Sartre notes, "I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the center of a freedom [that of the other] which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being" (*Being* 267). Dowell through Florence and then Nancy not only acquires but also maintains or at least tries to maintain his identity as an attendant. The question is not whether he is fond of this

identity or not, but it is to what extent he can turn his contingent existence into a necessary one. Therefore, by acting on and surpassing his situation through seizing upon the possibilities disclosed by others, Dowell can manage to render himself as a necessary being (as a nurse-attendant) *only insofar as* there are others (patients) to confirm his existence as necessary, and *as long as* he ceaselessly casts himself as a nurse-attendant to them.

CONCLUSION

TOWARDS A RE-EVALUATION OF THE SELF THROUGH OTHERS IN MODERNIST FICTION

Modernist fiction is marked by a strong emphasis on the self that foregrounds the subjective experiences and impressions. Placing the subject at the center, it closely focuses on the contact of the self with the world which is disclosed to the self through itself. The revelation of the world in modernist fiction is basically bound with the subject who is thrown into the world and as such perceives and, as a bodily being, comports itself in the world. In addition, the world the self finds itself in is revealed as that which is fundamentally populated as well as appropriated by others. With its thrownness, the self is necessarily entangled with others in the world through whom it comes to make sense of itself. Heavily concerned with the formation of subjectivity or selfhood, modernist writers present the self as embedded in a web of intersubjective relations which hold up a mirror for the self and consequently through which the self makes itself.

In mapping out the various intersubjective relations primarily informed by the issues of average everyday existence (they-self) and self-consciousness (*The Waves*), ethical encounters between the self and others (*Lord Jim*), and self-justification and identity formation (*The Good Soldier*) – all of which require, in one way or another, the existence of others, this dissertation has recourse to phenomenology whose genesis coincides with the emergence of modernist fiction. As a discipline that basically broaches such issues as conscious experience and the conditions of it, phenomenology probes into the experiences and perceptions as lived and given from the first-person point of view. With its emphasis on the first-person givenness of lived experiences, phenomenology puts the self/subject in touch with the external reality, or simply the world by characterizing it in such terms as “being-there,” “being-in-the-world” and “thrown into the world” (as in Heidegger) or plainly as “existence” (as in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty). Situating the subject in the world as such, phenomenology further reveals the world – which is given to or intended by the self and in which the self *is* – as

that which is fundamentally filled with others. As being in the world, the self necessarily finds itself always already enmeshed in the triangular nexus of self-others-world. Therefore, phenomenology provides an experiential lens through which the intricate relations between the self and others are re-evaluated with regard to the significance of the presence of others in the self's world.

The premises of phenomenology overlap with those of modernist fiction in their common concern with the subject and his/her experiences. However, the prevalent critical approaches to modernist texts generally dwell upon and emphasize the characterization of the subject as detached and alienated from his/her environs and, more significantly, from others. In addition, the subject is usually interpreted as fundamentally plagued by social isolation which is at times stretched to such an extent that his/her ties with the world are almost completely severed. For instance, all of the characters (especially Rhoda) in Woolf's *The Waves* are variously dismissed as voices cut off from their bodies and as free-floating consciousnesses unhitched from their circumstantial situatedness. In a similar fashion, the eponymous hero Jim in Conrad's *Lord Jim* is regarded as elusive and seen like a spirit let loose. Likewise, Dowell in Ford's *The Good Soldier* is deemed a mere nullity or nothingness and even resembled to the Cartesian *cogito* as self-standing with no need of a world or others to exist. In a sense, all of these figures are basically cast and fashioned as unmoored and *worldless* beings.

Against such prevalent and reductive approaches to the understanding of the self as isolated and alienated in modernist fiction, this dissertation has re-examined the standing of the self in its intersubjective relations by drawing upon the phenomenological insights that offer a well-suited theoretical and philosophical lens to comprehensively rework and re-evaluate the conception of the subject in a new light. Although each of the novels studied seemingly presents the characters as self-contained on the surface, it is seen on closer inspection that each novel acknowledges the presence of others as an integral part or constituent of the being of the self. In fact, others permeate every aspect of the life and identity of the subject to such a great extent that any inquiry into selfhood has to necessarily address the issue of others. In this regard, when analyzed from a phenomenological viewpoint, the selected novels demonstrate

that each of them offers a conception of the self as inextricably entangled with others. This applies even to *The Waves* whose characters *seem* much more detached and aloof than those of *Lord Jim* and *The Good Soldier*. Moreover, each novel depicts the characters as struggling with existential concerns and identity problems which find expression in their intersubjective relations with others and which essentially emerge in the concrete encounters with others. Therefore, the novels share a common concern for the subject who is not only bodily situated in the world but also whose identity formation is primarily subtended by others.

The self-other relations in these novels shed light on a different aspect or dimension of the self's intersubjective involvement with others. In *The Waves*, Woolf seems to offer an account of the self as that which initially appears to be wholly isolated; however, when examined more closely, Woolf's account reveals how the characters are situated in a binding relationship with others. In Woolf's work, others not only frame and dictate the way the characters comport themselves in the world in average everydayness but also confront the characters through concrete encounters that brings about a heightened self-consciousness and self-introspection. In other words, Woolf illustrates two prominent and constitutive aspects of the self: they-self and being-for-others. By situating the characters within a complex of insidious relations that push them towards a certain averageness or average existence and thus make them measure themselves against others, Woolf emphasizes the fact that much of everyday life of the self is lived as they-self, that is, anonymous and almost impersonal. For instance, Louis and Rhoda in *The Waves* are too much preoccupied with the average ways of comporting themselves in daily life by looking at others to see how they act. Louis tries hard to touch his hat the way others do and to appear as much English as possible in his behaviors and speech in order to dissolve among others and be like an ordinary English gentleman. Similarly, Rhoda pulls up her stockings the way Susan and Jinny do in order to be in line with the soothing ways of average everydayness. In addition, Bernard finds it extremely difficult to go against the grain and hence to be left "outside the machine" or "the sequence" both of which stand for the soothing average existence available to Bernard. In this respect, Bernard immediately goes back to absorb himself in the familiar ways of being and "wrap himself in warm coverings."

On the other hand, Woolf also offers intersubjective encounters as a medium to illustrate the heightened self-consciousness of the characters which is mediated through others. In such concrete encounters the most prominent instances of which occur during the two gatherings of six characters (seven in the first meeting) in the course of the novel, the presence of others transforms the characters and causes them to be highly self-conscious of their bodies and existence. In other words, such presence of others externalizes the characters, thereby making them aware of their own body and attributing to them certain objective qualities, which the characters come to recognize by adopting such other-oriented perspective on themselves. For example, Susan's character as a maternal figure living in rural Lincolnshire is only highlighted and brought to her attention in her face-to-face encounters with Jinny who is a highly attractive woman living in London. Additionally, it is once more in the presence of Jinny that Susan notices her "shabby dress" and "square-tipped fingernails" and becomes ashamed of her red hands and bitten nails. Likewise, Louis is aware of his distinct Australian accent only in the presence of others and thus shies away from being engaged in conversations with others. In a similar vein, Neville who is a well-accomplished figure loses his "credentials" under "the acid of [Susan's] green, her crystal, pear-shaped eyes." In a sense, the soothing comfort that the they-self enjoys in its average everydayness is at times unsettled and disturbed with the disorienting presence of others that effects a heightened self-consciousness. Hence, unlike the charges that are directed at *The Waves* as filled with ungrounded and detached figures, Woolf's work posits that each and every figure is entangled and enmeshed with others in a web of referential totality constituted by others.

Joseph Conrad in *Lord Jim* spotlights another equally significant dimension of the self-other relations by drawing attention to their potential ethical reverberations: the ethical self as fundamentally responsible for others – which is a dimension of the self that is addressed neither in Woolf nor in Ford. Conrad places Jim in certain ethically charged situations which evoke and even necessitate a certain response from Jim himself. For instance, Jim's concrete encounters with the pilgrims (others) on the sinking Patna immediately paralyze him because the presence of such vulnerable others reveals to him his ethical subjection to and responsibility for others which fundamentally characterizes

his selfhood. In effect, by presenting Jim in such ethically saturated encounters, Conrad posits that the self as being in the world not only collides with others but also finds itself in a position to act upon the world by making ethically demanding decisions with regards to others. In such instances, Jim recognizes the claim or demand others have over him and thus hears the call of others for acting responsibly. For example, when the Patna is about to sink and the crew members save themselves by jumping into the lifeboat, Jim is dumbstruck and paralyzed upon seeing the faces (in Lévinasian terms) of the sleeping pilgrims aboard. He immediately recognizes the call of the other and is tormented by the circumstantial impossibility of alleviating the impending suffering of others. Similarly, in the latter half of the novel, Conrad casts Jim into another concrete morally demanding encounter with a menacing figure, Gentleman Brown – who initially appears as needy and helpless and thus calls upon Jim to respond to his plight. Given the circumstances, Jim's response-ability is powerfully called forth with the desolate condition in which Gentleman Brown appears. Jim feels obliged to not only acknowledge the demanding presence of the other but also respond to such debilitating presence. Therefore, Conrad emphasizes the ethical dimension of the intersubjective encounters which cast and position the subject in an ethically binding relationship with others and which renders the self unilaterally subject to others.

Unlike the almost menacing and unwanted presence of others which evokes either self-introspection or ethical response-ability from the self and which strongly demands the self's attention in Woolf's *The Waves* and Conrad's *Lord Jim*, Ford Madox Ford in *The Good Soldier* introduces and explores the self's attempts to ground its being through a manipulation of others and thus acquire an identity that will justify its existence. As Ford postulates through his characterization of Dowell in the novel, the perpetual transcendence at the heart of the self's being compels it to seek anchorage in the world through others because others possess the power to render necessary the self's otherwise contingent existence embodied in its thrownness into the world. Dowell's distressing and upsetting realization of his contingency with no "anchorage in the spot" coerces him into confronting and overcoming his contingency through an appropriation of others. In other words, Ford's emphasis lies on the self's ultimate need of others who can acknowledge the self's existence. For this reason, Dowell first turns to Florence to

acquire his identity as a husband and then to the Ashburnhams to validate further his identity on the social level because they confirm his identity as a husband to Florence. However, when Florence fails him in his attempts to make himself a husband, Dowell immediately recasts himself as a nurse/attendant to Florence who acts the part of a patient. Dowell finds comfort in his newly acquired nurse/attendant identity which provides him with a *raison-d'être* and wedges a place for him in the world. Furthermore, when he is disconcerted with the death of Florence which deprives him of his identity, Dowell is at once resolved to find himself another patient, that is, Nancy to whom he acts as both a guardian and a nurse/attendant and who helps Dowell recuperate his identity. Thus, Ford in *The Good Soldier* posits that the self as always already in the making needs the assurance from the "outside," that is, others who will assure it of its "worthiness to exist" – which is ultimately a perpetual struggle, on the self's part, to render itself necessary by the mediation of others. Ford's account of the self-other relations as such provides a different outlook in that the presence of others in *The Good Soldier* not only serves the interests of but also is accordingly appropriated by the self on its way to justify its existence.

All in all, self-other relations, explored and illustrated in the works of these three canonical modernist novelists Woolf, Conrad, and Ford, demonstrate that the traditional rendition of the subject as singular and detached from others is not a viable position to maintain. On the contrary, despite such prevalent viewpoints, the subject is always already engaged with and fundamentally related to others who participate in as well as contribute to the formation of the subject's identity and his/her self-understanding. By situating their characters within intricate intersubjective relations with others, Woolf, Conrad, and Ford respectively investigate three different dimensions of the self's being as well as its relations with others: the average everyday self (they-self) and heightened self-consciousness through others, ethical self whose response-ability is evoked by others, and self-justification by acquiring an identity through others. In this respect, each novelist reveals the subject to be at the heart of a cyclic and never-ending interaction and struggle with others. Therefore, this study concludes that the phenomenological insights provided by Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Lévinas into self-other relations not only prepare the philosophical ground for questioning and

re-evaluating the otherwise reductive and singular approaches to the self in modernist fiction, but also enrich the readings and interpretations of these modernist novels. Accordingly, Woolf, Conrad, and Ford's works allow for a phenomenological perspective that contributes to a re-assessment of the self not only as inextricably intertwined with others, but also, more importantly, as fundamentally bound to and in need of others in order to be a subject.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1] The nineteenth century Neo-Kantian tradition basically proposes that our minds impose *a priori* structures on experiences and that such structures can be deduced from human reason, not from experiences.

[2] Unless otherwise stated, emphases appear in the original.

[3] In forming and developing the initial phases of his phenomenology, Husserl drew upon the insights of his teacher Franz Brentano whose work on "descriptive psychology" became quite influential on the early Husserl. Brentano argued in favor of descriptive psychology against the genetic one, and the main strand of his argument against the genetic psychology, which deals generally with causality, i.e. causal explanations for phenomena, is that perceptions and experiences are anterior to any possible causal accounts concerning them. Thus, "descriptive psychology is prior to genetic psychology, since studying the causes of perception, memory, emotion, etc. presupposes understanding what it is for an event to be one of seeing, remembering, regretting, etc." (Smith and Thomasson 5). The emphasis Brentano places on the description of the characteristics and essences of the basic types of mental phenomena finds echo in Husserl's understanding of phenomenology as the study of essences of experiences common to all acts of consciousness.

[4] This term can be easily confused with the ordinary use of the word as denoting purposeful or deliberate act. However, intentionality as understood by phenomenologists indicates consciousness' being directed towards an object and, in simpler terms, the "of"ness of consciousness itself in being conscious *of* an object.

[5] Franz Brentano in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* mentions intentionality as a "characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena:" "Every mental phenomena is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call . . . reference to a content, direction toward an object . . .Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself . . .This intentional in-existence [i.e. existence of object *in* mental phenomena] is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. . . . We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves" (68).

[6] Husserl's notion of an identical ego/self is in contradistinction to that of William James who conceives of the self as that which appears in the present thought and as that which is brought about by thought. Furthermore, James even says, echoeing Hume, that the selfsame ego is an illusion: "The sense of personal identity is not, then, this mere synthetic form essential to all thought. It is the sense of a sameness perceived *by* thought and predicated of things *thought-about*. These things are a present self and a self of yesterday. The thought not only thinks them both, but thinks that they are identical. The psychologist . . . might prove the thought wrong, and show there was no real identity – there might have been no yesterday, or, at any rate, no self of yesterday; or, if there were, the sameness predicated might not obtain, or might be predicated on insufficient grounds. In either case the personal identity would not exist as a *fact*; but it would exist as a *feeling* all the same; the consciousness of it by the thought would be there, and the psychologist would still have to analyze that, and show where its illusoriness lay" (315-16).

For an extensive discussion of this issue, see James's chapter "The Consciousness of Self" in *The Principles of Psychology*.

[7] Kant argues that one can be conscious of the selfsame transcendental ego prevailing in all perceptions but cannot intuit it as an object of reflection: ". . . this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in every representation, does not concern the intuition [grasping] of it, through which it is given as an object . . ." (446).

[8] Time-consciousness constitutes the fundamental base on which the recognition of a temporally extended object – and of the self, too – as identical across time in all sorts of the acts of consciousness is realized. For Husserl it is a bedrock upon which any sort of consciousness of anything is based on: "the most fundamental consciousness, presupposed in all other forms and structures of consciousness is the consciousness of time" (Bernet et al. 101). Husserl's departure point, therefore, is to investigate how succession of the moments in the perception of a temporal object is effected as a flow and not as fragmented and disappearing in each passing moment. The favorite example Husserl provides for the elucidation of time-consciousness is the perception of a melody, or a sum of tones. If tones were to be perceived and preserved exactly as they have just sounded – as time flows and new tones sound – there would be a bunch of tones perceived simultaneously and not in harmonious succession. In like manner, if each moment of a moving body, i.e, the motion thereof, were to persist unchanged in consciousness in every new moment, there would be no perception of a movement. Moreover, in perception, the space the body in motion traverses would be continuously filled with the images of the same body – which, in turn, would preclude the possibility of the perception of movement. Husserl remarks that "[t]he representation of succession comes about only if the earlier sensation [impression] does not persist unchanged in consciousness but is modified in an original manner; that is, only if it is continuously modified from moment to moment" (*On the Phenomenology* 13). Hence, in this ever-present flow, each and every impression of the present moment is kept in the retention of the just-elapsed now which will be itself transformed into another retention of the previous retention in its own turn. Husserl's conception of retention-primal impression-protention differs from William James and Franz Brentano's formulation of flowing time. James and Brentano take each passing moment as sinking into the past but at the same time remaining the same, i.e., unchanged. Instead, Husserl's idea of retention suggests that the passing moment does not abide unchanged but rather is continually modified in each new moment. This is why Husserl posits that each moment is inevitably retentionally modified. Husserl elaborates on the structure of time-consciousness and puts forward a tripartite structure by virtue of which consciousness seems to be aware of its own temporal flow as well as of temporal experiences or objects. Basically, Husserl proposes that "[e]very perception has its retentional and protentional halo" (*On the Phenomenology* 111); that is, consciousness has the structure of retention – primal impression – protention. As Dan Zahavi succinctly puts it in *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, "[t]he primal impression is embedded in a twofold temporal horizon. On the one hand, it is accompanied by a *retention* which provides us with consciousness of the phase of the object which has just been, i.e., which allows us to be aware of the phase as it sinks into the past and, on the other hand, by a *protention* which in a more or less indeterminate fashion anticipates the phase of the object yet to come" (64). In its simplest terms, the primal impression points at the intentional awareness of the now phase of the object one experiences in the present. In this moment, one is intentionally aware of the present as *present*. However, since the absolute flow of consciousness continually streams, the primal impression changes into, what one might call, that-just-has-been or that-just-has-elapsed. In other words, the primal impression becomes a moment of the past. Its being a moment of the past notwithstanding, this very primal impression does not disappear into oblivion for good. Rather, it is *retained* in the ever-coming new primal impressions – which Husserl calls "retention." Husserl notes that "[i]n the absolute passing-on, in the flowing process, the first primal impression becomes changed into a retention of itself, this retention becomes changed into a retention of this retention, and so

on" (*On the Phenomenology* 85-86). Essential to the understanding of succession in time is, therefore, consciousness's ability to retain the passing impressions that continually sink back into the past. The counterpart of retention in this above structure is "protention" by means of which consciousness, as embedded in the temporal flow, is directed to the future and expects the upcoming moments of temporal objects and experiences. According to John Brough, "[p]rimary expectation or protention is the immediate awareness of the future attending all of my experiences" (xl). Put another way, just like consciousness intends an object, or experience, and retains the elapsed moment, it simultaneously *protends* the next moment which has not yet come.

[9] This structure of internal time-consciousness echoes William James's famous rendering of the experience of the present given not as a knife edge but rather as riding on a saddleback: "In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time" (574). For an extensive discussion of the similarities and differences between Husserl's conception of time-consciousness and that of William James, see Richard Cobb-Stevens's "James and Husserl: Time-Consciousness and the Intentionality of Presence and Absence" in *Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity*, pp. 41-58.

[10] Such conception anticipates Sartre's idea that every act of consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness. Without being self-aware, no perceptual act can be given to consciousness, and neither can perception occur.

[11] Dasein can be roughly considered as Heidegger's name for embodied human beings in general.

[12] Indeed, Heidegger is so conscientious not to use the words like consciousness, ego, or *cogito* in his works. He deliberately avoids employing such terms so as to emphasize that his inquiries are not into the workings of consciousness, but rather into the nature of being and existence. Therefore, Heidegger's phenomenology is, in essence, more inclined towards an ontological investigation of Being – that is the very reason why he tries to describe the subject in his/her existence in a world full of meaningful relations. As Alan Schrift rightly remarks, "what is to be analyzed by phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is the meaning of Being, which entails that it is not just facts but meaningful facts that are to be analyzed . . ." (30).

[13] These terms are related to the care-structure which Heidegger explicates by proposing a complex and even paradoxical formulation for Dasein's being: "[T]he being of Dasein means being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)" (*Being* 193/237). Such seemingly complex nature of Dasein's being notwithstanding, each of the phrases, namely, being-ahead-of-oneself, being-already-in, and being-together, emphasizes a significant aspect of Dasein – all of which pertain to Dasein's care structure. Being ahead-of-itself stresses that Dasein is never complete and always projects itself towards a myriad of possibilities by "taking care" of the world. Dasein always does something or engages itself with something "in order to do" or what Heidegger calls "for the sake of" – which in turn pertains to Dasein's "understanding." On the other hand, being-already-in points to the fact that Dasein always already has a world and is situated in a flux of the referential totality of this world. Being-together-with denotes that Dasein's world is already fraught with entities and Dasein knows how to "take care" of them and comport itself to them.

[14] See David Cerbone's *Understanding Phenomenology* (Ch. 4, Husserl on Embodiment section) for a brief sketch of Husserl's ideas on embodiment in *Ideas* II, and its influence on Merleau-Ponty's thought.

[15] It should be noted, though, that Heidegger does not elaborate on the issue of embodiment and body. He already characterizes Dasein in its bodily situated existence and does not go into the intricate details of bodily perception and embodied consciousness as do Husserl and, more significantly, Merleau-Ponty.

[16] Scott Marratto introduces the translation of *le corps propre* as "the lived body" and, at times, interchangeably, as "one's own body" – the French original of which makes the latter translation and meaning possible. Yet I would argue that the translation as "one's own body" misses much of the anonymous existence Merleau-Ponty attributes to the living body simply because such translation is prone to lead to a misunderstanding of the body as particularly and singularly belonging to the self in a unique way. It is that, too. However, the body has, what Merleau-Ponty calls, "a generality of existence" that submerges and even erases the unique possession of the body that would otherwise demarcate the self from others by cutting all the ties between them. (See Scott Marratto's *The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity*, pp. 113-63).

[17] Descartes explicitly notes in the "Sixth Meditation:" "And although perhaps (or rather certainly, as I shall shortly claim) I have a body, . . . it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it" (55/79).

[18] Lawrence Hass further notes that neither the ancient Greek nor the medieval philosophers happened to wonder if others exist or not; and consequently, they never dealt with the issue of the problem of other minds simply because others' existence was never an issue for them. Hass contends that even many early modern philosophers following Descartes (except for Berkeley who employed the by-now traditional "analogical judgment" as a solution to the problem of other minds) never discussed this issue in their works (102-03).

[19] In his famous wax example in the "Second Meditation," Descartes demonstrates the problem of other minds in its fullness by making an analogy between the perception of the wax figure and subsequently of its melting down and that of the others' bodies and of their being people like oneself. In his argument, Descartes states that if we observe a wax figure with a distinct shape, color, scent, form and so on, we conclude that we "see" the wax with all its properties required of it to be known distinctly as wax. However, when it is brought near the fire, it starts to melt down and change all these previously mentioned qualities and attributes which are obliterated by the fire. Then the question arises, for Descartes, "[d]oes the same wax still remain?" (22/31). He answers in the affirmative: "So what was there in it that was so distinctly grasped? Certainly, none of those qualities I apprehended by the senses [that is, its shape, color, odor, form, etc.]: for whatever came under taste, or smell, or sight, or touch, or hearing, has now changed [with the fire]: but the wax remains" (22/31). Hence, Descartes argues that we cannot rely on the senses in an attempt to confirm the wax; rather, he maintains, it is the mind that perceives the wax by "judging" it to be the same wax (after melting) as it was before when in good shape and form. Moreover, language makes it all the more misleading and confusing because we tend to simply say we "see" the wax, but not "judge" it to be the wax. Descartes says that the confirmation of the wax by sight (i.e. by the senses, not the mind) would still do "if I had not happened to glance out of the window at people walking along the street" (23/33). Descartes contends that in daily expression we would say that we "see" the people just as we "see" the wax; "[b]ut what do I actually see other than hats and coats, which could be covering automata?" (23/33). Thus, according to Descartes, if we say we "see," it would be erroneous because we do not see the other's mind; instead, all we see is their clothes and their bodies. Therefore, through a sort of inference, "I *judge* that they are people. And therefore what I thought I saw with my eyes, I in fact grasp only by the faculty of *judging* that is in my mind" (23/33, emphasis added). In other words, the conception of others as having minds or as simply people like oneself can only be arrived at via the judgment of the mind, not by sight nor by any

other sense. Moreover, with such characterization, Descartes seems to have planted the seeds of the traditional argument by analogy concerning other minds – which necessitates that one can only indirectly infer the others' existence.

[20] Heidegger's attempt at centralizing the practical contextual life of Dasein might be said to find its basis in Husserl's *Ideas II* (1913) where Husserl, for the first time, introduces and explores Lebenswelt (life-world) – which is made up of significances and referential totality and which foregrounds the mundane practical daily nature of everyday life – similar to Heidegger's understanding of the world. Arriving at such a conclusion is all the more strengthened by Theodore Kisiel's statement that Heidegger studied Husserl's *Ideas II* "intensively" while preparing for the lecture course of the summer 1925 (qtd. in Overgaard p15).

[21] Epistemology as a discipline of philosophy is interested in understanding how one knows the external reality and beings in the world. This problem of the knowledge of the external world is the guiding force behind epistemology. This can be clearly seen in the (in)famous Cartesian skepticism towards the existence of the external world and in the way the Cartesian self-evident indubitable *cogito* from its inner sphere gets to know the dubious external reality.

[22] Heidegger disapproves of such argument by analogy approaches (see *Being* §26).

[23] Heidegger differentiates between the being of Dasein and entities/things by referring to that of the former with an uppercase initial Being and the latter with a lowercase one.

[24] For a discussion of Heidegger's critique of the traditional philosophy as regards the priority of intentionality and disinterested knowledge, see Hubert Dreyfus' *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, pp. 45-54.

[25] Merleau-Ponty employs this term numerous times throughout *Phenomenology of Perception*, especially when he pits the lived experience against the conception thereof by the "objective thought" – which tries to rationalize or make sense of the process of perception/experience by equating it to the physiological occurrences in the body (See the chapter entitled "The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology" in *Phenomenology of Perception*).

[26] According to Merleau-Ponty, the stimulus or excitation received by the body is not framed in terms of causality; instead, they are "conceived" and, so to speak, interpreted by the living body in order for a perception to occur in the way it does. In other words, the mapping out of each and every process of a received stimulus can tell nothing about *how* these processes are lived and experienced by the living body. In this sense, the data the objective perspective offers do not tally with the experience as it is lived. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "I cannot gain a removed knowledge of it [the living body]. In so far as I guess what it may be, it is by abandoning the body as an object, *partes extra partes*, and by going back to the body which I experience at this moment, in the manner, for example, in which my hand moves round the object it touches, anticipating the stimuli and itself tracing out the form which I am about to perceive. I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world" (87).

[27] I think it can be well argued that this holds for any embodied being including animals.

[28] Charles Taylor remarks as follows: "As I sit here and take in the scene before me, this has a complex structure. It is oriented vertically, some things are 'up,' others are 'down;' and in depth, some are 'near,' others 'far.' . . . Here is a 'world shaped' by embodiment in the sense that the way of experiencing or 'living' the world is essentially that of an agent with this kind of body. It is an agent who acts to maintain equilibrium upright, who can deal with things close up

immediately and has to move to get to things farther away, who can grasp certain kinds of things easily and others not . . . To say that this world is essentially that of this agent is to say that the terms in which we describe this experience . . . make sense only against the background of this kind of embodiment. To understand what it is to 'lie to hand' [ready-to-hand] one has to understand what it is to be an agent with the particular bodily capacities that humans have" (318-19). However, it should be noted that Taylor's rendition is reductive in that he characterizes such absorption in the world as exclusive to human beings. It can be as well argued that animals have this sort of engaged agency to interact with the world in more or less similar ways.

[29] Heidegger takes up the issue of existence or being as the guiding line of what he calls "fundamental ontology" whose "fundamental question" is "the question of the meaning of Being" (*Being* 6/24-25). In order to probe into the meaning of being, Heidegger proposes that one should pursue a structural inquiry into existence which is Dasein's defining feature (*Being* 13/32-33) and hence the analysis of the ontological structure of existence will unveil what constitutes it. Heidegger calls the coherence of Dasein's ontological structures revealed in the analysis its "existentiality" and the analysis of the fundamental constitutive structures of Dasein "the existential analytic" (*Being* 14/33). Existentials are "the most general characteristics of Dasein" (Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World* 40) and "the constitutive forms of *being human* . . . [and] govern the totality of human existing" (Schroeder 127). If the central question is, for Heidegger, that of what it means for anything to be, it should be none other than Dasein itself from which one must start to answer the question of being – because Dasein is distinguished from the other existent entities in the world "by the fact that in its being this being [Dasein] is concerned *about* its very being" (Heidegger, *Being* 13/12). And, as an extension of this difference, because "it, unlike other kinds of entities, always has an understanding of being: human beings are beings to whom entities are manifest in their way of being" (Cerbone, *Understanding* 42). Put differently, Dasein's concern with its own being and its ability to pose questions about its existence imply an understanding of being in general on Dasein's part. For this very reason, the structural investigation into existentiality should begin from the being of Dasein.

[30] It might as well be argued that unlike Husserl's constituting subject Heidegger's Dasein is constituted by others. The influence of others in the constitution of the self can be also traced in the work of Sartre (the self defines itself in opposition to others), Merleau-Ponty (seeds of alterity must exist in the self if there is to be a world of self and others – or simply intersubjectivity) and Lévinas (the self is at the mercy of the other) in different dimensions and varying degrees.

[31] Various translations have been offered for the term "das Man" including "the they," "the One," and "the Anyone." The first translation, "the they," has been criticized since it implies a rift between Dasein and others. On the contrary, Dasein itself is a part of *das Man* by repeating and promoting the ways "das Man" prescribes. As Heidegger puts it, Dasein "enhances their power" (*Being* 127/164).

[32] Heidegger's constitution of *das Man* carries some implicit criticism of Husserl's meaning-constituting transcendental subject who, in the first place, makes up the values, significances, meanings, etc. On the other hand, Heidegger's conception reveals Dasein as being thrown into the midst of a value-laden world where Dasein goes about its business the way *one* does. However, it should be also noted that Husserl does not refuse the meaningful world into which the mundane ego is born – similar to Heidegger's thought. As Hubert Dreyfus argues, "The Anyone [das Man] thus takes the place of Husserl's transcendental ego as the ultimate source of the significance and intelligibility of the world, so that whereas in Husserl, meaning-giving runs from the individual transcendental ego to the public world, in Heidegger it runs from the public world to the individual Dasein" ("The Priority" 126).

[33] In a letter to Sartre, Heidegger wrote that he agrees with Sartre's critique of his being-with: "I am in agreement with your critique of 'being-with' and with your insistence on being-for-others, as well as in partial agreement with your critique of my explication of death" (qtd. in Zahavi, "Beyond Empathy" 158).

[34] Sartre gives the example of the soldiers who expect the look not from the eyes of the enemies but rather from the bushes, from the farmhouse at the top of the hill, from the window of a building, etc., thereby emphasizing the nature of the look as that which can be present anywhere at anytime.

[35] This sentence reads originally in French as follows: "*je me* vois parce qu'*on* me voit" along with the one that starts with "Someone is looking at me!" ("on me regarde"). Hazel Barnes opts for a translation of "on" as "someone" which is a possible and correct translation. However, both sentences can be also directly translated as "I am seen" since "on" in French corresponds to the passive voice, as well. Hence, I believe much is lost in translation because the passive voice translation would emphatically underscore the idea of being seen and being visible. "On" in French covers both connotations at one stroke.

[36] Sartre's analysis of the French writer Jean Genet's life demonstrates that Genet comes to acquire in his early childhood the label of thief and leads his early life in committing crimes. As a child, Genet is indicted as a thief and, consequently, comes to recognize and accept himself as a thief. The acquisition of being a thief cannot occur without the intermediacy of the other. (See Sartre's *Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr* (1952)).

CHAPTER I

[37] See Virginia Woolf's "A Sketch of the Past," especially pp. 79-80.

[38] Barbara Claire Freeman states that although they "occasionally . . . produce the experience of rapture or ecstasy," moments of being mostly "entail negation and self-shattering. . . . [and] provoke a sense of utter helplessness and paralysis" (65).

[39] See Liesl Olson's "Virginia Woolf's 'cotton wool of daily life'" for a detailed analysis and numerous instances of the ordinary in Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*. On the other hand, even though Woolf never discloses the specific date of this day, Susan Dick tracks down the date by following the signposts and minute details offered by various characters and says that the date of this day when Clarissa has her party seems to be June 20, 1923 (52).

[40] C. Ruth Miller in *Virginia Woolf: The Frames of Art and Life* argues that Woolf's rendition of moments of being as violent shocks that pierce the "cotton wool of daily life," and thereby as revealing "reality" behind the everyday moments of non-being, is "a modification of Platonic theory" (19-20). Indeed, Woolf laboriously read Plato and is fascinated with Greek language (See McNeillie 2, 8). It seems viable that her theory of non-being and being harbors, to some extent, Platonic sediments.

[41] Her ideas regarding a new form of fiction find voice in Woolf's lecture to be delivered to the students at Oxford University – which is later published as "Poetry, Fiction and the Future" (which is posthumously republished under the title of "The Narrow Bridge of Art" in *Granite and Rainbow*).

[42] The new form and style that Woolf employs in *The Waves* formally have, in effect, no resemblance to her earlier work even though she plays with the structure of *To the Lighthouse*

by inserting the second part entitled "Time Passes" in-between the first part and the third one so as to create a bridge between the two and thereby enacting structurally the letter "H": as Woolf says, "two blocks joined by a corridor" (qtd. in Briggs, "The Novels" 74). In addition, as yet another difference from her earlier work, Woolf creates the whole novel through structurally alternating sections: each section where the reader directly reads the thoughts, feelings, experiences and sensations of the characters is preceded by descriptive passages of nature, that is, interludes or prologues written in italics. And the narrator of the chapters is reduced to use merely reported speech: "said" accompanied by the names of the characters. The rest is directly communicated in quotation marks so as to focus on characters' consciousness, or more appropriately, their perceptions. As is apparent in her diary entry dated September 25, 1929, she was already concerned with the technical problems of such a new experimental form: "Yesterday morning I made another start on The Moths, but that wont be its title. & several problems cry out at once to be solved. Who thinks it? And am I outside the thinker? One wants some device which is not a trick" (*The Diary* 3: 257). Moreover, she even diligently worked on the structuring of the sections which would enact the structure of waves.

[43] See Avrom Fleishman's *Virginia Woolf: A Critical Reading*, Alice van Buren Kelley's *The Novels of Virginia Woolf: Fact and Vision* and Lyndall Gordon's *Virginia Woolf: A Writer's Life*.

[44] An example would be Julia Briggs' detailed analysis of consciousness in *Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life*.

[45] See Susan Dick's "Literary Realism in *Mrs. Dalloway*, *To the Lighthouse*, *Orlando* and *The Waves*" and Pam Morris' "Woolf and Realism."

[46] Gillian Beer in her editorial notes to *The Waves* explains that the music hall Rhoda mentions while walking down Oxford Street is Wigmore Hall which is behind Oxford Street. See her explanatory notes on pp. 253-54.

[47] See Heidegger, *Being and Time* pp. 53/78, 148/188.

[48] Rhoda's implicit conflict with Jinny and Susan might be another example for this where Rhoda says that Jinny keeps her knowledge to herself while Susan sometimes helps and teaches her (*The Waves* 31-33). Similarly, Jinny seems to have the same feelings of enmity and hostility towards her peers: "There are girls of my own age, for whom I feel the drawn swords of an honorable antagonism. For these are my peers" (*The Waves* 84). Similarly, getting together with others is, for Louis, black with tortures and infamies practiced by man upon man (*The Waves* 182).

CHAPTER II

[49] Although Conrad wrote Author's Note to *Almayer's Folly* in 1895, he did not include it in the first published edition of the novel. Instead, he put it aside for about twenty years. With certain changes to the manuscript, it was published for the first time in 1921 in the Collected Editions of Conrad's works by the publishers Heinemann in England and Doubleday in the United States (Eddleman and Higdon xviii, 194).

[50] Lionel Trilling (1905-1975) is regarded as one of the most significant and influential American literary critics of the postwar years (Mendelson par. 1; Glick par. 1). In his reading of the English novelists such as Henry James, E.M. Forster and George Orwell, Trilling not only

"applied the idea of the 'moral imagination'" but also "raised questions about how we live our lives, about the nature of good and evil . . . about our ambivalence in making moral choices" (Glick par. 2). Furthermore, his emphasis on the moral vision in the works of such novelists is "[w]hat made Lionel Trilling unique among literary critics" (Glick par. 2). In this regard, his definition of sincerity – a concept fraught with moral significance – is relevant to as well as enriches my interpretation of Conrad's own understanding of sincerity as being true to oneself and others.

[51] Moral issues in Conrad's work variously appear in the form of "moral isolation" (Leavis 222) (as in *Under Western Eyes* and *Chance*), "moral insulation" (214) and "egocentric naiveties of moral conviction, the conventionality of conventional moral attitudes" (210) as well as "an interplay of contrasting moral perspectives" (210) (as in *The Secret Agent*), and "[m]orality representation of the human potentialities" (208) (as in *Victory*).

[52] See John A. Palmer's *Joseph Conrad's Fiction: A Study in Literary Growth* which focuses on the moral issues in Conrad's work.

[53] See Conrad's letter dated February 14, 1899 to William Blackwood where he suggests that, along with "Youth" and *Heart of Darkness*, "*Jim* being 20 or 30 thou[sand words] would almost make up matter enough for a book" (*Lord Jim: A Norton Critical Edition* 292; also see Hay, "*Lord Jim:* From Sketch to Novel" p.307).

[54] Maier-Katkin and Maier-Katkin cite what Conrad says of Marlow in his introduction to *Youth and Two Other Stories* in order to demonstrate that Conrad was quite troubled by Marlow as follows: "[Marlow] haunts my hours of solitude, when, in silence, we lay our heads together in great comfort and harmony; but as we part at the end of a tale I am never sure that it may not be for the last time" (602).

[55] Thomas C. Moser notes the similarity between this passage and the biblical story of Abel and Cain in Genesis 4.9: "And the Lord said unto Cain, where is Abel thy brother?" (135, fn.4).

[56] When talking to Marlow, Brierly's first mate Mr. Jones reveals that "neither you nor I, sir, had ever thought so much of ourselves . . ." (*Lord Jim* 43) and yet had in fact "saved lives at sea . . . rescued ships in distress" (*Lord Jim* 38). Also Mr. Jones says that he heard Brierly say to himself that "[h]e was second to none" (*Lord Jim* 41).

[57] For instance, Eben Bass immediately sees Jim's encounter with Brown as failure (443). Similarly, Eloise Hay finds fault with Jim who "is so passionately conscious of his old guilt that he loses the power to judge Brown objectively" (292). Hary Sewlall also seems to concede that "Jim is a failure in Patusan" (125).

CHAPTER III

[58] Merleau-Ponty remarks that "Descartes and particularly Kant *detached* the subject, or consciousness, by showing that I could not possibly apprehend anything as existing unless I first of all experienced myself as existing in the act of apprehending it. They presented consciousness, the absolute certainty of my existence for myself, as the condition of there being anything at all . . ." (x).

[59] It was not until 1919 that Ford started to publish under the name "Ford Madox Ford." Martin Stannard notes that Ford "changed his surname to 'Ford' in an attempt to prevent [his wife]

Elsie's (and [his lover] Violet's) interference when he set up home with Stella Bowen in June 1919" (3, n.2).

[60] From 1909 onwards, Ford continued a strained friendship on and off with Conrad for many years until the latter's death in 1924.

[61] Other contributors included Henry James, Thomas Hardy, Wyndham Lewis, John Galsworthy, W.H. Hudson and many others. For further information, see Tomlinson, "Modernism Began in the Magazines."

[62] In relation to his conception of a technique to present conversations, Ford remarks that "I then considered for a long time how conversations presented themselves to the mind. I would find myself in a room with a gentleman who pursued an almost uninterrupted monologue" ("Techniques" 314). See also Ford's "On Impressionism," especially pp.283, 287.

[63] Ian Watt confirms that "[i]t was Ford Madox Ford who gave wide currency to the view that he and Conrad, like Flaubert and Maupassant, had been writers of impressionist fiction" (*Conrad in the Nineteenth Century* 172).

[64] W[illiam] H[enry] Hudson is an English author and naturalist whose nature writing and literary style were admired by Ford, Conrad and Woolf (Alt 38; Saunders, "Ford and Turgenev" 65).

[65] Such experiences of giddiness and nausea find their best expression in Antoine Roquentin's nausea in the face of the gratuitous existence of everything including himself in Sartre's novel *Nausea* (1938).

[66] Dowell has in mind a relation, especially between a man and a woman: "But the real fierceness of desire . . . withering up the soul of a man is the craving for identity with the woman that he loves. He desires to see with the same eyes, to touch with the same sense of touch, to hear with the same ears, to lose his identity, to be enveloped, to be supported" (*The Good* 82).

[67] Martin Stannard notes that this document, unlike what the novel suggests, was not the Protest: "The document which Ford took Violet Hunt to see in 1910, and to which Dowell/Florence presumably refer, was *not* the Protest but the fifteen-point doctrinal statement (the 'protocol') drawn up at the Marburg Colloquy (1529)" (38, fn.2).

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APPENDIX I: ORIGINALITY REPORTS

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS/DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 06/07/2017

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 207 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 06/07/2017 tarihinde şahsım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 9 'dur.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:
1- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç,
2- Kaynakça hariç
3- Alıntılar hariç
4- 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orjinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

06/07/2017
Tarih ve İmza

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Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Date: 06/07/2017

Thesis Title / Topic: The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options stated below on 06/07/2017 for the total of 207 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 9 %.

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Date and Signature

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Program: English Language and Literature

Status: ☐ Masters ☐ Ph.D. ☒ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM

APPENDIX II: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORMS

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 04/07/2017

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

04.07.2017

Tarih ve İmza

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HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY

Date: 04/07/2017

Thesis Title / Topic: The Phenomenology of the Self and Others in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*, and Ford Madox Ford's *The Good Soldier*

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
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4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

04.07.2017

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname:	Hakan Yılmaz
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ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM