Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Political Science and Public Administration

Political Science Programme

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE FRAMING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG GROUPS IN TURKEY: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY FRAMES, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL VALUES

Ela Serpil EVLİYAOĞLU

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2024

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The jury finds that Ela Serpil EVLIYAOĞLU has on the date of 23.08.2024 successfully passed the defense examination and approves her Master'sThesis titled "An Experimental Study on The Framing of The New Constitution and Social Distance Among Groups in Turkey: Security Versus Liberty Frames, Personality and Political Values".

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18/ 09/ 2024
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Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Prof. Dr. Ali ÇAĞLAR** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

[*İmza*]

Ela Serpil EVLİYAOĞLU

ABSTRACT

EVLİYAOĞLU, Ela Serpil, *An Experimental Study on The Framing of The New Constitution and Social Distance Among Groups in Turkey: Security Versus Liberty Frames, Personality and Political Values,* Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2024.

This study aims to investigate the impact of security and liberty-framed constitutional vignettes on social distance and political tolerance among university students in Türkiye. The research was conducted in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, exploring how concepts of security and liberty influence attitudes toward various social groups. Using experimental manipulation and quantitative analysis, the study measured changes in social distance, tolerance levels, and emotional responses before and after exposure to different framing scenarios.

The findings revealed that the security-framed scenarios led to higher social distance scores toward least-liked groups, indicating that emphasizing security may increase social distance and alienation towards certain groups. However, there was no significant difference in political tolerance levels between the security and liberty frames. Additionally, socio-economic status was found to significantly affect negative emotions, with lower socio-economic status associated with higher levels of negative affect.

This study makes a significant contribution to understanding how political framing impacts social attitudes in a post-crisis context. By examining the effects of security and liberty framing on social distance and tolerance in the wake of a major socio-political event, this research provides valuable insights into the psychological and social dynamics at play. The findings also highlight the role of socio-economic factors in shaping emotional responses, offering important considerations for future research in this area.

Keywords

Tolerance, social distance, values, constitution frames, political knowledge

ÖZET

EVLİYAOĞLU, Ela Serpil, Türkiye'de Yeni Anayasa Çerçeveleri ve Gruplar Arası Toplumsal Uzaklığın Deneysel Bir Çalışması: Güvenlikçi Ya Da Özgürlükçü Çerçeve, Kişilik Özellikleri ve Siyasi Değerler, Yüksek Lisans, Ankara, 2024.

Bu çalışma, güvenlik ve özgürlük temalı anayasa senaryolarının Türkiye'deki üniversite öğrencileri arasında sosyal mesafe ve siyasi tolerans üzerindeki etkisini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma, 2016'daki darbe girişimi sonrası güvenlik ve özgürlük kavramlarının nasıl algılandığını ve bu çerçevelerin sosyal gruplara yönelik tutumlarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Deneysel manipülasyon ve nicel analiz yöntemleri kullanılarak, katılımcıların sosyal mesafe, tolerans düzeyleri ve duygusal tepkilerindeki değişimler, farklı çerçevelere maruz kalmalarından önce ve sonra ölçülmüştür.

Sonuçlar, güvenlik temalı çerçevenin, katılımcılar arasında en az beğenilen gruplara karşı daha yüksek sosyal mesafe puanlarına yol açtığını göstermiştir. Bu bulgu, güvenlik vurgusunun sosyal mesafeyi artırabileceğini ve bazı gruplara karşı daha fazla yabancılaşmaya neden olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak, siyasi tolerans düzeyleri arasında çerçeveler arasında anlamlı bir fark bulunmamıştır. Ayrıca, sosyo-ekonomik durumun negatif duygular üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olduğu, düşük sosyo-ekonomik duruma sahip katılımcıların daha yüksek negatif duygular yaşadığı tespit edilmiştir.

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki önemli bir sosyo-politik olayın ardından siyasi hoşgörü ve sosyal mesafenin nasıl şekillendiğini anlamaya yönelik önemli bir katkı sunmaktadır. Güvenlik ve özgürlük kavramlarının farklı çerçevelerle sunulmasının sosyal tutumlar üzerindeki etkilerini vurgulayan bu araştırma, gelecekteki çalışmalara ışık tutacak niteliktedir ve sosyo-ekonomik faktörlerin duygusal tepkiler üzerindeki rolünü ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Tolerans, toplumsal uzaklık, anayasa çerçevesi, siysi bilgi, değerler

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INTRODUCTION

Civil liberties are considered as crucial elements of maintaining democratic societies and supporting civil liberties for all, including the least-liked groups are classified as one of the indicators of democratic systems (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1979). Even though they are used interchangeably in the European and Turkish context, civil liberties are different from civil rights in the American context in which the measurement scales are developed. The difference lies in the broadest terms that, the prior indicate the freedoms from government that cannot be limited by the government led legislations and are protective the individual from government such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom to assemble, freedom of religion, privacy while the later ensures the equal rights and sustaining anti-discrimination among the society such as right to vote, equal access to education, employment and health services (Çamur, 2017). Among all, freedom of speech is one of the cores and crucial liberties of modern democratic societies. According to poll research in 2003, 97 % of the German citizens found it very important, in the Netherlands, freedom of speech is considered as more important than the social order (Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011).

Each political system has its own ideals and principles they impose and to societies they promoted (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). The diffusion of the democratic ideology leads value consensuses to change. According to democratic theory, the core unit of the system is individual. Individual rights, freedoms, equality, rationality are the emphasized values for democratic systems (Sullivan & Hendriks, 2009). In return, governments are believed to be determinative of common values shared in societies, democratic citizens are expected to hold prerequisites of democratic systems such as liberty, equality and individualism (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The democratic societies have to protect and promote civil rights for all citizens regardless of their religious, political or ethnic orientation (Sullivan & Hendriks, 2009).

Even though they are related terms, social distance and political tolerance differ in their conceptualization. Social distance addresses the level of closeness a person or a group would like to have with another person or group who are different in terms of race, ethnicity, social class, political opinion. Tolerance on the other hand is a degree of willingness to accept and allow outgroup members to perform their rights or liberties, express their opinions even when they contradict with one's own.

It has been seen that external event such as wars, threat, immigration and the personal factors such as degree of prejudice, political sophistication, values of the people have an impact on individuals' decision on preferred social distance to certain groups. For example, after World War II, social distance of Americans to German and Japanese was measured as the highest ever. Also in 1956, during the Cold War, social distance towards Russians, and after 9/11 distance towards Muslims were at the highest while these incidents are less vivid, social distance scores to these groups changed (Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005). Also, after the shootings at the Canadian Parliament in 2014, right-wing ideologies, people with higher intergroup anxiety scored higher degrees of social distance towards Muslims as well higher levels of prejudice and lower out-group trust (Jagayat, Hodson and Turner, 2018).

Tolerance is thought to be a predictive factor for the strength of democracies. Democracies are distinguished from authoritarian regimes by the emphasis they put on the civil liberties such as freedom of speech, free elections, free press, freedom to organize, freedom of expression for all citizens (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). The latest expression is related to political tolerance which means willingness to allow a member of a disliked group to enjoy those rights as well as the individual's self. A study comparing 17 countries' data revealed that political tolerance is highest in the stable democratic systems regardless of their economic situation (Reffley and Rohrschneider, 2003).

Marcus et al. (1995) revealed that there are three main elements that impact people's judgment when faced with a disliked group. The first is personality traits and predispositions, the second one is standing points their values and ideas on the disliked groups and thirdly current influences, threats of new information to shape their ideas (Keum, Hillback, Rojas, Zuniga, Shah, & Mcleod, 2005). When people dislike a group, they tend to classify them as less worthy of toleration. For example, after the attack of a Muslim terrorist group, al Qaeda, on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, in the United States which resulted in the death of 2,977 citizens, the tolerance towards Muslims and Arabs were at the lowest rate (Baker, 2003).

Among various methods to measure political tolerance, vignettes are considered as effective to evoke immediate reaction to the given situations. Vignettes are short stories about a political event that enables concrete scenarios instead of abstract questions and scenarios are widely used to measure political tolerance within the field. The opportunity to use vignettes in experimental settings was considered as a revolution in the research methodology by Sniderman and Grob (1996) (Gibson and Gouws, 2003). However, they are mostly abstract and context-free from the specific situations which prevents successful prediction of the actual opinion and behavior of individuals in a more related situation to the one's socio-political context. General Social Survey (GSS) is an example of context-free scenarios to measure people's attitudes on various topics (Gibson and Gouws, 2003). For example, Gibson (1996) investigated the political tolerance in relation to civil liberties by illustrating a context related frame on the two controversial topics in the United States by the time; the civil rights of Ku Klux Klan and the gay community. Instead of abstract scenarios, vignettes on real controversies were suggested as a more accurate method to approach political tolerance to civil liberties (Gibson, 1996).

Besides being important for democratic societies, civil liberties are prone to be classified as luxuries during crisis times such as wars (Baker, 2003). Under certain circumstances, people tend to sacrifice civil liberties, especially a risk to

security possessed by war or terrorist attacks (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003). For example, a study conducted one month prior and after terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, investigating the social distance to Muslims among non-Muslim communities has revealed a significant increase (Abrams, De Vyver, Houston and Veslijevic, 2017). Another study, conducted after the shootings at the Canadian Parliament on October 22, 2014, revealed similar results, increased prejudice and social distance to Muslims than the previous years (Choma, Jagayat, Hodson and Turner, 2018).

Current study was implemented during the discussions of the new constitution of Türkiye, in which the opposing sides could not agree on the contextual framework of the constitution including civil liberties. During the implementation phase, Türkiye faced a coup attempt on July 15, 2016, that evoked threat perception for the majority of the citizens and created a natural environment to study social distance and tolerance based on liberty-security frames. Therefore, the current study aims to contribute to investigating the social distance and political tolerance of university students by experimental manipulations on the new constitution's frame in the context of promoting security or liberty of the citizens after the coup attempt in Türkiye with relevant variables such as political sophistication, political values, personality traits and emotions.

CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. BACKGROUND OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS

The term "civil liberties" is primarily used in an American context, while in European and Turkish contexts, civil liberties are often interchangeable with civil rights and human rights. Therefore, to provide a better understanding, a brief background of civil liberties and rights will be provided.

In the American context, civil liberties are defined in the first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights. These include freedoms such as freedom of speech, press, to assembly, and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Civil liberties primarily emphasize autonomy rather than equality, serving as limitations on governmental power over individuals (Sullivan and Hendricks, 2009).

Civil rights, on the other hand, aim to provide protection from discrimination based on race, gender, disability, and sexual orientation. The earliest efforts to build civil rights emerged during the American Civil War (1861-1877). The industrially underdeveloped Southern states sought to establish a separate confederation to protect slavery, while the Northern states aimed to limit and abolish slavery and preserve the union. The Civil War concluded with Congress passing two significant amendments: the 14th Amendment, which protects African American citizens from discrimination and slavery, and the 15th Amendment, which grants African-American men the right to vote (Laycock, 1977).

World War I marked another milestone for the American civil rights movement once again based on racial discrimination. Prior to the 1940s, civil rights and civil liberties were used interchangeably however, with the rise of anti-communism

after World War II and during the Cold War Era, a distinction emerged (Lawson, 1991). An influential group sought to protect the rights of African Americans while also limiting the freedoms of communism supporters to safeguard the nation. This period led to the differentiation between civil liberties (freedoms) and civil rights (protections against discrimination). President Harry S. Truman's administration contributed to this distinction by supporting some limitations on freedoms to protect the nation. Consequently, after 1947, civil rights terms were used to guarantee protection against discrimination mostly racial mostly to protect African Americans and their long history of abolishing discrimination, while civil liberties addressed individual freedoms for all citizens (Lawson, 1991).

In contrast, the 46 member states of the Council of Europe use civil rights and civil liberties interchangeably under the umbrella of human rights and freedoms. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, widely known as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), was first signed on November 4, 1950, by 12 member states of the Council of Europe, including Türkiye. Similar to the developments in the United States, European countries also were in need of a protection for human rights to prevent what happened before and during WWII. The ECHR is a legally binding treaty, and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg enforces its provisions. Member states are obligated to abide by the court's decisions, making the ECHR a superior and more binding instrument within the European context compared to other non-binding declarations (Fenwicks, 2002).

In Türkiye, constitutional rights are outlined in the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye. Adopted in 1982, the Turkish Constitution guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to life, personal liberty and security, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, it includes provisions against discrimination and ensures equality before the law. These rights are in line with international human rights standards, reflecting Türkiye's commitment to upholding civil liberties and civil rights within its legal framework.

48 Countries including Türkiye, European countries and the United States signed The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The document is a milestone document that proclaims the inalienable rights to which every human being is entitled, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, language, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. While the UDHR itself is not legally binding, it has been a foundational document influencing global human rights standards and has inspired numerous international treaties, national constitutions, and legal frameworks, including those in Europe and Türkiye. Its principles have been incorporated into binding international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

Even though the majority of the globe agrees that liberties are sacred and cannot be limited under any circumstances, there is theoretical and practical evidence that this is not always the case. When countries are faced with natural disasters, major threats or attacks, people tend to sacrifice some liberties over security. For example, a study investigated the people's opinion on restricting freedoms during Covid-19 pandemic in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States revealed that, %77 of the respondents agreed that they are willing to sacrifice personal liberties (Alsan et al., 2023). However, in depth analysis indicated that disadvantaged individuals in terms of education, income, or race are less willing to support restrictions on freedoms.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States on September 11, 2001, America started to discuss civil liberties, and under which circumstances these liberties should be limited to provide security to the nation. Immediately after the attacks, President George W. Bush aimed to ensure the trust of citizens and demanded they should sacrifice some freedom to preserve

the security around the country (Sullivan and Hendris, 2009). The government discussed that two main civil liberties that can be abused by the terrorist are free press and due process rights (Baker, 2003). They claimed that Al Qaeda has reached the terrorists the ways to use freedoms in the U. S. Related to this, results of the CBS News/New York Times poll conducted two days after 9 / 11 revealed that almost 70 % of the participants agreed that the government should restrict some civil liberties to prevent terrorist activities. However, support for this limitation decreased for specific measurements such as whether the government should be allowed to unwarranted searches or monitoring telephones or emails (Davis, 2007). Also, some research at the time revealed the concern for the government to abuse this power to limit civil rights.

Davis and Silver (2004) conducted a study shortly after September 11, 2001, to investigate people's opinion on preferring security on civil liberties. Results indicated that low trust to government is associated with less willingness to trade off civil liberties to securities. Also, African Americans are found to be less supportive of limiting civil liberties in any level of threat. Prior to 9/11 attacks, according to the results of a public poll company in the United States, in 1997, only 29 % of the respondents were agreed the statement of it is necessary to give up on some civil liberties to protect the country from terrorists while after the 9/11, this rate increased to 50 % (Sullivan and Hendris, 2009).

1.2. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF SOCIAL DISTANCE

The term of social distance was conceptualized by the contributions of Tarde (1903) and Simmel (1908) based on the assumption that the relationships always include nearness and distance (Karakayali, 2017). Williams (1964) defines social distance as the degree of intimacy people would like to have with a member of the out-group (Weaver, 2008) while Emory Bogardus, who developed the widely

used social distance[1] scale defines social distance as the degree of sympathetic understanding between people or groups (Javakhishvili, Schneider, Makashvili and Kochlashvili, 2016). By this, the perception of social distance requires an ingroup and outgroup identification. There are several methods to define distance in social contexts. One of the methods is based on the idea that the people who feel close cognitively would like to be close physically as well. Therefore, the cognitive level in which people are willing to share the same workplace, neighborhood, and form marriage with members of a certain group is considered as an indicator of the accepted distance (Karakayali, 2017).

Development of the widely used scale for social distance was linked to the socio-political atmosphere of the time. Bogardus realized an increased opposition to immigrants in America in the early 20th century. Even though the immigration to the country called first wave immigration started prior to 1880, both early immigrants and long-term citizens were opposed to newcomers after the World War I especially Asians, but specifically Japanese, claiming that they will produce faster and more to take control of the country (Wark and Galliher, 2007). In 1913, in the West Coast of the United States, where Bogardus also lived at the time, a new law stating Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Asian Indian immigrants cannot purchase or lease a land for more than three years was accepted. Even in 1922, the United States Supreme Court decided Japanese people are aliens and cannot be eligible for citizenship which was both a result and reason for increased discrimination and prejudice towards immigrants but mostly to Japanese (Chan 1991).

Emerging from this polarized environment, the first study related to measuring social distance between social groups was conducted by Bogardus (1925) based on the degree to which people would accept the closest relationship with the members of 30 minority groups that Bogardus listed (Bogardus, 1947). The 7 item scale starts with accepting a relationship by marriage and friendship with the

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[1] During Covid-19 pandemic the term social distance has been used to refer to the physical distance. In order not to confuse the term due to the lingusitic usage of the term by the authorities, the term used here refers to distance towards social groups.

outgroup members as the shortest distance and goes to further distance such as being neighbors, working in the same place, allowing them as citizens, allowing them only visiting the country and lastly excluding them from the country. The lower scores represent a high degree of intimacy. In this study, he evaluated the social acceptance level of American university students to 30 racial minority groups, and he then replicated this study every ten years for the period of forty years. The comparison of 40-year results revealed that the overall social distance scores of the university students decreased each decade even though almost each decade a major political event emerged. Bogardus interprets this decrease as expected and even claims this decrease would be higher if WWII, Cold War, Korean War and Great Depression had not happened (Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005).

Following the pioneering study of Bogardus, social distance has been used as one of the indicators of tolerance and prejudice (Javakhishvili, Schneider, Makashvili and Kochlashvili, 2016). During the civil liberties and civil rights debates and Cold War, the results of Stouffer's study (1955) revealed that most of the Americans were not in favor of extending liberties of communists, socialists, and atheists such as free public speech and to have full citizenship rights. And during 1970's and 1980's while the distance towards leftist groups were decreasing, distance towards extreme rights such as Ku Klux and Nazi supporters were rising (Stouffer, 1982). Another study conducted among university students after 9/11 revealed that even though the Muslims and Arabs were rated as the most distant groups, their scores were lower than the distance towards Japanese during WWII, Russians during the Cold War (Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005). Researchers explain this difference with the impact of university education and the diverse environment universities provide to young people.

Parrillo and Donoghue (2013) replicated the classic Bogardus study with new added groups to make it relevant to the changes of American society since the 1970s. Results revealed that among 30 social groups, Arabs and Muslims were

the least liked group as they were in their 2001 study. One of the conspicuous results of the study is that race, gender and birthplace has a significant impact on social distance scores. For all groups, females showed lower social distance scores than males and for 18 of those 30 groups, the difference was significant. Blacks showed significantly lower social distance scores for African Americans, Dominicans, Hispanic/Latinos, Puerto Ricans than White respondents.

Besides American context, a study conducted with the members of 30 tribes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania examined the influence of ingroup - outgroup perceptions on social distance. The results indicated that the social distance is highly related with perceived similarity among tribes and also the physically close tribes are rated as more desirable than the distant ones (Brewer, 1968). The study of Triandis (1964) revealed that some factors are more important for some societies to determine social distance. For example, according to his study, in the United States race is the most important factor while in Germany occupation, religion in Greece (Brewer, 1968).

A study investigating the social distance among Egyptian, Palestinians, Israeli subjects to each other revealed that, they are sharing similar social distance measures from occasional contacts, business relations and having guests in the home and having a close friend in this order (Yuchtman-Yaar & Inbar, 1986). When they are asked to rank their perception on future relationships with the out-group members, Palestinians are less ready to have Israelis as guests in their homes in the future. For Israelis and Egyptians, they again show similar patterns to have occasional contacts in the future as well. An unusual aspect of the study, young people tend to desire more distance in all samples. In another study, social distance towards women immigrants by marriage in Korea among university students revealed that influencing factors for social distance are emotions and socioeconomic status (Young-Ja, Ye-Hwa, 2010). While college students show less social distance towards immigrant women by marriage than any other socio-economic group, also positive and negative emotions are found to be contributing factors to social distance scores.

Besides being affected by external factors such as wars, immigration social distance can be affected by various factors such as perceived threat, group identity and values of the respondents. For example, a study conducted in Türkiye revealed that %57 of social distance scores of Turkish citizens in Şanlıurfa towards Syrian migrants can be explained by anxieties about narrowing job market due to the immigration, concerns on increase in crime rates and integration problems (Erdoğan and Yetkin Aker, 2023). Also, another study revealed the perceived threat of Turks is accountable for 60% of the social distance towards Kurds (Balaban, 2013). A different study conducted in Türkiye investigated the social distance towards ethnicity (Turks - Kurds), religious sects (Sunni - Alevi), and major political parties (AK Party, CHP, MHP, BDP). Results indicated the distance among political party supporters was at the highest (Bilgiç, Koydemir and Akyürek, 2014) and elites indicated higher levels of social distance to BDP, a major Kurdish political party, than the general population. On the other hand, there are studies that present that political activists and elites present lower levels of social distance than the ordinary citizens, referring that political sophistication and rights-based approach for activists may have an impact on social distance levels (Protho & Griggg, 1960).

A research on investigating the social distance and related variables with almost 1000 participants in İstanbul in 2011 measured the attitudes towards ethnic groups, foreigners, religious identities and sexual minorities (Scarboo & Yiğit, 2014). For the research, ethnic groups defined as Turks and Kurds, foreigners as Americans, Arabs, Chineses, Greeks, Iranians, Russians, for religious identities Muslims, Jews, and atheists and lastly for the sexual minority homosexuals are identified. Results of the ethnic groups, two in ten willing to accept Kurds as family members by marriage while almost 8% willing to accept them only tourists to the country. For the foreigners, Americans and Greeks have the highest social distance scores while Arabs has the lowest social distance scores; however, 41% of the participants prefer them as tourists. Results of the religious groups revealed that very few respondents were willing to accept Jews and atheists as a member

to their families by marriage and almost a similar percentage was willing to accept them as close friends. Sexual orientation has the greatest social distance score among all of the categories in the study. More than two-thirds of the respondents chose to exclude homosexuals entirely from the country, fewer than 10% are willing to have close relationships such as being family members by marriage, being close friends and co-workers.

1.3. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Tolerance is defined as "the quality of allowing people to do or believe what they want although you do not agree with it" by the Cambridge Dictionary. Broadly, political tolerance is opposition to state intervention and limits the opportunities of any citizen (Gibson & Bingham, 1982). Widely used in the political concept, tolerance mostly addresses the support of equal access to rights and the liberties of less desired groups (Wang & Chen, 2008). The word for tolerance rooted back to the Latin word Tolerabilis means that which can be endured (Nizah, Jawan, Singh and Ku Samsu, 2015). According to APA Dictionary, tolerance is defined as "acceptance of others whose actions, beliefs, physical capabilities, religion, customs, ethnicity, nationality, and so on differ from one's own." (American Psychological Association, 2018).

Tolerance requires a set of cognitive and operational capabilities which are; theoretical and applicable knowledge on tolerance, tolerant behavior and the advantages of tolerance the second one is methods, techniques that the individual can use to behave tolerantly, and lastly, desire to actively choose tolerance. These steps require a cognitive system as well as necessity, personality characteristics, and personal experience as reinforcers. Also, from the perspective of the social system, people learn from their social environment and exposure to a social environment where the tolerance and related values are enhanced will lead to socially learning tolerance as Vygotsky emphasized (Shyryn, Assem and Zhant, 2013). On the other hand, Marcus et al. (1995) states

that there are three main elements that impact people's judgment when faced with a disliked group. the first is personality traits and predispositions, the second one is standing points their values and ideas on the disliked groups and thirdly current influences, threats of new information to shape their ideas (Keum, Hillback, Rojas, Zuniga, Shah, & Mcleod, 2005). When people dislike a group, they tend to classify them as less worthy of toleration.

Political tolerance differs from social distance with the emphasis on civil rights and liberties whereas social distance is mostly related to existence in the society without emphasis on access to rights (Bilgili, 2015). Also, political tolerance is different from social tolerance while the prior is related to activities people need to tolerate rights of others former refers to degree of allowing certain social activities of opposite groups such as celebrating culturally important dates (Erişen,2016), Tolerance is mostly considered as a core value to democracy and indicator of social cohesion especially in the plural societies (Lee, 2013). As a term tolerance is widely used religiously, psychologically and socially. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) declared the year 1995 as the Year of Tolerance on 16 November 1995, with three values: accepting and respecting the diversity of the world, recognition of universal human rights on the basis that people may vary on the appearances, on ideas and behavior and values and they all deserve to live by their identity, accepting peace as a virtue and prioritizing the peace (Shyryn, Assem and Zhant, 2013). Politically, intolerance may be the cause for social conflicts, rejection of minority rights, approval of discriminatory policies (Erişen and Kentmen-Cin, 2016).

The earliest studies to measure tolerance on civil liberties were conducted in the U. S. population, including Stouffer (1955), Protho & Grigg (1960), Lawrence (1976). These studies focused mostly on the attitudes towards left-wing political movements (Sullivan & Hendriks, 2009) and the rights they evaluated were wide in range, including not only right to assembly and speech but also allowing one group's books in libraries, performing as artists. Protho and Grigg (1960) study

searched for public agreement or disagreement on some general principles of democracy including majority rule, minority rights and right to vote and accepting a Black to hold the office. Even though the results indicated broader levels of tolerance, people tend to implement some exceptions in certain cases. Another pioneering study compared the levels of support to democratic values and tolerance between ordinary citizens and political elites (McClosky, 1964). Results showed that political elites showed more support to democratic values and presented higher levels of tolerance for freedom of speech, right to vote and so on.

The most common element in measuring political tolerance is free speech (Gibson & Bingham, 1982). Stouffer's (1955) study indicated that most Americans were not willing to extend the rights of communists, atheists and socialists to have full rights, speak publicly (Sullivan & Hendriks, 2009). In another study to measure tolerance to Ku Klux Klan (KKK) among the United States citizens, the researchers used media framing with a mock newspaper news to manipulate participants on framing. Their scenarios describe the news on a public rally of the Ku Klux Klan. The public order group listens to a dialogue on how some residents are opposed to free speech and violence occurred and even police involved while the participants of the free speech framing group listened to a dialogue on even though a resident is opposed to the group, he came to hear what the group will say. Results revealed that participants in the letting free speech to KKK framing group showed more tolerance to the target group than the participants in the disruption of public order framing group when free speech is allowed (Nelson, Clawson and Axley, 1997).

Keum et al. (2005) measured the tolerance levels of university students and ordinary citizens. They created fictional news stories on potential civil liberties restrictions following 9/11. After this short introduction, participants were provided four choices: to finish the reading and proceed with the survey or continue to read with three options including tracking and monitoring, search and seizure, or restrictions on speech and assembly with detailed information from the FBI on

the target group. At the end of this part participants would again like to choose to continue to read or proceed to the survey for 8 more times. At the beginning of the experiment participants were asked to identify a disliked and a liked group to be embedded into the stories. Participants randomly assigned to groups with groups framing vs individual framing conditions. Results indicated that participants in the individual framing condition showed lower security concerns than the participant in the group framing condition. For the group preferences, regardless of the individual and group factors, participants were more likely to be tolerant to a group or the individual from the group they liked.

A study conducted in Taiwan on political tolerance revealed that, the ones who are supportive of democratic values are more tolerant to the outgroup members and when the perceived threat increases the intolerance also increases (Marsh, 2005). Future studies should include the information from participants' social media using habits considering the impact of social media networks as the new method for communication. Investigations of the relationship between commitment to democratic norms stated in the abstract and their concrete manifestations, furthermore, generally find that younger and better-educated people demonstrate the most unswerving support for civil liberties of political minorities (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky and Brill, 1983).

In a study researchers prepared four vignettes on the foundation of the Islamic schools separate from the mixed schools, refusal of handshake due to religious reasons, wearing religious clothing at schools and discriminatory speeches of an imam in a mosque (Gieling, Thijs and Verkuyten, 2011). Then, participants were asked what they think the responsible person should decide on the presented matter. The results indicated that framing has an impact on adolescents' judgment of tolerance. In general, Dutch adolescents are found to be less tolerant towards Muslims in any scenario. Oppose to what has been hypothesized, more information on the topics did not have much effect on the tolerance levels of the participants. Also, the framing of the importance of civil liberties and freedom did not have much impact on increasing tolerance to Muslim groups. The researchers

attribute this result to high levels of national identification among Dutch adolescents and their concerns on Islamic culture would undermine their identity. Their data also supports these results that participants with lower identification have higher tolerance towards Muslims. Oppose to what has been hypothesized, more information on the topics did not have much effect on the tolerance levels of the participants. Also, the framing of the importance of civil liberties and freedom did not have much impact on increasing tolerance to Muslim groups. The researchers attribute this result to high levels of national identification among Dutch adolescents and their concerns on Islamic culture would undermine their identity. Their data also supports these results that participants with lower identification have higher tolerance towards Muslims.

In their study, Ramirez and Verkuyten (2011) asked participants political tolerance to extreme right-wing groups and Islamic fundamentalists in the Netherlands on three different media frames as neutral, freedom of speech and public order. The newspaper framings for freedom of speech stressed the importance of freedom of speech and civil liberties while public order is elaborated on the other group. Their responses were evaluated by their values. Results revealed that framing manipulation was successful and participants in the freedom speech group were the more tolerant group among public order and control groups. Also, when values are considered, participants who value civil rights are more prone to indicate higher levels of tolerance, and participants who value security and safety are less tolerant.

The degree of experience on democratic societies has also had an impact on the political tolerance of citizens. Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992) measured the tolerance levels of citizens in former Soviet States. Even though the results indicated higher levels of support to democratic values, when they were asked about the tolerance of the disliked groups, they were found to be intolerant. When Almond and Verba (1963) compared the stable democracies such as the United States and Britain with West Germany, Italy and Mexico as countries with shorter terms with democracy, some differences emerged. Citizens of the United States

and Britain had higher levels of trust to the political institutions, and higher levels of interpersonal trust within their communities. Inglehart (1977) explains the relation with interpersonal trust, trust to the political institutions and tolerance. He suggests that trust to these two elements determine the belief of citizens to lose control when an opposition group has the power in institutions. When they do not trust, they may feel that their rights will be limited, they will not have sufficient control on demanding their rights. When they believe losing an election of political power will not have any effect on their achievement of rights, they will be more satisfied and have higher levels of trust. Connectedly, the low degrees of tolerance among the societies in democratic systems can lead to polarization. Polarization divides countries as ingroup and out-group which also affects attributions to rights (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2018).

There is a growing number of studies regarding the tolerance literature in Türkiye. According to the results of the World Values Survey (WVS), Turkish participants score lower on tolerance related items. Also, Eurobarometer survey on discrimination special edition reveals that Turkish respondents score 9th for the less tolerant results. In a relatively new study, 5 target groups used in the Turkish sample consisted of the minorities in Türkiye: Kurds, Alevis, Armenians, and two Muslim groups one is secular Muslim and other is conservative. In the first experiment, scenarios were renting a flat and giving a job. Results indicated that Sunni Muslims are the most preferred and thrusted group among all for renting a flat or hiring for the job. Religion and education have a relationship with tolerance, meaning that religious people are more tolerant to Kurds while educated ones are less favorable. Secular and educated respondents indicated higher toleration for the Alevis. A third question involving who you would like to work for, revealed interesting results that highly educated people favored Armenian employers with the assumption that Muslim employers would not be as respectful to individual's liberties (Bilgili, 2015). Another study investigated the relation between religiosity, tolerance and values among Turkish respondents between 1995 - 2005 using the WVS data (Yeşilada & Noordijk, 2010). Results indicated increased conservatism over the years on the items of allowance of being neighbors with

homosexuals, drug addicts, immigrants, people with AIDS and people from different races. Religiosity has an important role in increasing intolerance, more religious people are found to be less tolerant towards the target groups. A study conducted in Turkey examined the impact of narratives of elites on distance and polarization. Political polarization opposes camps in terms of political parties while social polarization means the existence of two large groups in the society. According to a study, 61.7 % of the population are reported to believe that society is highly polarized. One reason for the increase of polarization shown as the narratives of the president using us and them language in his speeches.

A study investigated the role of perceived threat and prejudice on tolerance between two general election Turkey had in 2015 by using least-liked approach (Erişen and Erdoğan, 2018). Results revealed that, between June 2015 and November 2015 elections, the tolerance level significantly decreased. The comparison of party affiliation showed that, AK Party supporters perceived significantly higher threat perception from their least liked group than other parties after June 2015 elections and a significant drop has been observed on the same groups perceived threat scores after November 2015. In the same study, the highest ranked disliked groups were atheists, homosexuals, HDP supporters and racists. Also, perceived threats from disliked groups and prejudices against these groups were found to be the strong predictors of intolerance. As perceived threats increased, so did the levels of intolerance toward these groups.

Another study on the social and political tolerance and perceived threat towards in Germany and Netherlands shapes the EU policies on immigration revealed that, perceived threats play a significant role in shaping both political and social tolerance (Erişen and Kentmen-Cin, 2016). The study distinguishes between personal threats (direct threats to an individual's safety and well-being) and sociotropic threats (threats to society or the collective way of life). Both types of threats were found to decrease tolerance, with sociotropic threats having a particularly strong impact. In Germany, the presence of a Muslim cue increased political intolerance, whereas in the Netherlands, it decreased intolerance. This

difference is attributed to the distinct historical and cultural contexts of the two countries, including their approaches to multiculturalism and citizenship.

Apart from the structure of the states, individual factors with socio-economic demographics are found to be related to tolerance have been listed by several theorists. According to Adorno et al. (1950) these factors can be listed as education, the degree of dogmatism and authoritarianism, belief in democratic values such as free speech. There are studies that indicate the group selection on content-controlled research has an impact on the individual factors while studying tolerance. For example, Sullivan et al. (1982) indicated that less-educated people are more threatened by left-wing groups. Also, there are studies that examine the role of personality traits on political tolerance. For example, co-existence of authoritarianism, ambiguity, dogmatism (Adorno et al., 1950) found to be related to the levels of tolerance.

In general, six variables are defined because of research to predict the level of tolerance (Sullivan & Marcus, 1982). These are threat perceptions from the outgroup members, the degree of appreciation to democratic values, feeling insecure psychologically, conservatism, demographic variables such as socioeconomic status, and postmaterialism (Gibson & Duch, 1993):

Democratic values: Although accepted as a separate term, political tolerance is also considered as an applied democratic value meaning that it is far from being abstract but closely related to daily practices within the society. Threat perception: Assessment of potential danger and can be affected by imaginary, fictional, prejudices or the actual events that possess a threat to the integrity of the social group that individual belongs to. Psychological insecurity: Related to low self-esteem as a group and diminished cognitive capacity that prevents people from seeing different angles and leads to preserving the status quo. This factor is also related to threat perception and idea of the enemies. Political conservatism: Even though the relationship between conservatism and

intolerance has been well documented, there are still controversies. In the broader term, conservatism is related with the desire to protect the status quo and not willing to political changes. Postmaterialism: The concept associated with higher desires for individual autonomy, self-expression. Demographics: Variety of elements including political interests, age, gender, level of education, membership to any civic or political organization, religiosity has been found to be related to degree of tolerance.

For the current study, relevant factors to determine social distance and tolerance are political values, personality traits, political knowledge / political sophistication, and positive-negative emotions.

1.4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL VALUES

Values in the broad sense are believed to contribute to social life by creating a consensus over the prerequisites for social stability and by doing so increases cooperation and decreases the probability of violence that will be used to resolve conflict mainly originating from value conflicts (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). If a society agrees on shared values that society could develop a sense of identity and continue to live in social stability too. However, the value consensus could not stay the same forever. For example, according to value theorists, with the modernization of societies exposed to the industrialized world, this word gained some new values. Societies needed to adapt these new values in order to survive such as freedom, openness to new experiences as well as rejection to old values such as conformity and closeness (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000).

Basic personal values function as a baseline for all kinds of behaviors and opinions of individuals, and they are also considered as predictors of the political values that society also should have (Schwartz, 2006). Political values are considered as a form of extension of personal values that shapes individuals' beliefs, feelings and attitudes towards political issues (Piurko, Schwartz and

Davidov, 2011). A study revealed that personal values are predictors of supporters of different political parties in 14 democratic countries (Barnea, 2003).

Schwartz (1992) states that the early version of the values theory originated from the requirements of human existence to which all individuals and societies must be responsive, must have social interaction and urge to survive and connected to that presume the welfare of the groups. All these have evolutionary significance as Buss declared in 1986 and are considered as crucial for survival (Schwartz, 1992). The earlier version of the Schwartz's political value inventory included 11 core values which are ten core values and plus spirituality. Samples from 20 countries were used in order to test the validity and cross-cultural representation of values. Results of the study indicated that ten core values showed good fit in all 20 cultures tested (Schwartz, 1992).

The final version of the value theory of Schwartz (1992) identifies 10 personal values which originate from requirements of human existence (Schwartz, 2010). Those then personal values are; power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. Power is explained as prestige and position in society, control or dominance over people or resources. Achievement is explained as success of the person by competence with social standards. Hedonism is sentimental satisfaction and pleasure for the self. Stimulation is excitement, novelty and challenge in life. Self-direction means being independent both in thought and in action, explorative and creative. Universalism is understanding, being tolerant and protective for the welfare of all people and for nature. Benevolence is enhancing and preserving the welfare of the people whom the self is in contact with. Tradition is having commitment and respect with customs and their ideas, culture, religious acts and thoughts. Conformity is suppressing the actions, impulses and inclinations that could harm others and conflict social norms. Security means keeping the self and society stable, safe and in harmony. For example, universalism, self-direction, stimulation and hedonism were associated with acceptance of immigrants while

security, tradition and conformity were associated with the opposition to immigrants (Schwartz, 2006).

Based on these personal values and the interaction of those with political opinion and behavior, Schwartz et al. (2010) developed 6 core political values but then added two more, accepting immigrants and foreign military intervention, considering the emerging concepts that affect communities in recent years. These 8 core political values are as follows (Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione, 2010):

Traditional morality: associated with conformity, security and positive tradition to protect norms by avoiding social change and intolerance to novelties. Blind patriotism: associated with security, conformity, tradition, power on the idea that one's country is superior and intolerant to outgroups and negatively associated with universalism and hedonism. Law and order: associated with security, conformity and tradition to protect the current state against threatening social contexts while negatively associated with self-direction, universalism and hedonism since they are related to individual freedom and tolerance. Foreign military intervention: associated with security, conformity, power and tradition to protect the state from external danger while negatively associated with universalism and benevolence which are related to nonviolence and no harm to others. Free enterprise: associated with achievement and power since economic power is related to success and wealth, and negatively related to universalism and benevolence that promotes government regulations to provide for all. Equality: associated with universalism, benevolence and negatively associated with power and achievement since the concept is distant from prioritizing one's own interests. Civil liberties: associated with universalism and self-direction due to emphasis on high tolerance and less anxiety towards different ideas while negatively related to power, security and tradition due to lower perceptions of threat to customs and society. Accepting immigrants: associated with

universalism, stimulation, self-direction and benevolence while negatively associated with security, conformity and tradition.

There are a wide range of studies that investigate the relation between values and social distance and tolerance. For example, A study investigated the relation between religiosity, tolerance and values among Turkish respondents between 1995 - 2005 using the WVS data (Yeşilada & Noordijk, 2010). Results indicated increased conservatism over the years on the items of allowance of being neighbors with; homosexuals, drug addicts, immigrants, people with AIDS and people from different races. Religiosity has an important role in increasing intolerance, more religious people are found to be less tolerant towards the target groups. In another research, Biernat, Vescip and Theno (1996) found that egalitarian values have an impact on White people's attitudes towards Black people's freedoms. Also, a study revealed that high equality scores are associated with higher support to humanitarian aid, anti-discrimination towards women, and support to domestic social welfare programs (Feldman, 1988). In another study, certain values are found to contradict with others. Gender equality over patriotism, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority and participation over security (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008).

Intrinsic values of the people are thought to be predictors of upcoming democratic states or authoritarianism (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found that, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, South Korea, and Taiwan there is an intrinsic value change to supporting democratic values among people before these countries transition to democracy.

All forms of governments shape the value consensus of their citizens, what is allowed and not allowed in society, what are their rights and what are forbidden. Since the form of government is believed to be determinative of common values shared in societies, democratic citizens are expected to hold prerequisites of democratic systems such as liberty, equality and individualism (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). These prerequisites go hand in hand with tolerance towards all

citizens' rights to participate in politics and use their democratic rights in any sense Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

1.5. RELEVANCE OF PERSONALITY TRAITS

Tolerance studies indicated that tolerance is not a single concept but rather a complex and multidimensional construct (Witenberg, 2002). One of these dimensions are accepted to be the predispositions and personality traits (Butrus and Witenberg, 2012). Personality is defined as a biologically induced structure while personality traits indicated what people are like (Roccas et al. 2002 cited in Freitagg and Rapp, 2014), Personality traits are considered relatively stable internal dispositions commonly defined as enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours that characterise a person and distinguishes themselves from others. (McCrae & Costa, 1999). Early studies on the relationship between personality traits and tolerance have revealed some insights for future studies. Stouffer (1955) found people who tend to be pessimistic were less tolerant to ideological nonconformity. McClosky and Brill (1983) revealed that some personality traits such as misanthropy, self-esteem, and flexibility have a connection with the tolerant attitudes. Gibson on the other hand (1987) found that dogmatism and trust in general predict the levels of tolerance. Since Stouffer's (1955) study, personality traits found to have a role on political tolerance. For example, people high in dogmatism and authoriatarism and low-self esteem found to score low levels of tolerance towards disliked groups and less supportive of liberties of these groups (Oskarsson and Widmalm, 2014). Since personality has diverse dimensions, attempts to measure personality traits varies. Although there is not much, there Is a few studies that uses Big-5 Personality Traits as a tool to approach personality traits while investigating tolerance. This method to scale personality does not cover all aspects of the personality but rather summarizes more specific traits (Oskarsson and Widmalm, 2014).

Even though the current widely used model to personality traits is Five Factor Model (FFM), personality studies go back to the lexical hypothesis which accepts that the most important differences between people will be encoded into the language which will be used to describe people. In order to identify the personality traits, one must study the language details (Corr & Matthews, 2009). This complex structure has been studied for some years and eventually led to the development of FFM. Even though the FFM was discovered by Tupes and Christal who are air force psychologists in the 1960s, their work was lost and refounded in 1991. But with their pioneering studies, the current big five personality traits are shown to be sufficiently investigating the broader personality traits.

The FFM is the widely accepted model for theorizing personality up until now with its ability to capture a universal traits approach, ability to point at both common and unique features of individual differences (McCrae & John, 1992). The Big Five Traits are considered as recognizable aspects of personality and these aspects have been found to be stable over time (Costa & McCrea, 1992; Gerber, Huber, Doherty & Dowling, 2012). Also, these traits are related to variations of behaviors, opinions and attitudes (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling & Ha, 2010). According to the Five-Factor Model, personality traits can be described by a hierarchical structure with five dimensions which are extraversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experience and agreeableness (McCrae & John, 1992).

Openness to experience is associated with learning behaviors, strategies and cognitive orientations (George & Zhous, 2001 cited in Mondak & Halperin, 2008). High scores of this dimension are associated with increased creativity, curiosity, imagination, high-risk behaviors and nonconformity (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). There is evidence with research that openness to experience is associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, less stereotype (Freitag & Rapp, 2014). Agreeableness refers to co-operative, altruistic tendencies and social trust (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Those who score high in this dimension are thought to be warm,

sympathetic and get along well with others (Ha, Kim & Jo, 2013). Due to these characteristics, agreeable people tend to have less prejudice, close to support equality and altruism (Freitag & Rapp, 2014). Another personality trait, conscientiousness refers to impulse control and goal-oriented behaviors (Gallego & Oberski, 2011; Schoen & Schumann, 2007). Those who score higher in conscientiousness are viewed as dutiful, reliable and organized (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Those people have a tendency to political conformity, obedience and supporting order. They are more likely to present conservative approaches, deny equal rights for all, especially for immigrants in certain contexts (Freitag & Rapp, 2014).

Extroversion or energy is characterized with warmth, positive emotions, assertiveness (Schoen & Schumann, 2007), sociability and activeness (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Factor analysis indicated that extroversion is highly loaded with talkativeness, fun-loving and sociable (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Emotional stability or neuroticism is associated with reactivity, adjustment, emotionality and the opposite of these features are negativity, worrying, instability and neurotic tendencies (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). There is however, less evidence on those dimensions in terms of tolerance, social distance and related factors.

Personality traits found to be related to political tolerance since they are also forming the basis for the personal values which led to political values. In the broader term, personality traits are consistent dimensions of patterns that determine thought, feelings and actions (McCrae & Costa, 1990) while values are cognitive representations of goals that act like guiding principles (Schwartz, 1992). The research of Adorno et al. (1950) revealed that authoritarianism, dogmatism, intolerance to ambiguity is related to higher levels of intolerance. A study on the relationship between personality traits and political choice revealed that, center-left Italian voters scored higher on friendliness, openness and lower in conscientiousness while center-right voters were higher on power, achievement, conformity and tradition (Caprara et al., 2006). A research investigating the relationship between Big-5 Personality Traits and attitudes

towards immigrants in Swiss population revealed that extroverts and people who score low on agreeableness showed negative attitudes towards immigrants and providing them liberties (Freitag & Rapp, 2014). Also, only openness to experience is found to be significantly related to granting immigrants the right to vote.

Another study investigated the relationship between personality traits with Big-5 Inventory on three different tolerance settings: belief, act and speech. Participants were evaluated on how tolerant or intolerant they are towards an Asian backgrounded person in Australia. Results revealed that openness was a significant positive correlate and predictor of tolerance in belief dimension while not correlated with speech or act dimensions. Agreeableness on the other hand was positively predicted all tolerance dimensions (Butrus and Wittenberg, 2012).

1.6. RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

A widely accepted aspect of tolerance research is that intolerance is often a natural first response to perceptions of difference among people (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). This initial reaction of intolerance can stem from ingrained biases, fear of the unfamiliar, or a defensive posture against perceived threats. However, despite this immediate reaction, a body of scholarly work supports the idea that tolerance is a fundamental component of democratic states and, importantly, that tolerance can be cultivated through education and increasing political knowledge (Jones, 1980).

Political knowledge, also referred to in the literature as political sophistication, political schemas, political cognition, or political expertise, plays a crucial role in shaping how citizens make decisions on political matters. Political sophistication, as evaluated by Luskin (1990), is considered a merit of the individual, involving complex cognitive processes that enable a person to collect, organize, and critically evaluate information from the environment. These processes are

essential for forming well-rounded political beliefs. This sophistication includes an individual's connection to the political environment, their level of education, and their ability to integrate and synthesize information from diverse sources.

Research has shown that there is a significant correlation between political sophistication and the direction of political ideology. Studies indicate that an increase in political sophistication is more strongly associated with liberal tendencies rather than conservative ones (Goren, 2014; Delli Carpini & Keller, 1996). This association may be due to the fact that liberal ideologies often emphasize values such as openness, inclusivity, and tolerance, which are aligned with the cognitive flexibility that political sophistication fosters. An early study investigating the role of school education and general political knowledge on political tolerance revealed that political knowledge is a significant predictor of tolerance levels among 17-year-old and 13-year-old students. Interestingly, the study found that while political knowledge had a strong influence, school education alone did not have a significant impact (Jones, 1980). This finding underscores the importance of not just any education, but specifically political knowledge, in fostering tolerance. The distinction suggests that simply attending school is insufficient for cultivating tolerance unless the curriculum actively engages students in political and civic education.

Further supporting this idea, civic knowledge has been shown to promote support for democratic values. For instance, the more knowledge citizens have of political principles and institutions, the more likely they are to support core democratic principles, starting with tolerance. Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996) explore three possible explanations for this linkage and find substantial support for the "social learning" hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that specific knowledge of civil rights and civil liberties increases tolerance for unpopular minorities by fostering an understanding of the fundamental democratic values that protect diverse opinions and groups. Building on this foundation, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus's (1982) study offers a comprehensive examination of the various theoretical mechanisms that link education and political tolerance. They propose that education influences

political tolerance through several interconnected pathways, including political knowledge, ideology, and personality. Their findings indicate that personality, particularly psychological security, plays the most significant role in mediating the relationship between education and tolerance. Psychological security, as defined by the authors, encompasses a range of traits including faith in people, dogmatism, self-esteem, and self-actualization. However, they emphasize that dogmatism is the most critical factor within this construct. Sullivan and colleagues argue that dogmatism and faith in people serve as proxies for authoritarianism, with dogmatism reflecting a cognitive aspect and faith in people representing an emotional component. Their research suggests that much of education's effect on tolerance is mediated by its influence on reducing authoritarian tendencies. Social learning theory also supports the idea that education, particularly in democratic societies, plays a crucial role in exposing individuals to democratic values, thereby promoting tolerance (Gibson & Duch, 1993). However, it is important to note that in non-democratic systems, the impact of education on social constructs can be manipulated, potentially fostering non-tolerant environments instead (Gibson & Duch, 1993). This caveat suggests that the broader political and social context in which education occurs is critical to whether education fosters tolerance or intolerance.

More recent studies have continued to explore the impact of increased knowledge on tolerance, particularly in specific contexts. For example, Lester and Roberts (2011) conducted a study that demonstrated how enhancing religious knowledge among students could lead to increased tolerance. Their research focused on a program in Modesto, California, where public school students attended specialized religious classes designed to boost their religious knowledge. The program aimed to increase students' understanding of various religious beliefs and practices, thereby fostering greater religious tolerance. The results were promising, showing that both the students' knowledge and their levels of religious tolerance increased significantly. This study illustrates how targeted educational interventions can effectively promote tolerance by broadening students' understanding of diversity. Similarly, another study examined the impact of

increased knowledge on same-sex marriage at the constitutional level. Researchers provided participants with a 10-minute lecture on constitutional rights and then compared tolerance levels toward same-sex marriages before and after the intervention. The results indicated that even a brief educational intervention had both short-term and long-term effects on increasing tolerance levels (Hall, 2017). This finding underscores the power of education, even in small doses, to influence attitudes and promote more tolerant perspectives.

Moreover, the broader implications of political knowledge on societal attitudes have been highlighted in studies like that of Popkin and Dimock (2000). Their research found that higher levels of political knowledge contribute to a better understanding of civic affairs, which in turn decreases fears about the influx of new immigrants and their potential impact on society. This finding suggests that informed citizens are more likely to adopt tolerant attitudes toward diverse groups, as their understanding of civic dynamics helps to alleviate unfounded fears and prejudices. The process of cultivating political sophistication is also discussed within deliberative democratic theory, which posits that political sophistication can be developed if citizens are given time and opportunities to discuss and reflect on political matters (Gastil & Dillard, 1999). This theory emphasizes the importance of engagement and discourse in fostering a deeper understanding of political issues. Bandura (1986) further argues that face-to-face interaction is more effective in increasing political sophistication than merely receiving verbal or written information. This highlights the value of interactive and participatory approaches to education in enhancing political understanding and tolerance.

As a result of these findings, it is evident that more informed and knowledgeable individuals are more likely to hold diverse viewpoints on issues (Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2011). Political sophistication requires several key elements, including internal motivation to stay informed, the cognitive ability to understand abstract concepts, the capacity to organize information using higher mental processes, and active political information processing (Gup & Moy, 1998). It is

often measured through context-related information specific to particular occasions, reflecting the complexity and depth of an individual's political understanding.

Despite its central role in political science research, political sophistication remains difficult to fully define and measure due to its multidimensional structure (Helperin et al., 2009). The broadest and most widely used definition of political sophistication involves the respondent's political knowledge that can be recalled from long-term memory (Goren, 2001). This definition underscores the importance of deeply ingrained and accessible knowledge in shaping political attitudes and behaviors. Recent research indicates that levels of political knowledge have a significant impact on the acceptance of democratic principles, attitudes toward specific issues, and political participation (Galston, 2001). Stouffer's (1955) pioneering study on political tolerance also has important implications for understanding the impact of political sophistication on attitudes towards liberties. His research revealed that urban dwellers, elites, nonreligious people, men, and highly educated individuals tend to present higher levels of support for liberties to outgroup members (Bobo & Licari, 1989). These findings suggest that certain demographic factors, when combined with high levels of political sophistication, are associated with greater tolerance.

Several studies further suggest that political sophistication is more successful at predicting political tolerance than socio-economic status or occupation (Lipset, 1959). Increased knowledge of democratic norms and procedures, as well as an understanding of political institutions and principles, has a positive impact on tolerance (Keeter & Carpini, 1996; Galston, 2001). For instance, higher education and political knowledge are associated with more tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals and policies that support their democratic rights and freedoms (Gibson & Tedin, 1988). Similarly, Herson and Hofstetter's (1975) and Lawrence's (1976) examinations of tolerance also find that education serves as an important catalyst for more accepting attitudes toward political dissenters.

However, it is essential to recognize that not all research supports the idea that education universally impacts tolerance. For example, Jackman's (1973) study found that highly educated individuals might be swayed by strongly worded statements and focus on only one side of an issue, suggesting that even those with high levels of education are not immune to biases. Furthermore, a randomized study conducted by Green et al. (2011) tested the impact of civic education on political knowledge and support for liberties among participants from 10 different schools in the United States. The study found that while knowledge of civil liberties significantly increased for individuals exposed to the training, there was no significant impact on general political knowledge. Moreover, the results did not support the idea that increased knowledge would necessarily have a positive effect on tolerance, indicating that the relationship between education and tolerance is complex and context-dependent.

1.7. RELEVANCE OF EMOTIONS

Besides personality traits and political knowledge, emotions are also widely studied in tolerance studies. The theory of affective intelligence proposes that individuals rely on two emotional systems located in the limbic brain: the disposition system and the surveillance system. The disposition system is used for familiar, routine situations where learned patterns and behaviors guide decision-making, such as political partisanship influencing voting preferences. In contrast, the surveillance system is activated when encountering novel or disruptive circumstances. It helps people detect and respond to new threats or challenges by prompting them to reconsider and adjust their actions. This system is crucial for adapting to unexpected changes in the environment. For instance, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Americans became more politically engaged and many showed unexpected support for President George W. Bush, demonstrating how the surveillance system can lead to significant shifts in behavior in response to perceived threats (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Stevens, 2005).

Emotions play a significant role in shaping how individuals' attitudes toward a threatening group evolve, impacting their level of tolerance. Specifically, when people perceive a threat, it often triggers emotions like fear and anger, which can further intensify their intolerance towards the group they view as a threat. These emotional responses act as additional factors that exacerbate negative attitudes and reduce tolerance (Marcus et al., 1995). Besides, there are studies that evaluates emotions as a part of wellbeing and the wellbeing of tolerant individuals are higher. For example, positive affect found to be in negative relationship with discrimination while negative affect is related to lower acceptance and people who score higher on positive negative affect scale positive affect dimension has higher life satisfaction that predicts anti discriminatory attitudes (Cvetkovska, Verkuyten, Adelman and Yogeeswaran, 2021).

Research on the role of emotions on tolerance is broad. One study revealed that, emotions like fear and anger were found to heighten both intolerance and perceived threats, while positive emotions tended to reduce them. Moreover, hostility towards out-groups, such as Muslim immigrants, significantly predicted increased intolerance and perceived threat. This suggests that negative emotions and hostile attitudes towards specific groups strongly influence and exacerbate intolerance (Erişen and Kentmen-Cin, 2016). Research has shown that fear is a more significant predictor than anger when it comes to determining tolerance levels towards Muslims and Arabs following the September 11 attacks (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). This finding highlights how fear, as a powerful and pervasive emotion, can strongly influence individuals' attitudes and perceptions of out-groups, leading to increased intolerance. The impact of fear on intolerance is particularly pronounced in the aftermath of traumatic events, where heightened security concerns and perceived threats can exacerbate negative feelings toward specific groups.

These results align with the sophistication-interaction hypothesis proposed by Sniderman, Tetlock, and colleagues (1991). According to this hypothesis, individuals with lower levels of cognitive sophistication or political knowledge are more likely to rely on their emotions to form and justify their political views. This

means that such individuals may use emotional responses, like fear or anger, more frequently and intensely when evaluating issues, groups, and leaders. In contrast, those with higher levels of political sophistication tend to use more reasoned and informed approaches in their evaluations, potentially leading to more nuanced and less emotionally driven attitudes. Further supporting this hypothesis, other studies (e.g., Redlawsk & Lau, 2003) have demonstrated that people with lower political sophistication often exhibit greater emotional responses to political stimuli, which can drive more extreme and less tolerant views. These findings underscore the importance of understanding how emotional responses, particularly fear, interact with cognitive processes to shape political attitudes and tolerance, especially in contexts of heightened threat and uncertainty.

Evoked emotions can influence support for certain policies. For example, In 2017, the president of the United States, Donald Trump, stated that Muslims should be banned to entering to United States since they are dangerous and ruining the American ideal, this argument gained more than 50 % support of the citizens (Kertscher, 2017). Similarly, a study conducted on how evoked certain emotions can contribute to support for strict policies towards Syria in Turkish context indicated the role of emotions on support for strict policies (Erişen, 2015). Participants assigned to 3 experimental and one control conditions where different emotions has been emphasized. Then participants stated their level of positive emotions (enthusiastic, proud, hopeful) and anger and fear in response to Syrian crisis. Results revealed that, experimental manipulations were successful to evoke targeted emotions meaning that participants in the fear group stated more fear response while participants in the hope condition stated more hope. However, groups differed in perceived threat. Participants in the anger and fear condition stated more perceived threat than other groups and they also indicated higher levels of support to stricter and punitive policies against Syria.

Similarly in this study, the impact of security and liberty conditions on evoking positive and negative emotions will be evaluated.

1.8. CURRENT STUDY AND HYPOTHESIS

1.8.1. Current Study

Since the establishment of the modern Republic of Türkiye on 29 October 1923, Türkiye implemented three major constitutions as 1924, 1961 and 1982 as symbols of the democratic regimes (Demir, 2020). In 1950 Türkiye went to its first multi-party elections which is again one of the prerequisites for democracy. The current constitution of the Türkiye has dated back to 1982, which was formed after a coup by the military that military officials took control of the government to secure the democracy in their own words. However, Türkiye went through two military interventions that replaced the governments in 1960 and in 1982 which is not ideal in democratic theory. In democracies, military institutions are responsible only for security matters (Kubicek, 1999).

In 1995 and 2001 the constitution faced several reforms and discussions to form a new constitution took place from time to time since the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) became the ruling party in 2002. The first solid example to change the constitution was with a referendum in 2010. During the campaigns of political parties from the opposing sides used the narrative of "danger and threat to the system", both aimed to evoke the need for security for their ideology. The changes of the constitution by the 2010 referendum were adopted by %58 of the citizens. The constitutional amendments adopted were considered as an important development towards conservative ideas of the government (Özbudun, 2012). However, the discussions on the need of a new constitution have not ended, and a constitution conciliation committee was formed in 2011. The division of the committee on the general framework and the specific terms of the constitution such as the change of the system led to dissolvement of the process in November 2013. In early 2016, the government

once again announced a new process to form the new constitution and the discussions on the frame of the new constitution has started again.

Besides constitutional studies, Türkiye has been going through a politically polarized era. A year before the coup attempt Türkiye held two general elections within 6 months in 2015. In June 2015 elections, four political parties in the parliament failed to establish a coalition to form the government and a second general election has been held in November 2015. A study (Erişen and Erdoğan, 2016) regarding the tolerance during this period has been shared before.

The current study aimed to investigate the impact of different constitution frames on political tolerance and social distance and their relation to political values, personality traits and political sophistication. The data collection of the research started in June 2016, approximately one month before the coup attempt to the Turkish government occurred and the research was faced with an unpredicted intervention.

In the evening of 15 July 2016, Türkiye was faced with a coup attempt which the government announced was planned and executed by a religious group consisting of the supporters of Fethullah Gülen named as Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ). The coup attempt was implemented by military officials who are part of this organization with the aim of taking over the current political authority. On the evening of 15 July, the news anchor of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was forced to read a statement announcing that due to violations of the rule of law in the country a group called Peace at Home Council had taken control. The bridges over the Bosporus were blocked by the troops, the parliament building, and the national television station were bombed, gun fires were heard and fighter jets flew low over Ankara, the capital of the country (Altınordu, 2017). The organization was considered as a result of activities of the Gülen Movement more than 40 years in Türkiye. In fact, the significant presence of the movement in the judiciary and military system has been discussed for many years before the coup attempt took place.

The same night, President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called ordinary citizens to the streets to protect the country. After this call mainstreamed on the televisions, citizens went out to the streets especially in İstanbul and Ankara and faced tanks and soldiers. On the next day, the government announced the failure of the coup attempt with the death of 272 citizens on the streets, 2,191 injured and the surrender of most of the coup-soldiers (Yavuz & Balci, 2018). The involvement of the ordinary citizens lasted for 27 more days with "democracy watch" where people went on to the streets and squares to express their rejection of the coup attempt and the FETÖ.

The data of the current study naturally corresponded to the immediate aftermath of this coup attempt which is considered as a threat to the Turkish political system. Even though there is data from the period prior to the coup attempt, due to the size of the sample, the current study will be investigating the impact of security framed and liberty framed constitution scenarios on social distance and political tolerance of participants after the coup attempt.

1.8.2. Hypothesis

1. The interaction between time and experiment type will be significant meaning that the political tolerance scores of the security framing group will be significantly higher than the liberty framing group.

2. The social distance and political tolerance scores of the security framing group will be higher after the experiment manipulation.

3. The negative emotions of the security framing group will be higher than the liberty framing group after the manipulation.

4. The political values will have a role in predicting the social distance and tolerance for both groups.

5. Political knowledge will have an impact on the degree of the post-social distance and political tolerance scores means that the participants with higher political knowledge will present higher scores.

CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

2.1. SAMPLE

The research has been conducted with the university students in Ankara between June 2016 and October 2016 via a non-profit youth organization. The total number of participants for the time range is 499. However, Türkiye has been faced with a coup attempt on 15 July 2016 which this research considers as a natural experiment impact to the study. Therefore, 96 of the 499 responses gathered before the coup attempt and 96 of the responses failing to include any distant group sores have been excluded from the study and responses of 307 participants have been analyzed. The number of participants in the liberty frame was 139, and 168 for the security framed scenario. Participants were handed the print-out surveys and provided with the instructions however It should be noted that no control on acknowledgement of the manipulation has been checked and the sample is not representative hence number of the sample is not eligible to generalize the results. Therefore, the results should be considered as an observatory rather general.

The demographic findings of the participants revealed 307 individuals, a majority were female, with 183 participants accounting for 59.6% of the sample. The remaining 124 participants were male, comprising 40.4% of the sample. The age of the participants spanned from 18 to 33 years, with a median age of 20 years (SD = 1.91). It should be noted that the participant group was predominantly young and university students, with most individuals falling into early adulthood. Detailed distributions of gender and age within the sample are provided in Table 1.

Table 1 The Gender Distribution, Mean, SD and Range of the Participants

Gender	N (%)	Range	Mean Age	SD
Female	183 (59,6)	18-31	20,24	1,56
Male	124 (40,2)	18-33	20,00	2,27

In terms of the identity distribution within the sample, the data revealed that the majority of participants, accounting for 46.9%, identified themselves as members of the larger group that is neither an ethnic nor a religious minority. A smaller portion of the participants, 6.5%, identified as part of a religious minority, a proportion that was mirrored by those who identified as both religious and ethnic minorities. Additionally, 5.5% of the participants identified themselves solely as an ethnic minority. Notably, a significant portion of the sample, 20.2%, chose not to disclose their ethnic identity, making it the second most common response. Furthermore, 14% of the participants indicated that they were unsure or unaware of the details of their identity. The detailed frequencies and distribution of the participants' identity-related responses are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Identity Distribution of the Participants

Ethnicity	N (%)
Ethnic and Religious Minority	21 (6,8 %)
Ethnic Minority	17 (5,5 %)
Religious Minority	20 (6,5 %)
Not Religious or Ethnic Minority	144 (46,9 %)
Do Not Know	43 (14 %)
Do Not Want to Respond	62 (20,2 %)

The educational status of the participants' parents was assessed based on the highest degree obtained. The data indicated that fathers generally attained higher educational degrees compared to mothers. Specifically, the most common

highest educational level among mothers was primary education, with 28% of them holding this as their highest qualification. In contrast, the most frequent highest educational attainment for fathers was a university degree, which was achieved by 33.2% of them. Furthermore, a small percentage of mothers, 5.9%, did not hold any official educational degree, whereas this was much less common among fathers, with only 1% lacking formal education credentials. The detailed distribution of parental educational status is provided in Table 3.

Table 3 Educational Degree of Parents of the Participants

	N (%)	
	Mother	Father
Education Level		
Without any Official Degree	18 (5,9 %)	3 (1 %)
Primary Education	86 (28 %)	49 (16 %)
Middle School	54 (17,6%)	49 (16 %)
Highschool	83 (27 %)	74 (24,1 %)
College	56 (18,2 %)	102 (33,2%)
Masters Degree	8 (2,6 %)	22 (7,2 %)
Doctoral Degree	2 (0,7 %)	8 (2,6 %)

The socio-economic status of the participants was assessed using two key indicators: whether they had a private room while growing up and whether they or their family experienced difficulties in paying bills. The findings revealed that the majority of participants, 77.5%, had their own private rooms during their childhood, suggesting a certain level of financial stability. Additionally, 73.3% of the participants reported that they or their family did not struggle with paying bills, further indicating a relatively stable economic background for most of the sample. The detailed breakdown of these socio-economic status indicators is provided in Table 4.

Table 4 Socio-Economic Situation of the Participants

	N (%)
Having Own Room	
Yes	238 (77,5 %)
No	69 (22,5 %)
Struggling to Pay the Bills	
Yes	82 (26,7 %)
No	225 (73,3 %)

Participants were asked to rate their political ideologies on a spectrum ranging from far left to far right using a 7-point Likert scale. The results showed that the majority of participants, 28%, positioned themselves in the middle of the scale, indicating a centrist or moderate ideological stance. A significant portion of the sample, 39.4%, identified with leftist ideologies, positioning themselves on the left side of the scale, while 32.5% aligned themselves with right-leaning ideologies.

Regarding party affiliation, a substantial majority, 69.1%, reported that they do not affiliate with any political party, whereas 30.9% of participants indicated that they are affiliated with a political party. When it comes to political interest, also measured on a 7-point Likert scale, 25% of the participants reported a medium level of interest in political matters. Interestingly, 9.8% of the participants stated that they have no interest in politics at all, while 12.2% indicated the highest level of political interest.

In terms of electoral participation, a large majority, 86%, reported that they voted in the 1 November 2015 elections, while 14% did not participate in the voting process. The detailed distributions of these variables can be found in Table 5.

Table 5 Distribution of Political Ideology, Political Affiliation, Political Interest

	N (%)
Political Ideology	
1 (Far Left)	28 (9,1%)
2	48 (15,6%)
3	45 (14,7%)
4	86 (28 %)
5	48 (15,6%)
6	29 (9,4%)
7 (Far Right)	23 (7,5%)
Political Affiliation with a Political Party	
Holds Political Affiliation	95 (30,9%)
Does not Hold Political Affiliation	212 (69,1%)
Political Interest	
1 (Least Interest)	29 (9,8%)
2	18 (6,1%)
3	36 (12,2%)
4	74 (25%)
5	58 (19,6%)
6	45 (15,2%)
7 (Most Interested)	36 (12,2%)
Voting on 1 November 2015 Elections	
Voted	264 (86%)
Not Voted	43 (14%)

The city distribution of the sample reveals that a significant portion of participants, 24.8%, are from Ankara, the capital city. This indicates a strong representation from the central part of the country. Additionally, smaller but notable proportions of participants are from cities such as Antalya, Hatay, Eskişehir, and Trabzon, each contributing 2.9% to the sample.

When examining the distribution by region, it becomes evident that the Middle Anatolia region, which includes Ankara, is the most represented, with 128 participants making up 41.7% of the sample. This is followed by the Black Sea region, contributing 54 participants, or 17.6% of the sample. The Mediterranean region also has a significant presence with 39 participants, representing 12.7% of the sample.

Other regions are less represented, with the Aegean region contributing 24 participants (7.8%), Marmara region 25 participants (8.1%), East Anatolia 22 participants (7.2%), and Southern Anatolia 15 participants (4.9%). This regional distribution reflects a diverse but somewhat concentrated sample, with a majority of participants coming from the central and northern parts of the country. The detailed breakdown of the regional distribution is provided in Table 6.

Table 6 Regional Distrubution of the Participant's Origin

	Frequency	Percentage
Region		
Mediterranean	39	12.7
East Anatolia	22	7.2
Aegean	24	7.8
Southern Anatolia	15	4.9
Middle Anatolia	128	41.7
Black Sea	54	17.6
Marmara	25	8.1

Due to the design of the study, participants revealed their least-liked groups individually instead of a fixed group approach. Each participant wrote three least -liked groups for the study and the researchers grouped those social groups during the coding. A total of 921 items has been collected and reported.

The aim of the study is to evaluate the social distance and tolerance towards social groups in Türkiye. However, it should be noted that due to the impact of the coup attempt and also poor design of the study that does not allow to check directives of the questions, participants listed terrorist organizations rather than the social groups as aimed. For the first disliked group, the highest ranked groups are PKK (n=48), terrorist organizations (n=33), FETÖ (n=31), devout people (n=24), HDP (n=19), AK Party (n=18), Syrians (n=15), ISIS (n=11), conservatives (n=11), idealist (ülkücüler, n=10), fascists (n=7), and racists (n=6), Armenians (n=4), and Kurds (n=4). Also in the first group, 33 individual items were stated. These includes items such as women, missionaries, rich people, Islamophobic, pedophiles.

In the second disliked group, the highest ranked groups within this category are again FETÖ (n=58), PKK (n=22), leftists (n=16), of LGBTI+ people (n=15), AK Party (n=15), HDP (n=14), ISIS (n=13), idealists (n=12), racists (n=11), nationalists (n=10), Syrians (n=8), congregations (n=6), conservatives (n=4), Kurds (n=4), Turks (n=3), atheists (n=3). The others category in this group consists of items such as unemployed, police forces, injustice people, rich people, vegans, ignorant people.

In the third disliked group, the groups listed respectively are; Immigrants (n=30), LGBTI+ people (n=28) AK Party (n=20), FETÖ (n=17), ISIS (n=16), leftists (n=13), PKK (n=11), HDP (n=8), conservatives (n=8), liberals (n=7), MHP (n=7), DHKP-c (n=6). The others category in this group includes items such as soldiers, higher authorities, elitists, Kemalists, political party branches, feminists, ignorant people, patriarchy, rural people.

The details of the least liked groups can be seen in Table 7.

Table 7 Breakdown of the Least-Liked Groups

	N (%)		
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
AK Party	18 (5,9 %)	15 (4,9 %)	20 (6,5 %)
Armenians	4 (1,3 %)	-	-
Associations	-	-	9 (3 %)
Atheists	2 (0,6 %)	3 (0,9 %)	4 (1,3 %)
Communists	5 (1,6 %)	-	-
CHP	-	3 (0,9 %)	5 (1,6 %)
Conservatives	11 (3,6 %)	8 (2,6 %)	8 (2,6 %)
Devout People	24 (7,8 %)	7 (2,3 %)	14 (4,6 %)
DHKP-C	-	-	6 (2 %)
Fascist	7 (2,3 %)	2 (0,6 %)	2 (0,6 %)
FETÖ	31 (10,1 %)	58 (18,9 %)	17 (5,5 %)
HDP	19 (6,2 %)	14 (4,6 %)	8 (2,6 %)
Homophobics	-	3 (0,9 %)	8 (2,6 %)
Idealists (ülkücüler)	10 (3, 3 %)	12 (3,9 %)	7 (2,3 %)
ISIS	11 (3,6 %)	13 (4,3 %)	18 (5,9 %)
Kurds	4 (1,3 %)	4 (1,3 %)	2 (0,6 %)
Leftists	-	16 (5,2 %)	13 (4,3 %)
LGBTI	6 (1,9 %)	15 (4,9 %)	28 (9,1 %)
Liberals	-	-	7 (2,3 %)
Minorities	6 (1,9 %)	6 (2%)	6 (2 %)
Nationalists	-	12 (3,9 %)	4 (1,3 %)
Religious Organizations	-	6 (2 %)	1 (0,3)
PKK	48 (15,7 %)	22 (7,2 %)	11 (3,6 %)
Political Parties	5 (1,6 %)	7 (2,3 %)	1 (0,3)
Politicians	3 (0,9 %)	1 (0,3 %)	1 (0,3)
Racists	6 (1,9 %)	11 (3,6 %)	6 (2 %)
Sexists	-	5 (1,6 %)	-

Syrians	15 (4,9 %)	8 (2,6 %)	30 (9,8 %)
Terrorist Organizations	33 (10,8 %)	8 (2,6 %)	9 (3 %)
Turks	4 (1,3 %)	3 (0,9 %)	1 (0,3)
Others	35 (11,4 %)	33 (10,7 %)	58 (18,9 %)

2.2. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

The study is designed as experimental research with a 2x2 factorial design, where the two factors are the type of vignette (liberty frame and security frame) and time (political tolerance measured before and after the experimental manipulation). This between-subjects design allows for the comparison of how different framing scenarios affect participants' attitudes and behaviors across two time points.

The dependent variables in the study include positive and negative affect, social distance, and political tolerance measured after the manipulation (time 2). These variables are analyzed to assess the impact of the framing on participants' emotional responses and attitudes towards various social groups. The independent variables include political values, personality traits, and political knowledge, which are expected to influence how participants respond to the framing scenarios and to moderate the effects on the dependent variables.

A unique aspect of this experiment is the implementation of a least-liked group approach when measuring social distance and political tolerance right after the coup attempt. This method allows participants to self-identify the social groups they dislike the most by writing the names of these groups in the relevant section of the questionnaire. However, it should be noted the results of this study is an observational output rather than generalized.

2.3. INSTRUMENTS

2.3.1. Vignettes

The research involves the use of two distinct vignettes designed to explore the preparation of a new constitution and how it addresses civil liberties and rights. These vignettes serve as experimental manipulations to investigate the effects of framing on participants' attitudes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two scenario groups: one that presented the new constitution within a liberty-frame and another that presented it within a security-frame. Aside from these framing scenarios, all participants were administered the same set of questionnaires as part of the study.

The first scenario included the liberty-framework presenting that the new constitution has been prepared in an environment where liberties and civil rights discussions took part, and the new constitution will be emphasizing the liberties and promotion of civil rights. The highlights of this constitution are under no circumstances the freedom of expression and right to communicate and reach information and also protests and rallies will be hindered. The Turkish version of the vignettes can be seen in the Appendix 1.

The liberty framed scenario is:

 "As it is known, the issue of changing the current constitution and making a new constitution has been discussed in Turkey for a while. Preparation work for the new constitution, which has been going on for several years, gained momentum with the influence of social events and terrorist attacks in recent years, and the new constitution was accepted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 2016.

Although the 2016 Constitution has some unchanged articles from the previous one, it has brought significant innovations that will affect the daily lives of citizens. With the changes made, individual rights and freedoms were further supported and protected by the constitution.

For example, with the new constitution, it was accepted that freedom of expression could not be restricted on any subject. Similarly, the Constitution guarantees that freedom of the press, the right to disseminate information and make news cannot be restricted under any circumstances. The government was prevented from making any laws restricting citizens' right to peacefully assemble and petition the government to address their grievances."

On the other hand, the security framed scenario makes emphasis on the limiting freedoms to secure the nation from danger. The text can be found below:

"As it is known, Turkey has been discussing the issue of changing the current constitution and making a new constitution for a while. Preparation work for the new constitution, which has been going on for several years, gained momentum with the influence of social events and terrorist attacks in recent years, and the new constitution was accepted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 2016.

Although the 2016 Constitution has some unchanged articles from the previous one, it introduced very important regulations that will affect the daily lives of citizens. With the changes made, individual rights and freedoms were restricted on the grounds of protecting the security of the state, and these restrictions were protected by the constitution.

For example, with the new constitution, freedom of expression on some issues was restricted. Similarly, freedom of the press, the right of everyone to disseminate information and report news, has been irrevocably blocked in some cases. The article on the right of citizens to assemble peacefully and to petition

the government to find a solution to their complaints could not be included in the new constitution for security reasons. More importantly, according to this constitutional article, it was also possible for the government to make any law restricting the mentioned rights."

Aside from the different framing scenarios presented through these vignettes, all participants in the study were administered the same set of questionnaires. These questionnaires were designed to assess various attitudes and perceptions regarding the new constitution, civil liberties, and the balance between security and freedom. The Turkish versions of these vignettes can be found in Appendix 1 of the study.

This approach allows the research to systematically explore how different frames—liberty versus security—can shape public attitudes toward constitutional changes, particularly in contexts where the balance between individual freedoms and collective security is a key concern. The findings from this study could offer valuable insights into the ways framing can influence political attitudes and the acceptance of constitutional reforms.

2.3.2. Political Values Scale

The scale consists of items from various values scales such as Schwartz (2010), Feldman (1988), McCann (1997), Jacoby (2006), Gunther and Kuan (2007), and Schatz et al. (1999). Final version includes eight facets with 18 statements. Responses classified on a 5-point scale from completely disagree to completely agree. Traditional morality suggests that society ought to safeguard conventional religious, moral, and familial principles. Blind patriotism asserts that individuals should endorse and refrain from criticizing their nation. Law and order propose that the government should prohibit disruptive activities and ensure compliance with the law. Free enterprise advocates for limited government involvement in the economy. Equality advocates for the equitable distribution of opportunities and

resources within society. Civil liberties emphasize the freedom of individuals to act and think as they see fit. Foreign military intervention contends that nations should employ military measures when addressing international issues becomes necessary. Accepting immigrants posits that foreign immigrants make positive contributions to our country (Schwartz et al, 2013).

The Turkish version of the scale is also applied by Schwartz et al. (2013) in a study conducted in 15 countries. The results of the Turkish test conducted with 514 participants indicates a good fit of the model (0.95, p < .001) (Schwartz et al, 2013). This scale has been previously applied by Başlevent et al. (2013), and the study results demonstrated its suitability for use in Turkey. In the study, the appropriateness in Türkiye was found to be 0.95.

2.3.3. Political Tolerance Scale

Based on the Stouffer 's (1955) question on how tolerant ordinary people are, political tolerance has been measured by asking the degree of people's support for extension of civil liberties to disliked groups (Gibson, 2013). The first questionnaire of Stouffer includes 15 items on a 6 - point scale (Gibson, 1988). However, considering the results and factor analysis of those items, the items of the questionnaire have also been used separately based on the concept of the research question. For the current study, 3 items from Gibson's arrangement to the original questionnaire have been used as a 5-point scale. Those items corresponding to liberties are; allowing a group to make public speech, run for office and hold public rallies and demonstrations. For the Turkish adaptation of the questions, back-to-back translation has been performed. The reliability analysis of the scale was 0.82.

2.3.4. Social Distance Scale

The need for developing social distance scale emerged from the increased immigration to the USA from Germany, Scandinavia or the British Isles first and Italy, Poland, Russia, Hungary later (Wark & Galliher, 2007). Bogardus' Social Distance Scale (1967) is one of the most commonly used and widely accepted scales within social science circles for measuring intergroup prejudices (Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005). Bogardus suggested that through this scale racial attitudes can be measured and the change in those attitudes could be traced by conducting the scale at regular intervals (Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005).

Initially implemented in 1926 and subsequently repeated over a 40-year period (1926, 1946, 1956, 1966, 1977), the scale has consistently yielded results and has been translated into more than 20 languages and applied (Wark & Galliher, 2007). The scale includes questions to detect the desired closeness and degree of intimacy with the members of the target group such as: the level of social relationship, would marry with the member of the out-group, share the same neighborhood or workplace.

In Avcı's study (2013), the reliability and validity of the Social Distance Scale were measured, and the results obtained from Türkiye indicated a Chronbach's alpha of 0.95. With this level of reliability, the scale is considered suitable for use in Türkiye.

2.3.5. Five Factor Personality Scale (10-Item Scale)

The Big-Five framework is a structured model describing personality traits through five overarching factors, providing a comprehensive representation of personality. Each pair of opposing factors, such as Extraversion versus

Introversion, encompasses various specific facets like Sociability, which further include numerous detailed traits like talkativeness and outgoingness. This framework proposes that the majority of individual differences in human personality can be categorized into five empirically derived and broad domains (Gosling, Rentfrow, Swann Jr., 2003).

In this study, the 10-item short scale of the Five Factor Personality Model (Goldberg, 1992) will be utilized. Widely implemented in political science studies, this scale measures personality dimensions of extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. The reliability and validity studies of the scale in its English version have been conducted, and the test-retest analysis results revealed a coefficient of .72 (Gosling et al, 2003).

The ten-item short scale of the Big-Five Personality Theory (Atak, 2013) has been translated into Turkish, and validity tests have been conducted. Atak (2013) conducted the study with a total of 448 participants, including university students aged between 18-25 and those not in this age group. Initially, translations by four academics working in this field were compared to test language validity, and items with discrepancies were retranslated.

To measure the consistency of the forms, 36 doctoral students proficient in English answered both forms in the two languages. Pearson Moment Product Correlation Coefficient was calculated between the scores obtained from both scales. For the Openness to Experience subscale, the coefficient was found to be 0.96 (p = 0.000), for Agreeableness, it was 0.94 (p = 0.000), for Emotional Stability, it was 0.93 (p = 0.000), for Conscientiousness, it was 0.92 (p = 0.000), and finally, for Extraversion, it was 0.97 (p = 0.000) (Atak, 2013). The Cronbach's Alpha reliability coefficient for the scale was found to be 0.83 for Openness to Experience, 0.81 for Agreeableness, 0.83 for Emotional Stability, 0.84 for Conscientiousness, and 0.86 for Extraversion (Atak, 2013). As a result of these data, the scale is considered a reliable tool for measuring personality traits.

2.3.6. Positive - Negative Affect Scale (PANAS)

Positive and Negative Affect Scale is a 20-item scale that is developed for measuring self-report moods by Watson, Clark and Tellegen in 1988. The scale consists of ten positive affect related words and ten negative affect related words. Positive Affect (PA) expresses the extent to which a person feels active, alert and enthusiastic.

High PA is associated with high energy, concentration and pleasurable engagement. Opposed to that, low PA is associated with sadness and lethargy. Negative Affect (NA) on the other hand is characterized with distress, unpleasurable engagement that embodies aversive mood states. Beginning with 60 terms in total for measuring PA and NA, the final form of PANAS was settled on a 20-item measure as 10 for PA and 10 for NA (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).

The ten Positive Affect words are attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, proud, determined, strong, and active. Ten Negative Affects distressed, upset, hostile, irritable, scared, afraid, ashamed, guilty, jittery, and nervous. Respondents are asked how they feel themselves in the past few dates and rate the degree with a 5-point likert scale from very slightly to very much. The Chronbach alpha value for the English original is reported as 0.86 for positive items and 0.84 for negative items.

The adaptation of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale to Turkish was conducted by Gençöz (2000), and it was found to consist of two consistent dimensions, consistent with the original. In the same study, the internal consistency of positive emotion items was reported as .83, test-retest consistency as .40, and the internal consistency of negative emotion items as .86, with test-retest consistency being .54. Based on these data, the scale is accepted as a reliable tool for measuring emotional states.

2.3.7. Political Knowledge Questionnaire

Political knowledge has been assessed by two short questionnaires. The first questionnaire includes 9 questions on Turkish political actors, political system and political parties such as the name of the minister of international affairs, the number of total parliamentarians in the Turkish parliament. The second questionnaire consists of 4 questions on the constitutional committee such as the name of the constitutional committee chair, the name of the political parties represented in the committee.

2.3.8. Political Interest

The political interests of the participants were assessed through a set of four questions designed to capture different dimensions of their engagement with politics. First, participants were asked whether they voted in the most recent election, which provides a direct measure of their electoral participation and engagement with the political process.

Second, they were asked if there is a political party they feel they belong to, offering insight into their sense of political identity and affiliation. This question was aimed at understanding the extent to which participants align themselves with specific political entities.

Third, participants' general political interest was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, where they rated their level of interest in political matters. This scale ranged from "no interest at all" to "very high interest," allowing for a nuanced understanding of how politically engaged participants perceive themselves to be. Fourth, participants were asked to position their political ideology on a 7-point scale ranging from far left to far right. This scale provided insight into their ideological leanings and where they situate themselves on the political spectrum.

Additionally, political affiliation was further explored by asking participants explicitly whether there are any political parties they feel they belong to, reinforcing the earlier question on party identification and adding depth to the understanding of their political alignment. These questions collectively provide a comprehensive picture of the participants' political interests, affiliations, and ideological orientations.

2.3.9. Demographic Information

The demographic information collected from participants encompassed a broad range of variables to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the sample. Key demographic details included participants' age, city of birth, socio-economic status (SES), identity, gender, and political ideology. These variables were selected to provide a well-rounded profile of the participants, which is essential for analyzing how various demographic factors might influence their responses in the study.

Socio-economic status was evaluated using four questions designed to capture different aspects of participants' economic and educational backgrounds: Participants were asked whether they had a separate room while growing up, a yes/no question that serves as an indicator of household economic conditions during their formative years. Additionally, participants were also asked whether they currently experience difficulty paying their bills. This yes/no question provides insight into their present economic situation. Lastly, participants provided information about their parents' highest educational attainment, which was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from "no formal education" to "doctoral degree." This question aimed to capture the educational background of the participants' families, which is a key component of SES.

To measure participants' identity, a 6-item Likert scale was employed. This scale offered participants the opportunity to describe their identity across various

dimensions, reflecting the complexity and diversity of identity within the sample. The options included ethnic minority; participants who identify as part of an ethnic minority, religious minority; participants who identify as part of a religious minority, both ethnic and religious minority; participants who see themselves as belonging to both an ethnic and a religious minority. non-minority is an option for participants who do not identify with any minority group. Unsure of identity option reveals Participants who are uncertain about their identity. And lastly an option for participants who chose not to reveal their identity is added.

In addition to SES and identity, gender and political ideology were also key demographic variables. Gender was recorded as male or female, providing a basic demographic breakdown of the sample. Political ideology was assessed using a 7-point scale, where participants located themselves on a spectrum from far left to far right. This scale helps to situate participants within the broader political landscape, which is particularly relevant in a study examining attitudes toward constitutional changes and civil liberties.

Together, these demographic variables provide a detailed portrait of the participants, enabling a robust analysis of how various background factors may influence their attitudes and responses within the experimental framework. The rich demographic data collected will be instrumental in understanding the broader implications of the study's findings.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH FINDINGS

3.1. DESCRIPTIVES OF THE MAIN VARIABLES

The mean, range, and standard deviation scores of the main variables for the research can be seen in Table 8 below.

Table 8 Descriptives of the Main Variables

Variables	Range	Mean	SD
Traditional Morality	1.00 - 4.00	2.83	1.055
Law and Order	1.00 - 4.00	2.50	1.070
Freedom of Expression	1.00 - 4.00	2.32	.916
Equality	1.00 - 4.00	4.43	.826
Blind Patriotism	1.00 - 4.00	1.97	1.052
Civil Liberties	1.00 - 4.00	4.09	.835
Military Intervention	1.00 - 4.00	2.22	.975
Accepting Immigrants	1.00 - 4.00	2.29	1.074
Extrovertism	1.00 - 6.00	4.89	1.513
Agreeableness	5.00	4.80	1.051
Consciousness	5.00	5.43	1.122
Stability	6.00	4.11	1.363
Openness to Experience	5.00	5.11	1.174
Political Knowledge	.77	.587	.1504

3.2. THE CORRELATION VALUES OF THE MAIN VARIABLES

Correlation analysis has been implemented to understand the relationship between the main variables of the study. Results revealed consistent correlations with the literature of the subject. The results can be found in Table 9 below.

When the correlation between the political values, which measures 8 sub-values that determine the political attitudes and other variables, traditional morality sub-measurement was found to be in positive correlation with law and order ($r = .56$, $p < .01$) , blind patriotism ($r = .47$, $p < .01$), and military intervention ($r = .35$, $p < .01$) while significantly negative relationship was observed with openness ($r = -.28$, $p < .01$) from the personality traits.

Law and order found to be in positive correlation with blind patriotism ($r = .48$, $p < .01$), military intervention ($r = .43$, $p < .01$) while there is a negative correlation with equality ($r = -.18$, $p < .01$), civil liberties ($r = -.24$, $p < .01$), openness ($r = -.28$, $p < .01$) and pre-tolerance ($r = -.22$, $p < .01$). These negative correlations suggest that an emphasis on law and order might conflict with values that promote equality, individual freedoms, and tolerance.

Free enterprise has positive correlation with blind patriotism ($r = .15$, $p < .01$) and negative correlation with political knowledge ($r = -.13$, $p < .05$). This indicates that participants who favor free enterprise might also display stronger patriotic sentiments, but possibly with lower levels of political knowledge. Equality is in a positive relationship with civil liberties ($r = .43$, $p < .01$) and in a negative relationship with blind patriotism ($r = -.47$, $p < .01$) suggesting that participants who value equality also tend to support civil liberties while opposing excessive patriotism. Civil liberties were positively related to openness ($r = .14$, $p = .01$) and negatively to military intervention ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$).

Blind patriotism is in the positive relationship with military intervention ($r = .37$, $p < .01$) and in a negative relationship with openness ($r = -.14$, $p < .05$). Military

intervention also had a positive correlation with accepting immigrants ($r = .11$, $p < .05$), which might reflect a complex interplay between attitudes toward national security and openness to immigration. Civil liberties are in a positive relationship with openness ($r = .14$, $p = .01$) and in a negative relationship with military intervention ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$). Lastly, accepting immigrants is negatively correlated with extrovertism as a personality dimension ($r = -.14$, $p < .05$).

For personality dimensions, extrovertism is positively correlated with conscientiousness ($r = .36$, $p < .01$), stability ($r = .17$, $p < .05$), and openness ($r = .35$, $p < .05$) indicating that more extroverted participants tend to be more conscientious, stable, and open-minded. However, extroversion was negatively correlated with accepting immigrants ($r = -.14$, $p < .05$), suggesting that extroverted individuals might have less favorable attitudes toward immigration.

Agreeableness is positively correlated with conscientiousness ($r = .11$, $p < .05$), and stability ($r = .17$, $p < .01$). Stability is in a positive relationship with conscientiousness ($r = .47$, $p < .01$), and political knowledge ($r = .17$, $p < .01$). Lastly, openness to experience is in a positive relationship with pre-tolerance ($r = .13$, $p = .01$) suggesting that people with higher openness to experience scores tend to have higher tolerance scores at the baseline.

As for the experiment measures, pre-tolerance, post-tolerance and social distance scores of the sample, pre-tolerance is found to be in a negative relationship with traditional morality ($r = -.17$, $p < .01$), law and order ($r = -.22$, $p < .01$), blind patriotism ($r = -.20$, $p < .01$), military intervention ($r = -.13$, $p < .01$) and social distance ($r = -.60$, $p < .01$). This suggests that higher levels of pre-tolerance are associated with lower adherence to traditional and authoritarian values, as well as lower social distance. Pre-tolerance also had a positive relationship with openness to experience ($r = .13$, $p = .01$) and post-tolerance ($r = .79$, $p < .01$), indicating consistency in tolerance levels before and after the manipulation.

Post-tolerance score which measures the tolerance level after the manipulation is in a negative relationship with traditional morality (r = - .20, p < .01), law and order (r = - .25, p < .01), blind patriotism (r = - .26, p < .01), military intervention (r = - .14, p < .01), and positive relationship with accepting immigrants (r = .12, p < .01) suggesting that participants with higher post-tolerance levels are more open to immigration and less inclined toward authoritarian values. Also, post-tolerance scores are negatively correlated with social distance (r = - .57, p < .01) which requires more in-depth analysis to understand.

Interestingly, political knowledge, while a key variable in the study, did not show significant correlations with the dependent variables such as social distance (r = .01, p > .77), pre-tolerance (r = .01, p > .74), and post-tolerance (r = .02, p > .73). This lack of significant relationships suggests that political knowledge may not play a direct role in influencing these specific attitudes in the context of this study.

Table 9 Correlational Values of the Main Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1- Political Knowledge	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2- Traditional Morality	.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3- Law and Order	.31	.55**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4- Freedom of Expression	-.13*	.31	.54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5- Equality	-.01	-.10	-.18**	.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6- Bling Patriotism	.39	.47*	.48**	.15**	-.27*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7- Civil Liberties	.03	-.11	-.24	.07	.43**	-.08	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8- Military Intervention	.04	.35**	.43**	.09	-.08	.37*	-.12*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9- Accepting Immigrants	.00	-.03	-.08	.08	.03	-.07	.05	.11*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10- Extrovertism	.05	-.05	.01	.01	-.07	-.00	.04	.02	-.14*	-	-	-	-	-	-
11- Agreeableness	-04	.04	.00	.00	.10	.00	.01	-.05	-.10	.02	-	-	-	-	-
12- Conscientiousness	.09	.11	.06	.03	-.04	-.00	.06	-.01	-.03	.35··	.11·	-	-	-	-
13- Stability	.17**	.02	-.02	.02	-.07	.01	-.02	.04	.08	.16··	.17··	.46··	-	-	-
14- Openness to Experience	.03	-.28··	-.25··	-.00	.04	-.14·	.14·	-.09	-.01	.35··	.04	.07	.04	-	-
15 - Pre-Tolerance	.02	-.17··	-.21··	.00	.09	-.20··	.10	-.12·	.09	.06	.06	.05	.03	.13·	-

* The correlation is significant at p < .05, ** The correlation is significant at p < .01.

3.3. CORRELATION VALUES OF POSITIVE- NEGATIVE EMOTIONS MEASURED AFTER THE MANIPULATION AND MAIN VARIABLES OF THE STUDY

The study also examined the emotional responses of participants after the experimental manipulation by analyzing both positive and negative emotions. These were measured using the mean scores of relevant items on the scale. The correlation analysis between these emotional responses and the main variables of the study revealed several significant relationships.

The positive and negative emotions after the manipulation have been measured by the mean of the relevant items on the scale. Based on the correlation analysis among these scores and the main variables of the study, negative emotions are positively correlated with civil liberties ($r = .17$, $p < .01$) participants experiencing higher levels of negative emotions were more likely to support civil liberties. This might suggest that those who are more concerned with preserving rights and freedoms may feel negatively impacted by the manipulation.

Some variables from the political values had negative correlation with negative emotions measured after the manipulation. Traditional morality negatively correlated with negative emotions ($r = - .18$, $p < .01$). Individuals with strong traditional moral values were less likely to experience negative emotions after the manipulation. This might suggest that those who are more concerned with preserving rights and freedoms may feel negatively impacted by the manipulation. There is a significant negative correlation between law and order ($r = - .21$, $p < .01$), a commitment to regulations was associated with negative emotions after the manipulation. When personality traits are considered, agreeableness ($r = - .17$, $p < .01$) is in negative correlation with negative emotions suggesting that more agreeable individuals reported fewer negative emotions after the manipulation. Also, higher conscientiousness was associated with lower negative emotional responses ($r = - .14$, $p < .01$) and lastly individuals who are more emotionally stable ($r = - .15$, $p < .01$) experienced fewer negative emotions.

On the other hand, positive emotions after the manipulation are positively correlated with traditional morality (r = .31, p < .01). Participants with stronger traditional moral values were more likely to feel positive emotions after the manipulation. A strong belief in law and order correlated with increased positive emotions (r = .28, p < .01). Higher levels of blind patriotism (r = .32, p < .01) were significantly associated with more positive emotional responses. Support for military intervention was positively correlated with positive emotions (r = .20, p < .01). Positive emotions had significant negative correlations with equality (r = -.17, p < .01) and civil liberties (r = -. 12, p < .01). Participants who prioritized civil liberties tended to feel fewer positive emotions after the manipulation.

For personality traits, extroverted individuals tended to experience more positive emotions (r = .23, p < .01). Conscientiousness has a positive relationship with positive affect (r = .15, p = .01) meaning participants who were more conscientious also felt more positive emotions. Lastly, higher emotional stability was linked to more positive emotional experiences after the manipulation (r = .19, p < .01). An interesting correlation was observed between political knowledge and positive affect. Participants with higher political knowledge reported more positive emotions (r = .20, p < .01).

Interestingly, no significant correlations were found between positive or negative emotions and the pre-tolerance, post-tolerance, or social distance scores. This indicates that the emotional responses measured did not directly influence these specific dependent variables, suggesting that other factors might be more influential in shaping participants' tolerance levels and social distance attitudes.

The detailed correlations are presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Correlations Between Main Variables and Positive - Negative Emotions after Experimental Manipulation

Variables	Negative Emotions	Positive Emotions
1-Political Knowledge	.030	.199**
2-Traditional Morality	-.179**	.310**
3-Law and Order	-.207**	.277**
4-Freedom of Expression	-.026	-.010
5- Equality	.107	-.165**
6- Bling Patriotism	-.081	.322**
7- Civil Liberties	.174**	-.124*
8- Military Intervention	-.079	.201**
9- Accepting Immigrants	.067	-.071
10- Extrovertism	.000	.232**
11-Agreeableness	-.172**	.024
12-Conscientiousness	-.138*	.146*
13-Stability	-.154**	.189**
14- Openness to Experience	.102	.052
15- Pre-Tolerance	.084	-.072
16- Post - Tolerance	.031	-.103
17 - Social Distance	-.013	.072

* The correlation is significant at p < .05, ** The correlation is significant at p < .01.

3.4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAIN VARIABLES AND POST-TOLERANCE, SOCIAL DISTANCE, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT AFTER EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS

One phase of the study focuses on investigating the factors related to tolerance, social distance, and positive-negative affect in response to the experimental manipulation. To identify these relevant factors, four hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. For each regression analysis, variables relevant to the specific outcomes were entered systematically, considering the diversity of sub-scales involved.

In these analyses, the independent variables were entered in blocks, allowing the study to examine the predictive power of different sets of variables on the dependent outcomes of interest. This approach enabled the identification of key predictors for tolerance, social distance, and emotional responses, as well as an understanding of how these predictors interact with the experimental manipulation. The hierarchical regression framework was chosen to reveal not only the direct effects of the variables but also the unique contribution of each set of factors after accounting for the influence of other variables in the model.

3.4.1. Factors Related to Post-Tolerance Scores

To investigate the factors related to social distance scores, firstly the traditional morality, law and order, blind patriotism, equality, civil rights, military intervention has been entered into the program. For personality traits, all five are regressed. Lastly, political knowledge has been added to the analysis.

In the first model, the predictors law and order and blind patriotism were entered into the regression analysis and accounted for a significant proportion of the

variance in post-tolerance scores, $(F (2, 306) = 14.70, p < .01)$. Specifically, law and order $(\beta = -0.16, t = -2.66, p < .01)$ and blind patriotism $(\beta = -0.17, t = -2.86, p < .01)$ were both significant negative predictors meaning that higher levels of law and order and blind patriotism values are associated with lower levels of tolerance scores after the experimental manipulation. Together, these two variables explained 8% of the variance in post-tolerance scores.

In the second model, openness to experience was added to the regression. However, the inclusion of openness to experience did not significantly increase the explained variance, $(F(3, 304) = 9.95, p = .17)$. The coefficients for law and order $(\beta = -0.16, t = -2.50, p < .01)$ and blind patriotism $(\beta = -0.17, t = -2.85, p < .01)$ remained significant, while openness to experience was not a significant predictor $(\beta = 0.02, t = 0.415, p = .68)$ indicating that this personality trait did not have a significant impact on post-tolerance scores.

In the third model, adding political interest was introduced and resulted in a small but significant increase in the explained variance, $(F (4, 302) = 8.83, p < .05)$. In this model, law and order $(\beta = -0.16, t = -2.53, p < .01)$ and Blind Patriotism $(\beta = -0.17, t = -2.77, p < .01)$ remained significant negative predictors. openness to experience remained non-significant $(\beta = 0.02, t = 0.50, p = .62)$, while political interest emerged as a marginally significant negative predictor $(\beta = -0.10, t = -1.99, p < .05)$ suggesting that higher political interest might slightly reduce tolerance levels after the manipulation. This final model explained 10% of the variance in post-tolerance scores

Overall, the hierarchical regression analysis indicated that law and order and blind patriotism consistently predicted lower post-tolerance scores, while the introduction of Political Interest in the final model also contributed to explaining variance in the outcome.

Table 11: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Factors Related to Post-Tolerance Scores

Variable	β	t	R	R²	ΔR²	F	ΔF
Model 1			0,29	0,08	0,08	14,70**	
Law and Order	-0,16	-2,66**					
Blind Patriotism	-0,17	-2,86**					
Model 2			0,29	0,08	0,00	9,95	0,17
Law and Order	-0,16	-2,50**					
Blind Patriotism	-0,17	-2,85**					
Openness to Experience	0,02	0,415					
Model 3			0,31	0,10	0,01	8,83*	3,98
Law and Order	-0,16	-2,53**					
Blind Patriotism	-0,17	-2,77**					
Openness to Experience	0,02	0,50					
Political Interest	-0,10	-1,99*					

* The correlation is significant at $p < .05$, ** The correlation is significant at $p < .01$.

3.4. 2. Factors Related to Social Distance Scores

A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to examine the predictors of social distance. The analysis was performed in two steps allowing the contribution of different predictors.

In the first model, the predictors law and order, blind patriotism, and accepting immigrants were entered into the regression analysis. This model accounted for

a significant proportion of the variance in social distance, (F (3, 303) = 8.448, p < .001). Specifically, law and order (β = 0.122, t = 1.932, p = .054) was marginally significant, suggesting a trend where higher law and order values are associated with higher social distance scores, though this did not reach conventional significance levels. Blind patriotism (β = 0.155, t = 2.457, p = .015) was a significant positive predictor, indicating that higher levels of blind patriotism are associated with increased social distance after the experimental manipulation. Accepting immigrants (β = -0.123, t = -2.213, p = .028) was a significant negative predictor meaning that greater acceptance of immigrants is associated with lower social distance scores. These predictors together explained 7.7% of the variance in social distance.

In the second model, the personality traits stability and openness to experience were added to the regression. The inclusion of personality values stability and openness to experience resulted in a significant increase in the explained variance, (F(5, 301) = 4.938, p = .008). In this model, law and order (β = 0.091, t = 1.424, p = .155) was no longer significant, indicating that its effect on social distance diminished after accounting for the added personality traits.

However, blind patriotism (β = 0.147, t = 2.367, p = .019) and accepting immigrants (β = -0.136, t = -2.480, p = .014) remained significant predictors. Additionally, stability (β = 0.110, t = 2.014, p = .045) emerged as a significant positive predictor, suggesting that participants who are more emotionally stable tend to have higher social distance scores. Openness to experience (β = -0.141, t = -2.498, p = .013) was a significant negative predictor, indicating that participants who are more open to new experiences tend to have lower social distance scores. The inclusion of stability and openness to experience improved the overall model fit, increasing the explained variance to 10.6%

Overall, the hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the predictors contributed significantly to explaining the variance in social distance, with each subsequent model improving the fit of the model.

Table 12: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Factors Related to Social Distance Scores

Variable	β	t	R	R²	ΔR²	F	ΔF
Model 1			0,278	0,077	0,077	8,448	
Law and Order	0,122	1,932					
Blind Patriotism	0,155	2,457					
Accepting Immigrants	-0,123	-2,213					
Model 2			0,326	0,106	0,029	4,938	4,938
Law and Order	0,091	1,424					
Blind Patriotism	0,147	2,367					
Accepting Immigrants	-0,136	-2,48					
Stability	0,11	2,014					
Openness to Experience	-0,141	-2,498					

* The correlation is significant at p < .05, ** The correlation is significant at p < .01.

3.4.3. Factors Related to Positive Affect After Experimental Manipulation

To investigate the factors contributing to positive affect following the experimental manipulation, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in three steps. The analysis aimed to understand how political values, personality traits, and political knowledge influence positive attitudes.

To investigate the relationship between positive emotions and the main variables, in the first model, the predictors traditional morality and blind patriotism entered as predictors. These variables accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in positive emotions, ($F_{(2, 304)} = 24.010$, $p < .001$). Traditional morality ($β = .204$, $t = 3.382$, $p < .001$) and blind patriotism ($β = .227$, $t = 3.768$, $p < .001$)

were both significant predictors indicating that higher scores on traditional morality are associated with higher levels of positive affect and stronger blind patriotism is linked to increased positive affect. These two predictors explained 13% of the variance in positive emotions after experimental manipulations.

In the second model, the inclusion of personality traits specifically stability and extrovertism were entered into the regression. This involvement resulted in a significant increase in the explained variance, $(F_{(4, 302)} = 20.799, p < .001)$. Both extrovertism $(\beta = .220, t = 4.247, p < .001)$ and stability $(\beta = .144, t = 2.776, p = .006)$ were significant predictors, meaning that more extroverted individuals tend to experience higher levels of positive affect and emotionally stable individuals report higher positive affect. Traditional morality $(\beta = .213, t = 3.692, p < .001)$ and blind patriotism $(\beta = .222, t = 3.855, p < .001)$. also remained as significant positive predictors. This new model was successful to explain the 21 % of the variance by an increase of 8%.

In the third model, political knowledge and political interest were added to the analysis. This model resulted in a further significant increase in the explained variance, $(F_{(6, 300)} = 17.881, p < .001)$. Traditional morality $(\beta = .182, t = 3.209, p = .001)$, blind patriotism $(\beta = .226, t = 4.028, p < .001)$, extrovertism $(\beta = .181, t = 3.526, p < .001)$, stability $(\beta = .116, t = 2.279, p = .023)$ remained significant predictors. Political knowledge was not a significant predictor $(\beta = .088, t = 1.664, p = .097)$ while political interest $(\beta = .181, t = 3.365, p < .001)$ emerged as a significant predictor for the model indicating that participants with higher political interest tend to have higher positive affect scores. This final model explained 26% of the variance in positive emotions, with a 4% increase in explained variance from the second model

Overall, Traditional morality and blind patriotism has a positive relationship with political affect scores meaning that higher scores on traditional morality and blind patriotism are associated with higher degrees of political affect. Similarly, higher stability and extrovertism as personality traits are associated with higher political affect scores towards disliked groups. The hierarchical regression revealed that

the predictors significantly contributed to explaining the variance in positive attitudes, with each subsequent model improving the model fit.

Table 13: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Factors Related to Positive Affect

Variable	β	t	R	R²	ΔR²	F	ΔF
Model 1			0,36	0,13	0,13	24,01**	
Traditional Morality	0,20	3,38**					
Blind Patriotism	0,22	3,76**					
Model 2			0,46	0,21	0,08	20,79**	15,32**
Traditional Morality	0,21	3,69**					
Blind Patriotism	0,22	3,85**					
Extrovert MEAN	0,22	4,24**					
Stability MEAN	0,14	2,77**					
Model 3			0,51	0,26	0,04	17,88	9,65
Traditional Morality	0,18	3,20**					
Blind Patriotism	0,22	4,02**					
Extrovertism	0,18	3,52**					
Stability	0,11	2,27*					
Political Knowledge	0,08	1,66					
Political Interest	0,18	3,36**					

* The correlation is significant at $p < .05$, ** The correlation is significant at $p < .01$.

3.4.4. Factors Related to Negative Affect After Experimental Manipulation

The last hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the predictors of negative emotions. The analysis included three models, each adding additional predictors to the regression equation.

In the first model, the predictors law and order, blind patriotism and civil liberties were entered as predictors. This model accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in negative emotions ($F (3, 303) = 6.429$, $p < .001$) explaining 6% of the variance. Law and order ($\beta = -0.185$, $t = -2.835$, $p = .005$) was a significant predictor indicating that higher adherence to law-and-order values is associated with lower levels of negative emotions. Civil liberties ($\beta = 0.132$, $t = 2.297$, $p = .022$) was a significant predictor, suggesting that participants who prioritize civil liberties tend to experience higher negative emotions. Blind patriotism ($\beta = 0.018$, $t = 0.287$, $p = .775$) did not significantly predict negative emotions.

In the second model, the inclusion of personality traits, specifically agreeableness and openness to experience resulted in a significant increase in the explained variance ($F (5, 301) = 6.142$, $p < .001$) by an increase of 3.3.%. Agreeableness ($\beta = -0.177$, $t = -3.215$, $p = .001$) was a significant predictor, alongside law and order ($\beta = -0.173$, $t = -2.641$, $p = .009$) and civil liberties ($\beta = 0.131$, $t = 2.307$, $p = .022$). However, openness to experience ($\beta = 0.050$, $t = 0.873$, $p = .384$) and blind patriotism ($\beta = 0.020$, $t = 0.323$, $p = .747$) were not significant predictors for this model. The model explained 9.3% of the total variance.

In the third model, socioeconomic status and political interest were added and this model resulted in a further significant increase in the explained variance ($F (7, 299) = 5.785$, $p < .001$). Socioeconomic status was a significant negative

predictor (β = -0.134, t = -2.432, p = .016) suggesting that participants with higher socioeconomic status experience fewer negative emotions.

Political interest (β = 0.109, t = 1.982, p = .048) emerged as a marginally significant predictor indicating that greater political interest is associated with higher levels of negative emotions. Law and order (β = -0.160, t = -2.467, p = .014), civil rights (β = 0.126, t = 2.247, p = .025), and agreeableness (β = -0.153, t = -2.776, p = .006) continued to be significant predictors. However, openness to experience (β = 0.047, t = 0.831, p = .407) and blind patriotism (β = 0.012, t = 0.194, p = .846) remained non-significant. This final model accounted for 11.9% of the variance in negative emotions.

Overall, law and order and agreeableness had a negative relationship with negative emotions, indicating that higher loyalty and agreeableness are associated with lower levels of negative emotions. Conversely, civil liberties and political interest showed positive relationships with negative emotions, suggesting that higher clarity/commitment and political interest are associated with higher negative emotions. The hierarchical regression revealed that each subsequent model significantly contributed to explaining the variance in negative emotions, with incremental improvements in model fit.

Table 14: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Factors Related to Negative Affect

Variable	β	t	R	R²	ΔR²	F	ΔF
Model 1			0,24	0,06		6,42**	
Law and Order	-0,18	-2,83**					
Blind Patriotism	0,01	0,28					
Civil Liberties	0,13	2,29					
Model 2			0,30	0,09	0,03	6,14**	5,42**

Law and Order	-0,17	-2,64**					
Blind Patriotism	0,02	0,32					
Civil Liberties	0,13	2,30					
Agreeableness	-0,17	-3,21**					
Openness to Experience	0,05	0,87					
Model 3			0,34	0,11	0,02	5,78**	4,53
Law and Order	-0,16	-2,46					
Blind Patriotism	0,01	0,19					
Civil Liberties	0,12	2,24					
Agreeableness	-0,15	-2,77**					
Openness to Experience	0,04	0,83					
Socioeconomic Status	-0,13	-2,43*					
Political Interest	0,10	1,98*					

3.5. THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCORES AFTER THE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION

In order to investigate the impact of manipulation on social distance scores for the least liked groups between security and liberty framed groups, an independent sample's t-test has been implemented. Results indicated that the difference between groups was slightly significant *(t (305) = 1.907, p = .05)*. The social distance scores of the security framed group (M = 3,69, SD = .070) is slightly higher than the liberty framed group (M= 3.51, SD = .064).

This finding suggests that the security framing, which emphasizes the restriction of civil liberties to protect national security, may evoke a greater sense of social distance towards disliked social groups compared to the liberty framing. In other

words, when participants were exposed to messaging that highlighted the need for security, they were more likely to perceive and maintain a greater distance from groups they already held negative feelings toward. This increased social distance implies that security framing could potentially heighten perceptions of "us versus them," leading individuals to feel more alienated or disconnected from certain groups, particularly those they already view unfavorably.

The slightly significant difference, while not overwhelming and may not be generalized, still points to a noteworthy trend: framing that focuses on security may exacerbate existing biases or prejudices by reinforcing the idea that certain groups pose a threat to societal safety. This stands in contrast to liberty framing, which might emphasize individual freedoms and rights, potentially fostering a more inclusive or tolerant attitude.

The results align with theories suggesting that security-driven narratives can intensify feelings of suspicion or hostility towards out-groups, as the emphasis on protecting the nation can lead to an increase in social distance. However, the marginal significance also indicates that this effect, while present, may not be strong or universal. It raises important questions about the contexts and conditions under which security framing might significantly alter perceptions of social groups, as well as the extent to which such framing influences broader social attitudes and behaviors.

3.6. THE IMPACT OF EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION ON TOLERANCE SCORES BETWEEN FRAMING GROUPS

One of the aims of the current study is the interaction between time as pre and post scores on tolerance and experiment type as security and liberty framing groups. In order to conduct the analyses a Mixed ANOVA (2: time x 2: group) has been implemented. Results indicated that The main effect of time was not statistically significant ($F_{(1,305)}=0.041$, $p=.840$, $\eta2=.000$). This indicates that there was no significant change in tolerance from pre- to post-measurement.

The main effect of experiment type was not significant, (β=0.208, t (305) =1.759, p=.079) On average, participants in the liberty framing condition had slightly higher tolerance scores compared to those in the security framing condition, but this difference was not statistically significant.

The interaction between time and experiment type was not statistically significant, (F (1,305)=0.765, p=.383, $\eta2$ =.003). This suggests that the change in tolerance over time did not differ significantly between the liberty framing and security framing groups.

Overall, the mixed ANOVA revealed that neither time nor the interaction between time and experiment type significantly affected tolerance. The marginal effect of experiment type suggests a potential, though not strong, difference in tolerance based on the framing condition.

3.7. RELATION BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

The independent samples t-test comparing the negative emotions between the security and liberty framing groups yielded the following results (t (173) = 1.31, p = .192), The result is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no significant difference in negative emotion scores between the security framing group and the liberty framing group after the manipulation.

This finding suggests that, contrary to the initial hypothesis, the framing of issues in terms of security did not result in significantly higher negative emotions compared to framing them in terms of liberty. The expectation was that security framing, which often emphasizes threats, dangers, and the need for protection, would heighten negative emotional responses such as fear, anger, or anxiety. However, the data did not support this hypothesis, as the emotional responses in both framing groups were statistically indistinguishable.

The lack of a significant difference may imply several possibilities. It could suggest that both framing approaches—security and liberty—evoke similar levels of emotional intensity, possibly because both involve core values that resonate strongly with individuals. Alternatively, it might indicate that the specific manipulation used in the study was not strong enough to differentiate the emotional impact of the two framings. It's also possible that other factors, such as participants' pre-existing attitudes, beliefs, or the context in which the framing was presented, played a role in moderating the emotional responses, leading to the observed results.

3.8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELATED VARIABLES AND MAIN VARIABLES

An independent sample's t-test was conducted to assess the impact of gender on various personality traits. The analysis revealed significant gender differences in specific traits, while other traits showed no significant differences between men and women.

The results indicated that women (M = 4.99, SD = 1.04) scored significantly higher on agreeableness compared to men (M = 4.53, SD = 1.00), indicating strong statistical significance *(t (305) = 3.817, p < .01)*. This suggests that, on average, women tend to be more cooperative, compassionate, and empathetic than men, reinforcing common gender-based stereotypes associated with agreeableness. Conversely, the analysis found that men (M = 4.47, SD = 1.09) exhibited significantly higher levels of emotional stability *(t (305) = -3.788, p < .01)* than women (M = 3.87, SD = 1.37). Emotional stability, often associated with resilience and the ability to handle stress, appears to be more pronounced in men within the sample, suggesting that men might be better equipped to manage emotional responses in challenging situations compared to women.

Another independent sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the gender differences between political values. The analysis showed that men (M = 3.12,

SD = 1.08) scored significantly higher on traditional morality (t (305) = -3.955, p < .001) than women (M = 2.65, SD = 0.99). The results also revealed that men (M = 2.65, SD = 1.15) scored higher on the law-and-order scale compared to women (M = 2.40, SD = 1.00), with the difference approaching significance (t (305) = -1.943, p = .053). Men (M = 2.49, SD = 0.89) also scored significantly higher on the free enterprise scale than women (M = 2.22, SD = 0.92), with a significant difference (t (305) = -2.615, p = .009). This result suggests that men in the sample may be more supportive of economic systems that emphasize market freedom and individual entrepreneurship. Also, men scored higher (M = 2.48, SD = 1.08) on military intervention subscale (t (305) = -3.880, p < .001) than women (M = 2.05, SD = 0.86) suggesting a gender difference in attitudes toward the use of military force

As for examining factors related to political interest, political knowledge, and political party affiliation, the analysis revealed that only political interest significantly differs between genders. The findings show that men (M = 4.78, SD = 1.79) generally exhibit significantly higher levels of political interest (t (305) =−4.084, p < .01) compared to women (M = 3.79, SD = 1.64). This suggests that men, on average, are more likely to engage with and express interest in political matters than women.

In contrast, no significant gender differences were found in terms of political knowledge or political party affiliation. This indicates that, despite the difference in political interest, men and women possess similar levels of understanding about political issues and are similarly distributed across political party affiliations. The lack of difference in these areas suggests that while men may be more interested in politics, this does not necessarily translate into greater political knowledge or a different pattern of party affiliation when compared to women.

To investigate the impact of socio-economic status on various experimental variables, an independent samples t-test was conducted. Socio-economic status (SES) of the participants was calculated based on the average of two relevant questions: whether the individual had a private room while growing up and whether they were able to pay bills without difficulty. The analysis aimed to

explore the relationship between socio-economic status and several key outcomes, including post-tolerance scores, social distance scores, and emotional affects.

The results indicated that socio-economic status did not have a statistically significant relationship with post-tolerance scores, social distance scores, or positive affect. This suggests that regardless of socio-economic background, participants exhibited similar levels of tolerance, perceived social distance, and positive emotions.

However, the analysis did reveal a significant relationship between socio-economic status and negative affect. The t-test results showed a strong statistical significance *(t (305) = - 42.69, p < .01)*. Specifically, participants with lower socio-economic status reported significantly higher levels of negative affect (*M* = 2.41, SD = 0.93) compared to those with higher socio-economic status (M = 1.99, SD = 0.76).

This finding suggests that individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more prone to experiencing negative emotions, such as sadness, anger, or anxiety. The increased negative affect among those with lower SES could be attributed to the stress and challenges associated with financial instability, lack of resources, and potentially more difficult living conditions. These factors may contribute to a heightened emotional response when facing adversities, leading to more pronounced negative affect.

In contrast, individuals with higher socio-economic status, who may have greater access to resources and more stable living conditions, tend to experience less negative affect, possibly due to lower stress levels and greater capacity to cope with difficulties.

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

The current study was conducted during the heated debates surrounding the drafting of a new constitution in Türkiye, a process marked by significant disagreements between opposing sides, particularly regarding civil liberties. The timing of this study coincided with the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Türkiye, an event that significantly heightened threat perceptions among citizens. This context created a natural environment for examining how framing scenarios—focused on either security or liberty—might influence social distance and political tolerance among university students. In this chapter results of the study will be discussed and insights for future studies will be provided.

4.1. THE DISCUSSION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAIN VARIABLES AND POST-TOLERANCE SCORES, SOCIAL DISTANCE, POSITIVE-NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

In the first hypothesis of the research, relevant factors predicting the post-tolerance scores, social distance scores and positive-negative emotions were targeted. Main variables of the study were political knowledge, political values with 8 different sub-categories and personality traits with 5 dimensions. Since involvement of all sub-scales and dimensions would not be appropriate, correlated variables entered the regression analyses.

The first hierarchical regression analysis conducted to determine the predictive variables for the post-tolerance scores after the experimental manipulation. Tolerance in the political context focuses on the debates on who should not be allowed to do what and why (Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby, 2010). Results highlighted that law and order, and blind patriotism consistently predicted lower post-tolerance scores, meaning that individuals with higher levels of these values are less tolerant after the experimental manipulation. Law and order is

defined as enforcement and obedience to law, protection against threats to the social order (Schwartz et al., 2010). Also, law and order can be seen as an attitude to solve the problems within the society emerging from crimes and criminality (Cheesman, 2022). The association between law and order and lower tolerance may reflect a preference for maintaining social stability and control, even at the expense of restricting certain freedoms or behaviors. Blind patriotism on the other hand means unquestioning attachment to and intolerance of criticism of one's country (Schwartz et al., 2010). Individuals who exhibit high levels of blind patriotism may be less tolerant of dissenting views or behaviors that they perceive as threatening to national unity or identity. Also, blind patriotism is associated with intolerant attitudes towards outgroup members (Schwartz et al., 2010). This form of patriotism can lead to a rigid stance against those who challenge the status quo or express critical opinions, thereby contributing to lower tolerance levels.

Considering these findings, it becomes clear that both law and order and blind patriotism are influential in shaping attitudes toward tolerance, particularly in contexts where there is a perceived need to protect societal norms and national identity. The regression analysis underscores the importance of these values in determining how individuals respond to different framing scenarios and their subsequent levels of tolerance. This suggests that efforts to promote tolerance might need to address underlying concerns related to social order and national loyalty, particularly among those who prioritize these values.

The introduction of openness to experience into the hierarchical regression model did not significantly impact the overall predictive power of the model, indicating that this personality trait did not play a substantial role in explaining the variance in post-tolerance scores following the experimental manipulation. Despite openness to experience often being associated with greater acceptance of diverse perspectives and less stereotypes (Freitag and Rapp, 2014) and a willingness to embrace new ideas, in this context, it did not significantly influence tolerance levels. Regarding political interest, studies have found that it can

marginally contribute to tolerance levels, although its effect size tends to be smaller compared to other variables. Individuals with higher political interest may be more engaged in debates around tolerance, but this engagement does not always lead to higher tolerance levels

These findings underscore the complex interplay of values, personality traits, and political engagement in shaping attitudes toward tolerance. Based on these findings, it can be interpreted that concerns related to social order and national loyalty might be crucial in promoting tolerance, especially among those who prioritize these values.

The second hierarchical regression analysis is conducted to reveal predictive factors for social distance. The concept of social distance is related to how close people feel towards other group members (Karakayali, 2009). Unlike tolerance scores, social distance levels of the participants were measured only after the experimental manipulations. As it was the case for post-tolerance scores, blind patriotism is an important factor for predicting social distance levels of the respondents. As explained earlier, this value is associated with intolerance towards outgroup members, related to superiority and opposite of universalism and hedonism (Schwartz et al., 2010). Another variable in the model was accepting immigrants. Accepting immigrants is defined as welcoming attitudes towards immigrants with a belief that they may enrich one's country (Schwartz et al., 2013). This variable was in negative relationship with the social distance meaning that acceptance of immigrants associated with lower social distance. This suggests that individuals who are more accepting of immigrants tend to maintain closer social ties with diverse groups, exhibiting lower levels of social distance. The increased rate of immigrants around the globe has been contributing to the cultural, ethnic, economical conflict. The relation between these have been reflected by some media channels, right-wing politicians via xenophobic narratives. Openness to experience for example, is associated with rejecting stereotypes (Freitag & Rapp, 2014).

In the broader terms, accepting immigrants is associated with some personality values as well such as universalism, openness to experience, benevolence (Schwartz et al., 2013). This relationship is confirmed by the current findings that higher levels of openness to experience and stability were associated with less distance towards disliked groups.

The third hierarchical regression analysis conducted to investigate the predictor variables for negative affect after the experimental manipulation. The literature is wide in terms of the relationship between baseline emotions and tolerance. However, current research investigates the emotions that security and liberty framed scenarios evoked. A study investigating the role of moral emotions indicated that disgust, anger and pity are playing an important role in predicting prejudice, social distance and tolerance while disgust and pity are more sternly predicting social distance (Wirtz & Bertjan, 2016). Based on the analysis, law and order found to be related to negative emotions. Research has shown that individuals who prioritize law and order values tend to have a strong desire for stability and predictability in society. This emphasis on social control and order can mitigate negative emotions by providing a sense of security and reducing perceived threats (Cheesman, 2022). The connection between law-and-order values and reduced negative emotions has been observed in contexts where societal threats or instability are prominent, leading individuals who prioritize these values to experience less fear or anxiety.

Another political value associated with negative emotions is civil liberties. Civil liberties as a value are defined by favoring freedom, expressing concerns for others and opposition to conservatism (Schwartz et al., 2010). However, in politically charged environments, individuals who strongly prioritize civil liberties may experience increased negative emotions, especially when they perceive these liberties to be under threat. This heightened emotional response can be linked to the stress and frustration of witnessing or experiencing perceived injustices or restrictions on personal freedoms (Davis & Silver, 2004). Agreeableness on the other hand is a personality trait associated with warmth, kindness, and a tendency to avoid conflict. Individuals high in agreeableness are

more likely to experience lower levels of negative emotions because they are inclined to maintain positive social interactions and avoid situations that could lead to conflict or emotional distress. This has been supported by multiple studies that show how agreeable individuals often report higher overall life satisfaction and lower levels of stress and anxiety (John & Srivastava, 1999). Besides political values and personality traits, negative emotions were predicted by political interest. High political interest often correlates with greater engagement in political issues, which can amplify emotional responses. Individuals who are deeply invested in political matters are more likely to experience heightened emotions, both positive and negative, depending on the political climate and outcomes (Valentino et al., 2011). This is particularly evident in situations where political interests clash with personal values, leading to stress, frustration, or anger. Current study was also successful to show that people who are highly interested in politics indicated higher levels of negative emotions. Lastly for this analysis, socio-economic status was also in relation with the negative emotions. Higher socioeconomic status generally provides individuals with more resources, stability, and opportunities, which can buffer against negative emotions. Research has shown that individuals with higher SES experience lower levels of stress and anxiety due to greater financial security and access to resources that promote well-being (Adler et al., 1994). However, it is more likely that this relationship was not related to the experiment but rather related to the general emotional state of the low SES participants.

The last hierarchical regression was on positive emotions and predictive variables. Traditional morality and blind patriotism were significant predictors of the positive emotions. This finding is consistent with the prior research indicating these values often reinforce group cohesion and national pride, leading to heightened emotional responses (Schwartz et al., 2010). The attachment and emotional investment in these values can enhance feelings of pride and positive emotions when national ideals are upheld, which aligns with findings in political psychology that highlight the emotional impact of patriotism on individuals (Staub & Bar-Tal, 1997). Additionally, the inclusion of personality traits like stability and extroversion further improves the understanding of positive affect. Stability, which

relates to emotional resilience, and extroversion, which involves social engagement and positivity, both contribute to increased positive emotions, reinforcing the idea that personality traits play a crucial role in shaping affective responses (Schwartz et al., 2013). While political interest was found to contribute to positive attitudes, political knowledge did not significantly impact emotional outcomes. This distinction may suggest that active engagement and interest in politics may stir stronger emotional responses than mere awareness or knowledge, aligning with findings that suggest emotional engagement is more closely tied to action-oriented political participation than to informational understanding alone (Huddy et al., 2007). Interestingly, the study found that positive emotions were uniquely predicted by political interest, underscoring the distinct role that active political engagement plays in shaping positive affect. This highlights the nuanced interplay between values, personality traits, and political engagement in determining how individuals emotionally respond to various political and social stimuli.

4.2. THE DISCUSSION ON THE IMPACT OF EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION ON PRE-TOLERANCE AND POST-TOLERANCE SCORES

One of the hypotheses of this research was that there would be a significant interaction between the type of experimental manipulation (security vs. liberty framing) and time (pre and post tolerance scores), with the expectation that post-tolerance scores would be significantly lower in the security framing group compared to the liberty framing group. However, the results of the ANOVA did not support this hypothesis. The analysis revealed that neither the interaction between framing condition and time nor the main effects of time and experimental condition were significant. This indicates that there was no significant difference in tolerance scores from pre- to post-manipulation based on whether participants were exposed to the security or liberty framing. In other words, the framing scenarios did not produce the anticipated effect on participants' tolerance levels,

and the tolerance scores remained consistent across both groups regardless of the framing condition.

The concept of framing was first experimentally tested by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in their study on decision-making under risk. They demonstrated that people's choices could be significantly influenced by how options were framed, such as whether an outcome was presented in terms of lives saved or lives lost. This groundbreaking study showed that riskier choices were preferred when scenarios emphasized losses, introducing the powerful impact of framing on human decision-making.

Framing can evoke different emotions and cognitive responses by presenting the same event in varied ways. For instance, welfare policies can be framed as either a supportive community effort to help those in need or as a system that perpetuates dependency and poverty (Nelson, Clawson, & Axley, 1997). In the current study, framing effects were employed to evoke feelings of security or liberty, potentially influenced by participants' personality traits and political values. Although the hypothesis expected significant changes in tolerance levels based on these framing conditions, the lack of significant findings suggests that other factors may play an important role.

In the current study, framing effects were employed to evoke feelings of security or liberty based on the participants' personality traits and political values. The partial alignment of our findings with existing literature suggests that security threats can reduce political tolerance, as indicated by the higher social distance scores in the security framing group. However, the lack of a significant interaction effect on tolerance scores may indicate that the framing manipulation may not be strong enough to elicit a marked change in tolerance levels. Alternatively, other factors, such as participants' baseline political values or the timing of the experiment, may have played a moderating role. Also, empirical studies support the notion that framing effects, particularly those related to security and liberty, may not always yield significant changes in tolerance levels. Research has shown that while framing can influence public opinion on certain issues, its impact on deeply ingrained values, such as political tolerance, may be limited. For example,

a study found that manipulating perceived threats (e.g., terrorism) did not significantly alter citizens' support for security policies, suggesting that such manipulations may not effectively shift deeply held beliefs or attitudes, including tolerance levels (Mondak & Hurwitz, 2012). Similarly, research on media framing of civil liberties conflicts indicates that while frames can highlight certain aspects of a debate, they do not always lead to significant changes in tolerance, particularly when individuals already have established views on the matter (Gibson & Bingham, 1985).

The study employed an open-ended "least liked group" approach, where participants were asked to individually identify groups they socially disliked. This method, however, may have inadvertently influenced the participants' responses, particularly in the context of recent coup attempts that heightened concerns about national security. In such a charged environment, participants might have been more inclined to name violent and terrorist groups as their least liked, rather than focusing on social groups, which was the primary aim of the study. This shift in focus could have been driven by an immediate sense of threat, leading participants to prioritize security concerns over social dynamics.

The methodology, specifically the survey design, did not adequately address or intervene in how participants conceptualized "social groups." Ideally, the study should have guided participants to exclude violent and terrorist groups from their responses and instead focus on societal groups defined by cultural, ethnic, or ideological differences. The failure to clearly delineate these categories likely led to a misunderstanding of the intended concept of social groups, thereby compromising the study's effectiveness in measuring true political tolerance.

Furthermore, the lack of significant findings from the experimental manipulation could also be attributed to the limitations of the survey method used. This method may have been insufficient to fully capture and test participants' understanding of the constitutional framing of the issues at hand, particularly the distinction between security and liberty. The survey design may not have effectively emphasized the differences between the experimental conditions, thereby weakening the manipulation's impact. This methodological shortcoming could

explain why the experimental manipulation did not produce the expected effects, as participants might not have fully grasped the intended framing of the issues related to security and liberty.

These findings highlight the complex nature of political tolerance, which may be less malleable in the short term and more influenced by deeply ingrained values than by immediate framing effects. Future research could be more precise on the method used and consider the immediate impact of security evoking incidents.

4.3. THE DISCUSSION ON SOCIAL DISTANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND LIBERTY FRAMING GROUPS

Another hypothesis of the study was that the impact of experimental manipulation will be significant between liberty and security framing groups on social distance scores. The findings from the independent sample t-test, which indicated a slightly significant difference in social distance scores between the security and liberty framing groups, provide valuable insights into how framing can influence social attitudes. Although the difference was marginal, the results suggest that security framing may foster greater social distance towards disliked groups, aligning with existing theories on the impact of security narratives on social perceptions.

The notion that security framing increases social distance is consistent with the literature on how threat perceptions influence intergroup relations. According to Huddy et al. (2005), security-focused narratives often activate threat perceptions, which can lead to heightened in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. This "us versus them" mentality, as observed in the security-framed group, likely contributes to the increased social distance, as participants may perceive out-groups as potential threats to national security.

Similarly, Steele and Aronson (1995) suggest that framing that emphasizes threats to security can trigger stereotype threat and reinforce existing biases, leading individuals to distance themselves from groups they associate with these

threats. This is particularly relevant in the context of political messaging, where security rhetoric is frequently used to mobilize support by emphasizing the dangers posed by out-groups (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015).

The results, while not statistically significant, suggests that the effect of security framing on social distance may not be strong or universally applicable. This raises important questions about the specific conditions under which security framing influences social perceptions. Research by Valentino et al. (2011) indicates that the impact of framing is often contingent on individual differences, such as baseline political values or the degree of perceived threat. This could explain why the security framing in this study did not produce a more pronounced effect on social distance, as participants' pre-existing attitudes may have moderated their responses to the framing manipulation.

Moreover, research conducted by Gibson and Bingham (1985) on civil liberties framing suggests that while such frames can influence public opinion, their impact on deeply held beliefs, such as social tolerance, may be limited. This aligns with the current findings, where the framing did not significantly impact tolerance levels, potentially due to the existence of participants' pre-existing values. The timing of the experiment was crucial. The context of the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye might have played a significant role in shaping the results of this study. The attempted coup was a major national crisis that heightened concerns about security and national unity, potentially making security framing more salient and impactful for participants. The coup likely intensified fears about internal threats and the need for strong security measures, which could have led participants to respond more strongly to security-related frames, as suggested by research on crisis-driven shifts in public opinion (Cizre, 2016). This heightened sensitivity to security issues might have contributed to the slightly higher social distance scores in the security framing group, as participants may have been more inclined to view certain groups as threats to national stability.

4.4. GENDER DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL VALUES, PERSONALITY TRAITS, AND POLITICAL INTEREST

Results of comparison of personality traits, political values, political interests and political knowledge between female and male respondents provided insights on the different approaches based on gender. Even though the current study did not aim to provide an analysis on gender differences, it is worth it to search in detail for future studies whether the sample provides different approaches by gender.

The independent sample t-test revealed significant gender differences in certain personality traits, highlighting key areas where men and women differ. Women scored significantly higher on agreeableness while men exhibited higher levels of emotional stability.

The finding that women scored higher on agreeableness is consistent with a substantial body of literature that suggests women tend to be more cooperative, compassionate, and empathetic than men. Agreeableness, as a personality trait, encompasses behaviors such as kindness, trust, and altruism, which are often socially reinforced in women from a young age (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). This pattern may reflect both biological and social influences. Evolutionary theories propose that women's higher agreeableness is linked to their roles in nurturing and maintaining social harmony, which have been critical for child-rearing and community cohesion throughout human history (Buss, 1995).

Social role theory also supports these findings by suggesting that societal expectations and gender roles promote nurturing and cooperative behaviors in women more than in men (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Women are often encouraged to develop and express empathy and interpersonal sensitivity, which may explain their higher scores on agreeableness. These gendered expectations are not only reflected in personality traits but also in professional and personal life choices, often leading to women occupying roles that require higher levels of agreeableness, such as caregiving and teaching professions (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).

Conversely, men scored higher in emotional stability which is associated with the capability to control one's emotional reactions, absence of negative effects (Caprara et al.,1006). It should be noted that personality trait scale is a self-assessed scale which allows individuals to reflect one's own perception about themselves. From a young age, men are often socialized to suppress their emotions and exhibit stoicism, which aligns with societal expectations of masculinity. This socialization can lead men to perceive themselves as more emotionally stable because they are taught to manage or hide their emotional responses, especially in stressful situations (Brody & Hall, 2008). Cultural norms often reinforce the idea that men should be strong, resilient, and emotionally controlled. These expectations can influence how men self-assess their emotional stability, leading them to believe that they are more stable than women, who may be perceived as more emotionally expressive or vulnerable (Eagly & Wood, 2012).

Similarly, there were differences between genders on certain political values. The analysis revealed that men show higher levels of traditional morality scores than women. This suggests that men in the sample are more likely to endorse traditional moral values, which often emphasize the importance of conventional social norms, family structures, and religious beliefs. These findings are consistent with existing literature that shows men, particularly those with conservative orientations, are more inclined to uphold traditional moral standards (Schwartz et al., 2010; Eagly & Wood, 2012). Also, men scored higher on law and order, which restricts individuals' freedom to pursue unique or different interests, adventures and pleasures, and it discourages tolerance of different ways of living (Schwartz et al., 2013). This finding suggests that men may be more supportive of policies and ideologies that prioritize societal stability and strict enforcement of laws. Men's higher commitment of law and order could be linked to a greater preference for hierarchical structures and control, which are often associated with traditional masculine roles (Schwartz et al., 2010). The near significance of this result suggests that while the difference is not overwhelming, there is a trend where men tend to favor a more controlled and regulated societal framework.

Another subscale of political values that men indicated higher levels than women is military intervention. Military intervention is associated with the need of protection against danger and change and requires power (Schwartz et al. 2013). This finding is consistent with studies that indicate men are generally more inclined to endorse the use of force in international relations and are more supportive of defense spending and military actions (Eagly & Wood, 2012). This gender difference can be attributed to both biological factors, such as higher levels of testosterone, which are associated with aggression and dominance (Archer, 2006), and social factors, where men are socialized to adopt roles as protectors and defenders, which can translate into greater support for military solutions. Lastly, men also scored significantly higher on the free enterprise scale than women which suggests that men in the sample may be more supportive of economic systems that emphasize market freedom, individual entrepreneurship, and limited government intervention.

The last analysis based on gender differences revealed that among political interest, knowledge, and party affiliation revealed that political interest is the only factor where men and women significantly differ. Research has consistently shown that men tend to report higher levels of political interest, which is often attributed to gender roles and socialization processes that encourage men to participate more actively in public and political life (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). Historically, politics has been seen as a male-dominated sphere, and although this has changed significantly, remnants of these traditional roles may still influence the levels of interest and engagement among men and women today (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

4.5. DISCUSSION ON THE LEAST-LIKED GROUPS

The least-liked group approach allowed participants to freely indicate the social groups they disliked. Each participant indicated 3 disliked groups to evaluate their tolerance and social distance. The distribution of social groups in this study reveals critical insights into how different categories of groups—such as political,

religious, social, and ethnic groups—are perceived by university students in Türkiye, particularly in the context of security versus liberty framing.

The least liked approach with an open ending option enables wide range of groups instead of providing a list of social groups. However, in the current study considering the timing after the coup attempt which evoked the need of security and reaction towards terrorist attempts, the open ending selection was not the ideal method. Huge majority of the 921 responds to least liked groups were FETÖ, PKK, ISIS, and other terrorist groups which cannot be grouped as social groups within the society. Thus, these results should be evaluated as the approach of the sample to social structure immediately after the coup attempt.

Political groups have a strong presence among all three disliked group choices. The highest frequency among this group belongs to the AK Party and HDP. The frequent mention of terrorist and extremist groups reflects the heightened sensitivity to security threats in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt. The prominence of these groups suggests that students may be more inclined to view societal issues through the lens of security, particularly when such groups are perceived as a direct threat to national stability. FETÖ, PKK and IŞİD are the most frequently used groups. Considering the sensitive period of the study conducted, it can be expected that the FETÖ would be the most selected group however PKK and IŞİD and terrorist organizations as a general term are also as frequent as FETÖ. It can be interpreted that the coup attempt evoked other security threatening social groups' opposition as well. Religious and ideological groups were also frequently mentioned, reflecting the significant role of religion and ideology in Turkish society. The presence of these groups in the study aligns with the broader social context in Türkiye, where religious and ideological affiliations often intersect with political identities. Social and ethnic groups were moderately represented, indicating that these categories are also important but perhaps not as central as political or extremist groups in the context of this study. The inclusion of these groups highlights the ongoing issues related to ethnic diversity and social inclusion in Türkiye. The highest frequency in this group

belongs to Syrians and then Kurds. It is visible from other categories that the coup attempt has evoked oppositions towards PKK, considered as the terrorist organization, which has a wide perception as being mostly supported by Kurdish citizens and HDP, a main Kurdish political party. Syrians on the other hand, have been welcomed by the Turkish government with an open-door policy since 2011. By the time this study has been conducted the Syrian immigrant population within Türkiye has risen to 3 million people (UNCHR, 2021). One of the primary reasons for ranking Syrians as a disliked group can be attributed to the economic difficulties. The rapid and large-scale arrival of Syrians has also posed significant challenges to social integration. The strain on public services, such as education, healthcare, and housing, has led to tensions between local communities and Syrian refugees. The language barrier and cultural differences further exacerbate these challenges, making it difficult for Syrians to fully integrate into Turkish society (Erdoğan, 2020). It is also possible that the attempted coup has evoked hidden reactions towards Syrians. For the political groups, AK Party and HDP were the highly ranked political parties. The high frequency of those political parties being disliked may indicate that political polarization is a critical factor in shaping social perceptions.

4.6. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The concepts of social distance and tolerance are extensively studied within Western cultures, but there is a notable gap in research addressing these issues within the Turkish context. This study makes a humble contribution to the literature by evaluating social distance and tolerance within the Turkish political landscape, particularly in relation to a critical historical event: the 2016 coup attempt orchestrated by the religious organization FETÖ, later designated as a terrorist organization. Although the study began before the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the event disrupted data collection, creating a unique natural experiment environment that allowed for the examination of the immediate impacts of this political crisis on political tolerance and social distance. However,

considering the sample size and representativeness, studies on measuring tolerance with a more structured method is needed.

The coup attempt created an environment of heightened threat, providing a rare opportunity to observe how such a sudden and profound event influences social attitudes. Prior research has shown that immediate threats can significantly affect political tolerance, though such studies are rare due to ethical concerns about deliberately inducing threat (Abrams, De Vyver, Houston, & Vasiljevic, 2017). This study is among the first to measure the immediate impacts of the coup attempt on political tolerance and social distance, offering valuable insights into how a security-focused environment affects these social constructs. The findings demonstrate that evoking a security-framed constitution increases social distance, consistent with theories that suggest perceived threats can exacerbate in-group/out-group divisions (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

One concern related to the study is on the sample and its representative power on the topics. Since the sample of the current study focuses primarily on university students, which may not be representative of the broader Turkish population with different ages. Also, the majority of the participants were from metropolitan cities which might lead to underrepresentation of the rural areas. These aspects limit the generalizability of the findings to other demographic groups. Also, while the coup attempt provided a unique natural experiment, it also disrupted the data collection process. This interruption was unexpected and there was not enough time to re-arrange the structure of the research based on these immediate developments. This interruption might have introduced biases or inconsistencies in the data, as the external environment changed drastically during the study.

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deliberately inducing threat (Abrams, De Vyver, Houston, & Vasiljevic, 2017). This study is among the first to measure the immediate impacts of the coup attempt on political tolerance and social distance, offering valuable insights into how a security-focused environment affects these social constructs. The findings demonstrate that evoking a security-framed constitution increases social distance, consistent with theories that suggest perceived threats can exacerbate in-group/out-group divisions (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

Besides, in this study least-liked approach was used to determine the most distant social groups for the participants. While this provided a more free atmosphere to identify different and individual choices on the least liked groups, and also eliminate the ranking of liked groups, this approach also led to out-of-context responses as well. Therefore, in order to provide the context related results, a fixed-group approach might be implemented meaning that the researcher would prepare a wide range list of social groups that participants can select from to identify the social groups they feel more distant to. Another version for the least-liked approach is to ask respondents to provide like-dislike evaluations for a series of extremist political groups. After this, respondents were asked about their degree of support for the civil liberties of these groups, and their levels of political tolerance were assessed only for those groups which they actively disliked or objected to (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

This study has generated valuable insights that can inform future research. Conducted in the aftermath of the coup attempt, the study highlights how a significant national crisis can evoke heightened security concerns, which in turn affect social attitudes. Future research should consider measuring the level of perceived threat, as it likely plays a crucial role in shaping tolerance scores. For example, a study conducted in Türkiye revealed that prejudice towards Kurds is closely linked to perceived intergroup threat (Balaban, 2013), echoing broader findings that perceived threat is a key factor in in-group/out-group dynamics (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

In conclusion, while the study offers a novel perspective on the impact of political crises on social distance and tolerance in Türkiye, its limitations emerge the need for more structured and representative research designs in future studies. Understanding how different demographic groups and contexts influence these social attitudes will be critical for developing more effective strategies to promote social cohesion in times of political instability.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate the role of security and liberty scenarios on political tolerance and social distance towards least-liked groups in Türkiye in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt. By situating the research within the context of a significant national security crisis, the study emphasizes the important impact that evoked security concerns can have on social attitudes. The findings indicate that security framing, which emphasizes the need to protect national security often at the cost of civil liberties, tends to differentiate in term of social distance towards disliked social groups than the liberty framing group. This outcome aligns with existing theories on how perceived threats exacerbate in-group/out-group divisions, reinforcing the notion that security narratives can foster an "us versus them" attitude.

However, the study also reveals that the effect of framing on tolerance and social distance is not universally strong, as the results show only marginal significance. This suggests that while security framing may indeed influence social distance, its impact is likely moderated by a range of other factors, such as individual differences in political values, personality traits, or pre-existing attitudes towards specific social groups. For instance, individuals with strong pre-existing prejudices or conservative political values might be more susceptible to the influence of security framing, leading to greater social distance. In contrast, those who prioritize civil liberties or hold more liberal values might be less affected by such narratives, maintaining a more consistent level of tolerance regardless of the framing.

Moreover, the lack of significant change in tolerance scores over time, regardless of the framing condition, may point to the resilience of deeply ingrained social attitudes and the potential influence of immediate emotional responses. This resilience suggests that while short-term manipulations like framing can momentarily sway public opinion or social attitudes, they are unlikely to produce lasting changes in tolerance levels towards disliked groups. The enduring nature

of these attitudes could be attributed to the fact that they are often rooted in long-standing cultural, social, or personal beliefs that are resistant to change.

Additionally, the study indicates that increased exposure to certain framing conditions might not be sufficient to override these ingrained attitudes or immediate emotional responses. For example, individuals who are consistently exposed to security narratives might initially exhibit heightened social distance, but over time, their baseline attitudes may reassert themselves, leading to a normalization of their tolerance levels. This dynamic underscores the complexity of changing social attitudes through framing alone and highlights the need for more sustained and multifaceted approaches if the goal is to foster greater tolerance in the long term.

In sum, while framing can have a noticeable impact on social distance and tolerance, its effectiveness is limited by the interplay of various individual and contextual factors. These findings emphasize the importance of considering these moderating influences when designing interventions aimed at reducing social distance and promoting tolerance. Rather than relying solely on short-term manipulations, efforts to cultivate a more tolerant society may require a deeper engagement with the underlying values, beliefs, and emotions that shape social attitudes.

In addition to the framing effects, this study also explored the predictive power of various individual-level variables on political tolerance and social distance. The analysis revealed that personality traits, political values, and socio-economic status play significant roles in shaping these social attitudes. For instance, individuals with higher levels of openness to experience and universalism tend to exhibit greater tolerance towards outgroups, whereas those with more conservative values and higher perceived threats are more likely to endorse increased social distance.

Socio-economic factors, particularly lower socio-economic status, were also associated with heightened negative emotions and a greater propensity for social distancing. These findings align with previous research suggesting that personal

values and socio-economic context are critical in predicting how individuals respond to different social groups, particularly under the influence of external threats or crises. By integrating these variables into the analysis, the study provides a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to tolerance and social distance, underscoring the importance of considering both situational and individual-level influences in future research on these topics.

Overall, this study contributes to the broader understanding of how political crises and framing strategies shape political tolerance and distance. It highlights the need for more nuanced research that considers the complex interplay of factors influencing these attitudes, particularly in politically volatile environments. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing strategies that promote social cohesion and tolerance in times of crisis.

The findings also have some implications for policymakers, educators, and civil society organizations in Türkiye and similar contexts. It is essential to recognize that framing and narratives used in public discourse can either exacerbate or mitigate social divisions. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to how security and liberty issues are framed in public debates, especially during times of national crises. Policies aimed at fostering social cohesion should take into account the underlying personality traits, values, and socio-economic conditions that influence tolerance levels of individuals.

The distribution of disliked groups, even they are not social groups as aimed, in Türkiye following the 2016 coup attempt is particularly significant, as the event itself not only heightened security concerns but also deepened existing social and political divisions within the country. The coup attempt, widely perceived as a direct assault on the nation's democratic institutions, triggered a wave of nationalistic fervor and an intensified focus on security. In the aftermath, certain groups were quickly attributed as terrorists based on the narrative of the state officials. This shift in public sentiment is starkly reflected in the study's findings, where groups linked to the coup or those seen as a threat to national unity became targets of increased social distance and decreased tolerance.

Furthermore, the coup attempt appeared to evoke intolerance towards other groups that were not directly associated with the event but were nonetheless perceived as incompatible with the nationalistic narrative being promoted. This broadening of intolerance indicates that the heightened sense of threat, coupled with the state-driven narrative, created a more generalized atmosphere of suspicion and exclusion. As a result, groups that were already marginalized or viewed as outsiders found themselves increasingly alienated in the post-coup environment. The nationalistic fervor that followed the coup attempt was not limited to those directly implicated in the event; instead, it extended to anyone perceived as a potential threat to the unity and security of the nation.

This expansion of intolerance suggests that the crisis not only intensified existing prejudices but also generated new ones, affecting groups that might not have been targeted under normal circumstances. The state's emphasis on loyalty and the portrayal of dissent as a threat to national stability contributed to a climate where any deviation from the dominant narrative was viewed with suspicion. This led to a more pervasive sense of "us versus them," where the boundaries of social inclusion were tightened, and the scope of exclusion was widened. The atmosphere of fear and mistrust that emerged in the wake of the coup attempt had far-reaching implications, fostering divisions that went beyond the immediate context of the crisis.

Future research should investigate deeper into the mechanisms through which framing affects political tolerance and social distance, possibly exploring long-term impacts and the role of media in shaping public perceptions. Additionally, it would be valuable to investigate how different demographic groups respond to security versus liberty frames, considering variables such as age, gender, and educational background. Such studies could provide further insights into the resilience of democratic norms and the potential for promoting tolerance in divided societies. Continuous research and data collection are essential for understanding the evolving dynamics of political tolerance and social distance. Policymakers and academic institutions should invest in longitudinal studies that track changes in social attitudes over time, particularly in response to national

crises and policy interventions. This research should be disaggregated by demographic factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status to provide a nuanced understanding of how different groups are affected. Additionally, establishing public databases that share findings on social cohesion and tolerance can help inform policy decisions and enable civil society organizations to tailor their programs more effectively.

Ultimately, this study emphasizes the critical need for a balanced approach in addressing security concerns without compromising the fundamental civil liberties that are the cornerstone of democratic societies. By fostering a deeper understanding of the factors that influence political tolerance and social distance, we can better navigate the challenges of maintaining social cohesion in the face of crises, ensuring that the principles of democracy and pluralism are upheld even in the most turbulent times.

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APPENDIX 1. ETHICHS BOARD WAIVER FORM

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-09
		Yayım Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	FRM-YL-09 Yüksek Lisans Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu *Ethics Board Form for Master's Thesis*	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev Date	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
**DEPARTMENT OFPOLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Date: 18/09/2024

ThesisTitle (In English): AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE FRAMING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG GROUPS IN TURKEY: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY FRAMES, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL VALUES

My thesis work with the title given above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on people or animals.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not a research conducted with qualitative or quantitative approaches that require data collection from the participants by using techniques such as survey, scale (test), interview, focus group work, observation, experiment, interview.
5. Requires the use of data (books, documents, etc.) obtained from other people and institutions. However, this use will be carried out in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Law to the extent permitted by other persons and institutions.

I hereby declare that I reviewed the Directives of Ethics Boards of Hacettepe University and in regard to these directives it is not necessary to obtain permission from any Ethics Board in order to carry out my thesis study; I accept all legal responsibilities that may arise in any infrigement of the directives and that the information I have given above is correct.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
Name-Surname/Signature

Student Information	Name-Surname	Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
	Student Number	N21223143
	Department	Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ABD
	Programme	Siyaset Bilimi

SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL

Prof. Dr. Ali ÇAĞLAR

APPROVED
(Title, Name Surname, Signature)

FRM-YL-09   Rev No/Tarih: 02/25.01.2024   2

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-09
		Yayım Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	FRM-YL-09 Yüksek Lisans Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu Ethics Board Form for Master's Thesis	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev.Date	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih:18/09/2024

Tez Başlığı (Türkçe TÜRKİYE'DE YENİ ANAYASA ÇERÇEVELERİ VE GRUPLAR ARASI TOPLUMSAL UZAKLIĞIN DENEYSEL BİR ÇALIŞMASI: GÜVENLİKÇİ YA DA ÖZGÜRLÜKÇÜ ÇERÇEVE, KİŞİLİK ÖZELLİKLERİ VE SİYASİ DEĞERLER

Tez Başlığı (Almanca/Fransızca)*: ....

Yukarıda başlığı verilen tez çalışmam:
1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır.
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne veya ruh sağlığına müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Anket, ölçek (test), mülakat, odak grup çalışması, gözlem, deney, görüşme gibi teknikler kullanılarak katılımcılardan veri toplanmasını gerektiren nitel ya da nicel yaklaşımlarla yürütülen araştırma niteliğinde değildir.
5. Diğer kişi ve kurumlardan temin edilen veri kullanımını (kitap, belge vs.) gerektirmektedir. Ancak bu kullanım, diğer kişi ve kurumların izin verdiği ölçüde Kişisel Bilgilerin Korunması Kanuna riayet edilerek gerçekleştirilecektir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
Ad-Soyad/İmza

Öğrenci Bilgileri	Ad-Soyad	Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
	Öğrenci No	N21223143
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ABD
	Programı	Siyaset Bilimi

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

Prof. Dr. Ali ÇAĞLAR

UYGUNDUR.
(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)

* Tez **Almanca** veya **Fransızca** yazılıyor ise bu kısımda tez başlığı **Tez Yazım Dilinde** yazılmalıdır.

APPENDIX 2. ORIGINALITY REPORT

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-15
		Yayım Tarihi Date of Pub.	04.12.2023
	FRM-YL-15 Yüksek Lisans Tezi Orijinallik Raporu *Master's Thesis Dissertation Originality Report*	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev. Date	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih: 18/09/2024

Tez Başlığı: TÜRKİYE'DE YENİ ANAYASA ÇERÇEVELERİ VE GRUPLAR ARASI TOPLUMSAL UZAKLIĞIN DENEYSEL BİR ÇALIŞMASI: GÜVENLİKÇİ YA DA ÖZGÜRLÜKÇÜ ÇERÇEVE, KİŞİLİK ÖZELLİKLERİ VE SİYASİ DEĞERLER

Tez Başlığı (Almanca/Fransızca)*:...

Yukarıda başlığı verilen tezimin a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 104 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 24/04/2024 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 5'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler*:

1. ☒ Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
2. ☒ Kaynakça hariç
3. ☒ Alıntılar hariç
4. ☐ Alıntılar dâhil
5. ☒ 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tezimin herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumlarda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
Ad-Soyad/İmza

Öğrenci Bilgileri	Ad-Soyad	Ela Serpil Evliyaoğlu
	Öğrenci No	N21223143
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ABD
	Programı	Siyaset Bilimi

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

Prof. Dr. Ali ÇAĞLAR
UYGUNDUR.
(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OFPOLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Thesis Title (In English): **AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE FRAMING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG GROUPS IN TURKEY: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY FRAMES, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL VALUES**

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	Programme	Siyaset Bilimi

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APPENDIX 3. SURVEY FORM

Aşağıda güncel siyasi bilgilerle ilgili 15 soru bulunmaktadır. Lütfen her soruyu yanıtlamaya dikkat ediniz.

1- Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri kaç yılda bir yapılır? A. Üç yılda bir B. Dört yılda bir C. Beş yılda bir D. Altı yılda bir	**6- Günümüzde kullanılan anayasa yılına aittir?** A. 1924 B. 1960 C. 1971 D. 1982
2- Dışişleri bakanının adı nedir? A. Ali Babacan B. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu C. Veysel Eroğlu D. Mehmet Müezzinoğlu	**7- Şu an kaçıncı hükümet görevdedir?** A. 62 B. 64 C. 65 D. 66
3- Meclis başkanının adı nedir? A. Selçuk Özdağ B. Bülent Arınç C. İsmail Kahraman D. Cemil Çiçek	**8- Meclisteki milletvekili sayısı kaçtır?** A. 350 B. 400 C. 500 D. 550
4- Günümüzde mecliste temsil edilen kaç siyasi parti vardır? A. 2 B. 3 C. 4 D. 5	**9- Şimdiki meclis kaçıncı yasama dönemindedir?** A. 25 B. 26 C. 27 D. 28
5- Türkiye'nin mevcut siyasal sistemi hangisidir? A. Parlamenter B. Başkanlık C. Yarı başkanlık D. Meclis hükümeti	

Lütfen aşağıdaki cümlelerin **her biri için** belirtilen derecelerden birini kullanarak bir değerlendirme yapınız. Değer belirten rakamı maddelerin **sağına** yazınız.

1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum /   2 = Bir miktar katılıyorum/   3 = Kısmen katılıyorum   4= Çok katılıyorum/   5= Kesinlikle katılıyorum

TM1	1- Geleneklerimizi ahlaki değerlerimizi korumamız oldukça önemlidir.
TM3	3- Modern ve müsamahakâr yaşam tarzı toplumlumuzun bozulmasına neden olmaktadır.
TM5	5- Geleneksel aile bağlarına daha fazla vurgu olsaydı, bu ülkenin daha az problemi olurdu.
LO1	10- Hükümet şiddete dönebilecek bütün protestoları yasaklamalı.
LO3	12- Vatandaşlarının güvenini sağlamak için hükümet bireysel özgürlükleri sınırlandırmalı.
LO5	14- Polis, vatandaşları korumak için daha fazla güce sahip olmalı.
FE1	15- Bütün kamu girişimleri hükümet kontrolünden çıkartılmalı ve özelleştirilmeli.
FE3	17- Serbest piyasa hükümet müdahalesinden ne kadar uzaksa o kadar iyidir.
EQ1	19- Eğer bu ülkede insanlar eşit şekilde muamele görseydi bu ülkenin daha az sorunu olurdu.
EQ3	21- Toplumumuz herkesin başarılı olmak için eşit koşullara sahip olmasını sağlamak için gerekli olan her şeyi yapmalı.
BP1	23- Bu ülkeyi eleştirmek vatanseverlik değildir.
BP3	25- Doğru ya da yanlış olmasına bakmaksızın ülkemi savunurum.
CL1	27- Ülkemiz için en önemli konu sivil özgürlüklerin korunmasıdır.
CL3	29- Bireyler istedikleri şeye inanma ve istedikleri şey olma hakkına sahiptir.
MI1	31- Savaşa girmek bazen uluslararası problemleri çözmenin tek yoludur.
MI3	33- Ülkemiz tehlikeli rejimlerle mücadele etmek için birliklerini gönderen diğer demokratik birliklere katılmalıdır.
AI1	35- Başka ülkelerden bu ülkeye yaşamak için gelenler genelde bu ülkeyi yaşamak için daha da iyi hale getirir.
A13	37- Başka ülkelerden bu ülkeye yaşamak için gelenler bu ülkenin kültürel yapısını daha da zenginleştirir.

_____
_____-

Lütfen en az hoşlandığınız üç sosyal grubu aşağıdaki boşluklara yazınız.

1-_____
2-_____
3-_____

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **ilkini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
Toplumunuzda konuşma yapmalarına izin verilmeli					
Kamuda görev almaları yasaklanmalı					
Toplumunuzda toplanma ve gösteri yapmalarına izin verilmeli					

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan i**kincisini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
Toplumunuzda konuşma yapmalarına izin verilmeli					
Kamuda görev almaları yasaklanmalı					
Toplumunuzda toplanma ve gösteri yapmalarına izin verilmeli					

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **üçüncüsünü** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

Toplumunuzda konuşma yapmalarına izin verilmeli					
Kamuda görev almaları yasaklanmalı					
Toplumunuzda toplanma ve gösteri yapmalarına izin verilmeli					

Aşağıda sizi kısmen tanımlayan (ya da pek tanımlayamayan) bir takım özellikler sunulmaktadır. Lütfen aşağıda verilen özelliklerin sizi ne oranda yansıttığını ya da yansıtmadığını belirtmek için sizi en iyi tanımlayan rakamı her bir özelliğin **soluna** yazınız.

1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum　　　　　　**5 = Biraz katılıyorum**

2 = Katılmıyorum　　　　　　　　　　　**6= Oldukça katılıyorum**

3 = Biraz Katılmıyorum　　　　　　　　**7= Kesinlikle katılıyorum**

4 = Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum (Kararsızım)

'Kendimi .... biri olarak görüyorum.'

1. Dışa dönük, istekli	6. Çekingen, sessiz
2. Eleştirel, kavgacı	7. Sempatik, sıcak
3. Güvenilir, öz disiplinli	8. Altüst olmuş, dikkatsiz
4. Kaygılı, kolaylıkla hayal kırıklığına uğrayan	9. Sakin, duygusal olarak dengeli
5. Yeni yaşantılara açık, karmaşık	10. Geleneksel, yaratıcı olmayan

Lütfen kontrol ediniz: Yukarıdaki sorularda bütün ifadelerin önüne bir rakam yazdınız mı?
_____
_____

Şimdi size anayasa komisyonu ile ilgili bazı sorular yönelteceğiz.

10- Anayasa Komisyonu başkanı kimdir? A) Burhan Kuzu B) Mustafa Şentop C) Ömer Çelik D) Bülent Gedikli	12- Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu başkanlığını kim yapar? A. TBMM başkanı B. Anayasa Komisyonu başkanı C. Hükümet sözcüsü D. Başbakan
11- Anayasa Komisyonu'nunda hangi partiler temsil edilmektedir? A. AKP-CHP-MHP B. AKP-CHP-HDP C. AKP-CHP-MHP-HDP D. AKP-MHP	13- Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu'nun çalışma alanı nedir? A. Yeni anayasa yapım çalışmalarını yürütmek B. Anayasal kuruluşlarla ilgili sunulan kanun tasarı ve tekliflerini görüşmek C. Yasa tekliflerinin anayasaya uygunluğunu denetlemek D. Diğer komisyonlara başkanlık etmek

Lütfen aşağıdaki metnin her cümlesini dikkatlice okuyunuz. ÇALIŞMAMIZIN BİLİMSEL TEMELLİ OLABİLMESİ İÇİN BU ÇOK ÖNEMLİDİR.

(Liberty Frame)

Türkiye'de bir süredir mevcut anayasayı değiştirme ve yeni anayasa yapma konusu tartışılmaktadır. Birkaç senedir süren yeni anayasa hazırlık çalışmaları son yıllardaki toplumsal hareketlerin ve terör olaylarının da etkisinde ilerlemiştir. Hazırlanan yeni anayasa büyük bir olasılıkla bu yıl sonuna kadar Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne sunulacaktır.

Bir önceki anayasa metninde bulunan bazı değişmeyen maddelere sahip olsa da, 2016 Anayasasının, vatandaşların günlük hayatını etkileyecek oldukça önemli yenilikler getireceği öngörülmektedir. Özellikle yapılacak değişikliklerle birlikte özgürlüklerin güvenlikten ödün vermeden destekleneceği öngörülmektedir. Örneğin, tartışılan önemli bir değişiklik yeni anayasayla birlikte herhangi bir konuda başkalarının güvenliğinin özgürlükler adına tehlikeye atılamayacağının kabul edilmesidir. Benzer şekilde, can ve mal güvenliğinin basın özgürlüğü, bilgiyi yayma ve haber alma hakkı kadar önemli olduğu Anayasa'da vurgulanacaktır. Meclisin, vatandaşların can ve mal güvenliğini tehdit eden bir biçimde toplanma ve temsilciler ile bu tür hareketlerin desteklenmesi için iletişime geçilmesini kolaylaştıran herhangi bir yasa yapması engellenecektir.

(Security Frame)

Türkiye'de bir süredir mevcut anayasayı değiştirme ve yeni anayasa yapma konusu tartışılmaktadır. Birkaç senedir süren yeni anayasa hazırlık çalışmaları son yıllardaki *(toplumsal hareketlerin ve terör olaylarının)* da etkisiyle hız kazanmıştır. Hazırlanan yeni anayasa büyük bir olasılıkla 2016 yılında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne sunulacaktır.

2016 Anayasasının, bir önceki anayasa metninde bulunan bazı değişmeyen maddelere sahip olsa da vatandaşların günlük hayatını etkileyecek oldukça önemli yenilikler getireceği öngörülmektedir. Özellikle yapılacak değişikliklerle birlikte güvenlikten ödün vermeden özgürlüklerin daha fazla destekleneceği, anayasa ile korunma altına alınmış olacağı öngörülmektedir. Örneğin, tartışılan önemli bir değişiklik yeni anayasayla birlikte herhangi bir konuda özgürlükler adına başkalarının güvenliğinin tehlikeye atılamayacağının kabul edilmesidir. Benzer şekilde, can ve mal güvenliğinin basın özgürlüğü, bilgiyi yayma ve haber alma hakkı kadar önemli olduğu Anayasa'da vurgulanacaktır. Meclisin, vatandaşların can ve mal güvenliğini tehdit eden bir biçimde toplanma ve temsilciler ile bu tür hareketlerin desteklenmesi için iletişime geçilmesini kolaylaştıran herhangi bir yasa yapması engellenecektir.

_____
_____
Aşağıda farklı duygu ve hisleri tanımlayan kelimeler göreceksiniz. Yukarıdaki okuduğunuz metni göz önünde bulundurduğunuzda şu an hissettiklerinizi aşağıdaki kelimeler ne derecede yansıtmaktadır?

1 neredeyse hiç yansıtmaz ve 5 son derece yansıtırı ifade ederse 1'den 5'e vereceğiniz rakamı kelimenin yanındaki boşluğa yazınız

1=Neredeyse hiç   2=Biraz   3=Orta derecede   4=Oldukça   5=Aşırı derecede

	1'den 5'e rakam giriniz			1'den 5'e rakam giriniz			1'den 5'e rakam giriniz
İlgili		Hırçın			Gururlu		
Sıkıntılı		Tetikte			Korkmuş		
Heyecanlı		Utanmış			Hevesli		

Üzgün		Yaratıcı		Aktif	
Güçlü		Tedirgin		Düşmanca	
Suçlu		Kararlı		Gergin	
Ürkmüş		Dikkatli			

_____
_____

Lütfen en az hoşlandığınız üç siyasi grubu bir önceki sıralamanıza bakarak en az hoşlandığınız grup birinci sırada olacak şekilde tekrar aşağıya yazınız.

1-_____
2-_____
3-_____

Belirttiğiniz gruplarla kabul edebileceğiniz en yakın ilişkinin kutusuna "X" işareti koyunuz. Birden fazla ilişki için seçim yapabilirsiniz.

Lütfen her grup için işaretleme yaptığınızdan emin olun.
Lütfen ilk tepkinizi gözettiğinizden emin olun.
Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **ilkini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	1 Son derece yakın	2 Oldukça Yakın	3 Kararsızım	4 Oldukça Uzak	5 Son derece uzak
1- Evlilik yoluyla yakın akrabalık					
2- Şahsi dostluk					
3- Komşuluk					
4- Aynı iş yerinde meslektaşlık					
5- Ülkemde vatandaşlık					
6- Ülkemde sadece ziyaretçi olarak bulunulması					
7- Ülkemin dışında bulunmaları					

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **ikincisini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	1 Son derece yakın	2 Oldukça Yakın	3 Kararsızım	4 Oldukça Uzak	5 Son derece uzak
1- Evlilik yoluyla yakın akrabalık					
2- Şahsi dostluk					
3- Komşuluk					
4- Aynı iş yerinde meslektaşlık					
5- Ülkemde vatandaşlık					
6- Ülkemde sadece ziyaretçi olarak bulunulması					
7- Ülkemin dışında bulunmaları					

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **üçüncüsünü** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	1 Son derece yakın	2 Oldukça Yakın	3 Kararsızım	4 Oldukça Uzak	5 Son derece uzak
1- Evlilik yoluyla yakın akrabalık					
2- Şahsi dostluk					
3- Komşuluk					
4- Aynı iş yerinde meslektaşlık					
5- Ülkemde vatandaşlık					
6- Ülkemde sadece ziyaretçi olarak bulunulması					
7- Ülkemin dışında bulunmaları					

Şimdi tekrar en az hoşlandığınız üç sosyal grubu bir önceki sıralamanıza bakarak aşağıdaki boşluklara en az hoşlandığınız 1. sırada olmak üzere yazınız.

1-_____
2-_____
3-_____

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **ilkini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
Toplumunuzda konuşma yapmalarına izin verilmeli					
Kamuda görev almaları yasaklanmalı					
Toplumunuzda toplanma ve gösteri yapmalarına izin verilmeli					

Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **ikincisini** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
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Lütfen aşağıdaki tabloyu en az hoşlandığınız üç gruptan **üçüncüsünü** düşünerek cevaplayınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
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Kamuda görev almaları yasaklanmalı					
Toplumunuzda toplanma ve gösteri yapmalarına izin verilmeli					

_____
_____

| 14- Son seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı? (1 Kasım 2015)
A) Evet
B) Hayır | 15- Siyasi ideolojinizi belirtiniz.
(1= en sol ideolojiler, 7= en sağ ideolojiler)
1———2———3———4———5———6———7 |
| 16- Siyasi ilginizi ne derece olarak değerlendirirsiniz?
(1= en az, 7= en fazla)
1———2———3———4———5———6———7 | 17- Kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz bir siyasi parti var mı?
A) Evet
B) Hayır |

Demografik Bilgi Formu

1- Doğum yılınız _____ 2- Cinsiyetiniz _____ 3- Nerelisiniz? _____	4- Kendinizi aşağıdakilerden hangisi olarak tanımlıyorsunuz? A) Etnik ve dini azınlık. B) Etnik azınlık. C) Dini azınlık. D) Etnik ve dini azınlık değilim. E) Bilmiyorum. F) Cevap vermek istemiyorum
5- Annenizin en son aldığı diploma derecesi nedir? A) Resmi diploma derecesi yoktur. B) İlkokul C) Orta okul D) Lise E) Üniversite F) Yüksek Lisans G) Doktora	6- Babanızın en son aldığı diploma derecesi nedir? A) Resmi diploma derecesi yoktur. B) İlkokul C) Orta okul D) Lise E) Üniversite F) Yüksek Lisans G) Doktora
7- Büyüdüğünüz evde kendinize ait odanız var mıydı? A) Evet B) Hayır	8- Faturalarınızı öderken zorlanıyor musunuz? A) Evet B) Hayır

Katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.