



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

“THE CRISIS OF UTOPIA” IN EDWARD BOND'S *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE, AND GREAT PEACE*

Özden DERE

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2023

“THE CRISIS OF UTOPIA” IN EDWARD BOND'S *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK
AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE, AND GREAT PEACE*

Özden DERE

Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2023

KABUL VE ONAY

Özden DERE tarafından hazırlanan "Edward Bond'un *The War Plays: Red, Black and Ignorant, The Tin Can People* ve *Great Peace* adlı oyunlarında 'Ütopya Krizi'" başlıklı bu çalışma, 14.06.2023 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından doktora tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Prof. Dr. Hande SEBER (Başkan)

Prof. Dr. Şebnem KAYA (Danışman)

Prof. Dr. Nazan TUTAŞ (Üye)

Prof. Dr. Sıla ŞENLEN GÜVENÇ (Üye)

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi İmren YELMİŞ (Üye)

Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylarım.

Prof.Dr. Uğur ÖMÜRGÖNÜLŞEN

Enstitü Müdürü

YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI

Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarım bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır.

Tezin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinleri yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan “**Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge**” kapsamında tezim aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır.

- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren 2 yıl ertelenmiştir. ⁽¹⁾
- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ay ertelenmiştir. ⁽²⁾
- Tezimle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. ⁽³⁾

14/06/2023

Özden DERE

¹“*Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge*”

- (1) *Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü teze ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir.*
- (2) *Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internette paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir.*
- (3) *Madde 7. 1. Ulusal çıkarları veya güvenliği ilgilendiren, emniyet, istihbarat, savunma ve güvenlik, sağlık vb. konulara ilişkin lisansüstü tezlerle ilgili gizlilik kararı, tezin yapıldığı kurum tarafından verilir *. Kurum ve kuruluşlarla yapılan işbirliği protokolü çerçevesinde hazırlanan lisansüstü tezlere ilişkin gizlilik kararı ise, ilgili kurum ve kuruluşun önerisi ile enstitü veya fakültenin uygun görüşü üzerine üniversite yönetim kurulu tarafından verilir. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler Yükseköğretim Kuruluna bildirilir. Madde 7.2. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler gizlilik süresince enstitü veya fakülte tarafından gizlilik kuralları çerçevesinde muhafaza edilir, gizlilik kararının kaldırılması halinde Tez Otomasyon Sistemine yüklenir.*

* *Tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu tarafından karar verilir.*

ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandıđım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadıđımı, yararlandıđım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, **Prof. Dr. řebnem KAYA** danıřmanlıđında tarafımdan retildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

zden DERE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Prof. Şebnem KAYA for her invaluable patience, feedback, and her belief in my potential. I also could not have undertaken this journey without the help of committee members, Prof. Sıla ŞENLEN GÜVENÇ and Assist. Prof. İmren YELMİŞ, who generously provided guidance and expertise. Many thanks to the members of my defense committee, Prof. Hande SEBER and Prof. Nazan TUTAŞ for their valuable contributions. Words cannot express my deepest appreciation and thankfulness to my colleague Res. Assist. Arzu ÇEVİRGEN for her endless emotional and technical support, and her friendship that means more than sisterhood to me. I would also like to recognise my other colleagues at Hacettepe University, particularly Dr. Adem BALCI who has always inspired me not to give up, and Res. Assist. Emine AKKÜLAH DOĞAN for her sincere friendship and support. I am also deeply indebted to the profound academic environment provided by all of the distinguished professors and lecturers at Hacettepe University. Finally, many special thanks to my brother and my parents for having taught me the significance of life-time learning, particularly to my father, who passed away before the completion of this study.

ABSTRACT

DERE, Özden. “The Crisis of Utopia” In Edward Bond’s *The War Plays: Red, Black And Ignorant, The Tin Can People, and Great Peace*, Ph.D. Thesis, Ankara, 2023.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore how Edward Bond’s (1934-) trilogy, *The War Plays* (1984) – comprising *Red Black and Ignorant* (1984), *The Tin Can People* (1984), and *Great Peace* (1985) – reflects the transformation of utopianism throughout history. To this end, Zygmunt Bauman’s (1925-2017) classification of the historical transformation of utopianism is chosen to reveal Bond’s scrutinisation of utopianism. Each of these three plays, with its eclectic dramaturgy combining elements from agit-prop, Bertolt Brecht’s (1898-1956) epic theatre, and naturalistic theatre, criticises one form of utopianism through emphasising the devastating outcomes and consequent failure of it. The first play of the trilogy depicts a dystopian consequence that arises from a solid modern utopian philosophy, which prioritises progress and promises a flawless society through advanced scientific and technological innovations. The second play depicts a transition towards a postmodern and liquid consumerist utopian ideology, which elicits dissatisfaction among people owing to the emergence of a novel dystopian environment. The final play prompts inquiries into the plausibility of establishing a novel and just society in a post-liquidised world, which is scrutinised through a discussion on the loss of mental integrity because of a desire to turn back to old forms of being which Bauman called retrotopia. After the analysis, this study concludes that the trilogy in question can be categorised as an example of contemporary British political drama, which reflects the historical evolution of utopianism and scrutinises the feasibility of a utopia in the present-day post-liquidised, vaporised world, drawing upon Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity and his ideas concerning the transformation of utopianism.

Keywords

British political theatre, utopianism, Edward Bond, Zygmunt Bauman, liquid modernity, dystopia, retrotopia

ÖZET

DERE, Özden. Edward Bond'un *The War Plays: Red, Black And Ignorant, The Tin Can People* ve *Great Peace* Adlı Oyunlarındaki "Ütopya Krizi," Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2023.

Bu tezin amacı, Edward Bond'un (1934-) *Red Black and Ignorant* (1984, Kırmızı, Siyah ve Cahil), *The Tin Can People* (1984, Konserve Kutusu İnsanları) ve *Great Peace* (1985, Büyük Barış) adlı oyunlarından oluşan *The War Plays* (Savaş Oyunları) üçlemesinin ütopyacılık kavramının tarihsel gelişimini nasıl yansıttığını incelemektir. Bu amaçla, Zygmunt Bauman'ın (1925-2017) akışkan modernite kavramına dayanan ütopyacılığın tarihsel dönüşümüne ilişkin sınıflandırması, Bond'un ütopya kavramını nasıl yansıttığını irdelemek üzere seçilmiştir. Üçlemede yer alan oyunlardan her biri, agit-prop, Bertolt Brecht'in (1898-1956) epik tiyatrosu ve naturalistik tiyatro unsurlarını birleştiren eklektik dramaturjisiyle, bir ütopya türünü o türün yıkıcı sonuçlarını ve dolayısıyla başarısızlığını vurgulayarak eleştirir. Üçlemenin ilk oyununda, ilerlemeyi öncelikli hale getiren ve gelişmiş bilim ile teknolojik ilerlemeler sayesinde hatasız bir toplum vadeden katı modern ütopya bir felsefenin distopik sonuçları vurgulanmaktadır. İkinci oyunda ise, yeni bir distopik çevrenin ortaya çıkmasına neden olduğu için insanları hayal kırıklığına uğratan tüketici akışkan bir ütopya idealine geçiş vurgulanmaktadır. Son oyunda ise Bauman tarafından retrotopya olarak adlandırılan, eskide kalmış bir yaşam biçimine dönme arzusu nedeniyle yaşanan zihinsel bütünlüğün kaybı durumunun tartışılması yoluyla akışkan sonrası toplumda yeni ve adil bir toplum oluşturmanın mümkün olup olmadığı incelenmektedir. Yapılan inceleme sonrasında bu çalışma, Bond'un söz konusu üçlemesinin, ütopyacılık kavramının tarihsel gelişimini yansıtan ve günümüzün akışkanlaşma, buharlaşma sonrası dünyasında ütopya fikrinin uygulanabilirliğini ayrıntılı olarak inceleyen ve eleştiren çağdaş İngiliz politik tiyatrosuna bir örnek olarak değerlendirilebileceği sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler İngiliz politik tiyatrosu, ütopyacılık, Edward Bond, Zygmunt Bauman, akışkan modernite, distopya, retrotopya

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KABUL VE ONAY	i
YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI	ii
ETİK BEYAN	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF SOLID MODERN UTOPIANISM IN <i>RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT</i>	30
1.1. MODERNITY AND UTOPIANISM	30
1.2. CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY	34
1.2.1. Early Critics of Modernity.....	35
1.2.2. Later Critics Of Modernity	38
1.2.2.1. Max Horkheimer And Theodor W. Adorno: <i>Dialectic of Enlightenment</i> (1972)	40
1.2.2.2. Louis Pierre Althusser and The Neo-Marxist Theory of the State and Ideology.....	41
1.2.2.3. Michel Foucault And the Critique of Modernity Within the Context of “Disciplinary Society”	44
1.2.2.4. Zygmunt Bauman And Critique of Modernity.....	48
1.3. THE PROBLEM WITH SOLID MODERN UTOPIANISM	52

1.4. DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF SOLID MODERN UTOPIANISM IN <i>RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT</i>.....	54
---	-----------

CHAPTER 2: DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF LIQUID CONSUMERIST UTOPIANISM IN <i>THE TIN CAN PEOPLE</i>	72
---	-----------

2.1. POSTMODERNITY AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON AND UTOPIANISM.....	74
--	-----------

2.1.1. Linguistic Turn, Poststructuralism, and the Attack on Representation	77
--	----

2.1.1.1. Jean François Lyotard and <i>The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge</i> within a Utopian Framework.....	81
--	----

2.2. POSTMODERNITY AND CONSUMERISM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF UTOPIANISM.....	83
---	-----------

2.2.1. Jean Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson: Consumerism and Postmodernity	83
---	----

2.3. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY, AND CONSUMERISM.....	88
--	-----------

2.3.1. Liquidity as a Metaphor and Liquid Modernity.....	88
--	----

2.3.2. Privatised Imagination: Liquid Modern Utopias.....	93
---	----

2.3.3. Consumerism as a Post-Panoptical Means of Surveillance and Control.....	98
---	----

2.4. CRITICISM OF LIQUID CONSUMERIST UTOPIANISM IN <i>THE TIN CAN PEOPLE</i>.....	99
--	-----------

CHAPTER 3. DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF RETROTOPIA IN BOND'S <i>GREAT PEACE</i>.....	114
3.1. RETROTOPIA AS A POST-UTOPIAN CONCEPT	115
3.1.1. Forms of Retrotopia.....	118
3.1.1.1. Back to <i>Leviathan</i>	119
3.1.1.2. Back to Heritage.....	122
3.1.1.3. Back to Injustice.....	123
3.1.1.4. Back to the Womb.....	125
3.2. OSCILLATION BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE PRESENT: CRITICISM OF RETROTOPIA IN <i>GREAT PEACE</i>.....	126
CONCLUSION.....	141
WORKS CITED	150
APPENDIX I: <i>ANGELUS NOVUS</i> BY PAUL KLEE.....	162
APPENDIX II: DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT.....	163
APPENDIX III: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORMS.....	165

INTRODUCTION

The utopian imagination about the description of an alternative perfect world or order has been providing a large variety of literary works with raw material in literary history since its first examples emerged; however, even a quick look at its development evinces that these utopian expectations have brought about many ambiguities and questions about the nature and possibility of such a vision in an increasingly changing world. Doubts and anxieties about the future have gradually, particularly after World War I, replaced the utopian imagination. Added to this, rapid advances in technology led to an intense and widespread fear of the destructive nature of human beings, culminating especially after World War II, under the threat of mass destruction by nuclear weapons. This gradual process of change from the utopian to dystopian imagination brought about a considerable body of literary works, including almost every genre such as George Orwell's (1903-1950) *1984* (1949) in fiction, T.S. Eliot's (1888-1965) *The Wasteland* (1922) in poetry, and Caryl Churchill's (1938-) *Far Away* (2000) in drama. The majority of studies about dystopian literature appear to be dealing with fiction, and studies on dystopian predictions in contemporary British drama are generally limited to plays about the outcome of advanced science or technology, such as the negative results of human cloning in Churchill's *A Number* (2002) and the results of a nuclear physicist's research in Howard Brenton's (1942-) *The Genius* (1983). Nevertheless, the dystopian imagination in drama, which is intended to draw a picture of a world where disorder and chaos prevail, is not limited to the plays about science. Besides envisioning the catastrophic consequences of advanced technology and science, it goes hand in hand with political drama.

The dystopian visions in drama may serve to reveal how utopias are used or manipulated by ideologies, showing the possible dystopian outcomes of utopias whereby an amalgamation of different theatrical devices. The gradual shift from the utopian to dystopian visions in the period after World War I, which Dragan Klaić calls

“the crisis of utopia” (60), seems comparable to what Edward Bond (1934-), in his speech about the state of political drama, considers to be the third of the three crises in drama (*The Chair* 11). These concurrent crises, both in the utopian imagination and drama, also became a turning point in Bond’s career, and his theatrical theory began to mature and reveal itself particularly in the plays he penned after this new post-crisis period. Although Bond began his career in the 1960s, in a period which is possible to be called post-war, here he will be evaluated as a contemporary playwright on the grounds that the issues he has dealt with go far beyond his time and that he has been an active playwright during the last fifty years. Accordingly, the aim of this dissertation is to examine how dystopia and its gradual historical transformation are reflected in Bond’s trilogy *The War Plays* (1984) consisting of *Red Black and Ignorant* (1984), *The Tin Can People* (1984), and *Great Peace* (1985), as well as in contemporary British political drama, from the perspective of Zygmunt Bauman’s (1925-2017) theory of liquid modernity and his ideas about the transformation of utopianism. This dissertation will also be an attempt to show how the trilogy reveals the operation of utopia in cooperation with dominant ideologies, resulting rather in a dystopia, through a detailed analysis of the dystopian elements and different dramatic devices used in these plays. What makes this study unique is the fact that it attempts to combine and make an analogy between two significant figures such as Edward Bond and Zygmunt Bauman, who both have managed to draw attention to the sociological aspects and the logic behind the failure of utopianism throughout history. The anticipated contribution of the present study pertains to the domains of utopianism and British political drama. Previous studies and approaches in these areas have been lacking a comprehensive framework that would elucidate the logic behind the historical development, particularly the recent evolution of utopianism, and reveal the potential of political drama in this regard. This study aims to address these gaps in literature. In addition, since this dissertation will deal with how the stage has been employed as a convenient platform to disclose and discuss the relationship between utopias and dominant ideologies through an in-depth analysis of Edward Bond’s trilogy, this introductory part will not only include a detailed history of the development of literary utopia and dystopia but also concentrate on the development of utopian social theory, which is vital to better understand the reflections of the

relationship between ideology and utopia/dystopia in these plays. It will further provide detailed information on Bond's career and his development as a playwright, his concept of dialectical theatre, and his ideas about the current situation of political drama in Britain. Even though not as detailed as the relevant literary part, the relationship between ideology and utopia, along with major sociologists dealing with this relationship will also be presented.

To begin with the definition of "utopia," in its broadest sense, "utopia," according to the OED, corresponds to an imagined place or a state of things in which everything is perfect (Utopia, OED). It is, as Chad Walsh puts forward, a Greek word made up of *u-topos* and *eu-topos*, with a pun on it. It means both "no place" and "the good place," which amounts to saying that the concept of utopia almost always has an intrinsic self-negating quality (25). Since the driving force behind utopia is, as suggested by Ernst Bloch, dreaming about and hoping for the better, in other words, since utopia is an imagined place, its credibility and definition are closely related to people's expectations, hopes, and dreams about the future (3). That is why it is almost always an integral part of the current social context and status quo. For this reason, since Thomas More (1478-1535) coined the word in 1576, the definition and the use of both the word and the literary form have varied significantly. Although the dispersion of utopianism in several directions over time makes it one of the hard-to-define terms with several definitions emerging in line with the tendencies of the period, critics made several efforts to define the term and to determine the common characteristics of different utopian texts. One of the most significant contributions to the definition of utopia or utopianism was perhaps made by Lyman Tower Sargent who, in his seminal article titled "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited," gave a broad definition of utopianism and determines three major faces of utopia, namely literary utopias, non-fictional utopian social theory (ideological), and intentional communities (2).

Among these three faces, for utopian social theory and utopianism as social or ideological criticism, the sociology of Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) is essential.

Mannheim is the first one to associate utopia with ideology. In his *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1936; the original published in German in 1929), he argued that our ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all affected by our social situation. In particular, he named the beliefs of those in power “ideology” and the beliefs of those who hoped to overturn the system “utopia.” In both cases, their beliefs concealed the reality of their positions. Mannheim states,

It is always the dominant group which is in full accord with the existing order that determines what is to be regarded as utopian, while the ascendant group which is in conflict with things as they are is the one that determines what is regarded as ideological. Still another difficulty in defining precisely what, at a given period, is to be regarded as ideology, and what as utopia, results from the fact that the utopian and ideological elements do not occur separately in the historical process. The utopias of ascendant classes are often, to a large extent, permeated with ideological elements. (183)

Thus, utopias of the dominant class are interwoven with ideological elements in such an insidious manner that ideology prevents those in power from becoming aware of the weaknesses in their positions, whereas utopia prevents those out of power from being aware of the difficulty of changing the system. Furthermore, both ideology and utopia preclude the followers from seeing the strengths in the other’s position and the weaknesses of their own situation.

Although there were people who discussed ideology and utopia together, after Mannheim, the two terms were most of the time used separately. Fredric Jameson (1934-), one of the contemporary social theorists, reviews the matter again and deals with the binary opposition between ideology and utopia. Considering the social construction of identities, he suggests that there is a more complicated relationship between these two opposite forces. Jameson explains the current contradictory opinions regarding utopian social theory. He concentrates on utopia as a method for social theory and argues that the utopian impulse has become “an increasingly self-aware means of knowing and intervening in the world. . . [and that] the utopian process begins with a stubborn negation of all that is and then moves on to keep alive

the possibility of a world qualitatively distinct from the one in which we live,” thereby emphasising the critical function of the concept (qtd. in Moylan 4-5). For this reason, for him, the utopian process is always related to human beings’ endless imagination of or journey towards perfection, rather than an end or a result to achieve. Also, in *The Political Unconscious* (1981), analogous to Mannheim, Jameson points out the fact that “the effectively ideological is also, at the same time, necessarily utopian” (287), suggesting that utopia is an integral part of any ideology because any utopia will transform into an ideology when those dreaming of it gain power.

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) is another sociologist, who brought the two terms together, in his 1975 lectures. He argued that the most essential function of utopia is to lead people to question and re-evaluate the meanings of authority, social context, and the status quo, as the following extract from his lectures makes it clear:

May we not say then that imagination itself - through its utopian function - has a constitutive role in helping us rethink the nature of our social life? Is not utopia – this leap outside – the way in which we radically rethink what is family, what is consumption, what is authority, what is religion and so on? Does not the fantasy of the alternative society and its exteriorization “nowhere” work as one of the most formidable contestations of what is? (Ricoeur 16)

Besides, Ricoeur suggests that both utopia and ideology have positive and negative traits. The negative trait of ideology is distortion whereas that of utopia is fantasy. The two positive traits of ideology are legitimation and integration or identity, while those of utopia are an alternative power and exploration of the possible (12). In other words, ideology tells a story that justifies or legitimates the existence and beliefs of the group in power, thereby providing the group with an identity. However, these stories are distortions of reality, and Ricoeur maintains that it is necessary to reveal, or in the philosopher’s own words, to “unmask” this distortion. For him, one of the functions of utopia is therefore to undermine ideology (89).

More recent research on utopianism and its development, as well as its relationship with ideology, belongs to the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. He divides the history of utopianism into three periods, namely, the period of “gamekeeping utopia,” the period of “gardening utopia,” and the period of “hunting utopia,” corresponding to premodern utopianism, solid modern utopianism, and liquid modern utopianism, respectively. The premodern, or as is named by Bauman, “gamekeeping utopianism,” viewed the world as a wilderness and focused especially on protecting the borders between wilderness and civilisation, as well as the divine order of the universe. This kind of utopianism seldom tried to improve or change the natural or divine order of things, and it aimed to maintain the then-current status quo (Bauman, “Living” 4). Modernity brought about new types of utopias based on two fundamental conditions, the first of which was “an overwhelming feeling that the world was not functioning properly or optimally,” and the second of which was the fact that “humans possess the ability and potency to perform this task of recalibrating the social world” (Jacobsen “Activating Presence” 342). Utopias written during that period were therefore based on the belief in man’s potential to shape both the present and the future. The population was, for this reason, always under severe supervision and control by different mechanisms such as prisons, factories, and schools, which Bauman defined as “solid.” As opposed to solid modern utopianism, liquid modern or “hunting” utopianism did not concentrate much on “balancing” the order of things, be it divine, natural, or designed (Bauman, “Living” 4). As opposed to the long-term or future-oriented utopias of modernity, “hunting” utopias are more individualised and short-term predictions (Bauman, “Living” 4). They did not stem from any aspirations of controlling the present or the future, which means the melting of old “solid” mechanisms and their transformation into “liquid forms” (Bauman, “Living” 4). This is the contemporary period, which Bauman called “liquid modern times,” an era in which “utopia had almost vanished or if not vanished, had transformed radically” (Bauman, *Society* 222-41). This transformation reveals itself most particularly through the mechanisms operating to control society, and it may also be called a transformation from “disciplinary societies to the societies of control” (Nebioğlu 57).

In parallel to the function of utopia to “unmask” distortions of reality in utopian social theory, literary utopia, in one way or another, has usually been related to undermining the current system or beliefs and offering better alternatives in an imaginary world. Even though there were earlier examples such as Plato’s *Republic* (c. 375 BC) and depiction of a land of plenty in medieval “The Land of Cockaigne” (c. 1350), which is thought to have been written by a Franciscan friar, Thomas More provided the basis for the development of a literary tradition which relied on a particular narrative structure. According to Fatima Vieira, this narrative structure pictures the journey of a character to an unknown place (an island, a country, or a continent). Once there, he or she witnesses its social, political, economic, and religious organisation; this journey usually implies the return of the utopian traveller to his or her residence to take back the message that there are better ways of organising society (7). Vieira points out that More’s idea of utopia was, a product of the Renaissance when man discovered that there were alternative options to the society in which he lived and he became aware of the infinite powers of reason, and understood that the construction of the future was in his hands (9).

Following the Enlightenment, on the other hand, man’s positive worldview was based on Darwin’s theory of evolution, thereby reaching relevant conclusions regarding man’s welfare to be achieved in the future. As such, utopia as a literary form – which may be said to have emerged as a kind of travel writing, exemplified by More’s *Utopia* (1516) and Jonathan Swift’s (1667-1745) *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726) – turned into a visit to the future, and people began to search for a better life or a better structure of society in the future rather than in a different, remote place (Pohl 67). This change of perception in people’s state of mind about the attainability of a better society also brought about a change in the very nature of utopia, which was a turn from eu/utopia, the good/-non-place, to-“euchronia,” the good place in the future (Pohl 9). Due to the theories of progress which dominated European thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were based on the proposition that advancements in technology, science, and social organisation would result in an

improved human condition (Meek Lange), utopias were no longer depicted as a better, imaginary society in a remote, unknown, and inaccessible place.

As for the nineteenth century, even if it was not the Golden Age of utopianism, it was doubtless a golden age of optimism about human being's ability to make progress in every field (Roemer 79). Kenneth M. Roemer gives an overview of the period:

The industrial revolution and urbanisation both supported and undermined belief in another crucial perceptual tool: history viewed as progress. . . The primary socio-economic evidence for the perception of progress was the industrial revolution. Finally, it seemed as if the basic goals of traditional utopias could be met: science, technology, mass production and improved distribution systems ensured that all humanity could be fed, clothed and sheltered. The industrial revolution did indeed create great wealth and great poverty. (81-82)

However, the destructive effects of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1870) soon shattered the belief that progress was inevitable. From then on, particularly after World Wars I and II, dystopias gradually became the dominant form of utopian literature. Sargent summarises this gradual transition from utopia to dystopia as follows:

With World Wars I and II, the flu epidemic, the Depression, the Korean War, the War in Vietnam, and other events of the 20th century, dystopias became the dominant form of utopian literature. While the word dystopia was first used in the middle of the 18th century, and the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-73) used it in a speech in Parliament in 1868, the literary form and the use of the word to describe it did not become common until well into the 20th century. (*Utopianism* 51-52)

Another critic, Klaic, draws a parallel between the increase in the number of dystopias and the significant developments throughout the world. According to him, ambivalences, general wonder, and anxieties concerning the future of the world have replaced the dreams and hopes of achieving perfection since the early expressionists

and other modernists, especially after World War I. Klaic argues that “[the] pervasive fear of human destructive impulses, added to the increasingly enhancing technological abilities, reached its peak after World War II due to the threat of nuclear destruction, which in itself exemplified a revised apocalyptic scenario of the total annihilation of the world” (3). Indeed, the critic suggests that the major crises in the world, including the world wars and nuclear threats, have led to a crisis of utopia which, in return, increased the number of dystopias depicted in literature. He summarises this crisis with the following words:

This war introduced new high-tech weapons on a large scale. Tanks, machine guns, submarines, poisonous gas, and aerial bombs made warfare both more lethal and longer lasting, as no power could secure an easy and quick victory. Although the war was glorified as the war to end all wars, the utopian visions developed during the nineteenth century were shattered by this onslaught of contradictory reality. (Klaic 60)

Under these circumstances, there seemed to be no hope for a perfect society; that is to say, people did not expect to achieve the perfection supposedly offered by the progressivism of the previous generations. Klaic continues saying,

Since World War II, if not earlier, utopia seemed dead, despite the victory over the Axis powers, the utopian language of the Atlantic Declaration, and the founding documents of the United Nations. In fact, the whole postwar era can be seen as a time of incessant utopia-bashing. The experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima gradually revealed. . . that utopia is an absurdity, that it does not make sense even as an abstract concept. (63)

So, the literary utopia, which had flourished throughout Europe after Thomas More’s *Utopia* mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, almost disappeared and was replaced by dystopian visions after the second half of the nineteenth century. As Krishan Kumar asserts, the failure of revolutionary politics and socialism in any way other than as isolated experimental communities might have spelt the end of the whole utopian project (2). For this reason, a period of decay was inevitable in most

utopian writing, mainly in the latter part of the twentieth century. As a consequence of all these crises, which led to significant changes in people's approach to the realisability of a better society, critics had a new concern: to define dystopia and its basic tenets. Gregory Claeys, one of the most well-known scholars and critics of utopia and dystopia, emphasises that there are no such three faces of dystopia. In his *Dystopia: A Natural History*, Claeys writes,

The noun dystopia is often used synonymously with dystopian literature. However, as Ruth Levitas points out, 'Dystopias are not necessarily fictional in form: neither predictions of the nuclear winter nor fears of the consequences of the destruction of the rainforests, the holes in the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect and the potential melting of the polar ice caps are primarily the material of fiction.' The adjective dystopian implies fearful futures where chaos and ruin prevail. So there are non-literary, empirical usages of the term. (4-5)

Based on Levitas's description, Claeys points out the multi-dimensional meaning of dystopia and deduces three main forms of the concept: political dystopia, environmental dystopia, and technological dystopia; for him, among these forms, the totalitarian political dystopia, which is chiefly associated with the failure of utopian aspiration, received the greatest historical attention (5). For this reason, for the purposes of this dissertation, rather than trying to make a distinction between literary dystopia and dystopia as social theory, it would be better to classify dystopia in terms of its subject matter – that is to say, political, environmental, and technological dystopia – and to define the literary form, in its broadest sense, as any text or writing marked by the depiction of a dark and fearful future world in which chaos and disorder predominate. Even though Edward Bond's late plays present and exemplify a rich combination of these forms of dystopia, this dissertation is to dwell only on the political form, the first of Claeys's three classifications or headings. In addition, in terms of the development and transformation of utopianism throughout history from a criticism of the mechanisms operating in solid utopias to a criticism of mechanisms operating in liquid utopias, Bauman's theory of "liquid modernity" and his ideas on utopianism will be employed. This study will attempt to reveal the relationship between Bond's social criticism in his dystopias and Bauman's depiction of the transformation of utopianism through detailed analyses of Edward Bond's *Red, Black*

and Ignorant, The Tin Can People, and Great Peace. Also, instead of attempting to define distinct categories for dystopia reflected on the British contemporary stage, it will examine and exemplify the repercussions of dystopian visions and of the historical transformation of the concept on contemporary British political theatre, as this would be the subject of another, more comprehensive study.

The above-mentioned gradual dominance of dystopian imagination over the utopian one had its implications on the stage as well, particularly in British political theatre. Sue Ellen Case and Janelle G. Reinelt point out the fact that contemporary British theatre had the advantage of possessing a well-developed socialist theatre tradition and became a convenient platform for discussing alternative worlds, even though there was not an abundance of contemporary utopian plays throughout the world (222). As they suggest, the fact that Britain had a tradition of socialist theatre might have helped the existence of utopian plays on the British stage; however, so as to understand in what sense this fact contributed to the emergence of utopia or dystopia on the British stage, it seems essential to focus first on the situation and development of contemporary British theatre, particularly of British socialist theatre.

Three significant events may be regarded as landmarks in the development of contemporary theatre, particularly of the socialist or leftist theatre in Britain. The first of these events is the performance of John Osborne's (1929-1994) *Look Back in Anger* (1956), which paved the way for modern leftist plays with the robust and daring language of the protagonist, Jimmy Porter, who represents working-class people, and with its depiction of working-class lives, though the play is conventional in terms of plot. As Kritzer argues,

[t]he 'angry young men' rebelled against the proverbial patience and self-effacement of the English common people. . . In demanding a place in the economic and social structure of the middle class for those not born into it, the angry young men implicitly sought changes in the organization of a tradition-bound, class-based society . . . [T]he unifying idea of anger brought socialist playwrights such as Edward Bond, John Arden, and Harold Pinter to public attention and created an alliance between theatre and leftist politics. (4)

Look Back in Anger provided a new generation of writers, some of whom with a working-class background, with new opportunities to raise their voices. Playwrights who were eager to deal with alternative ideas and worlds became able to practise playwriting owing to the efforts made by the stage director George Devine (1910-1966) to search for promising but unpractised playwrights mainly with the establishment of the English Stage Company at the Royal Court in 1956 and the assemblage of the Writers' Group (Kritzer 4). As part of the activities of the Writers' Group, playwrights worked in collaboration and practised playwriting during "a series of Sunday-evening productions without decor" (Kritzer 4). Devine also had associates among directors such as Tony Richardson, John Dexter, Lindsay Anderson, and William Gaskill who welcomed a significant number of manuscripts sent by formerly unknown playwrights, including but not limited to Edward Bond, John Arden (1930-2012), and Harold Pinter (1930-2008) (Trussler, *The Cambridge Illustrated History* 322).

Later, within the same year, in 1956, the Berliner Ensemble's visit to London gave a new dimension to the attitudes towards theatre and performance in Britain. One may assert that this visit caused changes in the established viewpoints regarding the relationship between the form and content of a play, as well as the relationship between the performers and the audience (322). Bertolt Brecht's (1898-1956) epic theatre, composed of independent episodic scenes and reliant on the alienation effect achieved through various techniques such as direct address to the audience and the use of songs, presented an alternative to conventional realistic plays whose chief purpose was to create a dramatic illusion of reality by reflecting life as it is.

Brecht's concern was that . . . the idea that suffering in itself is humanizing, a tenet of neoclassical theories of the tragic [,] . . . had become, within modernity, a bourgeois justification of the status quo. This collective assumption is what Raymond Williams quite rightly describes as 'the tragic ideology'. . . and is the reason for a long-standing suspicion of tragedy on the part of the leftists. (Carney 11)

As reflected by Sean Carney, in contrast to realistic plays, epic theatre demanded a break with the conventional dramatic illusion, in other words, with the suspension of disbelief and “the tragic ideology,” by preventing the audience from identifying with the actors and the play because this kind of identification serves for the concealment of the major contradictions in society. Instead, theatre, from Brecht’s perspective, should create a distance between the audience and the play to make the audience realise and get rid of the dramatic illusion. Hence, the development of British theatre in the 1950s may be considered two-dimensional. On the one hand, there were socialist realist plays, which gradually flourished following the performance of *Look Back in Anger*, and Brecht’s epic theatre, which brought a totally new dimension to British theatre with its dramaturgy and performance techniques, on the other. That was “the birth of a new theatrical language of political theatre out of a merging of social realism with the European formalism of Brecht” (Carney 7).

Another key event, which led to the emergence of new perspectives about what could be accomplished on the stage, about a decade later, was the abolition of censorship in Britain by an Act of Parliament, the Theatres Act, in 1968. This gave the playwrights of the time the opportunity to deal with subjects previously regarded as taboo. Colin Chambers and Mike Priors outline the effects of this significant action:

Around 1968 a moral and political curtain dropped in the theatre, with the alternative movement on one side, feeding off its own energies and motivated by a common ideology of being separate from and rejecting all that lay on the other side. It was now the era of instant theatre, on any issue, created by anyone, in any style, performed anywhere. A radical, flamboyant, egalitarian edge to the work permeated the whole process: workshops and collectives replaced traditionally atomized ways of working; old hierarchies and divisions were broken down. Censorship in the shape of Lord Chamberlain’s office was abolished in 1968 and no subject was taboo. (17)

1968 was a turning point in the history of British theatre because it paved the way for a prolific era in which any playwright could reflect any subject in any style. It was the time of alternative theatres that advocated equal rights for those not represented on the British stage until then such as the working class, women, and LGBT people.

Activists contributed to an explosive increase in the number and variety of politically oriented theatres. The agendas of these theatres included, but were not limited to, issues of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. Among the theatre companies established during the 1970s, Foco Novo, Freehold, Portable Theatre, Belt and Braces, Gay Sweatshop, Joint Stock, Monstrous Regiment, the Tara Arts Group, Northwest Spanner, and Red Ladder may be listed (Kritzer 5). Furthermore, regional and alternative theatres, which would later be called “fringe,” became stronger. Also, the “new writing,” as a new term, started to be used to imply a particular kind of state-of-the-nation play, defined as a play employing “realism, from a leftist political perspective, and addressed to a middle-class, liberal audience in the late 1970s and early 1980s” (Itzin 256).

Several plays performed before and during the 1950s may be deemed utopian or dystopian, at least in terms of their atmosphere. For instance, existentialist or absurdist plays which portrayed man’s endless and futile efforts in a barren world could be classified as dystopian in terms of their bleak atmosphere. Socialist plays, which flourished after the Angry Young Men movement in the 1950s and especially after the Berliner Ensemble’s visit to London in 1956, could also be listed among the examples of dystopian plays depicting the failed utopias of capitalism. However, the actual convenient environment was achieved after the abolition of censorship in Britain because it allowed the playwrights of the time to deal with subjects the performance of which on stage was once seen as unacceptable. The abolition of censorship led to the experimental spirit of an increasingly popular fringe theatre. Without it, for instance, the directors Charles Marowitz (1934-2014) and Peter Brook (1925-) would not have explored, through the 1970s, the theories of Antonin Artaud about Theatre of Cruelty (1896-1948), which were especially influential in the 1980s and the 1990s and highly convenient for the depiction of dystopian themes (Trussler, *The Cambridge Illustrated History* 342).

However, according to many theatre critics, this prolific period, between the 1950s and the 1980s, did not produce the expected positive results in proving the subversive potential of theatre. Through the end of the 1980s, theatre reviewers expressed their discontent about the barrenness of a decade of new writing. Michael Billington stated in *The Guardian* that there was “a crisis in new writing . . . [and that] new drama no longer occupie[d] the central position it ha[d] in British theatre over the past 35 years” (qtd. in Innes, *Modern British Drama* 447). Similarly, Christopher Innes suggested that “British playwriting, in the mode of George Bernard Shaw, seem[ed] to be running out of steam. . . Barker and Brenton ceased to develop, and their recent plays [did] not measure up to their previous achievements; Shaffer retreated into commercial entertainment” (*Modern British Drama* 448). This discussion remained on the agenda throughout and after the 1980s; various theatre critics and reviewers were trying to find out what happened to political theatre. For some, there was a crisis in the public debate about socialism in the early 1980s, as the Labour Party and the unions recovered from a decade of turbulent industrial relations. Simon Shepherd, as a case in point, bitterly emphasised that

[t]he explanatory interlocking of private behaviours and larger social changes was associated with unfashionable philosophies such as Marxism, now (apparently) proved ineffectual by the overthrow of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. State-of-the-nation dramaturgy no longer seemed credible in the 1980s, yet political dramaturgy did not come to an end. (637)

The general impression was that, under the existing circumstances at the time, British political theatre did not prove to be subversive and was not able to make a change in the social structure of society. The state-of-the-nation theatre – as Itzin called it, in her *Stages in the Revolution*, to define the “plays depicting the state of England in decline” (256) – was not enough to achieve a change towards a better society. This so-called crisis in the British political theatre was exacerbated by the Cold War and the nuclear threat, as well as by the rise of “broadly right-wing theories of postmodernism, which challenged political binaries” (Milling 53), and Thatcher’s conservative government’s general entrepreneurial attitude towards theatre (Innes, *Modern British Drama* 448). These were the years of global economic crisis leading

to the recession of the 1970s; it was also the period when Fredric Jameson suggested that both the 1960s and the progressive historical change in a traditional Marxist sense came to an end. Thatcher's election as Prime Minister (1979) also proved that "the positive claims of a generation of politicised socialist playwrights about theatre's subversive potential since the early to mid-1970s and that the promise of revolutionary change proclaimed by the 1960s" were false (Milling 9). Thatcher's Conservative government's adoption of an entrepreneurial principle for the arts, along with the mechanisms the government employed to reduce the official unemployment figures, had some negative effects on British theatre (Milling 53). To explain a common discontent with the situation of British theatre, David M. Hirst refers to an article of George Goetschius – an influential sociologist whose enthusiasm for *Look Back in Anger* helped launch a theatrical revolution – penned in 1966. The article, titled "The Royal Court in its Social Context," deals with the question of what the future of British theatre might be. The critic notes that Goetschius revealed his dissatisfaction with the state of British theatre and related it to the respectability of new professions such as the film and music industry. He also repeats Goetschius's words: "This was the 'swinging sixties' with its whole new pantheon of cultural idols and its pronouncedly liberal attitude to politics and morality" (qtd. in Hirst 27). "For Goetschius," Hirst points out, what is necessary in such a period might be

a new Jimmy Porter who will give up the sweet stall, abandon some of his sexual obsessions and class-inflicted self-consciousness, and even the nostalgia of 'slim volumes of verse' and say something relevant to Britain in the sixties, a Britain which has moved so far beyond the angry young man and the kitchen sink as to give the impression that these were somehow involved in the Irish question and the Easter rebellion. (qtd. in Hirst 27-28)

Edward Bond, who was among the playwrights of the Writers' Group, established by George Devine, and who has been a playwright whose plays have been performed since the 1960s, may be regarded as what Hirst considered a new voice in various respects. He was also one of those playwrights who expressed their dissatisfaction with theatre's inefficiency in accomplishing its mission to cause a change in the

structure of society and who called for a new attitude towards playwriting during and after the 1980s.

Edward Bond was born in Holloway, North London in 1934. He had a lower working-class background. His father was a farm labourer, and later, a worker in a garage, and his mother was at home bringing up the family. Bond was brought up in North London by his parents who had moved to the city from East Anglia during the Depression of the 1930s since they were unable to get work on the land. In 1944, he returned to London and enrolled in Crouch End Secondary Modern School because he was not deemed efficient for attending the select Grammar School's entrance exam (Billingham 2). The writer would later interpret this as a positive event: "That was the making of me, of course. You see, after that nobody takes you seriously. The conditioning process stops. Once you let them send you to grammar school and university, you're ruined" (qtd. in Hay and Roberts 7). Bond left school at the age of 15 and worked as an office junior before he was called up for his compulsory military service. His two-year traumatic experience in the army or the dehumanising transformation of human beings into "automata" (Bond qtd. in Hay and Roberts 7) would become a recurring motif in the playwright's work (Billingham 3).

Bond's interest in drama and playwriting began with his attendance at a production of *Macbeth*, which was produced by the British actor-manager Donald Wolfit in 1948, when he was 14 (Billingham 3). He was deeply impressed and called the performance "[t]he first thing that made sense of my life for me. . . naturally, when I wrote, I wrote for the theatre" (Bond qtd. in Hay and Roberts 7). Before his most famous play, *Saved* (1965), Bond submitted two plays to the Royal Court in 1958. These were *Klaxon in Atreus' Palace* and *The Fiery Tree*; although none of them was performed, they granted him an invitation to join the Writers' Group and to become a regular play-reader for the theatre. His first play to be performed, *The Pope's Wedding* (1962), was produced at the Royal Court with a single (Sunday night) performance without decor (Hirst 26-27). Two years later, when *Saved* was first performed in 1965, the Royal Court was established as a theatre "of middle-class transition" (Hirst 27). Even though

these two plays he wrote earlier in his career seemed to be conventionally realistic plays (Hirst 27), “a shibboleth has grown up around the work of Edward Bond and the tag ‘controversial dramatist’ has continued to dog the man and his work” (Saunders 256). He was, at the beginning of his career, “not the darling of the critics”; one of the critics who saw the production of *The Pope’s Wedding* defined it as “too long, too portentous and too elliptical,” and the Lord Chamberlain’s Office denied the licence for *Saved* (Scharine 18).

It would not be wrong to say that Bond’s being labelled as controversial is, in part, related to his long-standing concern about the nature, causes, and function of violence in society. The violent stoning of a baby in a public park by a group of young men in *Saved* is regarded as one of the most unforgettable images in post-war British theatre and twentieth-century theatre. As Innes suggests, what *Look Back in Anger* had done for the fifties was done by *Saved* for the sixties (*The Political Spectrum* 81). Bond explains his approach to violence in the Author’s Preface to *Lear*:

I write about violence as naturally as Jane Austen wrote about manners. Violence shapes and obsesses our society, and if we do not stop being violent, we have no future. People who do not want writers to write about violence want to stop them writing about us and our time. It would be immoral not to write about violence.
(*Plays*:2 xxi)

Nevertheless, the reason for Bond’s idiosyncrasy and his being tagged as a “controversial dramatist” cannot be limited to his use of violence. His never-ending effort to find the most suitable dramatic form for his age made him a playwright highly conscious of the performance of his plays. That is why, unlike Beckett who seldom talked about his works, Bond wrote a large body of work about his theatrical theory and the performance of his plays.¹ During the late 1970s, he wanted to be on the stage to shape and mature his ideas on drama and to improve his writing. He therefore began directing his plays. However, Bond’s relationships as a director with both the National Theatre and the Royal Court were problematic. These theatres and

¹ Bond produced a large body of non-dramatic writings such as letters, notes, and explanations for his own theatrical theory which would be published as collections.

their actors accused him of being authoritarian and abstract in his direction, alongside being a “difficult writer” (Hirst 132). In 1985, he tried to direct his *War Plays* at the Royal Shakespeare Company, but he left the rehearsals because he was dissatisfied with the performance (Stuart, *Politics* 142). This experience was a turning point in Bond’s career in the sense that from then on he withdrew from mainstream British theatre to a significant extent (Saunders 256).

Added to his complaints about the performance of his plays, Bond’s dissatisfaction with the situation of British drama was apparent even at the very beginning of his career as a playwright. In the early 1960s, he reflected his concerns about the situation of British drama in a notebook entry, dated 21 February 1960 and entitled “Note on Dramatic Form: ‘We need a new dramatic form’” because “the old form falsifies experience” (Stuart, *Selections* 49). The positive side of Bond’s discontent with British drama was probably the fact that it had become a triggering force that led him into experimenting with a diverse range of theatrical forms. According to Jenny S. Spencer, “Bond’s stylistic diversity testifies to the technical alternatives opened up for British playwrights by the work of Beckett, Artaud and Brecht” much of which may be regarded as having developed within the experimental atmosphere of fringe theatre (“Edward” 123).

Bond has chosen a path very different from [other] politically-committed writers . . . His handling of dramatic techniques mirrors precisely his treatment of social and political structures. Just as he sees it as necessary to understand the history of Britain’s social and political institutions in order to change them, so too he has progressively come to realise that as particular dramatic genres are representative of ideals and ideas of their time, it is by . . . adapting them that the responsible playwright can most effectively operate. (Hirst 7)

Bond experimented with different theatrical forms used in various periods throughout history, spanning from ancient Greece to the present day. In *Restoration* (1981), for instance, he employed the comedy of manners to express the ethical and social values of modern times. In addition, he wrote a naturalistic tragicomedy, *Summer* (1982), which may be called an exploration of the moral and psychological concerns of the late nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. In *The Woman* (1978), he reworked Euripides’s

Trojan Women, a tragedy of the fifth-century BC Athens, in a way to “encompass the state of a nation at a crucial point in its history” through “more epic concerns and concomitant stage devices” (Billingham 7-8).

Bond’s interest in directing plays and his experiments with different theatrical forms should have allowed him to see the pros and cons of various forms. He says, “The form of the Ibsenite well-made play, derived from the Greeks via the Renaissance, isn’t related to the subject of the play, in the way that a picture-frame is usually related to a picture” (Bond qtd. in Billingham 24). For this reason and also because he is aware of the fact that theatrical tendencies of each epoch have been shaped by the dominant ideology of that epoch and by its social and cultural values, he thinks that there is a strong need for a new theatre. He underlines the urgent need for starting to think in epochs and understand the differences between the values of each epoch in terms of theatrical techniques in the following extract from *The Hidden Plot: Notes on Theatre and the State*²:

We have to begin to think in epochs of understanding – in waves of newness – when arguments within the old paradigm are no longer real, actual, have meaning. We are trapped in our knowledge. There would be a way out of this – it is the whole argument of radical innocence, of the ‘Notes on Imagination’. It means the abolition of all ideology. We can do this only by understanding how innocence is corrupted and how reason relates to imagination. (173)

For Bond, people are trapped in their knowledge of past values, and it is essential for them to escape from the pressure these values put upon them. The only way possible for escaping from this trap is the abolition of these past values and ideologies. Accordingly, the means by which society recreates itself, such as the stage and the media, should also change in line with the needs of the time. Former playwrights such as Brecht, Beckett, and Artaud have tried to achieve this through different theatrical forms, but these forms do not meet the needs of Bond’s present in which chaos and disorder prevail. Bond points out that “Artaud and his outrage, Brecht and his (*soi-*

² A collection of essays by Bond dealing with drama, its origin, function throughout history, and present state.

disant) reason, the concern with individual psychology, Beckett and his map of despair” have sought for it, but “all these lack a total theatre which can describe our lives and take us into the act of self-creation” (*Hidden Plot* 173). According to him, Brecht’s theatre is not sufficient to describe people’s lives in contemporary society in that it only appeals to reason, while theatre should appeal to both reason and emotion. That being the case, he says,

In contrast to Brecht, I think it’s necessary to disturb an audience emotionally, to involve them emotionally in my plays, so I’ve had to find ways of making that “aggro-effect” more complete, which is in a sense to surprise them, to say “Here’s a baby in a pram – you don’t expect these people to stone that baby.” Yet – snap – they do. (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 47)

Instead of relying heavily and merely on Brecht’s alienation techniques, which aim at distancing the audience from the play to allow them to evaluate it through pure reason, Bond uses “agro-effects.”³ This is because he thinks that the audience would be able to see the “human paradox,” which may be held as one of the bases of Bond’s theatrical theory, only by “being placed in it – not, as in Brecht, outside it” (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 48). For him, the playwright’s talent is “not in imitating dramatic forms but enacting situations which are critical to ‘being’,” and these situations are secured by violence, i.e. by “aggro-effect” or “theatre event” (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 186). He emphasises that all art is political, and it should show ways of remaining human in an inhuman society. For him, “[t]he province of drama is the proper care of the relationship between madness and sanity, imagination and reality, society and justice. Drama is essential to our humanness” (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 97).

Indeed, Bond’s drama questions the relationship between human existence and human society, and it emphasises the playwright’s responsibility to create “humanness.” He believes that political drama “needs to be radically reoccupied and rediscovered” in a way as to cover this questioning (Billingham 17). Therefore, playwriting for him

³ As is given in the quotation within the text, Bond uses the term “aggro-effect” to describe the opposite of the stereotypical understanding of Brecht’s “alienation.” [Rejecting](#) the supposed sense of detachment produced by Brechtian alienation, “aggro” confronts the audience with frightening, disgusting or simply extreme acts (Davis 202). For Bond’s definition of aggro-effect, see his *Hidden Plot*.

requires an understanding of various new concepts, such as the logic of imagination, the theatre event, and the centre, in other words, the “site,” as well as radical innocence and human paradox or drama’s paradox. Bond describes the site as follows:

There is the centre. The place where the drama is set often represents the centre (Elsinore is stone and rock by sea) but the centre is not a place but the site of a situation. Ibsen’s greatest plays are invaded by their centres – *Hedda Gabler* by drunkenness and *Ghosts* by disease: both are forms of corruption, what Hamlet calls the ‘rotten’. Ibsen’s *Master Builder* has a building site but no centre. The mountains in Ibsen’s ‘mountain plays’ are not centres because they are only symbols not sites. The centre is the site of the drama’s paradox. (*Hidden Plot* 14)

He continues explaining the term “site” as a combination and product of “the logic of imagination” and “the theatre event” by giving an example from his own play *Olly’s Prison*, which was staged by the Berliner Ensemble in 1994. At the very beginning of the play, a father, Mike, talks to his daughter, Sheila, for forty-five minutes, and he makes her a cup of tea. The daughter does not drink it; in the end, the father strangles her for not drinking the tea. Bond argues that the father’s strangling happens in a moment of crisis, and it is the theatrical site, reflecting the human paradox because the father “uses the cup as a map of his life: his self-site and the world-site” (*Hidden Plot* 18-19). The father’s use of the cup as a map of his life is what Bond calls “the logic of imagination,” and it turns the events into theatre events, which are “the conscious uses of ‘theatrical drama’ to enact or illustrate the centre. It does not comment on meaning but creates it from the interplay of freedom and the tragic” (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 16-17). As a result, it would not be wrong to say that Bond’s dialectical theatre is based on a dramatic paradox, in other words, a human paradox. This paradox is created and supported by a moment of crisis – revealing itself as a dilemma between what society dictates and what the individual wishes to do – usually reflected through what he calls an aggro-effect.

The term “human paradox,” which Bond frequently uses, is related to the existence of an interaction between human beings and their world. At the centre of this, there is an unresolvable tragic paradox resulting from that dialectic. It is apparent in almost all of

Bond's plays, alongside his non-dramatic writings. Simon Trussler suggests that Bond has a view of human life which is similar to Blake's; he "writes about man in his environment and man has made that environment an unnatural one" (*Edward* 33). For Bond, a child is normally born without a society. It has only a world because "[i]t knows no geography outside its house, it has no economy except its feeding bottle. Nevertheless[,] it has the whole world in the way adults cannot. This and the right to live in the world are its 'radical innocence' (Bond, *Hidden Plot* 65). If the child cannot feel at home in the world, it gets angry and cries. This may seem aggressive to others, but it cries to save its world. The child's innocence is radical because, for Bond, it is "demanding. It cannot accept that it should not be at home in the world" (*Hidden Plot* 65). What makes the child feel not at home in the world is society and the values it constructs. This is—an injustice for the child. Throughout their lives, human beings' radical innocence leads them to search for the justice they lose as they grow up, which is what "human paradox" is for Bond. The writer's characters are almost always determined by their environment. They are, as Spencer puts it, "shaped by the social, familial and economic relationships" ("Edward" 130). It is so because, in Bond's view,

[d]rama is concerned not with character but with the site of character. It is not concerned with a story but with the site of a story. In a street there is a wounded man and a discarded cigarette packet. Each is its own potential TE [theatre event] and the TE of the other. (*Hidden Plot* 47)

In this sense, Bond's drama deals not with man but with man in his environment, which he himself makes an unnatural one. As David Tuillon suggests, "He [Bond] writes down the inferno of our times" (3). Violence in his plays is principally a product and a symptom of corrupt and exploitative social organisations because there is an enduring, complex interaction between human beings and the society in which they live. The writer's view of human beings in the face of a repressive and unnatural society in this sense looks identical to Sigmund Freud's (1856-1939) redemption of the individual cast into a hostile social environment. Freud, in his *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1929), points out,

It was discovered that a person becomes neurotic because he cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes on him in the service of its cultural ideals, and it was inferred from this that the abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a return to possibilities of happiness. (45)

Moreover, what Freud emphasises in *Civilization and its Discontents* is that humanity's development in terms of civilisation can be carried too far and hence lead to its opposite which is regression. Civilisation is, according to Freud, "built up upon a renunciation of instinct," which results in unhappiness and "cultural frustration" (60). So, it may be said that Bond, like Freud, underlines the fact that what the utopia of the Enlightenment promises, viz. progress and development through civilisation, has brought about the opposite, leading contemporary man to loneliness, unhappiness, and violence.

Bond, in his preface to his trilogy *The Chair Plays*, entitled "The Third Crisis: The State of Future Drama," writes about three crises in the history of humanity and as a result theatre which gradually paved the way for violence owing to the injustice mentioned above. This injustice is, according to Bond, the main reason for human beings' destructiveness, and it allegedly corresponds to what Klaic refers to as the "crisis of utopia" or "utopia-bashing":

There have been two great crises when the means of living became too powerful for the purposes of living. Human beings had to understand themselves and live in a new way. Only drama can change human reality so radically. It did it in Athens and Jacobean London. The first created the classical world and in time Roman Christianity. The second led to the industrial revolution. That world no longer exists. We live in the third crisis. Our drama is full of the holes we fill with the debris of Auschwitz. We do it more and more now. History sets no precedents but drama will still allow us to live and be human if we rid it of the debris and create a new drama. It will be severe but ample beyond what we can imagine before we create it. It will be Tragic. It will take us to the edge of reality where we and the soldier will recover our innocence. (Bond, *Chair 3*)

The playwright asserts that the third and most recent crisis comes after Auschwitz, and theatres in Germany and Britain are now facing a challenge to adapt to this new life in which people try to remain human in a changing world replete with violence

and catastrophe. Bond's idea of crisis may also be related to Theodor W. Adorno's⁴ (1903-1969) assertion that it is brutal to write lyric poetry after Auschwitz (Adorno 34). The philosopher also sees utopia as essentially in the determined negation of itself (12). For that reason, there is a strong and urgent need for a new type of drama compatible with the needs of this new era of crisis. Bond further asserts that

[t]he reality of drama is politics. But we have no drama because we do not know how it is political. Our problem is that we have forgotten the last century. A hundred years is too much to forget, but we try to forget it. In the twentieth century the nature of being human changed. The imperative to be human did not change but the possibility, you could almost say the chance, of being human changed. It was the most inhuman time in the history of humankind. It created the place of absolute nihilism: Auschwitz. (*Hidden Plot* 3)

Bond therefore suggests that political drama and other former forms should be left behind. In his view, drama from now on should deal with the future, instead of the present, because the present is a product of the present ideology and its promised future utopia. Moreover, it is too close to be examined objectively. He says,

Drama is always about the future. Pinter wrote about the present – is stuck in it – because he is afraid of change. A dramatist who writes about society must write about the future. The present is too close to be written about knowingly. The future is the hidden purpose of drama, of all art. A dramatist has only two subjects: the future and the past which is the origin of the future (Bond, *Chair* 4)

In line with his ideas about the state of theatre and the need for a theatre dealing with the future, Bond's trilogy, *The War Plays*, presents different dystopian visions about the future. In all of the plays of the trilogy, the dramatist draws attention to the serious outcomes of the function of utopian ideology. In the first play, *Red Black and Ignorant*, he depicts the dystopian result of modern/solid utopian ideology which foregrounds progress and promises a perfect society through advanced science and high technology. In the second play, *The Tin Can People*, the playwright shows a transformed, postmodern/liquid utopian ideology and people's frustration at this new dystopian environment. In the last play, *Great Peace*, the possibility of establishing a

⁴ A German philosopher, sociologist, psychologist, musicologist, and composer known for his critical theory of society; also one of the most influential members of the Frankfurt School.

new and just society is questioned through a discussion of sanity and insanity. The output of the utopias depicted in these plays is desolate, violent, and barren worlds in which the characters try to survive and face the dilemmas between violence and their “human” side. The third play ends with a group of survivors creating their own society except for one character, Woman, who rejects to be a part of it, implying that even if people start over and create a new society, their own utopia, the solutions it offers will certainly and merely be limited to only a certain segment of this people.

As stated at the very beginning of this introduction, this dissertation aims to examine Bond’s trilogy in which the dystopian imagination operates to disclose the relationship between utopia and dominant ideologies, from the perspective of Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of “liquid modernity,” and to discuss how the stage has been employed as a convenient platform to disclose and discuss the transformation of utopianism and dystopia throughout history. To this end, the following chapters will include an in-depth analysis of Bond’s mentioned plays. The plays to be analysed in this dissertation were performed and published in the following order: *Red Black and Ignorant*, *The Tin Can People*, and *Great Peace*. The order of the analyses of the plays in the chapters of this dissertation will be the same as the order of the plays’ publication since this order seems to correspond to the historical transformation of utopianism as suggested by Bauman. In the trilogy itself, it is possible for the reader/audience to see a passage from a dystopia as a criticism of solid modernity to a dystopia as a criticism of liquid modernity, and finally, to an era representing the contemporary world where all the possibilities of establishing a perfect society vanish.

The first chapter, entitled “Dystopia as Criticism of Solid Modernity in *Red, Black and Ignorant*” will examine how the scenario of an apocalyptic dystopia and the scenario of a dystopian totalitarian regime characterised by fear and punishment are used to reveal the relationship between solid modern ideology and dystopia in these plays. The background section of the chapter will include well-known philosophers and sociologists such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Sigmund Freud, Max

Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor W. Adorno, Louis Pierre Althusser (1918-1990), and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), but the analysis of and the discussion about the operation of ideology and its impacts on human psychology will be based on the key texts by Zygmunt Bauman. Before the analysis, background information on the relationship between the critique of modernity and dystopia will be given, and major figures who focused on the criticism of modernity will be presented. The chapter will also focus on the dramaturgy and stage devices employed in each play of the trilogy. For instance, the introduction part of *Red, Black and Ignorant* and the nine short scenes at the very beginning of the play – in each of which an issue (to be specific, learning, love, eating, selling, work, the army, giving up the name “human,” and death, respectively) is dealt with – will be handled in the light of Foucault’s disciplinary society and the individual as the subject of ideology. Bond’s criticism of the pressure utopianism, the logic of Enlightenment, and progressivism put on people will be revealed using Foucault’s comments on Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) understanding of the panopticon.

The second chapter, entitled “Dystopia as Criticism of Liquid Consumerist Utopianism in *The Tin Can People*,” will concentrate on the presentation of a dystopian environment created by the utopian imagination of liquid consumerist ideology, which promises political power, peace, and wealth but results in war, the use of nuclear bombs, and individual and mass psychological problems. This chapter will attempt to analyse the significant transformations in utopianism during the latter part of the twentieth century, drawing on Bauman's conception of liquid modernity and liquid modern culture. These changes are portrayed as a dystopia in Bond’s *The Tin Can People*, serving as a critique of liquid modern utopianism. The chapter will show Bauman’s transition from a modernity critic to a postmodernity proponent, characterising the latter as a fluid manifestation of life and culture. Additionally, it will elucidate how Bauman adopted a comprehensive perspective as a sociologist, utilising his notions of modern and postmodern life and culture to present his conception of the progression and current prospects of utopianism in the modern world. Subsequently, an analysis of *The Tin Can People* will be conducted by

delineating the distinctions between solid modern gardening utopianism and liquid modern hunting utopianism, as posited by the sociologist. The introductory section of this chapter will refer to the contributions of several social theorists, aside from Bauman, including Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007), and Fredric Jameson, who are widely considered essential figures in any discourse on postmodernity and postmodern utopianism. The chapter will incorporate these social theorists with the aim of presenting a comprehensive account of the historical context and illustrating how their ideas influenced Bauman's formulation of liquid utopianism, a subject that will be scrutinised in the analysis. To maintain coherence and focus within the text, the examination of the primary concepts of the social theorists mentioned will be restricted to topics that relate to Bauman's interpretation of liquid modern utopianism since Bauman's works will serve as the primary foundation for the analysis of Bond's play in subsequent sections of the chapter.

The third chapter, entitled "Dystopia as Criticism of Retrotopia in *Great Peace*," is to concentrate on how Bond treats humanity's potential to create a new society and shows that even if it is created, this will probably be a remedy for only a single majority, rather than appealing to individual problems. The chapter will scrutinise Bond's treatment of utopianism after liquid modern era within the context of Bauman's examination of the contemporary state of utopianism, as presented in his 2017 publication entitled *Retrotopia*. To this end, this chapter will first focus on Bauman's *Retrotopia*, his last book published after his death, and it will then try to reveal how Bond's ideas and critique on the current state of utopianism in the aftermath of the failures of solid modern and liquid modern consumerist utopianisms in *Great Peace* are in the same line with Bauman's assessment of contemporary utopianisms and their future prospect. The sociologist's warning against the danger of being tempted to abandon critical thinking in favour of emotional attachment and to mistake their proper home with their past will be mentioned. Viewed through this lens, Bond's *Great Peace* will be analysed as an exposition and evaluation of the present-day state of utopianism.

In the conclusion part, following the detailed analyses in the main chapters, it will be deduced that Bond's trilogy may be considered an example of contemporary British political drama, reflecting the historical transformation of utopianism and aiming at questioning the possibility of a utopia in the contemporary post-liquidised, vaporised world through the lens of Zygmunt Bauman's evaluation of utopianism throughout history. Accordingly, the conclusion will also reveal that Bond underlines the personal struggle of individuals in a dystopian environment, caused by the utopian ideals and set by former ideologies, by means of developing a new kind of eclectic theatre as an indication of his theatrical theory matured and revealed particularly after *The War Plays*. In the consequence of the analyses of the plays making up Bond's trilogy, it will finally be emphasised that rather than being limited to the plays about science, the dystopian imagination in drama goes hand in hand with political drama and that further studies on dystopia, as reflected in contemporary British political drama, would be a fruitful area of research.

CHAPTER 1

DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF SOLID MODERN

UTOPIANISM IN *RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT*

1.1. MODERNITY AND UTOPIANISM

Modernity exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever came earlier, in the hope of reaching at least a point that could be called a true present, a point of origin that marks a new departure. (De Man 148)

According to the definition provided by the literary critic and theorist Paul De Man in the extract above, modernity, in its broadest sense may be described as a break from the past. The major concern of this chapter could also be found in De Man's emphasis on the logic behind modernity reflected through the words "to wipe out" to reach "a true present." By these words, the critic underlines, though indirectly, the dystopian potential of the utopia of modernity, which was possible to obtain now and then, as opposed to premodern utopias focusing on maintaining the existing order. The whole sentence itself may, in fact, be regarded as exemplifying the self-contradictory nature of modernity and the utopianism generated by it: You must remove or get rid of (wipe out) the old one to attain what is better (a true present). Modernity, by its very nature, encourages attaining what is better and being in a state of continuous progress, and it is the direct devastating outcome of this very nature that triggered and pushed the development and popularisation of dystopia forward because it stimulated competition and domination over others, and even destruction to this end. The result was a dystopian world filled with totalitarianism, fear, violence, war, and terror, which was exactly the opposite of

what modernity was expected to bring about. The objective of this chapter is therefore to analyse the concept of dystopia as a form of critique of established modern utopias, as portrayed in Edward Bond's *Red, Black and Ignorant* (1984). The analysis of the mentioned play here is based on the historical classification of utopianism proposed by Zygmunt Bauman. Additionally, this chapter aims to demonstrate the fact that the play in question serves as the very first part of Bond's trilogy, which can be interpreted as a reflection of the evolution of utopianism throughout history and a critical examination of the feasibility of achieving utopia in a postmodern era, when considered as a whole.

To this end, this chapter will focus on how a blend of a scenario of an apocalyptic dystopia and a dystopian totalitarian regime characterised by fear and punishment is used to reveal the relationship between the ideology of modern utopianism and dystopia in the plays forming Bond's trilogy. The analysis of and the discussion about the operation of modern ideology and its impacts on human psychology in *Red, Black and Ignorant* will be based on Zygmunt Bauman's term "solid modern (gardening) utopias." Before the analysis, background information on the relationship between the critique of modernity and dystopia as its outcome will be given, and major figures who focused on the criticism of modernity will be presented. Although there has been a significant number of philosophers, sociologists, and scholars of other branches who have concentrated on the Enlightenment and modernity as the root causes of violence and inequality in society, the background section of the chapter will include well-known philosophers and sociologists such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Louis Pierre Althusser, and Michel Foucault, whose theories or ideas may be employed to discuss the development and transformation of utopianism and dystopia throughout history. These well-known figures will be discussed in chronological order to reveal and illustrate the reasons for the gradual increase and dominance of dystopia over utopia. After laying the groundwork for the analysis of the play in terms of its critique of modernity, *Red, Black and Ignorant* will be analysed focusing on Bauman's concept of "solid" mechanisms of surveillance and state in general, which are essentially rooted in Althusser's investigation into Ideological State Apparatuses and Foucault's ideas on disciplinary society.

In the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “modern” refers to a contemporary or recent style or trend in cultural activities, such as art and architecture, that is characterised by a notable deviation from conventional styles and values. On the basis of this definition, any entity that deviates from its prior iterations in terms of novelty and distinctiveness can be classified as “modern.” However, the term has peculiar meanings when it is used in sociological and literary contexts. In the realm of social theory, the concept of modernity, particularly modernism, denotes the era following the Enlightenment, characterised by the primacy of science, reason, and progressivism. Within the context of literary theory and the arts, modernism or the modernist period, on the other hand, typically refers to the period between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Throughout this dissertation, the term “modernity” or “modernism” will be used in sociological context since it forms the basis of most studies on utopianism and its transformation throughout history. Grounding on the definition of the term within this context, it is possible to state that the heyday of utopianism seems to coincide with that of modernity, even though there have been numerous formerly written literary works such as Plato’s *Republic* and medieval poetry like “The Land of Cockaigne” (c. 1350), which is thought to have been written by a Franciscan friar. According to Michael Hviid Jacobsen, a Danish academic specialising in utopian studies, the era of modernity that arose from the principles of the Enlightenment gave rise to a novel form of utopia. This was primarily due to the conviction that individuals possess the ability and agency to mould the present and future into a state superior to the past. (“Activating Presence” 342).

This new form of utopia, which is modern, was based on the power of knowledge because after the Enlightenment, knowledge gained significance and transformed into a means of domination, resulting in the genocides of the twentieth century (Gritzner 38). That is why numerous critics and sociologists, beginning from the eighteenth century, especially after witnessing the devastating effects of modernity beginning with the World Wars, have concentrated on criticising the logic behind the Enlightenment. Moreover, as Jacobsen puts forward, it would not be wrong to state that the passage from utopian to dystopian projections developed in parallel with all these developments

throughout the world (“Activating Presence” 343). The main reason for the first shock triggered by World War I was the fact that it showed people that science and impulse aimed at making progress would easily lead to destruction when fed by human ambition and violence. Then, the Great Depression (1929-1939) revealed that stability and order, which were expected to come by means of capitalist economics, could create suffering. As Claeys argues,

[t]he promises of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophical and the nineteenth-century scientific and technological optimism seemed smashed. What now seems like a temporary recovery would take place in the second half of the twentieth century. But the road to dystopia was also now well signposted, as in the 1950s, the threat of nuclear war, and in the 1960s and 1970s, a looming demographic and environmental catastrophe, added to the growing sum of mankind’s woes. (357)

In short, the optimism first brought about by the Enlightenment philosophy and the ideology imposed by modernity, as well as by scientific advancements in the nineteenth century, gradually disappeared to be replaced by a sense of foreboding, and from then on, as Kumar puts it, “‘grand narratives’ of reason, science, progress, even revolution, were increasingly questioned” (559). This questioning and criticism of modernity, certainly, did not appear suddenly. Modernity did not at first attract great attention or seem relatable to utopianism, either. Many sociologists, scholars, and scientists were uncertain about their attitude towards it. They believed that progress and wealth could be produced by the advantages of science and reason, but one part of them was worried about the cost of this belief. Those early critics, of course, did not themselves call the era through which they lived “modern”; but they began to see the possible repercussions of what they call the Enlightenment. Even though “modernity” as a sociological term has only begun to be discussed by sociologists as a concept of significance in the late 1980s, throughout this dissertation, the term “modernity” will be used interchangeably with the term “Enlightenment” with an end to prevent confusion and anachronism, considering that the two terms are always associated with each other and the latter might be regarded as the basis of the first.

1.2. CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY

Since, in sociological terms, modernity is generally associated with the Enlightenment, it would be better, first, to understand what the Enlightenment is. In Western sociological tradition, the Enlightenment means the process of becoming rational. Reason is seen as a faculty that improves comprehension and eliminates superstition and ignorance. The concept of Enlightenment is associated with the intellectual movement that emerged in eighteenth-century Europe, which promoted the use of reason and the pursuit of progress as a counterpoint to the constraints imposed by religious dogma, traditional practises, and personal beliefs. In this sense, it pertains to a wider trend towards secularism, republicanism, humanism, and science (Turner 166). However, for many sociologists and philosophers, the said shift was problematic because it directly encouraged competition and domination over nature and others for the sake of continuous progress. This sub-section of the present dissertation will include several consecutive parts which are attempts to illustrate the relationship between the emergence of modernity and its gardening utopias with the dystopian turn through the ideas of major philosophers and sociologists dealing with this relationship. The first part will include two early critics of modernity, Nietzsche and Freud, who signalled the problems about the logic of the Enlightenment and modernity, even though they did not make an analysis of the functioning of this logic as detailed as the late critics of it. The second part dealing with the late critics of modernity will cover the ideas of two schools of philosophers, namely the German Frankfurt School represented by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, and the French neo-Marxist school represented by Louis Pierre Althusser and Michel Foucault. Major texts of Althusser and Foucault will be discussed in more length and detail since these two philosophers not only criticised modernity but also elaborated on the operation and the dystopian end results of modern utopianism. Another reason for the inclusion of an in-depth discussion of these two philosophers is that the terms they employed such as “interpellation,” “ideological state apparatuses,” and “disciplinary society” formed the basis for Bauman’s ideas on solid modernity and solid mechanisms of surveillance existent in the early solid modern world.

1.2.1. Early Critics of Modernity

Among the first philosophers anticipating the negative consequences of modernity, German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche may be listed. According to M. Keith Booker, Nietzsche's "well-known rejection of Christianity and of the 'slave morality'" that it spread have similarities with the authoritarian approach and power of ideologies (35). In addition, "the radical individualism that informs all of Nietzsche's thought," in a sense, may be interpreted as a foreshadowing of the conflict between individual freedom and obedience to authorities in society (Booker 36). Nietzsche offers a critique of the growing mechanisation of existence that is attributed to the imperialistic nature of science. He posits that science has become a unique incarnation of religion "worshipping the god of machines and crucibles" (Booker 36). Nietzsche also asserts that

the spirit of the un-Dionysiac . . . fights against Dionysiac wisdom and art; it strives to dissolve myth; it puts in the place of metaphysical solace a form of earthly harmony, indeed its very own deus ex machina, namely the god of machines and smelting furnaces, i.e. the energies of the spirits of nature, understood and applied in the service of higher egotism; it believes in correcting the world through knowledge, in life led by science; and it is truly capable of confining the individual within the smallest circle of solvable tasks, in the midst of which he cheerfully says to life: 'I will you: you are worth understanding.' (*The Birth* 85)

As he makes it clear, the system in the modern world promoted by reason and science is symbolically "the god of machines" and a type of new religion. The philosopher anticipates that this religion would be able to trap men in a prison of scheduled duties and tasks dictated by the modern world in the future. Throughout his *Untimely Meditations* (written between 1873 and 1876), Nietzsche additionally claims that modern culture is "barbaric," and he attacks the rationalism and superficial optimism of modern culture (79, 98, 180). In *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), again, he contrasts the Dionysian culture that existed in pre-Socratic Greece with the Apollonian culture seen in Socratic reason. Dionysian culture promoted bodily energies and passions whereas

Socratic reasoning formed the basis of modern rationalism and Enlightenment optimism, but this created a kind of repressive logic that developed into the basic tenet of modern society. Within the context of Socratic culture, emotions and physical sensations hold greater significance than rationality, ultimately serving as a fundamental tenet of contemporary philosophy and daily existence. It is also possible to find in Nietzsche harsh criticism of the mechanisation imposed by modernity:

The machine of itself teaches the mutual cooperation of hordes of men in operations where each man has to do only one thing: it provides the model for the party apparatus and the conduct of warfare. On the other hand, it does not teach individual autocracy: it makes of many one machine and of every individual an instrument to one end. Its most generalized effect is to teach the utility of centralization. (*Human* 249)

The philosopher's discourse constitutes one of the initial discussions on the contemporary state as a mechanism of oppression that culminates in centralisation, namely totalitarianism. His works can be interpreted as criticisms of contemporary politics as a medium to subject individuals to the system, thereby paving the way for subsequent anti-modernists and dystopian visionaries.

Another early critic of the Enlightenment and modernity is the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud. Although he is famous for his theory of psychoanalysis and examination of the human psyche, his works have always been related to the social life of human beings. It is possible to observe a common ground between his social thinking and dystopian literature. Freud suggests that the interplay between the "reality principle" and the "pleasure principle" is a fundamental determinant of an individual's psychic existence (Booker 29). It would also not be wrong to state that the majority of political dystopian literature depicts the same conflict between the individual desire and the thing that society requires him/her to do. The neurologist's thought is "largely inspired by the scientific impulses of the Enlightenment" (Booker 29); however, in time, he seemed to gradually become more and more hopeless about the possibility of attaining a society exceeding the limitations of the past. Particularly, his *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1930) shows that he is sceptical about human society and its limits

which may be evaluated as analogous to the pessimistic view that has been observed in a large body of dystopian works. Freud's work highlights the significance of the overpowering nature of immediate life necessities, leading to the unattainability of the "programme of becoming happy" (*Civilisation* 83). Throughout his work, the author contends that the reformation of social institutions and traditions is incapable of yielding happiness and freedom. This is due to the inherent conflict between civilisation and fundamental human impulses. For this reason, it is not a source of happiness, but of unhappiness. The neurologist states,

Liberty of the individual is no gift of civilisation. It was greatest before there was any civilization, though then, it is true, it has for the most part no value, since the individual was scarcely in a position to defend it. The development of civilization imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that no one shall escape those restrictions. What makes itself felt in a human community as a desire for freedom may be their revolt against some existing injustice, and so may prove favourable to a further development of civilization; it may remain compatible with civilization. But it may also spring from the remains of their original personality, which is still untamed by civilization and may thus become the basis in them of hostility to civilization. The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed against particular forms and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether. (*Civilisation* 95-96)

For Freud, the only thing that civilisation provides is a so-called security against injustices. However, since this means imposing restrictions by an external force, it is in direct conflict with personal desires and freedom. Moreover, Booker notes that Freud's proposition regarding the role of strong leaders as a form of social super-ego was made during the emergence of figures such as Josef Stalin (1878-1953) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), thereby assuming a menacing connotation (29). Furthermore, according to Booker, the concepts of mass psychology and mentality as presented in Freud's *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* (1921) can be interpreted as a precursor to the emergence of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, a recurring theme in various dystopian narratives (29).

1.2.2. Later Critics of Modernity

In the early twentieth century, many philosophers were still both enthusiasts and enemies of modernity and modernisation. On the one hand, they argued that modernisation as a process would give humanity the power to shape the world in the manner they wanted, and on the other, they foresaw the negative consequences of this process and argued that reaching this utopian ideal was impossible. In the late twentieth century, however, hopes about modernisation and modernity regressed due to the emergence of repressive and totalitarian regimes. A critique of modernity came to the fore, and this branch of thought was mainly represented by two schools of philosophers: the first was the German Frankfurt School (represented by Horkheimer and Adorno), which developed modern Critical Theory, and the second was French neo-Marxists such as Althusser and Foucault.⁵

The first one of totalitarian regimes leading to a regression in the belief that modern utopianism would result in a better world was Stalin's government which came to power after the 1917 Russian Bolshevik Revolution. Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924), who became the head of the government immediately after the revolution, promised a utopia "in which one segment of society would never be subordinate to others" (Claeys 129). However, the slave-worker camp system, which was closely connected to Stalin's rapid industrialisation program, was introduced in 1929 and resulted in total turmoil and violence in society. Even before that, in 1918, the rise of Bolsheviks and their destruction of those who disagreed with them caused the spread of such opinions as their politics was infallible and opposing them was impossible. Based on these opinions, the government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) created a long-term fearful and violent atmosphere, and Stalin's seizure of power through the end of the 1920s led to a 25-year dictatorship (Claeys 138).

⁵ For detailed information about the critique of modernity and these strands of criticism, see Berman's *All That is Solid Melts into Air* (1982).

Similar totalitarian regimes emerged in Germany and in China, as well. Germany struggled with chaos, riots, and economic depression following its defeat in 1918. When Hitler came into power in 1933, “Sturmabteilung (SA) [which was the military wing of the Nazi Party] and secret police force Gestapo . . . intimidated and imprisoned the social democrats, homosexuals, some clergymen and many who were opposing them” (Claeys 179). Intolerance towards those “others” triggered the killing instinct of the Nazis and culminated in the death camps the largest of which was established in Auschwitz complex in Poland. Destroying and enslaving the so-called enemies and inferiors (Jews, blacks, and Bolsheviks) was represented as a prerequisite for a perfect society (Claeys 179). The Chinese Revolution in 1949 under the leadership of Mao also led to workers or punishment camps even though it provided peace for a while. In this system including thousands of large camps, millions of people were killed for the sake of a perfect state. This process, during which thousands of books were burnt and many intellectuals named others as enemies, brought about not a perfect but a fearful and repressive state (Claeys 212-13). All these developments in the twentieth century showed that all utopias would eventually turn into dystopias and that all ideologies would other at least one segment within a society.

Apart from the fear created by totalitarian regimes, in the 1980s, a new wave of fear spread around the world. The Cold War (c. 1947-1991), which was a power struggle between the USA and USSR stimulated the need for nuclear armament and competition in this sense. Although there were not any close combats in this period, a deep fear of war and destruction remained on the agenda (Claeys 213). Governments issued informing and protesting pamphlets against nuclear armament such as *Protest and Survive* in England (1980) in this age (Milling 83). The arrival of the cruise missile at the territory of England in 1982 exacerbated the concerns about nuclear armament (84).

1.2.2.1. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno: *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972)

Influenced by all these developments and both by Freud and Nietzsche, after approximately a quarter of a century, Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that the logic of the Enlightenment which was based on rationalism was connected to the domination of man over both man and nature, and behind this impulse to dominate lied “fear - a fear of the other and the unknown, of what lies outside measurable, controllable existence” (qtd. in Gritzner 39). According to them, the “Enlightenment [was] totalitarian” and the major characteristic of the Enlightenment was its control over man through “alienating and dehumanising” political, economic, and psychological systems (Horkheimer and Adorno 4). They also pointed out the uncontrollable nature of the impulse to dominate and control, leading to destruction and violence instead of human beings’ well-being through the following words:

Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement of creation or in its deference to worldly masters. Just as it serves all the purposes of the bourgeois economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins. . . What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings. Ruthless towards itself, the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its self-awareness. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2)

As is understood, unlike premodern man who had to accept his position which was pre-ordained by a metaphysical or divine power and whose only need was to protect the existing order, modern man had to exceed his own limits and make every effort for the progress of society and for attaining the utopia of modernity even if it required domination over and exploitation of both others and nature, and even of himself. In factories and on battlefields, rather than an individual, modern man had to become a dehumanised part of the mass as a slave and subject, contributing to the production chain of industrial and capitalist ideology.

1.2.2.2. Louis Pierre Althusser and the Neo-Marxist Theory of the State and Ideology

Louis Pierre Althusser, a French philosopher, also a well-known neo-Marxist, presents an interpretation of Karl Marx's (1818-1883) historical materialism in his *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1970). He may be regarded as one of the first philosophers who provided elaborate insights into the modern man's subject position within the mass of the capitalist society and how ideology guarantees the hegemony of the dominant class in society. His theory of ideology has widely been employed in the social sciences and humanities, and it has formed a basis for many neo-Marxist thinkers. It is also possible to observe many traces of him in Foucault's theory of disciplinary society, particularly in his *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975), which is commonly used for the analysis of various dystopian writings.

Jacques Bidet, in the introduction to the 1970 publication, elucidates that Althusser's text is a political document that attests to its era. Bidet contends that the entire text is imbued with the essence of May 1968, which was characterised by the convergence of the workers' and students' movements, culminating in the largest strike in French history (Althusser xx). In this atmosphere, Althusser provides a re-study of the Marxist theory and a re-formulation of the capitalist society. He elaborates on the classical Marxist building metaphor which implies that every society is comprised of a base and a superstructure. The word "base" applies to the forces of production, the resources and materials which provide the goods society needs. Superstructure represents all the other elements of society including law, the state, and ideologies. The economic base in this metaphor (like the base of a building) determines everything else. Althusser proposes a reversal of this metaphor and posits that the social relations of production serve as the defining feature of a mode of production ultimately. The perpetuation of these relations is guaranteed by the collective operation of both the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) like the police, the army, the prison system, and the judiciary and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) like schools, family, and churches. The generation of law, as a

component of superstructure, is a result of the conversion of violence into “power in the state machine” (Althusser xxiv).

At this point Althusser warns the reader about the necessity to distinguish state power from the state apparatus as well as the classical Marxist Repressive State Apparatus from Ideological State Apparatuses. The state, for the Marxists, was perceived as an oppressive apparatus. It was a “repressive machine” that ensured the hegemony of the dominant classes over the working class to “subject it to the process of extorting surplus-value (that is, to capitalist exploitation)” (Althusser 70). For the philosopher, the state was therefore what the Marxist classics refer to as the state apparatus, and the word “state apparatus” stood not only for specialised apparatuses such as the police and prisons, whose existence resulted from the necessity of legal practice, but also organisations like the army, which functioned as “the auxiliary repressive force” (70). However, state power and the state apparatus should be distinct from each other, and the goal of class struggle should be the possession of state power with an end to use the state apparatus. This state is defined by Althusser as the [classical Marxists] Repressive State Apparatus, which is a mechanism characterised by violence. In contrast, ISA are described as

a system of defined institutions, organizations, and the corresponding practices. Realized in the institutions, organizations, and practices of this system is all or part (generally speaking, a typical combination of certain elements) of the State Ideology. The ideology realized in an ISA ensures its systemic unity on the basis of an ‘anchoring’ in material functions specific to each ISA; these functions are not reducible to that ideology, but serve it as a ‘support’. (Althusser 77)

Althusser classifies ISAs into eight distinct categories, which include scholastic, familial, religious, political, associative, and cultural apparatuses, and those about information and news, publishing and distribution (76). There are various institutions or organizations, supporting or corresponding to each ISA. Certain institutions serve the scholastic ISA, while others serve the religious ISA. Examples of the former include schools, while examples of the latter include churches. One of the primary distinctions

between RSA and ISA lies in the fact that the latter is characterised by plurality. Specifically, the ISAs are comprised of a diverse array of institutions and organisations, both public and private, that operate in a complex system of cooperation and coordination (76). The second point pertains to the distinction between the RSA and the ISA. The former operates as an oppressive entity, relying on the employment of physical violence, whether directly or indirectly. Conversely, the ISA do not employ physical violence in the same manner as the RSA (Althusser 77). Althusser explains that

[n]either the Church nor the school nor the political parties nor the press nor radio and television nor publishing nor entertainment nor sport have recourse to physical violence in order to function with their clientele. At any rate, the use of physical violence is not manifest or dominant in them. It is 'of our own free will' that we go to Church or school (although school is mandatory), join a political party and obey it, buy a newspaper, switch on the TV. . . This is to say that Ideological State Apparatuses are distinguished from the state apparatus in that they function, not 'on violence', but 'on ideology.' (78)

For this reason, it is almost always impossible to notice the workings of ideology within this complex structure. Althusser's theoretical contribution to the discourse on governmentality and the state apparatus is significant in that it allows the application of his ideas to a range of dystopian literary texts. Specifically, Althusser posits that the constitution of the subject as an ideological effect is a product of the imaginary nature of ideology within this structure (190). He suggests that "ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects" rather than using force or violence (190). According to him, ideology

'acts' or 'functions' in such a way as to 'recruit' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) through the very precise operation that we call interpellation or hailing. It can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace, everyday hailing, by (or not by) the police: 'Hey, you there!'. . . the hailed individual turns around. With this simple 180-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail 'really' was addressed to him and that 'it really was he who was hailed' (not someone else). (190-91)

In such a manner, the target individual embraces ideology voluntarily thinking that it appeals to him or believing that he/she acts on his own free will. From the moment of his/her birth, an individual is inherently a subject, shaped by the various forms of familial ideology such as paternal, maternal, conjugal, and fraternal ideologies. It is predetermined that the newborn will carry its father's name, thereby establishing its identity and uniqueness, as stated in the source material (192).

To put it briefly, Althusser shows the ways a state uses power over its subjects and controls them for the purpose of reproducing labour power, and he considers this happening through a collaboration of the RSA that are controlled directly by the state and act by repression and force and the ISA that work on recognition and subjection. The main reason for the applicability of Althusser's complex and collaborated working structure of the RSA and the ISA to many dystopian writings is the fact that the philosopher's theory focuses on the state's ways of maintaining its power, causing individuals' loss of identity and their eventual loss of the knowledge and power to fight against state power.

1.2.2.3. Michel Foucault and the Critique of Modernity within the Context of "Disciplinary Society"

In his book *Public Freedom* (2008), Dana Villa, who is a well-known scholar of Hannah Arendt's (1906-1975) political thought, dedicates a chapter to the relationship between the French philosopher Michel Foucault and the dystopian public. At the very beginning of his evaluation, he quotes Foucault's famous phrase "the Enlightenment, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines" (Foucault 222; Villa 264). As the scholar also argues, it is Foucault's identification of late modernity with domination that makes his *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* one of the most frequently cited texts of both dystopian and literary analyses. Foucault's analysis of the genesis and configuration of disciplinary societies has been demonstrated to be a highly effective method for interpreting authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, as

evidenced by works of literature like Ray Bradbury's (1920-2012) *Fahrenheit 451* (1951) and George Orwell's *1984* (1949).

In his *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault argues that discipline and liberty coexist and it is not possible to have one without the other. He writes that "the discourse of liberties and the binary oppositions between public and private, state and civil society led to a network of means of surveillance and control directed at the social body" (109). The philosopher asserts that a novel form of power, referred to as disciplinary, arose during the Enlightenment period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This kind of power does not seek control by means of violence, but it tries to manage and control large populations and masses in a more effective way. This is provided by a system of interconnected institutions such as schools, factories, prisons, the army, and hospitals.

Foucault, in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, explains the emergence of this new kind of power by drawing a parallel between the "carceral network" and domination and control in society (201, 271). To reveal the function of the carceral system in the development of disciplinary societies, the philosopher dwells on the nature and transformation of the penal system and observes a penal reform in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which created a completely new system of power to punish. He puts forward that "[the] right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society. But it now finds itself recombined with elements so strong that it becomes almost more to be feared" (90). The first step towards this shift was the removal of punishment as a "spectacle" (8) and the condemnation of public torture by the Enlightenment as an "atrocious" (55). After this condemnation the body was regarded as an instrument "caught up" (a word reminiscent of Althusser's concept of interpellation) in a "system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty" (11). Formerly, the body of a guilty person had been "the king's property" whereas after the penal reform, it became "the property of society, the object of a collective and useful appropriation" (109). The purpose of this

appropriation was not the prevention of crime but the transformation of the criminal. The procedure, in a sense, can be interpreted as a means of “redefining the individual as the subject of law” (128). The criminal was deprived of his/her freedom then, for the good of society, and was transformed into an individual abiding by the law through the method described below:

There was compulsory work in workshops; the prisoners were kept constantly occupied; the prison was financed by this work, but the prisoners were also rewarded individually as a way of reinserting them morally and materially into the strict world of the economy; by keeping the prisoners constantly employed on productive works, they were able to defray the expenses of the prison, they were not left idle and they were able to save a little money for the time when their capacity would cease . . . Life was partitioned, therefore, according to an absolutely strict time-table, under constant supervision; each moment of the day was devoted to a particular type of activity, and brought with it its own obligations and prohibitions. (124)

As is seen, instead of torturing the body as a punishment to illustrate the sovereign’s hegemony over the individual’s body, the new penal system focused on manipulating the movements and behaviours of the human body. It is, according to Foucault, a “machinery of power” that explores, deconstructs, and rearranges the body (138). In the eighteenth century, “[t]here were the military barracks: the army, the vagabond mass, has to be held in place”; the philosopher argues that “with the spread of workshops, there also developed great manufacturing spaces . . . first, the combined manufactories, then, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the works or factories proper” (142). Timetables, scheduled activities, and joint work were used to control the human body (128-29). In this manner, the disciplinary power generated subjected, “docile” bodies (150).

As for the instruments used for this purpose, their development was gradual. In Foucault’s view, “[t]he disciplinary apparatuses” classified the “good” and “bad” subjects (181). Through the evaluation of the acts of an individual, discipline rewarded the good individual by means of awards such as granting him/her higher ranks or positions and punished him/her by depriving him/her of these awards. This precise evaluation obviously required close observation or examination, in other words,

surveillance. It meant the demarcation of a place diverse from places for all the others. For Foucault, along with “the great ‘confinement’ of vagabonds and paupers,” there were other “more discreet, but insidious and effective confinements” (176). There were schools and hospitals to control, transform, and subject the individual. The philosopher regards the extensive and gradual implementation of a hierarchical, uninterrupted, and utilitarian form of surveillance as a pernicious development because the disciplinary power, through meticulous monitoring, has evolved into a comprehensive system that is internally connected to the economy and objectives of the mechanism in which it is applied (176). Within this integrated system, inspection was a major element. The philosopher states, “[t]he gaze [was] alert everywhere” (196) and describes Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon as “the architectural embodiment and basis of this composition” as can be seen below:

We know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the periphery building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. . . Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap. (200)

The subject’s visibility provided a thorough control and discipline of the body. As the scope of production enlarged and became wider, supervision became more essential since it became harder and harder to control large masses, and it spread to other forms of institutions operating within this system of social control. As an example, diseases, such as leprosy and the plague, resulted in the implementation of disciplinary measures. Foucault suggests that instead of a clear-cut division between two distinct groups, there should be various forms of separation. This would involve a comprehensive system of monitoring and regulation, as well as an increase and diversification of authority (198). The expulsion or detention of individuals afflicted with diseases was motivated not only by the desire for a pristine community but also by the aspiration for a well-regulated society. So, the transition from a structure of discipline to a widened surveillance was based on the extension of these mechanisms of discipline throughout all social

structures. Ensuring obedience to these mechanisms of discipline did not require force and violence. Foucault asserts, “Bentham was surprised that panoptic institutions could be so light: there were no more bars, no more chains” (202); all that is necessary is a real subjection made possible through an imaginary relation. Foucault adds that “it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work” (202), for the lucidity of dichotomous categorisations among individuals sufficed to ensure their subordination and the maintenance of the status quo.

1.2.2.4. Zygmunt Bauman and Critique of Modernity

A more recent figure dealing with modernity and its relationship with utopianism is Zygmunt Bauman. His trilogy – *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989), *Legislators and Interpreters* (1991), and *Modernity and Ambivalence* (1991) is mostly known and cited for the critique of modernity in them. Bauman is often regarded as the foremost sociological representative of postmodernism (Beilharz vii). However, it would be inaccurate to classify him as an adherent of postmodernism as he maintains that postmodernism is not something distinct from modernism, but rather a progression of it that has undergone a perpetual and fundamental metamorphosis from a solid to a liquid state. (Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* 10-11). For this reason, he may be called postmodern only in the sense that he criticises the strict adherence to rationality that led to the failure of the grand narrative of modernity. As for Bauman’s criticism of modernity, considering the large body of works he wrote about the situation of contemporary man, it is possible to suggest that it targets mainly two aspects of the logic behind modernity: the first is the endless modernist “Faustian” ambition to change (Beilharz 141) for the sake of a perfect, neatly arranged, and civilised society; and the second is the modernist obsession with order and certainty, the latter of which may be regarded as a direct result of the first.

As Bauman makes it clear in his *Modernity and the Holocaust*, modernity was able to create barbarism in the guise of civilisation. The Holocaust, in this sense, according to him, may be interpreted as a direct reflection of modernity’s potential for violence

(Beilharz 88). Bauman contends that the most remarkable aspect of the Holocaust is that it represents “a potentiality within modernity” rather than a reflection of its truth (87). According to the sociologist, the ideologies of Nazism and the existence of Auschwitz can be viewed as ordinary continuations of the contemporary factory system. He suggests that these phenomena represent a form of lethal Fordism that was in the process of being established, which ultimately resulted in a vast system of social manipulation that went awry due to its own technical culmination (91). At this point, Bauman employs the metaphor of the gardening state to represent the contemporary pursuit of a meticulous and conclusive state of organisation, which echoes the viewpoints of earlier critics of modern social engineering, such as those of Althusser and Foucault. According to Bauman, the modern project suggested the feasibility of a world that is devoid of not only sinners but also sin itself (*Life* 13). The objective of modernist social engineers was to create a world that eliminated not only individuals who made incorrect decisions but also the possibility of making such decisions which may be called “moral ambivalence” (*Life* 4). He also states,

[c]haotic being [for solid modernist social engineers] is devoid of social structure – if ‘structure’ means precisely an uneven distribution of probabilities, non-randomness of the events . . . They could speak of ‘chaos’ only as of departure from the norm, disturbance of the normal state of affairs – and thus as of an abnormal and exceptional state, a dangerous state, a state of ‘crisis’ or disease. Much like ‘crime’ or ‘illness,’ the idea of chaos seemed to be burdened from the start with a stigma no definitional efforts could wash off. (Bauman, *Life* 13)

It was both abnormal and frightening to go beyond the norms and the existing order since this is classified either as a “‘crisis’ or disease.” As a result, modern human beings exist “in the never-ending, since never fully successful effort to escape from Chaos . . . Society, we might say, is a massive and continuous cover-up operation” (*Life* 14). In this respect, life in modernity, as Bauman clarifies, may be regarded as a resistance to “fate and ascription, in the name of omnipotence of design and achievement” (*Ambivalence* 68).

This modernist endeavour to achieve a tight and final sense of order required a new type of social engineering and control that had not existed before the Enlightenment and modernity. Classification is the sole viable approach to achieving a flawless sense of order. This is because the act of classification involves conferring meaning and imparting a pattern to the world we inhabit, thereby eliminating any potential for ambiguity (Beilharz 106). Classification allows both inclusion and exclusion, and because the decision to include or exclude an individual might be arbitrary, classification automatically leads to the possibility of discrimination. All visions of order are therefore dichotomising in that they would inevitably create two categories of people: those who are included and those who are not included in any created group (Bauman, *Ambivalence* 38-39). Bauman argues that contemporary instances of genocide, particularly those rooted in racism, are institutional in nature and often enacted as state policies. These policies are frequently implemented through large-scale social engineering efforts, as evidenced by historical examples such as Nazism and Stalinism (39). Similarly, there could exist a multitude of classifications, including but not limited to ideological orientation, compliance, and propensity towards unlawful behaviour.–Bauman adds,

[a]part from the overall plan, the artificial order of the garden needs tools and raw materials. It also needs defence – against the unrelenting danger of what is, obviously, a disorder. The order, first conceived of as a design, determines what is a tool, what is a raw material, what is useless, what is irrelevant, what is harmful, what is a weed or a pest. It classifies all elements of the universe by their relation to itself. (*Holocaust* 186)

For Bauman, modern genocide, like a gardener’s job, is not a destructive but a creative activity allowing the elimination of the “weeds,” the obstacles or the adversaries in the path to perfect order aimed at a better society. All images of a society as a garden in this way identify certain segments of the population as human weeds. As Bauman states, it is necessary to segregate, contain, prevent the spread of, remove, and keep outside the boundaries of society all “weeds.” If these measures are not effective, it may be necessary to resort to killing them (186).

With the benefit of hindsight and of having read Althusser and Foucault, Bauman was aware that a social system maintains its existence by protecting its fundamental patterns through a “net of habit and diversion, surrounding the common man with a multitude of petty barriers and warning signs, as well as by hosts of paltry rewards complete with a morality which hails the virtues of these rewards” (Bauman, *Socialism* 48). As such, the current order within any society sustains itself by classifying obedience as normal while identifying disagreement as abnormal. What comes next is a system of reward and punishment to reinforce the basic pattern of society. This is a system which makes those staying within the boundaries remain in the same place and prevents those who tend to disagree with the current order from diversion. Bauman also refers to Foucault and his use of Bentham’s Panopticon in explaining modern power and clarifies that Foucault

used Jeremy Bentham’s design of Panopticon as the archmetaphor of modern power. In Panopticon, the inmates were tied to the place and barred from all movement, confined within thick, dense and closely guarded walls and fixed to their beds, cells or work-benches. They could not move because they were under watch; they had to stick to their appointed places at all times because they did not know, and had no way of knowing where at the moment their watchers - free to move at will - were. The surveillants’ facility and expediency of movement was the warrant of their domination; the inmates’ ‘fixedness to the place’ was the most secure and the hardest to break or loose of the manifold bonds of their subordination. Mastery over time was the secret of the managers’ power - and immobilizing their subordinates in space through denying them the right to move and through the routinization of the time-rhythm they had to obey was the principal strategy in their exercise of power. (*Liquid Modernity* 9-10)

So, the modern power of the state for Bauman is based on the fixity of the subordinated man. This fixity is provided through immobilising the subjects either by walls, workplaces, or cells which Bauman calls “solid” structures, varying from concrete buildings such as factories, schools, prisons, and hospitals to strict working timetables and plans which subjects must obey. The system in question and its associated patterns are solid in two regards. Firstly, it is founded on a steadfast adherence to spatial and temporal constraints, which is achieved through meticulous observation. Secondly, a significant number of modernist planners believed that the transition away from pre-industrial ways of life was both irreversible and definitive (Bauman, *Socialism* 55).

According to Bauman, the distinctions between political theorists like Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx were subtle. Bentham perceived the contemporary factory as a pre-existing blueprint for an ideal societal structure, while Marx characterised socialism as a contemporary factory without capitalists (55-56).

1.3. THE PROBLEM WITH SOLID MODERN UTOPIANISM

Zygmunt Bauman's elaboration on utopianism in his writings may be observed even in his early years in the two major leitmotifs of suffering and culture (Jacobsen, *From Solid Modern Utopia* 68). These two aspects are associated with utopianism both as a sense of consolation during times of suffering and as a realisation of culture. Bauman initially regarded the Left, specifically socialism, as a counter-culture to both capitalism and modernity. However, in the early 1980s, his optimism towards socialism as a dynamic utopia faded, particularly following the events of the 1990s in Eastern Europe and the conclusive removal of state socialist initiatives that encouraged state ownership of the means of production (Jacobsen, *From Solid Modern Utopia* 70). From then on, his standpoint about utopianism has become more universal and comprehensive in terms of humanistic values. In his more recent writings, Bauman dealt with the transformed social conditions in terms of utopia and made a critique of modernity, which was evident mainly in the above-mentioned works and replaced "his former defence of Marxist modernity" (Jacobsen, *From Solid Modern Utopia* 72). The author produced a considerable number of publications that can be categorised as critical analyses of postmodernity and assessments of the feasibility of envisioning utopias in the present day. These works include, but are not restricted to, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (1997), *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor* (1998), *Globalisation: The Human Consequences* (1998), *Liquid Modernity* (2000), and *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts* (2004). Additionally, the author penned an article entitled "Utopia with no Topos" (2003), which examines the shift from stable modern utopias to fluid modern utopias.

In most of his works, Bauman applies his theory of solid and liquid modernity to the history and development of utopianism, and he divides the history of utopianism into three periods, namely, the period of “gamekeeping utopia,” the period of “gardening utopia,” and the period of “hunting utopia,” corresponding to premodern utopianism, solid modern utopianism, and liquid modern utopianism, respectively. The premodern, or as is named by Bauman, “gamekeeping utopianism,” viewed the world as a wilderness and focused especially on protecting the borders between wilderness and civilisation, as well as the divine order of the universe (Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* 51-68). This kind of utopianism seldom tried to improve or change the natural or divine order of things, and it aimed to maintain the then-current status quo (Bauman, “Living” 4). The sociologist explains that “[w]hatever their sources of inspiration, utopias entered the historical stage as important members of the cast only after the stage had been set by a series of social and intellectual developments usually identified with the advent of modernity” (Bauman, *Socialism* 34), and he associates utopias’ entrance into the historical stage with mainly two conditions. The first condition is the sense that the world is not functioning properly and effectively (Jacobsen, “Activating Presence” 342), and the second is the belief that humanity has the potential to perform this act of correcting or organising the social world in a perfect manner. He clarifies the triggering force behind solid modern utopianism through the following words:

It was only this idea of perfectibility which paved the way for utopia. Indeed, to embark on sketching the outlines of a better, though never existing social order, one has to believe that no borders are in principle unencroachable and that the ease with which even the steepest ramparts can be scaled depends in large measure, if not solely, on the boldness of human imagination. This new and emancipating belief flourished in all its numerous aspects throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries until it took solid root in the European mind to the point of becoming a part of common knowledge, the constant backcloth against which to paint innumerable utopias. (Bauman, *Socialism* 34-35)

For Bauman, utopias of solid modernity were therefore products of the belief in the potential of man in shaping both the present and the future. As a sociologist, he is aware of the emancipating, egalitarian, and humanistic potential of modernist utopianism as a product of the European Enlightenment; however, he is, to a large extent, critical of its

embodiment in real life due to its totalitarian undertones promoting order, subjection, and control because he thinks that

[g]enocide is necessarily connected to that desire for rational social engineering which is also so ubiquitous within utopianism. More, all visions of artificial order are necessarily asymmetrical and thereby dichotomising; there is inevitably an in-group and an out-group, or a problem and an imaginary solution (for example eliminate the social parasites and improve life for the people). Further, the connection between eugenics, ordering and utopia is apparent in the fact that the imagination of the rationalizers or social engineers is tempted by the prospect of a state of ultimate and stable perfection. (Bauman, *Ambivalence* 38-39)

As is observed, according to Bauman, Nazism and Stalinism may be regarded as two situations when rational social engineering which is an integral part of utopianism reached their extremes. Besides its potential to reach extreme levels of genocide, this utopian model of a “better society” or a “better future,” as reflected by Bauman, is doomed to fail for mainly two reasons. First, what is called “better” cannot be fixed and it cannot be “once for all” (Bauman, “Utopia” 22). Second, there is a tendency to situate the ideal existence within the realm of social reform, as this constitutes a collective endeavour that ultimately leads to a state of equilibrium in the societal context (22). This state of equilibrium transforms the contemporary individual into a modern-day Sisyphus, perpetually engaged in the pursuit of an improved quality of life.

1.4. DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF SOLID MODERN UTOPIANISM IN *RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT*

Zygmunt Bauman’s elaboration on the transformed social conditions for utopia and his critique of challenging aspects of the early solid phase of modernity in the 1980s had its counterparts on the British stage. Jane Milling argues that plays in the 1980s dealt with more wide-scale political issues such as international power, discipline, and control and suggests that Caryl Churchill’s *SoftCops* (produced in 1984) is a response to Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, which shows how disciplinary systems

are internalised. According to the critic, global instability and insecurity created by the Cold War and the nuclear arms competition had an immense influence on the playwrights of the time not only because they were related to party politics but also because the Labour Party adopted a disarmament policy (Milling 72-75). Therefore, numerous plays about the lethal outcomes of nuclear war and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)⁶ doctrine were written and performed. Among these plays, Howard Brenton's (1942-) *The Genius* (1983), David Edgar's (1948-) *Maydays* (1983), and Sarah Daniels's (1957-) *Devil's Gateway* (1983) may be given as examples. It is possible to consider Edward Bond's *Red, Black and Ignorant* to be an example of these plays. The play not only portrays a post-nuclear explosion apocalyptic dystopia but also exposes the root cause of this dystopian society, which is grounded in a steadfast modern utopian ideology. This is achieved through the depiction of Monster's "life." Monster, the protagonist of the play, was deprived of the opportunity to live due to his untimely demise in his mother's womb during the catastrophic explosion. Based on the information presented in the preceding sections of this chapter, it is reasonable to assert that Bond's theatrical work may be evaluated as a dystopian critique of solid modern utopianism and its purportedly flawless system of governance. The primary objective of this part of the present dissertation is to analyse Bond's *Red, Black and Ignorant* in order to illustrate the utilisation of dystopian elements as a means of criticising the notion of solid modern utopianism. In addition, it will be revealed that this play may be considered the first instalment of Bond's trilogy, which scrutinises past utopian ideals and challenges the plausibility of conceptualising a utopian society in the present era.

Red, Black and Ignorant, which was written for the *Thoughtcrimes*⁷, is a brief play that was initially composed during the period spanning from December 1983 to January 1984. The initial presentation of the production in London occurred at the Barbican Theatre in January 1984, under Nick Hamm's direction and design. Subsequently, Bond's theatrical piece, originally titled *Birmingham Play*, was staged under the title

⁶ Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine: It is a doctrine aiming at deterrence in case of a nuclear assault by a superpower, stipulating the assaulted party to respond in such a way and manner to destroy both the assaulter and the assaulted (McDonough 812)

⁷ A two-week organisation of plays, films, exhibitions, and discussions about the issues dealt with in Orwell's 1984.

The Tin Can People. In 1985, *The War Plays* were published as a trilogy, which included *Great Peace* (1985) in addition to the two previously published plays. According to Billingham, the plays portray a war which represents the alarming potential and high probability of a catastrophic nuclear event (14). During an interview with *The Guardian* on 16 January 1984, Bond discussed the contextual factors that influenced his composition of *Red, Black and Ignorant*, as well as the primary themes he sought to convey through this theatrical work:

When I was asked to write for ‘Thoughtcrimes’ at the Barbican, I decided to write about nuclear war. A society which does not ‘know itself’ does not act rationally. If the processes by which the state organises society’s various strata and activities are corruptions of the truth, then these corruptions will affect all its decisions ... I created a character that in fact never lives: he is burned in the womb in a nuclear war. His ‘ghost’ angrily attacks those people who to preserve freedom condemn him and millions of others to the perpetual imprisonment of death. He argues that a society that invests and labours to make that possible, and gambles on having to do it, ought not to be called civilization. (qtd. in Billingham 14)

As expressed by Bond himself, the events in *Red, Black and Ignorant* take place immediately after a nuclear explosion. Bond states that during the creation of the Palermo improvisation, a fresh set of nuclear weapons was being established in Sicily with the consent of the majority of Italians, despite the awareness that these weapons had the potential to cause harm to children from other countries (*Plays:6* 237). For this reason, the playwright decides to deal with and show the fearful consequences of solid modern world order: namely, nuclear war and totalitarian regimes. As is also understood from the above-given quotation, throughout the play, it is possible to observe various situations in which the processes used by the state to organise society distort the characters’ ability to judge and to make the right decision. In addition, the play as a whole, with its fearful and dystopian atmosphere and its depiction of the characters who are not even able to lead their own lives due to the close control and observation imposed by the state, in a sense, proves that what we call civilisation and the “civilising process” aimed at achieving perfection provide exactly the opposite of what they have promised, viz., fear of death and total annihilation instead of freedom. Considering the relationship between the characters and the state, along with major state organs depicted throughout the play, it may be claimed that the dystopian environment

Bond portrays in the play functions as a criticism of and a warning about the outcomes of the potential extremities of solid modern utopianism as defined by Bauman.

In his *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Bauman presents a notion that characterises the modern state of being during its early “solid” phase. This notion is closely linked to the exercise of control by authoritative bodies that assert their entitlement to regulate life and establish norms of morality. He asserts that

[w]e can say that existence is modern as far as it is affected and sustained by design, manipulation, management, engineering. The existence is modern in as far as it is administered by resourceful (that is, possessing knowledge, skill and technology), sovereign agencies. Agencies are sovereign in as far as they claim and successfully defend the right to manage and administer existence: the right to define order and by implication, lay aside chaos, as that left-over that escapes the definition. (Bauman 42-43)

Based on the above-given extract, it is possible to say that, according to Bauman, the first precondition for solid modern utopianism is social engineering which covers design, manipulation, management, and control. Social agencies assume the responsibility to organise this manipulation and control of the existence of the members of society in such a way as to sustain their sovereignty and existent order. It would not therefore be wrong to suggest that Bauman’s explanation of the dystopian totalitarian regime resulting from solid modern utopianism is a blend of Althusser’s concept of the state and ideological state apparatuses and Foucault’s disciplinary society. According to Bauman, solid modern utopianism is based on “the sedentary imagination,” two remarkable attributes of which are territoriality and finality (“Utopia” 11). The sociologist argues that

[i]n the sedentary or ‘solid’ phase of modernity, there was an intimate correspondence between space and power. Power was a spatial notion, inscribed into the realm of sovereignty. And vice versa: the space was divided, and its divisions were circumscribed, according to the powers that ruled over it. States that replaced the dynastic realms with the advent of modernity as the seats of supreme authority were territorial entities. (Bauman, “Utopia” 12)

It is evident that the state’s power was determined depending on the size of its territory, and it is supposed to increase or disappear depending on the territorial acquisitions or

losses of this state. What showed the sovereignty of states, which had replaced the dynasties of the past, were control and supervision throughout their territories. For Bauman, states are sovereign, to the extent that they control

the admission to the House of Law. Whoever happens to be bodily present inside the territorial boundaries of the sovereign state, falls under that control. Inside a territory in which every subject is allocated its rightful place, an entity exempted from allocation and so denied a place of its own is stripped of rights – carries no rights that other subjects have the obligation (state-imposed and state-policed) to respect. (“Utopia” 13)

As stated by Bauman, the major means of supervision and control by the state was thus the agencies serving for the classification of every subject and allocation of a place determined for him/her within its territory. In this spatial arrangement, there is a proper place for everyone. Anyone who was denied a place within this system or classification is deprived of the rights or privileges he/she possesses. By means of this absolute power to sanctify exclusion or deprivation, sovereign state power functions as a kind of cage, an escape from which is thought to be a destiny feared. Those who are in the cage, in other words, the subjects in solid modern systems, see this cage as a shelter from insecurity and instability. So, the social engineering which is deemed necessary for a perfect order is “an exercise in inclusion and exclusion: in unconditionality of law and unconditionality of its exemptions” (Bauman, “Utopia” 14-15). The discipline and power of the state, mentioned by Foucault, are implemented through sovereign state agencies, elaborated by Althusser, by means of both spatial and economic arrangement and manipulation.

Taking Bauman’s definition of the characteristics of solid modern utopianism and Bond’s *Red, Black and Ignorant* into consideration, the play may be regarded as the epitome of a solid modern state which transforms into a dystopia with the realisation of solid modern utopianism. In the play, it is possible to see several sovereign “solid” agencies operating to sustain the state’s power through a significant number of means leading the characters to lose their identity and ability to make the right decision. *Red,*

Black and Ignorant includes an introduction part and nine consecutive short scenes. Throughout the play, the methods and the means used by solid sovereign agencies to maintain state power are criticised by putting emphases on these methods such as the discourse used by these agencies to promote solid modern utopianism, the classification used for keeping every subject in the place allocated to him/her, and the education system and its indoctrination of classification and hatred for the “other” at a very early age.

Bond generally deals with individuals’ conflict with society in his plays (Trussler, *Edward* 33). The same could also be suggested for *Red, Black and Ignorant*. “Human paradox,” a term frequently used by Bond, is connected to the existence of an interaction between the world and human beings. At the centre of this interaction, there is an insoluble tragic paradox resulting from this dialectic. Simon Trussler makes an analogy between Bond’s opinion about human life and William Blake’s view of human life. Bond, for the critic, “describes an individual in his environment but he made this environment unnatural” (*Edward* 33). According to Bond, a child is born without a society. It has only one world: “It knows no geography outside its house, it has no economy except its feeding bottle. Nevertheless, it has the whole world in a way adults cannot. This and the right to live in the world are its ‘radical innocence’” (*Hidden Plot* 65). The child cries if it cannot feel at home in the world. It seems aggressive, but it cries to save his own world. Its innocence is radical because it is, for Bond, “demanding. It cannot accept that it should not be at home in the world (65). What makes it feel that it is not at home are society and the values it creates. Bond believes that an individual’s radical innocence is destroyed by a hostile social environment and system. For this reason, it is possible to claim that what Bond calls “society and its values” or “a hostile social environment” in *Red, Black and Ignorant* are represented by the ideology of solid modern utopianism as defined by Bauman. In addition, the writer states in his *Notes on the War Plays* that

[w]e are constantly struggling to express our humanity in ways which society, because it is still inhuman, first discourages, then forbids and then corrupts – and finally rewards, calling the corruption ‘duty’. This would explain much of human

suffering. It would mean that we can only be human in conflict with society – yet society demands the right to define what is ‘good’. Good – after love is the most ambiguous of words. (Bond, *Plays:6* 215)

The part titled “Introduction” is comprised of Monster’s and Mother’s direct speeches to the reader/audience which function as Greek choruses and set the dystopian mood of the play. Mother’s direct speech to the reader/audience describes the moment of the nuclear explosion and Monster’s birth. Depicting the devastating effects of the explosion and Monster’s unnatural birth, Mother’s speech creates a frightening and gloomy atmosphere, leading the reader/audience to sense the fear and the explosive force leading to the annihilation of the world. Even at the very beginning of the play, in Monster’s direct address to the reader/audience, the lines “Alone of creatures we know that we pass between birth and death / And wish to teach each new mind to be as profound as crystal ocean through which we may see the ocean bed and from shore to shore” (Bond, *Plays:6* 11) indicate the extreme solid modern concern with ambition, order, and neatness. The words “as profound as crystal ocean” which allow “seeing the ocean bed and from shore to shore” implies that a plan for each new subject within society to make his/her visibility or clarity possible has been made even before his/her birth. The indoctrination process starts at birth and continues until death. This is the way the solid modern world welcomes children. Even before their birth, what they should wear, what they should do, and how they should live are determined.

Monster once again functions like a chorus when he underlines a master and slave relationship – even if not literally, there is a classification as masters who make plans and decide what is right or wrong and the slaves who have to obey and abide by the masters’ plan. Or, to put it more correctly, the chorus included in this scene serves to emphasise the prevailing power dynamic between the governing authority and the governed populace, a central tenet of solid modern utopian thought: “The earth whistled in derision / In final derision at the lord of creation. . . / That drowned the sounds of explosions and the last / screams of the world’s masters” (Bond, *Plays:6* 12). In this apocalyptic scene, which is related by Monster rather than being performed, even those dominating the world – the social engineers of solid modern utopianism - cannot

survive. At the time of the explosion, the world and even the universe destroyed by solid modern utopian ambition look over the concept of God and whistle “in derision” (13) because even God cannot retrieve what solid modern utopianism has done to humanity. Monster also functions almost like a ghost, haunting the reader/audience throughout the play and reminding them of the fact that no god could help to prevent this annihilation led by the solid modern world.

Although Tahereh Razaei and Asiyeh Khalifezadeh suggest that “socio-political institutions in *The War Plays* [are] represented only by *the army* and *the state*” (184), socio-political sovereign agencies which provide social control and supervision in the play are represented by more than two institutions, all of which could be classified under one heading as solid-state agencies, supporting the state in different circumstances and places. Particularly, in the parts after the “Introduction,” which are episodic scenes, depicting Monster in different environments, there is an obvious effort and control to provide the subjects’ cooperation with the authority for the maintenance of the status quo. In the scene titled “Learning,” for instance, Monster is portrayed in the school. When one of Monster’s school friends, Robinson, accidentally spits on Monster’s sleeve, his teacher tries to solve the issue by advising Monster to do the same thing as Robinson and then shake hands even though Monster tells him/her that Robinson is innocent and has not spat on him on purpose. Teacher’s guidance in this scene teaches Monster to take revenge instead of directing him to solve the problem in peaceful ways. Monster, then, aptly states,

I had not yet learned to hate
 That knowledge is gained in higher schools
 So far I knew only the basis of hate: fear
 We struck at each other as two men caught in the drum of a cement mixer would
 strike each other when they were using their arms and legs only to stop the drum
 spinning
 The effort of the struggle made us sweat
 As we grappled we smelt each other’s sweat
 It smelt of dust. (Bond, *Plays*:6 17)

It is possible to argue that Monster’s words in this scene reflect how the education system or schools as a solid sovereign agency indoctrinate children in such a way as to

ensure their compliance and submission. It is seen that the classification method used by solid modern states to guarantee the subjection of the members of society, which is mentioned by Bauman, is used to make a group – generally those who do not comply with the rules – “other,” or “stranger,” by the school in this scene. Monster reflects that he did not hate “others” before he went to school. This is where subjects are taught to classify, take revenge, and hate others. At the end of the two boys’ struggle, Monster says that their sweat “smelt of dust.” The word “dust” is generally used symbolically to imply lifelessness and death which may be interpreted as a reflection of the subjects’ inability to lead their own lives or to make their own decisions under the close observation of the solid modern state.

The scene titled “Eating” may be regarded as a representation of marriage as an institution. By means of this scene, the reader/audience becomes able to see the negative effects of solid modern life and order on social relations. At this point in the play, Monster and Wife have a quarrel about the book which Monster lost a while ago. The tension rises, and Monster finds himself spreading the bread over Wife’s face and making her eat it from the floor. The characters are under such oppression and supervision that a trivial subject like a lost book suddenly leads to a violent action. Wife’s words “You can afford your luxuries because I struggle to pay for the necessities” (20) indicate that their financial situation and living conditions are not that well. It is therefore possible to interpret that Bond uses the title “Eating” both to imply living conditions because living conditions depend on the act of eating and to imply that a trivial and ordinary act like eating can cause huge problems and violence. Through a theatrical event in this scene, Bond, in fact, reflects how much pressure the characters felt on their shoulders; for this reason, their only method of relief becomes violence. Wife summarises the effect of society on their decision between right and wrong through the following words:

As nature doesnt define what shall make us angry
 We define ourselves by the things we allow to make us angry
 If we choose these wrongly or are wrongly taught we are blind with rage even
 when we’re most calm. (Bond, *Plays*:6 22)

As is obvious, Wife's speech reveals the root cause of violence. Human beings do not know what anger or hate is when they are born. It is the then-current system and order – which is solid modern in this case – that teach them at what they should be angry. No choice made by a human being in the play belongs to himself/herself because it is a solid modern state and the utopianism it promotes determines what is right or wrong. Monster's words “[a]t every turn we break the oath we make when we're born to human reason / Even in hell to walk with decorum” (Bond, *Plays:6* 21) also imply that reason and propriety, or to put it in other words, solid modern utopianism's insistence on human reason and order has transformed people into obedient subjects who would not complain or walk in order and as has been told to them even if they know that they are in hell.

In a similar fashion, in the scene with the heading “Selling,” the reader/audience is made aware of the possible outcomes of the extreme control imposed by a solid modern state. Buyer, a state authority from the branch called the Register of Births, visits the family (Monster, Wife, and Monster's Son) and states that he wants to buy Son to train and make him a submissive citizen. The phrases Buyer uses show to what extent the characters are under control. Human beings are not only materialised but also trained to behave in a way a solid modern state would accept.

You want him to grow to be strong with a good character
 We will give him regular health checks and training in discipline
 He will learn to think and behave in such a way that the community will welcome
 him
 Later we may give him work
 If not, he'll need us even more
 Surely you wont deny him our help and protection? (Bond, *Plays:6* 23)

As is understood from Buyer's speech, the state buys new members of society, children, in return for a suitable job and a life free from troubles. As such, the control of a large number of citizens is facilitated, and all the possibilities of rebellion or non-compliance

are prevented. Later, it is understood that granting a good job and a life free from troubles is not the only method used. Classification and dichotomy created between citizens are also seen at work precluding parents from rejecting the offer. Buyer says, “I hope you’re not among those misguided parents who let their unfortunate children run wild . . . The computer would take as a deciding factor his parents’ non-co-operation with the state / The good citizen is satisfied more by serving than being served” (Bond, *Plays:6* 24). His words may be regarded as a warning for the parents by the solid modern state against the results of non-compliance with the authorities and as a kind of reminder of their duties as citizens. They will be labelled as non-compliers, and their son will be deprived of all his rights as a citizen. The extreme version of this desire to shape and indoctrinate children as complying and monotype individuals is eugenics for Bauman (*Holocaust* 186), and since the decision of the solid modern state to label a group is generally arbitrary, nobody would be able to prevent it.

Dehumanisation in solid modern working conditions is explored in a scene entitled “Work,” where the reader/audience can witness the adverse effects of solid modern working conditions on individuals’ sense of identity and humanity. This is exemplified by Son who refuses to assist a woman trapped under a beam. Son is reluctant to help Woman because both would apply for the same job. His description of the city, “And from the walls seep dust and the damp smells of exploitation that began with the makers of bricks and the builders of walls” (Bond, *Plays:6* 28), shows that people are exploited in their workplaces. Through Son’s decision to not help the woman, the impossibility of being human under solid modern supervision is reflected. Unemployment, famine, and fear of being excluded are felt at the utmost level, and it is almost impossible to think of helping other people in such a condition. Son says, “Without work Im an outcast / The community wont give me the power to control my life” (Bond, *Plays:6* 18). In a solid modern world, economic systems and conditions allow the states to control people even if there is not any war or violence. Fear of being devoid of the power to meet basic needs of life precludes Son from helping Woman and causes him to forget his humanity. Son, at the end of the scene, directly addresses reader/audience:

You would call my father good and me evil
 No – the pittance paid to the workless ensures that all seek work
 The government rules by creating two classes of citizens
 I am second class: I have no work
 I can't afford to behave as if I were first class. (Bond, *Plays:6* 32)

Here the character complains about the fact that it is very hard to decide between right or wrong or between good and evil. It is possible to deduce from the scene that there is a high rate of unemployment, and due to the small amount of money provided by the state for the unemployed, nobody wants to remain unemployed. Moreover, the state's method of ruling its citizens, or subjects, is overtly expressed by Son here. The state manages and manipulates its citizens by making a classification between them. It categorises the employed as first-class citizens and the unemployed as second-class citizens. In Bauman's terms, the employed in this context are classified as necessary plants and the unemployed as weeds. As the sociologist makes it clear,

Utopian imagination was essentially architectural and urbanistic . . . The purpose was to design a spatial arrangement in which there would be a right and proper place for everyone for whom a right and proper place would have been designed. In the sketching of anticipatory maps of Utopia, both (inseparable, as it were) edges of the power sword were adumbrated. The construction of good order was, invariably, an exercise in inclusion and exclusion: in unconditionality of law and unconditionality of its exemptions. ("Utopia" 14-15)

In the solid modern utopian aspirations, a place is assigned to everything and everybody, be it spatial, economic, or spiritual. It is challenging for all the citizens under the solid modern state's rule to remain merciful and benevolent because the system promoted by solid modern utopianism, which is based on technology, advanced science, and mass production, does not provide people with another option. The classification made between the citizens of the solid modern state, which consequently leads to inclusion and exclusion, prevents its citizens from making their own decisions and deprives them of their mercy and humanity since it is the state which decides whether something is right or wrong.

Another and perhaps most obvious sovereign agency performing to ensure the submission of citizens is the army. In the concluding scene of the play, called “Military,” Bond uses a new motif, which is employed in the other plays of the trilogy, too. This scene is what Bond called Palermo Improvisation, and it is possible to claim that in this scene the tragic paradox resulting from the control of an oppressive solid modern state reaches a peak. The playwright plans to make an improvisation with students at Palermo University. In line with the proposed scheme, a soldier returns to his residence with instructions to select an infant from their locality and kill it. There are two infants within his residential vicinity, namely those belonging to his maternal progenitor and a fellow inhabitant. He visits his neighbour who proceeds to exhibit her infant to him. The dramatist requests that the students sincerely perform the actions that the military personnel would undertake. The soldier in the improvisation gives the baby back to the neighbour, goes home, and kills his own brother/sister. All students choose to do the same thing (Bond, *Plays:6* 215). In the mentioned scene, Son is a soldier and returns home upon an order. He has been ordered to kill someone in his district because living resources are limited. Son ultimately opts to kill his father, known as Monster, instead of his old neighbour. The reason for his choice is not given in the play, but Monster asks the reason which is left unanswered. The army here serves as another solid modern institution. The tragic paradox reflected in the scene results from Son’s dilemma between his conscience and what the military order says. He defines what it is like to be a soldier with the following words by means of which the reader/audience witnesses the cruelty taught to soldiers, which, in Bond’s words, turns them into “automata” waiting for orders regardless of their morality (Bond qtd. in Hay and Roberts 7). Son says,

When a soldier heaves a grenade what does he see: a body explode like a bottle on
a wall
When a soldier slits a belly what does he see: guts spill like clothes from a suitcase
When a soldier fires a bullet what does he see: blood spurt like water from a
hosepipe
That is the soldier’s reward for his skills: the pleasure of seeing the way he kills.
(Bond, *Plays:6* 33)

As is clear, for a soldier, the people he kills are nothing but surplus materials of which the solid modern state would like to get rid for a perfect world order, or a

perfect “garden,” as Bauman calls it. Ironically, Son says that he loves the army because “all your problems are solved by training / Kill or be killed” (33). This may be regarded as a sign of how much people are deprived of their human side which is the major drive leading one to be merciful. As a result of this tragic paradox, Son decides to kill his father instead of his neighbour. Bond writes, in his *Notes on the War Plays*,

Was the paradox true only on stage? In a Nazi prisoner-of-war camp in Russia in 1942 prisoners were paraded every night for roll call. After all of them had responded to their number a few were killed in front of the others. They were not killed because they had committed what we would recognize as an offence, but to frighten the others into obedience. The commandant and his guards were not sadists – killing made life easier for everyone, it was an aid to discipline. (*Plays:6* 215)

The playwright’s comment reflects the special attention he draws to the extremities of solid modern utopian aspirations. Discipline, order, and clarity are deemed beneficial for the development of a perfect world order, but the question is whose order or discipline it is. Solid modern utopianism, when it reaches high levels, dehumanises individuals and dictates them to get rid of what Bauman calls the “weeds” for the sake of order and discipline even if it costs other people’s lives. As Wife says, “In the end the army’s doing this for the public good” (Bond, *Plays:6* 37). Later, Monster says,

People walked on tiptoe in the street as if they feared the vibration of their steps would set off the rockets
They stopped moving the furniture in their houses: the movement might show up on radar screens and bring destruction on them and their neighbours
Security was so great all were suspected. (Bond, *Plays:6* 37)

These lines reveal to what extent people are living with the fear of punishment and death. They hide in their houses so as not to be caught by the radar screens monitoring them. Worse still, almost all the characters in the play are used to being subjugated; they are deprived of their ability to make the right decision and react. The worst part of the strategy used by solid modern states, in addition, reveals itself in the following words. Wife says,

We dont own our lives
 They're owned by savages: that's why we're cruel . . .
 As long as we can sit at our table its an ordinary day.
 The roof's over our heads: the walls arent burning
 If we havent learned to sit at our table while the murderers walk the streets we dont
 know how our neighbours have had to live for years
 If they put a pistol to my head I'll go on washing the dishes as if they hadnt entered
 my house
 How else shall we live? (Bond, *Plays*:6 40)

The scene in question is notable for its ability to capture the reader/audience's attention and highlight the desensitisation to the acts of violence and oppression that pervades society. Despite the unjustified killing of innocent individuals who are labelled as "non-compliant" and "rebellious" and compared to weeds by the governing authorities, people continue with their daily routines as if nothing has occurred. Wife's speech also illustrates the fact that relentless oppression, violence, and control turn individuals into lifeless robots who would not only ignore a pistol directed at their heads but also become grateful because they have a house to take shelter. Monster also makes an analogy between people under the supervision of a gardening state and ants which could easily be crushed under the boots of soldiers; however, according to him, people should be conscious of how the gardening ideology works and stand against it to shape their destiny with their own hands. He says,

We know ourself and say: I cannot give up the name of human
 All that is needed is to define rightly what it is to be human
 If we define it wrongly we die
 If we define it and teach it rightly we shall live. (Bond, *Plays*:6 42-43)

These words Monster utters remind the reader/audience that the only thing that could be done by humanity to retrieve the lost human values – such as being merciful, kind, tolerant, and conscious – is making a re-definition of humanity after getting rid of all classifications, dichotomies, and discrimination promoted by solid modern utopianism for the sake of creating a perfect order.

Added to the consecutive episodic scenes employed to portray the state agencies operating to ensure the sovereignty of the solid modern state, characterisation has a vital role in portraying the dehumanisation of the subjects by the solid modern state.

According to Bauman, a modern solid state is goal-oriented, and the objective of this is to eliminate an opponent, albeit with a particular intention to realise a superior and fundamentally distinct community (Beilharz 95). The individual in solid modern utopianism is subordinate to the goals of progress. Due to classifications such as that between the ruled and the ruler or that between the submissive and the rebellious, they do not have any opportunity to act in a way to exhibit their personality. Hence, none of the characters in the play has an individual identity. They are stereotypes with no distinct attributes which would distinguish them from the community in which they live. They are merely characters in a certain social environment. They do not have names; instead, they are called Woman, Son, Buyer, and Girl. The lack of names may be interpreted as the characters' lack of identity. Indeed, they are only significant as parts of the community. In a sense, they are like tools used to maintain the status quo. It is possible to argue that Bond, through this method, which is analogous to Brechtian characterisation, prevents the reader/audience from feeling sympathy with the characters and allows an objective evaluation by breaking the dramatic illusion of reality.

In the funeral scene, Wife underlines the tragic situation and the characters' dilemma caused by the indoctrination and oppression of solid modern utopianism:

You who live in barbarous times
 Under rulers with redness on their hands, blackness in their hearts and ignorance in
 their minds
 Everything before your time was the childhood of humankind
 With the new weapons that age passed
 But you went on building your house with bricks that were already on fire. (Bond,
Plays:6 40)

The image of a solid modern state as a red, black, and ignorant entity supports and complements the fearful and oppressive mood of the play, which haunts the hopeless individuals cast into a hostile society or world in general. The words "red hands" and "black hearts" refer to bloody hands and merciless hearts to accentuate that the characters under the rule of a solid modern state are degraded to subjects ruled by these merciless and ignorant agencies. The words in the last line of the above-given extract, "building the house with bricks that were already on fire," may be considered to imply the futile efforts of solid modernity to make progress with wrong means which would

lead to its own end. All the events in the play and the continuous presence of the burnt Monster with bandages hanging down his body on stage turn into a terrifying apocalyptic scenario resulting from solid modern utopian aspirations. Monster may be regarded as the embodiment of an individual who is in between his radical innocence and the social codes and hard economic conditions constructed by solid modern utopianism.

In conclusion, the increased popularity of utopianism is closely connected to the advent of modernity, and its transformation into dystopia has occurred in parallel with the demise of modern utopianism and the emergence of postmodern doubts about the grand narrative of modernity. As is illustrated through the works of different critics who express their objections to the shortcomings of modern utopianism, that is, Bauman's gardening utopianism, given at the beginning of this chapter, modernist utopianism has destroyed itself due to its excessive insistence on order and clarity which has led to totalitarian regimes. Bauman makes this clear:

To seek control at the level of social system is first and foremost to seek the substitution of order for chaos, design for spontaneity, plan for anarchy, or else: control, control over both men and women and over nature. Whether we choose to call it capitalist or socialist, this modernizing frenzy of utopia lives out the dreams of rationalism, or implicitly of Enlightenment. (qtd. in Beilharz 119)

As shown by the history of humanity, all the realised versions of solid modern utopias have been based on the modernising utopia of rationalism and the Enlightenment by implication. However, they have turned into either dehumanising or disastrous dystopias. When considered in the light of Bauman's detailed examination of the basic tenets and the shortcomings of utopianism, it would not be wrong to suggest that the dystopian world depicted in Bond's *Red, Black and Ignorant* functions as a criticism of solid modern utopianism in that it highlights the potential extremes to which it can lead. Throughout the play, by means of Brechtian episodic scenes, Monster is depicted in different environments and institutions where he is exposed to indoctrination, dehumanisation, and oppression. Moreover, by portraying the imaginary life of Monster who has not had the chance to live because of a nuclear explosion, Bond shows all the alternatives one can have as a part of the system promoted by solid modern utopianism:

either die or lead a dehumanised life. Since there are no alternatives and the characters are stuck in the place determined for them by the solid modern state, that is, in institutions such as schools and factories, it is possible to say that this kind of utopianism is based on fixity to place. They are safe if they remain within the limits and boundaries determined by the solid modern state. In addition, all the characters in the play are dehumanised by sovereign state agencies, and they are turned into “automata” who cannot even act on their own will. They are lifeless beings, a part of the community and merely tools used to realise solid modern utopian aspirations.

CHAPTER 2

DYSTOPIA AS CRITICISM OF LIQUID CONSUMERIST UTOPIANISM IN *THE TIN CAN PEOPLE*

Postmodernity is modernity that has admitted the non-feasibility of its original project. Postmodernity is modernity reconciled to its own impossibility – and determined, for better or worse, to live with it. Modern practice continues – now, however, devoid of the objective that once triggered it off. (Bauman, *Ambivalence* 98)

If one hears today phrases like the ‘demise of utopia’ or ‘the end of utopia’, or ‘the fading of the utopian imagination,’ sprinkled over contemporary debates densely enough to take root in common sense and so to be taken as self-evident, it is because the posture of the gardener is nowadays giving way to that of the hunter. (Bauman, *Liquid Times* 100).

‘Utopia’ used to denote a coveted, dreamt-of distant goal to which progress should, could and would eventually bring the seekers after a world better serving human needs. In contemporary dreams, however, the image of ‘progress’ seems to have moved from the discourse of shared improvement to that of individual survival. (Bauman, *Liquid Times* 103)

The above-given excerpts from Zygmunt Bauman are significant because they summarise the three major attributes that define his sociology of postmodernity, as the theory of liquid modernity, and utopianism in liquid modern times. First, postmodernity

for him is not something distinct from modernity or a clear-cut different period. It is rather the continuation or transformation of modernity into a new form that has lost its earlier goal of making progress towards a better life. Expressions frequently heard since the beginning of the twentieth century, such as the end, the disappearance, or the demise of utopia, do not mean the end of utopianism, but its transition from a solid modern form to a liquid modern one, as the second excerpt shows. Solid utopians were gardeners who tried to organise, shape, or clean up their gardens in a way that excluded strangers or the “others” who were thought to prevent the achievement of a perfect order in the future. This position of the gardener has been gradually replaced by the position of the hunter who seeks immediate gratification in a liquid modern world. For the hunter, utopia is not a future paradise, but a constant search for new prey that can be captured immediately. The liquid modern utopia is therefore not a distant goal that would and could be achieved through progress, but a search for individual satisfaction and survival. The first chapter of this dissertation was an attempt to elaborate on the criticism of solid modern utopianism’s constant emphasis on order, progress, and cleanliness due to its quality of being sedentary or territorial and transfixed, together with the dystopian results of solid modern utopianism as reflected in Edward Bond’s *Red, Back, and Ignorant*. This chapter will be an attempt to examine the major shifts in utopianism in the late twentieth century in line with Bauman’s understanding of liquid modernity and liquid modern culture, reflected as a dystopia as criticism of liquid modern utopianism in Bond’s *The Tin Can People* (1984). To this end, the chapter will describe Bauman’s evolution from a critique of modernity and his definition of postmodernity as a liquid form of life and culture to a sociologist who took a more holistic approach, applying his ideas about modern and postmodern life and culture to present his vision of the evolution and current potential of utopianism in the contemporary world. Following this, *The Tin Can People* will be analysed by tracking the differences between solid modern gardening utopianism and liquid modern hunting utopianism as proposed by the sociologist. The preliminary part of the chapter will refer to the works of various social theorists other than Bauman, such as Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Fredric Jameson, who must be dealt with in any text discussing postmodernity and postmodern utopianism. These social theorists are included in this chapter to provide an overview of the historical background and

demonstrate how their concepts shaped Bauman's conception of liquid utopianism. To avoid incoherence and digression throughout the text, the discussion of the major ideas of each above-mentioned social theorist other than Bauman will be limited to issues that connect them to Bauman's understanding of liquid modern utopianism since Bauman's texts will lay the primary ground for the analysis of Bond's play in the later parts of the chapter.

2.1. POSTMODERNITY AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON AND UTOPIANISM

The first chapter of this dissertation has reviewed the differentiation between the concepts of "modernism" in literature and art, and "modernity" in the sociological domain, owing to the varied connotations associated with the term in different circumstances. Even though making such a distinction regarding "postmodernism" as a concept in literature and "postmodernity" as a term used in cultural studies is rather difficult in that the two terms seem to have fed each other and developed in an intertwined manner, this chapter will adhere to the same conceptualisation for the terms "postmodernism" and "postmodernity," as Bauman's notions of liquid modern culture and liquid modern utopianism fall under a cultural and sociological category rather than a literary category. There is no doubt that the linguistic turn represented by Roland Barthes (1915-1980), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), Michel Foucault, and other poststructuralists made significant contributions to the development of postmodern theory; however, they did attempt to define and theorise the postmodern culture as suggested by Zygmunt Bauman which will be the primary concern of this chapter, with only one exception: the French poststructuralist Jean-François Lyotard. To avoid digression, I will limit my discussion of these poststructuralists to a brief review in the following sections of this chapter, despite the fact that each of them deserves a more in-depth examination in other, more comprehensive studies.

As for the definition of the term "postmodernity," does the prefix "post-" actually mean "after"? This is perhaps the first question that arises when attempting to define

postmodernity. Although it sounds reasonable and is a safe starting point, the assumption that postmodernity began when and where modernity ended may lead to a false conclusion. It takes time for a new researcher to encounter sociologists such as the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1929-) and Zygmunt Bauman and recognise this. In his 1981 *New German Critique* article titled “Modernity versus Postmodernity,” Habermas argues that

the project of modernity has not yet been fulfilled. And the reception of art is only one of at least three of its aspects. The project aims at a differentiated relinking of modern culture with an everyday praxis that still depends on vital heritages, but would be impoverished through mere traditionalism. This new connection, however, can only be established under the condition that societal modernization will also be steered in a different direction. The life-world has to become able to develop institutions out of it- self which sets limits to the internal dynamics and to the imperatives of an almost autonomous economic system and its administrative complement. (12-13)

The excerpt from the article comes from a speech that Habermas gave in Frankfurt in 1980 in response to Daniel Bell⁸ and other social theorists’ attacks on modernity, which were overt attacks on the rationality held accountable for the ills of modernity (Bertens 107). In his speech, Habermas tried to promote the unrealised potential of the Enlightenment and modernity. He asserted that humanity should concentrate on learning from the failures of the “extravagant programs which have tried to negate modernity” instead of abandoning the mission of modernity as a hopeless struggle (Habermas 11). In a similar vein, the social theorists Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Scott Lash posited that modernity underwent a transformation into a new form known as “reflexive modernity.” This term, coined by the German social theorist Ulrich Beck, denotes the phenomenon whereby advanced modernity becomes self-referential. In *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Beck suggests that

[m]odernization within the horizon of experience of pre-modernity is being displaced by reflexive modernization. In the nineteenth century, privileges of rank and religious world views were being demystified; today the same is happening to the understanding of science and technology in the classical industrial society, as well as to the modes of existence in work, leisure, the family and sexuality. (10)

⁸ An American sociologist (1919-2011).

As is clear, rather than evaluating the contemporary timeframe as a distinct period following modernity, the social theorist defines it as a continuation of it, which is self-aware, and questions not only the legitimacy of science and technology but also the legitimacy of various types of existence, such as work, family, and sexuality. Given the diverse range of perspectives regarding the definition of postmodernity represented above through the ideas of Habermas and Beck, it is unfeasible for a researcher to provide a conclusive commentary on the lexical dimension of the term. Instead of establishing a firm foundation, this multiplicity of viewpoints considerably adds to the complexity of the matter.

As to the chronology of the use of the term “postmodernity” as a cultural phenomenon, the same is valid; like every movement or tendency throughout history, it is not a clear-cut and sudden event. The term has come a long way since the time before it was commonly used in the late 1970s. Various scholars such as Hans Bertens and David Harvey asserted that the first stages of the debate over the term “postmodernity” could be dated back to the times before the introduction of the term into the critical agenda, in the post mid-1950s and the early 1960s (Bertens 5; Harvey 38). Numerous former uses of the terms “postmodern” and “postmodernism” have also been revealed. According to Wolfgang Iser, the word “postmodern” was used as far back as the 1870s, and “postmodernism” appeared for the first time in the title of a book as *Postmodernism and Other Essays* by Bernard Iddings Bell in 1926 (Iser qtd. in Bertens 18). It reappeared in 1934, 1939, and the 1940s. Afterwards, occurrences begin to multiply. Bertens states that there is a limited degree of coherence between the initial uses of postmodernism and the subsequent discussion that emerged during the 1960s (18-19). For the scholar, various critics, for instance, Susan Sontag and Ihab Hassan, whose essays – respectively, “Against Interpretation” (1964) or “One culture and the new sensibility” (1965), “The Dismemberment of Orpheus” (1963), and “The Literature of Silence” (1967) – discussed a type of “art and sensibility” that “were widely called postmodern by the late 1970s” even though they did not overtly mention the term “postmodernity” (Bertens 5). This was not seen only in the 1960s. In the 1970s, there were critics who accepted and dealt with postmodern art but resisted or did not know

the term, such as Douglas Crimp who made attempts to develop a theory of new deconstruction in photography (1977) and Linda Hutcheon who, in 1980, “chose using the word ‘narcissistic’ instead of using ‘postmodernist’” (Bertens 14). Considering the difficulty in deciding which case would be accepted as the starting point, it is unfeasible and illogical to immerse oneself in a quest for the exact date of the origination and the utilisation of the term. Consequently, the following subsections of this chapter will focus on summarising the key concepts put forth by various social theorists who have contributed to the conceptualisation of “postmodernity” as a cultural phenomenon. Rather than delving into the historical development and the meaning of postmodernity, the aim of this part will be to connect these ideas to Bauman's concept of liquid modern utopianism.

2.1.1. Linguistic Turn, Poststructuralism, and the Attack on Representation

Poststructuralism has been one of the most fruitful foundations for both postmodern studies and Bauman's use of the metaphor of liquidity describing postmodernity. For the American social theorist Steven Seidman, poststructuralism, as the product of French intellectuals adopting a post-Marxist critical approach, may be regarded as “the embodiment of the rebellious spirit of May 1968” (18). Poststructuralism was influenced by the linguistic turn in post-war Western philosophical and social thought, which dated back to the early twentieth century; particularly to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, and Walter Benjamin, who took language not as an instrument in social practice but as its ground (Fynsk 8914). During the 1970s, it was these deconstructive practices derived from the poststructuralism of later Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida that drew postmodernism into a poststructuralist orbit. The orientation of this poststructuralist orbit is mainly textual. It focuses on the role of discourse and language in shaping subjectivity and social power structures in society. As a system of signs or words, whose meanings originate from relations of difference and contrast, language is considered a set of signs or words. In Western societies, these relations of difference and contrast, which are binary oppositions such as reason/intuition, body/mind, and speech/writing, have formed language and the cultural and institutional framework that constitutes society. Poststructuralism seeks to disrupt the prevailing

binary meanings that serve to maintain social and political power structures. Deconstruction is the employed methodology in this effort and it requires disrupting these binary oppositions and hierarchies. In short, the deconstruction method elucidates the historically conditional origin and political function of these binary oppositions (Seidman 18).

The gist of poststructuralists' attack on representation, which was based on the above-mentioned disruption of binary oppositions, could be found in Derrida's emphasis on what he calls "freeplay" in his essay "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (1970). Derrida employs Ferdinand de Saussure's (1857-1913) concept of the sign as an illustration of this freeplay. The "metaphysics of presence" that Derrida mentions is supported by Saussure's assertion that a sign comprises two components: the signifier and the signified, the latter being the signified, a mental and psychological image or meaning (Derrida 3). For all that meaning is made up of a system of differences, this would suggest that the speaker is aware of the meaning of the sign when he employs it. That is why Saussure also insists on the superiority of speech. As opposed to this, Derrida argues that, as is in writing, there is always a "distance between the subject and his words," even at the moment of speech, because the meaning of the sign is always unpredictable. There is no inherent or transcendent truth in sign (3). For this reason, the signified has no instant self-present meaning. The sign in question is solely and unequivocally a symbol whose meaning is derived from additional symbols. And a signified can also serve as a signifier, and the other way around. This perspective requires that the sign be stripped of its signified component because meaning never exists as it appears, which means that we cannot avoid the interpretation process (Derrida 3). Derrida wishes to put forward arguments over language as an open system, and through his rejection of the metaphysics of presence, the distances between the interior and the exterior become troublesome. For this reason, there is no source beyond language from which meaning can be generated (3).

According to Derrida, this is a process called "freeplay," which is the endless and arbitrary extension of the "interplay of signification" (2) without the transcendental

signified, that is, metaphysical meaning. Derrida also emphasises the direct result of this process, the absence of the centre:

From then on it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no center, that the center would not be thought in the form of a being-present, that the center had no natural locus, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word – that is to say, when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum. (2)

Derrida here argues that logocentrism, what he refers to as the “metaphysics of presence,” implicitly controls and pervades the entire Western philosophical thought. In the above-given quotation, he questions the very concept of presence, which entails authority, permanence, and control, by demonstrating that presence itself contains traces of absence and the centre is always in the process of being erased due to the endless interplay of signification. This decentering of the centre (or the subject) may be regarded as an anti-humanistic concept excluding all kinds of totalisation which have dominated Western philosophical thought for centuries. As the British scholar Peter Barry suggests, the centres Derrida mentioned above were destroyed or eroded as a consequence of various historical and political events, as well as the advances in technology in the twentieth century. For instance, World War I shattered the fantasy of constant material progress, and the Holocaust shattered the notion of Europe as the origin and epicentre of human civilisation (67).

This deconstructive absence of the centre revealed itself as the absence of the author in “The death of the author” (1967) by Roland Barthes. The critic here considers the text to be “a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash,” and “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (Barthes 146). Derrida’s poststructuralism observed in this essay is, for the most part, restricted to texts and literature. It reveals the workings and function of

language, and in particular, the inability of language or text to represent anything outside itself. The end of representation, however, was signalled by Derrida's absence of the centre and Barthes' death of the subject/author, making the issues of subjectivity and authorship increasingly pertinent to postmodern cultural theory. All representations are necessarily political in the sense that they cannot help but reflect the ideological frameworks from which they originate if representations cannot accurately depict the world, or, to put it another way, if texts cannot reflect an external transcendental reality. Since authorship and political questions like "Who is speaking or writing?" and "Why is he speaking or writing?" can be seen as the primary concerns of postmodernity, the end of representation forces us to revisit these issues. In short, even though Derrida's and Barthes' poststructuralist texts discussed above may seem limited to literary or linguistic theories, it is possible to read them as bases of the postmodern problematisation and questioning of history, art, and even positive sciences which have long been regarded as the expression of absolute truth by modernist social and cultural theory. As Barthes puts forward,

[w]e are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smother, or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author. (148)

As is evident from the critic's statements, since all representations are political, humanity should now deconstruct the binary oppositions constructed for political purposes in the name of achieving a good society and embrace everything that these binary oppositions ignore, otherwise, or destroy. This is also one of the flaws that Bauman sees in the solid modern utopianism discussed in the first chapter. Binary oppositions constructed for a better society have generated such deep dichotomies as reason/intuition, order/chaos, and friend/enemy that they led to the establishment of totalitarian regimes, the popularity of eugenics, and the Holocaust at the beginning of the twentieth century. This might also be viewed as a factor that allowed pluralism to replace the totalitarianism of the previous century.

2.1.1.1. Jean François Lyotard and *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* Within a Utopian Framework

Although debates about the workings of language and text and their relation to reality had long been on the agenda, Jean-François Lyotard, another poststructuralist, may be considered the first one who brought philosophy into the postmodern debate. According to Bertens, “the translation of Lyotard’s *La Condition postmoderne* into English in 1984” (the original edition was published in 1979) was taken as the sign of a “merger between an originally American postmodernism and French poststructuralism” (5). It is a widely known fact that Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979) is where the term “postmodern” was first used to describe contemporary culture. In this work, the philosopher analyses how the concept of knowledge is used in contemporary culture. He evaluates the postmodern condition within the context of the new technologies of communication and argues that it is a transition to a post-industrial, information-based society (3, 8, 37). He claims that the rise of postmodern thought is at the centre of a significant social and political change in language games in advanced capitalist societies. These language games have been used to form various intermingled grand narratives that support power structures in society. At the very beginning of his work, Lyotard says, “I will use the term *modern* to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth” (xxiii). For the philosopher, the means used for maintaining these power structures has been legitimation through giving reference to, or to put it in another way, through building its justifications on a metadiscourse advocating some kind of grand narrative during modernity. That is why he states that he would call “any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse modern” (xxiii). As also suggested by Bertens, Lyotard here reveals “the legitimation of science and the transcendent status of scientific knowledge” (120) and that the modern pursuit of knowledge and a perfect world is characterised by legitimation through the use of a metadiscourse. Lyotard defines the postmodern condition as the end of these “grand narratives” or “metanarratives,” specifying it as “incredulity towards metanarratives” (xxiv). In

addition, he suggests that this incredulity towards metanarratives is leading postmodern society to question the metadiscourse of modernist grand narrative dictating to accept humanity as “the whole and the one,” in other words, as a totalised society, for a better life. Lyotard emphasises the cost of this kind of totalisation:

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences. (81)

It is clear that postmodern culture and life may be seen as a kind of battle against totality, against community as “a whole and the one,” and consequently against a common ground for collective happiness. What is now in the foreground is difference, individuality, and distinction. As Lyotard clarifies, “What is new in all of this is that the old poles of attraction represented by nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and historical traditions are losing their attraction” (14). Grand narratives are the so-called transcendent and universal facts that formed the basis of Western civilisation and served to provide objective legitimacy for that civilisation. Now, with the advent of an information-based society, in a world where what is produced is knowledge or information instead of raw materials, all these grand narratives used by nation-states, or parties, have been out of favour. Lyotard’s stress on the demise of grand narratives becomes significant when considered within a utopian context, too. By questioning the legitimacy of grand narratives used by various states or institutions, in a way, it is possible to say that the legitimacy of science and reason and their claim for the right to say the absolute truth, as well as the ideology and the grand narratives of the nation-states of modernity, have been questioned, deconstructed, and destroyed in postmodern culture.

2.2. POSTMODERNITY AND CONSUMERISM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF UTOPIANISM

2.2.1. Jean Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson: Consumerism and Postmodernity

To have knowledge about Fredric Jameson, an American Marxist literary theorist and critic, and Jean Baudrillard, a French social theorist, is crucial for understanding the relationship between consumerism, late capitalism, and postmodern culture, as well as for capturing how Bauman's ideas on consumerist culture and its connection with liquid modern utopianism have been shaped by the theorists preceding him since Baudrillard and Jameson are the two theorists who have linked consumerism with postmodern culture. As reflected by Bertens, both Baudrillard and Jameson exposed the fact that commodification, as a defining characteristic of late capitalism, succeeded in erasing "the classically Marxist distinction between the economic and the cultural," leading to a setting where numerous economic and cultural symbols and representations feed off of one another (9-10).

Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) was a sociologist already well-known in sociology circles in the 1970s, but he was not recognised as a major postmodern theorist until one of his articles was translated into English in October 1982, and especially until *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities and Simulations* was published in 1983 (Bertens 109). Since the focus of this chapter is on Bauman's concept of liquid modern utopianism, which is based on the relationship between consumerism, late capitalism, and postmodernity, this subsection will focus on the social theorist's *The Consumer Society* (1970), though he is best known for his *Simulacra and Simulation* (1981), which deals with the process and the meaning of consumption in contemporary culture. In *The Consumer Society*, Baudrillard examines contemporary Western cultures, as well as US society, and exposes the role that consumerism plays in these civilisations. He describes how large companies satisfy personal demands and establish new social hierarchies that took the place of previous class divisions. Consumption, for the social theorist, has transformed

into a new myth which constitutes the morality of the contemporary world. He argues that

[j]ust as medieval society was balanced on God and the Devil, so ours is balanced on consumption and its denunciation. Though at least around the devil heresies and black magic sects could organize. Our magic is white. No heresy is possible any longer in a state of affluence. It is the prophylactic whiteness of a saturated society, a society with no history and no dizzying heights, a society with no other myth than itself. (Baudrillard 196)

For Baudrillard, society has now no morality other than consumption, and rejecting to be included in the process of consumption is regarded as a heresy. The theorist warns the reader against the danger of losing the foundations of being human posed by the consumption process. Through the example of a washing machine, which serves as a luxury item and a sign of status rather than a useful object, he illustrates how consumerism has permeated our system of values. As he makes it clear, “in the logic of signs, as in that of symbols, objects are no longer linked in any sense to a definite function or need. Precisely because they are responding here to something quite different, which is either the social logic or the logic of desire, for which they function as a shifting and unconscious signification” (Baudrillard 77). Accordingly, the individual feels that acquiring and displaying consumer items confers social prestige and privilege in a consumer society where the line between actual and imagined requirements has disappeared. A general logic of social division therefore develops. The need now is for differentiation rather than an object. Instead of buying individual products, the buyer is enticed to buy the complete system of goods and services. As such, he believes that he is socially distinct while simultaneously integrating into the consumer society. Consequently, consumption becomes a requirement for the individual. It is not a freely chosen activity but a so-called necessity to become a part of contemporary society.

According to Baudrillard, in addition to fostering individual desires, the consumption process creates a false sense of freedom by portraying signs of abundance and conceals the real social injustices in society. The theorist underlines the fact that

every street, with its cluttered, glittering shop-windows (the least scarce commodity here being light, without which the merchandise would be merely what it is), their displays of cooked meats, and indeed the entire alimentary and vestimentary feast, all stimulate magical salivation. There is something more in this piling high than the quantity of products: the manifest presence of surplus, the magical, definitive negation of scarcity, the maternal, luxurious sense of being already in the Land of Cockaigne. (Baudrillard 26)

As is obvious in the quotation above, wandering the streets with shiny shop windows, members of the consumer society think that they reside in a utopian world of abundance represented by the Land of Cockaigne. Baudrillard even draws a parallel between the out-of-town supermarkets and malls, which became popular in the USA and spread over Europe in the 1960s, and the drugstores. These malls entice customers by providing a vast selection of goods, a safe, comfortable, controlled, and predictable environment, and by employing advertisements. This includes advertising for both the goods sold in the mall and the mall itself. For Baudrillard, “in the drugstore, the cultural centre becomes part of the shopping centre. It would be simplistic to say that culture is ‘prostituted’ there. It is *culturalized*” (27). Commodities such as clothing and food, too, are culturalised as they are turned into luxurious accessories. It is possible to assert that, according to Baudrillard, in the contemporary postmodern culture, there is a completely different and active process of consumption that is supported by a set of signs and representations which gives the consumer society a false sense of freedom, abundance, and happiness. Thus, each individual acts as the consumer society wants him/her to act in the belief that he/she is free and content, and the economic and cultural spheres are inextricably intertwined.

For Baudrillard, another characteristic of the consumer society is the altered nature of violence, which may be viewed as influential in forming Bauman’s concept of liquid modern utopianism. The social theorist emphasises that this sense of prosperity, fuelled by advertising, has resulted in the birth of a new sort of violence never previously seen by humanity. At the start of his examination of contemporary violence, he states,

Some will look back longingly to the days “when violence had a meaning,” the good old violence of war, patriotism, passion and, ultimately, rationality – violence

sanctioned by an objective or a cause, ideological violence or the individual violence of the rebel, which was still of the order of individual aestheticism and could be regarded as one of the fine arts. People will go on trying to fit this new violence into old models and apply known treatments to it. But we have to see that this violence, which is no longer strictly historical, no longer sacred, ritualistic or ideological – nor yet again, for all that, pure act or expression of individual singularity – is structurally linked to affluence. (Baudrillard 178)

In the above-given quotation, the theorist complains about the fact that the violence we are witnessing today does not have a cause as it had before because we are neither in war, nor do our acts of violence result from a kind of passion. The type of violence we witness today is rather objectless, aimless, and connected to affluence. And when a member of the consumer society cannot adapt to the consumer culture, he/she has some pathologies leading him/her to violence. The theorist refers to Galbraith's words "[i]t is not easy to adapt to affluence. . . our economic attitudes are rooted in the poverty, inequality, and economic peril of the past" (Galbraith qtd. in Baudrillard 175) and continues saying, "[t]his difficulty of living in affluence should itself show us. . . the alleged 'naturalness' of the desire for well-being is not so natural" (Baudrillard 175). In the light of Baudrillard's discussion of the consumer society and its relation to postmodern culture, it would not be wrong to say that the consumer society caused humanity to face a new stage in which a new kind of lifestyle controlled not by solid mechanisms of control but by a set of signs and advertisements enticing us to consume. This is a stage in which we face a new type of morality based on consumption.

The second social theorist who has brought consumerism and postmodern culture together is Fredric Jameson. Jameson's 1983 essay "Postmodernism and consumer society" may be viewed as his "first concentrated effort at theorising postmodernism," and its broadened version, "Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism," which was published twelve months later in the *New Left Review*, has grown into one of the most frequently cited works in the 1980s (Bertens 153). The theorist's inclusion in the postmodern debate may be regarded as an event getting the left involved in this debate. Like Baudrillard, Jameson emphasises that culture has completely been

commodified by saying that “[p]ostmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodification as a process” (x), and he makes a comparison between postmodernism and modernism. For him, unlike postmodernism, “modernism was still minimally and tendentially the critique of the commodity and the effort to make it transcend itself” (x). As opposed to this, in Jameson’s view, in postmodernity, it is possible to observe that commodity and culture are intermingled. This obvious infiltration of commodification into all parts of life demonstrates postmodernism’s dependence on “the cultural logic of late capitalism” (45-46).

The theorist, as a Marxist, paints a grim picture of the present day and focuses on the dangers of late capitalism. He offers a critical assessment of the present in *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991) and alerts the reader to three key concurrent dangers of globalised capitalism. The first danger is the probable disconnection from history and the devaluation of historical reality. For Jameson,

it is hard to discuss “Postmodernism theory” in any general way without having recourse to the matter of historical deafness, an exasperating condition (provided you are aware of it) that determines a series of spasmodic and intermittent, but desperate, attempts at recuperation. Postmodernism theory is one of those attempts: the effort to take the temperature of the age without instruments and in a situation in which we are not even sure there is so coherent a thing as an “age,” or zeitgeist or “system” or “current situation” any longer. (x-xi)

Jameson views postmodern theory as an ineffective attempt to comprehend the circumstances of the contemporary era by rejecting traditional understanding methods such as narration, history, and the truth which is shrouded in ideology. There is nothing outside of ideology or textuality, according to postmodernists. In essence, postmodern theory challenges any assertion of truth, and according to Jameson, this is a symptom of the time that directly supports capitalism. He thinks that postmodernism is a “systematic modification of capitalism itself,” rather than a cultural element of a new social order (Jameson xi). The theorist emphasises the loss of historicity in relation to new types of “private temporality, whose ‘schizophrenic’ structure (following Lacan) will determine

new types of syntax” (Jameson 6). As such, he compares this loss of historicity to “Lacan’s analysis of schizophrenia as a language disorder” caused by an individual’s difficulty in entering fully “the realm of speech and language” (Bertens 156). According to him, those who have schizophrenia, in their failure to enter “the realm of speech,” experience a “breakdown of the signifying chain” until they are stuck among a number of “pure material signifiers,” to put it differently, a string of disconnected present moments (Jameson 27). As a result of this process, the individual loses his/her senses of temporality, past, present, and identity, which is a situation leading him/her to live in “a perpetual, always discontinuous, present” comprised of a series of disconnected signifiers (Bertens 156). For Jameson, this loss of historicity or sense of time indicates that postmodernism lacks depth, that is, it is characterised by “a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense” (9). In addition, this superficiality is closely related to the “disappearance of affect” within postmodern culture. Jameson claims that this lack of affect is about the individual subject’s so-called death, a death that refers to “the modernist feelings of alienation and angst embodied in a painting such as Edward Munch’s *The Scream*” (11). These feelings have evolved into “intensities” under postmodernism, which replaces the cognitive “fragmentation of the subject” of modernity (a word Jameson took from Lyotard) (Jameson 137). In short, the postmodern subject is deprived of a coherent reality because the rejection of traditional methods of understanding such as narrative, history, and reality with their ideological nature leads him to a kind of failure to enter the realm of language and reality, which is associated with schizophrenia defined as a breakdown of the signifying chain. As a result, there is a depthless, senseless, and fragmented postmodern subject striving for a coherent meaning and a place for himself in the contemporary timeframe constituted by a fragmented chain of endless presents through instant gratifications obtained by the consumption process.

2.3. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY, AND CONSUMERISM

2.3.1. Liquidity as a Metaphor and Liquid Modernity

Another and more recent sociologist, who brings the terms postmodernity and consumerism together, albeit his reluctance to use the term “postmodernity” as the definition of a new period following modernity, is Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman uses term “liquid modernity” to define the culture and the condition of contemporary society, which he prefers to classify as the “second” or “late” stage of modernity rather than using the term “postmodernity.” Bauman abandoned the term “postmodernity” in favour of the term “liquid modernity” in his 2000 book *Liquid Modernity*, when Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Jameson were already discussing it. Bauman’s comprehensive account of contemporary society in what Jacobsen calls the “liquid trilogy” (“Activating Presence” 346), including *Liquid Modernity* (2000), *Liquid Love* (2003), and *Liquid Life* (2005), as well as the subsequent *Liquid Fear* (2006), was informed by this profound critical atmosphere at the time. Bauman’s metaphor of liquid life or culture, which is characterised by fluidity, originates from *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. There, Marx and Engels used the metaphor of evaporation to describe what they called “the bourgeois epoch” in the following manner:

Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. (4)

Marx and Engels, as is seen in the quotation, use the metaphor of “solid” to describe the dominant characteristic of contemporary culture and existence. The first definition of the word “solid” in the OED is “hard, not in the form of a liquid or gas”; however, solid also means robust and well-made. Something solid is difficult to move or alter; in this sense, “all that is solid” may refer to all fixed, long-established institutions, ideas, or opinions thought to be unchangeable. The phrase “all that is solid melts into air” may therefore be interpreted as a metaphor emphasising the dissolution of all previously established values. The remarkable point, however, is that, as is well-known, when a solid substance melts, it transforms into a liquid. Here, the solid material, whatever it represents, melts directly into the air, as if it bypassed a stage, i.e. the stage of

transformation into a liquid state. Based on this phrase, it would not be incorrect to assert that Marx and Engels also emphasise something other than dissolution. As a result of the revolution in production, the dissolution of old values, prejudices, and institutions is a well-known fact. What is crucial here is the velocity of this dissolution. Its velocity is the reason for its direct transformation into vapour. After the dissolution of all fixed, substantial, and long-established values, all newly established values evaporate into thin air so fast that people are unable to distinguish between these new values. Marx and Engels accentuate two characteristics of contemporary culture through the phrase cited above: the first is the quality of being in a condition of perpetual change, and the second is the speed of this change, which forces individuals to confront their actual life circumstances in the absence of sound or stable, i.e. solid values.

After approximately half a century, drawing upon Marx and Engels's metaphor of solidity, Bauman suggests that late modernity, or what other sociologists refer to as postmodernity, is characterised by liquidity, thereby presenting a symbolic solution to the problem of postmodernity. The metaphor seems extremely in place because it may be regarded as an umbrella term covering the notions of change, transience, and hyper-individuality that lie at the centre of Bauman's concept of liquidity. The term is also associated with the concept of adaptability, as a substance in liquid form has the ability to conform to the shape of any given container. For the sociologist, what distinguishes liquids from solids is the fact that "they cannot sustain a tangential, or shearing, force when at rest," and for this reason, they remain in a process of "continuous change of shape when subjected to. . . a stress" (*Liquid Modernity* 1). Added to his emphasis on the continuous state of change, Bauman draws the reader's attention to the significance of the pace of movement in general. As he points out,

[w]hat prompts so many commentators to speak of the 'end of history', of postmodernity, 'second modernity' and 'surmodernity', or otherwise to articulate the intuition of a radical change in the arrangement of human cohabitation and in social conditions under which life-politics is nowadays conducted, is the fact that the long effort to accelerate the speed of movement has presently reached its 'natural limit.' Power can move with the speed of the electronic signal - and so the

time required for the movement of its essential ingredients has been reduced to instantaneity. (Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* 10-11)

The sociologist discusses the issue of velocity in a rather different historical context, to put it more clearly, within the context of an information age during which what is produced is information rather than material goods; for him, a fundamental shift in the regulation of human coexistence and social circumstances has caused humanity's effort to increase the pace of movement to reach its "natural limits" (Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* 11). As with all other factors regulating social conditions, power is able to change with the speed of an electronic signal. Therefore, what Bauman refers to is not "the solidity of the capitalism of the 1840s" which Marx and Engels have discussed. It is rather the end of "the long post-war boom and the period of affluence, consumerism and the welfare state, full employment, nuclear family, Fordism, the American Dream and its British and other European sub-versions" (Beilharz 165). Due to neoliberalism and globalisation, liquid modernity has eroded the fixed social conditions of the post-war era; liquidity has replaced relatively fixed gender roles, full masculine and lifetime employment. As a result of a ceaseless state of change and transience, feelings of uncertainty, insecurity, and the end of all forms of loyalty have begun to dominate in liquid times. In solid modernity, one had to comply with the rules established by various institutions; in liquid modernity, it is his/her ability to quickly adapt to changing circumstances that make him/her survive. In this sense, liquid modernity can be understood to refer to a rapidly shifting order which challenges all concepts of permanence and gives all kinds of social construction a sense of rootlessness.

A direct result of the end of all loyalties and the sense of rootlessness felt towards all social constructions is the end of solid modernity's "bonds which interlock individual choices in collective projects and actions – the patterns of communication and coordination between individually conducted life policies on the one hand and political actions of human collectivities on the other" (Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* 6). In this liquid modern world, it is not possible to talk about any bonds between individual

choices and collective projects or a sense of commitment to any collectivist ideals. Since Bauman emphasises individual “liberation, choice, and social transformation” in his theory of liquid modernity, individualisation is a key component of this theory (Lee 652). As Bauman makes it clear,

the present-day situation emerged out of the radical melting of the fetters and manacles rightly or wrongly suspected of limiting the individual freedom to choose and to act. Rigidity of order is the artefact and sediment of the human agents’ freedom. That rigidity is the overall product of ‘releasing the brakes’: of deregulation, liberalization, ‘flexibilization’, increased fluidity, unbridling the financial, real estate and labour markets, easing the tax burden. . . or . . . of the techniques of ‘speed, escape, passivity’ - in other words, techniques which allow the system and free agents to remain radically disengaged, to by-pass each other instead of meeting. (*Liquid Modernity* 5)

Bauman views the current state of affairs as a direct result of the dissolution of concrete mechanisms that were believed to restrict individual freedom of choice and action, as stated in the first sentence of the above excerpt. Based on this, it is no longer possible to discuss Freud’s theory that modern subjects are cast into antagonistic social environments, which limit their individual desires and freedom. There are no apparatuses of solid states or methods of nation-states to maintain the authority of the status quo and to limit the individual’s freedom. If one fails to adapt to the constantly changing conditions, then it is one’s own incapacity to be flexible enough to adapt to the new situation rather than the ills of the social system.

The rigidity of order Bauman mentions in the above quotation may be viewed as closely related to the solid modern endeavour to achieve a better society in the future through the establishment of permanent structures. In *Legislators and Interpreters*, published in 1987, the sociologist refers to the same issue and draws attention to the distinction between modern and postmodern subjects. According to him, modern and postmodern subjects are manifestations of distinct cultures, worldviews, and choices; the modern

subject is an instrumental, reasonable, and good planner, while the postmodern one is more pragmatic, suspicious, and risk tolerant. The modern subject is committed to the pursuit of reasonable mastery over the universe, whereas the postmodern subject insists on the impossibility of this objective. Therefore, moderns are legislators who understand how to change the world and perceive the unfavourable effects of social engineering as impending obstacles on their way to a more ideal society. Postmodern subjects as interpreters, however, act more cautiously and carefully as “mediators or messengers rather than Heroes of Modern Times” (Beilharz 161). Because of this, it is not possible to see any revolutions or revolutionaries in liquid modernity as Bauman underlines in his *Liquid Modernity*:

If the time of systemic revolutions has passed, it is because there are no buildings where the control desks of the system are lodged and which could be stormed and captured by the revolutionaries; and also because it is excruciatingly difficult, nay impossible, to imagine what the victors, once inside the buildings (if they found them first), could do to turn the tables and put paid to the misery that prompted them to rebel. One should be hardly taken aback or puzzled by the evident shortage of would-be revolutionaries: of the kind of people who articulate the desire to change their individual plights as a project of changing the order of society. (5)

In liquid modernity, revolutions are impossible because the old, solid social structures, which are the “control desks of the system” to be captured by revolutionaries, have become irrelevant. In a liquid world characterised by hyper-individualism, transience, and instantaneous change or movement, it is difficult for people to attempt to surmount their individual sufferings by collaborating on a project aimed at transforming society. Accordingly, solid powers have moved from the “system” to liquid “society”; politics in the solid modern sense have changed to “life policies”; and values “have descended from the ‘macro’ to the ‘micro’ level of social cohabitation” (Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* 7).

2.3.2. Privatised Imagination: Liquid Modern Utopias

Based on the information presented up to this point in this chapter regarding the postmodern debate led by various social theorists and sociologists, it would not be

incorrect to assert that postmodernity seems to pose a challenge to utopianism; however, this does not mean that this assertion is not controversial. On the contrary, Tobin Siebers, a US scholar, for example, argues that “utopia has emerged as the high concept of postmodernism” (2) because utopia is fundamentally about desire and it is the desire “to desire differently, which includes the desire to abandon such desire” (3). According to him, postmodernists are utopian because they recognise that they desire something other than what modernists have desired. In a similar vein, it is also possible to suggest that utopianism and postmodernism cannot be evaluated separately because both concepts have a common ground: a strong desire to question what already exists and deconstruct it. As it has been discussed through the key texts of various social theorists at the beginning of the chapter, since postmodernism has an evident aversion to dichotomies and binary oppositions, all sets of signs and significations about utopianism have inevitably changed direction. In his numerous works on liquid modernity, Bauman frequently discusses the shift in and the transformation of the fundamental principles of utopianism. His theories can be seen as a synthesis of all these postmodern disputes based on the sociologist’s vocabulary and analysis of the condition of utopianism at the time. To put it in this context, he believes that all dichotomies – including but not limited to those between reason and emotion, mind and body, and those that have been questioned and deconstructed in liquid modernity – are the components of various grand narratives of solid modern utopianism. Liquid modernity’s disruption or deconstruction of the chronological order of things has also influenced utopian ideals in various ways. In the context of this dissertation, and in the light of the preceding discussion on Bauman’s literature pertaining to liquid modernity, the focus in this part concerning liquid modern utopias will be directed towards a singular article by him. Specifically, the article titled “Utopia with no Topos” (2003) will serve as a crucial text for comprehending the notion of liquid modern utopias and the transformations in the concept of utopianism within the framework of liquid modernity.

Bauman’s discussion of the distinction between solid modern utopian aspirations and liquid modern ones in this article could be explored in terms of primarily three aspects of solid modern utopianism: finality, hyper-individuality as the inevitable consequence

of finality, and territoriality. He provides the following summary of the first two changes at the outset of his article:

Utopia is one of the forms such uncommon articulations may take. This article explores the conditions that defined that form - those of modernity in its initial 'solid' stage, a form that was marked and set apart from other articulations of the transgression urge by two remarkable attributes: territoriality and finality. It is concluded that in the transgressive imagination of 'liquid modernity' the 'place' (whether physical or social) has been replaced by the unending sequence of new beginnings, inconsequentiality of deeds has been substituted for fixity of order, and the desire for a different today has elbowed out concern with a better tomorrow. (Bauman, "Utopia" 11)

It is possible to say that the changes Bauman discusses are related, first, to the historicity of solid utopian aspirations and its end result revealing itself as a tendency towards hyper-individuality; the second, to the spatial quality of these aspirations. According to Bauman, in liquid modernity, it is possible to observe an unusual approach to historicity, particularly to the past and the future. In Bauman's view, solid modernity has been characterised by the pursuit of a better future whereas postmodernism rejects the idea of progress, departs from the senses of historical continuity and memory, and develops an extraordinary capacity to give away history and replace it with random components of the present (Harvey 54). For the sociologist, this is "a transformation from long-term visions to short-lived desires (Bauman, "Utopia" 23; *Liquid Times* 103). As he clarifies,

[t]he draftsmen of utopia took it for granted that the long series of improvements on social reality was bound to reach at some point its natural conclusion: not just a better society, but the best society conceivable, the perfect society, society in which any further change could be only a change to the worse. Passage from any 'really existing reality' to the perfect society will constitute a gigantic leap and a truly formidable change, with its usual vexing accompaniment of risk, apprehension and discomfort no less painful and harrowing for being 'transitional,' will be called for or desired. (Bauman, "Utopia" 15)

As it is mentioned in the previous chapter of this dissertation, the notion of solid utopians for Bauman refers to individuals who sought to establish a sense of order and control within their “gardens” by excluding outsiders or any other factors that may hinder the attainment of an ideal state in the future. From this solid modern point of view, as a consequence of the establishment of a strict order and control, they expect a final perfect state to be attained. The role of the gardener has recently experienced a gradual displacement by the hunter archetype, which prioritises the pursuit of instant gratification within a liquid modern context. For the hunter, the notion of utopia does not entail a future condition of paradise, but rather a perpetual pursuit of new prey that can be promptly captured. Bauman posits that the cessation of finality has led to the emergence of the concept of liquid modern utopia, which prioritises the pursuit of personal satisfaction and endurance over the attainment of distant goals through progress (*Liquid Times* 100). In contrast to the solid modern utopian conception of the ideal existence, in liquid modern utopianism, happiness is commonly regarded as a personal pursuit, consisting of a sequence of joyful moments that follow one another, rather than a constant condition (*Society Under Siege* 240). In this sense, it is possible to claim that the duty of a liquid modern utopian, a hunter, is to reshape the present without a concurrent pursuit of an enduring or communal transformation.

Bauman focuses on the origin of the word “utopia;” particularly on the meaning of “topos” in Greek, asserting that it refers to a “place,” in order to explain the changes in the spatial nature of solid modern utopias. According to the sociologist, utopias up until liquid modernity were essentially sedentary in that “[h]owever imagined, visions of a different and better life portrayed in the description of utopias were always territorially defined: associated with and confined to a clearly defined territory” (Bauman, “Utopia” 12). Power and space have been closely correlated in this stage of solid modernity that Bauman refers to as “sedentary” (12). State power has not only been determined by the magnitude of its territory, but it is also imposed upon its citizens through spatial sanctions and punishments. As the sociologist makes it clear, “[u]topian imagination was essentially architectural and urbanistic. Most attention of the model builders was devoted to plotting and mapping, leaving the job of projection of the map over the

territory. . . to the rulers of the topos” (14). As such, solid modern utopias were territorially organised worlds of solid mechanisms based on Jeremy Bentham’s model of Panopticon, the objective of which has been to create a spatial configuration that would allocate a suitable and appropriate position for each individual for whom such a position had been designated. The establishment of a sound system of governance consistently involved the process of incorporating and excluding individuals or groups, with a focus on ensuring that the law was applied universally and without exception. In the Panopticon, prisoners were restricted to the premises and prohibited from any form of mobility. They were enclosed by robust, compact, and heavily monitored barriers and restrained to their sleeping quarters, chambers, or workstations. They were constrained from movement due to surveillance which made them always adhere to their designated locations. Prisoners’ lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of their unrestricted observers further contributed to their immobility, and their being fixed to place was the guarantee of their subordination (*Liquid Modernity* 9). In such “utopias,” the authority of the managerial class was contingent upon their ability to swiftly navigate through space, their possession of transportation resources, and the consequent liberty of mobility (10). However, as Bauman suggests, liquid modern utopias may be called “post-Panoptical” in the sense that

[i]t does not matter anymore where the giver of the command is – the difference between ‘close by’ and ‘far away’, or that matter between the wilderness and the civilized, orderly space, has been all but cancelled. This gives the power-holders a truly unprecedented opportunity: the awkward and irritating aspects of the panoptical technique of power may be disposed of. (11)

Lyotard’s emphasis on the transient, highly context-specific, or dynamic nature of socio-economic and political systems resulting from the end of grand narratives had an impact on Bauman’s focus on the fluidification of social structures. The dissolution of binary oppositions between concepts such as civilised/uncivilised, orderly/chaotic, and clean/unclean that have been used by solid modern mechanisms and powerholders in the Panoptical period, for Bauman, marks the end of the reciprocal involvement among

various entities such as warring armies, the rulers and the ruled, and capital and labour. The predominant strategy for exerting power in contemporary times involves the act of evading, slipping away from, omitting, and steering clear of any limitations on one's authority. This entails a deliberate refusal to engage in the establishment and maintenance of structures that promote order, as well as the avoidance of accountability for the outcomes of such structures and the associated punishments (11).

2.3.3. Consumerism as a Post-Panoptical Means of Surveillance and Control

Based on Bauman's discussion on liquid modern utopianism, it would not be wrong to suggest that the finality and territoriality of solid modern utopias have recently become problematic in the swiftly changing atmosphere of a globalising and neo-liberal world. The contemporary social landscape is characterised by heightened mobility, fluidity of identities, and a gradual erosion of established social norms and institutions. According to Bauman, the contemporary world lacks stability, and it is in a constant state of flux and transition. Although borders remain in existence, their significance has diminished in proportion to the early solid stage of modernity. Liquid modern subjects currently reside in an epoch of global interconnectedness, a situation in which there are no remaining havens of refuge or concealment. The concept of distance does not serve as a barrier because individuals are constantly monitored and always available, dutifully carrying portable electronic devices such as cellular phones, internet-connected laptops, or credit cards that represent intangible constraints ("Utopia" 21).

However, for Bauman, the human urge for autonomy does not go away in the absence of these ingrained social norms and institutions, but it rather shifts in the direction of a demand for abundance and limitless consumption. Bauman's ideas about the role of consumerism in contemporary society have even given inspiration to recent studies on the consumption theory by scholars such as Fleura Bardhi, Giana M. Eckhardt, and Alexandrina Atanasova who have theorised the relationship between liquid modernity and consumer culture. Peter Beilharz, an Austrian sociologist who has produced a number of studies concerning Bauman, comments on Bauman's notion of liquid

modernity and compares Bauman and Hannah Arendt in relation to this shift of course, asserting that such civic privatisation inevitably weakens the public realm (142). He summarises this shift from Panoptical surveillance to the post-Panoptical one stating that “[t]he state colonize[d] the agora; this [was] how the romance of modern intellectuals with totalitarian power c[ame] to an end. In the meantime, however, the problem shifts, towards the domination of the agora by the market. The agora is invaded again, this time by the market” (Beilharz 165). Based on Beilharz’s comment, it is possible to say that the invasion of the agora by the market in liquid modern utopias is directly linked to the interface between the concept of desire and consumer culture. Although Bauman does not categorically label liquid modern utopias as “consumer,” he believes that consumerism is the outcome of people’s urge to re-imagine, re-construct, and re-frame the present in liquid modern times. For him, consumption provides a way of life in a world that is becoming more unpredictable and uncertain (Bauman, “Utopia” 23). In other words, liquid consumerist utopias are market-mediated forms of being to which the liquid contemporary subject adopt to escape from the present and set themselves apart from the others through consumption. Atanasova, in the introduction part of her article entitled “Re-examining Utopia in Contemporary Consumption: Conceptualization and Implications for Marketing” provides the reader with good examples of this escape from reality through the act of buying by referring to those people who wait at airports to take a “flight to nowhere” and to those consumers who pay for “eat[ing] airplane food in their homes,” which have become popular after one of the largest pandemics of history, COVID-19, has broken out (1). In liquid modernity, personal desires are not restricted, but they are encouraged in order to attain a new type of control.

2. 4. CRITIQUE OF LIQUID CONSUMERIST UTOPIANISM IN *THE TIN CAN PEOPLE*

The second play of Edward Bond’s trilogy, *The Tin Can People* (1984), can be viewed as a continuation of *Red, Black and Ignorant*, which has been discussed in the preceding chapter. Being comprised of three separate sections, bearing the titles “Paradise in

Hell,” “The Tin Can Riots,” and “The Young Sages,” respectively, the play is set precisely seventeen years after the nuclear bombardment depicted in *Red, Black and Ignorant*. In these three sections, like in the first play, short scenes follow one another, with choruses between them commenting on the action. The play, as a whole, can be undoubtedly classified as a dystopian work in that all of its three sections portray survivors, who struggle for existence, and their perseverance in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster in a world devoid of order. It starts with a group of survivors of a nuclear bombardment. They do not have to work because there are a number of warehouses filled with tinned food that has not been contaminated by radiation. They live in peace and harmony until they come across a stranger, First Man, who is another survivor of the catastrophe. At first, the stranger brings hope to the group, and he is welcomed. However, following the consecutive deaths of some of the group members, the tin can micro-society puts the blame on the stranger and attempts to kill him even though one of them had already died before his arrival. One of the survivors, First Woman, prevents others so that she and First Man could serve as the parents of the next generation. Considering the plot, it is possible to state that in the play the criticism focuses on the ideology and reasoning behind liquid consumerist utopianism, which Bauman connects to late capitalism and liquid modernity. Bond mentions his motivation for writing the trilogy saying that “in past revolutionary situations, the future was seen optimistically, even utopianly . . . I think we have to point out a real danger in the future” (Stuart, *Letters 2* 100). Here, the playwright makes clear that he wants to provoke the reader/audience to consider the viability of utopian thought in a setting where it is impossible to envision any revolutions that would lead to a better world. Accordingly, *The Tin Can People* can be interpreted as a dystopian society that serves the purpose of exposing and denouncing deficiencies and unfavourable consequences of utopianism in the second stage of modernity, i.e. liquid consumerist utopianism, which Bauman classified as a modified manifestation of the solid modern utopianism, in terms of several aspects.

The critique of liquid consumerist utopianism in *The Tin Can People* is based on the presentation of a short-lived consumerist paradise in a dystopian environment at the

beginning of the play and its consequent transformation into chaos. The play starts with a section bearing a rather ironic title, “Paradise in Hell,” giving the impression that something positive will be presented on stage. However, the dark and frightening depiction, made by First Chorus, of the shock and suffering experienced just after the nuclear catastrophe, through such words as “people fled in all directions from one hell into another” and “the skin of one person clothed the bones of another” (Bond, *Plays:6* 55), distorts the positive impression created by the title. The characters in *The Tin Can People* are seen in a bleak setting devoid of a state or government, or, to put it another way, on a wasteland without any social structures, organisations, or systems. Because of this, they initially think that they enjoy their freedom in paradise. Second Woman, as a case in point, says,

The animals are dead: their bones lie in the fields like broken traps
 If a few live they keep out of our way . . .
 Yet we’re in paradise
 There’s no need to work: we only do that when we dig tombs in the rocks to show
 respect for our dead
 We have tins: millions: enough to live on for a thousand years
 There’s no exploitation – and so there are no enemies
 If others came why should they attack us? (Bond, *Plays:6* 58)

As is evident in Second Woman’s words, they wander in a world including only a few survivors. Under usual circumstances, this must appear as a hell dominated by disorder and chaos. They have survived a nuclear bombardment; as a result of this, the bones of the dead function as traps for them, and the soil must be contaminated which would probably lead to famine after a while. Nevertheless, the characters see themselves as fortunate, despite the traumatic experiences they have encountered. As also put by Second Man,

Before the bombs we were strangers: now we’re closer than children to their
 parents
 All of us shared one common wound
 We knew the deepest humiliation possible to us: to be with the dying and not able
 to help or comfort them
 Now we live together in decency

Not because we're better than those who died but because when they destroyed each other they destroyed their problem: the conflicts that came from their struggles to sustain their lives. (Bond, *Plays*:6 59)

Second Man's words serve to highlight the sense of solidarity that has been forged amongst the survivors as a result of their shared experience of the catastrophe. Collectively, they have borne witness to the most adverse circumstances and endured the most profound forms of degradation that the human race has ever encountered. Prior to the nuclear bombardment, they were not acquainted with one another. However, due to the shared challenges they have endured, they have developed a close bond akin to that of a parent-child relationship. Following the bombardment, the absence of contested territories, boundaries, politics, and identities has facilitated a state of dignified and peaceful living for them.

Since they have found warehouses filled with canned food, the characters live in affluence rather than in poverty. They are not subjected to exploitation as they do not have to work for food or for their other needs. They have no opponents preparing to attack them because there are no borders, nations, or political parties. They feel secure based on their idea that they will create a paradise in hell and that peace will last forever because of their wealth. Bond, in his "Commentary on *The War Plays*," describes the tin can society as

the most advanced society possible in the capitalist world. Nuclear war has brought the audience's consumer society to its highest state of perfection. The Tin Can valley is heaven on earth. It gives labourless luxury outside financial, time – there is no instalment date. It is said that the distortions in society are caused by economic insecurity, that hunger and other needs feed the beast in us. If this were so, the Tin Can people should be happy in their ideal world. (*Plays*:6 276-77)

Based on the playwright's words, it would not be wrong to say that the tin can society at first embodies the perfect society of liquid consumerist ideology defined by Bauman. This can be characterised as a liquid modern utopia, in which survivors of a catastrophe benefit from endless sources with no need for work and which is devoid of the territorial

or sedentary attributes of solid modern utopias, where individuals are subjected to perpetual surveillance and regulation.

The rest of the play functions as a counter-argument to liquid consumerist utopianism suggesting that economic insecurity and the inability of individuals to meet their basic needs, such as hunger and thirst, are the primary causes of societal chaos and disorder. As also stated by Bauman, people's need for autonomy survives after the dissolution of social institutions of early modernity, and affluence does not solve the problems in society. The lack of autonomy, i.e. the lack of established social conventions and structures, results in a tendency towards a desire for copiousness and unrestricted consumption rather than preventing catastrophes. Bond states that "[t]oo affluent people, in the play and in reality, share one thing in common with the mad: they have everything. But like the mad they have a sense of loss, the conviction that they have nothing. It comes from the insecurity affluence lays bare" (*Plays:6* 276-77). Through the end of First Chorus's direct address to the reader/audience, the lines describing people running away in all directions as "one animal with a hundred thousand legs and arms and one body covered with mouths that shouted its pain / One part of this animal crawled towards the docks and another towards the commercial centre" (55) may be interpreted as an image setting the atmosphere of the play. It can also be evaluated as a reference to the function of commercial centres in the liquid modern life and a kind of foreshadowing that consuming and commerce function as an escape from reality for this micro-society. It would also be possible to interpret the animal metaphor here as an emphasis on the fact that their acts are based on their animal instincts in a constant search for prey, referring to commodities, aimed at endless and careless consumption. It is also an implication that people's humane characteristics are killed, and they have lost their identity as parts of the masses. This way, as stated earlier on, the tin can society lives in peace until First Man appears only to be held responsible for the outbreak of a mysterious illness. The absence of rationality gives rise to an escalating agitation among the populace to eliminate the recently arrived individual, ascribing to him all the underlying motives of their own delusional thinking.

As panic and fear gradually take hold of the tin can people after First Man comes, the characters gradually transform into hunter archetypes of liquid modernity. This results in the tin can riots. Before the riots break out, tin can people initially endeavour to implement traditional, established solid methods of regulation and aggression in order to take control of the circumstance. At first, as their leader, Second Man, advises First Man to stay in a secluded place to prevent him contaminating others within the group. He says,

See that small road?
 Take that – in two hours you come to a garage
 Wait there
 We'll bring you food and blankets – anything else you need
 You may be carrying a disease. . .
 You know how to get to the garage?
 It's a normal precaution to put you in quarantine
 But don't try any tricks (Bond, *Plays:6* 69)

Consequently, due to the unfamiliarity of a new environment that lacks the past order and rules they are accustomed to, tin can people resort to their previous reliable solid methods of control. This manifests through the creation of dichotomies, such as healthy versus sick, friend versus enemy, and us versus them, which ultimately result in limiting their mobility. The individuals in question aim to construct a correctional facility for him in a location that facilitates the close monitoring and surveillance of his conduct. This would certainly entail a return to the Panopticon style of surveillance as defined by Althusser, Foucault, and finally Bauman as a solid mechanism of surveillance.

Then, they try to kill First Man by means of old methods of aggression to prevent him from posing an obstacle to tin can people's peace and future. Similarly, Second Man tries to revive old values by offering to sacrifice himself for the sake and good of the community. At first, he states that he should be the one who is going to kill First Man on the grounds that he is a good runner. Even though First Woman tells Second Man that any one of them could kill First Man "if you can touch him when you kill him" (Bond, *Plays:6* 76), he remains adamant that he should be the one to kill their enemy. He says,

When I've killed him I'll break the spear and live on my own for six months
 Not out of guilt: he has to be killed for the community's sake
 Six months will be a sign of the respect we owe all the dead
 And it'll show anyone who heard we'd kill him that we did it reluctantly
 After six months you'll come and welcome me back (Bond, *Plays*:6 74)

Assuming the responsibility of leadership, Second Man intends to devise a weapon, a spear, to kill First Man who the tin can people see as their enemy. In order to prevent the destruction of the last remnants of human beings after the catastrophe, Second Man tries to keep the community alive as a whole. However, while he devises the spear, he suddenly dies. Following the arrival of Fourth Woman with the news about other members of the community dying, the group goes out of control in panic. The only methods they know from their past solid way of life fail to solve the issue. This may be interpreted as an implication of the fact that one cannot use old methods for new, different problems. It would also be convenient to claim that the tin can people's failure partly results from their inability to construct a new method to solve their problems at this part of the play. Upon the emergence of First Man, who appears different due to his long solitary travels and experiences of self-preservation, he is initially received with hospitality. However, this reception is short-lived as he is eventually subjected to displacement and the same discriminatory treatment that was characteristic attitude of the old solid culture towards otherness.

Having seen that using old solid mechanisms is a futile effort, the tin can people resort to overeating as a means of preventing the disease. This represents the fundamental ethos of existence within a consumerist system which is to maximise personal gain due to the persistent apprehension of inadequate resources for survival, premised on the false belief that an increase in possessions invariably equates to an improvement in the quality of life. During the riots, when the characters set fire to the warehouses, they show increased levels of aggression. Despite the fact that they are not hungry, their objective is to maximise their consumption of tins prior to setting fire to the warehouses. First Man describes their greed and violence:

Threw stones at me - stones smeared with food: is
 this how they feed their beggars?
 They shouted - dirt poured out of their mouths: are they the people

who shit from the face?
 They'd've eaten me but too full to run. (Bond, *Plays:6* 87)

The tin can people do not only eat more than they need; they use food both as a weapon against First Man and as an escape from the reality he represents. For Janelle G. Reinelt, a professor of theatre and performance studies, the focal point throughout the play is the concept of personal ownership and the phenomenon of commodity fetishism which undermines the nascent society due to its incapacity to transcend the social structure of the capitalist system (61). Commodity fetishism and consumerism as a means to define oneself are reflected through the exaggerated depiction of the characters' clothes throughout the play. For instance, Second Woman is described as "dirty and dishevelled and her clothes and skin and hair smeared and saturated with food" (Bond, *Plays:6* 85). Reinelt also suggests that overconsumption is

[t]he ultimate gest of life under capitalism: get as much for yourself as possible because of the constant fear that there won't be enough to live – the mistaken notion that more is always better. The play is an extended Brechtian gestus of this social relation, the equivalent to the scene in *Mahagonny* of eating to death and of the *Threepenny Opera* song, "Food is the first thing; Morals follow on". (61)

The tin can people's overconsumption based on the fear that there will not be enough sources for everyone and their false judgement that First Man will lead to their death and will have all the cans on his own may be regarded as the tin can people's second failure in adapting to new circumstances. Until First Man arrives, they have lived in peace and unity believing that they have been living in the paradise described by liquid consumerist ideology, but when the affluence, from which they have benefited since the nuclear bombardment, is under threat, their solidarity transforms into self-interest and violence.

Similarly, the criticism of overconsumption and liquid consumerist ideology in the play is intensified by the depiction of the characters "licking food off the bricks" (Bond, *Plays:6* 85) and by an analogy drawn between cannibalism as an extreme form of consumption and greed. Third Man's words, "[c]ut myself on a tin: ate with bleeding fingers: phew! My hands stink of cannibals" (Bond, *Plays:6* 85), in this sense, may be

evaluated as having a connotation of greed. According to Jordan J. Dominy, a long custom of both factual and fictional literature exists, and it portrays cannibalism, particularly anthropophagy, a type of cannibalism which applies uniquely to humans, through both literal and symbolic means. For him, cannibalism serves as a trope that operates in two distinct manners. First, it highlights the contrast between European civilisation and racially distinct barbarism. Second, it functions as a metaphorical tool to underscore the avarice of consumer capitalism, which is a phenomenon that arises with the proliferation of easily accessible luxury goods and the rise of the prosperous middle class (Dominy 144). The phenomenon also manifests itself during the emergence of the middle class at the peak of Britain's imperial dominance. The act of consuming luxury commodities that were imported from colonies, such as sugar, was juxtaposed with the consumption of the labour of enslaved individuals who were responsible for the production of commodities (Dominy 145). In *The Tin Can People*, cannibalism is used to highlight the greed of consumer capitalism. The play portrays the characters in an endless process of consumption giving the reader/audience the sense that they can eat each other if they lack food. The title also functions as an emphasis on both the commodification of the characters and their constant hunger and greed. They are tin can people representing hunter archetypes of liquid consumerism, who materialise not only their relationships but also their identity, and who are always after their new prey.

The characters' violence during the riots results from their individual desire to survive. They do not have to obey any rules since there are no laws imposed upon them. Since they do not have an attachment to any state, country, or system, they experience a sense of seclusion. They do not even have names because they lack identity. Bond states that the tin can people "have lost their names because they have lost themselves. Names are a sign of our humanity. In a nuclear age we still have to create our humanity" (*Plays:6* 287). In order to make up for this lack of identity and purpose, the characters form attachments to the items they consume. Given that their society is exclusively oriented towards consumption, their interaction with the external world is limited to the act of consuming, leading to greed when they face a sort of danger or threat. Initially, they appear to exhibit magnanimity and empathy due to their luxurious living conditions.

Their good intentions and willingness to share what they have are reflected by Second Man as follows:

If others came why should they attack us?
 The pillar of the house doesn't pull down the other pillar.
 We wouldn't want anything from them except that they should be alive.
 They could share our tins.
 If they took our land we'd give them more (Bond, *Plays:6* 56)

Based on Second Man's words, it is possible to say that there are no dichotomies or binary oppositions such as those between us and others, or friends and enemies, created by a solid modern state to maintain order in this liquid consumerist utopia. Since they have more than they need, when they meet others, the only possible outcome would be cooperation and sharing. However, when they begin to associate First Man's arrival with the consecutive deaths in the tin can society, their attitude completely changes as reflected in the words of Second Man: "Suppose he blackmailed us? / Moved into our houses so we had to move out / He could go to the stores and contaminate our tins" (Bond, *Plays:6* 42). So, from then on, the tin can people begin to be motivated by self-interest. They are preoccupied with preserving what they have. For this reason, they perceive the newcomer, First Man, as an impediment to their material well-being and therefore expendable. Another instance of violence with individual motivations is the emergence of conflicts among the members of this micro-society resulting from a tendency towards self-interest. After Second Man dies, Second Woman wants to take his shirt saying,

It could have been my shirt
 As good as stole it from me
 He was downstairs and he made me search upstairs
 When I came down he was buttoning up the shirt. . .
 Of course it was paradise for him: he got what he wanted! Not us. . . When we are
 all dead he'd've killed the new man and kept everything to himself. (Bond, *Plays:6*
 80-81)

As is apparent in the quotation, this liquid modern utopia is not actually as perfect as it seems. Second Woman not only expresses her desire for the shirt of the recently deceased Second Man but also accuses him of theft. She claims that he has retained all possessions for his own benefit and therefore referred to this location as paradise. This

can be viewed as a sign of the hyper-individualism prevalent in a liquid consumerist society. Their aggression reaches such an extreme level that they cannot see the results of their actions. Third Man explains why the tin can people do not have any other choice of action than being violent by emphasising that they are in an illusion and they do not know what to do since they have forgotten normal human relationships. He says that

[h]e's real – we're in a dream: we cant suddenly eat real food – or lose real blood
 We cant let anything be real after the bombs
 If its beautiful – makes you happy – kill it
 The dead cant bear to be with the living: we only ask to be buried
 With or without his disease he has to be killed. (Bond, *Plays*:6 87)

It is possible to interpret Third Man's comments as an indicator as to the true cause of the violence and aggressiveness of the tin can people. They have been living in a paradise-like state of wealth, removed from reality, and assuming they have freedom and choice. In this sense, First Man's arrival may be seen as a reminder of the fact that this paradise might one day come to an end for its dwellers. Therefore, whether or not First Man has a disease, he should be killed. For all these reasons, even if they do not kill First Man, their hostility causes them to ruin the tins and injure him.

Distortions resulting from a liquid consumerist sort of life in the tin can society are not limited to violence. The characters and their relations to others and life, in general, appear to exhibit what Bauman calls a hunter-type personality in terms of many aspects. Bauman defines the hunter utopians of liquid modern society through the following words:

the hunter could not care less about the overall 'balance of things' . . . The sole task hunters pursue is another 'kill,' big enough to fill their game-bags to capacity. . . It may occur to them sometime, in a distant and still undefined future, the planet might run out of undepleted forests; but if it does, they wouldn't see it as an immediate worry - and certainly not as their worry. Such a distant prospect will not after all jeopardize the results of the current hunt, or the next one, and so surely there is nothing in it to oblige me, just one single hunter among many, or us, just one single hunting association among many, to ponder, let alone do something about it. (*Liquid Times* 100)

Bauman's definition may be summarised as the loss of historicity and the sense of time leading to hyper-individuality and lack of a collective consciousness. First of all, the micro-society in the play does not have a culture even though they have a common past. They all experienced a nuclear bombardment and survived it. However, culture is shaped by common values, ideas, and knowledge. Due to their current state of prosperity, they hold the belief that they have discovered a new way of living subsequent to the war. According to Reinelt, they confuse the end of scarcity with the emergence of novel values (61) though they have neither traditions nor values. Following the death of one of the members of their society, Second Man, carrying the dead body, reveals his wish to continue their old customs. His dialogue with Second Woman is as follows:

SECOND MAN. Talk to us about him
 People used to talk about their dead
 It was one of the things that made them human
 SECOND WOMAN. What's the use?
 Tomorrow we could all be dead from radiation
 Not even one of us left to bury the rest. (Bond, *Plays:6* 57-8)

According to Second Woman, it is apparent that in a barren setting, traditional customs and practises hold no significance as people suddenly confront unforeseen perils. This uncertainty and lack of culture caused the tin can people to live individual lives based on self-interest. Their relationships are, for this reason, shallow and superficial. Second Woman says that “[w]e didn't use the word 'love,' we needed each other to live” (Bond, *Plays:6* 60). Similarly, when they try to kill First Man, Second Woman tries to prevent them by hugging First Man, and First Man says, “[I]et me tell you! / It was you in the room – in the riot? – in a coma? / It was you / I fucked you” (Bond, *Plays:6* 88). In the first instance, it is understood that connections among the members of the tin can people are founded on mutual advantage rather than emotions such as affection, integrity, and companionship. The second instance highlights the degradation of sexual intercourse to a mere act of seeking immediate personal pleasure, devoid of any emotional connection or intimacy. Second Woman's above-mentioned words “[t]omorrow we could all be dead” suggest that the tin can people lack concern for their future (Bond, *Plays:6* 58). Amidst an environment characterised by unpredictability and

potential hazards, the characters find themselves devoid of a sense of historical or prospective orientation. Instead, they persistently inhabit a sequence of present moments wherein they endeavour to fulfil their individual needs. To put it in a different way, their envisioned lacks a definitive conclusion, with each successive moment leading to another pursuit and subsequent immediate satisfaction.

The third section of the play comprises a short scene featuring a dialogue that prompts the reader/audience to critically examine the recent situation of humanity. Bond employs a convenient title, “Young Sages,” to reveal his intended aim. After experiencing an initial state of shock and frenzy, the tin can people destroyed the tins and injured First Man. In this scene, the survivors find themselves at the outset of their endeavour to commence anew and acquire the skills necessary to construct a transformed future. They first contemplate the reasons for the bombardment they experienced in the preceding play of the trilogy, *Red, Black and Ignorant*. Fourth Chorus asks a series of questions:

Why were the bombs dropped? . . .
 Suppose we said bombs were better food on one plate than on another?
 Or money in an account while somewhere in the same city people are in debt for a
 few sticks of furniture?
 Or one school in green fields and another on a waste lot?
 That would be hard to understand . . .
 Soon people need an interpreter to understand the words that come from their own
 mouth and would have to be someone else to know the passions in their own
 breast!
 That is even harder to understand. (Bond, *Plays*:6 90)

Fourth Chorus’s speech draws attention to the injustices in society in the past as the root cause of the nuclear catastrophe. Bond, through an emphasis on the unbalanced distribution of sources among people, in a sense, questions the shortcomings of ideologies used by both solid modern utopians and liquid modern utopians. After that, liquid modern utopians asserted the unbalanced distribution of sources among people as the main reason for the failure of solid modern ideology. Based on this assertion, they encourage consumption and individual satisfaction. This results in the tin can riots

which may be regarded as an indication of the failure of consumerism promoted by liquid modern utopians. As First Man says,

[a] tree grows but it doesn't own its own field. The owner can come along any time and cut it down and burn it. It's the same with us. When the things we need to live are owned by someone else, we're owned – we can be cut down and burned at any time. Now no tins – so we can only own what we make and wear and use ourselves. That's the only difference – but it means that at last we own ourselves. (Bond, *Plays:6* 90)

It would be convenient to say that First Man's final speech reflects the problem with liquid consumerist utopianism. His words can be evaluated as a reflection of the fact that liquid consumerist utopias create a different kind of submission and slavery while promising freedom through individual gain via consumption. Fourth Woman draws attention to the fact that solid modern utopianism and its devastating results such as totalitarianism and violence have not functioned as a lesson for humanity. She says, “[w]e don't learn from other people's mistakes – not even from most of our own. But knowledge is collected and tools handed on. We can't go back to the beginning but we can change the future” (Bond, *Plays:6* 90). The tin can people now witness the flaws of the liquid modern way of life and the utopianism promoted by it. They have learned from all these experiences that neither of the utopian aspirations imposed upon them in the past can bring them happiness, but they have the power to create the future. They have an opportunity now to “own [themselves]” (Bond, *Plays:6* 90) and make their own free decisions on how to continue. In this respect, the play appears to end on an optimistic note leaving the reader/audience in a state of both questioning the past and elaborating on what to do in the future.

To sum up, *The Tin Can People*, the second play of Bond's trilogy, portrays a new manifestation of utopianism, characterised by a fluid consumerist ideology. It can be interpreted as a manifestation of Bauman's concept of liquid modern utopianism, which is marked by the metaphor of liquidity that symbolises a swiftly evolving world devoid of values, traditions, and established social institutions. In this context, the characters resort to consumerism as a means of escaping the post-apocalyptic reality depicted in

the play. The narrative of the play illustrates the shortcomings of this ideology, as the characters are depicted living in a state of abundance without any established regulatory frameworks, institutional structures, or oppositional forces. The utopian concept presented in the play does not pertain to a specific geographical location or a pursuit of an idealistic future state. Instead, it pertains to the individual efforts of each character to endure and thrive in their present circumstances. Since utopianism depicted in the play is individualised, present-oriented, and mobile, it may be inferred that the play presents a case that challenges the feasibility of liquid consumerist utopianism, thereby serving as a criticism of such ideals and prompting the reader/audience to re-evaluate the viability of past forms of utopianism as expressed by Bauman.

CHAPTER 3

CRITICISM OF RETROTOPIA IN BOND'S *GREAT PEACE*

The initial two chapters of this dissertation demonstrate the merits of interpreting the first two plays of Edward Bond's *The War Plays* as a critical analysis of the destructive consequences of solid modern and liquid modern consumerist utopianisms, as defined by Zygmunt Bauman. The first play critiques the utopianism espoused by the ideology of solid modernity by highlighting its failure. Similarly, the second play critiques the consumerist utopia imposed by liquid modern ideology and its pervasive influence on the lives of individuals in liquid modernity. A rather positive tone characterises the conclusion of the second play, as the characters experience a sense of relief from the uncertainty that arises because of the absence of a collective consciousness and reliable social mechanisms. Additionally, they are able to overcome their inclination towards excessive consumption, which is fuelled by the ideology of liquid modern consumerist utopianism. The objective of this chapter is to evaluate Bond's analysis and assessment of utopianism in the third and concluding part of his trilogy, *Great Peace* (1985), and to scrutinise it within the context of Bauman's examination of the contemporary state of utopianism, as presented in his 2017 publication entitled *Retrotopia*. The sociologist, at the very beginning of this work, draws attention to *The Future of Nostalgia* (2001), a book by the Harvard Professor of Slavic languages and Comparative Literature Svetlana Boym, who describes nostalgia as "a global epidemic" characterised by a strong longing for a community with a collective consciousness, a longing for a pattern in a fragmented world, and a desire for stability in an era of accelerated change (Boym qtd. in Bauman, *Retrotopia* 6). Boym warns readers against the danger of being tempted to abandon critical thinking in favour of emotional attachment and to mistake their proper home with a previously imagined one (6). Drawing on her description of nostalgia as an epidemic, Bauman uses the word "retrotopia" to refer to various forms of inclination towards and longing for former imagined forms of existence as an escape from

contemporary reality which is devoid of a pattern or stability, or any hopes about a better future. When considered within this perspective, Bond's *Great Peace* could be interpreted as a portrayal and critique of the contemporary state of utopianism providing the reader/audience with several examples of retrotopia which prevent the characters from adapting to the new conditions of life. To this end, this chapter will first focus on Bauman's *Retrotopia*, his last book published after his death, and it will then try to reveal how Bond's ideas and critique of the current state of utopianism in the aftermath of the failures of solid modern and liquid modern consumerist utopianisms in *Great Peace* are in the same line with Bauman's assessment of contemporary utopianisms and their future prospects.

3.1. RETROTOPIA AS A POST-UTOPIAN CONCEPT

According to Thomas Sliwowski and Pawel Koscielny, PhD research scholars at the University of California, Rev Istvan is the one who introduced the term "retrotopia" for the first time in his 1998 essay on the intellectual history of political organisation between the Western European New Left and Eastern European dissident intellectuals. Retrotopia, in Istvan's view, refers to the growing influence of anti-modern critiques of capitalist society which first appeared, particularly among the New Left, in the 1960s and at approximately the same time, acquired a solid foundation in the writings of contemporary Eastern European leftist dissidents and revisionists. During the Cold War of the 1970s, when New Left thinkers in the West and revisionist social theorists in the East looked to traditional indigenous societies and peasant communities, respectively, as models for political organisation, these anti-modern critiques had a cultural impact that caused the concept of techno-utopian futurity to collapse. In addition, as Michael Hviid Jacobsen suggests, Bauman was not the first to refer to the term retrotopia; John M. Green released a futuristic book with the same name in December 2016. However, Bauman's use of the term was fundamentally sociological and intended to critique what he viewed as a potentially reprehensible and hazardous phenomenon.

Bauman's posthumously released book *Retrotopia* opens with a reference to the German critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin's remark on Paul Klee's 1920 painting, *Angelus Novus*⁹ (*Retrotopia* 1-2). In the ninth thesis of his 1940 essay "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Benjamin proposes a comparison between the figure in the picture and the Angel of History. Despite having his back turned, he claimed that the angel was about to move forward. According to Benjamin, the angel was contemplating the past, which it perceived as "one single catastrophe" that kept building up debris, and hurling it in front of its feet. Benjamin describes the angel's position through the following lines: "My wing is ready for flight / I would like to turn back / If I stayed timeless time / I would have little luck" (n.p.). For Bauman, the Angel of History has recently been perceived as one who fearfully gazes towards the future, rather than the past. The future is bleak. It gives a rising level of insecurity and is confronted with a mounting quantity of potential hazards. In contrast, the past, which has been subject to mythologisation, is perceived as a secure and peaceful shelter. The sociologist employed the term 'retrotopia' in his work to characterise the shift marked by the reverse movement of the Angel of History at this juncture. His reference to Benjamin's analogy between the Angel of History and the painting is of great significance as it forms the basis for Bauman's depiction of the perspective adopted by individuals living in a post-utopian era characterised by liquid modernity. The depiction of the Angel of History in the painting symbolises the transitional or in-between state of the individual in this era. This period is characterised by the absence of any promising visions about the future or the establishment of an individual paradise at present through instant gratification via consumerism. According to Jacobsen, *Retrotopia* was written during a time of the prevalent "politics of nostalgia" sentiment, which has been linked to "various political events such as the Brexit campaign in the UK, the presidency of Donald Trump in the US, the rise of right-wing nationalist governments in eastern Europe, and the widespread EU-scepticism in western and southern Europe" ("Retrotopia Rising" 87). Bauman makes it clear that, under these circumstances, that is,

⁹ For Paul Klee's painting, see Appendix I.

[a]fter the prospects of human happiness – tied since More to a topos (a fixed place, a polis, a city, a sovereign state – each under a wise and benevolent ruler) – have been unfixed, untied from any particular topos and individualized, privatized and personalized . . . it is their turn now to be negated by what they valiantly and all but successfully attempted to negate. From that double negation of More-style utopia – its rejection succeeded by resurrection – ‘retrotopias’ are currently emerging: visions located in the lost/stolen/abandoned but undead past, instead of being tied to the not-yet-unborn and so inexistent future, as was their twice-removed forebear (*Retrotopia* 7).

The above-given definition of the phenomenon that has been observed in recent years can be characterised as a peculiar reversal of utopian ideals, which Bauman called a “U-turn of utopia” (*Retrotopia* 6). In this respect, retrotopia may be regarded as a transformation “from investing public hopes of improvement in the uncertain and ever-too-obviously un-trustworthy future, to re-reinvesting them in the vaguely remembered past, valued for its assumed stability and so trustworthiness” (*Retrotopia* 6). In contrast to the modern and solid designs, forward-thinking plans, and optimistic aspirations for a more prosperous future, or the market-oriented and liquid pursuit of an idealised state of happiness and contentment, as discussed in the previous chapters, retrotopia adopts a retrospective approach by looking to the past, that is to say, to a bygone era that was once perceived as ideal because of the fact that there was a lack of concern regarding the potential to shape the future and the exploration of new pathways. As Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) suggests, the concept of progress can be understood as the manifestation of utopian ideals (247). However, for Bauman, the world seems to be devoid of any discernible features or characteristics. The period of consumerism is stuck in a dense layer of fog. At the very moment when it is incumbent upon people to undertake the momentous responsibility of imbuing this affluent, secure, and salubrious existence with significance, they have in fact killed the concept of utopia. During periods of uncertainty and hopelessness like this, individuals tend to seek comfort in the familiarity, stability, and predictability that they associate with a perceived historical era, although it may be an idealised or imagined one. For Bauman, this tendency leads to “retrotopia,” which “shares with Thomas More’s legacy its fixity on a territorially sovereign topos: a firm ground thought to provide, and hopefully guarantee, an acceptable modicum of stability and therefore a satisfactory degree of self-assurance” (*Retrotopia* 8). The sociologist has argued that the current phase of modernity is experiencing a profound crisis. The current crisis, he referred to as an “interregnum,”

elicits sentiments of nostalgia for a period prior to the beginning of darkness and seemingly insoluble challenges. Bauman's concern over the resurgence of nostalgia in liquid-modern society is evident especially in one of his recent testimonies published in *Retrotopia*. In this work, he highlights the prevalence of retrotopian feelings and their inclination towards preventing the establishment and development of new forms of life through a turning-back-to-past mentality. To put it briefly, retrotopia emerges from "the hope of reconciling security with freedom" (8), after these two processes; first, modern, solid designs about following progress and a better future; and second, the commodification of the concept of progress and the desire for personal advancement by those in authority and adoption of this commodification by the authorities' subjects as a means of emancipation as a way to escape the strict requirements of obedience and regulation, albeit at the expense of public amenities and governmental safeguarding.

3.1.1. Forms of Retrotopia

Zygmunt Bauman, in *Retrotopia*, argues that there is a prevalence of contemporary retrotopian sentiments which are expressed in diverse forms and disguises. Although these sentiments may not share identical objectives, they exhibit a comparable mindset. The sociologist employed the terms "back to" and "retrotopia" to depict the emergence of these sentiments, which are characterised by a desire to regress to a previous era rather than progress towards the future. In addition, the book provides a detailed account of the present situation, organised into chapters titled "Back to Hobbes," "Back to Tribes," "Back to Inequality," and "Back to the Womb," respectively. These sections highlight various political, social, economic, and moral factors that have contributed to the emergence of different types of retrotopia. The sociologist emphasises particularly the types of retrotopia listed in the following quotation:

Post-More, 500-years-long history of modern utopia, with an exercise in unravelling, portraying and putting on record some of the most remarkable 'back to future' tendencies inside the emergent 'retrotopian' phase in utopia's history – in particular, rehabilitation of the tribal model of community, return to the concept of a primordial/pristine self predetermined by non-cultural and culture-immune factors, and all in all retreat from the presently held (prevalent in both social

science and popular opinions) view of the essential, presumably non-negotiable and *sine qua non* features of the ‘civilised order.’ (*Retrotopia* 9)

For Bauman, in this phase of utopian history, there have been three tendencies; namely, a resurgence of interest in the tribal form of community, a re-emergence of the idea of an original or unspoiled self that is influenced by non-cultural and culture-resistant factors, and a general withdrawal from the dominant perspective on the fundamental and seemingly immutable characteristics of the civilised society. However, the sociologist argues that these three tendencies do not imply a simple reversion to a previously adopted way of living; these are rather deliberate efforts “to iterate the *status quo ante*, whether real or perceived, rather than simply reiterating it” (8). For this reason, he states that the phrase “return to” in nostalgic dreams does not necessarily refer to the past as it actually occurred but as it was imagined or idealised (9).

3.1.1.1. Back to *Leviathan*

To start with the form of retrotopia classified under the section entitled “Back to Hobbes,” it is based on a notable piece of political theory Thomas Hobbes introduced in *Leviathan* in 1651. Hobbes’ work is widely recognised as a seminal contribution to the field, providing a thorough examination of the fundamental aspects of human nature, the theory of social contract, and the essential components of a fair and enduring social order (Newey 7). The treatise *Leviathan* by Hobbes expounds his viewpoint regarding the inherent characteristics of human beings and the indispensability of a robust, centralised governance system to uphold societal harmony. The author posits that the human species is fundamentally motivated by self-interest and a compulsion for self-preservation. In the absence of a regulatory body to uphold laws and ensure stability, the social order would be susceptible to turmoil and discord. Hobbes suggests the formation of a supreme governing authority, referred to as the *Leviathan*, which would wield unrestricted power and uphold order via the social contract (113). According to Bauman,

[t]he right to draw (and redraw at will, if needed) the line between legitimate and illegitimate, permitted and prohibited, legal and criminal, tolerated and intolerable

coercion is the principal stake in power struggles. Possession of such a right is, after all, the defining attribute of power – while the capability of using that right and rendering its use binding for others is the defining trait of domain. Establishing and executing that right was viewed since *Leviathan* as the domain of politics – a prerogative of, and a task to be accomplished by, the *government* standing for the *political body*. (*Retrotopia* 12)

For the sociologist, the primary objective in power struggles is the ability to delineate the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable, authorised and unauthorised, lawful and unlawful, and permissible and impermissible forms of coercion, with the liberty to modify it as necessary. The ownership of a right is widely regarded as the fundamental attribute of power, while the capacity to enforce this right and render it obligatory for others is the defining hallmark of the domain. The act of establishing and implementing this entitlement has been regarded as the purview of politics since the time of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. This responsibility is considered the exclusive right and duty of the government representing the political entity.

The state holds the utmost responsibility of mitigating the inherent cruelty and violence of individuals by exercising this authority to distinguish between lawful and unlawful actions. As also stated by Bauman,

Hobbes' *Leviathan* – until so long ago believed to have duly acquitted itself of its postulated mission of suppressing the inborn cruelty of humans, so making human life among humans liveable, not 'nasty, brutish and short' as it would otherwise have been – is less and less trusted to do its job properly, or indeed to be capable of having its job properly done. Human endemic aggressiveness, resulting time and again in a propensity for violence, appears to have been anything but mitigated, let alone extinguished; it is very much alive and always ready to be kicking at a moment's notice – or indeed without notice. (*Retrotopia* 11)

As such, ability of the nation state to infuse a sense of confidence in its populace regarding the future, let alone inspire their idealistic aspirations, has disappeared. Instead, as suggested by Sliwowski and Koscielny, a multitude of big and small "gravely malfunctioning *Leviathans*" try to maintain hopelessly porous borders, defend against senseless "auto-telic violence," and keep track of populations whose lives are more and more "thrown into a competitive frenzy by corporate managerial practices,

quantitative performance metrics, and deregulated labour markets” (7). In Bauman’s mind,

[o]ur world – the world of weakening human bonds, of deregulation and atomization of politically constructed structures, or divorce between politics and power – is again a theatre of war . . . Conducted, day in, day out, either individually or (occasionally) in ad hoc or more durable alliances. . . By the united forces of market, teachers in our schools, managers in our workplaces – though now stripped of the state-issued uniforms and re-named as ‘competing individuals’. (*Retrotopia* 23)

As is understood, despite the nation-state’s lack of ability to give confidence to its people, humanity may be regarded as “on the road leading back to, Hobbes’ world – this time we are finding ourselves in the condition of war of all against all” not due to the absence of a powerful governing entity, but due to the concurrent presence of “numerous, all-too-numerous, big, small and tiny *Leviathans* gravely malfunctioning” (*Retrotopia* 25). For Bauman, for instance, the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008 marked the beginning of a period characterised by concerns about the future. The Global Financial Crisis highlighted the concerns about globalisation, leading to a new historical challenge for their subjects. Following this crisis, the sociologist says,

[s]ome have used disenchanting experiences with globalization as an excuse for a return to protectionism and the supposedly halcyon days of strong national borders. Others, wistfully recalling a nation-state that never really existed, cling to national sovereignty as a reason to refuse further European integration. Both groups question the foundations of the European project. But their memory fails them, and their yearnings mislead them. (*Retrotopia* 8)

As is seen, due to the lack of a *Leviathan*, that is to say, a state functioning to protect its people from others’ violence in a globalised liquid world without boundaries, humanity faces a dilemma wherein it must acquire an international consciousness that aligns with its global state. Otherwise, this would be a regression into a Hobbesian state model which has led to different forms of violence around the world, such as the World Wars and the Holocaust.

3.1.1.2. Back to Heritage

For Zygmunt Bauman, the second form of retrotopia is characterised by a tendency to turn back to collective memory. The phrase “turning back to tribes” refers to the efforts made by political leaders to mobilise social groups around customary values, familial ties, shared recollections, and deceased ancestors to prevent forgetting the components of collective memory (Sliwowski and Koscielny 8). The phenomenon is defined as a strong opposition to capitalism, a focus on moral values, and a tendency towards xenophobic attitudes. It also exhibits a notable preoccupation with the topic of national identity, emphasising the dichotomy between the authentic populace and those outside of it (Bauman, *Retrotopia* 28). The rationale behind this phenomenon is to console people with tradition in the absence of hopes about progress and the future. As Bauman puts forward, “once stripped of power to shape the future, politics tends to be transferred to the space of collective memory – a space immensely more amenable to manipulation and management, and for that reason promising a chance of blissful omnipotence long (and perhaps irretrievably) lost in the present and in the times yet to come” (*Retrotopia* 35).

According to Bauman, the utilisation of specific terminologies aimed at sustaining heritage over time is often characterised by severe and uncompromising language. This leads to situations where distinct groups fail to listen to opposing viewpoints and are unable to objectively evaluate information that contradicts their emotional beliefs (*Retrotopia* 27). To put it more clearly, Bauman emphasises the negative sides of this form of retrotopia through examples of Brexit and the hard-line immigration policies of Trump in the USA, stating that “[o]nce the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has been performed according to such rules, the purpose of any encounter between the antagonists is no longer its mitigation, but a gaining / creating of yet more proof that mitigation is contrary to reason and out of the question” (28). In terms of Brexit, the disjunction represented by the decree of the UK to leave the European Union, for Bauman, implies promoting “a ‘Small Island’ against a ‘European’ identity, a significant indication of identity issues of tribalism” (Clegg 7). Additionally, in more

general terms, for Bauman, in a globalised liquid world in which warfare is based on remote mass destruction weapons, turning back to territorial small “tribes” or “nations” would end in failure. As he points out,

[t]hat grim and cruel maxim – ‘sacrificing my life for the for the benefit of the group’ – has, in turn, been all but withdrawn, or died down, once it had become redundant – even bothersome and counter-productive – as a result of (and in close synchronization with) the replacement of a warfare relying on mass conscription and mass levy by technologically sophisticated operations of small professional armies, as well as the emancipation of economic exploitation from its past close links with territorial conquest. (Bauman, *Retrotopia* 49-50)

In summary, this form of retrotopia is distinguished by a proclivity to revert to communal memory and the attempts political leaders make to galvanise societal factions around traditional principles, familial bonds, shared reminiscences, and deceased forebears. However, this approach would not serve as a solution to individuals’ yearning to achieve a feeling of steadiness and assurance furnished by a tribal or national identity due to contemporary advancements in technology and globalisation necessitating a worldwide and adaptable stance towards warfare and territoriality.

3.1.1.3. Back to Injustice

For Bauman, in the past, the prevailing condition in the Western world was the pervasive occurrence of inequality under the then present circumstances. The distribution of opportunities in various aspects of life such as housing, education, employment, health, marriage, dietary habits, and mortality was primarily determined by the random chance of one’s birthplace. The period immediately following World War II witnessed a certain degree of uniformity in terms of socioeconomic conditions in countries such as the US, the UK, and France (Clegg 8). However, Bauman thinks that this period was an anomaly in historical terms. Between the post-World War II era and 1980, several measures impeded the trend towards heightened levels of inequality (9). These measures encompassed various strategies, such as the gradual imposition of taxes on capital income and wealth, alongside the eradication of capital due to war. Additionally, innovative thinking and economic expansion contributed to the reduction of wealth concentration by increasing the affluence of individuals who were previously

devoid of wealth. The main reason for this was the one-sided termination of reciprocal responsibilities between the labour and capital entities by the latter, within the framework of globalisation and the deregulation of state operations leading to their liberalisation, which were designed to counteract economic cycles, strengthen the societal wage, enhance the negotiating power of labour in matters pertaining to compensation and working conditions, and other similar measures. Bauman holds that this form of retrotopia which is characterised by a focus on the basic income and a return to the welfare state has shifted its focus from redistributing wealth to branding those who receive welfare as socially stigmatised. This phenomenon absolves the public conscience of any responsibility for perpetuating and worsening social inequality, which should instead serve as a catalyst for action. The term “being on welfare” is often interpreted as “being a freeloader” or “receiving something without earning it” and this perception is perpetuated by a distorted and deteriorated welfare-state mentality, which transforms it into a dishonourable label (Bauman, *Retrotopia* 67). This resulted in both a general reduction of civil liberties in favour of consumer choices and again an unfair distribution of income, as Bauman exemplifies through the following words: “The top 10 per cent of Americans own 86 per cent of American wealth, leaving to the other 90 per cent of the population 14 per cent of the national wealth to share. On the global dimension ... the bottom half of humanity (3.5 billion) has about 1 per cent of the world’s total wealth - just as much as the 85 richest persons on earth” (*Retrotopia* 55). As expected, considering these wealth distributions, the most profitable chances lie in serving the upper levels of the pyramid rather than its lower levels. A better alternative for this, according to Bauman, is to concentrate on Universal Basic Income (UBI). A non-discriminatory universal basic income has several advantages, including the liberation of impoverished individuals from welfare tricks, enabling them to obtain suitable employment and training. Additionally, the implementation of such a system eliminates the need for a surveillance state to monitor the legitimacy of beneficiaries, thereby reducing associated costs (*Retrotopia* 67). To summarise, this general information about the section titled “Back to Inequality” could be distilled into the fact that Bauman, as he has been in the previous section, is in favour of finding a solution to financial inequality by means of adopting a more global approach to this issue rather than turning back to old systems such as welfare state.

3.1.1.4. Back to the Womb

Like the forms of retrotopia which are called “back to tribes” and “back to Hobbes,” the rationale behind this form of retrotopia is rooted in the anxiety about future, which is compounded by the unpredictability and volatility of the current circumstances. Since the womb is a place where the baby is alone and secure, as well as uninterrupted by competitors, this form of retrotopia appeals to those who are worn out by the Hobbesian paradigm of intense competition and those who long for connection, seeking it instead in loneliness; to put it in a more contemporary context, in a digital world, gated communities or political neo-tribes (Sliwowski and Koscielny 8). The main reason for this, according to Bauman, is the fact that the concept of hope has recently been privatised around the world, particularly in the UK and the USA in a liquid modern consumerist world, and this leads to a transfer of ambitions and obligations from the broader community to personal spheres. As the sociologist underlines, “[a]t one time, workers understood that they could improve their conditions by collectively asserting themselves; now workers understand that their best option is to protect themselves by themselves. Among self-seekers, experiences of class and solidarity are impossible and irrelevant” (Bauman, *Retrotopia* 74). However, this form of retrotopia is problematic in its very essence because the presence of other individuals is a formidable and persistent aspect of human existence that distinguishes it from other forms of life. The human species is not biologically or conceptually designed to live in isolation, and “there are no other human beings inside the nirvana of the womb (and for that reason no humans at all; to say ‘how wonderful (warm, cosy, tranquil) it feels to be here, inside,’ a fully-fledged human is needed – a being whose training and becoming begins only once the womb has already been left behind)” (Bauman, *Retrotopia* 92).

In the light of the information given up to this point about Bauman’s ideas and concerns about the forms of retrotopia, it is possible to state they have recently become popular in various parts of the world due to a loss of hope about both the future as in solid modern utopianism and the present as in liquid consumerist utopianism. It would also not be wrong to say that the sociologist highlights that resolving modern-day problems

requires a forward-looking approach, rather than relying solely on past experiences as addressing global challenges requires a wider outlook that goes beyond local solutions. For him, retrotopia is almost always regressive since it is part-oriented. In this respect, the third play of Bond's trilogy, *Great Peace*, presents a valuable case study for examining Bauman's observations on the most recent form of utopianism known as retrotopia. Although it does not encompass all forms of retrotopia mentioned by Bauman, the play serves as a critique of retrotopia as it portrays the characters regressing due to nostalgia and a desire to turn back to their past.

3.2. CRITICISM OF RETROTOPIA IN *GREAT PEACE*

Edward Bond's *Great Peace* consists of two distinct parts. The initial part, comprised of eight scenes, includes an alternate rendition of the Palermo Improvisation in the first play of the trilogy, wherein, this time, Soldier, who is called Son in this play, is ordered to eliminate a child under the age of five residing in his vicinity due to the scarcity of sources. The second part includes First Woman, who is now called Woman 1 and who has survived the tin can riots of the second play, and a group of survivors, trying to establish a new community from the outset; as well as Woman, whose infant has been killed by her son after the nuclear bombing, wandering in the wilderness in between madness and sanity due to her loss. As Bond suggests in his "Commentary on *The War Plays*,"

[w]ith the exception of the First Woman in the second play (who also appears in a scene of the third play) none of the characters in any one play knows what happens in the other plays. . . The events of the first seven or eight scenes of the third play occur before the events of the second play. These scenes make up a fourth play, a political-military-family drama. In rehearsals it came to be called *the Greek play*. It could be played in its position in the text or separately on its own. Or it could be played after the first play. It could then be followed by the second play and the rest of the third play. (Bond, *Plays*:6 276)

For the theatre critic Jenny Spencer, this initial part was called the "Greek play" because "the single-focus action is set out with Aristotelian clarity" (*Dramatic Strategies* 236). The play subsequently reverts to the confrontation of the Palermo Improvisation mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation. Similar to the previous scene in the

first play of the trilogy, Soldier kills a child who is not the intended target. The scenes in this first part with a naturalistic style not only contribute to a decision-making process that occurs in “real time,” which is both distressing and intentionally prolonged for both the reader/audience and the character (Spencer, *Dramatic Strategies* 237), but also establish a cause-effect relationship with the events in the second part, reminding the reader/audience of the fact that the trauma, the sense of uncertainty and insecurity, and the sense of in-betweenness the characters experience in the second part are direct consequences of solid modern and liquid consumerist utopian ideals which they have embraced. Considering both the plot and the dramaturgy of *Great Peace*, which is the longest of the plays constituting Bond’s trilogy, it is possible to say that Bond’s critique of postmodern utopianism in the third and concluding part of his trilogy develops in the same line with Bauman’s critique of being stuck in various forms of retrotopia, which may be regarded as the last and most recent stage of utopianism, for several reasons. To this end, this part of the dissertation will start with an analysis of the part called the “Greek Play,” which sets the stage for a cause-and-effect relationship, and it will then continue with an in-depth analysis of the second part, where a critique of the two types of retrotopia, that is, desires to turn “back to the womb” and to turn “back to *Leviathan*” as defined by Bauman, is evident.

As reflected in the introductory section of this dissertation, Bond is a dramatist who posits that modern drama ought to engage with the future, while simultaneously drawing from a diverse range of historical and contemporary dramatic forms, in order to provoke critical reflection on the central themes at hand (Bond, *Chair* 4) The playwright expresses his perspective on the past and history, both in terms of his theatrical works and real life, also in his “Commentary on *The War Plays*”:

The War Plays make up a haphazard history of theatre. When I could I used dramatic means from the past, the rest I had to invent. Perhaps that is the proper use of postmodernism? . . . Postmodernism could take away the sacredness of the past and make history useful to us, so that it ceases to be our torment. It could release the dead from their prisons, free us from ghosts and at last let us talk to machines as equals. The danger is that capitalism is so powerful it can turn even our masters, the machines, into our slaves – and then we have no future: we become the dead who trade in coffins. (Bond, *Plays*:6 275)

Based on the playwright's words, it would be convenient to say that the dramatic form Bond used in his trilogy – which may be called eclectic on the grounds that the playwright blends various forms of theatre such as agitprop and Brechtian and naturalistic-style scenes – is also an illustration of his attitude towards history in the postmodern age. For Bond, attributing sacredness or extreme commitment to the past and history is a torment since this prevents contemporary man from moving forward. In his view, it is essential to utilise the past and history effectively by drawing lessons from it, while avoiding the pitfall of regarding it as sacred and something beyond scrutiny. Retrospection, critical inquiry, and charting an original course of action represent the most viable means of ensuring the survival of the modern individual. In the event that a community is unable to abandon traditional methods of survival, its prospects for the future are bleak, and its members risk becoming akin to the dead “who trade in coffins.” This phrase, which is used above, refers to individuals who persist in adopting outdated approaches that are inappropriate for contemporary challenges. The dramatic style Bond utilises in *The War Plays* is indicative of his approach to the past and history in drama. In *Great Peace*, the reflection of this approach is not limited to his dramatic style. Bond's ideas about the function of the past in terms of life conditions and survival are centred around a critique of the two forms of retrotopia explained by Bauman, that is, back to Hobbes and back to the womb.

To begin with the first eight scenes of the play, it may be said that they introduce the major theatrical event representing the paradox between sustenance and the precedence of the natural mother and son relationship and losing this attachment and humanity in an apocalyptic environment. Continuing from where *Red, Black and Ignorant* has ended, the first scene involves a military son and his surviving mother following a nuclear bombardment. The Colonel initiates the discussion by outlining the scarcity of sources, the occurrence of famine among the non-military populace, the implementation of rationing, the establishment of a Civil Defence recovery initiative, and the imposition of martial law. The emergency circumstance prompts an inviolable order to return to the “place of civilian domicile and terminate a child: as young as feasible and not exceeding five years” (Bond, *Plays*:6 94). Subsequently, the play reverts to the paradox of the

Palermo Improvisation. The realistic approach adopted here, which is observed in scenes staged as occurring in actual time, serves to protract Son's decision-making process for both the reader/audience and the character. This protraction enables the reader/audience to see both the characters' psychological responses to the inhuman act and the gradual distortion of the natural mother-son relationship throughout the play. Son, taking Mrs. Symmons's baby with the intention of killing it, cannot do it, and he is even attacked by other mothers on the street. His conflict between obeying orders and remaining a merciful human being ends in his decision to kill his own brother. In the eighth scene, Son's ironic refusal to comply with a minor request, namely picking up an empty cigarette packet, reflects the psychological distress he experiences subsequent to his fratricide. The reader/audience is left with such questions as "Should we interpret such resistance as a subversive act, suicide, proof of remorse, or simply as an indication of insanity?" Woman in this play replicates the conduct of Monster's wife in the first play through her reactions to Son's obligation to kill a child in the neighbourhood. Mrs. Symmons's child, who is their neighbour, resembles Woman's child in terms of gender and age. In this part, Woman's tangible nurturing behaviours associated with maternal care, such as procuring cigarettes for her son saying, "[f]ags – you must be dyin for a smoke / Need anything else from the shop?" (Bond, *Plays:6* 102) and her intention to do laundry for him reflected in her words "[m]y son's 'ome / Made me a present of 'is dirty washin" (100), are juxtaposed with her endeavours to kill Mrs. Symmons's child. Woman's attitude towards Son appears to change as soon as Son explains his intention in visiting her. Having heard the reason for her son's visit and as a response to his inability to kill Mrs. Symmons's child, Woman expresses her wish for him to adopt the behaviour of Pemberton, a non-human comrade who does not hesitate to kill someone, during a state of increased anxiety. For her, someone who has parental devotion would carry out the task in question without releasing it to their parents. She says,

I looked after you all these years an when the time comes I needed t' rely on you: I
 stopped yer
 Now your mate's out spendin 'is wages
 If only 'e'd bin my son!
 'E wouldn't 've listen t' me: told me t' get off!
 'E wouldn't 've dared cross my door till it was dead
 Waited outside 'er 'ouse an caught 'er when she left for work – yes
 Not bring 'is problems 'ome crying at 'is mother's apron strings
 Wouldn't even told me, god bless 'im (Bond, *Plays:6* 115).

As the theatre critic Janelle G. Reinelt argues, the concept of natural motherhood is closely linked to safeguarding the child, and it generally involves a tendency to ignore reality (69). As soon as Woman learns that there is a possibility that her child would be killed, she starts to make plans to kill Mrs. Symmons's child. The paradox represented in these scenes is the mother's intention and efforts to kill an innocent baby to protect her own. This clearly is an emphasis on the fact that contemporary cultural norms pertaining to social roles have the potential to disrupt the relationship between the parent and the child by generating a division between an idealised realm of altruistic nurturing and benevolence, and a practical world governed by anxiety about scarcity, self-centeredness, and manipulation. After acquiring these practices, they shape our reactions and responses towards each other throughout our lives.

As to the critique of various forms of retrotopia in the play, it would not be wrong to consider the second section to be the main part on which an argument on the discussion of the critique of retrotopia could centre. Throughout this part, the characters are depicted as stuck in a situation Bauman called "interregnum". This part is set in the aftermath of a nuclear bombardment, and all events take place in the wilderness representing the sense of being lost, scarcity, and the loneliness of the characters. Bond, in his "Commentary on The War Plays," clarifies that "*The Tin Can People* is about our affluence, *Great Peace* is about our destitution" (Bond, *Plays:6* 280). The characters' solid modern lives depicted in *Red, Black and Ignorant* and their liquid consumerist lives portrayed in *The Tin Can People* have resulted in catastrophe and violence. They have neither solid mechanisms of a nation-state that will form the basis of their actions, nor do they have affluence or any hopes about their future. Bond states that in the second part which follows the Greek play,

the dramatic form changes again. . . The people in *Great Peace* have no guide. They live in hell and you do not have a guide to your own house. No existing philosophy can guide them. No one has gone before and returned to tell them to turn back. A sleep-walker holds out his hand like a child that is led but no one leads him. It is the same with the people of *Great Peace*. It is as if they had internalized their landscape and become the stories that wander over it. But that is how all of us live in a nuclear age, even before the bombs are dropped. Inside our head we browse through the maps of ruins. (Bond, *Plays:6* 281)

For Bond, the dramatic form changes because the characters do not conform to the archetypal roles of the protagonists and the chorus. In contrast to the earlier plays of the trilogy, the chorus in this particular part is contained within the characters themselves. Their personal experience and inclination towards maintaining a state of mental stability enable them to communicate in an objective manner and to acquire the skill of doing so. This change is a result of the characters' imperative to address their paradox and attain self-realisation. The characters are in a sort of in-between situation, and since they do not know what to do, they persist in repeating their previous routines to reach the sense of security and stability they need. They are now in the middle of nowhere, unable to start anew and establish a new order. Nor are they capable of returning to their former modes of existence.

Throughout the second part, covering the section between the ninth and the twentieth scenes, it is possible to see a critique of the two types of retrotopia; the first of which is the critique of a desire to turn "back to *Leviathan*" and the second of which is the desire to turn "back to the Womb," as classified by Bauman. Bond deepens his critique by blending different levels of reality within the context of the development of each character throughout this part. It would also be feasible to claim that the major and most sensible criticism of retrotopia in the play revolves around Woman who exhibits a desire to turn back to her past and for this reason cannot go on with her life. Following the nuclear catastrophe, Woman is depicted as wandering in the wilderness nurturing a bundle of rags believing that it is her own dead child. The bundle motif and Woman's relationship with the bundle present different levels of reality that both elicit a strong emotional response from the reader/audience and encourage it to critically examine the underlying motivations behind her persistent yearning to return to the period when her child was still alive. The bundle motif and Woman's attitude towards it serve to puzzle the reader/audience throughout the play, leading it to ask questions such as "Is it a real baby or not?" and "Is Woman really alive or a ghost wandering in the wilderness?" The problem with Woman's state of mind is first revealed in the tenth scene after she encounters another woman called Woman 1. Based on what Woman 1 tells, it is understood that she is the First Woman in the *Tin Can People* and that the tin can

society could not survive or establish a new order. Woman 1 asks Woman for help to give birth to her baby. At first, the two women seem to get along well. Woman introduces the bundle of rags to Woman 1 as her own baby, leading to the following dialogue:

WOMAN 1: That came out of you?
 WOMAN. O yes
 It's a good child – not always cryin
 Tries to comfort me
 Its older than its years
 Uh – if yours is as good you'll be lucky
 Some children cry
 Mine knows Ive 'ad a lot t' bear – it doesn't burden me
 WOMAN 1 (stares at the bundle). Is that inside me? (Bond, *Plays:6* 137)

However, their seeming cooperation does not last long. In the next scene, it is understood that Woman 1 has died while giving birth to her baby. Woman abandons the newborn baby all alone in the wilderness claiming the belongings of Woman 1 as her own. Before she leaves the baby, she draws a picture on the ground which reveals her oscillation between reason and insanity. She describes what she draws through the following words: “There's a 'ouse – with two doors – an' a pond – a tree – these dots are the apples – a sun with a cloud – a car – an a boat on the lake – all ready for when you're big – an a matchstick lady in an apron t' feed you an teach yer lessons” (Bond, *Plays:6* 144). As is seen, she draws a perfect future for the baby, a positive scene of a typical middle-class house in her past life. Believing that she leaves a real future for the baby, she consoles herself. In this scene, she again sacrifices another baby for her own, but this time her decision is based on insanity rather than reason. In Bond's view, “[fr]om her first step in the wilderness the Woman's madness is a journey to sanity. When she abandons the baby we cannot blame her, because we drove her mad” (Bond, *Plays:6* 285). Therefore, in these two scenes, the concept of the natural mother-child relationship is presented through the depiction of Woman nurturing a bundle of rags. The scenario in which a woman could plausibly confuse a bundle of rags for an actual child is both shocking and reminiscent of Woman's wish to sacrifice her neighbour's baby to protect her own.

A similar communication and a play on the levels of reality take place between Mother and Woman in scene fourteen. Mother, in the scene, questions the reality of Woman's baby:

MOTHER. My dear you've 'ad your baby since the war?
 WOMAN. Yes
 MOTHER. Why 'asm it grown?
 WOMAN. It 'as its slow
 The bombs stunted it or I couldn't feed it properly
 I loved it but that wasn't enough (Bond, *Plays:6* 177).

Woman here relates the slowness of her baby's development to explosives which had a detrimental effect on its nourishment. Despite her affection for the baby, she acknowledges that her fondness alone was insufficient to ensure its optimal growth. Considering the distressing events in the preceding scenes and the current circumstances of Woman who has been wandering, the reality of Woman's mental instability could hardly be a matter of debate in the psychological sense. According to Spencer, "[w]ith her struggle to survive, practical knowledge, wry sense of humour and murderous relationship to her own children, the Woman of *Great Peace* offers an updated, more shocking, version of Brecht's *Mother Courage*, even to the pram-like cart she pushes through the scenes" (*Dramatic Strategies* 241). According to Bond, "[t]o protect her mind from the ravages of its madness the Woman needs the fake baby to be real. During the play, she recovers from madness, and then she needs it to be a sheet again" (Bond, *Plays:6* 283).

The way Woman interacts with the bundle – alternating between treating it as a real person and just a piece of cloth – shows how perplexed she is. For instance, the bundle unfastens by accident, causing her to drape it over her arms. Then, she proceeds to gather the sheet and reform it into a bundle again. In another instance, she flattens the bundle into a pillow so that Mother could rest her head on it; however, she keeps talking to the bundle to persuade it: "My precious – she's so ill – she must rest or she wont come through" (Bond, *Plays:6* 179). The bundle alternates between being animate and inanimate as Woman keeps transforming it. In another example, when Woman meets soldiers in their quarry, the soldiers give her food and question whether the baby is

really alive or not. Later they force her to unfold the bundle to see whether it is alive or not, leading to a violent scene in which the soldiers tear the bundle. Even after seeing that it is merely a sheet, Woman retrieves the sheet and continues to embrace it. This process of folding and unfolding the bundle, as well as Woman's various responses to it depending on the circumstance – either as a human being or as a piece of cloth – create a complicated network of opposing perspectives that prevents the reader/audience's efforts to comprehend the reality. Immediately after the scene when the reader/audience has already accepted the fact that Woman's child is not real, it is shocked again when the bundle of rags speaks, alternating to an animate being. Having been violated by the soldier, the bundle of rags speaks, and the fact that this speech provides Woman with the power she needs is reflected in her words: "T'night all the walkin and pain is worth it . . . Yes talk my precious an all the world can sleep" (Bond, *Plays:6* 168). In the following scene, it is understood that the bundle has not said a word since the last time it spoke. It must be equally shocking for the reader/audience when it sees Woman hitting the bundle out of her anger. Through Woman's interaction with the bundle and making the bundle speak at intervals, Bond plays with the levels of reality and seems to underline the difficulty in remaining mentally balanced and sane in a chaotic world.

Woman is so constrained by her past experiences that she has difficulty distinguishing between the multiple characters she meets and individuals from her pre-apocalyptic life. The following lines suggest that she believes that Mrs. Symmons and her daughter, who she has tried to kill in the past, are the characters referred to as Daughter and Mother in this scene: "Did we meet before the war? / I knew a woman like you – younger of course . . . Strange if we survived all these years – an the kid brought her mother to me – an left 'er in my care" (Bond, *Plays:6* 177). In addition, in the fifteenth scene, when Daughter and others try to convince Woman to join their new community, she explains the reason for her rejection to join them referring to the fact that Man is her son. She says, "I pretended about you an your mother' but that man *is* my son" (Bond, *Plays:6* 191). She confesses that she pretended to confuse them with Mrs. Symmons and her baby because she needed a purpose to go on, but now she is sure that Man is her son. She tells Daughter,

When you dumped your mother on me – its all right, Im glad you did – I started t'
 remember: yer see: you gave me a new life too
 I thought you an your mother'd been my neighbours when you were a kid
 Then I realised you 'adnt: I'd made a mistake . . .
 I pretended about you an your mother – but that man is my son. (Bond, *Plays:6*
 191)

Therefore, *Great Peace* does not include choruses in the traditional sense, as observed in the preceding plays of the trilogy. Instead, the characters in this play serve as choruses, offering commentary and information pertaining to their respective circumstances. The above extract illustrates Woman's use of people from her personal history as a means of attaining a purpose for her existence, exemplified by her attachment to a particular bundle of rags which she habitually carries. Bond himself comments on her confusion of Man with her dead son asserting that

[t]he stranger is too young to be her son. . . It is not important who she calls son, any man would do – but then, everyone must do. She does not return to the past to find she is innocent but to find what crimes her innocence drove her to . . . The paradox is political and makes the roles of mother, neighbour, stranger and citizen one, the house and the city one . . . Woman cannot be a good neighbour and a good mother. Like the audience with their bombs, she is monstrous. (Bond, *Plays:6* 285)

She constantly confuses the individuals she encounters with those from her past, who serve as her link to the environment and offer her a way to reconnect with humanity. Similar to the therapeutic effects of her relationship with the bundle of rags, these mistakes also help her as a form of therapy. According to Spencer, Woman's insistence on the fact that Man is her son also functions to “complicate the issues of truth and appearance; and double-casting the Son and the Man” and to distort “the certainty of viewers who witnessed the Son's death seven scenes earlier” (*Dramatic Strategies* 243).

The final scenes of the play, from the seventeenth to the twentieth scenes, may be regarded as crucial in terms Bond's critique of retrotopia through Woman's desire to live in the past because this part is where Woman and Man confront and Woman completes her progress from madness to sanity. After Daughter returns to the wilderness

where Mother and Woman stay in harmony together with a few people from the newly established community, she and others try to persuade Woman to stay with their settled community. However, Woman rejects the offer despite all their efforts. Man's insistence on and pleading for her attendance to them illustrate the shortcomings and vanity of sticking to the past. He says, "[t]hey blew the world up t' defend it / In the end democracy was just the way the military gave orders to civilians / We don't 'ave t' live like that – work for their owners – drop their bombs – eat their shit" (Bond, *Plays:6* 195). Man here offers Woman help and protection. He even offers a remote solitary and secluded life in a place where the settled community can observe her and help her whenever she needs. In the seventeenth scene, while Woman and Man discuss Woman's trauma, Man underlines the contradictions of the old system, that is to say a solid modern system which turns people into selfish and ignorant human beings. He tells her that

MAN. If the men 'oo dropped the bombs 'd bin like your son they'd've dropped
 them on their own kids
 You don't want sons like that
 Yer want your sons t'be ordinary killers so yer can be good mothers. (Bond,
Plays:6 203)

The major contradiction within solid modern systems or world orders is that it dictates that killing others' children is acceptable, but when it comes to our own children, the act suddenly becomes cruel and violent. The solid world order, in the name of protecting order, boundaries, and various values it deems sacred, turns people into monsters who do not hesitate to kill as long as those who are killed are not their own children. Man's above speech prompts the reader/audience to contemplate the central paradox of the solid modern order, that is, someone's, be it the state, an institution or an ideology, assuming the right to determine the legitimacy of the act of killing, emphasising that killing someone, no matter who he/she is, should be universally condemned; the intention behind and reasons for the act do not necessarily justify its moral rightness.

Despite all efforts, Woman rejects the offer. She prefers isolation to reintegration stating that "[t]his may be my last winter – I will choose 'ow I live it" (Bond, *Plays:6* 208). For

Spencer, she “exercises her fundamental freedom through resistance by opting for isolation instead of reintegration” (*Dramatic Strategies* 245). Woman’s rejection of reintegration coincides with her realisation that the bundle is not her child. She tells Man,

Yer see! . . .
 What I’ll do then is my affair
 Why d’yer still stare? – it’s a cloth
 (Opens the bundle) Empty
 Nothing in it
 I kept it in case it comes in ‘andy
 Rags are useful out ‘ere or at your place
 Empty nothing
 (She drops the cloth) . . .
 The bundle wasn’t my kid
 It was the other kid
 Or the kids in the ruins. (Bond, *Plays:6* 204; 208).

It may be said that Woman’s progression in the wilderness scenes, as she changes from a state of madness to rationality, is in parallel with her gradual realisation that the child has passed away and that the bundle of rags she clings to is nothing more than a piece of cloth. Her words in the last two lines indicate her guilty conscience, and they reflect her desire to turn back to the past and protect all the children who have died during and after the nuclear war. In the final scene, which includes no speeches, the depiction of Woman’s death may be regarded as the embodiment of her in-betweenness throughout the play. In this scene, she is portrayed as follows: “She stares at the blanket and gives it a short sharp jerk towards her. It grates on the ground. She turns back to face the way she’s going and walks a few steps. She lets go of the bundle. Without looking back, she clenches her fists and walks a few more stops. She stops. She drops dead” (Bond, *Plays:6* 209). Considering her last moves, it would not be wrong to say that she resembles the Angel of History painted by Paul Klee and mentioned by Bauman in his *Retrotopia*. One part of her wants to survive and go on, but the other part prevents her from moving. She takes a few steps, stops, takes a few more steps, and drops dead in the end; a scene symbolising her inability to leave the past behind and start a new life. Since she prefers a solitary life and loneliness as a safe haven to reintegration into a new

community, it is possible to suggest that the type of retrotopia Bond criticises through Woman's progress is what Bauman classifies under the heading of "Back to the Womb."

Another type of retrotopia which is criticised in *Great Peace* is the sense of nostalgia characterised by a desire to turn back to *Leviathan*, which Bauman classified under the heading "Back to Hobbes." This type of retrotopia is based on Hobbes's idea that the primary driving forces of the human species are self-interest and the need to survive. The social order would be vulnerable to upheaval and strife in the absence of a regulatory authority to uphold the law and maintain stability. For Hobbes, the government and its organs acting on behalf of this regulatory authority have the sole authority and responsibility for carrying out actions intended for stability. For Bauman, this type of retrotopia is a desire felt in the absence of stability and order in the liquid modern world to turn back to this old system which is characterised by a government or a state at the top and its solid mechanisms assuming the responsibility for maintaining stability. Considering the primary characteristics of this type of retrotopia, it is possible to assert that the soldiers and the depiction of their struggle to survive in the wilderness are central in terms of the criticism of the desire to live in this form of retrotopia. When Woman discovers the soldiers' camp, she sees that Pemberton, the commander – who may be regarded as Son's foil – and the soldiers under him have survived the social order that produced them. They now cannibalise human bonds and believe that they have died after witnessing the end of the world while they were killing civilians. In this scene, again, there is a blurring of reality in the sense that it is almost impossible to decide whether all the characters in the scene are dead, alive or ghosts. It is seen that they even lack the ability to distinguish between the living and the dead as reflected in the dialogue between Pemberton and Woman:

PEMBERTON. Its all right we don't kill anymore or break things
 We're dead
 You're safe with us
 WOMAN. Dead? 'E thinks 'e's dead- uh!
 SOLDIER 3. She don't understand
 PEMBERTON. Poor woman thinks she's alive
 (To WOMAN) You're dead
 WOMAN. Dead?

SOLDIER 1. That's why you don't feel 'ungry
 WOMAN. When did I die?
 PEMBERTON. I don't know
 WOMAN. Im not dead . . . When? . . . I don't remember dying. (Bond, *Plays:6*
 148)

Even if they believe that they are dead, the soldiers keep their old habits and obey their commander since they do not know what to do in this new situation, being now devoid of a state or government to serve. Pemberton in the same scene tries to prove that he is dead by challenging the validity of Woman's delusions, chief among which is the bundle she treats as a child. When Woman tells Pemberton that the dead do not eat, he says,

It's odd: a lot of time we still do what we used t'do
 That's why it aint easy t'know when you're dead. . .
 SOLDIER 4. Standing orders
 If we was deserters we'd need the discipline or we'd get in a state
 So we stuck t'orders (Bond, *Plays:6* 149; 150).

Therefore, one can assert that the soldiers, like Woman, are, in a sense, living in the past because they do not know what to do and how to behave in the absence of the type of order to which they were used. Their belief that they are dead may also be interpreted as a direct reflection of Bond's depiction of those who preferred to live in the past or regard the past as something sacred as those who "live in the coffins" which is given at the beginning of this analysis. The tension gradually rises until the events leading to the end of the scene, with the soldiers violating the bundle of rags, which Woman believes to be alive. Pemberton, after proving that Woman's baby is not alive, says, "Yer see! / The rag's not a kid: she was wrong! / She says we're not dead: she's wrong! . . . We're dead! All of us!" (Bond, *Plays:6* 162). In the end, Pemberton tries to kill Woman with tainted ammunition, and then he shoots his own tormented soldiers. When the soldiers' state is considered, one could suggest that they are living dead who are stuck in their past lives in a system which has produced their profession. Now, in the absence of solid modern world order, entitling them as a solid mechanism to maintain order, they are not able to adapt to the new circumstances in which they are expected to survive. The accuracy of their memory is not certain; the reader/audience does not know whether they tell the truth about the fact that they have seen the end of the world. It seems that they victimise themselves to escape from confronting their past crimes, denying that

they are alive and leading their lives in accordance with their past ways of life. The blurring of reality in the soldiers' story may be interpreted as a criticism of the type of approach to history as a way of denying responsibility for past immoral acts and trying to give an irrational series of events a meaning. Like *Woman*, the soldiers cannot adapt to this new post-apocalyptic world, and their story ends with their delirium and death. For this reason, it would not be wrong to suggest that they function as a criticism of the specific form of retrotopia characterised by a desire to live in a world controlled and ruled by *Leviathan*.

To sum up, as in the first two plays of *The War Plays*, optimism about utopianism is subverted in *Great Peace* through the dramatisation of the madness of life in the aftermath of a nuclear war and a portrayal of various strategies used to make sense of the world after this catastrophe. The play establishes an association between mortality and specific modes of existence, suggesting that individuals can forfeit their humanity and transform into subjects "living in coffins" through acts of inhumanity and their insistence to stay in the past. The characters are in such a terrible condition that they cannot even distinguish between reality and illusion. The population establishing the new settlement primarily consists of young individuals who were minors during the war, rather than mature adults. Their relative youthfulness in comparison to those who have experienced life to the fullest and are no longer present in the physical or metaphorical sense, appears to contribute to their optimism regarding the construction of a future. However, there are not any signs of or hints about these young individuals' future success; the reader/audience is not given the opportunity to learn whether they would adapt to this post-apocalyptic world or not. Nevertheless, it is not possible to claim that their success would be a solution for all even if they manage to establish a new, egalitarian, and peaceful society as soon as there are people who refuse to move on.

CONCLUSION

The concept of utopianism has been a prominent theme in literary history, providing a plethora of literary works with base material since its inception. However, an in-depth examination of its evolution reveals that these utopian expectations have given rise to numerous ambiguities and inquiries regarding the plausibility and the essence of such a vision in an ever-changing world. The utopian imagination has been gradually replaced by questions and worries about the future, particularly after World War I. Furthermore, the rapid advancement of technology gave rise to a pervasive anxiety regarding the deleterious tendencies of humanity, especially in the aftermath of World War II, when annihilation through nuclear armament appeared possible. This transition from utopian to dystopian thought gave rise to a significant corpus of literary works over time. Most scholarly research on dystopian literature primarily focuses on fictional works, while academic inquiries on dystopian visions in contemporary British drama, even though not all of them, are typically restricted to plays that explore the consequences of advanced science and technology. Nevertheless, the portrayal of dystopian societies in theatrical productions extends beyond those centred on scientific themes. In addition to contemplating the potentially disastrous implications of sophisticated technology and scientific advancements, the depiction of dystopia is often intertwined with political drama. The main objective of this dissertation was to reveal that Edward Bond's trilogy, *The War Plays*, which includes *Red Black and Ignorant*, *The Tin Can People*, and *Great Peace*, may be considered an example of contemporary British political drama, reflecting the historical transformation of utopianism and aiming at questioning the possibility of a utopia in the contemporary post-liquidised, vaporised world, based on Zygmunt Bauman's theory of liquid modernity and his concepts concerning the transformation of utopianism. This was attained through the analyses of the dystopian elements and varied dramatic methodologies utilised in the mentioned plays to illustrate that they reveal how utopianism operates in tandem with dominant ideologies, ultimately resulting in a dystopian conclusion.

Zygmunt Bauman categorises the historical development of utopianism into three distinct periods; namely, gamekeeping utopia, gardening utopia, and hunting utopia corresponding to premodern utopianism, solid modern utopianism, and liquid modern utopianism. Accordingly, premodern utopianism regarded the world as a wilderness and placed great emphasis on safeguarding the boundaries between wilderness and civilisation, as well as the divine hierarchy of the cosmos. This form of utopianism exhibited a tendency to preserve the prevailing status quo and refrained from attempting to enhance or modify the natural or divine order of phenomena. However, with the advent of modernity, utopianism began to be founded on the conviction that humanity possessed the capacity to influence both the current and forthcoming circumstances. Accordingly, with an end to make progress and influence the future, Bauman suggests, prisons, factories, and schools function as solid mechanisms that exerted strict supervision and control over the population, resulting in a constant emphasis on order and surveillance. In contrast to the fixed and concrete nature of solid modern utopianism, the concept of liquid modern or hunting utopianism placed less emphasis on achieving equilibrium within the framework of divine, natural, and man-made order. In contrast to the futuristic and enduring utopias of modernity, liquid modern utopias which are centred around hunting are characterised by their individualistic and short-term nature.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, entitled “Dystopia as Criticism of Solid Modern Utopianism in *Red, Black and Ignorant*,” the criticism of this form of utopianism’s constant emphasis on order, progress, and cleanliness due to its being sedentary or territorial and transfixed; and its dystopian results were examined with reference to Bauman’s definition of solid modern utopianism. From this analysis, it may be deduced that Bond’s *Red, Black and Ignorant* may be regarded as a reflection of the failure of solid modern utopianism in providing its subjects with a better or perfect society. The utopianism promoted by solid modern ideology in the play rather turns into a dehumanising dystopia. In the play, the characters’ ability to retain their identity and make appropriate decisions is undermined by a number of sovereign solid agencies working to maintain the power of the state through a variety of strategies especially in

the nine successive short scenes of the play, each of which portraying a different solid institution. The methods and strategies solid sovereign agencies use to uphold state power are criticised not only in the short scenes at the beginning but also in almost every scene of the play by emphasising these strategies, such as the discourse these agencies use to promote solid modern utopianism, the classification they use to keep each subject in the place that is designated for him/her, the education system's indoctrination of classification and hatred for the "other" at a very young age, and the Panoptical means of surveillance which are represented through indoor settings. In addition to the sequential episodic scenes used to highlight the state agencies striving to defend the sovereignty of the solid modern state, characterisation is essential in portraying the subjects' dehumanisation by the solid modern state. According to Bauman, who asserts that a modern solid state is characterised by being goal-oriented, the objective of this action is to kill an enemy, but with the explicit intention of achieving a superior and fundamentally different community. As a result, the subject is vulnerable to the goals of advancement in solid modern utopianism. Due to classifications like those between the governed and the ruler or between the obedient and the rebellious, he/she is unable to act in a way that reflects his/her personality. For this reason, they lack an individual identity. None of the characters differ from one another. They merely exist as figures in a certain social context. Instead of having names, they are called Woman, Son, Buyer, and Girl. The lack of names suggests that the characters lack identity and that they only matter as members of the community. Taking into consideration Bauman's description of solid modern utopianism and based on the analysis made in the first chapter, it may be concluded that Bond's dystopian world serves as a criticism of solid modern utopianism in that it highlights the potential extremes to which it can lead, especially in the light of Bauman's thorough analysis of the fundamental principles and the flaws of utopianism. Through Brechtian episodic scenes used throughout the play, Monster is portrayed as subjected to oppression, dehumanisation, and indoctrination in various settings and organisations. Furthermore, Bond illustrates all the options available to a person as a member of the system supported by solid modern utopianism by imagining the existence of Monster, who was denied the chance to live due to a nuclear explosion: either die or live a dehumanised life. It is also feasible to claim that this brand of utopianism is built on fixity to place

because there are no alternatives and the characters are trapped in the location chosen for them by the strong modern state, namely in institutions like schools and workplaces. If they stay within the restrictions and limitations set by the solid modern state, they are secure. All of the characters in the play are also rendered inhuman by independent state organisations, becoming "automata" that are incapable of even acting of their own free will. They are non-living members of the community who serve just as tools to accomplish realistic modern utopian ambitions.

The second chapter, entitled "Dystopia as Criticism of Liquid Consumerist Utopianism in *The Tin Can People*," concentrated on the presentation of a dystopian environment created by the utopian imagination of liquid consumerist ideology, which promises political power, peace, and wealth but results in war, the use of nuclear bombs, and individual and mass psychological problems. From the discussion presented in the second chapter, it may be inferred that characterisation in *The Tin Can People* is completely different from the one in *Red, Black, and Ignorant*; the first of which displays the characteristics of the gardener archetype of solid modern utopianism described by Bauman whereas the second of which have the traits of the hunter archetype of liquid modern utopianism. In *Red Black and Ignorant*, the characters try to get away from solid-state surveillance techniques or mechanisms in a sort of Orwellian dystopia. They are presented in a variety of enclosed contexts or locations that represent solid-state apparatuses, in situations such as while at school, at home, or while looking for a job on the street. This implies that individuals are physically or spatially under the jurisdiction of their state and that the decisions and directives of state institutions either influence or direct their behaviour. The characters resort to acts of violence under the directives of their superiors. The act of violence committed by Soldier is a manifestation of his adherence to the principles of military discipline. He engages in this unlawful act because of his belief that obedience and allegiance to the governing body would result in an improved quality of life for all members of society.

As opposed to this, the characters in *The Tin Can People* are not depicted in enclosed settings. They are, most of the time, in the wilderness. Consisting of three parts, the play presents a short-lived consumerist paradise in a dystopian environment and its consequent transformation into chaos. The characters are seen in a bleak setting devoid of a state or government. They are in a wasteland without any social structures, organisations, or systems in the aftermath of a nuclear bombardment. The characters' violence during the riots in *The Tin Can People* results from their individual desire to survive. They do not have to obey any rules since there are no laws imposed upon them. Nevertheless, they resort to violence because of their lack of solidarity and the insistence of late capitalism on constant consumption. As Bond clarifies in his preface to his *Saved*, "the cause and solution of human violence lie not in our instinct but in our social relationships" (*Plays:1* 12). Accordingly, the second play shows that human beings are not violent in nature, but what makes them inhuman is their social environments; at first a solid totalitarian state and then a social environment based on hyper-individualism and endless consumption, which is devoid of any control or order. The tin can people are deprived of a social system to which they can feel some connection. Hopeless and aimless, they try to reflect and protect themselves and solve their problems through aggression and violence. Throughout the trilogy, Bond's suggestion that "the structure of capitalism is built upon the cyclical violence" (Byrne par. 3) is revealed through the fact that changes in the realised forms of utopianism from solid modern to liquid consumerist, and then, to retrotopia cannot prevent violence.

Additionally, since the characters have found warehouses filled with canned food, they live in affluence rather than in poverty. They are not subjected to exploitation as they do not have to work for food or their other needs. They have no opponents preparing to attack them because there are no borders, nations, or political parties. They feel secure based on their idea that they will create a paradise in hell and this peace will last forever because of their wealth. However, in the absence of borders, nations, or political parties, the Panoptical solid mechanisms of control and surveillance are replaced by the liquid post-Panoptical mechanisms of control in this play. Throughout the play, liquid consumerism is constantly criticised through an emphasis on its excess. The tin can

people destroy their own paradise due to their fear of scarcity. As such, the false sense of freedom and abundance given to its subjects by liquid consumerist utopian ideology is contradicted through a depiction of the failure of this liquid consumerist utopianism in the play. In contrast to the first play of Bond's trilogy, the second play poses a critique of liquid consumerist utopianism, which is more individualised and present-oriented, through the exhibition of its shortcomings and negative traits.

In the third chapter, entitled "Dystopia as Criticism of Retrotopia in *Great Peace*," Bond's analysis and assessment of utopianism in the third and concluding part of his trilogy are scrutinised within the context of Bauman's examination of the contemporary state of utopianism, as presented in his 2017 publication entitled *Retrotopia*. The third chapter concentrates on how Bond treats humanity's potential to create a new society and shows that even if it is created, this will probably be a remedy for only a single majority, rather than appealing to individual problems. In his *Retrotopia*, Bauman warns the reader against the danger of being tempted to abandon critical thinking in favour of emotional attachment and to mistake their proper role with a previously imagined one. Bauman defines four types of inclination towards and longing for former imagined forms of existence as an escape from contemporary reality which is devoid of a pattern or stability, or any hope for a better future.

The concept of utopianism in the liquid modern era is challenged in *Great Peace* as the play depicts the chaotic aftermath of a nuclear war and explores the different approaches individuals take to comprehend their new reality. This subversion of optimism is achieved through the dramatisation of the madness that ensues in the wake of the nuclear catastrophe. The play draws a correlation between mortality and particular ways of being, indicating that individuals may relinquish their humanity and become living dead by engaging in acts of inhumanity and persisting in their attachment to the past. Two types of retrotopia are observed in this play. The first is a desire to return to *Leviathan*. This particular retrotopia is founded on Hobbesian principles, which posit that the fundamental motivators of humanity are self-preservation and the

pursuit of personal gain. In the event of the lack of a regulatory body to enforce laws and ensure stability, the social structure would be susceptible to disruption and conflict. Thus, for Bauman, the concept of retrotopia arises from a longing for stability and order in the context of a liquid modern world. This entails a desire to revert to an older system characterised by a centralised government or state with robust mechanisms in place to ensure the maintenance of stability. The portrayal of the soldiers and their endeavour to survive in the wilderness holds a vital position in the evaluation of the desire to turn back to *Leviathan*. They cannibalise the dead bodies and hold the belief that they have perished while using violence against civilians following the end of the world. Despite the soldiers' conviction that they have perished, they are noted to persist in their customary behaviours and adhere to their commanding officer's directives due to their unfamiliarity with the circumstances of being without a governing body or state. It appears that soldiers engage in self-victimisation as a means of avoiding accountability for their prior violent acts, thereby refusing to acknowledge their present existence and persisting in their previous patterns of behaviour. The potential distortion of factual events in the context of the soldiers' narratives can be construed as a critical commentary on the utilisation of historical accounts as a means of absolving oneself of culpability for past unethical deeds and endeavouring to ascribe significance to a sequence of irrational occurrences. The soldiers, as a result, are unable to acclimatise to the new post-apocalyptic environment, ultimately succumbing to delirium and death.

The second form of retrotopia found in *Great Peace* is Woman's desire to turn "back to the Womb," as classified by Bauman. After the nuclear disaster, Woman is depicted wandering through the wilderness with a bundle of rags, believing it to be her deceased child. The motif of the bundle and the woman's connection with it represent distinct levels of reality that evoke a powerful emotional reaction from the reader/audience and prompt them to scrutinise the fundamental reasons for her constant desire to revisit the time when her child was alive. Throughout the play, Woman is so limited by her past experiences that she has trouble telling the difference between people she encounters and people from her pre-apocalyptic life. Her rejection of joining the other characters who establish a new community is a sign of the unfeasibility of utopianism in the

contemporary world. In other words, her death after her choice to live on her own in her own retrotopia is an indication of the fact that any utopia will fail in covering all the segments of society in the contemporary age when there is no hope for the future, the present, or the past.

In the third play of the trilogy, rather than mature adults, young people who were minors make up the majority of the population founding the new settlement. The positive outlook of young characters towards the establishment of a better future appears to be influenced by their lack of extensive life experiences and the fewness of members of the older generation. Nonetheless, there is no sign regarding the prospective triumph of these young individuals; the reader/audience are not given the chance to ascertain whether they would adapt to this dystopian society or not. However, it is not feasible to assert that the success of establishing a new, egalitarian, and peaceful society would serve as a safe harbour for all, even if achieved, due to the presence of individuals who may resist progress.

In the light of the analyses made in the three chapters of this dissertation, it may be finally asserted that in Edward Bond's trilogy, namely *The War Plays*, which includes *Red Black and Ignorant*, *The Tin Can People*, and *Great Peace*, the playwright draws attention to the significant consequences of the operation of utopian ideologies. The first play portrays a dystopian outcome stemming from a solid modern utopian ideology that emphasises advancement and pledges an impeccable community through sophisticated scientific and technological advancements. The second play portrays a shift towards a postmodern/liquid consumerist utopian ideology, which is met with discontent from the populace due to the emergence of a new dystopian setting. The last play raises questions about the feasibility of creating a new and equitable community, which is examined through a discourse on sanity and insanity. All the plays here under consideration portray utopias that result in bleak, aggressive, and infertile environments, wherein the characters endeavour to endure and confront the ethical quandaries that arise from their propensity for violence and their innate humanity. The final act of the last play culminates in the formation of a new society by a group of survivors, with the exception of a character known as Woman who chooses to abstain from participation. This

outcome suggests that any attempt to establish a utopian society, even if it arises from a fresh start, will inevitably be constrained by the limitations of its creators, and may not be universally applicable to all members of the population. When considered within the context of Zygmunt Bauman's discussion on the transformation of utopianism throughout history, it is also possible to suggest that the trilogy provides the reader/audience with an opportunity to question and contemplate the shortcomings and consequences of the past two utopian ideologies, viz., solid modern utopianism and liquid modern utopianism. It also encourages the reader/audience to reconsider the feasibility of hope and utopianism in a period when all past forms of utopianism fail.

Works Cited

Primary Source

Bond, Edward. *Edward Bond: Plays:6*. London: Methuen Drama, 1998. Print.

Secondary Sources

Adorno, Theodor W. *Prisms*. Trans. Samuel M. Weben and Shierry M. Weber. London: Spearman, 1997. Print.

Althusser, Louis. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London: Verso, 2014. Print.

Atanasova, Aleksandrina. "Re-Examining Utopia in Contemporary Consumption: Conceptualization and Implications for Marketing." *AMS Review* 11.1–2 (2021): 23-39. Print.

Barthes, Roland, and Stephen Heath. *Image, Music, Text*. Glasgow: Fotana/Collins, 1977. Print.

Baudrillard, Jean. *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. London: Sage, 2017. Print.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Legislators and Interpreters*. Cambridge: Polity, 1995. Print.

---. *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2004. Print.

---. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity, 2018. Print.

---. *Liquid Times Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge: Polity, 2017. Print.

---. "Living in Utopia." *Respekt*. 13 June 2005. Web. 10 June 2021.

---. *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Cambridge: Polity, 1993. Print.

---. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. New York: Cornell UP, 1991. Print.

---. *Retrotopia*. Cambridge: Polity, 2017. Print.

---. *Socialism the Active Utopia*. London: Routledge, 2011. Print.

---. *Society Under Siege*. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. Print

---. "Utopia with No Topos." *History of the Human Sciences* 16.1 (2003): 11-25. *SAGE Journals*. SAGE, Feb. 2003. Web. 1 Oct. 2022.

Beilharz, Peter. *Zygmunt Bauman*. London: Sage, 2002. Print.

Benjamin, Walter. "On the Concept of History / Theses on the Philosophy of History." *Stanford University*. July 2020. Web. 24 Feb. 2023.

Berman, Marshal. *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. London: Verso, 2010. Print.

Bertens, Hans. *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History*. London: Routledge, 2005. Print.

Billingham, Peter. *Edward Bond: A Critical Study*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Print.

Bloch, Ernst. *The Spirit of Utopia*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. Print.

Bond, Edward. *Edward Bond: Plays:1*. London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 1997. Print.

---. *Edward Bond: Plays:2*. London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 1997. Print.

---. *The Chair Plays*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. Print

---. *The Hidden Plot: Notes on Theatre and the State*. London: Methuen Drama, 2000. Print.

Booker, M. Keith. *Dystopian Literature: A Theory and Research Guide*. New York: Greenwood, 1994. Print.

Byrne, Bryony. "Unidentified Discontent: Social Violence." *Aesthetica*. Web. 20 May 2023.

Carney, Sean. *The Politics and Poetics of Contemporary English Tragedy*. London: U of Toronto P, 2013. Print.

Case, Sue-Ellen, and Janelle G. Reinelt. "Preface." *The Performance of Power: Theatrical Discourse and Politics*. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1991. ix-xx. Print.

Chambers, Colin, and Mike Prior. *Playwrights' Progress*. Oxford: Amber Lane, 1987. Print.

Claeys, Gregory. *Dystopia: A Natural History*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017. Print.

Clegg, Stewart R. "Reading Bauman and Retrotopia." *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 34.4 (2018): 354–63. Web. 20 April 2023.

Davis, David, Alison Douthwaite, and Tony Coult. "A Glossary of Terms Used in Bondian Theatre." *Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child: Edward Bond's Plays for Young People*. Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2005. 201-21. Print.

De Man, Paul. *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1983. Print.

Derrida, Jacques. *Writing and Difference*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2017. Print.

- Dominy, Jordan J. "Cannibalism, Consumerism, and Profanation: Cormac McCarthy's *The Road* and the End of Capitalism." *The Cormac McCarthy Journal* 13.1 (2015): 143-58. *JSTOR*. Web. 27 May 2023.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage, 1995. Print.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Trans. David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2004. Print.
- Fynsk, C. "Linguistic Turn." *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001. 8913-16. Print.
- Gritzner, Karoline. *Adorno and Modern Theatre the Drama of the Damaged Self in Bond, Rudkin, Barker and Kane*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Print.
- Harvey, David. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 2015. Print.
- Hay, Malcolm, and Philip Roberts. *Bond: A Study of His Plays*. London: Methuen. 1980. Print.
- Hirst, David M. *Macmillan Modern Dramatists: Edward Bond*. London: Macmillan, 1985. Print.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noeri. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. Print.

Innes, Christopher. *Modern British Drama 1890-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. Print.

---. "The Political Spectrum of Edward Bond: From Rationalism to Rhapsody in Contemporary British Drama." *Contemporary British Drama, 1970-90: Essays from Modern Drama*. Ed. Hersh Zeifman and Cynthia Zimmerman. London: Macmillan, 1993. 81-98. Print.

Itzin, Catherine. *Stages in the Revolution: Political Theatre in Britain Since 1968*. London: Methuen, 1980. Print.

Jacobsen, Michael Hviid. "From Solid Modern Utopia to Liquid Modern Anti-Utopia? Tracing the Utopian Strand in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman." *Utopian Studies* 15.1 (2004): 63-87. *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Dec. 2022.

---. "Retrotopia Rising: The Topics of Utopia, Retrotopia and Nostalgia in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman." *Nostalgia Now: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on the Past in the Present*. Ed. Michael Hviid Jacobsen. Milton Park: Routledge, 2020. 78-97. Print.

---. "The Activating Presence - What Prospects of Utopia in Times of Uncertainty." *Polish Sociological Review* 155.3 (2006): 337-55. *JSTOR*. Web. 28 June 2021.

Jameson, Fredric. *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London: Verso, 2005. Print.

---. *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. Print.

---. *The Political Unconscious Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. New York: Cornell UP, 1982. Print.

Kellner, Douglas. "Modernity and Its Discontents: Nietzsche's Critique." U of California. Unpublished Book Chapter. Web. 20 April 2023.

Klaic, Dragan. *The Plot of the Future: Utopia and Dystopia in Modern Drama*. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1991. Print.

Klee, Paul. *Angelus Novus (The Angel of History)*. 1920. Monoprint. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem. Israel.

Kociatkiewicz, Jerzy, and Monika Kostera. "After Retrotopia? The Future of Organizing and the Thought of Zygmunt Bauman." *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 34.4 (2018): 335-42. Print.

- Kritzer, Amelia Howe. *Political Theatre in Post-Thatcher Britain: New Writing: 1995-2005*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.
- Kumar, Krishan. *Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991. Print.
- Lee, Raymond L.M. "Modernity, Solidity and Agency: Liquidity Reconsidered." *Sociology* 45.4 (2011): 650-64. Print.
- Lyotard, Jean Francois. *The Postmodern Condition*. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1984. Print.
- Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, 1955. Print.
- McDonough, David S. "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent." *International Journal* 60.3 (2005): 811-23. *JSTOR*. Web. 26 Jan 2023.
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." *Marxist Internet Archive*. Warwick University Website, 1991. Web. 18 Mar. 2023.
- Meek Lange, Margaret. "Progress." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2019 Edition. Web. 28 June 2020.

- Milling, Jane. *Modern British Playwriting. Voices, Documents, New Interpretations*. London: Methuen Drama, 2012. Print.
- Moylan, Tom. "To Stand with Dreamers: On the Use Value of Utopia." *The Irish Review* 34 (Spring, 2006), 1-19, 1986. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 June 2018.
- Nebioğlu, Rahime Çokay. *Deleuze and Schizoanalysis of Dystopia*. Cham: Springer Nature, 2020. Print.
- Newey, Glen. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan*. Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2014. Print.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. "The Birth of Tragedy; Or, Hellenism and Pessimism." *Project Gutenberg*. Ed. Oscar Levy. Trans. William August Haussmann. 04 Mar. 2016. Web. 12 Oct. 2022.
- . *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878-Fall 1879)*. Trans. Gary Handwerk. Stanford (Calif.): Stanford UP, 2013. Print.
- . *Untimely Meditations*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print.
- Pohl, Nicole. "Utopianism after More: The Renaissance and the Enlightenment." *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*. Ed. Gregory Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013. 51-78. Print.

Reinelt, Janelle G. *After Brecht: British Epic Theater*. Michigan: U of Michigan P, 1997. Print.

Ricoeur, Paul. *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. Ed. George Taylor. New York: Columbia UP, 1986. Print.

Roemer, Kenneth M. "Paradise Transformed: Varieties of 19th-century Utopias." *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*. Ed. Gregory Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013, 79-107. Print.

Sargent, Lyman Tower. "Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited." *Utopian Studies* 5.1 (1994), 1-37, 1994. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 June 2018.

---. *Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.

Saunders, Graham. "Edward Bond and the Celebrity of Exile." *Theatre Research International* 29.3 (2004): 256-66. Web. 24 June 2019.

Scharine, Richard G. *The Plays of Edward Bond*. London: Associated UP, 1976. Print.

Seidman, Steven. *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.

Shepherd, Simon. "Theatre and Politics." *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century English Literature*. Ed. Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. 7-27. Print.

- Siebers, Tobin. Ed. *Heterotopia: Postmodern Utopia and the Body Politic*. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1997. Print.
- Sliwowski, Thomas, and Pawel Koscielny. "Retrotopia in Central Europe: Anticommunism, Historical Time, and the Uses of the Socialist Past." *Ulbandus Review* 19 (2022): 3-30. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 May 2023.
- Spencer, Jenny S. *Dramatic Strategies in the Plays of Edward Bond*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. Print.
- . "Edward Bond's Dramatic Strategies." *Contemporary English Drama*. Ed. C.W.E. Bigsy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981. Print.
- Stuart, Ian. *Politics in Performance: The Production Work of Edward Bond, 1978-1990*. New York: Peter Lang, 1996. Print.
- , ed. *Selections from the Notebooks of Edward Bond, Volume One: 1959 to 1980*. London: Methuen, 2000. Print.
- , ed. *Edward Bond: Letters 2*. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013. Print.
- Trussler, Simon. *Edward Bond*. Ed. Ian Scott-Kilvert. Harlow: Longman, 1976. Print.
- . *The Cambridge Illustrated History of British Theatre*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. Print.

Tuailleon, David. *Edward Bond: The Playwright Speaks*. London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2015. Print.

Turner, Bryan S., ed. *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.

“Utopia” *The Oxford English Dictionary Online*, Oxford UP, n.d., <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dystopia>. Web. 28 May 2016.


Vieira, Fatima. “The Concept of Utopia.” *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*. Ed. Gregory Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. 3-28. Print.

Walsh, Chad. *From Utopia to Nightmare*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1977. Print.

Wilde, Oscar. *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde: Criticism: Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man*. Ed. J. M. Guy. Vol. IV. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Print.

APPENDIX I

Klee, Paul. *Angelus Novus (The Angel of History)*. 1920. Monoprint. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem. Israel.





HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 07/07/2023

Tez Başlığı : EDWARD BOND'UN *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE* VE *GREAT PEACE ADLI* OYUNLARINDA "ÜTOPYA KRİZİ"

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 149 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 21/06/2023 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 7'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- Kaynakça hariç
- Alıntılar hariç
- Alıntılar dâhil
- 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

07.07.2023

Adı Soyadı: Özden DERE

Öğrenci No: N13243723

Anabilim Dalı: İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

Programı: İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

Statüsü: Doktora Bütünleşik Dr.

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Prof. Dr. Şebnem KAYA



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Ph.D. DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT**

Date: 07/07/2023

Thesis Title : "THE CRISIS OF UTOPIA" IN EDWARD BOND'S *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE, AND GREAT PEACE*

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 21/06/2023 for the total of 149 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 7%.

Filtering options applied:

- Approval and Declaration sections excluded
- Bibliography/Works Cited excluded
- Quotes excluded
- Quotes included
- Match size up to 5 words excluded

I declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

07.07. 2023

Name Surname: Özden DERE
Student No: N13243723
Department: English Language and Literature
Program: English Language and Literature
Status: Ph.D. Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Prof. Şebnem KAYA



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 07/07/2023

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: EDWARD BOND'UN *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE VE GREAT PEACE* ADLI OYUNLARINDA "ÜTOPYA KRİZİ"

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Adı Soyadı: Özden DERE

Öğrenci No: N13243723

Anabilim Dalı: İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

Programı: İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

Statüsü: Y.Lisans Doktora Bütünleşik Dr.

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

Prof.Dr. Şebnem KAYA

(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)

Detaylı Bilgi: <http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr>

Telefon: 0-312-2976860

Faks: 0-3122992147

E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr



HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY

Date: 07/07/2023

Thesis Title / Topic: "THE CRISIS OF UTOPIA" IN EDWARD BOND'S *THE WAR PLAYS: RED, BLACK AND IGNORANT, THE TIN CAN PEOPLE, AND GREAT PEACE*

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Name Surname: Özden DERE
Student No: N13243723
Department: English Language and Literature
Program: English Language and Literature
Status: Masters Ph.D. Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Prof. Dr. Şebnem KAYA

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)