



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

English Language and Literature Programme

**SHAKESPEARE'S SATIRICAL
REPRESENTATION OF THE ELIZABETHAN
COURT AND THE NOBILITY IN HIS
ENGLISH HISTORY PLAYS**

Murat ÖĞÜTCÜ

PhD Dissertation

Ankara, 2016

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
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
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
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
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Murat ÖĞÜTCÜ

To my loving wife...

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ÖZET

ÖĞÜTCÜ, Murat. Shakespeare'in İngiliz Tarih Oyunlarında Elizabeth Dönemi Saray ve Soyluların Hicvedilişi. Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2016.

Geç Elizabeth Dönemi'nde, kötü hasat, yüksek enflasyon ve ayaklanmalar olarak ortaya çıkan sosyo-ekonomik başarısızlıklar görülmüştür. Kraliyet hazinesindeki darboğaz hizipçiliğe yol açmış, hazine gelirlerinin gelişi güzel dağıtılması ve himaye altında olanların hamilere yaptıkları baskı sonucunda hamî, himaye altında olanlar ve toplumiçi ilişkiler sorunsallaşmıştır. Kandırma ve ikiyüzlülük, hizipçiliğe dayalı bu toplum yapısında ayakta kalmak için gerekli unsurlardır. Ancak bu gerçek ile toplumsal davranışlar arasındaki bağ hakkındaki algıyı sorunsallaştırmış ve temel sorunları çözmektense bunları ötelemiştir. Ötelenen sorunlar ise ülke yönetimine karşı duyulan ve gittikçe büyüyen hoşnutsuzluğa dönüşmüştür. Bu hoşnutsuzluk düzensiz olmasına rağmen, yavaş yavaş Elizabeth rejimine karşı duyulan toptan bir muhalefet tavrını oluşturmuştur. 1580'lerin sonlarından itibaren, I. Elizabeth yönetimine karşı duyulan olumsuz tavırlar dillendirilmeye çalışılsa da sansür mekanizmasının varlığı ile hukuk sisteminin devletin baskı araçları olarak kullanılmasından dolayı bu tavırlar ya bastırıldı ya da cezalandırılmamak için dolaylı yünden dillendirildi. Bunların dillendirilmesini Shakespeare'in özellikle *1, 2, 3 VI. Henry* (1590), *III. Richard* (1592), *II. Richard* (1595), *Kral John* (1590 veya 1596), *1, 2 IV. Henry* (1597-8) ve *V. Henry* (1599) adlı tarih oyunlarında görmekteyiz. Sanılanın aksine, Shakespeare tarih oyunlarında ne rejim taraftarı ne de rejim düşmanı oldu. Menipiyen hicvi kullanarak sorunları ve bunları yaratanları sebep-sonuç ilişkisi içerisinde ele alıp, toplumun hizipçilik, ikiyüzlülük ve çatışma kültürü sarmalından kurtulması için güldürerek eleştirdi. Bunu yapmak için tarih oyunlarını seçmesi var olan sansür mekanizmasının etrafından dolanmasını kolaylaştırdı. Shakespeare'in geçmiş veya kurgu olayları herkesi eleştiren Menipiyen hicviyle sunması toplumda dile getirilemeyen sorunların olası çözümlerini ve bu çözümlerin olası sorunlarını gösterebilmesini sağladı.

Bu bağlamda, tezin giriş bölümünde İngiltere'deki saray ve soylu ilişkisinin tarihsel gelişimi ele alınacak ve her bölümde Shakespeare'in Elizabeth Dönemi'nde yazdığı tarih oyunları birbirini tamamlayan toplumsal sorunlar bağlamında incelenecektir. Birinci Bölüm'de, Elizabeth Döneminde hamiliğin keyfi pay edilmesinin nasıl hizipçiliğe yolaçtığı tartışılacaktır. İkinci Bölüm'de hizipçilik sonucu kutuplaşmış bir sarayda hayatta kalmak için ikiyüzlü davranış biçimlerinin gerekliliği konusu incelenecektir. Son olarak, Üçüncü Bölüm'de, ikiyüzlülüğün sorunlarla yüzleşmeyi sadece ötelediği ve rejime karşı gelinmesine yol açtığı iddia edilecektir. İster oyun olarak izlenmiş olsun, isterse dönemin kitap halindeki basımlarından okunmuş olsun, Shakespeare'in tarih oyunlarında Menipiyen hicvin kullanılması Elizabeth toplumunun bütüncül olarak sorunlarıyla yüzleşmesini sağladı. Bundan dolayı, bu çalışma Shakespeare'in tarih oyunlarında Menipiyen hicvi kullanarak Geç Elizabeth Dönemi hizipçiliğini, ikiyüzlülüğünü ve toplumsal çatışma kavramlarını nasıl hicvettiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Shakespeare, Tarih Oyunları, Menipiyen Hicvi, Geç Elizabeth Dönemi, Hizipçilik, İkiyüzlülük, Toplumsal Çatışma

ABSTRACT

ÖĞÜTCÜ, Murat. Shakespeare's Satirical Representation of the Elizabethan Court and the Nobility in His English History Plays. PhD Dissertation, Ankara, 2016.

Late Elizabethan society was marked with the growing discontent about socio-economic failures resulting from the failure of crops, high inflation and riots. The scarcity of financial resources of the royal patronage led to factionalism, while the arbitrary distribution of favours and bottom-up pressures of patronees further problematised a healthy relationship among patrons, patronees and within society. Deception and hypocrisy were necessary in order to survive verbal and non-verbal means of factionalism, which targeted especially one's reputation. This, however, problematised the perception of the reality of social behaviour and only postponed the solutions to the problems, which were transformed into a growing discontent towards the regime. Although outbursts of discontent were fragmented in nature, gradually they formed a cumulative attitude of dissent towards the Elizabethan regime. From the late 1580s onwards, negative attitudes against the rule of Elizabeth I were tried to be voiced. Because of the existence of censorship mechanisms along with the use of repressive state apparatuses of the judiciary system, however, these attitudes were either suppressed to avoid punishment or they were voiced indirectly. The voicing of these problems can be seen, especially, in Shakespeare's Elizabethan history plays, namely *1, 2, 3 Henry VI* (1590), *Richard III* (1592), *Richard II* (1595), *King John* (1590 or 1596), *1, 2 Henry IV* (1597-8) and *Henry V* (1599). Contrary to the general assumption, Shakespeare neither adopted a conservative nor a radical discourse in his history plays. Using Menippean satire, he ridiculed the follies of factionalism, hypocritical behaviour patterns and dissent to liberate the society from the chimera of these problems. He analysed problems and the cause and effect relationship of these problems. Accordingly, using the history play as a genre enabled him to circumvent the existence of censorship mechanisms. Presenting past or fictive stories using Menippean satire that criticised from multiple points of view, enabled Shakespeare to present problems that could not

be voiced, their possible solutions, and the possible problems that could be caused by these solutions.

In line with these, in the Introduction the historical development of the relationship between the English Court and the nobility will be given, and in each chapter, all of Shakespeare's Elizabethan history plays will be analysed in relation to complementary socio-economic problems of their time. In Chapter I, it will be discussed how the arbitrary distribution of Elizabethan patronage led to factionalism. In Chapter II, it will be analysed how factionalism led to the necessity of displaying hypocritical social behaviour to survive in the polarised court. Lastly, in Chapter III, it will be argued that hypocrisy only postponed the direct confrontation with problems and led to outbursts of dissent against the regime. Whether seen as plays or read in quarto versions, the use of Menippean satire in Shakespeare's history plays enabled the Elizabethan society to confront its problems in a holistic way. Therefore, this dissertation aims to analyse how Shakespeare in the Late Elizabethan Period uses Menippean satire in his history plays and how he satirises factionalism, hypocrisy and dissent.

Keywords: Shakespeare, History Plays, Menippean Satire, Late Elizabethan Period, Factionalism, Hypocrisy, Dissent

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INTRODUCTION

In the last years of the Elizabethan Period (1588-1603), the relationship among the aristocratic nobility, the meritocratic civil servants and the monarch in the Court was marked by factionalism, role-play and dissent, which was also reflected in Shakespeare's history plays. Since Shakespeare's history plays were based on chronicles that dealt with factionalism, role-play and dissent during the reign of King John, the Hundred Years War, and the Wars of the Roses, it would be useful to provide a framework of reference for contextuality. Therefore, in order to analyse the Late Elizabethan Period in a synchronic manner, a diachronic analysis of the development of the Court and the nobility in England until the Late Elizabethan Period is necessary.

In Elizabethan England, the Court and the nobility were military and political institutions that were the result of a long history. The history of the development of the Court and the nobility can be roughly divided into four periods, which are Celtic tribal aristocracy and Germanic companionship, Anglo-Norman feudalism, the 15th century and the Tudor period. Starting with the establishment of Anglo-Norman feudalism, clashes among monarchs, landed nobility and courtiers were seen from which the parliament emerged as a political mediatory institution. Then, the 15th century formed a transition period between feudalism and the emerging nation-state. Later, the Tudor period with its imposition of central authority in the Court with the decline of the landed nobility and the rise of the courtiers was another important milestone in the development of the Court and the nobility.

Although the emergence of the aristocracy in England goes back to a much earlier date,¹ the institutionalisation of aristocracy, whether within or without the king's household, was accomplished only with the introduction of "the Feudal System" following the "aristocratic conquest" of William the Conqueror in 1066 (Slack 5; Stenton 13), which was a turning point in the development of aristocracy in England. Particularly, William the Conqueror's modified feudalism centralised power under hereditary succession through primogeniture (Schultz 28; Thomas, *Norman* 86; Blackstone and McIntyre Cooley 2:215). This replaced the Anglo-Saxon nobility and the *witan*, a council that

gave advice only if the king so desired, with the Great Council of loyal Norman barons that were bound to the strong sovereign through “tenure and baronial service” (Schultz 30; Stenton 13). Consequently, William the Conqueror introduced a system that made “all authority ultimately lay with the king, who was expected to act with the advice of his great council of tenants-in-chief” (Stenton 17).

Nevertheless, what William the Conqueror left to his successors as guarantees for their sovereignty, that is, “feudal tenure and baronial service, central administration, and local government” (Schultz 30), would prove as conflicting administrative units that would gradually undermine the feudal system as a whole. This tripodal system was based on a delicate balance between the conflicting powers of the king and the baronial nobility, where the Anglo-Norman kings tried to circumvent the ascendancy of local magnates through increasing the power of courtiers by appointing them to royal offices. For instance, from 1300 to 1500, a total number of 221 new peerages were created in order to balance the power of the landed nobility (McFarlane 175-6). Therefore, the feudal kings had to devolve some proportion of their power to their nobility inside and outside the Court.

On the other hand, the devolution of the power of the feudal kings was inevitable because of the geo-strategic circumstances of the Anglo-Norman rule. Particularly, with its large possessions in France and the British Isles, the Anglo-Norman kings had to organise royal administration through subdivisions within the Court which could only be made possible through the appointment of the nobility in these subdivisions. For instance, Henry II had a huge possession through inheritance and marriage, so that “[h]is court was a place to which the able and ambitious were inevitably drawn” (Stenton 36). Hence, there was the need for courtiers, and in order to rule his kingdom sufficiently,

[f]rom the Great Council of barons the King selected a small group of administrators, the *curia regis*, and gave them specialized roles. One councilor became *justiciar*, or chief minister, and was given authority to act in the name of the king. Second of importance was the *chancellor*, who was responsible for the legal and secretarial duties of the government. The office of *treasurer* increased in power, and an account was demanded of all receipts and expenditures. (Schultz 32)

However, it should be noted that the domestic control in the feudal system could be achieved solely through the ability of the governing monarch in making a balance between his interests and the interests of his nobility with a strong hand. For instance, after Henry I “suppressed a serious baronial revolt,” he “ruled the land in peace for more than thirty years,” which was achieved through “an easing of strains in court and country alike” (Stenton 18). Therefore, according to the contemporary chronicler Walter Map, a successful monarch ought to act like Henry I and be “wise and controlled” in his “generosity” through fixed and “written down [...] orders” to maintain justice among his subjects, especially his nobility (qtd. in Stenton 18). Thereby, the Court would become “a school of virtue and wisdom” and “a place of companionship and respectful mirth” as Map further argued (qtd. in Stenton 19).

Moreover, in order to maintain a virtuous feudal court based on camaraderie, there were several reasons for the king to look after the interests of his nobility. The landed nobility, especially, provided military forces through their right of livery. Therefore, “the military [function]” of the nobility was “central to” the feudal system’s “existence” (Grummitt 145). Particularly, “[t]he tenants-in-chief [the landed nobility] held land by military service, that is, they had to fight for the king when needed. [...] The tenants-in-chief then enfeoffed mesne tenants—knights—in order to perform this military service” (Slack 5). Thus, as Stenton observes, the monarch as “the guarantee of stability” could not solely “rule according to his own mind” and, therefore, “was bound to keep good terms with his great men on whom his military strength depended” (43).

Another reason for the monarch to be in good relation with his nobility was the material income the king received from the fief of his lands he rented to his landed nobility. As Slack observes,

[f]eudalism is service in return for land. [...] The king was the supreme landowner and in return for land granted the tenants had to pay rent in the form of service and also money payments. The barons and knights owed loyalty, [...] military service, relief and aids in money [...] Relief and aids were feudal dues which had to be paid. Relief was money paid by an heir to land in order that his succession should be recognised. Aids were payments made by the tenants-in-chief or mesne tenants for the ransom of their lord, for the knighting of his son or the marrying of his eldest daughter [and there were many other dues]. (5, 8)

Therefore, the monarchs, such as Henry II, were aware of the fact that they had to “[discuss] every change in council before [they] issued the land” so that “[m]any of [...] Justiciars were barons by inheritance” (Stenton 43). These discussions which were mostly in the form of “pleas” by the nobility to the king, on the other hand, were handled carefully in order to “[evolve] the exact formula of a judicial writ” so that “by the end of his reign Henry II had collected around him a group of able men trained in the administration of a centralized government” (Stenton 43). Thus, it could be concluded that the stability of the country depended on the good, almost equal, relationship of the king with the barons based on a bilateral trust.

Besides, such trust acted like a cement to unite the country in domestic peace which could not be broken even by foreign influences. For instance, the kings of France and Scotland supported the revolt against Henry II by his three sons between the years 1173 and 1174 (Hosler 195-219). Yet, this “active aid [...] could not bring victory to the rebels, since in England the weight of the baronage held with the king” (Stenton 43).

Additionally, apart from protecting the country from a foreign invasion, domestic peace, which was achieved by a strong monarch who looked after the interests of his nobles, enabled foreign campaigns, as well. As the Court was initially a military institution (Grummitt 145), foreign campaigns were important both for the prestige of enlarging or maintaining possessions and to expand or secure material income from these lands. For instance, although it cost the treasury a good deal, the majority of his nobility supported Richard I (1189-99) for his crusading campaign. Therefore, although Richard I “had little interest in routine administration” of his country and spent only three months there, his aristocratic “supporters” protected his “interests” when Prince John wanted to take advantage in the king’s absence (Schultz 37). Similarly, although Edward III (1327-77) was accused of “spending” or rather “squandering the resources of the Crown” in the Hundred Years War, he would be considered, and later remembered, as a chivalric “warrior-king” because of “the prospects of rich booty and valuable prisoners to hold to ransom” (Schultz 58; Rogers 149; Myers 23; McKisack 269-71). Thereby, victory at war enriched not only the treasury of the crown but also all strata of the country from fighters to the purchasers of goods. For instance, “[t]he lords and knights

enjoyed fighting, and successful warfare offered many chances of advancement to the ambitious. The supply of food and clothing for the army enriched not only the contractors but large numbers of their suppliers in town and country” (Myers 23). Likewise, Henry V (1413-22), who adopted a “war-lord form of kingship,” after suppressing domestic baronial revolts (Morgan 36; Keen 281), used the French baronial conflict between the factions of Burgundy and Orleans in order to obtain the French crown. He sided with the Burgundians and after the victory of the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, Henry V obtained “great prestige and large sums of money from ransoms” (Schultz 69). Hence, domestic peace enabled successful foreign campaigns that were beneficial for the economy, as well.

However, domestic peace and especially successful foreign campaigns proved to be circumstances that had the potential to turn the self-confidence of strong feudal kings into authoritarian rule. As Stenton argues, “[m]uch [of] the kings of this period would have liked to rule as despots” yet, “they could not long keep up despotic power” (43). Eventually, despotic monarchs had to yield much of their powers to the nobility especially in the form of legal documents. The first important legal document that limited the powers of kings and tried to erase the possibility of despotic rule was the *Magna Carta*, the Great Charter, signed on the 12th of May 1215. Actually, the document “dealt primarily with feudal grievances and legal protection” and regularised that “no extraordinary taxes were to be levied without consent of the Great Council” (Schultz 39). Thus, the first attempts to reorganise the relationship of the kings with their nobility, especially in matters regarding taxation could be seen. The charter, on a larger scale, restrained the arbitrary rule of kings, so that a “limited monarchy grew” (Schultz 40) that was “controlled not by fear of revolt but by acceptance of the restraint of law” (Stenton 49), where the king’s “subjects reserved the right to force him to observe the laws” (Schultz 40). Consequently, the trust between the king and the nobility was reassured in written form.

Nonetheless, written documents, including the *Magna Carta*, could not efficaciously check the shows of strength of feudal monarchs. Thus, from time to time, bilateral trust could not be achieved between the kings and the nobility, especially in matters of

taxation and the appointment of court offices, which led to many revolts, inner turmoil and the erosion of the feudal structure. As a result, the parliament slowly emerged as an institution that acted as mediator between conflicting interests. As Schultz notes, “with the problem of finding a satisfactory substitute for political feudalism [...] [g]radually Parliament slipped into the stream of English life as the institution that could best accomplish this change in governance” (54). The word “parliament,” which literally means “discussion,” replaced not only physical violence, but also the Anglo-Norman Great Council that was solely constituted by the aristocracy (“parliament”; Stenton 56; Schultz 60).

With the rise of the moneyed fourth estate in the 13th and 14th centuries and the shattering of the feudal structure, the commoners emerged as a third political force apart from the monarch and the nobility. The commoners were composed of merchants, lawyers, peasants who became craftsmen or yeomen, (Myers 151-2), knights and burgesses from cities. Especially after the Black Death (1348-9, 1360), which killed one third of the population, the number of serfs decreased and, simultaneously, the labour wages increased (Myers 61; Schultz 64). The initial effects of the Black Death were that the peasants became socially mobile and transformed into the commoners through their acquired wealth. This had disastrous effects for the landed nobility (Schultz 64; Myers 24; Griffiths 214-5), so that the total number of the old nobility that was 100 in 1300 fell to 16 at the end of 1500 (McFarlane 173). The fall of the nobility accelerated the rise of the commoners, whereby the land-based system of the feudal society was about to collapse and was gradually replaced by a system that could embrace a relatively wider scope of the population, especially through the parliament.

Hence, representation was extended whereby the parliament gradually came up as a bicameral assembly in the form of the House of Lords, where the nobility and the higher clergy were represented, and the House of Commons, which arose from the rise of the moneyed class constituted by the gentry, merchants, lawyers and generally the commoners who did not fit into the three estate feudal structure (Gillingham 172). Reoccurrence of baronial revolts in order to achieve political ends exhausted the feudal society so that “the monarchs, as well as the barons and commoners, found in the

institution of Parliament the instrument to achieve a more mature political community” (Schultz 60). Therefore, ideological discussions replaced sheer physical conflict.

Yet, it should be noted that the emergence of the parliament was triggered by the shows of physical strength of the nobility in the form of revolts and *coups de état*. Although all of the nobility could express any political criticism in the Great Council about issues, such as the appointment of court offices and advisors into the select council called the *curia regis* (Stenton 55-6), their diplomatic pleas were from time to time not considered by the monarchs which resulted in baronial revolts. Particularly, factionalism in the reign of Henry III (1207-1272) regarding the appointment of foreign and unskilled councillors fostered instability and encouraged the landed nobility to take matters in their own hands. The Oxford Provisions (1258) were the first step for curbing the arbitrary powers of the king effectively by the use of an assembly of a baronial council that acted on behalf of the king, which was constituted by fifteen noblemen that dismissed ineffective court favourites and regularised the gathering of the parliament (Gillingham 153; Schultz 41-2).

Moreover, Simon de Montfort, who emerged as the effective ruler of the country after the civil war in 1264, extended parliamentary rule by summoning a parliament in 1265. This parliament wanted to “replace the monarchy with an enlightened oligarchy” (Schultz 42). Therefore, two knights from each county and two burgesses from each borough were asked to meet the nobility in this assembly that acted as a majority government (Stenton 56-7; Maddicott 309; McKisack 187-8). Although Montfort’s efforts for an oligarchy could not be realised, his ideas were seen as the basis for further parliamentary reforms, such as the Model Parliament of 1295 which adopted “the representative principle for the Commons as all forty counties and 114 chartered boroughs were instructed to send two representatives” and “[t]he higher clergy united with the lords to form the House of Lords” (Schultz 60-1). Consequently, parliamentary reforms were pioneered by baronial revolts which, however, could not replace the monarch as the centre of sovereignty.

However, although the monarchy survived parliamentary reforms, the erosion of central authority during the reigns of weak or too strong kings made later attempts to recover sovereignty futile. For instance, after the disastrous reign of Henry III, Edward I wanted to recover both the “power” and the “prestige” of the monarchy (Myers 15). Particularly, he wanted to “restore domestic peace whereby the king and his subjects could re-establish a stable relationship that gave due regard to the rights and aspirations of the both” (Griffiths 194). Yet, he “tried in vain to put fresh life into the feudal” system (Myers 15), once it had been proved that the monarch could be outpowered by his subjects.

Therefore, as the more clever gave in, abler kings acknowledged the necessity to rule under law through the parliament. Legislation, which had been considered as the arbitrary “will of the king with the consent of his great council,” was transformed into the “statute,” the “written document,” which functioned as the manifestation of parliamentarian share in sovereignty (Stenton 57; McKisack 196-7). Thus, parliamentary reforms continued. For instance, the Good Parliament of 1376 initiated the “highly effective procedure” of “impeachment” (Griffiths 206). Likewise, the parliament acquired control over “finance and legislation,” which was the result of the monarch’s “need of money” for foreign campaigns, which the parliament with its nobility and the moneyed commoners could provide (Schultz 61-2; Fletcher, “Corruption” 31).

Thereby, the monarchs realised the power of the parliament and tried to use it for their own ends, as well. For instance, the monarch could ask support for his policies even before they were enacted. As Stenton notes, “[t]he king in council in Parliament has become the supreme governing body of the land, having all the powers that had lain in the king in council of earlier days, but with the added prestige of an occasion of great solemnity. [...] It was the place where the king tested national opinion on his policy and asked for financial support to carry out” (57). Thus, any potential of political turmoil could be both observed before it accelerated and surmounted through a smooth transition in the form of political discussion. Hence, in the transitional period in the 13th and 14th centuries, parliamentary reforms functioned as “new remedies [...] for new

wrong” (Stenton 58). Consequently, the parliament could provide new solutions to new problems for a healthy relationship between king and the nobility.

Nevertheless, with the rise of the parliament, the nobility, through the House of Lords, apart from the *curia regis*, acquired an immense martial, political and financial power that, from time to time, surpassed the power of the king. The local magnates “became in the 15th century a strictly-defined and hereditary social group that was practically synonymous with the parliamentary peerage sitting in the House of Lords” (Griffiths 224). Gradually, the power of the local magnates increased in such a way that the balance between the king and the different factions in the nobility could not be maintained any longer. As McFarlane states, the local magnates in the reign of Henry VI, such as, Richard, Duke of York, who had a £7,000 gross income, Humphrey, Duke of Buckingham, with his £6,300 gross income and the Earl of Warwick, with a £5,900 income surpassed the yearly gross income of the king which was merely £2,000 (177-8). Thereby, the “dissolution of medieval polity” (Morgan 37) centred around the feudal king hastened. The result was the Wars of the Roses (1455-85), which happened after the loss of French possessions as a result of the political mismanagement of courtiers, such as Suffolk, under the rule of the weak king Henry VI who favoured courtiers over the territorial magnates (Morgan 38-40; Griffiths 234). This resulted in “the dynastic struggle between York and Lancaster” (Schultz 71; Haigh, *Military* 3) where the local magnates gathered around the Yorkists. After a long and discontinuous struggle, the York faction outpowered the Lancastrians with whom the conventional feudal structure also found an end.

Therefore, starting from the Yorkist period in the 15th century, another centralisation of authority could be observed in which the nobility was tried to be assimilated into the Court through the creation of “an overall structure of territorial lordship which might solve those problems of bastard feudal localism” (Morgan 64). Accordingly,

[i]n a century of powerful nobles and a government in disarray, Edward IV, a consummate politician-king, reversed the trend toward factionalism and re-established royal authority. [...] Edward governed better than the previous Lancastrians and restored a strong monarchy and confidence in government. [...] Edward greatly improved the finances of the Crown by abandoning the futile and expensive war in France and by confiscating his enemies' estates and receiving

'gifts' from friendly magnates and the merchants of London. [...] The King was an astute and brilliant soldier and businessman, capable of sound decisions, who paid close attention to the management of finances. It was during his reign that the power of the monarchy began to revive. (Schultz 68, 72)

Moreover, the new centralist yet territorial regime of Edward IV was based on the principles of meritocracy where he selected his followers not only among those who supported the Yorkist cause but rather according to merit. By "putting the partisan past behind him" (Morgan 57), Edward IV, in the manner of a "businesslike king" (Ross 418) established

the Yorkist household [...] as a comparatively small establishment; and from the start, in the particularities of its composition, personal preference rather than just an acceptance of inherited relationships was formative of its political style. Certainly many of Edward IV's servants had previously served his father; but then the Yorkist affinity even before 1460 was a distinctly eclectic fellowship, and a singularly recalcitrant fit in terms of the suggested model of a 'bastard feudalism' in which connections of lords and followers were of an essentially local derivation. (Morgan 56)

Thus, the Yorkists realised the need for not only "loyal" but also "able [...] officers of state" which were essential to the "stability" of the regime (Griffiths 235; Ross 67-8). Consequently, as the Yorkist kings had initially been "over-mighty subjects" (McFarlane 179), they were aware of the importance of local powers in running the central government.

However, the Yorkists were also aware of the need for a strong central government in order to check territorial power that could easily slip into factionalism. Therefore, in order to maintain royal sovereignty, the economic relationship between the Court and the magnates became limited and the Court tried to run its household on its own. As Morgan defines, "[i]nternally, much household service was invested in the king's enterprise of real estate management, which developed as the more positive and acquisitive corollary of the bid for domestic economy, and the realization of the policy of enabling the king 'to live upon mine own'" (63), whereby he tried "to reorganize the government's financial administration" (Griffiths 235). Therefore, the link between the Court and the country was maintained not on an economic basis but a political one. Thus, "each local bloc was linked to the Court and did not form a totally self-contained grouping, although some had a more localist political character than others" (Morgan

65). Consequently, although the Yorkists sprung from local power, they were the first to check the powers of local magnates effectively.

Yet, with Edward IV's death, the local magnates would again prove as threats to the relatively newly established order. With the ambitious reign of Richard III (1485-7), who was once a magnate (Morgan 67), the Wars of the Roses restarted, and what could have proved as a harmonious governmental system collapsed under his unqualified reign (Haigh, *Military* 141). Particularly, apart from his high aspirations, Richard III could not maintain the delicate balance between his magnates (Griffiths 234) while focusing on his political manoeuvres that shook political stability. Thus, eventually, the Yorkists could not maintain permanent order, and as Morgan observes, they "have failed to solve the problem of how to turn military victory into political stability" (55).

Nonetheless, the Yorkist model for maintaining royal authority was adopted and modified during the subsequent Tudor regime. Particularly, with the establishment of a nation-state with the Tudor era, the efforts of centralisation to circumvent the threatening power of local magnates were further enhanced through some regulations, which were about the rights for livery and maintenance of local magnates, judicial reforms through the Star Chamber Act, and domestic and foreign policy that fostered the self-sufficiency of the Court.

Firstly, Henry VII, like his Yorkist predecessors, was aware of the military power of territorial magnates and in order to curb any potentiality of insurrection, he "revived an earlier statute against livery and maintenance (the right of nobles to retain a private, uniformed retinue of soldiers)" (Schultz 80). Likewise, in order to remain self-sufficient in financial matters, Henry VII did not want to depend on his liegemen or the parliament for taxation income. Therefore, he "spared expenditures," encouraged foreign commerce in order to increase custom duties, "levied steep fines in court, and seized the property of outlawed nobles" (Schultz 82).

Besides, to check the nobility and force them to accept royal sovereignty, Henry VII reformed the judicial system and reinforced the central judicial authority of the Court

with the Star Chamber Act (1487). Cases were presided by two chief justices and court officers without juries so that court cases could be handled in shorter time and more effectively. However, this was disadvantageous for the local magnates who could influence the local judicial authorities. Particularly, as Schultz observes, the “vigorous prosecution of lawbreakers gradually compelled the nobles to accept royal authority since they could not intimidate or bribe this court as they could a local jury. In Tudor times the Court was popular with the people for it could act impartially and bring to justice those overlords who disregarded the rights of Englishmen in their local district” (81). Consequently, with the Tudors, the weak points of feudalism, such as the military, financial, political and local powers of territorial magnates decreased and a central and stable authority was maintained.

Furthermore, Henry VII was also mindful of the importance of economic freedom through liquidity as a source of unmediated power. Therefore, he was skilful and wise enough “to work for limited, rather than grandiose, objectives” in such a way to prefer to become a notorious “miser” in the public eye rather than to grant “royal concessions to gain parliamentary grants” (Schultz 81-2). Hence, Henry VII strengthened the power of the Court and stabilised the country through fiscal discipline by means of which “external peace and internal order” were established (Schultz 82; Gunn 138).

Moreover, with the suppression of domestic rivals after the 1490s, as “the military role of the Court declined” (Grummitt 147), Henry VII’s foreign policy also minimised the crown’s dependence on territorial power as he pursued a cheaper and less risky policy of diplomatic betrothment maintained through the diplomatic efforts of the courtier class. His “foreign policy centred around the goals of peace and security. He did not want unnecessary wars that could only drain the treasury and jeopardize his throne by possible defeat” (Schultz 83). Thus, possible foreign threats would be defeated through establishing blood relationships. By employing courtiers in diplomatic missions and betrothing his son Arthur, and later his son Henry, to Catherine of Aragon, Henry VII aimed to secure the west and the south of the country and win the alliance of Spain; he also tried to secure the north by marrying off his daughter Margaret to King James IV of

Scotland (Schultz 83; Guy, “Tudor Age” 272; Gunn 138). Hence, with the Tudors, a demilitarisation could be seen, which also fostered the decline of the landed nobility.

Therefore, the Tudors used the courtier class to centralise power in the Court. As Schultz and Guy observe, “Henry VII governed largely through the King’s Council which included fewer of the great lords than previously and more members of lower social ranks” (Schultz 83) which were chosen “personally [...] by the king for their ability, assiduity, shrewdness, and loyalty” (Guy, “Tudor Age” 268). Similarly, “as the Henrician court grew as the centre of political power, those noblemen who were outside the elite circle defined by its proximity to the king were increasingly seen as threats to royal power” (Grummitt 149). Gradually, the meritocratic courtiers replaced the landed nobility in the power relationship within the country. Particularly,

[t]he great baronial families, [...] were gradually being replaced in English political and social life by the rising country gentlemen and squires. This new landed aristocracy, based more on wealth or service to the king than on birth, built attractive country houses and became the nucleus of the leisure and governing classes in the counties. These amateur administrators took their work seriously and provided the Tudors with local influence that no central bureaucracy of royal officials could have matched. (Schultz 84)

Hence, through the central authority of the king and the establishment of the nation-state in England the dominance of the courtier class in the political sphere could be observed, as this class had emerged as a meritocratic social stratum.

Yet, it should be noted that the Tudor kings retained their sovereignty by various means. For instance, the Act of Supremacy (1534) did not make Henry VIII (1509-1547) solely the head of the Church in England but also asserted his unmediated power through which he refused to accept any power that was equal to or even above his. Similarly, through the extension of the Treason Act in 1534, Henry VIII’s subjects had to reassure his sovereignty and their allegiance to him in the form of an Oath of Supremacy (Schultz 90; Guy, “Tudor Age” 282). Likewise, through the Statute of Proclamations (1539), he could make “law by proclamation” in a quicker way according to the needs of the day (Schultz 92; Plucknett 45). Similarly, by appointing and controlling both the courtiers and the members of parliament he could maintain royal authority. This royal authority was further held by the relationship of the monarch with the courtiers as

regulated in the Privy Council, which was “an ‘inner circle’ of the Great Council” (Schultz 92), and “enforced policy under the Crown, supervised the law courts, managed Exchequer finance, and co-ordinated the localities” (Guy, “Tudor Age” 284). Consequently, starting from the reign of Henry VII and extending to the reign of Henry VIII, royal sovereignty was centralised effectively in the Court.

However, after the death of Henry VIII, members of the Privy Council became more powerful than the monarch; just like the magnates had become in previous reigns. Edward VI (1547-1553), as a “boy-king” (MacCulloch 222), left the running of the country to his courtiers who worked on his behalf, as he was unable to perform sovereignty on his own, which “left a power vacuum at the centre” (Guy, “Tudor Age” 293). The ultra-Protestant reformations under Cranmer split the country in two and created “factionalism” where one side wanted “further” reformation and “demanded a repudiation of all Catholic customs,” whereas the other side wanted “the restoration of the old service” (Schultz 94; Williams 465-87). Similarly, the antagonism between Somerset’s “social reforms” to protect the poor from the effects of the enclosure of common lands and high inflation as a result of the debasing of currency, and Northumberland’s political manoeuvres that were supported by the “propertied class” (Schultz 94; Guy, “Tudor Age” 293; Williams 83), created yet another factionalism with which the ill and dying monarch could not interfere. Political matters were solely in the hands of the courtiers in such a way that “radical Protestantism” and schemes on the succession could not be mastered by the monarch. Peculiarly,

[r]ealizing that King Edward was dying of consumption, Northumberland persuaded him to alter the succession in order to keep Mary Tudor off the throne and prevent her from restoring Catholicism in England. Northumberland’s scheme was to marry his son to the attractive Lady Jane Grey, granddaughter of Henry VIII’s sister, Mary, and have Edward name her as heir. The dying king agreed and the Privy Council felt it prudent to assent. (Schultz 95)

Yet, schemes for the succession of Lady Jane Grey proved to be short-lived and the succeeding reign of Mary Tudor (1553-1558) showed the problems related to radical policies and that factionalism would return in outbursts of “bloody” acts of violence.

Therefore, unlike her predecessors, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) was aware of the need to control the public and political factions and to canalise the conflicting powers of the courtier class and the old nobility for her own ends. This was not easy because with the Tudor regime the antagonistic types within the nobility had gradually merged into an amalgam in which the former distinct types could no longer be discerned clearly. Yet, members of the two types of the nobility in the Elizabethan Period tried to differentiate from each other and base their identity, their self, by distinguishing themselves from what they considered as the other. First, there was the landed aristocracy and second, the meritocrats who were civil servants elevated to the level of the nobility. As an extension of the Tudor reformation, the distinction between noble and ignoble, voiced in the beginning of the 16th century (qtd. in Stone 49), had turned into a contested issue as the *a priori* constitution of being noble, having landed wealth through primogeniture, was challenged by the emergence of individualism backed by humanism and the increase of social upward mobility following the abolition of the monasteries and the creation of Protestant peers in the aftermath (Stone 27; Knowles, *Dissolution* 284-5).

Nonetheless, the first category, the landed nobility, the “titular peerage” also called the “*nobilitas maior*” (Stone 53), considered themselves as the natural component of the nobility class. They based their nobility on “genuine genealogy,” which was used “to reassure [...] their innate superiority” (Stone 23). The claim of inborn superiority was backed up with the feudal ideology positioning the nobility as *pater familias* in the Great Chain of Being or World Picture and having sufficient “landed income” (Stone 21, 56; Tillyard, *World* 9, 18, 107; Tillyard, *History* 9, 24). Thus, members of the landed nobility could claim to be not only “a social elite” but also “a ruling class” (Bush 5).

The meritocrats, on the other hand, were not born but became nobles. MacCaffrey calls this group as a “compact yet flexible ‘aristocracy’” (“Place” 98). This flexibility is marked especially by their social mobility. Individual merits and virtues (James 310), which had been emphasised in contemporary conduct books (Castiglione H2^f), were the “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 82-3) of this type of nobility. They were of the socially mobile group which used liquid wealth to transform first into the landed gentry, acquire

posts within the court structure to further their social climbing and imitate the landed aristocracy with their newly acquired landed wealth (Stone 39; Canino 6-7; Rockett 488).

Although the meritocrats wanted to “clothe their social nakedness” with “bogus genealogy,” both the aristocrats and meritocrats of the Elizabethan Period were the result of a time span of just three generations (Rickman 9; Canino 7; Forgeng 12; Hazard 163; Stone 23, 59-60). Hence, the very distinction between aristocrat and meritocrat was an arbitrary one. As Stone maintains, the perceived world order of the landed aristocracy failed to see the realities of social mobility (36). Therefore, the very arbitrary nature of the distinction between who was and who was not noble fostered a battle where one claimed one’s superiority and the opponent’s inferiority (Stone 36).

This battle over precedence centred especially on the distribution of royal favour in which each group claimed to be the natural holder of the right of favouritism. Favouritism had both a top-down and bottom-up hierarchy. With the continuation of the centralisation of government in the Elizabethan Period (Stone 385; Williams 124), favouritism followed first of all a top-down hierarchy. On the top of the system was the monarch, followed by the peers, which were followed by the knights and burgesses. Success depended upon the grace of the provider, starting from the sovereign downwards to the smallest extension of the patronage system. As Williams argues, “[a]dvancement, rewards, and reputation depended upon the support of patrons” (398). This descending hierarchy, on the other hand, did not only make patronees dependents but also created a system where a bottom-up ascension to favour was possible. Apart from top-down invitations, this ascension manifested itself in the form of petitions (Loades, *Tudor* 86). However, ascension within the hierarchical court structure was not easy. Court attendance and to catch the attention of superiors were necessary keys to promotion (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 88; Loades, *Tudor* 85).² Yet, since court attendance was restricted according to pedigree, which made it difficult for direct upward mobility, there was a need for go-betweens (Bush 8; Williams 125, 130; Stone 402).³ The use of mediators enabled suitors to approach persons of higher status without violating the decorum of the top-down relationship in the patronage system. Lesser and greater

gentry obtained first “minor posts” that “did not require regular attendance” (MacCaffrey, “Place” 100-1) and later greater posts to build up their influence and prestige within the system. This was of importance not only for the aspirant bottom but also for the top of the system. It is true that “the great courtier, by reason of his influence in obtaining favours from the Crown, soon found himself besieged by eager clients anxious for his protection” (Stone 446). Yet, as Williams puts forth, the patronees were not the only ones who “depended” upon others because “the status of patrons themselves was enhanced by the protection and help they could give to those beneath them” (398). Thus, the distribution of favour created a mutual dependence between the patron and the patronee within the ascending and descending hierarchy of the patronage system.

The mutual dependence of patron and patronee, however, did not guarantee a harmonious court structure. Behind the conflict of patrons and patronees from different interest groups, especially of the landed nobility and the meritocrats, was the fact that albeit the patronage system was “key to political power,” it had limited resources (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 89; Adams 36-7). Contrary to Bush’s claim that Elizabeth I restricted the creation of a new nobility because she wanted “to uphold the nobility as an order of ancient, or of socially elevated, lineage” (102), the limited financial resources of the crown, drained especially by the direct and indirect wars with the Spanish Habsburgs (Black, *Reign* 406-11),⁴ was one of the main reasons for a restrained generosity towards her aristocratic and meritocratic nobility. This “enforced scarcity” of “grant of honours,” however, made these the more valuable and “prized” (MacCaffrey, “Place” 103). In such a system, reward was used by the monarchy to prevent factional quarrels by balancing financial support. The centralisation of power in the Court prevented the formation of territorial magnates with huge and powerful power bases, so that the nobility began to be solely dependent on the monarch’s favour (Bush 106-7; MacCaffrey, “Place” 95). As Levy argues, Elizabeth I gave each of her courtiers a special role “whether or not they approved” (275). Thereby, former martial magnates transformed into a “non-martial courtier” class (Bush 107), which could be manipulated by the monarch. The nobility was consciously made dependent upon the monarch within the Court to increase royal sovereignty by both using the nobility as an extension

of royal display and magnanimity for domestic and international purposes and to direct the energy of the nobility towards non-martial administrative work within the Court so as to eliminate the possibility of territorial rebellion (Stone 476-7; James 376). In particular, the very paradoxical condition of Elizabeth I, having both a masculine body politic and a female body natural, enabled her to create a personal cult as a courtly lady being able to be reluctant in giving favours to her predominantly male nobility (Montrose, *Subject* 219; Strong, *Gloriana* 111).⁵ Making both the aristocratic and meritocratic nobility indebted to the monarchy and using a possible withdrawal of royal favour as a threat, Elizabeth I could maintain loyalty (Stone 478-9). Likewise, the pluralistic mode of distribution hindered the creation of a too powerful peer and created competition among less powerful peers within the small “court circle” (MacCaffrey, “Place” 108, 114). Thus, through such a role-play, in which bilateral dependency was sustained “by agreement rather than force,” Elizabeth I could control both her aristocratic and meritocratic nobility by persuading them to “obedience” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 87-8; Jardine 292; MacCaffrey, “Place” 97).

The means for creating obedience and self-support in the nobility can be simply given in two categories of direct and indirect rewards. Direct rewards were in the form of land in exchanges, leases and gifts of honour and office, and in money in the form of cash, old debts, annuities, and arrears of debts (Stone 403-23; MacCaffrey, “Place” 103). However, because of the restraints on the Elizabethan patronage system, direct reward was used scarcely and cautiously (MacCaffrey, “Place” 121; Stone 424-5). In order to lighten the burden on the royal treasury, rather indirect reward was used to support the landed and meritocratic nobility (Stone 424-5). Indirect rewards constituted “monopolies, export licenses and similar marketable privileges” (Loades, *Politics* 307). Especially, after the 1580s when royal finances began to decline and the finite land-bound royal favouritism reached almost its limits, monopolies, which were used first as a temporary substitute for direct rewards, became a necessity in order to run the patronage system (Adams 29-30, 40). Monopolies were given to meritocrats and aristocrats alike that enabled their control of the prices of certain goods for their own interest (Elton 462). Although these monopolies created more problems by leading to inflation and rise in taxation that put more pressure on the economy, this system

continued until the 1590s because the nobility gained much from it and the economy could sustain such a burden (Williams 345, 359-63; Elton 462; Black, *Reign* 230-2).

Whether in direct or indirect form, the use of limited financial resources and the possibility of taking back those resources as a threat enabled control over the nobility which was successful until the last decade of the Elizabethan reign. Elizabeth I ruled through an effective bureaucracy that was rooted in “her selection of wise advisors for both domestic and foreign policies,” who were meritocrats (Schultz 97, 104). This, however, created dissent among the members of the landed nobility who saw themselves deprived of royal favour, especially in cases of appointment in the Court. In order to please both parties, she managed to balance the number of aristocratic and meritocratic nobility within her court until 1588 (Stone 758; Hazard 163; Canino 7).⁶ Likewise, the Queen distributed some of her powers. Yet, she was clever enough “to concede small points in order to win major ones” (Schultz 100). Thus, Elizabeth I followed the doctrine of *via media*, the middle way policy, not only for religious controversy⁷ but also for the rivalry within and without the royal household between the meritocracy of courtiers and the aristocracy of the old nobility. For instance, in the beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign the old nobility “hated” any “upstart” like Leicester or Cecil, who, on the other hand, did not favour each other, either (Chambers, “The Court” 81; Williams 250). Yet, Elizabeth I managed to lower tension between the old and new nobility. In order to maintain this stability in her court, she “attempted to control her councillors and magnates by drawing them into a web of personal, even emotional, relationships with her” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 87). Thus, as Weir argues, “[t]he nearer one was to the Queen, who was at the centre of a great web of patronage, the greater the rewards, which included court and government posts, knighthoods, [...] monopolies of goods, annuities, pensions, wardships and loans” (*Elizabeth* 254). Since power was centralised in the Elizabethan Court, Elizabeth I held her courtiers in her hands by controlling their finances which depended on her and their relationship to her. This bifurcated system of reward and punishment was “used as techniques of political manipulation,” in which she “expected her politicians to be courtiers, so that she politicised the Court and made politics courtly” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 87). Consequently, Elizabeth I turned the Court into an effective and unmediated institution for royal

sovereignty that could simultaneously control factionalism between the old and the new nobility.

However, establishing a personal relationship with the sovereign for prosperity added further tension. The “frantic competition for places and preferment and the stresses this engendered,” created “gossiping,” “backbiting” and “jostling for place,” (Weir, *Elizabeth* 254; Williams 205). Therefore, the relationship of the subjects with their monarch was based on a delicate, from time to time arbitrary, balance. Hence, “[f]luctuations in royal favour were of vital importance” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 89), not only for the fortune of the courtier but also for domestic stability, as well. The plague in 1593,⁸ the Nine Years War with Ireland from 1594 to 1603,⁹ the rise in inflation and protests against it from 1596 to 1597,¹⁰ the failure of crops from 1594 to 1597,¹¹ the succession crisis and the following “abortive” Essex rebellion¹² accelerated social “dissatisfaction” from the simplest peasant to her most loyal courtiers.¹³ This dissatisfaction was tried to be checked by measures of censorship (Williams 412), which, however, fuelled the dissent more. Although, “[f]or most of her reign Elizabeth was adept at keeping the peace between such factions; only in old age did she find it difficult to control them” (Weir, *Elizabeth* 256). Consequently, from the very beginning of the formation of the aristocracy until the last years of Elizabeth I’s reign, tension between the monarch, the nobility and the courtiers could be managed under effective, strong-willed monarchs who would yield their power to sustain socio-political stability. This stability, however, was based on such a delicate balance that it could not be maintained as a whole in any of the reigns of the sovereigns of the Kingdom of England.

In this long history, we have observed the diachronic bases for the political and material clashes among the monarch, the landed nobility and the courtiers and how each party tried to check and checkmate each other. This could also be observed by the public through the performance or publication of several works that targeted criticisms at the corruption of the meritocrats, the aristocrats and the failings of the patronage system in the respective periods.¹⁴ Yet, especially, following the cumulation of socio-economic crises, the Late Elizabethan Period (1588-1603) witnessed a peak point in the criticisms

against such failings. Accordingly, the Elizabethan court as an institution, and the meritocratic courtiers and the landed nobility as members of this institution were heavily criticised, particularly in the form of satires.

From Aristophanes onwards, satire has been one of the mediums for social criticism in literature. Whether as a mild Horatian teacher, a severe Juvenalian punisher or a chaotic Menippean, the satirist's first aim has been to correct folly through ridicule. Thus, folly forms the generative force behind the satirist to pass a moral judgment, to "compel" his specific understanding of "truth" and to change the opinion of his audience through the use of "persuasion" (Sutherland 3-5; Bloom and Bloom 59). This is done mostly by "shocking" the audience and distorting their follies like a "caricature" (Hight 5, 69). Hence, "[s]atire is a mode of writing in which social affection and vice are ridiculed [...] the purpose being to correct conduct" which "blends a critical attitude with [humour] and wit" (Peck and Coyle 170; Holman 447).

In the light of these definitions, the Elizabethan satirists considered the courtiers' and the landed nobility's interest in material things as a folly that had to be corrected. The clash of interests among these groups created the public image of the Court as a place of *luxuria*, a "lack of temperance and addiction to the flesh," in which "more material concerns than the morality of the nobility could be performed" (Fletcher, "Corruption" 28). Therefore, courtiers and the old nobility were perceived as social strata overindulged in self-interest rather than performing administrative or military deeds for the well-being of the society. Similarly, the monarch was criticised indirectly by attributing the failings of the system, like arbitrary distribution of financial resources, to the space of the Court. The Elizabethan satirists, including the courtiers themselves, presented many examples of satire,¹⁵ in poetry,¹⁶ prose,¹⁷ and dramatic works, directed at the corruption of the Court perpetrated by the meritocrats and the aristocrats.

Among these literary forms, criticism towards the Court through dramatic form was the more problematic and difficult. Censorship, which was first established in order to protect domestic printing houses and suppress religious dissent, was extended as a means for the suppression of social dissent in general, especially after the 1590s

(Williams 411-2; Chambers, *Elizabethan Stage* 3:158). Whether or not formal censorship could be enacted effectively remains a matter of dispute. Dutton argues against Chambers, Gildersleeve and Quincy who maintained that censorship was an effective instrument of absolutism (Dutton, *Mastering* 2-4). Dutton rather argues that censorship was a matter of improvisation determined by topical instances rather than a totalising “doctrine” (*Mastering* 51). This can be also supported by the scarcity of documentation left to us about the mechanisms of censorship so that any analysis of variable texts as the result of censorship seem incomplete and essentialist since these could also be the result of “censorship, fear of censorship, edition or even memory loss” as separate reasons or together (Dutton, *Mastering* 1-16; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 6). Yet, even the presence of censorship created at least an anxiety which fostered the use of covert political satire on the stage and later on the page in quartos, because overt criticism was punished in certain circumstances.

Under such stipulation, the corruption at court was satirised in two different ways. Accordingly, the playwrights would either use spatially and/or chronologically distant settings to criticise contemporary socio-political failings. The chronologically distant setting in history plays would prove prevalent as a mode.¹⁸ History plays would either depict court corruption in contrast to an idealised rule of a strong monarch, or directly deal with corruption at court in a scandalous way, which, however, was according to contemporary circumstances usually suppressed by censorship. Therefore, a “habit of analogical thinking, itself often fed by the fear of censorship” (Levy 275) was created which fostered allusions and allegorical encoding and the decoding of socio-political significance in especially these history plays. The history play as a sub-genre developed from the political allegories of Bale’s *King Johan* (1538-60) and Norton and Sackville’s *Gorboduc* (1561) that were imitated and modified in the university drama of the 1580s, such as in Legge’s *Richardus tertius* (1580) and the historical romances between 1580 and 1590, such as Greene’s *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* (ca. 1589) (McDonald 162; Gurr, *Playgoing* 87, 139).¹⁹ The real rise of historical drama, however, started following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 which witnessed the publication of the widely circulated 1587 Holinshed Chronicle and the gradual rise of Tacitean historiography that scrutinised the causes and effects of historical events to analyse contemporary

political issues (Campbell, *Histories* 18-27; Collingwood 57; Peltonen, “Citizenship” 87).²⁰ One of the earliest covert satirical history plays in line with these developments was Christopher Marlowe’s *Edward II* (performed ca. 1590). The play depicted the luxurious life of the upstart courtier who was not noble by birth, that is in this case, Gaveston, and the envy felt by the landed nobility against “the common sort” (1.4.93). As Levy maintains the use of historical distant settings were crucial to exemplify ideas and circumvent persecution (299-300). The other sort of direct and scandalous satire, and the government’s response to this kind, can be best exemplified in the fate of the play *The Isle of Dogs* (1597) written probably by Ben Jonson and Thomas Nashe collaboratively (Dutton, *Licensing* 117). As some references from the anonymous *The Return from Parnassus* (1599-1602?) and Nashe’s *Summer’s Last Will* (1592) suggest, *The Isle of Dogs* most probably satirised the “government” in the Court for their “complacency” towards the social unrest and its “corruption” (Marcus 35; Nicholl 242-56). The fate of this now-lost play suggests, however, that direct criticism of the Court was persecuted, suppressed and exterminated, as in the case of Ben Jonson who was arrested for writing the now-lost play (Williams 412; Dutton, *Licensing* 72; Gurr, *Shakespearean Stage* 43). Consequently, in the last years of Elizabeth I’s reign which saw much socio-political turmoil, criticism rooted in the dissatisfaction with the regime was inevitable; but direct criticism was not tolerated.

Under these circumstances, Shakespeare, too, both collaboratively and on his own, depicted and criticised the Court, the courtiers and the nobility, especially in his history plays. Although he was straightforward in his satire, he refrained, in accordance with the censorship imposed by Elizabeth I through Tilney, Master of Revels, in 1581 (Chambers, *Elizabethan Stage* 1:287-9), from naming the satirised persons or groups openly so as not to be accused of political or religious dissent. Shakespeare’s patrons, such as Ferdinando Stanley, Henry Carey, William Brooke, George Carey, and Henry Wriothesley, were members of the aristocracy; this is why Shakespeare also had to comply with their tastes and political preferences. As Dutton explains, “[t]he structure of licensing and censorship that grew up around the Master of the Revels was precisely one that enabled professional actors to become adjuncts of the court and aristocracy”

(*Licensing* 2). Therefore, Shakespeare had to be on his guard not to fall from socio-political and economical favours that he acquired through the aristocracy.

The performance and later publication of the plays, however, created an interactive space which shaped their reception in a heterogeneous way. As for the performances, the Elizabethan amphitheatres in which all of Shakespeare's history plays were initially performed created an "immediate" connection between play content and audience reaction (Crystal, *Pronouncing* 8; Crystal, *Think* 126-45; Gurr, *Playgoing* 1-2). The commercialisation of drama created a supply and demand relationship that reciprocally affected playwright/playhouse choices and audience tastes. According to Gurr,

London playgoers in the 1580s and 1590s created the unprecedented phenomenon of an audience paying money to hear poetry. [...] For the poets who were also players it must have been a revelation: poetry as a performing art speaking directly to an expectant crowd who paid money to enjoy the offering. Audience response could be directly manipulated, known audiences tastes could be catered for, new devices could be tried in the confidence that they would be welcomed as novelties. (*Playgoing* 2)

Shakespeare being a part of this system also had to bear in mind the tastes, demands, political stances and socio-economic backgrounds of the playgoers who did not only consist of noble patrons but also included commoners and lower class members. As for the print versions of the plays, almost all of Shakespeare's history plays were printed in 14 different quarto publications between the years 1594 and 1602. If the general reading habits of the Elizabethans, the impact of oral transmission to illiterate or semi-literate groups like servants or women through the reading aloud of literate men, subsequent retelling, and the approximate number of copies published each time, that is, 800, are considered, Shakespeare's history plays became the part of the consciousness of approximately 30,000 Elizabethans (Pitcher 356; Bell 7; Pearson, *Elizabethans* 66; Brown 295). The chronological distance between the stage and the page defies any link between the playwright's/playhouses' intentions and audience's reactions. Yet, whether or not the reasons for the publication of these plays were economic (Dutton, "Birth" 80), the reception of the plays by the reading audience in each respective publication was shaped by "historical factors" (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 50; Hadfield, *Politics* 7-8; Pugliatti 6), contemporary incidents and the socio-economic background of the

members of the heterogeneous reading public. Consequently, Shakespeare's plays were performed and read during a period where conflicting fixed social ties and fluid social relations coexisted.

Therefore, caught between the emerging and lucrative "market" economy and the established feudal order, Shakespeare, who obtained his living mostly through the first but invested in the latter (Kastan, "Class" 107; Shapiro 245-9; Burgess 139),²¹ was mindful in his criticisms towards the socio-economic failings of the system. While Shakespeare was careful not to disturb his patrons or the regime and used historically distant settings, he circumvented censorship by alluding to very topical and popular incidents and people, which would be picked up by his audience. For this purpose, Shakespeare employed mostly a Menippean form of satire. Menippean satire is a subdivision of satire and aims to ridicule ideas rather than persons (Relihan 4). Therefore, apart from its fragmentary nature, that is, being scattered throughout a text in a seemingly disorganised manner, Menippean satire is marked for its obscurity about the specific person who is satirised (Coffey 153, 181). Accordingly, Shakespeare presented the late Elizabethan society with its ills and aimed to ridicule the follies of the members of the Court, that is, the monarch, the landed nobility, the meritocrats, and the patronees of these that constituted a large proportion in the society, for correction and the enhancement of stability. The use of Menippean satire enabled Shakespeare to make a far more general, broader and holistic criticism of the failings of Elizabethan society, which hindered to attract direct criticism towards his satire as it just triggered audience reception in the performances and quarto versions of his history plays.

Although this analysis will primarily deal with Shakespeare's Elizabethan history plays, it will neither be an essentialist allegorical reading claiming that certain incidents were reflected covertly in the plays, nor will it assert that the plays did not shape history as well as they were shaped by history. The reception of the ideologically motivated choices of Shakespeare in choosing certain events to emplot his history plays in a certain time span will be examined.

It will be further argued that the choice of the history play as a genre had particular significance. Accordingly, the in-between constitution of historical drama on several levels provided multiple layers for signification. Firstly, the history play merged, what was considered by Aristotle and his Early Modern followers as irreconcilable genres, that is, history and drama; it merged particularities of history and the universality of poetry and created a literary space which was neither fact nor fiction in the eyes of the Elizabethan playgoers (Aristotle, “Poetics” 59; Hattaway, “Shakespearean” 4). Secondly, the historicity of the performance of staging history created a space where the plays and the audience perception shaped each other reciprocally. The timeless and mostly anachronistic reconstruction of a foreknowledge of 15th century history, through formal history in the form of chronicles like Hall and Holinshed’s chronicles (Kastan, “History” 167, 170-1; Collingwood 57-8),²² and personal family history through oral transmission liable to forgetting (Canino 2-3, 14-5, 220-1), created an in-between space of formal and personal histories. Thirdly, audience members consisting of the nobility, their patronesses and members from lower classes would carry these blurred forms of formal and personal histories in their encounters with history plays. They would use these formal and informal histories to identify their off-stage identities through their identification with on-stage characters.²³ This identification either in blood or deed created yet another transitional space where identities were performed through the simulated reality within these history plays. Thereby, Shakespeare’s history plays on the stage and on the page became “heterotopia[s]” because these created “unreal [spaces]” that did “exist in reality” (Foucault, “Spaces” par. 11-2). Thus, they “[juxtaposed] in a single real place,” that is the theatrical stage or the pages of the quartos, “several spaces, several sites that [were] in themselves incompatible” (Foucault, “Spaces” par. 20), such as past events in chronicle history and contemporary Elizabethan incidents. This created “heterochronies” (Foucault, “Spaces” par. 21) by palimpsestically (Harris 13-7; Baldo 16) and simultaneously depicting remote historical events, chronicle histories that were at their worst ahistorical and anachronistic or at their best shaped by the conditions Tudor chroniclers lived in (Tillyard, *History* 32, 39; Prior 16),²⁴ and contemporary Elizabethan practices of social life and incidents. Hence, this analysis will be elucidating the crossroads of playwright choice, historical moment and audience

reception and show how Shakespeare's history plays satirised the failings of the Elizabethan regime from 1588 to 1603.

Respectively, the approximate performance dates and the publication dates for the quarto versions of the following plays will be included in the analysis: *1, 2, 3 Henry VI* (1590), *Richard III* (1592), *Richard II* (1595), *King John* (1590 or 1596), *1, 2 Henry IV* (1597-8) and *Henry V* (1599).²⁵ Accordingly, the body of the dissertation will consist of three chapters. The first will deal with factionalism, the second with hypocrisy, and the third with dissent and how Shakespeare's history plays satirised socio-political issues with the aim of correcting them. The hypothesis of the dissertation maintains that following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the arbitrary distribution of the Elizabethan patronage led to factionalism. Factionalism led to the necessity of displaying hypocritical social behaviour to survive in the polarised court. Hypocrisy, however, only postponed the direct confrontation with problems and led to outbursts of dissent against the regime. The conclusion of the dissertation will summarise the body chapters and make further comments to reveal that Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire in his history plays enabled him to criticise the failings of the Elizabethan regime.

CHAPTER I

FACTIONALISM

The tensions between Late Elizabethan aristocrats and meritocrats manifested itself, especially, in the form of factionalism. Factionalism was a phenomenon related to “[a] party in the state or in any community or association” having “opprobrious sense, conveying the imputation of selfish or mischievous ends or turbulent or unscrupulous methods” of “partisan[s]” (“faction,” def. 3a; “factionist”). Factionalism was an ideological split (Levy 281), as it was materially motivated, and not primarily a matter of family bond. As Weir acknowledges, various Elizabethan “courtiers were related to each other or bound by ties of marriage or loyalty. This did not, however, prevent frauds, nor the forming of factions around favourites” (*Elizabeth* 256). As reflected in *3HVI*, fathers and sons could belong to different factions and they might even kill each other, even though accidentally, being blinded with their adherence to different interest groups (*3HVI* 2.5.55-122). Similarly, Shakespeare’s Richard II was fought by his own relatives who took different sides in the ideologically and materially motivated factionalism. In particular, while the Duke of York, Richard II’s uncle, “[was] joined” with Henry Bolingbroke, the Duke’s son Aumerle remained an adherent and a “friend” of the king (*RII* 3.2.200, 5.2.41-5). The resulting father-son conflict depicted the ideological side of factionalism which surpassed and suppressed bonds of familial and hierarchical loyalty. The conflict was depicted, particularly, in the degradation of Aumerle’s title by his father the Duke of York who not only dismissed merely a name but also the ties associated with that title, seen when he did not directly speak to his son and urged his wife to call him with his abased title: “Aumerle that was; / But that is lost for being Richard’s friend, / And, madam, you must call him Rutland now” (*RII* 5.2.41-3). Intergenerational affiliations were clouded over by the conflicting values of interest groups so that the Duke called his son a “[v]illain, traitor, slave!” after having detected him conspiring against Henry IV whom the Duke supported (*RII* 5.2.72).

Since familial bonds were not essential for categorising interest groups within factionalism, the main determiner in holding the members of these groups together was the material gain attached to being part of a faction. The predominance of materialism,

however, problematised ties of relationship and made factionalism a plastic, organic and mutable phenomenon. For example, the patronee John Hume in *2HVI* affected to be in support of Protector Gloucester who alienated himself from both factions in the struggle between the Houses of Lancaster and York. Yet, Hume, actually, played double, and worked as an informer for the Yorkists, which was based on the fact that there was no partisan-like bond in factionalism. As Hume demonstrated, “Hume must make merry with the Duchess’ gold; / Marry, and shall. But how now, Sir John Hume! / Seal up your lips, and give no words but mum: / [...] Yet am I Suffolk and the cardinal’s broker. / [...] Sort how it will, I shall have gold for all” (*2HVI* 1.2.87-107). Shaped by historical matter and received according to contemporary sets of values, Shakespeare’s history plays demonstrated the Elizabethan playgoers and subsequent reading public how factionalism was a canker that affected social relations. Family ties were important for the Elizabethans, yet factionalism surpassed these ties and outweighed it with its materialistic motivation.

The polarisation of Elizabethan politics and the formation of factions, on the other hand, did not dominate the whole of her reign but was rather apparent in the final years of her reign (Adams qtd. in Loades, *Tudor* 163), which was the result of the compilation of certain events in a narrow time span. Although MacCaffrey, in analysing primarily the early stages of the Elizabethan regime, argued that no one within the patronage system obtained as much as they desired, that dissatisfaction was little so that “the number of malcontents who felt altogether excluded from these good things was small” (“Place” 124-5), we should be careful not to overgeneralise this phenomenon in acknowledging the sovereign’s homogeneous power over her subjects throughout her reign. First of all, the very system of creating small factions, led by able courtiers that were easier to control, contained its self-undermining proportion that weakened the system. As Nauton maintains, Elizabeth I controlled the struggle between factions as she created these and weakened them according to her own politics (qtd. in Loades, *Tudor* 163). However, this control was not just a holistic top-down authority but was shaped by the bottom-up tensions created by the creation of interest groups. Rather, as Stone maintains, Elizabeth I tolerated these different interest groups because of her “timidity” to eschew “violence” they generated among themselves or towards her (qtd. in Loades, *Tudor*

163). The relative cooperation of first-generation courtiers was almost the main reason for the stability of Elizabethan control and economic boom until the 1580s (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271; Haigh, *Elizabeth* 101). Yet, changes in the conjuncture towards the last decade of her reign, like relative relief from immediate foreign invasion coupled with economic crisis following 1588 (Black, *Reign* 408-9; Williams 160-2, 203; Guy, “Tudor Age” 317) led to the appearance of that subversive element that weakened the system while it had been created along with the formation of the Elizabethan patronage system. In particular, with the relative relief from foreign threat in the Post-Armada Period courtiers were no longer obliged to cooperate with each other, as they did in the Pre-Armada Period (Hammer 88; Haigh, *Elizabeth* 101).²⁶ Therefore, the presence or absence of an imminent threat was an important marker that differentiated former periods from the last decade of the Elizabethan regime. For example, the fact that different interest groups cooperate when there was a common enemy was reflected in *HVI* when members of the Yorkist faction, the Duke of York and Buckingham, and Suffolk, the member of the Lancastrians along with the Lancastrian Queen Margaret agreed with each other to condemn their common enemy, the Protector Gloucester, of getting too “proud” and having conspired against the state and monarch through popular support (*2HVI* 3.1.1-65). Similarly, in *RIII* the anachronistic presence of Queen Margaret illustrated how the courtiers were “snarling all before [she, that is, the common enemy] came, / Ready to catch each other by the throat, / And turn [...] all [their] hatred now on [her]” (*RIII* 1.3.188-90). Hence, interests could unite factions together against a common enemy, which was the case until 1588.

Yet, when important statesmen, who had cooperated with each other before, died and the common enemy ceased to be effective in a certain period of time, then the rise of factionalism seemed to be a natural outcome when such tensions were released. Therefore, following the death of great patrons, a vacuum of control was created by the loss of powerful figures which resulted in harsh competition among lesser courtiers. Many patronees had to find new patrons which accelerated the pre-eminence of factionalism in the 1590s. As Williams maintained, “[d]uring the three years that followed the defeat of the Armada, the political ground had been shifting inside

England, with the deaths of Leicester, Mildmay, Walsingham, and Hatton” so that “[t]heir clients and followers had to find other patrons in a competitive world” (341). For instance, in the *HVI* plays it could be seen how Henry V’s death created a “vacuum” after which factions of “ambitious aristocrats” wanted to take over authority. When the nobility wanted to reorganise domestic and international offices after the death of Henry V (*IHVI* 1.1.1-177), it could be observed that Henry V’s “death has exposed the unstable nature of their temporary union. With a power vacuum at the centre, unscrupulous and ambitious aristocrats [would] seize their chance to dominate public affairs” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 103). Similar cases could be observed when Salisbury, Bedford and Talbot’s deaths marked the loss of old great statesmen (*IHVI* 2.2.4-17, 3.2.84-112, 4.4.130-208), whereby both the national and international strength of the monarchy began to fall apart.

What is more, the death of able councillors left the country to a less experienced young generation. Since Elizabeth I did not want new courtiers in her close circle of councillors and trusted almost only her old courtiers, experienced younger courtiers could not be trained, so that rather “[t]he sons of earlier courtiers [...] tended to succeed their fathers” (Loades, *Tudor* 165). Although this young generation was more energetic, it was also less cooperative (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 101; Williams 325).²⁷ The deaths of the old generation of able advisors created a vacuum which was tried to be filled with many courtiers. Although there were several interest groups, these were overshadowed by a bipolar system consisting of the Cecils and the Essex circle who projected each other as conflicting groups.

The Cecils were a meritocratic family which rose with the ascendancy of the Tudors. Both the Tudors and the Cecils were of Welsh origin and beginning with Henry VIII’s reign, the Cecils gradually moved into the inner circle of royal patronage (Hawkyard 250). Likewise, “[c]oming from a family with a tradition of service to major figures or to the Crown, [William] Cecil was naturally attracted to the Royal Court with its numerous opportunities for advancement in government” (Hawkyard 250). The death of prominent patrons in the 1590s monopolised patronage under the Cecils. As Loades and Hammer maintain, after the death of the prominent councillors, such as Leicester and

Walsingham, the Cecils began to hold almost absolute power in their hands (Loades, *Tudor* 165; Hammer 114). The strength of William Cecil was based on his policy to make people dependant by satisfying their needs. His policy was to “gratyfye your nobylte and the principall persons of your realme to bynde them faste to you with such things as have heretofore bene cast away upon them that in tyme of neede can serve you to no purpose; whereby you shall have all men of value in your realme to depend only upon you” (qtd. in Adams 39). William Cecil trained his son Robert Cecil in a similar vein, which formed a “partnership” that was important to sustain power and to stand against factional rivals (Hawkyard 268). The main goal of William Cecil was to guarantee his son’s succession to his monopolistic control over the patronage system (Williams 341-2). William Cecil succeeded in this but his son Robert Cecil proved quite different from him through his “radical” policies (Williams 325) to maintain his single-handed hold on the patronage system.

On the other hand, the aristocratic power groups centred first around Ferdinando Stanley who was second in line to the throne, but was disenfranchised like his fellow-aristocrats Oxford, Cumberland and Percy (Canino 189; Warner 231).²⁸ Yet, Ferdinando Stanley’s disinterest in regaining his former position of favour in active way and his abrupt death in 1594 (Coward 37; Manley, “Strange’s” 279) had made the Earl of Essex centripetal of pro-aristocratic sentiments. Therefore, even before Stanley’s death, Essex had an important place in the landed nobility. The Essex circle was the product of the burden of the deaths of the champions of Protestant aristocracy. Being the son of a martyr killed in warfare in the Irish campaign of 1576 and the stepson of the Earl of Leicester who had hoped that Sir Philip Sidney would inherit his lands and titles, Robert Devereux emerged with the death of these three important personages as the heir to aristocratic values (Hammer 17-9, 32-8, 54-60, 76-7; Gajda, *Earl* 4, 68; Williams 326-9, 342-3). The dual pressure of top-down inheritance and bottom-up expectations of patronees of the deceased patrons ultimately led to the creation of a strong faction against the meritocratic Cecils (Hammer 78-83; Williams 342-3; Gajda, *Earl* 62). In line with these expectations, Essex wanted to be the leading advisor in the Privy Council and his strength lay in his “informal intelligence system” he inherited from and built on the Earl of Huntingdon, his military patronees and his regional

patronage network (Hammer 22, 113- 219-20, 270-6; Williams 342-3). However, it has been noted that he could not make effective use of this network and failed to create a power base at the Court (Hammer 269-76; Williams 376). Therefore, when Essex campaigned to succeed to William Cecil's powers, who had been his guardian in his minority, he failed (Hammer 22, 314, 341, 371). This failure would prove the last phase of possible cooperation between Robert Cecil and the Earl of Essex.

Therefore, the collegial harmony among the privy councillors and courtiers of Elizabeth I was shattered following the death of former statesmen and the creation of energetic, yet, less controlled interest groups. As Loades elucidated, "ruling by faction [...] led to constant tension and uncertainty, and eventually to shameless gerrymandering which undermined the integrity of the administration" (Loades, *Politics* 300). The lack of compromise on ideological differences on the side of the new generation courtiers enhanced a competitive politics. Differences about appointments to offices and how to shape international relations paralysed executive powers of the crown and resources were to be claimed to be wasted by both the meritocrats, who were accused of domestic corruption, and the aristocrats, who were accused of wasting money on unprofitable campaigns (Montrose, *Subject* 155-9; Black, *Reign* 406-11).²⁹ Since "[p]atronage became both a means to end and a demonstration of political power; factions became the norm of Court politics rather than the exception. The politics of collegiality were replaced by the politics of competition" (Adams 44-5).³⁰

Under these circumstances, Elizabeth I could not control the patronage system anymore, which was aggravated by her growing age and subsiding energy. Elizabeth I behaved like a weak monarch granting the wishes of only some of her courtiers whereby she tried to cover up her weaknesses, such as expecting sycophancy, by acting like a self-centred tyrant creating fear to silence voices against injustice. Accordingly, suspension of disbelief was the essence of the reciprocal relationship between the monarch and her courtiers where both sides believed in the illusion within the patronage system. Haigh might be correct in arguing that "shallow" flattery reinforced Elizabeth I's elevated status as a monarch (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 95), yet, flattery was a double-edged knife that could also undermine sovereignty. Elizabeth I demanded flattery from her courtiers to

assert her centripetal position, but this means was used by the courtiers to manipulate her, as well. As Haigh puts forth, courtly life was “a routine of secularised rituals for an earthly goddess” where Elizabeth I “invited, indeed she insisted upon, the most extreme praise, expecting her courtiers to tell her obvious lies” (*Elizabeth* 93). Through this, she “made her emotions a tool of politics” in order to “manipulate others” whereby, however, “others could manipulate her” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 98-9). Hence, the cult of Elizabeth was abused by courtiers, who sought promotion, as seen in their efforts “to turn the collective process of Elizabethan cult-formation to the pursuit of [one’s] own material, intellectual, and geopolitical concerns” (Montrose, *Subject* 92). Therefore, “[t]he great myths of the Tudor monarchy worked at least as much because people wanted to believe them as because they were assiduously and skilfully promoted” (Loades, *Power* 107).

Elizabeth I’s arbitrary policies and the centralisation of power in the meritocratic Cecils rendered her being manipulated by these, which resulted in a stalemate of solving domestic and international problems. These problems showed themselves in the corruption of the civil service system manifesting itself in high scale bribery and the squandering of resources on unsuccessful foreign warfare (Williams 364-5; Black, *Reign* 406-11).³¹ Shakespeare’s visualisation of the figure of the monarch led by sycophants through Henry VI and Richard II must have corresponded with the failings of the Elizabethan regime in the eyes of the playgoers and later the reading public of the quarto versions of these plays. What is more, the punishment of these wrongdoing monarchs must have created a satiric catharsis, both relieving and accelerating socio-political tensions.³² For instance, right in the beginning of *HVI*, Henry VI’s vulnerability, or potential, to be controlled by others was depicted. In particular, Protector Gloucester accused Winchester of having “pray’d” Henry V’s death and the arrival of “an effeminate prince” whom he could control like a “schoolboy” (*IHVI* 1.1.33-6). Although the fact that Henry VI was just a child when he inherited the crown seemed to minimise Gloucester’s accusations, the young monarch’s later behaviour seemed to prove the threat of being ruled by a monarch who was manipulated by his/her lessers. For example, the Earl of Suffolk would manipulate the king to marry Margaret of Naples whom he would use to manipulate Henry VI the more. That is, Suffolk would

“win this Lady Margaret [...] for [the] king” (*IHVI* 5.2.109-10) and “Margaret shall now be queen, and rule the King; / But I will rule both her, the King and realm” (*IHVI* 5.5.107-8).

Likewise, Richard II’s fondness of flattery led him to be misled by his courtiers who abused their relationship with the sovereign to create a misbalance in the distribution of favours and the exertion of domestic and international policies. Richard II did not listen to “counsel” and rather gave an ear to flattery (*RII* 2.1.4). Richard II would listen to

[...] flatt’ring sounds,
 As praises, of whose taste the wise are fond;
 Lascivious metres, to whose venom sound
 The open ear of youth doth always listen;
 [...] Where doth the world thrust forth a vanity—
 So it be new, there’s no respect how vile—
 That is not quickly buzzed into his ears?
 Then all too late comes Counsel to be heard,
 Where Will doth mutiny with Wit’s regard.
 Direct not him whose way himself will choose.
 ’Tis breath thou lack’st, and that breath wilt thou lose. (*RII* 2.1.17-30)

As Richard II was preoccupied with sycophancy, he did not deal with socio-political issues such as mutinies, whereby flattery did not remain simply a personal vice but had political consequences as it led to the “sickness” of the body politic as illustrated by John of Gaunt in the same play. He argued that Richard II was in “reputation sick” who rendered his sick “body to the cure / Of those physicians that first wounded” him, meaning the many “flatterers” that “sit within” Richard II’s “crown” (*RII* 2.1.92-115). Gaunt accused Richard II of being a bad monarch because he let himself be flattered by others and destroyed his good reputation.

Similar to John of Gaunt, his son, Henry IV, was afraid of the corrupting potential of having around parasitic courtiers. In particular, he feared that his son, Hal, would be manipulated by Falstaff and his companions like Richard II had been manipulated by his own minions. The fact that Hal made himself too “common” by “stale and cheap to vulgar company” rather than keep himself “like a robe pontifical, / Ne’er seen but wondered at: [...], / Seldom but sumptuous, showed like a feast / And won by rareness such solemnity” (*IHIV* 3.2.39-59) made Henry IV concerned about the future of the

kingdom if he compared and contrasted his son's behaviour with the characteristics of Richard II's reign. Thus, Hal was seen to act like Richard II, which Henry IV lamented with the words "[a]s thou art to this hour was Richard then" (*IHIV* 3.2.95). Richard II as "[t]he skipping king" made company "[w]ith shallow jesters," "capering fools," "and rash bavin wits" after which he "[h]ad his great name profaned with their scorns" because the deposed king made himself too "common" and his presence unexceptional to his minions who were "with his presence glutted, gorged and full" (*IHIV* 3.2.60-84). The comparison and contrast between Richard II and Hal along with commentary on how Henry IV acquired his regal state sheds light on the problematics of the thin line between generosity and being abused by one's subjects. In a similar vein, when Henry IV in his sickbed asked for Prince Hal and discovered that he was in a tavern with his companions, the threat of the possible corruption of the state during the reign of a corrupt monarch who gave favours solely to his minions without taking law or justice into consideration came to the foreground:

KING [Henry IV]. Most subject is the fattest soil to weeds;
 And he, the noble image of my youth,
 Is overspread with them; therefore my grief
 Stretches itself beyond the hour of death.
 The blood weeps from my heart when I do shape,
 In forms imaginary, th'unguided days
 And rotten times that you shall look upon
 When I am sleeping with my ancestors.
 For when his headstrong riot hath no curb,
 When rage and hot blood are his counsellors
 When means and lavish manners meet together,
 O, with what wings shall his affections fly
 Towards fronting peril and oppos'd decay! (*2HIV* 4.4.54-66)

The image of a prodigal son was not solely related with his own personality but also with the problem that the head of the kingdom may be ill advised by parasites like Falstaff, which could generate national and international problems.

Such issues could not only be observed on the Elizabethan stage or on the pages of the quartos of Shakespeare's plays, but were also seen in the misgovernment generated through Elizabeth I's weakness in dealing with problems around the time these plays were performed and published. One weakness of Elizabeth I was her passivity in handling political matters. Particularly, Elizabeth I failed to understand that the leading

figures of the meritocrats and the aristocrats, namely Robert Cecil and the Earl of Essex, were not like their cooperative predecessors William Cecil and the Earl of Leicester. Indeed, she “had hoped that the younger Cecil and Essex would create the working relationship between Burghley and Leicester of the great days of the reign. It was not to be” (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271). Inaction that aggravated political crises could also be seen in Shakespeare’s Henry VI and Richard II. Henry VI’s passivity, for instance, manifested itself in “his failure to respond to threats and warnings, and above all by his failure to prevent the law from falling into the hands of predators” whereby he “demonstrated his inability to grasp the meaning of ‘good lordship’” (Loades, *Politics* 11). Henry VI could not realise that no matter how “so slight and frivolous a cause” it might be “factious emulations” would “arise” and that “[g]ood cousins both, of York and Somerset” would not “[q]uiet” themselves (*1HVI* 4.1.111-5). The theoretical basis behind Henry VI’s inaction was his misconception that he surrendered to God’s will. Thereby, he mistook his inability to act for piety. Henry VI’s “God shall be my hope” speech in the second part of the trilogy (*2HVI* 2.3.24) demonstrated his escapism from political problems. As Prior showed “[t]he one consistent spokesman for God’s providence and justice is the king. He looks to God for support, and he accepts the trials and calamities which befall him as God’s will” (40). For Henry VI, any success as well as any “[c]old news” or problem was the manifestation of “God’s will” that would “be done” (*2HVI* 5.1.68, 3.1.86). Henry VI would neither “fight nor fly” and rather justify his political paralysis as the impossibility to “outrun the heavens” (*2HVI* 5.2.72-4). Therefore, “[t]his is more than the habitual sentiment of a pious man. Henry literally accepts everything that happens to him as the will or justice of God” (Prior 40). For this reason, apart from Henry VI’s partiality because of his fondness of flattery in the factional quarrel between the supporters of Somerset and York, what aggravated the political crisis was that Henry VI remained a passive observer who simply mourned after crises. As he himself stated, he mourned after “[s]ad-hearted men, much overgone with care,” as for his misconception, “[h]ere sits a king more woeful than you are” (*3HVI* 2.5.123-4). Henry VI’s piety and resulting weakness showed the importance of ability to rule beside any reference to the divine right to rule and legitimism in matters of succession. Therefore, as Prior maintains, “Henry’s simple, passive submissiveness and his pious acquiescence to the will of God” was in contrast with “the image of

Henry V, who bequeathed a throne to his son but not the temperament of a king. [...] the ability to rule has much to do with the right to rule” (41). Contrary to his father, for instance, Prince Edward, son of Henry VI, could speak more authoritatively:

PRINCE EDWARD. Speak like a subject, proud ambitious York.
 Suppose that I am now my father’s mouth:
 Resign thy chair, and where I stand, kneel thou,
 Whilst I propose the selfsame words to thee
 Which, traitor, thou wouldst have me answer to.
 QUEEN MARGARET. Ah, that thy father had been so resolved! (3HVI 5.5.17-22)

Through the lamentation regarding Henry VI’s irresolution to act in an authoritative way towards his subjects, the general expectance for the need of a strong patron who could manage to control his patronees was voiced.

Besides, Henry VI showed his inactiveness in complying with the demands of his subjects, although he knew the contrary to be true. For example, even though he believed in Protector Gloucester’s innocence “[a]s is the sucking lamb or harmless dove,” he handed over his judicial prerogative totally into the hands of his subjects and stated “[m]y lords, what to your wisdoms seemeth best / Do, or undo, as if ourself were here” (2HVI 3.1.71, 3.1.195-6). Thereby, Henry VI did not only comply with the Suffolk circle and Queen Margaret’s accusation of Gloucester as “hateful raven” and “ravenous wolf” (2HVI 3.1.76, 78), but ironically enough, prepared the way to be overtaken totally by his own subjects who became gradually more powerful than him:

GLOUCESTER. Ah, thus King Henry throws away his crutch
 Before his legs be firm to bear his body.
 Thus is the shepherd beaten from thy side,
 And wolves are gnarling who shall gnaw thee first.
 Ah, that my fear were false; ah, that it were!
 For, good King Henry, thy decay I fear. (2HVI 3.1.189-94)

Although Henry VI realised how his judgment was overruled by his subjects and how they misled him, he could not act against them and fashioned himself as a “dam” which could not save its “calf” from “the butcher” as seen in the following speech:

KING [Henry VI]. Ay, Margaret; my heart is drown’d with grief,
 Whose flood begins to flow within mine eyes,

My body round engirt with misery,
 For what's more miserable than discontent?
 Ah, uncle Humphrey, in thy face I see
 The map of honour, truth and loyalty;
 And yet, good Humphrey, is the hour to come
 That e'er I proved thee false or fear'd thy faith.
 What luring star now envies thy estate
 That these great lords and Margaret our Queen
 Do seek subversion of thy harmless life?
 Thou never didst them wrong, nor no man wrong.
 And as the butcher takes away the calf
 And binds the wretch and beats it when it strains,
 Bearing it to the bloody slaughterhouse,
 Even so remorseless have they borne him hence;
 And as the dam runs lowing up and down,
 Looking the way her harmless young one went,
 And can do nought but wail her darling's loss,
 Even so myself bewails good Gloucester's case
 With sad unhelpful tears, and with dimmed eyes
 Look after him, and cannot do him good,
 So mighty are his vowed enemies.
 His fortunes I will weep, and, 'twixt each groan
 Say, 'Who's a traitor? Gloucester he is none.' (2HVI 3.1.198-222)

Thus, the monarch and courtier relationship needed to be maintained in a balanced way so as not to encourage interest groups to exert their power over the sovereign.

Moreover, apart from aligning the outcome of events to the will of God, Henry VI showed his political inertia through doing whatever the Queen and her circle wanted from him without questioning the subsequent political consequences. In particular, Henry VI's too close relationship made him vulnerable to comply with the Queen's demands. He protested "Nay, take me with thee, good sweet Exeter: / Not that I fear to stay, but love to go / Whither the Queen intends. Forward, away!" (3HVI 2.5.137-9). Thereby, Henry VI reduced himself to the position of *roy de nom*, meaning king just in name but not in deed, in transferring all executive decisions onto his subjects and lessers. Strong courtiers, thus, became a threat to the monarch where s/he was reduced to a puppet in the hands of his/her subjects. Although Queen Margaret questioned the presence of protectorship in Henry VI's minority, the general criticism towards the rule of subjects and their influence on monarchs was directed in a very ironic way. Given the fact that she would be influenced by Suffolk, her question of whether the ruling monarch and his queen should be called "in title and in style" a royal couple but "must be made [...] subject to a duke" (2HVI 1.3.49-50) created not only a Freudian slip but

also illustrated how Henry VI reduced himself to the position of king in name. Therefore, it was not surprising that Queen Margaret realised that

[b]eside the haughty Protector have we Beaufort,
The imperious churchman, Somerset, Buckingham
And grumbling York; and not the least of these
But can do more in England than the King. (*2HVI* 1.3.69-72)

Although it had been claimed that Elizabeth I remained “autonomous and independent” (Frye 9), she was always complying with Cecil’s demands and rejecting the demands of aristocrats like Ferdinando Stanley or the Earl of Essex. Therefore, Elizabeth I was as much independent as Henry VI whose simplicity lied in the fact that he followed the demands of his nobility in such an excessive way that he never stopped his “ears to their demands” (*3HVI* 4.8.39). Giving too much and being too pitiful were confused with royal generosity that generated awe and loyalty in the subject. Royal generosity needed to be practiced in a moderate way in order not to disturb the balance between courtiers and not to weaken one’s own position as a monarch. Yet, Henry VI was not aware that his unrestrained benevolence was in fact malevolent to him and the state. When Henry VI commented that the powers of the Yorkists would be less than his and the Duke of Exeter replied that “[t]he doubt is that [the Yorkists] will seduce the rest” of the nobility (*3HVI* 4.8.37), Henry VI did not believe in him as he had done whatever they wanted. He said:

I have not stopped mine ears to their demands,
Nor posted off their suits with slow delays.
My pity hath been balm to heal their wounds.
My mildness hath allayed their swelling griefs.
My mercy dried their water-flowing tears.
I have not been desirous of their wealth
Nor much oppressed them with great subsidies,
Nor forward of revenge, though they much erred.
Then why should they love Edward more than me?
No, Exeter, these graces challenge grace,
And when the lion fawns upon the lamb,
The lamb will never cease to follow him. (*3HVI* 4.8.39-50)

Henry VI may be right in claiming that if the monarch was generous and agreed with the requests of his patronees, he would be loved and respected. Yet, this should be done

in a moderate way to hinder an imbalance in the relationship between courtier and monarch.

However, if the sovereign gave all his/her power to be exercised by his/her advisers, this would weaken his/her power and prepare the way for the overthrow of his/her rule. Henry VI and Richard II's experiences were used as a warning to be careful with subjects, which would have been affirmed by discontent playgoers. Henry VI was aware of the power of his advisors that could undo their factional opponent and thereby himself as he took sides with one of the factions. Yet, he was unable to interfere and take political action. Therefore, Elizabeth I's monopolisation of the patronage under the Cecils paralysed her in a similar fashion so that she could not interfere in the friction generated in the last decade of her reign. As further reflected in Shakespeare's play, by rendering subjects more powerful than oneself, the sovereign lost control over them who perceived him/her as "simple" monarch whom they did not "fear" at all (*3HVI* 1.2.52, 58). Thus, Henry VI's passivity strengthened his overreaching subjects who, in particular, grouped under the Yorkist faction as Lord Clifford lamented:

O Lancaster, I fear thy overthrow
 [...]
 Impairing Henry, strength'ning misproud York.
 The common people swarm like summer flies,
 And whither fly the gnats but to the sun?
 And who shines now but Henry's enemies?
 [...]
 And, Henry, hadst thou swayed as kings should do,
 Or as thy father and his father did,
 Giving no ground unto the house of York,
 They never then had sprung like summer flies;
 [...]
 For what doth cherish weeds but gentle air?
 And what makes robbers bold but too much lenity? (*3HVI* 2.6.1-22)

Similarly, the Bishop of Carlisle urged Richard II to take action as "wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes, / But presently prevent the ways to wail" (*RII* 3.2.178-9). Inaction strengthened the opponents and this inertia created an auto-limitation to one's executive powers. Therefore, "To fear the foe, since fear oppreseth strength, / Gives in your weakness strength unto your foe, / And so your follies fight against yourself. / Fear and be slain – no worse can come to fight; / And fight and die is death destroying Death, /

Where fearing dying pays Death servile breath” (*RII* 3.2.180-5). Hence, the monarch’s pure lamentation was to be condemned because it was impractical in solving a problem and fear was rather self-defeating. Hence, political inertia created a power vacuum that would be tried to be filled up with overreaching courtiers who fought with each other and eventually against the system in compensation for the passivity of the monarch.

Furthermore, even though Richard II later tried to compensate his inaction with bitter words of anger, he could not undo his former inaction and change his present condition of a monarch to be overthrown, as he continued to be politically paralysed. In particular, Richard II was angry because he was forced to repeal his command of banishment and submit himself to his foes. He lamented “that e’er this tongue of mine, / That laid the sentence of dread banishment / On yon proud man, should take it off again / With words of sooth! O that I were as great / As is my grief, or lesser than my name! / Or that I could forget what I have been, / Or not remember what I must be now! / Swell’st thou, proud heart? I’ll give thee scope to beat, / Since foes have scope to beat both thee and me” (*RII* 3.3.133-41). Yet, these afterthoughts remained equally ineffective as he could not put his ideas into action and this led to an inner conflict:

KING RICHARD [II]. Northumberland, say thus the King returns:
 His noble cousin is right welcome hither,
 And all the number of his fair demands
 Shall be accomplished without contradiction.
 With all the gracious utterance thou hast,
 Speak to his gentle hearing kind commends.
[Northumberland with Trumpet returns to Bolingbroke.]
[to Aumerle] We do debase ourselves, cousin, do we not,
 To look so poorly and to speak so fair?
 Shall we call back Northumberland, and send
 Defiance to the traitor, and so die? (*RII* 3.3.121-30)

What is more, Richard II while submitting himself to his former subjects was not sure whether his present submission was in compliance with the body politic of being a sovereign who should execute his powers and not yield them to others. Firstly, Richard II fantasied about the easy life after he would give up his powers and turn into a simple person who would be buried in a highway and treaded on by his subjects as in his lifetime:

What must the king do now? Must he submit?
 The King shall do it. Must he be deposed?
 The King shall be contented. Must he lose
 The name of King? I' God's name, let it go.
 I'll give my jewels for a set of beads,
 My gorgeous palace for a hermitage,
 My gay apparel for an almsman's gown,
 My figured goblets for a dish of wood,
 My sceptre for a palmer's walking staff,
 My subjects for a pair of carved saints
 And my large kingdom for a little grave,
 A little, little grave, an obscure grave;
 Or I'll be buried in the King's highway,
 Some way of common trade, where subjects' feet
 May hourly trample on their sovereign's head;
 For on my heart they tread now whilst I live,
 And buried once, why not upon my head? (*RII* 3.3.143-59)

Richard II tried to escape from the moment of crisis he faced through daydreaming about the ease of not being a king anymore, which, ironically was the very reason of his discomfort. This sense of discomfort was seen when he learned that Bolingbroke wanted him to descend, both literally and metaphorically, which was in contrast with the top-down relationship of patron and patronee where the latter had to show respect. Thereby, Bolingbroke confronted Richard II once again for his loss of power and his Phaeton-like downfall:

KING RICHARD [II]. [...]

I talk but idly, and you laugh at me.
 Most mighty prince, my Lord Northumberland,
 What says King Bolingbroke? Will his majesty
 Give Richard leave to live till Richard die?
 You make a leg, and Bolingbroke says 'ay'.

NORTHUMBERLAND. My lord, in the base court he doth attend
 To speak with you. May it please you to come down.

KING RICHARD [II]. Down, down I come; like glistening Phaëthon,
 Wanting the manage of unruly jades.
 In the base court? Base court where kings grow base
 To come at traitors' calls and do them grace.
 In the base court? Come down? Down, court! down, king!
 For night-owls shriek where mounting larks should sing.
[Exeunt King Richard and his Followers from above.]
[Northumberland returns to Bolingbroke.]

BOLINGBROKE. What says his majesty?
 NORTHUMBERLAND. Sorrow and grief of heart
 Makes him speak fondly, like a frantic man
[Flourish. Enter below KING RICHARD and his Followers.]
 Yet he is come. (*RII* 3.3.171-85)

Richard II was passive and an escapist just like Henry VI, and once being confronted with socio-political crises saw death as a comfort. Although Elizabeth I did not consider death as a means to get over political crises, she remained, similarly, a passive spectator as seen in her post-Essex Rebellion comments on the 4th of August 1601 about the use of plays about Richard II to incite the Londoners to rise against her. She did not interfere with these performances played “forty times in open streets and houses” and rather exclaimed “I am Richard the Second, know ye not that?” (Harrison, *Last* 194), acknowledging the links between Richard II and her failings in contemporary Elizabethan problems.

Therefore, Elizabeth I further behaved like a weak monarch governed by her subjects as she wanted to live royally without bearing the necessary responsibilities attached to the state of sovereignty. In line with Figgis and Prior, we cannot argue that the term “divine right of kings” can be applied before the 17th century (Prior 139). Yet, the divine ordination of the monarch was the backbone of Medieval and Early Modern political structure (Collingwood 53, 55; Tillyard, *History* 9, 24; Kastan, “English History” 167). While the monarch was divinely ordained, which gave the monarch his/her power, it gave him/her also the burden of responsibilities. For instance, in the dedicatory epistle to *A Myrrovr for Magiftrates*, first published in 1559, Baldwin focused on the issue of responsibility:

For as Iuftice is the chiefe vertue, fo is the miniftracion therof the chiefte office: & therefore hath God eftablished it with the chiefte name, honoring & calling kinges, & al officers vnder the[m] by his owne name: Gods. Ye be al Gods, as manye as have in your charge any miniftracion of Iuftice: What a [foul] fhame were it, for any nowe to take vpon the[m] the name & office of God, and in [their] doynegs [show] them felves devils. (C3^r)

Therefore, Richard II’s emphasis on his divine ordination and rights associated with it became ironic. As Prior put forth,

Richard II is the only one of the kings dealt with in Shakespeare’s histories who is a king by virtue of natural inheritance in a line established by a long uninterrupted tradition of rule by lineal descent, and whose legitimacy is acknowledged by everyone; he is also neither statesmanlike nor much interested in the serious problems of rule, and he uses power self-indulgently. He is therefore the ideal protagonist in an action which represents the Lord’s anointed as unworthy of this

awesome title. In making Richard an advocate of divine right, and to a degree not stressed by his sources, Shakespeare sets the conflicts and dilemmas of the play in their most acute form. What can loyal, honorable, and mighty subjects do when the power of the state is vested unquestionably, and sacramentally, in one who seems irresponsible and unjust in its exercise? (141-2)

Especially, Richard II's visiting John of Gaunt on his deathbed made the monarch see his failings and his counteractions about his "right royal majesty" just highlighted his failings:

GAUNT. [...] Why, cousin, wert thou regent of the world,
 It were a shame to let this land by lease;
 But for thy world enjoying but this land,
 Is it not more than shame to shame it so?
 Landlord of England art thou now, not king.
 Thy state of law is bondsman to the law;
 And thou—
 KING RICHARD [II]. A lunatic lean-witted fool,
 Presuming on an ague's privilege!
 Darest with thy frozen admonition
 Make pale our cheek, chasing the royal blood
 With fury from his native residence?
 Now, by my seat's right royal majesty,
 Wert thou not brother to great Edward's son,
 This tongue that runs so roundly in thy head
 Should run thy head from thy unreverent shoulders! (*RII* 2.1.109-23)

Richard II's confidence in the divine right of the kings proved to be his weakness and deluded him in not seeing that to be king was not primarily based on lineage but also on responsibilities and the good government and management of the country. As Prior maintained,

Richard's conviction that the powers and privileges which kingship carries are beyond question his to use is a source of his weakness. The possession of royalty so long taken for granted as an inherited authority has dulled the king's sense of the personal qualifications and the political demands of the office, and nothing remains except an appreciation of the traditional forms and ceremonies which mark its public exercise and the sense of personal power which is the most conspicuous prerogative of kingship. Inheriting the glory and power of the office without any serious pressure on him to make prudent use of the instruments of royal power—councils, courts of law, responsible delegation of authority, military support—Richard has come to rely chiefly on the idea of the king as divinely ordained and supported. (142-3)

Thus, the Elizabethan equation of Richard II and Elizabeth I reflected the consequences of her passive observance of political crises favouring one interest group and creating anger and discontent in the excluded faction.

In a similar fashion, Elizabethan playgoers and reading audiences might have perceived Henry VI's declaration to his nobility to "[d]o or undo, as if ourself were here" (*2HVI* 3.1.196) as not only showing him to be ruled by others but also giving the hints of his desire to be discharged from royal responsibilities. Thereby, Henry VI wanted a simple life without responsibilities:

KING HENRY [VI]. [...]
 Would I were dead! if God's good will were so.
 For what is in this world but grief and woe?
 O God! Methinks it were a happy life
 To be no better than a homely swain,
 To sit upon a hill, as I do now,
 To carve out dials quaintly, point by point,
 Thereby to see the minutes how they run,
 How many make the hour full complete,
 How many hours bring about the day,
 How many days will finish up the year,
 How many years a mortal man may live.
 When this is known, then to divide the times:
 So many hours must I tend my flock,
 So many hours must I take my rest,
 So many hours must I contemplate,
 So many hours must I sport myself,
 So many days my ewes have been with young,
 So many weeks ere the poor fools will ean,
 So many years ere I shall shear the fleece,
 So minutes, hours, days, months, and years,
 Passed over to the end they were created,
 Would bring white hairs unto a quiet grave.
 Ah! What a life were this, how sweet, how lovely!
 Gives not the hawthorn-bush a sweeter shade
 To shepherds looking on their silly sheep,
 Than doth a rich embroidered canopy
 To kings that fear their subjects' treachery?
 O yes, it doth, a thousandfold it doth.
 And to conclude, the shepherd's homely curds,
 His cold thin drink out of his leather bottle,
 His wonted sleep under a fresh tree's shade,
 All which secure and sweetly he enjoys,
 Is far beyond a prince's delicates;
 His viands sparkling in a golden cup,

His body couched in a curious bed,
When care, mistrust and treason waits on him. (*3HVI* 2.5.19-54)

The pastoral imagery Henry VI employed was in compliance with his escapism from socio-political matters so far and was, therefore, not a new condition. The monarch was central to the patronage system and he had to look after his “flock” of patronees. It may be true that to be the patron of the nobility was like a curse, because of the many responsibilities attached to it. Yet, escaping from these responsibilities generated further problems which could not be solved with the transformation of the body natural into another profession as those responsibilities were linked to the body politic and may continue no matter in what condition the monarch would like himself to be. Hence, only the surface structure of kingship without powers and responsibilities was substituted by the shepherd who similarly had no regal responsibilities. Real-life pious seclusion and fantasised pastoral exclusionism could be interchanged with each other. Thus, the deep structure of escaping responsibilities in the plot of the play was valid for both forms so that there was almost no change in the characterisation of Shakespeare’s Henry VI, the passive king who discharged himself from all political responsibility.

Furthermore, Henry VI’s pastoral fantasy and desire to have a simpler life compared to the false court he lived in, was slightly condemned by Warwick who had now taken sides with the Lancastrian monarch. In a possible takeover of rule from the Yorkist monarch Edward IV, Henry VI would leave power to George of Clarence and Warwick who shook hands whereof the latter maintained that “[w]e’ll yoke together, like a double shadow / To Henry’s body, and supply his place, / I mean, in bearing weight of government, / While he enjoys the honour and his ease” (*3HVI* 4.6.49-52). Given the events after Henry VI discharged himself of royal responsibilities and the subsequent factional quarrel and dissent to the regime, Warwick’s assertion that Henry VI would “[enjoy] the honour and his ease” was very ironic. It should not assure Henry VI of an easy life as such a rule would generate the same conditions albeit with different subjects. The very idea of the patronage system was top-down responsibility in exchange for bottom-up loyalty and service, which made a patronage without responsibility not possible to function.

Moreover, apart from the burden of seigniorial obligation, the responsibilities of patron and patroness, essential in their reciprocal relationship, created a well-functioning patronage system. The patron was not solely responsible for his own decisions but also for those of his/her patronesses who followed those decisions:

BATES. Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough, if we know we are the King's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.

WILLIAMS. But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place', some swearing, some crying for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I am afraid there are few die well that die in a battle; for how can they charitably dispose of anything, when blood is their argument? Now, if these men do not die well it will be a black matter for the King that led them to it, who to disobey were against all proportion of subjection. (*HV* 4.1.130-46)

The fact that patronesses had to follow the conclusions of a patron and be obedient created the double-burden on the patron fearing his miscalculations might result in the ruin of his/her patronesses. Yet, similarly, the obligations of a patroness could not be taken as an excuse for misbehaviour. As Henry V elucidated on the Elizabethan stage, the mishandlings or misfortune of the son, the servant, or the soldier could not wholly be laid onto the father, the master or the monarch without considering the time and space bound peculiarities that brought forth problems to one's lessers (*HV* 4.1.147-58):

[...] there is no king, be his cause never so spotless, if it come to the arbitrement of swords, can try it out with all unspotted soldiers. Some peradventure have on them the guilt of premeditated and contrived murder, some of beguiling virgins with the broken seals of perjury, some, making the wars their bulwark, that have before gored the gentle bosom of peace with pillage and robbery. Now if these men have defeated the law and outrun native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God. War is his beadle, war is his vengeance; so that here men are punished for before breach of the King's laws in now the King's quarrel: [...] Every subject's

duty is the King's; but every subject's soul is his own. (*HV* 4.1.158-77)

Hence, any personal ill of the patronee should not be attributed to the patron without valid proofs. Thereby, it can be argued that the failings of the Elizabethan patronage system were both the failings of Elizabeth I's meritocratic patronees, centralised around the Cecils, and of herself as the patron who misbalanced favours allowing high-scale corruption for one faction and denying preferment for the aristocratic circles.

What is more, although Elizabeth I acted like a weak monarch through her passivity in political problems caused by her partiality and her demand to live royally without the accompanied responsibilities of reigning, she was also a self-centred tyrant who tried to cover up her injustice through the creation of fear against political action. As McLaren noted, "Elizabeth's councillors of the 1580s and 1590s" had been "increasingly disparaged as 'favourites', sycophants dependent on the erratic will of a tyrannical queen" (229). Therefore, the members of socio-economically excluded interest groups gradually "convinced themselves that Elizabeth fell into [the] category" of tyrant as they conceived they lived in the environment depicted by Tacitus on the "political survival when subject to tyrannical rule" (Guy, "1590s" 16). Likewise Shakespeare's Richard II used financial means to exert his arbitrary power on some of his subjects, especially through taxation and confiscation both to finance himself and to control dissenting voices. In particular, because of his extravagant spending solely on his minions, Richard II's treasury could not cover the expenses in order to finance the war against Irish rebels. To compensate his "liberal largess," Richard II wanted to extract the sum necessary to go to war from his subjects through arbitrary taxation with "blank charters" and confiscating lands in order to "deck [his] soldiers" for the war:

KING RICHARD [II]. We will ourself in person to this war,
 And, for our coffers with too great a court
 And liberal largess are grown somewhat light,
 We are enforced to farm our royal realm,
 The revenue whereof shall furnish us
 For our affairs in hand. If that come short,
 Our substitutes at home shall have blank charters
 Whereto, when they shall know what men are rich,
 They shall subscribe them for large sums of gold,
 And send them after to supply our wants;
 For we will make for Ireland presently.

[Enter BUSHY]

Bushy, what news?

BUSHY. Old John of Gaunt is grievous sick, my lord,
Suddenly taken, and hath sent post-haste
To entreat your majesty to visit him.

KING RICHARD [II]. Where lies he?

BUSHY. At Ely House.

KING RICHARD [II]. Now put it, God, in the physician's mind
To help him to his grave immediately!

The lining of his coffers shall make coats

To deck our soldiers for these Irish wars.

Come, gentlemen, let's all go visit him:

Pray God we may make haste and come too late! (*RII* 1.4.42-64)

Yet, if the patron sought to finance himself with the forfeiture of the lands or wealth of his/her patronees, this unjust breach in the line of patronage would earn him/her hatred from the partisans of his patronee. King Richard II planned to forfeit Gaunt's lands to finance the Irish War (*RII* 2.1.153-62), even though Gaunt's heir, Henry Bolingbroke, was still alive. Although Edmund Duke of York warned the king that his action was wrong and that this unjust action might stir loyal courtiers against him, Richard II proceeded in his practical and materialistic error of judgment, which would lead to his downfall as York foretold (*RII* 2.1.186-214). Richard II shattered the belief in the untouchable rights of the nobility, such as, the succession of land and title to legal heirs. As the Earl of Northumberland maintained, Richard II in crossing the borders of legitimate rule through his authoritarian arbitrary policies, shattered order as he led to insecurity within and distrust towards the system. Richard II "ignored" law and "offended" his patronees (Loades, *Politics* 11) whereby no member of the nobility was anymore sure of "[their] lives, [their] children, and [their] heirs" (*RII* 2.1.245). A similar condition was observed around the time a quarto of *RII* was published in 1598. Contrary to her largesse shown to the Cecils, Elizabeth I began, although fluctuating in her decisions, to take back offices and financial means from Essex and his followers from 1598 onwards ending with the removal of the Earl's monopoly on sweet wines at the end of 1600 (Stone 483; Williams 373).³³

Elizabeth I was not impartial in her policies and thereby shattered the belief of her courtiers in trusting her justice. Loades asserted that the powerful aristocratic cliques disabled Elizabeth I in maintaining real justice, so that "political balance" was more crucial to her than "justice" (*Politics* 299). Contrary to her behaviour, a patron had to be

impartial and act like a mediator between courtiers to prevent violence by forcing them to forget their strife. The fact that this was sometimes only an artificial means of peace-making, however, should be taken into consideration and be accompanied by some financial diversion to divert the courtier's energies towards their financial actions. For instance, Richard II was incapable of finding a solution to Henry Bolingbroke and Norfolk's quarrel. Since Richard II only wanted them to forget their quarrel without diverting them with other means this peace could not be sustained. There should be a sense of justice to be accepted by both parties:

KING RICHARD [II]. Mowbray, impartial are our eyes and ears.
 Were he my brother, nay, my kingdom's heir,
 As he is but my father's brother's son,
 Now, by my sceptre's awe, I make a vow
 Such neighbour nearness to our sacred blood
 Should nothing privilege him, nor partialize
 The unstooping firmness of my upright soul.
 He is our subject, Mowbray; so art thou:
 Free speech and fearless I to thee allow.
 [...]
 Wrath-kindled gentlemen, be ruled by me:
 Let's purge this choler without letting blood.
 This we prescribe, though no physician;
 Deep malice makes too deep incision.
 Forget, forgive; conclude and be agreed;
 Our doctors say this is no month to bleed.
 Good uncle, let this end where it begun;
 We'll calm the Duke of Norfolk, you your son. (*RII* 1.1.115-23, 1.1.152-9)

As Richard II did not propose a solution with which both parties might be satisfied but tried to suppress the problem, as a way to solve problems left to God's judgment, he ordained a duel between them to settle the dispute as they did not accept to be "friends" (*RII* 1.1.196-205). However, when Richard II intervened with God's judgment and ordained an uneven decision, banning Norfolk for life while banning Bolingbroke for ten years, he disrupted justice and no party was satisfied with the decision, wherein Richard II made them swear never to communicate with each other and not to foster any hatred and never to plot against him (*RII* 1.3.117-92). Yet, this unjust decision transformed the patron into a foe. Even though later Richard II shortened Bolingbroke's sentence to six years, this did not make Bolingbroke's party, especially Gaunt, the happier as the latter still lamented that he would be too old or dead to see his son's, his inheritor's return (*RII* 1.3.208-48). As Prior maintained, Richard II's interference with

the combat was motivated by taking “advantage” by both getting rid of Mowbray, and his possible links with the murder of Woodstock, and Bolingbroke, as a powerful figure in the line of succession to the throne (145). Injustice and self-interest, however, would prove disastrous for Richard II as the suppression of problems did not solve them. A patron had to be just, wherefore Richard II’s interference with the fight and his unequal distribution of punishment made him an unjust monarch.

Furthermore, since Elizabethan patronage was at first based upon “political balance” rather than “justice” (Loades, *Politics* 299), to maintain that balance was very crucial in order to create, at least, the illusion of justice for those who served the patronage system. The aristocracy considered itself as the naturally determined social strata to serve, shape and benefit from the patronage system (Hammer 22). Therefore, the exclusion of the pro-war aristocratic clique from the shaping of national and international policies created discontent among the members of especially those who supported the Earl of Essex (Stone 482; Williams 364-5). A similar exclusion of and discontent in the serving aristocracy could be observed on the stage and page when Shakespeare’s Hotspur accused Henry IV of having made worse what he inherited from Richard II whom he had deposed to bring justice. Richard II

[b]roke oath on oath, committed wrong on wrong,
 And, in conclusion, drove us to seek out
 This head of safety; and withal to pry
 Into his title, the which we find
 Too indirect for long continuance. (*IHV* 4.3.101-5)

Injustice created through the disproportionate distribution of royal favours rendered the rule of a monarch tyrannical. Hence, Elizabeth I’s misbalance of favours in favour of the meritocrats created a similar picture in the eyes of the aristocracy.

Moreover, Elizabeth I’s authoritarian conduct manifested itself in the fear created to control the realm. Hulse noted that Elizabeth I made not only use of “love” in her dealings with her subjects, but also made use of “fear” to exert her authority (Hulse, *Elizabeth* 11). This type of fear did not generate genuine friends around her, but rather those who were bound to her by necessity. This hypocritical support of Elizabeth I’s rule was pointed out by Maisse in 1597 when he asserted that “if by chance she should

die, it is certain that the English would never again submit to the rule of a woman” (qtd. in Montrose, *Subject* 249). Therefore, just like Shakespeare’s Richard III, Elizabeth I had “no friends but who are friends of fear, / Which in his[her] greatest need will shrink from him[her]” (*RIII* 5.2.20-1). This fear was mainly created by the very basis of the patronage system, namely material profit, by threatening to stop financial support in order to create loyalty (Stone 478-9). Therefore, it was quite interesting that Richard III in his final oration tried to encourage his soldiers by threatening them of the possible loss of “lands” and “wives” (*RIII* 5.3.322, 5.3.337), which were essential for the maintenance and continuity of a power structure within the feudal order of the Elizabethan patronage system. Yet, loyalty that was created only through fear proved to be more destructive, as seen in the downfall of Richard III and Richard II.

Rather than being flattered and “feared” as a monarch for a “hollow crown” (*RII* 3.2.160-5), the monarch as the centre of the patronage system should turn “fear” into “love” and “happiness” and make all of his/her patroness “be assur’d” of these (*2HIV* 5.2.44-61). Yet, Elizabeth I disregarded the importance of maintaining the balance among her nobility by giving over her powers to the meritocracy showing her weakness in her policies and exerting authoritarian measures especially to the excluded discontent aristocratic interest groups as a means to cover up her weakness. By excluding the landed aristocrats from favour, Elizabeth I accelerated factionalism from the 1590s onwards. “As Elizabeth grew old, she came to run a narrowly based regime, composed of old men and the sons of the previous councillors, with pluralistic office-holding and rewards concentrated in just a few hands,” so that “by 1597, the Privy Council had only eleven members and none of them were great territorial magnates. Courtiers lost real influence, the provincial nobility was excluded from government, and the next generation of aspiring politicians saw their careers blighted” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 102). Therefore, “towards the end of Elizabeth’s reign ‘near access’ became increasingly difficult” (Williams 130). Similarly, during the Wars of the Roses, and also generally, factionalism arose from the exclusion of some party from the patronage system: “political conflict was between those who controlled it [the Court], and those who were excluded from office and the fruits of patronage” (Loades, *Tudor* 147). For instance, Edward IV favoured the meritocratic relatives of his queen rather than the landed

aristocrats, that is, his brothers. Such personal relationship of the monarch with some of his/her subjects might disturb the balance between interest groups. As Edward IV's infamous brother Richard pointed out, the bestowing of favours, such as politically important marriage contracts, solely onto the meritocrats made the monarch "bury brotherhood" in one's "bride" (*3HVI* 4.1.51-5). Likewise, Henry IV excluded the Northern earls from favour although they had helped him to the throne. The tension arising through the exclusion of some of the nobility manifested itself when Henry IV demanded war captives from Hotspur, who, however, accepted only if his relative Mortimer was ransomed through these (*IHIV* 1.3.77-143). Henry IV, however, thought that Mortimer was treacherous after his crown for which he denied Hotspur's condition and demanded the prisoners (*IHIV* 1.3.77-143). A similar tension arose around the time *IHIV* was probably produced either "late in 1596 or early in 1597" (Bullough 4:156) when Elizabeth I wanted the delivery of some Spanish captives from the Earl of Essex. On the 22nd of September 1596, it was reported that Elizabeth I was

highly displeased with the Lord Treasurer, with words of indignity, reproach, and rejecting of him as a miscreant and a coward for that he would not assent to her opinion that the Earl of Essex should not have the profit of the Spanish prisoners. The Treasurer wished that the Earl should first be heard that, upon the conditions with which the Earl received them, so her Majesty should direct the compt. But herewith the Queen increased her ireful speeches that the Treasurer either for fear or favour regarded the Earl more than herself. Coming from the presence the Lord Treasurer received a letter from the Earl of Essex, misliking him for the contrary reason that he would offend my Lord for pleasing the Queen. The Lord Treasurer is now gone to Theobalds. (Harrison, *Second* 135)

Apart from demanding what seemed to be the natural belongings of the aristocracy for their service, similar to Elizabeth I's angry rejection to listen to the demands of her subjects was shown as the reason for the upheaval of the Hotspurs in *1-2HIV*. As the Archbishop of York asserted, their discontent was aggravated because their suits had been halted by those whom they complained against, so as to say "[w]hen we are wrong'd, and would unfold our griefs, / We are denied access unto his person, / Even by those men that most have done us wrong" (*2HIV* 4.1.77-9). Hence, if one faction of the nobility had no access to king as patron to deal with problems caused by another faction that was favoured by the monarch, then the nobility might rebel. This "particular" problem might make others unite with the faction to try to heal distress created by the unjust favouritism of the royal patron. Mowbray, whose father was banished because of

his quarrel with the present Henry IV, accused him of ungratefulness for the services done to him, “[t]hat” his supporters “by indictment and by dint of sword / Have since miscarried under Bolingbroke” (2*HIV* 4.1.128-9) and that a patron should give rewards for services and take care of his patronees or else he would be dissented. Consequently, if the monarch disturbed the balance between courtiers, did not follow hierarchy, and did not distribute favour evenly, this created discontent.

Elizabeth I rather misbalanced her relations with her courtiers in solely favouring her meritocrats in the patronage system. Although many critics like Canino or Bush maintained that in not giving new peerages Elizabeth I wanted to “uphold” aristocracy and merely created Burghley and Compton from the new nobility (Canino 7; Bush 102), the problem that accelerated the socio-economic friction between the aristocrats and the meritocrats lay in the fact that Elizabeth I favoured only one of these “‘new’ families,” that is, the Cecils. As Haigh argues, “Elizabeth seemed to have thrown in her lot with the Cecils and their friends, who were taking the major offices and the profits that went with them. Government had become the tool of a single and unscrupulous faction” (*Elizabeth* 102). In particular, the Cecils along with their patronees exploited the patronage system. Professionalising in civil service along with creating a close relationship with grandees and patronees within the patronage system, the Cecils moved socially upward and sustained their hold on power. William Cecil acknowledged before he died that he had benefited very much from the Elizabethan patronage. In a letter to Robert Cecil, William Cecil maintained that “diligently and effectually let her Majesty understand how her singular kindness doth overcome my power to acquit it who, though she will not be mother, *yet she showed herself by feeding me, with her own princely hand, a dutiful nurse*” (qtd. in Hawkyard 268, original italics). By feeding themselves, the Cecils created a network of corruption and drained the treasury (Loades, *Politics* 306). Although the critic MacCaffrey tried, paradoxically, to exclude the Cecils from the “corrupt” distribution of favours, even though the same controlled it, he criticised the deficiencies of the Elizabethan patronage system as limited means that were marked by obscure dealings and led to the formation of a “black market” of farmlands and monopolies that were exploited by greedy patronees (“Place” 124-6). Therefore, “[t]he monopolistic claims of the Cecils” to the patronage system “also contributed” to the

acceleration of “troubles at Court” (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 102). William Cecil wanted to secure the Cecils’ predominance in the court, or “near-monopoly of power” even after his death, for which he made “a show of personal withdrawal from politics” in order to “secure the advancement of his son Robert” (Williams 342; Hawkyard 265). Therefore, Elizabeth I lost her impartiality by monopolising the patronage to the Cecil faction.

The image of the partial monarch was also depicted by Shakespeare through his portraits of Henry VI, Edward IV and Richard II. Henry VI, in particular, was a bad monarch because of his “consistent partiality in the distribution of favours” (Loades, *Politics* 11). This partiality could be observed when Henry VI tried to reconcile the factions but took sides openly by putting on a red rose:

KING [HENRY VI]. Come hither, you that would be combatants.
 Henceforth I charge you, as you love our favour,
 Quite to forget this quarrel and the cause.
 And you, my lords, remember where we are –
 In France, amongst a fickle wavering nation.
 If they perceive dissension in our looks,
 And that within ourselves we disagree,
 How will their grudging stomachs be provoked
 To wilful disobedience, and rebel!
 Beside, what infamy will there arise
 When foreign princes shall be certified
 That for a toy, a thing of no regard,
 King Henry’s peers and chief nobility
 Destroyed themselves and lost the realm of France!
 O think upon the conquest of my father,
 My tender years, and let us not forgo
 That for a trifle that was bought with blood.
 Let me be umpire in this doubtful strife.
[Putting on a red rose]
 I see no reason, if I wear this rose,
 That anyone should therefore be suspicious
 I more incline to Somerset than York:
 Both are my kinsmen, and I love them both. (*IHVI* 4.1.134-155)

However, Henry VI did not realise the urgency to compromise. Similarly, Elizabeth I in taking the side of the Cecils hindered any possibility of compromise and cooperation among her privy councillors. Actually, she failed to reconcile the factions within her court from the 1590s onwards (Hammer 390). Henry VI was, likewise, indifferent to the factional friction and said, “[f]or my part, noble lords, I care not which; / Or Somerset or York, all’s one to me” (*2HVI* 1.3.102-3). This passage about the question of

favouring of York or Somerset for the position of regentship of France (*2HVI* 1.3.102-118), illustrated the fragile balance of giving privilege/favour within the limited patronage system. Henry VI was not aware of the factionalism and the possible imbalance of favouring one interest group over another. Rather, Henry VI handed over all his executive powers and monopolised the patronage system on another member of the Somerset circle, that is, Suffolk who like Cecil was aware that he had to control the sovereign to control the “realm” (*1HVI* 5.4.108). Quite similarly, the problem in Edward IV’s court arose when he let himself controlled by his queen and her relatives who had formed a powerful meritocratic faction threatening the monarch’s aristocratic brothers. The theatrical Edward IV, just like the real-life Elizabeth I, chose to support just one party of the conflict rather than try to reconcile all parties. In particular, Shakespeare’s Edward IV assured the queen and the faction around her relatives that the opposing aristocratic clique “shall obey [him], and love [their opponents] too, / Unless they seek for hatred at my hands; / Which if they do, yet will I keep thee safe, / And they shall feel the vengeance of my wrath” (*3HVI* 4.1.75-83). This, on the other hand, created self-confidence in members of the faction that was being supported. In another play, for instance, Shakespeare’s Falstaff trusted in his close relationship to escape justice and to benefit from royal favour. After Falstaff heard that Prince Hal would be crowned as Henry V, he would continue his close companionship with him and “keep Prince Harry in continual laughter” (*2HIV* 5.1.76). Yet, not only Falstaff but also others seemed to be sure that their relationship would continue. For instance, Prince Thomas warned the Lord Chief Justice, who had once convicted Falstaff, to “speak Sir John Falstaff fair” in order to avoid problems that could be generated by offending a person near and dear to the monarch (*2HIV* 5.2.33-41). Therefore, the concentration of favour on a single faction created both self-assurance in the favoured that their misdeeds were not persecuted, and discontent in the disfavoured who were excluded from favour.

What is more, the disproportion of the favours among those who seemed not to deserve it created havoc in the realm, similar to the ill-managed garden of Richard II. Taking the corruption of the Elizabethan civil service for granted, the support they got from the royal treasury was sharp in contrast with the serving aristocracy who tried their best to enhance the wellbeing of their country but did not benefit much for their toils. The

garden-commonwealth imagery was functional in depicting the need to “[c]ut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays” (*RII* 3.4.34), namely socially mobile persons. There was a need to “root away / The noisome weeds, which without profit suck / The soil’s fertility from wholesome flowers” (*RII* 3.4.37-9), like the corrupt civil servants hindering the feats of the aristocracy. Yet, as the servant of the same gardener elucidated, Richard II’s realm “[i]s full of weeds, her fairest flowers choked up [...] and her wholesome herbs / Swarming with caterpillars” (*RII* 3.4.44-7), that is, meritocratic favourites led to the ruin of aristocrats upon whom they exerted high taxes and confiscation. The problem lay in the fact that those meritocrats did not deserve the favours of the monarch as they wasted his resources. As the Gardener stated,

Had he done so to great and growing men,
 They might have lived to bear and he to taste
 Their fruits of duty. Superfluous branches
 We lop away that bearing boughs may live.
 Had he done so, himself had borne the crown,
 Which waste of idle hours hath quite thrown down. (*RII* 3.4.61-6)

Therefore, partiality in the distribution of favours might probably create the squandering of financial resources whereas favours could have been employed in a more profitable way if distributed evenly.

However, meritocrats were not just despised by the landed aristocracy for their hold on power but for the assumption that they were unworthy of this power as they had obtained it through their social climbing. Not noble by birth like the landed nobility, which was of a constant nature, a meritocrat was noble by deed and rose socially through his close relationship with the sovereign, which was of an arbitrary nature. Since peerage was taken seriously only if status was on an equal basis with estates, socially mobile meritocrats without estates were looked down upon (Adams 26). After all, the ethics of the emerging market economy was in stark contrast with that of the landed aristocracy. In particular, Elton argued that although Elizabethan society seemed to be closer to the modern period, in practice the Elizabethans still thought in medieval terms as observed in Elizabeth’s conservatism in her policies against any sort of “invention” or “change” (395). Since the Elizabethan model was based on the orderly medieval notion, the notion of degree seemed to be undisputed as the lack of degree

among men would create chaos, which was why the difference between the nobility and the non-noble was emphasised in sermons or through other means of propaganda. As Elton further stated

[t]he chief concept of the age—often unconscious, never questioned—was that of order and degree. It came as easily to the Elizabethan to suppose that all things, man included, had their place in an eternally fixed scheme of things, and that there existed degrees among men [...] The world which God had created had its settled laws, and in the great ‘Chain of Being’ every created thing, from the angles at the top to the animals and plants and metals at the bottom, had its assigned place. These ideas took a ‘medieval’ form: that is, they found expression in phrases and thoughts inherited from centuries of speculation and writing. [...] An age which insisted on degree could not think in radical terms or welcome the break-up of any established thing. [...] Without degree, with the natural order of things disturbed, the moral order itself would dissolve. Sanctionless, right would fall before might. The statesmen of the age held this view with cold passion, and every means of propaganda was employed to preach order, obedience, and humble acquiescence in one’s station. (396)

The feudal order that equated land and birth-rights with the notion of nobility formed the value system of Elizabethan aristocracy which considered nobility and the power associated with it as an *a priori* right. As Stone similarly argued,

the aristocratic ethic is one of voluntary service to the State, generous hospitality, clear class distinctions, social stability, tolerant indifference to the sins of flesh, inequality of opportunity based on the accident of inheritance, arrogant self-confidence, a paternalist and patronizing attitude towards economic dependants and inferiors, and an acceptance of the grinding poverty of the lower classes as part of the natural order of things. (9)

Taking the “aristocratic ethic” as the determiner of the value system of Elizabethan society, meritocracy associated with “service” to the crown, class mobility and social variability, became a deviant form of nobility. Although many critics like MacCaffrey argued that aristocrats followed “naked favouritism” for “unashamed opportunities” against “public” profit and that through the meritocrats there was at least some public benefit (“Place” 119), meritocrats were considered as groups that wasted financial resources in the civil service system (Hurstfield 137-62). Therefore, contrary to the view of many critics like Loades, Williams and Haigh,³⁴ from the point of view of the landed aristocracy it were the meritocrats who were the ‘unworthy favourites.’ In line with this, contrary to the general assumption, Levy showed that not the landed

aristocrats, that is, Essex and his circle, but the meritocrats, that is, the Cecils, were considered as favourites:

As far as Essex was concerned, the Cecils – jumped up bookmen, bureaucrats without military experience – were unfit servants to a great monarch, and were kept in power only by Elizabeth’s favour. Essex, on the contrary, had grown up a successful soldier during the years when Anglo-Spanish sparing turned to open warfare, and was convinced that his experience fitted him for membership in the highest councils. From his point of view, only ‘favouritism’, the queen’s support of the entrenched Cecils, prevented his rise and the concomitant triumph of his aggressive military policy[.] (281)

Hence, being an aristocrat was attached to a naturalised high status, contrary to meritocrats who could not claim such a status. In particular, since “like the Talbots, the Cecils came of humble origin from the Welsh marches,” which “was an embarrassment to a family with a great sense of its achievement and dignity,” it could be observed that “its opponents exploited the matter unmercifully” (Hawkyard 250). Although Robert Devereux’s aristocratic origin was based on “accident[s]” of good marriages to aristocratic women, he was proud of that origin on which he based his “greatness” (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 270).

In Shakespeare’s history plays, primogeniture was emphasised by the aristocrats as a social marker to distinguish themselves from the meritocrats. For example, although many critics focused on the mystery surrounding the circumstances of the Temple scene (Hunt 88), the scene rather revealed the equation of birth-right aristocracy with righteousness which foregrounded the theme of the dispute between York and Somerset in *IHVI*, in particular, and between Early Modern aristocracy and meritocracy, in general.

RICHARD [OF YORK]. Since you are tongue-tied, and so loath to speak,
In dumb significants proclaim your thoughts.
Let him that is a true-born gentleman
And stands upon the honour of his birth,
If he suppose that I have pleaded truth,
From off this brier pluck a white rose with me.
SOMERSET. Let him that is no coward nor no flatterer,
But dare maintain the party of the truth,
Pluck a red rose from off this thorn with me. (*IHVI* 2.4.25-33)

In the polemics about aristocratic and meritocratic virtue, the popular belief in the importance of aristocratic virtue overwhelmed. As Elyot stated in his *Gouernour*, “nobilitie maye in no wyfe be but onely where menne can [boasst] them of auncient [lineage]” (93^r). As Canino further stated, “popular opinion continued to support the biblical notion that a man’s familial connections were the overriding factors in determining personal merit” (4). Therefore, following the year when the production of the *HVI* plays was complete (Bullough 3:23-4, 89), apart from Greene’s *Quip for an Upstart Courtier* (1592) which depicted the dispute between new nobility and aristocracy favouring the latter, “[a] Scurrilous Jesuit Pamphlet” stated the discrepancy between the high status control of the meritocratic Cecil over the patronage system and his low status birth: “Of Cecil it is written that though he is Treasurer, guardian of the wards of nobles, and controls almost all things in England by his own judgment, yet he came of humble and obscure origin” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 152-5). Likewise, while York in the former scene emphasised his own superiority over the socially-mobile Somerset, Talbot pointed out the unsteadiness of the notion of contemporary nobility where the meritocrat Fastolfe the “hedge-born swain” could boast “of gentle blood” through his garter while cowardly fleeing the field pointing to a similar discrepancy:

TALBOT. When first this order was ordained, my lords,
 Knights of the Garter were of noble birth,
 Valiant and virtuous, full of haughty courage,
 Such as were grown to credit by the wars;
 Not fearing death nor shrinking for distress
 But always resolute in most extremes.
 He then that is not furnished in this sort
 Doth but usurp the sacred name of knight,
 Profaning this most honourable order,
 And should (if I were worthy to be judge)
 Be quite degraded, like a hedge-born swain
 That doth presume to boast of gentle blood. (*IHVI* 4.1.33-44)

As a consequence, primogeniture was considered by the aristocrats as a marker for their difference from the meritocrats whom they despised for their social climbing, violation of social stability and claiming rights and duties that inherently belonged to the aristocracy.

Nonetheless, primogeniture created also a superiority complex in the landed nobility. This complex demonstrated itself in the “arrogance” of Elizabethan aristocrats like the Earl of Essex (Hammer 21; Elton 469). For instance, as aristocracy was based on birth that brought superiority over others, in *IHVI*, Joan la Pucelle, trying to convince others of her fake aristocracy, protested against the shepherd’s claim to be her father obscuring her noble birth. Although her protestations were quite ironic set against the fact that she was depicted to be in reality the promiscuous daughter of the shepherd, her mimicry of aristocratic manners in despising people with a humble background showed that being proud of one’s birth in an excessive way could make one a laughingstock figure. In particular, Joan la Pucelle dismissed the shepherd as “[d]ecrepit miser, base ignoble wretch” and claimed that she was “descended of a gentler blood,” which excluded not only the possibility of his parentage but also the possibility of even being her “friend” (*IHVI* 5.3.7-9). Although Joan la Pucelle’s words on her “noble birth” (*IHVI* 5.3.21-2), along with the fact of her pseudo-nobility and her depiction as a base-born promiscuous witch, created laughter, it was quite interesting that those words on the status of aristocracy would have been taken for granted if they were voiced by York or heroic Talbot. All in all, aristocrats boasted of being “issued from the progeny of kings [or high nobility]; / Virtuous and holy; chosen from above / By inspiration of celestial grace / To work exceeding miracles on earth” (*IHVI* 5.3.38-41). Therefore, apart from the fact that genealogy was important for the nobility in general, the aristocracy had a superiority complex because of the notion that degree rendered them above all other people. Hence, meritocrats who climbed from humble backgrounds were despised like Joan despised the shepherd, her assumed father of humble origin.

Furthermore, primogeniture meant legitimacy for the aristocracy by which it authenticated the lawfulness of its mobile and immobile belongings and the power associated with them. For present representation and identity formation, family history was of vital importance which sustained the socio-economic position of the individual within the society. Accordingly, the family was the “basis for sympathy, linkage, and collaboration,” (Cressy, “Kinship” 48). Hence, “genealogy provided a basis for self-definition and societal recognition” as “[i]n early modern England, the past legitimized the present and guaranteed the future, and both the legitimization and the guarantee

were bound up in the notion of family pedigree” (Canino 4). Thereby, not having land or wealth through birth-right but through personal fortune made the meritocracy at variance with the ethics of aristocracy and to be despised. For instance, even though Philip the Bastard considered himself more lucky than his legitimate half-brother, by “tak[ing] [his] chance” like a meritocrat, he could not act independently as he had to “follow” his betters, whereas the legitimate brother, the landed nobility, had his own wealth of “five hundred pound a year” which he could control himself (*KJ* 1.1.44-81). Thus, if the courtier belonged to the landed nobility, he was powerful on his own like the legitimate son of Faulconbridge. Yet, if he was not, he would be the patron of a powerful landed courtier, wherefrom it might be deduced that aristocrats based their superiority and despised the meritocrats on the prescripts of primogeniture.

However, apart from the birth-rights of the landed nobility that differentiated them from the meritocrats, the latter were criticised for their easy obtaining of titles. Knighting was associated with rewarding an extraordinary feat (Rapple 22; Hammer 222), as in the case of Alexander Iden “[a] poor esquire of Kent, that loves his king” was “created knight for his good service” and given “for reward a thousand marks” along with the license to “attend” the king for slaying the traitor Jack Cade (*2HVI* 5.1.64-82). Yet, the lack of fixed rules and legislation for the determination of who could and could not be knighted created the possibility of misuse. Knighting rewards by Essex from 1591 onwards, for example, were problematic on two levels. Elizabeth I wanted him to be careful in bestowing knighthoods to those distinguished in “family and wealth,” because new knighthoods were valid after the war and would anger the present knights; at the same time, Essex’s giving of knighthoods was considered by Elizabeth as transgressing the boundaries of her own “authority” (Hammer 224). For example, in October 1591, there were rumours that in the Rouen campaign the Earl of Essex promoted “twenty-four knights” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 69). Essex’s aim was to create a powerful network against the meritocratic Cecils. Yet, the creation of meritocrats by an aristocrat further problematised social differentiation whose boundaries became more and more blurred. Around the same year Essex’s promotions started to become problematic, Shakespeare’s *2HVI* was performed (Bullough 3:89) in which the phenomenon of causal knighting was parodically depicted in the Jack Cade rebellion. Although the

chaotic constitution of the rebellion might be related to a carnival and subversive containment (Barber 13, 29; Greenblatt, “Murdering” 23; Hutson 148; Bernthal 259-7), it also gave an idea how the promotion of ignoble persons were to be considered in a negative way. For instance, when Jack Cade was warned to flee his noble counterparts, he asserted that “[h]e shall be encountered with a man as good as himself” and claimed “he is but a knight” for which “[t]o equal him I will make myself a knight presently. / *[Kneels]* Rise up, Sir John Mortimer. *[Rises]* Now / have at him!” (2*HVI* 4.2.102-12). The parodic mimicry of knighting had two functions. First the importance of order, hence, aristocratic ethics, was emphasised and excessive knighting and, thus, the creation of meritocrats was criticised. Thereby, social stability was foregrounded without which everyone would digress from his social position and chaos would emerge.

Moreover, the creation of meritocrats was related with either the common interest or the familial relationship of the monarch and the subject. For instance, the succession of Robert Cecil, the second son of William Cecil, to his father’s position was related with his father’s nearness to the queen, as contemporary Elizabethans noted from May to August 1591 (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 30-1, 47). The promotion of meritocrats through their relationships could be further seen on the Elizabethan stage when, for example, Edward IV made his queen’s “kindred” of lower status all “gentlefolks” (*RIII* 1.1.95). Richard of Gloucester further criticised the rise of socially inferior classes above the landed nobility and argued that “every Jack became a gentleman” (*RIII* 1.3.72). Through the rise of such meritocrats and the “great promotions” that were “given to ennoble” these, who did not have the wealth or land to sustain their nobility and “some two days since were worth a noble,” aristocrats and “many a gentle person [were] made a jack” and “[h]eld in contempt” (*RIII* 1.3.72-93). Consequently, the promotion of meritocrats problematised the social structure and created friction.

Additionally, because of the high demand for and supply of titles, the very distinctive marker of nobility as the exclusion from the general public seemed to be breached. Shakespeare’s Falstaff could be considered as the combination of a braggart soldier and a satiric fool who made his audience aware of contemporary problems (Birney 47-78;

Campbell, *Satire* 17-23). In particular, the general criticism made by Falstaff that what was “good” was made “common” in England (*2HIV* 1.2.215-6), for example, could be taken as a vantage point to criticise the abundant socially mobile civil servants whose number was unfixed contrary to that of the fixed number of the aristocracy. The preoccupation with family history in Early Modern people to prove their nobility was emphasised by Stone as “excessive adulation of ancient lineage” (27), by Rockett as “the great pedigree craze” (488) and by Canino as “obsession” (6). Estimates showed that there were about 60 peers, 400 knights and 13,000 lesser gentry in the Elizabethan Period (Stone 758; Rickman 9; Forgeng 12; Hazard 163). Since the meritocrats wanted to create “counterfeit genealogies in order to compete and gain respectability,” “[t]he College of Arms granted 2,000 grants for pedigrees and arms in the years between 1560 and 1589” (Canino 7). The relatively new nobleman Sir John Falstaff argued that he would be pleased if he “knew where a / commodity of good names were to be bought” (*2HIV* 3.2.16-25, *1HIV* 1.2.79-80). Yet, the very fact of the rise in the number of newly acquired titles of nobility showed the in-joke about the “common[ness]” of “good” (*2HIV* 1.2.215-6) titles within the Elizabethan patronage system. Thus, the commonness of nobility, which should be held in the hands of the few to make it more precious, was another point that the landed nobility perceived as a flaw in the arbitrary patronage system.

Furthermore, since titles were given arbitrarily they could be taken back in an arbitrary way, as well. One year after the 1598 quarto of *RIII* was published, Elizabethan readers had not only read about the fickleness of court fortune but also observed it when the Earl of Essex was discharged from his office in Ireland, marked as “the greatest downfall” the Elizabethans “have seen” (Harrison, *Last* 56-7). Similarly, as Shakespeare’s Richard of Gloucester maintained, “fair preferments” might be obtained but “then” the monarch or the queen may “deny [his/]her aiding hand therein, / And lay those honours on your high deserts” (*RIII* 1.3.95-7). This was also valid for the arbitrary politics of advancement and fall of some of the Elizabethan nobility in general. The whimsicality of advancement of meritocrats, on the other hand, was pointed out by the former queen Margaret, as well. She claimed that the “young nobility” whose “honour” was “fire-new,” that is, newly made through social promotion, hindered them to

conceive “[w]hat ’twere to lose it, and be miserable. / They that stand high have many blasts to shake them, / And if they fall, they dash themselves to pieces” (*RIII* 1.3.256-60). Therefore, the lack of firm legislation to determine promotion made the social climbing of meritocrats the more suspicious in the eyes of the aristocrats whose social superiority was fixed through their birth.

Apart from the lack of systematics in titular promotions, offices were arbitrarily given to or taken from not noble persons who were not suited to these offices. In 1599 when another quarto edition of *IHIV* was published, the theme of excessive knighting and the rise of the number of people whose titles did not suit them was common news. Since the Earl of Essex could not enlarge his power base through the legitimate means within the patronage system, as he and his circle were almost excluded from favour, he tried to raise the status of his followers through artificial promotion. As noted by an Elizabethan on the 23rd of August 1599,

[t]he Earl of Essex hath made many new knights, English and Irish, to the number of 59 in the whole since his first arrival. It is much marvelled that this humour should so possess him, that no content with his first dozens and scores, he should thus fall to huddle them up by half hundreds; and it is noted as a strange thing that a subject in the space of seven or eight years (not having been six months together in any one action) should upon so little service and small desert make more knights than are in all the realm besides; and it is doubted that if he continue this course he will shortly bring in tag and rag, cut and long tail, and so draw the order in contempt. (Harrison, *Last* 36)

Being aware of Essex’s digression and angry about it (Harrison, *Last* 92-3; Gajda, *Earl* 59), Elizabeth I tried to curb his power by making his promotions void in a proposed proclamation in 1600. Yet, as Sir John Harrington maintained “the annulling the knighthoods” might be problematic as “knighthood is like unto baptism and cannot be annulled, and to annul them would be a dangerous example” because “such a proclamation will be accompanied with the secret and most bitters curses of diverse” (Harrison, *Last* 94). Therefore, the problem about not noble persons taking noble titles lay in the fact that once a person was promoted to meritocratic nobility his title could not be taken back. Any misbehaviour on the part of those unsuited persons, on the other hand, seemed to be in the purgatory of theoretical discussions about discharging them from the nobility. For example, Doll Tearsheet protested to Hostess Quickly not to call

Ancient Pistol a captain as he did not “earn” the title and “villains” like Pistol “will make the / word [...] ill sorted” (2*HIV* 2.4.135-47). Hence, the receiving of offices through arbitrary distribution bears the problem that corrupt officers would besmirch the whole office as they could not be dismissed from their social rank.

Likewise, the instability created by social variability and mobility through the rise of meritocrats resulted in a vacuum. This vacuum was tried to be filled with the meritocrats who performed their nobility through voicing it. The pre-eminence of lineage/aristocracy in defining “personal worthiness and public status,” especially through biblical references, was noticed by Montrose and Canino respectively (Montrose, “Gentlemen” 430-1; Canino 4). Yet, Falstaff argued that he was “better than” Prince Hal and claimed that he was a “gentleman” (2*HIV* 2.4.284) solely by claiming himself one. Apart from the fact that the dialogue between Prince Hal and Falstaff served as quibbles for entertainment, the latter’s assumption of gentlemanliness was to close and abuse that gap created by the lack of effective legislation to prevent the misuse of fixed social roles by socially mobile classes. This could be further seen when Falstaff twice emphasised his gentlemanliness with the phrase “As I am a gentleman” (2*HIV* 2.1.135, 137) in order to get away without paying his debts to Hostess Quickly by further reminding her to be careful and remember his social ranking as “thou must not be in this / humour with me, dost not know me?” (2*HIV* 2.1.148-9). Thereby, the acquisition of titles in an easy way created a loophole for lower status meritocrats to bend law for their own ends.

The deficiency of effective and fixed regulations for defining the nobility reflected itself in the efforts of the meritocrats to compensate for their lack of inborn nobility, for which they were also criticised by aristocrats. The relatively short ascendancy of Robert Cecil from knighthood in May 1591 to Privy Councillor in August 1591 (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 31, 47) could have been perceived as the manifestation of an ambitious spirit of a younger son who was, actually, barred from inheriting the political legacy of his father according to primogeniture. According to a Jesuit pamphlet around 1592, for instance, the “humble and obscure origin” of the meritocratic Robert Cecil were shown as the reasons for both the incompatibility of his acquisition of political power as he

“controls almost all thing in England by his own judgment” and his thirst for that power who had “as well as other offices [...] ambitiously grasped” and “alone has usurped the office of Secretary after the death of Walsingham” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 153-4). In particular, ambition, whether in aristocrats or meritocrats, was likened to falconine behaviour as both seemed to have no limits. When, for instance, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester and Henry VI’s train go falconing, Gloucester’s rival Suffolk likened Gloucester’s falcon to his own ambitions and claimed that “[m]y Lord Protector’s hawks do tower so well, / They know their master loves to be aloft, / And bears his thoughts above his falcon’s pitch” whereof Gloucester maintained “’tis but a base ignoble mind / That mounts no higher than a bird can soar” (2*HVI* 2.1.1-14), which seemed to affirm man’s need to strive for more. Although the meritocratic Suffolk accused the landed nobility Gloucester of being ambitious, Suffolk was criticised for his own social climbing through scheming rather than his own ancestral nobility right before he was murdered for his misdeeds including the murder of Gloucester. Suffolk’s as a meritocrat was looked down upon by the Lieutenant who intentionally mispronounced his family name. Suffolk’s family name De la Pole was pronounced as “[P]oll” and “Pool” which the Lieutenant equated with “kennel, puddle, sink, whose filth and dirt / Troubles the silver spring where England drinks” to emphasise Suffolk’s harmful behaviour towards the kingdom, which he did by overreaching himself through his “devilish policy” through which he was “grown great” (2*HVI* 4.1.70-85). His “devilish policy” included the marriage of Margaret to the king, his control over her and the kingdom and the murder of Gloucester and that Suffolk’s ambition led to the loss of “France” abroad and civil war within the country (2*HVI* 4.1.74-103). As Hadfield maintained, “Suffolk has simply sought glory for himself and paid little attention to the needs of the state. His death, in a sequence of plays in which many innocent people die, is one of these that is richly deserved” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 118). Hence, Suffolk’s death formed a satiric catharsis as he was criticised for rising in the social ladder through his scheming and manipulating policy rather than his ancestral nobility, resembling the account by a Spanish Prisoner on the 9th of March 1592 of “unpopular” meritocrats who were “but of mean origin to have risen so high” especially in the eyes of “the Queen” who “esteemeth” them “highly” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 114).

Furthermore, in line with their social climbing, getting offices, titles and rewards seemed to be the sole motivations for meritocrats. The Cecils created a network of bribery and corruption in order to hold their control over power, wherein the only motivation and bond for the patronees of the Cecilian faction was to get and sustain the obtaining of rewards (Hurstfield 137-62; Hammer 398; Gajda, *Earl* 56; Hawkyard 268). The philistine approach of meritocrats was depicted on the Elizabethan stage, as well. For instance, when Prince Hal slew “brave” Henry Percy on the battlefield and left the scene to arrange Falstaff’s burial, assuming him dead, Falstaff rose and violated the body of Henry Percy to claim the latter’s death as his own accomplishment (*IHIV* 5.4.110-28). The main motive of Falstaff in claiming that he killed Percy was to make the monarch “do / me any honour” so that he “look to be either earl or duke” (*IHIV* 5.4.140-2). Although this feat seemed to be “the strangest tale that” was “ever [...] heard,” it was believed. Falstaff further pointed out his eagerness to receive repay in whatsoever form and stated, “I’ll follow, as they say, for reward” and stressed that his only bond with his monarch was that he remained a giver of rewards in praying that “[h]e that / rewards me, God reward him” (*IHIV* 5.4.154-63). His end was to “grow great” and “live / cleanly as a nobleman should do” by obtaining more and more material wealth and rising in the social ladder (*IHIV* 5.4.163-5). Similarly, the mustering of soldiers in the second wave of civil war in *2HIV* was marked by corruption, bribery and material self-interest. Accordingly, as shown in his “verbal satire” (Birney 61), Falstaff abused his position and for the money he was offered he dismissed able men like Mouldy and Bullcalf from military service (*2HIV* 3.2.1-290). Rather, although they were not suitable for warfare, he recruited people like Wart or Feeble because they could not afford to bribe him (*2HIV* 3.2.135-286). Thereby, Falstaff displayed why getting an office was important to procure material gain. As a consequence, getting a reward in the form of titles or privileges became the sole motivation of the corrupt nobility, which was criticised.

Reflective of such criticism, meritocrats were looked down upon by foregrounding the material aspect of their advancement. That is to say, ambitious meritocrats were accused of seeking advancement in order to become rich. For instance, Cardinal Winchester, in order to refute claims of his supposed ambition, argued that his lack of wealth and

advancement should be taken as signs for his lack of ambition (*IHVI* 3.1.29-32). York, on the other hand, criticised his meritocratic opponents by emphasising their “insolence,” “pride” and “ambition” for wealth and titles (*2HVI* 2.2.70-6). This was reflective of the Elizabethan attitude towards meritocrats who were shown as a money-minded social strata (Loades, *Politics* 306). In particular, the monetary aspect of criticism towards meritocrats was shown when the commoners and the landed aristocracy argued against Richard II’s squandering of financial resources on meritocrats, which the monarch acquired by taxing the landed aristocracy and commoners (*RII* 2.1.246-8). Therefore, the association of meritocrats with the spending of financial resources made them seen as parasites, just as Edmund of York maintained of Richard II’s minions who urged him “into his ears” the “vanity” of expenditures (*RII* 2.1.17-30). Edmund of York further commented on parasites as friends not in need, “friends that flattered him” (*RII* 2.2.77-85), which was accompanied with Henry Bolingbroke’s execution of the parasitic meritocrats who misled the monarch with false advice (*RII* 3.1.1-30). This created a satiric catharsis whereby the tension in the Elizabethan society about the abuse of civil servants was released.

Similarly, although Richard II did not realise the material relationship of ambitious meritocrats with their sovereign until the very last moments of the play, the tragicomic scene of Richard II criticising his horse became crucial in understanding the link between materialism and ambition. His former horse complying with the new condition of being in the possession of Henry IV made Richard II understand that people were materialistic and could shift according to their own interests:

KING RICHARD [II]. So proud that Bolingbroke was on his back?
 That jade hath eat bread from my royal hand;
 This hand hath made him proud with clapping him.
 Would he not stumble? Would he not fall down,
 Since pride must have a fall, and break the neck
 Of that proud man that did usurp his back?
 Forgiveness, horse! why do I rail on thee,
 Since thou, created to be awed by man,
 Wast born to bear? I was not made a horse,
 And yet I bear a burthen like an ass,
 Spurred, galled and tired by jauncing Bolingbroke. (*RII* 5.5.84-94)

Since Richard II had cared for the well-being of the horse through his royal generosity, he thought that it was the horse's pride which made it ungrateful towards its former benefactor. Yet, by creating an analogy between the horse's behaviours and human behaviours, Richard realised what humans could do when they were prey to their ambition and pride. Thus, pride and ambition were shown to be aspects of material advancement that had to be condemned.

The contempt for the ambition of meritocrats was parodically reflected by Jack Cade. Once the self-proclaimed king who even knighted himself like a meritocrat, Jack Cade, lamented his "[ambition]" after his rebellion was suppressed and he had to flee to the "woods" (*2HVI* 4.10.2-5). He realised his fault when he was about to starve (*2HVI* 4.10.1-15). A similar realisation could be seen when Richard II criticised social climbing and mused on his downfall and the arbitrariness of titles. While in his prison cell, he compared it with the outside world and his ability to produce thoughts in his claustrophobic environment (*RII* 5.5.1-5). There, he was stuck between two thoughts. The first was "ambition" and the second was "content" and these conflicting ideas tried to direct him towards either committing suicide or going on living (*RII* 5.5.188-41). His ideas on ambition seemed to comply with the general scorn felt towards it. In particular, he realised that his "[t]houghts tending to ambition" were still related to his "own pride" whereby he "wasted time, and now doth Time waste [him]" (*RII* 5.5.18-49). Richard II became the wise fool and criticised ambition, and people who were not content, just like himself in the beginning, confiscating Henry Bolingbroke's lands. He was aware of the arbitrariness of titles and worldly goods within the patronage system, which made ambition the more a fault.

Likewise, the very fact that meritocrats rose into nobility through their own ethically correct or incorrect behaviour, was depicted in an ironic way by Falstaff. Falstaff was a former page and climbed up to the status of meritocratic knight through the help of an aristocrat. He had been "Jack Falstaff" and just "a page to Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk," but was "now Sir John" (*2HIV* 3.2.24-5). The irony became apparent when Falstaff seemed to forget about this fact and criticised social climbers while he himself was one. In particular, Falstaff dismissed Justice Shallow's "gentle[manliness]" who

had “become a squire” and had “land and beeves” although he had been “Vice’s dagger” (*2HIV* 3.2.293-327). Falstaff’s attitude was reflective of the erosion of the feudal order through the market economy-oriented social climbers of the Elizabethan Period. The meritocrats not only opted for material wealth or titles, but also for the high social status that was still in the hands of the aristocrats.

Besides, another point of criticism voiced by the landed nobility against the meritocrats was the presence of a discrepancy between aristocratic and meritocratic manners. For them, aristocrats were active and hardworking, whereas meritocrats were lazy and fed upon the wealth of the nation through their close relationship with the sovereign. The inferiority of the meritocrats, on the other hand, was based on the ease of becoming noble just through the performance of manners associated with being noble rather than having the birth-rights. For instance, when Philip the Bastard was created Sir Richard by his half-uncle King John, the performative aspect of being a noble person was shown. Philip the Bastard as Sir Richard “now [could] [...] make any Joan a lady,” he would be greeted by the people with ““Good den, sir Richard!”” in a respectable way, and out of his status he would not recognise people of inferior rank and call them by whatever name he listed because such behaviour patterns were “too respective and too sociable” (*KJ* 1.1.184-8). He would “beseech” his lessers who would “answer, ‘at your best command’ and chat about “the Alps [...] and the river Po” and would conclude the day (*KJ* 1.1.195-204). Hence, not the legitimate birth-right but the mannerism and jargonism of nobility became significant to be considered as a noble person. The “habit and device” of “[e]xterior form” and “outward accoutrement” was combined with the acquisition of “inward” internalisation of these manners which were “learn[ed]” to “avoid” being mistreated by others (*KJ* 1.1.209-15). The attainment of such skills were necessary to be considered as a noble person and to make one’s “rising” permanent (*KJ* 1.1.215-9). Therefore, apart from asserting and criticising that nobility had affected and fixed manners, the mimicry of these by the meritocrats to sustain their nobility was another element why the aristocracy looked down upon them. Likewise, compared to the aristocrat active fighting in the battlefield, the court life of the meritocrat was seen by the Duke of Bedford as “living [...] in pomp and ease” (*IHVI* 1.1.142). This, on the other hand, was said to be emphasised a year after *IHVI* was produced when in 1591

Smithe maintained that “contrarie” to “ancient and true knowledge of discipline militarie,” which people have forgotten, the Elizabethans were marked by their “loth and Idleneffe” (A3^r-A4^v). Similarly, two years after Smithe’s work was published, Shakespeare’s *Hotspur*, as an embodiment of the landed aristocracy, criticised the hypocrisy and rude manners of vain and effeminate meritocrats who tried to look down upon him and his military achievements. As Lamb maintained, off the stage, the Elizabethan court was filled with “effeminate courtiers striving to please their female queen” (176). To satirise this phenomenon, on the stage, *Hotspur* foregrounded that he felt insulted not that his prisoners were demanded by Henry IV but that it was done by a courtier who had nothing to do with captivating those prisoners. Compared to himself and his soldiers, the courtier “shine so brisk and smell so sweet / And talk so like a waiting-gentlewoman / Of guns and drums and wounds,” that *Hotspur* was very “angry” at him and dismissed his demand (*IHIV* 1.3.40-56). The meritocrat was “neat, and trimly dressed / Fresh as a bridegroom,” “perfumed like a milliner” holding “[a] pouncet-box” between his fingers and took a sniff from it while he looked down upon “the soldiers bore dead bodies” as “‘untaught knaves’, ‘unmannerly’ / To bring a slovenly unhandsome corpse / Betwixt the wind and his nobility” and continued to speak “[w]ith many holiday and lady terms” while *Hotspur* was still bleeding with his “wounds” (*IHIV* 1.3.29-69). A likewise criticism by *Hotspur* was directed towards Prince Hal by Henry IV. Although affected, Prince Hal’s “barren pleasures” and “rude society” of meritocrats were criticised (*IHIV* 3.2.14). Consequently, so as to avoid being satirised on the stage or page, true aristocratic nobility should not follow behaviours associated with meritocrats either in the form of effeminacy and vainglory or uncivilised hedonism.

Following these tensions, the arbitrary distribution of royal favour and the exclusion of the old nobility in favour of the meritocrats, which were rooted in the weakening power of Elizabeth I, factionalism manifested itself from the 1590s onwards, especially, in the rivalry for governmental offices between the landed aristocracy and the meritocrats. As Black maintained, “when great affairs of state were under consideration differences of opinion bred factions, and factions might easily become feuds” which primarily manifested itself in “a latent rivalry among the members for a leading place in the

queen's favour" (Black, *Reign* 208). This, on the other hand, created a "frantic competition for places and preferment and the stresses this engendered" (Weir, *Elizabeth* 254). Therefore, "[e]very political decision and every official appointment became objects of closely observed factional competition, in which defeat was a serious blow to prestige and power. [...] There was no escape from conflict, and each side demanded loyalty" (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 101). For example, Francis Bacon's appointment to the post of Attorney-General in 1593 was hindered through the appointment of Robert Cecil's patronee which begot a brawl between the two in a coach and aggravated their relationship even though Cecil tried to compensate for Essex's loss by offering another post which also failed (Williams 345-6). Contrary to Williams' assertion about Elizabeth I's "independence" in relation to office appointments claimed to be seen in the "backfire[-effect]" towards "pressure upon her decision" (346), it should be noted that almost in every instance the suits of the Earl of Essex were rejected (Stone 483).³⁵ This one-sidedness of the distribution of royal patronage was further complicated with the death of other major councillors, after which the fight for the obtaining of offices accelerated. For example, in the case of the death of the Lord Chamberlain, Cobham, in 1597, the effects of a bottom-up urge for royal favour in a limited patronage system could be observed. "Early in 1597, the final illness and eventual death of old Lord Cobham plunged the Court into a hunt for offices" (Williams 354). Therefore, because of limited resources and the vacant seats in the Privy Council, every courtier wanted to be the sole advisor of Elizabeth I. Quite similarly, as Shakespeare's Winchester maintained years earlier on the stage, the real reason behind his feud with Gloucester was Gloucester's thirst to be the sole councillor of Henry VI. "It is because no one should sway but he, / No one but he should be about the King; / And that engenders thunder in his breast / And makes him roar these accusations forth" (*IHV* 3.1.37-40). This strife for the holding of the position of an advisor to the monarch showed how crucial the position itself was for it was through these offices that interest groups could develop and maintain their own strength.

In order to develop and maintain such strength, each interest group yearned for the position of the other. As rumours around the Court on the 12th of March 1591 and the 1st of July 1591 showed, "the great ones about her would each have his friend" for

appointments (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 16), which was valid, especially, for Essex who was hindered by his factional opponents so that he grew “impatient of the slow process he must needs have during the life and greatness of [his factional opponents] the Chancellor and the Lord Treasurer” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 38). Each faction was, as Winchester confirmed, “imperious in another’s throne” (*IHVI* 3.1.44). In particular, office promotion created a sort of envy in the party who was not promoted. The Duke of Exeter was, for instance, against Bishop Winchester’s promotion to cardinalship as Winchester would likely “make his cap co-equal with the crown” as once prophesied (*IHVI* 5.1.28-33). Therefore, promotion to office created factionalism as the promoted were accused of being too ambitious.

Moreover, leaders of interest groups could use patronees to fulfil their aspirations about royal favour. For example, when the patronees of Somerset and York wanted to determine their disagreement about whose patron was right in their own quarrel, their patrons asked Henry VI to grant the wish of their patronee (*IHVI* 4.1.78-81), in a way, to conclude their battle over privilege and favour. Here, cutting the favouritism of an opposing interest group was a means to protect the interests of one’s own faction. Thereby, factionalism over appointment was observed, at least, in hindering the opponent from getting royal favour. When the quarto edition of *2HVI* was published, the infamous coach incident between Robert Cecil and the Earl of Essex on the 6th of February 1594 elucidated how the Cecils in “preference of a stranger before” their “kinsman” Francis Bacon used every means to make the appointment of a patronee of a factional opponent “unlikely or impossible a manner” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 285). Therefore, any means might be used to prevent the advancement of an opposing interest group, even though this could harm one’s own relative in the process. In a similar vein, all possible means were used by Shakespeare’s factionalists in order to cut the favour of their opponents. For instance, Suffolk accused York of “treason” in order to repeal the appointment of the latter of the regentship of France (*2HVI* 1.3.178-9). Even the “suspicion” of “treason” made Humphrey of Gloucester advise the monarch to make one of York’s opponents, Somerset, the “regent o’er the French” (*2HVI* 1.3.205-7). Thus, the Yorkist faction’s favour was cut and that favour was directed in some vein to the Lancastrian interest group to which Suffolk and Somerset belonged. Hence,

factionalism over appointment was determined by hindering the opponent from getting royal favour. Courtiers plotted over favouritism and used Machiavellian techniques to get favours for their own party. In the trial of Sir John Perrot from 1591 to 1592, for instance, many of his factional opponents accused him of “treason” primarily to repeal his former “office” appointments in Ireland and, thus, strengthen their own interest groups (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 126). This interest-based motivation had noted by some critics who asserted that the fall of Perrot increased not only partisan factionalism but also led to Cecilian dominance and rise of corruption, especially in Ireland (Hammer 391). Thus, Somerset accusing York of treason and getting the appointment for regentship of France, was quite reflective of the means of factionalism in Elizabethan patronage as could be observed by the playgoers.

What is more, the cutting of favours had a twofold impact on a rival faction. Peculiarly, if an appointment was taken back from an interest group, the dispossessed courtier’s relationship with the sovereign could deteriorate into hatred while his rival got stronger. For instance, when Humphrey of Gloucester was discharged from the office of protectorship, his rivals, who “would ambitiously receive” that office, meaning anyone of the Lancastrian faction, were strengthened (*2HVI* 2.3.35-6). Therefore, the success of a factional opponent appointed instead of oneself fostered criticism towards the choice of the royal sovereign. This was also valid in the latter part of the Elizabethan reign. As Stone maintained,

[t]he successful operation of the Court system depended on the maintenance of a delicate and extremely complicated balance. Since offices suitable to the nobility were restricted in number; the greatest care had to be exercised in the distribution of these few so as to prevent a monopoly of tenure by any one faction. When this occurred, as under [...] Sir Robert Cecil, [...] explosive tensions built up among the excluded. The power of promotion and reward was the greatest hold the Crown exercised over the nobility and it was essential that this [...] should continue (481)

For example, after Somerset was appointed as Regent of France and “lost” most part of it, York remembered his dismissal from the office through Suffolk’s manoeuvres (*2HVI* 3.1.289-300). Someone’s being appointed to any post created strife among factions. An able monarch had to balance the needs of each faction without making either one strong enough to contest him/her.

Amid such tensions, in order to get royal favour and protect it, the means of late Elizabethan factionalism were backbiting, slandering reputation, and even the use of physical violence. As for backbiting, in the contemporary memoirs of Birch it was stated that “there was never in Court such emulation, such envy, such back-biting as is now at this time” (qtd. in Williams 341). To have a friend at court was therefore beneficial, and there was the potential threat of backbiting if one did not financially support a friend at court. Around the time the quarto edition of *2HIV* was printed, the importance of having friends at court that could be also foes was seen in a contemporary incident. According to Court news on the 1st of December 1599, Lord Mountjoy departed with Sir George Carew to Ireland as the Lord President of Munster not only because of his deeds to the crown and knowledge of the realm but also because “[h]e hath very good friends in Court, which would be very useful for Lord Mountjoy (Harrison, *Last* 57). The importance of having good friends at court was shown in the letter of Elizabeth I on the same Lord Mountjoy on the 3rd of December 1600 in which she assured him of her confidence in him and told him not to care for the patronees of his predecessor, the Earl of Essex, who tried to demoralise him through their “backbit[ing]” (Harrison, *Last* 127-8). To be careful with friends at court was also shown by Shakespeare when Justice Shallow urged to be mindful in having a friend at court: “Yea, Davy, I will use him well: a friend i’th’court is / better than a penny in purse. Use his men well, / Davy, for are arrant knaves and will backbite” (*2HIV* 5.1.28-30). While the passage showed the material benefits of having a friend at court, which would bring almost permanent financial resources, the threat of backbiting if the friend in court was not looked after was the side effect of this reciprocal relationship. This side effect, on the other hand, was used as a means of factionalism, which would, certainly, be affirmed by the Elizabethan playgoers who were aware of the circumstances of friendship in the Court, through any bureaucratic work that could be accomplished only by making friends in the Court by means of bribery (MacCaffrey, “Place” 117).

Similarly, slandering the opponent’s reputation was a means of factionalism because reputation was related with one’s status and credibility in society. The Elizabethan preoccupation with credibility manifesting itself in a “cult of reputation” (Stone 42), rendered reputation both the strongest and most vulnerable part of personal credibility.

Therefore, “[n]othing could be more damaging than to cast aspersions on someone’s ancestry or ancestors, and the consequence of such aspersions often led to duels and/or generational feuding” (Canino 7-8). For the Elizabethans, honour and reputation were linked together and the former “was the essence of [one’s] reputation in the eyes of his social equals” (Fletcher, “Honour” 93). Hence, accusations harming one’s reputation were used as means of psychological war against members of another faction, which could generate reciprocal manoeuvres to undo each other. From the very beginnings of the problematic last decade of the Elizabethan reign until the very end of it, members of different interest groups used accusations as means of factionalism. For instance, after the death of Sir John Perrot who fell from grace because of his factional opponents, it was reported on the 4th of November 1592 that “[m]any declare that his fall was brought about through the malice of Sir Christopher Hatton, the Lord Chancellor, whom Sir John had taunted because, as he said, he danced himself into favour” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 179). This generated a much stronger reaction from Sir Christopher Hatton whose reputation was at stake. Similarly, on the 8th of May 1602, the Earl of Northumberland and Sir Francis Vere had a brawl and they accused each other of being “knave[s],” “coward[s],” “buffoon[s],” “liar[s]” and “base-minded” men (Harrison, *Last* 274-5) in order to wound each other’s public image. For the honour-conscious Elizabethan society, the use of propaganda in factional friction was considered so harmful that on the Elizabethan stage it was likened to the poison of a reptile. As Shakespeare’s Norfolk maintained, the besmirching of one’s reputation as manifestation of psychological violence against people from other interest groups had longer-lasting effects than physical violence. An honourable death and having a “fair name” was preferred to be “disgraced” by “shame” which would be “[p]ierced to the soul with Slander’s venom’d spear, / The which no balm can cure but his heart-blood / Which breathed this poison” (*RII* 1.1.165-73). Indeed, “[t]he purest treasure mortal times afford / Is spotless reputation; that away, / Men are but gilded loam or painted clay,” whereof Norfolk acclaimed that “[one’s] honour is [one’s] life; both grow in one. / Take honour from [him], and [his] life is done,” which his opponent Bolingbroke affirmed in his words upon his own “honour” and Norfolk’s “[s]hame” (*RII* 1.1.175-95). Thus, one of the means of factionalism was the use of psychological war which led to hatred as both parties besmirched each other’s reputation. This, on the other hand, had longer-

lasting effects on both the public image of courtiers and the fossilisation of conflict between interest groups.

Besides, apart from intentional attacks on the reputation of factional opponents, there could be unintended but far more effective media for psychological warfare in factionalism. Rumour, for instance, was the outcome of unintentional ironic popular opinion which was related with the comparatively restricted and unreliable means of informative exchange in the Early Modern Period. As Humphreys maintained in his annotations on *2HIV*, Rumour or Fame was commonly used in classical, Medieval and Renaissance literature as allegory of misinformation (4). Similarly, one year before the first performance of *2HIV*, on the 29th of April 1596 a boy was sentenced for spreading false rumours where, accordingly,

[o]ne Smith, being a base fellow, a peasant and a boy, was this day sentenced in the Star Chamber to lose one of his ears upon the pillory at Westminster, the other at Windsor, to be whipped, and to have a paper on his head containing his slanderous words, to be imprisoned during pleasure, and fined £20. This fellow being recently one of the pressed men at Dover reported when he was dismissed that the news throughout the soldiers was that the Lord Admiral's ship being searched by the Earl of Essex, gunpowder, found ashes, dust and sand; and thereupon he called the Lord Admiral traitor. And so they came both to Court, and there the Earl of Essex and the Earl of Cumberland before the Queen took the Lord Admiral by the beard, saying 'Ah, thou traitor.' (Harrison, *Second* 93)

The disruptive potential of spreading rumours had negative effects, both on individual members, by wounding their reputation, and on the general factional battle between interest groups where any misinformation could trigger even physical violence, wherefore spreaders of rumours were condemned. The effectiveness of rumour was emphasised by Shakespeare, as well. Rumour was "anatomize[d]" in the Prologue of *2HIV* where he "*painted full of tongues*" set forth the specific means of misinformation like "continual slanders," "[s]tuffing the ears of men with false reports," "speak[ing] of peace while covert enmity, / Under the smile of safety wounds the world," and argued, gradually from the origin of the report "through the peasant towns" to the intended place of misinformation in the form of "smooth comforts false, worse than true wrongs," that there was "stern tyrant war" while there was "no such matter" (*2HIV* Induction.1-40). Rumour told the opposite of what happened at the end of *1HIV* and claimed that Henry IV had lost against Hotspur, although the opposite was true.

Thereby, rumour was the starting point of dramatic irony that opened the first scene of the play. Although Lord Bardolph assumed “[a]s good as heart can wish” that Henry IV was “wounded to the death,” his son Hal was killed by Hotspur Percy, his forces dispersed and Falstaff taken prisoner by Hotspur, Travers who first heard a similar account by Sir John Umfrevile learned from “[a] gentleman” that the “rebellion had ill luck” and Hotspur was killed (*2HIV* 1.1.13-48). Therefore, since the means for information exchange was unreliable, misinformation could be channelled through anyone, so that rumour had nothing to do with one’s own social status. Hence, although Lord Bardolph and Sir Umfrevile were noble persons they were vulnerable to false report and, quite accidentally, someone, who was of no significance, related to Travers the true version of the incidents. Consequently, not only intentional psychological war on factional opponents but also unintended slanders on the public image of those opponents by rumours and misinformation could be considered as means of factionalism.

Likewise, in accusations of treason that were related with factionalism, it was not important which party told the truth. What mattered was to condemn, disgrace and harm the members of the opposing interest group. For instance, the Trial of Sir John Perrot on the 27th of April 1592 showed how personal testimony and baseless assumptions were enough to condemn a nobleperson in the Elizabethan reign (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 125-6). In particular, Sir John Perrot was accused of contrived “rebellion against” and deposition of “the Queen” in 1587 after “treasonable practices” he “conferred with Sir William Stanley in 1586” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 125-6). These accusations were primarily based on “the imagination of the heart [of Sir John Perrot]; which imagination was of itself high treason, albeit the same proceeded not to any overt fact” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 126). A couple of years before Sir John Perrot’s trial (Bullough 3:24), Shakespeare’s *IHVI* similarly depicted on the Elizabethan stage the unimportance of fact in the face of factional quarrel. In particular, after the natural death of Henry V, Gloucester accused Winchester of having “contrive[ed]” to kill the deceased monarch, whereas Gloucester’s “manifest conspirator” accused Gloucester of being “a foe to citizens” by trying to control the monarch and usurping the crown, that is, “[t]o crown himself king and suppress the Prince” (*IHVI* 1.3.33-4, 1.3.62-8). Even many years after

the production of the play and Sir John Perrot's trial, many incidents about the misinformation "put upon" the nobility "by [their] enemies," like the one about the Earl of Lincoln on the 30th of July 1602, were reported by Elizabethans (Harrison, *Last* 292). Thus, the end of accusation was not to discover truth but to create advantage by disadvantaging factional opponents.

Moreover, apart from verbal accusations, accusations in written form, namely in the form of pamphlets, were used against factional opponents. Apart from the pamphlets concerning religious disputes between Anglicans, Recusants, and Puritans (Black, *Reign* 201-2; Voss 77; Collinson, "Ecclesiastical" 153), accusations in written form were an effective means of factionalism. For example, Winchester accused Gloucester of having composed "deep premediated lines" and "written pamphlets studiously devis'd" in order to bring a "charge" against him, for which Winchester wanted Gloucester to deliver an impromptu accusation, an "extemporal speech" to question and "answer" him "without invention" (*IHVI* 3.1.1-7). This scene emphasised the effectiveness of written accusations devised in advance in factional friction. In line with this, as forms of written accusations, petitioners in the petition system were used as informants against each other. As Mack put forth, the humanist education based on the Greek and Roman classics trained generations in the rhetoric of verbal and written information to counteract "accusations" (296). For example, on the 28th of January 1593, Sir Henry Knivett who was "committed to the Fleet by the Lord Keeper for having allowed his servants to commit an outrage upon a person coming to serve a process on a gentlewoman then residing in his house" made use of written accusations wherefore "he wrote a letter to some of her Majesty's Privy Council in which he slandered the proceedings of the Lord Keeper, alleging them to have been unjust" (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 192). The same letter got into the hands of the same Lord Keeper who allowed Sir Knivett to present his "proofs of his allegations" in front of the lords of the Council Board, "which being carefully heard, it appeared that he [Sir Knivett] had unjustly, undutifully and indiscreetly slandered the Lord Keeper, and for this offence he was committed to the Fleet" for which "he wrote a letter of submission, acknowledging his offence, beseeching the pardon of their Lordships and their favourable mediation with the Lord Keeper" (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 192-3). Quite similarly, the rhetorical

tradition used in legal disputes based on factional quarrels was reflected on the Elizabethan stage and was published one year after Sir Knivett's accusations in the quarto edition of *2HVI*. For instance, although there seemed to be no direct relationship between the petitioners and the noblemen whom they wanted to "deliver" their "supplications" (*2HVI* 1.3.1-3), the first and second petitioners were quite mindful to whom they should give their petitions. When the third petitioner, Peter, mistook Suffolk for Protector Gloucester, the latter of whom was the intended defendant of the petitions, the second petitioner called him back (*2HVI* 1.3.6-9), because the petition was directed "[a]gainst the Duke / of Suffolk, for enclosing the commons of Melford." (*2HVI* 1.3.20-1). The disclosure of the content of the petition was functionally mediated through Peter whose petition, on the other hand, was indirectly against one of Suffolk's opponents. In particular, Peter's "master Thomas / Horner" said that "the Duke of York was rightful / heir to the crown" (*2HVI* 1.3.25-7), whereby he accused York of the same and gave Suffolk the opportunity to use this information against his factional foe. Soon, the petition against Suffolk was torn by Queen Margaret and forgotten from then on, and the focus would be Peter's accusation against his master which would be used against York by Suffolk (*2HVI* 1.3.178-9). The arbitrary and parodic result of trial by combat where the strong yet drunk master Thomas Horner was killed by the weak servant Peter was used to justify York's discharge from the office of regentship of France (*2HVI* 2.3.54-106), which, thus, showed the effectiveness of accusations to harm factional opponents.

Similarly, accusations about treason could be directed at opponents through the behaviour of the people around them. For instance, when Shakespeare's Lord Derby approached Queen Elizabeth, the Queen immediately referred to Lord Derby's wife's not loving her as part of the royal family (*RIII* 1.3.19-29). The Queen's "I hate not you for her proud arrogance" (*RIII* 1.3.24) was a sarcastic and covert threat to mind his behaviour. Lord Derby tried to persuade the Queen that she had been either misinformed through "envious slanders of her false accusers" or behaved because of a "wayward sickness, and no grounded malice" (*RIII* 1.3.25-9). As was noted by Canino, Shakespeare made the Stanley in *RIII* more important than he was depicted in the chronicles in order to please the contemporary Stanleys, whose branch of the Derbys

were known to be loyal to the status quo (193-4). This was also related with the fact that Shakespeare was a direct or indirect patron of the Stanleys when *RIII* was performed (George” 306-7, 319; Manley, “Great” 169).³⁶ This is why, Shakespeare’s unhistorical reference to the quarrel between the queen and Stanley’s wife in *RIII* rather alluded to the contemporary Fourth Earl’s wife’s hostility towards Elizabeth I. As Canino further stated, “[t]he animosity between the two woman, which was widely known throughout London, had not abated in the early 1590s – it was a hatred that lingered. Elizabeth viewed Margaret as proud and arrogant and almost everyone, especially her husband, viewed her as weak” (194). Therefore, the fictive Stanley’s assurance that accusations towards his wife were but rumours and should not be taken into consideration suggested that Elizabeth I should not take heed of rumours against the Stanleys whom Shakespeare seemed to protect considering the power of accusations within factionalism and his relationship with the real-life Stanleys.

Nonetheless, the use of accusations, which was part of the mechanism of power struggle, was not related with the surface structure of factionalism, that is, with the specific persons involved, but with the deep structure and the unspoken consensus among the nobility. The “quarrel” between the Earl of Northumberland and the Earl of Southampton on the 5th of February 1597, where it “was like to have proceeded to a combat, insomuch that my Lord of Southampton sent a gentleman with his rapier” and the “quarrel” between the Earl of Essex and the Earl of Nottingham on the 21st of December 1597 (Harrison, *Second* 166, 244-5) follow the same pattern of accusation and offer of combat. When these incidents had happened, the quarto edition of *RII* was published; in it a similar repetitive scheme of factional friction could be observed by the Elizabethan readers. For instance, the scene where Bolingbroke and Mowbray accused each other of “treason,” fraud and murder and the scene where Bagot and Aumerle triggered a similar series of accusations were taken as parallels by many critics (*RII* 1.1.20-108, 4.1.1-107; MacIsaac 139; Ribner 160; Low 270). In both cases, opponents personally quarrelled as a reflection of their factional affiliations as either pro- or anti-Ricardian courtiers. Thereby, accusation as a means in factionalism showed a repetitive pattern manipulated to the idiosyncratic interests of each member and the overall advantages of a faction.

However, one of the most effective of verbal or written accusations concerned one's religious stance. All in all, religion was still an important marker for inclusion in or exclusion from Elizabethan society (Bayne 48-78; Williams 465-87; Guy, "Elizabethan" 126-49). Therefore, either some devotional practices were shown as deviant forms of religion or secular deviant practices were linked to the presence of sins (Collingwood 53; Walsham 16; Elton 397). Thereby, accusations about disregarding earthly and heavenly authority were linked, as accusations regarding heavenly issues strengthen the validity of accusations concerning secular matters. For example, in the trial of Sir John Perrot, while "Mr. Attorney proceeded to pen the treason which [was] alleged against Sir John," he used all his means of inductive and deductive reasoning to "prove" him "irreligious" and "of no religion" based mostly on the testimony of his accusers, one of whom Sir John declared unreliable because the accuser had "changed his religion five times in six years" (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 126-8). This elucidated the shaky, yet, effective ground on which accusations against the lack of religious devotion was based. Similarly, Shakespeare's characters made use of accusations against the religious adherence of their factional opponents. For instance, apart from accusations about murder or fraud, Protector Gloucester accused Winchester of being promiscuous as he gave "whores indulgences to sin" (*1HVI* 1.3.35). Similarly, York questioned his rivals' religious devotion and accused the Duchess of Gloucester of exorcism as a means to avenge himself on his factional opponent Protector Gloucester. In particular, York made use of the Duchess of Gloucester's tendencies towards ambition by employing Father John Hume as an intermediary between her, a "witch," and a "conjurer" demanded to accelerate the downfall of her foes through witchcraft (*2HVI* 1.2.74-86). York discovered the Duchess *in flagrante delicto* after the conjurers had interrogated a spirit about the futures of the king, York, Suffolk, and Somerset (*2HVI* 1.4.23-71). Thereby, Protector Gloucester's reputation was wounded through the "disgrace" (*2HVI* 1.3.97) he would suffer because of his wife's behaviour. Therefore, York took delight in his "pretty plot, well chosen to build upon" the Duchess, thus, building upon the "lord protector" as a "sorry breakfast" (*2HVI* 1.3.97, 1.4.56, 1.4.75). Hence, accusing one of real or alleged acts against religion was an effective means used by courtiers to undo their opponents.

Likewise, accusations related to atheism turned “atheist” into an offensive and degrading word in Elizabethan times and a catchword in factional power struggles. One year after the production of *2HVI* (Bullough 3:89), a “Scurrilous Jesuit Pamphlet” referred to the common accusations made against

Sir Walter Raleigh [...] [as] he keeps a school of Atheism much frequented, with a certain necromantic astronomer as schoolmaster, where no small number of young men of noble birth learn to deride the Old Law of Moses as well as the New Law of Christ with ingenious quips and jests; and among other things to spell the name of God backwards. [...] He compareth the seminaries, which the proclamation denounced, with the colleges in the two Universities of England neither for lack of living nor for crimes committed, for they are commonly gentlemen, or wealthy peoples’ children, and might easily have had preferment if they would apply themselves to the protestants’ proceedings. Moreover he showeth that a great multitude of gentlemen’s sons leaving their inheritances and other hopes of worldly possibilities at home come over daily to study and to be made priests with infinite desire to return again quickly to England. He declareth that there are more gentlemen at this time in the English seminaries of France, Rome and Spain than in all the clergy of England twice told, to which no gentlemen will afford his son to be a minister and much less his daughter to be a minister’s wife. (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 154)

As Greenblatt stated, the “notorious police report of 1593 on Christopher Marlowe” by the “Elizabethan spy Richard Baines” about ““Moses was but a Juggler, and that one Heriots being Sir W Raleighs man Can do more than he” reflected that “[c]harges of atheism levelled at Harriot or anyone else in this period [...] were smear tactics, used with reckless abandon against anyone whom the accuser happened to dislike” (“Invisible” 21). Hence, accusations against factional opponents through the use of references to atheism were motivated by friction rather than truth. Accusations of atheism, which were related with matters of religion, were linked to the secular world. Accordingly, since atheists did not fear God, they would commit any crime, whereby the accusers would be justified in their accusations. Thereby, “[t]he authority is secular as well as religious, since atheism is frequently adduced as a motive for heinous crimes, as if all men and women would inevitably conclude that if God does not exist, everything is permitted” (Greenblatt, “Invisible” 22). Therefore, personally rebelling against God through sinning was equated to and linked with rebelling against the crown. For example, Shakespeare’s Duchess of Gloucester’s “confederacy” with “[a] sort of naughty persons, lewdly bent” was not just a matter of personal deviation, but such a group “[d]ealing with witches and with conjurers” rather “[h]ave practised dangerously

against your [the monarch's] state" especially through "[d]emanding of King Henry's life and death / And other of your highness' Privy Council" (*2HVI* 2.1.157-68), which turned personal sin into public conspiracy. Such accusations, on the other hand, did "defile nobility" and "[dishonour]" an "honest name" (*2HVI* 2.1.181-90). Thereby, more harm was given to the factional opponent than physical violence could engender. As the Duke of Gloucester maintained, "had I twenty times so many foes, / And each of them had twenty times their power, / All these could not procure me any scathe / So long as I am loyal, true and crimeless" (*2HVI* 2.4.60-3). Hence, to undo a factional rival's reputation gave more harm to the opponent, wherefrom the accuser did not get any harm. Using this means, a member of an interest group did not need to be seen violent in front of the sovereign and exhaust any of his physical powers.

Moreover, in order to affect an opponent's social standing, politically motivated accusation of bastardy was employed. Right in the beginning of Essex's rise to power, in order to disgrace him as part of "factional vendettas," a "libellous pamphlet" was issued wherein "the old story of Leicester's illicit affair with Essex's mother and the alleged poisoning of his father" were dealt with (Hammer 37). Although Hammer further commented that there was no source about Essex's reaction towards it, this form of orthographic violence must have generated "outrage" (37). The use of accusations against lineage and reactions towards these accusations could be found several years after the incident in the early production of *2HVI* in 1592. When Queen Margaret, for instance, wanted to support Suffolk, Warwick wanted to silence her by claiming that any support of the Earl would be "slander to [her] royal dignity" (*2HVI* 3.2.209). Suffolk re-directed questions of womanly dignity and allusions to illicit relationship towards Warwick's mother in order to wound him by claiming that his "mother took into her blameful bed / Some stern untutored churl" and not his father of "Nevilles' noble race," which created an exchange of accusations whereby Warwick returned the accusation by saying "I would, false murderous coward, on thy knee / Make thee beg pardon for thy passed speech, / And say it was thy mother that thou meant'st / That thou thyself was born in bastardy" (*2HVI* 3.2.210-26). Pedigree was the Achilles heel of the nobility whose identity was built on the legitimate succession of their ancestral rights associated with their birth. Any accusation questioning their lineal descent did not only

deprive them of their forefathers in whom they took pride but also of the titles and lands they had acquired through them. Therefore, it was quite normal within the limits of the honour code that the party whose reputation was wounded, that is, Warwick, did not simply use the same form of psychological warfare but also threatened with violence in order to defend his reputation. In a similar vein, the future Richard III tried to persuade the people to make them believe in his attempts to declare Edward V and his brother bastards, in order to undo his opponents. In particular, Richard of Gloucester ordered the Duke of Buckingham to follow London's "mayor" to "Guildhall" and relate "the bastardy of Edward's children," along with accusations of lawless execution, "hateful luxury," "bestial appetite," "lust" and that the same late Edward V was begotten illegitimately yet minding to "touch this [last item] sparingly" as their "mother [still] lives" (*RIII* 3.5.71-93). These accusations, however, which were not real and were used for political manipulation, became public opinion. Especially, through the well-organised scenario, the Duke of Buckingham led the Mayor of London and the Londoners to Richard of Gloucester's house where Richard appeared as a pious person who was not interested at all in the crown (*RIII* 3.7.42-139). Right before the people urged Richard to take the crown, the Duke of Buckingham repeated the accusations against the late Edward IV. In particular, the Duke of Buckingham consciously referred to the "blemished stock" of Edward IV who would bring "infamy" through the spread of "ignoble plants" (*RIII* 3.7.116-39). Comparing and contrasting accusations of bastardy with the accomplishments of Richard of Gloucester, such as his "state of fortune" and "lineal glory," created a public opinion in favour of Richard and in disfavour against Edward IV and his line, wherefore "the citizens" turned to be Richard's "very worshipful and loving friends" (*RIII* 3.7.117-37). Thus, the importance of the use of accusations of bastardy in factional quarrels between meritocrats and/or aristocrats could be observed, especially in relation with their public standing, status and rights aligned to the birth-rights of the nobility.

However, violence could be used if other means failed to win against the factional opponent. The concept of honour legitimised the use of violence in Early Modern England. As James argued, as an extension of the "long-established military and chivalric tradition" to "resort to violence is natural and justifiable" as "[h]onour could

both legitimize and provide moral reinforcement for a politics of violence” (308-9). However, the emergence of the rapier after the 1580s created an epistemological shift from grand-scale battles between factions into personal duels (Stone 245-6).³⁷ Likewise, violence within the Court became unlikely as it was not only forbidden through repressive means but also through the creation of auto-control since fortune was linked directly to the sovereign within the Court (Loades, *Tudor* 90). Yet, although grand-scale violence was avoided, physical violence had not been eliminated and had just evolved to another kind from the 1580s onwards. Actually, since factions envied each other and seemed to be capable of doing anything to sustain their interests, a paranoid atmosphere was created where plotting for the opponent’s death, whether based on solid facts or not, was possible. The main determiner in the hastening of the Essex rebellion, for instance, was stated by the Earl of Essex himself as the threat he felt for his life (Harrison, *Last* 146; Gajda, *Earl* 32). The possibility of the use of physical violence when other means failed to undo factional opponents was also viewed by Elizabethan playgoers. For instance, Protector Gloucester argued that Winchester twice “[laid] a trap to take [his] life,” one “at London Bridge” and another “at the Tower,” which apart from Gloucester’s accusations that Winchester also wanted to kill the monarch, were signs of his “treachery” which were “manifest” through his plots to murder him out of his “envious malice” and “swelling heart” (*IHVI* 3.1.21-6). Likewise, a similar enmity could be observed when Suffolk ordered the murder of the same Gloucester. Yet, contrary to Winchester, Suffolk was successful in the destruction of his factional opponent. Suffolk commanded two murderers to kill Gloucester in his chamber for the accomplishment of which he “[would] reward” them “for this venturous deed” (*2HVI* 3.2.1-12). Hence, envy and hatred against members of different interest groups could result in the contrivance of plots, even though they may or may not be successful.

Besides, the enmity between members of different factions that could result in physical violence was without mercy. Honour violence had no rules in Elizabethan society and it was pivotal to save one’s own honour even with violence, wherefore the “obsession” of Young Clifford with his father’s death created some sort of “sympathy” or at least “understanding” in the Elizabethan audience (Canino 168-70). Shakespeare’s Clifford killed York’s young son, Rutland, in order to avenge his own father’s death. The cruelty

of infanticide had been noted by many critics so far (Gibinska 47; Goy-Blanquet, *Early History Plays* 165; Djordjevic 195). Yet, it should be noted that Young Clifford's reputation, hence, his personal standing in society, was at stake. Therefore, to uphold the dignity of his own faction even this act of violence seemed for him not sufficient enough to quell his anger towards his factional opponents. Clifford maintained,

Had thy brethren here, their lives and thine
 Were not revenge sufficient for me.
 No, if I digged up thy forefathers' graves
 And hung their rotten coffins up in chains,
 It could not slake mine ire nor ease my heart.
 The sight of any of the house of York
 Is as a Fury to torment my soul:
 And till I root out their accursed line
 And leave not one alive, I live in hell. (*3HVI* 1.3.25-33)

The elements of honour and pride in pedigree justified the behaviour of Shakespeare's Clifford along with his depiction as heroic, loyal and valiant nobleperson, just like the popular contemporary Third Earl of Clifford as noted by Canino (171-2). Yet, it also showed that rivalry between factions of courtiers could supersede the boundaries of common sense and mercy.

What is more, the use of physical violence created a vicious circle where factional opponents wasted their energies on each other. Towards the final stages of the Essex-Cecil rivalry, friction did not limit itself to sabre rattling but disrupted in instances of physical violence. On the 9th of January 1601, Lord Grey, of the Cecil faction, and the Earl of Southampton, supporter of the Earl of Essex, had open quarrel on the street where "Lord Grey, upon some new conceived discontent, assaulted my Lord of Southampton on horseback in the street with drawn sword, for which contempt against her Majesty's commandment he is committed to the Fleet. My Lord of Essex is greatly offended thereat" (Harrison, *Last* 139). The possibility of exchange of physical violence between the Cecil faction and the Essex circle must have further accelerated the Earl of Essex's feeling of being threatened, which led to his rebellion (Harrison, *Last* 146; Gajda, *Earl* 32). This type of disruptive and repetitive pattern of exchange of physical violence had been shown on the Elizabethan stage years ago (Bullough 3:23) and published as a quarto in 1600 when the Cecils and the Essexians frequently quarrelled

in open way. In the play, the Yorkists killed the son of Henry VI, both to avenge their father's death and to undo the Lancastrian faction by killing the heir apparent. The future Edward IV, the future Richard III and George of Clarence stabbed Henry VI's son (*3HVI* 5.5.38-40) as a decisive and final strike against their factional foes. In real-life, the Elizabethan audience members could similarly see, especially in later stages of factionalism, that physical violence became an inescapable consequence of the clash of interests.

Yet, factional violence was not just related with the upper strata of society but was devastating for the whole of the country as it was extended towards the bases of interest groups. Thereby, potentials that could have been cooperating with each other were wasted. For instance, at Norwich in October 1600, Sir Robert Mansell, "a friend of Cecil" fought a duel with Sir John Heydon who was "a follower of Essex" (Boyer 280). As Boyer further related, "[t]he two knights fought savagely, clumsily, 'as if they ran at tilt with their rapiers.' Heydon wounded Mansell eight times. Mansell wounded Heydon twelve times and finally cut off his hand" (280). Hence, factional friction had effects on and was also generated by lesser patronees, wherein the direction of physical violence was just determined by faction affiliation. Therefore, since factionalism was not a matter of familial bonds, physical violence could result in infanticide or patricide, as had been shown on the Elizabethan stage and published around the time when Mansell and Heydon fought against each other in 1600. In Shakespeare's *3HVI*, for example, Elizabethans could read again the story of a Lancastrian son who unintentionally killed his Yorkist father, and a father who unintentionally killed his son from another faction (*3HVI* 2.5.55-122). As the father maintained, it was an "[e]rroneous" and "deadly quarrel" (*3HVI* 2.5.90-1). On an off the stage, in violent conflicts of factional quarrels (*3HVI* 2.5.74), patronees were subject to more devastation.

Contrary to the majority of the historical matter of medieval warfare depicted on the Elizabethan stage, violence during the reign of Elizabeth I had lost most of its organised aspect and became rather a matter of temporary outburst between individuals through duels. Yet, violence as a means of solving problems was still valid in the Elizabethan mind. These duels were formally forbidden in order to canalise the energy of opposing

groups into non-violent means of power struggles whereby the crown could also benefit, as in the case of the quarrel between the Earl of Essex and Kildare in 1591 after which they were bound by the Queen to “each in securities of £10,000 not to assault, challenge or provoke the other” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 22). Physical violence, however, was still used in crises situations. Therefore, duels as forms of determining justice were also portrayed in Shakespeare’s plays as means of handling conflicts between interest groups. For instance, one year after a probable early production of *KJ* (Bullough 4:1), in 1591 it was reported that “[t]he Lord Admiral and Sir Walter Raleigh have quarrelled and offered combat” to each other to solve their dispute about conduct of warfare and their place in the protocol (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 69). Warfare in any form, whether real war, tournament or duel, was seen as God’s justice in the form of “trial” to determine “whose right is worthiest,” that is, “lawful” and “right” according to Providence’s grace, as in the case of when the citizens of Angiers urged King John and King Phillip to fight in order to determine the rightful king to enter their town (*KJ* 2.1.206-66, 281-6, 307-11). Hence, the winner would be determined by God’s justice. Likewise, in the year when the quarto edition of *RII* was published, on the 21st of December 1597 it was reported that the Earl of Essex wanted to resolve his contravention with the Earl of Nottingham about precedence in the Privy Council, as he

desires right to be done him, either by a commission to examine it, or by combat, either against the Earl of Nottingham himself or any of his sons or name that shall defend it; or that it will please her Majesty to see the wrongs done to him, and so will suffer himself to be commanded by her. There is such ado about it as troubles the place and all proceedings. Sir Walter Raleigh is employed to end this quarrel and make atonement between them. But the resolution of Lord Essex is not to yield but with altering the patent, which cannot be done by persuasion to bring the Earl of Nottingham to it. (Harrison, *Second* 244-5)

Yet, as it has been noted, trial by combat as proposed leveller of factional problems affected domestic peace and order. A similar quarrel and demand for trial by duel was asked by Shakespeare’s Bolingbroke and Mowbray who, after Richard II’s persuasion failed to suppress their anger and “purge this choler without letting blood,” were allowed to fight a duel to determine who was right in his accusation of “high treason” related with fraud and murder of Woodstock (*RII* 1.1.153, 1.1.87-108). Bolingbroke linked justice with the outcome of the fight by stating “[w]hat my tongue speaks my right drawn sword may prove,” which Mowbray accepted if the fight was conducted

through the “chivalrous design of knightly trial” which would eliminate the one who “unjustly [fought]” (*RII* 1.1.30-83). Richard II ordered that preparations for a duel be made “[a]t Coventry, upon Saint Lambert’s Day. / There shall your swords and lances arbitrate” whereby not only the quarrel would be “settled” but will be solved according to “[j]ustice” through the “victor’s chivalry,” that is, his skill in warfare as manifestation of God’s justice (*RII* 1.1.196-205). Therefore, victory in combat was linked to God’s will which was linked to the outcome of justice (Low 273). Bolingbroke and Mowbray similarly appealed to “heaven,” “God’s grace,” their “good cause” and “innocency” (*RII* 1.3.11-41). When Richard II interfered in the process of the trial by throwing his warder down (*RII* 1.3.118), however, he intervened in God’s judgment and ordained an uneven decision, banning Norfolk for life while banning Bolingbroke for ten years, whereby he broke the order of justice in which no party was satisfied with the decision. Although Hamilton defined Richard II’s behaviours within his “royal prerogative” (14), the monarch’s interference to the outcome of the duel posited the problematic constitution of the equation of God’s law with the monarch’s decisions who could misuse his powers for his own “advantage” rather than considering justice (Low 271; Prior 145; Çağlayan 55). A patron needed to be impartial and to be a mediator between courtiers to prevent violence. For instance, in the same play later, Bagot accused Aumerle, a supporter of the former monarch, of having killed Woodstock, and Henry Bolingbroke, now Henry IV, proceeded in a quite different way. Although the incident primarily related to Aumerle and Bagot escalated into a grand-scale inter-factional quarrel through the multiple exchange of gages (*RII* 4.1.1-107), Henry IV did not yield to demands of trial by combat or made an arbitrary decision but tried to find a common and non-violent ground to solve the problem. For that reason, Henry IV suspended the issue to a later “trial by jury” whereby “common law” would try the disputants (Low 273). Thereby, rather than manipulating the case for his own end, in undoing a factional opponent, Henry IV found a compromise based on law on which all of the courtiers could agree.

Nevertheless, such idealisation of conflict-solving on the Elizabethan stage was not apparent in real-life as Elizabeth I could not control the patronage system but rather transferred her responsibilities and powers onto the meritocracy. Thereby, she excluded

the aristocracy from favour and created a misbalance in royal favours wherefrom factionalism accelerated in the last decade of Elizabeth I's reign. The verbal, written and physical means of factionalism, on the other hand, were used for the advantage of one's own faction. Nevertheless, the chief means of survival in this system was to use theatricality and hypocrisy within and without the Court of Elizabeth I, which will be dealt in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE THEATRICALITY OF DISSIMULATION

Factionalism within and without the Elizabethan court necessitated members of different factions to conceal their behaviour as any information could be abused by a factional opponent to wound one's reputation. Therefore, the chief means for survival in this system was to use theatricality and hypocrisy. The theatricality of Elizabethan behaviour, however, was not solely driven by the maxims of the Court. In particular, humanist education through rhetoric and drama trained the future members of the society to shape previously acquired information according to occasion and audience, with suitable words, effective gestures and mimics. The majority of the Elizabethan people received a basic Latin education in grammar schools where they analysed Roman rhetoricians, like Cicero, Ovid or Vergil, and playwrights, such as Terence and Plautus, through which both analytical skills and performative skills were acquired (Mack 2; Simon 4-7, 23; Byrne 216-7; Gurr, *Playgoing* 80-1). They were educated in the skills of "[i]nvention, that is, "the assembly of material," "[d]isposition," that is, the "appropriate structure," "[s]tyle," "[m]emory" and "[d]elivery," that is, "the use of voice and gesture" (Mack 9). Likewise, making use of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, they constructed their own credibility, their *ethos*, took necessary precautions to gather supportive material, the *logos*, and were careful to take *pathos*, that is, audience needs and values, into consideration (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* bk. 1.3, page 17; Mack 52-3). Apart from classical texts, in grammar schools and subsequent levels of education, Lily's *Grammar* (1557), Cox's *The Art or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (1532), Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), Rainolde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563), and Day's *The English Secreterie* (1586) were used to train future members of Elizabethan society in how to make use of verbal performance. Similarly, Early Modern conduct books shaped by humanist thought argued for the use of rhetoric and histrionic behaviour, such as Castiglione's *Covrtyer* (1528) whose *sprezzatura*, translated by Sir Thomas Hoby (1577) as "*Reckelefneffe to couer Arte*" (Yv^t) maintained the artful concealment of behaviour. The importance of histrionic behaviour was also reflected in the publication of several books on poetry and rhetoric. Peacham's *The Garden of Eloquence* (1577), Sidney's *Defence of Poesie* (1595) on "counterfetting" (C2^v), and Puttenham's *Arte of*

English Poesie (1589), especially the passages on “ornament” (114-130), linked oratory performance with literature. Through basic education in grammar schools, further education and publication of books related to the issue, the average Elizabethan was trained in social performance that was necessary in a deferential and hierarchically ordained society. In particular, the careful scrutiny of one’s place in social hierarchy determined by gender, profession, and age, the use of “thou” and “thee” towards equals and inferiors for informal purposes and “you” and “your” towards equals and superiors for formal occasions, the doffing of hats in front of superiors, the petition system that functioned through bottom-up shows of deference to the superiority of the officeholder to solve certain issues, the importance to be able to protect one’s interest in law courts through rhetoric (Forgeng 24, 139, 173)³⁸ were all related to the performance of certain roles on certain occasions.

Furthermore, the Elizabethan theatre was yet another space where theatrical behaviour could be seen and imitated by the audience that consisted of all walks of life, such as lower and middle classes who might give petitions to the court officials and the courtiers who were subject to these petitions. Especially, with the incorporation of actors within the patronage system with the 1572 Vagabondage Act, legitimised forms of dissimulation within the space of theatre for actors were enabled. Although the aim of the Act was to assimilate players, who could assume any shape defying social order, into social hierarchy in order to protect them by making their feigned actions “fictive [...] role-playing” rather than showing any real-life ambition, it also showed the efforts of central authority to impose its power on the City and also on the players by defining the limits of dramatic space (Montrose, *Purpose* 55; Kastan, “Class” 108-9). Being “exempt from sumptuary laws,” dramatists were allowed to transgress limits put on “social crossdressing” initially set “to enforce a congruity between the appearance and the reality of status” (Montrose, *Purpose* 37; Kastan, “Class” 105). Through theatre, several stages of man’s life were shown to the Elizabethan playgoers as several stages of theatrical performance where feigning actors showed the possibility of feigning to the audience. As Montrose argues,

dramatic actions have a partial affinity with rites of passage, which give a social shape, order, and sanction to human existence. Such transition rites impose culture-

specific thresholds upon the life cycle; and, by the same symbolic process, they conduct social actors safely from one stage of life to the next. In other words, transition rites mediate the discontinuities which they themselves have articulated. (*Purpose* 33)

Yet, apart from being descriptive of the certain stages in man's life an Elizabethan had to enter and perform, the dramatists' class-transgression by impersonating people from different classes showed that status was mere performance and could be mimed. As Kastan maintains,

[a]cting threatened to reveal the artificial and arbitrary nature of social being. The constitutive role-playing of the theatre demystifies the idealization of the social order that the ideology of degree would produce. The successful counterfeiting of social rank raises the unnerving possibility that social rank is a counterfeit, existing 'but as the change of garments' in a play, in Walter Raleigh's telling phrase. In the theatres of London, if not in the *theatrum mundi*, class positions are exposed as something other than facts of human existence, revealed, rather, as changeable and constructed. When 'every man wears but his own skin, the Players,' as Raleigh writes, 'are all alike'. ("Class" 106-7)

Hence, the London stage that allowed social transgression made acting as a profession inherently subversive and socially transgressive. Therefore, the anti-theatrical clique that consisted of religiously oriented City Authorities and their supporters argued that plays defied social hierarchy by attracting members of the lower status to idleness not just by wasting their time by watching a play but also by exposing them to bad examples of dissimulative behaviour on the stage (Wickham 85-6; Greenblatt, "Circulation" 15).³⁹ The actor's performance on stage, which was dissimulation, problematised ethical questions on truth and appearance as acting was equated with lying and trespassing of social boundaries. As Montrose points out, that "the professional players' assumptions of various roles—their protean shifts of social rank, age, and gender—seemed to some to be wilful confusion and subversion of the divinely ordained categories of difference that had brought order out of chaos at the foundation of the world" (*Purpose* 36). For instance, contemporary Elizabethans like Stubbes criticised the theatre because it made the conjunction of essence and appearance elusive, "[s]o that it is verie hard to knowe, who is noble, who is worshipfull, who is a gentleman, who is not" (C2^v). Players who were of lower status could play members of higher social classes; this was considered by Rankins as a fallacy since "Players ought

not amidst their folly present the persons of Princes” (C3^r). Similarly, Gosson stressed the theatre’s class-transgressive nature to criticise it, as an actor could “take vpon him the title of a Prince with counterfeit port, and traine” (*Playes Confuted* E5^r). This rendered social status a mere performance, as “priuat men” could dress themselves “gentlemanlike” so that “proportion [was] so broken, unitie dissolued, harmony confounded & the whole body must be dismembered and the prince or the heade cannot chuse but sicken” (Gosson, *School* G7^v). Therefore, Chettle, criticised playgoing and plays with the words “[f]ie upon following plaies” because the actors’ “wordes are full of wyles” (E2^v). Yet, apart from the display of histrionic gestures on the stage, as Sir John Davies maintained, Elizabethan amphitheatres were places in which “whores, / Porters and feruingmen together throng” (B2^v-B3^r). The use of role-playing by prostitutes to allure clientele or by criminals like cony-catchers to trick people into believing in their innocence, such offstage displays and exchanges of dissimulative behaviour within the amphitheatres provided further spaces of the attainment of performative social role-playing. Hence, on and off the Elizabethan stage members of the audience were exposed to dissimulative behaviour which they could imitate and perform. The very sensitivity towards the ethics of theatre and its potential to affect audience behaviour was not only acknowledged by anti-theatrical cliques, but also by its supporters. In particular, when Nashe in *Pierce Penniless* (1592) defended the theatre, he also emphasised the potential to alter audience behaviour as plays “are lower pills of reprehension wrapt vp in sweete words” (H1^v-H4^r). Hence,

[t]hose who attacked the theatre and those who defended it were agreed upon its compelling affective powers. Theatrical performance was thought to have the capacity to effect moral changes in its audience—whether for better or for worse. Plays might inspire, instruct, reform, delight, terrify, sadden, entrap, corrupt, infect, or incite—in any case, they might do far more than pass the time. (Montrose, *Purpose* 49-50)

Therefore, the “possibility” of social subversion led to a sensitivity in the Court, the City, the Church and the acting companies and to the emergence of restrictive means of censorship, at least on a theoretical level (Dutton, *Mastering* 2-4, 51; Levy 275).⁴⁰ These “affected the relation of the theater both to social and political authorities and to its own sense of itself: even the theater’s moments of docile self-regulation, the instances of willingness to remain well within conventional limits, were marked out as

strategies, institutional decisions made to secure the material well-being of the playing company” (Greenblatt, “Circulation” 16). Consequently, it can be said that dissimulation and theatrical behaviour could be imitated by the Elizabethan playgoers as there was, at least, a potential that plays could affect audience behaviour, for good or for bad.

Moreover, the potential of influence on audiences by players was related to the fact that the interaction of audience and performer was more direct than any other form of literature in the Elizabethan Period. With the adaptation of the raised thrust stage of booth theatres and the amphitheatre-like places for bear-baiting in the construction of the Theatre (1576), a crowded and intimate space between audience and actor was established (Shurgot and Owens 17; Cooper 26). Through the pre-eminence of amphitheatres in the Elizabethan Period, gradually a commercially systematised connection between acting company supply and audience demand was created. According to Gurr,

London playgoers in the 1580s and 1590s created the unprecedented phenomenon of an audience paying money to hear poetry. [...] For the poets who were also players it must have been a revelation: poetry as a performing art speaking directly to an expectant crowd who paid money to enjoy the offering. Audience response could be directly manipulated, known audiences tastes could be catered for, new devices could be tried in the confidence that they would be welcomed as novelties. (*Playgoing 2*)

Apart from the monetary ties between audience and performer, their close relationship was further enabled by physical conditions. Contrary to post-1660 proscenium arch stages, the “thrust stage” of the Elizabethan amphitheatres enabled an actor to share “the same visual space with his audience” through “three-dimensional” acting, that is, by performing a role on the stage, among actors, and off the stage, among audience members, simultaneously (Brennan 5; Mulryne and Shewring 21; Blatherwick 70). The immediate exchange of actor and audience was also supported by the emphasis on the phonocentric quality of Elizabethan drama. Especially, after the construction of “Shakespeare’s Globe” in 1997, forming a simulation of amphitheatre experience of the Elizabethan Period, and with the multidisciplinary research on Original Pronunciation (Crystal, *Pronouncing* 8; Crystal, *Think* 126-45), former academic hypotheses on

player-audience interaction has been evidenced. For instance, it has been proven that “[p]erformed texts” do “supply an immediate response from the recipients, so that playwrights engage in a form of communication which is more nearly intercommunicative than any other publication” (Gurr, *Playgoing* 1). Likewise, it has been proven that “[a]s performance texts, the plays were composed for a tighter grouping of people, a more immediate and readily recognisable social entity, than any audience for a printed text” (Gurr, *Playgoing* 1-2). Therefore, Elizabethan public theatre formed a legitimate space to perform dissimulation for actors and an immediate access to imitate dissimulative behaviour by the playgoers. Accordingly,

[p]lays, together with the commercial trade in books, afforded an opportunity for the unlearned to appear learned, removing the controls on the trade in learning which a closed patronage system would have imposed. When Gullio the gallant in the Parnassus plays recites a speech to his lady, Ingenioso the scholar comments, ‘we shall have nothinge but pure Shakspeare and the shreds of poetrie that he hath gathered at the theators’ (line 986).’ (qtd. in McLuskie 56)

A sort of peripheral learning through the space of Elizabethan drama reflected and created a “dissonance” with its cosmopolitan constitution and showed the “individually and collectively experienced anomalies, discontinuities, and contradictions” (Montrose, *Purpose* 39). Yet, this dissonance offered an example for the “heterogeneous audience of social players [that is, ordinary Elizabethans in their everyday social practices and performances,] not only to adjust to but also to manipulate to their own advantage the ambiguities and conflicts, the hardships and opportunities arising from the contradictory realities of change” (Montrose, *Purpose* 40). Consequently, first, the preliminary Latin education based on the acquisition of performative rhetorical skills, and second, the theatrical behaviour that could be imitated by playgoers, enabled Elizabethans to train themselves in how to survive in the factionalism preeminent in the Late Elizabethan court.

As had been stated in the last chapter, the vertical relationship between patrons and patronees and the horizontal relationship between counterparts of different interest groups were governed by maxims of hierarchical behaviour, which created tensions within and without factions. Hypocrisy, role-play, flexibility, being careful with one’s own patronees and not trusting anyone, were the means to survive in this system of

intra- and inter-tension. As for hypocrisy or role-play, Levy maintains that it “was the essence of being a courtier, and many a reader, then and now, of Castiglione’s handbook was wondered whether there was any substance at all beneath the fine display and elegant acting” (274). This, however, was not an easy role in a “romantic adventure” but a hard one in “sordid intrigue” (Chambers, “The Court” 81). This could be seen, for instance, in Sir John Harington’s words on the histrionic constitution of court life: “I have spent my time, my fortune, and almoste my honosite, to buy false hope, false friends, and shallow praise;—and be it rememberd, that he who castethe up this recknoning of a cowrtlie minion, will sett his summe like a foole at the end, for not beinge a knave at the beginninge” (qtd. in Chambers, “The Court” 81-2). Those who were frustrated or those who had attained success acknowledged that “[d]issimulation and deceit were the qualities that won success” (Williams 131). Here, the use of rhetorical skills was very crucial in order not to lose one’s position within the Court. One also had to care for one’s social credibility, gather necessary information to sustain it, mind the needs and values of especially superiors in a given situation and use performance or non-performance in an effective way. One of the most prominent persons that could use these skills was Sir William Cecil who, as Hawkyard maintains, could survive by being cautious, as seen through his expertise in social behaviour in the transition periods from being Somerset’s secretary, cooperater in the succession of Lady Jane Grey, and mediator between Queen Mary and Elizabeth (250-1). Apart from his meditations and his notes made in crisis situations, where it could be seen that several plans tried to be refuted by himself to create the most effective means to repel the crisis and sustain his interests, Sir William Cecil also gave clues on how to behave and survive in the Elizabethan court. Especially, his precepts written to his son Robert most probably in 1584, found in a commonplace book in 1600, but not published until 1617 (Alford 19; Woodhouse 16), were like a list of means to survive within the patronage system where rivals and patronees may create problems. In particular, Sir William Cecil’s maxims maintained that he should not “[t]rust” anyone in the Court, be careful with his friends, mind parasitical patronees, be deferential to his superiors and remain observant rather than instigating action (*Certaine* 10-6). Thereby, dissimulative behaviour to protect one’s interests was actively propagated by the members of the Elizabethan court.

Moreover, as dissimulation was necessary to survive in the face of Elizabethan factionalism, a discrepancy between essence and appearance was unavoidable. This meant that the truth behind social behaviour was not important in this system. What was more important was to act, and to be considered in a certain way; and this was achieved through rhetoric and persuasion. Elizabethans upheld the necessity of secrecy and hypocritical role-play in state matters, which were derived not from the religious ethics of Providentialism but from the ideas of “Machiavelli” on “the prudential calculation of political interests” (Montrose, *Subject* 229). Indeed, Machiavelli’s principles written in his *The Prince* (1532), and printed as *Il Prencipe di Nicolo Machiaueli* in London in 1584, had a great impact on Early Modern English behaviour patterns. Using “deceit” to “dissimulate,” calculating actions, and the necessity “to appear to have” certain traits gave examples of how to employ Machiavellianism, persuade others and achieve one’s ends (Machiavelli, *Prince* 29, 62, 70). For instance, in a separate paginated annotation in Savile’s *Ende of Nero* (1591), it was written that “the secrete trueths of aparences in affaires of estate, for the masse of the people is guided and governed more by ceremonies and shewes then matter in substance” (qtd. in Montrose, *Subject* 229). Likewise, the power and importance of the art of persuasion as a weapon to manipulate others (Blanpied 223), as “fair persuasions mixed with sugared words” (*IHVI* 3.3.18), was stated by Shakespeare’s dissimulative (Hall cvii^f) Joan of Arc. As put forth by Shakespeare’s Suffolk, to “flatter, face, or feign” (*IHVI* 5.2.163) were the means of dissimulation which were intentionally rejected by courtiers who practised these to sustain their public image as honest men. As Shakespeare’s Suffolk tried to convince others, the “actor[-like]” rehearsal and subsequent performance of Suffolk [did] not solely make him an “artist-politician” (Blanpied 225), but also showed the importance of audience reaction towards such performances. Therefore, the sincerity of the image was not in question in social behaviour. What was in question was to make others believe in the performance of it. Richard of Gloucester, for instance, manipulated truth for his own end “[w]ith lies well steel’d with weighty arguments” to condemn Clarence in the eyes of Edward IV (*RIII* 1.1.148). Thereby, the Early Modern debate about the “disjunction” between the “value of appearances” and of “moral truth” became more apparent (Slotkin 6). Likewise, when Richard of Gloucester achieved to woo Lady Anne, whose husband and father-in-law he had murdered, he was aware of the power of

acting and rhetoric where the Aristotelian *ethos* and *pathos* were far more effective than mere *logos*: “And I, no friends to back my suit at all / But the plain devil and dissembling looks— / And yet to win her, all the world to nothing!” (*RIII* 1.2.240-2). Whether because of her total deception or her desire for the “evil” other (Slotkin 8, 17), Anne was initially persuaded by Richard because he had created an image that appealed to her. This appeal was very important because “Richard’s performance here w[on] [the audience] as well as Anne. If he can do this, he can do anything” (McNeir 176). Hence, successful dissimulative persuasion was far more effective than unsuccessful sincerity, which was seen in another play when Lord Saye could not dissuade the angry mob led by Jack Cade who wanted to murder him. Although Lord Saye used his simple “apparel” to persuade the rioters to believe in his honesty and “honour” and rejected to have “foul deceitful thoughts,” he failed and his rhetorical skill was subverted by Jack Cade to prove Lord Saye’s seemingly religious insincerity, as Cade accused Saye to work with the devil and have “a familiar under his tongue” (*2HVI* 4.7.50-112). Similarly, if a courtier remained truthful, he could die because of the plots of strong politicians. For example, when Richard in *RIII* wanted to learn whether Lord Hastings would support his claim to the throne, he sent Sir William Catesby to him. Meanwhile the Duke of Buckingham asked what Richard would do if Hastings did not “yield to” their “complots,” for which Richard replied that he would execute him (*RIII* 3.1.191-3). Apart from the fact that Lord Hastings could not discern Richard as a dissimulator (McNeir 178), if Hastings had concealed his intentions, like Stanley the Earl of Derby did (*RIII* 4.4.492-3, 4.5.1-20, 5.2.5-6, 5.3.30-7, 5.3.80-103), he would have survived Richard III, outlived the following crisis of succession and been part of the inner circle of the succeeding monarch Henry VII. Quite similarly, in 1597, when a quarto edition of *RIII* was published, Bacon argued that in factionalism it “were better to maintaine [...] indifferent, and neutrall” (*Effayes* C3^v). Likewise, when yet another quarto edition of *RIII* was published in 1602, Sir Fortesque advised his son the following:

[W]hen the hour came [of the Queen’s death], [do not take] knowledge in the meantime of any person or pretension [to the throne]; for he had found by experience that they that met Queen Mary at London were as well accepted, standing free from former combination, as they that went to Framlingham; and that they that came into the vineyard *hora undecima* had *denarium* as well as they that had sweat before all heir fellows. The practice of opponents, as he thought, would cause the labour of all men to be holden and accounted meritorious that had so

much discretion as in the meantime to be silent and indifferent. (Harrison, *Last* 278)

Consequently, the performative aspect of human relationships necessitated a courtier to make use of dissimulation and concealment of behaviour.

Besides, that necessity manifested itself in the need to learn deceitful behaviour as a reflection of group consciousness. For instance, Philip the Bastard in *KJ* referred to the performative aspect of social behaviour, especially, in the nobility. Although he analysed and made fun of the mannerisms associated with the nobility, he was aware that he had to act like them to be part of them. Not only in “outward accoutrement” but also through “inward motion” in the form of persuasion, the “[s]weet, sweet, sweet poison for the age’s tooth,” he had to comply with the prescripts of the “worshipful society” of the nobility (*KJ* 1.1.205-19). Therefore, if a courtier wanted to be part of the system, it was important for him to learn how to deceive others. Oscar James Campbell pointed out how the Bastard’s words might have been the product of William Kempe’s parodic use of “the dialogues appearing in the fashionable primers by which French and Italian were taught,” such as those in Florio’s *Firste Frutes* (1578) and *Second Frutes* (1591) that were also parodied by John Eliot in his *Ortho-epia Gallica* in 1593 (*Satire* 9). Yet, contrary to Campbell’s assertion, the Bastard’s parodic handling was far away from being Horatian or a “gay social satire” (*Satire* 9). Rather, Philip the Bastard’s satire was of a Menippean nature that attacked meritocrats from the point of view of a would-be aristocrat who wanted to be part of the system based on seeming. Philip the Bastard was originally from the lower gentry, hence, he despised the hypocritical behaviour patterns of the nobility. Thereby, it could be concluded that Shakespeare’s satire was only directed at the nobility. Yet, in order to be part of the system governed by these noblemen, the same Philip was forced to mimic such behaviours. Thus, it could be argued that Shakespeare satirised the rulers and the ruled alike who acted according to the rules of dissimulation in factionalism. As Piesse further puts forward, Philip the Bastard asserted that “[t]he notion of being able to read oneself properly according to context [was] vitally important” (132). Thus, truth, whether to denote “honest[y]” or “fact” (Jones, “Truth” 398), was related to the conjuncture. Hence, not the essence of truth but its perception determined reality. Thereby, the play “suggest[ed] that

legitimacy [was] a constructed category, that it depend[ed] on the consent of various political constituencies, and that it [was] subject to shifts as political circumstances change” (Vaughan 382). Philip the Bastard had a “will to the truth” (Foucault, “Discourse” 151) of hypocritical behaviour that was used by the nobility because he did not want to be excluded from the system. Yet, at the same time, he wanted “to avoid deceit,” which was why he had to ironically learn and make use of the characteristics of deceit himself (*KJ* 1.1.215). He was aware of ethical concerns about “truth,” and was maybe the only character, albeit a fictive one, who was sensitive about ethics (Jones, “Truth” 399-400). Yet, he was aware that he had to adjust himself to dissimulative behaviour patterns: “Since kings break faith upon commodity, / Gain, be my lord, for I will worship thee!” (*KJ* 2.1.597-8). Therefore, rather than Campbell’s assertion that the Bastard was fluctuating between Horatian and Juvenalian satire, or between “savage directness” and “self-interest” (*Satire* 13), the Bastard used Menippean satire to criticise all parts of the problem while remaining a part of the system. In this light, the use or rejection of dissimulation also did determine whether or not a courtier wanted to be part of court life.

Furthermore, apart from pressures within the social group of the nobility composed of members of different factions, the pressure without also shaped the performative aspect of Elizabethan behaviour. In particular, a member of a faction had to be careful not to be seen as a deceitful person by others as this would harm one’s public image. He had to affect his behaviour not to attract the hatred of the monarch or the people. For instance, a member of a faction, whether patron or patronee, had to conceal his ideas and be patient in his manoeuvres, for which he had to be artfully prudent and affect his manners. For example, when Shakespeare’s the Duke of York visited his uncle Mortimer in prison to ask for his lineal rights to the succession, York revealed his private ideas about the “execution” of his father by Henry V as “bloody tyranny,” for which his uncle urged him to remain in “silence,” keep his ideas private and be “politic” because his adversaries, the Lancastrians, were still “[s]trong-fixed” (*IHV* 2.5.100-2). Thus, it was crucial to “suppress” one’s “voice” as was affirmed by York’s behaviour later in the Court in Paris when he did not show his anger towards Henry VI’s support to his factional rival Somerset. He “let it [his anger or the matter] rest” and focused on

“[o]ther affairs” (*IHVI* 4.1.180-1). A similar necessity was recommended to a contemporary Elizabethan courtier two years after the production of *IHVI* and one year after *2HVI* was put on stage. In particular, Sir John Perrot should but “could not brook any crosses or dissemble the least injuries although offered by the greatest personages, and thereby he procured to himself many and might adversaries who in the end wrought his overthrow” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 178-9). This showed that the concealment of real intentions was a protective means, especially, at times when the rival interest group was still powerful. In line with the protective means, it could be seen that Shakespeare’s York in *IHVI* was like an actor who used action and silence in a very conscious way (Blanpied 221-2). As the Duke of Exeter maintained,

Well didst thou, Richard, to suppress thy voice;
 For had the passions of thy heart burst out
 I fear we should have seen deciphered there
 More rancorous spite, more furious raging broils,
 Than yet can be imagined or supposed[.] (*IHVI* 4.1.182-6)

This is why the Duke of York felt the need to “dissemble” and “make fair weather” until his opponent grew “weak” and he “strong,” which could be seen when in *2HVI* he revealed his ideas about using the Irish soldiers to overthrow Henry VI but said to Buckingham that he came with the army just to divest Somerset of his offices in the Court (*2HVI* 5.1.23-37). Similarly, the use of equivocation became yet another strategy for concealment, when, for instance, York stressed his so-called allegiance to Henry VI by making the French “swear” not to “be rebellious to the crown of England” (*IHVI* 5.3.169-72). Through this equivocation he could conceal his aspirations for the crown by emphasising that his and the French’s “allegiance” were “to the crown of England and not the man [Henry VI]” (Kelly 362). Therefore, setting aside ethical problems of whether dissimulation could be used to “conceal vice” with “feign[ed] goodness” or to attain “gratification” (Vickers 45), it was a necessary means to survive in a court ruled by factionalism.

Therefore, one had to wait for the right time to reveal his real ideas. For instance, Shakespeare’s Duke of York dissimulated his intentions to undo the Lancastrians and claim the crown for himself. For this end, York pretended to support the Lord Protector Duke Humphrey of Gloucester with “a show of love” to win the support of the Nevils.

He calculated his timing of disclosure according to his “advantage” which would be terminated once “Humphrey with the peers be fallen at jars,” after which York would reveal his intentions to make Henry VI “yield the crown” (2*HVI* 1.1.227-56). Yet, until then, he must “be still awhile, till time do serve” (2*HVI* 1.1.245). It might be claimed that the scene merely rendered what was found in the chronicles of Hall which said that York

began secretly to allure to hys frendes of the nobilitie, and priuatly declared to the, hys title and right to the Crowne, and lykewyse dyd he to a certain wyfe and faige Gouvernors and Rulers of dyuers cities and townes: which priuie attemp was fo politiquely handeled and fo secretly kept, that hys prouifio was ready, before his purpose was openly published, and hys frendes opened them felfes or the contrary parte coulede them espye: but in concludion tyme reueled truth and olde hyd hatred openly sprange out, as you fhall hereafter bothe lament and heare. (clii)

Yet, quite similarly, Bacon advised in his essay on factions a couple of years after the publication of 2*HVI* and 3*HVI* that “the chiefest wildome [was] either in ordering those things which [were] generall, and wherein men of feuerall Factions doe neuertheleffe agree, or in dealing with correfpondence to particular perfons one by one” (*Effayes* C3^r). This would be achieved especially by calculating when to conceal and when to disclose opinions. Likewise, the relationship between might and right was further illustrated when Shakespeare’s Edward IV remained overcautious and wanted to “conceal” his intentions until he and the Yorkists “gr[e]w stronger” (3*HVI* 4.7.58-60). When his fellow-factionalists proved that they would grow stronger if they seized the moment, and did not miss the timing with “scrupulous wit,” to declare him king again, which would “bring” him “many friends” and supporters, Edward IV complied with their reason (3*HVI* 4.7.61-6). Thus, a member of a faction in the Elizabethan Period had to conceal his intentions until he was powerful; before that time he had to be hypocritical, patient and careful.

However, concealment was not simply inaction but required the expertise and performance of the contrary, which was acting. For example, the tension that grew between the Yorkists and the Lancastrians was at first concealed as it was overshadowed by the quarrel between the Lord Protector and the Bishop of Winchester. Here, the temporary inaction of Yorkist and Lancastrian factionalists was described by

Exeter as “feigned ashes of forg’d love” (*IHVI* 3.1.192), which was very functional. The quarrel was not simply absent, but rather postponed, whose manifestation in “flame[s]” (*IHVI* 3.1.193) was withheld through active feigning and acting. A year after *IHVI* was put on stage, particularly on the 14th of April 1591, a similar necessity could be observed in the real-life factionalists of the Elizabethan Period. Accordingly, although the Earl of Essex and the Earl of Kildare, Henry Fitzgerald, had a quarrel “in the Presence chamber and used towards each other words very unfit to be uttered in that place and by persons of their quality,” they had to conceal their hatred towards each other because they were formally forbidden to continue their quarrel (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 22). Although their animosity was recorded to have continued (Hammer 90), through withholding physical encounters they tried to cover up that animosity. Likewise, Shakespeare’s Richard, to “catch the English crown” and become Richard III, put forth that he would use Machiavellian tactics of calculated inaction and action through the use of role-play. Richard stated,

[w]hy, I can smile, and murder whiles I smile,
 And cry ‘Content!’ to that which grieves my heart,
 And wet my cheeks with artificial tears,
 And frame my face to all occasions.
 I’ll drown more sailors than the mermaid shall,
 I’ll slay more gazers than the basilisk,
 I’ll play the orator as well as Nestor,
 Deceive more slyly than Ulysses could,
 And, like a Sinon, take another Troy.
 I can add colours to the chameleon,
 Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
 And set the murderous Machiavel to school.
 Can I do this, and cannot get a crown?
 Tut, were it farther off, I’ll pluck it down. (*3HVI* 3.2.182-195)

Apart from pointing out the sentiments of the anti-theatrical clique regarding the “associations of ‘hypocrite’ with ‘actor,’” which linked these to “the ambitious actor politician,” the soliloquy showed that political calculation of action and performed inaction were closely related to theatrical behaviour and dissimulation (Vickers 50; Barish 101; Montrose, *Purpose* 37-8). Hence, social behaviour became seeming, which was the disjunction between essence and appearance through feigning.

However, in order to be able to feign social behaviour, one had also to conceal the fact that he was feigning. According to Castiglione's concept of *sprezzatura* or "*Reckelesneffe* to couer Arte," social performance was effective if it seemed "naturally in him, than learned with study" so that he would not be perceived as a "lyer" who used "diffimulation or flatterie" openly (Yv^r, Zii^r). Hence, one had to be careful not to reveal his real intentions. In the previous quotation by Richard of Gloucester, it might be argued that it was very implausible for him to reveal what and in which manner he would perform his social dissimulation (3HVI 3.2.124-195). Yet, no matter how unrealistic soliloquies or asides may seem to modern audiences, their use was functional in showing real intention within dissimulative behaviour that might have not been otherwise noticed by the playgoers in the noisy atmosphere of Elizabethan amphitheatres (Gurr, *Playgoing* 44-5; Blatherwick 70).⁴¹ Similarly, off the stage there were instances in which courtiers might have revealed their hypocritical actions to themselves or to only a few. Soliloquys as intra-personal and asides as inter-personal means of disclosure, showed the hypocrisy of courtiers in Shakespeare's history plays. Similar aside-like disclosures were employed by Elizabethan courtiers to conceal their real intentions to a general public since it was dangerous to disclose all of one's ideas to others. Therefore, only a part of one's real intentions were shared with some fellow-factionalists, patronees or people whom one could trust. For instance, Shakespeare's Richard III was careful not to disclose everything to Buckingham, especially after he became suspicious of the latter. In particular, when Richard III shared his intentions with Buckingham to murder the princes in the Tower and the latter wanted to think it over for a while, Richard withheld his ideas and wanted him to "let that rest" (RIII 4.2.24-6, 4.2.84). A similar concealment could be observed in the Earl of Essex's relationship with Elizabeth I, which was the result of an irony in his expectations of the patronage system ruled by her. As Hammer maintains,

although she represented the defining identity of the realm and embodied all that he had been taught to revere and obey, Elizabeth also often inhibited his efforts at public service. On the one hand, there was undoubtedly a strong vein of respect and affection in his praise for Elizabeth. These feelings should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, Essex clearly had growing difficulty with her indecisiveness and her unwillingness to allow him fully to pursue his conception of how the war should be fought. [...] To be fair, all of Elizabeth's misters found her prevarication and inconsistency a trial at times; nevertheless, for Essex, who was decidedly a man of

action and who habitually overstretched his own resources in order to advance the war effort, the frustration of dealing with Elizabeth could be acute. (331)

Essex's frustration with Elizabeth I's policies was apparent, yet he tried not to voice it publicly. Essex voiced his criticism of Elizabeth to few people either in soliloquy-like poems like "Forget my name since you have scorned my love, / And woman-like do not to late lamente" (May 46), or by aside-like correspondences. For instance, in a letter Essex wrote to Penelope Rich, his sister, he openly criticised Elizabeth by stating that "the time wherein we live is more inconstant than women's thoughts, more miserable than old age and breedeth both people and occasions like to itself, that is, violent, desperate, and fantastical" (Rawson 160). The theatricality of such behaviour, of feigning and concealing, was reflected in Shakespeare's history plays, as well. For instance, when everyone applauded the re-creation of Richard Plantagenet as the Duke of York in *IHVI*, the Duke of Somerset showed his anger only to his supporters through an aside and said "Perish, base prince, ignoble Duke of York!" while the others called him "high prince, the mighty Duke of York!" (*IHVI* 3.1.179-80). Likewise, when Edward IV reacquired the throne, Richard of Gloucester seemed to support him and his queen with tender "love" which he showed through his "kiss" to the son of Edward IV (*3HVI* 5.7.31-2). Yet, Richard revealed his real intentions in his asides and equated himself with "Judas" crying "hail" while actually meaning "harm" (*3HVI* 5.7.32-3) in showing his hypocritical affections. What is more, in solus Richard revealed his real intentions in a very sardonic and sarcastic way, yet pretended before others, such as Clarence. In particular, Richard had propagated "drunken prophecies, libels and dreams, / To set [his] brother Clarence and the King / In deadly hate, the one against the other" (*RIII* 1.1.32-5). In the soliloquy, Richard affirmed himself as "subtle, false, and treacherous," but when his brother came he affected ignorance of the same plans and wished his "Brother" a "good day" (*RIII* 1.1.37, 1.1.41). After Clarence's departure, Richard called him "[s]imple, plain Clarence" whom he would "send [...] to Heaven" as a reflection of his "love" towards him (*RIII* 1.1.117-20). Thereby, Richard emphasised the histrionic essence of behaviour in court life, which necessitated the concealment of real ideas to protect self-interest. This is why, Shakespeare's same Richard assumed to be moved by the former queen Margaret's curses which had frightened Hastings, Rivers and Queen Elizabeth (*RIII* 1.4.304-9). Richard cried for "God[']s] pardon" for his

opponents which was for Rivers “[a] virtuous and Christian-like conclusion” (*RIII* 1.4.310-7). Richard was aware of the fact that if he overreacted and “cursed now” his opponents, he would “[have] cursed” himself (*RIII* 1.4.318-9). Yet, he was “well-advis’d” to affect “virtuous” behaviour “[for]ever” if the topical condition required it (*RIII* 1.4.318). The audience might have perceived his thoughts and even become “his accomplice” (McNeir 173), yet the success of Richard’s dissimulation lied in the fact that the onstage audience, the characters in the play, did not perceive the theatricality of his behaviour.

Therefore, in order to be successful in acting, a courtier had to be careful not to create an alienation effect and make people around him conscious of his acting but make them concentrate on the fabricated truth of his performance in a cathartic way. A year after the quarto edition of *3HVI* and two years after the production of *RIII*, in an advice letter in 1596, the Earl of Essex was warned not to appear as a hypocrite in his behaviours, which was especially perceived “when he happeneth to speak with compliment to her Majesty, he doth it with formality and not as if he feeleth it, whereas he should do it familiarly” (Harrison, *Second* 139). Likewise, one year after the possible final performance of *RIII* on the Elizabethan stage, in 1595 Thomas Lake pointed out how the factions tried and seemed to be successful in covering up their hatred towards each other, especially after the crisis of appointment to the vacant Solicitorship contested by Francis Bacon and the Cecil faction. Lake argued that “the factions [were] never more malicious yet well smoothed outward” (qtd. in Williams 354). Such type of success could be seen in Shakespeare’s Richard of Gloucester, especially, when he accused others of being hypocrites while during his accusations he actually showed himself as a hypocrite. In particular, through a false modesty that he “cannot flatter,” “speak fair,” “[s]mile in men’s faces, smooth, deceive and cog” like his factional foes, that is, the family members of Queen Elizabeth, he argued that he was unfairly condemned by these (*RIII* 1.3.42-50). He fashioned himself as a “plain man” governed by “simple truth,” yet performed the very contrary (*RIII* 1.3.51-3), which persuaded Edward IV of his sincerity. In a later scene when Edward IV assumed to have contrived peace between Richard and the others, Richard continued to play the simple man who “hate[d]” “enmity” and seemed to have “true peace” with Queen Elizabeth and her

followers (*RIII* 2.1.53-73). Hence, it was necessary to conceal the fact that a courtier was dissimulating, so that he could use dissimulation as a tool to persuade and manipulate others according to his interests.

Furthermore, in order to sustain concealment, the use of dissimulation by a courtier should be continuous. In particular, the continuity of acting was essential not to spoil the theatrically crafted public image of a courtier who intended to protect his own interests albeit ethical consequences. For instance, the Earl of Essex who manoeuvred to create the public image of a military hero, made use of dissimulation especially through affecting withdrawal from the Court to gather the Queen's attention, and through trying to suppress his hatred towards the Cecil faction as much as possible (McCoy, *Rites* 79-102; MacCaffrey, *War* 514-5).⁴² Yet, Essex was not able to suppress his hatred, especially after 1597, even though several letters of advice by Francis Bacon, Henry Cuffe, or anonymous letters said Essex should "dissemble lyke a courtier" (qtd. in Gajda, *Earl* 190; Camden 189-90).⁴³ Because of different value systems, "Essex's vaulting ambition and Cecil's quieter but shrewder quest for power were bound to clash" (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271). Yet, Cecil's subsequent success in undoing his opponent and surviving even after the succession was based on his skill to suppress his emotions, which he most probably learned by affecting the manners of his father. As it was noted, William Cecil's "natural disposition was ever gentle, temperate, merry, courteous, affable, slow to anger, ever shunning revenge, and never doing anything in fury or choler, neither yielding to passion, but always tempering his affections" (Harrison, *Second* 296). A similar restraint on "yielding to passion" was used by Robert Cecil as a manoeuvre to succeed in his factional quarrel with Essex by seeming to support Essex (Hammer 397; MacCaffrey, *War* 514-5).

The success of such calculative behaviour in court life was depicted on the Elizabethan stage by Shakespeare especially through his portrayal of Richard III who calculated his way to the throne by getting rid of opposition simultaneously. This could be seen when Richard accused his factional foes of being murderers of Clarence while it was he himself who had actually planned his murder. When he revealed the death of Clarence on the premise that Edward IV's second order to stop the execution arrived too late,

Richard turned the occasion to condemn the followers of Queen Elizabeth who were surprised by the news. Richard said, “[m]ark’d you not / How that the guilty kindred of the Queen / Look’d pale when they did hear of Clarence’s death?” and he pointed out their facial expressions as signs for their guilt (*RIII* 2.1.136-8). Yet, although he ordered the murder of Clarence himself, Richard wanted “[t]o comfort Edward [IV]” (*RIII* 2.1.140-1) in order to continue to show himself as the simple man condemned by Queen Elizabeth and his followers whose malice had manifested itself in the death of Clarence. The performative condolences presented to Edward IV would also be functional in aggravating his sickness through his guilty conscience and quicken his death to make room for Richard’s aims at the crown, which would not be achieved if Richard would abandon dissimulation once he achieved what he wanted.

What is more, apart from taking measures directly about oneself, a courtier had to seem considerate of his opponents in order to sustain a credible public image and survive in Elizabethan factionalism. Accordingly, at least until 1594, Robert Cecil seemed to cooperate with Essex to ease their relations, especially by supporting Essex’s interests and encouraging him (Hammer 351-3). Thereby, Cecil achieved to turn out to be right in subsequent disputes and avoided to be considered as the part who wanted quarrel. Similarly, Shakespeare’s Protector Gloucester and Winchester seemed to appear as friends in front of Henry VI, while they quarrelled with each other in asides not heard by Henry VI. Particularly, in the hawking trip, the factional opponents claimed to be “[t]alking of hawking; nothing else,” while they questioned each other’s courage and arranged a duel in the “evening, on the east side of the grove” with “two-hand sword[s]” (*2HVI* 2.1.35-53). Although Henry VI was aware of their quarrel and tried to soothe their anger following their secret arrangement of the duel (*2HVI* 2.1.35-57), it could be stated that the factional opponents felt themselves obliged to conceal their quarrel to avoid a possible interference of Henry VI against their duel. Quite similarly, Edward IV wanted to end the quarrel between Hastings and the kinsmen of Queen Elizabeth. He was aware of their being “factious one against the other,” yet he wanted them to reconcile “unfeignedly” without leaving any “hidden falsehood” (*RIII* 2.1.12-22). Off the stage, apart from the theoretical punishments like banishments or amputations to be exerted by the Knight Marshal against those who violated the peace in the Court, there

was a strong auto-censor by courtiers shaped by dissimulation “to restrain [themselves] in the royal presence” or, at least, cover outbursts of violence through the efforts of other noblemen (Loades, *Tudor* 90). It was essential not to look like the quarrelsome part of disputes and even seem to care for the factional opponent, which placed emphasis on the successful appearance of dissimulation.

Moreover, in order to achieve such a perception according to the same principles, one had to approve of his opponent in front of others. He had to put a show of approval of the behaviours of his factional opponent outwardly while hating him in “silent secrecy” as the Duke of York maintained (*2HVI* 2.2.68). He further said that in “dangerous days,” where the quarrel between Winchester and the Lord Protector overshadowed other tensions, one had to “[w]ink at” their opponents’ “insolence,” “pride,” and “ambition” (*2HVI* 2.2.69-76). Therefore, the lack of strength, the possibility to create a public image as a contentious person, and the wrong time to disclose ones ideas, necessitated a courtier to approve of or at least not to mind the actions of factional opponents in an open way but use secret means to undo these. For instance, two years before the quarto edition of *2HVI* was published, albeit the ebbs and flows in his behaviour, the Earl of Essex could contain himself in the absence of his rival Robert Cecil and improve his credibility, especially in the eyes of Elizabeth I. In particular, in 1598, when Robert Cecil was absent on a foreign mission, “[t]he Earl of Essex [got] in exceeding great favour” because “he doth carefully attend her Majesty and her service, and very honourably takes the pains to see all matters dispatched as if the Secretary [Sir Robert Cecil] were here” (Harrison, *Second* 262). Thereby, Essex showed care not to promote his rival’s interests by appearing to take advantage of his absence, which made Essex more favourable. Yet, with the deterioration of his fortunes in 1599, accompanied by his more and more unpredictable nature, the Earl of Essex could no longer hide his anger and was “said to be infinitely discontented and in his discontentment uses speeches that may be dangerous and hurtful to his safety” (Harrison, *Last* 38). In the same year, his rival, Robert Cecil, by remaining patient when Elizabeth I’s “anger” persisted against Essex, made himself appear to “[have] done all good and honest office for my Lord of Essex” (Harrison, *Last* 54). Likewise, in 1600 when *2HVI* was published, Robert Cecil appeared to behave almost like Shakespeare’s

Duke of York, who concealed his intentions. Firstly, Cecil “hindered” the trial of Essex in “the Star Chamber” for which he “won much honour and love by it, for he manifestly hath not been so adverse to the Earl as it is supposed,” and secondly, when Essex was put into custody and all of the other lords “spoke condemning him greatly” Cecil “made a wise grave speech” (Harrison, *Last* 69, 88-9). Thereby, Cecil proved that continuous dissimulative behaviour was far more effective to be successful in the Elizabethan court.

However, the continuity of theatrical performance in daily life did not necessarily result in making all of the people believe in the courtiers who actually concealed their real intentions through their crafted public image. For example, one of the few persons who did not believe in Shakespeare’s Richard of Gloucester’s dissimulation was his mother, the Duchess of York. Although Clarence’s son believed in his “good uncle Gloucester” who “wept,” “hugg’d” and “kiss’d” the boy to make him “rely on him” and believed that Queen Elizabeth contrived his father’s murder, the Duchess of York could easily understand the “deceit” behind Richard’s actions (*RIII* 2.2.20-30). For her, “[d]eceit [...] steal[s] such gentle shape, / And with a virtuous vizor hide deep Vice” (*RIII* 2.2.27-8). Similarly, when *RIII* was published in 1597, it was reported in the Court that opponents of the Earl of Essex in “his absence confess his worth but wish him well only in words” (Harrison, *Second* 235). This suggested that performing to be wishing someone well could be perceived superficial and not effective to hide the real thoughts of these courtiers.

Yet, disbelief in the sincerity of such performances was only important if it was shared and voiced by other people, as well. Not the truth or logical proof but perception or psychological proof determined signification. Therefore, apart from referring to calculated chess manoeuvres (Poole 55-6), when Suffolk argued that Humphrey of Gloucester practiced “deceit” so that to undo him it was valid to use “good deceit” (*2HVI* 3.1.261-65), the joined factions of Yorkists and Lancastrians did not muse on the truth of Suffolk’s accusations or the essence of Humphrey’s behaviours so long as their interests were sustained. Similarly, when Shakespeare’s Richard warns Prince Edward against hypocrites while being one himself, Prince Edward did not consider his uncle as

a hypocritical person as he perceived him as a loyal adviser. In particular, Richard said that the prince was inexperienced in “the world’s deceit” and could not “distinguish of a man / Than of his outward show” and that his executed matrilineal uncles used “sugar’d words” which prevented him from perceiving them as “false friends” with “the poison” in “their hearts” (*RIII* 3.1.7-15). Although Prince Edward rejected Richard’s claim that his matrilineal uncles were “false friends,” he still believed in Richard who himself used “outward show” and “sugar’d words” to conceal “the poison of [his heart]” (*RIII* 3.1.10-4). The scene had close resemblance to chronicle material which stated that Richard

made such semblance of lowliness to his prince, that from the great obloquy that he was in so late before he was suddenly fallen in so great trust that at the council next assembled he was made the only chief ruler, and thought most mete to be protectour of the kynge and his realme: so that, were it deffeny or were it foly, the lambe was betaken to the wolfe to kepe. (Hall ii.viii¹)

Yet, the scene also illustrated that not the reality beneath “real” or “false” performance but the “aesthetics” of perception and “affective response” towards these “varieties of seeming” became determining in human relations (Slotkin 11). Since this perception was shaped by the theatricality of human behaviour, courtiers analysed relations like playgoers did in theatres. Accordingly,

[t]heatre-goers, like courtiers, were inveterate and expert judges of acting, and were accustomed not only to searching for the reality beneath a mask, but also the idea that a man or woman might wear more than one – or that one mask might be used by several persons. [...] In such ways (and others) did theatre imitate Court life. The reverse was true as well, and the great courtiers often resembled actors on a stage. (Levy 275)

Hence, dissimulation was only present if it was voiced in general. Therefore, although “the very act of pronouncing, or thinking, the word ‘hypocrite’” was related to display of “masking followed by an unmasking” (Vickers 50), the display of histrionic behaviour should be shared not just by few people but become a general attitude towards a dissembler.

Besides, the fact that characters like Richard III were able to dissimulate was based on the conscious emphasis on their histrionic skills, which they did by frequently equating themselves with actors. In particular, many critics have noted the theatrical capacities of

Shakespeare's Richard as an "orator" and "actor" which determined his social relations by playing many roles, like "Richard the Simple" who used false humility, "Richard the Blunt" who openly attacked his opponents in order to accuse them of the crimes he had committed, and "Richard the Compassionate" who seemed to care for friend and foe alike by being "Richard the Humble" and "Richard the Good Uncle" (McNeir 171, 176-7).⁴⁴ Based on the chronicle material copied from Thomas More's history on Richard III, which depicted him as a figure of "malice, fraude, and deceite" (Hall ii.lix^r), Shakespeare developed Richard's qualities in dissimulation also by taking further suggestion from More's equation of Richard's carefully crafted public image. Accordingly, More equated "kynges games" with "ftaige playes [...] plaid vpon scaffoldes, in whiche poore menne bee but lookers on" (Hall ii.xxiii^v). One of the first instances of this equation could be seen when, Shakespeare's Henry VI equated Richard's skills in dissimulation with the skills of the Roman actor "Roscius," one of "thofe Tragedians admired before Chrift was borne" renown in the Early Modern for his "theatrical supremacy" (3HVI 5.6.10; Nashe, *Pierce* H3^r; McNeir 172). Likewise, Richard defined himself as the trickster figure, the Vice or Iniquity, prominent in morality plays and Tudor interludes. In particular, the allegorical personifications of several vices through the Seven Deadly Sins in the morality plays of the 14th and 15th centuries had been amalgamated into a single and distinct character called Vice that did not limit itself anymore to the personification of abstractions in the 16th century (Hammond 100). According to Spivack, the Vice character used deception through "trick of tears and laughter" where "[h]is weeping feign[ed] his affection and concern for the victim" but created a sympathetic reaction in the audience for his capacities in deception (161). As Hammond maintains, "Iniquity is the Vice's name in *Nice Wanton* and *Darius*" (215, note 82), and the Vice character was still used during Shakespeare's early career by other playwrights as a "clown" to make "satiric burlesque" (Barber 45; Hammond 100). Several of the characteristics of Vice could be seen in Shakespeare's Richard of Gloucester. In particular, as Hammond summarised from Happe, the following can be named as the characteristics of the Vice character found in Richard:

The use of an alias, strange appearance, use of asides, discussion of plans with the audience, disguise, long avoidance, but ultimate suffering of punishment, moral commentary, importance of name, and reluctance concerning it, self-explanation in soliloquy, satirical functions which include an attack on women, and various signs

of depravity such as boasting and conceit, enjoyment of power, immoral sexuality[,] [...] [the use of] impertinence, logic-chopping, use of oaths and proverbs, and the self-betraying slip of the tongue (qtd. in Hammond 101)

In particular, during a speech about Julius Caesar and fame with Prince Edward, the son of the deceased Edward IV, Richard likened his skills in verbal irony to “the formal Vice, Iniquity” as he “moralize[d] two meaning in one word” by playing a joke on the short life of the unfortunate prince (*RIII* 3.1.82-4; Hammond 215). Although Hadfield argued that Richard made a “criminal abuse of rhetoric” (*Republicanism* 129), he was successful in playing his role as a courtier without making other people aware of the fact that he was acting, showing an example how acting could be used in order to achieve one’s goals through dissimulation.

Quite similarly, Buckingham underlined that a courtier had to be like an actor and play the tragedian’s role if the present condition necessitated it. For instance, when Richard wanted to know whether Buckingham could affect his behaviour and “quake,” “change” his “colour” and seem to be “distracted and mad with terror,” Buckingham argued that he could “counterfeit the deep tragedian [...] [a]t any time, to grace [his] stratagems” (*RIII* 3.5.1-11). Apart from being a helper or just another “tool” for Richard used for his dissimulation (McNeir 173, 177-9; Besnault and Bitot 115), with his use of “theatrical-Machiavellian terms” (Vickers 50), the character of Buckingham presented several layers of meaning. First, the character of Buckingham was played by a “tragedian” who acknowledged that as an actor he feigned and affected his behaviour to look different than he really was. Second, although there was no tragedy played in the time of the Wars of the Roses, within the heterotopian space⁴⁵ of the Elizabethan stage that fused the past to the contemporary Elizabethan realities in anachronistic ways, the Shakespearean character Buckingham showed the possibility of displaying theatrical behaviour based on his experiences as an audience member. In 1598, when a quarto edition of *RIII* was published, the necessity to play the tragedian’s role on certain occasions was observed in William Cecil’s, “the Lord Treasurer’s[,] funeral” where “[i]t was noted that the Earl of Essex, whether it were upon consideration of the present occasion, or for his own disfavours, carried the heaviest countenance of the company”

(Harrison, *Second* 304). Hence, a courtier in the Elizabethan Period, similarly, had to be like an actor and play the necessary role.

Furthermore, just like actors who might have some part in shaping the plot of the play (Long, “Precious” 414-33), courtiers tried to manipulate the behaviour of their equals or betters through certain strategies within the theatricality of social behaviour. For instance, in 1596, an advice letter to the Earl of Essex urged him to contrive action and counteraction in his communication with, especially, the monarch. The letter said, “to win her Majesty’s favour he ought never to be without some particulars afoot which he should seem to pursue with earnestness and affection, and then let them fall upon taking knowledge of her Majesty’s opposition and dislike” (Harrison, *Second* 139). One year after this letter, the quarto edition of *RIII* was published in which a similar histrionic manipulation of social behaviour could be observed, once again, by the Elizabethan readers. In particular, being conscious of their theatrical performances in order to keep up appearances which would appeal to the norms and needs of their audiences, Shakespeare’s Richard of Gloucester and Buckingham combined persuasive skills of rhetoric and dissimulation of dramatic performance. For instance, Buckingham and Richard set forth the main plot line of their theatrical show. In the exposition, Buckingham would incite the people about the bastardy of Edward IV and his line; in the rising action, he would verbally underline the virtues of Richard to the citizens of London; and in the climax, Buckingham would convince them of Richard’s virtues through demonstration. Richard would “[p]lay the maid’s part” and say no to the crown but “take it” afterwards unwillingly and exempt himself from any future failure (*RIII* 3.7.50, 3.7.226-37). Just like in a theatre production, props and minor characters were chosen to support the characterisation of the main character. In the rising action of this plot, for instance, Richard would “get a prayer-book” and “stand between two churchmen” (*RIII* 3.7.46-7) to support his feigning, or impersonation, of a virtuous man who seemed not to be interested in worldly matters. The emphasis on virtues was crucial, if we consider the sensitivities of the City Authorities. Especially, Richard and Buckingham’s emphasis on religion was reflective of the Early Modern friction between court values and the values of the citizen gentry. As Stone maintains, “[n]ot merely did the system turn all courtiers into sycophants, but it accentuated the

psychological gulf between Court and Country, giving the gentry a sense of clear moral superiority over the cringing courtiers” (478). Therefore, Buckingham and Richard used the *logos*, or logical proof, of the Holy Scripture and churchmen to build a credible public image, or *ethos*, which would appeal to the value system, the *pathos*, of the receivers of their persuasive show, that is, the City Elders whose religious orientation was abused in this process. Hence, Richard through Buckingham brings forth moral proof to persuade the City Authorities. For instance, Buckingham compared and contrasted Edward IV’s sins of lechery with Richard’s affected virtues, and in order to persuade the citizens, Buckingham said

[a]h ha, my lord, this prince is not an Edward:
 He is not lolling on a lewd love-bed,
 But on his knees at meditation;
 Not dallying with a brace of courtesans,
 But meditating with two deep divines;
 Not sleeping, to engross his idle body,
 But praying, to enrich his watchful soul.
 Happy were England, would this virtuous Prince
 Take on his Grace the sovereignty thereof.
 But sure I fear we shall not win him to it. (*RIII* 3.7.70-9)

Buckingham used the criticism of the citizens towards the idle and “lewd” nobility and tried to convince the citizens that Richard was not one of these nobility but rather acted like them and looked like a conservative man who was “praying” constantly. Thus, they should be “[h]appy” if Richard succeeded Edward IV; after which the religiously oriented people would be governed by “a Christian prince” and “a holy man” (*RIII* 3.7.95-8). Yet, the verbal image-making strategies of Buckingham and the almost mime-like demonstration of Richard’s virtues through mute “clergymen” and non-verbal “props” related to religion would not succeed if Richard himself did not employ his false modesty through his rhetorical skills. Found in chronicle material,⁴⁶ Thomas More’s emphasis on the histrionic quality of such “a stage plaie” supported Richard as “the prince of players [...] “as he add[ed] touches that [went] beyond the requirements of the role” (Hall ii.xxiii^v; McNeir 182). Through this “picture[-like]” show, Richard covered the ugly truth of his vicious character through the “beauty” of “piety” and turned the scene into a “tableau” with three characters “of the kind relished in civic pageants, one designed to appeal to bourgeois piety” (Slotkin 10-1; McNeir 181; Venezky 131-2, 168). A similar strategy in order to create a public image and to appeal

to superiors and inferiors alike was employed by the Earl of Essex who actively tried to depict himself as a chivalrous knight-servant of Elizabeth I caring for her well-being through his policies by frequently presenting himself in tilts (McCoy, *Rites* 79-102). Other means employed by Essex were the distribution of manuscripts and later public print versions of his ideas, “such as the letter to Rutland or the text of his Accession Day entertainment” and the attempted distribution of “‘True relacion’ of Cadiz,” the former around 1595 and the last in 1597 (Hammer 252-3, 314-5), when *RIII* was probably performed for the last time in 1595 and printed for the first time in 1597. Although Essex was not as successful as Shakespeare’s Richard III in moulding a desired reaction to his strategies (Hammer 315, 339), he tried to use similar means of theatricality in order to convince others. Quite probably, the failure of Essex derived from subversive readings of his theatricality. In particular, “Henry Howard and Francis Bacon [...] warned Essex that he would be the practical victim of a particularly Elizabethan interpretation of *paradiastole*—the rhetorical technique of re-describing moral qualities—so that ‘all his vertues [would be] drawne into the nature of vices’ by his enemies, but also the queen” (qtd. in Gajda, *Earl* 190, original square brackets). The success of *paradiastole* over other forms of persuasion was, interestingly, depicted through Shakespeare’s Richard III, as well. Richard III used “*paradiastole*” as a “rhetorical” device to show “vice” as “virtue” and “virtue” as “vice” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 128). Although such usage made his show of piety before the City Elders an “Im-morality play” (McNeir 181), it was successful. For instance, through his syllogism on “whether to depart in silence, / Or bitterly to speak in [their] reproof” on the citizen’s offer of the crown, Richard used *paradiastole* as a strategy to flatter the citizens for their “faithful love” and show himself as a person who defied worldly “ambition” and was religiously oriented (*RIII* 3.7.140-9). Emphasising his “poverty of spirit” and his “many [...] defects” even if he were a legitimate candidate for the throne, and claiming that he had no legitimate claim to the throne (*RIII* 3.7.153-72), Richard actually revealed his true identity and the true mindset regarding the succession. Yet, because of the verbal and gestural demonstration of his virtuous behaviours to the audience consisting of City Authorities, these straightforward words upon their illegitimate offer for the succession were considered by them as verbal irony to cover up his seeming modesty, another Christian virtue. Likewise, Richard’s final words, which

form the climax of his rhetorical tirade, that “God defend that I should wring [the crown] from” Prince Edward (*RIII* 3.7.172), created the image of Richard as ardent defender of the legitimate order of things. When Buckingham affected to be offended by Richard’s refusal to ascend the throne to prevent the illegitimate succession of bastards and took the citizens with himself, Richard ordered them to come back. Richard seemed to be convinced of their claims on the illegitimacy of Edward IV’s line, which was actually contrived by himself and Buckingham, and accepted their offer as a “burden” (*RIII* 3.7.228). This unwillingly accepted “load,” on the other hand, was presented as an excuse for Richard to hinder future criticism towards his reign, which excuse he supported with his former histrionic performance of a religious man and his claim that “God” was his witness in his final words (*RIII* 3.7.227-35). This again supported his instrumentalisation of verbal persuasion and theatrical behaviour to affect his public image.

However, it is quite interesting that such an instrumentalisation was not just employed by Shakespeare in the depiction of evil tyrants like Richard III but also in seemingly idealised warlords like Henry V. Prince Hal consciously used hypocrisy and role-play to create an image of the prodigal son whose “reformation” emphasised his personal development better than the an initial creation of a perception of him as a virtuous person. He wanted to “be more wondered at, / By breaking through the foul and ugly mists” so that the rare appearance of his virtues “when they seldom come, they [were] wished-for come,” through which his “reformation, glittering o’er [his] fault, / Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes / Than that which hath no foil to set it off. / [He would] so offend, to make offence a skill, / Redeeming time when men think least [he] will” (*IHIV* 1.2.185-207). Therefore, his development from Prince Hal to Henry V revealed many instances of theatrical performances, such as the ambush on Falstaff, the trick on Francis, his oral play script for a parody of Hotspur’s family life, or the mimicry of father and son relationship in alternate roles (*IHIV* 2.2.72-107, 2.4.3-108, 2.4.362-468). Through what had been stated as “[t]he holiday-everyday antithesis” (Barber 196), Prince Hal perfected his histrionic skills, which were necessary for him to survive in this system afterwards, because he correctly equated everyday social life with acting. As Greenblatt argues, “Hal’s characteristic activity is playing or, more precisely,

theatrical improvisation—his parts include his father, Hotspur, Hotspur's wife, a thief in buckram, himself as prodigal, and himself as penitent—and he fully understands his own behavior though most of the play as a role that he is performing" ("Invisible" 46). That awareness of the performativity of his action was also seen in his sensitivity for consistency in his role, observed especially when his father got sick. He was sorry for his father's sickness and his "heart [bled] inwardly;" yet because of his company with "Falstaff" and his affected prodigal life, Hal feared to be called a "hypocrite" and "so lewd" by the people for weeping and showing his distress openly although he seemed not to care for his father at the first place (*2HIV* 2.2.38-59). Not the truth regarding the sincerity of his behaviours, but the feigned outward reality and the threat of being considered a dissimulator became important for Hal. Therefore, when Hal took his father's crown and left through another door, he tried his best to use his histrionic expertise and oratory skills in his narration to sustain his image as a loyal son in the eyes of Henry IV (*2HIV* 4.5.138-176). As Bulman maintains,

Hal weeps at the rebuke and with apparently unfeigned emotion seeks to prove his loyalty and love; but as he does so, he recounts a speech which bears little resemblance to what he actually has said just moments earlier. [...] Hal's memory of what he said, which continues for several more lines, amounts to a theatrical fiction intended to exculpate him – the sort of revisionism at which Hal repeatedly proves himself skilled. It is sufficient, however, to win his father's trust. (168)

Whether or not he might be considered a Machiavellian in the ethically derogatory sense (Hoenselaars 145; Wentersdorf 286), Hal made use of dissimulation and was successful in it by playing his roles continuously.

What is more, although hypocrisy appeared to be ethically problematic, it was an essential part of human relationship to protect one's interests and to defeat factional foes in the Elizabethan patronage system. Religious polemicists were sensible in relation to dissimulation as "fraudulent attempts," "falsehood" and "hypocrisy," argued against "feign[ing]" even for "the cause of religion" and dismissed these "liars" as remnants of Catholicism (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 75, 173, 212). Likewise, supporters of the codes of honour and warfare, such as Barnaby Rich, criticised "that fraud and deceit is reputed for policie, and treason and treacherie are called gravitie and wisdom, and he is holden the noblest champion, that by any of these meanes can best

deceive” (qtd. in Black, “Counterfeits” 372). Yet, the humanist understanding of Castiglione’s ideas on dissimulation was to prevail in determining social behaviour in the Elizabethan court, which could be seen in the many advice letters to Essex to put ethical concerns on honour aside and dissimulate. This was also reflected in Shakespeare when Prince John of Lancaster was able to “swear [...] by the honour of [his] blood” or “[u]pon [his] soul” and claim he “will maintain [his] word” to rebels in a hypocritical way and “break [his] faith” (2*HIV* 4.2.54-68, 4.2.106-23). Although some critics asserted that this hypocrisy made John a foil to the heroic ideals incorporated in Prince Hal (Bulman 167-8; Holstun 208-9),⁴⁷ the latter’s theatrical behaviour was no less hypocritical when analysed in detail. Taken the conjuncture into consideration, John of Lancaster’s hypocrisy was a trick against the rebels to make them disperse their army to be easy prey and be taken captive. In order to survive, one had to be hypocritical and not follow his “princely word” (2*HIV* 4.2.66). Since hypocrisy might be used by those who wanted to harm themselves, and traitors might assume the appearance of loyalty and use flattery to mask their hypocrisy, a courtier or patron’s use of hypocrisy to defeat them was justified. Therefore, when he learned how Scroop, Cambridge and Grey “intend” to “sell” his “life to death and treachery,” Henry V could use hypocrisy to disclose their intentions (*HV* 2.2.1-11). As Wentersdorf argues, Henry V used hypocrisy in order to make the conspirators blame themselves so that he remained the ideal king punishing wrongdoers against his body politic (268-9). Whether or not Shakespeare took the account of one of the traitors, namely Cambridge from the *Myrrovr for Magistrates* which stated that he dissimulated because of his lack of power and would “privy fletye agaynft theyr open wrong” (xxix^r), the traitors, without having any foreknowledge, dissimulated and “[bore] themselves[,] / [a]s if allegiance in their bosoms sat, / Crowned with faith and constant loyalty” (*HV* 2.2.3-5). The sham flattery manifested itself in compliments about the comfort of living “under the sweet shade of” Henry V’s “government,” that “[n]ever was monarch better feared and loved / Than” him, and that his “father’s enemies” have turned into his friends and “serve” him with “duty and zeal” (*HV* 2.2.25-31). Here Henry V played a chess game of hypocritical moves where he asked their opinions about their preparations for France. Accordingly, he did not “doubt” about its success since he did not “carry” anyone who did not “consent with” him and did not “leave” anyone “behind that doth not wish / Success

and conquest” to his exploits (*HV* 2.2.20-4). Actually, Henry V was pointing implicitly to the executions of the traitors not leaving them behind or taking them to the wars. Similarly, Henry V’s move to show “mercy” to the pawn-like imagined assassinator, the traitors’ counter-move of mercilessness, their seeming success in making the king believe in their sincerity, and Henry V’s final disclosure of his knowledge about their treachery in giving their verdicts of execution into their hands (*HV* 2.2.40-76), were not ethically problematic in so much as Henry V’s hypocrisy helped him to protect himself. While hypocrisy disfigured the traitors into “English monsters,” “savage, and inhuman creature[s],” Henry V’s hypocrisy made him a careful patron (*HV* 2.2.79-145). Even though he was such an able user of dissimulation, Henry V acknowledged that he could not discern the hypocrisy of Scroop, Cambridge and Grey. Therefore, although “the truth of it stands off as gross / As black and white,” his “eye will scarcely see it” (*HV* 2.2.103-4). Since the survival within factionalism was maintained by hypocrisy and role-play which was used by everyone, it was difficult to differentiate between neutral or benevolent dissimulation from malevolent ones. The traitors “seem[ed]” “dutiful,” “religious,” and “[c]onstant in spirit” and their “fall” taught Henry V to be careful even with the “best” and most virtuous “man [...] [w]ith some suspicion” (*HV* 2.2.127-40). In 1599 when the quarto edition of *HV* was published, a similar concern about the elusiveness of real social behaviour was described:

It is a very dangerous time for courtiers, for the head of both factions being at Court a man cannot tell how to govern himself towards them. There is much observing and prying into men’s actions that they are to be holden happy and blessed that are away. [...] It is a world to see the humours of the time, which is now so full of danger that a man must take good heed of what he say or write. (Harrison, *Last* 42-3)

The emphasis on taking “heed” was based on the fact that everyone was “much observing and prying” about each other’s behaviour since everyone made use of dissimulation and tried “to govern himself” and his behaviours. If the courtier did not withdraw himself from public life, then he had to comply with the dictums of dissimulation even though it might have ethical complications.

Therefore, the equation of performance and deceit, as a reflection of the Sidneyian element of feigning of literature in general especially seen in the theatre as

“counterfetting, or figuring fourth” and imitative learning through “dissimulation,” no matter how “honest” that may be (C2^v, E2^f), created suspicion towards any performance in everyday life. For instance, Bolingbroke’s bending of his knee to the Duke of York in order to show his submission to the “grace” of his “uncle” might be “deceivable and false” set against the present condition that he had come and “dared to march” with soldiers and other dissatisfied members of the nobility to claim his right for the Dukedom of Lancaster although he was “banished” from the land on pain of death (*RII* 2.3.81-105). When the banished Henry Bolingbroke arrived in England in the absence of Richard II, he seemed not to want the crown and according to his mighty supporters, like Northumberland, he “hath sworn” to be after only “for his own,” that is, the confiscated lands of his dead father (*RII* 2.3.148-51). A similar claim had been depicted in Holinshed’s chronicle where Bolingbroke

fware vnto those lords, that he would demand no more, but the lands that were to him descended by inheritance from his father, and in right of his wife. Moreouer, he vndertooke to cause the payment of taxes and tallages to be laid downe, & to bring the king to good gouernment, & to remooue from him the Cheshire men, which were enuied of manie; for that the king esteemed of them more than anie other; happilie, bicaufe they were more faithfull to him than other, readie in all respects to obeie his commandements and pleafure. (3:498)

Nonetheless, we are not quite sure whether Bolingbroke concealed his real intentions or was spurred by the nobility to seize the crown later on. The latter of these might be more possible because of the condescending attitude of the nobility; for instance, when Northumberland merely called Richard II as plain “Richard” “hid[ing] his head,” whereas Bolingbroke “[o]n both his knees [did] kiss King Richard’s hand” (*RII* 3.3.5-19, 3.3.31-41). This had been similarly depicted in Holinshed’s chronicle (3:497-8). Yet, apart from parallels between history play and historiography, whether or not Bolingbroke intentionally dissimulated, he was able to create an image of an heir to the throne who seemed not to want “further than [he] should” and usurp the crown, but was appointed by the nobility who were to blame for any wrongdoing against Richard II. Bolingbroke assumed a submissive position and seemed not to intend to harm Richard II. He said “[b]e he the fire, I’ll be the yielding water: / The rage be his, whilst on the earth I rain / My waters; on the earth, and not on him” (*RII* 3.3.31-61). Yet, Richard II did not believe in Bolingbroke’s naivety as breaching his command of banishment and

gathering an army around him was “treason” and he claimed that Bolingbroke was after the “crown” which he would not enjoy to “live in peace” (*RII* 3.3.72-100). Within the limits of a system governed by hypocritical role-play as means for survival, there were many signs to prove Richard II’s fears and ideas concerning Bolingbroke right. The noblemen who stirred Bolingbroke acted hypocritically in front of Richard II in order to support the public image of Bolingbroke as a wronged nobility who came to “humbly kiss” Richard II’s “hand,” do “faithful service” to Richard II, and that “[h]is coming hither hath no further scope / Than for his lineal royalties” (*RII* 3.3.101-20). Northumberland, who acted as the mouthpiece of the nobility emphasised the truth of his words with his own “gentleman[liness]” as he gave “credit” to Bolingbroke’s sincerity (*RII* 3.3.120). Yet, the stress on the sincerity of the *ethos* of men in arms and the reality that role-play and theatricality, used to dissimulate for one’s own interests, reflected the very insincerity of members within and without the Court who had to use hypocrisy to survive in factionalism. In particular, although Bolingbroke only seemed after his own lands, in the later phases he was willing to accept the crown without questioning the ethical complications of his oaths on loyalty taken in front of Richard II. When Edmund Langley proclaimed him “Henry, of that name the forth,” his initial response came in a quite natural vein as “[i]n God’s name, I’ll ascend the regal throne,” whereof his former courtesy shown towards Richard II disappeared and he called him plain “Richard” who had to be “[f]etch[ed] hither” like an ordinary man (*RII* 4.1.108-14, 4.1.156-8). This was similar to Northumberland’s manner who called Richard II only by his first name earlier and Bolingbroke tried to defend Northumberland by saying there was no offense in calling Richard II as such (*RII* 3.3.15). Bolingbroke accepted the new conjuncture and began to use the royal “we” instead of “I” to refer to himself (*RII* 4.1.319-20, 3.3.119). The oscillation of Bolingbroke’s behaviour, his “denial of ambition and the contradictions of his actions” (Bolam 141), was reflective of the antithetical approach towards the historical and literary depictions of Henry IV. Hall and Holinshed referred to how Richard II was “disceiued”/“deceiued” by Bolingbroke (Hall ix^r; Holinshed 3:507). Daniel in his *Civile Wars* (1595), however, argued that Henry IV was not a dissimulator but was pressed by nobility and that “others faith” did “deceiue” him (bk. 1, canto 99, F1^v). Yet, the underlying theatricality of both assertions cannot be denied. This theatricality was also supported through the name symbolism of

Bolingbroke stated by Bolam as follows: “‘bulling’ could mean ‘to deceive’ or, more likely in relation to water, ‘to boil’ or bubble up from its source. Bullingbrook, as a newly emerging, active source of water (with a possible subtext of deceit)” (142). Thereby, Bolingbroke achieved “fluidity and flexibility” in his theatrically constructed image (Hopkins 409-10). This, however, made others suspicious about the essence of Bolingbroke’s appearance. In the later murder of Richard II it was not clear whether or not Bolingbroke, now Henry IV, masked his schemes with an affected naivety, calling forth “[h]ave I no friend will rid me of this living fear?” and being sorry and “full of woe” for the misunderstanding of his patronesses who killed Richard II without his knowledge (*RII* 5.4.1-11, 5.6.30-52). Therefore, when Henry IV wanted to go on a pilgrimage to cleanse himself from the sin of this murder (*RII* 5.6.49-50), Elizabethan playgoers and readers might have been quite unsure whether he was sincere or was continuing with his show of naivety. Even in later plays, that suspicion grew more and more when Henry IV constantly referred to his lack of “intent” for the crown and “necessity so bow’d the state / That [he] and greatness were compell’d to kiss” (*2HIV* 3.1.45-79). As Greenblatt maintained,

[a]t such moments *2 Henry IV* seems to be testing and confirming a dark and disturbing hypothesis about the nature of monarchical power in England: that its moral authority rests upon a hypocrisy so deep that the hypocrites themselves believe it. [...] [Henry IV] actually seems to believe in his own speeches, just as he may believe that he never really sought the crown[.] (“Invisible” 55)

It was this desire to use dissimulation and deceit which made any social performance suspicious.

Therefore, the necessary role-play and theatricality in Elizabethan factionalism made trusting someone almost impossible. Especially, the possibility of changing of sides and double-dealing by members of interest groups created mistrust which, on the other hand, created fear and paranoia in, especially, the patron in the patronage system. Therefore, as William Cecil advised his son Robert Cecil, a courtier in the Elizabethan Period should not trust anyone in order to protect his interests: “Trust no man with thy Credite, or Estate: For it is a meere follie for a man to inthral himselfe further to his Friende” (*Certaine* 15).

The material motives behind trust and distrust in dissimulative court life was further explicated in Bacon's essay "On Faction" where he argued that "[i]t is commonly seene that men once placed, take in with the contrarie faction to that by which they enter" (*Essayes* C3^v). This was also reflected in Shakespeare when Joan of Arc maintained that patronesses did not "trust" anyone "but for profit's sake" (*IHVI* 3.3.63). This was further illustrated in John Hume's double-dealing for the "duchess' gold" and the "gold" of Suffolk who were factional foes (*2HVI* 1.2.87-107). Quite likewise, Shakespeare's Warwick who was first a Yorkist and a "false peer" in the eyes of the Lancastrian faction, changed sides, became a Lancastrian and considered himself a "subject" of Henry VI (*3HVI* 1.1.52, 5.1.25-38). Chronicle material pointed out that Warwick's "grudge" was based on the wrongdoings of Edward IV which he endured until time permitted him to act against the latter:

By this a man may fe that often it chauceth, that frendes for one good turne will not render another, nor yet remember a great gratuite and benefite in time of necessitie, to the shewed and exhibited: But for kyndnes they shew vnkindnes, & for great benefites receyued, with great displeafure they do recompense. Of thys the erle of Warwycke was nothyng ignorat, which although he loked for better thankes & more ample benefites at kyng Edwardes handes: yet he thought it best to diffimule the matter, tyll such a time were come, as he might fynd the kyng without stregth, and then to imbrayd him with the pleafure that he had done for him. (Hall cxcv^v)

Accordingly, Shakespeare demonstrated Warwick's protective dissimulation after he was sent for marriage negotiations to France. The "misdeed of Edward [IV]" of disgracing him, by marrying Elizabeth Grey, was not the sole reason for abandoning the Yorkist faction as there were other problems that cumulated but were suppressed by Warwick. In particular, the Yorkists killed his "father" and although Warwick helped Edward IV to his throne he violated his "niece," which Warwick "let pass" (*3HVI* 3.3.181-98). Yet, the last "misdeed of Edward [IV]" that "dishonour[ed]" him (*3HVI* 3.3.183-4) triggered the release of his concealed problems which compelled him to abandon his dissimulative support to Edward IV and change sides. This changing of sides, on the other hand, could trigger others to do the same once the conjuncture altered. Accordingly, when Warwick abandoned Edward IV and his brother Clarence also got offended by the king's misbehaviour, both of the alienated courtiers joined against their former patron. Particularly, although Clarence was "Edward's brother" he seemed not to be "a feigned friend" to Warwick, but seemed genuinely to follow him, which

Warwick rewarded with marrying off his “daughter” to “sweet Clarence” (3HVI 4.2.1-12). Nevertheless, the changing of sides created an instability in patronage behaviour, so that it became nearly unpredictable who would desert whom. Therefore, the former “sweet Clarence” might turn back to support whom he had abandoned, that is, Edward IV (3HVI 4.2.12, 5.1.81-102). A patronage who wanted to support his former patron again might call his actions an “unnatural [...] trespass” that seemed to be corrected by supporting one’s initial patron and “defy[ing]” the original factional enemy as his “mortal foe” (3HVI 5.1.81-94). Hence, patronages who had abandoned their patron could support him again when the conjuncture changed.

For this reason, it was important to be careful with one’s friends and differentiate trustful friends from those who dissimulated against one’s own interests. A courtier had to beware of “hollow friends,” like Shakespeare’s Edward IV asserted. In particular, Edward IV being forsaken by his brother Clarence and Warwick, and unaware of his brother Richard’s “stay not for the love of Edward, but the crown,” Edward tried to be sure of the sincerity of the remaining of his followers, especially of Hastings and Montague who were “near to Warwick by blood and by alliance” (3HVI 4.1.125-41). Edward IV claimed that he would rather have them “foes than hollow friends” as he could identify the behaviour of the former in an easier way (3HVI 4.1.138-41). Taking into consideration Montague’s desertion, albeit Montague wished “God help” him “as he proves true” to Edward IV and Hastings’s loyalty to Edward IV that would cost his head later (3HVI 4.1.7, 4.8.30, 4.1.142; RIII 3.1.191-200, 3.4.80-107), it was difficult to identify patronages and supporters who did not sham support for their own interests but tried to cross their interests with the interests of their patrons in a court ruled by dissimulation. Quite similarly, King John’s noblemen who had forsaken their monarch to help the French dethrone him for his misdeeds, changed sides, once again, when Melun retold that Lewis, Dauphin of France, had “sworn [...] [u]pon the altar at Edmundsbury,” where he swore allegiance “and everlasting love” to them, to kill them if he won the battle (KJ 5.4.10-61). Where truth was not maintained and political interest might outweigh it, it was difficult to believe in sincerity of actions, so that in the play the Elizabethan playgoers and readers were almost “left as ignorant as the lords themselves on this point, and forced to participate with them to this extent in the

difficulty of judging truly” (Jones, “Truth” 410-1). This showed also that the sincerity of the old foes and new patrons might not be believed in because they might use their changing of sides for their own interests as long as they benefitted from it. This is why, upon the change of the present condition, the English nobility of King John’s court could call their former patron once again their “great King John” (*KJ* 5.4.57). Hence, for a patron it was important to discern hypocritical followers who might desert him.

Furthermore, although the trespassing patroness, like Salisbury in *KJ* or like Clarence in *3HVI*, might argue that he was “in [full] obedience” and no longer “unconstant” (*KJ* 5.4.56; *3HVI* 5.1.102), the actions of these might always be doubtful and be manipulated by others. This could be observed when Richard made use of such a doubt to contrive the fall out between Clarence and Edward IV (*RIII* 1.1.32-41). Apart from the suspicion about any further abandonment, it became apparent that this fear was not groundless. Accordingly, if a patroness had once forsaken a patron, he could forsake the new patron, as well. For example, Shakespeare’s Henry IV acknowledged that his once helpful patronesses, the Nevils, who had been “great friends” and “feast[ed] together” with Richard II, had abandoned and had fought against Richard, just like they did now to him (*2HIV* 3.1.57-61). Although Henry IV subsequently tried to understand patroness behaviour through the prophecies of Richard II, Warwick showed analytically that the reason for the fickle behaviour of the Nevils lied in the fact that “great Northumberland, then false to [Richard II], / Would of that seed grow to a greater falseness, / Which should not find a ground to root upon / Unless on you” (*2HIV* 3.1.89-92). This exemplum-like episode emphasised that a courtier had to be careful with his allies who might just support him in good days. As William Cecil advised his son, a courtier should be generous to “Kindred and Allies” who should “bee welcome to [one’s] Table [...] But shake off the Glow-wormes, I meane *Parafites* and *Sycophants* that [would] feede and fawne on [him] in the Summer of [his] Prosperitie; but in anie aduerse Storme, [would] shelter [him] no more than [...] an Arbour in Winter” (*Certaine* 12). Hence, a patron might be deserted by his patronesses when occasion permitted them no longer to be obliged to suppress their negative attitudes towards their patrons or when their interests laid within abandoning them. For instance, when the Earl of Essex conducted his Azores campaign in 1597 in spite of warnings to avoid warfare, “[f]ormer friends of

Essex turned in his absence to the Cecils” and with the failure of the campaign many forsook him (Hammer 382-4). After Essex’s death, Bacon, who long had abandoned his former patron, even maintained that “euerie honest man [...] [would] forfake his friend rather than forfake his King” (*Apologie* 7-8). Hence, since patronees focused on the present condition and their own interests, a courtier could be abandoned by his patronees.

Although Shakespeare’s Richard II similarly experienced abandonment by his patronees, what was more problematic was that his remaining patronees dissimulated and misadvised him in order to sustain their own position rather than to be caring for the patron’s interests. First, his Welsh forces forsook him in his Irish campaign because of his delay and their assumption of his death based on their perception of supernatural omens (*RII* 2.4.1-17). As the Earl of Salisbury said, Richard II’s “friends [were] fled to wait upon [his] foes, / And crossly to [his] good all fortune goes” (*RII* 2.4.18-24). This made Richard II become desperate as “[a]ll souls” seemed to get “safe fly from [his] side” (*RII* 3.2.80). Yet, apart from Salisbury, flatterers flocked around Richard II and misguided him as they just wanted to “[c]omfort” him and make him “remember” that he was a king and should be strong (*RII* 3.2.82), even though he lacked the power base he could trust on. This resulted in a false-confidence in Richard II who said “[I]ook not to the ground, / Ye favourites of a king. Are we not high? / High be our thoughts” (*RII* 3.2.88-9). Nevertheless, when he heard about the insufficient means of the Duke of York to stop the advancement of Bolingbroke, Richard II made false reasoning to comfort himself “[s]ay, is my kingdom lost? Why, ‘twas my care; / And what loss is to be rid of care” (*RII* 3.2.95-6). Thus, either way, it was problematic to trust one’s patronees because they could either forsake one and no longer feel the need to dissimulate or might continue with dissimulation to delude the patron to continue to act against his own interests.

Therefore, double-dealing and the changing of sides created mistrust in the patron against his friends and patronees. As for mistrust, for instance, Richard III did not trust Stanley, Lord Derby, because he “fear[ed]” that he would “revolt, and fly” to Richmond, wherefore Richard III captured Stanley’s son as a pawn and “assurance”

(*RIII* 4.4.475-96). The distrust was generated not simply through Stanley's relationship with Richmond who was his stepson, but in Stanley's dissimulative behaviour. Although Stanley claimed that Richard III had "no cause to hold [his] friendship doubtful: / [he] never was nor never will be false," it could be seen that it was he who sent for Richmond and who clandestinely supported his cause by remaining, at least, passive (*RIII* 4.4.492-3, 4.5.1-20, 4.5.1-20, 5.2.5-6, 5.3.30-7, 5.3.80-103). Thereby, his son was not harmed and he did not fight against Richmond. Therefore, Stanley's dissimulation, and his "doubtful" and "false" behaviour required Richard III to mistrust him.

Nonetheless, the lack of trust in others also resulted in the alienation of the courtier from others and made him too self-centric. Many of Essex's followers advised him to feign his actions, yet he rejected. The constant reminding of dissimulation did not persuade him and, on the contrary, they "[increased] his conviction that only evil conduct would triumph at the Elizabethan court" (Gajda, *Earl* 257), which is why he distanced himself from such councillors. Shakespeare's Richard III had an alibi for his evil deeds as the reflection of the Tudor myth showing Richard III as an evil misshapen king (Slotkin 6; Bach 241), which was affirmed in Shakespeare's plays (*3HVI* 5.6.68-93; *RIII* 1.1.1-41, 1.1.145-62). Yet, the characterisation of Richard III also showed the possible isolation of a courtier who did not have any trust in others and just thought on his own interests. Richard said that he had "no brother" and the "word 'love', which greybeards call divine, / Be resident in men like one another / And not in me: I am myself alone" (*3HVI* 5.6.80-83). Dissimulation, intentionally used to secure individual interests, created distrust, which further created fear and isolation. Therefore, "[i]n Shakespeare, hypocrisy [was] linked inseparably with that rapacious egoism that [was] willing to destroy all in order to advance itself" (Vickers 83). This is why, Richard III did not trust his other allies, either, although they had no blood ties with Richmond. He mistrusted them, even though he made use of "corrupting gold" from time to time, because they were bound to him through "fear" (*RIII* 4.2.34, 5.2.20) and might dissimulate just like him. Since "the value of a man's word was at the very foundation of reliability in human affairs" (Kelly 358-9), Richard III could rely on others as much as he himself was unreliable. Hence, it was quite paradoxical that

Richard III wanted to assure himself of the sincerity of his allies by distrusting them. The dream visions that haunted him might have added insult to injury, but even without the reflections of his guilty conscience Richard III would “[u]nder [his] tents [...] play the eavesdropper, / To see if any mean to shrink from” him (*RIII* 5.3.222-3). Sir Walter Raleigh’s assertion that “the [C]ourt [...] glows and shines like rotten wood” (qtd. in Weir, *Elizabeth* 255) reflected how the emphasis on appearance corrupted the Elizabethan court where no one could be exempt from that corruption.

What is more, Richard III’s prophetic dreams showed that he created a kingdom led by fear and suspicion, both of which he experienced himself. Richard III’s oscillation between self-confidence and self-condemnation revealed how role-playing had worked against him. When he started from his nightmare, he said “What do I fear? Myself? There’s none else by” (*RIII* 5.3.183). This showed that authoritarian means that created dissimulative relationships did not just protect a patron from friends and foes alike but also isolated him. Playing many social roles like an actor might be harmful for the personality of the actor-like courtier who might vacillate between those roles and not act normal anymore. Essex experienced a similar clash of roles when he wanted to be a warlord but also acted like a spoiled courtier through his affected absences from the Court (Levy 275; MacCaffrey, *War* 486, 520), and subsequently could not perform any of these as expected by his followers and supporters. Thereby, he gradually isolated himself, first from his good advisers and finally from anyone in 1601. The possible consequences of the use of several roles were further depicted in the fictive nightmares of Shakespeare’s Richard III. As McNeir maintains, Richard

plays three roles at once in debate with himself. His continuous play-acting has fragmented his personality, so dividing him that he has disintegrated into the ineffectuality of one who has lost all cohesion as an individual. At least temporarily, he is potentially anyone and at the same time no one. Thus, he carries on a dialogue between his external or defending self and his internal or accusing self, the dramatized inner voice of his conscience. And he seems to speak as a third person, distinct from the other two, who comments on what they are saying. [...] Schizophrenia can be carried no further, and the actor is exposed without his masks, split and confused. (184)

Hence, the very requirements of the system to dissimulate in order to protect interests in factionalism could make one suspicious of everyone, alienate himself from others, lose support, and fall into disgrace and loneliness.

However, if a courtier did not dissimulate and acted boldly, he might similarly fall, which made the choice of behaviour very paradoxical. In particular, if courtiers did not affect their behaviours, according to their interests and acted bluntly, revealing their true intentions to friend and foe alike, and criticised others for being political hypocrites, they would make headlong decisions. On impulse, they would not weigh their interests with the present conjuncture, but rather behave in a rash way. For example, Hotspur criticised Henry IV as a “vile politician” and “subtle king” who was a “king of smiles” that were insincere, and that he was a “fawning greyhound” who “did proffer” Hotspur with words of “‘gentle Harry Percy,’ and ‘kind cousin;’” to disguise his cozening hypocrisy (*IHIV* 1.3.237-54). Yet, his criticism was voiced so loud that his uncle, the Early of Worcester, felt compelled to silence him and soothe his anger, since showing one’s ideas openly would be like “to o’erwalk a current roaring loud / On the unsteadfast footing of a spear” (*IHIV* 1.3.186-92), which illustrated the danger in rashness. Not only because of the family ties with the Nevils, but also because a similar concern for what had been termed as the “neo-chivalric cult of honour” and emphasis on these values, Shakespeare’s Hotspur and the Earl of Essex were linked to each other (McCoy, *Rites* 3; Barker 302-3).⁴⁸ When the play was staged around 1597, Essex was likewise warned by people around him to act calmly as “his patience continually giveth way to his crosses, and upon every discontentment he will absent himself from Court;” this was not “working his own good” as even to “sit in every Council” was important so that “there may be nothing concluded but with [his] good liking and privity” (Harrison, *Second* 235). Hotspur’s retraction from Henry IV’s court similarly disempowered him as he was not part of the court circle and not able to defend his rights in a diplomatic way. Worcester knew that Henry IV had forgotten his support in making him king but Worcester was silent in order to preserve his position to find an optimal time to act against the king. Hotspur, however, as the name connoted, was too hot and blunt (Kalnin Diede 72) regarding these matters because he disdained dissimulation and the

court manners he exemplified with the “gentlewoman[like]” courtier he met on the battlefield (*IHV* 1.3.29-69). As Bulman put forward,

[i]n opposition to [dissimulative] calculation, the figure of Hotspur is pivotal. Often in performance a romantic figure, impulsive and valiant, young Henry Percy embodies all that is glorious about feudal chivalry – its code of honour, its passion for heroic achievement in arms, its emphasis on loyalty to self and family over state. (159)

When the quarto edition of *IHV* was published, the Earl of Essex similarly reacted gradually in an open way. On the 4th of August 1598, it was recorded that Essex openly quarrelled with Elizabeth I:

The absence of the Earl of Essex at this time is very unseasonable both for the common good and his own private; for the longer he persisteth in this careless humour towards her Majesty the more her heart will be hardened. If he should persist in contending with her in this manner it may breed such hatred in her as will never be reclaimed, so that though she may be forced to use his service, yet not having her Majesty’s love therein he shall be subject to their tongues who will practice against him. (Harrison, *Second* 298-9)

The similarity of behaviour between Essex and Hotspur has been noted by many critics (Watson 76-91; Haydn 555-98).⁴⁹ Both Essex and Hotspur were sensitive about the honour code, were relatively successful warlords, and created problems to their monarchs who, however, felt the necessity to continue to support these. Accordingly, “[m]uch as Elizabeth favoured Essex, King Henry envies Hotspur and wishes that his own son were imbued with such chivalric ambition; yet he knows that the intrinsic honour of such a warrior, valuable if circumscribed by the court, will be dangerous if channelled by those who wish to subvert Henry’s rule” (Bulman 160). The fact that such open-minded and headlong handling should be controlled, manifested itself in the fact that it might make a person act without judgment. When, for instance, Hotspur criticised Glendower, his ally, Worcester, once again wanted Hotspur to remain patient and not to be that much blunt in his behaviours. As Worcester said,

Though sometimes it show greatness, courage, blood
(And that’s the dearest grace it renders you),
Yet oftentimes it doth present harsh rage,
Defect of manners, want of government,
Pride, haughtiness, opinion and disdain,

The least of which haunting a nobleman
 Loseth men's hearts and leaves behind a stain
 Upon the beauty of all parts besides,
 Beguiling them of commendation. (*IHV* 3.1.177-85)

Consequently, the abandonment of dissimulative behaviour could make a courtier less attentive towards shaping his social behaviour and lead him to make mistakes.

Moreover, a patron, especially one who would disdain from using dissimulation, had to be heedful not to be stirred by patronees towards any confrontation or any behaviour that would endanger him, since patronees would consider their own interest and any means would serve their ends. For instance, Lady Percy warned her husband Hotspur to be alert against the advice of Mortimer who incited Hotspur to act against Henry IV “[a]bout his title” and “[t]o line his enterprise” rather than Hotspur’s interests (*IHV* 2.3.78-80). Lady Percy perceived that Mortimer and the rest of Hotspur’s faction were dissimulative and made use of Hotspur’s value system based on the unconditional belief in the protection of the family and its honour. Hotspur did not listen to his wife’s advice because he could not equate his followers with what he had othered, namely, theatrical behaviour. Yet, in a court ruled by affected manners, not only foes but also friends could make use of dissimulation, which was why a courtier had to be careful in differentiating between discrepancies of essence and appearance. When *IHV* was put on stage in 1597, an advice letter urged Essex to be careful to discern affected friendship: “Thou [the Earl of Essex] hast 100,000 true hearts in this small isle that daily expect and wish thy settled content, and the fall of them that love thee not. [...] And whereas thou retainest many in thy favour as true and secret friends, remember that Christ had but twelve and one proved a devil” (Harrison, *Second* 235). Likewise, in the same year, a similar concern was voiced by Bacon. He stated that “[f]actionous followers are worfe to be liked, which follow not vpon affecttion to him, [...] but vpon discontentment conceiued againft some other; whereupon commonly infueth that ill intelligence, that we many times see between great perfonages” (*Effayes* B4^v-B5^f). Quite similarly when Bacon maintained those concerns and Shakespeare presented them, one year after *IHV* was published, pro- and anti-Cecilians tried to spur their respective patrons to act in an aggressive way, particularly minding their own interests if the factional foes were subdued. For instance, Sir Walter Raleigh tried to spur Robert Cecil against the Earl of Essex. On the 14th of August 1600, Sir Walter Raleigh warned Cecil

that if Essex was set free from confinement, he would not change his behaviour because “his malice is fixed” and would consider this as the weakness of Elizabeth I rather than Cecil’s benevolence (Harrison, *Last* 103-4). Likewise, when Essex began to fall from favour, many excluded young noblemen, their patronees, and soldiers gathered around him (Stone 483; Williams 373-4). It was observed that Essex began to be absorbed with the demands of these disfavoured members of the Elizabethan society who spurred his indignation against Cecil’s hold on the patronage and Elizabeth I’s uneven distribution of favours. Therefore, it was stated that upon his return to London on the 22nd of December 1600 that

his doors are set open to all comers. Sir Gelly Merrick, his steward, entertaineth at his table many captains, men of broken fortunes, discontented persons, and such as saucily use their tongues in railing against all men. Sermons are preached there daily by zealous ministers to which the citizens flock in great numbers; [...] And if any showeth a dislike of these things, he is forthwith censured as an envier of my Lord’s honour and liberty. Moreover, now and then he letteth fall words which show his disdainful stomaching the power his adversaries have with the Queen; nor will he listen to the wiser counsels of his friends. These things are brought to the Queen’s ears and alienate her affection from him more and more[.] (Harrison, *Last* 132)

Actually, a courtier should only listen to wiser counsels rather than to those who provoke him because the latter solely want to undo factional opponents or regain their own financial aids provided by the courtier. In conditions when tension between the monarch and a member of the high nobility deteriorated and dissimulation could no longer be applied to survive in the Court, it was difficult to find real advisors or at least to give ear to those who might dissuade one from rash and uncalculated actions. On the other hand, partisans who followed one without advising on or warning against the outcomes of one’s actions were more abundant. For instance, one year after the quarto edition of *2HIV* was published, on the 18th of March 1601 when Sir Charles Danvers and Sir Christopher Blount were executed, before his execution Blount claimed that almost all of Essex’s remaining “friends” argued for a violent coup “with 3,000 of his best soldiers and chief leaders,” whereas “he only dissuaded him as a course too bloody and wished him to go peaceably and speedily only with two or three of his friends and kneel before the Queen” (Harrison, *Last* 172-3). The subsequent execution of Essex had been foreshadowed by the death of Shakespeare’s Hotspur which was the manifestation of unconditional belief in the suggestions of patronees or fellow-factionalists in a

careless way. The rebellious earls had fashioned Hotspur as their leader and this fashioning through constant ill advice terminated his life. As Morton exclaimed to Hotspur's father,

You were advis'd his flesh was capable
Of wounds and scars, and that his forward spirit
Would lift him where most trade of danger rang'd.
Yet did you say 'Go forth'; and none of this,
Though strongly apprehended, could restrain
The stiff-borne action. What hath then befall'n,
Or what hath this bold enterprise brought forth,
More than that being which was like to be? (*2HIV* 1.1.173-9)

The rebellious earls posited themselves as patronees around Hotspur and gave him ill advice, although they were aware of the relative possibility of his downfall because of his rash actions. Hence, patronees could ruin patrons who might abandon dissimulation, act bold and not scrutinise their advices but follow them headlong. Patrons who were not careful about their patronees and other members of their factions reversed, thereby, the top-down and bottom-up relationship of authority. The patrons allowed themselves to be governed by their patronees, although the contrary was the norm within the patronage system. Consequently, being bold rather than dissimulative was not a definite means to continue to exist in Late Elizabethan factionalism that triggered hypocritical behaviour.

Therefore, hypocrisy and theatricality, which were means for survival within the factionalist system of the Late Elizabethan patronage to protect interests against factional foes, created, paradoxically, mistrust within factions. The pressure put on courtiers without the faction by factional foes and within the faction by friends and patronees aggravated social tension that was generated by the arbitrary distribution of royal favours by Elizabeth I. This led to the cumulation of social criticism against Elizabeth I and her favouritism that manifested itself in dissent, which will be dealt within the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

DISSENT

The continuation of the arbitrary distribution in the patronage system amid the draining of royal resources, because of martial expenditures and domestic corruption,⁵⁰ fostered social dissent against the regime. Even though there was a seeming satisfaction with stability, no matter how fragile that stability was, a major part of the society was tired of Elizabeth's politics in the last decade of her reign. As Elton acknowledges, "[t]owards the end of the century, especially, speculation turned into different channels. Men said later that they had waited for the old queen's death before embarking on new enterprises; people can grow tired of a worthy and cautious conservatism" (396).

Socio-political fatigue manifested itself in fits of protests varying in degree and length. The Late Elizabethan Period was a long decade of outburst of instances of social unrest that could not be maintained altogether until the very end of the reign of Elizabeth I. Whether as flashes in the pan or the tips of icebergs, dissent was an omnipresent phenomenon in a passive aggressive or activist manner. Popular unrests following the friction among the layers of the deferential society, domestic and foreign influences regarding religious differences and the horizontal and vertical pressures put on prominent figures of the regime to amend the failings of the system led to a multi-layered and heterodox constitution of Elizabethan dissent. In the Post-Armada Period, the initial most serious threat towards the regime was linked with the succession question. Especially between 1592 and 1594, Catholics within and without tried to encourage Ferdinando Stanley, the Earl of Derby, second in line to the throne, to usurp the crown aided by a foreign invasion (Coward 146; Bagley 65).⁵¹ The subsequent failure to persuade the earl, and his ensuing mysterious death (Manley, "Strange's" 280),⁵² did not, however, end dissent towards the regime, as can be exemplified as follows: the strife between Catholics and Puritans throughout the remaining years of the Elizabethan Period; the unrest among apprentices until 1595, culminating in the Tower Hill insurrection and mass protest (Deiter 13-25, 79-96);⁵³ the Irish Nine Year's war from 1594 to 1603 (Black, *Reign* 408-10), and the post-1597 dissent of the Earl of Essex (Hammer 267-8, 384-7),⁵⁴ showed dissatisfaction with the injustices perceived to

be committed by the Elizabethan government and jurisdiction. In short, people from all walks of life voiced their ideas against the mishaps of the Elizabethan system in the last decade.

The Parliament provided one of the few opportunities to voice sentiments against the general failings of the regime within a legal frame. The Elizabethan government was the cumulative result of a long English tradition of the interpretation of republicanism as a limited “constitutional monarchy” where subject-citizens would have the right to advise the monarch under constitution that limited the powers of the monarch (Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* 16).⁵⁵ Defined by influential political tracts as an Aristotelian “mixed” type of government (Smith, *Common-velth* B1^r-B3^v), the Tudor regime as a constitutional monarchy, checked by parliament and laws, gave its citizens an active role in the maintenance of its well-being (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 19-20). This active participation in politics was assumed to manifest itself in the form of parliamentary supervision of the monarch and the people’s right to petition (Smith, *Common-velth* F3^v; Aylmer H2^v-H3^r). Thus, the petition system along with the parliament could be used to voice criticism against the failings of the Elizabethan government.

Nonetheless, although this type of commonwealth seemed ideal, realities told another story. Generally, there were two types of making use of the parliamentary system. The first constituted a bottom-up relationship of the parliament and the monarch where the parliament created laws which the sovereign had to obey. The second created a top-down relationship where the parliament was a mere advisory tool of an absolutist monarch, the latter being manifest, especially, towards the end of the Elizabethan Period. In her 45-year-long reign, Elizabeth I called only ten parliaments which lasted less than 30 months in total (Roskell 307; Forgeng 31). Apart from the relative low number of parliament sessions and their limited time span, Elizabeth I tried to limit the function of the English parliament to sustain her prerogatives albeit “popular debate” (Black, *Reign* 217-8; Guy, “Rhetoric” 302; Zaret 56). As Hurstfield’s puts forth, “Tudor monarchs behaved as though Parliaments were no more than regrettable necessities” (44). Pro-regime judiciary tracts still used in those times supported such ideas by maintaining that although laws hindered the monarch from becoming a tyrant, the

monarch's greatness lied in his/her ability to govern (Fortescue 87^v-88^r). Such "ambivalence about the royal will" was used by the Elizabethan regime to silence political debate about issues Elizabeth I considered "fit to be handled by herself alone, or by herself in conjunction with [her privy] council," such as the "succession, religion, foreign policy, [...] trade" and the laws of the realm (Perry 5; Black, *Reign* 217-8).

This, however, made the republican pleas, of those excluded from political decision-making, more aggressive. The disenchantment of people after the 1580s created the feeling that "it was wrong that they were excluded from the political processes," because politics was in the hands of a few centred in the Privy Council (Hadfield, *Politics* 21-2). This disenchantment led to strong assertions against the regime within and without the parliament. Debates on whether parliament ought to be active or passive was voiced, for instance, in the 1593 parliament, by Peter Wentworth. His subsequent imprisonment showed "what was clearly a problematic and uneasy compromise" (Hadfield, *Politics* 24) regarding criticism to be voiced and to influence governmental policies. This inflexible attitude led to the acceleration of friction among social strata. Accordingly, "[c]riticism of the executive became more and more pronounced in parliament: privy councillors were treated with less respect than formerly: even the popularity of the queen, great as it was, seemed to wane; [...] The glory of the reign was passing away" (Black, *Reign* 207). Social criticism could not be voiced through legitimate channels, which was why dissent in the form of aggressive resistance became almost the singular form of directing criticism at the regime.

Nevertheless, because of several ontological dilemmas regarding legitimate rule and the ways to oppose misbehaving legitimate rulers in a legitimate way, to challenge the status quo of the Elizabethan Period was not very easy. Accordingly, "[t]he problem of what subjects could and could not debate was related to the question of the legitimacy of the monarch and how it derived its authority" (Hadfield, *Politics* 24). The authority of the monarch in the Elizabethan Period was fashioned to be divinely sanctioned, which made any resistance towards that authority sacrilegious. The negative attitude towards dissent was rooted in Providentialism and the divine ordination of the monarch was backed up with royal display, which made the body politic and the body natural of

the monarch untouchable. In particular, during the time of Elizabeth I, the image of the monarch had been turned into a state-controlled icon which was used to canalise and limit thoughts about the monarch's superior position. This image was maintained especially through court portraiture, licensed engravings for public printing, coins, miniatures, literature in praise of Elizabeth I and her very remoteness and inaccessibility except to a small circle of her advisors (Loades, *Power* 113; Williams 125-6; Dickinson 96-7; Hazard 125). Several media spread this topos of visibility (Greenblatt, "Invisible" 64), in which Elizabeth I was made an icon, to be feared and awed. In particular, "incorporate texts" were used "to guide and delimit the beholders' 'reading' of the dominant visual images" (Montrose, *Subject* 5). This limitation fostered idealisation that was antithetical to the contemporary condition, if we take into consideration the ongoing socio-economic crisis and the restraint in the financial means of the royal patronage. Accordingly, the royal patronage, which was actually limited, was "'decked' out by the imaginary forces of the spectators" of theatrical royal display that perceived Elizabeth I as an unlimited fountain of patronage (Greenblatt, "Invisible" 64). The significance of this canalisation of thoughts was sustained through Elizabethan iconography which adapted former forms of imagery to the "masculine" body politic and "feminine" body natural of Elizabeth I (Montrose, *Subject* 219). Making further use of former Catholic forms of icon creation, Elizabeth I as Virgin Queen was turned into a secularised form of Virgin Mary, to which was added the manners and images of the courtly love tradition (Montrose, *Purpose* 62; Loades, *Power* 109).⁵⁶ The feminine and the masculine was used to create what John Bossy named as "*monarcholatry*—the symbolic sacralization of the monarch as head of both [the feminine] church and [masculine] state" (qtd. in Montrose, *Subject* 3; Perry 19; Dillon 22). The theatricality of royal display enabled Elizabeth I to regulate "access" towards her (Perry 18). Here, the adopted courtly love tradition further solved the problematics of her central position as a female ruler to attract male courtiers as the head of the masculine state. John Aylmer (1559) and Thomas Smith (1562-5, 1583) defended the rule of a female monarch by arguing that the monarch's being of the female sex enabled male courtiers to be more assertive in giving advice that withheld the monarch from turning into a tyrant, whereby in such a "rule mixte" "graue and discrete men as be able to supplie all other defectes" of such a rule (Peltonen, "Citizenship" 100-1; Aylmer H3^r; Smith,

Common-velth D2^v). Hereby, Elizabeth I was fashioned as the manifestation of the ideals of political government.

This elevated position of Elizabeth I was also based on the Chain of Beings and Providentialism. Although its overall effectiveness in the minds of all inhabitants of the Elizabethan Period can be questioned (Tillyard, *World* 9, 18, 107; Ribner 9-10),⁵⁷ the Chain of Beings was an important structure used to elaborate on the causes and effects of political life. Estate division and the actions of persons in these estates were divinely ordained in a top-down hierarchical order according to God's plan. Since God was the king of kings and the monarch was His earthly representative, his/her actions had not only a greater significance on the whole society, but s/he was also untouchable by those inferior in the social hierarchy (Riehl 93; Collingwood 53; Agamben 15; Spiekerman 7-8). Thus, in accordance with the providentialist understanding that God had "a plan of his own with which he will allow no man to interfere" (Collingwood 53), the political decisions of the monarch could not be questioned or interfered with by his/her inferiors.

The immunity of the monarch and the difficulty of acting against him/her when s/he transgressed his/her powers was the result of the limiting paradoxes related to the providentialist understanding of political history. Many Christian political writings tried to incorporate Plato's (*Republic* 2:235-333, bk. 8, 543a-569c) and Aristotle's mixed type of governments (*Politics* 173-275, bk. 3, 1275a-1288b) into the Christian understanding of government. Yet, they could not answer whether to oppose or succumb to tyranny, because the divine appointment and quasi-omnipotence of the monarch almost made silence and obedience compulsory (Salisbury 191, bk. 8, ch. 17; Aquinas 18).⁵⁸ "Passive obedience" was used to indoctrinate subjects to support their superiors and, thus, the regime that was based on the hierarchical control within the line relationship. Homilies and didactic literature were further used for this indoctrination. For instance, Cranmer's *Certain Sermons* asserted that "it [was] not lawfull for their subiectes, by force to refilte" tyrants because "Chrift thought us plainly, [that] euen the wicked rulers haue their power & auhoritie fro[m] God" and that they should "feare the terrible punifhme[n]t of almighty God, againft traytors, or rebellious perfons" (N4^r, O2^v). Likewise, the *Homilie Against Difobedience and Wylfull Rebellion* (1571)

maintained that “rebellion [was] worfe then the worst prince, and rebellion worfe then the worst gouernement of the worst prince” (B2^v). Similarly, the *Myrrovr for Magistrates*, advocated not only hierarchical order but also obedience to that order (Prior 31; Goy-Blanquet, “Elizabethan” 63-4). In line with these Christian understandings of a divine plan where bad events were the outcome of some original sin committed by authorities, in the form of tyranny, or by subjects, in the form of disobedience, contemporary chronicles and histories were heavily indebted to Providentialism, which reinforced the dissemination of passive obedience with the use of historical exempla. In this light, any wrongdoing of a monarch was analysed from a broader perspective as God’s plan operated under a greater scheme of vices and virtues. A monarch’s wrongdoings were either a scourge on the vices of the people or a test for the same (Collingwood 53; Elton 397).⁵⁹ For instance, Hall predominantly emphasised that chronicles were primarily didactic and conformist in “enduc[ing] vertue, and repress[ing] vice” (Hall n. pag.). Similarly, in Holinshed, “the wicked fins and vnthankfulnesse of the inhabitants towards God, [were depicted as] the cheefe occasions and causes of the tranfmutations of kingdoms” (Holinshed 3:A3^v). Although “[t]here were many examples of the bad harvest reaped by evil actions” (Bullough 3:14), dissident people who deposed wicked monarchs were also “wicked” and “lewd” (Holinshed 3:431) because they should have waited for God’s judgment instead. Thereby, people were indoctrinated that the actions of the monarch, whether vicious or virtuous, had been divinely ordained and should not be questioned. The command not to question the regime was supported with the idea that one should not question one’s superiors according to hierarchical social structure. “Vengeance is mine” (Romans 12:19) meant vengeance was God’s, so that dissatisfied people should wait for God’s, their superior’s, just retribution, and should not take matters into their own hands and disrupt social order.⁶⁰

Acting against the wrongdoings of a monarch showed itself in three problems a possible upheaval could create. Social upheaval may cause chaos and civil war may emerge. What is more, a civil war might possibly lead to another tyranny as a “civil war [was] likely to produce a dictator” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 112; Aristotle, *Politics* 407, bk. 5, 1306b). Therefore, the threat of civil war that derived from dissent to the status quo

was condemned. First of all, dissent was fashioned as a social condition that should be cured and purged through elimination and absorption. There was a need for a cathartic cleansing of unnatural disorder to reconstitute order, especially through the form of capital punishment. Repressive means of punishment were essential to reconstitute coherence within the body politic of the state, in order to cure its humoral order that was corrupted through unnatural dissent. Lambard in his *Eirenarcha* (1581) elucidated that punishment was used “for examples sake” to maintain “authoritie” and “security” (67). Thus, dissenters who violated the order of things and became traitors were to be punished according to their offence. By prolonging the punishment through quartering, drawing and hanging at Tyburn, as forms of “death-torture,” “pain [would be carried] almost to infinity” since the culprits dared to challenge the sacred body politic and the order represented by it (Foucault, *Discipline* 33, 53-4; Girard 8; Agamben 15). The rehabilitation of the disorder in the body politic was demonstrated with the eversion of the body natural of the dissident. As Keyishian elucidates, the culprits “had [...] to suffer punishments that suited and expressed their horrendous crimes” (180). For instance, the case of William Hackett demonstrated how dissent corrupted coherence within the society and led to a clash of opinions, which could only be cured by purging the disorderly from society. On the 16th of July 1591, William Hackett claimed himself as the Messiah, criticised and cursed the regime, and led to the gathering of a huge crowd, after which he was arrested (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 41-3). In the aftermath, the disrupting effects of Hackett’s failed uprising manifested itself in the polarisation of the population as believers and nonbelievers, the latter of whom considered him and his accomplices as “mere fanatics” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 43). When at his execution a hostile huge crowd gathered around him, again, they got so furious at the repetition of his curses and criticisms against the holders of secular and divine order, that is, the queen and God, that “the people” demanded that no “mercy should be shown him” for which they “cried out that he should be cut down at once, being very angry with the officers for not showing more haste” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 46). After several corporeal mutilations, finally “[Hackett’s] heart was cut out and shown openly to the people” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 46). The heart was used as the last sign to concretise the abstract revelation of the unnaturalness of his dissent. Following the performance of capital punishment as a deterrent example for other people, the clash between Hackett’s

supporters and opponents slowly ceased. According to Hazard, the Early Modern death penalty in general “signalled in its time a dramatic nonverbal externalization of inward criminal intent. Castration killed the seed for further treasonous acts; drawing and burning the inner organs rendered visible the treasonous heart and stomach; quartering and scattering the evildoing body mimicked and ended its vagrant behaviour” (227). The permanence of such spectacles was achieved further with the (semi)permanent and Panopticon-like “architectural apparatus[es]” and spaces of London, which included the Tower, where culprits would be held and those primarily from the nobility would be executed, their heads displayed on poles on London Bridge, the scaffolds, the Tyburn Tree, Smithfield, and prisons like New Gate (Foucault, *Discipline* 59-60, 201; Ashley, *Popular* 89; Forging 38).⁶¹ The effectiveness of punishment was maintained through the material presence of the above which were “independent of the person who exercise[d]” “power” and were “permanent” because of the presence of their “effects” of “terror” (Foucault, *Discipline* 59-60, 110-1, 130, 201) either through the exposition of the body parts of the executed and/or the memories of these in the spectators. The discursive and material exercise of the executive powers of the government through formal capital punishment would reinstate and cure the social order through a “sacrificial catharsis” that would contain the dissemination of dissension (Girard 29-30). Capital punishment was thereby a form of a Repressive State Apparatus of especially the “judicial system” that circumscribed such “political ritual” to restore order and assimilate active and passive dissidents who defied “the law” and “the will of the sovereign” (Althusser 142-5; Foucault, *Discipline* 47-8; Girard 8, 15). As Hazard argues, “[p]unishment for violation of ceremonial decorum was parodically ceremonial, and, like its prototype, the parody was manifested bodily. [...] [B]odies or the body parts were metonymic witness to the constraints of Elizabethan justice. Other forms of sanction were also enacted through the body—even in its absence” (229). By implementing punishment with theatrical means, the Elizabethan justice system aimed at upholding the health of the body politic by purging the unnatural parts. Thereby, punishment and discipline “serve[d] to preserve the peace by containing socially toxic behaviour” (Keyishian 176). What was valid for the body natural was, metaphorically, valid for the body politic. As Hadfield maintains, “[c]ivil war infects the whole realm” (*Republicanism* 112). Therefore, for the health of the body politic, dissent and disorder,

which were described as sicknesses of political order, needed to be cured and eliminated. Consequently, dissent and the possible consequences of civil disorder were considered likely to cause further problems in the government.

Shakespeare's Elizabethan history plays, either predominantly as in the first tetralogy or occasionally as in the later plays, depicted civic turmoil, mostly criticising it. For example, Shakespeare's Henry VI who wanted to dissuade Humphrey of Gloucester and Winchester from their factionalism epigrammatically maintained that "Civil dissension is a viperous worm, / That gnaws the bowels of the commonwealth" (*IHVI* 3.1.72-3). The use of humoral and corporeal imagery alluded to the long medicinal tradition that made use of political discourse of obedience and "fedition" to analyse the body (Ryan-Lopez 16; Jones, *Bathes* n. pag.; Jones, *Briefe* C3^r, Bostock B1^v, B3^v). While medicinal works made use of such political imagery, political works made use of medicinal tropes in analysing problems as forms of "fickenes" (Cranmer, *seconde Tome* kkkkii^v-kkkkiii^f). The idea of sickness was used by Bacon in his *Effayes* (1597) where in one essay he argued against the "ill" effects of factionalism in the form of "discontentment" (B5^r) that was malevolent to the contemporary political order. Similarly, such humoral imagery was employed in chronicle histories, as well, because it enabled to point out the unnaturalness of disorder prompted by the lack of or the attack on order. For instance, Hall argued that the death of powerful nobles during the reign of Henry VI led to a power vacuum that was tried to be filled up with disorderly groups. Accordingly, "people [...] felt" that this vacuum did "grow like a pestile[n]t humor, which succesciely [a] litle and litle corrupteth all the membres, and destroyeth the body" (Hall cv^v). Therefore, Shakespeare's Exeter feared that factionalism between the Yorkists and the Lancastrians would harm the whole country, so that "[a]s festered members rot but by degree, / Till bones and flesh and sinews fall away, / So will this base and envious discord breed" (*IHVI* 3.1.194-6). Hence, for a healthy system, the basic dynamics of that system should not be disrupted in any manner. Coherence and maintenance of order were prioritised to hinder further problems. Therefore, when one year after the production of *IHVI*, it was reported on the 11th March of 1591 that the aim of scattered fractions of Puritan "discontent[s] [...] to bring in a uniformity [their] causes" brought actually "nothing but desolation" (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 15), it was emphasised that their scattered discontent targeted the uniformity of the established

order. The Puritan dissent as threat to the uniformity of the system even extended until the final years of Elizabeth I's reign. That might have been why *HV* employed the human body and the body in a metaphorical sense to describe a healthy functioning "government." As the Duke of Exeter and the Archbishop of Canterbury mused, the different "parts" of the "government" would "keep in one consent," especially through "[o]bedience" uniting men of "divers functions" by utilitarian rewards and the force of punishment exerted by "executors" (*HV* 1.2.178-221). The naturalness of obedience was sustained through the bifurcated system of punishment and reward which made disobedience unnatural. Therefore, as Legatt maintains, the "anatomy" of the body politic could be "in harmony" only through punishment and reward to delimit social submission (Legatt 119-20). Consequently, for a healthy body politic and a healthy relationship among its different parts, disorder should be shunned and order should be maintained.

Furthermore, the disruptive effects of disorder through domestic factionalism and dissent towards the policies of the government manifested itself in the weakening of the country which encouraged foreigners to threaten it. Albeit decreasing after 1588, the fear of foreign invasion was still part of the Elizabethan consciousness. Accordingly, there were several instances of attempted or expected invasions. For instance, on the 16th of May 1591, an act of the privy council demanded that "[t]he Lords-Lieutenant and others, charged with the defence of the places on the coasts, are warned to have all things prepared to resist any attempt that the enemy may make" and that "immediate order taken to watch and guard the beacons as has been done before in time of danger" (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 30). The following eight years, at least, witnessed similar preparations for real, supposed and false alarms for invasions,⁶² which indicated that even after the Armada victory foreign invasion was still seen as a possibility by the Elizabethans. For that reason, it was crucial to sustain civil order and to remain strong against any possible invasion. This was reflected on the Elizabethan stage, as well. For instance, when Henry VI wanted to end the factional quarrel between the Yorkists and the Lancastrians, he pointed out the fact that "[i]f [foreign countries] perceive dissension in our looks / And that within ourselves we disagree, / How will their grudging stomachs be provoked" (*IHVI* 4.1.139-41).⁶³ Similarly, Shakespeare's Philip

the Bastard focused on the fatal consequences of civil disorder which did “wound” England and encouraged “the proud foot of a conqueror” to step on English soil (*KJ* 5.7.110-4). The final words in the play, “Nought shall make us rue, / If England to itself do rest but true” (*KJ* 5.7.117-8), were not just lines of Elizabethan jingoism, but emphasised that order within should be maintained for whatever reason. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 only postponed possible foreign invasions, which remained to threaten domestic security, seen, for example, in the many instances of abortive continental Catholic “Neville conspiracies” from 1584 to 1595 centred on Charles Neville, Earl of Westmorland, who was involved in the 1569 Northern Rising (Canino 116). Yet, especially between the possibly last performances of *IHVI* and *KJ*, around 1590 and 1594, domestic dissension that would assist foreign invasion was a very contemporary issue, particularly in regard to Ferdinando Stanley, Lord Strange and later Earl of Derby, second in line to the throne (*Calendar of State* 39-40). In 1591, the *Calendar of State Papers Domestic* reported William Cecil’s investigation of foreign prisoners who tried in England “to talk about the succession, and persuade Catholics to cast their eye upon Lord Strange” as a possible “Catholic King allied to Spain” appreciated “by the Catholics unanimously” (*Calendar of State* 39-40). Ferdinando Stanley did not clear such allegations, at first, and William Cecil rather withheld a letter, as further evidence, that was assumed to be ordered to be written by Robert Parsons, the notorious leader of the English Mission of the Jesuits. In the letter, there were coded instructions about approaching Ferdinando Stanley about his possible succession to the throne upon the death of the queen (*Calendar Salisbury* 104). On the 26th of August 1592, it was reported that George Dingley “heard from Father Parsons that the King of Spain had promised Sir William Stanley to invade England, but not until 1593” when “he hoped to have [...] 16 great ships and 10,000 men, and more commodity to come to the Irish kerns” after which “Sir William Stanley could go to his own country, where the Earl of Derby could go to assist him” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 156). According to this plan, the Earl of Derby would be “proclaimed King” following the success of a Spanish invasion around April 1593 (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 156-7). This was supposedly confirmed by a report about Cardinal Allen, the diasporic Catholic Cardinal of England, that “‘Lord Strange, though he were of no religion, should find friends to decide a nearer estate’ for him” (qtd. in Bagley 65). When Lord Strange

became the Earl of Derby, the insistence of the Catholics increased, which could be seen when his younger brother Sir William Stanley who was in exile was reported that he “‘thinks yt in only my L. Strange Catholiques can have hope’ after [the] Queen” (qtd. in Coward 146).

The relationship of Shakespeare with Ferdinando Stanley at the beginning of his career, especially until 1594, whether as “a freelance playwright” or as part of Ferdinando Stanley’s company, the Lord Strange Men, has been associated especially with his first tetralogy and the references regarding the past of Ferdinando’s ancestors, the Cobham’s and the Stanleys (George 306-7, 319; Manley, “Great” 169). Yet, the relationship of Shakespeare with Ferdinando Stanley, as reflected in the first tetralogy, might not have been delimited to the nobleman’s past, but might reflect Stanley’s contemporary political ideas. Ferdinando Stanley tried to remain loyal to the regime, despite the tolerance of or adherence to Catholicism of the rest of his family from which he wanted to distance himself (Bagley 65; Manley, “Strange’s” 280). Stanley’s rejection to be part of a Catholic scheme by exposing the plot and surrendering a Catholic spy to the regime (Coward 146), were in accordance with the relative distance towards approval of dissent in the first tetralogy and the contemporary play *KJ*. Ferdinando Stanley might have used the plays to fashion himself as a loyal noblemen against the common opinion of his potential for treason (Bagley 66; Manley, “Strange’s” 276-7; Canino 190). Bearing in mind the post-1593 forced isolation of Ferdinando Stanley that withheld him from royal favour by taking from him certain titles and lands and some of his livery (Manley, “Strange’s” 280), and that Ferdinando Stanley did not revolt to amend such wrongdoings, it could be stated that he did not consider dissent, through domestic forces or foreign assistance, as a way to solve problems. Thereby, both on stage and off stage, the need to suppress criticism towards the system and to bear the wrongdoings of the monarch were observed. This attitude of not disrupting order was reflective of the need for internal peace for whatever personal cost that would also hinder foreign intervention.

Moreover, the limitations on verbal and physical social criticism were related to the fact that dissent and factionalism only brought domestic chaos rather than remedy to the

problems. On the Elizabethan stage, this concern was reflected, for instance, when it was lamented in *IHV* that the ongoing civil discord could not be controlled by the monarch once it accelerated into general dissatisfaction with the government and led to frequent violent outbursts between several interest groups. The Duke of Exeter argued that dissent would lead to chaos: “This jarring discord of nobility, / This shouldering of each other in the court, / This factious bandying of their favourites, / [...] doth presage some ill event. / ’Tis much when sceptres are in children’s hands, / But more when envy breeds unkind division – / There comes the rain, there begins confusion” (*IHV* 4.1.188-94). Being an adaptation of chronicle material regarding the Gloucester-Winchester “greate diuifion [...] whiche, of a sparcle was like to growe to a greate flame” in 1425 (Hall xciv^f), the script possibly performed on the stage might have reflected the anxieties regarding the problems of the maintenance of order following disorder. Quite interestingly, a rather dystopian vision seemingly adapted from Shakespeare’s depiction of the Wars of the Roses in *1-3HV* was stated by Dingley on the 14th of September 1592, as well:

[M]any of our nobility were believed to be discontented at not being advanced and would easily be moved to follow the Spaniard, who would promise to put them in places of authority if he should possess England. The Earls of Oxford and Cumberland, and the Lords Strange and Percy are much talked of as alienated by discontent. Their chief hope is the Queen’s death; wherefore the Spaniard lingers in his attempt at again assaulting England because time will call her away, when they have certain hope of a debate between the two houses of Hertford and Derby, who will seek the throne, each for himself; during which contention the Spaniard thinketh entry into England would be without danger. (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 167)

Similarly, on the 25th of September 1592, when the Court was at Oxford, the emphasis on the chaotic effects of dissent and the need for harmony within the nobility for the well-being of the country were pointed out in a philosophical disputation. There, “Mr. Savile” philosophised on “*An dissensions ciuium sint respublicae utiles?*” that is “([w]hether the disagreements of citizens are useful for the state) [and] took occasion to commend by name the Lord Treasurer, who was present, the Lord Chamberlain, the Lord Admiral and the Earl of Essex” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 173). The audience members of Savile were, then, living in relative harmony in contrast to Oxford, Cumberland, Strange and Percy who were suspected of discontent. Concerns about concord and discord were also depicted in another play of Shakespeare’s. In his critical

account on previous chronicles on King John, Holinshed argued that “dailie treafons” and the lack of “faithfull subiects” led to the “not verie fortunate” reign of the king (3:196). In *KJ*, a similar concern for the emergence of chaos was asserted by Philip the Bastard who argued that the clash of the legitimate “powers from home and discontents at home” would bring “vast confusion” like the “raven on a sick-fall’n beast” (*KJ* 4.3.151-4). Order, even in its corrupt state, therefore, was better than disorder that would emerge from opposition towards that order.

Besides, chaos in the higher levels of society would encourage ascending forces to implement their ways of governance in a chaotic way. Once order vanished, deferential hierarchy, which was the basis of such order, would vanish, as well. For example, Shakespeare used the clownish procedures of the rebels in *2HVI* to analyse the fatal consequences of domestic “chaos” (Arab 26; Champion 304). This he achieved through amalgamating chronicle history and previous plays about the Peasants Revolt in 1381 and Cade’s rebellion, and adopting the illiterate rebels of the 1381 revolt to reflect upon those of the 15th century (Hall *clix^r-clxi^r*; Holinshed 3:429-437, 3:632-5).⁶⁴ In particular, Shakespeare’s Jack Cade took opportunity of the chaos among the nobility, while being encouraged by the Duke of York to do so. Being “a grotesque antimasque” of “the Wars of the Roses” where Cade was described by York as “a grotesque Morris dancer,” “a wild Morisco” (Legatt 16-7; *2HVI* 3.1.364-6), the Cade uprising was the manifestation of how dissent among the nobility could lead to popular unrest that defied the fundamentals of order. Following the upheaval led by Jack Cade, he promised members of the lower classes a pseudo-proto-socialist state where social differences would cease to exist (*2HVI* 4.2.59-70). The phrase, “When Adam delved and Eve span, / Who was then the gentleman,” which had been used in the Peasant’s Revolt in 1381, was used in *2HVI* as “Adam was a gardener” (Carpenter 253; *2HVI* 4.2.124) and would criticise hereditary rights that differentiated between the aristocracy and commoners.

From the perspectives of the 20th and 21st centuries, Cade’s promises could be appreciated (Laroque 252; Nuttall 44); yet in the Elizabethan society that was based on the justice of social difference and not equity, such promises were considered rather shocking. Cade tried to “[abolish] all private property in order to eliminate the social

hierarchy that differentiate[d] poor laboring men from nobles and gentry” (Wright and Buck 73). Therefore, the Cade rebellion was a threat to established hierarchy based on land and status ownership in a society based on difference. As a rebellion by the relatively lower strata of society, the emphasis on “commons” (2*HVI* 4.2.172) and commoners, both meaning “common lands shared by a community” and “the social estate or status of laborers,” and the attempt to abolish “private property” and “subordination” (Wright and Buck74), were threats to the very basics of the feudal order, still the influential and determining factor in Elizabethan social life.

Furthermore, chaos, resulting from the suspension of hierarchical order, could lead into the substitution of written laws by oral arbitrary laws. Hierarchy was seen as a guarantee for order in general and any transgression would shatter the proper function of the justice system. As Cranmer maintained, “where there is no righte order, there reigneth all abufe” (*Certain Sermons* N1^v). Therefore, as for “[p]assive obedience” and “suspicion of popular rule, Shakespeare was merely echoing the prevalent doctrine of the day, which regarded the poor as a delinquent, fickle, ignorant, and stupid mass not fit to be trusted with any authority” (Stone 30). Thus, the apocalyptic vision against dissent was also related to the possibility of a political vacuum where spoken and arbitrary laws would substitute, no matter how defective they were, written ones.

In the Elizabethan Period, there was already a tension between “positive law” through “common law,” the “strict adherence to precedent,” and “equity” through “Equity courts” which foregrounded “Judgement” and “judicial discretion” to adapt abstract “*written*” law to concrete incident (Keyishian 177; Lambard, *Archeion* 77, 80, 82). Yet, these formal and functional forms were still within the boundaries of the written culture. Hence, they were controllable, so that judicial decisions would prevent arbitrary personal decisions. To further hinder personally motivated verdicts, the formulations of the 14th century judge Bracton were used in the Elizabethan Period, where an authoritative magistrate would follow “proper legal procedures” within the limits of “justice” (2:340). The institutional and impersonal constitution of judicial procedures were articulated as the very foundations of order in the Elizabethan Period. Therefore, Cade’s suspension of written law manifested itself in examples of arbitrary

decision-making that re-emphasised the importance of such written laws to sustain order and the rights of people within the deferential social structure. In particular, following the Butcher's oral petition, Cade would "burn / all the records of the realm," after which his "mouth" would "be the / parliament of England" (*2HVI* 4.7.5-13), which were depicted further in the arbitrary trials by Cade of noblemen or commoners. For instance, the parodic hanging of a clerk "with his pen and / inkhorn about his neck" mocked written law procedures, which were substituted by Cade's informal "examin[ation]" and questions about whether he could "write and read and cast account," and the acknowledgment of the crimes of the "villain" and "traitor" were substituted by the clerk's confessions about his ability to "write [his] name" (*2HVI* 4.2.100-1, 4.2.78-99). Likewise, Cade gave his sentence for Lord Saye even before his parodic trial and said that Saye would be "beheaded for [the accusations] ten times," which included high taxation and the loss of the French territories (*2HVI* 4.7.17-21). In relation to the subsequent comic accusations about the increase in literacy through "erecting" "grammar school[s]" and advancement in "printing" technologies (*2HVI* 4.7.23-37), Lord Saye, as the representative of order, was used to embody not only criticism towards the failings of the system, but also to show that disorder following dissent and criticism would indiscriminately shatter all commonsensical order.

The shock regarding the suspension of the feudal order would be felt in the Elizabethan society in vertical and horizontal social relationships. Without material and discursive order, social differentiation that placed the financially self-sufficient paterfamilias in the centre, would cease to exist and formerly disciplined men and women according to their "age, social status, marital status, and context" (Shepard 1) would be set loose. Accordingly, a proto-socialist state based on oral laws formulated randomly by a dictator-like commoner as depicted in *2HVI* would be rather a "dark [...] carnival" if realised in reality (Legatt 17; Arnold 97-8). As Legatt further maintains, the "anarchy" of the rebels that created some "energy" was rather "threatening, and the first London audiences must have felt the threat more sharply as it crept towards familiar places" (17), like the many references to London streets and locations, such as the "London Bridge" or "the Tower" (*2HVI* 4.4.48, 4.5.8). For example, when the play was published in 1594, there were many instances in which such locales were used to

challenge the order through popular uprisings and riots. In the Tower Hill Insurrection of 1595, for instance, the apprentices, who rioted and were “punished with whipping, setting in the pillory, and long imprisonment” (Harrison, *Second* 31) rioted again. They tore their pillories, erected “a gallows [...] in front of the door of the Lord Mayor” and attempted to seize Tower Hill (Deiter 93; Harrison, *Second* 31). The *Proclamation Against Unlawful Assemblies* on the 4th of July 1595, which restricted “go[ing] out into the streets in the evening,” “writ[ing] or be privy to seditious bills,” and the execution of “[f]ive of the unruly youths” (Harrison, *Second* 32, 39) were effective in maintaining bottom-up disorder. The contemporariness of disorder and defiance of deferential society through ascending dissension in the Tower Hill Insurrection may have made the subversive procedures of Jack Cade more appalling.⁶⁵

Besides, dissent for whatever reason was seen as a wrong means to correct wrongdoings. For example, in late 1596, in the Oxfordshire Rising some citizens wanted to march onto London in order to protest and solve the problems regarding “enclosures” of the “common fields” in a time of dearth and starvation (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 156, 161). Yet, the very fact that they rose up rendered their just pleas for the right of nourishment seditious rather than legitimate. When the quarto edition of *RII* was published around the same time, Shakespeare’s the Duke of York urged Bolingbroke to forsake his rebellion for reacquiring his confiscated lands. Accordingly, dissent seemed to be a wrong means to be used even for a just end. Although York sympathised with his “cousin’s wrongs” and did his best “to do him right” within the limits of the approved legislative procedures, he did not approve of this and considered Bolingbroke’s return to England up “in braving arms,” amid the verdict for his banishment on pain of death, as a “rebellion” through which Bolingbroke was trying “[t]o find out right with wrong” (*RII* 2.3.140-7).

The reason for the “wrong” of Bolingbroke’s reaction towards the confiscation of his lands by Richard II was related to the fact that Richard II, according to the providentialist order and legitimate succession, was a divinely ordained king who could not be acted against by worldly forces. As Prior emphasised “[t]he widely held belief that resistance to a king is a sin rests on the assumption that the source of a king’s

power is divine” (139). Richard II’s interference in God’s judgment in the duel scene had been used by some critics to show the discrepancy between his words and his deeds regarding divine ordination and order (Hamilton 14; Low 271; Prior 145). Yet, Richard II’s legitimate succession and political writings within the providentialist mode made his wrongs answerable to God alone. This, theoretically, hindered any possibility of worldly dissent by his inferiors. For instance, since dissent disrupted order in general, it was among the “detested sins” and would also be reacted against by “heavenly” powers (*RII* 3.2.36-62). Accordingly Richard II maintained, “Not all the water in the rough rude sea / Can wash the balm off from an anointed king; / The breath of worldly men cannot depose / The deputy elected by the Lord” (*RII* 3.2.54-7). Richard II as a legitimate monarch did not derive his legitimacy from worldly powers or human consent but from divine ordination. The violation of such legitimacy was principally illegitimate because it would disrupt the very legitimacy and immunity of that divine order.

Although there might be reasons for dissent and the later deposition, such as murder and ill rule, as in the case of Richard II who was accused of having a hand in the murder of the Duke of Gloucester, within the providentialist pattern one had to be patient, not act against a monarch who was “God’s substitute” on earth, and leave judgment to God alone (*RII* 1.1.98-108, 1.2.37-41). The theoretical dead-end to find means of removal for tyrannical monarchs manifested in the inertia of Gaunt who “cannot correct” as “correction lieth in the hands / Which made the fault” (*RII* 1.2.1-8). That is, the monarch as the head of the kingdom was automatically the head of the judiciary and executor of justice which problematised the fact that his inferiors were exerting justice on him instead. Although “patience” may be considered as “cowardice” by others (*RII* 1.2.9-36), there was no other solution within Providentialism to remove monarchs who abused their powers. As Gaunt explained to the Duchess of Gloucester, the widow of Woodstock, he was much more eager to act “against the butchers of his life” but had to withhold himself because Richard II’s, the legitimate monarch’s, involvement in the murder could be acted against only by “God” and “the will of heaven” (*RII* 1.2.3-8, 1.2.37-43). The untouchable body of the sovereign and the problems regarding legitimate resistance towards monarchs who succeeded to the throne legitimately

prevented Gaunt from voicing his criticism towards Richard II in public; he restrained from “lift[ing] / An angry arm against” the king and rather held his “tounge [...] bycause it deal[t] with a prince” (Agamben 15; Mulcaster 243; *RII* 1.2.40-1).⁶⁶ Consequently, as dissent was not legitimate the wronged people had to leave the judgment to God alone.

Furthermore, since dissent was not legitimate, the power transference from Richard II to Bolingbroke turned order upside down. The subsequent deposition scene (*RII* 4.1.108-320) was omitted from the quarto editions in the Elizabethan Period for its defiance and usurpation of the sacred body politic of the monarch (Albright 688; Helgerson 37). The performed version was a close adaptation of chronicle material found in Holinshed. It was reflective of the problematics set forth by the Bishop of Carlisle that a monarch could not be tried by his subjects and that Bolingbroke without being anointed as king could not exercise regal powers (Holinshed 3:512). The deposition of Richard II’s body politic as a king and subsequently the metaphorical deposition of his “intellect” because of Richard II’s firm belief in his legitimate right to be king being at odds with the realities of deposition (*RII* 5.1.26-50), were interconnected with the fact that deposition, no matter how wrongly the monarch ruled his/her kingdom, was not just and would probably beget further conflicts. In particular, the maddening of the deposed Richard II’s body natural was reflective of the disorder to follow once the body politic was taken over by Bolingbroke. The usurpation unsettled the social hierarchy and the fixation of titles and names. For instance, in the quarto editions of 1597 and 1598, the reference “King” became a referent without clear reference especially in Act 5 scene 3⁶⁷ when Bolingbroke was referred to as “King H.” and merely “King” just like Richard II was referred to as such until Act 5 scene 1.⁶⁸ Similarly, as Legatt notices, the Duke of York reflected the confusion of titles and names declaring that “[t]o Bolingbroke are we sworn subjects now” rather than referring to him as “King Henry” (*RII* 5.2.39; Legatt 70). Like the probably staged but certainly not published deposition scene and the shattering of the mirror, the deposition did not only shatter the identity or body natural of Richard II (*RII* 4.1.276-302; Legatt 71), but also the body politic of kingship and order was torn into pieces. Thereby, Shakespeare’s Richard II reflected the transformation of the historical Richard II into “an embodiment of painful historical

awareness” prompted by “traumatic loss” (Baldo 11). As historical hagiography, Richard II’s experience of usurpation of the crown inverted order at the very top of the system, which would be used to analyse forthcoming problems. The Bishop of Carlisle’s protest against Bolingbroke’s ascension to “the regal throne” was in the form of a prophecy that “[t]he blood of English shall manure the ground, / And future ages groan for this foul act, [...] / And in this seat of peace tumultuous wars / Shall kin with kin and kind with kind confound [...] / O, if you raise this house against this house, / It will the woefullest division prove / That ever fell upon this cursed earth” (*RII* 4.1.114-5, 4.1.138-48). The defiance of the order at the very top of the system would lead to disorder on other social levels and make it quite difficult to cure such ills until the very origin of defiance was cured. Reflective of further historical knowledge from chronicle material about the Wars of the Roses and its depiction in Shakespeare’s first tetralogy, the illegitimacy to act even against wrongdoing monarchs was depicted through such prophecies within providentialist patterns. Likewise, the former Richard II had prophesied that dissent would beget dissent and deposition would beget deposition. In particular, Richard II stated that Northumberland would rise against the now Henry IV as they would “fear” each other because of the ambition of Bolingbroke’s followers and the fact that he was “plant[ed]” as an “unrightful [king]” and that this kingdom could be “pluck[ed]” back by his seemingly loyal followers (*RII* 5.1.55-68). Once order was broken, “corruption” in any manner might emerge (*RII* 5.1.59). Although Warwick’s analysis of this prophecy in *2HIV* tried to demystify and rationalise the reasons for the rebellions in Henry IV’s reign (*2HIV* 3.1.80-92), it gave the idea of the “classical argument for history as life’s teacher, *Historia magistra vitae*” and the problematics of such teaching regarding issues like dissent and usurpation (Baldo 93). The idea that such corruption would beget corruption was an adaptation of chronicle material. Although Bolingbroke had his reasons, because Richard II’s “guiltless life” was taken by him, Richard II became “a prince the most unthankfullie used of his subiects [...] for the which both [Bolingbroke] himselfe and his lineall race were scoured afterwards, as a due punishment unto rebellious subjects” (Holinshed 3:507-8). Thereby, dissent towards a wrongdoing monarch would not purge social problems but intensify them. Bolingbroke’s usurpation did not wipe out the problems faced by Richard II but rather transferred them onto the new king. As Legatt argues, “[t]he new king has a number of

ironic affinities with Richard, not the least of which is blood guilt. In the first scene he declared that Gloucester's blood cried for revenge like sacrificing Abel's' (I. i. 104); in the last [scene], he tells Exton, 'With Cain go wander thorough shades of night' (V. vi. 43)" (Legatt 74). Therefore, although it is contested by some critics for critical and moral reasons (Ribner 104-6; Prior 24), Tillyard's formulations that Richard II's usurpation of his crown and his murder were original sins, to be cleansed later on, were the pro-regime justifications against rebellion in whatever situation (Tillyard, *History* 261-3; Hall lxxviii^r, ccx^r, ccxxiii^{r-v}; Holinshed 3:541). The problems regarding misgovernance were related to the body natural of Richard II. Bolingbroke's usurpation, however, transferred the taint of the body natural onto the body politic that would be transferred from generation to generation until a final moment of divine retribution.

The subsequent plays of Shakespeare, namely *1-2HIV*, did not only depict the fulfilment of the prophecies regarding the disrupting impact of dissent with Northumberland and Hotspur's uprising, but, ironically, showed Henry IV arguing that "rebellion" always did "find rebuke" and punishment, and prophesising in a propagandist way that "Rebellion in this land shall lose his sway" (*IHIV* 5.5.1, 5.5.41). This manifested that dissent, either in aristocratic or popular bottom-up militaristic interventionism, would only result in failure. The basic principle behind this comment was that any order, albeit having many points to be criticised or having been originated in some stained constitution, should not be opposed in an open way and through violent means. For instance, in several letters of advice by Francis Bacon, Henry Cuffe,⁶⁹ or in anonymous letters, many of Essex's reasonable patronesses wanted to remain within the limits of the order of things in the Elizabethan government. They urged Essex to refrain from his martial posts and from insisting in his idea that aggressive militaristic policies were to be preferred in solving problems of domestic and foreign relations (James 429).⁷⁰ Essex should concentrate on non-violent statesmanship, hide his political ideas, and "dissemble" (qtd. in Gajda, *Earl* 190; Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 276; Harrison, *Second* 139-40). Bacon repeatedly pressed the Earl, as he did on the 15th of September 1599, to take "a white staff in his hand, as my Lord of Leicester had," work for the well-being of society in diplomatic manners, attend "Court" and not "put arms"

(Harrison, *Last* 39). For that reason, advocates of the established order did not want a militaristic interventionist rebellion against social injustice.

The overwhelming force of anti-dissent sentiments of Elizabethan society could be felt throughout Shakespeare's history plays, yet, especially, in *HV*. Dissent was against the order of things and was, thereby, to be considered as an abnormality. Homilies against dissent pointed out the abnormality of rebellion by emphasising the “vnkindnes, vnnaturalneffe, wickedneffe, mischeuoufneffe” of “rebels” who were not “thankful” to their “Soueraigne” and “armour[ed] [themselves] wickedly” (*Homilie Against B4^{r-v}*). Similar to such homilies, the diction of Shakespeare's Henry V foregrounded providentialist dictums against the unnaturalness of dissent, through which he pointed out how his rebellious nobility lost touch with humanity. The rebellious lords were “English monsters” each of whom were “cruel, / Ingrateful, savage and inhuman creature[s]” (*HV* 2.2.85-95). As Keyishian elucidates, the rebels touched the sacred body politic of the monarch whose “revenge” ought to be taken for “maintaining public order” (179). Chronicle material, such as Holinshed, and didactic literature, such as the *Myrrovr*, revealed that dissent against Henry V arose not just from material motivation, that is, French money, but also aimed to reconstitute the Yorkist line through the ascension of the Earl of March to the throne (*HV* 2.2.89-93, 2.2.155-82; Holinshed 3:548-9; Baldwin xxviii^v-xxx^r). Yet, the providentialist tone of Shakespeare's Henry V was used to inhibit even the voicing of such reasons, which might have been too obvious for the playgoers familiar with Shakespeare's first tetralogy, the chronicles and didactic literature elucidating these (Wentersdorf 283). Through the ritualistic trial of these “monsters” in the cat and mouse game of Henry V, the monarch was able to trick the rebels into condemning themselves (*HV* 2.2.39-60, 2.2.79-85; Wentersdorf 269). As Legatt puts forward, “[a]rresting the conspirators at Southampton, [Henry V] contrive[d] a little morality play (recalling the scene with the Lord Chief Justice), which use[d] theatrical trickery and surprise to highlight his mercy and justice and their unworthiness” (127). In the same year of the production of *HV*, a similar concern about the implementation of impersonal vengeance on dissenting groups could be seen in the Proclamation Concerning the Army for Ireland. Therein it was “declared” that the English forces did not aim at a “conquest” of the “country” of Ireland but aimed “only

to reduce a number of unnatural and barbarous rebels, and rout out the capital heads of the most notorious traitors” (Harrison, *Last* 15). In the same proclamation, the rebels were called “barbarous,” “wicked” who were about to face “extreme misery” (Harrison, *Last* 15). The analyses of dramatic, nondramatic, narrative and non-narrative material from the Late Elizabethan Period showed two effects of the depiction of matters regarding dissent on the stage and their publication afterwards. On the one hand, through the stage, “social pressures” could be released in a cathartic way (Montrose, *Purpose* 63) by punishing a misbehaving monarch with rebels and the rebels with death alike. On the other hand, as a result of the dissemination of providentialist doctrines urging against verbal or physical dissent to maintain social tension, the Elizabethan subjects were encouraged to obey their government in silence.

However, albeit the presence of restrictive means of providentialist dictums, a positive attitude towards dissent was tried to be formulated that maintained it to be right to rise up against tyranny. The providentialist theories did not reject the possibility of misgovernment through tyranny, as noted in the previous section, but were against dissent towards the regime in any manner.⁷¹ The problematic constitutions of misgovernance and tyranny under providentialist theories were foregrounded especially in the difficulty of removing tyrants when this was not fixed in law or tradition. As Prior maintains, since “constitutional provisions for the removal of an inept or evil ruler do not exist, the alternative means can only be forceful and violent” (122). Therefore, what remained to be done in order to expel autocratic rule manifested itself in aggressive resistance.

In order to control possible social unrest, there were many proclamations. If we just look at the numbers, there were 381 only between the years 1553 and 1603, so that we may, like many Old Historicist critics, consider proclamations as very “effective” means against dissent (Lehto 236; Youngs 37-40). Yet, the excess of pro-government writings as repressive means showed not the effectiveness of these means but the high amount of resistance.⁷² Although the definition of riot is contested, only in 1595, there were “13 insurrections” (Manning 55, 208; Deiter 93-5). According to Black, although there seemed to be no dissent to the Elizabethan regime by the majority of “political

theorist[s]” who tended to write “laudatory rather than critical,” there was “a good deal of discontent,” showing that the Tudor ideal of government [...] was already entering upon a period of disintegration” (*Reign* 206). Thus, the excess of the production and distribution of ideas supporting the status quo did not reinforce but it rather undermined it.

While state propaganda tried to exhaust civil discontent and Christian providentialist theories urged passive obedience and failed to provide a means to remove absolutist rulers, Republicanism, which emerged after the classical revival, formed an alternative to those limited theories. Republicanism was a multifaceted combination of ideas which was only bound together with the principle ideas of resistance and change. Actually, there was no singular and pure form of Republicanism but rather several forms of Republicanisms. Some forms emerged because of the “anxieties about the apparent rise of absolute or arbitrary tendencies within the English monarchy” and the need to cure these problems through historical socio-political texts about “mixed government[s]” that were “to illustrate the evils of tyranny, not the virtues of kingless government” (Worden 311; Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* 18).

Apart from sharing similar targets, another common point of Early Modern Republicanisms was that they were primarily based on classical texts. While Ancient Greek texts were the bases for the definition of tyranny, it were the Ancient Roman texts which defended tyrannicide.⁷³ For instance, Aristotle in his *Politics* argued for the mixture of a single-man, minority and majority rule in order to prevent the tyranny of any of these three forms of government (207, 225, 315, bk. 3, 1279a, 1282a, 1294a). Yet, he failed to give proper answers on how to remove tyrants (*Politics* 251 bk. 3, 1285a-b). On the other hand, Cicero in his *De Officiis* pointed out that a tyrant deprived of human compassion should be opposed and eliminated, which would morally be justified for the well-being of society (115, 191-3, 287, 299). Similarly, it may be argued that the foregrounding of the due punishment of tyrants in Seneca’s political and dramatic works strengthened and endorsed Republican ideas against tyranny (Seneca, “On Mercy” 149-50; Seneca, *De Beneficiis* 206-7, bk. 8, ch. 19; Seneca, *Hercules* 7, 67, 83; Prior 122).

Nevertheless, since some of the classical sources could not on their own provide a proper solution for the removal of tyrants, Republicanisms made use of biblical references, as well. Thereby, the practitioners of Republicanism abused providentialist theories and created a biblical basis for their theories. Yet, the dual nature of the Bible, as the Old and the New Testament, procrastinated active resistance. The New Testament, predominantly, urged obedience to authorities (Romans 13:2-14; Luke 2:15; Luke 20:22-5; Acts 24:10; 1Peter 2:13-7), whereas, there were references approving of resistance and tyrannicide in the Old Testament (Daniel 3:14-8, 6:10, Hebrews 11:1-40; 1Kings 16:30-21:24; 2Chronicles 15-6). What is more, there were references in the Old Testament that urged obedience (Psalms 75:7; Daniel 2:21), while some references in the New Testament approved of resistance in certain circumstances (Acts 4:19, 5:29; Romans 13:1), further complicating which reference was morally and religiously appropriate. Thus, “examples of the killing of tyrants” and “of passive non-resistance in the face of tyranny” (Prior 122) created more questions than providing answers. This confusion, however, fostered active discussion whereby the practice of Republicanism in this form reinforced its principles and made it a very popular topic. Actually, “[a]ll these classical and biblical precedents became sources for the discussion of tyranny and tyrannicide in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance” cumulating, especially, in the Elizabethan Period (Prior 122-3; Lucas 92). Therefore, Elizabethan Republicanism was very “eclectic,” organic and defied any “monolithic” conception (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 30; Hadfield, *Politics* 8), in which resistance to absolute rule was negotiated.

Moreover, this organic constitution was related to the historical development of Republican ideas approving tyrannicide in the Early Modern Period which saw shifts in governance and religious profession that created interconnected clashes between the status quo and dissidents who abused each other’s claims for the removal of the other. For example, the ideas of Republicanism as forms of resistance towards tyrants were first used by Continental Protestants against what they considered to be the tyranny of Catholicism (Prior 125-6; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 49). For example, the Protestant John Ponet, in his *Shorte Treatise of Politicke Power* (1556), criticised ‘passive obedience,’ maintaining that forms of government were created by God to hinder chaos,

and that any form of government was formed for the well-being of the people (A5^r). Yet, tyrannical rulers “thought, they might by their owne reason, doo what them lusted,” for which “tyrannye and oppreffion,” people in ancient times, “when they sawe, that the gouernours abused their autoritie, they altered the state” after which tyrants “were so easili and so sone (contrary to their expectacion) ouerthrowen” (Ponet A2^r, A5^r). Tyrannicide, usually advocated by Catholics, was used, thereby, by Protestants, as well. As Ribner maintains, Ponet’s arguments illustrated that “if the ruler is unworthy, the people may revoke the authority they have placed in him” because “evil princes must be deposed and tyrants punished by death” (311). Likewise, while the Catholic priest Allen in his *Defence of Lawful Power* (1567) abused Protestant doctrines of the status quo, the Catholic Robert Parsons further mused on the legitimacy of deposition “that a king vppon iust causes may be deposed” (Allen A4^r-A5^r; Parsons 61, Part 2, ch. 4; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 34-5). Interestingly enough, the Protestant Oxford don and MP Robert Ashley similarly emphasised the notion of justice in his work *Of Honour* (ca. 1590s). Accordingly, only “dull spirited” people could be beguiled by “Tyrantes,” while smart people would be “obedient to” only him/her who “ruleth by laws and instritucions and gouerneth iustly” (Ashley, *Honour* 49). The notion of justice was not singular as the constitutions of what was conformist or radical depended on the socio-political background of the contemporary status quo. This was based on the fact that the reading of certain works, rather than the works themselves, affected the perception of these as conformist or radical writings (Hadfield, *Politics* 7-8).

As for continental sources, basically there was an overwhelming Italian influence on English forms of Republicanisms in the Early Modern Period. Being very influential, Machiavelli’s *Vindiciae* on governance and resistance were used by both Catholics and Protestants, yet in line with associations of Machiavellianism, either acknowledging or plagiarising from his works (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 32; Donnelly 31; Tutino 24, 180-2; Languet A2^r, B5^r, B7^v, B8^r). Particularly, Machiavelli in his four sections of *Vindiciae* scrutinised “whether subjects have to obey princes who command them to act against the word of God; whether princes who make such demands can be resisted; whether princes who ruin their states can be resisted; and whether neighbouring princes

have a duty to help the subjects of an oppressed people overthrow their prince” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 32; Machiavelli, *Vindiciae* 1, 32, 75, 216).

Similarly, foreign states, and mostly Italian city states, with rather republican governance were set as ideals by both Catholics and Protestants. In particular, Venice was set as an ideal model in several works (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 36-42; Hadfield, *Politics* 7-8; Peltonen, *Classical* 102-18). In William Thomas’ *Historie of Italie* (1549), for instance, the Venetian state was admired for its government which followed the Aristotelian mixture of government forms and hindered factionalism under an arbitrary rule (77^f-80^f). In a similar line, many works from the 1570s onwards appeared which overtly or covertly praised non-monarchic governance based on Italian models (Buchanan B1^v, C2^r, C4^r; Valerius eiv^v-evi^r).⁷⁴ Since these works were written in open praise of the republican form of governance, they could be read as criticisms towards the failings of contemporary monarchical rule.

Apart from the propagandist nature of such works, the fact that Protestant and Catholic resistance literature made use of each other foregrounded the fact that no matter how much they clashed with each other, they underlined the failings of Elizabethan governance. As Hadfield acknowledged, the translation of Gaspar Contarini’s *De Magistratibus et Republica Venetorum* (1543) in 1599 by Lewis Lewkenor was no “coincidence” in a period “when criticism of Elizabeth was reaching epidemic proportions, as she herself acknowledged after the Essex’s coup” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 41). The absence of “factionalism” in republican Venice, on the other hand, “would have assumed an especial significance for many readers before, in, and after 1599” if “the increased importance of factions at the English court in the late 1590s, with the conflict between the Cecils and the [E]arl of Essex’s circle” was considered (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 41-2). In particular, Lewkenor in his translation of Contarini argued that foreign models of non-monarchical rule, where “men of greatest wifedome” ruled, could and should be applied to England (Contarini A2^v, A4^r). Lewkenor’s arguments were not new, but the subsequent discussion from 1598 to 1599 made that translation controversial. Accordingly, the preacher Simon Harward, in 1598 (published 1599) argued that people living in “Monarchie” could not adopt such citizen-

“Aristocratie” from “[f]orraine gouvernements” as models to be imitated (B4^r–B5^r). As Harward’s conformist reactions elucidated, the paradoxical use of Catholic city states as possible models for non-oppressive rule by Protestant resistance literature from the 1570s onwards was yet another factor that complicated considering Republican pleas as utilitarian means to reform the grievances of the Elizabethan governance without dismissing them for schism. Early Modern English Republicanisms were a “[c]luster of themes concerning citizenship, public virtue and true nobility [...] to ensure that the most virtuous men governed the commonwealth” (Peltonen, *Classical* 2). Yet, the reciprocal abuse of Catholic and Protestant resistance literature and models further complicated the constitution of Early Modern Republicanisms.

As it has been noted so far, although there was a long tradition of attempts to define the sanction of resistance theories in the Elizabethan Period, especially with the emergence of Neo-Tacitean ideas from the 1590s onwards, resistance towards mismanagement was voiced much more. Neo-Tacitean ideas focused on classical texts and history and thereby combined Republicanism and resistance theory with what has been termed as new history,⁷⁵ the last of which analysed history from secondary causes. This type of history differentiated itself from providentialist Christian mode of history writing. Accordingly, with the rise of classical learning, history writing was influenced by Greek and especially by Roman historians, philosophers and rhetorician’s ideas that history, or rather important historical figures, served as an exemplum for the present (Campbell, *Histories* 18-27; Goy-Blanquet 58, 67-8).⁷⁶ Starting with Polydore Vergil’s innovations in the handling of English historiography, and continuing with Thomas More’s *Richard III* and Edward Hall’s *The Vnion of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancastre and Yorke* (1548), history writing gradually developed towards Neo-Tacitean historiography to focus primarily on the cause and effect relationship rather than providentialist models (Prior 17).⁷⁷ Although English historiographers who focused on secondary causes did not totally abandon providentialist modes, whereby former providentialist history writers also less frequently analysed history from secondary causes (Prior 18), new history aimed at understanding and predicting more precisely the possible outcomes of certain action. Thereby, the citizens became more active in analysing the order of things rather than remaining silent towards social problems.

The developments in new history in Early Modern historiography enabled Neo-Tacitism, as a form of resistant theory, to minimise the limitations posed by providentialist analyses of history. Rather than the divine sanction of the monarch, theorists could focus on governance as a man-made entity that could be reconstructed by men again. Theorists could analyse historical events in a parallel manner to understand contemporary conditions. Accordingly, “classical learning in general and history in particular had important lessons to teach to the sixteenth century” (Peltonen, “Citizenship” 87). While most of such republican works in the 1590s acknowledged the monarchic system, they aimed at limiting the powers of Elizabeth I with quasi-democratic means urging her to listen to counsel and not to rule through arbitrary decisions of her own. For instance, the works and translations of Livy, Tacitus, Sallust and Suetonius were very influential on the rise of Neo-Tacitism (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 43). Particularly, Gabriel Harvey’s analyses of the Roman Livy “carefully” compared and contrasted historical politics with “topical” politics (Jardine and Grafton 30-78). What is more, Tacitus’ works were translated by Savile as *The Ende of Nero* (1591) and by Grenewey as *The Annales of Cornelivs Tacitvs* (1598). Tacitus influenced historiography and resistant theory because he “narrated the events of the reigns of the most tyrannical of Roman emperors,” and could show how to “survive” in “and point the way towards beneficial change” against “absolutism” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 44). The English translations, in particular, were very influential and reflected the shift in signification as a result of the radicalisation of readings of Tacitus’ works in the Late Elizabethan Period. While Savile dedicated his work to his “moft excellent Maieftie,” Elizabeth I (¶2^v), Grenewey’s was dedicated to the Earl of Essex “as well a guide, as image of mans prefont eftate” (Tacitus, *Annales* n. pag.).

The shift in dedicatees showed that Tacitean resistance literature from its covert usages transformed into more overt forms. This overtness manifested itself, especially, in works that used Tacitean methodologies to analyse political theory, such as Lipsius’ *Sixe Bookes of Politickes* (1594) or native history, such as Hayward’s *Henrie the IIII* (1599). In the latter, for instance, Hayward in the final part of his dedication to the reader analytically showed his methodology in Tacitean fashion, “what meane is to be

ved [...] what thinges are to bee suppressed, what lightly touched, and what to be treated at large” (A4^v). This consciousness in analysing secondary causes on past events to serve “for priuate” and public “directions,” could be observed in the reasoning of resistance towards tyrants through the example of Richard II’s misgovernment whose “subiects [...] at length resolved to reuolt” (A3^f, H4^v, 56). Accordingly, “K. Richard should both voluntarily refigne, & also solemnly be depofed, by consent of all the states of the realme” (M3^f, 85). If the assertions about didacticism in the dedication to the general reader, the specific dedication to the Earl of Essex (A2^f) and the matter and manner of handling with the deposition of the reign of Richard II were considered, it could be stated that Neo-Tacitism enabled to voice social criticism towards the contemporary regime through historical example.⁷⁸

Reflective of the developments and sensitivities regarding history writing and resistance theory in the Early Modern Period, the idea of the tyrant and the sanction to resist him/her was depicted on the stage, as well, especially through the Senecan tyrant which developed out of the traditions of the morality play and early history play. For instance, from Bale’s *King Johan* (1538-60) and Norton and Sackville’s *Gorboduc* (1561), which were very early examples of “the English political-morality play” that dealt with “tyranny or insurrection,” to Legge’s *Richardus tertius* (1580) which showed a Senecan “tyrannical monster,” a type that was popular from the 1580s to the 1590s (Kernan 264, 359; McDonald 162; Prior 128; Umunç 219-23),⁷⁹ the English theatre, including outdoor and indoor theatres, staged tyranny, rebellion and tyrannicide. Whether “Senecan” or not, arbitrary rulers or “tyrant[s]” with shortcomings and “violent compulsions” depicted on stage, problematised and interrogated issues about the force of “fear over love, power over legitimacy, and the will over law” (Prior 127-8; Norland 33), whereby the stage transformed into an extension of the political culture of Early Modern England.

Under such conditions, the royal image, which was one of the major instruments in sustaining loyalty through awe and fear, was abused by antagonists to the regime. Elizabeth I was shown to resemble a Senecan stage tyrant who was morally deprived through the excess of a defect. The defect of Elizabeth I was associated with her ageing

femininity. Accordingly, amid social dissatisfaction, the maintenance of an ideal image of the monarch was very hard, which was aggravated by the growing age of the queen, especially in the 1590s. Therefore, there was a need for a uniform image of Elizabeth I. The “Mask of Youth,” that is, formulas set in Late Elizabethan portraiture “that totally ignored reality and instead gave visual expression” of Elizabeth I as a young woman emerged because Elizabeth I as an old woman was “judged unacceptable” and far from her state-controlled image as the embodiment of “eternal beauty and freshness” (Strong, *Gloriana* 147-8; Cerasano and Wynne-Davies 12).⁸⁰ The use of the Mask of Youth was politically important as the decay of her body natural as “an ageing woman” was likened by dissenting figures, like Essex, to the decaying of the body politic, directly challenging the “symbolic forms through which her regime sought to secure the devotion of her subjects” (Montrose, *Subject* 244-5; Hammer 330). The ageing queen tried to maintain the idealisation of her body politic especially with her royal miniaturist Hilliard who in his *Art of Limning* (ca. 1600) formulated how by the absence of shadows he gave an unrealistic view about the age of the queen (Montrose, *Subject* 224-8). Yet, the use of the image of Elizabeth I as a young monarch and an “allegorical apparatus” could not function as “a propaganda triumph” but was just a cover up for the “difficulties and decline” of the Late Elizabethan Period (Riehl 150; McCoy, “Lord” 212). With her growing age, not only the beauty of her body natural but also the idealisation of her body politic deteriorated, which attracted “contempt” to both of them (Montrose, *Subject* 221-2). For instance, it was reported on the 22nd of December 1600 that Essex argued that her misgovernment was based on her “being now an old woman” (Harrison, *Last* 132). Elizabeth I’s obsession to prove her beauty with the Mask of Youth intensified disrespect towards her in the last decade, because that mask equated her with “*Vanitas*” (Montrose, *Subject* 244). This misogynistic equation fostered dissent towards Elizabeth I’s regime whose failings were attributed to her gender. Such emphasis enabled anti-monarchists to liken Elizabeth I’s arbitrary decisions to biblical sources on female tyrants who were depicted in a misogynistic way of being governed by the impulses of their female body natural. Queen Jezebel’s horrifying but deserved death (1Kings 16:30-21:25) or Asa’s deposition of her tyrannous and dissenting queen mother Maachah (2Chronicles 15:16) were read by Elizabethan monarchomach groups to support the tyrannicide of, especially, arbitrary

ruling female tyrants. Yet, generally, the fact that Elizabethan society was based on patriarchy created paradoxes in top-down and bottom-up relations that were pointed out by dissidents of the Elizabethan government. According to these, the masculine order of society created an “absurdity” of “female magistracy,” because “a woman’s nature could” not have the “virtues appropriate to a prince,” as women were “lacking courage, open-handedness, and constancy of fixed purposes” which were “male [...] characteristics” (James 443-4). The lack of such characteristics “frustrated” Essex, especially, who claimed that “[problems] proceeded ‘chiefly from the sex of the Queen’” (qtd. in James 444). Sexist resentment was aggravated by ageism which pointed out the absurdity of efforts to uphold Elizabeth I’s image as a young monarch. The use of the Mask of Youth became a tool for criticism itself as a symbol for the decadence of the system masked by hypocrisy, deceit and role-play. Through such theatrical behaviour arbitrary policies were tried to be masked, whose realities beneath were, however, perceived by disenfranchised aristocratic patronesses and their followers as forms of tyranny.

Similar to off-stage theatricality that had to be used by the Elizabethans in relation to ontological problems regarding the legitimacy of dissent and how to justify it, on the stage and page, Shakespeare’s history plays enabled analyses of tyrannical behaviour, and how to justify and practice dissent. For instance, the inaccessibility of Elizabeth I who intended to fashion herself as a semi-divine ever-young monarch (Hazard 125; Perry 18)⁸¹ was used as a sign of her isolated autocracy defying any bottom-up help in decision-making. The anti-monarchical literature and drama that reflected such political matters were, thereby, a figurative “looking-glass” (*RII* 4.1.268), similar to the material one held by Shakespeare’s Richard II. Through the “mirror” and through the written items about his misgovernment, Shakespeare’s Richard II saw “the very book indeed / Where all [his] sins [were] writ” that constituted “[him]self” (*RII* 4.1.273-5). Through the dashing of the mirror into “a hundred shivers,” Shakespeare’s Richard II tried to explicate the “moral” that the very act of “fac[ing]” and perceiving one’s failures in government, a monarch would be torn into pieces by his very failures (*RII* 4.1.289-91). Similarly, the problematics and rather avoidance of such backward looking analyses of problems about policies, could be seen in the depiction of Shakespeare’s Henry IV. He

had to fashion himself as a “seldom seen” monarch to be ever “fresh and new” and “wondered at” in the eyes of his subjects (*IHIV* 3.2.55-9). The problematics regarding his succession to the throne and his exclusion of some of the nobility in his reign isolated Henry IV within the “present” and hindered him from focusing on his failures in the past (Baldo 68). As Baldo further points out, the very act of presenting such a ruler on the stage as means of a “remembrance” where “a troupe of players remembers a monarch who himself cannot afford to remember, at least publicly” (68-9) rendered doubly subversive the theatrical depiction of the theatrical means of monarchs to cover up social problems, such as through masking and disregarding. Drama, thereby, visualised contemporary problems of governance through histrio-historic monarchs.

However, such kind of isolation, the fears to face criticism, and challenges to governmental policies were depicted not just in a tragic or pathetic way but also in a comic way. For example, the mock-deposition scene in *IHIV* between Falstaff and Prince Hal enabled the depiction of a metaphorical deposition that did not just make fun of the social order but shed light on why such a scene could not be, at least published, in an uncut way. Accordingly, when Falstaff asked Hal to “practise an answer,” in a theatrical sense, before he met his father (*IHIV* 2.4.365-468), the request triggered a metatheatrical role-playing by the two who alternatively impersonated the king and his son. Apart from being only a carnivalesque parody for the sake of laughter *per se* (Hawkins 287; McGuire 52; Gottschalk 611-2; Campbell, *Satire* 18-9; Birney 53), with Falstaff impersonating the monarch with his “cushion” for a “crown” (*IHIV* 2.4.368-72), the scene showed and ridiculed the providentialist dictums regarding deposition. In particular, in his bombastic impersonation of Henry IV in “King Cambyses’ vein,” Falstaff made fun of the king’s fashioning of his isolation and pseudo-impersonal policies by pointing out “a villainous / trick of [his] eye and a foolish-hanging of [his] nether lip” (*IHIV* 2.4.373-94). While here and in many other instances Falstaff functioned “as a cynical chorus” (Dillon 27), the role exchange between Hal and Falstaff pointed out the subversive nature of the dramatic impersonation of the failings of living monarchs. When Hal asked Falstaff to exchange roles, the latter responded how he did dare to “[d]epose” him (*IHIV* 2.4.423), making fun of the most capital crime in Elizabethan jurisdiction. As Montrose foregrounds, the

“mock deposition scene,” as a “comically impudent metatheatrical example[,] suggest[ed] why the Elizabethan regime refused to countenance personations of the prince” by showing “a potentially dangerous capacity to subject the rule to ridicule and to demean the royal office” (*Purpose* 96). The fact that Falstaff was, actually, the politically corrected impersonation of the proto-Puritan dissident Sir John Oldcastle, and that the “memory” of this fact could not be retracted as easily from the minds of the Elizabethan playgoers as done on a sheet of paper in a quarto edition, through the words “for Olde-castle died Martyre, and this is not the man” (Quarto 0 and 1, L1^v), made Falstaff’s mock-heroic challenging of the monarch and status quo the more “problematic” (Baldo 57-8). The fact that the Cobhams, at the very heart of the status quo, descended from the dissident Sir John Oldcastle had been elaborated by many critics as an intended or unintended challenge to the Lord Cobham and thereby to the Cecilian policies he supported (Clare 76-9; Kastan, *Shakespeare After* 83-95). Although Baldo argues that Shakespeare intentionally skipped Falstaff’s/Oldcastle’s religiously dissident “history,” similar to the “chronicle” writing tradition of omitting problematic issues (62), it could be argued that the very omission foregrounded such issues in the signification process of playgoers and readers in the Elizabethan Period.

Even though the subversive element of Falstaff’s dramatic impersonation and the “[c]omedy” related to it was “crushed” by “[h]istory” at the very end of *2HIV* (Legatt 101), it showed that along with poetic justice in the tragic or pathetic ends of wrongdoing monarchs, as in *Richard II* or *Henry IV*, dramatic mockery was yet another effective means for satirical catharsis. From the 22nd of June 1600 onwards, the number of theatrical locations and companies were tried to be limited by the Privy Council (Chambers, *Elizabethan* 4:329-31; Montrose, *Purpose* 63-5; Gurr, “Social” 17). Yet, the potential of mockery could be observed when Elizabeth I lamented that she could not prevent performances about *Richard II* which were played “forty times in open streets and houses,” probably likening him to her (Harrison, *Last* 194). Contrary to this disapproving anecdote, it was quite interesting that the phenomenon regarding the likening of Elizabeth I to *Richard II* did not just appear as part of resistance literature towards the end of the 1590s, but was used, initially, by conformists to praise Elizabeth I. In particular, Nelson’s *Device for Lord Mayor’s Pageant* (1590) was

intended to commemorate through an allegorical representation the rescue of Richard II by the “Ma[y]or of London” who during the Peasants Revolt killed the rebel “Jacke Straw” (6-7). The aim of the pageant of allegorical and historical figures was to reinforce “loyaltie and concord” against the threat of civil war that would destroy “Englands peace” (Nelson, *Device* 3, 5). Yet, the reception of the impersonation of Richard II as an archetype of Elizabeth I would prove subversive and reinforce the potentials of drama to create a space for social criticism in line with the spirit of the mock-deposition scene in *IHV* between Falstaff and Prince Hal.

Moreover, the depiction of tyranny and dissent on the stage and on the page concretised the reasons for containment and how it was possible to challenge that containment. For example, the fact that people did not revolt against tyranny, because of necessity or being afraid of the repressive means used by the tyrant, pointed out that an autocratic monarch was not protected through heavenly but rather earthly means that could be analysed within the limits of cause and effect. Thereby, the reasons for certain human behaviour in rulers who were not or could not be checked by any limits could be scrutinised. For example, Shakespeare’s *RIII* elucidated how loyalty towards a regime turned out to be a political necessity rather than being based on high ideals. Richard III’s use of capital punishment and material reward to eliminate voices against his policies⁸² showed that the legitimate means of the government, namely reward and punishment,⁸³ could be manipulated to sustain illegitimate political decisions. As Prior puts forth, “Shakespeare’s Richard represents the ultimate limits of political action unscrupulously and inhumanly employed” and were devoid “of morality and just rule” (138). The arbitrary and tyrannical policies of Richard III could be analysed by the playgoers and the readers through the characters. Thereby, Elizabethans could also discern the cause and effect relationship of such policies. Richard III created a kingdom that was contained only through “fear” (*RIII* 5.2.20-1). This could be seen when Richard III emphasised only the possible material losses of his followers if Richmond were to win and did not refer to Richmond and his army as traitors or dissidents but merely as “vagabonds, rascals, and runaways” (*RIII* 5.3.337-8, 5.3.317-8).⁸⁴ Richard’s words against the forces of Richmond did not connote the divine sanction of the monarch, but were mere insults. What Shakespeare did here was very important. By not

completely adapting Richard III's speech from chronicle material and omitting the word "traytors" (Hall ii.liiii^v), Shakespeare bereft the depiction of the tyrant from any providentialist overtones that could diminish bottom-up resistance towards him. Thereby, rather than any fear related to God's wrath, the fear of loss of favour were the means to and reasons for the silence towards the failures of a tyrannous regime (Hall ii.lv^r; *RIII* 5.3.337-8). Richard III's foregrounding of loss was ineffective compared to the positive conditioning of Richmond who emphasised that even Richard's followers followed him out of necessity because they feared him as a "tyrant" (*RIII* 5.3.246-50).

Richmond, as the founder of the Tudor dynasty, with his address approving tyrannicide, seemed to defy the Tudor dynasty's ideology of obedience even to tyrants according to the prescripts of Providentialism. As Siegel puts forth, "*Richard III* tacitly accepts not the official Tudor doctrine of obedience even to tyrants but the minority doctrine of the extreme Protestants [...] who proclaimed the right to rise up against tyrants. For the first of the Tudors, the Tudor doctrine does not apply" (*Shakespeare's* 58). Yet, the paradox was used to explain the overthrow of a tyrant not just through second causes but through supporting these causes through providentialist explanations in order not to minimise dissent into a political manoeuvre that had no moral concerns. After having explained how a tyrant might obtain power, the final end of the tyrant in a providentialist way, omitting the torture narrated in chronicles that might have created pity towards him (Hall ii.lviii^v-lix^r; Bullough 3:248), enabled to overcome the theoretical dead-ends of political science in relation to how to remove a tyrant legitimately. The handling of tyrannicide in the play almost follows Cicero's ideas that tyrants should be treated like "members" that should be "amputated" for "the health of the other parts of the body of [...] humanity" (299). Shakespeare's Richmond pointed out that if the "tyrant" Richard III as "God's enemy" were "slain," they would restore order for which they would be rewarded with "pay" and the security of freedom for their "children's children" (*RIII* 5.3.253-63). Hence, Richmond's oratory emphasis on the providential did not just present the contemporary Tudor regime as the inheritors of "God's vicereagents" (Prior 28), but also illustrated how dissent could be explained and justified. Richmond's speech emphasised the need for an equivocal justification of

dissent both analytically with second causes and religiously with Providentialism if *Realpolitik* required it.

Claims by her dissident subjects about Elizabeth I's tyrannous rule to justify dissent seemed to foreground her likeness to Richard II, such as through the production of several plays and the play staged before the Essex rising (Harrison, *Last* 194; Gajda, *Earl* 27).⁸⁵ However, there were no overt comparisons of her to Richard III, the much more apparent example of tyranny on and off the stage.⁸⁶ Yet, similar to the formulation of the physical failings of Richard III that were used to illustrate his "crook'd [...] mind" (*3HVI* 5.6.78-9) in the most effective way in Shakespeare's plays, with the acceleration of the voicing of criticism towards Elizabeth I's policies, a likewise physiognomic study was used by her dissidents. In particular, when a quarto edition of *3HVI* was published in 1600, on the 22nd of December 1600, Essex was reported that "he said that being now an old woman, she is no less crooked and distorted in mind than she is in body" (Harrison, *Last* 132). The failings of the Late Elizabethan government, namely the body politic, were scrutinised by the dissidents through a cause and effect relationship. Since royal patronage centred on Elizabeth I herself, any misdistribution of it must have been related to her own personal errors. These personal errors manifested themselves in arbitrary decisions that could not be amended by bottom-up advice. The projection of the failings of the body politic onto the body natural of the monarch through ageism and misogyny reflected the dissidents' perception of the monarch and her government as distorted and necessary to be reformed.

However, although arbitrary rule was scrutinised and the need for reformation was perceived, there was a need for a strong leader to voice dissent and act against it. A leader would usually be chosen from among the higher nobility and fashioned by public and bottom-up pressures. The basic reason behind such a choice was that members from the higher nobility possessed more socio-political influence and manpower through their patronage network than a leader from the commoners could obtain. The fact that Ferdinando Stanley, Lord Strange, later Earl of Derby, was a "legitimate and probable successor to the English throne" was, for instance, one of the main reasons why Catholics and disenfranchised noblemen like Oxford, Cumberland and Percy, gathered

around him and fashioned him as a leader albeit his reservations and negative attitude towards dissent (Manley, “Strange’s” 276-9).⁸⁷ In line with this off stage significance, Ferdinando Stanley with his acting company and the heroic impersonation of his ancestor Talbot, one of whose titles was that of the present “Lord Strange” (*IHVI* 4.4.177), constructed him consciously and unconsciously as a strong and powerful nobleman possibly capable of challenging the system.

Nevertheless, following the “untimely” and mysterious death of Ferdinando Stanley (Coward 37; Manley, “Strange’s” 279), Essex became the sole aristocratic champion for dissatisfied groups, especially from 1594 onwards. Primarily, the humanist education of Essex and many of his aristocratic followers made them feel an obligation to look after society because they had the privilege to look after its members as they were superior to them (Hurstfield 63). Likewise, Republican literature asserted that the best citizens were those who privileged the well-being of the country, which further passed on the burden of social supervision to the most distinguished ones, namely the aristocracy (Foord ¶7^r, 5^v, 24^v; Sansovino 88^v). The importance of having technocrat aristocrats was further emphasised in Lewkenor’s infamous translation of Contarini’s *De Magistratibus* (trans. 1599) that asserted that the Venetian State was successful because “the whole assemblie” chose their governors from “men of greateft wifedome, vertue and integritie” (A2^v). The fact that Lewkenor was associated with Essex’s lower patronees (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 92), reinforced that Essex might have felt the responsibility and burden to care for society by being an active aristocrat in decision-making.

Apart from such inward pressures, outward pressures were also decisive in the fashioning of Essex as a strong leader to voice criticism against the failings and to propose solutions for the benefit of the system. Essex, who inherited from Leicester and Sidney the mission for the advancement of Protestantism, also inherited the ascending pressures from a Protestant patronee network ranging from mild Anglicans to Ultra-Protestants and Puritans (Hammer 32-8, 54-60, 76-83; Gajda, *Earl* 62, 68).⁸⁸ The multi-(sub)sectarian patronee network saw Essex as a strong militaristic leader who could have impact on decision-making.

Similar to the off-stage need for strong leaders by dissident groups, Shakespeare's *RII* adapted chronicle material and depicted such need. The first performance of *RII* was thought to have been enacted during the controversial shift of dissident leadership from the deceased Ferdinando Stanley to the Earl of Essex in 1594. The play, quite interestingly, dealt with historical matter about Richard II that analysed the responsibility of and the need for a strong aristocracy to care for and cure society. Holinshed's chronicle foregrounded how "the nobilitie," the "prelates," "manie of the magifrats" of "cities, townes and communalitie" urged Bolingbroke to come back to "[expel] K. Richard" and "take vpon him the sceptor" himself (Holinshed 3:497). This bottom-up pressure on the aristocratic duties to care for the well-being of society made Bolingbroke a centre that attracted "a great number of people, that were willing to take his part" (Holinshed 3:498). Bolingbroke was, all in all, among the nobility who was near the succession line, which was why he was supported by such different groups. Similar to chronicle material, the nobility waited for Shakespeare's Bolingbroke to act against Richard II because they saw him as a leader whom they and others could follow. When the Earl of Northumberland, Ross and Willoughby heard that Richard II would confiscate the lands of Gaunt that should actually be inherited by his lawful heir Bolingbroke, they tried to remain in "silence" by first starting timidly then continuing energetically to criticise the monarch as a "most degenerate king" (*RII* 2.1.224-300). When they heard from Northumberland that Bolingbroke was about to land on the English "shore," the others joined Northumberland to meet Bolingbroke whom they fashioned as a central force to redress the king's wrongs and tyranny that bound the country in the "slavish yoke" of a "blemished crown" (*RII* 2.1.277-300). The reason for the nobility's procrastination was the fact that it was problematic to oppose an anointed monarch although s/he abused his/her royal prerogative. The irresponsibility of Richard II as the only legitimately ascended monarch in Shakespeare's plays, and the fact that Richard II acted as the spokesperson for the divine rights of kings, made this concept questionable (Prior 141-2). Richard II's ruling according to his arbitrary will was reflective of the tension between absolutist monarchical rule and parliamentary decision-making in Elizabethan times. The likening of Elizabeth I to Richard II first to ensure that rebellion would be put down in *Lord Mayor's Pageant* (1590) proved fatal because Richard II was more associated with arbitrary will that defied law and custom.

As Wilkinson maintained, the historical Richard II in the chronicle discourse was associated with his emphasis on his prerogatives defying limitations from his advisers (qtd. in Baldo 13). Some of Elizabeth I's nobility who, like a vast group of the gentry, wanted to have a say in political decisions to cure the problems of Late Elizabethan policies, similarly reacted against her concerns about her prerogatives. The inadequate means to reform such on-stage and off-stage rulers, within the providentialist political discourse, also emphasised the need for a strong alternative leader to oppose the monarch from the outside. Thereby, the depiction of Richard II's arbitrary and self-centric rule that became "a self-undermining authority" (Greenblatt, "Invisible" 40) reflected off-stage concerns as it generated in the play the need for a strong leader to oppose the system as a whole, through which, by and by, Bolingbroke "earned" his "kingship" (Legatt 80).

Nevertheless, political dissent and upheaval against the regime by whatever force was only legitimate if all other means within the jurisdictional system were exhausted. For instance, the execution of Lord Saye by the mob of Jack Cade in Shakespeare's *2HVI* materialised criticism against judiciary failings in general. Cade accused Saye of "appoint[ing] justices of / peace, to call poor men before them, about matters they / were not able to answer;" moreover, "[he had] put them / in prison, and because they could not read [he had] / hanged them, when indeed only for that cause they / [had] been most worthy to live" (*2HVI* 4.7.37-42). Apart from the carnivalistic defence of non-readers, the scene illustrated how containment could be "produced" (Foucault, *Discipline* 47) and excused through repressive means, which made dissent the only way to oppose wrongdoings. Here, dissent enabled to "voice" such grievances and "challenge their supposed betters because nothing [fit] into its place anymore" (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 121; Şahiner, "Power" 9-10). Cade's criticism towards Lord Saye, thereby, elucidated how the justice system lacked legitimate means to criticise misconducts in governance. Similarly, as the Elizabethans could not voice their problems through legitimate ways, this rendered illegitimate means the only way to reserve their defence. For instance, two years after a quarto edition of the play emerged, in 1596 protesters in Oxfordshire were similarly not listened to but were rather silenced by holders of authority through repressive means, such as hanging (Harrison, *An*

Elizabethan 161). Thus, among the reasons for popular uprisings on and off the stage led to the exhaustion and collapse of justice system.

Likewise, when the quarto edition of *RII* was published in 1597, one year after the Oxfordshire revolt, the Elizabethan readers might have, once again, understood the judicial and legislative reasons behind outbursts of uprisings. In particular, in *RII*, Bolingbroke emphasised that he dissented to get justice because all means within the justice system were exhausted. Bolingbroke pointed out that Richard II shattered hierarchical order, on which the legitimacy of his rule rested, by confiscating his title and lands “perforce” and giving them to “upstart unthrifths” (*RII* 2.3.113-36). Hadfield maintained that “tyranny, following Aristotle’s definition, was generally perceived in terms of a monarch’s [...] desire to amass wealth for himself at the expense of his people” (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 23; Aristotle, *Politics* 219-22, bk. 3, 1281a-b). Accordingly, Fortescue, basing his arguments upon Thomas Aquinas, asserted “that the king [was] gyuen for the kingdome, and not the kingdome for the king” (Fortescue 86^v). That emphasis could be seen in chronicles, as well, where Richard II was “careleffe, did not behaue himselfe,” “forgot himselfe, and began to rule by will more than by reason” manifesting itself, especially through confiscation, injustice and arbitrary distribution of favours (Holinshed 3:493, 3:496). If these readings of Aristotle and the chronicles were taken into consideration, Richard II could be considered a tyrant who usurped the lands of his subjects for his own pleasure. York’s criticism towards Richard II for confiscating Bolingbroke’s lands (*RII* 2.1.195-9) was related to the fact that defying the hereditary right for succession was also defying the basis of the monarch’s rule as Richard II was “king by hereditary succession” (Prior 148). Richard II brought on chaos and rebellion by his misdeeds as he did not abide by the law himself, the law which was the very basis of his power and legitimacy. Thereby, order in Shakespeare’s Richard II’s reign was “not smashed from without” only, but by “the King himself who rebels” against order through murder, confiscation, taxation, and arbitrary decisions regarding favouritism (Legatt 62), which legitimised dissent against him.

Similar to Richard II’s abuses, the Elizabethan patronage excluded most of the aristocrats, and thereby their noble or commoner patronees, either from important

offices, such as Ferdinando Stanley, Oxford, Cumberland, and Percy (Smith, *Servant* 87-9; Flynn 16)⁸⁹ or from influencing decision-making, such as the Essex circle (Stone 482-3).⁹⁰ Rather, the patronage was given to the meritocratic Cecils wherein other meritocrats, like Raleigh, were used to balance inter-factional conflict (Hammer 114; Nicholls and Williams 125).⁹¹ Upstarts climbed up the social ladder and obtained certain offices and lands, and non-aristocratic or “‘new’ families” and their followers obtained and controlled much of royal favouritism (Haigh, *Elizabeth* 102; Williams 342).⁹² Thereby, they prevented the aristocratic nobility from holding their birth-rights of being part of governmental decision-making by advising the monarch and having control over favouritism (Stone 9; Levy 281). The analogical reading of topical failings in the Elizabethan government and those during Richard II’s reign were used to analyse under what conditions dissent might be justified. The Duke of York’s criticism of Richard II’s misdeeds, in the chronicles, on the stage and in the quarto editions, was reflective of the dissatisfaction with arbitrary policies which fostered further criticism. While Richard II’s “tyranny by regiment” semi-sanctioned rebellion against him (Prior 150), Elizabeth I’s arbitrary policies that could not be reformed through parliamentary or aristocratic supervision rendered her regiment tyrannical for those excluded from decision-making. As Hurstfield put forth, “despotism” was an “authoritarian rule in which the government [was] resolved to enforce its will on a nation and to suppress all expressions of dissent [...] in which the people [had] few means of influencing decisions on major issues” (26). That is why, dissatisfied groups in the Elizabethan Period read Richard II as an archetype for Elizabeth I and argued that to challenge her regime was justified because of the exhaustion of legal means, which they observed in Bolingbroke’s justification of his dissent presented on the stage or in the quartos. As Bolingbroke stated, he was “denied to sue [his] livery here, / [...] [His] father’s goods [were] all distrained and sold, / [...] What would [they] have [him] do? [He was] a subject, / And [did] challenge law. Attorneys [were] denied [to him], / And therefore [he] personally [did] lay [his] claim / To [his] inheritance of free descent” (*RII* 2.3.129-36). When individual rights could not be protected by law, individuals would seek to maintain it through their own means. What is more, in the Late Elizabethan Period, the neglect towards individual rights was not only a problem limited to the English terrain, but it also spread to other places that affected their domestic policies, as well. In

particular, loss of faith in the justice system could also be seen when the Irish lords under the Earl of Tyrone revolted in 1593, one year before the production of *RII*, because of “[t]he plantation schemes of Elizabethan settlers for which the Irish nobility “faced the prospect of a similar reduction in their land and power, not unlike the anxiety felt by the English nobility in Richard II at the dispossession of Bolingbroke” (Baldo 31). As Keyishian maintains, “[i]n Shakespeare, [...] dramatic conflict mostly derives from the failure of the state to vindicate individuals” with “dire consequences” (179). Thus, from the standpoint of those who felt wronged, dissent was a legitimised means to restore justice when there was no other means to obtain it within the judiciary system.

Nevertheless, whether justified or not, dissent against the failings of the Elizabethan government was a *de facto* phenomenon in the Late Elizabethan Period. Economic prosperity had given way to economic problems that derived from epidemics, war, high inflation and bad harvest.⁹³ The uneven distribution of favours and the high scale corruption of the civil service further drained the revenues of the royal patronage.⁹⁴ Factionalism accelerated, rivalry for such limited resources became fiercer, and social criticism, primarily made by the disenfranchised ignoble majority of the population, was voiced by the higher nobility, as well.

The aggression of the courtiers manifested itself, initially, in criticisms towards court fortune. The haphazardness of court favour had been dealt with by many contemporary courtiers and men of letters who craved for but did not get the reward they imagined from the fountains of the patronage system. Raleigh’s assertion of the “rotten[ness]” of “the [C]ourt” (qtd. in Weir, *Elizabeth* 255), Spenser’s description of the Court as a “place” where “each one seeks with malice and with strife” (Spenser, *Colin D2*^v), and Sir John Harington’s words that he had “spente [his] time, [his] fortune, and almoste [his] honosite, to buy false hope, false friends, and shallow praise” in his efforts to become “a cowrtlie minion” (qtd. in Chambers, “The Court” 81-2), were among the examples of anti-court sentiments voiced by disenfranchised courtiers.

In Shakespeare’s history plays, court favour was depicted as fragile because material rewards in general were rather temporal joys. For instance, Lord Hastings pointed out

the temporariness of joy claiming that people “hunt” for “momentary grace of mortal men” (*RIII* 3.4.96-7). He also emphasised the fickleness of fortune in general, when he likened people who “[built]” their “hopes” on the appearance of things that had “good looks” to “a drunken sailor on a mast, / Ready, with every nod to tumble down / Into the fatal bowels of the deep” (*RIII* 3.4.98-101). Similar to Hastings’ depiction, the handling by Shakespeare of the case of Eleanor Cobham, who was sentenced to banishment for her involvement in satanic practices against Henry VI and the ruling nobility, foregrounded the temporariness of joys correlated with court fortune (*2HVI* 2.3.1-13). Eleanor Cobham said that “[t]o think upon my pomp shall be my hell” because she fell from being the wife of a “prince and ruler of the land” to “a pointing-stock,” antithetical to her high expectations and “[wish for] this world’s eternity” (*2HVI* 2.4.41-7, 2.4.87-90). When a quarto edition of *2HVI* was published in 1600, the fragility of court fortune manifested itself when Essex lost almost all of his fortune following his trial on the 6th of June 1600, where it was recounted that “[i]t was a most pitiful and lamentable sight to see him that was the minion of Fortune now unworthy of the least honour he had of many” (Harrison, *Last* 89).

Moreover, problems regarding the arbitrariness of court fortune further manifested itself in the arbitrary acceptance of petitions in the petition system which did not function properly. As a very important part of the voicing of bottom-up problems, the petition system enabled, at least, a mediated participation in politics (Hadfield, *Republicanism* 19-20). Yet, similar to the problematics regarding the effectiveness of active parliamentary participation in politics (Roskell 307),⁹⁵ the petition system faced similar problems, as a result of the arbitrary pleasure of the royal prerogative of the monarch. Firstly, many religious minorities failed to persuade Elizabeth I about their religious rights with their petitions and turned to the radical policies of “quietism and schism” (Zaller 136). Secondly, the channels of approaching the monarch through petitions were restricted from time to time for various reasons, such as in the 1593 Proclamation to “restrain the access of so many suitors to the Court [...] on pain of imprisonment” (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 246). Lastly, as Bacon’s essay “Of Suet[r]s” in 1597 illustrated, the conclusion of a petition could be delayed or concluded against the interest of the suitor to wound a factional opponent (*Effayes* B6^r-B7^r). Thus, the

petition system in the Late Elizabethan Period failed, from time to time, to address the problems of some groups in society. Arbitrary decisions in the handling of petitions was reflected on the stage and read by the Elizabethans in Shakespeare's *2HVI* where the "supplications" of the petitioners "[a]gainst the Duke / of Suffolk, for enclosing the commons of Melford" were to be shred into pieces upon Suffolk's knowledge of the petition against him (*2HVI* 1.3.1-3, 1.3.20-1, 1.3.38-41). Similarly, apart from the rejection of suits for personal reasons, the ineffectiveness of the petition system was related to the time-consuming hierarchical constitution of the civil service. In the hierarchical civil service system, several layers of mediating civil servants and the need to find as many grandees as possible to sustain that the suit would be affirmed (Hammer 356-7), led to a long time lapse to obtain favours. The waste of time and energy thereby was another point of criticism directed at the system that provoked dissent. A comic illustration of this could be perceived in the quibbles of Falstaff and Hal, where Falstaff, in contrast, was very happy for "waiting in the court" "[f]or obtaining of suits" (*1HIV* 1.2.66-71). The petition system was reduced to a laughingstock through its ineffectiveness in the Late Elizabethan Period. Hence, under these circumstances social criticism could not be voiced through legitimate channels of the petition system. Governed by haphazardness, it did not solve the problems but created new ones by encouraging people to dissent.

Beside the disregard towards bottom-up suits, the temporariness of court fortune was also related to the instability of obtaining favours in general. For instance, Sir Walter Raleigh's fortune was marked by that instability. Until the appearance of Essex in the court circle in 1585 and his gradual ascension to royal favour, Raleigh had held a relatively firm position at court (Hammer 13). Yet, because of Raleigh's marriage, which the queen did not approve, Essex "r[ose]" at court and the animosity between Raleigh and Essex increased (Wallace 51; Hammer 16, 19, 63-5, 83-7, 116). Raleigh fell from grace and saw "it necessary" during his fall "to conserve his resources as his own tide ebbed" (Wallace 51; Hammer 16, 19, 63-5, 83-7, 116). While the reconciliation of the two in 1592 did not have any positive effects for Raleigh because of the scandal regarding his illicit marriage, following the 1596 reconciliation, Raleigh was backed up by the Cecils both to serve as a "bridge between the Cecils and Essex"

and to serve as yet another force against the rise of Essex (Hammer 15-6; Nicholls and Williams 125; Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 150, 160-5). Yet, the favour which Raleigh obtained remained far from being stable (Pearson, *Elizabethans* 102). Similarly, in the turbulent period between 1597 and 1601, the relationship between Essex and Elizabeth I was not lineal and there were many ups and downs. Accordingly, on the 16th of July 1598, Elizabeth I first wanted to send “Mr. William Killingrew to the Earl of Essex as if of his own accord, but instructed by her;” later she changed her mind and “bad him stay;” but sent him on the 16th of August 1598 and did not like Essex’s “answer” to allow “him again to her presence;” yet she “restored” him to “favour” on the 15th of September 1598; but without giving him further “offices” (Harrison, *Second* 290, 299, 308, 314). A similar ebb and flow of favours could be read in Shakespeare’s *IHV* in the same year. Especially, in a quibble between Falstaff and Hal about stealing, it was argued that court fortune would rather ebb and flow than be stable. In particular, Falstaff who wanted to get a license for the legality of theft in Prince Hal’s reign fashioned himself as one of “Diana’s foresters, / gentlemen of the shade, minion of the moon” and maintained that he was of the “men of good government, being / governed, as the sea is, by our noble and chaste mistress / the moon” (*IHV* 1.2.22-8). Hal’s answer to this was a gag about the ebb and flow regarding the position of the thief on the “ladder” or “the ridge of the gallows” (*IHV* 1.2.29-37). Yet, Hal’s words about “the / fortune of us that are the moon’s men doth ebb and / flow like the sea, being governed, as the sea is, by the / moon” (*IHV* 1.2.29-32), could be taken as criticism of Elizabeth I’s arbitrary patronage system where fortune may ebb and flow. Around the time between the publication of the first and second quarto of *IHV*, on the 3rd of January 1599, court gossip voiced the unpredictability of court fortune that “according to the custom of the Court that commonly knows not overnight what shall be done in the morning” (Harrison, *Last* 1), which illustrated how court fortune was unpredictable off the stage, as well.

Moreover, court fortune was so arbitrary that even powerful courtiers could fall from grace altogether and lose their socio-economic standing, their wealth or even their lives. According to a long tradition, fortune and *peripeteia* were personified as female figures and seen as the reasons for failure in general (Collingwood 36; Prior 22-3). In line with

the misogynistic resistance literature (Montrose, *Subject* 244; James 443-4), Elizabeth I's femininity was taken as an analogy for the fickleness of female fortune she was associated with. For example, in one of his letters, Essex covertly criticised his fortune in the hands of Elizabeth I that made "the time wherein [he] live[d] [...] more inconstant than women's thoughts" and "more miserable than old age," which made him "desperate" (Rawson 160). The fall of powerful figures from grace and their death depicted primarily in Shakespeare's first tetralogy had only relative off-stage significance, when these plays were performed during 1589-1594, with the exceptional cases of Raleigh's oscillating fortune and Ferdinando Stanley's mysterious death. The fall and deaths of Shakespeare's Suffolk, Warwick, Rivers, Vaughan, Grey, Hastings, and Buckingham were rather of significance when the quarto editions of some of these plays were published between 1597 and 1600, especially regarding the *peripeteia* Essex experienced. For instance, the fickleness of posterity was narrated in a didactic tone in Hall's chronicle which recounted how Suffolk was made duke by petition of the commoners and how he lost power because of the commoners who charged him with treason (Hall cxlix^r, clvi^v-clix^r). The publication of the adaptation of Suffolk's life to the stage in the 1600 quarto edition of *2HVI*, was of topical significance for the Elizabethan reader audience who might have perceived similarities with the fate of the Earl of Essex. Shakespeare's Suffolk rose in power to rule the decisions of the Queen who had a great influence on the decisions of the King, and was banished at the height of his power (*1HVI* 5.4.107-8; *2HVI* 3.2.283-90). In the same year, all of his offices and titles, except hereditary ones, were taken from the Earl of Essex and he was banished from the Court, although he had strived to have influence on the decisions of Elizabeth I (Harrison, *Last* 89). The arbitrariness of court fortune was not just a fictive warning, but had off-stage correspondences in the Late Elizabethan Period.

Furthermore, the depiction of the fall of Warwick in *3HVI*, published in the same year in 1600, illustrated the paradox of pursuing material gain, such as royal favour through offices and lands, when their pursuit would lead to the death of the patron critical of royal distribution and decisions. Pursing one's due reward until death to hinder a possible material collapse of one's finances that would lead to death was tautological. In particular, Warwick perceived at the very end of his life that the absence of favours was

not much important when life and death were to be considered. Warwick mused on his power to influence the power holders with his words “For who lived king, but I could dig his grave? / And who durst mine when Warwick bent his brow?” (*3HVI* 5.2.21-2). Warwick realised that his material belongings in Warwick, and its surroundings, like “parks,” “walks,” “manors” and his “lands,” along with the “pomp, rule,” and “reign,” were unimportant when he faced death (*3HVI* 5.2.248). Although these material belongings might be merely “dust” (*3HVI* 5.2.27), because of the bottom-up pressures to sustain one’s household and retainer, their loss would be equal to death for a courtier who had to maintain his own network of patronage with the royal favour he had. Therefore, it could be stated that the female personification of fortune beguiled courtiers through material possessions which would eventually lead them to their downfall either in defending or losing favours in the patronage.⁹⁶

Likewise, the case of Buckingham who was the former confidante of Richard III and was later executed, illustrated the fickleness of court fortune. Buckingham, who revolted because he did not get the royal reward he expected for his services for the monarch, was taken prisoner. Before his execution, Buckingham mused that he fell just like his factional enemies such as Hastings, Rivers, Grey and Vaughan (*RIII* 5.1.1-9). A similar situational irony could be perceived in the ebbs and flows of favour that was “tilting from Raleigh to Essex” from 1585 until 1601, where, in varying degrees, the fall of the one was appreciated by the other, their followers or third parties (Nicholls and Williams 73, 125; Hammer 84-91, 115-6; Harrison, *Last* 74), without considering the arbitrariness of court fortune in general that determined their fates rather than the success of one side in particular instances. Thus, court fortune was arbitrary which manifested itself in the fall of prominent courtiers, who, while they tried to undo their factional foes, could themselves turn into the foes of the monarch.

Besides, with the fall of the patron, the fall of the patronees could be seen, because not only the nobility but also lower social groups were affected by the shortage of royal favour. Therefore, the problem of patronage was not an issue exclusive to a “small” group of the privileged in society but affected a great part of the society; and the imbalance between the limited resources and the huge number of clients, especially

after the sale of Crown lands and the campaigns both of which attracted persons for newly created peacetime or martial offices, made things worse in the give and take relationship between the sovereign and her subjects (Loades, *Politics* 304). Under such conditions, the pressure of clients from bottom-up was also another important factor for the rash behaviour of Essex in his rebellion. As Stone claims, Essex's "thwarted ambition, but" especially "the ceaseless nagging of his creditors, and a realization of the severely reduced circumstances [...] drove him to the act of folly that was to cost his life" (483). Essex had a large group of patronees and friends who not only reflected his real political power, but also created financial problems as there was a disproportion between his followers and his income. As Hammer illustrates, Essex had many "martial" and civil "adherents" and "the pressure of their expectations and the consequent swelling of his own sense of importance drove Essex to assert his pre-eminence among the younger generation at Court;" the quantity "of adherents created the illusion of power. [...] Essex's fundamental problem was that he had a large following [...] but a relatively small power-base" (269-70). Thus, the Earl of Essex could not finance his and their expectations at the same time, which put inward and outward pressures on sustaining and even enlarging his influence on the patronage system. When Essex began to lose favour, however, the bottom-up pressure accelerated because of the interconnectedness of their fortune. Therefore, among many other reasons, courtiers would dissent to the failings of the regime also because of the ascending pressure by their power base and/or followers who would incite these to violent actions after they lost favour at court. For instance, Edward IV's wife, Queen Elizabeth, lamented on several instances that a possible disaster might befall her, her family members and followers after his downfall (*3HVI* 4.4.26-8; *RIII* 1.3.8). Although the Queen had a special position outside the patronage system, her laments about the aftermath of the death of a patron elucidated that fortune at court was interconnected with the patron's well-being. Likewise, Queen Margaret, apart from having a similar relationship within the patronage (Howard and Rackin 196), functioned as a foil to Queen Elizabeth to show that power and anything associated with it, such as respect or privilege, were arbitrary things. Queen Margaret had been a queen respected by "subjects" and feared by "rebels" (*RIII* 1.3.161-2) but after Henry VI's death she was

despised by everyone. Social status, financial resources and self-esteem could only be obtained by patronees/followers/allies whose patrons possessed these themselves.⁹⁷

Although Henry V seemed to be effective in cleansing himself as a patron from the misfortune of his patronees through his analogies of father-son and master-servant relationships, the initial responses of Bates and Williams for the ruin of patronees, because of their support and “obedience” to patrons (*HV* 4.1.130-84), were indicative of the interconnectedness of patron and patronee fortunes. Patronees, whether right or wrong, equated their loss of fortune with the failures of their patron who would have a “heavy reckoning” (*HV* 4.1.134-46). One year before the performance of *HV*, a similar situation could be observed on the 26th of August 1598 in the Earl of Essex’s letter to the Lord Keeper. Essex asked “cannot princes err? Cannot subjects receive wrong? [...] I have received wrong, and feel it. My cause is good, I know it; and whatever come, all the powers on earth can never show more strength and constancy in oppressing, than I can show in suffering whatever can or shall be imposed upon me” (Harrison, *Second* 302). What had been used in pro-republican pleas in 1576 and later by Wentworth about the possibility of errors in the judgment of a monarch and the need to amend these through parliamentary supervision was used by Essex to illustrate that he perceived as a patronee that he was abused by his royal patron and that his misfortune was the result of his royal patron’s misgovernment (Peltonen, “Citizenship” 102-33; Hurstfield 67). Yet, apart from Wentworth’s infamous speech back in the 1570s, even in the same year in 1598 when Essex lamented the loss of his fortune, parliamentarians criticised the haphazardness of the decisions of the monarch. Albeit veiled through rhetorical comparisons, the speech of Yelverton in the parliament pointed out the possibility that monarchs who relied on their own ideas could be wrong in their decisions and could create problems for others. Accordingly, Yelverton suggested that top-down “mischiefes” could emerge in governments where “misdemeaner” was not corrected by active bottom-up supervision (qtd. in Peltonen, “Citizenship” 104). The year before the production of *HV* and the year when the play was performed, witnessed the period in which criticism that targeted the elevated status of the monarch was at its peak. Providentialist explanations about the supremacy of the monarch and his/her immunity from doing wrong were not accepted by the wronged patronees who perceived the give

and take relationship in correlative ways. Therefore, Greenblatt's assertions upon Williams' speech about the monarch's responsibility as patron to his patronees and Henry V's providentialist "explanations" making the death of soldiers the punishment of God were quite true; this revealed the situational irony created by Henry V's prayer to God not to punish him for the taint of Richard II's murder which he inherited from his father and which secured his succession (*HV* 4.1.134-84, 4.1.286-303; Greenblatt, "Invisible" 61). The irony was illustrative of Late Elizabethan problematics regarding providentialist theories protecting patrons and the realities perceived by wronged patronees who were at odds with each other. The socio-economic dependency of patronees on the well-being and favour of their patrons could function only at times of economic prosperity where bottom-up pressures for the obtainment of further favour could be maintained. Amid the economic crisis in the 1590s, the reduction or the loss of financial means of aristocratic patrons created a ripple effect that intensified and affected patronees, their families and their followers.

Therefore, the intensification of the crisis in the Late Elizabethan Period was reflected in the radicalisation of patronee behaviour. Having lost his financial means or aiming at more albeit limited resources, patronees would spur their patron's indignation to rise up against the system. As Williams maintains, Essex saw the Irish campaign as a way to regain royal favour according to his aspirant clients around him (Williams 367; Harrison, *Last* 39). This, however, had negative possibilities: absence from court and the possibility of defeat would lead to disfavour him again (Williams 367; Harrison, *Last* 39). Even victory would soon attract envy; hence, it was not wise for Essex to go to the campaign (Williams 367; Harrison, *Last* 39). When the quarto editions of the almost ten year old plays *2HVI* and *3HVI* were published in 1600, it was a topical issue in regard to the radicalisation of patronees and misdirection of patrons to revolt against the system. For instance, Eleanor tried to spur the ambition of Protector Gloucester to dissent against Henry VI and seize the crown, for which she would help him (*2HVI* 1.2.1-16). Protector Gloucester, however, was aware that this ascending pressure would rather undermine his position and "tumble" him "down [...] [f]rom top of honour to disgrace's feet" (*2HVI* 1.2.41-50). Although Eleanor as the wife of Gloucester was not his patronee, her desires reflected the problem between followers and patrons in

general. In particular, patronees would try to out-Herod Herod by considering the well-being of the patron even against his wishes. For example, Eleanor thought on behalf of the Protector and claimed that under the present conditions he should pursue the crown just as she wished (2*HVI* 1.2.64-5). Just like her, many patronees tried over actively “[t]o play [their] part in Fortune’s pageant” (2*HVI* 1.2.67). The fact that such people within the pyramid of the patron’s patronage system multiplied and put more and more pressure on the patrons intensified social tensions. Likewise, the scene where Richard spurred his father, the Duke of York, to seize the crown from Henry VI, showed the manoeuvres that could be used by patronees to canalise the actions of their patron to realise their own wishes. For example, Richard first justified the seizure of the crown, for which he himself opted, by reasoning about its legal condition, then concentrated on the benefits of that seizure and concluded climactically to make his father agree with his words (3*HVI* 5.6.91, 1.2.21-34). Fashioned as the “successor” of Leicester as patron of the Protestant cause, Essex had been constantly urged, in similar manner, to be more active in accomplishing that cause (Hammer 32-8, 54-60, 76-83; Gajda, *Earl* 62, 68).⁹⁸ These bottom-up pressures accelerated, especially, at the time of publication of the quarto editions of 2-3*HVI*, when it was reported on the 22nd of December 1600 that Essex was surrounded by “many captains, men of broken fortunes, discontented persons, and such as saucily use their tongues in railing against all men” who prevented him from “listen[ing] to the wiser counsels of his friends” (Harrison, *Last* 132). The pressures of such “discontented persons” outnumbered the “wiser counsels” of reasonable patronees and on the 2nd of January 1601 it was reported that only dissatisfied patronees and fellow aristocrats were to be found near Essex who incited the Earl with dissentious words on how “the superior majestates of the realm,” namely the aristocrats, “[had] power to restrain kings themselves” (Harrison, *Last* 138). Having in mind the responsibilities of the aristocrat for the well-being of society and his loss of financial means, the patronees, followers and fellow-aristocrats of the Earl of Essex constantly pressured him to take action against the regime and regain favour, so that he could distribute that favour among them in return.

Whether just or unjust, anti-court sentiments were indicative of the negative effects of exclusion from favour for whatever reason. If a courtier and with him his followers did not get a reward, within the reciprocal give and take system of the patronage the

mechanism of which was based on loyalty for service, the courtier and his followers might get spiteful against rather than remain loyal to the holders of the regime. For instance, when *RIII* was thought to be staged, namely between 1592 and 1594, the dissatisfaction of some of the nobility who centred around Ferdinando Stanley, such as the Earl of Oxford, the Earl of Cumberland, and the Lord Percy was related to their relative exclusion from decision-making and court favour, which led to their fashioning as supporters of pro-Spanish dissident groups, whether they were really so inclined or not (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 167). The Earl of Oxford was more than bankrupt in the 1580s and 1590s, the Earl of Cumberland, George Clifford, hoped to have more financial rewards for his privateering missions, and the Lord Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, at that time tried and succeeded to survive as a concealed Catholic in the Elizabethan Period (Pearson, *Edward* 49, 56-7; Nelson, *Adversary* 319-20, 330-5, 343, 352-98; Smith, *Servant* 87-9; Wagner 65; Flynn 16). With the death of Ferdinando Stanley, bottom-up pressures and hopes also faded for these noblemen of whom some succeeded and some failed to sustain new allegiances and favours (Pearson, *Edward* 355-427; Wagner 65; Batho xlvi-xlvii). When *RIII* was published in quartos in 1597 and 1598, however, it was then the aristocratic clique around Essex that felt resentment towards the regime, especially because of the oscillation of Elizabeth I's favours in a discursive and material way. One of the turning points of this relation was when on the 23rd of October 1597, Charles Howard, the Earl of Nottingham and the Lord Admiral, was given credit for the 1588 Armada victory and the 1596 Cadiz expedition, whereby Essex's rival took "precedence over the Earl of Essex" (Harrison, *Second* 198). The second most important turning point was on the 2nd of July 1598, when Essex "[withdrew] from the Court" because Elizabeth I rejected the appointment of Essex's patroness with a post in Ireland, for which he quarrelled with her, "uncivilly turned his back upon the Queen as it were in contempt and gave her a scornful look," after which Elizabeth I gave "him a box on the ear" and expelled him (Harrison, *Second* 287). A similar oscillation of favours could be read in Shakespeare's *RIII* when, for instance, Buckingham demanded his "earldom" and Richard III seemed not to be interested to reward him as he had promised (*RIII* 4.2.89-118). Buckingham considered that "such contempt" of the monarch was not a due reward for his "service" (*RIII* 4.2.119-20). Likewise, the bilateral relationship of hard service and due reward formed a vertical

tension in the Late Elizabethan Period. At the top, service could be regarded as duty and reward had to be restrained because of financially hard times, whereas at the bottom, the eagerness to do more service was motivated by getting more reward. The discrepancy between expectation and fulfilment was the main reason for dissatisfaction among the courtiers. Several of the “disappointed” groups “lamented” their fortune, like the one in 1594 who said ““Little gain there is gotten in this time,”” or another in 1597 that “no man is rewarded to his desert” so that even Elizabeth I herself in 1600 “felt bound to explain to a disappointed petitioner that the cost of war had forced her to ‘restrain her bountiful hand from rewarding her servants’” (qtd. in Loades, *Politics* 303). Consequently, dissent among courtiers started primarily from the arbitrariness and restraint of favour.

Therefore, a monarch had to be careful and not spur a courtier towards hatred and resentment. This could be seen when Buckingham invited and “[s]tirr’d” the enemies of Richard III who gathered around Richmond (*RIII* 4.3.46-57, 4.4.467-8). The discontinuation of Buckingham’s reward and the subsequent dissent strengthened the groups who were similarly disaffected by the procedures of Richard III. Accordingly, because of Buckingham’s presence “to welcome” Richmond “ashore,” “many doubtful hollow-hearted friends” of Richard III remained rather “[u]narm’d and unresolv’d to beat” Richmond (*RIII* 4.4.433-9). A similar conspiracy started around 1597, when Essex secretly corresponded with James VI of Scotland and tried to secure James’ succession to the English throne, through which Essex wanted to restore his central position in political decision-making and benefit in a possible transition period (Gajda, *Earl* 37-40; Lockyer 159; Goodman 13). In the following years of the publication of the 1597 and 1598 quarto editions of *RIII*, the Earl of Essex faced a similar situation of disenfranchisement after which his secret conspiracy had to be materialised in an uprising.⁹⁹ A regime that lacked an organised police force to protect itself (Forgeng 35; Hill Cole 145), could be threatened by dissatisfied aristocrats, who were relatively powerful with their men in livery that were like personal soldiers and popular support by satisfying the demands of commoners. As an early warning, on the 4th of October 1596, for instance, Francis Bacon advised the Earl of Essex that his “popular reputation” and “military dependence [...] presented a [...] dangerous image [...] to any

monarch living” (Harrison, *Second* 139-40). Accordingly, when later in 1599 three military offices were given to Essex, which increased his popularity among the commoners, Elizabeth I disliked Essex’s popularity (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 281; Williams 367). On the 15th of September 1599, Francis Bacon warned Elizabeth I not to give these military positions when Essex lost his favour, “for to discontent him as you do and yet put arms and power into his hands, may be a kind of temptation to make him prove cumbersome and unruly” (Harrison, *Last* 39). The threat of the powerful but disenfranchised aristocrat showed itself in militarist-interventionist manoeuvres to remove factional opponents or to change the system. As Perry argued, the initial articulation of “criticism” against a monarch could be made by targeting the monarch’s “intimates and counsellors,” shamming it with rhetorical schemes that these were only against wrongdoing advisers and care for the well-being of the system and the monarch (10-1). In this line, Essex had been thinking about seizing the Court and eliminating his rivals (Williams 373; James 441-2). Later it was understood that Essex contemplated a militaristic interventionist policy. When he was in Ireland in 1599, he contemplated to invade “England with 3,000 of his best soldiers and chief leaders, and by them to have made his way to the Queen to have redressed all his wrongs” (Harrison, *Last* 173). Contrary to his instructions, Essex knighted many of his seemingly unqualified followers in the Irish campaign in 1599, which created dislike in Elizabeth I and problems regarding the “annulling of” such “knighthoods” (Harrison, *Last* 13, 36, 92-5). Essex’s insistence on the knighting of many of his patronees, therefore, might be taken as signs of his intentions to use military force to eliminate his rivals and regain his central position in the government. The pretext of eliminating wrongdoing advisors to save the monarch was a historical matter published, again, around the time when Essex had to return from Ireland. In Hall’s chronicle, the Duke of York’s invasion of England from Ireland while his supporters quarrelled against his factional rival Somerset in order to excuse his militaristic invasion with claims to remove evil councillors was explicated as follows. The Duke of York “allured [...] lufty bachelars, & actiue perfons, of a great numbre, proteftyng and declaring, that the[y] neither meant euil, nor thought harme, either to the kinges person, or to his dignitie: but that their intent was, for the reuenging of great iniuries doen to the publique wealth, and to perfecute and reforme diuerse rulers about the kyng” (Hall clxiii^f). Such explication was adapted in Shakespeare’s *2HVI* that

could be read, again, in 1600 by the Elizabethan readers. Similar to chronicle material, the Duke of York used the army he mustered against the Irish rebels in order to seize the crown. In particular, York welcomed the mustering of men against the Irish rebels because he “lack[e]d” a powerful military force to realise his dissent against the Lancastrian regime (2HVI 3.1.340-80). Similarly, when his final attempt to regain his past glory failed in the Irish mission in 1599, Essex secretly wanted to use his forces in Ireland and planned to realise a pro-Essexian Irish-Scottish invasion of London. He wanted to redress the grievances in the Elizabethan government by forcing Elizabeth I to abdicate in favour of James VI; this plan, however, failed because the Scottish king rejected (Bruce xii; James 441-2; Gajda, *Earl* 39; Black, *Reign* 442-3). Although unsuccessful, this showed that constant warnings against giving the Earl of Essex active military positions, who felt inward and outward pressures and misconceptions regarding the amendment of his disenfranchisement from favours, were similar to “put[ting] sharp weapons in a madman’s hands” (2HVI 3.1.346). Following his return from Ireland, Essex fell from grace, and when Elizabeth I discontinued his monopoly on sweet wines in 1600, which would make him unable to maintain his former standards of living and status, he was again compelled to use violent means. As it was reported on the 30th of October 1600, following the loss of the monopoly on “sweet wines,” the Earl of Essex “sue[d] now only for grace, and that he [might] come to her presence, of which small hope as yet appeareth” (Harrison, *Last* 122). Essex had little hope left not only for a healthy relationship with Elizabeth I, but also for a central position he could financially support during her reign. As Stone summarises, not being “able to command lavish credit,” Essex “would be obliged to abandon his political position, dismiss his followers, reduce his household, retire into the country, and sell some of his estate to clear off the debt” (483). Since patronage in general was monopolised in the hands of the Cecils, the excluded young aristocracy and their patronees who gathered around Essex were almost ruined as a result of the financial crises the Earl had to face. As Stone further elucidates, “[o]f his seven aristocratic followers, five—Rutland, Southampton, Sussex, Bedford, and Mouteagle—were angry young men in a hurry, all in their twenties, all chafing at the infuriating grip on office retained by the Cecils,” and “were hard pressed financially” (483). The “grip” of the Cecils on favouritism amid the cancelling of one of Essex’s most important financial means aggravated resentment not

only towards the Cecils but also towards Elizabeth I herself. For instance, earlier “in October [1599], [Essex] complained to Lord Keeper Egerton that he found his enemies ‘absolute’ at Court, preventing him from securing any favours for his own friends. The Queen was cold towards him, although, he asserted, the fault was in no way his” (qtd. in Williams 366-7). When Essex was tried for allegations of misbehaviour during the Irish expedition on the 6th of June 1600, it was reported that “[m]any that were present burst out in tears at his fall to such misery” (Harrison, *Last* 89). He lost almost all of his offices, yet, the fact that Essex was tried by his factional foes, who “left out the fine” and the imprisonment in “the Tower” as a show of grace (Harrison, *Last* 88) must have been devastating for the Earl’s morale, as well. After that trial and the radicalisation of Essex’s policies, Elizabeth I “alienate[d] her affection from him more and more” (Harrison, *Last* 132). Loss of favour was disastrous for a courtier. The withdrawal of his monopoly and other financial means made Essex more desperate because of inward pressures in regard to his belief that he should have a central position in decision-making as a leading aristocrat, and outward pressures from disenfranchised fellow nobles and patronees. Consequently, to convey militaristic facilities to a discontented aristocrat would not rejuvenate his loyalty but would put pressure on the monarch.

Apart from having a military force, popular support was seen as another potential threat against the regime in case the patron, who was favoured by the people, fell from grace. In spite of the news about Essex’s failures in the Irish expedition, for instance, the people continued to favour him. As a contemporary account narrated in 1599, “[t]he common people still favour my Lord, hoping by his means to be freed from their intolerable exactions” also because they “would follow any who would be more likely to procure them some immunities” from “servile conditions” (Harrison, *Last* 27-8). The people were suppressed by economic conditions and the existence of censorship mechanisms, which turned into support for anyone who tried to or was perceived to try to challenge those problems. Therefore, even after his disgrace in Ireland and his arrest, popular support towards Essex did not fade, which showed itself in public prayers in favour of Essex and the publication of his prints on horseback (qtd. in Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 281). The prints were the most problematic manifestation of Essex’s popularity among the people as it defied the royal image of Elizabeth I as

solitary authority. The emergence of the engravings of noblemen, like that of the Lord Admiral, Cumberland and Essex for public sale “celebrated their heroic exploits” (Montrose, *Subject* 215-8). Yet, the privy council considered this problematic and ordered them to be banned as, for Montrose, “the public sale of such prints put them in direct competition with those of the Queen” as this was “a palpable threat to the monopoly held by the royal image in the hearts and minds of the Elizabethan populace” (*Subject* 215-6). In spite of his subsequent house arrest, which made the Cecils victorious at court, Essex did not lose popular support but increased it, which accelerated factionalism and made the Earl a threat to the Elizabethan regime (Williams 370-1). The power of popular support towards the Earl manifested itself on the 13th of February 1600, when many of the commoners gathered and pressurised the Privy Councillors against Essex’s trial in the Star Chamber. Accordingly it was reported on the 14th of February 1600, that the day before “[m]ultitudes of people assembled to have seen or heard his trial; but by Mr. Secretary’s care it was hindered, for he took a very submissive letter to the Queen and did all the good office he could to remove her Majesty’s resolution of having him called to the Star Chamber” (Harrison, *Last* 69). The same report applauded Cecil’s commonsensical behaviour and argued that his behaviour showed that he had “not been so adverse to the Earl as it [was] supposed” (Harrison, *Last* 69). Yet, taken the circumstances into consideration, Cecil might have felt the need to affect to care for his factional rival Essex to appease tension which he could not divert from Essex who was favoured by the people. Around the time when popular support for Essex peaked, issues about popular support in *2HVI* could be re-read with topical significance. For instance, similar to chronicle material that depicted “the grudge of the people” against the fall of an aristocrat they favoured (Hall cli^v), Elizabethan readers could read in the quarto edition of 1600 of *2HVI*, how the Cardinal of Winchester pointed out the manner of “the common people favour[ed]” Protector Gloucester (*2HVI* 1.1.155) and how Queen Margaret warned that “the common[s] [...] [would] follow him” in good or bad times, which would make him a “lion” to be “tremble[d]” and minded by the sovereign (*2HVI* 3.1.4-30). The inter-factional struggle between Gloucester and Winchester, as depicted in Shakespeare’s almost decade-old *2HVI*, rendered the accusations against Gloucester biased. The distance between performance and production might not indicate any tangible idea for the initial

intensions in the production of the play text, but contemporary incidents might shed light onto why the plays were published and how they could have been received by readers in a topical way. In the play, the opponents suggested that Gloucester should have been eliminated before growing strong enough to challenge the crown. This seemed plausible as over-mighty subjects had always been trouble to the crown in the past ages. Yet, this was also a topical issue if we compare this to the warnings of Bacon to Essex that he should not appear too powerful, seek popular support and attract the hatred of the sovereign (Harrison, *Second* 139-40; Harrison, *Last* 39). When a quarto edition of *2HVI* was published in 1600, when popular support to Essex seemed to be at its height, it could be argued that the popularity of peers among the commoners was fashioned to trigger factionalism along with threats for popular uprisings. In particular, following the death of Protector Gloucester, the commoners formed an uprising to protest his death. They were “like an angry hive of bees / That want[, that is, lack] their leader, scatter up and down / And care not who they sting in his revenge” (*2HVI* 3.2.122-9). Fashioned to protect the monarch from ill, commoners might form a pressure on state policy which they would identify as measures to “guard” the interests of the monarch, “whether” s/he “will or no” (*2HVI* 3.2.242-69). Popular dissent could arise when a popular figure was killed or even arrested. Commoners heard of Gloucester’s death and started an uprising and accused his factional opponents, Suffolk and Cardinal Winchester as murderers. Public opinion was very important as seen in the pressure put by the commoners onto Henry VI to execute the wrongdoers, which were effective, at least for a while, in making Henry VI exile Suffolk (*2HVI* 3.2.283-97). Although Elizabethan commoners could not get organised effectively as could be seen in the many fragmented uprisings in the 1590s,¹⁰⁰ popular pressure could be effective to alter some political decisions, as could be perceived in the cancellation of Essex’s trial in the Star Chamber in 1600. Consequently, popular support towards a disenfranchised aristocrat could potentially form a threat against the regime by putting pressures on decision-making.

What is more, apart from protecting oneself from factional opponents with the support of the people or posing a potential threat to the monarchy, having popular support was very crucial in a planned violent turnover of the government. The planned mission

about seizing the Court through an invasion was aborted in 1599, but after his public disgrace and Elizabeth I's refusal to continue his patent over sweet wines and the loss of his farm, Essex took action together with his aspirant followers (Williams 373). He laid out the plan "to seize the Court" with his military force comprised of "noblemen" and their retainers (Harrison, *Last* 161). Essex was aware that he needed also popular support for the success of his rebellion. As he confessed later on the 21st February 1601, following the *coup de état*, Essex hoped to be supported by the people, and aimed to secure his decisions by "[calling] a parliament, and condem[ing] all those whom they charged to have misgoverned the State" (Harrison, *Last* 161). The display of several pirate street performances about Bolingbroke and Richard II and the use of a play about Richard II's deposition by Bolingbroke before the Essex rebellion, might have been indicative of the need for popular support for aristocratic take overs of the regime. Accordingly, the historical Bolingbroke was able to overthrow the Ricardian regime not only because of the grievances of the people but also because of their support. According to chronicles, the chief reason for the success of Bolingbroke was the support of the "com[mo]n people" Bolingbroke received before, during and after his banishment (Holinshed 3:495; Hall A2^f-A4^f). Speculations about the possibility of the use of Shakespeare's *RII* by Essex before his rebellion set aside (Montrose, *Purpose* 68-75, 103-4; Deiter 100; Gajda, *Earl* 27), the 1598 quarto, at least, enabled the Elizabethan readers to read and re-read Bolingbroke's depiction as an aristocrat who dangerously courted popularity (*RII* 1.4.24). During and after his banishment, Shakespeare's Bolingbroke was supported by commoners, the manner of which could be seen in the sentiments of commoners against taxation imposed by Richard II and in Bolingbroke's entrance to London as Henry IV by a cheerful crowd (*RII* 2.1.246-8, 5.2.11-21).

Besides, the Elizabethan readers could read in the 1600 editions of *2HVI* and *3HVI* the importance of popular support for the materialisation of political changes. In particular, popular support for the Yorkist faction was actively fostered and would prove decisive in the success in taking over the control of the realm. As a close adaptation of Hall's depiction of how the Duke of York "began secretly to allure to hys frendes of the nobilitie, [...] and lykewyfe [...] to a certain wyse and faige Gouvernors and Rulers of

dyuers cities and townes” (Hall clii^r; *2HVI* 2.2.1-82), and manipulated “the kentifhmen” to “fodayne rifing” against the “oppreffion” they felt (Hall clix^r; *2HVI* 3.1.354-76), *2HVI* and *3HVI* had depicted the decisiveness of the use of popular support to overthrow the regime. In particular, York would take his forces from Ireland, and devise a popular upheaval under “a headstrong Kentishman, / John Cade of Ashford” whom he would fashion as the dead “John Mortimer” to test and “perceive the commons’ mind” about the Yorkists (*2HVI* 3.1.354-74). Although York had a great military force (*2HVI* 3.1.379-82), having popular support was decisive in making a *coup de état* successful. This could be seen in the difficulty of removing York from the throne once he was placed on it, not only because he had “troops of soldiers,” but also because parliament and “the city favour[ed]” him (*3HVI* 1.1.64-8).

Nonetheless, in order to obtain popular support, an aristocrat should actively pursue fashioning a certain community sentiment in favour of his dissident policies. For that reason, places where the people might gather could be used by dissidents to forge public opinion against the regime. In 1591, Hackett and his fellow conspirators used the streets and “the Mermaid Tavern in Cheapside” to propagate their ideas and trigger a popular insurrection (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 41-2). In 1592, “apprentices of the feltmakers” gathered especially around “Blackfriars” to voice their sentiments against the unfair imprisonment of an apprentice (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 138). Similarly, in the 1595 riots, the rioters made use of public spaces, such as “the market” in “Southwark” or “[St.] Paul’s” to voice their ideas and incite the people to take action against grievances (Harrison, *Last* 28-9). The importance of the usage of public spaces by dissidents was reflected on the stage and page in Shakespeare’s history plays, as well. For example, in *IHIV*, it could be seen that the dissatisfied nobility made use of “market-crosses” and “churches” to incite popular support. In particular, when Henry IV met the forces of the rebelling nobility, their spokesperson Worcester delivered to the monarch the reasons for their rebellion, namely his ingratitude towards those who had helped him to the throne in excluding them from favour (*IHIV* 5.1.30-71). Yet, Henry IV argued that these accusations were used to justify their rebellion and create public opinion. Henry IV stated, “[t]hese things indeed you have articulate, / Proclaimed at market-crosses, read in churches, / To face the garment of rebellion / With some fine colour that

may please the eye / Of fickle changelings and poor discontents, / Which gape and rub the elbow at the news / Of hurly-burly innovation” (*IHV* 5.1.72-82). The discrepancy between Henry IV’s in-the-making of formal history and the personal family histories of the rebellious aristocrats elucidated similarities regarding fictionalisation and the importance of point of view in creating public opinion (Legatt 90; Baldo 64, 73). Yet, both groups, either for or against the regime, emphasised the effective use of spaces to disseminate ideas against the regime and to manipulate information for one’s own interest. Two years following the publication of the 1599 quarto edition of *IHV*, on the 14th of January 1601, news about Essex pointed out that “his house near Temple Bar” was used to disseminate dissentious ideas by drawing “multitudes thither, that the Queen could not but take it ill” (Harrison, *Last* 140). This, apart from the notorious use of the Globe theatre one day before the revolt (Montrose, *Purpose* 68-71), was more crucial in spreading ideas against the regime. Hence, the use of spaces to gather commoners was crucial for the success of dissent against the regime.

However, the only way for success in this battle was “treason” which bore problems within itself, namely, of divided loyalties according to the honour code, where loyalty to the cause and loyalty to the sovereign would clash. As one of the more reasonable followers of Essex, Francis Bacon maintained that “euerie honest man [...] [would] forfake his friend rather than forfake his King” (*Apologie* 7-8). This dictum manifested itself, especially, from 1599 onwards when some of his followers rejected Essex’s radicalised policies. For instance, when Essex was spurred to invade England in 1599, “bonds of ‘friendship’ bound [his followers] in honour to Essex, yet honour also raised issue of ‘faithfulness’ to the queen. For treason, so clearly proposed in the invasion project, constituted in terms of honour a ‘blot’ with which no honourable lineage would wish to be stained” (James 441-2). Quite similarly, *RII* initially showed the problematics of remaining loyal to the monarch while trying to fight against “favourites” or rivals (Perry 247). The street scene, in particular, illustrated problems of divided loyalties. York narrated the “theatre[-like]” procession of the former and the present king through London (*RII* 5.2.1-3, 5.2.23). In this narration, the Duchess and the Duke of York and even the people, who reportedly received him cheerfully, abstained from calling “Bolingbroke” with his new title Henry IV, whereas Richard was still

named “King [Richard]” (*RII* 5.2.6-40). While York was one of the first to turn away from Richard II to withdraw his forces and “remain [...] neuter,” York was against the deposition of Richard II and could not approve of the mishandling of Richard II by the people (*RII* 2.3.159, 3.3.116-7, 5.2.34-40). Yet, York was careful to utter these words in his private lodgings and differentiated his private thoughts from his family’s public role as “sworn subjects” to “Bolingbroke” (*RII* 5.2.39).

Therefore, in order to obtain the support of the people, religion and religious jargon could be employed to use the value system of the people against possible negative attitudes towards dissent. For instance, Morton acknowledged that the initial failure of the Hotspur rebellion was that the “same word ‘rebellion’ did divide / The action of their bodies from their souls, / And they did fight with queasiness, constrained,” whereas the support of the Archbishop of York would “[turn] insurrection to religion” (*2HIV* 1.1.187-201). Employing providentialist diction, the Archbishop used especially the death of “fair King Richard” to underline that to act against “Bolingbroke” was a religious duty, after which people did “flock to follow him” (*2HIV* 1.1.202-9). Hence, dissidents had to make use of religious backing or jargon to make people appreciate their moves. The use of the “holy war” by the Archbishop was necessary to deflect problematics regarding the “memory” of “[t]he past” and “the present insurrection” (Legatt 88; Baldo 80; Birney 73). One year after the publication of *2HIV*, for quite similar reasons, during his rebellion Essex cried in favour of the “Queen” and tried to stir the Londoners by claiming that Protestant “England” was to be “assigned over to the [Catholic] Infanta of Spain” (Harrison, *Last* 146). Thus, he tried to add a religious backing to his uprising. Thereby, the importance to clothe dissent, based on pragmatic reasons, with providentialist reasons was indicated on and off the stage.

Nonetheless, despite the justification, the analytical reasoning, and material preparations, the result of dissent in the Elizabethan Period was failure. This was rooted in the fact that chivalric ideals and feudal bonds gave way to more pragmatic and market oriented policies in the Late Elizabethan Period. When in 1599, the production of *HV* explicitly referred to the Irish campaign of Essex as “the General of our gracious Empress” and compared him to Henry V as a “conquering Caesar” (*HV* 5.0.22-34),

Essex was fashioned as a chivalric hero who was a continuation of the militaristic power of England, seen in Henry V's imperial exploits in France and the successful subjugation of Wales as depicted, again, in Shakespeare's play (Baldo 117-9; Hadfield, *Politics* 14; Williams 370). The subsequent failure of the Irish campaign, the pursuit and the failure of Essex to change the Elizabethan government were related to the fictionalisation of codes of honour in fiction and in non-fiction. Essex's admiration of Tacitus and his reading of classical literature convinced him that theoretical didacticism could be realised practically if historical examples were analysed correctly (Chernaik 18-9; Shapiro 123-5). Yet, similar to the impractical and bookish knowledge of Shakespeare's Fluellen about war taken from Tacitus and Plutarch (*HV* 3.2.56-142, 3.6.29-37, 4.1.66-75, 4.7.11-49; Baldo 118), Essex took such classical models to support his assumptions about aristocratic conduct and honour. The very uncompromising nature aligned to the code of honour, no matter how dignified, encapsulated its followers to a simulacra of chivalric ideals that were not shared by many in the transitional period from feudal society to market economy (McCoy, *Rites* 79-102; Levy 288-9).¹⁰¹ Hotspur's words in performance and print from 1596 to 1599 were reflective of this claustrophobic encapsulation defying compromise or counter-advise: "By heaven, methinks it were an easy leap / To pluck bright honour from the pale-faced moon, / Or dive into the bottom of the deep, / [...] And pluck up drowned honour by the locks, / So he that doth redeem her thence might wear, / Without corrival, all her dignities" (*IHV* 1.3.200-6). Hotspur's "dedication to honour is couched in language that is exciting but unconsciously self-critical" (Legatt 87), because he uttered his neo-chivalric ideals in a conditional phrase indicating its remoteness from reality. That remoteness was further explicated upon the death of Hotspur where Morton maintained that only "chance" was taken into consideration in devising dissent and that Northumberland and the other members of the dissenting nobility without "wisdom" encouraged Hotspur to "[g]o forth" with the "bold enterprise" (*2HIV* 1.1.162-79). As has been indicated before, quite similarly, between the production of *2HIV* and its 1600 quarto publication, Essex had thought about seizing the Court and eliminating his rivals, especially after his aspirant followers spurred his indignation the more in the absence of Essex's reasonable councillors such as Bacon who had left him (Williams 373). In order to undo his opponents, Essex also corresponded with James VI who

“responded” Essex “cautiously” (Williams 373). The day before his uprising, on the 7th of February 1601, the Earl of Essex commissioned the production of a Richard II play for self-incitement and disseminated that “his own person” was in “danger” as he alleged that his rivals wanted him to “be murdered in his bed” (Montrose, *Purpose* 68-71; Harrison, *Last* 144). The claim that “his life was sought” was repeated on the 8th of February 1601 and the claim of certain “counterfeited [...] letters” to undo him were made to create public sympathy towards his victimisation when he argued that he and his followers “were assembled to defend their lives” (Harrison, *Last* 145). Yet, contrary to his expectations, Essex did not get popular support for his uprising in 1601. When he “entered into London” with 200 men and “began to cry out ‘For the Queen! For the Queen! A plot is laid for my life’” almost nobody from “the City [...] would take arms for him” (Harrison, *Last* 146).

The reasons for the failure of Essex’s revolt were manifold. First, he was favoured in relation with the patronage under Elizabeth I (Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 282; Williams 376). Not only the common people but any client always cared for material gain within the patronage system as that system was based on a give and take relationship between patron and client. As a report during Essex’s preparations to go on the Irish Wars in 1599 illustrated, “[t]he common people still favour my Lord, hoping by his means to be freed from their intolerable exactions; but if they saw him in adversity, they would respect him no more” (Harrison, *Last* 27-8). Essex did not get support in his later revolt because he defied his link with the Elizabethan patronage. Popular support for him, as predicted in 1599, lost momentum so that many of his so-called supporters forsook him. What is more, the lack of creating a powerful patronee base in London, the lack of sufficient organisation and the “inconsistencies” in pursuing the honour code led to the failure of the coup (Hammer 269-76; James 438; Williams 375-6). Just like Hotspur laid hope on his friends and the support they would obtain from the public, Essex’s failure was rooted in this confidence in other people. For instance, Hotspur was warned by an anonymous letter that “[t]he / purpose you undertake is dangerous, the friends you have / named uncertain, the time itself unsorted, and your whole / plot too light for the counterpoise of so great an opposition” (*IHV* 2.3.9-12). Yet, Hotspur was too confident of his friends and his family members,

who were of respectable origin, hence to be trusted, who warranted their support with “letters,” so that Hotspur dismissed the anonymous warning to be part of black propaganda undertaken by a “lack-brain” and “rascal” (*IHIV* 2.3.8-14). Yet, as Bardolph later acknowledged, Hotspur’s “plot” was indeed “*too light*” because of the discrepancy between expectation and reality. In particular, Bardolph maintained that Hotspur “lin’d himself with hope, / Eating the air and promise of supply, / Flatt’ring himself in project of a power / Much smaller than the smallest of his thoughts, / And so, with great imagination / Proper to madmen, led his powers to death, / And winking leap’d into destruction” (*2HIV* 1.3.27-33). The reason for the failure of Essex was based on being similarly out of touch with realities concerning his plans and his forces in the *coup de état*. Not even “one man of the meanest quality would take arms for him,” and his verbal schemes to incite the people with words about his and the Queen’s life endangered by pro-Spanish schemes for the succession were “but all in vain” (Harrison, *Last* 146). Apart from the lack of attendance of the citizens of London, Sheriff Smith who had “a thousand of the trained bands” and “would be assistant to [Essex] upon all occasions” proved to be a turncoat and “withdrew himself by a back door to the Lord Mayor” (Harrison, *Last* 146). Therefore, the illusion of high attendance to a rebellion was another important reason for the failure in changing the system by violent means. Essex’s “supposed friends amongst the élite, and the people” did “fail him” (James 449-50). The reasons for the failure of the Hotspur rebellion that could be read in the quarto editions of 1598 and 1599, could be re-read by Elizabethans following the abortive coup of Essex. For instance, Hotspur’s father and Glendower did not take part in the rebellion, which was an unexpected change in the plan that affected the whole plot. His father’s “sickness” did “infect / The very life-blood of” his “enterprise” because not only he but also his father’s “friends” and followers would forsake Hotspur once they were not gathered by Northumberland (*IHIV* 4.1.28-41). Likewise, the fact that Glendower could not “draw his power this fourteen days” (*IHIV* 4.1.123-5), was another example of loss of power within the faction that weakened the possibility of the success of dissent.

What is more, even though dissident groups might lack some of their military power due to several reasons, it was rather important not to lose popular support. All in all,

popular opinion was of indeterminate nature because of the lack of trustworthy mediums for the transmission of information. That was why there were additions to William Cecil's advice to his son that he should not "affect nor neglect popularity too much. Seek not to be E. and shun to be R.," probably indicating Essex and Raleigh (qtd. in Hurstfield 61; Doty 107). According to Fox, "[i]n a society which had few means of confirming or denying news, in which political insecurity was often of the highest order, and in which the authorities tried to restrict and censor the circulation of intelligence, it is hardly surprising that fervent speculation and wild rumours were rife" which was why "the scope for wild and unfounded stories was immense" (354–355). The choric Rumour in *2HIV*, performed between 1598 and 1599 and published in 1600, materialised the manipulation of public opinion. Rumour was "[s]tuffing the ears of men with false reports," "speak[ing] of peace while covert enmity" (*2HIV* Induction.8-9). Rumour "rumoured," particularly, "through the peasant towns" the false report of the defeat of Henry IV (*2HIV* Induction.33, 1.1.1-215), which indicated how oral transmission of information made it more liable to become misinformation. Even after that initial scene, however, the forces of Henry IV also perceived the indeterminacy of information, especially, in crisis situations. Accordingly, "Rumour doth double, like the voice and echo, / The numbers of the feared" (*2HIV* 3.1.97-8). Yet, not only in fiction but also in outward reality, the indeterminacy about the destructive force of public opinion could be perceived, especially through "scaremongering" (Fox 359). The confusion and "disorder" following the rebellion of the Percys in Shakespeare's *2HIV* on the stage and page reflected the "impermanence" of orally transmitted information (Baldo 93), seen during the Essex rebellion, as well. For example, the abuse of religion by the dissidents to sustain popular support, could be perceived and propagated before and during the confusion of upheaval as an irreligious act. Holinshed's chronicle focused on the fulfilment of a "prophecie" regarding the fatal end of the Archbishop of York and the remaining Percys for their abuse of religion (3:530, 3:534). In a similar fashion to chronicle material, Shakespeare's Prince John of Lancaster maintained that the Archbishop "misuse[d] the reverence of [his] place" to rise "under the counterfeited zeal of God [...] against the peace of heaven" (*2HIV* 4.2.1-30). A likewise consequence could be observed when Essex tried to use the Catholic threat in order to spur the citizens of London to assist him "but all in vain [...] not a man took arms" (Harrison,

Last 146). The heterogeneity of the Essexian circle maintained only through the honour code was decisive in the failure to use religion to hold support for the rebellion (James 435). Similarly, even the image of the falling apart of the rebels among themselves might create a negative popular opinion which would further strengthen the status quo. According to the confessions of the Essexians, “[w]hen [Essex] saw that” even “his own company slunk away from him privately by degrees, and heard withal that the Lord Admiral was coming with a strong party of men, he began now to cast away all hope” (Harrison, *Last* 146). His retreat following the loss of forces and the advancement of counterforces, therefore, further weakened the Essexians. A similar strengthening of the status quo could be re-read in Shakespeare’s *IHV*. For instance, when Worcester heard the news that Northumberland would not take part in the battle because of his sickness, he commented that “some, that know not why he is away” would claim “[t]hat wisdom, loyalty and mere dislike / Of our proceedings kept the Earl from hence” which would “breed a kind of question in [the justification of their] cause” and create “the ignorant a kind of fear” (*IHV* 4.1.59-74). Consequently, the dependency upon popular support was a double-edged weapon that could be employed successfully or unsuccessfully, wherein the loss of some support for the rebellion might create a snowball effect and lose popular support for the uprising.

Besides, Essex also failed because he acted like an “over-mighty subject of a century before” and could not cope with the transitional period in which “bureaucratic” meritocrats were favoured over landed aristocracy (Levy 288-9). The Essex rising was like the act of an over-mighty subject of a bastard feudalism where he with his livery, the Irish knights, tried to become another “king-maker” by deposing Elizabeth I and eliminating the Cecils and putting James VI on the throne and ruling the country on his behalf (Elton 473). Therefore, Essex was the victim of his supporters who “had temporarily or permanently lost touch with political reality and had disastrously exaggerated Essex’s popular support” (Williams 375). Essex was radicalised by his remaining immoderate patronees and followers who acted like flatterers without criticising but rather encouraging almost all of his plans. On the 21st of February 1601, the trial of Essex revealed that his patronees “Blount, Cuffe, Temple and those other who were at the private conspiracy at Drury House, had more dangerous and malicious

ends for the disturbance of the State than could have been prevented if his project had gone forward” (Harrison, *Last* 161). The ambitious patronesses, who wanted to elevate their patron to a central position in politics, swarmed around Essex and provided him with only affirming voices about his constructed reality. A similar divergence regarding theory and practice could be re-read by contemporary Elizabethans from the 1599 quarto edition of *IHV* where Hotspur was spurred by his patronesses to take action and continue with the rebellion even though his forces gradually withered and other patronesses warned him not to take rash action (*IHV* 4.3.1-15). While some of the fellow factionalists warned Hotspur, Essex was not warned but only stirred in his rebellion further. When Essex desperately returned home, he found that the hostages he took as a guarantee were released, and his house was eventually besieged by pro-Elizabethan forces, whereas one of Essex’s ardent followers, the Earl of Southampton rejected to “yield” to those forces and claimed that they were “fully resolved to lose [their] lives fighting” (Harrison, *Last* 146-7). Apart from being a final attempt to reassure fellow-dissidents, Southampton’s words were indicative of how Essex lost touch with reality through constant display of heroic overconfidence that was the prime reason for the failure of Essex’s revolt in 1601.

On the other hand, since dissent failed to change the corrupt order of things, dissidents had to be maintained within the rules of that order. Subsequent to the failure of the Essex revolt, the dissidents were imprisoned, tried and punished by the Elizabethan judicial system. Punishment, was “hierarchi[s]ed,” “regulated” and “calculated” in general (Foucault, *Discipline* 33-4). There were also certain rules in the Elizabethan Period which scrutinised culprit and crime together (Bracton 2:290, 2:299). Accordingly, since a violent turnover of the system was the utmost crime to be committed, the punishment had to follow suit. In line with the deferential social hierarchy, Elizabethan punishment was hierarchised, according to which the types and venues for capital punishment were distinguished in relation to the offence and the offender. In particular, the nobility were to be imprisoned in the Tower which was used as a royal prison to confine and behead dissident noblepersons who were, usually, exempt from corporeal mutilation inflicted on traitors (Wilson, *Tower* 11; Cressy, *Dangerous* 39; *RIII* 3.1.68-89).¹⁰² While Tower Hill, on the north of the Tower, was

used as a public space for capital punishment, Tower Green, which was surrounded by the Tower walls, was used for some executions that required concealment because of possible political consequences (Deiter 17; Parnell, “Observations” 320-6).¹⁰³ Following his trial, Essex was executed on the 25th of February 1601 on Tower Green for similar reasons to prevent outbursts of violence or the rejuvenation of dissent.

Contrary to the practice of using bodily remnants displayed on the Tower Walls or the London Bridge as “panoptic” reminders of the consequences of dissident behaviour (Foucault, *Discipline* 59-60, 201, 209), Essex’s body and head were said to be buried immediately (Harrison, *Last* 174). Secrecy was used as a stratagem to control the dissemination of the memories related to his dissent. The concealment of such punishments within the Tower walls left the details to public imagination. While the display of his bodily remnants might have transformed them into sacred objects to be venerated, the quasi-evaporation of the material Earl of Essex intended to put emphasis on the superiority of the power of the status quo. Punishment through discursive and material means were used to create reverence to the might of the executive powers of the monarch and government. Thereby, punishment was used to purge dissidents by using their fates as examples to be taken to reconstitute order.

Nevertheless, no matter how severe the punishments were, if the reasons for dissent were not resolved, succeeding generations might rejuvenate that dissent. Successors of factions might continue fighting against the regime, which was observed by Shakespeare in his second tetralogy in relation to the possibility of continuance of the Percy rebellion generations later. One of the rebels elucidated that families and power bases might continue their dissent: “though we here fall down, / We have supplies to second our attempt: / If they miscarry, theirs shall second them; / And so success of mischief shall be born, / And heir from heir shall hold this quarrel up / Whiles England shall have generation” (*2HIV* 4.2.44-9). Even after the execution of Essex, the potential of the continuance of dissent could be observed. On the 24th of March 1601, there were reports of “[s]trange rumours” were it was “noised about of three rainbows seen in the Tower, and of a sceptre appearing in the place where the Earl of Essex was beheaded. Others tell of a bloody block, seen by the guards, falling from heaven to earth upon that

spot” (Harrison, *Last* 174). Of a more tangible nature, the incident reported on the 27th of March 1601 showed how far the threat of the continuation of dissent was possible. Accordingly, “[t]here [was] a lewd libel abroad” which was sung as follows: “Chamberlain, Chamberlain, / [...] his wit’s dull as lead; [...] Little Cecil trips up and down / He rules both Court and Crown, [...] With the long proclamation, / He swore he sav’d the town, / [...] Raleigh [...] seeks taxes in the tin, / He polls the poor to the skin, / Yet he swears ’tis no sin. / Lord for Thy pity” (Harrison, *Last* 174). Essex regained some of his popular support following his death which witnessed several pseudo-hagiographic reports that elevated him and his cause one again. His opponents were criticised and satirised more openly, albeit written satires had been forbidden from 1599 onwards. Since Robert Cecil had a small stature (Handover 32), the belittlement in the ballad was contrasting his then unquestionable hold on the patronage. The vacuum that was tried to be filled with the still unpopular Raleigh was referred to in the ballad and linked to a more grievous economic problem that was at its peak in 1601 about the abuses in monopolies, referred as “taxes in the tin” because Raleigh possessed the monopoly of tin (Harrison, *Last* 223; Dean 88). In particular, on the 20th of November 1601, the Parliament met and hotly debated the abolition of monopolies abused by the remainder of the nobility, including Raleigh. While Francis Bacon tried to divert dissident voices among the commoners to be in line with the realities of the Elizabethan patronage system that tried to patch the lack of land-based resources to be given as favours with monopolies, focusing on Elizabeth I’s “prerogative” to choose whomever she wanted to possess a monopoly, others like Francis Moore and Mr. Martin tried to sustain the interests of the commoners against “bloodsuckers” (Harrison, *Last* 221-3). The Essexian rebellion aimed to eliminate the Cecilians and thereby amend socio-economic grievances that were the result of the Cecilian misdistribution of favours within the patronage system. The execution of Essex and the suppression or dissolution of his faction, *per se*, was not, at least in 1601, effective in the suppression of dissent. Thus, there was a need to resolve the reasons for dissent to hinder its reoccurrence.

In line with these, merely executing all of the nobility involved in the uprising would not eliminate but only postpone dissent to a future period. Therefore, Elizabethan policy tried to balance punishment and mercy in order to rejuvenate loyalty towards the

regime. According to Early Modern judicial literature, “retribution” which “was backward-looking, seeking to uphold the moral order” should be accompanied by “utilitarian ideas of punishment” which were “forward-looking” (Keyishian 175). This duality could be observed in the punishment of fictive and real rebels in the Late Elizabethan Period. The punishment of disfavoured courtiers who rose up against the system was two-fold. Some leaders were eliminated whereas the greater part of the dissenting faction was tried to be assimilated into the system. The latter would be pardoned in return for a ransom that turned dissent into loyalty while this would procure extra financial resources for the royal patronage. Accordingly, the leaders of a rebellion would be punished with capital punishment to exert the power of the monarch and restore order by purging disorder (Althusser 142-5; Foucault, *Discipline* 47-8; Girard 8, 15, 29-30). For instance, John of Lancaster sentenced the Archbishop and his accomplices to death, not minding the ethical concerns regarding his promise to “redress” their “grievances” (2*HIV* 4.2.54-115). The equivocality of this statement set aside, the fact that “the block of death” was “[t]reason’s true bed” (2*HIV* 4.2.122-3) was reflective of the need to punish the leaders of an uprising. Whether Henry IV’s initial offer for “pardon absolute” was sincere or not, Prince John’s hypocrisy in redressing the traitors was necessitated by pragmatic “political” reasons, even though it was moralistically problematic (1*HIV* 4.3.50; Prior 195). Yet the executions of the dissident nobility proved to be temporary means to purge disorder. Henry V’s equivocal play with the rebels due to his knowledge about their plans for assassination (1*HV* 2.2.40-76) and the subsequent Wars of the Roses as depicted in the earlier plays 1-3*HVI* illustrated that if the reasons for dissent were not solved, dissension would be continued by remaining followers or heirs of the executed nobility.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, punishing all of the rebels would have been disadvantageous to the system. By sparing some of these nobles from punishment in return for ransom, dissent was turned into loyalty and extra financial means were levied on the nobility. For instance, the Elizabethan jurisdiction released several members of the nobility in 1601, like the two brothers of the Earl of Northumberland, “Sir Charles Percy and Sir Jocelyn Percy” after been given “bonds for them of £500 in each,” “the Earl of Rutland, the Lord Sandys, the Lord Cromwell, and Sir William Parker” following “payment of their

charges” and Sir Ferdinando Gorges (Harrison, *Last* 176, 195, 228). An act of mercy shown to others could lower social pressure following the execution of prominent figures. Thereby, the rebelling nobility could be maintained within the system by restricting their financial means further as a preferable alternative to capital punishment.

Nevertheless, no matter how punishment could lead to wastes of potential and that acts of mercy could be as effective as retribution, there should be a certain balance between pity and punishment. In the famous sermon at St. Paul’s Cross on the 1st of March 1601, Dr. Barlow exemplified from “Matthew xxi. 22, ‘Give unto Caesar the things of Caesar,’ wherein he spoke of the confessions of my Lord of Essex made to him, and his words concerning the people of London” that if “he been remitted and lived, there could have been neither safety to the Queen’s person, nor peace to the land, nor hope of the Gospel’s continuance” (Harrison, *Last* 167). Accordingly, although Elizabeth I towards her final days regretted the loss of Essex (Harrison, *Last* 272, 320), on the 15th of September 1601, she stated in the first phases of the aftermath of Essex’s execution that “mild severity” should be also employed rather than exclusively following “an unwise and destructive clemency” (Harrison, *Last* 202). The discrepancy between “forgetting” and “forgiving” taken from Biblical models as elucidated by Margalit (196-200) was crucial to understand why Elizabeth I could not forgive Essex and had to execute him and some of his radical followers. Whether “blotting out” or “covering up” (Margalit 196-7), forgiving the trespasses of Essex would only endanger the Elizabethan government. The post-Essexian need to balance punishment and mercy could also be re-read by Elizabethan readers in the 1600 quarto edition of Shakespeare’s *3HVI*. After the upheaval and defeat of York, for instance, when Henry VI perceived the head of York on the gates of York, he got very upset and asked “God” not to inflict “revenge” on him because he would not “wittingly [...] infringed” his “vow” about York’s well-being (*3HVI* 2.2.1-8). Yet, Clifford argued that Henry VI should not “pity” York as “[t]o whom do lions cast their gentle looks? / Not to the beast that would usurp their den” (*3HVI* 2.2.11-2). Hence, monarchs should be cautious of rebellion rather than be pitiful towards it and mind the balance between pity and threat.

The benefits of such a balance between mercy and retribution manifested itself in a two-fold manner, as sham pardons to diminish the intensity of dissent through a lapse of time and as real pardons assimilating dissidence through the still pending threat of punishment through some financial burden. As for the first, the pardoning of dissenting groups might be just a temporary strategy employed to cool down social friction. After a certain time, the pardoned traitors might be eliminated by some excuse. Although it was reported on 11th of March 1601, that “the Queen meant to deal graciously and mercifully with” the rebels, and “there shall be no more arraignments neither of Lord nor other, but all mercy coming,” two days later, Merrick and Cuffe were executed (Harrison, *Last* 171-2). Whether related to the differentiation between aristocratic and commoner rebels, the execution of Merrick and Cuffe indicated that clemency could be used as a scheme to ease social tensions. A similar scheme could be observed in the 1600 quarto of *IHIV* where, for example, Henry IV sent word that he would pardon Hotspur and his dissenting faction but Worcester feared that the monarch would ever “suspect” them “and find a time / To punish this offence in other faults,” which was why they did “misquote” Henry IV’s peace offer to Hotspur (*IHIV* 5.2.1-27). As for the second, to pardon some of the nobility and commoners involved in uprisings was important for the reconciliation of groups who felt themselves excluded from the system, in general, and the patronage, in particular. Even though former Essexians like Ferdinando Gorges or the Earl of Rutland recovered their fortunes following the ascension of James I (Baxter 1:58-9; Palmer and Palmer 211), at least, their cases showed that the use of mercy in a careful way enabled the reintegration of former dissidents. A close adaptation of Holinshed’s chronicle (3:515), the scene between Henry IV and Aumerle revealed the importance of the use of partial mercy to control social disorder conducted by members of higher social strata. Shakespeare’s Henry IV pardoned Aumerle for his involvement in an attempt to assassinate him, albeit Aumerle’s father, York, wanted the contrary (*RII* 5.2.41-5, 5.2.67-72). The reason for his pardon was that Aumerle surrendered himself to the mercy of the monarch and informed him of the attempt, whereby all the others were executed (*RII* 5.3.29-145). If this incident were to be taken together with Henry IV’s advice to Prince Hal to “make” his father’s former enemies his “friends” (*2HIV* 4.5.204), it could be stated that it was very important to reconstruct order by re-integrating dissident groups within it. In this

line, Shakespeare's company, which had been found to be compelled to play some form of history play about Richard II, was reintegrated into the system by being made to "perform again at court" the day before Essex's execution (Montrose, *Purpose* 68, 103-4). This "was a symbolic assertion that the state was secure and that its subjects were loyal" to the regime (Montrose, *Purpose* 68). Dutton and Montrose agreed that Shakespeare's company was left unpunished because they performed according to the rules in the "allowed" place, the Globe, and a permitted play about Richard II (Dutton, *Mastering* 124; Montrose, *Purpose* 70). Also, the players might have been exempted from charge because they obeyed "their betters" and "the pressures exerted by their superiors and patrons" to stage the play primarily for "financial" reasons as the Essex faction paid 11 shillings more than the usual fare (Montrose, *Purpose* 71-3). Consequently, in the post-Essexian period from 1601 to 1603, the punishment of certain leaders with capital punishment and fines and the reintegration of the majority of dissidents were used to ease social tensions.

To conclude, Essex's Tacitean analysis of histories in books on history or history plays was reflective of the general problematics of Elizabethan re-readings of history to formulate dissent against arbitrary distribution of favours amid economic crises. History was not considered as an example to be taken but tried to be used to fulfil one's desires. Essex did not read the problematics of dissent, such as, the problems regarding how to organise it, how to sustain loyalty to his cause; and even if he was successful, that he would probably not being able to control his former supporters. Although Essex hoped to become yet another Bolingbroke, he turned out to be another Hotspur. Essex's ambitions for an ultra-Protestant continental Europe under the leadership of England were at odds with his relative exclusion from decision-making while the Cecils held a firm hand on the royal patronage of Elizabeth I. Essex was also like Hotspur because he had the potential to be a good leader and fell because of his rash actions to compensate for his exclusion from the control of policies in the government. The aristocratic ethics of Essex based on the honour code were at odds with Elizabethan realities, as was also illustrated by the pragmatist Falstaff (Birney 63-4): "What is in that word 'honour'? What is that / 'honour'? Air. A trim reckoning. Who hath it? He that / died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? / No. [...] 'Tis insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it

/ not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not / suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere / scutcheon" (*IHV* 5.1.134-40). This and Hotspur's fatal end were like warnings to those warlord patrons who were too hot to be spurred to pursue physical violence as a means to alter state policies.

Whether in a tragic or comic way, Shakespeare's history plays encoded or enabled to decode social criticism towards both the failings of governmental policies and the failings of resistant groups to amend these. This was also related to the fact that the Elizabethan theatre with its thrust stage scaffold was similar to the "raised" scaffolds of execution places as has been pointed out by several historic and contemporary critics (Owens 115, 120-1; Kastan, "Class" 106-7).¹⁰⁵ Thereby, as Martha Nussbaum asserts, the theatre was rendered into another kind of "courtroom" in which, contrary to the audiences in its real counterpart, the playgoers were in an omniscient position and were provided, through soliloquys and other techniques, with the motives for guilt of culprits in a more direct way (qtd. in Keyishian 183). The adaptation of socio-political issues into the analytical space of theatre performances and into quarto editions sustained the significance of such encoding and decoding throughout the last decade of Elizabeth I's reign. Reading, forced reading or misreading of historical examples simulated on the stage and page enabled to point out and satirise the problems of the Elizabethan government and the problems of resistant groups to solve these problems through troublesome means like physical violence.

The paradox of challenging problems through problematic means satirised in Shakespeare's history plays, manifested itself, especially, in the case of the Essex coup. All in all, the reason for groups of people to follow Essex was their resentment of the Cecilian dominance over patronage. Yet, with the failed coup and Essex's death, the Essex faction gradually disappeared or assimilated with other dominant groups leaving Cecil as the sole power in England (Williams 376). Following his execution, Essex's legacy was tried to be circumscribed into that of a traitor and favourite, such as through the commission of *A declaration of the practices and treasons attempted and committed by Robert, late Earl of Essex, and his complices* (1601), wherein "the ambitious nature of the late Earl to make himself the first person in the Kingdom, [...] his gathering of a

faction, his plan for surprising the Court and obtaining possession of the Queen and the State and for possessing the City; his attempt to raise the City, and the defeat of that dangerous conspiracy” were shown (Harrison, *Last* 177). The declaration was written by Francis Bacon, but “exactly perused by the Queen herself and some alterations made again by her appointment” (Harrison, *Last* 177). This indicated how consciously the legacy of Essex as a disobedient courtier was fashioned by the status quo. That is why, most critics of Old Historicism, Elton, among them, would argue that Essex was an “arrogant” favourite, whereas Cecil was a “hardworking” minister (469-70). While state propaganda tried to erase the heroic legacy of Essex and emphasise the Cecilian faction as civil servants who only thought about the well-being of the government and society, Robert Cecil, in order to secure his then undisputed hold on the patronage, took over the negotiations with James VI of Scotland for the succession to the English throne. Cecil simply wanted to secure his position in the next reign that would be similarly governed by his hold on the patronage system.

CONCLUSION

The final years of the Elizabethan regime (1588-1603) were marked by the pre-eminence of factionalism that was triggered by several factors. Factionalism as an ideological split appeared in the Post-Armada Period when experienced councillors died and the new generation of advisors was less cooperative. This was based on several factors. Elizabeth I monopolised the patronage under the meritocratic Cecils and this created discontent in aristocratic circles. Thereby, she appeared as a weak monarch losing her impartiality towards her subjects. Her inertia in dealing with problems was similarly the result of that misbalance. In order to cover up her weakness she exerted authoritarian means creating fear so that dissidents would be ruined socio-economically. This, however, only accelerated the friction between power-holding meritocrats and excluded aristocrats. Friction, on the other hand, was an extension of the discrepancy between civil servants who ascended in status through their merits arbitrarily evaluated by a monarch, and aristocrats who claimed their worth and status through their lineage which was of constant nature. Therefore, primogeniture, the acquisition of titles, the issue of social climbing and the manners of these social climbers have been dealt in order to understand the mechanism of rivalry between the aristocrats and the meritocrats for governmental offices. Furthermore, the means used in order to live within factionalism have been grouped under psychological warfare and physical violence manifesting themselves especially towards the end of Elizabeth I's reign.

Amid such hostility, theatrical dissimulation was a means of survival tactic in the Elizabethan court that was ruled by factionalism. The use of dissimulation in social relations was caused by several factors. First, Early Modern humanist education through rhetoric and drama trained the future members of the society to shape previously acquired information according to occasion and audience. Then, this preliminary performative education was enhanced by the Elizabethan theatre through which the impersonation of several social roles could be imitated by the audience. No matter how the ethics of theatrical dissimulation was in question by religious polemicists, the importance of seeming became central in Elizabethan society. As an extension of these, the Elizabethan court has been noted by many critics as a place where courtiers acted

their roles like actors on a stage. In the Court, it was important to learn deceit, either to perform it or to protect oneself from it. Yet, during such performances it was important not to be perceived as deceitful, since in a deferential society, like the Elizabethan society, reputation was pivotal. Although the subsequent discrepancy between essence and appearance created ethical questions on conduct, to be hypocritical became necessary because everyone dissimulated. Thus, courtiers were suspicious of each other, which made trust within the Court circles impossible. Therefore, a courtier had to be careful, not only with factional foes, but especially with friends and patronees. Nevertheless, because of lack of trust, a courtier could isolate himself from others, which could lead to unguided behaviour and fall from favour. Yet, if a courtier acted boldly and abandoned dissimulation in order to avoid its consequences, he would endanger his reputation, social position and even his life, so that eventually he might experience the same isolation and fall. Analyses of Shakespeare's Elizabethan history plays showed that either way, dissimulating or being bold, survival in the dissimulative court ruled by factionalism became more and more difficult, which made courtiers dissent against the present paradigm and feel the necessity to change the system, especially towards the end of Elizabeth I's reign.

However, dissent in the Elizabethan Period was problematised through conflicting attitudes towards its legitimacy. While providentialist works of politics and history tried to maintain obedience to the regime, resistant literature re-evaluated classical and religious works to find answers to how to oppose and alter tyrannical rules. Fostered by such a political debate, dissent could be observed, especially, in two periods, namely from 1588 to 1595 and from 1597 to 1601. In the first time span, commoners as religious groups or apprentices voiced their criticism towards the regime in fragmented and instantaneous protests. Likewise, the Catholic diaspora unsuccessfully tried to incite Ferdinando Stanley, second in line to the throne, to assist a foreign invasion to change the government. In the latter period, the disenfranchised nobility gathered around the Earl of Essex who was similarly losing ground in the Court. The Earl of Essex's aggressive efforts to regain his power led to his desperate and abortive *coup de état* in 1601, which showed that there were no simple solutions to the problems in the final years of the Elizabethan Period.

Hence, contemporary incidents, letters, books on politics and history, and ballads are examined in this dissertation to exemplify how passages in Shakespeare's history plays might have been received by the playgoers and the reading public of the plays *1-3HVI*, *RIII*, *KJ*, *RII*, *1-2HIV* and *HV*. Accordingly, it is understood that the tone of satire against the Elizabethan patronage system that leads to factionalism develops from bitter burlesque in the first tetralogy and *KJ* to refined sarcasm in the last tetralogy. The context of reception that is based on probable dates of performances and of quarto publications show that while Shakespeare's history plays reflect the paradigms of Late Elizabethan factionalism, Shakespeare does not criticise just one part of the problem. He does not use Horatian satire which would criticise social problems only mildly and less effectively. He does not use Juvenalian satire, either, which would criticise these problems only from a limited point of view. Rather, through the use of Menippean satire, he identifies the failings that lead to factionalism in a holistic way. Therefore, Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire in his history plays is neither exclusive nor is it directed at problems from a single vantage point. Instead, Shakespeare satirises the follies of all the classes in the Late Elizabethan Period when factionalism and the arbitrary distribution of favours force hostile and hypocritical behaviour patterns.¹⁰⁶ Accordingly, Shakespeare's depictions of kings like Henry VI or Richard II who are misguided by flatterers analyse the source of factionalism. The arbitrary distribution of favours that lead to factionalism in these plays are similar to the failures of Elizabeth I who could not distribute her favours evenly. Likewise, Shakespeare's history plays point out how the differentiation between the aristocrats and meritocrats, which split the Court into several factions, is rather of an arbitrary and blurred nature. Shakespeare's plays are reflective of the meritocratic Cecils' efforts to become landed nobility through the acquisition of lands and titles, and the aristocratic Essex's failed attempt to create a powerful network of patronees through the knighting of commoners. Such paradoxes could be seen in Shakespeare's history plays when characters like the commoners Joan la Pucelle and Jack Cade claim to be noblepersons in *1-2HVI*, the Woodvilles' rise in and fall from favour in *RIII*, Philip the Bastard's making fun of aristocratic manners while being eager to become one in *KJ*, and Falstaff's desire to rise in the Court merely through his friendship with Prince Hal in *1-2HIV*.

Furthermore, the in-depth analyses of the plays have revealed that Shakespeare is aware of the failings of the system, but is against socio-political iconoclasm. Shakespeare's history plays, for instance, do not deny the necessity of hypocrisy in a deferential society like the Elizabethan one. Some of his characters like Richard III or Henry V emphasise dissimulation in a metadramatical way showing how social behaviours are merely performances. Likewise, the plays have led to conclude that histrionic behaviour patterns as depicted in the theatres could be imitated by playgoers in real-life.

Nevertheless, Shakespeare also foregrounds ethical problems regarding the practice of hypocrisy. To be part of, rise in, or protect oneself in this system, one has to use hypocrisy, as can be observed in the cases of Philip the Bastard in *KJ*, Richard III, and Henry V. The fact that sincerity is harmful is further depicted through the nemesis of relatively admirable characters like Hotspur in *1-2HIV*. In Shakespeare's history plays, the rulers and the ruled, who are forced to follow the prescripts of hypocritical social behaviour, are satirised alike by Shakespeare.

Moreover, Shakespeare's history plays reflect the social tensions of the Late Elizabethan Period that result from economic recession and the clash between the passing feudal norms and the emerging market economy. The Elizabethan society was falling apart and people tried to voice their criticisms against its failings. Shakespeare's first tetralogy was probably commissioned by Ferdinando Stanley, a nobleman who attracted many dissidents, while, especially in his second tetralogy, Shakespeare found himself amid the power struggle between the Earl of Essex and the regime. Shakespeare's history plays, all of which deal primarily with dissent, illustrate the problem of how to oppose a legitimate yet repressive government in a legitimate way.

Through the use of Menippean satire, the reasons for negative and positive attitudes towards dissent can be examined in Shakespeare's history plays. Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire enables the criticism of both pro- and anti-government theories and their theoretical dead-ends. The arbitrary distribution of economic resources oppressed disenfranchised Elizabethan nobles and commoners. The limited means in voicing social criticism legitimately radicalised Elizabethan politics. Yet, to use aggressive

means to change the government could only foster new problems like civil war and foreign invasion. While Shakespeare in his history plays primarily depicts and mostly criticises the threat of domestic turmoil, he also depicts the reasons for dissent. Shakespeare's plays show that dissent is not solely driven by bottom-up ambition, but also by top-down mismanagement. Menippean satire permits Shakespeare to satirise the causes, the effects, and the people involved in these problems. Jack Cade's rebellion as a commoner's movement is not just caricaturised in *2HVI*, but its depiction enables Shakespeare to show how the commoners are disenfranchised by the lawmakers. Likewise, the reason for aristocratic rebellion is not just unscrupulous thirst for power. The exclusion of aristocrats from the benefits of royal patronage in favour of meritocrats, as seen in *1-3HVI*, *RIII*, *RII*, and *1-2HIV*, can be named as another important reason for dissent. Yet, analyses of the plays show that either way, passive or active dissent cannot cure the problems that derive from the arbitrary distribution of favours and factionalism. Hence, Shakespeare's history plays do not provide definitive answers for social questions in a propagandist or partisan way, but, along with possible answers, pose more questions.

The stage and page are, thereby, mediums of releasing and/or intensifying problems, whereas it should be noted that not the intention of the playwright but the signification of the audience sheds light on why historical matter on the stage and decade-old plays on the page receive public attention. The interconnectedness of subject matter that combine several plays in the first and second tetralogy reveals that the performances of Shakespeare's history plays were considered successful by the playgoers. Likewise, although quarto editions of these plays appear years after their first performances, they can be considered still successful as can be concluded from the number of editions. With the use of Menippean satire, Shakespeare's history plays provide a space to concretise abstract problems, to think over possible solutions, and realise the problems regarding these solutions. The depiction of histrio-historic monarchs, noblemen and commoners on the page and stage enable topical criticism. Amid the presence of censorship mechanisms, any association with real-life persons could be deflected by claiming that these plays were just timeless pieces of drama and/or issues of the past. The heterotopian spaces of the stage and the page enable such fluidity in signification

that can be subverted by conservatives and radicals, like in the case of the plays about Richard II used as state-propaganda in 1590, and as agit-props in the 1600-1 street shows and the Essex coup. Hence, Shakespeare's history plays are multi-layered plays that combine the historic, the histrionic and the contemporary in the Late Elizabethan Period.

In the light of these arguments, during the Elizabethan Period the history plays of Shakespeare encode or enable to decode social criticism that is directed at the top-down and bottom-up reasons of factionalism and subsequent socio-political problems both in tragic and comic modes. Up to now, in the analyses of Shakespeare's history plays, Old Historicists like Tillyard or Elton defined Shakespeare as a conservative playwright who upheld the values of the Elizabethan regime, whereas New Historicists such as Greenblatt or Hadfield have, from time to time, reduced Shakespeare to a covert partisan of radicalism. This division has polarised academic research, which denies any holistic analyses of Shakespeare's history plays. Looking at Shakespeare's history plays from a single political vantage point is paradoxical to his manner of dealing with the problems of the Late Elizabethan Period, which he does from several points of view. This dissertation thus claims that Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire in his history plays is both in line with his holistic analyses and also erases the division between Old and New Historicism. Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire aims to foreground, ridicule and correct the follies of all the Elizabethans who were forced to live in and sustain the vicious circle of the failings of the system. The stage and page provided spaces to argue against social problems in a relatively open way that was denied to Elizabethan playgoers and readers in real-life. Therefore, Shakespeare's history plays that use Menippean satire are important in posing questions and providing possible answers to these questions.

NOTES

¹ From the early Bronze Age, “a tribal aristocracy centred around a king-like chief and a slowly evolving aristocracy” could be seen (Schultz 4). Yet, it is not until the introduction of *comitatus* along with the Anglo-Saxon invasions that the aristocratic class and its council, the *witan*, established as distinctive social strata in England (Schultz 19, 21). The reciprocal relationship of the Anglo-Saxon kings and their thanes was based on interest in the form of “give and take” (Lavelle 122) through “the military functions of the king’s household,” which “were central to its existence from the earliest times” (Grummitt 145). This type of aristocratic “companionage” (Morgan 27) continued even after the Norman Conquest.

² Also see the following: Williams 126-7; Stone 402; MacCaffrey, “Place” 101.

³ Also see the following: Adams 37-8; Haigh, *Elizabeth* 90-1.

⁴ Also see the following: Adams 34-5; Williams 361-4; Elton 461).

⁵ Also see the following: Haigh, *Elizabeth* 87-92; Jardine 292; MacCaffrey, “Place” 97.

⁶ Also see the following: Dutton, *Mastering* 45; Rickman 9; Forgem 12.

⁷ *Via media* combined Catholic ritual and Episcopal rule with Protestant literary interpretation of Christianity (Bayne 48-9; Williams 455).

⁸ See: Williams 228.

⁹ See the following: Williams 357-9; Guy, “Tudor Age” 309-10; Connolly 233.

¹⁰ See the following: Williams 160-2, 203; Guy, “Tudor Age” 317.

¹¹ See the following: Williams 160, 360; Guy, “Tudor Age” 264.

¹² See the following: Williams 370-6; Lockyer 159; Cramsie 49; Bourdin 70; Goodman 13.

¹³ See the following: Williams 387-8; Guy, “Tudor Age” 316.

¹⁴ For instance, William II’s court was seen by contemporary chroniclers as an immoral court and his courtiers were criticised for “immorality,” “profanity,” “lechery, effeminacy and sodomitical pursuits” (Fletcher, “Corruption” 29; Barlow 135; Thorndike 293). Similarly, in a 14th century poem named “On the Times” in Richard II’s reign, “[l]echery, lust, and pryde” (5) seen “[a]t Westmyster halle” (33) were noted as follies to be corrected.

Moreover, the courtiers and the nobility were seen as threats for stability and order. Favouritism directed at courtiers and the latter’s thirst for obtaining favour drove the kingdom into baronial revolts and outbursts of violence. Particularly, during the reign of Stephen, “civil war” dubbed the period as one of “anarchy” (Schultz 31; Gillingham 139). Similarly, Henry III “alienated many of his subjects” by appointing French advisors which “provoked the English barons” (Schultz 41; Stenton 52). Likewise, Edward II’s reign was marked for his favouritism of Gaveston, a Gascon knight who climbed from nought to the highest point in peerage as Earl of Cornwall, and the Despencers, the Earl of Winchester, who was Edward II’s chief advisor, and his son, which led to Edward II’s being overthrown by the discontented barons (Schultz 57-8; Myers 16-8; McKisack 2-102). Equally, Richard II’s reign saw executed advisors and baronial

confiscation as a revenge, which also led to his deposition (Schultz 62-3; McKisack 451-62, 488-93). Thus, the shows of physical power between the courtiers and the old nobility could drag the kingdom into political turmoil. This has also been depicted in contemporary satires. For instance, Langland in his *Piers Plowman* compares the courtiers and the nobility to rats and mice who, if not controlled by a sovereign, would “rende” and “destruye” the country into pieces (Prologue 146-209).

However, it was not until the 15th century that the court as an institution, hence, the courtiers and the nobility, were attacked heavily. This was also rooted in the fact that the word “courtier” as *curialis* was used for the first time in that period (Morgan 68). William Caxton (ca. 1415-1492) was not only the first to introduce the printing press in 1476 but he also was among the first persons to criticise the court. For instance, he defined the courtiers as a “threat” (qtd. in Morgan 69) to stability in his appendixes to the editions of Lydgate’s *The Horse, Sheep and Goose* (1475-6). Caxton extended his criticism through his translation of Chartier’s *The Curial* (1483) which maintained that “[t]he court, to the end that thou understand it, is a convent of people under fantasy of common weal, assemble them together for to deceive each other [...] For among us of the court we be merchant and newfangle that we buy the other people. And sometime for their money we sell to them our humanity precious. We buy other, and other buy us” (qtd. in Morgan 69).

Gradually, criticism towards the court in literary satires grew in number, starting especially with the Tudor period. John Skelton, as a member of the household of Henry VII and Henry VIII, criticised the court in many of his dramatic and verse satires, to name a few, such as, *The Bowge of Court* (1498-99), *Magnificence* (1515-6), and *Why Come Ye Not to Court?* (1522). In *Magnificence*, for instance, the “largeffe” (25), the generosity, of the monarch is tried to be abused by the courtier-like allegorical characters Fanfy and Felycyte who illustrated the public image of the materialism of the courtiers and the nobility in the court.

¹⁵ Apart from criticisms directed at the court, the “War of the Theatres” between the years 1599 and 1602 where playwrights directed satire against each other (Schelling 481-8) and the religiously oriented pamphlet war between Puritans, Anglicans and Catholics (Collinson, “Ecclesiastical” 159-169; Black 201-2; Bayne 57; Guy, “Elizabethan Establishment” 129), were important in foregrounding social criticism in the last decade of the Elizabethan reign.

¹⁶ In poetry, there were several means to criticise the court, but the pastoral as a distant setting emerged as a commonplace reference point in order to criticise the falsehood of the court by comparing and contrasting the pastoral and the court. Based on the Roman tradition of satire (Long, *Epicurus* 179; Fredericks 157), Elizabethan satirists criticised the urban life of the court from an artistic distance through the pastoral setting of their works. For instance, although Edmund Spenser intended his *Faerie Qveene* (1590, 1596) to praise Elizabeth I as the “goddess” (*SC*, “Aprill” 96-9), the “Great Lady of the Greatest Isle” (*FQ* 1.Proem.30), like most of the courtiers towards the end of her reign, he felt dissatisfied with what he got for his attempts for achievement. Spenser felt mistreated for his efforts in composing the *Faerie Qveene* exemplified with the poet nailed on his tongue before Mercilla’s castle (*FQ* 5.9.217-34) and the Blatant Beast who is usually considered as the personification of backbiting that could harm a courtier (*FQ* 6.12.343-51). Likewise, Spenser contemplates in the “October Eclogue” on the pangs of “poetic creativity” (Seber 144), that is, the dichotomy between artistic achievement and the gain from this achievement. In the debate between Piers and Cuddie, the clash between optimistic idealism, “the glory eke much greater then the gayne” (*SC*, “October” 20) and pessimistic materialism, “little good hath got, and much lesse gayne” (*SC*, “October” 10) could be seen. Here, although through lyric literature one can elevate himself according to Neoplatonism, “loue does teach him climbe so hie,” (*SC*, “October” 91), Cuddie, the *pastor*

infelix, cannot be persuaded by Hobbinol, the *pastor felix*, to follow literature solely for art's sake as he fears persecution, which is why he excludes himself to a "humble shade" where he "may safely charme" (SC, "October" 117-8) from both materialistic and social difficulties, which is another reason why Spenser used the historically distant setting of King Arthur's time in his *Fearie Qveene* as he perceived it "furthest from the daunger of enuy, and suspition of present time" (Spenser, "A Letter" 167, their italics). Thus, Spenser used the distant pastoral setting of King Arthur's time in order to be able to criticise the wrongdoings in the Elizabethan court.

Furthermore, apart from Spenser, Anthony Munday and John Donne were other prominent literati who attacked the corruption at the court. In his pastoral poem "The Woodman's Walk," Munday, for example, portrayed the court as a place of falseness where material ambition would only bring further distress. He maintains that "[...] falsehoods sat in fairest looks / And friend to friend was coy; / Court favour fill'd but empty books / And there I found no joy" (21-4). Likewise John Donne muses on the falseness of the court and depicts the courtiers "prone" to materialistic interests. For him, they are the incarnations of the Seven Deadly Sins. According to his "Satire IV: The Court" (1597), courtiers are "[a]s prone to all ill, and of good as forget- / full, as proud, as lustful, and as much in debt, / As vain, as witless, and as false as they / Which dwell at Court, for once going that way" (13-16). Thus, art in the form of verse satire was politicised and used as a means to criticise the court.

¹⁷ In the form of pamphlets, letters and proto-novels, Elizabethan satirists criticised the court and the courtiers for their moral corruption. For instance, Sir Walter Raleigh wrote in one of his letters: "Go tell the court it glows and shines like rotten wood." (qtd. in Weir *Elizabeth* 255). Similarly, Greene in 1592 in his *Quip for an Upstart Courtier* criticised the meritocracy represented by Velvet Breeches, but was in favour of the ancient nobility represented by Cloth Breeches. Likewise, Thomas Nashe in his picaresque novel, *The Vnfortunate Traveller: Or The Life of Jacke Wilton* (1594), focused on the corruption of the courtiers. He used the historically distant setting of the court of Henry VIII and foreign wars in order to direct his criticism towards the court without being punished. For example, in a sarcastic manner, he lists vices that would make a person "as perfect as any courtier." Nashe says,

[a]s before I laid open vnto him the briefe summe of the seruice, so now I began to vrge the honourableness of it, and what a rare thing it was to be a right polititian, how much esteemd of Kings & princes, and how diuerse of meane Parentage haue come to be Monarchs by it. Then I discourst of the quallities and properties of him in euery respect, how like the Woolfe, he must drawe the breath from a man long before he bee seen, how, like a Hare he must sleepe with his eyes open, how as the Eagle in his flying casts dust in the eyes of Crowes and other Fowles, for to blinde them, so hee must cast dust in the eyes of his enemies, delude their sight by one meanes or other, that they diue not into his subtleties ; howe hee must be familiar with all, and trust none, drinke, carouse, and lecher with him out of whom he hopes to wring any matter; sweare and forswear, rather than be suspected, and, in a word, haue the Art of dissembling at his fingers ends as perfect as any Courtier. (*Vnfortunate* 17)

¹⁸ Accordingly, even the relatively small time span provided by the Henslowe diaries between 1598 and 1602 show that half of the plays registered, 123 in total, were history plays (Wasson iv).

¹⁹ Also see the following: Kernan 264, 359; Prior 128; Charlton 23-9, 138-86.

²⁰ Also see the following: Goy-Blanquet, “Elizabethan” 58, 67-8; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 36, 43-4, 52-3; Hampton 33.

²¹ Also see the following: Greenblatt, *Will* 78-81; Montrose, *Purpose* 87.

²² Also see the following: Tillyard, *History* 32, 39; Campbell, *Histories* 60-5; Prior 16; Goy-Blanquet, “Elizabethan” 62.

²³ For a detailed analysis of the characters in Shakespeare’s history plays, consult Uzmen’s *Shakespeare’in Tarih Oyunlari*.

²⁴ Also see the following: Kastan, “History” 167, 170-1; Campbell, *Histories* 60-5; Collingwood 57-8; Goy-Blanquet, “Elizabethan” 62.

²⁵ Throughout the dissertation, in parenthetical references Shakespeare’s plays will be abbreviated as follows: *Henry VI Part 1* (1HVI), *Henry VI Part 2* (2HVI), *Henry VI Part 3* (3HVI), *Richard III* (RIII), *King John* (KJ), *Richard II* (RII), *Henry IV Part 1* (1HIV), *Henry IV Part 2* (2HIV), and *Henry V* (HV)

²⁶ Also see the following: Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271; Williams 325.

²⁷ Also see the following: Hammer 88; Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271.

²⁸ Also see the following: Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 156-7, 167; Manley, “Strange’s” 276-9.

²⁹ Also see the following: Williams 364-5; Adams 34-5; Loades, *Politics* 306.

³⁰ Therefore, it is no coincidence that Shakespeare focuses on the theme of decadence and civil war in his first tetralogy. Hadfield gives Lucan’s *Pharsalia*, translated by Marlowe, as a “model” for Shakespeare’s plays about civil war. Accordingly, Hadfield states that “[t]he degeneration of the Roman republic from a thriving and egalitarian body politic of citizens into a fractious and unstable worlds in which the strongest and most ambitious fight for control serves as a model for England during the bloody civil wars known as the Wars of the Roses. The three *Henry VI* plays – as well as *Richard III* – are Shakespeare’s *Pharsalia*” (*Republicanism* 105).

³¹ Also see the following: Adams 34-5; Montrose, *Subject* 155-9; Loades, *Politics* 306.

³² The term “satiric catharsis” is borrowed from Birney’s work, which she primarily based on Randolph’s ideas (Birney 2-3). Accordingly, Birney maintained that satiric catharsis had a dual function and could lead to change or reform according to its use or “suppression” (ix-x, 10-1). “The authorial satirist can work toward curing the actual world by preventing catharsis in his play, or he can effect mimetic cure by causing catharsis” (17). Birney was right in her assertions that “the desire to change the temporal order” after having been “dangerously incited to radical criticism” could be released through “satiric catharsis” which would “purge the audience of these disturbing emotions” (10-1). Yet, the main problematics of her formulations lied in her use of Elliott’s surmisal that satire originated from a rather Juvenalian mode (Birney 1-2, 10). For Birney, satire equaled to the satirist’s singular point of view that was coupled with “forcefulness” and “hatred” (1-2, 10). Birney’s hypothesis reduced satire to Juvenalian satire

and disregarded other modes of satire including Menippean satire. Therefore, while Birney's ideas regarding satiric catharsis with its dual function is acknowledged, her reductive ideas about satirical modes will be disregarded throughout the dissertation.

³³ Also see the following: Harrison, *Second* 252, 287, 299, 302; Harrison, *Last* 21, 41-2, 56-7.

³⁴ For arguments that incorrectly assert that aristocrats are favourites, also see the following: Lodes, *Tudor* 165-6; Williams 372, 375; Haigh 102.

³⁵ Also see the following: (Harrison, *Second* 109, 252, 287, 299, 302; Harrison, *Last* 21, 41-2, 56-7).

³⁶ Also see the following: Bagley 66; Manley, "Strange's" 276-7; Canino 190.

³⁷ Also see the following: Loades, *Politics* 297; Loades, *Tudor* 89; James 309.

³⁸ Also see the following: Mack 296; Loades, *Tudor* 86; Shepard 1-3, 10-1; Walker 39-40.

³⁹ Also see the following: Williams 397; Montrose, *Purpose* 48-9, 56.

⁴⁰ Also see the following: Williams 411-2; Chambers, *Elizabethan Stage* 3:158; Wickham 85.

⁴¹ Also see the following: Hattaway, *Elizabethan* 52; Brennan 5; Mulryne and Shewring 21.

⁴² Also see the following: Hammer 54, 199-200, 203, 350-1, 381; Harrison, *Second* 262.

⁴³ Also see the following: Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 276.

⁴⁴ Also see the following: Hoenselaars 142; Slotkin 14; Besnault and Bitot 114; Rossiter 140.

⁴⁵ See Foucault, Michel. "Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias." *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité* 5 (1984): 46-49. *Foucault.Info*. Web. 29 January 2014.

⁴⁶ The scene was narrated by Hall as follows: "At the laft he came out of his chambre, and yet not doune to them, but in a galary ouer them with a bishop on euery hande of hym, where thei beneth might fe hym and speke to hym, as thoughe he woulde not yet come nere them til he wift what they meante" (ii.xxiii^r-xxiii^v). Interestingly enough, the clergymen in the scene were omitted in Holinshed (3:731).

⁴⁷ Also see the following: Black, "Counterfeits" 378-80; Sicherman 518.

⁴⁸ Also see the following: Siegel, "Shakespeare" 40; Watson 76-91; Haydn 555-98.

⁴⁹ Also see the following: Barker 302-3; McCoy, *Rites* 3.

⁵⁰ See the following: Adams 34-5; Williams 364-5; Black, *Reign* 406-11; Montrose, *Subject* 155-9; Loades, *Politics* 306.

⁵¹ Also see the following: Manley, "Strange's" 277-81; Canino 189-90.

⁵² Also see the following: Coward 146; Bagley 66.

⁵³ Also see the following: Kermode 77; Beer 9; Hammer 354-5; Manning 55-7; Doran 69-70.

⁵⁴ Also see the following: Gajda, *Earl* 27-31; McCoy, *Rites* 79-102; Williams 356-9.

⁵⁵ Also see the following: Hadfield, *Republicanism* 17; Collinson, *Elizabethans* 55.

⁵⁶ Also see the following: Haigh, *Elizabeth* 86-8, 92; Weir, *Elizabeth* 257; Dickinson 97. The use of such an image could be further observed, for instance, on The Second Grand Seal of Elizabeth I used from 1586 until her death which depicted her seated on the one side, and mounted on a horse like a warrior, albeit a female one, on the other side (Montrose, *Subject* 180-1; Strong, *Gloriana* 111).

⁵⁷ Also see the following: Tillyard, *History* 9, 24; Collingwood 53; Kastan, “English History” 167.

⁵⁸ Also see the following: Smith, *Common-vvelth* B3^r; Merbury 40-1; Nisbet A1^v, A4^v, 4; Mulcaster 243.

⁵⁹ Also see the following: Walsham 16; Spiekerman 7; Prior 14-5.

⁶⁰ This was further problematised through the emergence of centralised authority and the breach with the Catholic Church in the post-Reformation period. Having no ties with the Pope or any other power that was above the earthly monarch made it difficult to remove a misgovernment in a lawfully accepted way. As Prior maintains, “[s]ince an absolute national monarch recognized no ‘higher power’ or ‘overlord’ who might lawfully command the removal of a bad king, and since monarchy was not by election and any demand from the people was viewed as the ultimate danger to civil order, there could be no lawful way of removing a tyrant” (126). Hence, the monarch became a *homo sacer* (Agamben 15) upon “providentialist doctrine[s]” which were the sources that eventually protected and “legitimated the Elizabethan state and the personality-cult that exalted the Queen” (Montrose, *Purpose* 88-9). Thereby, action against the wrongdoing monarch was equated with lack of religious devotion and the breach of order. Accordingly, “[n]o one who actually loved and feared God would allow himself to rebel against an anointed ruler” (Greenblatt, “Invisible” 25), which was why “[t]hose who advocated, or appear to advocate, ‘subversion, Realpolitik, and revolution’—whether in print or in action—were guilty of sedition and were frequently deemed to be satanic agents” (Montrose, *Purpose* 89). Therefore, Elizabeth I as a monarch was politically untouchable; her immunity was based on a tradition of political discourse that was shaped by providentialist emphases on order that left no room for the removal of misbehaving monarchs.

⁶¹ Also see the following: Cressy, *Dangerous* 39; Laurence 9, 43; Inwood 289-90.

⁶² For a detailed account on the specific dates the following can be examined: 13th of August 1591 (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 47-8), 27th of August 1592 (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 157), 6th of October 1595 (Harrison, *Second* 50), 12th of November 1595 (Harrison, *Second* 59-60), 6th of June 1596 (Harrison, *Second* 104-5), 31st of October 1596 (Harrison, *Second* 147), 7th of November 1596 (Harrison, *Second* 150), 9th of May 1597 (Harrison, *Second* 186), 27th of October 1597 (Harrison, *Second* 219), 30th of October 1597 (Harrison, *Second* 221), 31st of October 1597 (Harrison, *Second* 221-2), 1st of August 1599 (Harrison, *Last* 29-30), 7th of August 1599 (Harrison, *Last* 32), 8th of August 1599 (Harrison, *Last* 32-3), 7th of October 1599 (Harrison, *Last* 44-5).

⁶³ In Hall's chronicle, it was emphasised that domestic strife weakened the country in foreign affairs (cv^v).

⁶⁴ Also see the following: Grafton 330-42; Nelson, *Device* 3-7; *Jack Straw* A3^f-F3^f; Şahiner, "Re-Reading" 85-7.

⁶⁵ The negative attitude towards, especially, popular uprisings, was also related to the fact that in a deferential society, members of the lower classes were looked down upon in line with the Chain of Beings and humoral imagery. The differentiation of the "head and body of the realm of England" (Smith, *Common-vvelth* H2^v) and functions of certain social strata, were further elaborated by many, such as, John Jones who in his *The Art and Science of Preserving the Bodie and Soule* (1579) maintained that "the Queenes proceedings" in her government were maintained by "[t]he hands" which "minister eche member, the feet ferue all the body, and the heade gouerneth all the motions in a meane" (56). Accordingly, superior faculties, like the "intellect," were located at the superior sphere of the head, whereas those considered to be of lower faculties like body parts for urinating or defecating, were located in the lower part of the body (Sherman 107-8; Tillyard, *World* 91; Sharpe 128). This hierarchical perception of the body natural was also used in describing the status of members from different social levels. In accordance with the hierarchies about men over women, the father over the family, the elderly over the young, the master over the servant, the patron over the patroness and the higher classes over the lower classes, the superiors were regarded to have superior physical and mental faculties whereas the inferiors were regarded to lack such faculties. That was why, dissenting commoners were perceived as a mindless mob who would follow anyone whom they perceived to be superior or who persuaded them. In particular, commoners were depicted as an angry "multitude" directed as easily as a "feather [...] lightly blown to and fro" (2HVI 4.8.55-6), and would, eventually, choose the status quo, as depicted in chronicle histories (Hall clx^v-clxi^f). No matter how Cade would urge them to think on their "ancient / Freedom" and the present "slavery" where the "nobility" would "break [their] backs with burdens" (2HVI 4.8.20-32), the commoners were to prefer security and "money" provided by the status quo (2HVI 4.8.44-52). The stupidity of the commoners did not just create comic effect where a group of people went from one part of the stage to the other, but was also reflective of the relative lack of education, as paradiastolically vindicated by Cade (2HVI 4.7.28-37), of those involved in the rebellion. Giving voice to socially excluded groups was used to analyse and then correct them rather than preserve them as disorderly groups. Just like in the last speeches of convicts who were to be executed, the voicing of dissent was to be used to reaffirm the status quo. For instance, when 2HVI was performed around 1591, William Hackett's last speech where he "was exhorted to ask God and the Queen for pardon, and to fall to his prayers" but instead "began to rail and curse her Majesty," "angered" the "people" and the "magistrates" were once more convinced that Hackett deserved his verdict (Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 46). Hence, any subversion or heterodoxy was used in order to confirm the orthodoxy (Greenblatt, "Invisible" 35-7), that is, Jack Cade's proto-socialist rebellion failed, once again on the stage and the page, in order to confirm the maintenance of order, and, indirectly, the maintenance of the Elizabethan government.

⁶⁶ Also see the following: Prior 123-4; Spiekerman 7-8; Collingwood 53; Smith, *Common-vvelth* B3^f; Merbury 40-1.

⁶⁷ 1st Quarto (I1^v), 2nd Quarto (I1^v-I2^f), 3rd Quarto (I1^v-I2^f).

⁶⁸ 1st Quarto (H3^v), 2nd Quarto (H2^v), 3rd Quarto (H2^v).

⁶⁹ For courtiers who advised Essex to dissemble see the following: Gajda, *Earl* 190; Camden 189-90; Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 276.

⁷⁰ Also see the following: Gajda, *Earl* 190; Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 276; Harrison, *Second* 139-40, 281-2.

⁷¹ For details, see the following: Aquinas 18; Salisbury 191, bk. 8, ch. 17; Cranmer, *Certain Sermons* N4^r, O2^v; Smith, *Common-velth* B3^r; *Homilie Against* B2^v; Merbury 40-1; Holinshed 3:A3^v.

⁷² For the ineffectiveness of proclamations regarding sumptuary laws see: Hazard, *Elizabethan Silent* 107-8.

⁷³ In this vein, one of the first Early Modern works using classical sources in order to approve tyrannicide was Salutati's *De tyranno* (15th century), which saw tyranny not from a providentialist perspective but from a "secular" one (Prior 124). Salutati differentiated between tyranny in succession by usurpation and tyranny in rule and gave importance to the "lawful[ness]" of tyrannicide and that the usurper might, in time, become a "lawful ruler" (qtd. in Prior 124). Yet, again, even Salutati did not give precise "procedures" to dispatch a tyrant, which shows the difficulty of fighting against the oppression of autocratic rule (Prior 124-5).

⁷⁴ Also see the following: Patrizi 3^r-5^v; Goslicius 27-8; Barston B1^{r-v}, 3^r, 14^r-15^r, 25^{r-v}, 26^r, 27^r; *Breefe Discourse* 3-6, 14-6; Guazzo 15^{r-v}; *Cyuite and vncyuite Life* 47^v-48^v.

⁷⁵ For a detailed study of the development of English historiography, see Ögütçü, Murat. "Early Modern English Historiography: Providentialism versus New History." *Batı Edebiyatında Tarih: History in Western Literature*. Ed. Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu. Ankara UEM (Ürün Yayınları), 2014. 351-378. Print.

⁷⁶ Also see the following: Collingwood 57; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 36, 52-3; Hampton 33; Mack 23, 25, 37-8; Prior 16.

⁷⁷ See, for instance: Hall ccx^r, ccxv^r, cxxvi^r-cxxxvii^v, xxxiii^v-xxxiv^v, ccix^{v-r}.

⁷⁸ Yet, just like in Early Modern resistance theory in general, Tacitism was used not only by republicans but also by those who favoured the status quo to claim that the Elizabethan regime was "a Monarchie governed popularlie," that people should be "true servant[s] to the Queen" and care for the well-being of the society, that is, for "*bonus civis*" (Peltonen, "Citizenship" 93, 103-4; Hadfield, *Republicanism* 28, 44; Gajda, "Tacitus" 266; Case 98-101, bk. 2, ch. 1; Beacon 81, bk. 3, ch. 6). Apart from re-readings of Neo-Tacitean works in a conformist way, censorship mechanisms also affected the encoding of resistance literature in a covert way. Post-Armada censorship that targeted, especially, works of history and theory that dealt with politically sensitive matters, such as political decision-making, (Williams 411-2; Chambers, *Elizabethan* 3:158; Wickham 85; Weiß 189; Dutton, *Mastering* 2-4, 51), necessitated such ambiguous writing. Such covert writing, however, did not just help to protect activists, relatively, from persecution, but enabled the dissemination of their ideas regarding non-monarchical rule and tyrannicide at least after some period of time.

⁷⁹ Also see the following: Gurr, *Playgoing* 87, 139; Charlton 23-9, 138-86.

⁸⁰ Also see the following: Strong, *The Cult* 48; Montrose, *Subject* 219.

⁸¹ Also see the following: Loades, *Power* 113; Williams 125-6; Dickinson 96-7; Greenblatt, “Invisible” 64; Montrose, *Subject* 5.

⁸² For details, see: *RIII* 3.2.63-70, 3.3.1-26, 3.4.59-107, 3.5.18-23, 4.3.1-22, 4.4.506-16, 5.1.1-29.

⁸³ In the Elizabethan Period, the use of prisons, torture, execution and the display of these tried to withhold disorderly behaviour as Repressive State Apparatuses (Althusser 142-5). Through the beheading and later impaling of heads on the Tower walls or on the London Bridge, or the presence of gallows, the Tyburn Tree and the towering image of the Tower of London (Forgeng 38) a “panoptic arrangement” of how disorder would be punished was created (Foucault, *Discipline* 34, 49, 58-60, 201, 209; Girard, *Violence* 20-38, 287; Hazard, *Elizabethan Silent* 229). The very success of this form of containment lied in the fact that punishment was impersonal and almost omnipresent through the fears triggered by memories and the physical spots present in everyday life about the methods of disciplining (Foucault, *Discipline* 59-60, 110-1, 130, 201). The dramatic rather than narrative depiction of the tyrant in action using such Repressive State Apparatuses, therefore, enabled to make tyranny and its power through repression and fear more tangible.

⁸⁴ In the play, it was interesting that Buckingham was the only person whom Richard III named a “traitor” (*RIII* 4.4.516). It was more interesting that Richmond, at the end of the play, did not refrain from calling any criticism towards the newly established Tudor rule as “treason” (*RIII* 5.5.39, 5.5.22).

⁸⁵ Also see the following: Montrose, *Purpose* 68-75, 103-4; Deiter 100.

⁸⁶ Although it could be stated that to depict Richard III as a tyrant was a “commonplace” within the established Tudor frame of mind (McGrail 47; Prior 136; Legatt 52; Shaughnessy 117), Shakespeare’s adaptation of chronicle material and former plays differentiated itself by a detailed account on the motives and procedures of Richard III’s behaviours as a tyrant. Richard III and the theme of tyranny was dealt with before in narrative and dramatic form. As for first, in the 1563 edition of *Myrrovr for Magistrates* Richard III confessed his sins of “tiranny and treafon” which got their “iult rewarde” (cliii^v). As for the latter, Legge’s *Richardus tertius* (1580) showed England ruled by the “Furor,” “Madness,” of the “tyrant” (Action 3.Prologue 202-3) and the anonymous *True Tragedy of Richard III* (c. 1590) depicted Richard III as “[a] man ill fhaped, crooked backed, lame armed, withal, / Valiantly minded, but tyrannous in authoritie” (A3^v). The physiognomic traits of Richard III formulated in chronicles of this “[cruel] tiraunt” (Hall ii.i^{v-t}), which were recently partly proven by archaeological findings that discovered that Richard III had “severe scoliosis rendering one shoulder higher than the other” (King and Schürer par. 5), were of pivotal importance in the Elizabethan Period for understanding evil in a concrete way. As Crawford maintains, “physiognomy” could be analysed to “determine from a given bodily form the state of the soul [...] transparent to the error, or righteousness, of its conscience” (19). That was why Richard’s birth as “an undigested and deformed lump,” “born with teeth,” and a “crook’d” shape manifested his “crook’d [...] mind” and behaviours through fratricide, homicide and infanticide (*3HVI* 5.6.35-93; *RIII* 1.1.1-40, 3.2.63-70, 3.3.1-26, 3.4.59-107, 3.5.18-23, 4.3.1-22, 4.4.506-16). Therefore, Shakespeare’s much more detailed account of Richard III as a tyrant in action had two major effects. First, to scrutinise the reasons for Richard III’s tyranny in the new history sense enabled a thorough analysis of the failings of a government that were marked by the use of “power” in a “selfishly” manner rather than “the welfare of the commonwealth” (Prior 122). Second, the crooked image

and the crooked deeds of the tyrant who could fool everyone around him concretised tyranny for the Elizabethan playgoers and readers.

⁸⁷ Also see the following: Canino 189; Warner 231; Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 156-7, 167.

⁸⁸ Also see the following: Williams 342-3; Collinson, *Richard* 174-5; McGinnis 169.

⁸⁹ Also see the following: Harrison, *An Elizabethan* 167; Wagner 65; Pearson, *Edward* 49, 56-7; Nelson, *Adversary* 319-20, 330-5, 343, 352-98.

⁹⁰ Also see the following: Williams 364-5, 373; Haigh, *Elizabeth* 102; Black, *Reign* 208.

⁹¹ Also see the following: Loades, *Tudor* 165; Williams 342.

⁹² Also see the following: Nicholls and Williams 24, 31; Adams 26; Hurstfield 137-62; Loades, *Politics* 306.

⁹³ For details, see the following: Hawkyard, Starkey and Dutton 271; Haigh, *Elizabeth* 101; Black, *Reign* 408-9; Williams 160-2, 203, 228, 357-60; Guy, "Tudor Age" 264, 309-17; Connolly 233.

⁹⁴ For details, see the following: Adams 34-5; Williams 364-5; Black, *Reign* 406-11; Montrose, *Subject* 155-9; Loades, *Politics* 306.

⁹⁵ Also see the following: Forgeng 31; Black, *Reign* 217-8; Hurstfield 44; Perry 5; Hadfield, *Politics* 24.

⁹⁶ The fact that Shakespeare portrayed Warwick first in a negative light when he was a Yorkist, seen when he constantly broke his vows and fled, and then in a positive light when he was finally a supporter of the Lancastrian cause (Canino 103, 123), made his fall at the height of the Elizabethan reader's sympathies for him more tragic. Similar to Warwick's premortem anagnorisis, following the deaths of Rivers, Vaughan and Grey (*RIII* 3.3.1-26), Hastings both delighted in their fall (*RIII* 3.2.96-102), and pointed out that "men [...] who think themselves as safe" in court should beware themselves (*RIII* 3.2.63-70). The situational irony that was created after the death of Hastings foregrounded that factionalist struggles might blind courtiers from perceiving that the fickleness of court fortune was not idiosyncratic but a general phenomenon.

⁹⁷ Although the relationship of the queens to Henry VI and Edward IV could only analogically indicate the dependency of the patroness on the patron, a more concrete example for the fall of patronesses might be observed in Shakespeare's *RII*. There, Richard II's minions were killed by the monarch's adversaries. In particular, Richard II's minions were aware of the fact that they would be the first targets of the angry nobility and commoners when their patron would lose his power. As Green maintained, "our nearness to the King in love / Is near the hate of those love not the King" for which the commoners would "tear" them "all to pieces" (*RII* 2.2.123-38). The fortune of the patronesses were dependent on the fortune of their patrons who was, thereby, responsible not only for his but also for their fall in any crisis situation.

⁹⁸ Also see the following: Williams 342-3; Collinson, *Richard* 174-5; McGinnis 169.

⁹⁹ Similar to the off-stage resentment, the quarto editions of *IHV* were published between the years 1598 and 1599, during which Elizabethan readers could read, and perceive, once again,

the exclusion of Shakespeare's Hotspur, Northumberland and Worcester from Henry IV's favour that drove them to revolt against him. Hotspur, Northumberland and Worcester's "noble plot" of a Scottish-aided revolt would be used to "be revenged on" Henry IV's discriminating policies (*IHIV* 1.3.256-86). According to Holinshed, the Percys "charged" Henry IV, basically, to act "contrarie to his promife[s]" (3:523), which Shakespeare's Earl of Worcester emphasised through his assertion that the reason for their dissent was that they were cut from the favour of Henry IV whom they had helped to power. As Worcester stated, he, his brother Northumberland and his son Hotspur Percy "were the first and dearest [...] friends" of the now Henry IV and the then Bolingbroke (*IHIV* 5.1.33). Yet, Henry IV forgot his "oath" and their help and "did oppress" them (*IHIV* 5.1.58-71). Taking into consideration that the rebels were the ones who helped Henry IV to usurp the throne (Prior 66), it was difficult to claim high ideals for or against the rebellion depicted in the *1-2HIV* plays. Particularly, "forgetfulness" of previous help was the main point that started a conflict according to both the rebels and the conformists (Baldo 62-5). Yet, there was still the need to maintain a balance. Although Baldo argues that Hotspur on their first encounter with Henry IV in *IHIV* tried to redirect how he defied the king's order to hand over the prisoners, by distracting him with an anecdote about a foppish courtier messenger (Baldo 62-3; *IHIV* 1.3.29-69), the scene was indicative of how Henry IV could not maintain a balance between his royal pleasure and the due reward of his subjects. As Prior puts forth, Henry IV failed because on his way to the throne he depended on mighty subjects while after his ascension he wanted to have absolute power without giving these subjects their due (185), hence, repeating somehow Richard II's mistake of excluding some of the nobility from favour.

¹⁰⁰ For details, see the following: Deiter 13-25, 79-96; Kermode 77; Beer 9; Hammer 354-5; Manning 55-7; Doran 69-70.

¹⁰¹ Also see the following: Gajda, *Earl* 9; Ferguson 73; Strong, *Cult* 146.

¹⁰² Also see the following: Foucault, *Discipline* 33; Laurence 6; Cressy, *Dangerous* 39; Stow 38; Brown and Curnow 17; Parnell, *Book* 16. Furthermore, while there are three references to other places of execution in the first tetralogy, except for references in *RII* (4.1.315, 5.1.2, 5.1.52) and in *Henry VIII* (1.1.207, 1.1.213, 1.2.194, 5.1.106, 5.3.54, 5.3.89, 5.3.93, 5.3.97, 5.4.61), almost all references to the Tower in Shakespeare's works are cumulated in the first tetralogy where it is mentioned 47 times.

¹⁰³ Also see the following: Denny 317; Starkey 579-81; Weir, *Six* 475; Taylor 184.

¹⁰⁴ Moreover, apart from its significance for future politics, the death of a dissident nobleman was rather a loss of a potential that could be used for the benefit of the state at the present. For instance, Hotspur's death in the battlefield was like a trial by combat in which his death proved him to be on the wrong side of the argument. Hotspur's valour was acknowledged by Hal who called him "brave Percy" whose "body did contain a spirit / A kingdom for it was too small a bound" (*IHIV* 5.4.86-9). His "[i]ll-weaved ambition," however, led to the waste of Hotspur's potential (*IHIV* 5.4.87), in which Hal did not point out the fact that Hotspur and the rest were excluded from Henry IV's favour and therefore dissented. As Baldo observed in Worcester's words, that his "nephew's trespass may be well forgot" because of his "youth and heat of blood" (*IHIV* 5.2.16-7), Hotspur was just remembered in good terms (Baldo 64). Quite similarly, it was reported on the 18th of April 1602 that Dr. Barlow, [...] one of her Majesty's chaplains, received a check at her Majesty's hands because he presumed to come in her presence when she had given special charge to the contrary, because she would not have the memory of the late Earl of Essex renewed by him who had preached against him at Paul's."

(Harrison, *Last* 272). Likewise, when on the 9th of March 1603 Elizabeth I had to pardon Tyrone, she was angry because she thought that “it [was] most dishonourable to pardon a rebel that had made seven years’ war with her, whereas she would not be permitted to spare Essex for one day’s delict; and upon this when she reflects she falleth into great passion, and this also is thought one cause of her sickness” (Harrison, *Last* 320). No matter how the political dead-end required such a compromise to secure at least the Irish front in the conflict with the Spanish who were still fighting in the Low Countries to invade England (Harrison, *Last* 320; Kesselring 197-8; Hayes-McCoy 136), the fact that Essex was executed whereas Tyrone was pardoned, whom Essex fought against in 1599 as a last attempt to secure his position in the government, was ironic. The irony set aside, although Elizabeth I had a wavering impulse regarding her favour and dislike, those incidents showed, at least, some regret for Essex’s downfall and the acknowledgment of the loss of such a potential.

¹⁰⁵ Also see the following: Foucault, *Discipline* 46, 49, 51; Cunningham 209-11; Tennenhouse 13-5; Greenblatt, *Self-fashioning* 201.

¹⁰⁶ Shakespeare’s use of Menippean satire is not restricted to his history plays. His comedies, tragi-comedies, and tragedies also employ Menippean satire. The seeming chaos created by the criticism directed at superiors and inferiors alike is important to confront society with its problems in a holistic way. This holistic manner, on the other hand, provides the basis for being less harsh in the process of social criticism.

In Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (1595), for instance, Menippean satire can be observed in the rehearsals and staging of the metatheatrical *Pyramus and Thisbe* by the artisans led by Bottom. Rather than just following a belittling attitude of faultfinding, Shakespeare’s use of Menippean satire enables him both to make fun of the clumsiness of the artisans and the snobbishness of eagle-eyed critics, the latter of whom are chastised by head of the state, Theseus (1.2.1-104, 3.1.114, 5.1.1-356). Thus, the use of Menippean satire gives Shakespeare the chance to look at problems from several points of view, like in this case regarding drama as a profession.

Furthermore, Shakespeare’s use of Menippean satire in his tragi-comedies reflects the hybrid constitution of these plays that combine the high and the low in subject matter and characterisation. Employing Menippean satire in *The Merchant of Venice* (1596) enables Shakespeare, for instance, both to trigger laughter by complying with racial and sexist stereotypes and criticise society for its lack of empathy for socially inferior groups. Portia as a woman is restricted by patriarchy in her personal choices. She lives in confinement that is in accordance with her death father’s last wish who wants her to marry whoever chooses the correct casket (1.2.20-34). Yet, she is able to circumvent that restriction in guiding Bassanio to choose the right casket and directs her criticism towards patriarchy’s restrictions on the capabilities of women through her successful rhetorical performance while disguised as a lawyer in the court scene (3.2.63-72, 4.1.119-396). Likewise, Shakespeare’s characterisation of Shylock is not two-dimensional because of his use of Menippean satire. Shakespeare illustrates how the majority takes joy in looking down on racial others and how such behaviour patterns that are considered comic by them can be considered tragic if it would happen to these socially superior people (3.1.48-66, 4.1.89-103).

As for tragedy, the rottenness of the Danish court in *Hamlet* (1601), for example, reveals how Shakespeare makes use of Menippean satire. Through this type of satire, Shakespeare does not only criticise the Machiavellian schemes of contemporary politics that are incarnated in Claudius (1.2.1-41, 3.3.36-, 98, 4.3.56-66). Shakespeare also points out the ineffectiveness of the standards of the passing feudal norms that are based on aggressive masculinity, which can

be observed in Hamlet's struggle and failure to fit into these norms as a learned humanist (4.4.31-65). Consequently, it can be argued that Shakespeare's use of Menippean satire is not limited to his history plays. It can be also concluded that the use of satire in Shakespeare's comedies, tragi-comedies, and tragedies provides food for thought for further studies. Answers for questions like what other types of satire can be seen in Shakespeare's plays, to what extent his satire is determined by contemporary incidents, and whether there is a development in the manner of his criticisms, may be found in future analyses of his plays.

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 Student No: N09149146
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