Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

British Cultural Studies Programme

A FOUCAULDIAN READING OF THE CRIMINAL PATIENT IN PETER SHAFFER'S *EQUUS* AND THE PSYCHIATRIC PRISONERS IN MARTIN MCDONAGH'S *THE PILLOWMAN*

Aram DANESH

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2023

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KABUL VE ONAY

Aram Danesh tarafından hazırlanan "A Foucauldian Reading of the Criminal Patient in Peter Shaffer's *Equus* and the Psychiatric Prisoners in Martin McDonagh's *The Pillowman*" başlıklı bu çalışma, 15.06.2023 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylarım.

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Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Dr. Öğr. Üyesi İmren YELMİŞ** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

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To the memory of my father, Poorang Danesh, whom I miss so much despite his felt presence…

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ÖZET

DANESH, Aram. *Peter Shaffer'ın* Equus'*undaki Suçlu Hastanın ve Martin McDonagh'ın* Yastık Adam'*ındaki Psikiyatrik Mahkûmların Foucault'cu bir Okuması*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2023

Bu tez, Peter Shaffer'ın *Equus*'unda (1973) bir kurum olarak temsil edildiği haliyle akıl hastanesinin, ve Martin McDonagh'ın *Yastık Adam*'ında (2003) bir kurum olarak temsil edildiği haliyle hapishanenin Foucault'cu bir analizini yapmayı ve Foucault'nun *Disiplin ve Ceza* (1975) eserinde ortaya koyduğu argümanlarını takip ederek bu iki oyunu karşılaştırmayı, ve seçilen oyunlardaki akıl 'hastası' öznelerin kurumlar tarafından nasıl 'ele alındığını' incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu karşılaştırma, esas olarak kurumlardaki 'öznelerini' (yatan hasta ve mahkum) 'disipline etme ve cezalandırma' sürecinde yetkililerin (psikiyatrist ve polis) kullandığı tekniklere, aygıtlara, motivasyonlara ve oynadıkları rollere, ve bir hapishanenin zihinsel olarak 'hasta' olan bir *suçlu*yu hapsedebilecek, bir akıl hastanesinin ise suçlu bir *zihinsel* '*engelli*' kişiyi duvarları içine alabilecek kadar benzemelerine odaklanmaktadır. Akıl hastanesi ve hapishanelerin Panoptikon ve gözetim tekniklerinin kullanımlarının, 'söylem' oluşturma ve söylemi yerine getirme güçlerinin, ve fiziksel ve zihinsel manipülasyon yoluyla 'öznelerini' 'anormallikten' 'normalliğe' doğru 'disipline etme ve cezalandırma' süreçlerinin ortak oluşu sebebiyle bu iki kurumun, öznelerini veya öznelerinin özgün kişiliklerini 'idam' ettiği tartışılmaktadır. Tezde, akıl hastanesinin kişinin 'norm' söyleminin dışına çıkmasına neden olan 'benzersizliğinin' 'anormal' kısımlarını kişilerin benliğinden çıkararak 'öznelerinin zihinsel özgünlüğünü idam ettiği,' ve hapishanenin (*Yastık Adam'*ın totaliter ortamında) bunu, kişiyi toplumdan uzaklaştırmak için suçluyu kelimenin tam anlamıyla idam ederek, yani 'özneyi' cezalandırarak ve genel toplumu bu süreçte 'disipline ederek' yaptığı iddia edilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Michel Foucault, *Disiplin ve Ceza*, Peter Shaffer, *Equus*, Martin McDonagh, *Yastık Adam*, 'zihinsel suçlu,' suçu olan zihinsel 'hasta,' Panoptikon, mimari binalar

ABSTRACT

DANESH, Aram. *A Foucauldian Reading of the Criminal Patient in Peter Shaffer's* Equus *and the Psychiatric Prisoners in Martin McDonagh's* The Pillowman, MA Thesis, Ankara, 2023.

This thesis aims to make a Foucauldian analysis of the mental hospital as an institution as represented in Peter Shaffer's *Equus* (1973), and the prison as an institution as represented in Martin McDonagh's *The Pillowman* (2003), comparing them following Foucault's arguments made mainly in his *Discipline and Punish* (1975), and examining how the mentally 'ill' subjects of these institutions are accordingly treated in the two selected British plays. The comparison mainly focuses on the techniques, apparatuses, motivations, and the role authorities (the psychiatrist and the policemen) play in 'disciplining and punishing' their 'subjects' (the inpatient and the inmate) within the institutions, and how they are so similar in that a prison is able to imprison a *criminal* who is mentally 'ill,' and that a mental hospital is able to admit a *mentally* '*ill*' criminal person within its walls. Due to their shared use of Panopticon and surveillance, ability to form and enforce discourses, and 'disciplining and punishing' their 'subject' through physical and mental manipulation into 'normality' from 'abnormality,' the prison and the mental hospital are argued to 'execute' the subject or his/her individuality. The mental hospital is argued to 'mentally execute' its 'subjects' by removing from them the 'abnormal' parts of 'uniqueness' which make the person fall outside the discourse of the 'norm,' and the prison (in *The Pillowman*'s totalitarian setting) is argued to do this by removing the person from society by literally executing the criminal, hence 'punishing' the 'subject' and 'disciplining' the general society in the process.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, Peter Shaffer, *Equus*, Martin McDonagh, *The Pillowman*, mentally 'ill' criminal, criminal inpatient, Panopticon, architectural buildings

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INTRODUCTION

> PIERRE. I do bring convicts as part of their rehabilitation you see, and I also bring… physically ill patients to the beach but I also bring [the] mentally disturbed… I know them all by name. I've turned a mob into individuals.
>
> --Caryl Churchill, *Softcops* 46

Fuelled by the inclusion of psychiatry into criminal judgement and seeing history's apparent uncertainty towards differentiating between the 'mad' and the criminal, this thesis aims to argue that the mental hospital and the prison, as institutions, share the same motivation of disciplining and punishing its subjects who are at the same time mentally 'ill' and criminals as seen in two selected British plays, namely Peter Shaffer's (1926 - 2016) *Equus* (1973) and Martin McDonagh's (1970) *The Pillowman* (2003). *Equus* features a mentally 'ill' criminal who becomes a psychiatric inpatient, and *The Pillowman* features two criminals who are mentally 'ill,' and are interrogated and judged in a prison because of that. The same but differently sorted words making up these adjective clauses, depending on the judgement of the governing bodies and potentially a psychiatrist (or a policeman in a dystopian setting), decide whether a person is incarcerated or hospitalised depending on which of the two nouns become the adjective of the clause: mentally 'ill,' or 'criminal.' This judgement relies on the intensity of both the crime and the 'soundness' of the mind that controls the body which committed it; hence, if the mind is deemed 'insane enough,' the person can be hospitalised, diagnosed, treated, and 'gained back' to society; if not, s/he is imprisoned, punished, rehabilitated, and 'gained back' to society, given that the society/government functions like our contemporary ones do, unlike fictional, totalitarian and dystopian settings like that of *The Pillowman*. In consideration of these arguments, it can be said that to be able to be 'normalised' and 'gained back,' the person in question, either inpatient or inmate, *must* lose something from their individual characters, which makes them 'abnormal' so that they may fit in with the rest of the 'normal' society. This, in turn, is argued in this thesis to be the 'execution' of a person's individuality by the removal of what is 'abnormal,' which is argued to be the aim of both the mental hospital and the prison, and their respective apparatuses. Accordingly, *Equus*

and *The Pillowman* are first separately analysed, and then compared and contrasted in the exploration of this thesis of the similar 'treatment' of the mentally 'ill' criminal, and the criminal who is mentally 'ill,' respectively.

To better grasp the arguments introduced in this section and understand the aim and methods of argument of this thesis, short explanations of the plays seem necessary, as well as the reasons behind their being chosen to be explored. The protagonist of *Equus*, the main source of this thesis' first chapter, is Dysart, who is a psychiatrist in a mental hospital. He has undertaken the case of Alan, a teenager who was brought in because he had blinded six horses. He committed this crime because of various psychological 'complications' stemming from his 'abnormal' interpretation and mixing together of religious, political, economic, sexual, and moral narratives he had been exposed to by his family and his surroundings. Throughout the play, Dysart questions himself and the nature of his work as he tries to 'cure' Alan. He starts to believe that his job is about taking in 'individuals' and giving out 'normals,' which seems to him a process that destroys the 'uniqueness' of a person and sacrificing their individuality to the god of 'normal.' The play seems in line with Foucault's argument that psychiatric treatment is similar to criminal punishment. Therefore, Dysart's position as the doctor and Alan's position as the patient are similar to the positions of an investigator/judge/policeperson and the position of a criminal convict/suspect, respectively, because the aim of the authorities in both institutions is to upkeep 'normality,' as will be discussed. Because of this, the line in between what makes a criminal and what makes a 'mentally ill' person seems very thin. In this thesis, *Equus* serves for the analysis of the 'mentally ill' side of that line in its understanding and argument that the mental healthcare is very similar to criminal punishment by exploring the relationship between Dysart and Alan, the doctor and the patient who are argued to be similar to the policemen and the criminal in McDonagh's *The Pillowman*, respectively.

The second chapter of this thesis will explore *The Pillowman*. The play's protagonist is Katurian who had been psychologically scarred by his parents during his childhood so that he could become a successful writer of short stories that would eventually feature, mostly, violence and/against children. This is because his parents started to conduct an

'experiment' on Katurian by torturing his older brother Michal in a room adjoining his own bedroom so that he may hear Michal's screams but never know the source of the voice because he does not know that he has a brother, yet. This experiment began on Katurian's seventh birthday and when Michal was around eight years old and went on for seven years until Katurian's fourteenth birthday when he discovers the truth about the screams next-room and suffocates his parents with a pillow and begins to look after the brain-damaged (due to the torture he was subjected to for seven years) Michal by himself. The events of the play itself take place in a prison when the brothers are adults, because recently (in relation to when the play begins), two children had been killed in the exact same ways that Katurian described in his short stories, and another is missing. The play, therefore, is about two brothers who have 'mental problems' and who are criminals. They are imprisoned, manipulated, and interrogated by the two policemen, Tupolski and Ariel (who are not really 'normal' people themselves), who try to find out the truth about the crimes in question. In this thesis, the policemen in the play are argued to take on the role of a psychiatrist as they try to understand the actions of Katurian and Michal, their criminal responsibilities, and decide on their punishments. Accordingly, this play has been chosen for this thesis in its exploration of the differentiation between the criminal and 'mentally ill' by looking at the criminal side of the argument. The policemen are argued to, in this case, act with similar motivations to the Dysart of *Equus*, but with different yet metaphorically similar means. The 'interrogation' processes, the carrying out of the 'treatments,' and the ultimate results seem to be identical. One of the only differences between the policemen and Dysart might be the temperaments of the policemen, who seem like "men who are limited in their perspective, brutal in their outlook and violent in their impulse to reduce everything to one narrow 'truth'" (Lonergan 110), when compared to the character of Dysart, who seems more open, sympathetic, and patient.

Having explained the plays, it should be beneficial to clarify the method and aims of this exploration. The foremost topic of discussion of this thesis is the similarities between the processes a mental inpatient and a criminal encounter in the two supposedly different institutions. To do this, the thesis takes Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) *Discipline and Punish* (1975) as its source of arguments, and the chapters revolve around it and

secondary sources written by him, including *Madness and Civilization* and *History of Madness* (1961), and *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), along with texts of his lectures on related topics. It should be noted at this point that this thesis is not concerned with the effectiveness, morality/ethicality, or the necessity of the mental health and penal judgement institutions and their practices, and it does not aim to provide a 'solution' to its argument that they seem to function similarly with similar means to similar ends; its sole aim is to point out the similarities.

In his book *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Michel Foucault traces the history of punishment in France and argues that beginning from the late-eighteenth century, punishment became gradually less about the body and physical pain and making a spectacle about it in order to set an example, and more about the mind and psychological pain: "[T]he punishment-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property" (11). This is important because previously, both physical and mental 'crimes' were punished bodily by inflicting pain; however, as can be understood from Foucault, both types of 'crimes' began to be punished *both* bodily and mentally. In his *History of Madness*, he also explains this process, understanding, and the shifting of the 'centre of punishment' from the body to the mind between the late seventeenth and the late nineteenth centuries (what he calls the 'classical age') as follows:

> When the eighteenth century confined as insane a '*deranged mind inventing its own devotion*' or a priest because no sign of charity could be found in him, the judgement that sentenced that form of madness did not mask a moral presupposition, but simply made manifest the ethical division between madness and reason. It took a 'moral' consciousness, such as the term was understood in the nineteenth century, to object to the inhuman treatment the mad had received in the previous age - *or to be amazed that they had not been treated in hospital at a time when so many physicians were writing learned treatises about frenzy, melancholy, and hysteria.* (*Madness* 140, emphases added)

While the first emphasised portion of the above quote defines quite literally *Equus'* Alan as will be discussed in the following chapter, the second emphasised clause may reflect how a contemporary psychiatrist might react when seeing Katurian and Michal's punishment in *The Pillowman*, as will be discussed in the second chapter.

Gradually, during Foucault's 'classical age,' the authorities' judgement of madness and criminality became clearer regarding how the body served the purpose of an apparatus to the soul by physically acting out what is thought by the mind. Thanks to this, the psychological nature and the origins of a crime became relevant in the 'judge-mental' process of 'punishment and discipline.' It slowly came to be accepted that it should not be only the act of the crime itself that should be questioned, but the motivation, drive, and the will of the mind had to be questioned, too. Therefore, the 'soundness' of the mind behind the body that committed the crime became important for deciding on a 'proper' legal punishment and on its severity in relation to how 'insane' the criminal is. This required a psychiatric evaluation, which meant that the penal system and the institution(s) of mental health became entangled, blurring the line between insanity and criminality. Hence, "the practice of calling on psychiatric expertise […] means that the sentence, even if it is always formulated in terms of legal punishment, implies […] judgements of normality, attributions of causality, assessments of possible changes" (Foucault, *Discipline* 20), which implies that the binary line between body and mind is blurred in terms of crimes and the penal process they undergo.

With the inclusion of psychiatric institutions to the process of penal judgement, therefore, "the power of judging has been transferred, in part, to other authorities than the judges of the offence" (*Discipline* 22). In this way, Foucault argues, as psychiatry and criminal justice mixed together, gaining the aim of rehabilitation, prisons began to become places which included dedicated recreational breaks, social events, and other 'rehabilitative' elements in addition to the ones related to punishment such as cells and solitary confinement which focused on the general loss of liberty and aimed at making the prisoner reflect in isolation to weaken and ultimately discipline him/her to be regained to society. Hence, in addition to serving as a deterrent from committing crimes, the aim of criminal justice changed into turning a criminal into a person who is useful to his/her society. In short, the place to which criminals were sent became part-prison and part-psychiatric hospital due to the rehabilitative and punitive characteristics the institution has come to employ. As the psychiatrist became partly a criminal judge, the criminal judge became partly a psychiatrist in terms of their shared purposes; a judge could say (or could have

said), in Foucault's words: "Of course, we pass sentence, but this sentence is not in direct relation to the crime. It is quite clear that for us it functions as a way of *treating* a criminal. We punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a *cure*" (*Discipline* 22, emphases added). Half of the terminology in this single quotation belongs to that of a doctor, and the other half belongs to that of a judge, drawing attention to the similarity between the two governmental institutions' means and motivations for the 'treatments' of their subjects.

In relation to the plays, Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, regardless of its relative old age when compared to *The Pillowman*, includes invaluable arguments which make it the primary secondary source of this thesis. It was published two years before *Equus* and twenty-eight years before *The Pillowman*, and is forty-eight years old now, at the time of writing this thesis. However, the relevancy of the work, both to the plays and to contemporary penal systems and mental healthcare, makes it available for literary research, especially when considering that in both plays, the aim of the authority institution(s) is to 'discipline and punish' their subjects. His exploration includes how older public, bodily punishments like scaffolding and public executions slowly left their place to more 'discreet,' publicised but not *in* public, much less torture-focused punishments: "[The] hold on the body did not entirely disappear in the mid-nineteenth century. Punishment had no doubt ceased to be centred on torture as a technique of pain; it assumed as its principal object loss of wealth or rights" (Foucault, *Discipline* 15). Foucault argues that as the notion of punishment went from solely physical pain to a more psychological approach, the mind became more of a centre for punishment, making the body a medium through which the 'mind' should be punished. This is done, gradually, through isolation to weaken the criminal's mind, turning the person more 'docile' and passive; through recreational breaks to allow for social growth; through making the prisoners work manual labour; and through taking them away from the 'normal' society and putting them together with people 'like' them, other prisoners who stepped outside the law and, more importantly for this thesis, the 'norms.' One of the examples of this body-to-mind change is given in *History of Madness* as follows, regarding some changes in law in France during the last quarter of the seventeenth century:

> Prisoners who showed the ability and the desire to work could be set free, not so that they might be useful members of society once again but because they had renewed their allegiance to the great ethical pact that underpinned human existence. [In 1684], a new ordinance created a section inside the hospital… stipulated that work was to occupy the greater part of the day, and was to be accompanied by readings from certain 'pious books.' Rather than stressing the productive nature of their work, the regulation made it plain that this was of a purely *repressive nature*: 'they should be forced to work for as long as possible, at activities as arduous as their strength…' Only after these initial stages, where they were given the opportunity to demonstrate a willingness to change their ways, should they be given instruction in a trade 'fitting their sex and inclination.' Any wrongdoing was to be punished by 'curtailing their soup ration, increasing their workload, sending them to prison, or by the use of the other punishments applied in these hospitals… A reading of the [quoted material] makes it clear that *the obligation to work was part of an attempt at moral constraint and improvement, which if not the ultimate meaning*, provided the *essential justification for confinement*. (Foucault, *Madness* 73, emphases added)

It can be argued, therefore, that the punishment began to be centred on changing the mind, docilising it while disciplining the criminal with rewards or repercussions according to the actions and the willingness the subject undertakes, and the quotes regarding the late seventeenth and the mid nineteenth centuries above show how gradual this change is; and it might be argued due to this graduality that the effects of this change can also be seen in *relatively* contemporary literary works like *Equus* and *The Pillowman*, proving the timelessness and applicability of Foucault's arguments on the subject.

Foucault continues to argue that as the punishment became more 'mixed' between the body and the mind, it became clearer to the governmental bodies that are able to 'discipline and punish' that they can do so more physically in prisons, or more psychologically in mental hospitals, blurring the line between these two aspects that make an individual and essentially imprisoning the mind within the person's body, while imprisoning the person's body to the limits of the 'norms' the mind must conform to: "A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; *the soul is the prison of the body*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 30, emphasis added). Accordingly, psychiatry gradually became much more involved in penal punishment due to the 'required' judgement on a person's criminal liability for 'appropriate' punishment. All these developments both in psychiatry and penal judgement brought with them a need for knowledge in the 'assessment' of individuals, shifting the focus of a 'case' from the crime or mental 'illness' to the individual experiences and events that led up to it. Hence,

in general terms, institutional buildings and governmental apparatuses and systems came to be more focused on gathering information on the people they are 'responsible' for, to that the people conform to the 'norm' which has been set by these institutions. Due to the need for relevant information, concepts like the Benthamian Panopticon come into play.

As Dysart in *Equus* and the policemen in *The Pillowman* function as apparatuses of upkeeping 'normality' and the 'normal functioning' of society, they need information on their 'subjects' and they have the necessary means of collecting it. One of the most important notions of collecting information without letting out information of your own in a governmental scale shares the name of a mythological Greek figure *Argus Panoptes*, a creature that has a hundred eyes all over its body, fifty of which are open at all times to see and gain information to be shared with the goddess Hera. In line with this notion, the word 'panopticon' comes from the combination of the Greek words '*pan*-' which "is a combining form meaning 'all,'" and '*optikón,*' meaning "sight, seeing" ("Panopticon"). From the meaning of the word itself, it can be understood that nothing escapes the attention of the 'all-seeing' eyes of Panopticon, making it a viable structure to build for any institution of the government to survey, control, and discipline its subjects. Accordingly, this idea in disguise of a mythological figure is later 'institutionalised' by British philosopher and social reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who proposed the Panopticon Prison building, in the centre of which rises a tall tower on top of which the inspector of the prison might be, or absent from, a state that the prisoner cannot be sure of due to the light on top of the tower between the inspector (if present) and the convicts:



Design for the Panopticon by Jeremy Bentham in 1791 (Steadman 10)



(Stateville Correctional Centre opened in 1925 in Illinois, US, and designed according to Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" Concept. The photograph was taken by Dou DuBois and Jim Goldberg in 2002.) ("Stateville Prison, Joliet, IL: Art Object?")

The inspector cannot be seen due to the light source on the tower, but can be heard by the prisoners: "Bentham creates the fiction of God in the panopticon through a gaze and a

voice… In the panopticon, we are seen without seeing the one who sees us; we hear a voice without seeing the one who speaks. The panopticon is governed by a gaze and a voice which are desubjectivised, detached from their bearer - in a word, by gaze and voice *qua* objects" (Božovič 11). It is important at this point to note that "[for] Foucault… the historical emergence of Panopticism was not only confined to prisons, but began to be employed throughout society" (Roberts 35), meaning schools, hospitals, and places of work started to make use of panoptic apparatuses to be able to ensure 'normalcy' is followed by the society. This unknown, godly gaze is important for Dysart, and Ariel and Tupolski in *Equus* and *The Pillowman,* respectively, who function by taking other institutions' contributions of information (like Alan's family and close circle of people who give information to Dysart), in addition to functioning as institutions which collect information for any purpose (like Ariel and Tupolski who psychologically and physically torture Katurian in search for related information). This thesis uses the idea and the functioning of panopticon to explore the processes of penal judgement and mental diagnosis, and their relevance to the information gained during the appointments and the interrogation of Alan and Dysart, and the policemen and the Katurian brothers, respectively.

It should be beneficial to explain the idea and the nature of surveillance in relation to Panopticism because as one of the most important notions of gaining information, surveillance is used both by a psychiatrist and a police officer, and both by their governing institutions as a whole within *Equus* and *The Pillowman*. Thanks to surveillance, these institutions have the capability to record, categorise and differentiate each convict or inpatient according to a set of established rules/laws and diagnoses through the help of past experience which was recorded for this purpose. To explain further, Dandeker's definition of 'surveillance' should be useful to understand how this thesis uses the term:

> In a general sense: surveillance activities are features of all social relationships. The exercise of surveillance involves one or more of the following activities: (1) the collection and storage of information (presumed to be useful) about people or objects; (2) the supervision of the activities of people or objects through the issuing of instructions..; (3) the application of information gathering activities to the business of monitoring the behaviour of those under supervision, and, in the case of subject persons, their compliance with instructions. (37)

All of the three points might be found both in *Equus* and *The Pillowman*, since the mental hospital and the prison both need information about people, they confine and supervise them both among themselves and *from* society, and they continue to collect information on the subjects under their supervision, as well as deciding on what their subjects do through instructions. In combination with the above, Bentham's definition of 'surveillance' summarises how the thesis understands and inspects the term 'knowledge,' and how this knowledge is gained through surveillance and panoptic means in the representation of the mentioned institutions in the two plays: "a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind" (qtd. in Mattelart 7).

To make effective use of this knowledge gained through panoptic means, an ideology around the subjects of crime and 'madness' has to be set to 'treat,' 'punish,' or 'discipline' individuals or groups. Stuart Hall summarises Foucault's discourse on the representations of the 'other,' most importantly for this thesis, the criminal and the insane, as follows:

> Subjects like 'madness,' 'punishment' and 'sexuality' only exist meaningfully *within* the discourses about them. Thus, the study of the discourses of madness, punishment or sexuality would have to include the following elements:
>
> 1 statements about ['madness' or 'punishment'] which give us a certain kind of knowledge about these things;
>
> 2 the rules which prescribe certain ways of talking about these topics and exclude other ways..;
>
> 3 'subjects' who in some ways personify the discourse - the madman.., the criminal..; with the attributes we would expect these subjects to have, given the way knowledge about the topic was constructed at the time;
>
> 4 how this knowledge about the topic acquires authority..;
>
> 5 the practices within institutions for dealing with the subjects - medical treatment for the insane, punishment regimes for the guilty… - whose conduct is being regulated and organised according to those ideas;
>
> 6 acknowledgement that a different discourse or *episteme* will arise at a later historical moment… producing… new discourses with the power and authority, the 'truth,' to regulate social practices in new ways. (Hall 45-46, emphases on original)

It might be said that Hall's summary of Foucault's ideas on the discourse and the representation of the 'madman' and the criminal corresponds to the discourse, representation, and the definition of the 'normal' in a given society and by a given

government or the power upholding bodies/institutions of it. Accordingly, to pick out what is 'abnormal' and decide on whether it is 'punishable' or 'treatable,' both the penal judgement system and the mental healthcare system must define what is abnormal, must have an understanding on how to talk about it, must have 'subjects' to punish or 'treat,' establishing the truth about it, and must have 'sufficient' processes to achieve what they aim for. As Alan of *Equus* and the Katurian brothers of *The Pillowman* fall under the category of 'abnormal' as characters who are both mentally 'ill' and criminal at the same time, in a psychiatric hospital and a prison, respectively, the above topic of representation is important for this thesis in the likening of the two institutions due to the similar ideological motivations and means they share.

In addition to creating and applying in practice a set of discourses around the notion of the 'abnormal,' the knowledge gained both by panoptic and repressive means (like Dysart's 'investigation' and Katurian's being tortured for information, respectively) also serve as power to be used *against* the 'abnormal' subject(s) in question for punishment, disciplining, and 'treatment' purposes, and *for* the 'normal' society and its practical upkeep by the institutions of, namely, the prison and the mental hospital. Knowledge is arguably partly turned into power through the 'examination,' which might be perceived in relation to the topic of this thesis as the 'diagnosis' process or the appointments by a psychiatrist to find out a person's mental 'illness,' and the interrogation or an investigation carried out by policemen to make a judgement on a suspect's criminality based on the crime they committed, or whether s/he is innocent or not. The process of the 'examination,' then, is the process of gaining power through gaining information from the individual, and perhaps more importantly, exercising the existing power they have on the individuals through the employment/enforcement of their discourse:

> The examination as the fixing, at once ritual and 'scientific,' of individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his own particularity… clearly indicates the appearance of a… modality of power in which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that characterise him and make him a 'case'... the examination is at the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge. (Foucault, *Discipline,* 192)

As might be understood, being able to decide on a person's individuality, 'diagnose' him/her with a mental 'illness,' or disciplining and punishing the person in accordance with the crime they had committed is, in itself, an exercise of power of the authority over the individual, and ultimately, the society. This ability to judge and 'diagnose' relies mostly on the knowledge gained as, for example, evidence of a crime, psychological liability towards committing one, or knowledge of past trauma and the state of the familial affairs of a subject. Furthermore, by complying with their education in doing their jobs, a psychiatrist and a policeman comply with a discourse already set by previous knowledge gained from previous cases. Accordingly, the policemen in applying the discourse of the 'guidebooks' in *The Pillowman*, and Dysart in applying the discourse of his education (which is conveyed in the play as a dream he had about sacrificing children who are not 'normal' in a ritual) in *Equus* in the punishment and treatment of their subjects, are putting their subjects within mental boundaries on what they should be and act like by the standards, which is using discourse against the subject to 'normalise' him/her. Hence, Foucault's own discourse on knowledge and power and their relationship is relevant in the analysis of *Equus* and *The Pillowman* due to the 'examination' being practised in both plays under the names of 'diagnosis or appointments,' and 'interrogation,' respectively.

The processes by which the 'examination' is made have similarities in both institutions, as well. For example, an interrogator and a psychiatrist share a lot of questions which they have to ask to the 'convict' in relation to the truth behind the person's behaviour, actions, and/or thoughts. In short, if an act of crime has been committed, the questions serve the purpose of finding the truth about that act ("Why did you do that?"); if an act of crime has not been committed, the questions serve the purpose of finding out the person's liability towards committing one in the future, like "What are you thinking about when you don't undertake any activity? You are not asleep, you are just lying in a bed. What are you thinking about? What is on your mind?" (Ziółkowska 1625). Nevertheless, the psychiatrist is able to ask both types of questions regardless of the aforementioned degree of liability towards crime. Much like a criminal investigator, Dysart, as a psychiatrist, states in *Equus* that "It's my job to ask questions. Yours to answer them" (Shaffer 30). Furthermore, the patient does not have to be inclined towards legal criminality, it is

enough to be ‘abnormal’ and be diagnosed with (almost) any type of a disorder to begin a treatment. Hence, the treatment, whether behavioural, medical, physically free, or hospitalised, is about ‘curing’ the ‘abnormal’ and ‘normalising’ the patient’s mind and personality. Accordingly, it can be argued that stepping outside the ideologically established norms of the society (either mentally or physically) results in different kinds of punishment and processes of treatment to gain the ‘patient’ or the criminal back into it. In order to do that, both processes rip individuals from their different or unique qualities, and therefore, their individualities. Both limit the freedom of their prisoners/patients and keep them away from the public until they are released/cured, have staff who look after and regulate the prisoners/patients, have recreational and social breaks and visiting hours, put people alongside people who are ‘similar’ to them, and, are able to shorten or lengthen a person’s sentence based on the way s/he behaves according to the ‘norms’ and the more specific regulations of the institution and the law.

What the psychiatrist or the penal officer has to do, then, is to ‘discipline’ their subject to push them into ‘normality,’ so that they act accordingly to their specific space and position within a state. Foucault explains ‘discipline’ as follows:

> Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, [discipline] separates, analyses, differentiates… It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements… Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. (*Discipline*, 170)

Accordingly, Alan in *Equus* is to be disciplined by Dysart into ‘normality,’ and Katurian in *The Pillowman* is to be executed so that by publicising the news about the punishment, the public, or the ‘normal’ people might be pre-emptively disciplined, without being punished in the process. The functioning of ‘discipline’ in the plays will be regarded in the chapters under the definition of “hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (Foucault, *Discipline* 170).

In relation to being a part of ‘disciplining,’ the notion of punishment is important, as well. The thesis’ arguments on body and mind, and their binary relationship manifest themselves in the plays’ employment of punishment during the process of disciplining either the subject (in *Equus’* case) or the public (in *The Pillowman’s* case). Punishment and body have been linked in that the mind (which might be ‘ill’ or not) is, and ‘has to be’ punished through the body, and ‘docilising’ the thoughts of the mind corresponds to the ‘docilisation’ and the ‘submission’ of both the mind and the body:

> [We can accept] the general proposition that, in our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain “political economy” of the body: even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use “lenient” methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue - the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission. (Foucault, *Discipline* 25)

Accordingly, the way the body is treated by the mental hospital and the prison as institutions is explored through analysing how, in the plays, the mind of the subject(s) is affected through the body’s relocation into isolation, physical punishment in the form of pain and torture, loss of liberty; as well as how the body of the subject(s) is affected through the mind’s ‘recarceration’ into mental bars that inhibit the subject from moving his/her body in ways that defy ‘norms,’ effectively ‘disciplining’ the person into docility and ‘normality.’

Since ancient history, these ‘mental bars’ have been set through the use of discourse. As an ancient example of this kind of categorisation and perhaps one of the earliest researchers of sociology and psychology, Theophrastus (c. 371-287 BCE) had been “making a study of human nature, associating with all sorts and conditions of men and contrasting in minute detail the good and bad among them” (3). Though it seems that he was concerned neither with the ‘treatment’ of such qualities nor the reasons behind their presence in a specific person, he was drawing attention to the ‘abnormal’ and the ‘different’; therefore, it can be argued with examples that his *Character Sketches* employs both the ‘ill’ and the criminal under the same kind of criterion of character. Theophrastus claims that his aim is to help people decide on who to *be* by deciding whom to *be with*, and indirectly, whom to avoid, which makes him essentially, or potentially, a psychiatrist,

because he creates a discourse on the notion of 'best people' in relation to mental 'health' and criminality: "My thought is […] that our children will be better for it if we hand down to them the right sort of treatment of the subject, one that they can draw on for practical examples. It will help them choose the *best people to know and be with*, and they will have something to aim at" (3, emphasis added). For example, his character, "The Absent-Minded Man" (59) carries a large part of the symptoms of what is now known as 'attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder' (ADHD), and his "The Offensive Man" who is "the kind who exposes himself when he passes respectable married women on the street" (47) is a literal criminal in contemporary terms, and they are 'excluded' from the 'normal' people around whom it is 'okay' to be. It seems that mentally 'ill' criminal 'types' are present in his sketches to establish a discourse on the topic of the 'abnormal,' which shows further the similarities between the 'ill' and the criminal and how they are seen together by the society from their earliest explorations by pointing out what is 'not normal.' In this respect, Theophrastus' work, in addition to serving as a work of 'discursive formation' in Foucauldian terms, shows how creating a discourse around the 'other' is an ancient practice and it arguably directly points out the timelessness of Foucault's own discourse of the 'ill' and the criminal as related to this thesis and the works of literature which have been chosen to convey his arguments through, even though the plays are almost three decades apart from one another.

However, though they are scarce, more recent and related research on the topic and the specific plays, as found through a literature survey, include Duygu Şakiroğlu Yüksel's *A Freudian Reading of Peter Shaffer's* 'Equus' *and* 'Amadeus,' in which she argues how the characters in Shaffer's two plays represent the Freudian terms 'id,' 'ego,' 'super-ego' by evaluating their behaviour; and Ayla Çiçek's *Political Violence in Martin McDonagh's* 'The Lieutenant of Inishmore,' 'The Pillowman' and 'Hangmen' in which she focuses on political violence in McDonagh's plays in relation to McDonagh's biographical past and the development of national Irish theatre in accordance with related national historical violence. Though these theses share the plays of this one as their primary sources separately, this thesis differs from them in terms of applying Foucault's arguments mostly in his *Discipline and Punish* to *both* plays by exploring both at the same time in its

comparison of the mental 'healthcare' and the penal judgement systems without making a psychoanalytical reading or focusing on violence solely.

Equus and *The Pillowman* provide insights to the ideas of 'crime,' 'criminal,' 'patient,' 'mental disorder,' psychiatrist, judge, mental and physical imprisonment, and punishment and the relationships between these and other related notions as has been discussed in relation to Foucault and his *Discipline and Punish*. Accordingly, Foucault's argument that mental institutions and the criminal justice system are intermixed is used in the analyses of *Equus* and *The Pillowman*. These plays represent, separately, the psychiatric mental health institution and the criminal justice system; however, an analysis made through Foucault's argument should show that these separate bodies act in almost identical ways and with almost identical motivations even though the 'norms' accepted by the fictional, totalitarian, and even dystopian government of *The Pillowman* is quite different compared to the more 'normal' and contemporary society and seemingly much more democratic state of *Equus*. Dividing the discussion of these plays into two, in the first chapter of this thesis, the psychiatric hospital and the psychiatrist of *Equus* is likened to a prison and a police person, respectively. This is done by comparing the process of mental diagnosis and treatment with that of criminal judgement and punishment. The second chapter compares the prison and its apparatuses, namely the two policemen of the play, with the mental hospital and its apparatuses, likening it and its processes to a psychiatric institution and its own processes. The conclusion chapter compares the two plays and lays out these similarities directly, so that the previous discussions materialise accordingly. In doing so, the literal execution of a person, and the 'execution' of their individuality in the plays are explored in the arguments made in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 1

THE FOUCAULDIAN REPRESENTATION OF THE CRIMINAL INPATIENT IN PETER SHAFFER'S *EQUUS*

PIERRE. Learn while you're young to worship Reason. Reason is my goddess. Fall at her feet.

-Caryl Churchill, *Softcops* 6

Looking at Peter Shaffer's *Equus* under the light of Foucault's ideas evolving around "the soul is the prison of the body" (Foucault, *Discipline* 30), this chapter aims to argue that the involvement of the mental hospital as an institution and its staff within the upkeeping of the 'normal' in society and the role they play in the life of the 'mentally ill' protagonist of the play, Alan, show similarities to how institutions of punishment (namely the prison) and people staffed in such institutions are involved within society and the judgement of criminals. Investigating the power relationships between the characters and how they affect Alan's psychology, body, and life in general, the chapter argues that Dysart (the psychiatrist, author-ity of the play) is a judge of mental criminality that stems from 'abnormality' and 'mental illness,' that Nurse is a prison warden who establishes control and communication for and between the hospitalised and the staff in the institution, and that Alan's family and close circle of people who stand for a microcosm of society function as witnesses to Alan's 'crime' of 'abnormality' and serve as the gaze through and thanks to which such institutions exercise their power. By considering how "the submission of bodies through the control of ideas" (Foucault, *Discipline* 102) is exercised in *Equus*, the chapter will conclude that mental rehabilitation and punitive incarceration function in fundamentally the same ways and under the same motivation; enforce 'normality' and punish the acts and personalities who think or act outside it.

Peter Shaffer, though not a psychologist or a criminologist himself, was fascinated by a real story revolving around a 'mentally ill criminal,' and he felt he had to turn it into a play. The idea for *Equus* came to Peter Shaffer from his friend: "[I felt a] shock of excitement when I first heard from a friend the bare and certainly inaccurate details of a dreadful story and an appalling crime" (*Collected Plays* xiv). Thanks to his "wide-ranging and eclectic thinking" (Gianakaris 4), Shaffer managed to turn this story into a theatrical work and subsequently a primary source for theses such as this one. Even though his familial background and the settings he lived in were hardly particularly suitable for deciding to follow a dramatic career, it seems that his life made him enough of a playwright to make him say, "I write plays because I feel I have to" (Pree 1).

Shaffer was born in 1926 into a Jewish family living in Liverpool. The family moved a lot because of WWII. However, along with his twin brother, he continued his education. Before being both enrolled in Trinity College in 1947, the brothers served as Bevin Boys, who "were young men directed into the coalmines instead of the Forces during [WWII]. They were volunteers, optants … or conscripts" (Kneif 1). He studied history until he graduated in 1950, a year after which he travelled to New York City. He worked at various jobs there, being involved mostly with books and literature. He "later remarked that this period of his life was bleak and frustrating," however, "his frequenting New York theaters" (Gianakaris 5) most probably played a role in his career as a playwright, especially his starting it, though it was preceded by his career as an author of detective novels for a while.

His most successful plays include *Five Finger Exercise* (1958), *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* (1964), *Equus* (1973), and *Amadeus* (1979), which feature themes related to the search of individuality and inevitably the role of psychology in it. *Equus* has been chosen for this thesis thanks to the way the play incorporates this search. Shaffer, in his Preface to *The Collected Plays of Peter Shaffer* (1982) states that "I think I had not sufficiently realized when I began *Equus* how deeply the leveling and limiting of the human psyche by the cult of a narrowly defined Normality is a common preoccupation of our time" (*Collected* xiv).

Having interpreted the psyche almost as a prisoner of norms and implying that this interpretation came to be during the conception of *Equus*, Shaffer's ideas seem to fall in line with the argument of this chapter, and Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, which will be published two years after this play's first performance. Furthermore, Shaffer's "fusion of presentational narrative modes with traditional realism" (Gianakaris 8) - referring to the frame narrative structure acted on an absurd, shifting setting that requires a dynamic stage on which the characters act and talk as if in a 'real world' setting - in telling *Equus'* story of psychological imprisonment and mental execution is crucial in tying together a knot of literature, reality, psychology, treatment, punishment, and consequently, Foucault.

The historical context of the play, and its own setting, however, as with his other plays mentioned in the previous paragraph, do not seem to directly represent historical conflicts within the English society as much as it seems to represent personal but universal conflicts Alan and Dysart go through as humans in their exploration of the 'self.' Because of the theme of "search for the self" also found in his other plays named above and his seeming refusal of staying away from social commentary, he has been described as

> in many ways a theatrical contrarian, a playwright who has consistently gone against the current, achieving tremendous popular success and considerable critical acclaim with plays whose subjects, strategies, and style are often quite the opposite of prevailing theatrical trends… [In] an age when theatrical discourse has often been dominated by angry outbursts of class-based frustration with the here-and-now, by anti-capitalist agitprop, and by various milder forms of social protest, Shaffer's plays avoid such topical sociopolitical commentary. They have, in fact, often depicted the not-here and not-now, with subjects that are… diverse [and] remote from contemporary issues. (Hutchings 32)

Shaffer's remarks go parallel with Hutchings' arguments. When asked the question "what provokes a play from you?" (Pree 64), Shaffer answers:

> It's very simple really. Take [*The Royal Hunt of the Sun*]. I felt more and more inclined to draw the character Pizarro, who is a Catholic, as an atheist, or at least as a man who explores what and who am I. When the Church is revealed to him as being wicked and suspect and loyalty, friendship, is revealed as being suspect and wicked; he has a feeling of the meaningless of life. It is this: what can one ultimately find to give one strength and stability. (Pree 64)

It might be argued that the same is true with *Equus*. Instead of the ‘corruption’ of Church, it might be seen in *Equus* the ‘normalising function’ of the mental health institution not as a part of specific, historical, or contemporary criticism, but as a part of Dysart’s search for his self (and Alan’s) which happens to take place within the institution, ultimately placing the general ideological context of the play within Foucault’s arguments related to the ‘normal’ and the institutions.

Having explained the partial conception and the ‘aim’ of his play, a short summary of it is necessary before attempting to fully examine it. *Equus* opens with Martin Dysart, “an overworked psychiatrist in a provincial hospital” (Shaffer I.i.10) in his mid-forties giving a monologue about his doubts related to his profession, which have been there for years and which were surfaced by his patient Alan Strang, a teenager boy who is ‘obsessed’ with a god in the form of horses, Equus, that he created as a result of his mental ‘illness’ that is supposedly caused by religious, political, and societal conflicts mainly within his family and his close circle, which also caused Alan to be isolated from ‘normal’ interaction within his society:

> Alan had always needed special care since his childhood, but he had received none, neither from his parents nor from anybody else in the society in which he lived, until he was taken to Dysart. While there is no account about his having any friends that he could spend time with, there is also the fact that his parents, who seem to be a perfect mismatch in opposing each other seriously in terms of worldviews, philosophies and beliefs, isolated Alan even more from regular interaction with the world. (Bal 611)

To specify the aspects of this summary, Alan had “blinded six horses with a metal spike” (Shaffer I.ii.12), because he did not want his ‘god’ seeing everything anymore. Creating a frame narrative addressed to the audience, Dysart’s monologue ends, and Dysart starts telling the story of, and the relationship between, himself and Alan. The boy is introduced to Dysart by Hesther Salomon, who is a magistrate whose bench “wanted to send the boy to prison” (Shaffer I.ii.11) instead of a mental hospital. According to Hesther, Dysart is the only psychiatrist (nearby, at least) who can “handle him” (Shaffer I.ii.13), and since she does not want Alan to be imprisoned with her argument being Alan’s supposed lack of criminal liability, she brings him to Dysart instead. As the appointments begin, Alan is

uncommunicative and 'responds' to Dysart only by singing jingles from television commercials which he memorised. Dysart relates this behaviour to a (supposedly) dysfunctional family. Alan opens himself slowly throughout the play with the help of Dysart. While Dysart's visit to the Strang household and the people relatively close to Alan visit Dysart's office to be questioned and provide information to help with the treatment, Dysart gradually puts together a course of 'treatment' for Alan. During the process, Alan's fascination with horses and the 'causes' and effects of it on his life and crime are revealed, along with Dysart's own problems and doubts related to the idea of mental treatment and the profession of psychiatry, referred to by him as the "adjustment business" (Shaffer I.ii.13). After having compiled the information taken from Alan's parents, Mr. Dalton the stable owner (whose horses Alan blinded), and Alan himself (via hypnosis, 'tricks' like placebo truth pills, 'gamified' sessions, and word-play) regarding mostly his fascination with horses, political but most importantly religious conflicts at home, his sexual interaction with Jill (worker at the stables), and eventually the crime itself and its causes, Dysart unwillingly (at heart) decides to 'treat' Alan into 'normality' by stripping the boy from his 'individuality' which is held to be a precious quality by him. A monologue on his decision and remarks regarding this dilemma mark the end of the play.

Although the play is concerned mainly with Alan's 'disciplining' and 'mental punishment' of mental 'illness,' it also contains aspects of bodily restraint through mental manipulation (for example, the thought/fear of losing one's liberty because of imprisonment acts as a deterrent to physically acting out criminality) to achieve 'normality.' This direct or indirect consequence of achieving mental well-being has the effect of blurring the supposed binary of body and mind: As it progresses, the play continues to provide clues as to how Alan's personality has come to grow in the shape of flashbacks triggered by Dysart's psychoanalytic techniques. This is important in that it explains a key factor that caused the crime he committed: experience. While investigating Alan's mind, Dysart peeks into Alan's past to see what made him, him. This includes how he perceived and continues to perceive his surroundings and the people around him. How his mind makes sense of the world around him, and how the world around him affects his mind and

consequently his actions. The binary of body and mind, in this way, is blurred, mainly because both affect and alter one another in a two-way conflict. Billington's review of the 2007 performance of *Equus* featuring Daniel Radcliffe points this out, as well: "As a story, it is compelling… it pursues Shaffer's familiar conflict between Apollo ad Dionysus" (Billington "*Equus*").

This binary might be seen to mirror the differences between the prison (representing the body) and the mental hospital (representing the mind) as institutions, and it has been explained further by Laing, a psychiatrist who has been mentioned quite a number of times alongside Shaffer's works due to their shared, supposedly 'antipsychiatric views.' Experience, according to Laing, is a specific person's individuality, their way of seeing the world, and thinking about and interpreting it: "If we are stripped of experience, we are stripped of our deeds; and if our deeds are, so to speak, taken out of our hands like toys from the hands of children, we are bereft of our humanity" (Laing 29). As implied by the term Laing uses instead of 'psyche' (experience), an individual is constructed out of specific conditions such as genetics, time and place, interactions – within the times and spaces the individual lives and moves through – with the world and finally the people in it. In this respect, Laing states deterministically that "[his] psyche is [his] experience, [his] experience is [his] psyche" (21). It can be argued in consideration of the arguments above that, if deeds or actions are caused (or even predetermined) by the individual's psyche, by forbidding/punishing certain actions; governments, rules, laws, and societies in general forbid/punish certain 'types' of psyche that are 'responsible' for such actions. The binary of body and mind, therefore, loses its characteristics that make it a binary, especially when it is transposed into the 'binary' of action and thought, since 'thought' precedes 'action.' This is where the soul becomes the prison of the body, and where the mental hospital becomes a prison for the individual who is deemed to be harmfully or even unproductively 'abnormal' in relation to general society.

Accordingly, Dysart's aim as a psychiatrist is to 'normalise' Alan and prevent him from committing physical crimes by mentally imprisoning him into 'normality,' altering his mind to change how his body acts so that the society may carry on in a healthy manner as

standardised by 'norms.' In relation to 'normality,' while discussing Freud and psychoanalysis, Davis argues that

> it is hard to imagine the existence of psychoanalysis without the concept of *normalcy*. Indeed, one of the core principles behind psychoanalysis was that we each start out with normal psychosexual development and neurotics become abnormal through a problem in that normal development… Psychoanalysis can correct that mistake and bring patients back to their normal selves. (20)

To uphold 'standardised normality' in a given society such as the one presented in *Equus*, an 'abnormal mind' that lets and/or causes its body to act 'abnormally' must be readjusted into excluding such acts from being committed and preferably even from being contemplated. This is especially important when considering Alan's 'abnormal,' psychosexual relationship with his god, Equus. Hence, 'bringing Alan back to his normal self' is exactly what Dysart's aim is in *Equus*. He is in the "adjustment business" (Shaffer I.ii.13), adjusting the minds of his patients so that they do not commit/repeat 'criminal/abnormal' acts and consequently function as healthy and useful members of society. Put differently under penal terms, he punishes minds which commit the crime of falling outside the norms put forward by the society. He imprisons the mind, psyche, or soul, into the norms, which in turn imprisons the body into acting 'normally,' so that a 'normal' and functional society is preserved. To do this, Dysart diagnoses, as a judge convicts; questions, as an interrogator interrogates; inquires, as a detective investigates, and executes a treatment, as an executioner executes. The binary of treatment and execution, therefore, is blurred like that of the body and mind. All these points and questionable lines of binaries intersect at Shaffer and his *Equus*.

Because of his traumas, past, and individual circumstances, Alan creates his own 'Normality' and therefore constructs his own prison out of the material he collects from around him throughout his experiences. His prison does not exclude what has been strictly left out by the norms of his society, resulting in his eventual life sentence behind physical bars, which, thanks to Hesther and Dysart, is exchanged with a life sentence behind mental bars. Dysart's job is to readjust Alan's mental bars so that they confine him within the

norms, getting rid of his individuality and replacing it with a 'normal' mindset in the process. As in his dream, Dysart is to sacrifice the subjectively positive (according to him) 'abnormal,' the individual, the child, so that the subjectively negative 'Normal' is upheld, and he hates it:

> The Normal is the good smile in a child's eyes – all right. It is also the dead stare in a million adults. It both sustains and kills – like a God. It is the Ordinary made beautiful; it is also the Average made lethal. The Normal is the indispensable, murderous God of Health, and I am his Priest… I have honestly assisted children in this room… But also – beyond question – I have cut from them parts of individuality repugnant to this God. (Shaffer I.xix.62)

Dysart "both represents and deconstructs morality" (Ertin 42); hence, he continues to do his job but still questions it. The quoted speech portrays a dilemma which is the source of his doubts in his considering the importance of the individual against the whole. This dilemma is inevitably related to some of the key elements of what makes the whole that is the society; rules, laws, norms… Considered in this way, treatment turns into punishment in accordance with the techniques 'proper treatment' requires; such as moving and keeping the criminal away from society (sometimes even in conditions resembling solitary confinement), medicating him, questioning him, and after many other steps, ripping him from his own individual personality to leave behind a functioning member of society. Consequently, through these psychoanalytic and 'rehabilitative punishments,' by cutting from his patients parts of their individuality, he is cutting from them the criminal aspects which make them individuals. Dysart seems to be keenly aware and somewhat against this form of 'treatment,' though he seems unable or unwilling to act against his professional code. Instead, he finds himself reluctantly accepting both Alan's and his own fates; him being in control, and him facing this dilemma on the one side of which stands the individuality and mental freedom of his 'patients,' and the societal 'Normal' which he is to professionally upkeep so as to 'protect' the society on the other (and get paid while doing so).

As a Priest of the 'Normal,' a psychiatrist, Dysart's job is to uphold the discursively formative legal laws and 'discipline and punish' those who cannot or do not obey. He

himself is not directly concerned or distressed about his treatment being a kind of punishment; however, he faces that dilemma on the one hand of which he must serve the oxymoronic 'murderous God of Health' for the functioning of a whole, while on the other hand dealing first-hand with individual parts that form or harm it, all the while himself being one of them. This is not so different from being a judge; a statement that is supported by the fact that some of Dysart's patients – like Alan – are literal criminals. Instead of being convicts, they (have) become patients, and it seems to be the case that mental hospitals and prisons are interchangeable institutions for patients and criminals. Foucault, regarding the process of 'normalisation' through the two institutions' mixing together (and consequently regarding Dysart's function in *Equus*), states that

> [w]ith expert medico-legal opinion we have a practice concerned with *abnormal* individuals that introduces a certain power of *normalization* and which, through its own strength and through the effects of the *joining together* of the *medical* and the *judicial* that it ensures, tends gradually to transform judicial power as well as psychiatric knowledge and to constitute itself as the *authority* responsible for the *control of abnormal individuals*. (Foucault, *Abnormal* 42, emphases added)

This means that the process of normalisation combines the notions of 'punishment' and 'treatment' to be able to 'treat' a criminal, a 'delinquent,' or a 'mentally ill' individual into functioning 'normally' within a society. In effect, normalisation serves to 'docilise' the 'indocile' or 'might-be-indocile-in-the-future' people/bodies and keep them under control so that they *at least* do not harm the 'flow' of society in general.

Achieving and protecting societal 'normality,' then, means that the physical actions of the 'individual bodies' constituting that society should be kept under normal, 'docile' boundaries; however, it seems that to create and control docile individuals whose bodies act within 'normality,' the minds of their bodies should be 'normal' in the first place, and if not, should be 'normalised' accordingly. This recalls the blurred binaries of body/mind, hospital/prison, and criminal/mentally 'ill.' As such, traits (or crimes, reasons, catalysts, events...) that 'lead' a person into mental hospitalisation and/or imprisonment can be roughly collected under the category of indocility, which is an aspect of the mind.

Indocility, or docility, though, is 'practiced' through the body. In this respect, it can be argued that it is not the body in Foucault's "docile bodies" (Foucault, *Discipline* 135) that is docile, but it is the mind that controls it. The mind can act upon the body to 'docilise' it, and the body can provide the mind with 'experience' through its senses; hence, the person or the institution 'in charge' of the patient/criminal can work on only one, or both of these parts of the individual. It might be said that penal justice considers itself mainly with the body and mental treatment considers itself with the mind. However, according to Foucault, both concepts and their institutions aim at creating docile bodies: "The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 183). Hence, in addition to this 'normalisation,' by punishment via categorisation and 'mental confinement,' both institutions aim to create said 'docile bodies' by restricting them to certain, standardised actions and norms: "[The art of punishing] refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the *principle of a rule to be followed*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 182, emphasis added). The 'principle of a rule,' effectively, is one of the key factors of achieving docility, confinement into certain actions and mindsets.

Alan's case makes a great example for Foucault's arguments that disciplinary (in this case, legal and medical) institutions have the same purposes; he *could*, and was in fact about to, be imprisoned for life. However, he was eventually brought to Dysart to be treated. This shows both how these institutions are interchangeable and how they are so interrelated that a magistrate has the ability to hospitalise a criminal who is sentenced for life and 'save' him from prison. As has been argued, therefore, the line between 'criminal' and 'mentally disordered' is blurred. On one hand, Alan is a criminal according to Hesther's bench who sentenced him for life; on the other, he is mentally disordered according to Hesther who thinks Alan should be hospitalised and treated by Dysart. However, Alan is an *individual* person according to Dysart, whose job is to *take away his individuality*: "My desire might be to make this boy an ardent husband – a caring citizen – a worshipper of abstract and unifying God. My achievement, however, is more likely to make a ghost!" (Shaffer II.xxxv.108). This 'problem' has also been noticed by Garcia,

who states that "[in] the stage,… two opposite views are presented: to some, Alan is deeply disturbed and in need of a 'cure' (the view fostered by Alan's psychiatrist… and [a magistrate], Hesther Salomon). To others, his [blinding of the horses] can only be explained by an evil personality (as argued by… the stable owner, and the bench of lawyers judging the 'case')" (81). While there is apparently some variety in the decisions of the parties involved in the 'course of action' for Alan – imprisonment, 'treatment,' or 'making a ghost' – regardless of which category he eventually falls in, he shall end up as a docile body who, even if not completely functional, at least is not harmful to his society, who is 'disciplined.'

An institution aiming to discipline has to exercise its power over its subjects to be able to *enforce* discipline upon them, and one of the weapons to achieve this, according to Foucault, comes through the idea of Panopticon under the name of 'surveillance': "In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being always able to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection" (Foucault, *Discipline* 187). Being observed or even thinking so holds so much power that, having been overwhelmed by it, Alan blinded the horses without taking into consideration the consequences of such a crime; to try to get rid of the gaze, even though he might not have thought or known about it, he indirectly accepted a life sentence. This power is strongly related to the idea of Panoptic surveillance as first put forward by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and carried forward through Foucault's ideas. Different forms of Panopticon as buildings were idealised, however though other forms of it are similar, as well, the description of the 'prison-Panopticon' is the most relevant here:

> The prison-Panopticon depicts a prison designed as a circular building… with an inspector in the central tower who oversees the activities of convicts in their cells… Surveillance is carried out from one single point, and it is the inspector… who possesses… extended power. The inspector is perceived as an invisible omnipresence. (M. Galič et al. 11-12)

In the case of such a Panopticon institution, namely the hospital in this case, an attempt to get rid of constant surveillance would leave the person attempting unsure whether or

not s/he succeeded due to the nature of Panopticon surveillance; the invisibility of the inspector and the uncertainty towards his existence from the point of view of the 'observed' lead them into acting as if they are watched nevertheless, since the consequences might be harsh if they actually are. Such is the inescapable power as explained by Foucault, Bentham, and Galič.

In *Equus*, the overwhelming power of this perceived panoptic surveillance caused Alan to blind six horses; he thought that Equus was constantly watching him, and that is why he could not commit the 'crime' of having sexual intercourse with Jill. Within his own normality, religion, mental prison, and discipline, the constant gaze of his God kept him under subjection. Equus' knowing and watching whatever he does exercised over him such a power that he blinded his God and six of the animals he is so fascinated with, so that he could be relieved of the pressure that denied him Jill, whom he so much desired: "Eyes!... White eyes – never closed! Eyes like flames – coming – coming! … God seest! God seest! … NO! … Equus… Noble Equus… Faithful and True… God-slave… Thou-God-Seest-NOTHING!" (Shaffer II.xxxiv.106). The god-like powers of such observation and surveillance and their being subverted by Alan when he blinds the horses lay in line with Foucault's 'panopticism,' referring to the idea of seeing everything in an institutional setting, explained by Galič and Foucault himself: "It is precisely the inspector's [in this case, Equus' and Dysart's] apparent *omnipresence* that sustains perfect discipline" (M. Galič et al. 12, emphasis added). In short, in 'appropriating' Alan, his God Equus 'uses' surveillance, which serves to collect knowledge and eventually exercise power over him and control him to act according to 'his own normality.'

Alan's 'own normality,' his religion and his god Equus, had been created by his mind and this 'normality' was arguably modelled after religious 'norms.' The All Seeing (Christian) God is transposed as Equus and sexuality is still a sin in his 'religion.' Equus, in some ways, 'replaced' Jesus Christ and God as religious figures because of religious conflicts within the house. This argument is strengthened by the fact that a "little extreme" (Shaffer I.xi.39) painting of Jesus was replaced by a photograph of a horse which "comes out all

eyes" (40) according to Alan's mother. His mother's belief in religion conflicting with his father's political 'irreligion' led to the replacement of Jesus on Alan's bedside with a horse. The loss of this religious painting for Alan was apparently important and impactful for him, and by replacing that painting which stand for the belief in Christianity for him with a picture of a horse that will eventually stand for his 'Equism,' he creates his own religion, filling the 'space' of belief that had been emptied by the conflict between his parents and his father's eventual tearing the painting from his wall and Christianity from his mind. However, the general notion of 'belief' that he gained from his mother stayed, and transferred itself into creating and seeing Equus as a god as implied by his recovery from the trauma the destruction of the painting caused him:

> DYSART. But he recovered when he was given the photograph of the horse in its place?
>
> DORA. He certainly seemed to. At least, he hung it in exactly the same position, and we had no more of that awful weeping. (40)

The following quotation from Foucault's *History of Madness* lies mostly in line with Mr. Strang's thoughts, the play's main (for this thesis' purposes) cause for conflict and apparent reason for Alan's crime of blinding the horses, and it is about 'madness and religion': "Religious beliefs prepare a sort of imaginary landscape, an illusory milieu that encourages *hallucinations* and all forms of *delirium*" (*Madness* 367, emphases added). It might be argued that Mrs. Strang prepared this 'landscape' for Alan, Mr. Strang tore it down, and because of that, Alan felt the need to 'create a new religion' for himself to fill this space. As such, and in addition to his parents' control and surveillance on him, his 'religion' includes Christian and societal aspects of power relationships, constant surveillance, and eventual 'rebellion' through his blinding the horses, much like his father's 'rebelling' against Jesus and tearing his painting from Alan's wall.

To 'fix' Alan's 'problem' of having his own religion, Dysart uses the gaze of the hospital, society, and legal bodies to exercise power over him and control him to act according to

the normality put forward by the society. Foucault explains panopticism in relation to the main source of power Dysart uses, as follows: "A type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision… control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, *the modelling and transforming of individuals in terms of certain norms*" (Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms" 70). In line with Foucault's ideas, Dysart's panoptical collection of gazes include those of legal, punitive bodies; for example, the first information regarding Alan that Dysart acquired came from Hesther, a legal body herself:

> DYSART. Why? What's he done? … What could possibly throw your bench into two-hour convulsions?
>
> HESTHER. He blinded six horses with a metal spike.
>
> [*A long pause.*]
>
> DYSART. Blinded? … All at once or over a period? … Where? … How old? … What did he say in Court? (Shaffer I.ii.13)

Dysart gathers information about his soon-to-be-patient, which will enable him to exercise his power through discourse by first categorising him generally; a categorisation which would be narrowed down into a 'diagnosis.' While doing this, he asks questions which resemble those of a detective's or a policeman. The argument that what Dysart is conducting is an 'investigation' in penal terms is more apparent when he says to Alan, "It's my job to ask the questions. Yours to answer them" (Shaffer I.ix.30). Although the tone is quite different, the same set of reasons lies behind Katurian's being questioned by the policemen in *The Pillowman*: "You will answer everything we want you to" (McDonagh I.i.4); gather information, diagnose/judge, treat/punish; keeping the subject(s) under surveillance and away from possible crime in the meantime.

Accordingly, to make a 'case' out of him/her, the 'subject' is examined, questioned, and individualised so that a discourse about their personalities can be formed and considered

in relation to the 'bigger' discourse of the government in question, so that a categorisation can be made and 'appropriate' punishment or 'treatment' may be conducted. This is done by placing the 'subjective truth' of the mentally 'ill' characters against the 'objective truth' of the governing body and defining the former as 'abnormal.' Rice summarises Foucault's points on this topic by quoting him:

> A statement is not an isolated 'utterance,' but 'always belongs to a series or a whole… [It] is always part of a network of statements' which compose a discursion. Reflexively, the discursive formation… sets the context in which constitutive statements are held to… be 'true.' And truth, for Foucault, is no more than an 'ensemble of rules… [and] a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution and operation of statements.' (Rice 339)

Accordingly, through the employment of the statements/rules/discourses put forward and standardised as 'truth' by the governing body, Dysart, or a criminal investigator, is able to place and compare their subject's mind within the context of the general 'truth' and form a 'diagnosis' or make a judgement, effectively creating and enforcing the discourse of 'truth' and 'normality.'

In addition to the questions he directly or indirectly employs in his 'investigation,' to achieve supervision and surveillance over his patients, Dysart and the hospital in *Equus* make use of available apparatuses, one of the most important of which/whom is Nurse. It can be argued that Alan's room at the hospital is akin to a prison cell, whereas Nurse functions as the 'prison guard' and Dysart the 'warden.' In this respect, Nurse provides Dysart with whatever information she gathers from Alan, and she is in a way the 'eye' for Dysart, if Dysart is Panoptes, Nurse is one of his eyes: "Allen's [*sic*] every move is monitored by the nurse, and even Allen's [*sic*] talk in a dream is eavesdropped every word, and then conveyed to the doctor by the nurse" (Jiao 1139). She works as a one-way bridge of information from Alan to Dysart, even while he is asleep:

> NURSE. We had to give him a sedative or two, Doctor. Last night it was exactly the same.

> DYSART [*to* NURSE]. What does he do? Call out?
>
> NURSE [*to desk*]. A lot of screaming, Doctor … One word in particular … Over and over again … It sounds like 'Ek.' (Shaffer I.vi.19)

Aside from monitoring the patients, Nurse seems to be a literal messenger between them and the Doctor, as well, delivering the 'tape recorder' to Dysart when needed:

> DYSART. All right. I have patients who've got things to tell me, only they're ashamed to say them to my face … I give them this little tape recorder … They go off to another room, and send me the tape *through Nurse.* (Shaffer I.x.38, emphasis added)

The 'tape technique,' though useful as pointed out by Dysart, is a form of communication that might be found to bear resemblances to the systems of communication which can be found in prisons, especially in the way they affect and alter the outcome of the motivations and the processes that serve to achieve them, which are, as argued before, shared by hospitals and prisons:

> The prison community is a relational system in which a number of persons, inmates and personnel, interact *overtly and covertly* with one another according to *specially prescribed rules of behaviour* … *Definite functional relationships* exist between [inmates and staff], which directly affect the success or failure of prison administration and the *rehabilitative programs.* (Caldwell 649, emphases added)

The "prescribed rules of behaviour" for the hospital staff, "functional relationships," and "rehabilitative programs" seem to be included within *Equus*, and a very concentrated example of this extract from the *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science* can be found within a stage direction of the play:

> ALAN *is sitting on his bed holding the tape recorder.* NURSE *approaches* briskly, *takes the machine from him - gives it to* DYSART *in the square - and leaves again, resuming her seat.* DYSART *switches on the tape.* (Shaffer I.xiii.43, emphasis added)

The 'briskness' of Nurse and the lack of dialogue or any other communication at all (besides the contents of the tape) seem to contribute as a 'prescribed rule of behaviour' to the 'functional relationship' between Dysart and Alan within this 'rehabilitative program.' The stage direction is given almost in a military fashion and it contributes to the hierarchical relationship between the three characters. Alan does not 'give' the recorder, Nurse 'takes' it and 'gives' it to the demander, Dysart, who immediately starts working on Alan's rehabilitation by listening to it. Here, Nurse fulfils her role as the 'prison guard,' the watchful eye, and the messenger.

In addition to her role(s) related to knowledge and information, Nurse serves as a physical, repressive force within the play, as well. When Alan acts up during the first Act of the play, Dysart intimidates, or even threatens him lightly by mentioning Nurse, so that Alan might cooperate:

> ALAN. *That's not fair!*
>
> [*He springs up, clenching his fists in a sudden violent rage*.]
>
> You're a - you're a - You're a swiz! … Bloody swiz! … F***ing swiz!
>
> DYSART. Do I have to call Nurse?
>
> ALAN. She puts a finger on me, I'll bash her!
>
> DYSART. She'll bash you much harder, I can assure you. Now go away. (Shaffer 32)

Even though the only person who actually 'bashes' Alan is his mother in the play and Nurse probably does not have the 'right' to bash any patient, the threat of being physically restrained if he acts up is very real as seen later in the first Act of the play after Alan tries again to subvert the hierarchy between him and Dysart by being a "Nosey Parker" (Shaffer 55) himself and questioning Dysart and his very personal, marital and sexual relationship. After this, Alan snatches Dysart's cigarette packet without regarding Dysart's warnings that he should not. The next time he appears on the stage, "[*he*] *is subdued*" (Shaffer 60), presumably by Nurse and/or other staff. As a result of his acting up, Alan's rights of bodily movement are immensely reduced due to the constraint on his body. Putting the role of body in the process of punishment and discipline into perspective, Foucault argues that "[the] body, according to… penality, is caught up in a system of *constraints* and *privations*, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations, punishment has become an economy of *suspended rights*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 11). Accordingly, the act of subduing Alan is yet another way of establishing discipline in the way a prison would, complete physical restraint; and Nurse, in this case, acts more as a 'guard' than a nurse.

Even though she carries out fundamental tasks for the functioning of general mental disciplinary practice, Nurse is hardly enough and sufficient as an apparatus to keep Dysart and inevitably the governing bodies over society and their own apparatuses such as hospitals, schools, laws and its enforcers, up to date with his 'cases'; another highly important apparatus of information, as seen within the play, is the institution of family and its members. "Doctor-Patient Relationship in Psychiatry" states that "[approach] towards the patient should be scientific," and one of the means to achieve this is "[involving] relatives in an appropriate way: Relatives can offer *valuable data* and insights into the patient's condition" (Lakdawala 85, emphasis added). Dysart, quite literally, investigates Alan's family, life, past; his 'experience' that created his psyche and made him. After Dysart's questions are met with a simple and insufficient "[mind] your own beeswax" by Alan, he states to Hesther that: "I want to have a look at his home, so I invited myself over" (Shaffer I.vi.22). It is argued, therefore, that when the gaze of the

hospital falls short, it can and does extend itself to include other gazes, because "it does not matter who exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the [Panopticon]: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants" (Bentham 45). Hence, in the absence of the hospital's gaze, there is that of the family, as well as that of the society in general.

With information from people around Alan, Dysart links the crime to Alan's psychology, his psychology to his upbringing and environment, and his upbringing and environment to his relatives and close circle of people. Doing so, Dysart acts like a detective who works in the process of legal judgement: "[It] falls to this *punitive* technique… to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. *It is a biographical knowledge and a technique for correcting individual lives*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 252, emphases added). This is *exactly* what Dysart practises for Alan and presumably for many other inpatients, however, contrary to the authority who applies the quoted technique, he is a psychiatrist and not a person of criminal judgement. He goes out into the 'field' to 'question' Alan's parents to gather biographical knowledge and knowledge on his upbringing, going back "not only to the circumstances but also to the causes of his" (Foucault, *Discipline* 252) blinding the horses; extending the range of examination and the observation of Alan: "Mrs. Strang, have you any idea how this thing could have occurred? … Can you remember anything else like that you may have told him about horses?" (Shaffer I.vii.24). Mr. Strang is questioned, as well, providing Dysart with additional information on his social and ideological position which will ultimately help 'categorise' Alan. Dysart supposes that because religion plays an important role in raising children for a considerable number of families in many societies, questions about it might reveal answers regarding potential trauma and recovery; therefore, he goes to investigate it: "If there's any tension over religion, it should be evident on a Sabbath evening!" (Shaffer 22). There actually is, as previously supposed by Dysart, a tension over religion and it affects Alan. Dysart's questions reveal Mr. Strang's ideas about the topic: "Bloody religion - it's our only real problem in this house, but it's insuperable; I don't mind admitting it" (Shaffer 28). It is evident from this sequence of conversations and

'interrogations' that the questions seem to be related to, but not specifically *about* Alan, and rather about the people who have been 'active witnesses' and about how they interacted with him and how their actions and Alan's interpretation of them resulted in a serious criminal offence.

People involved in Alan's upbringing and people who know him somewhat closely are treated and questioned as witnesses even though none witnessed the actual, physical crime. Instead, these people have witnessed the 'crime' that is Alan's 'abnormality,' 'mad' actions caused by his mental 'illness' which 'caused' and led up to the actual event of blinding the horses. For example, Mr. Strang observed Alan reining himself and acting like a horse in his 'private' time, Mrs. Strang observed his fascination with horses, Jill saw him watching the stables before he started working there, Mr. Dalton (the stable owner) had his suspicions but thought nothing at first… 'Observations' like these may be conducted by anyone because, as has been mentioned, "[any] individual can operate [the Panopticon]" (Bentham 45), and because of this, when asked about Alan's situation by Dysart, the person who answers turns into an eye of Panoptes, relaying information to the person at the centre. These 'observations' prove to be 'legally evidential' to Dysart, since his investigation to diagnose Alan evolves around gathering information from the people who have seen his actions that can be related to the crime, effectively turning these people into witnesses and Alan into a criminal.

Alan's parents and Mr. Dalton, acting as individual eyes to the Panopticon, bring in pieces of Alan's story to Dysart at the hospital for him to bring together to form a diagnosis; so many pieces that they provide as much information as, if not more than, Alan himself. The first one to arrive is Mrs. Strang: "I've been shopping in the neighbourhood. I thought I might just look in" (Shaffer I.xi.39). Not to see Alan, but to see Dysart and inform him about the photograph of the horse that had replaced the painting of Jesus in Alan's bedroom. This is important because after the questioning that took place in the Strang household, the parents realised the role religion plays in Alan's 'condition.' This is why Mrs. Strang first came to Dysart to inform him further about it. The visits of Mr. and Mrs. Strang show that it is the gaze of the society and family that is used to evaluate Alan;

especially when taken into consideration that these visits happen unprompted, meaning Dysart never specifically asked for them to happen. However, the tone and general approach taken by Dysart during these visits still resemble those of a criminal investigation conducted on the boy's mental health with the help of witnesses as argued above, and the resemblance is especially strong with the questioning of Mr. Dalton.

As opposed to Alan's parents, Mr. Dalton is summoned by Dysart to his office since he is the stable owner who seems most definitely to have valuable information for Dysart. He is the most affected person by the crime in terms of money and professional image; hence his opinion on Alan and his hospitalisation: "In my opinion the boy should be in prison. Not in a hospital at the tax-payer's expense" (Shaffer 41). Although his opinion shows (like Hesther and her bench) whether a 'mental criminal' 'belongs' in a hospital or a prison may change depending on the point of view and the place of the 'witness' to the crime, it is also conflicting with a later remark of his in an answer to Dysart's question asking why would Alan go out at nights alone and not during the day with others: "Are you asking me? He's a *loony*, isn't he?" (Shaffer 42, emphasis added), a statement that would suggest that Alan 'belongs' in a mental hospital. However, what is more important in this section is that right after he enters Dysart's office, Dysart makes use of the information he gathers from the 'interrogation' with Mr. Dalton. From it, Dysart finds out about Alan that there is a girl named Jill involved with the situation before the crime, that the horses in the stable were being ridden during some nights without the stable-owner's knowledge, and whether related or not, who sleeps on the premises during nights. Even though some of these questions are not *directly* about the crime, such as the one about the number and identity of the residents of the stable, they are about the potential 'eyes' that may be witnesses to either crime; physical or mental, showing further their purpose and function in relation to the panoptic machine.

The next visit, that of Mr. Strang's, provides further information on yet another aspect of Alan's mental crime of being 'different' via his father's eyes. He arrives as "*nervous and embarrassed*" (Shaffer 45) not only because of his son's current position in society, a

'criminal inpatient,' but also because of the 'disgraceful offence' he came to tell that Alan had committed eighteen months ago prior to this visit, thinking that it might help with Dysart's diagnosis and treatment of Alan. An 'offence' against religious, sexual, societal, and mental 'norms'; Alan, probably regularly at nights, reins himself as if he was a horse and beats himself with a coat hanger in front of the photograph of the horse in his bedroom. Because Alan's bedroom door was ajar that time, his father's gaze happened to witness this 'disgraceful offence' which he could not mention to neither his wife nor the doctor in front of her. Again, however, the society's 'secret' gaze benefits that of the hospital. From this interaction, Dysart understands more about how religion has to do with the crime at hand, along with how a girl, who might have been deduced by him as being Jill as early as this point in the play, is 'involved' in it more than being the person who introduced Alan to the stable. Without the information about Jill from Mr. Dalton and Mr. Strang, Dysart could not question Alan about it, making the process of treatment much harder. Furthermore, even though the 'nature' of the crime would probably be eventually found out, the specific circumstantial cause' of it could only be learned and 'taken out' from Alan, who is certainly not willing to do so. This shows further how the gaze of the people around Alan is more than important; the gaze of the society is a must to 'normalise' his mind, given that most of the information that Dysart makes use of to 'treat' Alan comes from the people around him, representing societal institutions one of the most important of which is, in this case, family.

All of the above arguments on the inclusion of family or the person's entourage into the psychiatric evaluation of the 'subject' might be supported with a report to the management board of the department of Paris, written in the last decade of the eighteenth century, which has been included and translated in Foucault's *History of Madness*: " 'The mad or the insane will be admitted to the different establishments… on the basis of reports from legally recognised doctors and surgeons, signed by two *witnesses*, *parents*, *friends* or *neighbours*, and certified by a justice of the peace from the section or canton'" (qtd. in Foucault, *Madness* 440, emphases added). Even the word choices in this report, especially that of the word 'witness,' seem to show how this process of 'admitting to a mental hospital' might be likened to the process of penal judgement and decision. In relation to

the question Foucault asks which will be quoted at the end of this chapter, it seems hard to differentiate between 'madness' and criminality when considering the fact that witnesses to both might report the person in question to the authorities by saying, 'I am a witness to this person's actions and/or thoughts of 'abnormality.''

While the gaze of these 'witnesses' and the verbal communication between them and Dysart serve important diagnostic purposes, the bodies and specifically the body language of the people who Dysart 'interrogates' are important, as well; this involuntary form of communication and information is subjected to his gaze, too. It should be noted that the main events of *Equus* take place within a frame narrative, and since Dysart is telling the story from his own memory, the stage directions given to characters are representative of what Dysart has paid attention to and/or are important in relation to the treatment or the crime itself. In this respect, the body carrying Alan's mind is surveyed from yet another aspect; one that is not especially concerned with actions (such as committing a crime, or even its whereabouts and how it went there), but with much subtler actions that may precede and possibly indicate bigger, more 'important' ones. Such clues taken from the body language of an individual help to more 'accurately categorise' and also proceed with the treatment or appointment more 'appropriately' or effectively. In relation to the report quoted in the previous paragraph, Foucault explains how and why the patient should be observed (bodily and mentally) following his/her admittance to the hospital:

> What should then follow is a long process of observation carried out by the 'staff of the institution' and 'health officers.' And there, in the privileged environment of confinement, and under its purified gaze, the division is made: if the subject manifested obvious signs of madness, 'all doubt should disappear. He can be retained without scruples, and he should be looked after and protected from his own errors.' (Foucault, *Madness* 440)

This is exactly what happens following Alan's admittance to the hospital; observation of the 'subject' to determine whether he is 'truly insane' or not, and, especially during their first appointments, this observation is mostly on Alans's body language because he refuses to exchange any information verbally.

On their first meeting, Alan's unwillingness to communicate and his feeling that he is overpowered by Dysart could be read by him through Alan's refusal to shake hands, the loudness of his singing, and the lack of his singing. During their first appointment, Alan's actions, excluding the commercial jingles themselves, are given in stage directions which are more important as pointed out by Dysart's approach which adapts according to how Alan reacts bodily and tonally, both of which are under surveillance and taken as 'yes' and 'no' for answers since direct verbal communication is not an option for Dysart at this stage. However, he is quickly able to deduce how to approach his patient to gain some level of cooperation from him, just before overpowering Alan by taking information from what Alan thinks to be uninformative answers to Dysart's questions:

> DYSART. Is this your full name? Alan Strang?
>
> [*Silence.*]
>
> And you're seventeen. Is that right? Seventeen?... Well?
>
> ALAN [*singing low*]. Double your pleasure,
>
> Double your fun…
>
> DYSART [*unperturbed*]. Now, Let's see. You work in an electrical shop during the week. You live with your parents, and your father's a printer…
>
> ALAN [*singing louder*]. Double your pleasure,
>
> Double your fun…
>
> DYSART. I mean does he do leaflets and calendars? Things like that?
>
> [*The boy approaches him, hostile.*]
>
> ALAN [*singing*]. Try the taste of Martini… (Shaffer I.iii.14-15)

After Alan sings louder and shows hostility towards him, Dysart figures out that questions about the father of his patient will not prove effective to improve communication. After this realisation, he opens up another topic and takes on another tone to shift the conversation:

> DYSART. I wish you'd sit down, if you're going to sing. Don't you think you'd be more comfortable?
>
> [*Pause.*]
>
> ALAN [*singing*] There's only one 'T' in Typhoo! (Shaffer 15)

After seeing that dodging the topic of Alan's father got him a rather neutral response from Alan, Dysart takes on an appreciative tone which results in a much better response in terms of cooperation:

> DYSART [*appreciatively*]. Now that's a good song. I like it better than the other two. Can I hear that one again?
>
> [ALAN *starts away from him, and sits on the upstage bench*.] (Shaffer 15)

At this point, Alan sings the Doublemint jingle again, pointing out that he likes that one more. This helps Dysart to figure out exactly how he should communicate with Alan: one-way verbal (Dysart to Alan) and one-way tonal and gestural (Alan to Dysart). This is enough for Dysart, who immediately begins the process of admitting him to the hospital and the power relation between them by proving even how Alan chooses to *not* communicate is a source of knowledge by mentioning his parents again, but this time to show how this knowledge is available to him and how it is a source of power by concluding the appointment, leaving Alan to contemplate and with no choice but to accept the situation:

> DYSART [*smiling]*. You know I was wrong. I really do think that one's better. It's got such a catchy tune…
>
> [*Silence. The boy glares at him.*]

> I'm going to put you in a private bedroom for a little while… [They're] rather more pleasant than being in a ward… [*He rises*] By the way, which parent is it who won't allow you to watch television? Mother or father? Or is it both?
>
> [ALAN *stares at him.* NURSE *comes in.*]
>
> Shaffer 15).

The knowledge gained from Dysart's observation of Alan about the involvement of his parents on his time watching television proves to overpower Alan, since this time he does not raise his voice, act hostile, or refuse Dysart *even though* he asked a question about his parents, mentioning them both to see if Alan would react to the mention of his father as he did before. It can be argued that if the question were a 'yes' or 'no' question, as in "do your parents let you…" or "don't your parents let you…," Alan's reaction would arguably be more 'active,' but because Dysart asks the question in a way to convey that he *knows* at least one of his parents does not let him watch television, Alan is overpowered and rendered passive due to his failed attempts at hiding himself and/or refusing to give any information about anything to Dysart. This particular scene might be explained through Foucault's 'examination' again: "[The examination] is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish… The superimposition of the power relations and knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance" (Foucault, *Discipline* 184-85). During their first appointment, literally the examination, by pointing out the simple fact which Alan did not willingly provide, Dysart silences Alan, getting him one step closer to being 'normalised' through this 'normalising gaze,' effectively classified under a condition or a cause for one, and overpowering him by the sheer power of individual knowledge which allows for Alan's being categorised into a discourse of the 'abnormal.' This proves further that in addition to verbal and visual information gained from Alan and others, non-verbal and carpal information is also used as an apparatus of establishing and exercising power, similar to how a comparable scenario in a setting involving a suspect and a criminal investigator would render the suspect unable to resist incarceration. In short, Dysart's power is enabled by knowledge and his knowledge is provided by observation, investigation, and surveillance, very similarly to how the penal punishment system gains and makes use of such knowledge.

The general power relationships within the hospital in *Equus* function similarly to those within a prison, as well. Dysart's position seems equal to Hesther's (a magistrate), as pointed out by their sincere dialogues and how they interact, but more importantly by the ability and power they both have to either make Alan an inpatient, or an inmate. Nurse appears to be equivalent to a prison warden, below Dysart and above Alan, as has been pointed out in "Collective Behaviour in Total Institutions" regarding the hierarchy within the hospital staff:

> At the top of the hierarchy is, of course, the hospital administrator, followed by the chief psychiatrist and the psychiatry staff. Below this level then follows nursing service… The line of authority, formally, is quite clear; psychiatrists at the top with non-professional and lesser trained medical specialities at the bottom. Below the pyramid are, of course, the patients. (Denzin 357)

The formation of such a hierarchical pyramid seems necessary in the formation of a functioning panopticon machine that is able to see all the bottom parts from the very top, and control and manipulate whatever actions and directives the staff (like Nurse) has to follow. The panopticon architecture of a prison, therefore, is applicable to the mental hospital in terms of surveillance and general management of staff, who exercise their share of power over the patients. The position of Nurse within this hospital hierarchy becomes clearer when she first meets Alan:

> NURSE. Well now; isn't this nice? You're lucky to be in here, you know, rather than the ward. That ward's a noisy old place.
>
> ALAN [*singing*]. Let's go where you wanna go - Texaco!
>
> NURSE [*contemplating him*]. I hope you're not going to make a nuisance of yourself. You'll have a much better time of it here, you know, if you behave yourself.
>
> ALAN. F**k off.
>
> NURSE [*tight*]. That's the bell there. The lav's down the corridor. (Shaffer I.iv.16)

Having seen how Dysart established his power over Alan and how ultimatums were absent from his 'tactics,' it can be deduced from Alan's first verbal reaction until this point in the play is caused by Nurse's remark about him behaving himself. Furthermore, even if Alan did not receive an ultimatum from her, it must be easy for him, who will try to undermine and subvert even Dysart's power to try and break him (succeeding at times), it is likely that he would go against Nurse, regardless. Since he is inclined towards 'revolting' and disrupting the established power dynamics, as pointed out by his behaviour and general demeanour especially during his later appointments with Dysart, he is likely to understand Nurse's position within the institution due to her receiving orders from Dysart. Because Nurse plays the role of a middleperson, Alan does not need elaborate subversion and simple swearing is enough, unlike with Dysart whom he psychologically attacks on a personal level. However, regardless of his attempts and levels of success at his subversions, the power dynamics and relationships in the institution are clear-cut much like those of a prison.

The representation of this conflict/subversion of power is acted on a platform, a setting that is a "square [which] resembles a railed boxing ring" (Shaffer 3). All the characters at all times are visible on the stage, though on different platforms. When their time comes, actors step on the main square platform and deliver their part. This is important because there is a constant battle of power that takes place within this boxing ring between characters, especially Alan and Dysart; between characters and institutions, mainly Alan and the hospital and Alan and society/norms or institutions in general (because of his 'abnormality'). This aspect of epic theatre as a setting is used within the context of the play as the living places of society: the institutions. The main institution in *Equus* is the psychiatric hospital, however, as has been argued, the setting stands for the institution of prison and family, as well. As the stage rotates and characters come and go, although the physical stage stays more or less the same, what it represents changes according to the action and characters. However, the fact that it resembles a boxing ring is communicative of the idea that when the stage represents the Strang household, there is a metaphorical boxing match between religion and 'logic'; when it represents the beach, a boxing match between society and the general conflict within the Strang family; when it represents the

hospital, a boxing match between not only Alan and Dysart, but between ‘normality’ and ‘individuality,’ as well. This is a battle in which on one side is “The Normal… the indispensable, murderous God of Health…” and “...his Priest” (Shaffer 62) Dysart; on the other, the ‘unwanted, unhealthy,’ but *individual* criminal whose crime is this individuality, Alan. Dysart’s metaphorical punches towards Alan’s ‘abnormality’ aim at turning him into a ‘normal’ person by sacrificing his individuality to the ‘God of Health.’ These ‘punches’ consist of various treatment methods like hypnosis, a placebo truth pill, and overall exercise of power over Alan through knowledge gained via panoptic surveillance. Alan’s ‘punches’ consist of more general notions and acts like subverting Dysart’s authority through his ‘kind’ of knowledge, an example would be him asking about Dysart’s wife and using this knowledge from the answer to anger him; in this interaction in which Alan finds out about Dysart’s unhappy relationship with his wife, the “doctor has been psychoanalysed by the patient, and it unnerves [Dysart]” (Hudson 35).

Nevertheless, Dysart eventually ‘wins,’ and tells what will happen after his ‘treatment’ finishes, emphasising the loss of his passion and individuality, which is required for him to be ‘normalised’: “You won’t gallop any more, Alan. Horses will be quite safe” (Shaffer II.xxxv.108). Just like in his dream in which he was a Greek priest making sacrifices of children (whose faces were all Alan’s), cutting their bodily parts, removing from them parts of themselves and getting more disgusted with each sacrifice, now, in the real world as the Priest of the God of Normal, he will, after the final metaphorical punch he delivers to Alan’s personality by treating him, do the same in psychiatric terms:

> Dysart’s dream reveals his hidden knowledge about his job as a child psychiatrist – standardising children according to social ‘norms.’ Dysart’s job is to erase all the unique colours of the children that mark their individuality and difference. His job is to train their minds [*sic*] work in the same direction and with the identical mechanisms. These unique colours are blindly accepted as the symptoms of insanity which should be treated and got rid of as soon as possible… Dysart’s job is precisely… guaranteeing the order in the world and predictability of people. (Yılmaz 95)

In line with these arguments, it can be argued further that, by standardising children and removing from them the ‘symptoms of insanity’ to uphold and enforce the discourse of

the 'normal,' Dysart functions with a similar motivation to a penal officer, which is 'guaranteeing the order in the world.'

In conclusion, by the end of Alan's treatment, Dysart has been, along with his literal profession of psychiatry, an investigator of crime; since he questioned 'witnesses' and investigated familial, religious, and political conflicts that 'led' to Alan's crime; he used panoptic surveillance and knowledge to overpower Alan; he used apparatuses like Nurse to keep him under control and gain further knowledge on him; he used the physical institution to 'imprison' Alan to keep him away from causing further harm to society while 'rehabilitating' him; therefore, through all the such roles Dysart possesses and practises, he has come to resemble a policeman who 'deals with' the criminal first-hand, a judge of mental 'health' and therefore a judge of criminality, an apparatus of normality who gazes and acts on 'abnormality,' a prison ward, and a convictor. In relation to Dysart's 'penal' qualities he carries as a psychiatrist, Foucault's question might come to mind: "Is it surprising that the… prison, with its regular chronologies,… its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge… resemble… schools… [and] *hospitals*, which… resemble prisons?" (Foucault, *Discipline* 228, emphasis added). Hence, because Dysart, as a psychiatrist, 'treats' a *criminal* in a psychiatric *hospital*, the institutions of the hospital and the prison almost inevitably merge together within their discourses, and Foucault's question has been attempted to be asked again and explored by this chapter in the thesis in relation to *Equus*.

CHAPTER 2

THE 'MENTAL CRIMINAL' AND THE 'JUDGES OF NORMALITY': FOUCAULT'S *DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH* IN MCDONAGH'S *THE PILLOWMAN*

PIERRE. [He] is bringing some order into crime. He knows who the criminals are and he will catch them. But then what? What do you do with them? If you don't use their bodies to demonstrate the power of the law – Never mind.

-Caryl Churchill, *Softcops* 30

While listing his thoughts on prisons and their principles in his *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault first explains the "*principle of correction*" (269, emphasis in original); which, achieved through 'disciplining and punishing' the criminal, is arguably the same 'principle' which a mental hospital might have under the name of 'the principle of *treatment*.' He goes on to state that the "penalty that deprives of liberty has as its essential aim the *reformation* and *social rehabilitation* of the *convict*" (qtd. in Foucault, *Discipline* 269, emphases added). Focusing on how the words 'reformation' and 'social rehabilitation' are used in relation to a 'convict' and not a 'patient,' the prison as an institution, due to the similarities it shares with a mental hospital in its motivations, functions, and the processes by which it achieves these might be linked further to mental hospitals in different settings and types of government in literature; namely for this chapter, a prison set in a totalitarian dictatorship. Hence, with these main ideas in mind and Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* in hand, this chapter aims to argue that the prisoners in Martin McDonagh's *The Pillowman* (2003) resemble mental health patients, like the Alan of *Equus* as argued in the previous chapter in terms of how they are treated, interacted with, observed, questioned, tortured, and eventually, mentally or physically 'executed' depending on the institution. Furthermore, the prison in *The Pillowman* serves the society in ways that a mental hospital would: Isolate the prisoner/patient from society to prevent further harm, confine them into a limited physical and mental 'space' by physically and mentally limiting them, rehabilitate them, remove what caused the

crime/mental 'illness,' and eventually 'execute/cure' them and send them back into society if possible. Because "*The Pillowman*… mirrors the oppression of the state upon its people in the name of law and through the police institution" (Yelmiş 11), the policemen of the play, Tupolski and Ariel, are argued to serve as psychiatrists because their job is finding out the nature of the crime, investigating it, and taking action to discipline and oppress the public into 'normality'; which may correspond to finding out the nature of a mental 'illness,' diagnosing it, and treating the 'patient' 'accordingly' into 'normality' for psychiatrists.

Before discussing the play under these arguments, it is beneficial to provide biographical information on the author. Martin McDonagh was born in 1970 in Camberwell, London, and grew up in a family of Irish immigrants, making him Anglo-Irish. This greatly influenced his work and shaped his perspective on the world due to the 'conflict' between his origin of Irishness and his life in England: "[He is] second generation Irish, who [was] reared, educated, and socialised in Britain, but [he] also [exists] with strong, complex, and ambivalent connections with Ireland. Within the specifics of that Irish community operating within a London environment, McDonagh absorbed and rehearsed notions and conventions of Irishness and much more besides" (Jordan 2-3). He began his career in the 1990s as a playwright, writing a series of highly acclaimed plays that established him as a unique voice in contemporary theatre. His three early works, *The Beauty Queen of Leenane* (1996), *A Skull in Connemara* (1997), and *The Lonesome West* (1997) are all set in the Irish countryside and are collectively known as *The Leenane Trilogy*. His later three plays are collectively known as *The Aran Islands Trilogy*, though the last one was never published as a play but was made into a film recently in 2022: *The Cripple of Inishmaan* (1996), *The Lieutenant of Inishmoore* (2001), and *The Banshees of Inisheerin* (2022). All of these plays won awards in addition to his *Hangmen* (2015) and most importantly for this thesis, *The Pillowman,* which had "actually been performed publicly in a rehearsed reading in Galway in April 1997" (Lonergan 102), six years before its being published.

Including *The Pillowman*, most of McDonagh's plays carry grotesque features, which partly originates from other British and international playwrights whose literary works have influenced him: "McDonagh's borrowing from other playwrights, including J.M

Synge, Harold Pinter, Samuel Beckett, and Franz Kafka, has been noted by both scholars and reviewers. His influences clearly include Quentin Tarantino, soap operas, and contemporary British playwrights like Mark Ravenhill and Sarah Kane" (Fitzpatrick 141). One of the characteristics of McDonagh, as might be understood from the playwrights he has had been influenced by, is mixing violence and humour in unnerving settings and stories, which might be especially likened to Tarantino and his works. It is also important to draw attention to McDonagh's frequent use of violence in his plays. It has been stated that "Martin McDonagh's plays either contain violence or are based on violence… The plot story of *A Skull in Connemara* is based on violence… In *The Lieutenant of Inishmore*, there are so many murders that, at the end of the play, Davey and Donnay plan another murder to end all that violence. *The Pillowman* is one [*sic*] the plays that both displays and is based on violence" (Bozbey 27-28). However, he has been criticised both in relation to the high number of Irish characters in his plays (*The Pillowman* is outside this statement), and frequent use of violence:

> McDonagh has been criticised for his liberal use of violence and cultural stereotypes in his plays, yet when viewed by Irish audiences it becomes clear that he is subverting common characterisations by emphasising known stereotypes. When interpreted using Foucault's concepts of truth, knowledge, and power, the violence in McDonagh's plays is necessary to the action and characters' development. (Shalom 53)

This is also the case in *The Pillowman*, because as will be argued later in this chapter, violence is used in 'discursive formation,' and the collection of information in the 'disciplining and punishing' processes in relation to Foucault's arguments on the topic.

The Pillowman is an exception among McDonagh's plays, taking place within an unnamed country/government, with characters speaking plain English instead of English infused with Irish dialect and idioms, like the language in his *Leenane Trilogy*, 'cod Irish,' which is "the specific dialect of McDonagh's Leenane [existing] only within the world of his plays" (Dennis 138). "Before his outstanding work *The Pillowman*, he wrote mainly about the Irish and Ireland" (Yelmiş 5); however, as the representation of his Irish characters were criticised by Irish scholars as being 'violent, barbaric, and stupid' (Lonergan 101) and seen as false representations of the Irish and Irishness to international

audiences, his *Pillowman* has been argued to be a response to this criticism, putting the play within a context of literature, instead of history. Lonergan has argued that

> [i]f McDonagh had wanted to defend himself against such accusations, *The Pillowman* would have been an ideal response. It comprehensively asserts the autonomy of the writer, arguing that although a storyteller can elicit reactions of pleasure or pity or disgust, he or she is not responsible if audiences choose to react negatively to what they read, see or hear. If we apply the apparent theme of [the play] to McDonagh's critical reception, a clear message seems to emerge: that he is entitled to write plays however he wishes, and if a theatremaker or audience member in Ohio or Tokyo or anywhere else misinterprets his intentions, then McDonagh should not be held responsible – *just as his protagonist Katurian should not be held responsible when his brother Michal is inspired to act out the murders that Katurian merely imagines in his short stories* (Lonergan 101-102, emphasis added)

Hence, as the play itself lacks a physical and historical context (besides taking place in a prison) and is open to interpretation, it might be seen as a critical response towards the 'false' criticism he had received about his former representation of the Irish. This 'lacking' has been also somewhat criticised by Billington, who argues that "where [his] previous work, such as *The Lieutenant of Inishmore*, fed off existing Irish forms, in his new play he is shooting in the European dark. The result, while clever, has a feeling of hollowness," however, he seems to agree that the subject of the play is "the dangerous power of literature" ("*The Pillowman*"), which might be another way of saying that any kind of misinterpretation of a work is at least potentially harmful either to the audience, or the author.

To summarise the play; in *The Pillowman*, Katurian Katurian Katurian is a short story writer living in a "totalitarian f***ing dictatorship" (Shaffer 23) along with his older brother Michal who is mentally 'ill' and 'slow' due to physical and emotional trauma he faced from seven to fourteen years old. In *in-medias-res* fashion, the play starts with Katurian's interrogation by a detective, Tupolski, and a policeman, Ariel. Tupolski is a detective and "the number one" in this case. Ariel, on the other hand, is a policeman who is really violent and 'who hates people who hurt children,' not unlike Tupolski, but more extremely (McDonagh 77). It is revealed that Katurian is being questioned about his short stories, and thinking that the accusation on him is related to political matters and his role as an author, he argues that none of his short stories 'suggests' anything and he proposes to remove the section(s) he might have written even if it is accidentally political. It is later

revealed that Katurian and Michal are interrogated because of the recent killings of children who were killed in ways which were described in detail in Katurian's short stories, namely "The Little Apple Men," "The Tale of the Town on the River," "The Little Jesus" (the latter is not 'performed' by the murderer and is instead replaced by "The Little Green Pig"). The interrogation is violent. The main factors behind the violence and torture are Ariel's own violent nature (which stems from his own traumatic past) and the 'freedom' of the interrogators in getting the information they want; physically, they may beat up, electrocute, or partially drown the 'suspect'; mentally, they may confuse, disorient, and 'trick' him. Although it is not entirely clear that the physical aspect of this interrogation 'technique' is completely 'lawful' in their totalitarian government (the equipment required are present in the interrogation room seemingly at all times, implying their legality), the mental aspect of it is in the code of the policemen's education. The audience finds out as the interrogation takes place and the brothers talk in a separate room in a different scene, that Michal is the one who killed the children according to how Katurian had described them in his short stories and read them to Michal. It is revealed that Michal was tortured as a child by his parents to 'inspire' Katurian, who is unaware that he has a brother and is forced to listen to a boy screaming because of the pain in a room adjacent to Katurian's so that he may turn out to be a great writer: Michal is being tortured as an experiment, the aim of which is to make Katurian an excellent author. Katurian finds out about this and to save Michal whose brain was 'damaged beyond repair' (McDonagh 34), he kills both his parents using a pillow to asphyxiate them. During present time, after finding out from Michal that he killed two children (supposed as three by Katurian at that point), Katurian kills Michal with a pillow in the same way he killed his parents, so that at least he may die in his sleep peacefully because they will be executed soon, anyway. Katurian's only hope, having given up on his life because he knows he will be executed soon, is saving his stories for the people who will continue to live. To do this, he makes an agreement with the policemen, falsely confessing that he killed three children along with two adults who are his parents to save his stories from being burned from history. It seems that the third child was never killed and just painted green according to one of the few peaceful stories Katurian had written. The play ends with Katurian's execution and his stories "sealed away to remain unopened for fifty-odd years" (McDonagh 34).

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the binary between body and mind is blurred in treating an individual with a mental 'illness.' In *The Pillowman*, the argument stays the same. Punishing Michal (representing the body, in this case) for the murders is enough neither for the institution nor the officers conducting the investigation:

> TUPOLSKI. Along with the evidence we found in your house, your brother, spastic or not, has, under duress or not, admitted enough about the killings for us to execute him before the evening's out, but, as Ariel said, he's hardly the brains behind the operation, so we want you to confess too. We like executing writes. Dimwits we can execute any day. And we do. (McDonagh 30)

It can be understood from this monologue that the mind that 'caused' the crime is as crucial in a 'case' as the body who/which committed it. Michal is a "dimwit" and Katurian is deemed a 'psychopath' by the standards of Tupolski and Ariel and presumably the state they live in, however, the state of their subjects' mental health seems to carry no importance as Katurian is executed after killing Michal, anyway. This is because in the society of the fictional setting, it is seemingly unnecessary to upkeep mental hospitals because the mentally 'ill' can be executed without hesitation as pointed out by Tupolski. *The Pillowman'*s totalitarian government seems to be like pre-19th century France as explained by Foucault, before a "whole set of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgements concerning the criminal have become lodged in the framework of penal judgement" (Foucault, *Discipline* 19). The lack of a psychiatrist in the judgement of Katurian and Michal's offences may hint at a lack of general mental healthcare in the government, which may be the reason behind Michal's being interrogated at a prison, and not being under 'treatment' in a mental hospital. Therefore, including and punishing 'criminals' *and* 'mentally ill criminals,' the prison in *The Pillowman* serves the purposes of a mental hospital, *as well*: To upkeep the functioning of the general society unseen in the play, the prison and its apparatuses aim to 'normalise' the 'abnormal' by removing the 'abnormal' part(s) from the person's individual character through 'discipline,' or by removing the 'abnormal' individual altogether from society itself. The latter seems to be

chosen by the penal system of *The Pillowman*, which is a reason why Dysart's dream/nightmare of sacrificing 'abnormal' children for the sake of the 'normal' in *Equus* seems to be a real-life practice for Tupolski and Ariel in *The Pillowman*.

In addition to this purpose of removing 'ab-' from the '-normal,' the prison, and Tupolski and Ariel, serve to conduct 'mass therapy' or 'public penal education' by punishing the actual criminal and publicising this punishment to general society with the hopes of 'sending out a signal' (McDonagh 30) that is supposed to deter other people from committing crimes and, arguably, showing signs of mental 'illness' which might be considered crimes in themselves. In the specific case of *The Pillowman*, Ariel states that executing a writer sends out a message to the public that conveys, 'do not go around killing children.' This statement may be applicable to all crimes and criminals, because when an individual is executed for whatever reason, that reason becomes something to avoid as a citizen who wishes to retain his/her life against the governing body and not become a criminal.

Accordingly, Ariel's 'message' resembles the function of the public tortures and executions of the 'past' as explained by Foucault:

> The function of the public torture and execution was to reveal the truth; and in this respect it continued, in the public eye, the work of the juridical torture conducted in private. It added to the conviction the signature of the convicted man. A successful public execution justified justice, in that it published the truth of the crime in the very body of the man to be executed. (Foucault, *Discipline* 44)

While not entirely public as Foucault's description of the public punishments of 18th century France is, the penal workflow of the government in *The Pillowman* allows for a 'mass therapy,' or a public process of teaching the law/ideology of the governing body to the masses by making the punishments public. This is seemingly done by keeping the interrogation/investigation a secret and making the punishment not publicly executed but publicly known. In this way, the prison as an institution 'punishes' the criminal and 'disciplines' the public.

In *The Pillowman*, therefore, the prison and its apparatuses differ from mental hospitals not in terms of their subjects, motivations, or techniques, but in terms of their 'target audience.' While the hospital deals with the 'patient' in order to individually 'treat' him/her, Tupolski and Ariel (the prison) punish the criminal to publicly 'discipline' the general society. Furthermore, both institutions 'kill' the patient-criminal who first came into the physical building: While the mental 'patient' leaves the hospital as a 'healthy' person in psychological terms and after 'ideal' processes including medication, the criminal either leaves the prison as someone else due to the experiences, rehabilitations, and interactions s/he might have had during imprisonment, or is executed in the case of *The Pillowman* as punishment and never gets to leave the building. Nevertheless, both institutions either change the person by removing the 'insane' or 'criminal' parts of their individuality and effectively 'executing' the individual who was brought to the building in the first place, or literally execute the person. Hence, to create and upkeep a 'desired normality,' the specific individualities and characteristics of specific people and groups of people within a society which might overstep the boundaries of the 'normal' are filed down.

Foucault's thoughts on 'disciplines' summarise the nature, purpose, and methods of the prison in *The Pillowman*:

> It might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities… [The disciplines] try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost…; secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible…; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses… within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. (Foucault, *Discipline* 218)

It *might* be argued that in a dystopic, totalitarian state in which mental hospitals are seemingly deemed unnecessary, the most efficient way of disciplining the public and punishing the mentally 'ill' may be executing them and making this public as might be understood from Tupolski's outburst:

> TUPOLSKI. [You] execute a writer, it sends out a signal, y'know?.. It sends out the signal

'DON'T… GO… AROUND… KILLING…LITTLE…F***ING…KIDS.' (McDonagh 30)

This may be a specific and rather extreme example, however, if ethics is generally absent, 'the execution' method arguably requires the "lowest possible cost" while bringing the effects of its power to its maximum intensity and extending it to the public to increase the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system as Foucault describes above. However, if ethics is generally present and prisons and mental hospitals coexist, like in *Equus* or contemporary real-life governments, it might be argued that the same process is done in mental hospitals through individual 'treatment' through confinement, cheaply produced medication, and 'regaining' the 'patient' back into society. This comparison extends the argument of the blurred line between body and mind; the incarceration in the context of the prison corresponds to the hospitalisation in that of the mental hospital; the bullet used for executing or even threatening the inmate corresponds to the mass-produced medication used to 'neutralise' patients so that they do not commit mental (like being 'abnormal') or literal crimes. Both institutions, therefore, use the body to alter the mind, and use the mind to alter the body, so that the crime and/or the 'mental illness' of the individual in question does not get 'worse,' which can apparently be achieved through mental and/or physical execution.

In addition to the effectiveness of such punishment, its accuracy seems important, as well, not unlike how a diagnosis is key for the 'effective treatment' of a patient. Even though Michal and Katurian's respective confessions to the policemen were enough to them at first, the policemen kept questioning Katurian as he wrote his "*lengthy confession*" (McDonagh 73) until they found out that the third victim might be still alive, and Ariel and his party went to search for her. This is important because when Katurian finishes his confession and hands it over to the policemen, they were believing at that point that Katurian killed in total six people, including three children; and considering that they are willing to execute him then and there, Ariel's pointing out how Katurian's childhood might be used as a defence in court shows how punishing the 'correct' person in the 'correct' way is still applicable even in this dystopian government:

> ARIEL. Y'know, your childhood could be used as a pretty decent defence in court. Well, it could if we weren't going to by-pass all that court shit and shoot you in an hour. (McDonagh 77)

The reason for their aggressive by-passing might be linked to their hatred towards child murderers, and it might be argued that if Katurian had not confessed falsely to killing children so that he may save his stories and aroused the hatred of the policemen, he might have had a chance at court, even though he is a criminal for killing his parents and eventually, his brother, and even though Ariel and Tupolski seem to like executing writers. Furthermore, Ariel and Katurian might be compared in terms of the crimes they have committed (excluding the killing of Michal for the argument's sake): Ariel killed his own father because he was sexually abused by him as a child; and Katurian killed his own parents because of heavy trauma inflicted on him and his brother when they were children. However, Ariel is a policeman whereas Katurian is a criminal, mostly because of the children involved in the case. This shows, even in this totalitarian government, crimes are held differently under the penal system and the level of extremity and the nature of the crimes themselves are important in choosing the 'correct' and 'accurate' punishment for the criminal; much like how different mental 'conditions' 'require' different methods and levels of 'treatment' shaped accordingly to the 'patient' and the mental 'illness.' While explaining the 'examination' as a part of the 'disciplining' process, Foucault mentions how each individual under examination is made into a 'case':

> [The individual is] a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power. The case is no longer, as in casuistry or jurisprudence, a set of circumstances defining an act and capable of modifying the application of a rule; it is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalised, excluded, etc. (Foucault, *Discipline* 191).

If Ariel and Katurian are compared under the penal system in judicial terms, they both have committed the same crime (excluding the killing of Michal), however, as Foucault has argued, the 'case' is not only the circumstances and the actual, physical crime itself; it is the individual when compared to others and the crime when compared to other crimes

and established laws and rules originated from them, creating a discourse to follow. This is how Ariel could be “corrected and normalised” whereas Katurian is quite literally excluded from life at the end of the investigation/interrogation. This system of ‘classification’ of ‘criminals’ might be seen employed further when considering that Michal is never physically tortured by the policemen even though he is a suspect, the same position as Katurian, ‘thanks to’ his perceived mental ‘capacity,’ which is seemingly able to be compared to that of a child.

Hence, to punish accordingly to the discourse created by the classifications and rules, the policemen need knowledge on their suspect and the crime itself. As apparatuses of the prison, they may use surveillance, previous and ongoing investigation (before and after the suspects are detained), and as argued above, interrogation. These are all forms of collecting knowledge to overpower the detained and pin the crime correctly to the individual. Similar to a psychiatrist, the policemen investigate Michal and Katurian’s past, and their routine before they even come in (as implied by their questions about the ‘Jew quarter in the first scene of the play); incarcerate, isolate, and watch them within the institution, and question, interrogate, and gain knowledge directly from them so that a correct judgement (or diagnosis) be made on them and the case itself. In this respect, knowledge provides the policemen with all the power they need to change Katurian and Michal’s nouns from ‘suspects’ to ‘criminals,’ and punish them accordingly. As it is Dysart’s job to ‘diagnose’ and *then* ‘treat,’ Tupolski and Ariel’s job is to ‘judge’ and *then* ‘punish/execute.’ The first steps of both processes require knowledge to be collected before moving on to the next, and the initial and one of the most prominent ways of gathering knowledge is panoptic surveillance.

Tupolski and Ariel (or the prison as an institution itself) carry the means to conduct panoptic surveillance. This may be deduced from the fact that the policemen are aware of Katurian’s stories in the first place. The play makes no hint of a structure like the internet of our society that could have contained and make available Katurian’s stories much more publicly than ‘traditional’ publishing could, and, considering that the burning of the physical copies of the stories is enough of a threat that everyone involved is convinced that that would be the end of them, it should be safe to assume that they are the only copies

to exist and that the policemen are aware of their existence only because the person who wrote them is being constantly watched. Even if not, the policemen threatening Katurian with burning his stories may correspond to censoring them from the public, which is effectively what is 'supposed' to happen to his stories for 'fifty-odd years,' after which they may be published or made available to the public again. This "highlights the problem of restricting individual freedoms in a totalitarian regime" (Çiçek 37), which seems similar to Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) and its protagonist who is paranoid to death since he illegally owns a pen and a notebook into which he writes his thoughts like a diary.

Considering that only one of Katurian's stories was published ("The Tale of the Town on the River") and that the policemen had read a lot of his stories before Katurian and Michal were brought in, linking the murders to these stories is seemingly only possible through the government already knowing about the stories and having read them, or, in an arguably less possible way, conducting investigation on the murders and relating them specifically to short stories in general before finding out about Katurian's writings; since although deemed to be a good story writer by himself, Michal, and even the policemen, namely Tupolski (McDonagh 92), he and his short stories seem by no means famous or popular, and that is why being able to connect the stories to the crimes requires previous information about the stories, which requires extensive surveillance due to Katurian's stories being not known by many people. This argument strengthens the idea that regardless of their relation to crime, individuals (or at least their literary works) are being surveyed continuously by the apparatuses of the state with or without the individuals' knowledge, implying constant panoptic gaze.

Furthermore, before learning that the interrogation is about child murders, Katurian assumes that he is accused of something political he may have written accidentally. This is indicative that the characters live in a type of government that closely watches society and its productions, in this case literary works, so that the ideology it represents and supports is never damaged and that the institutions of this government take action towards people who commit the 'crime' of damaging it; including criminals, 'retards whom they can kill every day' (McDonagh 30) and people who are 'abnormal' in terms of the ways

in which they do not 'fit in' the society; physical, mental, or in ways related to the person's past, such as having committed a crime:

> [*The Pillowman*] considers the circulation of ideology in a contemporary, we are to assume, unnamed totalitarian state. The drama establishes the regimes through which citizens are recruited, indoctrinated, and interpellated by systems and structures. It considers how institutions, totalitarian and democratic, through narratives socialize, discipline, and induce re-enactment, most especially within the boundaries of family life. (Jordan, "War on Narrative" 176)

Accordingly, it might be said that even before penal punishment begins and even before an individual becomes a 'criminal,' s/he is being surveyed in this totalitarian state in case s/he commits a crime and needs to be surveyed further under the light of the information the state already has on the individual. In this sense, it might be argued that "the circulation of ideology" includes the creation *and* the enforcement of discourse, and because of this, panoptic surveillance seems necessary to upkeep the regimes of citizens established by the state and it makes sure that the narratives its institutions create to discipline and socialise the 'normal society' stays as the 'norm.' Hence, 'authorities' 'author' the general society's 'norms,' they write/create, distribute, and enforce the ideology which is 'supposed' to be the 'norm' to conform to. Accordingly, in writing/creating his own stories, it seems that Katurian steps outside the 'bigger,' 'lawful' boundaries of the 'norms' that encompass him and arguably everything he interacts with. Katurian must act according to the 'real authority,' just like Alan in *Equus*, who, in creating his own 'reality/religion,' steps outside the 'norms' which have been placed on his mind as mental 'bars' to bar him from, and punished for, not conforming. In this respect, Katurian's stories and Alan's 'religion' are similar because they both create discourses; they 'author' a reality that is different to the reality established by the 'authorities.' In relation to 'authorities,' the constant surveillance and the threat of Katurian's stories being censored provide insights on Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses in relation to the creation and the distribution/enforcement of ideology in shaping and enforcing the 'norm' of the government in *The Pillowman*. Althusser argues that

> Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly *by ideology*, but they also function secondarily by repression… Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to 'discipline' not only their shepherds, but also their flocks… The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship), etc. (Althusser 81, emphasis in original)

Accordingly, by burning the stories/censoring them completely from the public, the policemen of the play would be destroying a cultural element while creating a literary field that is devoid of Katurian's stories, which is effectively creating and enforcing 'normality' through the 'destruction' of the 'abnormal.'

To do this, knowledge is required about the persons, topics, and events in relation to the 'crime' itself. In accordance with this, to enforce 'norms,' the mental hospital and the prison share the usage of knowledge collected by panoptic means, surveillance and constant control of subjects. Additionally, they share psychological processes of learning about the 'subject' and the 'case' at hand. Though it might be said that a psychiatrist/patient communication is more 'honest' than the communication between the policemen and Katurian and Michal in *The Pillowman*, in both institutions, psychological means and 'tricks' are openly used; which is especially seen when a comparison is made to the communication between Dysart and Alan in *Equus*. Tupolski and Ariel have been discursively educated to psychologically 'play' with their prisoner so that they may get knowledge out of him. This is revealed when Ariel confronts Tupolski about the way Tupolski proceeds with the investigation:

> ARIEL. [This investigation] has been lacking in focus and clarity from the start… Such as what was that whole 'peripheral vision' thing? That whole 'peripheral vision at the bottom of your eyes' thing? What was all that about?
>
> TUPOLSKI. Disconcert and destabilise the prisoner with asinine nonsense, *it's in all the guidebooks,* Ariel. I would like now to continue questioning the prisoner without *the aid of your electrical claptrap*, so could you disconnect Mr Katurian, if you don't mind, I'd like him to focus. (McDonagh 82, emphases added)

This dialogue explains how psychological ‘tricks’ have been used until this point by the policemen according to their “guidebooks” to confuse Katurian for more information. The policemen ask ‘unrelated’ questions and pick on ‘annoying’ details, like Tupolski’s asking about the blindfold on Katurian in the beginning of the first act, saying “who left this on you?” (McDonagh 3), as if Katurian could have any information on that topic. Disregarding the nature and purpose of a blindfold, even if Katurian knows the person who initially blindfolded him, it is seemingly illogical to ask him about the person who ‘left’ the blindfold on, since anyone who has not removed it might be included in the answer. The question itself is absurd and unnerving because there is no way to answer it, which is why Tupolski asks it. During the first act of the play, the policemen talk and ask in a similar fashion continuously to be able to psychologically undermine and weaken the suspect’s mind and gather information accordingly.

Just as they start the interrogation, the psychological ‘torture’ starts, too. To establish power over Katurian, who is already submissive and willing to ‘help’ to begin with, elaborate and ‘thought-out’ processes are employed by the policemen:

> TUPOLSKI. I have to fill this form out now. It’s a form in case anything bad happens to you in custody… We’ve got a mistake here with your name, I think. Your surname is Katurian, yes?
>
> KATURIAN. Yes.
>
> TUPOLSKI. See, we’ve got your first name as Katurian.
>
> KATURIAN. My first name *is* Katurian.
>
> TUPOLSKI. Your first name is Katurian?
>
> KATURIAN. Yes.
>
> …
>
> KATURIAN. My parents were funny people.
>
> TUPOLSKI. Hm. Middle initial?
>
> KATURIAN. K.
>
> *Tupolski looks at him. Katurian nods, shrugs.*

> TUPOLSKI. Your name is Katurian Katurian Katurian?
>
> KATURIAN. Like I said, my parents were funny people.
>
> TUPOLSKI. Mm. For 'funny' I guess read 'stupid f***ing idiots.' (McDonagh 8, emphasis in original)

Tupolski's questions, at first, are simple to answer and Katurian gives his answers simply and truthfully. However, Tupolski's last comment offsets the present tone and potentially surprises Katurian, which seems intentionally done to 'destabilise' him. The whole form seems to serve the same function of 'unnerving and disconcerting' the suspect for Tupolski. Initially, he gains Katurian's trust that nothing will happen to him during the oncoming interrogation; however, this is short-lived because Tupolski will rip the paper in half just a minute later, saying, "[that] *wasn't* a form in case anything bad happens to you in custody. I was just mucking around… It was a piece of paper I was about to tear in two" (McDonagh 9, emphasis in original). Immediately after 'gaining his trust' and destroying it, Tupolski starts asking questions related to Katurian's stories starting with "The Little Apple Men." The fact that Tupolski's questions come immediately after his attempt at destabilising Katurian suggests that this psychological "mucking around" is another 'tool' in the policemen's interrogation kit they use for 'extracting' knowledge to be used against the 'criminals.' This 'tool' is not unlike the ones Dysart uses in *Equus* as a psychiatrist. The above scene is reminiscent of the scene in *Equus* in which Dysart and Alan's first appointment takes place, when Dysart, through Alan's jingle-singing, figures out details from Alan's family life to overpower and silence him. Dysart comments on the jingles and arguably 'pretends' to like one of them just before questioning Alan on his parents and gains knowledge through the lack of an answer he gets. Hence, a very similar, if not the same technique is used by both a psychiatrist and two policemen: Gain the 'subject's' trust immediately before questioning him and overpowering him with the questions, the way the questions are asked, and the knowledge collected through them. Furthermore, both scenes include mentioning the family of the person in question, another way of 'weakening' the 'subject.

Along with verbally induced confusion and pressure, Katurian is made to experience anxiety, agitation, anger, and disappointment through the use of a placebo-like process just after a box of unknown (to him, yet) contents is brought in front of him:

> *Tupolski goes to the filing cabinet, takes out a metal box the size of a biscuit tin, then sits back down with it, placing it on the table between them.*
>
> …
>
> KATURIAN. What's in the box?
>
> *Sound of a man screaming hideously a few rooms away. Katurian stands, becoming flustered.*
>
> That's my brother.
>
> TUPOLSKI. (*listening*) Yes, I believe it is.
>
> KATURIAN. What's he doing to him?
>
> TUPOLSKI. Well, something f***ing horrible. I don't know, do I?
>
> KATURIAN. You said you wouldn't touch him.
>
> TUPOLSKI. I haven't touched him.
>
> KATURIAN. But you said he would be fine. You gave me your word.
>
> *The screaming stops.*
>
> TUPOLSKI. Katurian. I am a high-ranking police officer in a totalitarian f***ing dictatorship. What are you doing taking my word about anything? *Ariel returns, wrapping his bloodied hand in white cloth.* (McDonagh 23)

This dialogue is another example of having gained trust and breaking it, confusing Katurian, creating rising tension, and eventually breaking him to make him open the box to see what all this is about. To his shock, there are five little toes inside. All this process begins with fake torture as it is revealed later on that Michal was never beaten by Ariel, instead, he was asked to scream as if he was in pain to make Katurian think that Michal

(who is innocent to Katurian at that point) is being tortured to ultimately make Katurian open the box, see the contents, and question him about it:

> Even the probability of his brother's exposure to torture and harm again is enough for Katurian to shed the role which has been cut out for him [both as a son because he killed his parents, and as a younger brother]… and the severed child toes in the box Tupolski gave Katurian brings him to a crisis by making him face his past, and reinforce his uneasiness, fears, and questions. (Yorgancıoğlu 483)[1]

This is a psychological trick played on Katurian, and it is arguably the 'placebo' effect acting on him, which is supposed to make him speak, hence his change of 'course of action' into saving his stories and not his and his brother's lives after he hears the truth from Michal in the second act and understands the inevitable punishment of execution. After the revelation of the crime, for Katurian, "[suddenly] the prison may not mean imprisonment, but represent a strategy of fear and control employed by the detectives to achieve their desired results" (Haughton 85), which is a 'description' that arguably matches with that of a mental hospital. In *Equus*, for example, one of Dysart's strategies is to make Alan fear Nurse for his desired result of general 'treatment,' and another is to use Alan's reluctance and unwillingness to provide suitable and immediate information to Dysart, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

It seems important to mention at this point that both Michal and Katurian are able to hear each other's screams from the respective rooms they have been situated and interrogated in. This has to do with the physical arrangement and the planning of the physical institution itself; how the rooms have been placed to serve a function in addition to simply being rooms to interrogate in, and what has been placed in the rooms and how all of these are used for their intended purposes. Foucault, mentioning 'disciplines' in relation to this topic, has argued that,

> [in] organising 'cells,' 'places' and 'ranks,' the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they

[1] Translation from Turkish to English is mine.

> mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture… The first of the great operations of discipline is, therefore, the constitution of '*tableaux vivants,*' which transform the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities. (Foucault, *Discipline* 148)

Accordingly, the sole purpose of the arrangement of the rooms in the prison in *The Pillowman* might not be to allow prisoners to hear each other scream, however, Tupolski and Ariel use this to their advantage. In addition to this function, the cells in this prison are decorated accordingly to give a sense of what the cell is supposed to mean to the prisoners. The police interrogation room in which Katurian is interrogated is different from where Michal has been situated. In addition to conveying to the audience what is 'meant to happen' within specific settings, these rooms/cells paint a 'living picture' as mentioned above, providing 'fixed positions,' 'carving out individual segments,' and 'guaranteeing the obedience of individuals.' Hence, while the interrogation room is home to the power struggle between the policemen and Katurian, Michal's cell is home to opening up, revelation, and turning 'inside' for the truth. These two settings might be argued to correspond to Dysart's office and Alan's room, for which the same 'qualities' are applicable, as well, showing further how Foucault's 'disciplines' are present in both institutions in very similar if not the same ways.

The cells provide isolation, and isolation, according to Foucault, is key for the submission of the subjects: "[The] isolation of the convicts guarantees that it is possible to exercise over them, with maximum intensity, a power that will not be overthrown by any other influence; solitude is the primary condition of total submission… *Isolation provides an intimate exchange between the convict and the power that is exercised over him*" (Foucault, *Discipline* 237, emphasis added). This is important because thanks to having been left alone in the second act of the play, Michal and Katurian could talk and the truth could be revealed to the audience; and later after Michal has been killed and Katurian could reflect on the situation in total solitude, to the policemen, as well. Tupolski and Ariel leaving the brothers in the same cell for a while might be a planned move or they might have just wanted to take a break for a sandwich (McDonagh 37), but it can be argued that most of the key revelations of this play take place only after the 'isolation' of the brothers for some time. In *Equus*, Alan could only reveal how his fascination with

horses really started while alone to a tape recorder, to which Dysart listened later for important information related to his diagnosis. It seems that a similar, psychological process is present in *The Pillowman*, as well. In short, Foucault's argument on isolation and its effects on the 'convict' and the case itself seems to be applicable to the brothers and their case in this play; inner reflection, admission, and ultimately, submission, as seen when Katurian 'gives up' on his life as he kills Michal and decides to save his stories by submitting himself to the policemen fully.

This subjection is made possible not only by psychological 'tricks,' but also by sheer physical pain caused by bodily torture. As has been argued both in the previous chapter and this one, a powerful body (an institution, an apparatus of one like the policemen, or simply an individual) might affect a subjected body's mind through changes to his/her physical situation like incarceration/change of place, isolation, and/or physical torture. Accordingly, Tupolski and Ariel's use of physical pain inflicted on Katurian serves to establish their power even further while aiming to collect more knowledge out of Katurian's mind through his body. Therefore, it is immediately functional to subject him even more through pain, and in the long run, it is functional by possibly getting more information out of him which will be used later on as tools to overpower him further.

Foucault has stated that "[we] should admit… that power produces knowledge;... that *power and knowledge directly imply one another*; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault, *Discipline* 27, emphasis added). In this respect, power, in the case of *The Pillowman*, is exercised both physically and mentally on the brothers; and in both ways, it is used to gain further knowledge which will enable even more power through the metaphorical placement of the brothers against the 'normative' discourse. This cycle of power and its establishment eventually leads to Katurian's execution as enough evidence (information/knowledge) is collected. The ultimate punishment and the ultimate discipline are achieved through the ultimate way of exercising power: Shooting a bullet to shut down both the body and the mind at the same time; since there is no further knowledge, evidence, or information to

be collected from the individual whose 'purpose,' as might be argued, is to provide them to the governing body according to the government or its repressive tools in general.

Hence, before the execution, the physical violence in *The Pillowman* serves to weaken the mind for knowledge in addition to establishing further power and determining whether the 'suspect' is a criminal, or not. This is how the play begins to "[depict] the state's imposition of subjective violence on its subjects through institutions such as the law, police forces, and prison" (Akşehir-Uygur 364), with subjective violence referring to literal physical torture inflicted on Katurian in Žižekian terms. It can be argued that even the 'threat/suggestion' of violence to gain more knowledge is seen as enough by Tupolski; however, Ariel takes his 'suggestion' literally in this example when Katurian discovers five bloody toes inside the box:

> ARIEL. That poor little Jew boy's five f***ing toes and they were found in your house and it's nothing to do with you?
>
> KATURIAN. (*crying*) I just write stories!
>
> ARIEL. They make a nice final f***ing twist, don't they?
>
> TUPOLSKI. Make him swallow them.
>
> *Ariel wrenches Katurian off the chair.*
>
> ARIEL. Where's the mute girl?! Where's the mute girl ?!
>
> *Ariel tries to force the toes into Katurian's mouth.*
>
> TUPOLSKI. Don't make him swallow them, Ariel. What are you doing?
>
> ARIEL. You *said* make him swallow them.
>
> TUPOLSKI. Only to scare him! They're evidence. Have *some* sense! (McDonagh 29, emphases in original)

Here, the first evidence 'against' Katurian is shown to him on the 29th page, after a series of questions to cause psychological confusion which led up to this revelation where

physical force truly shows itself for the first time. This might be seen as a 'climax' of the policemen's interrogation 'script,' their (dis)course of 'interrogation.' The rising action consists of confusing questions asked to Katurian, the introduction of the box to the scene, and the revelation that his brother is in the next room who was – at the time thought by Katurian to be – tortured moments ago. The climax is when all these psychological factors are forced as the box is opened and Katurian is physically forced half-way to eat the contents. This part introduces physical pain and consequent physical and psychological trauma to the interrogation, all in the search for the lost mute girl.

When the more psychological part of the interrogation is apparently deemed 'not enough' by the policemen as they fail to get an answer from Katurian (who is still unaware of the crime), they resort to literal torture at the end of the first scene of the play:

> KATURIAN. I… believe that I'm not going to say another word to you until you let me see my brother. So torture me as much as you like, Detective Tupolski, 'cos I ain't saying another f***ing word.
>
> TUPOLSKI. (*pause*) I see. (*Pause.*) Then I'd best go get the electrodes.

After this, at the beginning of Act Two, Katurian's screams are heard by Michal:

> *Michal [is] listening to the intermittent screams of his brother, Katurian, being tortured a room away…*
>
> *Katurian screams again. Michal mimics them at length, till they fade away…*
>
> *Katurian screams again. Michal mimics till they fade, then gets up, idles around…*
>
> *Katurian screams. Michal just listens.*
>
> *Sound of next-door room being unbolted. Michal listens. Michal's cell is unbolted and the bloody, breathless Katurian is thrown in by Ariel.* (McDonagh 36-37)

As the torture conducted on Katurian turns physical, the interrogation and the punishment become “mixed” (Foucault, *Discipline* 41), and just like how disconcerting a suspect is part of the policemen’s guidebook/education/discourse as pointed out by Tupolski, a guidebook on how to torture a suspect might exist, as well. Nevertheless, Tupolski and Ariel use physical, classical torture to search for the ‘truth,’ explained by Foucault:

> Beneath an apparently determined, impatient search for truth, one finds in classical torture the regulated mechanism of an ordeal: a physical challenge that must define the truth; if the patient is guilty, the pains that it imposes are not unjust… In the practice of torture, pain, confrontation and truth were bound together: they worked together on the patient’s body. The search for truth through judicial torture was certainly a way of obtaining evidence, the most serious of all - the confession of the guilty person. (*Discipline* 41)

While Foucault is concerned with the penal system of 18th century France in the above quotation, the excerpt summarises how the policemen, or the prison as an institution, in *The Pillowman* employ classical torture to ‘extract’ knowledge from the criminal(s).

However, physical torture serves another purpose in this play besides gaining information; it is used to ‘create’ information, as well. Michal was tortured by the brothers’ parents as an ‘artistic experiment,’ and the sole aim for this was to create a successful short story writer. The torture and pain inflicted on Michal’s body is transposed into a physical part of psychological torture through Michal’s screams on Katurian’s mind when they were children. This ‘experiment’ is destructive for Michal and arguably constructive for, unbeknownst to him at the time, Katurian; “[in] other words, Katurian’s parents shape his desire without his realisation that it is only their desire that has passed to him” (Kolahjooei 103), which is a point that will be argued upon in the following paragraphs. In relation to this, psychological manipulation is conducted on Katurian as revealed by his narration of the double torture:

> KATURIAN. (*to Mother, in a boy’s voice*) ‘What were all those noises last night, Mama?’ (*normal voice*) he’d ask, after each long, desperate, sleepless night, to which his mother would ever reply…

> MOTHER. Oh little Kat, that's just your wonderful but overactive imagination playing tricks on you.
>
> KATURIAN. (*boy's voice*) Oh. Do all little boys of my age hear such sounds of abomination nightly?
>
> MOTHER. No, my darling. Only the extraordinarily talented ones. (McDonagh 31-32)

As Katurian tells the story of his and his brother's childhood, a binary is formed between the torture he is going through in the present and the torture of their childhood. In the former, torture is used to 'create' in the form of discursive formation, while in the latter, torture is used to 'find out,' place the 'abnormal' discourse against the general society, and eventually, destroy it. However, one similar quality of both 'instances' of torture is that an ideology is being forced on the subject(s), and, according to Foucault, this is how 'discipline' is distributed as a type of power:

> Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by 'specialised' institutions…, or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by preexisting authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganising their internal mechanisms of power…, or finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police). (*Discipline* 215-16)

It can be understood from this quotation that in *The Pillowman*, discipline, as a type of power, employs another sub-type of power that is physical violence and torture; and as a singular institution in itself, Michal and Katurian's family disciplines Katurian *into* a short story writer by punishing Michal for the process. However, as apparatuses of a governmental institution, Tupolski and Ariel's job is to enforce a much more generalised discipline, which is of societal 'norms.'

This is a conflict where the discipline of a specific family clashes with that of a government that encompasses all families in it. Hence, it may be argued that it is not Katurian and/or Michal who are punished by the police, but the way their parents have

disciplined them. The brothers, after being 'disciplined' in the way they did and placed within the discourse of their parents, have created their own mental 'bars' according to which they think or act; Katurian's stories got 'darker and darker,' and he 'had to' kill his parents, whereas Michal was 'brain-damaged beyond repair' and 'had to' kill children. After being convinced by his mother that only the talented children hear sounds of torture, Katurian continues his narration:

> KATURIAN. And that was that. And the boy kept on writing, and his parents kept encouraging him with the utmost love, but the sounds of the whirrs and screams kept going on… and his stories got darker and darker. They got better and better, due to all of the love and encouragement, as is often the case, but they got darker and darker, due to the constant sound of child-torture, as is also often the case. (McDonagh 32)

As his parents' experiment reaches success, the way Katurian writes and thinks evolve into including what is deemed 'should-not-be-included-in-a-mindset' by the government. Ariel, as an officer of this government, threatens Katurian:

> ARIEL. I'm a good policeman… good in the sense of I stand for something… I stand on the right side. The child's side. The opposite side to you. And so, naturally, when I hear that a child has been killed in a fashion… in a fashion such as this 'Little Jesus' thing… You know what? I would torture you to death just for *writing* a story like that, let alone acting it out!... F**k what your mum and dad did to you and your brother. F**k it. I'd've tortured the f**k out of them if I had them here, just like I'm gonna torture the f**k out of you now too. 'Cos two wrongs do not make a right. (McDonagh 78, emphasis in original)

Ariel's ideology, representing that of the government albeit in a violent way in itself, is opposite to the 'ideology' or the 'discipline' created by the Katurian parents since they are criminals for conducting the experiment. However, even though the parents were 'punished' by Katurian, the 'discipline' enforced on him and his brother lives on in the forms of stories and murders, and the psychological state of the brothers; which 'have to' be 'disciplined' again according to the 'norms.' This is similar to how in *Equus,* Alan's

parents, through actions and conflicts they have amongst themselves, and the outside world, have led Alan to create a religion of his own which led to the blinding of the horses. In both *Equus* and *The Pillowman*, crimes stemming from childhood trauma are committed; and the traumas are inflicted on the children in the way their parents discipline them. Ultimately, the disciplines both families conduct go against the disciplines that 'should' be conducted, hence the punishment the children go through.

Like how there is a power conflict between the 'discipline' of the family and the 'disciplines' of the government (the latter 'eliminates,' or is supposed to 'eliminate' the former), there are also different levels of power relationships and conflicts that take place within the prison in the play. The first to be mentioned is the power relationship between Katurian and the policemen. It starts with Katurian being completely submissive towards the policemen since he, at the time, believes that there is no crime that he is associated with, and this interrogation must be because of something 'accidental.' After the policemen introduce themselves, he states his submission clearly: "Well, the main thing I want to say is, I have complete respect for you and for what you do and I'm glad to help you in any way I can. I have complete respect" (McDonagh 3). The initial threats made by the policemen serve to establish further dominance over Katurian:

> KATURIAN. I will answer everything you want me to. You don't have to…
>
> ARIEL. There was never a question, 'You will answer everything we want you to.' There *was* a question, 'How much are you going to make us f**k you up in the meantime?' was what the question was.
>
> KATURIAN. I am going to try not to make you f**k me up at all because the reason is I will answer everything. (McDonagh 3)

The policemen, unlike Katurian, are aware in the beginning of this interrogation that Katurian's stories are linked to a series of murders, which is why despite his total and clear submission, they continue to dominate him and establish power over him. It might also be argued that thanks to the experience and education they have on their job, they

know that they must 'break the will' of their subject; even though the 'will' is of submissive nature at first, they pre-emptively "disconcert and destabilise the prisoner" (McDonagh 82) for the 'upcoming' stages of interrogation. The interrogation, in this case, may be likened to Foucault's 'examination' under his discussion of 'disciplines,' which was mentioned in the previous chapter:

> The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement… It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them… In it are combined the *ceremony of power* and the form of the experiment, the *deployment of force* and the *establishment of truth*… The superimposition of the *power relations* and knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance (*Discipline* 184-85, emphases added).

While Foucault's ideas revolve around more general terms in relation to the creation of a whole type of knowledge as power to be exercised on general society by the power upholders in the form of discourse, when considered in this specific case, the interrogation in *The Pillowman* corresponds to the same process: In the interrogation, a 'ceremony of power' is conducted by Tupolski and Ariel, who, by the 'deployment of force,' try to 'establish the truth.' It might also be stated that in the interrogation, power relations and knowledge relations go hand in hand as was argued before. Similarly in *Equus*, the deployment of knowledge was used by Dysart as a form of psychological power/force over Alan, and this was to 'establish the truth' under the name of a 'diagnosis,' instead of the 'judgement' of the policemen when compared to this play.

The 'deployment of force' is used not only on Katurian, but on Michal, as well. Not in the sense of physical torture, but by using Michal's body and threatening to hurt him, the policemen gain psychological leverage on Katurian by exploiting his love and care for Michal: "[He] is worried about his brother whom he has protected throughout his life even from his own parents by killing them with a pillow. Due to his stress, fear and panic, Katurian is easily deluded by Ariel and Tupolski" (Atasoy 15). The revelation of his brother's being in a prison cell in the same building is enough to unnerve Katurian:

> KATURIAN. Listen, I don't understand what I'm doing here… I don't have anything against anybody. Any Jews or you or anybody. I just write stories… That's my life. I stay in and I write stories.
>
> *Ariel stands, moves to the door.*
>
> ARIEL. This reminds me. I'm going to talk to the brother.
>
> *Ariel exits, Tupolski smiles, Katurian stunned, scared.*
>
> KATURIAN. My brother's at school.
>
> …
>
> TUPOLSKI. Your brother is one door down… What are you scared about?
>
> KATURIAN. I'm scared my brother is all alone in a strange place, and I'm scared your friend is gonna go kick the shit out of him, and I'm scared he's gonna come kick the shit out of me again although if he does it's okay, I mean I'd rather he didn't… he's got nothing to do with these stories anyway… so I just think it's completely unfair you should've brought him down here *and I think you should just f***ing go and f***ing let him out of here right now! Right f***ing now*! (McDonagh 14-15, emphasis added)

Even before a threat against Michal was specifically made, the knowledge that his brother is there causes psychological pressure on Katurian, hence the outburst. This affects the power relationship without shifting it; with this revelation, the policemen hold more power over Katurian, while Katurian starts and fails to undermine their authority as he continues to answer their questions. Only after Katurian is made to believe that his brother is being beaten in the next cell and he sees children's toes as evidence against him and his brother that he seriously refuses the policemen, and after that, he undergoes serious physical torture offstage.

It might be argued then, that Michal's being in the prison serves more than one purpose: First, as a potential 'witness' or a 'partner in crime' from whom valuable information (which translates into power that will be used in 'jurisdiction') might be gained; second, as the brother of the 'brains behind the operation' to create psychological and emotional pressure on Katurian; and third, as an 'anchor' of confession, because while the brothers

are left alone for a while and have a conversation, Michal confesses to Katurian almost 'accidentally,' which leads to Katurian killing him and planning a false confession of his own to save his brother from torture and execution, as well as his stories from not being passed down to the next generations. These 'qualities' Michal carries, such as being a 'suspect,' a 'witness,' and a brother, make him valuable to the policemen in terms of how his involvement in the interrogation provides an advantage over Katurian in the form of knowledge and leverage. Excluding the 'threat of violence' and focusing on the information he provides or is 'supposed to' provide, he serves a similar purpose Alan's family and close circle of people served for Dysart in *Equus*; sources of information which are used to overpower Alan, and to 'correctly diagnose' him.

After learning the truth from Michal and returning to the interrogation room, Katurian *seems* more submissive than before, since he writes out a half-true confession about the six people he claims to have murdered:

> KATURIAN. I've confessed to everything truthfully, just like I promised I would. And I believe that you'll keep all my stories with my case file and not release them until fifty years after my death, just like you promised you would.
>
> ARIEL. What makes you think we'll keep our word?
>
> KATURIAN. Because I think, deep down, you're honourable men.
>
> ARIEL. (*standing, seething*) Deep down?! Deep f***ing down…?!
>
> KATURIAN. Could you beat me up after I've finished this? I'm just up to the part about murdering my mother and father.
>
> *Katurian continues writing. Ariel lights a cigarette.*
>
> Thank you. (McDonagh 75-76)

Before, during the first act and at the end of it, Katurian's 'demands' were met with either policemen making fun of him or Katurian being tortured because he refused to give the information he did not have at that moment. Overall, until this point, his 'requests' of

seeing his brother or 'making' the policemen let him out were outright refused. However, now that Katurian is providing the information the policemen have been trying to get from him, he 'gains' a kind of authority over them through the power he 'has' by having and providing the information in question; at the same time, he also becomes, or at least seems to become, more submissive than before, because he is doing what the policemen want now. Katurian uses the power he indirectly gains from his submission to manipulate the policemen into saving his stories, because he knows he will be executed soon, anyway.

Accordingly, his 'demands' are now met as Ariel, arguably the more 'impulsive' and violent policeman of the two, stands back and lights a cigarette, having decided to let Katurian finish his confession instead of beating him up for speaking up. This 'change' in the power relationship between the policemen and Katurian shows how much power information carries with it, especially when considering the argument that Ariel could beat him up then and there and probably get the confession regardless of the pain which he has already inflicted on Katurian before. This visible, temporary and minor change in the power relationship between the two might be linked to the way information is conveyed. In panopticon terms, before beginning his confession, Katurian was "the object of information, [not] a subject in communication" (Foucault, *Discipline* 200), because the information on him and his brother, and the crime at hand was tried to be gathered through an investigation, panoptic surveillance, and eventually physical and psychological force. But now, as he begins and continues his confession, he turns into an 'object of information' through *becoming* a 'subject in communication' because he directly communicates the information he is asked to provide. This non-directional (still bottom to top) change in the flow of information changes how Katurian is treated by the policemen because for a while, they have to rely on the information Katurian provides them, and not the information gained from their specific investigation through panoptic means.

Accordingly, Katurian continues to subvert the policemen's authority over him, especially Ariel's. He almost reverses the roles and 'diagnoses' Ariel in this example: Just after receiving the full confession from Katurian, Ariel proceeds to torture him again after Katurian says that he trusts him with the preservation of his stories and Ariel begins a

monologue about how he hates people who hurt children and he is protecting the children by doing his job and he will reap the rewards when he is older and there are more children around because people will not be killing or hurting them thanks to him (McDonagh 77-78). He asks Katurian to kneel down so that he can connect the electrodes when Tupolski comes back from the 'forensics people':

> TUPOLSKI. Were you doing your 'Children are gonna come up and give me sweets when I'm an old man' speech?
>
> ARIEL. F**k. You… (*to Katurian*) You! Kneel down here, please. I've already asked you politely.
>
> *Katurian slowly goes over to Ariel. Tupolski sits at the desk, scans through the rest of the confession. Katurian kneels down.*
>
> KATURIAN. And who was the first one who told *you* to kneel down, Ariel? Your mum or your dad?
>
> *Ariel stops dead still. Tupolski's jaw drops…*
>
> TUPOLSKI. Oh you didn't go and tell him all your dad shit, did you, Ariel? Jesus!
>
> ARIEL. No, Tupolski, I didn't go and tell him all my dad shit… I've never said a word about my problem childhood. I wouldn't *use* the phrase 'problem childhood' to describe my childhood.
>
> TUPOLSKI. What phrase would you use? A 'f***ed by your dad' childhood? That isn't a phrase.
>
> *Ariel starts shaking slightly.*
>
> ARIEL. Would you like to give the prisoner any further information, Tupolski? (McDonagh 79-80, emphases in original)

This exchange between the policemen and Katurian unnerves Ariel who continues to connect the electrodes as he speaks, however, the electricity is never turned on because Katurian's deduction starts a conflict between Ariel, who finds Tupolski's behaviour disrespectful, and Tupolski, who is "just tired of everybody round here using their shitty

childhoods to justify their own shitty behaviour" (McDonagh 80). After the above exchange ends and Ariel is about to start torturing Katurian for punishment and arguably for 'fun,' Katurian instigates another conflict by asking where Ariel's father is now and ultimately saves himself from the torture before his execution:

> TUPOLSKI. Hurry up and torture the prisoner, please, Ariel. We've got to shoot him in half an hour.
>
> *Ariel connects the electrodes to the battery.*
>
> KATURIAN. Where's your father now, Ariel?
>
> ARIEL. Do not say a word, Tupolski! Do not say a word!..
>
> KATURIAN. Is he in prison?
>
> ARIEL. And you shut your mouth also, pervert.
>
> KATURIAN. Or you'll do what? Or you'll torture and execute me?... Is he in prison?...
>
> TUPOLSKI. He's not in prison, no… They *couldn't* arrest him…
>
> KATURIAN. Why couldn't they arrest him?
>
> *Ariel has cleared himself from the electrodes and is just about to turn the battery on when Tupolski, at the last possible moment, speaks.*
>
> TUPOLSKI. Because Ariel had already murdered him, of course.
>
> *Ariel laughs slightly, shaking again. He doesn't turn the battery on…*
>
> He held a pillow over his head while he was sleeping. I see you boys have a lot in common. (McDonagh 81-82, emphases on original)

Even though Katurian will be executed soon, Ariel tries to end this conversation by demanding Tupolski to shut up because the prisoner is gaining information from it. It might be argued that this is an excuse because Ariel seems to suffer from PTSD as he shakes at the mention of his childhood problems and that is the main reason for his wanting to end the conversation. However, whatever the true cause might be, his choosing *this* excuse supports further how information about someone, especially an authority

figure, carries the power to subvert the position and power of the figure in question, which is exactly what happens in the above dialogue. This is also similar to, if not the same as how, in *Equus*, Dysart overpowers Alan by deducing that at least one of his parents does not allow him to watch television: “By the way, which parent is it who won’t allow you to watch television? Mother or father? Or is it both?” (Shaffer I.iii.15). Comparing this to Katurian’s question quoted above; “[and] who was the first one who told *you* to kneel down, Ariel? Your mum or your dad?” (McDonagh 79) shows how Katurian subverts Ariel’s authority by questioning him, almost acting like an interrogator himself, and taking the role of a psychiatrist by asking the exact same question to subvert and overpower his ‘opponent’ in exactly the same way, since both Alan and Ariel give the same response of standing still in shock for at least a while. Another example would be Alan’s asking Dysart about the relationship with his wife, information which Alan is not ‘supposed’ to have, and this angers Dysart, which makes Alan ‘partially’ successful in subversion, not unlike Katurian, proving further the representation of Foucauldian power through the ‘collection’ of individual information.

Nevertheless, although Katurian’s attempts at subversion meet success in preventing further torture after he, even though falsely, confesses, they do not save him from ultimately being executed regardless of the actual truth which is revealed to the policemen near the end of the play that he never killed children and killed ‘only’ his parents and Michal, who would arguably be executed by the policemen if they had the chance, anyway. The situation is explained by Ariel who sympathises with Katurian just before he is executed:

> ARIEL. I know all this isn’t your fault. I know you didn’t kill the children. I know you didn’t want to kill your brother, and I know you killed your parents for all the right reasons, and I’m sorry for you, I’m really sorry for you, and I’ve never said that to anybody in custody before. But at the end of the day, I never liked your stories in the first f***ing place. Y’know? (McDonagh 101)

Ariel said before that he would "torture [him] to death just for *writing*" (McDonagh 78, emphasis added) such stories, however, after the truth is revealed, he does not torture Katurian, and at the end of the play, saves the stories which he 'never liked in the first place' from being burnt and erased from literary history or censored completely and isolated accordingly.

This shows how crimes, like how mental 'illnesses' are 'treated,' are punished according to the severity and the context in which they have been committed, and how they may be 'justifiable' but punishable at the same time. All this complexity can be understood and revealed only through information on the act itself, and knowledge about the person(s) in question and about the people they are related to/involved with, which are all gathered through investigation, interrogation, surveillance, and incarceration to allow for the collection of the previous ones, as well as to detain the person from public during the process. Additionally, all these types and methods of collecting information prove useful to classify individuals and contextualise their punishment through surveillance within the boundaries of the 'normal': "[One] finds in the programme of the Panopticon a… concern with individualising observation, with characterisation and *classification*" (Foucault, *Discipline*, 203). Accordingly, just like how Dysart of *Equus* complies with the 'rules' and 'treats' Alan's 'illness' with the information gained from individual observation, characterisation, and classification, Ariel does the same by not 'preventing' Tupolski who executes Katurian and asking why he did not provide the full ten seconds before his execution which was promised to Katurian moments before.

In conclusion, in determining and 'judging' the crime they are investigating, Tupolski and Ariel take on the role of the 'violent' psychiatrist by using psychological tricks along with physical violence to gather information from Katurian and, excluding violence, Michal. The policemen investigate the crime as if they are investigating a mental 'illness,' given that during the process, they learn about the past and current lives of the Katurian brothers, Michal's 'condition,' and which conditions have led to this point in addition to the information about the crime itself in order to 'categorise' the criminal and the crime according to their penal, 'judge-mental' discourse. The policemen have education on the

psychological aspects of interrogation and they use that to their advantage of gaining more information on the criminals and the crime, which is not unlike a psychiatrist who employs similar techniques to provide a 'diagnosis' for a 'patient.' In judging and categorising, the policemen make use of panoptic apparatuses like the physical prison structure and implied constant surveillance even before the brothers were 'suspects'; they imprison and isolate the brothers to protect the society they have been taken away from; they judge the brothers according to their crimes and even presumably according to their mental state since Michal is never beaten during the course of the play by the policemen; hence, it has been argued in this chapter, due to the similarities listed above, that the policemen of *The Pillowman* and the prison as an institution as it is represented, resemble psychiatrists and mental hospitals, respectively.

CONCLUSION

> PIERRE. I shall just explain quite simply how the criminals are punished, the sick are cured, the workers are supervised, the ignorant are educated, the unemployed are registered, the insane are normalised, the criminals – No, wait a minute. The criminals are supervised. The insane are cured. The sick are normalised. The workers are registered. The unemployed are educated. The ignorant are punished. No. I'll rehearse this a little. The ignorant are normalised. Right. The sick are punished. The insane are educated. The workers are cured. The criminals are cured. The unemployed are punished. The criminals are normalised. Something along those lines.
>
> -Caryl Churchill, *Softcops* 49

In relation to Michel Foucault's explorations on mental 'illness,' discipline, and mental and criminal 'punishment,' the concepts of the mentally 'ill' criminal, and the criminal who is mentally 'ill' have been argued in this thesis to be similar as they have been represented in the selected plays with the characters of Alan in *Equus*, and Katurian and Michal in *The Pillowman*. In doing so, the institutions which 'take care' of these characters have been argued to be similar in terms of how they aim to 'docilise' the subject's mind through the relocation and the manipulation of the person's body; how they either aim to discipline the individual through punishing him/her, or discipline the public by punishing the 'criminal.' Arguments on how the 'abnormal' characters fall outside of the discourse of 'normal' and how they are 'resituated' within it by the institutions; how panoptic surveillance and other institutions' gazes are utilised by the prison and the hospital in punishing and 'treating' the 'subject'; and how power and knowledge in terms of being able to form and enforce a discourse is used in the institutions are taken into account, as well. Additionally, explorations on how individual information on the person establishes power over him/her in the 'treatment' or the punishment of the 'subject'; and how the person's past, and accordingly personality, is effective within 'disciplining and punishment' is made. And finally, it has been argued that the mentally 'ill' person, as represented in both institutions, is either executed 'mentally' by 'treating the illness' and 'destroying/killing' the unique individuality and the 'passion' the 'subject' might have which falls outside the mental 'normality' discourse, or executed 'physically' by 'simply' removing the 'subject' from general society, literally killing him/her in a dystopian, totalitarian setting.

Though the mental hospital is thought to act more on the mind, and the prison is thought to act more on the body, both institutions as represented in *Equus* and *The Pillowman* seem to act equally on both to be able to discipline and punish its subjects. For example, in *Equus*, Alan is 'encouraged' by Dysart to reflect in physical isolation and convey what he has reflected to him with the help of a tape recorder. In addition to this, Alan is made to take a placebo truth pill (willingly) the aim of which is to, seemingly to Alan, alter his brain's physical and chemical makeup so that he may answer Dysart freely and truthfully without much consideration or attempts to hide himself. However, most importantly, the fact that the hospital *requires* Alan to be an inpatient and *physically* stay at the hospital until he is *mentally* 'cured' shows how the body might be affected and altered to affect and alter its mind in a mental hospital, blurring the line between the binary of body and mind, and strengthening Foucault's arguments on the physical docilisation of people through mental repression and fear into 'normalcy' with the use of Panopticon surveillance. In *The Pillowman*, a similar process takes place, during which the policemen quite violently torture Katurian to get more information out of his mind, isolate him in a cell with his brother Michal so that they may reflect on the situation and see each other, which eventually leads Katurian to learn about almost the whole acts of crime themselves and decide on a 'solution' in isolation to save his stories. Furthermore, while continuing their investigation, the policemen keep Katurian and Michal away from the society, locked in an interrogation room and a cell, respectively, which is exactly what Dysart does while continuing the 'treatment' of Alan, keep him away from the 'normal' society while 'treating' him in isolation. Considering that Alan, and Katurian and Michal are all characters with criminal actions and at the same time mental 'disorders' who are locked in two differently named institutions away from society to be disciplined and punished by the institutions' authorities, Foucault's arguments on how the centre of punishment gradually changed from the body to the mind throughout history, and how the two institutions came to be so intertwined that both might 'deal with' both 'types' of people at the same time, seem to find themselves represented when the two plays are compared. To discipline the mind of the subject or the public, therefore, it seems that it is at least 'beneficial' to punish the body in the process, which is seen in both plays.

In addition to being altered by the institutions of the mental hospital and the prison, one of the most important qualities the ‘subjects’ of the plays share is how they have been shaped by their families during their childhoods; notably, how the states of their mental ‘health’ have been altered to ultimately cause literal crimes, which have been ‘deemed’ as crimes by the dominant discourse of their respective governments. In creating their own ‘little’ discourses, these ‘subjects’ become criminals in the eyes of their states and the discourses of their ‘normality.’ In *Equus*, Alan’s parents have conflicting ideological ‘beliefs’ regarding, most importantly, religion and the government: While Mrs. Strang, Alan’s mother, is religious and dogmatic, Mr. Strang is defined by Dysart as an “Old type Socialist… Relentlessly self-improving” (Shaffer 21). The conflict between his parents have led Alan to construct his ‘own reality’ and ‘religion,’ which have in turn made him mentally ‘ill,’ and eventually, a criminal. The case with the Katurian family of *The Pillowman* is similar; the parents inflict physical torture on Michal to inflict psychological torture on Katurian, making Michal ‘brain-damaged’ and Katurian a ‘psychopath’ due to the nature of the short stories he writes. Ultimately, both become literal murderers because of the experiences they underwent during their childhoods. Lonergan states that “[*The Pillowman*], then, puts the audience on the side of child-killers and parricides, and allows us to be fairly comfortable with that position” (111). This argument is applicable to *Equus*, as well, provided that the play makes the audience sympathise with a teenager who has blinded six horses and a psychiatrist who seems ‘reluctant’ to do his job.

In relation to this, Çakırtaş explains the ‘mental aspects’ of the characters in *The Pillowman*, and the explanation might be applied to *Equus* and its characters, too:

> In the play, the characters construct a differing version of their own selves. On the basis of this, of course, childhood has a lot of influence. *False childhood processing*, fear, violence, *psychological traumas are the underlying factors of behavioural disorders*… experienced by Katurian Katurian and Michal in the play… The detectives’ attitudes also have a number of behavioural disorders. As conversations turn to the depths of mental disorders, the presence of very serious traumas comes to light. (42, emphases added)

Alan, Katurian, and Michal all ‘process’ what they have experienced differently compared to how a ‘normal’ person or child does. Alan creates a religion ‘in his head’ and blinds horses because of events and ‘disorders’ that have been caused by his familial traumas;

Katurian's stories become darker and more violent and he kills his parents; and Michal murders two children to see whether Katurian's stories are 'realistic' or not because he had created his own 'normality,' one that (due to his mental 'illness') 'requires' the reassurance that Katurian's stories are reflective, or not, of how real life violence works. Katurian's subjective 'normality' is one that finds it 'okay' to write stories involving harsh violence towards children, which is enough for the policemen to consider killing Katurian just for writing them. In relation to the idea of discourse, Katurian's narratives become a kind of religion for Michal who attempts and partially succeeds to cement Katurian's stories, or discourse, in reality. Accordingly, in *Equus*, too, the mentally 'ill' characters are 'subjected' to their respective institutions because their own discourses and notions of 'normality' fail to *not* fall outside the discourse and notion of 'normality' as set by their governments and their institutions. This shows how to discipline and punish, both 'correctional' institutions have to enforce the standardised discourse of the 'normal' by destroying the ideas, ideologies, and discourses created, or attempted to be created, by the 'abnormal' individualities living in a 'normal' society.

In addition to the 'subjects' portrayed in the plays, the 'authorities,' the psychiatrist of *Equus* and the policemen of *The Pillowman* resemble one another, as well. Dysart, for example, questions and 'interrogates' Alan to 'diagnose' him during the course of their appointments. He makes sure that he gets enough information from Alan's family, friends, and employer to 'cure' him as 'effectively' as possible. He overpowers Alan, determines where he physically should be, monitors him, and manipulates him to achieve his aim of 'executing' Alan's individuality or his mental 'illness' which makes him an 'abnormal' person and which led him to become a criminal. Although harsher when compared to the mental hospital in the more 'conventionally contemporary' setting of *Equus*, the policemen of the prison in the totalitarian government of *The Pillowman* follow a large portion of the same procedures as Dysart. They overpower Katurian and Michal by determining where they physically should be, monitoring them individually, and Katurian's stories arguably pre-emptively, manipulating Katurian by lying to him about his brother and his physical and mental state, and, even though much more extremely than what happens in *Equus*, affecting them bodily (torturing Katurian and isolating Michal, and later his brother with him) to get the most information out of them so that the

information may ‘allow’ them to execute their ‘subjects,’ disciplining the public as was argued in the previous chapter and punishing the person in the process. These similarities show how the two institutions and their apparatuses are similar so much so that the way they work applies to the same ‘type’ of people, people who are criminals and who are mentally ‘ill’ at the same time. In relation to this, Alan was first considered to be imprisoned and punished in a prison, potentially for life, before being brought to Dysart by Hesther to be ‘diagnosed and cured’ as an inpatient instead, so that he may be ‘normal,’ or at least ‘less abnormal’ for the rest of his life (corresponding to a life sentence behind ‘mental bars’); and in *The Pillowman*, Ariel argues that Katurian’s childhood and related trauma could serve as a decent defence in court (McDonagh 77), pointing out how, even in such a totalitarian system, Katurian’s position and ultimate end could be different if some unclear conditions were met, like in Alan’s situation.

In conclusion, Peter Shaffer’s *Equus* and Martin McDonagh’s *The Pillowman* have been analysed and compared in Foucauldian terms, arguing that the two plays, when compared, reveal and support Foucault’s arguments on the superimposition of psychiatry into penal punishment in disciplining the aforementioned ‘type’ of people as they have been represented in the plays. The interchangeability of the institutions on the ‘treatment’ or ‘punishment’ of the mentally ‘ill’ characters of Alan, and Katurian and Michal, seems to prove that considerations of mental ‘health’ in penal judgement and considerations of criminal liability in psychiatry fall on the same page as Foucault has argued in his *Discipline and Punish*. Hence, even though the plays have been written almost three decades apart and are different and specific in what they respectively seem to aim to convey to the audiences, the fact that one setting is a hospital and the other a prison, and the fact that both plays feature characters who ‘require’ a mental ‘evaluation’ in relation to criminal activity seem to be enough to find the similarities between these institutions and how they function using Foucault’s guidance on the topic.

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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
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Tarih: 7/7/2023

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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 7/7/2023

Tez Başlığı: Tez Başlığı : Peter Shaffer'ın *Equus*'undaki Suçlu Hastanın ve Martin McDonagh'ın *Yastık Adam*'ındaki Psikiyatrik Mahkûmların Foucaultcu bir Okuması

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı:	Aram DANESH
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Programı:	İngiliz Kültür Araştırmaları
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ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT

Date: 7/7/2023

Thesis Title: A Foucauldian Reading of the Criminal Patient in Peter Shaffer's *Equus* and the Psychiatric Prisoners in Martin McDonagh's *The Pillowman*

My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname:	Aram DANESH
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<u>ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL</u>

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)