Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of English Language and Literature

ANIMETAPHORS AS POLITICAL TOOLS IN *VOLPONE* BY BEN JONSON, *MACBETH* BY WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE AND *THE BIRD IN A CAGE* BY JAMES SHIRLEY

Türkan YILMAZ

Ph.D. Dissertation

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The jury finds that Türkan Yılmaz has on the date of 08.01.2024 successfully passed the defence examination and approves her Ph.D. Dissertation titled "Animetaphors as Political Tools in *Volpone* by Ben Jonson, *Macbeth* by William Shakespeare and *The Bird in a Cage* by James Shirley."

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To all animals including Benuş, Cemil, Cemile…

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ABSTRACT

YILMAZ, Türkan. *Animetaphors as Political Tools in* Volpone *by Ben Jonson,* Macbeth *by William Shakespeare and* The Bird in a Cage *by James Shirley,* Ph. D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2024.

The study of animals in literature and culture has always been a subject approached by many scholars from varying disciplines; yet now the animals are subject of a close scholarly investigation, delving into the deeper human connection to the animal world and calling attention to the ideas on both anthropocentrism and anti-anthropocentrism. Accordingly, when the plays of English Renaissance drama are examined in detail, it appears that it was quite popular among the then dramatists to use animal imageries to express their judgement on the political issues of state, class, and gender. In this way, while the plays offer a historical account of the understanding of the human and the animal in the Renaissance period, they also display the dramatists' use of animetaphors to reflect their ideas on the political agenda of their age. That being the case, this dissertation sets out to examine first *Volpone* (1606) by Ben Jonson (1572-1637), then *Macbeth* (1606) by William Shakespeare (1564-1616), and lastly *The Bird in a Cage* (1632) by James Shirley (1596-1666), which illustrate the affinity between the use of animal imagery and political discourse. Through the close analysis of these plays, the present dissertation aims to show that the mentioned playwrights' use of animetaphor enables their plays to be scrutinised in accordance with some of the principles of posthumanism, for a close analysis of the plays makes it clear that the playwrights, in fact, challenge the dogmatic ideals of Renaissance humanism, and the legacy of antiquity fundamentally based on the supremacy of human beings over the world of animals. Thus, this study, which has an original approach to English Renaissance drama, aims to show that powerful animal imageries in the selected plays are characterised by their obvious implication of sharp criticism of the political discourses of the Renaissance such as gender politics, economic politics, and politics in terms of domestic, national and international aspects. By doing so, this study points to, rather than a hierarchical order between human and animal, intermingled common bonds existing between them.

Keywords
English Renaissance Drama, Posthumanism, Animal Studies, Animetaphor, Political Discourse

ÖZET

Yılmaz, Türkan. *Ben Jonson'ın* Volpone*, William Shakespeare'in* Macbeth *ve James Shirley'nin* The Bird in a Cage *Oyunlarında Politik Araç Olarak Hayvan İmgelemi*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2024.

Kültür ve edebiyat alanlarında hayvan çalışmaları, birçok farklı disiplin ve araştırmacı tarafından çoğunlukla incelenen bir konu olmuştur; ancak günümüzde hayvanlar, insanmerkezcilik ve anti-insanmerkezcilik üzerine fikirlere dikkat çeken ve insanların hayvan dünyasıyla olan bağlantısını derinlemesine inceleyen bilimsel bir yaklaşımın konusu haline gelmiştir. Buna göre, İngiliz Rönesans dönemi tiyatro oyunları dikkatle incelendiğinde, dönemin oyun yazarları arasında hayvan metaforları kullanımının, devlet, sınıf ve cinsiyet politikaları üzerine kendi fikirlerini beyan etmede oldukça popüler bir yöntem olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Böylece, bu oyunlar, Rönesans döneminde insan ve hayvan kavramlarını anlamlandırmaya yönelik tarihi kaynak özelliği taşımanın yanı sıra oyun yazarlarının kendi çağlarının politik düzeni konusundaki düşüncelerini yansıtmak üzere hayvan metaforlarını ne denli etkin kullandıklarını gösterir niteliktedir. Bu tezin de amacı söz konusu dönemde yazılmış, hayvan metaforları kullanımı ve politik söylem arasındaki ilişkiyi sergileyen Ben Jonson tarafından yazılan (1572-1637) *Volpone* (1606), William Shakespeare tarafından yazılan (1564-1616) *Macbeth* (1606) ve son olarak da James Shirley tarafından yazılan (1596-1666) *The Bird in a Cage* (1632) oyunlarının incelenmesi yoluyla söz konusu yazarların aslında hayvan metaforları kullanımıyla, insanın diğer canlılardan üstünlüğü esasına dayanan Rönesans hümanizmini sorgulayan ve bu sebeple oyunların günümüz posthümanizm ilkelerine göre okunmasına olanak sağlayan özelliklerinin incelenmesidir. Bu sebeple İngiliz Rönesans tiyatrosuna orijinal bir yaklaşım sunan bu tez, incelenen yazarların, dönemin ulusal ve uluslararası boyutlarda toplumsal cinsiyet, sınıf veya ekonomi politikalarına dair sert politik eleştirilerine ışık tutan güçlü hayvan metaforlarının çözümlenmesini konu alır. Böylece bu çalışma, insan-hayvan hiyerarşisi üzerine kurulu bir düzen yerine ikisi arasındaki doğal ve ortak bir paydayı işaret eder.

Anahtar Sözcükler
Rönesans İngiliz Tiyatrosu, Post-hümanizm (İnsan-sonracılık), Hayvan Çalışmaları, Hayvan Metaforları, Politik Söylem

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INTRODUCTION

And as each part
Of universal being came to life,
Each filled with images of its own kind:
Among the stars gods walked the house of heaven,
And where the sea opened its waves fish spawned;
Earth gathered beasts, and in the trembling air
The flight of birds.
Yet world was not complete.
It lacked a creature that had hints of heaven
And hopes to rule the earth. So man was made.
[…] It had a godlike figure and was man.
While other beasts, heads bent, stared at wild earth,
The new creation gazed into blue sky;
Then careless things took shape, change followed change
And with it unknown species of mankind.
(Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 5)

Although the drama of the early modern England including Elizabethan, Jacobean and Caroline periods did not have some generic terms that the current audience is familiar with such as "epic theatre" or "political theatre," this does not necessarily mean that the plays about politics did not exist at all during these historical periods. At some point, as Bertolt Brecht's colleague Erwin Piscator, "who preferred the term 'political theatre' to 'epic'" (Edelman 133) ascertains, "every dramatist has something specific to say to his own time, something which cannot be passed on from one generation to the next without comment" (31). In effect, over the course of time which was less than a century (1558-1649), Elizabethan, Jacobean and Caroline periods, whose "beginnings coincided with the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the mood of patriotic fervour" and "sudden end with the beginnings of the Civil Wars" (Trussler xiv), the dramatists including William Shakespeare (1564-1616), Ben Jonson (1572-1637), and James Shirley (1596-1666) were unescapably exposed to the changing dynamics and revolutionary spirit of their times. Correspondingly, the rulers of the aforementioned periods – Elizabeth I, James I and Charles I – patronised the theatre because "[t]he City authorities were always deeply uneasy about the theatre, and although it enjoyed royal favour […], no more than the City did the Court want crowds of unruly theatregoers on its doorstep" (Trussler xi). For the royal part, theatre was a convenient way to give a political broadcast to govern their citizens. Therefore, the contents of the plays were always

regulated by the Lord Chamberlain's Office (the Revels Office), a governmental organisation appointed to expurgate and licence the plays to be staged. Under these convergent pressures, the dramatists were obliged to adjust their plays to what royal authority required. At the same time, they stressed the need for finding subtle ways of euphemistically expressing and conveying their own ideas to their audience such as applying animetaphors in long distant settings in the course of their plays.

That being the case, following a short introduction, the first chapter of this dissertation presents a comprehensive survey of the complex relations between the two species in order to examine the deep roots of anthropocentric taboos and properly analyse the animetaphors in the examples of English Renaissance drama. The subsequent three chapters, on the other hand, set out to examine *Volpone* (1606) by Ben Jonson, *Macbeth* (1606) by William Shakespeare, and *The Bird in a Cage* (1632) by James Shirley, which exude the great affinity between the use of animal imagery and political discourse of the period. As the dates of the plays' performances reveal, while *Volpone* and *Macbeth* are historically the products of the Jacobean drama yet clearly reflect the continuity of the Elizabethan drama, *The Bird in a Cage* belongs to the Caroline drama. Thus, the distinctive animetaphors of the plays that encapsulate the political atmosphere of these three periods in which probably the most extensive changes occurred in England are to be closely analysed. By doing so, this dissertation aims to show that the above-mentioned playwrights' use of animetaphor within the political context voicing the criticism of the political discourses of the Renaissance such as politics of gender, economics, and politics in terms of domestic, national and international aspects, enables their plays to be scrutinised in accordance with some of the principles of certain recent theories as *posthumanism*. Accordingly, a close analysis of the plays makes it clear that the playwrights, in fact, cast a critical eye over the dogmatic ideals of Renaissance humanism along with the legacy of the Antiquity, which were fundamentally based on the ascendancy of humans over the world of animals.

As a critical discourse that emerged in the middle of the 1990s, *posthumanism* aims to revise and reinterpret the discriminative principles of humanism embedded in the philosophical impetus of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment about human

perfectibility and exceptionalism. As the postmodern theorist Ihab Hassan, who coins the term *posthumanism* in his "Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?" (1977), puts the unquenchable desire for change in the humanist framework into words,

> [w]e need first to understand that the human form – including human desire and all its external representations – may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned […] five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end as humanism transforms itself into something we must helplessly call posthumanism. (212)

As is seen, posthumanism, in the context of animal studies, interrogates the rigid dichotomy between the human animal and the nonhuman animal in order to pertinently mirror human's animal origins with no hierarchical ontological differences in the ecological order. In other words, in the violation of all dogmatic Renaissance ideals referring to the conventional boundaries between the species, a posthumanist approach may uncover the untouched political humanist discourses on race, class, and gender norms through a new light thrown by a posthumanist reinterpretation and reframing. In this vein, in his "Introduction" to *Posthumanist Shakespeares* (2012), Stefan Herbrechter explicates the very basic definition and function of posthumanism as follows:

> Humanism, having been one of the main targets of theory, continues to be the main battleground, arguably this time in its pluralised form: that is, humanisms […]. The 'posthuman' and 'posthumanism' are starting to take shape, but just like the fragmentation of humanism into mainstream or liberal humanism, existentialist humanism, radical humanism etc., the uncertainty and pluralisation spills over into that which is supposed to supersede it. Posthumans promise and threaten in many familiar and sometimes less familiar forms. Posthumanisms revaluate, reject, extend, and rewrite many aspects of real or invented humanisms. There is no surprise in this, because that is what the prefix 'post-' does. This is its rhetorical essence: It ambiguates. It plays with supersedence, crisis, deconstruction, regression and progression at once. (4)

As its prefix 'post-' denotes, posthumanism brings the word 'human' with all its connotations, deeply embedded within the anthropocentric conceits of the Cartesian

dualism and Christian doctrines regarding speciesism, to the table. It critically aims to amend or alter humanist mind-set, which has always been in the grip of an obsession with human exceptionalism, through challenging the human subjugation of animals and identifying the inevitable ontological and epistemological linkage between human and nonhuman animal entities. With this aim, it defamiliarises the familiar, traditional, and common perspectives on speciesism that is, according to Wolfe, the fertile ground for all patterns of discriminative practices:

> It is this pervasiveness of the discourse of species that has made the institution of speciesism fundamental to the formation of Western subjectivity and sociality as such, an institution that relies on the tacit agreement that the full transcendence of the 'human' requires the sacrifice of the 'anima' and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we can engage in what Derrida will call a 'noncriminal putting to death' of other humans as well by marking them as animal. (*Animal Rites* 6)

That is to say, posthumanism shifts the focus of attention by decentring the human content and foregrounding the nonhuman content with wide diversity in cultural lenses reflecting the independent existence of animals, plants, and things from human reason and perception. Thus, many scholars from various lines of critique can refer to posthumanism in their studies such that Graham Harman uses the term in his object-oriented ontology (401-409) while N. Katherine Hayles interprets posthumanism as a useful blueprint for combining human subjectivity with the technological advances in informatics (192-220). Accordingly, as Karen Raber ascertains in her *Shakespeare and Posthumanist Theory* (2018), "[p]osthumanist thought thus has many progenitors, an uncertain and fluid lineage – and spawns as many offspring as humanism has and still does" such as "animal studies, body studies, cognitive ecology, ecocriticism, the new materialisms and ecomaterialism, and systems theory" (12). Particularly, animal studies among these new critical approaches has recently stood out as the way for gaining a better posthumanist insights into human literature and culture by reanalysing both human and animal identities and interrogating the catastrophic results of anthropocentrism. For instance, Cary Wolfe (*What Is Posthumanism?*), Donna Haraway (*When Species Meet*), and Erica Fudge (*Perceiving Animals*) pursue the posthumanist perspective in animal studies in order to problematise the traditional anthropocentric

speciesism. For example, in her own formulation of posthumanism, Haraway defines it as her "awkward term for a not-humanism in which species of all sorts are in question" (164), and makes the term an epitome of "the Great Divides between what counts as nature and as society, as nonhuman and as human" (9). A significant milestone has been therefore set by these academicians, for their arguments have paved the way for a critical revision of what is meant by the terms 'human' and 'animal.'

According to this line of critique, a new interest in the daily domestic life, literature, economy in the early modern England galvanised into action. Thus, many contemporary scholars such as Andreas Höfele, Karen Raber, Erica Fudge, Laurie Shannon, Bruce Boehrer, Simon Estok, Joseph Campana, Scott Maisano, and Juliana Schiesari contributed to the development of animal context of Renaissance as a serious academic field. Indeed, this relatively recent scholar interest in species relations encompasses many germs of a much older literary tradition. For instance, James Edmund Harting's *The Ornothology of Shakespeare* (1864) analysing the bird species in Shakespeare's works, Besse Mayou's *Natural History of Shakespeare* (1877) and J. Sanford Saltus's *Some of Shakespeare's Animals* (1918) exemplify the earlier inquiries pursuing the nonhuman world of the Renaissance. Nevertheless, Erica Fudge defines these earlier examples as "a part of antiquarian research" which "represented animals often in order to depict folk rituals and the pleasures of "the lowest of people"" (*Renaissance Beasts* 7). On the other hand, Karen Raber labels them as "hobby history" (*Animal Bodies* 9) or "an amateur sport" which "can be seen as continuations of the pre-modern method for cataloguing animal appearances in literature and culture" ("Shakespeare" 286) as can be found in medieval bestiaries. Accordingly, the animal studies formulates two principles so that it can be a new academic subfield:

> First and foremost, it must be 'good' history; that is, it must fulfil the standards of research and analysis set in all other areas of history. In the case of the early modern period, it must offer us a new way of thinking about a well-established area of study […]. Second, it should evaluate its relationship to the modern world in which it is created. For example, it might be empowered by recognising the fact that, like history from below, women's history, the history of ethnicity, and so on, it has a role to play in current ethical, environmental, social, and political debates. (Fudge, *RB* 9-10)

From this critical standpoint, animals are to be evaluated as worthy creatures who are subjects of human analysis, not the agents employed in order to motivate further analysis of human in human-centred discourses. Furthermore, excavating the common history shared by human and nonhuman as represented in the literary works of the Renaissance might offer a way out of the perennial dilemma of the human/animal division by opening up new intellectual horizons for better understanding of the complex relations among species and for acknowledging the coexistence of various entities on Earth.

As a matter of fact, the Renaissance has much to offer to the analysis of the contradictory philosophies endorsing exceptionalism of *L'uomo universale* of the Renaissance on the one hand, and subverting such humanist trajectory by blurring the lines between human and animal on the other. By the same token, in some of the plays of the period, it is possible to observe that the playwrights, in fact, fracture the dogmatic ideals of Renaissance humanism promoting the supremacy of human beings over the nonhuman animal entities, and criticise human hubris through the use of animetaphors. In this way, while animal "was a mere instrument for use and […] was the aspect of Man that needed to be tamed," the Renaissance beasts "have a more active role in their historical moment: they have the power to create new ideas" (Fudge *RB* 10) and to lead to the reassessment of historical socio-cultural facts. Accordingly, when some of the eminent plays of the English Renaissance drama are examined in detail, it appears that it was quite popular among the then dramatists to use animal imagery to express their subjective judgement on the political issues such as the state politics, class system, and gender norms. Aiming to express their serious criticism of the aforementioned subjects, many English Renaissance dramatists refer to various animals to either glorify or satirise an idea, attitude or a character given in the corpora of their plays. In this way, while the plays have much to offer to a historical account of the understanding of the human and the animal in the Renaissance, they also display the dramatists' use of animal metaphors, or animetaphors, to reflect their ideas on the ongoing political atmosphere of the age at issue.

In order to delve deeper into this matter, giving a careful definition of *animetaphor* is a prerequisite for providing a significant insight into the crucial function of animetaphors within the selected plays of English Renaissance drama. As the term is the combination of *animal* and *metaphor*, the nature of metaphor and human need to apply to it might be investigated in the first place. In *Poetics* (335 BC), Aristotle affiliates metaphor with *mimesis*, and expresses that "[e]veryone delights in representations," despite "the most detailed images of things which in themselves we see with pain, e.g. the shapes of the most despised wild animals even when dead" (4). Richard Janko, the translator of *Poetics*, comments on the close affinity between *mimesis* and metaphor by ascertaining that the power of *mimesis* "depends on our recognition that the representation is a representation," and accordingly, "[p]lot is the representation of action; similarly words themselves are representations of things, and metaphor is a word which represents another" (220). As a consequence, human beings are inclined to learn through close observation, and as Aristotle adds, we "infer what each thing is, e.g. that this person [represents] that one" (4). Therefore, metaphor "derives its power from the auditor's movement between representation and reality, metaphor and literal word" (Fahey 16). In this vein, it is possible to claim that the main reason for human inclination or need for animetaphors to describe, criticise or extol the human deeds is the human interpretation of human biology as a common share with animals. Another reason for human use of animetaphors for the condition of humanity might be the power of language itself. As Eliecer Crespo-Fernandez rightly observes, "[m]etaphorical language is a powerful resource to shape taboo concepts for dysphemistic use," and thus, "animal metaphors capture the most objectionable and undesirable characteristics of human beings, which makes them particularly effective for dysphemistic purposes" (136-37). In other words, as a part of semantic pejoration, animetaphors have widely been applied by humans in order to dehumanise the other human being.

Drawing on Jacques Derrida's concept of *animot*, Akira Mizuta Lippit coins the term *animetaphor* (*EA* 162-97), which simply refers to the use of animality in the realm of figurative language where the human psyche can merge with the animal psyche. Lippit bases his neologism on Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic interpretation of metaphor as a vehicle for the blurring of the lines between the unconscious and animality, and thus

allowing the deep world of the unconscious to find expression in language. Thus, Lippit asserts that

> [o]ne finds a fantastic transversality at work between the animal and the metaphor – the animal is already a metaphor, the metaphor an animal. Together they transport to language, breathe into language, the vitality of another life, another expression: animal and metaphor, a metaphor made flesh, a living metaphor that is by definition not a metaphor, antimetaphor – 'animetaphor.' The animetaphor may also be seen as the unconscious of language, of logos. (165)

From this perch, the use of animetaphors in a text goes beyond the limits of *logos* which is attributed to only humans and reaches the wilder shores of the unconscious of the unwritten side where "[t]he genealogy of language, like that of the dream, returns to a place outside logos" (Lippit 166). Therefore, the figurative representation of animals both impedes and bridges the flow of figurative language as if "[t]he animal returns like a meal that cannot be digested, a dream that cannot be forgotten, an other that cannot be sublated" (Lippit 170). In fact, Lippit bases his argument on Freud's resemblance between unconscious level of mind and animals, for both of them remain uninterrupted by the state of consciousness, and he explains that

> [u]nconscious ideas, like animals, remain alive through the processes of perpetual rejuvenation: the unconscious allows ideas to remain charged forever. These forces – unconscious ideas and animals – affect, in a manner yet to be determined, occurrences in the phenomenal world without, however, being a part of it. (104)

Apparently, the Freudian theory of unconsciousness engendered a new route for animals to resurface in the modern human world; yet this time not as a dehumanised other but as an ontological counterpart with its own epistemological subjective peculiarities. For instance, in her account of anthropomorphic projections in *The Birds* (1963), Karyn Ball explains how animetaphors operate in a film: "[T]he film's protagonists are bellicose animetaphors for a primal unconscious, the irruption of a despotically suppressed self-preservative instinct projected onto a planetary dispossessed, which returns to stab the civilisation that conjured it" (553). Similarly, the unnatural cannibalistic inclination seen in the king's horses in *Macbeth* can be interpreted as the foreshadowing of

Macbeth's unnatural murder of the king. Similar to the avian animetaphors in *The Birds*, all natural elements in *Macbeth* including Duncan's horses are triggered by the human's neglect of natural order and transgress the limits. Accordingly, it is possible to observe that animetaphors reach out and engulf the archaic heritage of human unconsciousness, and they embody what is unknown, eerie and fearful. Through the close analysis of aforementioned three English Renaissance plays, the last three chapters concern themselves with reconfiguration of the place of human animals and nonhuman animals within the political discourses of the Renaissance such as gender politics, economic politics, and politics in terms of domestic, national and international aspects. By doing so, this chapter aims to highlight that the mentioned playwrights' use of animetaphor enables their plays to be reanalysed by a posthumanist approach. In effect, anti-anthropocentric and anti-essentialist posthumanist reading of these plays makes it clear that the playwrights, in fact, challenge the dogmatic ideals of Renaissance humanism featuring the supremacy of human beings over the world of animals. Thus, this study, which has an original approach to English Renaissance drama, aims to show that powerful animal imageries as exemplified in the selected plays are characterised by their obvious implication of sharp political criticism, and point to rather intermingled common bonds existing between human and animal.

In short, as nonhuman creatures – mostly as the epitome of difference – through which human animals may define themselves, animals have always found a significant place for themselves in human history and culture. Surely, this dissertation is not the one and only that engages itself in the posthumanist reinterpretation of the English Renaissance. For instance, "The Future in the Instant: Posthumanism(s) in Early Modern English Drama" (2010) by Farrah Lehman, "Our Animal Kindred: Affinitive Anthropomorphism in Medieval and Early Modern Literature" (2013) by Joyce Prince Chaney, and "The Discord between the Elements and Human Nature: Ecophobia and Renaissance Drama" (2018) by Z. Gizem Yılmaz afford a deep insight into possibilities for posthumanist practices in early modern English drama. However, English Renaissance drama and its distinctive animetaphors as political tools in respect to contemporary posthumanist theory have not been analysed much. Moreover, while *Volpone* and *Macbeth* are the two well-known samples of early modern English drama,

they have not been analysed in terms of their anti-anthropocentric animal content within their political contexts. Most importantly, the analysis of the political avian animetaphors in *The Bird in a Cage* is the dissertation's most significant contribution to English Renaissance drama studies, for both the playwright and the play have not been much researched before. The cogent reason behind the selection of these plays is the fact that they are full of apt animetaphors that appropriately hold a mirror up to human connection to the animal world in the early modern period. In this way, the playwrights' political criticism through the use of animetaphors parallels that of our own era, and thus, a sense of historical continuity is ensured. Accordingly, these plays reveal the playwrights' intensive questioning of the Renaissance emphasis on human exceptionalism through the use of animetaphors that express the dramatists' disapproval of the class, gender, and state politics of their age. In this vein, this dissertation has made a contribution to English Renaissance drama studies as it throws light on the socio-historical analysis of the place of nonhuman animal communities in the eyes of human animal communities in the selected plays.

CHAPTER 1

ANIMAL-RELATED DISCUSSIONS FROM THE ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE RENAISSANCE

When studied in light of posthumanist views about the welfare of animals, the literary agency of animals in early modern English drama paves the way for the close analysis of the cultural fabric of human-animal relations in the English Renaissance. Therefore, this dissertation primarily concerns itself with the aspects of Renaissance English drama as a popular form of entertainment and a powerful instrument in introducing the audience/reader with politics in the early seventeenth century through a variety of animetaphors in the plays. For the reason that thought-provoking animetaphors are considered to be a vehicle for the artistic and thematic integrity of the plays, they are a useful way for the playwrights to involve in the political life in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Most importantly, the use of animetaphors in the plays scrutinised in the spectrum of this dissertation crosses the human-animal divide in order to reinterpret the Renaissance humanism's elevation of the dignity of human. After all, the animal representation "brings to language something that is not a part of language," and "because the animal is said to lack the capacity for language, its function in language can only appear as another expression, as a metaphor that originates elsewhere, is transferred from elsewhere" (Lippit 166). However, a sophisticated understanding what *animetaphor* as a term suggests stands in need for a historical analysis beyond linguistic urges.

Accordingly, when the socio-historical roots of a rigid division between animals and humans are analysed, it appears that, in Western thought, the position of the two species is predominantly determined by primarily the ancient Greek and Roman traditions both of which are subsequently enmeshed in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In *Animal Liberation* (1975), Peter Singer launches a liberation movement for an end to human exploitation of animals. In order to do so, he reveals the historical origins of regarding animals as inferior entities by stating that "Western attitudes to animals have roots in

two traditions: Judaism and Greek antiquity. These roots unite in Christianity, and it is through Christianity that they came to prevail in Europe" (186). The inevitable outcome of such a powerful combination would have been humanism, which was the backbone philosophy of the European cosmogony between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries.

To begin with, the question of rationality, supposedly cognitive skills such as expressing emotions and language possession in animals, possibility or impossibility of human's natural kinship with nonhuman animals, and vegetarianism were among central issues hotly debated by both the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. Accordingly, it is possible to observe not uniformed but divided "rival schools, each taking its basic doctrines from some great founder" (Singer 188) such as that of Plato or Aristotle in the ancient period. Indeed, although the ancient philosophers display contradictory tendencies towards animal-related debates, their teachings make the ancient period the first place where the growing gulf between human and animal is created on the basis of denial of reason to nonhuman animal entities. As Maria Michela Sassi points out, "Greek culture was thoroughly imbued with a general interest in human nature nurtured by a marked awareness of particular forms of *difference* between individuals – in gender, age, social class, or ethnic group – differences above all a somatic nature" (xi). Correspondingly, Stephen T. Newmyer adds that "the adult male Greek citizen functioned as the 'centre,' while certain other classes of males, as well as women, barbarians, and nonhuman animals formed the 'other'" (507). Thus, analogies, classifications, and categorisations, applied to explain the cosmos and the living creatures, were based on the pairs of opposites in ancient Greek philosophy (Lloyd 7-8). Inevitably, the Greek philosophers tended to depict the relationship between human and nonhuman animal by constructing hierarchical oppositions which reckoned human distinctly superior to animal. As is explained within the dissertation, the cumulative effect of such a discriminative approach would have spread to the ideas generated by the philosophers of the following ages.

Indeed, being credited with his substantial contributions to the field of mathematics and physics, Pythagoras (580-500 BC) is also referred to be the first eminent ancient

philosopher who defined *vegetarianism* through his theory of soul-transmigration that stresses the psychological and anatomical proximity between animals and humans as follows:

> You do not believe that souls are assigned, first to one body and then to another, and that our so-called death is merely a change of abode? You do not believe that in cattle, or in wild beasts, or in creatures of the deep, the soul of him who was once a man may linger? You do not believe that nothing on this earth is annihilated, but only changes its haunts? And that animals also have cycles of progress and, so to speak, an orbit for their souls, no less than the heavenly bodies, which revolve in fixed circuits? (qtd. in Walters and Portmess 24)

In the Pythagorean cosmology, reincarnation exists between animals and humans, which affirms "kindredness of spirit among all living things," and thus, by abstaining from sacrificing animals for food, "we do justice both to ourselves and to our ancestors, as well as to animals themselves" (Wlaters and Portmess 5). As Michael Allen Fox rightly observes, Pythagoras's vegetarianism is based on his beliefs in "the ensoulment of animals, the identical composition of human and animal souls, the transmigration of souls after death, obligatory nonviolence, and the natural and supernatural kinship of humans and animals" (6-7). In other words, Pythagoras designates a world in which both human and nonhuman entities live on equal ground due to their shared qualities. To clarify this point, the etymological definition of the word 'animal' would be useful:

> Animals are so called simply because they breathe. The word, used as an adjective in English before the noun became established, originally described any living being, as opposed to something inanimate. Its source is the Latin word *animalis*, 'having the breath of life,' from *anima* 'air, breath, life.' As a noun, the word was hardly used in England before the end of the 16th century – the older beast [ME] from Latin *besta* was the usual term – and does not appear in the King James Bible of 1611. (Cresswell 16)

Therefore, *anima*, as the Latin noun for *soul*, hints at Pythagoras's vegetarianism which mostly springs from spiritual and metaphysical senses leading to a unity and harmony of life, and regards human brutality to animals as an unjust act against a fellow having a kinship to humans (Newmyer, *Animals* 20).[1] However, the Western ideological construction of the place of human and animal adopts discriminative political creed of

Plato and Aristotle and not Pythagoras's consolidative tenets that entail an alignment of the human with the animal instead of the hierarchically ordered relation between the two species.

On the other hand, Plato, preceded by Socrates and followed by Aristotle, and his "tripartite soul theory" along with his world of ideas constitute a great proportion of Neo-Platonic philosophy of the Renaissance. In the *Republic* (c. 375 BC), Plato draws an apt analogy between the three classes of the society, namely the producers, the auxiliaries, and the guardians, and the three parts of the human soul which are reason (*nous*), anger (*thymos*), and desires (*epithymia*) (155-61). Accordingly, the human soul is the amalgamation of animals, which is a "many-headed and intricate beast, having in a ring the heads of tame and wild beasts, able to metamorphose and make grow from itself all these things" (qtd. in Gilhus 205). In this sense, the rational faculty, which is supposed to be an inherent quality possessed only by human beings, is responsible for the domestication of these wild animals within the human soul to make man just. Furthermore, according to the animal symbolism in Plato's *Republic*, the guardians are likened to "dogs" which are expected to secure the ideal state from "wolves" referring to tyrants (123-25). In this way, Plato develops his political theory by establishing a rigid hierarchy between humans and animals, between the ruling class and the ruled ones.

The depiction of the soul as a compound of mind (humane intellectualness) and body (animalistic instincts) and the definition of the ultimate aim of human life as the domestication of these wild animals were much prevailed motifs during the Antiquity. As Abraham J. Malherbe rightly observes, "[a]t least as early as Plato human passions and the pleasures of the flesh are described as beasts which fight against man" (44), and "[t]hat these warring passions should be subdued by the wise man became part of the teaching in philosophical schools and gymnasia in pre-Christian time" (74). The Greek hero Orpheus in *Punica* by Silius Italicus, for instance, becomes the conqueror of the animals by charming them through his music and makes them inactive. In this way, he "represented paradisical bliss, awakened the souls of beasts to spiritual life or subdued human passions [...]. Orpheus figured in the spiritual movement of syncretic Platonism"

(Gilhus 206). Similarly, Hercules, the Greco-Roman hero, is described as performing his twelve labours some of which require killing of the animals such as the Nemean lion and the Stymphalian birds. Metaphorically speaking, the wild animals stand for human pleasures, and the hero turns out to be an ideal figure who constantly strives to achieve defeating hedonistic impulses despite severe setbacks. In other words, the hero "purified himself of the beasts, and this is what is meant by his taming the earth" (Malherbe 75). On the other hand, in *Politics* (350 BC), Plato's disciple Aristotle refers to human as a naturally "political animal" (9), and in the whole corpus of *Nicomachean Ethics* but particularly in Book I Chapter 13, he defines human being as a "rational animal" (20-22). In both definitions, he differentiates human beings from nonhuman animal beings by underscoring the major discrepancy between them. Indeed, Aristotle holds the idea that although humans and animals share common animal nature, they are not to be considered as equal. Aristotle stresses that "man alone of the animals possesses speech," and the faculty of language is the solid basis for the construction of a family and a city (*Politics* 11). To strengthen his idea on the need for forming a unity among people, Aristotle continues, "man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice" (*Politics* 13). He believes that humans are innately embellished with goodness, and the isolation from this goodness turns man into "the most unscrupulous and savage of animals" (*Politics* 13).[2]

On the basis of Plato's tripartite soul theory, in *On the Soul* (350 BC), Aristotle divides the concept of soul into three levels. Accordingly, rational soul is possessed by human beings, sensitive soul exists in human beings and animals, and nutritive soul is shared by all living creatures including plants. Thus, he elaborates that rationality can only be found in human beings, which separates humans from nonhuman communities, and he "concludes to a sort of extrinsic teleology wherein animals are for the sake of human beings" (Dombrowski 544). In fact, in *Politics*, Aristotle designates nature as an entirety of all hierarchical organisations among creatures based on their cognitive skills:

> Plants exist for the benefit of animals, and some animals exist for the benefit of others. Those which are domesticated serve human beings for use as well as for food; wild animals, too, in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish us not only with food, but also with other kinds of assistance such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life. Accordingly, if nature makes

> nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. (23)

Similarly, Aristotle elaborates his political ideas on the class hierarchy by claiming that just as soul is superior over body, so humans, as being the ultimate symbol of reason, should rule over animals that are governed by their instincts (*Politics* 63-65). In addition to his approximation of animals and slaves, Aristotle states that the emotions requiring judgements are the products of cognitive skills and the mental capacity, from which animals are absent (*Rhetoric II* 9). In this way, human beings are empowered to give emotional responses due to their rationality, and hence can be morally virtuous, whereas animals cannot be virtuous in the same way that human beings are, because "[t]heir dispositions are concerned with reactions to pleasant and painful sensations, not with assessment and emotional response" (Fortenbaugh 167).

As a result of both Plato and Aristotle's assessment of animals as entities created for the sake of human, an anthropocentric cosmology was predominantly prevailed in classical culture. As Nathaniel Wolloch most fully expresses,

> [o]ne further important component in the development of the Western ethic of human mastery of nature was the classical tradition […]. Aristotle, to mention one of the most influential historical conduits of the classical outlook, was very straightforward about the human singularity in the natural order. Aristotle and Plato had been the main sources for the development of the theory of the Great Chain of Being, which became popular in the works of Alexander Pope and many others in the eighteenth century. (*History* 5-6)

Accordingly, the legacy of antiquity fundamentally based on the supremacy of human beings over the world of animals would have formed the defining characteristics of Christianity. Correspondingly, the Roman Empire saw the foundation of Christianity, and felt a profound impact of the Christian ideals. As Peter Singer rightly observes,

> Christianity brought into the Roman world the idea of the uniqueness of the human species, which it inherited from the Jewish tradition but insisted upon with still greater emphasis because of the importance it placed on the human being's immortal soul. (191)

Since the beginning of human history, within anthropocentric monotheistic discourses, the idea of 'human uniqueness' enforced by the belief in the human rationality as dioristic pecularity of the human has led to human establishment of absolute control over nonhuman beings, as a consequence of which humans have regarded themselves as superior entities. As for the alleged privileged status of human being, Keith Thomas explains,

> [a]ccording to Aristotle, the soul comprised three elements: The nutritive soul, which was shared by man with vegetables; the sensitive soul, which was shared by animals; and the intellectual or rational soul, which was peculiar to man. This doctrine had been taken over by the medieval scholastics and fused with the Judaeo-Christian teaching that man was made in the image of God (Genesis I.27). Instead of representing man as merely a superior animal, it elevated him to a wholly different status, halfway between the beasts and the angels. (17)

Thus, it is blatantly obvious that the Roman Empire is the place where the anthropocentric teachings of the ancient Greek philosophers are enmeshed in the Christian doctrines that denote the dualism of human versus animal. As is expected, the Roman philosopher Seneca (4 BC-65 AD) shares Aristotle's ideas on the correlation between intelligence and emotional reactions. Appropriately, he asserts that

> wild animals, and all creatures apart from human beings, are without anger; for anger is contrary to reason [...]. Animals have violence, rabidity, ferocity, aggression, but do not have anger any more than they have licentiousness [...]. Dumb animals lack human emotions, but they do have certain impulses that are similar to emotions. (*On Anger* I.3.4-8)

In the same way, in *De inventione* (91-88 BC), the famous Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 BC), whose education is mainly formed by Stoic anthropocentric ethics, draws a thick line between humanity and animality by referring to the faculty of reason (*sapientia*) and the power of speech (*eloquentia*) (45-41), which are evaluated as peculiar to human beings or as Cicero calls "higher and nobler things" (62). According to Cicero, rejecting the capacity of human being for language and rationality equates human to the beast, and sensuality, which is rooted from corrupted instinctual realm of animals, downgrades man to the same level as beasts (33-37). Therefore, he regarded

the animal side of human nature as an extremely destructive power over social life. In his opinion, "the escalation of struggles, murders, and political personalism affecting Rome's declining Republic can be traced back mostly to the loss of a virtuous feeling of community" (Tutrone 64).[3]

In time, as philosophers mentioned above articulated the notion that rationality and intellect-based skills such as expressing emotions and language possession are peculiar only to human beings, animals were gradually accepted as not only different but also inferior beings. In his *Animals, Gods and Humans* (2006), Ingvild Saelid Gilhus points out that "[t]he tones of these treatises is probably a reflection of the fact that they were written in a period when the position of animals in relation to humans and the position of humans in relation to the divine were being debated and were in a process of change," and thereby, they reflect "a clearly anthropocentric perspective" (42). Likewise, Gary Steiner explains the changing status of nonhuman animal communities from pre-Socratic to post-Socratic period as follows:

> None of the pre-Socratic thinkers make any rigorous distinction between faculties of the soul such as understanding and perception. They all acknowledge differences between human beings and animals, but they do not see human reason as the sign of an essential distinction between the two. Instead they either emphasise the commonality of humans or they base their arguments for differential treatment of human beings and animals on the idea of divine bequest. The terms of the controversy over the moral status of animals shifted fundamentally once it became a philosophical commonplace to assert that reason or understanding distinguishes human beings from 'the beasts.' This shift signals the beginnings of a distinctively anthropocentric approach to an understanding of the boundary separating us from animals. (53)

As can be clearly observed, during the Antiquity, the central issue of animal rationality along with language and emotions as the indicators of cognitive skills was the solid basis for the division between human and animal and for regarding animals as inferior entities due to their supposedly defect reason.

Continuing with the historical background to the animal studies, the Middle Ages is in deference to this same ancient tradition that reason is considered as quintessentially

peculiar to human, and thus, animals are to be mastered and exploited by human. In fact, as image of animals in medieval fables or in medieval chivalry and heraldry can be quickly visualised, animals had a firm hold on the medieval life and art. Besides, animals occupied a prominent place in daily routine, for humans relied on them in multiple fields such as clothing, agriculture, transportation and nutrition. In her useful introduction to *A Cultural History of Animals in the Medieval Age*, Brigitte Resl neatly summarises the centrality of animals in the Middle Ages as follows:

> Between 1000 and 1400, social and cultural developments and the associated increase in human intervention with the natural environment had serious unforeseen effects for the animal population in Europe. Drastic changes occurred in all spheres in which humans and animals interacted, whether in the roles of animals in such aspects of everyday life as farming, hunting, and entertainment, or in the more abstract fields of religion, science, and philosophy; all these were variously manifested in literature, art, and symbolism. (1)

As a matter of fact, the medieval period underwent great changes in the way human animals and nonhuman animals were viewed. Beyond the socio-cultural reasons such as a drastic increase in human and animal populations as hinted at in the quotation above, the church-oriented socio-religious life of the medieval ages was remarkably effective at making a hierarchical division between humans and animals. In accordance with the interpretations of medieval theologians who were responsible for informing the folk about the Christian ideals and fundamental teachings of the Bible, humans were seen as having superiority over animals in the hierarchy of creation. Thus, theologians "excluded them [animals] from the afterlife, and viewed them with suspicion relative to the sacred sphere because of their previous associations with pagan worship" (Page 30). Indeed, the Bible is generally referred to be the primary authoritative source of the ontological and moral status of animals and humans (Morrison 39). Accordingly, Cary Wolfe points out that "the animal as the repressed Other of the subject, identity, logos, and the concept reaches back in Western culture at least to the Old Testament" (x). Especially the biblical account of the creation posits that human is created in the image of God, and therefore, this God-like creature has dominion over every living creature. A short part from Genesis might illuminate the religious understanding of the place of human and animal:

> And God said, Let the earth bring forth the liuing creature after his kinde, cattell and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kinde: And it was so.
> And God made the beast of the earth after his kinde, and cattell after their kinde, and euery thing that creepeth vpon the earth after his kinde: And God saw that it was good.
> And God said, Let vs make man in our image, after our likenesse: And let them haue dominion ouer the fish of the sea, and over the foule of the aire, and ouer the cattell, and ouer all the earth, and ouer euery creeping thing that creepeth vpon the earth. ("Genesis" 1:24-26).

On this point, it is important to draw attention to the changing status of human being "from man as a certain *kind* or *type* of animal in creation to man as something else altogether in light of his ability to reason" (Strommen 16). As human animal has identified itself as "the pinnacle of creation" (Singer 188) totally dominating all other nonhuman entities, animals have become the embodiment of otherness.

In this light, in consideration of the creation myth in Christian cosmology, the Great Chain of Being, formulated on the basis of the interpretation of the Bible by early Church fathers of late antiquity such as Augustine of Hippo (354-430), refers to the divinely organisation of the hierarchical relationships existing among every element of nature. Hereof, the Church fathers elaborated upon the wide disparity between humans and animals, and confined their attention to privileged status of human by referring to the hierarchy of God's creation. For instance, in *The City of God* (AD 5), Saint Augustine emphasises that "we do not apply 'Thou shalt not kill' to plants, because they have no sensation; or to irrational animals that fly, swim, walk, or creep, because they are linked to us by no association or common bond. By the Creator's wise ordinance, they are meant for our use, dead or alive" (53). Accordingly, the divine law is referred to be an ecclesiastical hierarchical system allowing the killing of animals but prohibiting murdering human being, or as Augustine calls "a rational animal" (265). Therefore, the content of the Great Chain of Being describes a universal order in which all interdependent subjects have their own place and duties. In this regard, God is placed at the top and respectively followed by angelic figures, humans, animals, plants and inanimate objects. Moreover, every segment of the system has its own hierarchical order in which the lower one provides the higher one with its full service and loyalty. For

example, a fixed social scale, ranging from kings at the top and then to nobles, merchants and peasants, exists among humans.

Saint Augustine was heavily impressed by Plato and Aristotle's aforementioned tripartite soul theory, and he contemplated body and soul as unified entity rather than separate arrangements: "He [God] made man a rational animal, composed of soul and body […]. He let men share generative life in common with the trees, and the life of the senses with the beasts of the fields, but the life of intelligence only with the angels" (V.11.265). In the Middle Ages, it was common for the people to cogitate on human being dualistically as a compound of soul and body, and thus,

> from their intermediate position in the Great Chain of Being, humans could follow their physical nature downward toward the lower, physical concerns of the earth; or they could follow their soul upward toward the higher spiritual levels leading toward God. (Mustol 36)

In this view, worldly existence of a Christian was widely construed as a pilgrimage from "this lowly earth to the beatific vision or union with God in the heavenly Jerusalem above" (Mustol 36). This depiction of secular life as a spiritual pilgrimage to the post-apocalyptic life paved the way for the allegorical representations of the spiritual battle of the vices and virtues taking place in the human soul, which can be traced back to Prudentius's *Psychomachia* (4 AD), and was reflected in numerous medieval literary works including courtly romances or hagiographical writings. The struggle between good and evil for victory could be represented by "the human form of Christ combating demonic forces with animalic shapes," as Sophie Page writes down, or solely by "animal images, such as the battle between the divine animal (lamb) and the diabolical animal (dragon)," or by "pairs of animals designated as enemies in the bestiary tradition" (37). Therefore, for medieval Christians, animetaphors were a suitable means of establishing an intimate connection between their experiences in the earthly realm and their aspiration for the heavenly realm. In medieval hagiographic works, animals are generally employed in order to reveal a saint's absolute commitment to God. As Brigitte Resl notices, "the most common interaction between saints and animals in

earlier hagiographical works involves the encounters of the former with the serpents and dragons that commonly symbolised evil in general, or the devil more specifically" (17).

The cultural background to such symbolic representations of reptiles can be found in the creation account of the "Genesis." In Christian cosmology, the figure of devil as the supreme source of evil lies at the very root of various figures found in the Hebrew Bible. The serpentive figure that tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden and the riotour Lucifer who was dismissed from heaven, for example, are among several figures of the devil. However, those figures were not necessarily the dramatic symbol of evil in pre-biblical Judaism. In the Christian New Testament with its tendentious interpretations adopted by Christian pattern of thought, in contrast, they provided the necessary material for the figure of devil representing the chief opponent of God (Bailey 37-38). For instance, in Jewish theology, the prelapsarian condition of humanity and the concept of the Fall are not included. Furthermore, in Christian tradition, the devil, seducing Eve into eating from the forbidden tree, comes into existence in the Serpent. As for the position and significance of the Serpent in "Genesis," William Caldwell points out that

> [i]t is endowed with the faculty of speech and inspired with occult wisdom, able to prophesy the effect of eating from the forbidden tree. The serpent appears as a medium of the power of temptation. Its function is to present the outward object with suggestions calculated to stir the sinful desire within the soul. It makes the appeal of apparently superior wisdom to the natural inclinations of innocence – an appeal to the senses. (31)

As can be inferred, the Serpent is not depicted as an animal, but the devil itself that tempts woman. Thus, Judeo-Christian doctrine framed a far more adverse image of women and animals, too. In this way, the positive connotations of snake such as the snake-shaped god of healing Asclepius which is still an emblem of medicine have been replaced by the pejorative ones as can be observed in medieval hagiographic works. Nevertheless, as Sophie Page calls attention, biblical animal images "were considered symbols for inspiration rather than literal representations," and thereby alluding to multiple meanings (34). Page continues by giving an example that the rebellious serpent of "Genesis" 3:1 turns out to be God's tool of judgment for sin in "Numbers" 21:6 when

it is sent to bite the people of Israel revolting against God (36). In addition, the bronze serpent on the pole becomes God's agent for curing Israelites bitten by the snakes in "Numbers" 21: 4-9. Thus, it is difficult to convey the sheer complexity of even a single animal image in the biblical symbolism; yet animal images are virtually indispensable for biblical interpretations and teachings.

As can be deduced, the avid interest of the antiquity in natural life and animals was coupled with the Church's emphasis on biblical symbolism during the medieval period, and thus medieval bestiaries, "a genre based on the principle that the characteristics of animals had been determined by God to serve as a guide to moral conduct and to reinforce biblical teachings" (Page 33), and beast fables became popular. Furthermore, the Renaissance scientific rebirth would be marked by its more secular interest in medieval bestiary stories extended by the thirteenth century (Klingender 343). The primary function of medieval bestiaries was to spread and explain the teachings of the Bible. Indeed, as Peter Scott Brown rightly observes,

> [t]he highly allegorised meanings and characteristics attributed to various animals, birds, and Monstrous Races; the text heavily laced with passages from Scriptures; and the inclusions of the Creation cycle and account of the Fall of humankind all contribute to the bestiary's value as an instructional text. (53)

On the other hand, they were aimed to provide scientific lens to conveniently mark the differences of nonhuman animal communities from humans. In the *Bestiary* (12 AD), the behavioural differences between animal and human are based upon the innate and illogical savagery of animals: "They are called Beasts because of the violence with which they rage, and are known as "wild" (ferus) because they are accustomed to freedom by nature and are governed (ferantur) by their own wishes" (7). Accordingly, animals are contemplated as almost pseudo-community challenging the hierarchical norms of the feudal society of humans, for animals are not confined by any social values that trammel humans. Brutality and savagery of animals would supply the Renaissance dramatists with a useful material in order to express their criticism about the vices of humans leading to a corrupt society.

Figure 1: An illustration of a lion from a bestiary (12th c.), The British Library, London, Add. MS 11283, fol. 1r)

In a secular sense, animalistic symbols were adopted by different sections of society for multiple purposes. In order to grasp the significance of those animal images in daily life during Medieval Ages, one must first delve deeper into the community life from the perspective of the people involved. As it is already stated above, the members of the medieval society were regarded as an integral component of a rigidly hierarchical system called feudalism, which enabled the king or the great baron giving the land he owned to his vassal in return for military support and undisputed loyalty. The vassal worked and cultivated the land through his peasants (Herlihy xvii–xviii, Gies 32). In order to establish and maintain the relationships among three major estates of the society, namely the Clergy, the Nobility and the Peasantry, some animals were employed as an indelible mark of power and social status. The reason for such employment of animals is "a marked tendency to adapt the bestiary pictures to the secular interests of knights and courtiers" (Klingender 396). In this way, the symbolic animal implicitly undertakes to reflect the identity of family involved. For instance,

> [d]ogs, lions, unicorns, and bears, among others, proudly attested to the qualities of the families that took them as their symbols. There were various reasons that people chose different animals for their heraldic devices. A

> person might have felt that his character reflected the qualities of a certain creature, such as a dog's fidelity. A particular animal might also have called to mind a specific aspect of appearance and ability, such as the massive strength of an elephant or the superb sight of a lynx. (Morrison 53)

The coat of arms, incorporating emblematic animals, were regarded as stamps of nobility, for it was only given by the king and only received by a knight (Barter 69). In addition to providing information about the dynasty of a knight, the coat of arms was of great significance in a battle zone: "For knights fighting in full armour with their faces hidden behind helmets, the coat of arms emblazoned on shields, a horse's caparison, and war banners helped them distinguish friend from in the confusion of battle" (Barter 69). In rural settings, anthropomorphic animals or mummers disguised as animals were a fundamental part of medieval social practice. For instance, "animal impersonations had been ritualised as part of the Kalends of January celebrations, a time for rural communities to prepare for the upcoming agricultural season" (Kiser 123).

Figure 2: Mummers wearing animal masks (14th c.), The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, MS Bodley 264, fol. 21 v.

Beside mummers and performing animals, medieval folk tradition actively involved animals in public festivities and social displays where domestic animals in particular served as target of aggression. Along with cockfighting and bearbaiting practiced in England since Anglo-Saxon period, festive horse races were regularly held in all over England (Kiser 114-19).

Figure 3: Bearbaiting (14th c.). The British Library, London, Add. 42130, fol.161r.

Consequently, animals and animetaphors helped the medieval folk make sense of the world around them, and they were also used as a convenient visual way of recording things and passing knowledge. Above all, the representations of nonhuman animal entities were intrinsic part of the medieval identity formation. Although medieval theologians widely regarded animals as inferior to humans in reference to the hierarchy of creation, the biblical animal metaphors helped nonhuman animal entities win a critical regard. In addition to their centrality within the socio-cultural history of medieval England, animals were in every aspect of daily life ranging from the parchments produced from animal skins to means of travel, clothing or farming. Finally, medieval animal lore would pass on and shape the great bulk of Renaissance consciousness in terms of the place of animals in social, religious and literary contexts,

and thus animals would be the object of the human gaze in order to comprehend and interpret the Renaissance ideals.

As it is widely acknowledged among scholars in Renaissance studies, Renaissance philosophers strongly felt inclined to consort with classical antiquity and to break away from established medieval traditions; yet remarkable continuity between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance was all too apparent (Kristeller 21-32, Fubini 118-38, Witt 1-30, Black 1-12). James Hankins perfectly summarises this natural bond existing among these two successive periods with a stark image of "the posture of a man with one foot in the Middle Ages, saluting with the other the rising dawn of the Renaissance" (138). Inevitably, this socio-cultural continuity provided a tremendous impact to how nonhuman animal communities were ingrained in the Renaissance consciousness. The most enduring belief shared by the two periods was the concept of the Great Chain of Being, which was, in terms of animal studies, the main determinant of ontological and epistemological outlook on the place of animals and humans. In fact, the hierarchical cosmic order was the very essence of the Renaissance psyche, and Eustace M. W. Tillyard explains this point as follows:

> If the Elizabethans believed in an ideal order animating earthly order, they were terrified lest is should be upset, and appalled by the visible tokens of disorder that suggested its upsetting. They were obsessed by the fear of chaos and the fact of mutability; and the obsession was powerful in proportion as their faith in the cosmic order was strong. To us chaos means hardly more than confusion on a large scale; to an Elizabethan it meant the cosmic anarchy before creation and the wholesale dissolution that would result if the pressure of Providence relaxed and allowed the law of nature to cease functioning. (13)

Holding human's rationality and potentiality in the highest esteem, the Renaissance thinkers repeatedly insisted on the term 'human exceptionalism,' which revealed the main discursive attribute of the period. The anticipated outcome of this perpetual insistence on human's 'superior' cognitive capacity was humanism, the backbone philosophy of the European culture between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Beginning as a movement grounded in the discovery, translation, and imitation of the classical Greek and Latin texts and the close study of the Antiquity,

humanism rapidly turned into a dynamic cultural phenomenon, influencing almost every facet of Renaissance intellectual life. Francesco Petrarca, Marsilio Ficino, Niccolò Machiavelli and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola were the leading Italian figures of the humanistic movement marking a critical turn to classical learning toward the end of the thirteenth century. They coined the term *Studia Humanitatis* meaning "the Humanities," and thus they were called "Humanists," and based on such designation, in the nineteenth century, "the Humanities" was evolved into "Humanism," which "serves to educate and to develop a desirable type of human being" (Cassirer, Kristeller, and Randall 4). Humanism was brought to its climax when it was spread to almost all Europe as well as England in the sixteenth century. According to Renaissance humanists who were brought up with the Christian beliefs and who received a scholastic training, man, as in the Christian Chain of Beings, was at the centre between divine and brute, and because of the fact that he has reason, his freewill played a key role in ascending or descending on the chain (Hamilton 100). Pico della Mirandola succinctly summarises the changing position of human in accordance with the practice of mental skills as follows:

> If he cultivates vegetable seeds, he will become a plant. If the seeds of sensation, he will grow into a brute. If intellectual, he will be an angel, and a son of God. And if he is not contented with the lot of any creature but takes himself up into the centre of his own unity, then, made one spirit with God and settled in the solitary darkness of the Father, who is above all things, he will stand ahead of all things. (*On the Dignity of Man* 5)

Mirandola refers to the tripartite soul theory, based on the aforementioned ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and underlines that the distinctive peculiarity about humans is their capacity to have an intellective soul. Hence, the ancient classics, which were thought to contend the highest level of human accomplishment, were of great importance in order to properly exercise human intelligence and to incite the untapped human potentials. Only through the close study of the classical works could humans expand their cognitive capacities and exercise their own freewill in order to edge their own ways. This alleged idiosyncrasy of humans, inexorably leading to define humans' interchangeable position, is repeatedly bolstered through Renaissance ideologies. From this rather anthropocentric viewpoint, animals were seen only as the agents to define human identity and subjectivity. Furthermore, this conceptual emphasis of humanist

discourse on human rationality has fundamentally altered the way of the following anthropocentric philosophies and led to discriminative speciesist approaches. Ultimately, this incitement to reach the highest individual development paved the way for the concept of "the 'all-sided man' – *l'uomo universale* –" who, as a microcosm, belonged to macrocosm around him (Burckhardt 83).

On the other hand, with his political treatise *The Prince* (1513), Niccolò Machiavelli unleashed radical ideas severely affecting the conventional historical and political thought. In effect, "it is through his writings that humanism can be tied most explicitly to republicanism" (Crane 15). As a matter of fact, "civic humanism constituted a distinct political discourse which (via a 'Machiavellian moment') had passed from Renaissance Florence to Oliver Cromwell's England, and thence to colonial America, where it formed the ideological matrix of the American Revolution" (Hankins 1-2). While outlining the articulation of humanist view, J. G. A. Pocock touches upon the difficulty of an exploration of Machiavellism in territorial monarchy such as England as follows:

> Republican and Machiavellian ideas had to become domiciled in an environment dominated by monarchical, legal, and theological concepts apparently in no way disposed to require the definition of England as a polis or the Englishman as a citizen. (334)

Thus, the transportation and adaptation of the continental humanist concepts and philosophies to England was not before the Civil War (1642-1646), and only after the Civil War "the Englishman acquired the means of seeing himself, in Aristotelian, Machiavellian, or Venetian terms, as a classical citizen acting in a republic" (Pocock 336). Interestingly, in *The Prince*, Machiavelli aptly sums his ideas up through his sophisticated employment of animetaphors as follows:

> Thus, since a prince is compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So one needs to be a fox to recognise snares and a lion to frighten the wolves. Those who stay simply with the lion do not understand this. (69)

Accordingly, being able to govern the beasts in man, and to know the proper time to activate the proper animal in him are the central features a prince should retain. In a way, Machiavelli's transforming metaphors reveal that he interprets the political arena as a place where man metamorphoses from human into animal.

Turning back to the Renaissance animal-related discussions, apart from cognitive agents, the physiological distinctions between human and animal were reapplied in an effort to reinforce the idea of human uniqueness in medieval and early modern traditions. Keith Thomas points out the cultural deep roots of such division as follows:

> By Tudor times, the amount of inherited law on the subject was already enormous. Since Plato a great deal had been made of man's erect posture: Beasts looked down but he looked up to Heaven. Aristotle had developed the theme, adding that men laughed, that their hair went grey, and that they alone couldn't wiggle their ears. In the early modern period differences in anatomy continued to impress. (31)

Indeed, anatomical differences between species gave grounds for the socio-cultural and discursive construction of the human autonomous identity. Relevantly, Joyce Salisbury refers to the early Christian church fathers who were apt to severe links with pagans by establishing essentialist differences between human animals and nonhuman animals (4). To clarify his point, Salisbury gives an example of Albert the Great and wrote:

> Albert the Great in the thirteenth century catalogued many differences. Some of the differences he noted were obvious: animals were hairier than people; humans could laugh, and animals could not. Some differences were not so obvious: unlike human sperm, animal sperm was unaffected by the movements of heavenly bodies. Finally, his general summary of the characteristics of quadrupeds reveals his reasoning on all these points: 'All such animals are prone to the ground, because of the weight of their head and the earthy character of their body, they tend to bear themselves in a horizontal plane, their innate heat being inadequate to maintain them in an erect posture.' […] All these things define animals in ways that stress their difference from humans. (4-5)

Accordingly, the ecclesiastical writers whose ideas shaped the dominant medieval ideology frequently attempted to formulate particularly what animal was in order to

separate human from animal. However, during the Renaissance, the assiduous attention focused on what human was with the aim of indicating human exceptionalism. In early modern medical sense, for example, the human anatomy became the vast subject of research as *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* (*The Fabric of the Human Body*) by Andreas Vesalius (1543). Such a keen interest in human physiology, underpinned through the ideals of humanism, paved the way for growing perception and representation of human form in numerous discourses of the Renaissance culture. Renaissance humanists, for instance, delineated the bodily perfection of human form. In relation to this point, Gent and Llewellyn contend that

> [d]uring the Renaissance there was a strong belief that the success and progress of works of art were measured by their treatment of the human figure. This story is as old as writing on art; antiquity encouraged its adoption by Renaissance humanists and, subsequently, by even more powerful forms of humanism. Art historians often present the Renaissance as the moment in human history when a tradition that was abstract and mathematical came together with the exemplary religious tradition to create a new version of bodily perfection. The key concept is that the human figure can express perfection. (2)

As is stressed above, one of the chief rationales behind the close affinity between the widespread representation of human body and the Renaissance individualism is the religious tradition. It is important to underscore that while the elevated position of human and blatant degradation of nonhuman in the medieval ages reside in the religiosity of the period, this attitude is subsequently fed with liberal and non-scholastic ideas of the Renaissance. That is to say, the medieval religious restraints imposed by the Church on human rationality and potentiality is replaced by the extensive philosophical, political, and cultural inquiries of the Renaissance scholars. The reason for this shift is because the ecclesiastical teachings of the medieval Church was displaced by relentless secular quest for the classical Greek and Latin works delving into human nature in this earthly life. In the nineteenth century, John Addington Symonds interpreted the Renaissance as almost an anti-religious revolution:

> During the Middle Ages man had lived enveloped in a cowl. […] Beauty is a snare, pleasure a sin, the world of a fleeting show, man fallen and lost,

> death the only certainty, judgement inevitable, hell everlasting, heaven hard to win; ignorance is acceptable to God as a proof of faith and submission; abstinence and mortification are the only safe rules of life; these were the fixed ideas of the ascetic medieval Church. The Renaissance shattered and destroyed them, rending the thick veil which they had drawn between the mind of man and the outer world, and flashing the light of reality upon the darkened places of his own nature. (14)

From this point of view, the secularisation of human mind was the major triumph of the Renaissance ideals. Nonetheless, as Douglas Bush noticed in the twentieth century, "in the Renaissance the ancient pagan tradition, with all its added power, did not overthrow the medieval Christian tradition; it was rather, in the same way if not quite to the same degree as in the Middle Ages, absorbed by the Christian tradition" (34). Thus, the re-emergence of pagan Greco-Roman classical humanism obliged the early Renaissance humanists, who "were not tempted to question Christianity," to spend a great deal of effort in order to "reconcile Christianity with the pagan beliefs of the ancients" (Grant 6). Furthermore, the Reformation, religious movement of the Renaissance, "was only the climax of a widespread medieval movement; Luther's chief guides, apart from the Bible, were Augustine and medieval pietists" (Bush 35-36). That is to say, the Reformation was not an anti-religious movement at all; instead it was the eventual cumulative effect of the medieval strident criticism on the ethics of Christianity. What the Reformation achieved was the idea of unnecessity of papal mediate agency in the relationship between God and human. Therefore, Protestantism was "the expression of Renaissance individualism *par excellence*," because it deputised every single individual as his own priest through superseding the supreme rule of the Roman Catholic Church and extending the vernacular translations of the Bible (Bush 35).

Inevitably, all these impulses towards individualism provided the Renaissance art with a fertile ground for illustration of perfection of human body as a sign of perfection of human intellectuality and spirituality. With this aim, in parallel to the contemporary Renaissance ideologies, the features of the art forms, which evoke human rationality, such as proportion or symmetry, became crucial to making the primary stress on human rationality (Öndil 23). The effects of Leonardo da Vinci's *Vitruvian Man*, "The Man of Perfect Proportions," (1485-1490), or Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni's

The Creation of Adam (1508-12) were substantial in magnitude in terms of Renaissance humanism, for both of them fully illustrated the perfection of human anatomy and intellectuality. Nevertheless, as Donna J. Haraway points out, they were also the most imitated and parodied paintings in the field of post-humanist studies, because they "come to mean Renaissance humanism; to mean modernity; to mean the generative tie of art, science, technology, genius, progress, and money" (7), which brought forward an increase in the human exploitation of the natural sources as well as animals.

On the other hand, the animal content of the Age of Enlightenment, or the Age of Reason, has its roots in the ideals of Renaissance humanism which, though acknowledging the existence of animals, puts a heavy emphasis on humans' allegedly unique and innate rationality. Nevertheless, the Age of Enlightenment witnesses a series of analogies between humans and animals that introduce animal as not living subjects but mechanical things since they are claimed to lack rational capacity. Accordingly, the Age of Enlightenment encapsulates the European cultural advancement in science, philosophy, politics and economics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period, many intellectual figures such as Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke etc. radically reoriented the Western way of thinking by putting forward numerous compelling political, philosophical and scientific arguments. Francis Bacon (1561-1639) and René Descartes (1596-1650), who contributed substantially to the sophisticated understanding of the new experimental science and empirical philosophy, would become the guiding spirits of the methodology of science for the following philosophers. In *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), Bacon rejects the Aristotelian approach to science, "for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgement till they be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual capacity" (144). On the other hand, unlike the Baconian inductive method, the Cartesian deductive approach suggests that ideas should be collected from *a priori* principles, rather than intuitions, and experiments should have auxiliary function. In the light of the teachings of both Bacon and Descartes, the prevailing new scientific enterprises brought a new wider dimension to the philosophical inquires into the question of human-animal relations.

As the changes increased in time, the dichotomy between humanity and animality evolved into Cartesian polarity, referring to the sovereignity of mind over body. René Descartes (1596-1650), a significant milestone in the modern Western philosophy, famously elaborated his, as Wolloch calls, "Cartesian beast-machine theory of animal automatism" in his *Discourse on Method and Meditations* (1637) (14). Accordingly, Descartes viewed and defined animals as *automata*, a highly intricate physical machines or mechanical objects without reason, language, and soul; and thus, he saw no difference between inanimate objects and animals (*DMM* 167). On the other hand, reason is viewed as an essential part of an immaterial soul which resides in humans' body and supplies them with a chance to gain subjective experience. As Descartes famously proposes,

> I am a thinking thing (or a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think). And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch it is only an extended and nonthinking thing, it is certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am), is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (*DMM* 112)

The Cartesian dictum 'Cogito ergo Sum,' translated into English as 'I think, therefore I am,' refers to the peculiarity of human being as a thinking self-contained existence, which paves the way for a rigid dichotomy between body (being) and mind (knowing) and a total supremacy of mind over body. In this sense, the ontological presence of animate things is directly equated with possessing innate mental ability to philosophise and rational soul to have subjective experience; and thus, nonhuman animals are viewed as the degraded non-existent machines since they lack reason.[4] As a consequence, as Kara Reilly emphasises, "Descartes's conflation of *cogito* or mind with the soul and the elevation of human reason over all other feelings created a major epistemic shift in which one's only transcendental link to God is internal" (69). This radical alteration from the Neoplatonic ideal of embodied soul to the dichotomy between body and mind makes a clear division in Western philosophy. Accordingly,

> [t]he turning point was not, as usually believed, that between the ancient world and the Christian culture that grew out of it, nor that between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, nor that between pre-industrial and industrial society, but rather that between Western culture up to the seventeenth century and what came after. The sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation and the concomitant elevation of human reason as the ultimate arbiter of reality by philosophers such as Bacon and then Descartes laid the groundwork for the exploration of empirical reality […] that produced the scientific revolution and its technological consequence, the Industrial Revolution. (Nelson 43)

In total contrast to the Neoplatonic worldview which regards nature as an animate entity and human's uniqueness as being rational animal, the Cartesian philosophy tends to perceive nature as "inert passive mechanical matter, along with the anxiety about a separation between the rational mind and the body" (Reilly 70), and this "seventeenth-century philosophical dualism," as Claude Lévi-Strauss observes, had a long shadow on the attitudes towards nonhuman animal communities (8).

Against Descartes's distorted vision of animals as *automata*, John Locke (1632-1704) asserted, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), that animals do have the faculty of perception "which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom, and the inferior parts of nature" such as "vegetables" (145). Likewise, in contrast to Descartes, Kant asserts that animals cannot be diminished to sole machines since they are endowed with sensibilities such as pleasure or desire. According to Kantian assessment of animals, "[a]n animal is not only a beautiful and teleologically organised creature but also a creature that can feel pleasure and pain, represent the world, have desires and act upon those desires and 'principles' analogous to ours" (Katsafanas 224). However, Kant regards animals as *non-rational beings* which lack reason in the full sense entailed for moral agency while he refers to human as animal but also *rational being* whose reason is the source of moral standing (*Power of Judgement* 210). In Kantian human-animal analogies, animals are not autonomous like humans that are depicted as "an animal rationale" (*Anthropology* 238); and thus, they are not moral agents, and they have no fundamental worth which establishes the base for humans' direct duties to human dignity (*Anthropology* 238-46). Accordingly, Kant's moral theory requires appreciation of animals in order to foster humane moral tendencies. In

other words, on Kantian ground, animal cruelty is not theoretically but morally a wrong dastardly deed since it may harm one's moral responsibility not to animals but to other humans. On this issue, Kant notoriously writes the following:

> With regard to the animate but non-rational part of creation, violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other people. […] Even gratitude for the long service of an old horse or dog (just as if they were members of the household) belongs indirectly to a human being's duty with regard to these animals; considered as a direct duty, however, it is always only a duty of the human being to himself. (*Metaphysics* 237-38)

Apparently, Kant seems to hold that although humans are not charged with direct moral duties to animals, promoting the protection of irrational animal entities is an indirect duty of rational human in order to stand on human dignity. Such an anthropocentric care for animals is considered to be "thoroughly speciesist position" by Peter Singer who vehemently objects to the status of animals in Kantian philosophy, and writes that

> [w]e ought to consider the interests of animals because they have interests and it is unjustifiable to exclude them from the sphere of moral concern; to make this consideration depend on beneficial consequences for human beings is to accept the implication that the interests of animals do not warrant consideration for their own sakes. (244)

Abstaining from animal cruelty only for the sake of developing much more humane traits is the hypocritical facade of the anthropocentric moral understanding, because accordingly, "it is the effects that our treating animals in certain ways has upon our character, and […] the effect our character has on how we treat human beings, that provide the grounds for morally approving or disapproving our treating animals in certain ways" (Regan 16).

Aside from the philosophical debates, one of the most perennial themes of the Enlightenment was the similarities and differences between human and animal as the

biological science progressed through the living dissection of animal bodies with the aim of leading to human treatments. With the removal of the religious sharpest limitations on dissection of human body in the sixteenth century, the seventeenth century witnessed the blossoming of the modern study of anatomy. However, animals were still the main object of the scientific experiments that were conducted on animals as it is so today. For instance, William Harvey, the physician to James I, and his comprehensive explanation for the blood circulation in his *De Motu Cordis* (*the Motion of the Heart*) (1628), came about through his emphasis on recognising that the blood contained in arteries circles around the human body through the heart pumps (Harvey 25). Through his cardiovascular investigation, Harvey, all of whose living dissections were engaged with the dissection of animal bodies (Jalobeanu and Wolfe 302), showed the function of heart in the blood circulation in human body. As is seen, animals constituted an indispensable part of the physiological observations through vivisections in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as in most of recorded history of humanity including Galen's use of monkeys, dogs and pigs for anatomical experiments (Aziz and Hunter 230). In fact, the increasing conflict over the extent to which humans can exercise sovereignty over animals for the sake of scientific experiments dates back to the seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century, the case of deliberate cruelty towards animals during experiments became one of the most debated issues among the philosophers and scientists of the period. As Harrison notes,

> although the beast-machine hypothesis itself is acknowledged to have been controversial even in its seventeenth-century setting, the denial of sentience to animals by these philosophers is considered to be symptomatic of a more general early modern trend in which increasing numbers of animals found themselves subjected to painful experiments, attached to dissecting tables, or confined within the chambers of air pumps and in which the natural world itself became victim to the exploitative tendencies thought to characterise the worst features of the Scientific Revolution and of modernity generally. (186)

As is already alluded, the historical argument for scientific experiments on animals "rested on the concept that the 'humans deserve more' than their animal counterparts," which contributed to the development of the anthropocentric conceit (Aziz and Hunter 232). More pointedly, one of the most concrete and vital evidence of such concern about

animals attached to dissecting tables is Joseph Wright of Derby's painting, *An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump* (1768).

Figure 5: *An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump*, by Joseph Wright of Derby, (Derby, 1768). Oil on canvas, 183 x 244 em. National Gallery, London.

Inspired by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke's air pump experiments conducted in order to show the direct interaction between the pressure and volume of gas by means of creating a space evacuated of air, Joseph Wright of Derby (1734-97), in his painting, dramatises the catastrophic impacts of the other pole of the Enlightenment ideals on a wide range of individuals around the experiment table and a white cockatoo. In such a vacuum pump, as long as air bleeding continues, the experimental animal within the glass globe will suffocate and eventually die. This process is depicted by James Ferguson as follows: "If a fowl, a cat, rat, mouse or bird be put under the receiver, and the air be exhausted, the animal is at first oppressed with a great weight, then grows

convulsed, and at last expires in all the agonies of a most bitter and cruel death" (119). Close study of the painting reveals that the young lady covering her face with her hands reflects the sentimental tendencies towards the sight of animal killing, "as though the cold dispassionate gaze of reason would prevent her from seeing with her heart and making a deeper, prerational connection to the bird" (Senior 4). In this way, the painting does not solely illustrate the scene of cruel animal experimentation but it also reflects the lingering doubts whether the absolute faith in the superior ascendancy of reason and science over nature could lead to a moral failure.

In fact, animal vivisection was confirmed and triggered by the Cartesian mechanical philosophy which advocates that "animals do not feel pain, since pain could exist only with understanding, which animals lack," and thus, "they only exhibit the external manifestations of pain, which are purely mechanical responses to stimuli" (Baratay and Hardouin-Fugier 57). With the onward march of scientific progress, the Cartesian beast-machine conjecture led to insensitivity to the ethical and moral rights of animals. Despite the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1849 and of 1876 in the United Kingdom, which were implemented in order to establish a set pattern for the use of animals in experiments, the illegal vivisections continued to be operated. However, with the changing economic and social developments, the assumed superiority of humans and the putative inferiority of animals became one of the topics brought into question. This inevitably induced a change in philosophical perspectives on animals. Because, as Jean-Luc Guichet explains,

> [s]timulated by the challenge of the Cartesian 'animal machine,' animated by disputes about the souls of animals that had reached a crescendo during the last third of the previous century and continued among Enlightenment thinkers, engaged in by both empiricists and materialists, thinking about animals became an essential pivot in the new anthropology that sought to create a new definition of man by reducing the importance of the relationship to God and increasing the role of originary, primordial factors and empirical influences in this new definition. (145)

As might be inferred, some patterns of Christian anthropocentric praxis in society emerged into some increasingly polarised opinions on the moral standing of animals

and ethics of animal exploitation in philosophy and science. Thus, the Enlightenment thought deeply embedded in Cartesian rationality gradually morphed into sensation and sentiment. By virtue of the age,

> [t]he traditional interest centring on the sensory and mental differences between human beings and animals, which was shared by both the Renaissance humanists and the Cartesians and indeed almost anyone in the early modern era interested in animals, still persisted even in the late eighteenth century. Yet toward the end of the century new modes of discussion of animals, mainly historiographical and economic, gradually displaced this traditional discourse. Descartes's view of animals, which had been so famous, and often notorious, in the seventeenth century, was in fact practically discredited by the turn of the eighteenth century. (Wolloch 14)

Accordingly, one of the ground-breaking changes in the eighteenth century in terms of widely held views about the relations between human and animal is the gradual replacement of "more modern versions of ethical arguments in favour of sensitivity to animal sentience" for the Renaissance ideologies (Wolloch 15). In other words, with the establishment of the crowded metropolitan cities, the industrialised sources of incomes, and the gradual break from the actual contact with nature, the increased sensitivity to nature and animals turned into a vital prerequisite for the modern civilised appearance of the century. In accordance with the Enlightenment ideals, "once humanity asserted its place in the natural order no amount of inter-human political turmoil could completely and permanently annihilate this most constitutive of achievements" (Wolloch, *History* 195). Thus, the multi-faceted nature of the Enlightenment provided encouragement and direction for the new scientific discoveries. However, through the end of the century, the Scientific Revolution's ambitious scheme of dominating nature sowed a seed of doubt in some contemporary philosophers' minds. The Baconian approach to nature, which suggests that "[j]ust let man recover the right over nature which belongs to him by God's gift, and give it scope; right reason and sound religion will govern its use" (*Organon* 101), was gradually replaced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's perception of nature. According to this, nature is the only place to which humans should return in order to keep with their prelapsarian condition and avoid degeneration. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who is one of the leading figures of the Enlightenment and the

indomitable spirit of Romanticism, concisely expresses the dented human pride as follows:

> This rare man, the honour of his century and his species, and perhaps the only one since the human race has existed who had no other passion than that of reason, nevertheless did nothing but proceed from error to error in all his systems, out of having wished to make men similar to him, instead of taking them as they are and they will continue to be. (*The Confessions* 355)

With this in mind, the Cartesian 'I think, therefore I am' motto was transformed into 'I sense, therefore I am' parody in the hands of naturalist Jacques Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (qtd. in Senior 4). Accordingly, the impetus behind the eighteenth century sentimentalism towards animals was the result of the belated acknowledgement of the fact that animals do have certain traits and sentiments that they share with humans. However, there was still a rigid division between the two species, and nature along with its nonhuman animal elements was mostly utilised in order to solidify human culture and identity.

During the Romantic period, on the other hand, nonhuman animal communities were viewed from a completely different light than that of the Enlightenment era. The human figure of the Enlightenment as the source of science, philosophy, and culture is almost replaced by the animal figure as a means of reaching to prelapsarian, uncorrupted, instinctive condition of humanity. With the perennial influence of the Enlightenment thought triggering the development of the anatomical research, one of the main causes for the Romantic interest into animality and animetaphors "was the growing scientific insight into the anatomical and psychological continuity between human and nonhuman animals" (Heymans 1). Indeed, this affinity between the two species would have been heavily emphasised by the upcoming revolution fomented by Charles Darwin and his *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Thus, it might be possible to assume that animal welfare occupied a pivotal role in the socio-historical context of the Romantic Movement to reformulate the social, moral, theological and political prominence of humans and animals. Peter Heymans explicates the reason for this as follows:

> The end of the eighteenth century witnessed a general loss of taxonomic stability, whereby the universal and static character of social, political and biological laws was increasingly disputed. Changeability and evolution had become keywords not only in the biological sciences, but also in the radical liberal politics of William Godwin and Thomas Paine, who criticised the conservative ideology underlying class divisions and the dehumanising labour conditions that these divisions appeared to authorise and nourish in an early-capitalist economy. (2)

As is supported by the quotation, the traditional hierarchical bonds between the socio-cultural binaries – between man and woman, between upper class and working class, between individual and state, between human and animal, between mind and body – were all exposed to and disrupted by the Romantic radical liberalism that unfolded individual rights, be they human or animal. In his *Memorializing Animals during the Romantic Period*, Chase Pielak declares that "beasts matter because they appear in Romantic literature at points when its authors figure moments of ontological category rupture – when being itself is challenged" (4). Pielak continues by indicating how animal otherness provided the British Romantic poets such as William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge or Lord Byron a basis for comparison between human animal and nonhuman animal through the various images of deadly animals. The criticism of the knight's evident hedonistic delight in hunting the hart in William Wordsworth's "Hart-Leap Well," the striking and disruptive encounter of an albatross in Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," the lament for the random killing of William Blake's defenceless "The Fly" reflect a humane need to redefine human's own place in the natural order and urge to reconsider the cruel exploitation and the rights of nonhuman animal communities. Moreover, the representation of the human's *rendezvous* with animal in Romantic literature usually "mark moments and practices of rupture – of what is the human, of how we might live together, of community, and of life itself" (Pielak 2). In relation to this point, the theory of evolution is another deep shadow casted upon the literary and philosophical culture of the nineteenth century. Along with the poetic tradition of the period, *The Mill on the Floss* (1860) and *Silas Marner* (1861) by George Eliot, *Wives and Daughters* (1865) by Elizabeth Gaskell, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891) by Thomas Hardy, *The White Peacock* (1911) by David Herbert Lawrence all explore the possibility of hereditary transmitted features.

Apparently, this search for the impact of ancestral lore on human being was triggered by Darwinian evolutionary ideas which markedly shifted the nineteenth century intellectual mind-set

> from conceiving the world as an ordered hierarchy where some are natural lords over others to perceiving it as a place of conflict and mutual aggression. In this fearsome new world those things previously thought of as subordinate – people, animals, emotions – were now understood to be unruly, eagerly seeking to overturn the structures and disciplines that traditionally bound them. (Michie 145)

The scientific denomination and classification of nonhuman animals as an Enlightenment project, known as *systematics* and founded by Swedish naturalist Carl von Linné (1707-78) in his work *Systema Naturae* (1730) (Hediger 76), had reached its crescendo in the latter part of the eighteenth century. However, this 'mission' of supposedly superior human is destroyed by the Darwinian theory of evolution promoting the idea of *natural selection*, which unfolds the ancestral close affinity among all living things including human and asserts hybridity between animals and humans. Accordingly, as Charles Darwin notes,

> [a]nimals – whom we have made our slaves, we do not like to consider our equal. Do not slave-holders wish to make the black man other kind? […] – the soul by consent of all is superadded, animals not got it, not look forward if we choose to let conjecture run wild then animals our fellow brethren in pain, disease, death, suffering, and famine; our slaves in the most laborious work, our companion in our amusements, they may partake, from our origin in one common ancestor we may be all netted together. (*Notebook B* 231-2. 228-29)

It is rather conspicuous that Darwinian theory of evolution called for a virtual revolution in the way nonhuman animal communities were viewed by declaring interspecies relations and human's common animal origins. On the basis of his observations, Darwin, "a liberal meritocrat […] and a socialist" (Amigoni 6), delved into animal mentality and concluded that animals do possess consciousness so that "monkeys are capable of elaborate deceit, insects can solve problems, and many animals can deliberate about what to do" (Jamieson and Bekoff 111). In fact, as Rod Preece rightly

observes, “notion that animals possess all the attributes of humans in vestigial or complete form – human and animal differences are of degree and not of kind – was current in Europe more than two centuries prior to the publication of the *Origin of Species*” (*Awe for the Tiger* 116). The salient point argued in Darwinian speciesism, as the eventual cumulative effect of prior philosophies, is that, besides blurring of the ontological discrepancy between humans and animals, Darwin’s theory of transmutation attributed cognitive skills to nonhuman animals. This, in return, as contemporary cognitive ethologists such as Donald R. Griffin agree, conveys the gist of transforming human conception of the moral consideration for the animal realm (viii). Margot Norris, on the other hand, points out Darwinian liberation of biology from the restricted Enlightenment ideals by stating that

> Darwin replaced the cybernetic model of Nature as a machine with his theory of natural selection, which removed intelligence (and, by inference, a rational creator) altogether as the source of life and put in its place innumerable, dispersed, trivial organic forces operating unconsciously and irrationally, on an ad hoc basis subject to chance, over time. Darwin thereby liberated biology from its Enlightenment enthrallment to physics. (6-7)

However, in *Animal Fables after Darwin* (2018), Chris Danta investigates the impact of Darwinian bio-politics on the change in literally anthropomorphised animals in the fables. Accordingly, Danta argues that such Darwinian dissolution among the various species led inexorably to the measurement of the nonhuman animal in accordance with the human capacity and terminology (2). In the same line of thought, George Dvorsky asserts that “[t]he idea of ‘species,’ while helpful in such fields as systematics and genetics, is not an entirely useful concept when establishing the moral worth of an animal” (140). Nevertheless, Dvorsky continues, “[o]nce stripped of scientific nomenclature, nameless organisms can be classified based on their various morphological and psychological capacities,” instead of being constructed and labelled as “disabled humans” as for “the great apes” (140). Another critical issue about Darwinian speciesism is that Darwin’s evolution principles are heavily based on his natural observation during his Beagle voyage not on scientific experiments. However, they “consisted of a great variety of observational orientations and inscribed accents that played uneasily and ambiguously on shifting fault lines of semantic distinction: the

human and the animal, the cultivated and the natural, the colonial and the home, the living and the dead" (Amigoni 10). For these reasons, although Darwinian theory of evolution has always been open to be criticised, it ultimately prompted enquire into the animal realm. In addition, Darwinian biological findings spotlighted numerous following hypotheses and scientific research areas such as comparative psychology, ethology, and behavioural ecology, all of which have generously contributed to the field of human-animal relationships.

In post-Darwinian period, for instance, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was the first to resonate with Darwin by stating that "biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature" ("Introductory Lectures" 285). In the same spectrum, one of the most trenchant criticisms for the very much anthropocentric ethics of Christianity with regard to divine origin of human perceived as superior to all other creatures belongs to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Undoubtedly, Nietzsche's "death of god" triggered by modern evolutionary biology would have seminal impact on the upcoming "philosophical impetus that gave rise to a practical challenge to the way we think about nonhuman animals" and on philosophers that "are gradually discovering the conceptual resources to call into question the traditional privilege enjoyed by the human" (Calarco and Atterton xvii). In *The Antichrist* (1895), Nietzsche boldly declares that regarding human as the only rational and moral creature that is purified from his instincts and senses has no contact with reality because

> [w]e have learned to think differently. We have become more modest in every respect. We no longer derive man from 'spirit,' from 'divinity'; we have placed him back among the animals. We consider him the strongest animal, because he is the most cunning: His spirituality is a consequence thereof. On the other hand, we guard ourselves against a vanity, which also wants to make itself noticed again here – as if man were the great hidden design behind animal evolution. He is absolutely not the crown of creation: Every creature is, next to him, at the same stage of perfection. And even in asserting this we are asserting too much: Man is, relatively speaking, the most botched animal, the most morbid, the animal which has strayed most dangerously from its instincts – of course, with all that, also the most *interesting*! (112)

As is seen, Nietzsche firmly denies viewing human as the pinnacle of evolution endowed with the highest limits of rational and moral qualities, and he transgresses beyond the bounds of anthropocentric standpoint which insists that human culture is accumulated acridly separate from nature and its elements. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883), Nietzsche introduces his neologism *übermensch* (over-human) in order to demonstrate that "the relationship between animality and culture" is "agonistic and not static; the animal, the human, and the overhuman are tied to each other and cannot be separated into distinct stages of evolution" (Lemm 2). Moreover, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* (1887), Nietzsche explains the historical evolutionary process of change in the agonistic place of human that is, as Nietzsche defines, "a rope fastened between animal and overman-a rope over an abyss" (*TSZ* 7). Accordingly, the civilised version of human is forced to move from the limitless nature to the confines of city and society required human to eradicate the primitive instincts shared with animals (*GM* 57-96). However, denying the existence of the deepest human instincts and fighting for the disappearance of them are futile as "all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself" (*GM* 83), and lead to deformation in human psyche. What disturbs Nietzsche about such domestication procedure of human for the sake of being civilised is that it mutates human from free, unconscious and strong animal to tamed, conscious and weak creature, for it puts human animal away from its primordial instincts. In his description of modern civilised human, Carl Gustav Jung agrees with Nietzsche by expressing that

> [a]s scientific understanding has grown, so our world has become dehumanised. Man feels himself no longer involved in nature and has lost his emotional 'unconscious identity' with natural phenomena […]. No voices now speak to man from stones, plants, and animals, nor does he speak to them believing they can hear. His contact with nature has gone, and with it has gone the profound emotional energy that this symbolic connection supplied. (*Man and His Symbols* 95)

Indeed, human's excessive trust in humane ability to have reason and language eventually minimised its connection with nature, and this is the primary source for humane strong tendency towards speciesism. Accordingly, it is possible to observe that animal studies firstly aim to remind human of its natural connection as being *human*

animal. As John Trevisa's *On the Properties of Things* (1398) (translation of Bartholomaeus Anglicus's *De Proprietatibus Rerum* (1245)) indicates, human enlisted in the category of animals in medieval France and Britain: "All that is compounded of flesh and spirit of life, and so of body and soul, is called animal, a beast, whether it to be the air like birds, or of the water like fish that swim, like men and wild and tame beasts" (qtd. in Crane 1). However, with the Renaissance's strong emphasis on the elevated position of human in the Chain of Being and subsequently the Enlightenment's particular stress on the reason of the enlightened human, human animal was detracted from its natural sources. As Laurie Shannon ascribes,

> [b]efore the cogito, there was no such thing as 'the animal.' There were creatures. There were brutes, and there were beasts. There were fish and fowl. There were living things. There were humans, who participated in animal nature and who shared the same bodily materials with animals. These humans were measured as much in contradistinction to angels as to animals, taking their place within a larger cosmography, constitution, or even 'world picture' than the more contracted post- Cartesian human/animal divide with which we customarily wrangle. (18)

In fact, this dawning awareness about the parallelism between the developing technology and human's withdrawing from involvement in nature bridges the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' trajectories of animal studies. Accordingly, the twentieth century witnessed the appearance of new intellectual horizons for grasping the role of animals in the articulation of human identity within its socio-cultural history. Being triggered by the radical figures of the previous century such as Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Charles Darwin and Friedrich Nietzsche, the twentieth century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida brought new dimensions to the friction between anthropocentric and anti-anthropocentric approaches to the relation of humans to animals. In addition to forming a distinct current of protest against the supposed human sovereignty over animal, these new intellectual movements made the term 'animal studies' function as a hypernym covering a broad range of interdisciplinary study fields within the social, biological, and natural sciences. Likewise, studying animals in language and literature became a significant part of analysing human nature and culture. For instance, Jacques Derrida's concept of *animot* (*The Animal* 41), Akira Mizuta Lippit's *animetaphor* (*Electric Animal* 162-97), and

Kalpana Rahita Seshadri's *humAnimal* (*HumAnimal* 21) are helpful in pointing out why and how the use of animality in figurative language can refer to the unique mix of the human psyche and the animal psyche in the realm of language. In effect, the animal studies challenging the myths of human's divine origin constitutes an essential part of humanities scholarship as "[i]t has interrogated how the category of 'species' is fashioned and regulated in material and textual 'nature-cultures'" (Chrulew and Wadiwel 6). In this sense, animal studies "intersects with categories of class, race and gender, demonstrating how mechanisms of animalisation (of both humans and animals) perpetuate the suffering of oppressed groups, whether human or otherwise" (Chrulew and Wadiwel 6). By doing so, an extensive search for the nonhuman animal subjectivity exposes and voices the cruelty of the 'civilised' one's unattested violence against the 'uncivilised' one.

To begin with, given Nietzsche's content of cross-species relationship, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) involves with questions regarding the place of humans. Particularly, his strong emphasis on the Aristotelian ontological abyssal gaps between humans and animals poses Jacques Derrida's pointed questions of animality. Heidegger, in accordance with his path of a comparative examination to grasp the perception of *mundus* (world), claims

> man is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears and which he makes up in part. Man also stands over against the world. This standing-over-against is a 'having' of world as that in which man moves, with which he engages, which he both masters and serves, and to which he is exposed. Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part he is at once both master and servant of the world. (*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* 177)

He continues to famously argue that "the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming" (*FCM* 177), and he uses the term "captivation" (*Benommenheit*), which refers to "intermediate state somewhere between consciousness and unconsciousness" (*FCM* 239), in order to define the in-between status of animals between human shaping the world and stone having no world. As is seen, Heidegger's almost Cartesian attribute to animals is based on a radical break between humans and

animals, disregarding blatant similarities between the two species. In fact, in his concept of *Dasein* ("there being"), Heidegger attributes existence exclusively to humans (*Being and Time* 39-46), and in this way, animals are closed off to access to the "world," and thus to "the possibility, the condition of oriented being here and being over there" (Inwood 42). In his comparison between Nietzschean and Heideggerian philosophies regarding animals, Akira Mizuta Lippit clarifies the definition of Heideggerian "world" as follows:

> Evidently, Heidegger's 'world' is one that precedes such anthropocentric notions as subjectivity, phenomenality, and consciousness: The 'world worlds,' for Heidegger, even in the absence of human consciousness. World makes possible those various modes of being, without being itself one of them. The 'ever-nonobjective' world secures the ground for objects, entities, and various levels of conscious and non-conscious existence. And yet human beings do 'have' a world or are, at least, equipped with the capacity to have a world. (792)

Accordingly, the discrepancy between humans and animals hindering the cross-species alliances is the fact that human has the innate capacity to grasp and assign "meaning," or "the worldly power of language" (Lippit 793).

In total contrast to Heideggerian endowing human with vocal and cognitive skills, Claude Lévi-Strauss calls attention to the "metaphorical relation which is imagined between the society of birds and the society of men," and to "the relation of bird names to human names" (*The Savage Mind* 205). In this way, Lévi-Strauss stresses the relevancy of animals within human society "either because they suggest it by their own social life (which men look on as an imitation of theirs), or alternatively because having no social life of their own, they form part of ours" (*TSM* 207). Accordingly, Lévi-Strauss states that

> all the members of the species *Homo sapiens* are logically comparable to the members of any other animal or plant species. However, social life affects a strange transformation in this system, for it encourages each biological individual to develop a personality; and this is a notion no longer recalling specimens within a variety but rather types of varieties or of species, probably not found in nature and which could be termed 'mono-individual.'

> What disappears with the death of a personality is a synthesis of ideas and modes of behaviours as exclusive and irreplaceable […]. From this point of view it seems not untrue to say that some modes of classing, arbitrarily isolated under the title of totemism, are universally employed: Among ourselves this 'totemism' has merely been humanised. Everything takes place as if in our civilisation every individual's own personality were his totem: It is the signifier of his signified being. (*TSM* 214)

Despite such social process of creating "mono-individual" by ascribing idiosyncratic peculiarities to every single member of species, Levi-Strauss emphasises both social and biological close affinity between the two species.

On the question of language in relation to human and animal, Derrida points out the fact that "if animals do not speak, it is because they do not articulate" because "[t]he possibility of human language, its emergence from animal calls, what makes possible the functioning of conventional language, is therefore articulation" (*Margins of Philosophy* 151). In Heidegerrian animal cosmology, on the other hand, animals that "cannot die in the sense in which dying is ascribed to human beings but can only come to an end" (*FCM* 267), and "cannot speak either" ("The Nature of Language" 107), cannot be comparable with human *Dasein*. Heideggerian *Dasein,* though remaining mostly in Cartesian trajectory regarding animals, "does not locate man's essence in some specific faculty such as reason" (Inwood 43), which challenges Cartesian rigid dichotomy between mind and body. However, Heidegger vigorously denies a sense of continuity between human and animal, and "rather than seeing human beings as simply component parts of nature, he sees them as those beings through whom nature comes to light and emerges into presence" (Foltz 89). Thus, he deliberately establishes an opposition between the two species by following the Cartesian duality lore with the aim of highlighting the dominancy of humans over nonhumans.

In the same line of thought with Heidegger, Michel Foucault (1926-84) deals with the issue of human relation to nonhuman entities when he needs an antagonist organism in order to decentre anthropocentric principles. However,

> Foucault did not explicitly thematise human relations with nonhuman animals in a way that politicised their subjected bodies and lives; nor did he live long enough to be prompted to engage with more recent discourses on the animal. Rather, in somewhat typical humanist fashion, he commonly referred animality (as sign, symbol or metaphor) back to the sphere of human concern […]. He was certainly alert to the use of 'animalisation' as a political strategy for rationalising violence against various marginalised groups in human societies; and yet he never took the further step of challenging the logic of speciesism that makes possible this matrix of oppression. (Chrulew and Wadiwel 4-5)

In *Madness and Civilisation* (1961), for instance, Foucault likens "the symbolic man" to "a fantastic bird whose disproportionate neck folds a thousand times upon itself – an insane being, halfway between animal and thing" (29) in order to demonstrate that "the transference of the human/animal biopolitical caesura to the mad legitimates their imprisonment, their violent domestication and their animal-like displays under the tutelage of their keepers" (Chrulew and Wadiwel 26). Ironically, both Heidegger and Foucault contributed to the birth of the anti-human content of the century while engaging with decentring human content of anthropocentrism, which invoke the same idea suggested by Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano: "We just need to read a bit more closely and to see that critical posthumanism has ideological allies and philosophical resources in Renaissance humanism itself" (6). That being the case, it is possible to say that "anthropocentrism was in the context of a project the thrust of which was to de-centre human being" (Chrulew and Wadiwel vii). Albeit rather implicitly, it is at this point that Foucault unpacks the operation of speciesism which can be doubled "with the range of other descriptors constitutive of epistemic and physical violence: For example, the racio-gendered-sexualised speciesism that positioned enslaved African American women in animal nature as reproductive bodies that could be sexually violated with impunity" (Pugliese 24-25). Foucault calls this process "constant verticality" (*MC* xii) in order to refer to biopolitical hierarchies in Western cosmology "with the tautology of Western-white-man at the apex and all other forms in descending scale towards that brute animality that can be captured, enslaved and killed with impunity" (Pugliese 25). By following Foucault's genealogy of power in its relation to knowledge, Kalpana Rahita Seshadri coins *humAnimal* in order to signify that

> [i]f we understand modern discriminatory practice as a functioning of what Foucault terms biopower, we can immediately discern that what is termed "racism" is synonymous with the practice of dehumanisation, whereby the victim is disqualified from being a full member of the elite company of human beings. It has often been observed that dehumanisation occurs through the instrumentalisation of the sole and sacrosanct dividing line between human and nonhuman – that is, language or, more properly, the logos as meaningful and credible speech. The other is silenced – rendered speechless as a mute beast undeserving of human sympathy or recognition. (ix)

Apparently, Seshadri aims to explain how mechanism of dehumanisation is intrinsically bound up with mechanism of animalisation, for in both cases *logos*, that is to say language, is occupied by the powerful one, and thereby turning the suffering one to be a silent victim at the hands of "the originary violence of a language" (Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 106).

Jacques Derrida (1957-2004), on the other hand, posits a radical discontinuity with the essentialist philosophical conventions of Continental Europe in regard to the history of animals in Western culture by simply declaring that "essentialist discourse on animals attempts to create homogeneities where only radical heterogeneity can be found" (Calarco 5). Thus, much of his later works and seminars focused on the questions of animal and animality by which he accentuates the growing menace of the essentialist accounts of animal studies. In his criticism of Plato's identification of writing with pharmacy, Derrida attacks the Western logocentric ideologies and claims that

> [w]hat we are provisionally and for the sake of convenience continuing to call a metaphor thus in any event belongs to a whole system. If *logos* has a father, if it is a *logos* only when attended by its father, this is because it is always a being and even a certain species of being, more precisely a *living* being. *Logos* is a zoon. An animal that is born, grows, belongs to phusis. Linguistics, logic, dialectics, and zoology are all in the same camp. (*Dissemination* 79)

The gist of Derrida's theory of deconstruction is to deconstruct the articulated binary oppositions such as writing and speaking or human and animal, and the hierarchical relations that exist between them. More pointedly, Derrida refutes the Cartesian mind-

body dualism by claiming that logos is already "a living, animate creature," and thus, "logographical necessity ought to be analogous to biological, or rather zoological, necessity" (79). In this way, an epistemology (knowing) and an ontology (being) are not the two opposite sides; instead, they are mutually complementary to each other as a head is inseparable from a body. Likewise, Matthew Calarco shares Derrida's worries about the constitutive attitude towards the question of the animal adapted from the political contexts of different identity politics as follows:

> Much like the critique of essentialism in feminism, queer theory, and race studies, theorists in animal studies seek to track the ways in which the concept of 'animality' functions to demarcate humans clearly from animals and establish homogeneities among what appear to be radically different forms of animal life. In so doing, they seek to demonstrate that the notion of animality plays more of a constitutive than denotative role in discourses about animals. (2)

With the aim of deconstructing the essentialist terms which can be found in the scope of discourses on the ontology of nonhuman animals and animality, Derrida, in *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (2006), coins the term *animot* (41), which is combined "with 'mot' (meaning word) a punning suffix to the French plural 'animaux'" so that animality "is not to be understood as "singularising category 'The Animal' but as multiplicious and discursive" (Goldman 161). To put it another way, Derrida repeatedly criticises the European philosophical tradition for being logocentric regarding animals by constantly using the general plural term 'the animal' in order to deprive animals of the *logos* rather than "acknowledging the disparate modes of being, relation, and language to be found among animals" (Calarco 4). According to Derrida, this philosophical totalitarian attitude towards animals is only another type of violence against nonhuman animal entities. Therefore, he introduces his neologism *animot*, which draws attention to "the fragility and porosity of the supposed frontiers of the 'proper' upon which we have presumed for so long to found the traditional opposition between man and animal" (Mallet x-xi). By doing so, Derrida propagates the reversal of conventional perspectives in philosophy as the various occurrences of his multiple *animot* in a text "function as so many alarm signals, wake-up calls designed to prevent the usage or unavoidability of the term the animal, in the singular, from soothing us into an all-too ordinary and all-

too-little-noticed dogmatic slumber" (Mallet x). In this way, it can be possible to acknowledge the multiplicity of different manners of being and living, and develop a deep empathy with the oppressed one, whether human or nonhuman.

Within the same framework, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari introduce their *rhizome* by choosing Franz Kafka's *Metamorphosis* (1915) as a case study, and elucidate that "[w]hat is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality – but also the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial – that is totally different from the arborescent relation: All manner of 'becomings'" (21). By rejecting human supremacy over nonhuman entities, the rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari "facilitates the entry of the animal into the phenomenal world not as a fixed entity but as a dynamic" (Lippit 128), and thus, it opens route for all versions of becomings without imposing any hierarchical and nonlinear essence or identity. As Bruce Boehrer neatly summarises, each of these neologisms "assumes that to ground political or ethical action on notions of the human is to perpetuate the very inequities that politics and ethics are intended to remedy; hence the deconstruction of the human emerges as a philosophical imperative" (5). Such deconstruction of human in the anthropocentric philosophical traditions of Continental Europe that are obsessed with the uniqueness of human and hegemony of humanism is of great significance, for it is the crack big enough for posthumanist studies to look through. Moreover, the reassessment of humanism and its operation by the power holders in various colonial or gender discourses has privileged the reconsideration of animals with a new slant to the equal validity of their ethical, moral, and ontological worth.

It is in deference to this tradition that dire necessity to recognise the animal communities' centrality in the analysis of human society embodies the very essence of the activist fights for animal rights movement prevailed in the twentieth century. Peter Singer, Gary Francione, Tom Regan, Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti, and Erica Fudge are among the contemporary authors who express the damaging effects of advanced capitalism and technologies on the moral worth of animals, at whose core "there is a radical disruption of the human-animal interaction" (Braidotti 7).

In this light, particularly the space of last two decades has been marked with a prodigious growth in animal studies through a posthuman outlook on human-animal relations. Rethinking the concept of humanism, posthumanism elucidates the ill-considered ideals of anthropocentrism such as speciesism, and thus challenges the human-made cultural borders among species based on the human interpretation of the biologically determined facts. Approaching closer to the animal welfare, animal studies as a branch of posthumanist theory reviews the multi-layered roles of animals throughout the human history and redefines what 'human animal' and 'nonhuman animal' mean. Therefore, the whole corpus of the first chapter is dedicated to formulating the theoretical survey of the animal-related discussions from the ancient period to the contemporary one that have gradually shifted from humanism to posthumanism, or from anthropocentrism to anti-anthropocentrism. As can be inferred from such mapping of the distinctive philosophical patterns, the critical analysis of the Renaissance period is a priori within the context of animal studies in order to understand both the deep roots of these anthropocentric taboos and to explain properly the crucial function of animetaphors in English Renaissance drama. Following such a long survey of debates on the place of animals in human cosmos, the following chapters offer three distinctive examples of early modern English drama and explicate the significant animetaphors that are the embodiment of the playwrights' political criticism of their own age.

CHAPTER 2

THE USE OF BEASTS TO PRESENT HUMAN BESTIALITY: THE PROTO-CAPITALIST HAUTE BOURGEOISIE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF POSTHUMANISM IN BEN JONSON'S *VOLPONE*

Ben Jonson, I think had all the critical learning to himself; and till of the late years England was as free from critics, as it is from wolves.
(Thomas Rymer, 1674)

Good wits are greatest in extremities.
(*Volpone*, 172)

Ben Jonson's *Volpone* (1606), filled with numerous veiled or direct allusions to innate human rational capacity as prescribed in the second epigraph above, is, indeed, a very cruel irony and subversion of the predominant Eurocentric and mostly anthropocentric ideals of the Renaissance humanist reform linked to an optimistic belief in the daring extreme deeds of well-educated human reason. Accordingly, as a result of the supposedly cultivated human rationality, the Renaissance is also marked by its economic and political balances, embroiled in the bourgeoisie and exposed to tremendous changes due in part to not settled but upcoming free market economy which steadily escalated financial rivalry among individuals. In this vein, while Jonson criticises social hierarchy caused by humane inclination towards legacy hunting and the proto-capitalist system forcing parasitism as a licence to own money and power, he also attacks the biological hierarchy established between human and nonhuman being. Though Jonson is a playwright who has classicist set of values regarding the place of human and nonhuman, his use of humours becomes a fully functioning political, biological and psychological metaphor for certain generic similarities between the two species. In this respect, it displaces the human/animal distinction, and instead celebrates the coexistence of all natural beings in harmony, which enables the play to be open to a posthumanist reading. Accordingly, when *Volpone* is closely scrutinised, it is apparent that, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge states, "there is no goodness of heart in any of the prominent characters" in the play's society (270), and every character has much to offer

to the anti-human content of the play. Such concern of the play throws light upon the human relations to its environment, and especially to animals. Thus, *Volpone* goes beyond the label instructive 'medieval bestiary,' and presents a dense array of ways animals were exploited by humans in daily life, the then-contemporary zoology knowledge, the animal content of human rituals and myths including superstitions, and the organic link between human and nonhuman animal during the early modern period. In this way, the play functions as a fascia binding animality and humanity together. That is to say, the play serves as an arena where the two species are both contrasted with and likened to each other not to glorify human dignity but to fiercely attack human vices such as lust or greed fed by the growing capitalist system. In other words, the socio-economic and socio-political representations of the play's human characters through animetaphors along with the sexual politics of the period allow Jonson to criticise human greed especially for money and estate. However, Jonson deploys and analyses such greed in any possible social arena such as in the sexual norms or the food culture of the period. In this sense, Jonson overtly expresses his worries about the rise of free market economy and its catastrophic dehumanising impact on vulnerable human intellectual nature, enabling a posthumanist reading of the biological, social or political relations between humans and animals of the play. Consequently, the animetaphors in the play become the prime agents for Jonsonian satiric comedy in relation to both monetary and sexual politics of the period through intensifying the impact of any kind of irony, whether dramatic, situational or verbal.

Along with his court masques and poems, Ben Jonson (1572-1637) has always occupied an outstanding place in the arena of English Renaissance drama through his identification with the comedy of humours, in which characters are identified with their dominant humour in order to satirise human follies. His comedies such as *Every Man in His Humour* (1598) along with *Every Man out of His Humour* (1616), *The Alchemist* (1610) or *Bartholomew Fair* (1612) are the representative epitomes of Jonsonian comedy of humours. In particular, *Volpone* (1606) reiterated Jonson's place as an officially recognised playwright as "the exultant dedication of its 1607 edition to the two 'universities' [Oxford and Cambridge] makes clear" (Parker and Bevington 1). However, as Allan C. Dessen rightly observes, "*Volpone* represents an impressive first

step toward, but not the culmination of, Jonson's moral comedy" (106) due to some relevant but blurring effects of the subplot as well as "the presence of Celia and Bonario in the midst of the animalistic world of Venice" (105). The reason for Jonson's such strong interest in composing comedy of humours is that he enunciates himself a classicist. Thus, comedy of humours supplies him with the necessary material to amalgamate the techniques of classical drama formulated by Aristotle and the vibrant dynamics of English Renaissance drama. Furthermore, as Sean McEvoy claims, it provides Jonson with a stage on which he can satirise the politics of the period without getting into trouble with legal barriers:

> When the vogue for published prose and verse satire seemed to the authorities to be getting out of hand it was banned by the Bishop of London and the Archbishop of Canterbury in June 1599. George Chapman's *An Humorous Day's Mirth* (1597) had already transferred the satirist's mockery of contemporary character types to the stage. Jonson then drew on this fashionable subject and produced innovative and distinctive drama in the only literary form in which satire was permitted. (19)

Most importantly, Jonson's application of humours theory to the formulation of tumult in his plays enables him to express his criticism of voracious nature of human being that sets humans apart from animals. In other words, through the use of thematically descriptive animetaphors, Jonson is able to investigate the full greatest extent of the overwhelming human greed for material or carnal desires. Moreover, despite his clear linkage of his voracious characters with carrion birds, Jonson shows that human hunger constantly bolstered by greed is not the natural element; instead, it is sourced by the strong inclination of human immoral nature to relish the thought of having more than enough.

Nevertheless, Jonsonian use of humours theory was widely considered to bring "the crude and mechanistic view of the human mind," and criticised as the denouement of "his inability to produce 'convincing' psychological characterisation in the manner of Shakespeare" by his contemporaries (McEvoy 20). In his posthumously published "Lectures on the English Comic Writers" (1841), William Hazlitt (1778-1830), an

acknowledged Romantic genius for art and literary criticism in English language, compares Shakespeare and Jonson from a critical vision of comedy as follows:

> Shakespeare's characters are men; Ben Jonson's are more like machines, governed by mere routine, or by the convenience of the poet, whose property they are. In reading the one [Shakespeare], we are let into the minds of his characters, we see the play of their thoughts, how their humours flow and work […]. In Ben Jonson it is, as it were, confined in a leaden cistern, where it stagnates and corrupts; or directed only through certain artificial pipes and conduits to answer a given purpose. The comedy of this author is […] for the most part obtuse, obscure, forced, and tedious. (43)

Accordingly, while Hazlitt praises Shakespeare's ability to present human nature in an unmannered, or unstudied way, he finds Jonson's art mannered and mechanic. He criticises Jonson's comedy for not having spirit of wit. Certainly, adopting humours theory restricts the process of characterisation, and leads to characters who "are one-dimensional caricatures and lack the psychological complexity" (Botvinick 3). However,

> [a]lthough these criticisms have surrounded Jonson's work for centuries, it was not until the Romantic period that they took root in the cultural zeitgeist and began to control the perceptions of scholars, theatre reviewers, and theatre practitioners. Undoubtedly, Jonson possessed a cynical view of humanity, and this can be seen in his decision to populate his best plays almost exclusively with rogues and gulls. For many, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the complete absence of virtue in Jonson's characters is problematic. (Botvinick 3)

Analysed in this way, although Jonson's use of humoral comedy enforced by his fable-like narration through his use of animetaphors was criticised for being mechanic, it emphasises the physiological and psychological kinship shared by the two entities in contrast to Renaissance anthropocentric elevation of human reason and dignity. Furthermore, by basing his play upon such kinship, Jonson shows the inferior position of human when compared to animal due to humane proneness to desiring more than enough.

In other respects, such humoral mechanistic outlook on human reason can be seen as a component of Jonsonian didacticism. As being a classicist, Jonson confers in his prologues to some of his plays such as *Every Man in His Humour* (1598) that comedy should have a didactic and moral aim to correct human vices and follies (245). Indeed, as Kent Cartwright neatly summarises,

> Aelius Donatus, the fourth-century commentator on Terence whose theories helped to shape Renaissance comedy, conceived of action in three stages – *protasis*, *epitasis,* and *catastrophe* – the whole driven by error. The *protasis* explicates background and constitutes the first act. The *epitasis* marks the launching of a plot, trick, or conspiracy in the second act, which leads, in Acts III and IV, to complications, reversals, 'turbations,' the entire 'knot of error.' The *catastrophe* comes in Act V with affairs suddenly salvaged from near-disaster to happiness […]. Philip Melanchthon, the sixteenth-century Wittenberg scholar, replaced Donatus's emphasis with a focus on the moral imperilment that arises from error. (78-80)

For Melanchthon (1497-1560), as mentioned above, the harshness of catastrophe is a significant part of the humanist educational and didactic efficacy. Indeed, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously expresses, "[a]fter the third act, this play becomes not a dead, but a painful, weight on the feelings" (270). Accordingly, Act V Scene xii, where Mosca is sent to the galleys as a slave-for-life and Volpone is put in prison by the Senate, sets the biting dark tone of comedy in *Volpone*. Therefore, his comedies "show Jonson able to turn his ferocious satirical gifts to a coherent purpose, what he called 'high moral' comedy" (Black, Conolly et all 570). In this vein, much in the same way that the animalistic names of the main characters and the self-interest based relations among them serve to the play's clear moral message about the destructive nature of excessive greed, so too does the practical application of theory of humours.

The problematic nature of Jonsonian characterisation lies in his ability to convey disruption in his work through comedy, and animetaphors are his agents to mirror cynicism in dystopian capitalist society of humankind that projects its evil on the enigmatic yet natural world of animals. On this point, it is of great significance to meditate on the reason for Jonson to form a play which is certainly not the first and only one drawing parallels between humanity and animality in literature and art of the

medieval and Renaissance eras. Nonetheless, as Richard Dutton justifiably argues, "no other play of its era is so fully peopled with characters who are explicitly animals, birds, and insects, behaving exactly in the manner of Aesop's archetypal beasts, as the text knowingly reminds us" (*Volpone* 347). Dutton furthers his claim by stating that

> [b]east fable was often a form of coded political satire […]. I want to argue that this is exactly what beast fable was for Jonson in *Volpone,* following precedents both ancient and modern: That the play is indeed 'a manifesto of independence,' as its remarkable 'Epistle' announces it to be; and that it advises Jonson's 'betters and patrons' about the parlous state of England – rather than Venice – at the time it was written, in the wake of the Gunpowder Plot. (*Volpone* 347)

Accordingly, Dutton interprets the master-servant relationship established between Volpone and Mosca under the strong shadow of the strict patronage regulations Jonson himself was forced to obey (349). In an era in which theatre was one of the most leading commercial industry retails as a popular form of social gaiety, various laws were enforced in order to regulate the content of the plays under the two reigns of both Elizabeth I and James I. Thus, by calling attention to the political tone of Jonson's preface to *Volpone*, in which Jonson gives a definition of a successful poet "that comes forth the interpreter and arbiter of nature, a teacher of things divine no less than human" (qtd. in Parker and Bevington, 34), Dutton highlights the obvious parallels between the micro-political context of the play and the macro-political context of the period out of which Jonson formed his play. On this point, it is important to note that just like Shakespeare, Jonson is one of the Renaissance dramatists who witnessed and experienced the social and political impact of the death of the last Tudor monarch, and the accession of James I, the first Stuart monarch to the throne first-hand. Accordingly, A. R. Braunmuller and Michael Hattaway illustrate the tremendous impact of reigns on the contexts of drama of the period:

> Chronology's drawbacks are most simply illustrated in its grossest form, division by regnal periods. 'Elizabethan,' 'Tudor,' 'Jacobean,' 'Stuart' ordinarily can point to the crudest of contrasts, even if we recognise how absurd it is to suppose, for example, that Jonson, Shakespeare, or Chapman, or their theatre companies, or the audiences, or their experiences and

> sensibilities changed detectably on that day in March 1603 when Queen Elizabeth died. (xii)

In fact, the fall of the public theatre with the death of Elizabeth I and the rise of court theatre with the accession of James I was one of the main reasons of the change in financial and social conditions of dramatists, actors, acting companies, and theatre owners. Even such difference can affirm and explain what Braunmuller and Hattaway imply by mentioning the death of Elizabeth I in their statement about the relation between theatre and monarch.

Indeed, the death of Elizabeth I, who was "the figurehead of militant nationalistic Protestantism" (Hackett 237), and the following accession of James I to the throne in 1603 brought new codes of politics. The fundamental change that occurred in the social, political, and cultural life in Great Britain during the Renaissance came with a variety of repercussions felt in the field of economy as well. Although the bourgeoisie and free market economy were not firmly established in Jonson's time, the impetus behind such social attitude towards legacy hunting is the then-contemporary changing social forces which were triggered by the broadly liberal politics and economics of the period. In *Sociology of Renaissance* (1932), Alfred Von Martin claims that before being marked with its adherence to fine art, literature and intellectual developments, the Renaissance should be studied in accordance with its economic and political realities embroiled in "haute bourgeoisie" that assiduously cultivated such culture, for "that class of 'property and intellect' (Bildung) here makes its first appearance in modern history" (ix). From this standpoint, the rise of "the capitalist domination by the moneyed great bourgeoisie, which exploits democratic tendencies which had destroyed feudalism, as the best way to ensure its own domination" stresses the changing social dynamics of the new era (Martin 2). In order to indicate the Renaissance's deliberate breach with the medieval socio-economic heritage and impact of man-in-the-centre trend on the bourgeoisie, Martin puts the two bygone eras side by side for comparison:

> In the Middle Ages political power with religious sanction had prevailed: Now comes the era of an intellectually supported economic power. Religion as well as politics becomes a means, just as previously commerce and

> secular culture had been no more than the means to an end. The Middle Ages in their social structure as well as in their thought had a rigidly graduated system. There was a pyramid of Estates as well as a pyramid of values. Now these pyramids are about to be destroyed, and 'free competition' is proclaimed as the law of nature. God and blood, the traditional powers, are deposed, and though they maintain some of their importance their dominance is shattered. (2)

Surely, Jonson casted a critical eye on the predictable effects of such "free competition," as called in the quotation above, on human greed. His choice of setting for his play, Venice where the first private bank and then public one flourished between 1348 and 1584 (Dunbar 312), tells something of his apprehension about the close link between human greed and money. However, as M. H. Abrams and Stephen Greenblatt interpret,

> [t]his dark satire on human greed is set in Venice, but its true target is the city of London, or the city of London is about to become. It is a place devoted to commerce and mired in corruption, populated by greedy fools and convincing rascals. Like Shakespeare, Donne, and Thomas More before them, Jonson was deeply disturbed by the rise of a money economy in which every aspect of life could be prostituted to commercial interest. (1303)

Such inhumane greed fed by the spirit of early capitalism forms the skeletal system of *Volpone*'s society. As being the dramatist of the post-Reformation England and performing under Elizabeth I and James I, Jonson, in his city comedies, mostly "staged a fallen world defined by commerce, greed and hypocrisy, a world in which a series of fools, buffoons, thieves, alchemists, puritans and projectors combine to swindle and outwit one another in search of money, status, food and sex" (Lake and Yamamoto 114). In *Volpone*, for instance, through Mosca's transformation from a "flesh-fly" (195) to a "basilisk" (194), Jonson presents how money can lay the way open for title to get one foot on the social ladder. Although Mosca's name is previously referred to only as a parasite in the court until he gets legacy from Volpone, the 4 Avocatori [name] later sends Notario to learn his name and bring him to the court (198). Through legacy hunting, Mosca achieves to be "a brave clarissimo" though not by birth (189).

As the play develops, Mosca's such underlying motivation for such a distinctive social transformation through legacy hunting is valid for the other carrion birds of the play. Through his farcical characters sharing several traits that stand in a stark contrast to a universally valid set of moral principles, Jonson establishes his elegant dramatic style following the classical patterns. However, the carrion birds that some of the characters are identified with in the play such as vultures, crows and ravens, are the organisms whose behaviours and attitudes are modified in accordance with their natural hereditary drives like hunger. Nonetheless, within the world of the play, no other animal except human pushes the limits and behaves in a way that cannot be labelled as a natural instinctive pattern. In other words, the legacy hunters of the play may be resembled to the carrion birds at a surface level in Jonsonian imagery; yet ironically underneath they are rapacious creatures unnaturally and constantly demanding more than offered or supplied. In other words, in its natural realm, what triggers a raven to feed on dead animals is not the bird's extreme greed for food but its inborn impulse to be fed. On the other hand, Volpone, Voltore, Corbaccio, Corvino, all these Venetian gentlemen are already rich enough to not have to conspire against each other or look forward to the death of the other. However, they all keenly seek a way to trick the other in order to get his legacy and to enlarge their estates. From the very outset, Volpone is presented as the ringleader of the other characters who are willing to sacrifice their social or religious values and loyalties for the sake of their material gains, and he sets gold as the standard of these values. Accordingly, as Mathew R. Martin rightly observes,

> [t]he material mind and its waking dreams are fashioned by and integrated into the material world of Venice's commercial exchange economy, a dystopian, anti-Platonic economy that values an object not by the extent to which it has been being by participation in an Idea but by the extent to which it appears valuable. In the exchange economy an object's being is consumed by its *appearance*. Gold is the 'dumb god' (I.i.22) of this economy: The motor, token, and end of exchange, gold is the measure of all things including 'the price of souls' (I.i.24). (27)

Thus, humans' behaviours likened to that of animals are not triggered by the same natural stimulus, and human excessive greed or unsatisfied nature cannot be explained with the biological terms such as basic instincts of human physiology. In this sense, it is possible to observe that in Jonsonian world animals might be more virtuous when

compared to humans, for humans, whose avarice is not sourced by natural elements, are inferior to animals. On the other hand, Volpone's final punishment is the product of social forces, since "his crimes expose what society wants hidden, the arbitrary and merely constructed nature of the system of socially organised selves" (Lawrence, qtd. in McEvoy 68). In effect, this is the core of Jonsonian criticism of society, for "Jonson protests the inhumanity not just of greedy people but of greedy laws – laws made by the greedy to protect the acquisitions of the greedy" (Abrams and Greenblatt 1303). As can be deduced, Jonson's grotesque parody of human nature in *Volpone* alludes to his bitter criticism of the changing social realities around him, and it aims to warn the readers about the possible devastating results of such state of affairs such as parasitism.

On the basis of political representations of animals in literary works, the widespread appearance of animals in literary works with the purpose of giving moral lesson has always been one of the essential functions of animatephors, and *Volpone* has been mostly interpreted as a "morally instructive animal fable" (Cohen 47). The animalistic metaphors of the play illuminate the play's central argument and affirm the theme of parasitism. Over the course of the play, Volpone (the fox) is circled by the carrion birds, namely Voltore (the vulture), Corbaccio (the crow), and Corvino (the raven), waiting for the fox to die so that they can eat it. However, they are tricked by Volpone through the help of his parasitic servant, Mosca (the fly), who finally cheats his master. In fact, Jonson takes the names of most of his characters from John Florio's Italian/English dictionary, *A Worlde of Words* (1598), in which "volpone" is defined as "an old fox, an old reinard, an old craftie, slie, subtle companion, sneaking, lurking wily deceiver" (qtd. in Stout 97). On the other hand, Volpone traces back to Aesopian fables along with the Reynardian convention of the medieval vulpine epic, "even as it operates within a moral universe in which a degree of order, in the form of poetic justice, is achieved" (Robles 69). However, Jonson applies to zoomorphism, attribution of animal traits to human, with the aim of conveying the same moral message found in the tradition of anthropomorphism, attribution of human traits to nonhuman, in folk tales. Accordingly, the wicked anthropomorphised fox in *Reynard the Fox* coils up into the villainous zoomorphised human through the characterisation of Volpone in the crafty hands of

Jonson with the aim of socio-political satire on the changing economic policies and their effect on human morality.

Nevertheless, Jonson's play is not solely a fable with a deliberate attempt at conveying a moral lesson; it also challenges the duality between the corporal nonhuman animal and the intellectual human so as to merge the natural agency with the cultural territory. As Lawrence Danson cogently expresses, Volpone is "not just a symbol, but a symbol-using animal, that is a man" (qtd. in McEvoy 67). For instance, Volpone's name does not stand only for his fable role as the fox; instead, he leaps out at the audience as a beast by all his appearances with his "gown," "furs, and night-caps" (57). To put it another way, Jonson goes beyond likening human to animal by creating Volpone as the metamorphosis of human being into nonhuman animal being. Thus, Jonson's fox, which is a zoomorphic human, can be reinterpreted in accordance with anthropomorphism, the term "used to describe the belief that animals are essentially like humans," and "usually applied as a term of reproach, both intellectual and moral" (Daston and Mitman 2). When analysed in this way, Volpone, along with the other zoomorphic characters identified with their attributed animal qualities, becomes an arena where humanity is entangled with animality, and they nest inside one another. At this point, the careful choice of animal plays a crucial role in the creation of zoomorphic characters. Accordingly, "[h]ardly any other mammals living in the wild enjoy as much popularity as the fox [vulpes] – both male and female (vixen) alike – in the traditions since antiquity" due to "its physical and mental faculties" referring to "cunning, slyness, perfidy, and even wickedness" (Uther 134). In his *Reynard, Renart, Reinaert and Other Foxes in Medieval England* (1999), Kenneth Varty traces the deep roots of English fox lore back to French Renarts and later Dutch Reinaerts, and stresses the popularity of Reynard's iconic status figure by conveying that "he was once the leading character in a book meant for adults which became a best-seller in the fifteenth century and remained popular for more than 200 years, a book characterised by violence, murder, adultery, rape and corruption in high places" (23). In fact, along with animal symbolism, the Reynard stories were quite common for the Renaissance consciousness, and "[t]he animal analogies and stories were so pervasive, in fact, so taken for granted, that their influence functions at an almost subterranean level; and this obliquity of influence is

nowhere truer than in England" (Parker 5). Around 1481, *Reynard the Fox*, based on its Dutch version, was translated into English by William Caxton, who stuck to the original source of his translation. Nonetheless, some adaptations in the story occurred in the seventeenth century, for "[t]he seventeenth century asked for literature that was not only entertaining but also morally appropriate, and therefore reprintings of the Reynard story appeared with some changes, additions and abbreviations" (Varty 254-55).

Figure 6: Reynard's triumph, drawn by Ernest Henri, from *The Rare Romance of Reynard the Fox, the Crafty Courtier: together with the shifts of his sone Reynardine,* (1872).

Jonson's animalia then, is absorbed harmoniously into his effort to instil morals into his audience and the didactic lecturing of the period. Indeed, as D. A. Scheve informs, "[t]he episode of the fox feigning death is set forth in detail in a book Jonson had in his own library, Conrad Gesner's *Historia Animalium* (1557)" (242). Mario Ortiz Robles, on the other hand, focuses on the reasonable grounds for *Reynard the Fox*'s specific choice of fox figure in the eyes of the public:

> The vices symbolised by the figure of the fox come to be naturalised in this tale of social cunning and upward mobility in which the fox itself plays an almost invisible role. The vulpine epic thus offers a significant counternarrative to the benign tale of recognition and domestication that characterises the dog tale. Dogs are a 'companion species,' to use Donna Haraway's suggestive phrase, in part because we share our otherness with them in a domestic space, along with the microorganisms, habits, and affects that transit between both species. Foxes, in contrast, exist at the further edges of domestication, remaining wild as a species, even as they are routinely hunted for sport, which makes the fox a symbolically rich site for staging the encounter between nature and civilisation. (70)

Thus, Jonson's fox, which is a human, can be reinterpreted in accordance with anthropomorphism, the term "used to describe the belief that animals are essentially like humans," and "usually applied as a term of reproach, both intellectual and moral" (Daston and Mitman 2). Although the use of animal symbolism in fables might be helpful in conveying the moral messages intended to be internalised by the audience, it also locks animals in the stereotypical fictional characterisation created from the perspective of human reason. In rejection to anthropomorphism due to its affinity with anthropocentric exploitation of animals, Claire Parkinson challenges the whole basis on which a tendency to anthropomorphise animals is centralised:

> Anthropomorphism shapes ideas about nonhuman animals more than any other aspect of their popular representation. Yet, despite their undeniable and enduring popularity, anthropomorphised animals are considered a problem […]. Anthropomorphised animals are subsumed into a human social logic where their commodification, especially for a family audience, is predicated on the erasure of their individual complexity and species difference. In its pejorative sense, anthropomorphism remains to some extent weighed down with associations to childishness, a lack of objectivity and sentimentality […] and in humanising animals we risk losing sight of them as beings in their own right, with individual experiences and capacities that are quite different from our own. (1)

Interestingly, the kernel of animal satire was not only fed by humane inclination towards projecting human behaviours onto animals; but "it coexisted with an anthropomorphic belief in the moral capacity of animals to act like humans" (Bruaene 33). The most striking evidence of such belief is animal trials. Although it was not a common phenomenon in England and "[t]he institution of courts formed by peers, along

with a general resistance to Roman law, may help to explain the absence of animal trials in England" (Dinzelbacher 411), almost the whole content of anthropomorphic lore in England was profoundly shaped by the Continental sources. Surely, European animal trials in which animals as nonhuman members were exposed to a legal procedure just like humans tell something of humane need to anthropomorphism in order to come to terms with human nature which was challenged by Jonson's criticism of human intellectuality. Although moral capacity has been attributed to rational human animal, animal trials show human's blurred perception of nonhuman animals regarding their intellectual and moral abilities. Such practices should be closely examined in order to understand the true nature of human interest in anthropomorphic depictions based on the acceptance of kinship between human and animal, which was definitely denied in the content of the Renaissance anthropologic matters.

At this point, Jonson's humour theory defies the conventional acceptance of animals as objects and equates the play's human characters with the nonhuman animals at least at a corporal level in *Volpone*, and thus, challenges human identity and hubris by referring to common physiological shares between the two species:

> The human subjugation of animals allows humans to claim exclusive possession of reason and a set of qualities associated with this claim (language, free will, an immortal soul, and so on), since if animals also possessed any of these qualities, they could resist being dominated. The human subjugation of animals also allows humans to gloss their stereotypically upright posture as heaven-oriented and that of the animals as oriented towards base, worldly appetites. Yet bodily evidence for human distinctiveness stumbles over the obstacle that bodies, whether human or animal, are worldly, and, as such, grow and eat, die, rot, and turn to dust. (Steel 108)

Viewed in this way, the theory of humours, which does not refer only to human bodily features but also involves the animal organism, explains the obvious linkage between the two species, for the biological system of both organisms includes the same natural elements. As the ancient scholar St. Isidore of Seville (560-636) explicates "[t]he body is made up of the four elements. For earth is in the flesh; air in the breath; moisture in the blood; fire in the vital heat. For the elements have each their own part in us, and

something is due them when the structure is broken up" (qtd. in Yılmaz 32). Humans as well as animals are the parts of the same physical environment, and their *corpus*, which is "so called because being corrupted, it perishes," and "[f]or it is perishable and mortal and must sometime be dissolved" (Isidore of Seville 217), is also comprised of the natural common components. From this standpoint,

> the material and discursive enmeshment within the human body is undeniable; however, to accept material agency would consequently threaten the ultimate subjective and intellective position of human beings. Therefore, agency, and later existence within the 'Cogito ergo Sum' ideology, was denied to nonhuman beings and matter by formulating a supposed separation between ontology and epistemology so as to privilege human agency. (Yılmaz 32)

In effect, the term for humour is "rather ὑγρόν 'fluid:' the 'fluids' are the uniform parts (ὁμοιομερη) which are tender and wet in the bodies of animals with blood" (Demont 278). In order to clarify this statement, it is important to analyse the roots of humoral pathology. In fact, the basis of medieval humoral theory dates back to Greco-Roman classical arguments based on the classical tenets of Zeno of Citium (333–264 BC) regarding the four elements, which were followed by the Hippocratic and thereafter by the Galenic classification involving the specific patterns of interactions between bodily fluids and a person's psychological profile. Accordingly,

> [b]lood was aligned with the basic qualities hot and wet, and the season spring; yellow bile with hot and dry, and summer; black bile with cold and dry, and fall; and phlegm with cold and wet, and winter. […] When we describe a person's temperament today as sanguine, choleric, melancholic, or phlegmatic, we are, in effect, referring to their dominant bodily fluid or humor: Blood (sanguis), yellow bile (cholé), black bile (melaina cholé), and phlegm. (Adamson 205-206)

In spite of his Stoic propensity for regarding animals as irrational entities, Galen, who in some cases "refuses to interact with the test animal which he normally uses for his medical research," owes his four-humour theory to the animals specifically nonhuman primates that he dissected during his experimentations for further human medical profession (Vespa 411-12). Indeed, animal experimentation was a very common

practice among the ancient physicians, and thus, "medical training pivoted on assumed anatomic, biochemical, and physiological characteristics shared by man and beast" (Greek 15). It is in deference to this same tradition that Renaissance medical teaching conventions, which was developed by "the work of humanists providing important editions and commentaries of Aristotle, Hippocrates and Galen" and by "the growth of a relative independent experimental anatomy" (*experientia*) along with Aristotle's particular research method of "the acquisition of true causal knowledge" (*scientia*) (Papy 318), included animal vivisections beside dissection of human cadavers. Indeed, the conjecture about anatomical surgical research during the Renaissance historically traces Andreas Vesalius's *De humani corporis fabrica* (*On the structure/fabric of the human body*) (1543) and Ambroise Paré's *Apologie and Treatise* (1564), both of which led to William Harvey's *De Motu Cordis* (*Motion of the Heart*) (1628) in which Harvey explicates his discovery of general blood circulation in human body.[1] Apart from their vivisected bodies for anatomical progression, animals were frequently profited from in order to alleviate human sufferings. At this point, in her *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture* (2013), Karen Raber introduces her "mutual consumption" so as to illuminate another crucial dimension of physiologically shared sphere between human and animal:

> Humans consumed dung and urine, used brains and other internal organs for salves, applied live animals to wounds, ground up both animal and human bones, cooked up messes of snails and worms, and so on in the quest to heal themselves. This process was not one-sided, either: Human urine, sweat, and bodily effluvia were fed to animals in a similar attempt to cure. This process of exchange emphasised humans' and animals' common physiology, tending to dissolve theoretical distinctions between the two categories of life. (104)

Invoking the concept of posthumanism, the widespread use of animals in Renaissance medical treatment posits a radical continuity between humans and animals, as it can be observed in *Volpone*. While speaking about the ingredients of Mountebank's medicinal oil which recovered Volpone from his alleged failing health, Corvino lists the names and parts of diverse animals that were possibly added to the content of the oil:

[1] For further information, see p. 56.

> All his ingredients
> Are a sheep's gall, a roasted bitch's marrow,
> Some few sod earwigs pounded caterpillars,
> A little capon's grease, and fasting spittle:
> I know them to a dram. (107)

Subsequently, Mosca informs Corvino that despite the medical aids of the physicians who applied animals to their treatment, the only way for Volpone to be fully recovered is to sleep with a woman:

> Consulting on him, how they might restore him;
> Where one would have a cataplasm of spices,
> Another a flay'd ape clapp'd to his breast,
> A third would have it an oil,
> With wild cats' skins: at last, they all resolved
> That, to preserve him, was no other means,
> But some young woman must be straight sought out. (107)

Such medicinal use of human/animal bodies as a treatment for human/animal diseases, which Raben calls "the waste-and-body-parts-as-medicine trajectory" (108), testifies to the certain physiological aspects common to human and animal and hints at the mutual co-existence of the both species. In conjunction with this point, Linda Kalof confers the English curiosity about animal psychology reflected in their burning interest in animal-baiting:

> Numerous theories have been put forward to explain the English penchant for animal-baiting in the early modern period. For example, it has been argued that the popularity of animal-baiting was based on an interest in studying animal nature and temperament, with the bear pit serving as a 'psychological anatomy theatre' that exposed not only the courage of the animals but also their basic character. (90)

Kalof continues her observation by building a link between comedy of humours and bear-baiting which "lies in the degrading treatment of the humorous individual and that the humours characters are forever trying to prove themselves" (90). Within the scope of comedy of humours, which reverberates "a dissection of individual characters singled out by an internal humoral nature, a particular trait or habit of speech that disclosed the

private self, stripped of surface pretensions" (90), animal-baiting spectacles or the blood sports turn out to be psychical plays. More precisely, they become "choreographed theatrical games" (Kalof 91) in which human neuroses caused by being long segregated from its own natural wild tendencies towards atrocity and violence externalised onto the façade. This allegedly civilised human-induced violence in an effort to tame the wild one can be interpreted as another political, social or spiritual realm for the human/animal cohesion not division, for "[t]he city, the place of humanity, is opposed to the wilderness, the place of savagery, but ironically it is the city which produces the very thing which makes its inhabitants more suited to the wilderness" (Fudge 19). Such oxymoronic combination of nature and civilisation comes into being with the terms 'baiting' evoking pain and 'spectacle' echoing with pleasure, which captures Erica Fudge's attention and she indites that

> [t]he binaries of baiting and being baited; watching and performing; human and animal collapse into one another in dangerous and important ways. […] The Bear Garden emerges as a place of immense contradictions: the place which reveals the difference between the species also reveals their sameness. Baiting is the most explicit and spectacular site of anthropocentrism in the early modern period, but it is also the most explicit and spectacular site of humanity's confusion about itself. (19)

Apparently, such spectacles reminding of the arenas of the Roman Empire that occupied a prominent place in the memory of the Renaissance "provide a richly evocative frame of reference for the conjunction of spectacle, punishment, and animality" (Höfele 136). In his analysis of close physical and psychological affinity between theatre and bear-baiting, Andreas Höfele stresses the natural collusion between the two places by conferring that

> [i]t would be a pious delusion to construe the playhouse as a critical mirror to the cruelty of baiting and juridical violence, an observation post on an island of 'meta-violence,' detached from and uncompromised by the atrocities it exposes. In a culture of spectacle such as early modern England there is no safe haven, no escaping from the circulation of visual energy, the contagious promiscuity of images so suspicious to Puritan advocates of visual abstemiousness. (119)

For a number of reasons, animal-baiting spectacles enchanted the folk for a considerable amount of time in the history of human culture; yet one of the most obvious reasons was that the distorted account of animal physiology as well as animal psychology, which lessened animals into irrational and insensitive machines with only unconscious reflexes, had a decisive influence upon how animals were viewed and treated by humans. In England, with the endorsement of the changing public perceptions about animals and the intellectual metamorphosis of the still-anthropocentric philosophies of the previous century as can be found in Jeremy Bentham's writings on the status of animal, any kind of baiting and maltreatment of animal were prohibited by the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1835 (Patronek 7-8). *Volpone* itself drops some particular references to the cruel exploitation of animals for human entertainment such as the lions imprisoned in the Tower of London as the royal beast for sightseeing (82) until the reign of William IV (Davenport 39), or baboons extorted from their primordial natural habitat to be put on show (85). All these references provide the background to Jonson's search for the correlation between nature of extreme human greed driven by an overwhelming longing for power and pleasure and exploitation and abuse of animals.

Another interesting arena that demonstrates the place of animals in the English Renaissance socio-cultural and political discourses is the animal-flesh consumption. Jonson's political satire of Puritanism – branch of Calvinism that is a form of Protestantism, who, "[i]n spite of Elizabeth I's political skill," "increased their numbers steadily and continued to demand further reforms" (Morgan 6) – is revealed within context of the religious doctrines of meat consumption. During Act I Scene ii, Jonson fiercely attacks hypocritical human nature to cover up human greed, and "ridiculously po-faced, a Zeal-of-the-Land Puritan who can see no distinction between fiction and reality" cannot avoid getting bitten by Jonson's criticism (Yearling 146). After all, Jonson is a dramatist who fervently believe that "Mischiefs feed/ Like beasts, till they be fat, and then they bleed" (208). Interestingly, the first use of 'beast' in the text itself refers to the Puritan:

> Androgyno: But from the mule into whom didst thou pass?
> Into a very strange beast, by some writers called an ass;
> By others a precise, pure, illuminate brother

> Of those devour flesh, and sometimes one another,
> And will drop you forth a libel, or a sanctified lie,
> Betwixt every spoonful of a Nativity pie. (55)

Here, Jonson's anti-Puritan satire is highlightened by his use of 'precise,' "a term often applied satirically to English Calvinists and Puritans," and 'libel' referring to the fact that "Puritans were often castigated for their scurrilous polemics" (Parker and Bevington 55). In addition, the Puritans' preference to use 'Nativity' instead of 'Christmas' due to the term's affiliation with the Catholics suggests that "the Puritans are seen here as hypocritically gluttonous and as sanctimoniously pious in their speech" (Parker and Bevington 55).

In a like manner, Jonson's drawing attention to the Renaissance cuisine that was famous for its abundance of animal content develops a historically well-documented close link between human greed and sexual excess "that is bound up with individual psychological attitudes and cultural or ethnic practises" (Soble 48). Satirising human selfish desire for animal-flesh consumption, *Volpone* presents a long list diverse animals used in the specific set of cooking traditions and practices of the Renaissance such as Sir Would-be's "Colchester oysters" (84). More pointedly, Volpone is very intent on persuading Celia to sleep with him, and lists a number of various nurtures including parts of animal body, involving a deliberate exaggeration of his both sexual appetite and gulosity:

> Is nothing: we will eat such at a meal.
> The heads of parrots, tongues of nightingales,
> The brains of peacocks, and of ostriches,
> Shall be our food: and, could we get the phoenix,
> Though nature lost her kind, she were our dish. (135)

This minor yet mighty detail indicates Jonson's reversal of the situations, for the issue of diet and "dietetics," a theory that attributes bodily health to a moderated lifestyle, was indeed thought to be an indispensable part of one's overall well-being during the Renaissance (Adamson 206), and "[t]he balance of the four humours was greatly affected, it was thought, by the foods that one consumed" (Vaughan 48). Ironically, the unbalanced humours of the characters in the play's society in *Volpone* is not only

caused by their greed for food but also for money and promiscuity. Moreover, in the context of the Renaissance, sexual looseness was regarded as the harmful result of gluttony, and "[t]he dietaries similarly warned against the physical effects of gluttony and its impact upon the Christian soul" (Fitzpatrick 155). For instance, as Joan Fitzpatrick well exemplifies, in *Volpone*

> Androgino, pretending to embody the soul of Pythagoras, is questioned by Nano about the 'forbid meats' he has consumed; one of which, when he has taken the shape of 'A good dull mule,' is beans. As Gordon Campbell noted, the eating of beans was 'forbidden by Pythagoreans because flatulence was thought to allow the breath of life to escape from the body.' This connection with 'the breath of life' also explains the common association between flatulence and lust: the male orgasm was considered an 'evacuation,' a term used by Richard Burton, and it signified loss. (159-60)

During this part of Act I Scene ii as referred to by Fitzpatrick, Nano reminds of Pythagoras's dietary laws according to which beans could be suitable for a mule as forage and not for human being. In relation to this point, while mentioning the Calvinist interpretation of eating animal flesh, Erica Fudge emphasises the significance of consuming animal meat which "held a more powerful position in theological terms than any attempt to regain the vegetarian innocence of Eden" (*RB* 75). Accordingly, meat-based diet signals human's control and higher position over animal while vegetable-based diet "would take away a point of humiliation for humans that was vital to their understanding of their place in the universe" (Fudge, *RB* 75). In relevance to this point, *Volpone* is of particular relevance to the great affinity between the consumption of meat and the cultural construction of masculinity, for apparently, Volpone's sexual appetite overlaps with his gulosity. In her formulation of the sexual politics of meat, which "is an attitude and action that animalises women and sexualises and feminises animals" (4), Carol J. Adams furthers the function of feminism by defining the term as an "analytic tool that helps expose the social construction of relationships between humans and the other animals" (9). By the same token, Fudge asserts that "[s]ocial and cultural history, perhaps recognising a progression from the study of the working class, women, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals to the study of animals, has begun to pay attention to the nonhuman in new and productive ways" (*RB* 7). Ultimately, the gender and colonial ideologies of meat-based Western culture equating non-European races, workers, and

women with nonhuman animal entities in order to distinguish and elevate the position of civilised Western man would be brought into question during the following centuries. For instance, Jacques Derrida's analogism *carno-phallogocentrism* offers a schema of such interrelated discriminative practises: "Authority and autonomy are, through this schema, attributed to the man (homo and *vir*) rather than to the woman, and to the woman rather than to the animal. And of course to the adult rather than to the child" ("Eating Well" 113-14). To put it another way, Derrida's term crystallises the Western tendencies towards adopting three criteria in order to acknowledge a person as a full subject: "one must be a meat eater, a man, and an authoritative, speaking self," because "they are perhaps the three primary conditions of recognition" (Calarco qtd. in Adams 6).

Nevertheless, as *Volpone* suggests, the cultural construction of masculinity is about not only consuming animal meat but also becoming animal itself. On this point, the play's mention of the Greek myth of abduction and rape of Europa by Zeus with a reference to Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (8 AD) adds another layer to the play's animetaphoric use of animals in myths. In relation to the Elizabethan sexual politics, the story is recalled in Volpone's long speeches in Act 3 Scene vii during which he desperately begs Celia in an endeavour to persuade her to let him sleep with her:

> If thou hast wisdom, hear me, Celia.
> Thy baths shall be the juice of July-flowers,
> The milk of unicorns, and panthers' breath
> […]
> Whilst we, in changed shapes, act Ovid's tales,
> Thou, like Europa now, and I like Jove,
> Then I like Mars, and thou like Erycine:
> So, of the rest, till we have quite run through,
> And wearied all the fables of the gods. (135-36)

Here, while Europa and Jove (Jupiter) allude to the Greek myth of abduction and rape of Europa by Zeus disguised as a bull that is "white as the snow untouched by Southern rams" as described in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (58), Mars and Erycine (Venus) refer to the affair between Ares and Aphrodite as depicted in Homer's *Odyssey* (277). In a scene of almost *zooerastia* [sexual intercourse between human and animal], Zeus's disguise as

a bull paves the way for the analysis of relation of humans and animals regarding sexuality and bestiality. Throughout the recorded history of humanity, sex has become one of the most prevailed powerful taboo, and some animals such as goat, bull, pig or baboon have had bad reputation for their sexual aggressive drives, which makes them customary cultural signifiers of degradation of human sexuality. Zeus's guise in a white bull whose "muscles stand out bulging on his neck/ and the dewlap dangles on his ample chest" (Ovid 1172-73) signifies male power, aggression, and sexual potency. In *Volpone* itself, Voltore's metaphorical reference to Bonario as "[t]he rider on men's wives" (166), together with Mosca's previous reference to Celia as "gallant wife" (77), evokes the widely known Latin equestrian euphemism for sex, which codifies social and cultural roles of man as rider to have dominance over female body and woman as horse to be mounted by the rider. Indeed, horse stands out as the most prevailed symbol found in medieval and Renaissance culture, with its sexual connotations. As Brown explains,

> [t]he horse symbolised the passions. The bridled horse brought to rein by its master symbolised passion governed by reason. The horse symbolised humanity's animal and sexual dimensions, in particular those of women, and the idea of riding semiotically contained a reference to the sexual act. The verb, *equitare*, to ride on horseback, was a Latin euphemism for intercourse. (81)

However, leaving aside being a "rider on men's women," Bonario most probably is the only typical man who is still bachelor in the society of the play. Thus, together with the utterances of other legacy hunters including his father Corbaccio who calls his son as "Monster of men, swine, goat wolf, parricide" (163), Voltore's ascription of 'rider' to Bonario serves to a wholly unwarranted smear campaign against Bonario which is triggered by Volpone aiming to vindicate himself of his sexual crimes. On the other hand, Bonario hurls insult at Volpone as "libidinous swine" (137) in order to criticise his tyrannical and licentious acts. Similarly, Corvino mentions Volpone's gaze as "goatish eyes" (104) again with the aim of cursing Volpone's promiscuous and unprincipled sexual appetite. Not surprisingly, as can be observed in the act of scapegoat, these animals standing for their aggressive sexual behaviours were simultaneously a favourite target of the rituals of expulsion or purification common in either polytheistic or monotheistic religions, for "sacrificing animals was a degenerate

representation of a disciple sacrificing his own passions, which the bull or goat symbolised" (Percival 617). The ancient affinity between Jewish and Christian cosmogonies retraces the footsteps of the primitive archaic world in regard to the killing of animals in exorcism rituals for purification from humane sensuality. Indeed, the powerful spur for blaming animals for sexual crimes caused by human carnality and resulting in the devastation of religious, sexual or social rites is an inevitable outcome of human interpretation of human sexuality as something that binds humanity and animality. However,

> [t]he fact that our sexuality […] implies that it is not good practice to refer to our sexual powers and actions as the 'animal' part of our nature, as though it were precisely here that our kinship with the rest of the animal world were manifest. It seems clear that in important respects we human beings are far more profoundly 'sexed' than the other animals, and that we are far more deeply conditioned by this orientation […]. One indication of this is the fact that fertility and the desire for sexual activity are not limited to certain periods among human beings, as they are in the case of other animals. (Dwyer 21)

Accordingly, it is possible to claim that the reason for human inclination or need for animals to describe and criticise the wrong human deeds is the human interpretation of sexuality as a common share with animals. According to this, sexuality degrades the intermediate position of human in the Great Chain of Being that "allows us to comprehend human character traits and behaviour in terms of nonhuman attributes; that is, it explains why we speak of higher forms of life (humans) in terms of lower forms of life or existence (animals, plants and objects)" (Crespo-Fernandez 137). Another reason for human's use of animetaphors for the condition of humanity can be the power of language itself. Following Eliecer Crespo-Fernandez, "[m]etaphorical language is a powerful resource to shape taboo concepts for dysphemistic use," and thus, "animal metaphors capture the most objectionable and undesirable characteristics of human beings, which makes them particularly effective for dysphemistic purposes" (136-37). In other words, as a part of semantic pejoration, animetaphors have widely been applied by humans in order to dehumanise the other human being. For example, Lady Politic, who constantly flirts with Volpone, ironically labels Celia "chameleon" (165), a lizard that changes its colours in accordance with its surroundings, or "hyena" (165) that "was

supposed to entice by its human-sounding voice" (Parker and Bevington 165) in order to accuse her of inveigle Volpone into extramarital affair.

Under the light of these discussions, *Volpone* offers the socio-political criticism of gender norms of its era, and it needs to be pointed out that animals, animalistic representations, or animetaphors are again the main agents of Jonson in drawing his political criticism of sexual codes of the period. In effect, while bourgeoisie economy inevitably led to differentiation among the conventionally divided social strata regarding landed nobility and upper/middle/petite/haute bourgeoisie, its efficacy on the sexual politics of the period was fairly clear. Indeed, witnessing the major socio-economic shift from feudalism to capitalism, the seventeenth century experienced numerous socio-political changes and cultural turmoil that triggered the thoroughly unscrupulous human greed for money and profoundly shaped the sexual and moral politics of the period. For instance, through the uneasy alliance between Volpone and Corvino to share Celia's body in return for Volpone's estate, Jonson ascertains how the moral values of a society can be degenerated by corrupted human rationality entitled as the supreme faculty separating human from animal by the Renaissance anthropocentrism. Indeed, as the cult of 'Virgin Queen' at the top of the monarch stating that she has "the body but of a weak and feeble woman"; yet she has "the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England too" (qtd. in Levin 148) or the boy actresses mimicking women on the stage may indicate, the issue of gender was another crux that lies in the Renaissance both anthropocentric and misogynist approaches. As Alan Haynes usefully summarises in her *Sex in Elizabethan England* (1997), although "[w]riters and readers alike of the period thought a chastity a peerless virtue, and women should be heedful of it because there was little difference between being unchaste and being thought unchaste," the Renaissance men "saw sexual availability in every aspect of town and city" (136). In fact, it is no coincidence to find such contrarieties in every aspect of the Renaissance social life because

> [t]he sixteenth century [and its far-reaching effect on the following century] in England, and in Europe more generally, was a time of tremendous change, the fault line between medieval and modern. The universal Church in the West split into fragments: Catholic and a variety of sects of

> Protestants. The explorations into Africa and the Americas also made people think differently about the world in which they lived and the gender relations of people in that world. This time period likewise saw the further development of nation-states, with changing definitions of the nature of monarchy. Those definitions became even more complex when women moved into positions of political power. It may come as no surprise that the sixteenth century was not only a century of queens but also of witchcraft accusations, most of which were aimed at women. (Levin *Queenship* 1-2)

Such controversial sexual politics of the Renaissance and puzzling widespread perceptions of the place of women in society, which were heavily affected by the socio-political and socio-economic break from the previous period, were one of the hotly debated issues by the Renaissance poets and playwrights. In Jonsonian commentary, probably the most striking character that presents greed as the most powerful humane obsession is Corvino, and the plot among Corvino, Volpone and Celia alludes to the gender representation and sexual politics of the period. While Volpone is characterised as a greedy person who sees his gold as his "saint" (47), Corvino's corruptive nature is revealed after his hypocritical speeches about honesty. Corvino, after seeing Volpone disguised as a mountebank under his wife Celia's window, labels her as "fricace for the mother" meaning whore (103), and enjoys delivering a long speech on his honour and virtue of women (102-105). Nevertheless, he is also the crow circling Volpone for his own financial goals, and does not hesitate about letting Volpone have sex with his wife without Celia's consent in order to inherit Volpone's fortune. When their plans are all destroyed, Volpone underlines the irony of a moral-pimp to Corvino's face:

> Methinks
> Yet you, […] the fine bird Corvino,
> That have such moral emblems on your name,
> Should not have sung your shame and dropped your cheese,
> To let the Fox laugh at your emptiness. (193-94)

Interestingly, in such a speech the tone of the play reminds of a scene from one of Aesopian fables, for the characters speak as if they are fully aware of and embrace their animalistic metaphors. In addition, Frances Nicol Teague claims that emblem books such as Gilles Corozet's *Hecatomgraphie* (1542), whose "eleventh fable that of the fox and the crow and its woodcut of the crow dropping the cheese into the fox's mouth,"

could be accounted as a source for this play, at least for Volpone's speech given above (112). Here, "the cheese" refers to Celia, who is described by Mosca to Volpone as follows: "As the true, fervent instance of his love/ His own most fair and proper wife; the beauty/ Only of price in Venice" (130). As Isaac Hui suggests, Mosca "describes Celia as Corvino's 'proper' wife. The word 'proper' is linked with the concept of property, which relates to the functioning and mechanism of capitalism" (42-43). Previously, in Act 1 Scene vii, Celia is described by Mosca to Volpone as follows:

> The blazing star of Italy! A wench
> O' the first year! A beauty ripe, as harvest!
> Whose skin is whiter than a swan, all over,
> Than silver, snow, or lilies! A soft lip,
> Would tempt you to eternity of kissing!
> And flesh that melteth in the touch to blood!
> Bright as your gold, and lovely as your gold! (78)

As can be realised, no feature of humanity is attributed to Celia, and Mosca's final punchline determines Celia's position as a valuable but dehumanised material property such as gold at the hands of male members of patriarchal society. In Act 3 Scene vii, Corvino asks "What is my gold/The worse for touching?" (40-41), and continues Mosca's perception of Celia as gold which can be sold and bought. Indeed, in the patriarchal scenario of the early modern England which establishes a model for marriage entrenched in biblical authority, marriage for money and widely-held perception of women as property was the common attitude shared by the multiple legal systems regulating the rules involving property such as "the common law, equity, manorial law and ecclesiastical law" (Erickson 5). Although "[t]he religious controversies which racked England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave rise to an increasingly secular state in which common law and statutes came to dominate" (Erickson 6), the legal status of married woman defined by the Common Law as *femme couverte*, referring to the new social position of married woman under the guardianship of her husband, was prevailed until the Married Women's Property Law of 1882 (Melman 109). In accordance with her *femme couverte* position, woman "had ceased to legally exist, forfeiting her right to sue, or be sued, be liable for debts and, most significantly, hold, or discharge of property in her own right (Melman 109). Thus, it is

no surprise to find that Corvino offers his wife as a present to Volpone with the aim of inheriting his estate, while the other carrion birds offer 'other' material gifts.

Ostensibly, the clear perception Volpone and other fortune hunters have of Celia as a gold capsules the codes of human greed for both money and sexuality guided by human pride. Nevertheless, according to the Christian tenets, such vices are listed under the category of the seven deadly sins; namely "pride, greed, wrath, envy, lust, gluttony and sloth (Linley 69-70), all of which "replace the original value of the Christian virtues and the original loyalty of the soul to God" (Spivack 311). Indeed, as David Farley-Hills notes,

> it was the essential belief of most sixteenth – and seventeenth – century Englishmen that the world was presided over by a benevolent God, it is not surprising that a happy world is often used to image a happy eternity. Sin in this happy world is a local aberration and if it becomes too threatening can be expunged by satire. Nor is it surprising that celebratory comedy is rarely found as defiance of a hostile universe, its relative manifestation. (147)

Thus, it is no surprise to find famous biblical values embedded into the corpus of the Jacobean plays, and accordingly, "[e]very action in *Volpone* is starkly silhouetted against a backdrop of Christian ethics" (Linley 71). Indeed, in his own distinctive dramatic style following the rules of classical drama, Jonson, whose "religion was that of any normal Englishman of the day to whom this world mattered more than the next" (Palmer 82), combats social and religious degeneration in all his manifestations. Particularly, in *Volpone*, all seven vices of the concept of Christendom apply to Jonson's corrupted characters whose world is centred upon gold, a material substitution for God that corrodes all of the humanistic values of the Renaissance. As this chapter of the dissertation aims to emphasise, they are all slothful, jealous, greedy and lecherous characters trying to find an easy way for having more money instead of working honestly. In fact, in his analysis of Mosca as a figure between the Vice and the parasite, Isaac Hui refers to Robert Withington's interpretation of the function of such common figure in dramatic works of the period as follows:

> Mosca is a fly, a parasite and a Vice. The parasite is a classical figure, and the Vice is a Christian character. Robert Withington suggests that the parasite 'came from the classical drama to an English stage,' while the Vice 'was originally the agent or servant of the Seven Deadly Sins,' and sought to entrap 'Mankind' – by whatever name he was known – into the power of evil. (99)

Although Mosca stands out as a perfect foil for Volpone, Jonson draws a debauched society in which each member is further wicked than the other and plots against another; but ends up being caught in his own trap. By doing so, they turn out to be the more dangerous and crueller creature than animal.

Celia and Bonario, however, "scarcely count in this welter of cheating" (Enck 129), and they are represented as the virtuous counterparts. In this way, they become Jonson's significant plot devices in order to teach his own moral doctrine by securing the poetic justice at the end of the play. In such a degenerated society, these two characters, as their names suggest, accomplish to signify positive values regarding human and humanism such as innocence or dignity, and peculiarities which the other characters seem to be wholly absent from. In his close analysis of Shakespearean specific choice of thematically depictive names as metaphors for his characters, Grant W. Smith notes that the name Celia "derives from the Latin word *caelum* meaning 'heaven' and suggests something 'celestial' and therefore 'spiritual' (206). It is possible to observe the same connotation in Jonson's use of this symbolic name for his character, for Celia vigorously resists both Volpone's seduction and her husband's disgusting acts of intimidation. Similarly, Bonario's name is sourced by the Italian adjective 'buono' which might be translated into English as 'kind,' or 'good-tempered,' and he symbolises honour by protecting Celia from both Volpone and her husband. Furthermore, both Bonario's filial relation to his father, Corbaccio, who even disinherits his child for the sake of cycling Volpone as another carrion bird (139), and Celia's struggle with her husband for his aim to share his wife with Volpone in exchange for Volpone's inheritance illuminate how excessive greed for material gain boosted by the early capitalist spirit can lead to the destruction of natural familial bonds. As Brian Parker draws attention, "far from uniting humanity in sexual and social harmony, gold in Venice 'unnaturally' breaks the bonds of family and friendship," and thus, in such a

materialist world, "the very term 'family' degenerates from its primary meaning of a material and parental bond to the secondary one of economic house hold" (10). In Jonsonian satiric manner, in such a society, Volpone is extolled by Mosca as "the true father of his family" (75). Ostensibly, these two characters, who are, as William Butler Yeats famously describes, "united not in love but in innocence and going in the end their separate way" (qtd. in Yearling, *Volpone* 37), provide the perfect foil for the other characters' overwhelming greed. Rewarding the good for their benevolent deeds while punishing the wicked for their transgression, Jonson strongly resists pressure from the Renaissance idealistic doctrines of human uniqueness and harshly criticises the morally corrupted nature of a capitalist society.

Another significant aspect of the play with the most linkage to the discussion on both human/animal division and man/woman division is Jonson's direct implications of the mythical animals, which again alludes to the sexual politics of the period. At the very outset of the play, Mosca mentions and, in a way, introduces Corvino, Corbaccio and Voltore by calling them as "harpies" (60), which are mythical and mystical "fabulous monsters, part woman, part rapacious bird – an image appropriate to grasping, rapacious persons, and perhaps hinting at costuming of the birds of prey visiting Volpone (Parker and Bevington 60). Indeed, as Cassandra Eason informs, harpies exemplify how human interpretation of animetaphors are subjected to change in time, for

> [i]n early Greek mythology, the three Harpies were not ugly or evil as were their later personae. With bird bodies, and heads and breasts of women, they were originally described as beautiful, long-haired, winged goddesses of the storm, with the ability to fly faster than the wind. Like the Valkyries, the swan maidens of Viking myth, the Harpies bore away the souls of the slain for healing. In time, however, they acquired the image of hideous old women with the bodies, wings, beaks, and claws of birds, who seized mortals or semideities and carried them off to the underworld, leaving in their wake a foul stench. (55)

Borrowing this archetypal figure from the story of Jason and the Golden Fleece in Greek mythology, famous Roman myth-tellers Ovid and Virgil apply to harpies in the composition of their classical works. For instance, in his *Aeneid* (29-19 BC), Virgil depicts harpies as ferocious birdlike animalistic figures which "have faces like girls'"

and "have hands like claws" when Aeneas and his people, on their way to Italy, cramp within the confines of the harpies' island Strophades (61). Virgil's such depiction of harpies constitutes an immediate source of Ovidian "girl-faced vultures" in *Metamorphoses* (173). Moreover, such animalistic metaphor of woman-bird "also taps into the Roman belief that witches were synonymous with metamorphosis and flight" (Johnson 128), and would pave the way for medieval and Renaissance concept of witch figure in the witchcraft discourse. On the other hand, these classical works with their interpretation of the mythological creatures became a series of authorities and functioned as a common-place book that Renaissance dramatists could consult and cite in their plays. At some point, it is important to recall that humanism, the backbone philosophy of the Renaissance culture, began as a movement grounded in the discovery, translation, and imitation of the classical Greek and Latin texts and the close study of antiquity. Thus, it is no coincidence to come across numerous incontrovertible borrowings from classical literature in Renaissance literature and art. As Jonson refers to Ovidian and Virgilian mythic figure of harpies in depiction of his characters, Shakespeare makes use of the same figure in his *The Tempest* (1610) in which Ariel's vindictive reappearance in disguise as a harpy is associated with destiny and divine retribution (Vaughan 238). In *Volpone*, on the other hand, Mosca uses "harpies" (60) as a derogatory term, for he calls Corvino, Corbaccio and Voltore as harpies with an emphasis on these legacy hunters' gullible nature. In effect, Mosca's epigrammatic depiction of the legacy hunters is visualised in his master Volpone's witty use of chimera as a metaphor implying their miserable condition at the court:

> I am Volpone, and this [Indicating Mosca] is my knave;
> This [Indicating Voltore], his own knave; this [Indicating Corbaccio], avarice's fool;
> This [Indicating Corvino], a chimera of wittol, fool, and knave. (205)

As can be observed, Jonson does not confine his use of mythical animals to direct quotations from the classical literature; he also subtly fits his characters' condition into a caricaturised version of mythical animals as in the case of chimera, "a mythical three-natured beast (traditionally part lion, part goat, part serpent)" (Parker and Bevington

205) that is turned upside down in Volpone's ironic description of "a chimera of wittol, fool, and knave" (205).

Figure 7: Chimera (~350–340 BC). Louvre Museum, France.

Apart from harpies, in *Volpone*, Lady Politic directly attributes Peregrine to "light land-siren" (153) again mythical "mermaids who lured men to their destruction, and as half woman, half-sea creature they are like transvestites" (Parker and Bevington 153). Lady Politic's blasphemy intends to mean 'promiscuous whore,' since she mistakenly supposes that Peregrine is her husband's mistress disguised as a man. Undoubtedly, the sirens were among the most prevailed figures in Renaissance minds not only because of their appearance in literary works but also due to their popularity in topical issues. During his sea voyages in 1493, Italian navigator Christopher Columbus maintained that "he saw three sirens, who rose very high from the sea, but they were not as beautiful as they are depicted for somehow their faces had the appearance of a man" (Jane 143). Though it has today been suggested that his visions of sirens were in fact "sea mammals that include the sea cow and the manatee, which has two forward flippers, a flat seal-like tail, and can grow up to fifteen feet long" (Eason 151), Columbus's sirens etched indelibly in Renaissance consciousness. Turning back to Lady

Politic's "light land-siren" (153) implying 'whore,' such animalistic mythical figures mentioned as derogatory remarks on womanhood in the play indicates how it is easy to label woman as unchaste. Ironically, "[h]aving elbowed aside her fumbling husband, whom she finds with a man she believes to be a transvestite prostitute – it is Venice –," Lady Politic becomes "aggressively sexual in the mode formerly assigned to a man," and from now on "her torrential style of speech-making, verbal incontinence, signalled sexual incontinence too" (Haynes 162). She overtly and persistently flirts with Volpone. It is important to recall that the play's setting is deliberately Venice, "the city most associated in English minds with luxury trade, courtesans and role-playing sodomites" (Haynes 159); yet Jonson's intended target is London where prostitution was an illegal act but "everyone knew that you could easily find a prostitute in the Bankside district of Southwark, near the theatres (or even in them)" (Forgeng 68).

Figure 8: Terracotta statuette of a siren (550-500 BC). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

It is worth noting that through its characters Nano, Castrone, and Androgyno, Jonson's *Volpone* has something against the spotlighted human physical and intellectual endowment found in such anthropocentric content of the Renaissance anthropologic

matters. In an age of Renaissance which has been heavily marked by its conceptual emphasis of humanist discourse on human rationality, the strict definition of human being is shaped by a person's free will, for "humans could follow their physical nature downward toward the lower, physical concerns of the earth; or they could follow their soul upward toward the higher spiritual levels leading toward God" (Mustol 36). However, *Volpone* defies the Renaissance worldview based on the Great Chain of Beings, God's construction of the natural order, by presenting bodily deformed yet rationally wiser characters who are perceived as equal to animals by both the play's society and the Elizabethans. While the then-contemporary Renaissance ideologies evoked perfection of human anatomy and intellectuality, they dismissed deformity; yet it is blatantly obvious that the play defies the Renaissance anthropocentric understating of human perfectibility. As Leonardo da Vinci's *Vitruvian Man*, "The Man of Perfect Proportions," (1485-1490) or Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni's *The Creation of Adam* (1508-12) illustrates, the Renaissance search for the classicalism showed itself in the perfect description of human body as a sign of perfection of human intellectuality and spirituality. Indeed, natural philosophical tendencies of the period regarding "the issue of the giant human-dwarf-pygmy continuum are part of what we might call the longue durée history of the question of what it means to be human" (Davies 181). However, in opposition to the expected representation of dwarf or eunuch, *Volpone* offers the physically typical human characters with a cynical or gullible sapience, or physically deformed atypical characters with a cultivated intellect. As their Italian names denote, Nano (dwarf), Castrone (eunuch), and Androgyno (hermaphrodite) contrast with the perfection of human anatomy; yet they benefit from their atypicality in a pleasing way. In Nano's speech which is of "very few instances in early modern literature or life when a dwarf speaks of his own experience" (Berg 30), Nano defences his difference in stature by listing its peculiarities:

> First for your dwarf: he's little and witty,
> And everything, as it is little, is pretty;
> Else why do men say to a creature of my shape,
> So soon as they see him. It's a pretty little ape?
> And why a pretty ape? But for pleasing imitation
> Of greater men's actions in a ridiculous fashion?
> Beside, this feat body of mine doth not crave

> Half the meat, drink, and cloth, one of your bulks will have.
> Admit your fool's face be the mother of laughter,
> Yet, for his brain, it must always come after:
> And though that do feed him, it's a pitiful case,
> His body is beholding to such a bad face. (117)

As his speech highlights, Nano shifts attention from his overt bodily difference, and "includes consideration of his intellectual, aesthetic, and economic strengths" (Chess 30). Apparently, these figures standing between the physicality of human and animal betoken a larger set of ideas rather than being Jonson's random character choice. In relation to this point, Allan Dessen both accepts and denies the importance of these creatures for the play's integrity by saying that they "do relate thematically and symbolically to the main action but at the cost of slightly blurring the dramatic focus" (105). However, it may also be argued that *Volpone*, as a play which criticises the then-contemporary belief in human perfectibility, presents these three different types of animal-like anomalistic characters consciously in order to challenge the Renaissance idealism of human body that is another way of bringing the particular emphasis on human rationality into the forefront. As Sara van den Berg observes, "early modern dwarfs, both living dwarfs serving at court and fictional dwarfs in literature or artistic representation, could carry political, religious, psychological, and aesthetic meaning, serving as a surrogate for the ruler, the subject, the self, and perhaps the artist" (23). As a paradigm, dwarves placed a difficult question on the agenda of human-animal relations, for they "introduced the notion of difference into courtly vocabulary and daily life, yet the flawed human space they embodied also allowed courts to reassert their rigid standards of normality" and humanity (Gadessi 53). In his *A History of the Earth and Animated Nature* (1852), Oliver Goldsmith explains the function of such "pet-like" human figures at the court of King James I as follows:

> These poor little men were kept to be laughed at; or to raise the barbarous pleasure of their masters, by their contrasted inferiority. Even in England, as late as the times of King James I, the court was at one time furnished with a dwarf, a giant, and a jester; these the king often took a pleasure in opposing to each other, and often fomented quarrels among them, in order to be a concealed spectator of their animosity. (245)

Previously, Elizabeth I, who "gave her courtiers animal nicknames – Burleigh was the fox, the French ambassador the ape – and in her first Christmas revels there appeared the strange figures of cardinals, bishops, and abbots with the heads of crows, asses, and wolves" (Parker 5), had her own dwarf called Thomasina who "was always dressed in the latest fashions, paid for by the Privy Purse, being the recipient of a long series of attractive and elaborate gowns, petticoats and pairs of sleeves" (Vincent-Connolly 269). Apparently, dwarfs had considerable popularity during the Renaissance when "they were objects of fascination and trade" (Adelson xx), and they "were downgraded to functioning as pets and entertainers in the Renaissance courts" (Adelson 43). In his speech, Nano complains about human perception of dwarf as "a pretty little ape" (117), which affirms the Renaissance obsession wit not only reason but normalcy in stature as well. In addition, Isaac Hui believes that the existence of these anamorphic characters provides the play with a fertile ground for comparison between humanity and animality:

> *Volpone* embodies the signification of the ape, arguing that the ultimate dwarfish character of the play is the gold in Volpone's shrine, which means that while the gold helps to create the feeling of possession in a capitalist subject, the power of death and impotence, or in other words, dispossession, is always present, challenging this illusion. Therefore, the dwarf should not just be seen as a character that provokes cheap laughter, but rather, in Lacanian terms, as one that works as an important 'stain' which serves as a memento mori. (26)

Besides being a "stain" on human illusion of immortality in Lacanian sense, Nano questions the Renaissance long attribution of humane rational scope to typical perfect human body in a posthumanist sense. Although Nano, along with Androgyno and Castrone, namely "three distortions of natural sexuality" (Haynes 159), is only a part of Volpone's wealth, his words presenting his intellectual capacity develops incongruity between he and his master, Volpone, who wastes his rational abilities for immoral destructive tricks. In this way, Nano becomes "theatrical emblem of Volpone's spiritual deformity" (Parker and Bevington 11) since his existence challenges the Renaissance anthropocentric idealised combination of human body and reason by providing the perfect foil for his master, which implies corruption caused by cultural decadence due to the humans' materialist ambitions.

It is a salient fact that normative Renaissance discourses insist on philosophical and intellectual parameters that differ human from animal, and the subsequent group includes any abnormalities that fall outside the supposed normal course of nature. However, it is also important to take historical conventional modes of perceptions into consideration while using certain adjectives such as "monstrous," "anomalous," and "abnormal," for

> [w]hile these terms may create unease in a twenty-first-century reader, they are purposed words that carry an early modern mediated reasoning. Perhaps a welcome compromise could be the use of 'extraordinary bodies' to qualify the bodies of individuals whose physical features did not conform to the visible norm determined by a dominant cultural group. However, it is important to note that the sixteenth-century bodies of dwarves, hirsutes, and castrati were first and foremost anatomically anomalous bodies before they became extra-ordinary sites of intellectual inquiries, delight, wonder, and horror. (Ghadessi 2)

Thus, in the same manner as nonhuman animal communities, physically deformed human figures were to be an agent for defining norms for ideal human shape that had a close affinity with rational thought. Indeed, by the end of the Renaissance, "deformity was used as an allegorical instrument to depict madness," and "art had equated deformity with sin, madness and physical corruption" (Sullivan 265).

However, Jonson bases his play on a broad dramatic irony of the plays' corrupted human characters whose words and actions are constantly contrasted in a way that they provide a stark contrast to the deformed characters, and for this reason the play goes beyond a crude farce and embodies dark comedy. For instance, for Volpone, who says "[g]ood wits are greatest in extremities" (172), being witty means being immorally cunning. He accounts himself clever; yet the issues he meditates on such as sleeping with a married woman are all about greed and lust. He considers himself "the great beast" yet he is deceived by his supposed harmless fly Mosca who turns out to be a much more sinister "[e]xcellent basilisk," a reptile that could kill with its glance, as Volpone calls Mosca (194). In all of such cases, Jonson presents his bitter criticism of Renaissance fervent belief in edifying human rationality, and stresses the point very strongly that human, as a part of natural world, has its own weaknesses and advantages.

Mosca likens Voltore's situation to "hog-louse" (176), an insect with the ability to transform itself into a ball in case of danger, when Voltore learns Volpone chooses Mosca as his heir. Indeed, Mosca's simile both epitomises the struggle of every character to survive in a society which glorifies parasitism instead of any "honest polity" (129), and equates such world with the natural world of animals where they develop natural strategies in order to stay alive such as feeding on another life form as the carrion birds do:

> This is the creature had the art born with him;
> Toils not to learn it, but doth practise it
> Out of most excellent nature: and such sparks
> Are the true parasites, others but their zanis. (113)

In his lines, Mosca's deliberate use of "creature" and "nature" formulates parasitism and presents it as a natural innate quality bestowed on only the "spark" ones among humans. Thus, Jonson's perception of human nature as naturally base that is allegorised to that of animals might not be a coincidence. Indeed, as the play itself offers, the evil nature of allegedly rational human characters within perfect physical shape far overweighs than that of animals or dwarves. However, Corvino's wife Celia and Corbaccio's son Bonario are not included in the disgusting acts of legacy hunters, and they provide an ideal foil for the others. In this way, Ben Jonson encourages an extensive empirical inquiry for how the dominant group of Western white men discriminate and gain control over supposedly minor group of 'queer birds' including woman, child, animal, dwarf, eunuch or hermaphrodite.

On the other hand, in relation to the main plot of the play revolving around the conflict of interest among the rapacious carrion birds, the burlesque subplot among Sir Politic, Lady Politic and Peregrine provides Jonson with another social stratum through which he can vigorously attack and assault the same thing: Greedy human nature corrupted by human intellectual vanity. As Sir Politic's name denotes, he seems like 'Sir Politic'; but, as his speeches reveal, he is still in the process of "would-be," though he is sure that he fully deserves his title thanks to his intelligence. Nevertheless, in most of the cases, he is presented as probably the most gullible character in the play. In opposition to the

notions about the irrelevancy of the subplot in *Volpone,* Jonas A. Barish refers to John D. Rea's observation, and stresses the significance of the play's subplot in which it is possible to find the continuous lines of animetaphors, such as both Sir Politic and Lady Politic are seen as parrots by the other characters:

> Sir Politic Would-be, like the characters of the main plot, has his niche in the common beast fable: he is Sir Pol, the chattering poll parrot, and his wife is a dead lier specimen of the same species. Rea's accurate insistence on the loquaciousness of the parrot, however, must be supplemented by recalling that parrots not only habitually chatter, they mimic […]. For Sir Politic and Lady Would-be function to a large extent precisely as mimics. They imitate their environment, and without knowing it they travesty the actions of the main characters. In so doing, they perform the function of burlesque traditional to comic subplots in English drama, and they make possible the added density and complexity of vision to which the device of the burlesque subplot lends itself. (83)

As clearly stressed in the quotation, Jonson's double plots are reflected in each other. In this way, the two parallel plots function as a supplementary for each other while, at the same time, they become a part of Jonson's contradictory parallelisms such as human vs. human or human vs. animal in order to subvert audience expectations:

> In *Volpone* Jonson deliberately problematises our responses through the strange double-vision that the play creates, and in so doing, he forces us to think more seriously than we might otherwise do about the role of wit and role-playing in human life, the value of morality, and the ways in which theatre and reality might intersect. (Barish 146)

In both the main plot and subplot of his play, Jonson presents profound insight into the diverse dimensions of human greed with his own moral judgement embroiled in *Volpone*'s poetic justice. Moreover, in both of its plots, *Volpone* is a definite reference to the fact that as the ways animal and human species come closer vary, the animetaphors in human language diversify.

Consequently, human/animal segregation in Renaissance anthropology was fairly clear due to the Renaissance humanist tenets which prompt the idea that "[m]an gradually breaks away from nature; as his needs and his industry develop he changes more and

more from an animal being into a conscious human being" (Heller 325). However, it is obvious that in accordance with the socio-economic changes, the Renaissance is also marked by its growing social and cultural demand for reconstruction of the value and meaning of the animal body with all of its implications in any kind of context. On this point, Jonson's use of humour theory referring to the shared sensitivity of human and animal offers a new perspective on human/animal relations. When analysed in the spectrum of posthumanism, *Volpone* crosses the human-animal divide in order to investigate the Renaissance humanism's elevation of the dignity of human, and becomes an arena where the pair of supposedly conflicts such as animality and humanity, nature and civilisation, are amalgamated within each other. By doing so, the play, with its numerous animetaphors as powerful instruments in introducing the audience/reader with politics in the early seventeenth century, fully exposes Jonson's criticism of the dogmatic ideals of Renaissance humanism degenerated by the Renaissance capitalist monetary politics and the ascendancy of human beings over the world of animals. To put it another way, as being a satire on the nature of human's extreme greed, *Volpone* presents Jonson's scepticism about the human capitalist condition and the human morality, which is clearly in conflict with the ideals of Renaissance humanism. In effect, in his analysis of contemporary dramatist Caryl Churchill's plays within the spectrum of ecocriticism, Mohebat Ahmadi concludes that her plays "represent how late consumer capitalism has led to the disintegration of society, the increasing privatisation of social life, the aggressive pursuit for self-interest, as well as the exploitation of natural resources" (34). It would be no wrong to adapt Ahmadi's observation for Jonson's *Volpone* by shifting his emphasis on late consumer capitalism to early consumer capitalism so that the close link between the Renaissance English theatre and contemporary one in regard to their anti-anthropocentric and anti-capitalist tendencies can be established. As can be observed, animals were ruthlessly exploited by human greed in any possible arena ranging from medical laboratories to the Renaissance cuisine, and animals, with their either literal or metaphorical existence are there to be used by Jonson as a vehicle to display the extent which human greed may benefit from nonhuman being, just like a parasite. On this point, Celia's cry, "I would I could forget I were a creature" (162), resonates Jonson's own deep pessimism about human condition, for, as his legacy hunters show, only the human animal is the

rapacious creature unnaturally and constantly demanding more than offered. In this way, despite being farcical characters resembled to carrion birds, these greedy human beings are presented as inferior to animals, and more hazardous to the natural and social balances. Along with other masterpieces of the English Renaissance drama such as most of the works written by Christopher Marlowe or William Shakespeare, Jonson's *Volpone* expresses a great deal of scepticism and criticism of the playwright about the ideals of Renaissance humanism elevating the intellectual power of human being. However, although these plays are fed with the topical issues of their ages, they closely study the word 'human' along with its complex nature, and for this reason they defy the centuries and universally appeal to social and humanitarian disciplines.

CHAPTER 3

"I HEARD THE OWL SCREAM/ I HEAR HORSES/ SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES:" UTOPIAN NATURAL ANIMAL WORLD DISRUPTED BY DYSTOPIAN POLITICAL HUMAN WORLD IN WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE'S *MACBETH*

"I do not like your utopia, if there are to be no dogs."
(H.G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia*, 255)

A horse! A horse! My Kingdom for a horse!
(*Richard III*, 189)

With regard to the use of animetaphors as a political tool within the posthumanist scope of human being relations to nonhuman animal being, William Shakespeare (1564-1616) is probably the most preeminent figure of the Renaissance English theatre who successfully fits his critical opinions on the state, gender, or class politics into his elaborate animal metaphors with which the corpora of his plays imbued. Indeed, as C. T. Onions expresses, "[p]erhaps no writings of this period contain such an abundance of animal lore as Shakespeare's" (477). As asserted in *Shakespeare's Animals* (1995), a Pavilion Books anthology based on the illustrations taken from the Bodleian Library and presenting a huge list of Shakespearean animal imageries, Shakespeare "uses no fewer than 4,000 allusions to animals in his character portrayals" (7). In the same vein, the first part of *The Book of Shakespeare's Insults* (2021) is titled "Beastly Barbs" in which diverse astonishing animal metaphors changing from "bawling, blasphemous, incharitable dog" in *The Tempest* (43) to "wretched, bloody, and usurping boar" in *Richard III* (38) in almost every Shakespeare's play are compiled by Stella Caldwell. Furthermore, in his *The Ornithology of Shakespeare* (1864), James Edmund Harting accentuates that

> [i]t is not to be supposed that Shakespeare was always a firm believer in the popular notions respecting animals and birds to which he has made allusion. In many cases he had a particular motive in introducing such notions,

> although possibly aware of their erroneous nature, and he evidently adopted them only to impart an air of reality to the scenes which he depicted, and to bring them home more forcibly to the impressionable minds of his auditors, to whom such 'folks-lore' would be familiar. (97)

In the light of Harting's observation, it is appropriate to express that Shakespeare's all multipliable authentic animalistic metaphors set an example of Shakespearean sheer inspiration drawn from natural world and its nonhuman citizens, which foregrounds a set of deep ironies. For instance, while the English patriotic implications are wrapped in the "little herd of England's timorous deer" (974) in *Henry IV* (Part I) *(*1600), Iago's racist labelling Othello as "a Barbary horse" (2118) emphasising Othello's otherness with the aim of inducing Brabantio not to marry his daughter Desdemona to Othello is dramatically absorbed into *Othello* (1604). However, in *Macbeth* (1606), in addition to the direct use of animetaphors, various animals' physical existence represented through visceral depictions of the human characters such as the sounds of horses' clip-clops forms an appropriate grand metaphor for comparing human society and nonhuman animal society. In this way, the literal existence of animals as inspiratory off-the-wall conceit in the play suggests almost a contra-society consisting of animals whose utopian natural balance is disrupted by the unnatural acts of the play's human greedy, dystopian society. Thus, *Macbeth*'s content of nonhuman beings promoting an axis of symmetry between human and animal challenges the spotlighted human physical and intellectual endowment prevailed in the anthropocentric content of the Renaissance anthropocentric discourses. In this vein, *Macbeth* turns out to welcome a posthumanist reading through displaying the adverse outcomes of excessive human greed guided by human hubris for both natural animal world and social human society of the play. Set in James I's native Scotland and written after the accession of James I in 1603 upon the death of Queen Elizabeth I in the same year, *Macbeth* highlights Shakespeare's commentary on the consequences of the monarchical conflicts, and the play's animal society clears up the human condition on a platform of royal politics as well as the complex nature of human psychology. This chapter of the dissertation, therefore, aims to address all of these anthropocentric concerns in more detail to supply further posthumanist socio-political context regarding state politics as well as gender politics for *Macbeth*.

On the basis of a complex political atmosphere in England, *Macbeth* expresses Shakespeare's great deal of scepticism about the validity of normative Renaissance discourses insisting on philosophical and intellectual parameters that differ human from animal. Such Shakespearean scepticism is the key to understanding and defining the critical points in light of posthumanist theory which has already embedded in Shakespeare studies. Currently, numerous contemporary critics evince interest in the possible affinity between Shakespeare and posthumanism in their works such as Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus's *Posthumanist Shakespeares* (2012), Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano's *Renaissance Posthumanism* (2016), and Karen Raber's *Shakespeare and Posthumanist Theory* (2018). Ostensibly, the needle tightly knitting these works into each other is Shakespeare's ability to empathise with natural world and to provide nonhuman animal perspective on human animal world. Definitely, Shakespeare is not the one and only Renaissance dramatist who had interest in natural life and brought up its elements to his works. Nonetheless, Shakespearean attitude "is unique among the dramatists of his time, for he shows a sympathy with and understanding of the animal's point of view and sufferings which no one else in his age approaches," which is particularly underscored "in the case of horses and birds, the two he loves best" (Spurgeon 27).

First of all, it is noteworthy that, as many Shakespearean critics agree, Shakespeare is not the devout dramatist of either politics or philosophies of his time. Therefore, Shakespeare's plays are typically based on a dualistic, or better to say, relativistic construction due to the playwright's not propagandist but wider perspective on social, political, or cultural issues. As for the emotional state of his characters, as Nietzsche writes,

> Shakespeare reflected a great deal on passions, and by temperament probably had very easy access to many of them (dramatists in general are rather wicked people). But, unlike Montaigne, he was not able to talk about them; rather he laid his observations about passions in the mouths of his passionate characters. Of course, this is unnatural, but it makes his dramas so full of thought that all other dramas seem empty and easily inspire a general aversion. (119)

Similarly, Amos Oz shrewdly observes, "[e]very extremism, every uncompromising crusade, every form of fanaticism in Shakespeare ends up either in a tragedy or in a comedy" (71). Thus, the close analysis of Shakespeare's plays reveals that he does not intend to supply his audience or reader with only one mundane aspect of an issue in question. On this point, Robin Headlam Wells accentuates the artistic evolution of Shakespeare as a playwright, and comments on his position as a dramatist as follows:

> In play after play Shakespeare deals with the past and the lessons it has for the modern world; with the problem of tyranny; with the responsibilities of rulers and subjects; with war and the question of whether and under what circumstances it can be justified. […] Shakespeare was plainly interested in politics; but he was above all an artist writing both for the stage and for publication, and one of the characteristics of great literature has always been a sense of the irreducible complexity of the moral and political issues it deals with. Despite his royal patronage, Shakespeare seems to have been less interested in acting as a spokesman for, or critic of, the government, or even attacking or defending particular constitutional models, than in analysing the human causes of failure in different types of polity. (27-28)

Accordingly, one essential point made in the quotation is that the seminal works by Shakespeare have always been plausible for multiple readings. Either in his tragedies or comedies, always accompanied by his vulgar humour appealing to the Elizabethans' taste of bawdy language, Shakespeare interrogates the nature of human animal through his character portrayals whose traits, at a basic level, are similar to those of nonhuman animal entities. To put it another way, Shakespeare exposes the conversion process of "the paragon of animals" of the Renaissance humanism to the "quintessence of dust" of life in Hamlet's rumination on what human is as follows:

> What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals – and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me. (163)

In the same fashion, Hamlet's intensive questioning of the Renaissance formulation of the dignity of man echoes in Macbeth's meditation on the meaning of life in mourning for his wife's death:

> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
> And then is heard no more. It is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing. (154)

As can be inferred from both Hamlet and Macbeth's famous soliloquies in contemplation of the meaning of life, Shakespeare does not offer any eventual definite delineation of the aforementioned subject or the problem. Likewise, he does not insist on any clear side of any political, philosophical or social issue; instead, his plays offer ample opportunity to explore the true nature of ideologies or politics at mention. Shakespeare's such preference for the philosophical and political construction of his plays singles him out for criticism, for he, far more than Jonson, Middleton or any other Renaissance dramatist, contextualises his works within less topical more universal framework instead of a spectrum based on the then-contemporary issues. For instance, hailing *Macbeth* as "a tragedy of imagination," Harold Bloom draws attention to Shakespeare's almost own introspective journey to the complex nature of the human unconscious mind in the corpus of the whole play:

> The witchcraft in *Macbeth*, though pervasive, cannot alter material events, yet hallucination can and does. The rough magic in *Macbeth* is wholly Shakespeare's; he indulges his own imagination as never before, seeking to find its moral limits (if any). I do not suggest that *Macbeth* represents Shakespeare […]. But in the Renaissance sense of imagination, *Macbeth* may well be the emblem of that faculty in Shakespeare, a faculty that must have frightened Shakespeare and ought to terrify us, for the play depends upon its horror of its own imaginings. Imagination is an equivocal matter for Shakespeare and his era, where it meant both poetic furore, as a kind of substitute for divine inspiration, and a gap torn in reality, almost a punishment for the displacement of the sacred into the secular. Shakespeare somewhat mitigates the negative aura of fantasy in his other plays, but not in *Macbeth*, which is a tragedy of the imagination. (516-17)

As clearly stressed in the passage, although its clear bonds with the current social and political dynamics such as the Renaissance witchcraft account, *Macbeth* intrinsically voices grave concerns for the extent of the neural activity of cognitive faculties of human brain and imagination in an age when "such interlinking terms as brain, mind, spirit and soul are frequently exchanged one for another" (Anderson 69). In relevance to

this point, in his *Shakespeare's Political Drama* (1988), Alexander Leggatt further clarifies Shakespearean approach to the politics of the Renaissance period as follows:

> Shakespeare's treatment of politics is exploratory rather than prescriptive. He is by our standards little concerned with the practical implications of political life. […] His interest is not in examining what political structures best serve the general good, but in watching how people behave within the structures they have. Politics for him is not a search for solutions to social and economic problems but a search for power and authority by the politicians themselves. This is not just because Shakespeare is cynical or because the quest for power makes better drama (though it does). He is not just a man of his profession but a man of his time. (239)

According to the quotation above, it is safe to claim that *Macbeth* is not only a play about the state politics, but also a philosophical search for the nature of power and monarchy, which indicates "the ways that Shakespeare and social justice work on theatrical and political stages" (Ruiter 26). In this respect, it is also of great significance to bear in mind that, as Walter Clyde Curry puts forward, Shakespeare was an artist of his age rather than a "teacher" or "systematic philosopher" (x). Simultaneously, as Curry adds, he openly concerns himself with "historical interpretation, offering necessarily both general and specific observations upon the complex stimuli which aided in the production of *Macbeth*" (xiv). At some point, as Gillian Woods rightly asserts in her *Shakespeare's Unreformed Fictions* (2013), "[d]rama resurrects history from the sepulchral text: collapsing the substitutive process of representation" (28).

In the light of the preceding discussion, *Macbeth*'s society, as being the portrayal of its own time, serves as a pedestal for Jacobean society facing a lot of disparate but connected issues such as political turmoil disturbing the delicate balance of foreign policy issues and non-ephemeral economic problems at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Although the play's setting is Scotland in the eleventh century and its plot follows the historical credentials compiled from Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* (1577), *Macbeth* is endowed with a capacity for commentary on Shakespeare's modern-day England in particular, and universal issues related to the great affinity between human nature and political systems in general.

Indeed, as Philip Goldfarb Styrt accurately detects in his *Shakespeare's Political Imagination* (2022), Scotland's crisis functions as a prologue to the play:

> In brief, a medieval monarchy suffers from discord and rebellion. A foreign invasion threatens to topple the king, while some of the local nobles flock to the invaders' banner. The king employs a charismatic collateral member of the royal family to organise the national defence, and waits away from the battlefield to hear who won. The troubles facing Scotland under Duncan sound very similar to those facing England under John, merely substituting Norway for France (I.ii.50-52), Macdonald and the Thane of Cawdor for Pembroke, Essex and their fellows (II.ii.9–12, 53-54), and Macbeth for the Bastard (II.ii.16). (49)

As can be inferred, the two ongoing wars are introduced at the very beginning of the play: The first one is the Civil War involving Macdonwald's revolt against the king and the latter engaging national war between Scotland and Norway. After providing such complex historical background to the main action of the play, *Macbeth* casts a critical eye on the political atmosphere in England after the death of the last Tudor Queen and the accession of the first Stuart King as the emperor of Great Britain. Accordingly, the play "incorporates the voices of Jacobeans who felt uneasy and remained sceptical about the idealistic vision of their new monarch" (Tsukada 61), and got further complicated by uncertainty about the future. As a matter of fact, the Renaissance was already a definite turning point in the history of the world as well as England since it

> is known for being both a melting pot and ablaze with a particularly diverse array of philosophical and theological ideas: scepticism, stoicism and humanism combining with various forms of Catholicism and Protestantism. In addition major social, political and technological changes were occurring: urbanisation, secularisation, the enclosing of land, court life, wars and disease, colonisation, the printing press and developing technologies, including, of course, optical technologies and a new profusion of mirrors. (Anderson 69)

In addition to all these globally changing dynamics that were mostly undergone under the long reign of Elizabeth I from 1558 to 1603, England, after a short succession crisis ended with the accession of James I, experienced a change in the monarchical establishment of the previous dynasty. On the one hand, Elizabeth I stands out as an

example of an effective ruler to whom "the nation was indebted for the security of religious, the great forerunner of civil liberty, […] the public welfare," and political expedience with the Parliament (Millar 413-14). Through her balanced, strategic manoeuvrings in the diplomacy and foreign policy arena following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Elizabeth I provided a balanced distribution of power among the power-holders, let the government carry out its business with minimal royal intervention or manipulation, and thus avoided any serious conflict over governing England (MacCaffrey 25-26). On the other hand, James I, with his title of King of Great Britain, supported the union of all powers in the hands of divine power. Even before his accession to the English throne, James I, as the King of Scotland, makes remarks on the relation between kingship and divinity in his treatises *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1597) and *Basilicon Doron* (*The King's Gift*) (1598). Apparently, the newly appointed king "loved to think himself as a model of justice and mercy" (Martin, *Shakespeare* 76); however, his absolutist theory of monarch based on the unconditional acceptance of the divine rights of kings paved the way for the violent struggle between James I and the Parliament over the significant national issues such as the King's union scheme with Scotland, legislation on taxation and foreign affairs. James I's vision of the Parliament as a threat to his supremacy and his religious strife triggered many oppositions resulting in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. By exploding the Houses of Parliament, the devout Catholic extremists, who were "horribly disappointed by King James's rejection of his earlier promises of religious toleration" (Herman 117), organised a failed plot in order to assassinate James I, who was Protestant. On this issue, A. R. Braunmuller affirms this is one of the two political topical issues included in *Macbeth* along with Matthew Gwinne's brief Latin pageant "pandering to James's belief that he was descended from Banquo" (5). The second topical issue can be found in "the Porters words" (58-59) referring to "the notorious imprisonment, trial, and execution (1606) of the Gunpowder plotters" (Braunmuller 5). Indeed, this attempt, once again, raised the long conflict of religion between English Protestants and Catholics to the surface under the Protestant monarchy. Traumatised by this attempt to regicide, James I, as the Venetian ambassador Nicolo Molin reports,

> had let it be known that he wished to have the Scots about his person, as he has not much confidence in the English, who know this and are greatly annoyed. The King is in terror; he does not appear nor does he take his meals in public as usual. He lives in the innermost rooms, with only Scotchmen about him. The Lords of the Council also are alarmed and confused by the plot itself and the King's suspicions; the city is in great uncertainty. (qtd. in Herman 118)

In effect, as G. P. V. Akrigg notes, James I has been depicted by some as "one of the most complicated neurotics ever to come to English throne" (qtd. in Evans 187), and "he never achieved the kind of love and admiration from his English subjects that Elizabeth had so royally borne" due to the English citizens perception of him as "foreigner" and "his withdrawn and touchy personality" (Evans 187). On this point, William Flesch's observation that "Shakespeare's Jacobean tragic villains – Iago, Edmund, Macbeth, and Augustus – are all younger men bent on destroying their elders" (125) can be interpreted as the dramatist's own concern about the exchange of the Elizabethan national stability for the Jacobean increasing instability injected into England's political life. When the fact that "[f]rom the time of James I, the monarch exerted more and more direct control over the theatre, and when parliament took power from the king in 1642, beginning the Civil War, it closed the theatres" (Forsyth 65) is taken into account, it appears that history grounds and justifies Shakespeare's assumptions as a playwright with political foresights.

Considering such socio-politic atmosphere of the period, Shakespeare, as an artist whose plays were acted in front of the members of the monarchy, had an undue pressure on his shoulder in order to "vindicate the king's public image" (Norbrook 80), and this paved the way for putting a reasonable interpretation on *Macbeth* as Shakespeare's theatrical adulation to James I. Nevertheless, I agree with the critics who assert that bringing down Shakespeare to a flatterer lavishing praises to the new king does not act as a helpful gloss on *Macbeth*. The reasons for some critics such as Christopher Martin to peruse the play and refer to it as a project to "please" James I are sourced by the play's clear engagements with the King's personal interest zones such as witchcraft on which James I wrote *Daemonologie* (1597), and was responsible for the violent persecution of hundreds of women labelled as witch during the witch-hunts in England:

> *Macbeth* was most obviously written to please the King. Shakespeare telescoped various details from Holinshed's history, including the fictitious character, Banquo, whom James regarded as an ancestor, and adding the witches because he knew of James's preoccupation with witchcraft. To show the terrible consequences of killing a king would also impress James, especially after the attempt on his life in the Gunpowder Plot, which had stunned the country in 1605. (78)

In addition, however, reading *Macbeth* solely as Shakespeare's theatrical tribute to the King would be rather misleading since the play is surely not the emblem of the King's political vision that "presents his succession as the fulfilment of ancient prophecies and his British project as the next to be fulfilled" (Tsukada 60). Instead, it offers many paradoxical sets of values amalgamated within each other without sticking on only one side of the issue. Accordingly,

> *Macbeth* is not a univocal play. *Macbeth* invites the audience to interpret the vision it presents, yet it does not articulate or impose its own political judgement on the audience. In *Macbeth*, what particularly informs this interpretative multifariousness is the effective use of prophecies. By staging James's much publicised political vision through this problematic vehicle, Shakespeare addresses the conflicting emotions felt by the Jacobeans towards that vision, highlighting both the hope and the unease James's reign aroused. (Tsukada 60-61)

Written after the following year from the Gunpowder Plot and staged in 1611, *Macbeth* reveals that "[t]he political system in Scotland encourages envy and rivalry among its leading men," which "is a danger to the king himself," because "Macbeth's role as superior defender of his king places him immediately in a position of suspicion" (Oort 98). In such an atmosphere of "fair-is-foul-foul-is-fair," best summarised in the words of the witches (4), and signifies the quick reversal of supposedly settled values, no character can envision the future of himself as an individual or of the country as a citizen. Thus, as Henry Neill Paul clarifies,

> [t]he philosophy of the play is in truth a fusion of the thoughts of two minds. But there was here no contradiction. The ethics of King James, although Shakespeare may not have cared for his precise and theological form of expression, were the ethics of the people of England, and those of the

> dramatist, and were readily molded to fit the latter's pattern for his high tragedies. (140)

Hence, the incongruous texture of the play layered through the witty use of animetaphors and the practical application of amphibology in the witches' riddles hurl *Macbeth* away from simplistic interpretations discussed above. In this way, while drawing parallels with the King's political vision, the play simultaneously supplies the audience with a chance to interrogate "the ideological and iconographical tactics of James through which he staged his succession and his union scheme" (Tsukada 60).

On the other hand, within Renaissance accounts of human, "human subject was understood as extended both in terms of its material properties, which shared in and linked it to the properties of all of sublunary creation," and thereby, "as a manifestation of the wide-ranging soul, which linked man to God and to the souls of all levels of created life" (Anderson 69). Accordingly, it is no surprise to find characters in a Renaissance play deeply embedded within the natural life and its nonhuman inhabitants around them. In *Macbeth*, for instance, calamitous weather patterns always sign and accompany the critic actions of the plot such as Duncan's death (55-56) which, as Karen Raber observes, "results in 'unruly' shaking of the earth" (*SPT* 40). As Raber continues,

> [t]heatrical use of squibs during performances of *Macbeth* to produce effects of thunder and lightning would have bathed the Globe in sulphurous odours. The resulting 'olfactory confusion' as much as it shaped the internal political world of the play defined the audience's experience of *Macbeth* in part by eliciting memories of the historical Gunpowder Plot. Political disruption, the confusion of religious identity, and the consequent violation of a quasisacred space during an attempt on the king's life aligned momentarily with the horror of witnessing a fictional regicide in progress on stage. (66-67)

Similarly, in "The Smell of *Macbeth*" (2007), Jonathan Gil Harris draws attention to how the theatrical stage effects such as the use of squibs to report the weather conditions in *Macbeth* are essentially complementary to the political disruption within the play (467). On the other hand, some of the eminent critics of *Macbeth* such as Walter Clyde Curry who places the witchcraft theme in *Macbeth* into historical

perspective interpret such weather patterns and unnatural animal behaviours as "a manifestation of demonic power over the elements of nature" (80). However, such interpretation might pave the way for simultaneously acknowledging the Sisters as the source of the bloody acts performed by Macbeth, which diminishes the play's psychological profundity. Accordingly, at the other extreme, there are critics like Marvin Rosenberg who considers the issue as symbolic projections of the mind:

> In Freudian terms, the witches could be projections of inner images of the powerful female mother-figure who suborns the male, driving or luring him to his own destruction. […] The Sisters themselves, whose femaleness dominates the male side of them, can be seen as immediate visual symbols of mysterious, primeval, but ambiguous feminine influence. (23)

Similarly, in his *Shakespeare and Ecology* (2015), Randall Martin reminds of the fact that "the play's on – and off – stage spectators do not see the Sisters act in any violent way," and thereof "[t]his allows for the possibility of understanding their incantations not as recipes for malice but as inventories of early modern and present-day military conflicts" (107). Ann Thompson, on the other hand, emphasises the fact that even though the witches' prophecies may seem as demonic manipulation, "[t]he audience awareness is greater than that of any of the characters," as the prior knowledge regarding Macbeth's inner intents is adequately conveyed to audience through Macbeth's soliloquies (154). Even the play itself attributes multiple names to the witches: They are named "witches" in the Folio direction, but only the sailor's wife refers to one of them as a "witch" (11). Instead, they call each other "sister" (11), whereas Macbeth entitles them "imperfect speakers" (16) or "the Weird Sisters" (98), and Banquo addresses them respectively by "the devil" (19) and "the instruments of darkness" (20). As such rich variety of the titles assigned to the witches suggests, Shakespeare deliberately blurs the lines between the witchcraft theme in its historical context and the witchy, demonic side of the Renaissance ideal, rational human so that he can offer a wide range of options to interpret his play. Moreover, the figure of witch that is an outcast from human society overlaps with the figure of animal. In effect, all the other living entities – blacks, females, animals, physically deformed ones, children – that are different from the figure of the European, white, adult, male human being were the epitome of difference and abnormality during the Renaissance.

My reading of the play agrees with Rosenberg, for neither Lady Macbeth nor the witches function as a trigger behind Macbeth, who noises "foul and fair a day" (14) around before coming across the witches and contemplates murdering Duncan before meeting Lady Macbeth (20). Thus, it might be inferred that such psychic transformations of natural phenomena into unnatural demerits against human fault such as bizarre act of regicide or infanticide are felt by the play's both human and animal societies. In this vein, the play offers almost an organic unity of nature with its nonhuman animal entities and human characters of the play who are dwelling in castles in the heart of woods such as Macbeths' castle in Inverness. By doing so, the play slips over the closed borders of Renaissance anthropocentrism and invites its audience to understand the sufferings of nonhuman animals affected by the vices of human animals from a posthumanist animalistic perspective. Accordingly, Alex Aronson interprets the setting of the Macbeths as "an exact replica of their own inner darkness," for "[w]hatever chaos their unconscious creates, is immediately projected into a universe from which light and light-receiving sense of sight are banished" (59). In the same vein, Geraldo U. de Sousa points out that the house of the Macbeths "creates adjacency, juxtaposition, and contiguity," and "[i]n this ambiguous boundary, domestic life abuts a fantastical, wild world" (143). Nonetheless, Duncan and Banquo ironically offer a wonderful panorama of Macbeths' castle with a martin on the nest above the castle:

> Duncan: This castle hath a pleasant seat; the air
> Nimbly and sweetly recommends itself
> Unto our gentle senses.
> Banquo: This guest of summer,
> The temple-haunting martlet, does approve,
> By his loved mansionry, that the heaven's breath
> Smells wooingly here: no jutty, frieze,
> Buttress, nor coign of vantage, but this bird
> Hath made his pendent bed and procreant cradle.
> Where they most breed and haunt, I have observed,
> The air is delicate. (33-34)

Here, "the whole little scene is built round the bird and its peculiar choice of a site for its nest," which signals the arrival of "a guest who is to be 'fooled' or deceived" (Spurgeon 188-89). Correspondingly, even "the temple-haunting martlet" is deceived by Macbeth just like Duncan, Banquo, and Scotland itself since, ironically, as the drunken

Porter rightly stresses Macbeths' castle is literally the "Hell Gate" (58), which is "the mouth of hell through which evil spirits emerge in this darkness to cause upheavals in nature" (Curry 80-81), and thereby, "the order of nature is turned upside down, in which the image of the good is seen reversed in the dark mirror of evil" (Smith 161). In this 'hell,' the animal inhabitants of nature are categorised under the list of characters with moral goodness that are late on to acknowledge Macbeth's inner wicked thoughts.

Ostensibly, almost in every scene of every act, animals take up a residence either with their literal existence or as animetaphor in the highly figurative, descriptive language of the characters in the play. In Act I Scene ii, for instance, at a war-torn military camp near Forres, the "bloody man" (1), one of the captains in Duncan's army, delivers the latest reports on the state of the revolt to the King Duncan by mentioning the help of "Gallowglasses" (13), and how both Macbeth and Banquo were dismayed by the enemies "[a]s sparrow eagles, or the hare the lion" (35). Here, while the actual presence of horses and their importance for a medieval warrior society, which will be reanalysed in the following pages, is implied by the term "Gallowglasses," horsemen "armed with a sharp axe" (Muir 6), Macbeth and Banquo's bravery is depicted through the metaphoric use of four animals. Accordingly, Macbeth and Banquo's strength as brave soldiers is resembled to an eagle which can hardly be afraid of a sparrow and a lion which naturally cannot be scared by a hare. While Macbeth and Banquo are glorified by the use of animetaphors, their enemies are belittled again by the application of animetaphor. Interestingly, such metaphorical expression of power exerted by hegemonic big-strong animals over rather thin-weak ones is echoed in Old Man's description of the unnatural events that occurred in the night of Macbeth's murder of Duncan, which was through the literal killing of a falcon by an owl (69). Apparently, while Duncan is "[a] falcon, towering in her pride of place," Macbeth is "a mousing owl" that cannot pray a falcon under natural circumstances. Probably, as Duncan is likened to a falcon at the very outset, his murder is first sniffed by the birds, too. While his entrance into Macbeths' castle is detected by the raven as Lady Macbeth accounts, "The raven himself is hoarse/That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan" (29), his death is signalled frantically by the sound of the owl again reported by Lady Macbeth: "It was the owl that shrieked, the fatal bellman" (51), and "I heard the owl scream and the crickets cry" (52). In their

close analysis of the play's language, Jonathan Hope and Michael Witmore draw attention to Lady Macbeth's use of "the" as determiner before "owl" instead of "an," for she reports an unexpected crisis requiring for the use of indefinite article, and they assert that

> [t]he effect is to present the owl not as an actual, specific owl, but as a generalised, mythical or proverbial owl; and this shift is clear in her epithet 'the fatal bellman,' which also, much more expectedly, uses the definite article. So Lady Macbeth's choice of determiner shifts the owl from the immediate, specific 'now' of the play, into a less determinate mythological space and time. The owl becomes an idea, rather than a thing. (201)

Apparently, the owl, one of the play's simple animals reacting against the deeds of the human characters, is represented by Lady Macbeth as the symbol of violent death brought by Macbeth as if it is the reason for the murder as "the fatal bellman" (51). In this sense, an innocent bird becomes an agent of death and its natural scream, along with the cries of the crickets, functions as a death bell foreshadowing the deathbed of Duncan. According to Abraham Stoll, Lady Macbeth's "materialising" of the owl's shriek is her own political strategy satisfying "her desire to ignore conscience," and thus "metaphor does seem to be an adequate signifier for conscience" (146). In effect, the same sound of the bird is simultaneously heard by Macbeth:

> Macbeth: I have done the deed. – Didst thou not hear a noise?
> Lady Macbeth: I heard the owl scream and the crickets cry. Did not you speak?
> Macbeth: When?
> Lady Macbeth: Now.
> Macbeth: As I descended?
> Lady Macbeth: Ay.
> Macbeth: Hark! (52-53)

Ostensibly, Macbeth is distraught with his horrible deed disturbing the delicate balance of nature and animals seem to forebode and hinder it. However, as Lady Macbeth expresses, "no compunctious visitings of Nature" (30) is allowed to penetrate into the black, cynical thoughts of human mind. In this way, it might be possible to observe that Shakespeare holds an inquiry into the humanistic ideals of his age regarding the significance of human imagination and dignity, for his obvious implication is that

human characters such as Macbeth and his lady are vastly inferior to animal. A further innuendo to the owl is made by Lennox:

> Lennox: The night has been unruly: where we lay,
> Our chimneys were blown down; and, as they say,
> Lamentings heard i'th'air; strange screams of death,
> And, prophesying with accents terrible
> Of dire combustion, and confus'd events,
> New hatch'd to th'woeful time, the obscure bird
> Clamor'd the livelong night: some say the earth
> Was feverous, and did shake. (61-62)

In fact, "the obscure bird" as a symbol has been present in cultural history of various societies due to its innate ability to see in darkness. Whilst, "[a]s Athena Pronoia, "the foreseeing," the goddess and her owl signified not only learning, intelligence, and wisdom, but prophetic abilities," it was regarded as an emblem of wisdom in ancient Greek culture, in Christian cosmology, "the owl is called the figure of those Jews who rejected Christ; like the owl they loved darkness more than light" (Werness 304).

Figure 9: Athena and the owl, Athenian red-figure lekythos (5 BC), Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Indeed, such Western and Christian interpretation of the owl figure indicates how Judaism and Christianity were supplementary and complementary to each other since "[t]he owl is condemned in the Torah as unclean (Leviticus 11:17-18; Deuteronomy 14:16-17), and is associated by a pair of the canonic prophets with the terrestrial desolation resulting from divine acts of vengeance (Isaiah 34:11, 15; Zephaniah 2:14)" (Ziolkowski 26). As for the use of owl symbolism in Shakespeare, James Edmund Harting accentuates that

> with the character assigned to it by the ancients, Shakespeare, no doubt, felt that the introduction of an owl in a dreadful scene of a tragedy would help to make the subject come home more forcibly to the people, who had, from early times, associated its presence with melancholy, misfortune, and death. Accordingly, we find the unfortunate owl stigmatised at various times as the 'obscure,' 'ominous,' 'fearful,' and 'fatal' 'bird of night.' (84)

On the same cause for the widespread cultural perception of evil symbolised by "the bath" with "his cloistered flight," or "[t]he shard-born beetle with his drowsy hums" that are identified with "black Hecate's summons" (84) in Macbeth's implication of Banquo's murder to his wife, the most probable reason for owl to be associated with horror and bad luck is its tendency towards "nocturnal habits and its uncanny appearance" (Onions 482). In *Animals as Disguised Symbols in Renaissance Art* (2008), Simona Cohen points out the close affinity between the adverse connotations attributed to "the enlarged or bodiless animal-head" and owls' innate ability to increase their head's size in proportion to their bodies (208). Cohen adds that it is possible to observe contrasting peaceful and combating bird imageries in a piece of art in the Renaissance in order to "convey the theme of the *psychomachia* opposed to spiritual salvation," and "[t]he animal heads in their proximity to the combat motif further define the battle of the soul in terms of sin" (208). However, as Harting explains with references to the Swiss naturalists' research, "[f]ar from bringing any ill-luck to our dwellings, owls are really of the greatest service to us in destroying great numbers of vermin" (87). Accordingly, it can be deduced that in human trajectory of comparison between good and evil through animetaphors, the natural ability of an animal that helps it survive acts as an arbiter on the cultural perception of that animal by humans. Likewise, the positive connotations of snake, one of the salient animetaphors in *Macbeth* as is discussed in the

following lines, such as the snake-shaped god of healing Asclepius which is still an emblem of medicine have been replaced by the pejorative ones as can be observed in medieval hagiographic works or in the figure of the rebellious serpent of "Genesis" 3:1 (Page 36). Thus, it is difficult to convey the sheer complexity of even a single animal image; yet, as Sophie Page calls attention, animal images "were considered symbols for inspiration rather than literal representations," and thereby alluding to multiple meanings (34).

It is interesting to find out that Shakespeare provides his animetaphors with a distinguished continuum that complements the semantic code of the image within the whole corpus of the play. For instance, the heirless Macbeth's obsessive jealousy of "the grown serpent" Banquo, whose "worm" can escape from death (90), twinges even after getting him killed "[w]ith twenty trenched gashes on his head" (90):

> Macbeth: We have scorched the snake, not killed it.
> She'll close and be herself. (81)

Here, allusion is made to "the wonderful vitality which snakes possess, and to the popular notion that they are enabled, when cut in two, to reunite the dissevered portions and recover" (Harting 16). Thus, the returning, or better to say resurrection, of Banquo and not Duncan as a ghost must be related to Banquo's animalistic representation as a snake from Macbeth's perspective in addition to its "emphasis on the repose that Duncan has gained by getting murdered, and the line of the reigning monarch descends from Banquo" (Frye 24). The image of snake is also echoed in Lady Macbeth's advice to her husband on "Look[ing] like th' innocent flower/But be[ing] the serpent under 't" (32), which "explicitly invokes the Fall" and the postlapsarian condition of human kind (Waterfield 508), reveals the whole force of the dramatic twisted contrast between Macbeth and Banquo, for, Macbeth whose mind is, according to his own description, "[f]ull of scorpions" (83) in a state of constant turmoil, is supposed to be symbolised by a snake; yet he subconsciously projects his evil capacity onto Banquo by labelling him as snake. As is seen, Shakespeare does not only create an animalistic image for a

moment to increase the dramatic effect of a scene; but he also originates an intricate web of implications that run throughout the play.

Through Lennox's narration, on the other hand, it is again repeated that the natural phenomenon offers a counterpart to the actions occurring in *Macbeth*'s society, and thus, nature with its all elements in it functions as a mirror image of society where "the broad repercussions of a single destructive human action are conveyed through images of the parallel discord in the world of nature" (Beardwood and Macdonell 10-11). Just as Macbeth's killing of Duncan transgresses the social order and divine law as in the case of Judas, who "breaks bread and drinks wine with his victim," and leaves before the conclusion of the supper in order to make the final arrangements for his master's destruction" (Smith 179), which is presented as human malicious behaviour that causes discomfort or annoyance in nature, the natural order, too, appears to be transgressed by Macbeth's deed. The stark example of such correlation between civilisation and nature is revealed in Ross's dialogue with Old Man in which he claims that he witnessed cannibalism among Duncan's horses:

> And Duncan's horses (a thing most strange and certain)
> Beauteous and swift, the minions of their race,
> Turn'd wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out,
> Contending 'gainst obedience, as they would make
> War with mankind.
> Old Man: 'Tis said, they eat each other.
> Ross: They did so; to th'amazement of mine eyes,
> That look'd upon't. (69-70)

In effect, this scene, as Kenneth Muir notes, "serves as a chorus," and "by means of the portents it underlines the unnaturalness of Duncan's murder, it reports the success of Macbeth's schemes, and it gives us a taste of Macduff's integrity" (69). Therefore, whereas the animal society is described as the coherent and wholesome in its own nature, the human society, with its unnatural vices, is presented as a hotbed of revolt and dissension, which is totally in contrast with the tenets of the Chain of Being in the Renaissance schema. In this way, animals along with animetaphors become an important agent to reflect the political disorder in the play. Accordingly, the unnatural

cannibalism among horses caused by human mischief to nature, which is "the social devaluation to which Shakespeare subjects his horses" (Boehrer 92), vivifies wickedness belonging not to witches or animals but to humans in extremity. By the way, it is important to note Ross accounts that he personally witnessed the event, and thus, it is not a reported popular legend but a real occurrence that happened in front of Ross' eyes. In this way, Shakespeare opens a new window into consideration for suffering of nonhuman animals by displaying their strong reactions to the human deeds "in the evidence of his sympathy with the animal hunted or snared, and in his understanding and feeling for the horse and his movements and response" (Spurgeon 32). Moreover, the fact that the unnaturally cannibalised horses belong to the unnaturally murdered victim re-evokes Shakespeare's location of animal entities with the human characters of the play who are not as wicked as the usurper. Ostensibly, Duncan's horses wage war on human dystopian society; yet ironically, Macbeth identifies himself with a horse metaphor in order to describe his indecisive status regarding the idea of regicide:

> Macbeth: And Pity, like a naked new-born babe,
> Striding the blast, or heaven's Cherubins, hors'd
> Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
> Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,
> That tears shall drown the wind. – I have no spur
> To prick the sides of my intent, but only
> Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself
> And falls on th'other – (39-40).

Fascinated by Macbeth's elaborate psychological depiction of pity above, William Blake (1757-1827), as Blake critics agree, illustrates such poignant scene in which "heaven's Cherubins, hors'd/Upon the sightless couriers of the air," and "into this swift motion of grace 'pity' is swept up, the innocent helplessness of the phrase 'naked new-born babe' acquiring power from the mounted 'Cherubins'" (Merchant 80). As can be seen, Shakespeare's lines "convey something of the same tension between momentum and arrest that threatens to pull apart Blake's picture," and in both of the works, pity is carried away by "the blind, speeding horses" in both Shakespeare's lines and Blake's painting (Goldsmith 209-10). In a like manner, Susan Schreiner notes that such "image

of speed corresponds to the overriding importance of time mentioned throughout the play" (383). On this correlation, Steven Goldsmith analyses that

> *Macbeth* describes a world where actions never stop, moving time forward irrevocably and remorselessly, producing effects regardless of intentions. Even the sympathy for silent, neglected suffering, and the outrage that makes one want to 'blow the horrid deed in every eye,' moves the observer and his agency forward, whether or not they meet the needs of another which motivated response in the first place. (210)

Hereupon, it can be revealed that the horse metaphor and the sounds of galloping horses reverberate in almost every act of the play, and the image of prancing horses is correlated with passing of time in both pieces of art. Definitely, Blake's painting "is involved in his own private mythology of the Fall"; yet it also "faithfully records the images of Macbeth's vision" (Merchant 80).

Figure 10: "Pity" (1795) by William Blake. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Interestingly, the synthesis of Shakespeare's lines and Blake's painting reminds of Plato's two-horsed chariot allegory in *Phaedrus* (BC 370), which might be seen as a prototype for Freud's tripartite model of the human psyche and depicts a chariot (soul) driven by charioteer (reason) by force of one white and one black horses only one of which "is thoroughly noble and good, while the other is thoroughly the opposite" (Plato 246). For this reason, in the journey of the chariot to the realms of "justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute" (247) with its charioteer, they experience a process by which they ascend and descend consecutively. Accordingly,

> [d]esignated in Plato's original Greek wording as *logos*, the charioteer represents the overall situation our species has been in where we have been trying to understand the two conflicting elements within us of our ideal-behaviour-demanding instinct and our defiant, searching-for-knowledge, psychologically upset angry, egocentric and alienated intellect, with the ultimate goal being to find the reconciling understanding of our condition that will enable us to be liberated and transformed from it. (Griffith 80)

Apparently, either Plato's *Phaedrus* or Blake's *Pity* existing long before or long after the time of the play carries strong connotations attached to the word 'human,' and displays how soul perishes of excessive greed of human nature. When *Macbeth* is considered as Macbeth's own journey from good to evil and to his final doom step by step, it is revealed that the play's sharing with all these works is its peculiar quality of universality.



Figure 11: Panathenaic Amphora (500-480 BC). The British Museum, London.

Ideologically not fanatic but moderate, dualistic style of the play's pattern is another major element to the play's universality. In relation to this point, Cleanth Brooks pays attention to Shakespeare's subtle way of supplying dualistic slippery ground to his play:

> Is Pity like the human and helpless babe, or powerful as the angel that rides the winds? It is both; and it is strong because of its very weakness. The paradox is inherent in the situation itself; and it is the paradox that will destroy the overbrittle rationalism on which Macbeth founds his career. ("The Naked Babe" 34)

This is the point at which, for the first time, grace overcomes sin in Macbeth's interior monologue; yet he realises that he is late for his salvation when he "could not say 'Amen'" that "[s]tuck in [his] throat" after regicide (53). Previously, following the discussion over the immorality of committing regicide, which, according to Macbeth, would be a proper act for animals but not for humans, Macbeth applies to the horse-rider metaphor and yacks it up endlessly, depicting his search for action of magnitude; yet he cannot find any reasonable "spur" under his heels in order to prance his horse. On this point, whilst Macbeth considers in his soliloquy that he is not supposed to murder the King because Duncan is both his relative and host, and the King is a virtuous man (39), he cites different reasons to Lady Macbeth such that he has just bestowed a new title that he cannot hastily give up (40). In any case, he decides in favour of the fecklessness of his burning ambition nurturing his sheer wanton vandalism enclosed in a capsule of horse metaphor:

> The *intent* in this metaphor is the *horse*; Macbeth personates *ambition* (because, with reference to the deed in question, he has cast from him all other motives of action), and is himself both *rider* and *spur* (for these are united in one, because he is describing them in but one and the same quality of *urger of the steed*); and, acting in this character, he foresees that he must overlap what he jumps for, and fall on the other side of it. (Elwin, qtd. in Furness 74)

Satirically, in the previous scene, Duncan praises Macbeth's horsemanship: "but he rides well/And his great love, sharp as his spur, hath help him" (35). Furthermore, Macbeth's horse metaphor reappears in Act III, Scene i, when Macbeth speaks to Banquo: "I wish your horses swift and sure of foot/ And so I do commend you to their

backs" (74). This time, Macbeth, who "is ruled by an inferiority complex which leads him to recognise in Banquo a kingly quality that he himself does not possess" (Kaaber 178), subconsciously reflects his image of falling on the other side of his horse on Banquo, as he previously did the same with the snake imagery. Accordingly, Bruce Boehrer argues that

> Shakespeare's plays enact a downward displacement of the horse's character as a social signifier […]. [T]his displacement, in turn, may be loosely correlated to the decline of the armigerous gentry's identity as a military class, which decline is [*sic*] closely mirrored by the horse's own emerging obsolescence as an instrument of warfare in early modern England. In other words, Shakespeare associates the horse pre-eminently with chivalry, and – as Ralph Berry has argued – he presents chivalry primarily as 'a defunct ideology'. (91)

In fact, the immense diversity of equine animetaphors alone can indicate the long history shared by both humans and horses, which leads to the great bulk of various horse metaphors as social, cultural, or political emblems. In effect, "[t]he variety of horse metaphors that exist in English reflect, albeit indirectly, the multiple roles played by the horse in pre-industrialised societies" (MacArthur 75). In his *Horses in Shakespeare's England* (1987), Anthony Dent underlines the significance of the ideal horsemanship content of the Renaissance English drama for its audience as follows:

> It had everything to do with display, with magnificence, with what the modern show judge calls 'presence' in horse and rider. It was above all theatrical and its presentation either to a select audience of the Prince and his court or less frequently to the eyes of the vulgar had so much in common with dramatic spectacle that it is no wonder that the writers for the stage were drawn time and again to a description of it. (89)

Accordingly, both for the time of the play's staging and for its medieval setting, the picture of a warrior soldier who cannot achieve mounting on his horse by managing to control it and falls on the other side would not be more than a caricature, which would definitely hurt Macbeth's pride, and not the other excuses he offers but only this is the gist of his hesitation in killing Duncan. Hence, it is perhaps a final irony that the end of

the play symbolically leads to the fall of Macbeth on the other side of his horse, of his overriding hubris.

Turning back to the issue of unnatural cannibalism among Duncan's horses, as Christopher Ivic informs, *canibales* or *anthropophagi* "enters the English language in the sixteenth century as a name for a supposed human-flesh-eating tribe in the Caribbean" as can be found in "Richard Eden's translation of Sebastian Munster's *A Treatyse of the Newe India with Other New Founde Landes and Islandes* (1553)" (45). As a matter of fact,

> [c]annibalistic, violent, unlettered – these are qualities English audiences associated with the Celts whom their supposed ancestors and Roman armies had forced to the margins of the British Isles; similar fear and prejudice appear elsewhere in plays and other documents, public and private. (Braunmuller 11)

Probably with this and such precipitating causes, the Renaissance dramatists were highly interested in this term, and *Macbeth* is not the only play in which Shakespeare develops imageries around the figurative use of cannibalism that "signify a bloodthirsty, barbarous act" (Ivic 45). In *King Henry VI, Part 3* (1600), for instance, Richard, Duke of York, in his conversation with Northumberland, refers to King Henry by resembling his face to that of "the hungry cannibals" (152). As François Laroque observes in his "Cannibalism in Shakespeare's Imagery," in Shakespeare,

> references to cannibalism, which are symptomatic of profound evil and disorder are, oblique. Notes that animal cannibalism, accounts of which could have been found in the works of ancient naturalists like Pliny the Elder, is often a portent of disaster in Shakespeare (*Coriolanus* and *Macbeth*). […] [C]annibalism becomes the occasion for a complete overthrow of values. […] Thus it is not surprising that cannibalism should bear the brand of tyranny and that it should serve as an emblem of chaos and cosmic disorder. (34-35)

Appropriately, Macbeth's unnatural act of 'eating' another human being from his own kind, who is ironically his cousin at the same time and refers to Macbeth as "a peerless kinsman" (26), extends cannibalism from humans to animals. On this point, Heather

Blurton reminds of the fact that "the classical discourse that explicitly accuses tyrants of being like cannibals in their relation to the people over whom they unjustly govern" (64). Hence, the dystopian world of humans where either personal or national brutal violence perpetrated by humans against humans, which falsely attributed to animals, formulates the gist of Shakespeare's political critique of both the Renaissance anthropocentric theories and the state policies, for cannibalism stands out as an apt metaphor for tyranny or despotism of either a king over his people or human over other species.

Another instance of cannibalism is cited when Witch I adds various obnoxious ingredients most of which include parts of distorted animal bodies, such as the "howlet's wing/ For a charm of powerful trouble" (106), to their cauldron, and one of them is the blood of "sow […] that hath eaten/Her nine farrow" (110). This drops another hint on cannibalism among animals, and paves the way for psychic continuity between Lady Macbeth and the Sisters within the context of sexual codes of the period paralleled by political and natural disorder in the play. Accordingly, it is possible to infer that while money politics of the period are fed directly into sexual politics in Ben Jonson's *Volpone*, as discussed previously, in Shakespeare's *Macbeth* state politics penetrates deep into sexual norms determining the conventional gender roles. In this way, the image of the sow eating her infants becomes one of the vehicles indicating the reversal of seemingly established social values in the face of social degeneration since, as it is included in Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles Scotland*,

> *sowes* have long been recognised as loving and attentive mothers and consequently symbolise motherhood, fertility, prosperity, and happiness. Therefore, it would be extremely unnatural for a *Sowe* to eat her own *Farrow* (young pigs). The act was considered so abominable that King Kenneth II of Scotland (ca. 954-995) passed a law that 'if a sow eate hir pigs, let hir be stoned to death and buried, so that no man eate of hir flesh.' (qtd. in Papadinis 277)

Strikingly, while lamenting for the slaughter of his whole family by Macbeth, Macduff likens his wife to a "dam," a quadruped bird that desperately tries to protect her "pretty chickens" (135). Lady Macduff's such maternal instinct stands in direct contrast to Lady

Macbeth's savage indifference when she utters "Come, you spirits […] Come to my woman's breasts/And take my milk for gall" (30), or when she delivers a speech with the aim of convincing Macbeth to kill the King:

> I have given suck, and know
> How tender 'tis to love the babe that milks me:
> I would, while it was smiling in my face,
> Have pluck'd my nipple from his boneless gums,
> And dashed the brains out. (42)

Apparently, just like the female sow which has eaten her infants and thus is possessed by the Witches, Lady Macbeth who is willing to transform herself into unfeminine villain evokes the Spirits in order to be possessed by them. Janet Adelman comments that such intricate web of metaphors revolving around "the play's context of unnatural births, the thickening of the blood and the stopping up of access and passage to remorse begin to sound like attempts to undo reproductive functioning and perhaps to stop the menstrual blood that is the sign of its potential" (135), which stands in sharp contrast to Lady Macduff's position as a mother of not specified but at least two sons. Similarly, Harold Bloom notes that

> Macbeth's temporary solution to the infantile vulnerability and maternal malevolence revealed by Lady Macbeth is to imagine Lady Macbeth the all-male mother of invulnerable infants. The final solution, both for Macbeth and for the play itself is an even more radical excision of the female: it is to imagine a birth entirely exempt from women, to imagine in effect all-male family, composed of nothing but males, in which the father is fully restored to power. (44)

From this angle, such continuity between the Sisters and Lady Macbeth leads to the sharp contrast between "sow […] that hath eaten/Her nine farrow" (110) standing for childless Lady Macbeth and a "dam" symbolising domestic Lady Macduff taking her "pretty chickens" under her wings (135), both of whom are deprived of careful attention of their warrior husbands. This contrast between the play's two wives establishes one of the most outstanding parallels of the play. Accordingly, while Lady Macbeth is depicted as a woman who has the capacity for killing her infant if she is forced to do so, Lady Macduff is presented as a woman who, as her maternity instincts require for, can shelter

her babies from any kind of danger. Furthermore, Stuart Pryke subtly observes another instance where the birds allegorically represent Lady Macbeth and Lady Macduff in the words of Lady Macduff: even "the poor wren/The most diminitive of birds, will fight/Her young ones in her nest, against the owl" (117-78). Accordingly, Pryke describes Lady Macduff as "remain[ing] apolitical, more interested in her family than in her hierarchical position and the political intrigue enveloping Scotland" (343). Pryke continues by increasing the scope of Shakespeare's ornithological metaphors in relation to the representation of these two families by treating them as "symbolic of the Macduffs' and the Macbeths' respective personalities: the 'wren,' small and vulnerable, matches Lady Macduff's defenceless position, whilst it can be no coincidence that the 'owl,' like Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, stalks the night in search of its prey" (343). The 'wren' image of Lady Macduff stands out as one of the most remarkable Shakespearean bird images that "reveal the intense feeling for the trapped, limed or snared bird, which rouses in him a passion of pity and sympathy" (Spurgeon 27). In this way, the contrast between the two ladies develops into comparison between the husbands and the houses. Relevantly, Macduff's son, almost with a naturalist perspective, resembles his condition after his father's supposed death to birds:

> Lady Macduff: Sirrah, your father's dead:
> And what will you do now? How will you live?
> Son: As birds do, mother.
> Lady Macduff: What, with worms and flies?
> Son: With what I get, I mean; and so do they. (119)

Whilst the previously mentioned "temple-haunting martlet" (34) in the dialogue between Duncan and Banquo impersonates the innocent and uncorrupted status of animals in their own nature, the son's zoomorphic resemblance of himself to the birds signifies the natural power of survival instinct in animals shared with humans under any adverse circumstance. Indeed, the son's sceptical interrogation of the meaning of some specific words such as 'traitor' along with his mother's answers to his questions calls political ideologies of the period triggering the inhumanity that penetrates to all corners of the play's world into question. At this point, their dialogue indicates the reversal of all socio-political values as the play does not offer any precise answer to the question of who the true traitor is; instead it deliberately keeps the question a political one on a

dialectical platform. In addition, as Leggatt observes, the child's further investigations reveal almost oxymoronic set of degenerated social values:

> He may not know the meaning of the word 'traitor' but he knows that snares are set for rich birds, not poor ones, that there are more liars and swearers in the world than honest men, that if marriage is a market no loyalty is involved, and that his mother is lying to him. He is like one of Shakespeare's clowns, whose jokes convey a bitter wisdom about the world. In the context of the growing horror of life in Scotland, he is looking at the world with the hard eyes of a child who has grown up in a war zone. (*Macbeth* 171)

Following the horror of regicide and other subsequent almost random murders, the son polishes Macbeth's cataclysmal authoritarian regime that is prone to the extent of infanticide. In his *The Politics of Nature* (1992) written within the context of the British Romanticism, Nicholas Roe refers to this conversation between Lady Macduff and his son:

> This dialogue is a momentary respite from tension, a pathetic tableau that is succeeded by the horrifying murder of the little boy. As elsewhere in *Macbeth*, Shakespeare defines tyranny in terms of the human community it violates: the sanctity of family life and domestic relationship. Lady Macduff despairs of a world in which 'we know not what we fear,' and this prompts her turn to the child's naïve comprehension of events. Their dialogue touches on the snares of persecution, and teases suggestively about 'poor birds' unwittingly trapped and killed. (147)

As is argued, Macbeth's bloody act roughly shakes the whole world in Scotland including its human and animal communities. On the other hand, John Waterfield associates Macbeth's killing of Macduff's family with James I's treatment of the Catholics – "good and loyal in everything but professing the wrong religion and systematically penalised by being deprived of their goods and property" – and finds Shakespeare courageous enough to dare to speak so forthrightly (512). In any case, it is clear that in *Macbeth*, just like the other elements of nature, birds symbolise chaos in Scotland caused by the moral and political rife corruption prevailed in the roots of human society, which again leads to a serious clash with the Renaissance anthropocentric understanding of human grandiosity. Moreover, all these animetaphoric

use of birds in *Macbeth* indicate that "birds were essential to human life and human identity, and we can learn about human life and texts by attending to birds and the specificity of bird reference in Renaissance texts" (Bach 42). In the same vein, Rebecca Ann Bach, by adapting Francis Barker's reading of dead metaphors regarding human body to that of birds, draws attention to the dead metaphors relating to birds and offers that "they can point us to the related "structured forgetting" of the "central and irreducible place" of birds in England's "social order" (42). Either in its positive connotations as in the case of 'wren,' or in its adverse implications as for 'the fatal bellman,' the literal or metaphorical use of birds is considered virtually indispensable for the play's literary substantiality.

Apparently, the animalistic bird analogies in the context of motherhood regarding the comparison between Lady Macbeth and Lady Macduff give rise to thoughts about womanhood in the Renaissance. In her *Shakespeare and the Nature of Women* (1975), Juliet Dusinberre portrays the post-reformation England with its approach to womanhood:

> Protestantism had triumphed, marriage had ousted celibacy, but the old attitudes to women remained in place. The double standard still operated, wives were still beaten, daughters forced to marry, and chaste marriage was still a dogma invented by theologians to accommodate a married clergy. (41)

Oppressed by the masculine standard of judgement around her in the play's society that holds a mirror to the English society, Lady Macbeth "suppresses all exodynamic traces of femininity and motherhood, acquiring traits more characteristic of endodynamic sexual violence […] while she transforms herself into a masculinised creature of "direst cruelty" (Sadowski 285). Nevertheless, when the whole play is taken into account, it is revealed that, in spite of all these cross-gender imageries, there is a gradual drift of Macbeth away from Lady Macbeth. Though the text never mentions the reason why the Macbeths, in their "[v]iolent and unsettled" marriage that "nevertheless adheres strictly to the rituals which surround kinship and the home" (Hopkins 145), do not have a child, King Macbeth gets obsessed with the idea of not having any rightful heir to his throne.

This obsession makes him killing or being responsible for the murder of eleven named characters, including "the grown serpent" Banquo (90), and many nameless ones since it is not known, for example, how many people are killed in Macduff's household. Moreover, being an heirless king leads Macbeth to cynical disillusion about the meaning of life, for

> [t]he babe signifies not only the future; it symbolises all those enlarging purposes which make life meaningful, and it symbolises, furthermore, all those emotional and – to Lady Macbeth irrationalities which make man more than a machine – which render him human. It signifies pre-eminently the pity which Macbeth, under Lady Macbeth's tutelage, would wean himself of as something 'unmanly'. (Brooks 64)

As a married yet childless woman in her community in which "[t]he sermons, conduct books and mother's advice books all placed sexuality within the framework of motherhood" leading to the articulation of traditional ideas on masculinity as well (Aughterson 104), Lady Macbeth is also highly affected by their childless marriage. In effect, as Adelman expresses, "[t]he opening scenes strikingly construct male and female as realms apart" (141) in the play, and such division continues until the deaths of women at home and those of men at outside. Accordingly, Lady Macbeth's social construction of manhood through animetaphors is highly worth mentioning. Her addressing to Macbeth as "the poor cat" (41) who "would eate fyshe, and would not wet her feete" (Muir 41) is surely applied to humiliate Macbeth's masculinity in order to trigger him to kill the King. In the following lines, after Macbeth rejects the idea of murder and admits to "dare do all that may become a man" (41), Lady Macbeth continues her strategy by rhetorically asking him "What beast was't then/That made you break this enterprise to me" (41), and again insults Macbeth by lowering him to the 'level of beasts.' The subsequent use of man and beast suggests the glaring disparity between human animal and nonhuman animal. On this point, Laurie Shannon draws attention to Shakespeare's approach to the word *animal* as a generic term as follows:

> While references to the creatures now gathered as animals defy inventory, the collective English word *animal* appears a mere eight times across the entire verbal expanse of Shakespeare's work. His practice on this point of nomenclature tilts overwhelmingly against the word. By contrast,

> Shakespeare uses the terms *beast* 141 times and *creature* 127 times (Spevack). In this pattern, he is typical. As the *OED* confirms, animal hardly appears in English before the end of the sixteenth century. (474)

However, Shannon adds that Shakespeare's choice of *beast* instead of *animal* is linked to his conscious preference for challenging the dualism of human versus animal, for "he wrote from a cosmography that drew on broadly textual ideas like *the Book of Nature* and *the Book of Creatures*" that "challenge a simple, exceptionalist sense of language, signification, or writing as a human monopoly" (475), which evokes Jacques Derrida's "bêtise," his neologism for deconstruction of the supposed divide between animal and human (64). Indeed, *beast* was no synonym of the contemporary use of the term *animal*, since "*beast* (at least when referring to nonhumans) intended neither fish nor fowl but a quadruped, usually livestock" (Shannon 475). In a like manner, C. T. Onions reminds of the fact that to the Elizabethans, "the animal kingdom meant, not vertebrates and invertebrates, not mammalia, insecta, crustacea, and the like, but beats and fowls (both wild and tame), fishes, and creeping things or worms" since "[m]odern zoological classification was not possible until the practice of dissection, which at the close of the Elizabethan age was yet in its infancy" (477). Indeed, *A Greene Forest or a Naturall Historie* (1567) by John Maplet is assigned to be the first book in English "in which the term *Natural History* is known to occur" (Onions 477). Hereupon, the sources of the knowledge of animals paraded by Shakespeare and his contemporaries were provided by "the experience of everyday life, especially in the country, the meagre resources of the Tower or other menageries, books of travel and of natural history, and, above all, the traditional stock of fact and fable derived from ancient sources" (Onions 477). Although it was uncommon for the Renaissance dramatists to refer to nonhuman animal entities as *animal*, Shakespeare's avoidance of using the term seems to be the result of his attention to the "cosmic voicing" emphasising "the participation and authority that the *Book of Nature* accords to all creatures," as can be observed in his portrayal of "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks/Sermons in stone, and good in everything" (16-17) in *As You Like It* (1599) (Shannon 475). The same cosmic voice can be heard in *Macbeth*, too:

> Macbeth: Stones have been known to move, and trees to speak;

> Augures and understood relations, have
> By maggot-pies, and choughs, and rooks brought forth
> The secret'st man of blood. (96-97)

Apparently, Shakespeare followed the line of the widespread medieval and Renaissance perception of Nature as a "deity, subordinate only to the Christian God, and sometimes His competitor as an 'absolute monarch'" (MacFaul 9); yet he also accomplished to present that perception in a neutral tone by bending or even breaking the rigid taxonomic hierarchy of species. On the part of the play quoted above, Harting notes that "[e]ven at the present day, there are many who profess to augur good or evil from the flight of a magpie, or from the number of magpies seen together at one time," and he also adds an old tongue twister on the issue as follows: "One for sorrow, two for mirth/Three for a wedding, four for a birth" (120). Such environmental imageries including animals and voicing their sharp senses radically transforms Shakespeare's stage into a political platform on which human and nonhuman animal are unified.

Turning back to Lady Macbeth's animetaphoric insults she throws at her husband, she furthers her casting aspersions on Macbeth through direct rhetoric questions such as "Are you a man? (92)," or "What, quite unmanned in folly?" (93) at the time when Macbeth is haunted by the ghost of Banquo at the "failed" feast table set for the celebration of Macbeth's coronation, which is a "register for audiences of eating's fragile role in establishing bonds, whether social or political" (Raber 119). Macbeth, dizzy with the vision he has had, seems to reply his wife's question while, at the same time, he is involved in a scuffle with the ghost:

> Macbeth: What man dare, I dare.
> Approach thou like the rugged Russian bear,
> The armed rhinoceros, or th' Hyrcan tiger;
> Take any shape but that, and my firm nerves
> Shall never tremble. (95)

Here, Macbeth's triple of the exotic animals, namely "the rugged Russian bear," "the armed rhinoceros," and "th' Hyrcan tiger," are mentioned in order to transpose Macbeth's own tyrant-like barbarity into ferociousness of the enemy, Banquo, through animetaphors. As C. T. Onions accounts, "[t]he tigers of Hyrcania, a country south of

the Caspian or Hyrcanian Sea, were known from Pliny, who says Bartholomaeus, describes them as 'beasts of dreadful swyftenes'" (486). In effect, Macbeth's bloodthirstiness is sourced from his savage Machiavellianism hinging on his belief that "For mine own good/All causes shall give way: I am in blood/Stepp'd in so far" (98). Macbeth is portrayed as almost monstrous human who can sacrifice the right of all living beings to live elsewhere in the universe for the sake of his own interests. Accordingly, "though the treasure/Of Nature's germens tumble all together" (110) "so that they became barren or produced only monstrosities" (Muir 110), Macbeth cares only about his short-term gain in exchange for his numerous bloody deeds. In the conversation between Macduff and Malcolm, during which Malcolm deceptively gives Macduff his vision of being the next king who is more lecherous, greedy and despotic than Macbeth in order to determine whether he may take Macduff into his confidence (124-29), Macbeth's excess capacity for evil is furbished, for in this dialogue Malcolm "practises an authentic Machiavellianism, whereas Macbeth's Machiavellianism is crude and so fails" (McGrail 26). Above all, this conversation is of great significance as it "forcefully introduces a moment of reflection on the question of what tyranny means and so is an appropriate starting point for a discussion of Shakespeare's understanding of tyranny," and accordingly, "[t]he tyrant, for Shakespeare, is no mere usurper" (McGrail 26). In this way, Malcolm's deceptive strategy turns out to be a discussion "on the contrast between true royalty and tyranny that is very germane to the matter" (Muir lxiii). Apparently, Shakespeare indicates the ideal nature of regimen by depicting its reversed version.

On the other hand, Macduff's son's comparison between the rich birds and the poor ones referring to the condition of humanity in his conversation with his mother resembles Macbeth's eminent analogy between dog and human in terms of their hierarchical status based on their innate abilities in their own specimen:

> Ay, in the catalogue you go for men;
> As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
> Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are clept
> All by the name of dogs: The valu'd file
> Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle,
> The housekeeper, the hunter, every one

> According to the gift which bounteous nature
> Hath in him clos'd; whereby he does receive
> Particular addition, from the bill
> That writes them all alike; and so of men. (77-78)

In fact, John D. Rea, as A. R. Braunmiller refers to, asserted that this part of the play is presumably based on Erasmus's *Colloquia* (1518) "where a few general, moralised analogies between human and canine behaviour are mentioned" (242). Nevertheless, Braunmiller proposes that *Of Englishe Dogges, the diversities, the names, the natures, and the properties* (1576) by Dr. John Caius is more likely to be the main source of such zoological comparison between dogs and humans (242). In any possible scenario, it is clear that although Macbeth seems to invite comparison between dogs and humans in order to encourage "the two nameless commoners – the First Murderer and the Second Murderer – to slay two successors to the throne, Banquo and Fleance," which is "the most rebellious act of all: murdering heirs to the throne" (McCarthy and Schlueter 78), by appealing to their manhood, Shakespeare closes the world of dogs to that of humans in regard to diverse stirpes of dogs with different duties. Such almost zoological juxtaposition of these two species in which "[n]early all the important kinds of dogs are included" as in *King Lear* (Onions 479) reveals Macbeth's internal moral contradictions:

> Although this speech at first seems a distended analogy (dogs and men are alike in their variety, some good, some bad), Macbeth's rhetorical tactics contradict his criminal purposes. The varied plenitude of dogs and men to which Macbeth appeals represents a universal and social order he has violated and now seeks to violate further; the premise of varied quality leads as easily to negative valuations of the men as to positive; 'bounteous nature' has given each a different 'gift,' but Macbeth's analogy holds that nature has given his hearers the 'gift' of destroying nature. (Braunmiller 242)

Nonetheless, Andreas Höfele, in his reading of Nietzsche, asserts that "[b]eing 'rather wicked' inoculates Nietzsche's Shakespeare against idealistic distortion," and thus, "it enables him to see beyond civilised (that is, tamed) 'goodness' to conceive the transgressively 'overhuman' animality of a Coriolanus or a Macbeth" (263). Accordingly, just like in the case of Christopher Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* (1592) or John Milton's *Paradise Lost* (1667) in both of which "Satan is both admirable and

deluded: admirable in his rejection of royalty ratified only by tradition; deluded in thinking that the only other ratification of God's regal power is force" (Flesch 239), Macbeth, within relativised dual trajectory that validates only subjective truth, can be seen as "a source of poetic energy and imagination, indeed the one real source" (qtd. in Forsyth 65). In the same fashion, R. A. Foakes holds the idea that Macbeth deserves admiration since

> *Macbeth* is a play that escapes from ordinary moral boundaries and judgments; it is less about a criminal who must be morally condemned than about a great warrior who breaks through the fear-barrier only to find on the other side not the release and fulfilment he looks for, but a desert of spiritual desolation. (26-27)

After all, as Nietzsche dictates, "fact is precisely what there is not only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in itself': perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing" (*TWP* 267); yet it is not easy to sympathise with Macbeth and his extreme ambition. In relation to this point, Freud's definition of civilisation as "all those respects in which human life has raised itself above its animal status and differs from the life of beasts" (5-6) affirms that civilisation covers all of the social, psychological, economic re-orderings which differentiate human from its primordial animal condition. From this perspective, it becomes conceivable that Macbeth is the embodiment of human's internal journey to its own primitive, unmodernised, pure and thus natural instincts, which provides the main impetus behind the ongoing debate on the impoverished dualism of human versus animal resonated with the binary nature/culture or civilisation. Correspondingly, what provides Macbeth with the real 'spur' may be Duncan's own mistake to intervene with the process of rising in rank. On this point, Northrop Frye notes that

> [t]he scene in which Duncan makes Malcolm Prince of Cumberland in front of Macbeth is oddly anticipatory of the scene in *Paradise Lost* in which God the Father arouses the jealousy of Satan by displaying his Son, and it is interesting that Milton considered writing a Macbeth which would include the ghost of Duncan. (24-25)

Furthermore, Duncan appears to be perplexed by the previous Thane of Cawdor's betrayal: "He was a gentleman on whom I built/An absolute trust" (23), uttered following another 'most reliable' officer Macdonwald's treason against him. Nevertheless, Duncan immediately repeats the same mistake by appointing Macbeth to the new Thane of Cawdor, which disrupts the whole balance of power:

> Macbeth: By Sinel's death I know I am Thane of Glamis.
> But how of Cawdor? The Thane of Cawdor lives
> A prosperous gentleman, and to be king
> Stands not within the prospect of belief,
> No more than to be Cawdor. (16)

Apparently, being appointed as the new Thane of Cawdor was a dream that Macbeth cannot cherish for so long as well as being a king; yet Duncan, by his quick bestowing this title upon Macbeth, triggers Macbeth's instincts. In his *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud expresses that "a great part of the struggles of mankind centres round the single task of finding some expedient solution between these individual claims and those of the civilised community" (61). Accordingly, Macbeth's making his own individual claims triggered by Duncan leads him to being a chained bear on the stake. Beset from all sides, Macbeth feels choked, and visualises himself as a chained bear to be killed in the savage practice of blood-sport bear-baiting: "They have tied me to a stake. I cannot fly/But, bear-like, I must fight the course" (156). In this way, as Höfele stresses, "[t]he stage holds a stake for the suffering […] and the cornered Macbeth and makes [him] 'bear' [his] predicament" (210). Caroline Spurgeon notes another bear-baiting image from *King Lear* when Gloucester cries "I am tied to the stake, and I must stand the course" (54), and comments that Shakespeare's "sympathy is wholly on the side of the bear, and he accentuates his bravery and the horror of his position" (110). In contrast, Bruce Boehrer holds the idea that "[e]lsewhere, to be sure, Shakespeare alludes to bear-baiting in more or less neutral terms but nowhere else in his work does he use the sport as an extended element of character construction" (*SAA* 139). Possibly, the bear imagery, as a well-established symbol that can be traced back to an ancient past, can help to comment on Shakespeare's intent on using such a forcible metaphor for Macbeth's final condition. Accordingly, the bear "has symbolised cruelty and evil," for "in the *Old Testament* it is used to represent the Kingdom of Persia, which

brought death and corruption into the world, and was finally destroyed by God" (Ferguson 12). Moreover, the medieval representation of bear as a devilish creature is commensurate with "the use of the bear as a symbol of gluttony (one of the seven deadly sins), and also the bear's association with sexual lust" (Ziolkowski 30). On the other hand, infant bears were considered to come into the world as shapeless entities that are formed by their mother, and "[t]his legendary act became a symbol of Christianity, which reforms and regenerates heathen people. It is in this sense that a number of legends concerning the taming of a bear by a saint may be interpreted" (Ferguson 12). Within this sense, Macbeth, as a devilish traitor, is submitted to discipline on stake imposed by poetic justice as the medieval and Renaissance concern with tragedy requires for "the fall of great men or women, brought low by fortune's wheel and so exemplifying the mutability of human life, or overreaching themselves and illustrating the retribution visited upon the proud and sinful" (Foakes 10).

To continue with Malcolm, in contrast to his father, he treats the people around him with utmost caution and suspicion. He does not trust Macduff as he left his family abandoned in Scotland; yet the most important reason is the fact that Macduff may be one of Macbeth's agents since Macbeth "[w]as once thought honest," before he has fallen from grace and Macduff "lov'd him well" (123). For this reason, Malcolm thinks Macduff can win Macbeth's favour by "offer[ing] up a weak, poor, innocent lamb/T' appease an angry god" (129). By comparing himself to a lamb, Malcolm rightfully expresses his concerns for his safety, and shows that he would become an intelligent king whose power does not rely on sword but on subtle manoeuvrings. Moreover, Stuart Pryke draws attention to holy allusion of 'lamb' as follows:

> In Christian tradition, a lamb symbolises innocence, something which Malcolm feels he still has to protest in relation to the murder of his father. Additionally, lambs are often associated with the phrase 'like a lamb to the slaughter' (based on Jeremiah 11:19). If Malcolm returns to Scotland with Macduff, he perhaps fears that he, too will be offered up like the symbolic lamb, murdered just as his father was before him. (363)

From this vantage, it is possible to infer that the symbol of Christ as Lamb of God, which has been the most repeated and instantly recognisable sacramental symbol in

both medieval and Renaissance cultural and religious contexts is vividly crystallised in Malcolm's words. Accordingly, Malcolm's testing Macduff's honesty "requires a politician's command of language and a shrewd grasp of human psychology, neither of which Duncan appears to possess" (Beardwood and Macdonell 45). Based on this, Malcolm's upcoming sovereignty seems to be presented as a solution to Scotland's unbalanced political and natural life:

> Macbeth's defeat by Macduff returns Scotland to its rightful order in both the human and natural worlds. The restoration of human (i.e., moral) order is signalled by the return of the legitimate heir from his exile in England, where he has taken shelter under the English king Edward the Confessor. Shakespeare, critics argue, is implying that Malcolm's reign will be as peaceful and benevolent as both his father's and the pious English king's. This renewal of moral order is simultaneously a return of natural or cosmological order, symbolised by the arrival of spring when the greenery of Birnam wood rises to envelop Macbeth's dark and wintry castle on high Dunsinane Hill. (Richard van Oort 97)

As can be realised, Shakespeare ponders some clear affirmative implications about Malcolm's sovereignty, which are suitable for Northrop Frye's definition of an ideal ruler:

> The ruler represents, though he does not embody, the upper order of nature, the world man was originally intended to live in. The conventional physical symbol of this order is that of the starry spheres with their unheard music. The music is that of the Apollonian world, for Apollo was the god of music, at least of the music that suggests 'harmony,' order, and stability. (23)

In like fashion, Marion Bodwell Smith comments that "[t]he approach of Malcolm's troops to Dunsinane must have presented much the appearance of the May Day Procession, coming to dispossess the old King of Winter and bring in the young King of May whose harvest of peace and public weal would be planted newly with the time" (187). On such implications of the play's end, it is crucial to bear in mind that this is a play in which Shakespeare directly refers to James I's ascendancy, and he is obliged to respect stage censorship tightly imposed by the Lord Chamberlain's Office. Accordingly, despite his suspicion about Shakespeare's own intent on adapting his play in regard to the King's interests, Braunmuller points out that Shakespeare "identifies a

central structural problem: there are two competing narratives. One subordinates Duncan's death to Macbeth's becoming king; the other, contradictorily, elevates the future greatness of Banquo and therefore of his descendants, the Stuarts" (25). Nevertheless, at the flip side of the coin, the ominous implications about the political future of Scotland are digested in the resolution of the play. Accordingly, Macduff's entrance with "Th' usurper's cursed head" (162) reminds of Macbeth's violent murder of Duncan and points out the condition of Scotland driven into the vicious circle of killing for power. In effect, the play forms some constructive ideas that draw the core of Shakespeare's political philosophy: first one of them appears when Macbeth, after killing Banquo, realises that he becomes merely a part of perverse cycle – "It [Banquo's murder] will have blood, they say: blood will have blood" (96), and the second one reveals when Doctor examines Lady Macbeth and confers that he, as a physician, cannot cure her illness but "the divine" can, for "Unnatural deeds/Do breed unnatural troubles" (140-41). Respectively, as these two statements darkly hint at, *Macbeth* does not aim to provide a mechanism whereby the solutions are channelled into the problems; instead, it continuously operates within wider political inquiries regarding the true nature of power. Relevantly, in his *Shakespeare's Political Animal* (1990), Alan Hager concludes that the 'spur' "for a moment making [Macbeth] immortal, or, rather, the "best" of humans and therefore the closest to gods, a king" is, indeed, one of the exerted pressures of the Renaissance anthropocentric ideals; yet "[i]deals create strain for the individual, as Shakespeare shows throughout his dramatic career," and "idealistic tension can burst into sudden creation or destruction" (118). As the line between villain and hero is shortened on a slippery ground, the illustration of a king as a chained bear on the stake would not be the one and only exemplary instance but would most likely happen regularly. On this point, Günseli Sönmez İşçi warns that nobody can be sure of Malcolm's grant that he will not be a proper feudal prince who confiscates his people's property, has his eyes on their wives and daughter like "vulture" (88) in Ben Jonson's *Volpone*, and can fecklessly lead to civil war when he has the power of divine rights behind him (94). In effect, İşçi's assumption is echoed in Macduff's concern about Malcolm's reign: "Such welcome and unwelcome things at once/'Tis hard to reconcile" (130). Likewise, A. C. Bradley points out the probability of emergence of seemingly contra ideas as emanations of their common roots: "Treasonous ambition in

Macbeth collides with loyalty and patriotism in Macduff and Malcolm: here is the outward conflict. But these powers or principles equally collide in the soul of Macbeth himself: here is the inner. And neither by itself could make the tragedy" (13). Although, in opposition to the "butcher" Macbeth (162), who usurped the throne, Malcolm ascends the throne "by the grace of Grace" (163), the way for him to do so is so set in killing the king, which equalises their Machiavellianism: the end justifies the means. As this fact underscores, it is natural for Shakespeare to delve further into search for possibilities with their differing outcomes. Accordingly, it is difficult to assume that Malcolm is the ideal king and his reign is offered as a political solution by Shakespeare himself, for at the end of the play, "[w]e are left with an awed sense of the overwhelming potency and vitality of evil," and thus, "it is not a resolution, but a tremulous, vital equilibrium between affirmation and despair, in which we submit ourselves to an unknown fear" (Sanders 275). As for Macbeth, Neslihan Ekmekçioğlu's final apt description of Richard II in her analysis of Shakespeare's *Richard II* in terms of the constant conflict between truth and representation deems appropriate for Macbeth, too:

> Richard is willingly imprisoned within himself, absorbed by a relationship with his own reflection, which flatters him with his own self-admiring gaze. On this occasion the cracked mirror fails him. He becomes poetically a completely anonymous being, without name, without title and with the shattered images of his broken identity. (49)

Accordingly, just like Richard II, Macbeth, who is enchanted by the divine image of himself as a king, is doomed to acknowledge the mortal image of his body as an ordinary human being whose physical existence is not more valuable than that of a horse or a bird.

In conclusion, *Macbeth* is a search for the ideal ruler and the ideal political system. With such quest at its centre, the play is stamped with a hallmark of its great bulk of environmental imageries and animetaphors, which sets the stage for the human characters merging with either literal or metaphorical nonhuman animal characters. Thus, in a posthumanist sense, on a literal level, the play presents a transferred

experience from the human to the animal as the animals' first-hand experience of Macbeth's brutal violence is conveyed through the strange cannibalism among horses or the owl's nightlong hoots. Accordingly, the play's human dystopian community compelling the law of Nature is sharply contrasted with the naturally utopian peaceful world of animal entities. On the metaphorical level, Shakespeare makes effective use of animetaphors ranging from "a weak, poor, innocent lamb" to "the rugged Russian bear," all of which serve the literary substantiality of the play. Through the application of such animetaphors, Shakespeare provides himself with an interior space where he can comment on the interrelated state and gender politics of the Renaissance humanism without being disturbed by the fear of censorship. By doing so, Shakespeare both provides animals with a voice to reflect their own experiences and pursues an extensive inquiry into the well-established animetaphors in order to "evaluate Man in terms of animals and animals in terms of Man which seems to be part of the heritage of every race and every individual in every age" (Yoder 60-61). As is seen in the case of Shakespearean serpent or bird imagery, his forcible animetaphors supply the dramatist with a chance to arrange a play in a thought-provoking pattern on a philosophical and political dualism. In this way, while not being starkly political and topical, he can resume a universal journey to the in-depth analysis of human greed for power reflected in the interaction between the state politics and gender codes of his time. Above all, Shakespearean animals or animalistic images indicate that the dramatist regards human as inferior to animal, for it is human who destroys the natural and social harmony for the sake of its own selfish desires not for the compulsive satisfaction of its natural instincts as it is so in the animal realm. His distinctive use of animals in depicting metamorphosis of his villain from human to repulsive creature intensifies the audience or the readers' aversion for Macbeth. In such process, Shakespeare does not only apply to the conventional connotations attached to any animal; instead, he both associates his dramatic figure with a prevailed animal image and puts other animals up against his violent deeds either with their literal or metaphorical existence. Thus, such distinctive and specific Shakespearean way of using animetaphors as significant artistic devices for depicting a mood of pessimism about the aesthetic, ethical, moral, or political ideals of the Renaissance humanism regarding the dignity of human being is attempted to be proposed.

CHAPTER 4

A WELL DOCUMENTED LINK BETWEEN THE EARTH OF HUMANS AND THE SKY OF BIRDS: POLITICAL AVIAN ANIMETAPHORS IN JAMES SHIRLEY'S *THE BIRD IN A CAGE*

Sweet fellow prisoners! 'Twas a cruel art,
The first invention to restrain the wing,
To keep th'inhabitants o'th' air close captive
That were created to sky-freedom. Surely
The merciless creditor took his first light
And prisons their first models from such bird loops?
I know yon nightingale is not long-lived;
See how that turtle mourns, wanting her mate. […]
They shall no more be prisoners to please me.
(*The Bird in a Cage* 11-24)

Following the close analysis of the two classic examples of the Jacobean plays, which were heavily affected by the previous set of ideas of the Elizabethan drama, within the framework of animetaphors as political tools for socio-political criticism of the dramatists in the wider arena of sex, class and state politics, *The Bird in a Cage* (1632) by James Shirley (1596-1666) comes into prominence as one of the high comedies of the Caroline era in England during the reign of Charles I (1625-1649). Though being a clear reflection of a dense cluster of ideas, politics or conventions of the Caroline drama, Shirley, who "painted English manners, English men /And formed his taste on Shakespeare and old Ben" (Garrick qtd. in Hall 202), and his play, which traces the main plot of John Fletcher's *Women Pleased* (1619-23) (Forsythe 288), share a common set of characteristics with the aforementioned plays in regard to the political use of animals for political and social assessment. Once more, animals, particularly birds in this play, are the basis of the metaphor for human greed for power as well as the politics of sexuality of the age. For this reason, as stated in Eugenia's lines full of lament and sorrow for birds in the epigraph above and as the play's title suggests, the play is constructed on various literal and metaphoric uses of birds. As the stereotypical image

rapidly emerging within the context of avian animetaphors, the cage metaphor in the play first alludes to the plights of the characters. Subsequently, in a broader sense, it refers to the direct and multifaceted relations between human and nonhuman animal, man and woman, state and citizen, or even to the Puritans and the Royalists in the context of struggle for power during the Caroline period in England. The considerable variation within the references made through these two widespread brilliant conceits reveals the play's critical eye on English state politics regarding sexual, monetary or class policies. Furthermore, the play's both real and symbolic birds investigate the agency and subjectivity of human animals as well as of non human animals. In line with this, the play welcomes the posthumanist outlook on human-animal relations. In a critical posthumanist context, the play pushes the limits of the then-contemporary humanist trends by offering a society in which the oppressed human characters are identified with birds and share the same captivity with a bird in a cage.

Written nine years before the ban on London theatres by the Puritan Parliament in 1642, Shirley's comedy holds up a mirror to the ongoing political and religious controversies, social differentiation and dilemmas of its period ranging from morally corrupted arranged marriages to politically corrupted courtiers obsessed with degree. In fact, as being one of the most scholarly excavated centuries in English history, the seventeenth century is full of violent social, political, economic and religious upheavals. It is chiefly marked by the English Civil War between the followers of the Parliament of England ("Roundheads," the parliamentarians) and the supporters of King Charles I ("Cavaliers," the royalists) from 1642 to 1649 enmeshed in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms namely Scotland, England and Ireland between 1639 and 1653 (Burns 112), the Interregnum period (which was governed by the Commonwealth of England under the leadership of first Oliver Cromwell and then his son Richard Cromwell) between the execution of King Charles I in 1649 and the Restoration period that started in 1660, and the Glorious Revolution between 1688 and 1689, which ended with dethroning of James II and the accession of William III of Orange in 1689. When the time of Shirley's play is brought into focus, the constant friction between the firm belief of the Parliament about the vital necessity for its existence as the representative of the English citizens in terms of politics and patronage of the country and the authoritative hegemony of Charles I, based

on his father James I's claim for 'divine rights of the kings' referring to a political and religious axiom of royal absolutism, appears. Under the shadow of such a long-running feud, Charles I's dissolution of the Parliament in 1629 over a wide disagreement on the King's taxation without the consent of the Parliament and the unlawful nature of imprisonment by the King (Burns 110) identify characteristics of the political realm of the time when Shirley was about to compose his play. At the end of his eleven-year personal "policy of rule without parliament" (Cust 104), the King summoned the Parliament in 1640 in order to "secure funding for his war in Scotland, a conflict brought on by his attempt to impose authoritarian episcopal rule on the Church of Scotland and override Presbyterian governance" (Truxes 84), which led to the Bishops' Wars between 1639 and 1640. Nevertheless, the Parliament that inevitably mounted stiff resistance to Charles I's sovereign authority stipulated some conditions such as legislating strict restriction upon the decisions of Charles I. In January 1642, as a consequence of the chain of cataclysms and the tension heightened between the absolutist King and the Parliament, "Charles I declared Parliament in rebellion, and the nation inched toward the catastrophe of the English Civil War" (Truxes 85).

Inescapably, drama and theatre received their fair share of the socio-political problems in this period. In September 1642, shortly after the outbreak of the English Civil War,

> English Parliament banned public performance with an ordinance stating that '[p]ublic Stage-plays […] being Spectacles of Pleasure, too commonly expressing lascivious Mirth and Levity,' do not agree 'with the Seasons of Humiliation' and ordering that '[p]ublic Stage Plays shall cease, and be forborn.' […] Criticism traditionally regarded the theatrical ordinance as the culmination of a long-standing anti-theatrical grudge borne by the Puritans who dominated Parliament in the mid seventeenth century. (Craig 2)

Obviously, writings of some eminent Puritan political propagandists such as William Prynne for the pre-1642 period, which disseminated messages about public theatre and female appearance on stage in some parts of Europe such as in France were particularly effective in the Puritan ban on theatres. However, with the return of Charles II from his exile in France upon the Parliament's invitation to him to restore his father's throne in 1660, the English Restoration of the Stuarts started. In the same year, the theatres were

reopened and the first professional female actresses such as Elizabeth Mitchell Corey, Elinor Dixon Leigh, Elizabeth Barry and Nell Gwyn started to appear on the English stage.

Consequently, as being rough time span during which the pendulum constantly swung from side to side, the seventeenth century proved to be one of the significant milestones in the history of English drama and theatre. Surely, socio-political crisis fed directly into religious controversies and resulting in economic depressions in the nation had dominant influence on the theatres, and thus, "[i]ntense political engagement in the drama radically transformed dramatic form and content" of the period (Owen 158). James Shirley, who died in the year of the Great Fire of 1666, "lived through the closing of the theatres in 1642, the restoration of Charles II, the return of the country to orthodox Protestantism and the great plague year of 1665" (Knutson 362). With such a complex socio-political background, Shirley and most of his works voiced the sense of uncertainty felt by the whole nation as a result of such controversies. For instance, in *The Bird*, Philenzo's lines, "So shall I be more sure of prayers than if I built a church, for they are not certain to continue their foundation" (1105), reflect a question mark over the future of religious institutions.

Indeed, during his career, Shirley, who "successfully acquired patrons and succeeded to Shakespeare's place as chief poet with the King's Men" (Knutson 355), "allied himself with coteries of politicians at Gray's Inn, English and Irish courtiers, Catholics, and literati who could provide the patronage he sought" (Knutson 362). As Roslyn L. Knutson neatly summarises crucial steps in the long course of Shirley's career,

> [p]resumably he signed a contract with Beeston, perhaps a prototype of the Brome contract in 1635, to supply Lady Elizabeth's Men, later Queen Henrietta's Men, with two plays a year. This affiliation lasted until 1636, when plague again shut down the playhouses. Shirley then moved to Ireland and wrote for the theatre in Dublin. When he returned to London in 1640, he affiliated himself with the King's Men at Blackfriars and the Globe. Both at the Cockpit (later Phoenix) and Blackfriars playhouses, Shirley addressed audiences more routinely upscale and female than Shakespeare and Dekker would have known. (361)

The preference of such audiences are reflected in Shirley's favourite genres: "[T]he realistic-instructional-social comedy, tragicomedy and romantic tragedy" (Knutson 361). Apparently, *The Bird* might be considered as an example of Shirley's realistic-instructional-social comedy.

Fitting neatly into the patterns of the previous two plays analysed within the scope of this dissertation, in order to draw its strident criticism of English political issues on a safe ground, Shirley's *The Bird* provides a foreign dramatic setting, and it shares the common setting, Italy, with Jonson's *Volpone*. Even the history of the play's dedication and its modified title in accordance with the ongoing debates on theatrical culture and female appearance on European stage indicate the play's intricate ties with its era. Indeed, William Prynne (1600-1669), precisely "an outspoken Puritan antitheatricalist" (McManus 1080), and his *Histrio-Mastix: The Player's Scourge, or the Actor's Tragedy* (1632) act as an arbiter in Shirley's formulation of his play. With the aim of mocking Prynne's work and his successive imprisonment, Shirley changes his upcoming play's title from *The Bewties* (*The Beauties*) to *The Bird in a Cage* (Senescu 48). Moreover, he dedicates his play to Prynne by epigrammatically stating that "[t]he fame of [his] candor innocent love to learning – especially to that musical part of human knowledge, poetry – and in particular to that which concerns the stage and scene doth justly challenge from [Shirley] this dedication" (1082). In this way, Prynne "was a bird in a cage himself" (Sanders 23), and his imprisonment in the Tower of London, or his "happy retirement" as Shirley calls (1082), conjures up the first powerful image of cage within the corpus of the play.

Preceded by Stephen Gosson's *Schoole of Abuse* (1579) and followed by Jeremy Collier's *Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage* (1698), Prynne's *Histrio-Mastix* offers a compilation of parts from the Bible as well as from the writings of eminent Church Fathers such as Saint Augustin. Accordingly, the work basically reflects a set of ideas about theatres, stage, stage-plays and women acting in stage-plays, and their social function from a Puritan controversialist's point of view, as presented below:

> That which the very best, the holiest Christians, have always constantly avoided, condemned as evil; the very worst and most notoriously vicious only of Christians, of Pagans, of ancient and modern times, affected, applauded, frequented with pleasure and delight […]. But such is the case of Stage-plays. Therefore they are certainly evil and so unlawful unto Christians. (Prynne I.147)

Clearly, Prynne's work is one of the savage attacks on the English stage in general, and in particular, of the indecent assaults on European "Women-actors" labelled as "notorious whores" (1165) by Prynne in the index part of his work where he gives definition of "Puritans as "condemners of stage-plays and other corruptions" (1163). Moreover, he refers to the French women actresses' performance recently performed at Blackfriars as "impudent, shameful, unwomanish, graceless, if not more than whorish attempt" (I.414). Indeed, as Margot Heinemann rightly observes, "Puritanism itself was a household-based religion, especially in early Stuart times, somewhat as the Jewish religion still is; and this gave more importance and responsibility to the role of wife and mother" (190). Thus, it is no surprise to find that women were to be caged in houses, and were not to be seen on the stage according to the Puritan mind-set.

As previously mentioned, the speculative ideas about European females acting in public theatre were promoted in pamphlets or books by some Puritan conservative figures such as William Prynne, and not surprisingly, they would have acted for the Puritan closure of theatres in 1642. However, in the pre-1642 period, Prynne's lines costed him a lot, for his words were interpreted as a direct insult thrown at Queen Henrietta Maria, who was first seen by Charles I while she was performing the role of Iris in "a rehearsal for Anne of Austria's *Grand Ballet de la reyne représentant les Festes de Junon la nopciére*" in 1623 (Britland 16-17). With her marriage into Charles I's England in 1625, Henrietta, as "a young bride of fifteen" would transform "into a strong-willed, confident queen," and her "gaining Charles's affections and confidence cleared the way for Henrietta's ascendancy into a recognised position of importance at court" (White, *HM* 57). Despite her burning interest in French court dances in her native land, the French Queen refused to attend English court dances, and by doing so, she "not only denied the court the pleasure of assessing her physical attributes, but effectively refused to accept her symbolic place within the court's sexual economy" (Britland 17). However, in spite

of their shared reluctance to appear in conventional forms of public display, both the King and the Queen "were positively addicted to the spectacular private performances of court masques," and the royal couple "regularly played roles in productions, helped determine set design and costuming, and recommended themes and plots" (White, *HM* 28).

Undeniably, just as the Jacobean masques, the Caroline masques were far beyond solely being a private way of court entertainments and James Shirley, as the writer of eminent masques such as *The Triumph of Beauty* (1646) and *Cupid and Death* (1653), was especially interested in the appearance of female performers in the courtly masques. These masques had a paramount political importance since many of them "illustrated the godlike nature of royalty through referencing classical or literary figures and many of the plots created images, and reinforced themes, of order, harmony, moral goodness, beauty, and authority" (White, *HM* 28). From its early Stuart period marked by the artistic collaboration between Ben Jonson and Inigo Jones, the elaborate private courtly masque, a form of "elite social ritual rather than public drama," was regulated in accordance with the class conventions of its members (McManus, *WRS* 6), and thus, offered a sharp contrast with the Elizabethan unrefined public theatre. Along with their symbolic meanings in political platform, the masques' allowance for bodily performance of women was also the main focus of attention since it paved the way for female appearance on the English stage after 1660. The emergence of female performance in the *mise en scène* of the courtly masques "where boy players with speaking female roles would be juxtaposed with the silent aristocratic women's bodies dancing and displaying" (Schafer 173) would be a key to the appearance of professional women actresses on the Restoration stage. Thus, the practice of court masques might be considered as the spring female performances bubbled up since

> [t]he nature of the court masque genre was itself a prime factor in allowing elite early modern women access to its stage […]. Such female performance was possible amongst the elite of the age only because it was dependent upon the courtly norms and regulations of aristocratic behaviour. Elite female performance, by definition, involved the intersection of class and gender discourses which circulated within the masque and found a specific site of expression in the performing female body. (McManus, *WRS* 6)

Hence, the masques were assigned to symbolic meaning by the Queen, for she clearly benefited from the royal stage "to advance ecumenism, enhance the image of Roman Catholicism, and promote the cult of Platonic love (which elevated women into the true objects of heroic action)" (White, *HM* 28).

Accordingly, taking the prism of the gender politics of the age into consideration, it is possible to state that Henrietta was courageous enough to interfere in state affairs, which "would have catastrophic repercussions; in the end" and "served to lower people's respect for Charles and called into question his ability to govern effectively" (White, "PR" 206). Thus, due to her religion and nationality, the French Catholic Queen kept her position as an unpopular yet powerful woman figure of authority in the diplomatic arena of England whose "very presence was seen as the greatest obstacle to any settlement with the king" for many of the parliamentarians and the royalists during the pre-Civil War period (White, "PR" 209). Therefore, Prynne was only one of the many who held "the notion that Charles I was tied by apron strings all used expectations for her gender as a measuring stick with which to beat her" (Bucholz and Levin xxvi), which reminds of the manner adopted by the Duke of Mantua, who tries to establish strict control over his daughter Eugenia by closing her in a tower in Shirley's play. By transgressing the limits of the hierarchical gender structure and of the established legal forms of state affairs through her legitimacy and agency caused by her alleged impact on the King, the Queen gradually became the target of sharp criticisms scheduled for publication. Such "newsbooks and pamphlets were effectual because the sheer scale of their production alone indicates that writers and publishers on both sides regarded them as valuable propaganda tools" despite "the most severe censorship regulations yet established" (White, *PR* 208). Such heady atmosphere of hostility towards the Queen paved the way for scurrilous attacks unleashed by particularly anti-royalist groups on her taking a role in Walter Montagu's masque, *The Shepherd's Paradise* (1633), for

> [w]hile masques were performed with a 'private' elite audience in mind (the king and queen, courtiers, aristocrats, and visitors), we know from the Prynne episode that their content could (in a roundabout way) reach to a more 'public' pedestrian audience. Furthermore, as Sharpe tells us, books of masques were produced and circulated, and repeat performances of masques were often staged during royal progresses. Be that as it may, the heavy hand

> of press censorship, and the famous example of Prynne, no doubt helped muffle public opposition to the queen's masques. (White, *QH* 28)

At the end of all these sensational uprising events, though Prynne's *Histriomastix* was completed before the Queen's performance in *The Shepherd's Paradise* in 1633, due to the Queen's previous performance on stage in 1626, Prynne was twice accused of sedition, and was imprisoned (Dillion 378). Additionally, his cropped ears in the first trial "were amputated, his nose was slit, and his cheeks were branded with S. L., for 'seditious libeller'" in his second trial in 1637 (Bricker 2). Surely, such severe corporal punishment indicates the king's intolerance towards any seditious remark on his Queen. Most significantly, the case of Prynne highlighted a long-standing controversy about the female appearance on stage, and *Histriomastix* gave rise to a "political furore" by "add[ing] fuel to a growing literary debate over the issue of women's cultural visibility and agency" (Tomlinson 275).

On the other hand, by dedicating his play that coins the motto "women can play their parts" (1112) to Prynne in order to satirise his work and his final punishment, Shirley "defended the queen against the Puritans' rabid attack on her playacting; as a result, he secured the commission to write *The Triumph of Peace* for the Inns of Court" (Knutson 362). However, Shirley's support for the Queen makes him a paradoxical figure of his age. Most probably, the fact that Shirley was the main dramatist of Henrietta Maria's Men both had overwhelming influence on his choice of subjects regarding obstacles encountered and surmounted by women and brought discredit upon his drama. Accordingly, as Barbara Ravelhofer stresses,

> [f]rom one critic we hear that he was an elitist obsessed with degree; another notes approvingly that he was no cringing 'little-spittle.' His sense of place gave country concerns a dignified voice; but apparently he also listened to London's citizens, and he was the Queen's darling. He received favours from King and courtiers; yet he was disillusioned with the court. His plays were enormously popular; or they bombed. He was a scandalous writer for some, and a dull one for others. (1)

The main reason for this situation might be the fact that, due to her religion and nationality, Charles's French Catholic Queen, who actively involved herself in state

affairs, was a serious disturbance to many of both the parliamentarians and the royalists, and, as stated in the quotation above, Shirley's affinity with the Queen, as *The Bird* reveals, put him on dangerous ground. However, for this sympathy, as Alfred Harbage rightfully states, "the zeitgeist" should be "blame[d] rather than the authors themselves" (124), for the Caroline playwrights were obviously exposed to Charles I's developing autocracy, and theatre was compelled to submit to his political attitudes. Considering the fact that "[t]he court dictated the subjects and style of Caroline drama which adopted to the values and ideals of the court uncritically" (Sharpe 30), Shirley's political favour of the court as the playwright of the period might be apprehensible. Looked at from this angle, another 'bird' of the play is the Queen as her state of being socially oppressed at the hands of constant attacks from the parliamentarians as well as the royalists might refer to her 'cage.' In this sense, in his play, Shirley's Eugenia caged in a cage-like-tower by his tyrant father might refer to the Queen herself. In effect, as *The Birds* indicates, Shirley likens women to birds. The play ponders hard over the invisibility of women in social life and on stage, and posits that just as birds, women are not to be caged up behind bars of marriage and domesticity by nature. The same observation is made by Elaine Shefer in her interpretation of the caged bird image in the Pre-Raphaelite art as follows: "The imprisoned or caged birds are contrasted with the free birds who are at liberty to wander where they will. The woman herself stands between two alternatives, the inner world of her home and the outer world represented by the garden" (437). Similarly, at the very beginning of the play, Eugenia sighs heavily when she learns she is about to be locked up in a tower: "Indeed, I shall think Time has lost his wings/ When I am thus caged up" (1084). Here, Eugenia both internalises her situation as a caged bird and touches upon one of the conventional representations of Time that "has his scythe, hourglass, wings, forelock and satyr's legs" (Daniell 288). Accordingly, the image of Time as fleeting through the emblem of winged feet is embedded within the Renaissance consciousness as is seen in Milton's *Sonnet 7*: "How soon hath Time, the subtle thief of youth/ Stol'n on his wing my three-and-twentieth year" (1-2).

As a matter of fact, Shirley's deep concern for female visibility in social life and particularly on stage puts a huge question mark against the conditions of women of the

Renaissance who were denied any political right and defined as a legal property of their husbands. In her close analysis of *The Tragedy of Mariam* (1613) by Elizabeth Cary, İmren Yelmiş emphasises the fact that women were not allowed to equally benefit from the intellectual freedom of the European Renaissance which was heavily marked by its inclination to privilege man over woman, and accordingly shaped the hierarchical social structure featuring gender discrimination (61). As Yelmiş continues, both Cary and her dramatic character Mariam are snared like a bird at the cage of the patriarchal world order that consciously ascribes women speech or writing to undisciplined female sexuality (73). In the same way, according to Prynne's denunciation, "dancing and female acting are associated with transgressive female sexual" and "[f]emale honour, commonly defined in terms of chastity and the enclosure of the woman's body, is threatened by this "shamelesse" public display of that body" (Walker 389). For instance, a preceding figure Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466), an unmarried Veronese noblewoman, epitomises the apparent paradox of the Renaissance that puts human namely European white male in the centre by decentring women. In her search for a secular humanist career, Nogarola came across numerous obstacles within the conservative and almost misogynistic assessment of females during the Italian Renaissance. In her *Dialogue on the Equal or Unequal Sin of Adam and Eve* (1451), Nogarola sparked off an intense debate on the relative responsibility of Adam and Eve for their transgression of divine order which paved the way for their forcible ejection from the Garden of Eden. Along with a wide variety of anatomical and socio-economic factors, the fixation on the biblical account of the Fall that reverberated through history by its representation of woman as a temptress has always been the most cogent reason for women's second-class status. With this in mind, Nogarola's call for gender equality in biblical assessment of the sexes is highly distinctive. In the strong shadow of the Fall during the early modern period, women were considered as being "the more sexually voracious of the sexes," as represented in many Renaissance medical works. For instance, in his "On the Common Conditions of Women" (1597), Ludovic Mercatus blends his natural observations with his biblical interpretations, and thus, defines "womb hysteria" as "an immoderate and unbridled desire to copulate, so strong and unquenchable that the woman appears mad and delirious as a result of this excessive and insatiable appetite" (qtd. in Aughterson 53). Along with the biblical account of the

Fall, these supposedly medical writings shaped the way how femininity was perceived as a creature that should be disciplined under constant male surveillance. In *The Bird*, this image of women is revoked in the male conversation among the three courtiers:

> Dondolo: Do not women play, too?
> Grutti: They are too light, quickly down.
> Morello: Oh, yes! [Sings] They are the best gamesters of all
> For, though they often lie on the ground,
> Not one amongst a hundred will fall
> But under her coats the ball will be found.
> 'With a fading'. (1117)

Here, even though the courtiers chatter about soccer, Dondolo's question seems to be answered by Donella's line, "women can play their parts" (1112), which reveals strong textual ties within the context of Shirley's insistence on female appearance on the stage. On the other hand, Grutti's quick labelling of women as "light" that, in the given quotation, means "wanton" (McManus 1117) once again reiterates the vulnerability of the position of women in an increasingly capitalist patriarchal society of the early seventeenth century. Likewise, Morello's physical metaphor of ball game for depiction of women as accomplished liars ends with a "refrain of a popular song of an indecent character" (Sanders 235). Besides, Morello's metaphor is commensurate with Grutti's previous description of women as being "too light, quickly down," for both "down" and "fade" are consciously chosen words by both characters in order to imply that women are always "ready and willing to lie down for sex" (McManus 1117). Albeit his honesty as a person, Philenzo adopts the same sexist attitude with the courtiers he harshly attacks:

> 'Tis but his modesty
> At first not to seem easy, he must be courted:
> Statesmen, like virgins, first should give denial.
> Experience and opportunity make the trial. (1097)

To offer and direct his political criticism at statesmen, Philenzo likens them to virgins and implies that like virgins, statesmen are expected not to seem easy; instead, they should let themselves be indulged prior to copulation. Philenzo's such a sexist simile

exposes the state of women as being sexually possessed and oppressed by social norms for female sexuality and the cult of female chastity at the hands of male authority. In a like manner, Philenzo makes a bet with the Duke that he can enter into the banished tower if the Duke provides the necessary conditions as follows:

> But let me have freedom and money enough (for that's the circle I walk in) and if I do not conjure up a spirit hot enough to inflame a frozen Lucrece' bosom, make mummy of my flesh and sell me to the apothecaries. Try me with some masterpiece! A woman's love is as easy as to eat dinner without saying grace, getting of children, or going to bed drunk. Let me have money enough and tax me to the purpose. (1090)

Here, "a frozen Lucrece" is a mythological reference to the significance of female virginity to the patriarchy, for the Roman Lucrece, who was raped by Tarquin and subsequently committed suicide, "was proverbial for female chastity" (McManus 1090). Philenzo's uneasy locution as he alludes to Lucrece sounds as if he implies that he can deflower or penetrate into again the raped woman's bosom or hymen if the Duke offers him enough money and freedom. Apparently, while Shirley offers his satire of the foppish courtiers thorough Philenzo's critique of them, he does not present Philenzo as the most sensible male character of his play.

Nonetheless, Shirley offers Eugenia and her confidantes a way to entertain themselves during their confinement in the tower. Appropriately, they decide to perform a masque that they call *The New Prison* (1121), which is based on again the mythological story of Danae and Jupiter, and depicts their own captivity. As noted previously, the English stage was not open for female actresses until the Restoration except for the appearance of female courtiers in masques. Thus, this part of *The Bird* with all its female roles was most probably performed by the boy actors during the play's early staging. Strikingly, Shirley expostulates with the substitution of boy actors for female roles through Morello's disguise like a woman (1105-107). With the aim of testing the guardians protecting Eugenia's tower, Morello dresses and acts like a lady in order to deceive the guardians; yet "Morello's inadequate performance of his female character transforms him into a hermaphrodite; half man, half woman" (McManus 1079). However, on a textual level, Shirley creates a kind of harem for Eugenia and her confidantes so that

they can play their own theatrical roles both on stage and in life. In this way, along with Shirley, the audience enters the inner world of women highlighting solidarity among them. Apparently, Shirley retraces the footsteps of Thomas Middleton, John Webster or William Shakespeare in regard to creating strong female characters in the art of drama, and his *The Bird* features "what might be the only play-within-a-play improvised by an all-female set of characters in English professional theatre between 1558 and 1642" (Ravelhofer 3) not yet on the stage but on the text. Indeed, it is well-known that the English stage was open to women actresses with Charles II's restoration of throne that started in 1660. Before this break point, courtly women, headed by Queen Anne and Queen Henrietta Maria respectively, could perform only in courtly masques. On this point, it might be better to say that Shirley's *The Bird* offers a play full of both women and men, and imagines a stage on which women can act their own part that would be accomplished in the latter half of the 17th century.

Given the source implications involved, *The Bird* is largely an ideological construct revolving around the two interrelated metaphors of bird and cage for investigation into human affairs. While the combination of these two conceits – along with their strong connotations conveying the very essence of poetic expression in the play – provides Shirley with a chance to keep an eye on the then-contemporary English state policies on sexual as well as class politics, it also highlights his brilliant use of animetaphors. Thus, Shirley's animalistic imageries give reasonable ground for the close analysis of his work within the novel context of the posthumanist rejection of anthropological Renaissance universals, for "[t]he presence of animals in the stories we tell demonstrates that 'human nature is an interspecies relationship'" instead of furbishing human grandiosity (Thiyagarajan 79). Indeed, it might be suggested that Shirley's bird content is part of a continuum of the long-term human close observation of birds and their behaviours, which has always been a source of both artistic and divine inspiration for as well as inexhaustible subject of human imagination. For instance, in her *The Birds of the Bible* (1909), as Gene Stratton-Porter notes,

> [i]t must have been the remembrance of myriads of birds, massed in migration, which was in the mind of Isaiah when he wrote that beautiful and poetic line, 'As birds flying, so will the Lord of Hosts defend Jerusalem.'

> He had seen clouds of birds sweeping the night sky to seek the land in which they homed, and he thought that, like them, the Almighty would fly to the defence of the loved city. (34)

In fact, Gene Stratton-Porter has put in a great deal of effort to compile a comprehensive list of birds ranging from peacock to raven that were quoted in the Bible with the aim of encapsulating complex humane features in a clear and powerful animetaphor. While doing so, she also reveals the human need for seeking inspiration from the animal world sharing common features with the human world. On the other hand, in her *Birds and Other Creatures in Renaissance Literature* (2018), Rebecca Ann Bach indicates the centrality of birds with their species-typical tendency to live in groups of conspecifics along with their voices and appearances to the Renaissance human culture through the analysis of Shakespeare's animal imageries. Bach argues that

> [h]umans, like other living things that we too easily call 'animals,' were called 'creatures' in the English Renaissance, and so were beasts, birds, and fishes; everything in the world was God's creation. In addition, many humans were identified as beasts, some humans were identified with birds, and a creature such as Shakespeare's Caliban might be identified as a combination of a fish and a beast. Partly in consequence, humans could be categorised as closer to birds than to beasts. […] Also, and very significantly, soaring and singing birds could be categorised as closer to angels than were many kinds of beasts, including beast-like people. (3)

Accordingly, the representation of angelic figures with wings commonly found in the ecclesiastic literature of monotheistic religions (Ersoylu 20) closely approaches birds to angels in the Chain of Beings as it is visualised in human vision, and that seems the basic reason for humane need to identify itself through avian metaphors. Nevertheless, the birds in the Renaissance texts played a multifunctional role. Indeed, birds have always seemed quite familiar creatures to humans, and thus, been the basis of diverse metaphors as either moral creatures as in the case of Solomon's dove referring to the Creator (Stratton-Porter 118) or immoral monsters ideally embodied in Ben Jonson's carrion birds in *Volpone*. However, in both cases, the general intention behind creating these posthumanist avian imageries is to pursue both human and nonhuman world further, which demonstrates that human culture cannot be fully grasped without the close analysis of its natural affinity with its environment.

As its title propounds, *The Bird* is full of both literal and metaphorical uses of divergent birds which obviously make several allusions to different historical figures and socio-political subjects. As explained above, it might be considered that whereas William Prynne and Henrietta Maria are Shirley's out-of-text birds, the play's both lovers, Eugenia and Philenzo, are his in-text-birds. Reminding of a fairy-tale scenery, the play starts with introducing The Duke of Mantua, who sees his daughter Eugenia as his commodity and tyrannously shuts her in a deliberately built tower with the intention of arranging a marriage between Eugenia and the Prince of Florence. By the way, Philenzo, Eugenia's lover, who is the Cardinal's nephew, is permanently exiled from the Duke's city, for the Duke accepts "no blood to mix/ With any beneath prince" (1085). Notwithstanding, Philenzo returns in disguise as lunatic Rolliardo with a false beard and is accepted by the Duke as a licensed fool (1089). From then on, Rolliardo as an assumed fool becomes Shirley's tool for his satire. Philenzo disguised as Rolliardo ensures that he can do any devoir right well if the Duke appoints him. Giving undue importance to his position of power, the Duke makes fun of Philenzo, and assigns him to penetrate into his daughter's tower so that he can also ensure the security of the tower highly protected against and closed to male access. However, Rolliardo perfectly well manages to fulfil the task by hiding in a huge cage full of scarce birds welcomed into the tower. Upon a letter from the Prince of Florence that states the Prince's support for the young couple's marriage and Philenzo's shattering revelation about his true identity, the Duke allows the couple to marry. Behind his delusively simple plot, Shirley constructs a complicated chain of events, with a large cast of courtiers, frequent references to both classical and contemporary literary works along with myths, and several unexpected twists in his play. In the shadow of Charles I's autocratic tendencies deeply felt by the theatre industry, Shirley's play, as most of the plays of the Caroline drama, adopts courtly royal style and taste. However, although "the events are treated with ridicule rather than rancour," Shirley's satiric tone is clearly audible (Happe 48).

By defining Philenzo as the Duke's wise fool who has a right to speak out for what he thinks right when compared to the other courtiers, Shirley applies to the dramatic technique of articulating sharp political and social criticism through an alleged fool, as is seen in Shakespeare's Porter in *Macbeth*. In this way, he might protect himself

against any imminent danger of becoming the target for courtiers' attacks, for what the fool says is to be considered nonsense. Symbolically, all Shirley's criticism about the courtiers is epitomised in "Johnanape[-like]" (1098) Morello's "amorous lock" (1084) which is

> a reference to the lengthy frontal lock worn on the left side of the front hair, a trend started by Charles I himself. Oddly enough, Shirley's mocking of this trend is in agreement with one of Prynne's earlier works, *The Unloveliness of Love-Locks,* produced in response to this fashion trend. (Young 217)

One thing emerging very clearly from this quotation is that it may be quite unfair to James Shirley if he is assumed as the dramatist only lavishing insincere praises to Queen Henrietta, for, in *The Bird*, he openly attacks the falsity of fops through Rolliardo's satire upon court corruption. On this point, it might be useful to remind of the fact that "the Caroline professional playwrights specifically set themselves apart from the courtiers," and "this is especially true of the younger competitors – Shirley, who lost the laureateship to Davenant, and Brome, who satirised them sharply" (Clark, *Professional Playwrights* 4). Thus, in contrast to the courtier playwrights of the Caroline era, Shirley is ranked as one of the professional dramatists who relied on their dramatic art for income. In effect, Rolliardo introduces himself as "towering in the air like a falcon; the small birds dare not peep for him" (1089). Through this falcon-eye on the Duke's city, which reminds of the dark satiric perspective of Jonson's *Volpone,* Shirley supplies Rolliardo with the position of a detached satirist who observes the veneer of his society. By doing so, Shirley is able to present his harsh criticisms against the court issues and the foolish courtiers along with pious platitudes. Particularly the subplot of the play involves with a head-on clash between the two sides: Ronaldo and Bonamico who support the humble lineage with honest character instead of nobility of birth with an immoral temper on one side, and on the other side, "flattering tribe of courtiers" or "glow-worms" (1104) referring to Grutti, Morello and Dondolo, who are, as Ronaldo says, "perfumed goats" (1097). Accordingly, despite the strange visual effect of their "blueish green light," male glow-worms are pretty tiny creatures between 6 and 9 mm (Faust 100). Similarly, in spite of their radiant appearance just as the glow-worms, the courtiers are demoted to little shiny insects by Philenzo. As might be

expected, Philenzo frequently hurls animalistic insults at the courtiers. “Musk-cat” (1102), “woodcock” (1102), “Christian coxcombs” (1111) are some of the other animalistic insults thrown by Philenzo at the courtiers in order to criticise their foppish style. As it appears that these noble courtiers are unable to dare save their lovers from being locked up in the tower, Philenzo mocks the courtiers’ fake loyalty to their ladies as follows:

> Save you, nest of courtiers. Smooth faces, rich clothes, and sublime compliments make you amorous in sight of your ladies. Donzel del Phebo and Rosicleer, are you there? What pestilent diseases have you got, that you wear so much musk and civet about you? Oh for a priest of Cupid to sacrifice you now! How your breeches would burn like incense and your hair, disguised in sweet powder, leave your bodies in a mist, while your bones were inwardly consuming with the fire of Dame Venus’ altar! (1109)

As is expected, these exaggerated lover-courtiers are quintessentially ‘courageous’ enough to try Bonamico’s invisible-man-magic in order to satisfy their insatiable desires for adultery or bribery (1100). In contrast to these noble but immoral lovers, Philenzo with no noble birth claims that he “will fall upon her [Eugenia], as Jupiter on Danae” (1090). Indeed, the London theatres were familiar to this mythological story – the story of Danae, who is locked up in a brazen tower by her father Acrisius, and Jupiter, who impregnates Danae and promises to return and rescue her – from Thomas Heywood’s *The Escapes of Jupiter* (1611) (Wiggins 135). Similarly, Eugenia plays the role of Danae in their masque titled *The New Prison* performed by Eugenia and her confidantes with the aim of entertaining themselves during their imprisonment in the tower. Such parallels between the lovers starkly juxtapose the sincerity of true love with the insentient nature of arranged marriage, which was another socio-political matter of great importance in England during the early seventeenth century. Apparently, the pure love between Philenzo and Eugenia holds the mirror up to false values sourced by love of money and high social standing. In this way, Shirley’s challenging critique of rigid class system involves the investigation of the concept of arranged marriage which is based on the ground of money and status through the couple’s sensual marriage. Through this humane love marriage, “the social disintegration caused by the Duke’s tyranny is resolved” and Philenzo manages to survive his death punishment (Hasler 34).

Philenzo's use of a huge cage with rare breeds of birds as his conveyance for leaking in Eugenia's tower defines him as one of the protagonists to whom the play's title directly alludes. In literal sense, he hides himself among the birds in the apparatus in which a hideout built in the central column of the aviary so that the Duke does not suspect any treason. In point of fact, such an interesting idea for reaching Eugenia, which instantly reminds of the story of the Trojan Horse, is put forward by Bonamico, one of the debtors kept in the Duke's cells and is alleviated by Philenzo's financial aid. In Act IV scene i, Bonamico introduces the cage with the birds closed in it to the Duke and the courtiers, and stresses that it is a present for the Duke, who would later send the cage to her daughter so that Philenzo hiding inside the cage could reach Eugenia's tower. While displaying the cage, Bonamico provides a definition of the birds by expressing that "Though they all wear feathers, there's not a roarer amongst 'em and, yet, were they suffered, they'd fly high, for some of 'em are very lofty minded" (1118). Bonamico's depiction of the birds, which emphasises the meek and mild nature of birds when compared to riotous horses, is of great significance since the human anthropocentric language defines and reflects human attitude towards nonhuman being. In the following line, Bonamico also equates the ability of birds to fly high with high avian intelligence, which is in total contrast with even contemporary and almost universally folk idea attributed to 'birdbrain,' 'nincompoop,' or 'nitwit' as a pejorative term referring to a foolish or stupid person who behaves in a mentally deficient manner. On this point, as Brandon Barker attests,

> [t]he rise of the Aesop's Fable Paradigm simultaneously raises the possibility that scientific work on animal cognition is exceedingly difficult to parse because of the weight attached to animals (both real and symbolic) in human culture. Folklorists who read headlines about crows being smarter than seven-year-old children should seriously consider the science, in scientific and folkloristic terms, before mistaking sweeping comparisons of mental processes across species for (objective) truth. (19)

Indeed, following his enunciation of each of the birds in the cage, Bonamico states that he did not mention the two birds and by referring to Dondolo and Grutti he says: "A pair of gulls, which you may share between you" (1120). Here, 'gull' is used as a derogatory speciesist remark directed at a person who is fooled or deceived.

Correspondingly, Dondolo and Grutti are responsible for the security of the tower; yet Bonamico foreshadows that they will be ironically deceived by him. While these animalistic terms are used to degrade humans, at the same time they are applied to emphasise human high mental abilities when compared to animals, and such division sets up a formidable barrier between the two species. Relevantly, Jennifer Ackerman lists some of the famous avian metaphoric insults found in human speciesist language as follows:

> An ineffectual politician is a 'lame duck.' To 'lay an egg' is to flub a performance. To be 'henpecked' is to be harassed with persistent nagging. 'Eating crow' is eating humble pie. The expression 'bird brain,' for a stupid, foolish, or scatter-brained person, entered the English language in the early 1920s because people thought of birds as mere flying, pecking automatons, with brains so small they had no capacity for thought at all. (181)

Nevertheless, in the past two decades, nonhuman animal communities' centrality has been recognised by scholars from various disciplines due to the inadequacy of traditional anthropocentric approaches to social sciences. Such recognition paved the way for the appearance of new ways of thinking about the place of animals in human society and culture along with their peculiar innate abilities. Relevantly, following his depiction of birds, Bonamico continues by describing his version of "chain of being" in which creatures' are categorised according to their capacity for bringing pleasure as follows:

> Oh, my lord, we're all born in our degrees to make one another merry: the birds make me merry, I make my wife merry, the fool makes your courtiers merry, and the courtiers make your grace merry.
> Duke: And whom do I make merry?
> Bonamico: The whole commonwealth if you govern handsomely. (1118)

The Elizabethan anthropocentric great chain of being was the dominant belief that everything occupies a peculiar place and rank in divinely order of their perceived significance in the universe. In Bonamico's order of being, the birds fall into the lowest part whereas the king attains the highest position as it is so in the Great Chain of Being; yet Shirley challenges the real chain by destroying the mainstay of the supposed

hierarchical order among entities in terms of their natural importance and mental abilities. By basing the order upon natural ability to amuse the other, Shirley's Bonamico evidently teases the Renaissance anthropocentricity about its obsession with grading the living things according to their alleged importance or unimportance. Ultimately, the anthropocentric claims about human cleverness and human advancement depend on how those concepts are perceived:

> As a class, birds have been around for more than 100 million years. They are one of nature's great success stories, inventing new strategies for survival. […] After all, evolution isn't about advancement; it's about survival. It's about learning to solve the problems of your environment. (Ackerman, *GB* 8)

Clearly, leaving the fact that human alleged high intelligence is not alone enough for the continuity of human race aside, it has always been the growing menace to the future of every living creature on Earth.

Turning back to the analysis of the play, in way of the courtiers' bombarding Bonamico with questions about the rare breeds of the birds, he respectively brings in every bird by name with its own characteristic features and briefly mentions their past. To the courtiers' amazement, Bonamico's detailed explanation for each of the six birds reveals that every bird belongs to peculiar political figures of the period and stands for different topical socio-political issues. The allusions in these dialogues are respectively made to Gabor Bethlen, The Ottoman Turks and Venetians, Count of Gondomar and Marquis Ambrogio Spinola, the siege of Bergen and the Dunkirk privateers. In this sense, John Clyde Loftis's interpretation of Lope de Vegas's play, *La Nueva Victoria de Don Gonzalo de Cordoba* (*The New Victory of Don Gonzalo of Cordoba*) (1637), as having "the quality of a dramatic gazette" (132) is readily applicable to Shirley's play. In each of these separate issues, different birds are applied to further develop both the themes and stylistic aspects of the play; yet above all, they indicate their centrality in human socio-cultural life. Through these animetaphors, Shirley affords an opportunity to discuss the Renaissance exaltation of Man, for apparently, in his play which has great

amount of animal content, he opens the doors for the reinterpretation of speciesism in Renaissance cosmology.

In regard to Bonamico's catalogue of remarkable birds, upon Grutti's question, Bonamico introduces the first bird, "an Arabian woodcock, the same that carried a bunch of grapes in January last to Bethlem Gabor" (1118), and it refers to universal power struggle through imperial diplomatic contacts and military activities of the period. The woodcock is Arabian since Gabor Bethlen was the prince of the Principality of Transylvania (1613-29) when the territory was one of the European Christian tributaries of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to previous Catholic Prince Zsigmond Bathory who sided with the Holy Roman Empire under Ferdinand II from the Habsburg dynasty, Calvinist Bethlen cooperated closely with the Ottomans who "tolerated and protected non-Muslims and supported Protestants" against Catholic powers in the Thirty Years' War with the aim of expelling the emperor from the state (Bulut 109). Indeed, Bethlen was familiar to the English politicians of the period as Bethlen's ambassador Matthias Quadt "went to London in order to collect the signature of King Charles I on the treaty acknowledging Bethlen as a member of The Hague alliance, an international coalition against Emperor Ferdinand II in 1625" (Karman 800). As is clear from these cases, the bird "reflects the Protestant and Catholic conflict of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), for which Bethlen was famous, and that between Christian Europe and the Islamic Ottoman Empire" (McManus 1118). In this context, it might be possible to observe that the woodcock, "a bird proverbially associated with foolishness because it was believed easily caught," refers to Gabor Bethlen himself, "who had died after being poisoned by a Hungarian Jesuit in 1629" (Sanders 237). Accordingly, the 'bunch of grapes' alludes to the poison itself (Senescu 53). In this case, it might be deduced that the bird that carries poisonous grapes to Bethlen serves a useful function as the angel of death. When the prevalence of such biblical connotations of birds in the rabbinic tales of the Renaissance culture is taken into consideration, the attribution of this identity to the Arabian woodcock makes sense. For instance, one of these stories from Babylon in the fifth century is conveyed by Rosemary Ellen Guiley as follows:

> One morning, King Solomon hears birds chirping, and, because he understands the language of birds, he learns that the Angel of Death plans to take two of his closest advisers. He tells them, and they beg him to help them escape their doom. He urges them to flee to the enchanted city of Luz, which the Angel of Death is forbidden to enter. But the Angel of Death knows all, and when the men arrive at the city gates, they find the angel waiting for them just outside, barring their way. (23)

Indeed, the story brings back the birds giving alarm calls with their powerful instincts to warn of chaos in Scotland in *Macbeth*. In the same vein, the Arabian woodcock foreshadows the impending doom for Gabor Bethlen.

Secondly, upon Dondolo's question, Bonamico introduces the Duke of Venice's "bullfinch" which was "taken by the Turks," and "Since his captivity, the wretch endured/ Much misery by the infidel: it had nothing/ But bread and water for three months" (1119). Concordantly, the Duke of Venice's affinity with the bullfinch captured by the Turks reminds of Pope Pius V's diplomatic help to Alvise Mocenigo, the Duke of Venice between 1570 and 1577. Apparently, here, Shirley refers to the centuries-old series of wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice that took place between 1396 and 1718, and specifically he might allude to the Fourth Ottoman-Venetian War (1570-1573). Accordingly, the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus that was under the Venetian rule led to the formation of the Holy League of 1571. At the end of protracted negotiations between Alvise Mocenigo and Pope Pius V, the Catholic powers of southern Europe including Spain were persuaded to cease the Ottoman Empire's maritime expansion in the Mediterranean Sea, and finally Christendom and Islam encountered in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 as a result of which the Ottoman fleet was defeated (Konstam 7-9). When the fact that "only the Pontiff was capable of uniting the various political states into a single body, and overriding the animosity between Venice and the western Mediterrannean Christian states" (Konstam 9) is taken into consideration, the Duke of Venice's appealing to the Pope for help seems proper to lead his existence. However, such a joint action between the Duke and the Pope is caricatured in Shirley's line, for as Frances Frazier Senescu interprets, the bullfinch with its flamboyant "red plumage" on its breast resembles the Pope (54). Moreover, Thomas Bewick explains that the bird "is called *Monk* or *Pope* in some countries" due to its

"origin of the neck fine glossy black" (165). Therefore, Bewick's note strongly supports Senescu's interpretation of the bullfinch as a clear allude to the Pope himself. In this sense, in contrast to the former Arabian woodcock as the angel of death, the bullfinch referring to the Pope follows the cult of Hermes in the ancient Greek *Odyssey* (c.700 BC) or Utnapishtim in the Mesopotamian *Epic of Gilgamesh* (c. 2100-1200 BC), since it symbolises a divine intervention that saves the situation in Shirley's play.

Figure 13: Hieronymus Bosch, *The Garden of Earthly Delights* (1503-04). The Prado, Madrid.

On the other hand, Shirley's stress on the bullfinch's captivation by the Turks raises one of the burning issues within the historical context of the play: the representation of the Ottoman Turks with whom the Jewish were believed to dubiously collaborate (Burton 203). On this point, Bonamico's representation of the Turks through their atrocities against the bird problematises the dramatist's own perspective on the issue. In fact, due to a lack of sufficient evidence, it is not possible to convey precise information about Shirley's personal attitudes towards the Ottoman Turks; yet Bonamico's lines reflect the widely-held Continental perception of the Turk as barbarous by European standards but powerful enough to captive 'the bird' or better to say Venice. Shirley seems to handle the calamities between the Ottomans and the Venetians with a gentle irony, for as the editor of *The Bird* writes down, "while those 'taken by the Turks' could be imprisoned

as galley slaves, many were better treated and some converted to Islam" during everlasting skirmishes between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (McManus 1119). Furthermore, birds were quite precious creatures for the Ottoman Turks, for sultan himself is referred to be Simurg bird (phoenix). As it has been present in cultural history of numerous societies, phoenix, a classical symbolic code of resurrection, became source of inspiration for Islamic cosmology along with Turkic mythology as well. Hence, as represented in *Surname-i Hümayun Miniatures* (1588) found in Topkapı Palace, the Simurg bird overtly alludes to "the meaning of protector, watcher, believed that it brings royalty on those who stay within its wing shadow as Huma Bird in terms of function and meaning, under state bird symbolic" (Kartal and Alp 440). Accordingly, in the Ottoman terminology, imperial council is called *Divan-ı Hümayun* according to which "divan" refers to council and "Hüma" alludes to phoenix (huma kuşu, anka kuşu, Zümrüdüanka, devlet kuşu) (Gezgin 21), and thus, to the sultan himself. In relation to this point, the death of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (1432-1481), also known as Mehmed the Conqueror due to his conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) that marks the end of the Byzantine Empire, was declared by Nicolò Cocco, the Venetian ambassador of the time, to the doge, Giovanni Mecenigo, and so to Pope Sixtus IV and he stated that "La grande aquila é morta!" (the great eagle is dead) (Freely 44). As the biblical references to eagles exemplify such as in *Isaiah* 40:31, eagles have always been associated with freedom and strength in human world, and thus, the eagle ascription to Mehmed the Conqueror reveals the fact that he is the one who established both national and international socio-political path to pursue in the following centuries of the Ottoman Empire (Inalcik 12). Moreover, the compassionate treatment of animals in Islamic society became one of the most popular themes within the Renaissance travel literature. One of these writings belongs to William Biddulph, an English traveller whose *The Travels of Certaine Englishmen* […] was published in London in 1609, and in his work, Biddulph conveys "customs related to Islamic charity, where he emphasised that the Turks showed greater mercy to birds, cats and dogs than the poor" (Arbel 69). As evidenced by Biddulph himself, far from being treated in a cruel manner by the Turks, the birds occupied a prominent place in both socio-cultural and literary life of the Ottomans.

Relevantly, as Anders Ingram attests in his *Writing the Ottomans: Turkish History in Early Modern England* (2015), the Holy League of 1571 "stimulated huge interest in the Turks in England including a large volume of historical writing" (119). In fact, in English socio-historical culture, theatre has always played a key role in "adapting, articulating, and disseminating foreignness," for theatre has always been used as a significant medium through which "the different appearances, behaviours, and beliefs of other cultures were imported, distorted, mimicked, and displayed" (Vitkus 29). Thus, it was common practice among the Renaissance English dramatists to reflect the repercussions of such multicultural contact established through the expanding trade as well as diplomacy in the Mediterranean zone. As seen in Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* (1590) or in Shakespeare's *Othello* (1604), the plays of the period with foreign content give a sharper focus on domestic conflicts; yet they also touch upon international affairs, which paves the way for questioning "the epistemological structures of Eurocentrism" that "privileged the elite, white, heterosexual, abled, male, European perspective" (Powell 1).

Figure 14: A miniature displaying a phoenix figure as a kite from *Surname-i Hümayun* (1582). Topkapı Palace, Istanbul.

Thirdly, upon Prenetto's question, Bonamico indicates "the blackbird, which was hatched that day/ Gondomar died, and which was ominous/ About that time Spinola's thrush forsook him" (1119). As a matter of fact, both of these names had earned the English population's lasting enmity. Hence, whereas the blackbird hatched on the day of Gondomar's death is used to evoke the perceived image of Gondomar as evil demon, the thrush is elevated to an angelic position of having power to forsake Spinola. Firstly, Don Diego Sarmiento, Count of Gondomar, was a Spanish diplomat who was ambassador to the Jacobean court from 1613 to 1622. During his professional career, Gondomar offered Spain a fresh insight into English affairs and he was "a promoter of the 'Spanish Match' – the proposed but failed attempt to secure a marriage between Prince Charles and the Spanish Infanta – in the early 1620s" (Sanders 238). Along with his Catholic origin, his undue interference in the English royal policies aroused the deep hostility felt by many English citizens against him (Fernandez 80). As a reaction, in his play *A Game at Chess* (1624), Thomas Middleton bases his Black Knight on Gondomar that schemes to bring about the collapse of the White House in the play. According to Sanders, Middleton's allegorical characterisation of Gondomar may explain the connection between Gondomar and the demonic blackbird that was born on the same day when Gondomar dies in Shirley's play (238). Secondly, Spinola's whale in Jonson's *Volpone* appears as Spinola's thrush in Shirley's *The Bird*. Accordingly, both plays refer to Marquis Ambrogio Spinola, who was one of the commanders in the Spanish military force and was responsible for the Netherlands. In *Volpone*, "Spinola's whale" (83) refers to Sir Politic's ridiculous paranoia about the grave threat from the Spanish invasion although Spain and England were at peace at the time of the play. It is well-known that Spinola was a rewarding commander and "a robust defender of the Catholic empire" (Zucchi 256); however, "some credulous people believed that he was a military mastermind who thought of having a whale swim up the Thames River to London, where it would take in water and then spout the water over London, drowning the city" (Bruce, *Ben Jonson* 58). On the other hand, in Shirley's play, Spinola is endowed with a thrush, a bird living near to human dwelling; yet "the relevance of 'Spinola's thrush' forsaking him remains unclear" (Sanders 238). According to Clare Mcmanus, "thrushes were proverbial innocents, caught in traps made from their own droppings," and thus, Bonamico probably makes allusion to "Spinola's ruin in Spanish

service" (1119). Nonetheless, the bird may also allude to the English hostility towards Spinola as in the case of Gondomar, who is associated with the demonic blackbird. As Spinola was accused of being a member of the Society of Jesuit, it would be natural for English dramatists to "associate a leading commander on the Catholic side in the quarrels of Christendom with Jesuit militancy, just as they did so much else that they disliked" (Lamal and Arblaster 247). As a result, in both cases, the Londoners hostility towards both of the European Catholic figures who became entangled in the English international or domestic affairs is represented through birds.

In relevance to the point discussed above, the rail (rallidae) that is the final bird Bonamico exhibits can be added to the play's Spanish content, for the bird's story alludes to Dunkirk pirates in the English Channel. Bonamico tells the story of the bird as follows:

> This was a rail,
> Bred up by a zealous brother in Amsterdam
> Which, being sent unto an English lady,
> Was ta'en at sea by Dunkirks. Name but Rome
> And straight she gapes as she would eat the Pope.
> A bird to be made much on: she and the horse
> That snorts at Spain by an instinct of nature
> Should ha' shown tricks together. (1119)

Obviously, the topicality of this passage refers to Dunkirks, "pirates on the English Channel who had been plaguing English shipping for years until a treaty between Spain and England ended their attacks in 1630" (Senescu 155). Here, rail, a small amphibious bird, is, according to Sanders, "a pun on the ranting ('railling') of extreme Protestant sects from Amsterdam," for "fundamentalist Puritans from Amsterdam were a common stage representation as Ananias and Tribulation Wholesome in Jonson's *The Alchemist*" (Sanders 239). Meanwhile, "she and the horse" that "ha' shown tricks together" may allude to the exhibition of trained animals by the touring shows; yet, according to McManus, "the examples given here seem intended to pander to English Catholicism in the midst of the Thirty Years' War" (1119).

Following Prenetto's question, the Duke displays a bird and asks a question about it. Bonamico this time introduces "the pigeon" that "was so shrewdly handled/ For carrying letters at the siege of Bergen" (1119). In relation to aforementioned thrush and Spinola, Shirley again refers to Spinola through the historical context of the Dutch Revolt. In fact, this topical allusion is only minor part of the series of the European wars caused by the universal violent conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants including the Thirty Years' War (1621-48) that foreshadows the Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars between 1652 and 1674 (Hattendorf 92-93). Accordingly, the Dutch compelled the Spanish navy forces that was at Spinola's command to "unsuccessfully laid the siege to Bergen-op-Zoom" in 1631 (Loftis 130). Senescu expounds the play's relevance to the siege of Bergen as Shirley's dating the composition of *The Bird* (128). On the other side, the play's pigeon carrying letters at the siege of Bergen points out the natural outcome of bird and human encounters by revealing human use of this type of birds as carrier pigeons which "have been known to perform a journey of forty miles in an hour and a half" (Bigland 325). Accordingly,

> the custom of employing the pigeon in carrying letter from place to place in time of war, and in case of sieges, when all means of communication were intercepted by the enemy. This was performed by a timely interchange of the birds, which, being let fly, immediately returned to their former abode. (Bigland 324)

In effect, as part of the play's immense diversity of avian animetaphors, such pragmatic human use of pigeons as literal carriers indicates the long history shared by both humans and birds along with the strong social network of the two species.

Bonamico continues with "a wagtail of the city, which a silkman/ So dearly loved he called it wife, but could not (Though in much jealousy he had caged her up) Keep her from flying out" (1119). The silk merchant's identification of his wife with a wagtail ("kuyruksallayan kuşu" in Turkish) divulges the play's concern over the gender representation and sexual politics of its period as discussed above. Accordingly, a wagtail, a small bird with a long tail, is one of the earliest references to "a profligate or inconstant woman" (McManus 1119), and thus, it was "proverbial for gossips or

promiscuous women in the seventeenth century" as it is represented so in the silk merchant's story (Sanders 238). In a broader sense, Elaine Shefer lists the images of cage and bird conjured up to demonstrate females as being much weaker sex than men due to their supposed propensity for sexual immorality as follows:

> Bird cage imagery was used to condemn women who ventured beyond the home. The image of a 'woman at the window,' therefore, represented the spectre of women outside their 'cage'; women playing with birds were viewed as the pets of male guardians; and women in 'unconventional cages,' such as nunneries and brothels, supposedly existed beyond the 'proper cage' of domesticity. (*Birds* xxiv-xxv)

However, the patriarchal identification of female as bird in a pejorative sense constitutes one side of the binary opposition between the adverse and affirmative representations of female as bird. As is known, animetaphators frequently form dualistic concepts such as good and evil or virtue and vice, and even the same animalistic allegorical figure can have double meaning in different contexts. In this sense, Eugenia's strong identification herself with birds provides different perspective upon the animetaphorical connection made between women and birds. The Duke of Mantua "build[s] a place to lay [his] treasure/ Safe from the robber [Philenzo]" (1085), offers her as his "gift" to her suitor (1137), and automatically labels his daughter as licentious and unprincipled in sexual matters when she declares that she loves Philenzo:

> Thou art dead already, girl,
> And, in thy shame, I and the dukedom suffer.
> Thou may'st remember-false to thy own vow-
> Philenzo, whom I banished for thy sake.
> The title of my subject, and thy love
> To him, pulled our displeasure on him. Since,
> We studying to add more height to thee,
> Thou hast made thyself less, and, for aught we know,
> Clasped with the son of earth to cool the fever
> Of hot sin in thy veins. (1133-34)

As a tyrannical father figure, the Duke treats her daughter as his commodity and fully expects her to obey her ruler's orders by getting married to the Prince of Florence, who is suitable for her degree. Closed in a tower so that she cannot have contact with her

lover Philenzo, Eugenia soliloquises and she likens her situation to birds: “I know yon nightingale is not long-lived; / See how that turtle mourns, wanting her mate” (1125). As both McManus and Sanders note (1125, 247), nightingale is frequently associated with melancholy and it is often “an image of female mourning” (McManus 1125) mostly due to its function in the classical myth of Philomel and Tereus. Accordingly, as reanimated in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (1594), Procne’s husband, Tereus the Thracian king, rapes Procne’s sister Philomel and cuts her tongue. After rescuing her sister, Procne kills her son and the women “cook him up in a cauldron; and they feed him to his father” (Tassi 100). Then while Philomel is metamorphosed into a nightingale, and Procne is transformed into a swallow, Tereus becomes a hoopoe in Ovidian tale (*Metamorphoses* 160-69). Similarly, Geofrey Chaucer’s “Legend of Philomela,” one of the nine stories in his *Legend of Good Women* (c. 1380s), draws on the figure of Philomel as a nightingale singing her lament. As is seen, nightingales have always been a forcible metaphor for particularly oppressed female condition in literary texts, and thus, they symbolise dehumanisation of women within socio-cultural formation of power and sex politics. Indeed, as Carolynn Van Dyke points out, “[i]nseparably material and imagined, observed and anthropomorphised, the literary nightingale inhabits the borders between states of being” and affects the way how female perceives her identity as well as how she is widely perceived by the social norms around her (127).

On the other hand, Eugenia’s mention of mourning turtle dove that wants its mate drops a subtle hint about “proverbially loyal and monogamous” nature of these birds (Sanders 247). In this sense, this kind of birds is referred to be moral creatures that, as Johannes Jonstonus writes in his *An History of the Wonderful Things of Nature* (1657), “do not inconsiderately couple; for when one dyeth, the other lives single always after” (qtd. in Bach 2). Indeed, the use of avian symbolism with moralistic intent is quite common in the biblical treatises of early Christian ecclesiastic literature. Within the frame of their symbolic contexts, “the bird in general has long been a common Christian symbol of the transcendent soul, and in medieval iconography a bird entangled in foliage symbolised the soul embroiled in the materialism of the secular world” (Parker and McKenzie 189). In relation to this point, while birdcage is an eminent classical image of the soul’s

imprisonment within the body, this metaphor can be employed as "an image of the enclosed monastic life in monastic literature" (Aavitsland 272). However, such religion-dominated anthropocentric approaches to birds making interpretation based solely on human condition contain hardly any information concerning birds themselves. Conversely, Bach closely relates the literary use of birds as moral and chaste creatures on the scientific sense in the Renaissance cosmology that acknowledges animals' self-consciousness about sex as follows:

> In early seventeenth-century England, elephants, birds, and some other creatures, like some humans, could know themselves even to the point of having self-consciousness about sex, and, therefore, could be seen as subjects. There was a longstanding Aristotelian counter-tradition that insisted that humans alone had self-knowledge, but that was only one strain of thought and perhaps not the dominant one. (2)

Thus, they were the performers of animal dramatic representation on stage in their own right. In this regard, in *Real Animals on the Stage* (2020), Teresa Grant, Ignacio Ramos-Gay and Claudia Alonso Recarte collect studies pursuing a socio-historical inquiry into the semiotic transfer of animal roles from the text to the stage through the close analysis of some case studies such as William Sampson's *The Vow Breaker* (1636). In fact, there is no adequate record of how the literal birds of *The Bird* were performed in the earlier productions of the play. However, when the fact that animals appeared in performances and so were exploited in the human entertainments from ancient times is considered, it might be expected that Shirley's stage hosted real birds. Such inference can be drawn from Dennis Kennedy's notes on the animal performativity by the seventeenth century:

> In *The Winter's Tale*, Shakespeare's famous stage direction 'Exit, pursued by a bear' is considered by some historians to indicate the availability of trained performing bears. […] At Bartholomew Fair in London, fair-ground booths exhibited animals as well as human performers: the tiger who, in 1701, 'pulled the feathers so nicely from the live fowls,' the morris-dancing dogs (who danced before Queen Anne), and an Italian singing pig. It was in the fairs that performing horses established their popularity. Not only were they *animaux savants*, they also demonstrated tricks and feats which formed the basis of the modern circus. (22)

Hence it might be deduced that, in the play's earlier staging, Bonamico displayed real birds on the stage in the course of his exhibition of the birds which were already not provided with a line to say. In relevance to animal performers on the stage, the play also mentions the display of exotic animals transferred from the colonised land such as the "monstrous bird from Peru" (1095) and the baboons that "have passed for men already, been taken for usurers i'their furred gowns and nightcaps" (1095), "an anti-Semitic comparison between usurers, who were usually Jewish and often dressed in 'furred gowns,' and performing apes" (McManus 1095). Moreover, Donella's wish to be allowed to have their "little dogs and monkeys" (1087) in the tower during their captivation indicates the Caroline courtiers' interest in keeping exotic animals as a dazzling emblem of status and power, namely civilisation, which is one of the causes of the expanding interest of the Renaissance in natural history. Most strikingly, Bonamico's birds in the cage are part of the play's displaying the then-contemporary fashion of collecting exotic animals which led to the birth of "the great zoos of London, Paris, and Berlin" that "brought considerable prestige to the national capitals" in especially the nineteenth century (Berger 22). Similarly, Keith Thomas argues that the "royal menagerie [at the Tower in London] symbolised its owner's triumph over the natural world" while "the zoo became a symbol of colonial conquest as well as of wealth and status" (277).

Consequently, all these inherent political parallels with numerous topical allusions made through the effective use of avian animetaphors reveal *The Bird*'s significance to the English socio-political and sexual controversies of the Caroline period. Throughout *The Bird* in which "all of seventeenth-century theatrical life is digested" (McManus 1079), Shirley presents a biting political satire of human nature and human folly by succinctly covering almost all the salient points of the case of human-animal relations. In this sense, Shirley's both literal and symbolic birds are impressive examples of the ways how human culture has always enjoyed the benefits of birds as dualistic symbols of nature and the soul, as intriguing allegories of sins and vices, and as messengers. In the same vein, as the play overtly implies, the avian metaphors were imbued with gender codes of Shirley's period, which have been transmitted and mostly valid for today. Thus, the plays' animal content leads to the intensive questioning of speciesism

embedded within Renaissance human subjugation of animals. Accordingly, it might be possible to attest that *The Bird* expresses a great deal of scepticism and criticism of the playwright about the ideals of Renaissance humanism elevating the intellectual power of human being. By doing so, meanwhile the play is imbued with the topical issues of its age, it also closely studies the word 'human' along with its complex nature, for Shirley's animetaphoric use of birds points out the essentiality of birds for human culture. Ultimately, *The Bird*, which entails the great bulk of various bird metaphors as social, cultural, or political emblems, develops animistic thinking that bombs the Renaissance anthropocentric understanding of human grandiosity out.

CONCLUSION

> All animals mistrust man and are not wrong to do so; but once they are sure that he does not want to harm them, their confidence becomes so great that one must be more than barbarous to abuse it.
> (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Confessions* 201)

> For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.
> (Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* 143)

Holding a mirror to humanity, animals, representations and images of animals, personified animals, and animetaphors have always been employed in intellectual and literary history of many cultures in order to help explain almost every aspect of human life and to form ontological, epistemological, ethical or political theories. In effect, they "were the literal and figurative vehicles for the transmission of goods, people, and ideas, the bodies upon which empires were advanced, and the bodies on which the ideals and values of empires were inscribed" (Raber and Tucker 1). It is thus often through the images of animals, along with the analogical use of animetaphors for the human condition, that modern Western philosophy has been profoundly shaped by a clear division between the realm of the animal and the human. In fact, for centuries, to explain human beings in their complex social, physical, and political nature, nonhuman beings have always been referred to as inferior entities. In the same way, the metaphoric use of animals in literary works have been applied to reinforce the division between human and animals. In *Picturing the Beast* (1993), Steve Baker underlines that

> [w]hen animals figure, or can easily be thought of as figuring, in binary oppositions, they invariably represent the negative term in the opposition: 'the Other, the Beast, the Brute.' The occasions on which they serve a more positive metaphoric role […] are generally ones which cannot be cast so readily into binary terms. (83)

Though animalistic metaphors have seemingly represented two opposites, namely human and animal, they contemporaneously reveal the bond binding each other. As

Christy Tidwell argues, "[m]etaphoric inclusions of the animal may remind the reader of the differences between human and nonhuman, but they cannot do so without also reminding the reader of the connections between human and nonhuman" (154). Thus, starting from the Antiquity until the present age, animals have formed the skeleton of numerous philosophical, political, cultural, psychological, and socio-historical discourses. However, it is only in the last decades that nonhuman animal communities' centrality has been recognised by scholars from various disciplines due to the inadequacy of traditional anthropocentric approaches to social sciences. Karen Raber observes that "[a]natomical and physiological sameness is at the root of many modern assaults on the supposedly firm boundary between human and animal, and has historically troubled contrasting efforts to establish human exceptionalism" (4). As Robert Malcolmson and Stephanos Mastoris assert, "history being written by humans, is mostly about humans" (29). They also add that neglecting or even rejecting the place of the nonhuman creatures in the past leads to neglecting an important aspect of human society (Malcolmson and Mastoris 29). Such recognition paved the way for the appearance of new ways of thinking about the place of animals in human society and culture in order to "consider human society in the light of zoological information, treating human beings as the human animals that in fact they are" (Clark 1). Thus, animal studies are not conclusively designed to investigate only human nature; they also help acknowledge the fact that homosapiens cannot be considered as separate primates from nature. For instance, in *Posthumanism* (2000), Pramad Nayar states that "[l]iterary texts that have since the Renaissance always shown us how humans behave, react and interact – indeed it has been said that literature 'invented' the human – have now begun to show that the human is what it is because it includes the nonhuman" (2). Similarly, in *What is Posthumanism?* (2009), Cary Wolfe refers to the "ideals of human perfectability, rationality, and agency inherited from Renaissance humanism" (xiii) to argue that "posthumanism names [...] a new mode of thought that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon" (xvi.). In *The Posthuman* (2013), Rosi Braidotti underlines the fact that "[a]t the start of it all there is He: the classical ideal of 'Man', formulated first by Protagoras as 'the measure of all things,' later renewed in the Italian Renaissance as a universal model and represented in Leonardo da

Vinci's Vitruvian Man" (13). Finally, in *Renaissance Posthumanism* (2016), Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano invoke the same idea by suggesting that "[w]e just need to read a bit more closely and to see that critical posthumanism has ideological allies and philosophical resources in Renaissance humanism itself" (6). Therefore, studying the relations between animals and humans, specifically in the Renaissance period, is of great importance; for the gist of the posthumanist approach has its origins in Renaissance humanism. In an age of pandemic illnesses, climate crisis and ecological catastrophes, humanity is expected to comprehend the urgent message that natural life in our planet is under such a threat that traditional deep-seated taboos, surrounding the boundaries between human and animal, have to be broken down in order to provide Earth with the ecological balance that gives life. Surely, "[t]he acceptance of biological evolution and the genetic relationship of our species to others was a shattering blow to the human ego, from which we may not have fully recovered, for it is not easy to give up a deep seated faith that our kind is unique and qualitatively superior" (Griffin 253). Nevertheless, the anthropocentric arrogance of human is needed to be drawn to an end and let other forms of living experience their own subjective agency on Earth before it is too late.

From this perch, a considerable insight that is provided by this dissertation is that the Renaissance humanist understanding of the human and the animal and recent posthumanist philosophical approaches to the interspecies relations converge at some point due to their common concern. At the core of the philosophical approaches to the complex phenomenon of human-animal relations discussed in the whole corpus of the dissertation, there are surviving remnants of Renaissance humanism and its permanent attitudes towards 'the other,' which values human above the rest of creatures by prompting human intellectual vanity and human subjectivity. The Renaissance's considerable emphasis on the hierarchical order in the universe highlights the philosophical and ethical value of human being; thus, it praises remarkable capacity of human being for reason, language, creativity, and in all, dignity. Inevitably, the playwrights of the period dwell on a cluster of issues including the fluidity of the borderline between the human and the animal, representation of the human and anti-human content in the plays, or the animality of humanity. In fact, when some plays of

the period, such as the three plays within the scope of this dissertation, are analysed, it is possible to observe that in contrast to the Renaissance ideals foregrounding the ethics of humanism, they have an anti-anthropocentric or posthumanist approach or they are open to a posthumanist reading, for the dramatists question the rigid hierarchy between the two categories of creatures through the use of animetaphor, demonstrating the conflict between humanism and posthumanism. Viewed in this way, animetaphor is mostly applied in the early modern English drama to unveil the dramatists' critique of their society, the Jacobean and the Caroline courts, the problematic issue of succession and certain notions in Renaissance thinking which may lead to failure and corruption instead of progress and perfection. In addition, in a Jacobean world where the theatre was under the rule of the Lord Chamberlain's Office, the use of animetaphor functions as a tool for the playwrights to voice their personal opinions on important political subjects of their age without being disturbed by censorship.

Within this theoretical scheme, this dissertation has been involved in an inquiry into how animals hold a prominent place in English Renaissance drama in order to discuss the reinterpretation of Renaissance human exceptionalism by the playwrights within the political context of their plays. With this aim, this dissertation has evaluated two well-known samples of early modern English drama, which are *Volpone* (1606) by Ben Jonson and *Macbeth* (1606) by William Shakespeare along with respectively less known *The Bird in a Cage* (1632) by James Shirley in terms of their anti-anthropocentric animal content within their political contexts. Since the plays scrutinised within the chapters of the dissertation have not been analysed much in terms of their distinctive animetaphors as political tools, this dissertation yearns to open up a modern viewpoint for the consideration of various related scholarly subjects. Indeed, the analysis of Shirley's play might have been the dissertation's most significant contribution to English Renaissance drama studies, for both the playwright and the play have not been much researched before.

To conclude, by presenting a major survey of the animal-related discussions from the ancient period to the contemporary one, this dissertation has offered many different viewpoints on the deep roots of anthropocentric taboos and the crucial function of

animetaphors in English Renaissance drama. Furthermore, through the close textual analysis of the primary texts, this dissertation has offered the notions revolving around both the clash and affinity between humanism and posthumanism. While waging war on the strong presumption that humans have full sovereignty over animals, both in degree and in kind, the dissertation provides an advance towards gaining a better posthumanist insights into human literature and culture along with a better understanding of the human animal and the nonhuman animal. In this respect, this study prompts one to inquire into the the field of human-animal relationships in the early modern English drama, and thereby, offers an opportunity to study animetaphors in any research area ranging from ecological studies to postcolonial studies where speciesism functions as an institution and leads to discriminative attidues toward 'the other.' Lastly, it is worth noting that as nonhuman animals are not natural decors for the sake of human existence on Earth, human animals are not the final arbiters of meaning.

NOTES

[1] Furthermore, as Tsekourakis has noticed, "according to Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans, the motives for abstinence from animal flesh were mystical and religious" (qtd. in Newmyer, *Animals* 98). Accordingly, if human body is exposed to excessive amounts of inappropriate animal food, the soul gradually becomes indolent. Pythagoras's defence of abstention concludes that glutting oneself on animal food significantly lessens his inner goodness along with his affinity with God.

[2] Indeed, in his *Categories, the History of Animals*, a pioneering work of zoology, Aristotle explores the natural world, and registers his detailed observations of the differences and similarities among various animals. Aristotle's taxonomy bears similarity to the hierarchies established in Plato's *Republic*; however, through his analysis based on direct observations, Aristotle differs from his predecessor. In relation to this point, Patrizia Pinotti coins "symbolic zoology" to argue that Plato's speciesism in the *Republic* is the metaphorical one, while Aristotle's categorisation is purely biological and ontological one (103).

[3] Inevitably, the transition from traditional Greek and Roman religion to Christianity in the Roman Empire had a considerable impact on how animals were regarded. The three treatises on animal rationality by Plutarch (50-120 BC), namely *On the Cleverness of Animals*, *Whether Beasts Are Rational*, and *On Eating Meat*, have much to contribute to this change in ancient debate on the perception of nonhuman animal communities. Within these treaties included in *Moralia* (100 AD), Plutarch notes that there is a wider dimension to the question of the division between human and animal, and he defends animals' inherent abilities. For instance, in *On the Cleverness of Animals*, he compares marine species to land animals in terms of their innate rationality (12.965). Plutarch, along with other Roman philosophers such as Porphyry and Celsus, "raised the question of whether reason was the only relevant categorical boundary mark," and defended the idea that animals may have rationality which cannot be explicable by human merits (Gilhus 41). In *Moralia*, Plutarch, for instance, reports his observation of the hedgehog which can predict meteorological changes, and intuitively defines its direction in accordance with the wind (972). Not surprisingly, Plutarch shared the same line of thought with Pythagoras on the politics of eating "the flesh of a murdered being" and of vegetarian diet (qtd. in Marshall 78), and had a staunch advocate of respect for nonhuman animals' intelligence and right to live. In effect, "no ancient author argued so broadly or so passionately for the necessity of vegetarianism on aesthetic, hygienic, spiritual and ethical grounds as did Plutarch" (Newmyer, *Animals* 86).

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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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İNGİLİZ Dili VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

29/01/2024

Tez Başlığı: Ben Jonson'ın *Volpone*, William Shakespeare'in *Macbeth* ve James Shirley'nin *The Bird in a Cage* Oyunlarında Politik Araç Olarak Hayvan İmgelemi

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Tarih: 29/01/2024

Tez Başlığı: Ben Jonson'ın *Volpone*, William Shakespeare'in *Macbeth* ve James Shirley'nin *The Bird in a Cage* Oyunlarında Politik Araç Olarak Hayvan İmgelemi

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