



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**THE UNITED STATES BASES IN EUROPE AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS
TO US HEGEMONY: FROM COLD WAR TO 2008**

Glten stntađ

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2013

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ÖZET

ÜSTÜNTAĞ, Gülten. “Avrupa’daki ABD Üsleri ve Üslerin ABD Hegemonyasına Katkıları: Soğuk Savaştan 2008’e”, Master Tezi, Ankara, 2013

Söz konusu çalışma, deniz aşırı askeri üsler aracılığıyla ABD hegemonyasının sürdürülüşünü anlamayı ve analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Böylece, modern dünya politikası içinde hegemonyanın kökleri, ABD’nin üstünlüğünü yaymak amacıyla kullandığı araçlar, ABD askeri üsleri ve bu üslerin hâkimiyetine katkısı incelenmiştir. Hegemonya kavramının seceresine ve teorilerin bu konudaki yaklaşımı üzerine odaklanan çalışma, diğer temel teorileri de göz önünde bulundurarak, Marksist-Gramşiyen yaklaşımı merkeze almıştır.

Araştırma, ABD’nin kendi ideolojik ve politik duruşunu paylaşan hemen her ülkede askeri üs inşa ettiğini göstermektedir. Bu noktada, Avrupa ülkeleri üs yapılanmasının özünü temsil etmektedir. Bu üsler kurulurken, politik süreçler, ideolojik çatışmalar, güvenlik algılaması, ekonomik hedefler ve hegemonya arayışı gözönünde bulundurulmuştur. Soğuk Savaş üs politikası, bu dönemde üs edinme ve hegemonya tesisi yarışının en üst seviyede seyretmesi nedeniyle çalışmanın merkezini oluşturmaktadır. ABD’nin askeri yapılanmaları kendi amaçları doğrultusunda kullandığı, çok sayıda askeri müdahalenin bu tesisler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirildiği, çalışmanın temel argümanıdır. Soğuk Savaş boyunca, Avrupa ülkeleri hava, kara ve nükleer üs olarak ABD’nin, Sovyetler Birliğini çevreleme politikasına hizmet etmişlerdir. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ise, söz konusu üsler yeniden organize edilmiş ve farklı misyonlar için kullanılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, üslerin ABD hegemonyasını güçlendirme misyonu sabit kalarak ABD’nin askeri üs yapılanmasının, hegemonik yayılmacılığının bir parçası olduğu ve bu ülkenin hegemonik çıkarlarına hizmet ettiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hegemonya, rıza, baskı, ABD hegemonyası, Marksist-Gramşiyen yaklaşım, askeri üsler, Soğuk Savaş ve Avrupa ülkeleri.

ABSTRACT

ÜSTÜNTAĞ, Gülten. “The United States Bases in Europe and Their Contributions to US Hegemony: From Cold War to 2008”, Master’s Thesis, Ankara, 2013

This study analyzes the perpetuation of US hegemony through its overseas military bases. It examines the roots of hegemony in modern world politics, the tools that the US uses to expand its dominance and the specific contribution of US overseas bases to its dominance. After focusing on the genealogy of hegemony and theories considering the concept from various points of view, this study takes Marxist-Gramscist hegemony approach as its theoretical basis, although other main theories are also considered.

The study shows that the US has established military bases in almost every country that share its ideological stance. It discusses the political processes, ideological debates, security perceptions; economic goals and hegemony seeking attempts when these bases are deployed. Cold War politics lies at the core of the analysis since the base contest between two blocks and hegemony driven politics reached a peak during this period. The study claims that the US used all its military deployments towards achieving its goals, with many military invasions being launched through the bases to perpetuate the hegemonic order in favor of US interests. During the Cold War in particular, European countries served as the air, ground and nuclear bases of the US as a part of the containment policy against the Soviet Union. During the post-Cold War era, these bases reorganized and used for different missions, although their basic mission to enhance US hegemony continued. In short, the US overseas military base structure forms part of its hegemonic expansion and is a reflection of hegemony’s coercion component.

Keywords: Hegemony, consent, coercion, US hegemony, Marxist-Gramscist perspective, military bases, the Cold War, European countries.

TABLE OF CONTENT

KABUL VE ONAY	i
BİLDİRİM	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ÖZET	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: GENEALOGY OF HEGEMONY	6
1.1. Historical Roots of Hegemony	7
1.2. Notion of Hegemony in Machiavelli	8
1.3. Neo-Realist Perspective	8
1.4. Marxist-Gramscist Perspective	13
1.5. World-System Theory	17
1.6. In Pursuit of US Hegemony	23
CHAPTER 2: INSTALLATION OF US MILITARY BASES	32
2.1. Overview of US Military Expansionism	32
2.2. Monroe Doctrine Lays The Foundation of US Security Policy	36
2.3. First US Military Bases	38

2.4. Increasing US Military Influence in Latin America During President Wilson Era.....	39
2.5. World War II and the Truman Doctrine.....	41
2.6. Eisenhower Doctrine and Changing Politics of the Middle East.....	46
2.7. Nuclear Race Seizes Europe.....	51
2.8. Post-Cold War Era.....	57
2.9. New World Order and Unilateralism.....	60
CHAPTER 3: US BASES IN EUROPE.....	64
3.1. US Military Posture in Europe.....	64
3.2. Legal Bases of Military Installations.....	67
3.3. Humanitarian Dimension of Base Mission.....	70
3.4. Five Key Base Countries in Europe.....	72
3.4.1. Germany.....	72
3.4.2. The UK.....	76
3.4.3. Italy.....	77
3.4.4. Spain.....	80
3.4.5. Turkey.....	80
CHAPTER 4: US MILITARY INTERVENTIONS VIA ITS BASES AND NEW BASE POLITICS FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS.....	84
4.1. Lebanon (1958)	85
4.2. First Gulf War (1991)	86
4.3. Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999)	87
4.4. Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom, 2001)	89
4.5. Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003)	89

4.6. September 11 And New Base Build Up	91
4.7. US Hegemony Debate Revisited	96
CONCLUSION	102
REFERENCES	111

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

USSR:	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US:	The United States
WWI:	World War I
WWII:	World War II
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
OPEC:	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
USEUCOM:	United States European Command
EUCOM:	European Command
USAREUR:	US Army Europe
SOFA:	Status of Forces Agreement
MOBs:	Main Operating Bases
FOSs:	Forward Operating Sites
CSLs:	Cooperative Security Locations
DoD:	The US Department of Defense
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
USAFE:	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USNAVEUR:	U.S. Navy Europe

JTF-East:	Joint Task Force-East
GATT:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
SALT I:	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I
SALT II:	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
CENTCOM:	US Central Command

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table 1:</u> Defense Expenditures for the Major Powers (2006)	31
<u>Table 2:</u> Nuclear Delivery Vehicles of the Great Powers (1974)	56
<u>Table 3:</u> Reorganizing the US military existence in Europe (1995)	59
<u>Table 4:</u> US Military Postures in Europe, after (2000)	69

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: US Military Bases World Wide 2001-2003.....34

Figure 2: US Military Existence in Germany.....75

Figure 3: Detailed Map of the US Facilities in Europe.....

INTRODUCTION

The concept of hegemony is a crucial factor in world affairs and has been discussed ever since ancient times. However, it became popular when Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci used the term in explaining his country's, Italy, political impasse following fascism penetrated the governance. While Gramsci defined hegemony at the state level, Robert W. Cox adapted it to global politics, by explaining the nature and implementations of hegemonic order. Although various International Relations theories consider hegemony concept from different point of views, most of them agree that, even today, if the hegemon does not act in accordance with the hegemonic order, its power maybe challenged, making its decline or collapse possible. On a similar basis, this study tries to understand the current global hegemonic order, its dynamics and its perpetuation in relation to the current hegemon: the United States. While many tools are required to preserve the hegemonic system structure, this study focuses on the military aspect and practices in international relations.

In general, the rise of the United States as hegemon since WWI, but especially after WWII, using both consent and coercion hegemonic elements help makes sense of world politics. However, since the coercive side of US hegemony seems to have been more dominant in determining its international relations, it raises questions about the future of such hegemony. It is assumed that the hegemon cannot survive only by relying on pure military power. Rather, a stable hegemonic order requires the consent of other states in the system. Moreover, hegemony relies on soft power to convince other states in line with its interest instead of using material capabilities as the source of power. Comparison of the consent and coercion elements of hegemony in the world order give hints regarding the stability or instability of the system. Since the system is determined by the hegemon's moves and attitudes, any changes in the consent-coercion balance is deeply felt by other states.

Adopting a critical and analytical perspective in describing US hegemony and the order it has built; this study draws on a wide range of academic literature. At this point, Gramsci's thoughts and Cox's arguments which developed Gramsci's ideas by adapting them to international level of analysis appear as main study sources. As a creator of world-system theory, Wallersteins' articles and books are focused on in the theoretical

discussion of the study. Ikenberry and Keohane' studies about hegemony in neo-realist perspective shed light on the thesis. Finally, Vine and Cooley claims in the matter of the United States' military bases all around the world constituted the backbone of the study. The main goal of the study is to understand the mechanism of hegemonic order and the United States' implementation of it as a way to control world affairs through overseas bases, besides the changing position of US hegemony. There is a particular focus on the hegemon's coercive power to discuss its reasons and results. A cause and effect relationship in the hegemon's behaviors emerges as the defining factor in the hegemonic order. Regarding the scopes and limits of the study; political, economic and humanitarian dimensions of these military bases are not focused on widely since the main discussion is about military dimension of the United States bases and their contributions to US hegemony.

In this study, US hegemony, its apparatuses and ways of its operating globally are considered within a particular era, from the Cold War to the Obama presidency, because US power reached its peak during this period. While consent and coercion have operated together in some US reactions to international disputes the analysis reveals a breaking point that leads one to question US hegemony in its historical process. From this perspective, thesis has four key claims. First; the United States project to build up its military bases started during the Cold War as a part of its containment policy directed at the Soviet Union, and aiming to ensure peace and stability in Europe. At the peak of the Cold War, military base construction in Europe gained momentum. Second; the United States military presence in Europe allowed the United States to intervene in many Third World Countries for artificial reasons and as a part of expansionist and containment policy. In a sense, these military installations served US interests as springboard in operations against the other countries. Third; these bases, not surprisingly, allowed the United States to broaden its international hegemony since they had strong ties with economic and political processes. Many studies have pointed out that the United States became a hegemonic power after the WWII, and that its military presence abroad played a noteworthy role in promoting its hegemonic position. Fourth; after the Cold War ended, the United States adopted a policy of reducing its overseas military bases. However, the September 11 attacks created a reason for a new engagement, and military build-up and relocation policy in some regions. Many

international occupations and military interventions were carried out following the attack. As a result, US hegemony was deteriorated due to its unilateral actions, losing support of other states in the system and relying on pure power instead of using soft power in ordering the world affairs.

While the key research question of the study is how the United States military bases in Europe do contribute to US hegemony. There are other secondary questions which are addressed:

- What are the key aspects of hegemony and its historical roots?
- What are the dynamics that led to the rise of the United States as the founder of the current hegemonic order?
- In which ways did the Cold War contribute to the development of US hegemony?
- Which aspects of hegemony allowed the United States to execute control over the global system?
- How did controversial military engagements affect its hegemonic position?
- What kind of future is foreseen for US hegemony?

In attempting to answer to these questions satisfactorily, the thesis's four chapters focus on different subjects to discuss the various aspects of US hegemony. The first chapter gives a historical background to the concept of hegemony. Although the concept's history dates back to ancient times as mentioned above, the chapter examines its modern day usage, particularly that of two crucial theorists. Then, the chapter focuses on the theoretical debate and approaches considering hegemony from different perspectives. These include the main approaches of international relations: neo-realist, Marxist-Gramscist and world-system theory. Their clear responses to questions about the hegemonic order allow us to track the modern day implementation of hegemony by the United States. For reading the hegemonic order parameters, this study adopts a Marxist-Gramscist perspective. That is; it embraces a more critical point of view than the other two approaches. The chapter then offers an overview of US hegemonic development from a Coxian approach, a stance that is applied to all stages of the study.

The second chapter focuses on more practical topics, such as the first establishment of US military bases around the world. It examines the link between the rise of the United

States as a strong actor at the global level and military base politics, before discussing doctrines of US history as a complementary element to the establishment of US hegemony. Since the Cold War and its relation with the military base structure in Europe lie at the center of this study, this chapter tries to analyze Cold War dynamics and the policies pursued by the two main rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. The chapter looks at the changing atmosphere of bipolar stability and how it led to fierce competition in ideology, armaments and nuclear proliferation. The nuclear containment of the Soviet Union by the United States-Europe alliance, its effects on international relations can be clearly seen in Middle East policies and conflicts. Since both countries aimed to expand their influence zones in different parts of the world, their hegemonic contest can be traced in many crises and wars. A later phase began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The chapter analyzes the new dynamics of the system, which left the United States as the unipolar hegemon. The chapter focuses on various unilateral acts of the United States in the post-Cold War era, and discusses the tools that the sole hegemon used to maintain its unique position. The positioning of the United States in accordance with renewed threat perceptions is also considered since its direct and indirect effects were felt at a global level. Additionally, a regime discussion is mentioned and viability of the system without presence of a hegemon is questioned.

The third chapter is more related with narrative issues. It provides information about the United States' military settlement in Europe, examining the foundations and legal basis for its military base engagement, including the structure of base agreements between the guest and host countries and the economic and political dimensions. The chapter focuses on five key United States bases in Europe in order to demonstrate their crucial role by considering particular technical details of these military installations and their structure. Finally, the chapter analyzes the link between the Post-Cold War's unipolar structure and the unilateral actions of the United States as the hegemonic power.

The fourth chapter analyzes selected examples to demonstrate how these military facilities were used for US military engagements. This clarifies the importance of these bases to realizing the hegemon's aspirations. The chapter then examines the evolution in the United States policy-making as hegemon from the end of the Cold War until the

September 11 attacks on the United States by analyzing the reasons for the transformation of US military base policies. It reveals a dramatic change in stationing military bases in response to 'old allies' or in the process of redesigning and redefining the hegemon's new interests. This leads to a return to discussing US hegemony and its future after September 11, and the way it took shape with new military interventions following the attacks.

In short, this thesis tries to explain the features, military dimensions, perceptions and actions in different periods of the current US hegemony, while also evaluating what this implies for the survival of the hegemon given the policies it has followed.

CHAPTER I

1. GENEALOGY OF HEGEMONY

Since this study is based on the concept of hegemony, it is essential to describe the various approaches to the concept. Although its original usage goes back to the ancient Greek era, it was the Italian neo-Marxist political theorist, Antonio Gramsci who made the concept popular in modern international relations (IR) theories. Following his new perspective for explaining the nature of IR, the term became used frequently by major IR theories to support their approaches to understanding the world system. From his particular position in critical theory and Marxist thought, Gramsci tried to explain the post-WWII era in terms of decisive American power. While doing so, Italy's specific post-war situation provided a consistent guideline in that he wished to understand the victory of fascism in Italy, and found the concept of hegemony helpful for this.

However, prior to understanding Gramsci's concept, the historical background of the concept can shed light on today's hegemony perceptions and how different IR theories consider the concept. Although there is no settled definition of the concept in the IR, it is necessary to analyze the approaches of these basic theories before discussing Gramsci's use of it.

While there is a range of IR theories with different approaches to the subject, this study will focus on the neo-realist, Marxist-Gramscist, and world-systems perspectives. On these, the Marxist-Gramscist perspective forms the main base of the study since it gives the clearest hints to understanding and explaining US hegemony. Specifically, Gramsci's emphasis on both consent and coercion while explaining the hegemony of international actors seems particularly valuable for observing and defining the source of US power in IR. In relation to this, Robert W. Cox's ideas are also critically important since he first applied Gramsci's thoughts on hegemony to IR, and is seen as a founder of critical theory in IR. This chapter ends by discussing the roots and sustainability of US hegemony according to various views on the subject. There are two conflicting approaches to the issue. One claims that US hegemony, which first appeared after WWII, has been in decline since the 1970s; the other argues that the United States is still the sole hegemonic power of the world order.

1.1 HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HEGEMONY

The history of hegemonic power discussions goes back to ancient times. Significant ancient historians, such as Thucydides, Aristotle, Isocrates and Herodotus, considered the subject from different perspectives. For instance, Herodotus saw hegemony as the political and military association of the *polis* under the leadership of Athens to get rid of the Persian threat. Athens and Sparta joined military forces against the Persians and this was a symbol of hegemonic order that, under Athenian leadership, both city states defended their existence, civilization and military. When this alliance broke down, Sparta weakened Athens using its powerful military and then the region surrendered to chaos. Marked by the Peloponnesian War, the era hinted at the end of the golden age of city states. However, Herodotus did not mean that these city states transferred all power to Athens; rather, their alliance was limited, and primarily motivated by the self-interest of each *polis*. Thus, they had regular chances to join or leave this alliance. For Aristotle, there were two types of hegemony: one is a kind of despotism, while the other is imperial rule. The former is concerned with dominating others by force in favor of the ruler. The latter is a leadership of equals in which the interests of all are considered (Fontana, 2008, p. 81).

Some of today's scholars have adopted similar perspectives. Lentner, for example, argues that hegemony is both domination and leadership. While the former rests on power, the latter involves consent, and in the ancient Greek city states leadership was based on consent (as cited in Gilpin, 1981, pp. 144–5). Rivalry among city states made it essential for one to take the leadership but only in the form of an alliance. As Ehrenberg (1960) explains, although Athens had aspirations to dominate others, the each polis adopted the principle of maintaining its autonomy and breaking up the alliance once threats had been removed. Thus, each city state had its own citizenship system, and the alliance was an *ad hoc* situation (pp.113–4). According to Lentner (2005), “there was a contest between Athens and Sparta about joining their forces under Athens hegemonic power against Persians. So, Herodotus believed in leadership of Athens rather than Sparta and this was the main strife issue in future rivalries” (p. 739).

1.2 NOTION OF HEGEMONY IN MACHIAVELLI

There is an analogy between Machiavelli's *centaur* and Gramsci's hegemony. According to Boothman (2008), "[t]he combination of coercion and consent within hegemony can quite be traced to Machiavelli and his *centaur*, "semi-animal, semi-man and one without the other is not durable" (p.209). Gramsci's centaur is coercion and consent. In explaining his concept of Prince-people harmony, Machiavelli emphasizes that, for a stable state, both structure should unite around a common point, and a "public interest" should be shared by all sides. Likewise, Gramsci points out that "for a stable hegemonic system, led and leading groups should act together in reconciling the interests so that state can function in the best way"(Boothman, 2008, p.210).

To clarify Machiavelli's view, he argues that "coercive power" is not enough to maintain a state order. Rather, alternative methods are needed to gain the support of opponent and to make them share the same goal with leading groups. Due to his centaur's dual character, namely law-force, a prince knows when and how to use each approach to safeguard the empire (Fontana, 1993, p.143). Fontana argues that (1993) Gramsci redefined his notion to create a bipolar structure: one is hegemony, and the other is civil society. While the first represents state force, the second represents consent.

1.3 NEO-REALIST PERSPECTIVE

The neo-realist perspective shares a similar definition of hegemony with other approaches when consent and coercion terms are considered. According to Volgy and Imwalle (1995), "[h]egemony occurs when a single central actor has the capability and willingness to lead the system and to create order and predictability in global politics" (p.823).

Neo-realist approach criticizes theories that consider hegemony as resulting from relations among social groups and their intended realization of projects in society through the political use of state tools. It also objects to the standpoint that history only emerges as the production of social blocs, structures and relations among states. Instead, the state's importance is emphasized (Joseph, 2002). 1970s enhanced importance of other actors while state is losing its central place when events revealed weaknesses in

realist theories' ways of defining and explaining world affairs and developments. For example, the Vietnam War was increasing discomfort among Americans, while the arms race had lost its intensity, and there was a crisis in oil supplies. The Bretton Woods system¹ was unable to prevent these negative developments, economic and other forms of interdependence gained importance. These developments led realists to review their power and state centric approach and to accept of the importance of non-state actors, such as international organizations and transnational movements (Keohane & Nye, 2006, pp.726-7). Although he is a classical realist, Morgenthau (1977) criticizes the United States power relying on military apparatuses and nuclear power. He claims that, "[c]onventional weapons has reversed the true order of things: it wastes scarce human and material resources upon nuclear weapon systems of which we have already a surfeit, and accepts as permanent an inferiority in conventional weapons, which not only makes conventional war more likely and its outcome doubtful" (pp.7-8).

However, despite this reviewing and new willingness to accept the effects of other factors in world politics, state was renamed central to neo-realism by pointing out new kinds of threats, such as terrorist attacks and lesser states' incentives to use power more easily than great powers. Still, military power was considered to determine economic interdependency, even if, in some cases, there was no guarantee that military force would be more successful than economic processes for maintenance of hegemony (Keohane& Nye, 1987, pp.733-34). Structural realists emphasized the economic dimension of IR and its link to world politics. However, international economy is not a non-political actor in distributing power among states. Therefore, even if a modern state loses power due to economic events, it can regain its power through historical groups (Gilpin, 1984).

Neo-realism has been used to define the new conjecture in IR by taking a materialist point of view of world politics, such as capabilities of military or economic power, and the superiority of population and territory. Neo-realism ignores other non-material

¹ The Bretton Woods system was based on stable and adjustable exchange rates. Exchange rates were not permanently fixed, but occasional devaluations of individual currencies were allowed to correct fundamental disequilibria in the balance of payments (BP). Ever-increasing attack on the dollar in the 1960s culminated in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and it was reluctantly replaced with a regime of floating exchange rates. <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/bre.htm>

factors in world politics and does not favor the power equality. However, hegemony means much more than merely controlling material resource to eliminate opponents. It also entails using different tools, such as soft power, to shape others' decisions and policies in the direction of the hegemon's position. Thus, trying to explain the whole system from a material capabilities standpoint might be incomplete and ineffective (Beyer, 2009, p.413). While material capabilities are essential for laying the foundations of hegemony, its perpetuation requires ideology.

The classical realist perspective argued that, in the absence of a dominating state, a proper, healthy international regime was impossible. Now, collapse of the system is not totally confined to sharing all resources. Additionally, hegemon still might lead world politics, and international regimes may continue their tasks (Crone, 1993, pp.502-3). Hegemonic power creates order with superiority being the main subject. In some cases, these regimes do not have to operate in favor of subordinate states. Instead, they may try to use different tools, such as bargaining in bilateral talks or being free riders. They may prefer this instead of looking for creating of a new system in which they will have less effect. Thus, the system is prevented from evolving into chaos. However, there can be times when the hegemon has to make concessions to secondary states not to lose control over the regimes (Crone, 1993, p. 504). These realists also claim that a challenge or counter-balancing policies against the hegemon can be avoided if it can appease others' concerns and provide them with the benefits they need (Layne, 2009, p. 150).

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) explain how the hegemon first obtains its position and then perpetuates it in the international system. For them, the source of power has two pillars. One is about using material powers, such as economic and military sanctions, threats and promises; the other is about winning over elites in subordinate states. The hegemon's cooption of this class with its rules and order allows it to establish its system in those countries without exercising pure power them. Thus, the hegemon mostly avoids wasting its economic and military resources to make secondary states adopt the international order and norms, although, in some cases, both methods are needed (p.283).

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) name this process 'socialization', adding that,

Socialization occurs primarily after wars and political crisis, periods marked by international turmoil and restructuring as well as the fragmentation of ruling coalitions and legitimacy crises at the domestic level. Secondly, elite receptivity to the norms articulated by the hegemon is essential to the socialization process (284).

Considering its interests, the hegemon allocates power among secondary states. This is the key to creating stable, open economic regimes in which the hegemon exercises control over the system. International regimes play an important role here in keeping the system alive even when there is a decline in hegemonic power. The most important example of this is the 1970s, when the fragmentation of US hegemony did not lead to a total collapse of the world economic system (Krasner, 1982, pp.499-500).

Krasner (1982) points out that, even if the hegemonic structure loses its capacity to operate a regime, the system remains stable since the well-established order provide norms, rules and principles for the rest of the world and it does not led a secondary states to take advantage of the system by easy access to information. Such a regime may also 'strengthen or weaken the resources of particular actors.' That is, it may destroy the environment that first created it (p.504). At this point, international security regime offers an order that suggests superpowers to make concessions in the system rather taking advantage of the weakness of others in terms of creating more peaceful system. On the issue, Jervis (1982) defines a security regime as, "Principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate." Besides creating an atmosphere for cooperation, the regime prevents states to be in pursuit of their short-run interests. The possibility of reciprocate in state relations, led states to refrain using military apparatus as a means of achieving their goals (p.357). According to Krasner (1985), even if rules and procedures change in a regime, principles and norms remain unchanged. An essential change in the latter is resulted with disappearance of the regime. For Jervis (1982) the Concert of Europe was a security regime in history which was created between 1815-1823 and a war was refrained since great powers was not in pursuit of maximizing their power. The term that defined the era was 'concession' to others to keep the system in coherence (p.363). Keohane (1984) also emphasizes that the system might remain stable after the decline of hegemony and adds that, "Regimes may be maintained, and may continue to foster

cooperation, even under conditions that would not be sufficiently benign to bring about their creation. Cooperation is possible after hegemony. The decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead to decay of international regimes" (pp.50-51).

Norrlof (2010) points out that while the neo-realist perspective defends the existence of a hegemon in the world system, it also indicates the need for public goods for other states to take advantage of the order. It allows the emergence of the free-rider issue that is against hegemonic interests. Nevertheless, the system is still based on considering other states' interests, so it makes the hegemon responsible and benevolent. However, this approach has some contradictions with the theory that states are focused on self-interest. Additionally, there is not just one style of hegemon. One style is benevolent but the other is more exploitative, tending to use force to perpetuate the international system. Another point of view claims that, if secondary states ally with hegemonic interests, there is no need to use such power and behave exploitatively (pp.13-15).

At the same time, some neo-realists are more pessimistic about the hegemonic world order. For them, the balance of power conception also suggests a crisis in international politics. For example, Krahnemann (2005) argues that such a powerful hegemonic structure may create problems in the global system since there is no other state to balance the hegemon, smaller states may feel that their interests are threatened and start an anti-hegemon campaign (p.535). However, the existence of potential anti-hegemonic opponents wishing to create an alternative world system in accordance with their vision does not always mean that large-scale conflicts or wars will result. Volgy and Imwalle (1995) predict that any decline in the hegemon's military or economic performance may encourage challenges to its power "in the forms of crises and interstate wars" (p.827). To prevent such challenges, "hegemony acts to distort the relationship between national achievement and international recognition. Hegemons are likely to create rules for ascription consistent with conformity to hegemonic leadership and to seek to minimize status for those who are in conflict with hegemonic norms" (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995, p. 827).

1.4 MARXIST-GRAMSCIST PERSPECTIVE

Marxist-Gramscist perspective, specifically Gramsci's concept of hegemony, forms the main theoretical anchor of this study since it is assumed that it contributes more to understanding US global hegemony. The origins of Gramsci's writings can be found in the conditions in which he wrote his *Prison Notebooks* about hegemony, fascism's success in his country, Italy, the bourgeoisie's failure to prevent it, and the setback created by fascism's domination (Martin, 1997, pp.38-39). In essence, in the Gramscian sense, hegemony is a nation-based subject regarding the dominance of a leading structure over all other parts of society (Litowitz, 2000, p.516). Regarding the origins of Gramsci's thoughts on hegemony, Cox (1983) mentions two elements. The first is the foundation of the first communist state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) based on the ideas of Lenin. The second is Machiavelli's thoughts about hegemony. The Soviet leadership emphasized two aspects of the leading class: while the use of force over other uncooperative classes was seen as one tool, consent was exercised among allied groups (p.163-4). In Gramsci, Lenin's working class is transformed into the bourgeoisie, which gains hegemony by granting certain concessions to subordinate groups without using coercion. Thus, it involves civil society in the political process (Cox, 1983, p.1208). While the Soviet standpoint confines hegemony to the domination by the proletarian class, Gramsci's hegemony is established for political leadership and for society in general (Joseph, 2002, p.28).

Antoniades (as cited in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 166-366) states that there are two components of state control: one is domination, based on use of force; the other is hegemony, mainly based on consent. While the military, the police and other security apparatuses of the state are responsible for establishing dominance over society, hegemony also involves legitimizing all the leading class's beliefs and thoughts as if they were the conscious, shared choices of society (Litowitz, 2000, p.519). Additionally, for Gramsci, the leading groups should make concessions to the needs of the rest of society to reach a compromise for a strong, stable state. Thus, he concludes that there is an alternative to a state-focused point of view of the international system (Antoniades, 2008, pp. 3-4). Regarding the limits of consent and coercion as state apparatuses, Moolakkattu (2009) argues that the ruling classes use their intellectual

capability to require less coercion and more consent. The state is thus the combination of political and civil society with coercion being a hidden arm of the ruling group that is not used unless needed (p. 441). Conceptualizing hegemony from a neo-Gramscian perspective, Cox (1982) first suggested that hegemony arises on the basis of consent, which means the adoption of thoughts and their support through material resources and institutions. In this perspective, the two pillars of hegemony are material capabilities and a set of institutions that act in harmony with each other (p.139).

In relation to both the ruled and ruling classes fixing their interests in favor of the order, Clark (as cited in Cox, 1996, p. 136) questions the legitimacy of hegemony, explains this through Cox's perspective: "To become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, an order which most other states could find compatible with their interests." Clark (2011) goes on to use Cox's arguments to clarify the concept of hegemony in the world system. Once a certain order has been established under the leadership of a particular state, a system based on consent can be created and maintained (p. 20).

Although Gramsci's concept of hegemony originally applied mostly to the state level system, he believed that a universal hegemony under the umbrella of the Communist International was feasible through a war of position.² It would require creating a counter-hegemonic structure equipped with the same weapons of former the hegemonic order and the same economic, political and ideological powers (Gill, 1992, p.53).

Gramsci's emphasis on culture and identity is also visible in Cox's historical perspective. For Cox, events and all parts of society that play an important role in constructing the system have to be taken into consideration at a certain time of history (Moolakkattu, 2009, p.441). According to Buckel and Lescano (2009), all sides of the hegemonic establishment constitute a hegemonic bloc, although this does not mean that every component of the structure shares an equal position in the struggle to be the hegemon (pp.442-3). Considering the relations and struggle in the internal dimension of

² The war of position constitutes a longer term strategy, coordinated across multiple bases of power, to gain influence in the cultural institutions of civil society, develop organizational capacity, and to win new allies. As in a game of chess, power lies not just in the playing pieces, but in the configuration of forces, and each set of moves and counter-moves presents fresh possibilities to prise open the seams of a historical bloc (Levy and Egan, p.807).

hegemony, a historic bloc is created by a complex political strategy through which society is changed, reshaped and kept in harmony with this bloc's political vision and interests. Although it is known that these structures and classes do not always share the same point of view, hegemony may help these classes to minimize these divergences in social processes. State tools allow to these structures to get around economic interests and application of hegemonic intentions (Joseph, 2002, pp.28-32).

While complex and multidimensional elements appear as the leader, the struggle does not end here. As the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, struggles to maintain its authority over civil society, it also has to remain superior to other groups in terms of the economy, culture, values and institutions to maintain its leadership. That is, hegemony is related to all aspects of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology. If opposition groups wish to defeat a bourgeois-led system, they first have to capture civil society (Maglar, 2013, p.2). In any case, the order is ruled by bourgeois. Maglar (2013) states that, "Goal of Gramscian philosophy, so long as civil society and its organizations have been associated with the bourgeois class itself and its ideological hegemony." (p.3). This means that any conflicting group which conquers civil society takes over control of the state. The societies in which hegemony can take hold include particularly Western states, where there is hardly any resistance to the dominant lifestyle, and where there is a high level of compliance with it (Litowitz, 2000, p.531).

Civil society includes all economic and political institutions that play an important role in maintaining society, such as the media, religious organizations and educational institutions. Civil society tries to control all opponents and anti-state discourses and activities by pacifying them to create a consensus between the state and those opponents, but without using the apparatus of coercion. Additionally, Gramsci attributes a special role to intellectuals for maintaining the system by forcing them to legitimize the ideology of state and keep society in alignment with the hegemonic order's interests. In the process, these petty intellectuals are turned into organic intellectuals (Buckel and Lescano, 2009, p.443). For Gill (1992, p.51) organic intellectuals construct strong ties between the structure and superstructure, although their mission does not end here. They also shape hegemony ideologically, creating an atmosphere in which hegemony

can thrive and perpetuate itself. Thus, they have a powerful position in the historic bloc by theorizing the most acceptable and appropriate ideology.

Cox (1994) defines hegemony in a wider context by emphasizing the ties among society, economy, culture, gender and ideology that determine the future of political rule. However, besides this underlying dominance, hegemony means more. It has an internalized coherence, even if it is not a product of internal dynamics but involves some external imposition (p. 366).

Internationalizing Gramsci's hegemony concept, Cox (1981) emphasizes the idea of historical structure that creates the necessary conditions for the revolution of the bourgeoisie. According to Cox (1981),

Historical structure is a particular combination of thought patterns, material conditions and human institutions which has coherence among its elements. These structures do not determine people's actions in any mechanical sense but constitute the context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place (p.136).

When these structures rely on indirect methods instead of pure force to maintain hegemonic leadership, counter-hegemonic upheavals may occur. If they have sufficient power, suitable conditions and resources, a new structure may arise. While material capabilities include all kinds of usable resources, ideas also create a common sense in society as a unifying factor. There is an important tie between concept of hegemony and institutions since they have capability to halt internal strife without resorting to violent force (Cox, 1981, pp.136-7).

Gill (1992) argues that hegemony occurs when material capabilities and ideas are in harmony (p.46-47). Regarding the success of hegemony in the international arena, Gill (1992) argues that "when the major institutions and forms of organizations –economic, social and political – become models for emulation in other subordinate states" (p. 47). According to Cox, (1983) world hegemony requires a conveyor, namely the international institutions that are responsible for expanding the hegemonic order to subaltern states with less damage to hegemon's interests. Economic expansion and its law are imposed on others through the power that established hegemony over others, specifically through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and similar institutions. These actors are, at the same time, legitimizing and ideological

agents that work in favor of the ruling powers. While core countries establish and dominate in such an order, the elites in periphery countries prefer to cooperate with the system in the hope of finding a method that can benefit peripheral states. However, their passive revolution attempts fail so they become conveyers of 'modernization' to their own developing or undeveloped countries, making them agents of the dominating forces. Their thinking is now consistent with the hegemonic order.

While the end of WWII marked a new era in hegemonic structure, Rupert (1990) argues that, once the previous conflict driven world system ended, a new kind of hegemonic formation, a new state/society complex, was constructed with the United States at its heart. Although it created a partial peace and internal prosperity at a national level, it was achieved at the expense of international strife and rivalry (p.9).

1.5 WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

This important theory, introduced by the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, provides a clear explanation of the current concepts of hegemony and hegemonic order. Wallerstein addresses the world-system on the basis of historical, economic and social transitions and systematic change. One core concept of the theory is the world-economy, which is a social system and economic surplus under the control of the capitalist market and at the same time the decisive mode of production (Wallerstein, 1976a, p.345). To summarize the theory, Wallerstein analyzes the capitalism that developed in Western Europe through its historical background. He follows the Marxist tradition by referring to the economic exploitation that develops around a capitalist system. He considers two main eras, which he examines in terms of economic transition. Specifically, the basis of the capitalist economy was shaped in the sixteenth century in Europe (Elmas, 2010, pp.134-136).

Regarding the emergence of the world-system, Wallerstein looks at the crisis of feudal Europe in the sixteenth century and the rise of a capitalist system that totally changed the mode of production. The division of labor removed boundaries while eroding the domination of one group over production, a kind of interdependency among states. Wallerstein (1976a) summarizes the situation as follows:

[C]ontrol by ruling groups is operated primarily not through weapons of force but through access to decisions about the nature and quantity of the production of goods (via property rights, accumulated capital, control over technology, etc.). The other basic dichotomy was hierarchy of economic specialization, core versus periphery, in which there was an appropriation of surplus from the producers of low-wage, low-profit, low-capital intensive goods by the producers of high-wage, high profit, high-capital intensive, so-called ‘unequal exchange’(pp.350-351).

According to the theory, there are recurrent cycles in the world economy because the system is dynamic and changeable, making possible the decline and rise of hegemonic powers in the world-system. Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995, pp.388-9) provide a comprehensive definition of world-system theory by describing it as not only the ‘world market’ or cultural, political structure. Rather, its structural base results all kinds of economic, social and political relations, and has no borders. According to DuPlessis (1998), the focus is on the system not its units, and on the history of the system not the history of particular states or groups. The capitalist nature of the system prevents it being taken under the control of any one country or region. Moreover, capital is not limited within national or regional borders and does not operate in favor of these units (pp.222-3). DuPlessis (1998) argues that the system itself, by allowing the production of goods for exchange in the market, turns out to be the global hegemonic power.

For Chase–Dunn and Grimes (1995), there are two basic structures which create order in the system: core and periphery societies. While the first is the decisive power regarding the mode of production and mutual relations, besides being highly developed, the second is less-developed, and a well-organized hierarchy keeps periphery states in their secondary position. Although the system is shaped around these two structures, there is another component, the semi-periphery, which acts as a bridge between them. This structure shares similarities with both the core and the periphery a tall levels, and helps maintain the system (pp.388-9).

Wallerstein (1976b) also discusses the difference between core, periphery and semi-periphery structures. The core has a clear hierarchical superiority in production, technology and other areas over the periphery. Periphery states have low profits, less-developed technological equipment and less diversified means of production. Semi-peripheral structures have a special place in the theory because it is easy for them to

take advantage of the system. For instance, when an economic crisis occurs, it is easier for them to adapt to new economic conditions and markets than both core and periphery states. Semi-peripheral states may also act against both core and periphery interests to minimize their losses in world market during times of a breakdown (p.462-3).

Each component has specific role, with the core, as the center of capital, representing all high level, high profit economic activity, while periphery states are the source of raw materials more than capital. The generation of surplus, which is essential for the system to be maintained, is thus an issue of hierarchical transfer, going from the periphery via the semi-periphery to the core (Robinson, 2011, pp. 729-30). Regarding this hierarchical structure of the world-system, Strausfogel (1997) states the following:

The trends observed are the continuing expansion of the world-system; increases in the commodification of land, labor and capital; state formation; the size of economic enterprises; the transnationalization of capital; mechanization; and the proletarianization and polarization of the work force (p.125).

Although the core should be considered as one state or region, there may also be rivalry between core states to take advantage of the system to increase their economic gains. Additionally, the capitalist world-economy involves all regions and countries in the system till it reaches its ecological limits (Sanderson, 2005, p.181).

Even though economic processes and units have a decisive role within world-system theory, culture also deserves consideration. Culture creates a base for the construction and appropriation of a 'global culture' which feeds the world economy and world polity in the system (Strausfogel, 1997, p.122).

Chase-Dunn et al. (1994) explain the concept of World Empire in terms of the three elements of core, semi-periphery and periphery. These form a cycle and hierarchy in which it is possible to lose position when the core loses its base and the semi-periphery takes its place. This cyclical change enables the new core to control the periphery and exploit all its economic, political and social assets to maintain its hegemonic dominance of the so-called 'world empire'. The hegemon controls the whole system by producing and exchanging goods. Therefore, the rise and fall of a hegemon depends on its economic and other capabilities, particularly its military capacity and power (pp.361-2).

Robinson (2011) points out that the world system does not turn into a world empire because of its capitalist nature because the source of power derives from its untransformed nature. Additionally, the world system encompasses all structures by combining all states, groups and people via a common market (pp.727-8).

Chase-Dunn et al. (1994) remark that there is a link between hegemony and means of payment, which leads powerful states to compete for operating capital. In addition, hegemony can only be perpetuated through the permanency of capital accumulation and world historical development. Therefore, the system has to be based on the superiority and priority of hegemon and its leading structures by controlling the accumulation of surplus (p.366). According to Sanderson (2005), the capitalist world-economy contains hegemony cycles in which the most powerful economically or otherwise leads the world economy over other core states. However, no core state can perpetuate its position forever, and may lose its base when a stronger core state takes its place. On this basis, only three states in history can be considered as hegemons: the Netherlands (1625-75), Britain (1815-73) and the United States (1945-70) (p.182).

Being a hegemon brings various privileges, including a determining position regarding the laws, rules and order of the system, while also dominating the system politically. While this allows the hegemon to maximize its interests, it makes conflict inevitable over capital, world markets, natural resources, etc. (Robinson, 2011, p.731).

Wallerstein (1993a) suggests that the system works by states from the leading group, the bourgeoisie, dominating the proletarians by controlling the decision-making process about how the system runs. As he puts it, “[r]uling groups operate through access to decisions about the nature and quantity of the production of goods (via property rights, accumulated capital, control over technology etc.)” (p.350).

Regarding the relationship between hegemony and world-system theory, Wallerstein (1993b) remarks that a decisive factor for gaining hegemonic power is having economic superiority. The destructive nature of WWII totally destroyed previous rivalries in Europe while the internal dynamics of the United States were improving in areas such as production and technology. According to Wallerstein, there were four factors behind the rise of the United State as a hegemonic power. The first was its attempt to

reconstruct other important powers to establish and perpetuate the economic system by balancing production and consumption rates. This was combined with propaganda to promote the mentality of a free world for all. Second, the United States became the only military power able to suppress any challenge to its economic order, as well as easily containing the Soviet Union threat militarily. The third factor was becoming a shield against communism as a guarantee for all countries. Finally, the United States adopted an emancipatory role regarding Asian and African colonies in order to incorporate them into the system (pp.1-2).

Wallerstein and Zukin (1989) emphasize economic power over other fields, noting the thirty great years that the United States experienced following WWII, when it gained control over production and dominated militarily and politically (p.432). Robinson (2011) takes a distinctive non-nation-state-centric position about the future of hegemony and hegemonic power. Instead, he suggests that following the end of US hegemony in the world economy and system, no single nation state will replace it since transnational organizations, institutions and groups do not have geographical limitations and are not bound by state control (p.741).

World-system analysis helps to understand the rise and fall of a hegemon in the system. Whenever one state rises as a new economic, political and military power it means that another is declining. The hegemon has control over all kind of economic activities, technology and military power. Dominating these fields brings ideological superiority and acknowledgement by the rest of the world. However, deep economic depressions and world wars may sweep away the current hegemon and create a new one, as has happened in historical long-wave cycles (McCormick, 1990, pp.128-9). The volatile structure of the system may cause such dramatic changes, which can be termed hegemonic transitions. In short, all competition is about accumulation and, in the case of changing accumulation, hegemonic power also changes hands (Chase-Dunn et al. 1994, p.371).

By creating a kind of stability, hegemony is the desired system for capital owners and important industrial sectors. However, order is not the only motivation for the middle-class's preference for hegemony because expectations of a bright economic future are also important. Why then does hegemony not continue permanently? Wallerstein (2005)

claims that this is because the hegemon has to undertake various political and military roles that undermine its position. For example, if other core states try to replace the hegemonic power by controlling economic processes, the dominant state may have to resort to military force. Because safeguarding and perpetuating the system is expensive, a decline in all fields may occur and a new power may rise over about 30 years. This implies that the system does not depend on the existence of a particular hegemon but on any hegemon able to guarantee the accumulation of capital (pp.58-9).

One of the most important contradictions of hegemonic power is related to its two major responsibilities. McCormick's (1990) study finds the following:

The twin functions of the hegemon as global banker and global policeman lead it to overinvest in multi-national ventures abroad and in military production at home. If it sustains the high-level military spending necessary to carry out its global policing, it neglects civilian research and development, distorts its economy, and reduces its capacity to compete in world markets. On the other hand, if it cuts military spending to restore civilian productivity, it diminishes its role as global protector of a capitalist free world. This is a dilemma that a maturing hegemon cannot sustain both (pp.129-130).

There are various views regarding the source of hegemonic power. Some scholars see it as a harmony of economic and military domination. Another element that creates a hegemon is naval power, which provides it with geographic superiority. The last one is controlling and leading all kinds of economic innovations that dominate the flow of money. In contrast, scholars generally agree about the process of a hegemon's decline in the system, in particular referring to the difficulties of maintaining leadership and the existence of strong competitors in the core system (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, pp.412-3).

World-system theory considers that the United States lost its hegemonic position in the 1970s. Wallerstein (2003) gives a detailed description of the rise and fall of US hegemonic power. For him, the United States was invincible, both militarily and economically, after 1945. No one could compete with its economic power in world markets. US cultural superiority was another reason for this dominance. Later on, however, it lost this dominant position because of three events. First, it was weakened economically. Second, there was a global uprising against US hegemony. Third, it lost control over the periphery because third world states were no longer willing to be so

dependent on US dominance. As a result, the world is currently experiencing chaos in the capitalist order (pp.1-3). Gill (1992) asserts that neo-realism and world-system theory make many similar points, such as their agreement on the timelines of peace and chaos. In both, while peace is identified with the presence of a hegemon, chaos is the result of a struggle between core states (p.39). Although he is not Marxist, having a similar point of view with Wallerstein, Modelski (1978) mentions the long-cycle concept meaning a global system which has "recurrent pattern in the life (or functioning) of it. The concept implies that over a certain period of time the system, in some meaningful sense, returns to its starting point." (p.214). This global system oversees all other local, regional or world systems. A world power, arising following a world war, dominates the system but later on it finds a fierce power competition that leads to multipolarity. At this point, the system deteriorates and moves towards its inception. In today's global system, nation-states play important role in functioning of it (Modelski, 1978, pp. 217-230).

1.6 IN PURSUIT OF US HEGEMONY

This section considers the roots of US hegemony from a historical perspective. Although the three theories have different standpoints regarding the source of US hegemony, a general evaluation will take place under the title. While, realists argue that US hegemony provides stability, the Marxist-Gramscist approach considers it as a means of exploiting the third world, and the world-system perspective also takes the issue as a system that controls the third world through various economic and political methods. But, before the discussion of US hegemony, a state formation-based debate is appropriate to understand evolution of hegemonic order. Sorensen (2005) points out that even there were many 'types of social organizations' in history before sovereign state formation, sovereign states turned to be decisive political organization in world affairs and security. (p.81) However, Anderson (1996) claims that due to self-determination has been a challenge and rebellion to sovereign states and their security perception in the system (pp.37-38). The United States used the right of self-determination to legitimize waging the war against Germany and other states with US President Woodrow Wilson's principles. On the other hand, the United States' itself ignored the right for their own peoples. Later on the principle laid foundation of US operations in

Balkans and served for as a tool in weakening the sovereign states. Regarding transforming nature of state Sorensen (2005) asserts that modern state is changing towards postmodern state and with the transformation national economy is replaced with a global economy meaning a ' deep integration among the advanced economies'. The other dimension of change in the structure of state is threats to the national security such as terrorism (pp. 87-91). Response to these threats might result with the violation of international law that is frequently voiced for the United States actions. A transformation in the structure of state might lead to US to reconsider the functioning of hegemonic order and develop new behavior patterns to the rest of world.

Regarding the history of US hegemony, McCrisken (2003) notes the strong belief in US exceptionalism by policy-makers and American citizens have shaped US foreign policy as the leading role in world economics and politics. The American-Spanish war of 1898 can be seen as the turning point that allowed the United States to emerge as the rising power. While this was portrayed as a war against imperialism, this historical development later transformed the United States into an imperialist power (pp.3-18). However, the historical advice to future generations was rather different. As Kane (2006) reports, the United States' founding president, George Washington, advised future politicians not to join any alliances. Thus, while President Wilson initiated the League of Nations, his country preferred not to be part of it (p.3).

The path leading the United States towards becoming a hegemonic power can also be seen during WWI. There was a clear contradiction between the war policy of state and private sector in that the United States was the only country that supported the Allies politically while its armaments sector did not refrain from selling crucial arms to the Axis powers, which were diplomatically the United State enemy. Such a pattern of behavior is peculiar to a hegemon. Even if it was not banned under international law to sell arms to both fighting sides, this kind behaviors create dilemmas and absence of a great power to end it, strengthened the unilateralist behaviors of the United States in the international order (Kane, 2006, pp.76-7).

With Roosevelt, the United States followed an isolationist policy that focused on its own interests, even though it also attempted to create a stable and peaceful world order with the foundation of new institutions. However, this isolationist approach lost its justification in 1941 with the Pearl Harbor attack.³ The United States response to an attack on its home territory contradicted all aspects of its previous isolationist policy. Interventionists in all areas gained influence in the United States, and this marked the rise of a new hegemon to succeed Britain. The clear victory in WWII allowed the United States to expand its political, economic and ideological agenda to the rest of the world. As McCrisken (2003) points out, after 1941, rhetoric about the American Century could be heard. Although there was some dispute about the justification of using the atomic bomb and the lack of effort to halt the Holocaust, the United States was still seen as a liberator of all humans. As well as military power, an economic boom was another factor which gave rise to US hegemony. Summarizing the economic aspect of the post-1940s era, Denison (1985) points out that “[e]conomic history from 1929 to 1948 was dominated by depression and war. Then, the growth rate of national income was very high with 3.9 percent. What gives this period homogeneity is a sustained high rate of growth of productivity computed on a potential basis” (p.1). However, this superiority also created enmity, with the Cold War becoming a war of hegemony. US propaganda promoted the idea that it had an obligation to establish and then secure world peace and order.

Another element that contributed to US hegemony was its support for decolonization. This posture helped its ideas and values to expand and be adopted widely. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 was another important factor in the United States' path towards post-war hegemony. This declared that the United States would stand against the communist threat in Greece and Turkey instead of Britain, which could no longer assist the struggle financially, and signaled a clear challenge to Soviet expansionism. Then Marshall Plan, 1947, also enhanced the hegemonic stance of the United States by preparing to restore war-torn European economies, in which the United States dollar was a key actor. Kelly

³ The severe attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor naval base in the US led eventually to the US dropping the nuclear bomb on two Japanese cities, Nagasaki and Hiroshima, causing huge human losses. This act ended WWII and proved that that US military power could not be defeated by ordinary military methods. The resulting unchallenged deterrent power led to a new arms race with those states that had enough capability. The US's devastating attack may thus be seen as the dropping of the 'hegemonic bomb' in the world system.

and Lebow (2001) claims that WWII and the Cold War created a positive atmosphere in Europe in favor of US hegemony because Europe needed an ideology of democracy and US hegemony offered a concrete model. Standing against fascism had provided legitimacy to the United States as a hegemonic power, which allowed it to gain the consent of Europe's leading elites (p.604).

As a tool for enhancing US hegemony, the Marshall Plan made it easy for the United States to insert its leadership and expand its hegemony in Europe. According to Rupert (1990),

[p]urposive American intervention solidified the basis of centrist, liberal capitalist regimes in the occupied and liberated countries of the West, excluding both communist and fascist alternatives to the neoliberal state and clearing the way for a moderate, consensual politics of growth. It was in these terms that the American global hegemony of the post-war era was expressed (p.9).

The Korean War in 1950 was another opportunity for the United States to reinforce its image as protector of freedom and modern world values against the communist bloc. Thus, US military and economic power, as well as strong rhetoric regarding American ideals against the Soviet Union, acted together to create a world hegemon. However, the United States made its fatal mistake by sending troops into Vietnam in 1963, a year that marks the start of the decline in US hegemonic power. For the first time, it experienced a defeat that reversed earlier perceptions about the invincibility of its military power. As well as triggering discussions at home about US Cold War policy, Vietnam also damaged its economic situation. Thus, within just five years, US hegemony was being questioned and debated. According to Kelly and Lebow (2001),

The United States waged a costly and unsuccessful war in Southeast Asia that alienated public opinion in most of the country's closest allies. In more recent decades, American hegemonia has been further eroded by a score of poor international policies, including Reagan's bellicose foreign policy rhetoric, excessive Congressional hostility toward the United Nations and foreign aid in general, the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the landmine ban and the Kyoto accord, as well as the new unilateralism of the Bush administration symbolized by the reckless drive for national missile defense. (p.604).

Martins and Thompson (2007) offer a clear description of the United States as hegemon: “There is a need for a political function that can control competition among states and maintain interstate coordination in order to define the economic, juridical, political and military rules that guarantee the operation of a global capitalist economy” (p.6). One key sign of the decline in US hegemonic power was not any lack of military capability or ideological weakness but the current-account deficit in the balance of payments on the dollar. After the 1980s, US deficits grew to high levels that could not be tolerated. Although there was some improvement in the 1990s, it was temporary. Additionally, the United States economy could no longer achieve its previous high rates of growth (Martins & Thompson, 2007, pp. 17-23). In addition, it can be said that fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet regime resulted in the United States using its unipolar position, particularly militarily, to maintain its overwhelmingly dominant position over the system. However, this meant that it lost its ideological and political superiority (Kelly & Lebow, 2001, p.605).

Norrloff (2010) claims that economic dimension of the hegemonic power process should be emphasized first. The post-war era brought a relative welfare in the United States and other countries that created global support for the free-market economy. However, economic gains were not shared equally, while developing countries were forced to support political and economic reforms. Thus, instead of implementing structural reforms and transformation to eradicate under-development, these countries were forced to conform to the system created by the hegemon. Within this process, many economic, political and military institutions were established, such as the IMF, World Bank, G-7 and NATO. However, secondary states had little access to the benefits of these structures because those states at the top of the hierarchy maintained the real leverage over others. In particular, the United States kept control over trade and economic activities so that, even if it appeared to be altruistically safeguarding the global system against Soviet ideology it was probably an illusion since the United States benefitted most from the world order, economically and politically (pp.15-7).

Other scholars point out that Europe no longer needed the United States as much as it had during the Cold War, nor its military presence and hegemonic ambitions. Since Europe felt no serious international threat to itself, and problems were more common

within Europe, the situation did not require the patronage of a superpower. Additionally, Europe was seeking a way to establish its own defense policy since the United States had lost its flexible and reconciling approach in times of crisis (Calleo, 2000, pp.70-71). However, the key reasons for the decline in US hegemonic power were not only ideological or political. Cox (2001) calls attention to economic factors and a setback in the Bretton Woods system, which had been a source of financial stability in the 1970s. Competition with rising economic powers, such as Japan, and the subsequent oil crisis triggered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) created an impasse for the superpower (p.320).

As to the military expansion of the hegemon, Park and Schwarz (2005) give some statistics. The United States has military installations in almost twenty countries and is the biggest arm seller of the world with 14 billion dollars in the 1990s (p.155). Such a military expansion should be evaluated in relation to the sharp policy change observed best after the September 11 attacks on the United States. With this clear challenge, the deterrence system that "relies on the existing power balance to prevent an adversary from seriously considering a military challenge because of its expected adverse consequences" (Lebow & Stein, 1995, p.162) that developed after 1945 was replaced by a doctrine of preventive war after September 11 attacks that overturned the existing international political order. This meant that the United States, as hegemonic power, preferred to dominate the capitalist system by force instead of consent. A realist perspective predicts that such imperial ambitions will not be able to support US hegemony in the long run (Golub, 2011, p.764).

US military has a decisive role in maintaining its hegemonic preponderance. On this point, Abraham (2005) remarks that US military bases, extending worldwide, are intended to remove all threats to its hegemony, particularly those of rivals such as China and Russia. Thus, a modern containment policy seems to be emerging. Not surprisingly, base deployments and the search for investment in host countries takes place alongside (p.5447).

Regarding discontent with US hegemony, Ferguson (2004) argues that, even though it includes some illiberal features, in essence it adopts liberal democratic values, market economy and interventions as a military tool, and these elements form the hegemonic

characteristics of the United States. Moreover, it aims to secure raw materials such as petroleum and gas. However, while the military is crucial for ruling, nongovernmental organizations and companies, and the local bourgeoisie are other important elements for establishing a hegemonic order.

As already mentioned, some scholars argue that, following the end of WWII, US hegemonic dominance began to decline in 1970 when the United States lost its monopoly over the world economic system with the collapse of Bretton Woods system that the United States dominated the world economy by using dollar as the only currency that other countries were obliged to tie their currencies as exchange rate. As a result of this setback, the hegemon began to increase its military activities and interventions (Go, 2007, p.10).

The end of the Cold War intensified debates regarding US hegemonic power. Ikenberry (1989) asserts that “in terms of the ideals and plans it originally articulated, the United States got much less than it wanted; in terms of direct involvement in leading the postwar western system, it got much more involved than it wanted” (p. 376). At this point, a comparison with the major military and economic powers may help evaluate US hegemonic expansion in the post-Cold War era. Posen (2003) argues that military strength is one of the symbols of US hegemony, and statistics show that the United States has not decreased its defense budget, which still surpasses all other developed countries. He considers the United States' hegemonic position as one of command of the commons, and asserting that its superiority in military, economics, ideology and technology is still unquestionable. Additionally, its nuclear capability and high-technology weapons, and skilled personnel to use them, give the United States a unique superiority over all other states in the system (pp.7-10).

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting unipolar power structure encouraged the United States to renew its security politics in the 1990s. Barber (1994) defines the United States' new role of military hegemony as ‘executer of operations other than war’; is meaning that it avoids engaging in large-scale wars while undertaking small scale military operations. Given the absence of a global challenge to US interests as happened in the Korea and Vietnam wars, the new doctrine emphasizes that there is no longer a need for huge military engagements, and that ad-hoc operations, such as

Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991, are enough to allow the United States to achieve its goals. Changing security policies include “peacekeeping, counter terrorism operations, counter-drug operations, sanction enforcement, raids and strikes” (pp.1- 4).

However, even though the United States continues to maintain its hegemonic position in many areas, such as finance, military and ideology, a prominent decline is visible. The current-account deficit in payments, the problem of legitimacy and the United States military-political reaction to the 9/11 attacks reveal that securing the system is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive, which suggests that the United States is losing its capacity to fully control these components (Martins, 2007, p.17).

The United States' aggressive reaction to the September 11 attacks triggered a new discussion about US hegemony in which it was criticized for neglecting the soft power element of hegemony and focusing on hard power, which actually refers to consent and coercion. Additionally, since military force is focused on more than necessary, the United States should realize that its message cannot be expanded by power politics (Golub, 2011, p.765).

Thus, it can be considered that the September 11 attacks opened a new era in the discussion of US hegemony. Astrada (2010) has described the new hegemonic position of the United States:

The United States engages in a unilateral hegemony of a ‘new’ type- one that pre supposes interaction with select allies before acting, yet with predetermined imperatives. Hegemony directs allies’ actions according to specific US interests. Unilateralism is based on the perception of the United States as a global as well as regional hegemonic power in the ‘new’ post-9/11 security context (p.27).

The size of the United States defense budget in 2006 also indicates that it is eager to perpetuate its military hegemony. As Table 1 shows, US military spending is more than the rest of the world combined. This clearly implies that no other regional power can match US military expenditure so it continues to invest in its military to expand its hegemonic power.

Table 1-Defense Expenditures for the Major Powers (2006)

	Defense Expenditures (\$ Billions)	% Great Power Defense Expenditures	% World Defense Expenditures	Defense Expenditures % of GDP	Defense R&D Expenditures (\$ Billions)
The United States	528.6	65.6	46	4.1	75.5
China	49.5	6.1	4	2	n.a
Japan	43.9	5.4	4	1	1.1
Germany	36.9	4.6	3	1.4	1.1
Russia	34.7	4.3	3	4.1	n.a
France	53	6.6	5	2.5	3.9
Britain	59.2	7.3	5	2.7	4.4

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The 15 Major Spending Countries in 2006,” at

<http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2012.xlsx>

Table 1 clearly shows that no other regional power can reach the military expenditures of the United States and it continues to invest in military to expand its hegemonic power.

CHAPTER II

2. INSTALLATION OF US MILITARY BASES

This chapter focuses on the historical background to the United States military bases and the elements of the first examples. In terms of the establishment of US hegemony, its bases in Latin America are distinct in largely reflecting the coercive element of its hegemonic expansionism. The chapter examines on the doctrines which shaped US military posture and US hegemony in various parts of the world, and the penetration of the United States hegemony in Europe through its post-WWII policies.

2.1 OVERVIEW OF US MILITARY EXPANSIONISM

From a theoretical perspective, the establishment of bases in a number of countries requires us to consider whether they result from an invitation or the consent of host countries or due to pure coercive pressure. It is also important to investigate whether these military installations were so crucial to the United States security, especially after the end of the Cold War. Böhme (2012) argues that the level of technology that the United States has reached since WWII indicates that it does not require these military bases as much as it is assumed. Aircraft carriers, which are just like mid-ocean bases, long-range missiles that can hit any target, and the in-flight refueling capacity for fighter aircraft raise doubts about the need for a US military presence in several countries. It is reasonable to argue that these bases' function is more to expand its hegemony in a territory than preventing imperialist attacks against the United States. These bases also transfer US-led capitalist economic dynamics to the host countries, turning them into huge market for services and commodities. Additionally, they play a role in transforming the host countries' armies and creating prototype structures, besides serving as source of intelligence for the United States. Even during crises, the United States prefers not to close down its bases but rather to negotiate to guarantee their permanency (pp.58-65).

In short, it can be seen that economic, political and military conditions determine US base policy. For instance, while the United States employed coercive power more in Latin America, it used cultural and economic expansionism in Europe. Lundestad (1986) points out that, following the end of WWII, US influence in Western Europe was

extended militarily, politically and culturally, with the formation of NATO solidifying US influence in the continent. The United States took an active part in any attempt by Western European countries to eliminate the communist structures. The United States also linked the provision of economic assistance to these countries with military installations. The Marshall Plan, set up in 1947 to restore war-torn Europe and to create an unshakable alliance with Western Europe, was a conscious step towards creating consent among European states (p.267). In contrast, the first US military bases established in Latin America reflected of the United States coercive power.

Having gained independence and defeated Spain in the colonial war of 1898, the United States gradually rose to become the new imperial power in its hemisphere. Since military predominance is the most important precondition of being a hegemon, the United States has successfully used its military superiority against all other states that challenge its hegemonic aspirations. Statistics may help to give a clear picture of US' involvement in overseas missions. By the 1970s, almost a million military personnel were serving around the world in different bases. WWII and the post-war era led the United States to establish many military facilities in Europe against the Soviet threat, and this policy gained momentum once communism took control in China, Czechoslovakia and half of Germany. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 caused the immediate redeployment of US military components (Tarr, 1966, pp.32-4). When Japan surrendered to the United States to end WWII, permanent US military bases were created, among which Okinawa is the most well-known, and described as the 'US city in Japan' and the base was criticized both by the Japanese themselves and at a global level because of the illegal treatment and abuses of local people by US military personnel.

Gerson (2009) claims that the United States has more than 100 military installations in Japan, and there are reports that US soldiers have been involved in rapes, deadly traffic accidents, fights, murders etc. These bases host missiles and missile defense systems, and they have been used to attack or invade third countries in case of threat perception by the United States (p.52-4). In effect, the United States base web ranges widely across all of Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa, which host such installations willingly or unwillingly, and withdrawal or relocating is determined according the possibility of

war or threat perception. Fields (2004) points out that US overseas bases policy has changed since the September 11 attacks, with new missions being established in many countries such as in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Washington prefers to keep one of its biggest installations in Germany, almost 80,000 military personnel, although there is no an imminent threat against its territory (p.80).

Figure 1- US Military Bases World Wide



Source: <http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2009/8/23/114055/036>

Johnson (2004) claims that the United States has military installations in 130 countries including 700 bases. He summarizes the latest trends regarding US bases:

Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians, teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task forces built around aircraft carriers. After Sept 11 new bases were opened. In the impoverished areas of the "new" Europe - Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria; in Asia -Pakistan (where we already have four bases),

India, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and even, unbelievably, Vietnam; in North Africa -Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria; and in West Africa -Senegal, Ghana, Mali, and Sierra Leone. The models for all these new installations, according to Pentagon sources, are the string of bases we have built around the Persian Gulf in the last two decades in such anti-democratic autocracies as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.⁴

Regarding US intentions through these overseas military bases, Gerson (2009) argues that, while they support the status quo in different regions, the possession of these bases makes easier to reach natural resources, such as oil and gas, for instance in the Middle East. Additionally, they are used to contain ‘enemy countries’ as it did against the Soviet and Chinese during the Cold War. These installations serve US military plans and interventions in different countries. Finally, “they create jumping-off points for US military intervention” (pp.54-55).

Another dimension of the base issue is the occurrence of the so-called base wars. Harkavy (1989) shows how this base race resulted in various invasions, wars and interventions. For instance, when the United States became concerned about a Soviet base in the Caribbean, it invaded Grenada in 1983. Likewise, the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in 1979 to acquire easier access to the Persian Gulf, which caused the United States to reinforce its bases in neighboring countries such as Turkey in response.

As to how this military build-up affected the people of host countries, Vine (2009) gives a few examples:

In Alaska, in 1942 the Navy displaced Aleutian islanders from their homelands to live in abandoned canneries and mines in southern Alaska for three years. In Puerto Rico, the Navy carried out repeated removals on the island of Vieques. (...) In Okinawa, the military seized large tracts of land and bulldozed houses for bases during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. Displacement continued into the 1950s, affecting 250.000 people or nearly half of Okinawa’s population (p.66).

⁴ The US Defense Department’s annual Base Structure Report for the fiscal year 2003 is the source for Prof. Johnson’s article. Even if the department is updating its data annually, the total figures remain similar in general.

Dancs (2009) reports that the United States budget for overseas bases, military personnel and facilities is 250 billion dollars, on top of which it is necessary to add the costs of various wars, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

2.2 MONROE DOCTRINE LAYS THE FOUNDATION OF US SECURITY POLICY

It is appropriate to address the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the United States' political, military and economic vision regarding the Americas and its rivalry with Europe, since it lay at the core of US foreign policy. In 1823, James Monroe, President of the United States, declared two basic foreign policy principles. The first was de-colonization, which provided justification for the United States to control territories it considered crucial to its interests. The second referred was non-intervention, which legitimized the United States' use of force (Meiertöns 2010, pp.25-6).

Through the Monroe Doctrine, the United States aimed to keep all European powers out of its hemisphere by announcing the principles and considering that any military intervention in South America was a threat to its existence. The political atmosphere in Europe, especially in Spain and France, favored monarchism over liberalism, and both countries aimed to reestablish their control in America, so it seemed a clear threat to the United States (Root, 2010, p.429).

In one of his addresses to Congress, President Monroe stated the following:

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. (...) We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere (History of Congress, 1823, pp.14-23).

However, this official presentation of the doctrine hides the real intent behind it by consistently emphasizing values of liberty and democracy. The then Secretary of State of the United States, Hughes (1923) commented that, since the United States recognized Brazil, Mexico, Chile and some former other colonies, any intervention in these

countries from Europe (the Holy Alliance) represented a challenge to US security. Thus, this official perspective considered South America as the United States' backyard and connected to the north in terms of economy, security and peace. Therefore, it was impossible to think of it as a separate territory or with different interests. The Monroe Doctrine was passed down to other US governments and it was a clear message to Europe's expansionist countries which had colonial ambition on the region. For US politicians, the declaration defended the United States' hemisphere and prevented the Old World from realizing their imperialist ambitions over the New World (pp.612-5).

Meiertöns (2010) claims that this doctrine did not originally include any idea of hegemonic expansion into South America, with self-defense against imperialist European powers being its main motivation. However, almost 50 years later the doctrine represented US dominance over the whole continent. Its main intention was to prevent Europe dominating the Americas, with the United States alone retaining the 'right' to use military power against former colonies (pp.30-38). Thus, the doctrine seemed to provide a legal way of establishing hegemony in the continent, which paved the way to the United States becoming a new imperialist power in the global system. While the United States was trying to legitimize the principle *de facto*, domestically and abroad, it was questioned in the process of establishing the League of Nations. During the Cold War, the doctrine was used against the Soviet Union and formed the basis for other US doctrines (Hart, 1901, p.83).

In some respects, the implications of the doctrine for various Latin American countries worried their citizens, with an Argentine poet, for example, describing the doctrine as "Yankee imperialism", implying that is the doctrine's principles were just another imperialist version of the Old World, Europe (Pepper, 1914, p.114). Over time, the doctrine was transformed and, while its original aim had been to prevent any European invasion on the American continent, its later aim was to control American territory, militarily, politically and economically. After 1845, the United States adopted an approach based on annexing of the South to replace Old World powers, with the United States now considering itself as the only arbiter in Latin America (Hart, 1901, p.77). France's annexion of Mexico from 1861 to 1867 was a test of how the United States would implement the doctrine. In this case, the United States stated that France's

intervention represented an open threat to itself, and unless France withdrew a war was likely, so France had to leave the area. In similar fashion, after 1823, the United States gradually put an end to Spanish and French domination in South America (Hart, 1901, pp.81-82). Thus, the Monroe Doctrine played an important role in building US hegemony in South America.

2.3 FIRST US MILITARY BASES

In the 1900s, US statesmen envisaged that an undefeatable navy was essential for the United States to become a new superpower. This meant that overseas stations to provide coal fuel had to be established, so the first US military bases were established in Latin America at the end of the 1890s. The first overseas military installations were constructed in Cuba and Panama as both the Spanish-American War and the Panama Canal project were ongoing, making it necessary to protect US interests in these territories. Since then, the Guantanamo base in Cuba has served US plans in many ways: as territory for hosting US soldiers, fueling warships, and currently as a military jail for alleged Al Qaeda militants (Gerson, 2009). During the end of 19th century, the United States gradually expanded its colonial reach, annexing Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam (Gillem, 2007, p.20).

The completion of the Panama Canal was a turning point in US imperial plans because, by establishing a direct Atlantic-Pacific link, it made access to Asian, especially Chinese markets, easier and allowed the United States to respond to any territorial threat from the Old World. That is, both security and economic interests seemed to make the canal crucial to the United States. The Colombian government was not eager to allow the United States to carry out the project, which created the pretext for Washington to attack Colombia. Thus, Panama declared its independency from Colombia and eventually, the United States got what it wanted and, since then, the canal has continuously served US interests (Livingstone, 2009, p.13).

Poland (2009) gives a clear and brief background to the history of US military posts in Latin America:

US military bases in Latin America have had several missions: police interventions, troop training, counter-insurgency warfare, counter-drug operations, intelligence and

communication tasks. Bases in Panama and Puerto Rico provided convenient platforms to launch interventions in Central American nations which the United States did frequently from 1900 to 1933. The United States carried out its military interventions by naval forces from the sea. From 1907 to 1999, the United States had complex of military bases in Panama (pp.73-74).

To be more specific, the United States imposed its military presence 36 times in Latin America till 1934. For instance, the Dominican Republic and Haiti were occupied by the United States for a long time, since they occupied a critical position in relation to US economic ambitions (Livingstone, p.15). Likewise, the United States navy provided a constant means of intervention, remaining permanently ready on the coasts of Latin American countries in case of any order requiring military operations against them. This presence also played a role in overthrowing anti-US regimes in the region. For instance, when Nicaragua's democratically elected leader failed to cooperate with US policies, he was forced to resign in 1910 by US navy units (O'Brien, 2007, p.75).

2.4 INCREASING US MILITARY INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA DURING PRESIDENT WILSON ERA

During his eight-year presidency, President Woodrow Wilson contributed hugely to strengthening US military bases in South America. Installations in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala were reinforced by naval units, which did not refrain from intervention when US political apparatuses failed to achieve their goals (Birtle, 2009, p.191). As Wilson once admitted, "He was going to teach the South Americans to elect good men!" For example, in 1914, the United States military toppled Mexico's leader following a long standing intervention (Birtle, pp-192-199). While power politics dominated in relations with South America, the United States also provided financial aid to these countries, although the aim of such funding was to manipulate political, economic and military balances in Latin America in support of those repressive regimes that acted in parallel with US ambitions on the continent. In short, military interventions and foreign aid functioned side-by-side, and had a complementary structure (Schoultz, 1981, p.150).

The United States used various tools to prevent European expansionism by cutting access to strategic locations throughout the continent. For example, out of concern for

German expansionism towards Denmark, evidenced by its attempt to install a military base in Virgin Island, the Wilson government decided to buy the Danish Virgin Islands for 25 million dollars, which it later renamed the United States Virgin Islands (Vine, 2009, p.49). One of the long-term military deployments of the United States during the interwar years took place in China, beginning in 1912 and continuing for 26 years. This was in response to the Chinese Boxer Rebellion against foreign elements, which aimed to establish Chinese economic and political control over the country. Because this would have created a threat to the western presence and assets, the United States sent the military to protect its interests. Besides controlling Western interests in China, the base that was constructed also aimed to prevent expansion by imperialist Japan (Birtle, pp.249-242).

In recent years, the United States has dismantled its bases in Panama (1999) and Ecuador (2009). However, new ones were immediately installed in Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica and Ecuador. Naval units also patrol in the area, with the Fourth Fleet having restarted its activities in 2008 after a 58-year hiatus (Vine, 2012).

While the United States dominated Latin America during the Wilson era, Europe was ruined by WWI, which had only ended with the help of the United States. Following the end of the war, Wilson declared his 14 points to prevent future catastrophic wars among European powers. Although Wilson stated that the only aim of the declaration was “to make the world safe to live in and nothing peculiar to the United States”, the 14 points served long-term US interests. In addition, Bailey (1945) argues that the United States did not keep the promises it made to Europe, calling them “wartime idealism”. Despite initiating the establishment of the League of Nations, the United States refused to become member of it and the organization proved a failure. Meanwhile, the punitive structure of the Treaty of Versailles imposed a burden on Germany that was too heavy to bear, and the United States contributed to the collapse of the European economy by imposing high trade tariffs and barriers. Consequently, Europe’s economy fell into the Great Depression that paved the way for Hitler’s rise to power.

2.5 WORLD WAR II AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The WWII years had several effects on US hegemony. While European predominance over the world system, especially British dominance, declined rapidly before power was lost irretrievably, the United States became the only clear winner from the process. Europe's decline marked the rise of a new hegemon: the United States. On this issue, Drezner (2007) argues that the establishment of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (today's World Trade Organization) and NATO in the late 1940s served the interests of the new undisputed hegemon: "These organizations reflected its dominance, its preferences and were designed to boost the power of the United States and its European allies" (p.2).

US economic power was unchallengeable. Its gross national product had risen from 209.4 billion dollars in 1939 to 355.2 billion dollars in 1945. It produced 46% of the world's total electricity. It controlled over 59% of the world's total oil reserves. No other country's gross national product came close to even one-third of the United States' (Lundestad, 1986, p.164). Thus, as a great power, the United States was determined to end WWII to the disadvantage of the Axis powers, to enforce its hegemony over the Old World, and to win a victory of deterrence against Germany's expansionism. It therefore reached various bilateral agreements with Britain that gave it rights to bases in various British colonies, such as British Guyana, Newfoundland. It also established bases in Greenland and Iceland. During the WWII, the United States had won the right to keep air and naval bases in the North Atlantic such as Eastern side of the Bahamas, Southern coast of Jamaica for the next 99 years in exchange of transferring five warships to Britain (Schake, 1998, pp.34-35).

Vanveltner (2005) reports that US plans for base deployments in Europe and other key locations were drafted in 1944, with the Joint Post-war Committee preparing a document about overseas bases. While Alaska was initially considered to be the prime location from which to contain the Soviet Union, later its difficult climate conditions were taken into consideration, so Europe was marked as the most appropriate area for air and ground military installations (p.51). Four clear aims were given for establishing this military presence: a) to reinforce US hegemony as the leading power; b) to secure US interests abroad throughout Eurasia; c) to create a deterrent effect; d) to cooperate

with allies on military training (Kugler, 1998, p.13). Thus, the end of WWII allowed the United States to establish a new order that made it an unchallengeable hegemon. The war allowed the United States to control Germany, Korea and Japan, while military outposts were also formed in Italy (Gillem, 2007, p.16): “Between 1898-1945, the United States went from a continental empire to a global superpower, with only one rival-the former Soviet Union” (p.20).

Since the United States was not eager to abandon the bases that it had won during the war in the Pacific, it also looked for a way to dominate this region in order to retain its presence. Its goal was to encircle Pacific from the Philippines to Japan and Alaska. Accordingly, permanent bases were sited on Okinawa in Japan, the Ryukyu Archipelago in the Philippines and the Aleutian Islands in Alaska (Vine, 2009, p. 52).

While the Old World had been engaged in WWII, the United States and the Soviet Union had become divided by ideological, economic and political reasons. On the one hand, WWII reinforced Europe-US relations; on the other hand, it created a new kind of enmity between Washington and Moscow by emphasizing hegemonic contest (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004, pp.20-21). The war indicated the beginning of a new era in relations between Europe and US, an irreversible US involvement in the Old World’s politics. However, it also signaled the end of the United States’ previous isolationist policy established by the Monroe Doctrine. According to Sullivan (2008), end of the war also initiated a new historical conflict: US-Soviet rivalry in all fields, with the Soviet Union’s occupation of East Germany becoming a symbol of this ideological, military, political and economic contest. While the United States installed values such as democracy and capitalism, the Soviet Union supported the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, so it did not take long for Washington to get involved in proxy wars between communism and capitalism, initially in Greece and Italy (pp.17-18).

While some parts of the world were attracted by US’s free-market economic policies, its pro-independence approach to ending colonialism, and its support for the self-determination rights of new states, others rejected such ideals in favor of Stalin’s ideas (Herring, 2008, p.549). Lundestad (1986) points out that this rivalry had different aspects:

Only the United States became a global power in the years. While America's influence could be felt in most corners of the world, with only few exceptions the Soviet Union counted for little outside its border areas, however vast these border areas. The American expansionism went so deep and affected so many different parts of the world that it can be said to have resulted in an American empire.

Similarly, as the United States expanded its sphere of influence into Europe, it did not neglect Latin America. During WWII it used all means to ban trade with Europe, obliging the region to buy American weapons using its military aid program. Through its Good Neighbor Program, the United States made regular use of its military bases in Latin American countries. For instance, number of Mexican soldiers served in the United States army, while Brazil served as a port for US warships. The numbers of military personnel and bases increased during the war (Herring, pp.557-559).

As to how WWII contributed to US hegemony and the situation of Europe, it might be claimed that ideological divisions between East and West forced the United States to play a more active, hegemonic role in the continent to counter the Soviet Union, in the silent declaration of the Cold War (Tarr, 1966, pp.34-6). Disputes between the Soviet regime and the United States arising from WWII suddenly turned into a US containment policy against its erstwhile negotiating partner. The United States diplomat, George F. Kennan, constructed such a perception on the United States side with his famous telegram which was called 'Long Telegram' to the United States State Department. Published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine with 'X' nickname in 1947 under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Kennan's ideas played a crucial role in determining the United States policy and relations between the two sides, advising the containment of the Soviet Union. Kennan defended a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment" of the Soviet regime (Hixson, 1989).

In his telegram Kennan (*Foreign Affairs*, 1947) writes as follows:

[t]he Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. (...) It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies

will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Ironically, in 1948, just after his construction of this anti Soviet perception in US foreign policy, later developments forced him to resign. The Truman government decided to contain the Soviet regime through the deterrent effect of high-technology and hydrogen bombs, NATO cooperation, and by excluding Soviets from negotiations that were not in harmony with his Kennan's ideas. Kennan was against a militarized containment policy, preferring a disengagement policy in Europe. For Kennan, such huge pressure on the Soviet regime "consolidated communist power throughout Eastern Europe" (Hixson, 1989, p.73).

In 1947, the success of communists in the civil war in Greece between communists and conservatives motivated US President Harry S. Truman to declare the Truman doctrine, stressing "the policy of the United States' support to free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." While it created the basis for the development of US hegemony, in its first stage, 400 million dollars in foreign and military personnel aid was released for Greece and Turkey (Meiertöns, 2010, p.102). In his statement Truman (Yale Law School, 1947) declared that, "As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help." In contrast to the Monroe doctrine, the Truman doctrine still shapes US foreign and security policy, providing a foundation for US overseas military operations (Meiertöns, 2010, p.109). According to Meiertöns (2010), "[the] Truman Doctrine does allow for the use of force by the United States in cases of prior 'indirect aggression' as an aspect of US foreign policy. So it can be justified as an intervention upon invitation, as well as a collective exercise of self-defense and it creates necessary prerequisite for the use of force" (p.119).

In the post-war era, the United States aimed to revive Europe economically and militarily against the Soviet threat besides penetrating the Old World and creating a Europe dependent on permanent US aid. This resulted in the Truman Doctrine, on which the Marshall Plan was based on. Following the declaration of the Marshall Plan, 13 billion dollars of monetary aid was released for European countries destroyed during

the war. It showed its first effects in West Berlin, with its clear economic development compared to East Berlin, separated by two different ideologies. In response, the Soviet regime banned all border crossings (Marsh & Dobson, 2001, pp. 24-25). Following the financial and political backing to Europe, a military organization- NATO- which aimed to defend the western ally's interests was established in 1949. According to some scholars, the aim of NATO was to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down." While providing moral support to the Old World, the United States engineered a clear recovery in every area. Germany was also integrated back into Europe without raising French objections. The United States supported all kinds of activities of right-wing parties in these countries while hindering leftist movements. These economic, political and military sanctions had a deterrent effect on other formations aiming a pro-Soviet rule (Herring, 2008, pp.620-622). By supporting a German-French peace, the United States laid the foundations for a united Europe. Europe undertook a military commitment toward the United States that it could never reject by accepting economic aid with its conditions. Western Europe was anyway eager to remain under the United States' security umbrella against the Soviet threat (Ikenberry, 1989, pp.387-394).

The other turning point in US policy against the Soviet Union was National Security Council Paper (NSC) 68, published in 1950. This declared that the Soviet regime and communism was the only threat to world security, and that the United States would fight it until it was overcome. Following this declaration, the United States defense budget rocketed during the Eisenhower era from \$13 billion to \$50 billion (Brands, 1989, p.965). Although some commentators have claimed that the document was "designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish" in the Cold War, Layne & Schwarz (1993) argue that the document's perspective would have been the same even if the Soviet threat had not developed (p.5). Thus, this proves that the United States did not create the rules and new order in response to a threat or an enemy. Rather, it first established an order before struggling with those who were against it, as a hegemonic system requires.

Communism's relative success in China, Czechoslovakia and East Germany created a military alert on the United States side. The outbreak of the Korea war in 1950 marked a

new era in power struggle between the capitalist and communist worlds in which the United States implemented its containment policy against the Soviet Union. It replaced its military deployments in France with deployments in Germany and the UK, with intercontinental missile defense systems being developed as the foundation of deterrence (Tarr, 1966, pp.34-6). The Korea war also signaled a new US strategy to build bases, with the aim of preventing communist hegemony by creating counter-hegemony via these overseas bases. By 1957, the United States had 556 military installations in Europe (Schake, 1998, pp.37-38).

While NATO created a defense umbrella over Europe, it also provided the United States with an opportunity to deploy nuclear weapons in these countries against the Soviet threat. West Germany, Turkey, Italy, France, Netherlands, Greece, Britain, Belgium and Spain all hosted such weapons. These intermediate-range nuclear weapons were seen as a deterrence tool that could prevent a war between two blocks. Concerned by these weapons, a resistance movement emerged in European public opinion to get rid of these installations (Heller & Lammerant, 2009, pp.97-99). Meanwhile, some US military bases installed after WWII belonged to enemies during the war. For instance, the Aviano air base in Italy had hosted both Italian and German war planes, but later on Britain took control and made it an air operation base. Eventually, the base was handed over to NATO in 1954 as a preventive step against the Soviet threat (Gillem, 2007, p.179).

2.6 EISENHOWER DOCTRINE AND CHANGING POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

With a new wave of military installation underway in 1950, US hegemony was gaining strength. Lutz (2009) underlines that these military bases provided access to foreign markets and energy resources and created an image of US global power.

The Cold War was escalating, with a nuclear war seeming a possibility as the Soviet Union developed a second-strike capability, which means a country has ability to respond it with a strong nuclear retaliation following it is attacked, against its rivalry in the mid-1950 by acquiring nuclear weapons that destroyed the United States' first-strike assurance. Before this process, the United States had started a new era in relations with

the rest of world. The passing of the Atomic Energy Act in 1946⁵ indicated that the United States planned to act against the Soviet threat through a nuclear arsenal stockpile. Thus, while there had only been two nuclear weapons in 1945, this number was fifty in 1948 and kept on increasing (Rosenberg, 1983, pp.3-71).

Meanwhile, a pro-Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was a clear challenge to the United States, and an attempt to isolate Eastern Europe from any capitalist penetration. These steps by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gave the United States the reason to contain the Soviet Union militarily, politically and economically. At the same time, Europe's perception of the Soviet threat made the 'Old World' vulnerable to accepting all US demands (Cox, 1990, p.30). While the division of Berlin contributed to a reinforcement of the United States point of view, it also made the United States think about using a nuclear bomb against Soviet rule. However, Moscow's retaliatory capacity deterred the United States. The Korean War in 1950 marked the beginning of a new campaign to increase US nuclear bomb stockpiles, so that they reached almost 18,000 by the end of the 1950s. With the start of Eisenhower's presidency in 1953, the United States entered a new era on this issue (Rosenberg, pp.3-71).

In the 1960s, ballistic missile technology and competition marked the era on both sides. The UK, Greenland and Canada became first places where ballistic missile early warning systems were introduced. Italy and Turkey also hosted nuclear weapons as part of the United States' containment policy (Rosenberg, 1983, pp. 3-71).

At the end of the 1960s, the situation had changed and the Cold War was being questioned, even by Western allies, following the eruption of the Cuban missile crisis. This led to détente between two blocks in the 1970s. The Soviet Union also had similar problems, such as a disagreement with China over basic issues, and economic crisis and turmoil in east Europe, which also compelled it to engage in détente (Cox, 1990, pp. 32-33). Garthoff (1982) summarizes both parties' considerations as they participated in détente policies:

⁵ The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) determined how the United States federal government would control and manage the nuclear technology it had jointly developed with its wartime allies (Britain and Canada). Most significantly, the Act ruled that nuclear weapon development and nuclear power management would be under civilian, rather than military control, and it established the United States Atomic Energy Commission for this purpose. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Energy_Act_of_1946

US leaders saw it (...) as a way of "managing the emergence of Soviet power" into world politics in an age of nuclear parity; the Soviet leaders, for their part, envisaged it as a way of managing the transition of the United States from its former superiority into a more modest role in world politics in an age of nuclear parity. Thus each saw itself as "manager" of a policy transition for the other. Moreover, while the advent of "parity" meant a decrease in the global managing ability of the United States, this fact was not sufficiently appreciated in Washington (p.1).

However, pro-Soviet successes in Africa and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Red Army proved that *détente* was not so effective in preventing conflict between communist and capitalist blocks, so the Reagan era marked start of renewed Cold War (Cox, 1990, pp.32-33).

During the Cold War, the Middle East was ideologically and militarily the most important battleground of the United States and the Soviet Union. US involvement in the Middle East was not so welcomed by Arab countries since it gave full support to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948, which immediately led to a harsh reaction by other Middle East countries. This move had different dimensions: while one was about domestic considerations in relation to the strong Jewish lobby in the United States, another was continuing the containment policy against the Soviet regime in the Middle East and Mediterranean. US media was dominated by sharp propaganda about the expansionist aspirations of the Soviet regime in the Middle East without using military means. A further rationale to justify the United States declaration recognizing the establishment of a Jewish state was that Stalin had demanded Finland to sign a pact with his country. Following this decision and appearance of Israel in the Holy Land, turmoil dominated the Middle East, triggering the first Arab-Israeli war (Evensen, 1992, pp.122-135).

However, protection of Israel in the Middle East or eliminating the Soviet threat was not the only motivations for the United States' active role in the region. One of the most important incentives was ensuring a permanent flow of oil to western markets. Accordingly, US oil companies had started to be very active in the 1940s in the region. Europe owed its rapid economic development to this smooth flow of oil and, since any Soviet intervention would mean a collapse in the process, this it also entailed a threat to

US security. Washington's fear of communism and a cut in oil supply can be seen in the United States' operation to overthrow the Iranian regime. When Iranian leader Mossadegh nationalized the country's oil industry by canceling all agreements with Britain, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) carried out a coup in 1953, replacing Mossadegh with the Shah (Divine, 1981, pp.71-76). Following the coup, Iran was recognized as the owner of its oil but marketing decisions were turned over to a consortium in which American and British petroleum companies had 80 percent control. Unsurprisingly, this regime change also led the United States to deploy military installations in Iran and begin spying activities against the Soviet missile threat. Iran also turned into an important arms client for the United States (Sullivan, 2008, pp.40-41).

Halliday (1988) argues that leaders who came to power in the Middle East were more inclined to the Soviet regime with anti-western tendencies. Accordingly,

Syria after 1949, Egypt after 1952, Iraq after 1958, Algeria and North Yemen after 1962 and Libya after 1969 challenged Western interests by cooperating with the USSR. The most conclusive moment was in the Suez crisis in 1956 when the Israeli-British-French aggression against Egypt consolidated an alliance between Moscow and Cairo" (p.3).

The United States-backed Baghdad Pact, in which Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq took part, backfired, causing the Soviet regime to spread into the region following Egyptian leader Nasser's agreement with the Soviet Union over armament supplies. An inevitable break up between the West and Egypt came following a disagreement on credit for the Aswan Dam project. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, in which France and Britain had considerable interest (Divine, 1981, pp.80-82). When Nasser decided to solve Egypt's water problem, the United States decided to support this to prevent Soviet-Egypt cooperation in the region. However, according to Dougherty, (1959) the United States later withdrew its backing from the project, which offended Nasser's self-esteem. Additionally, the decision weakened the United States position in Egypt. If the Suez Canal crisis had not happened then, an intervention by the West would not have occurred. Consequently, Jordan and Lebanon would not have slid into civil war since they followed pro-Western approach, while Egypt and Syria adopted more pro-Soviet stance (p.21).

Increasing US hegemony over European politics was confirmed by the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Without gaining the approval of the United States, France, Britain and Israel planned and implemented a military operation against Egypt to counter its nationalization of the canal, leading to a harsh US response. Its resolution in the UN Security Council (UNSC) calling on these countries to leave Egypt was vetoed by alliance countries, France and Britain. In response to this challenge, the United States imposed various economic measures against them while warning Britain to withdraw immediately. It was the first and last conflict to divide the allies so sharply and publically. The outcome demonstrated Europe's political and economic dependence on the United States (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004, pp.25-26).

Meiertöns (2010) points out that, while the Suez crisis resulted in the withdrawal of Britain, France and Israel from Egypt, Israel did not relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh.⁶ Therefore, the United States administration decided to take a radical step with Congress allowing the United States military to use force in the Middle East against the communism threat. The decision included the provision of military, economic and political aid to those countries that applied to the United States. Thus, the path to the permanent deployment of US troops in the region was created (pp.122).

When the Eisenhower doctrine was declared in 1957, based on supporting pro-American regimes in Arab countries, its only pretext was Soviet aggression. However, it became rapidly clear that the region was the target of a proxy struggle between the superpowers who were attempting to defend their ideological stance, as demonstrated by the Arab-Israel wars, other regional conflicts and regional proliferation (Hubbell, 1998, p.8).

Trying to keep Jordan's pro-western king in power and prevent a nationalist upheaval, the United States immediately sent financial aid and directed the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. Concerned by an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States' "transferred a Marine regimental combat team from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf and a tactical air strike force from Europe to bases in Turkey"(1981, Divine, p. 97). Thus, all of a sudden, the Middle East was hosting both US land and naval military components.

⁶When Israel occupied part of the Sinai, which intensified the oil crisis, the US decided to support UN calls for Israel to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh and impose an economic embargo on Israel. This move forced Israel to leave the region.

Lebanon also slid into internal conflict and asked for US help. 15,000 US marines were sent to reestablish order (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2009, pp.4-5). While Lebanon's Christian leader adopted a pro-western attitude, Nasser supported pro-Arabic groups and a civil war took over the country. However, Lebanon's problems were not the direct result of the blocks. Rather regional rivalry engulfed it, leading to a proxy war. Following a coup in Iraq that toppling its pro-Western leader, the United States responded by intervening in Lebanon's civil war. Although the intervention only lasted for three months, its effects on the future of the country and region were important (Sullivan, 2008, pp.50-51).

Another country that the Soviet-US struggle divided was Yemen. There were already tribal conflicts and a Yemeni claim on Aden, which was then under the control of Britain. While the Yemeni administration supported Egyptian and Syrian unification, and welcomed Soviet monetary assistance, another tribe objected to this, so a civil war broke out (Barrett, 2007, pp.56-57).

2.7 NUCLEAR RACE SEIZES EUROPE

1945 marked a new era in the armaments race and hegemonic competition when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After the cities were destroyed, Japan surrendered to the United States, ending WWII. Because it was clear that only the United States had the technology to produce the atomic bomb, for Stimson (1947) this meant they offered more than a total destruction, being much more a psychological weapon against other rival states challenging the United States hegemonic posture (pp. 14-15). However, the event also triggered a new global arms race as other states attempted to defend themselves. Thus, the closing of WWII period with a hegemonic bomb introduced a more problematic phase, the Cold War, an era of struggle for hegemonic leadership characterized by a competition for nuclear weapons.

Some have argued that the arms race could cause US hegemony to decline or collapse entirely. According to Kennedy (1988), for example, nuclear armaments, since 1945, proved extremely costly for the United States, and it does not seem possible that these weapons can be used in a war. Thus, it was a burden on the United States economy to invest in such weapons. The United States also had global interests, and global

challenges to these interests, in other regions, such as the Middle East and Latin America, which the United States could not abandon. Therefore, the United States military presence in Europe, and defending the region against other great powers, is vital to its interests. However, the burden it imposed on the United States economy was severe and concentrating US military power in a single region prevents it from implementing “a grand strategy which is both global and flexible”. Consequently, the United States felt itself trapped between “American commitments and American power”. That is why the Pentagon has had to adopt an ad hoc military base policy rather than anchoring Europe with permanent and large military installations (pp.514-19).

The United States nuclear dilemma is a result of its policy during the Cold War. In this period, nuclear armament captured the continent. While the Soviet regime constructed nuclear bases in East Europe, the United States, as a part of its containment policy, developed a counter-nuclear policy. NATO became the most important element linking both continents militarily, and a means for coordinating common defense policies. Additionally, fears of Western Europeans in front of communism threat helped establishment of such an organization. The United States containment policy caused many European countries to host nuclear weapons and missile systems on their territories; thus they put aside the disagreements that WWII had once created.

Walsh (2008) summarizes US-Europe military cooperation during the Cold War and draws attention to the role of NATO, which also led to the installation of US military bases in Europe:

The deployment of US nuclear weapons to Europe provided a link between conventional defense and the United States strategic arsenal. A Soviet offensive overran NATO conventional forces, theatre and tactical nuclear weapons would be used. This link between NATO conventional and European-based nuclear forces and the United States strategic deterrent, known as “coupling”, would remain the centerpiece of NATO strategy throughout the Cold War (p.91).

According to Flournoy (2001), at the peak of the Cold War, there were 350,000 US troops in overseas bases. Concentrated in Britain, Germany and Italy, these deployments protected US interests in Europe (pp.237). These US ground, air and naval components in Europe allowed it to maintain its economic growth. Kristensen and

Norris (2010) consider that since first deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Europe after WWII, the number of US installations was highest in 1971, with almost 7,300 nuclear warheads (p. 65). Johnstone and Cramer (1991) point out that their explosive power varied, with some as much as 1,000 kilotons. Various, “artillery, airplanes and short-range missiles” were used to deliver them (p.230).

Following Eisenhower’s New Look policy of 1953, these weapons were seen as the best defense against the Soviet threat. While some nuclear weapons are deployed by the United States directly, others were installed under the NATO umbrella. A NATO document from 1967 intended these weapons to be used first when a threat occurred (Buteux, 1977, p.785).

The United States' attempts to dominate the nuclear armaments race brought innovations, too. Stewart (2005) points out that the United States air force and navy were equipped with high-tech nuclear missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. Hydrogen bombs and the vehicles needed to carry them for intercontinental flights resulted in the United States establishing intercontinental ballistic missile systems (pp.252-253).

The first threat of nuclear war between the two blocks occurred in Cuba in 1962, when the United States mobilized opponents of the Cuban government and planned and implemented an attack to overthrow Cuba’s socialist leader Castro. In response, the Soviet government decided to deploy missiles in Cuba, which the United States declared was a reason for war. At this point, both countries were ready to use their nuclear capability against each other in the case of a state of war. However, Russian leader Nikita S. Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for the removal of US Jupiter missiles previously deployed in Turkey. Thus, on this occasion, the danger of nuclear war actually led to detente (Cocroft & Thomas, 2005, p.9). According to the *National Security Archive* (1995), "Kennedy gave private assurance to Khrushchev that the United States would speedily take out its missiles from Turkey, but only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as an open agreement that would appear to the public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to blackmail."

As technology developed, the purposes of nuclear weapons also gradually changed. For instance, in the 1950s, while nuclear military strategy was based on massive retaliation,

in the 1960s, mutually assured destruction (MAD), meaning to launch a full-capacity response to any Soviet Union attack, was replaced by 'flexible response'. Additionally, the then president of the United States, J. F. Kennedy, wished to use these weapons to diminish the adversary's military power. Then, Nixon introduced a new perspective based on insufficient defense against a nuclear attack by the adversary, which developed new nuclear planning. This relied on ensuring less damage to the United States and its allies. Besides the use of strategic, theatre and tactical nuclear weapons in a possible war, alternative responses such as political and military measures would be used to prevent a destructive scenario (Walsh, 2008, pp.15-17). Nevertheless, all US and NATO nuclear tactics still aimed at deterring the Soviet Union.

While Germany provided a base for US land forces, Britain hosted the United States air force, making the United States provider of a nuclear umbrella for Europe. The 1950s was marked by a nuclear equilibrium between the two blocks in producing, stockpiling and stationing nuclear weapons, and the nuclear race was at its peak. In contrast, the 1960s introduced a new perspective to the nuclear race. Instead of total destruction, the United States discovered that the Soviet nuclear threat could be controlled by limited measures, such as "flexible response", which was announced officially in 1967. Thus, rather than direct involvement in all-out nuclear war, surveillance and radar systems were deployed in Europe, with NATO member countries becoming the most important actors in this process during the 1970s (Cocroft & Thomas, 2005, p.52). In mid-1960s almost 375 US bases were built abroad (Go, 2007, p. 28), these years also marked a *détente* era in Europe. Since the Soviet regime had embraced an appeasement policy rather than aggression, the two sides reached an agreement to ban under-sea testing of nuclear weapons. However, France declared that it could leave NATO in response to the United States' latest installations. As a result, NATO and the United States had to move some bases out of France to Germany and other European countries (Stewart, 2005, pp. 267-7). The Soviets' unexpected move to reduce the tension between two blocks has been generally explained in terms of the China effect. For example, Stewart (2005) argues that when Beijing adopted a harsher attitude against the capitalist world and voiced its dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's own policy, Moscow felt itself obliged to cooperate with the West (p.267).

The war in Vietnam proved, however, that flexible response strategy did not work well, and it could not result in favor of US ideology in all aspects. Gaddis (1982) indicates that none of the United States' targets which were envisaged at the beginning of the war were achieved. During ten years of war, the communist threat was not eliminated and the war became a quagmire for the United States military, which harmed the country's national pride. Additionally, the United States interests and image were damaged in the United States and abroad (pp.236-239).

Walsh (2008) points out the context of how US-Europe relations evolved as follows:

As the Soviets increased their strategic arsenal, perceptions about the United States nuclear guarantee to NATO Europe began to shift. In 1976, the Soviets began to deploy a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-20, to replace older system targeted on Western Europe. These concerns helped push the United States toward exploring options for deploying improved theatre and tactical system in Europe. Additionally, the United States had developed a new type of nuclear warhead, known as the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) (p. 81).

However, Germany was hesitant about the deployment of the neutron bomb on its territory since it might trigger a nuclear war within Germany, so other European countries were offered to the United States for possible stationing. Hippel (2004) also suggests that, since the superpowers retreated from high profile re-armament and tried to find a way towards reconciliation, this period could also be called one of *détente*. Additionally, both states decreased escalation and, instead of focusing on critical regions such as the Middle East and Berlin, they preferred to involve themselves in more limited areas where they could continue to impose their ideologies more easily(p.4).However, this atmosphere did not last long for a number of reasons. Garthoff (1982) stresses that both sides had different motives while pursuing *détente* policy. The United States considered it as a way to control Soviet power, while the other side wished to decrease US dominance over the world system. Even if avoiding nuclear war, establishing military parity and arms control were the most important goals during the process, the search for absolute security undermined *détente* because both sides suspected that the other was engaged in a secret military build-up (pp. 13-41).

Both superpowers made attempts to halt the salient nuclear arms race. The first was Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, following the Cuban missile crisis with an agreement

also involving the UK. The resulting treaty banned atmospheric nuclear arms testing. In 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was signed when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1979, the second SALT II was signed to extend the earlier treaty (although the United States Senate did not ratify the agreement) (Kennedy, 1988, pp. 395-6). Despite these efforts, the nuclear arms race reached a peak in the 1970s, as shown in the table below.

Table 2- Delivery Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons of the Great Powers (1974)

	The United States	The USSR	Britain	France	China
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	1,054	1,575	-	-	-
Intermediate ballistic missiles	-	600	-	18	c.80
Submarine-based ballistic missiles	656	720	64	48	-
Long-range bombers	437	140	-	-	-
Medium-range bombers	66	800	50	52	100

Source: Kennedy (1988, p. 494)

2.8 POST-COLD WAR ERA

While an era ended in world politics with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the various nations of the old regime demanded independence or autonomy, another era began with Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the United States' intervention by declaring a new national security strategy that would lead to new invasions and military operations around the world. However, there are arguments that do not consider the huge gaps between pre-Cold War and post-Cold War era. Layne (1998), for instance, asserts that there was not too much change in US foreign policies following the end of the Cold War. It has perpetuated its main strategy to dominate world affairs. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not as much of a focus of the United States while it shaped its global agenda (p.8). Although the final aim of the United States, as hegemon, is to seek power and dominance over the rest of the world, the process to maintain this determines the hegemonic dominance and its future.

Of course, the global political atmosphere changed with the advent of the post-Cold War phase; in particular, the Soviet regime was not an enemy anymore (Levy, 2001, pp.46-56) so relations between the two states changed to cooperation. Soviet President Gorbachev was against in perpetuating Cold War dynamics and called for the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, offering to establish a new world system with the United States. Following concrete steps by the Soviets, such as decreasing the number of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, the United States responded positively and a new *détente* emerged. Thus, a transition from enmity to cooperation was realized between the two blocks (Powaski, 1998). As a result, military facilities in European countries were reorganized in accordance with the new tasks and interests of the United States in place of containment of Russia. The perception of threat was redirected to the Third World, lesser states and terror issues.

The collapse of the bipolar world system gave rise to a unipolar moment that triggered many debates. On the one hand, there are arguments that the new order is evolving towards a multipolar power system, but on the other hand, there are harsh criticisms of this view: "The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies" (Krauthammer, 1990, p.23). Enjoying a unipolar world, the United States felt itself so powerful that it could neglect or deny the

constitutionalist pressures of the system. Regarding the hegemon's and weaker states' actions in the current hegemonic system, Hurrell (2002) considers that, when the hegemon needs a multilateral framework, it involves itself in the process, but unless there is no such a need, it acts alone and unilaterally. Lesser states try to take advantage of the situation because of their limited unilateral capacity. They try to restrain the hegemon's unilateral structure as much as they can, by making concessions to keep the hegemon in line with international law and the system (p.191). However, as hegemon, the United States aims to make other great powers accept its hegemonic position in the system and to make them act consistent with its interest and values, rather than by dominating lesser states and others. The United States mostly owes this position to its economic parameters. However the United States will eventually lose this hegemonic power since hegemony is not just domination but also requires legitimacy in the execution of force (Mastanduno, 2005, p.179).

Although the perception of threat has changed, military bases have remained or been relocated in line with new US interests. Thus, the United States military used the pretext of the 'War on Drugs' to interfere in Latin American countries and it introduced 'the War on Terror' after the September 11 attacks. Interestingly, the Washington administration's budget to finance and train Latin American soldiers and police forces was 20 times more than all other aid. On the other hand, uncontrollable regime changes in some countries, such as Venezuela, have led to US military installations being removed. Until 1997, US military elements were seen an unchangeable fact especially around the Panama Canal. Later on, however, the United States moved its Howard Air Force Base from Panama to Miami. While the United States Army South mission was moved to Texas, its naval elements were stationed in Florida. Some missions were not moved but their tasks changed sharply. For instance, since 1983, Joint Task Force Bravo was headquartered in Honduras as a mobilizing force but its mission later became mainly humanitarian. In contrast, some bases gained importance, such as Guantanamo Naval Station in Cuba. While it previously had no critical role in interfering in Latin American politics, the September 11 attacks turned the base into a prison for detainees who labeled as 'terrorists' by the Bush administration. Since then, the base has been the focus of criticism regarding torture and mistreatment of prisoners (Olson, Isacson, Haugaard, 2007, pp.1-20).

Sloan, Sutter and Yost (2004) find that the G. W. Bush administration and its new security policy marked a new era in relations with Europe, too. The hegemonic aspirations of the new president and his team disturbed the transatlantic alliance, and European countries began to consider that the nature of relations had changed: while once it was based on international law and cooperation, now military power determined the ties. However, even if some European countries questioned their partnership with the United States; NATO played a unifying role between the allies to repress objections under its security umbrella. The United States proposal to make NATO stronger by removing the need for a UN mandate for its military operations was considered by Europeans an attempt to broaden US hegemonic expansion (pp.54- 59).

After the Cold War, the United States redesigned its military base policies in accordance with the changing political atmosphere. Calder (2007) describes the new role of these military sites: “bases serve as crucial guarantors against destructive regionalism and balance of power rivalry at the heart of the global system, inhibiting the nationalistic, and mercantilist forces” (p.65).

Changing perception of threat brought with renewed base politics. *The United States Department of Defense News Release* (1995) declared that the United States overseas bases, especially in Europe, would be ended or would be relocated. According to release, Washington decided to ‘return or reduce’ operations at 959 overseas sites. It means a 57 percent reduction and most of them in Europe. The release gives the list of the mission ends or relocations:

The following U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) installations are scheduled to be returned or partially returned. (1995).

Table 3- Reorganizing the United States Military Existence in Europe (1995)

Installation	Location	Status
Pulaski Barracks	Kaiserslautern	Partial Return
Steinbachtal Ammo Area	Wurzburg	Return

Olen Storage Area	Belgium	Return
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The following U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) installations are scheduled to be returned or partially returned.

Pruem Air Station	Spangdahlem	Partial Return
Uxbridge Support Annex	Mildenhall, UK	Partial Return
Carpenters Park	Mildenhall, UK	ReturnFamily Housing

The following U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) installations are scheduled to be returned.

Edzell Main Site	NSGA Edzell, UK	Return
RAF Inverbevie	NSGA Edzell, UK	Return
Sewage Treatment Farm	NSGA Edzell, UK	Return
Trinity Fields	NSGA Edzell, UK	Return

The following USAREUR installations were announced previously for return, but will now be retained.

Installation	Location
Fintherlandstr	Mainz
Family Housing	Germersheim Army Depot Karlsruhe

Source: The United States Department of Defense News Release (1995)

2.9 NEW WORLD ORDER AND UNILATERALISM

While the end of the Cold War should have heralded the victory of US hegemony and its order against communism, instead of stability the new atmosphere brought more chaos with the United States declaration of a New World Order under the first Bush

administration. President Clinton later continued Bush's vision with his Balkan interventions, before it was finally expanded globally by the second Bush government. Layne & Schwarz (1993) argue as follows:

Although interventionists advanced humanitarian reasons for the United States involvement, they couched their primary arguments in terms of upholding a set of principles that have come to be associated with world order, and, hence, vital interests. These principles (which were also invoked during the Persian Gulf War) include punishing aggression, preserving the inviolability of borders, and preventing instability (p.4).

Feeling itself freer than during the Cold War era to impose its rules and order, the United States clearly showed that no state could act against its dominance. Any opposition to its coercive power would face the military apparatus of hegemony. Carpenter (1992) compares Bush's attempts to seek post-Cold War stability to the search for the Holy Grail. Bush's attempts paved the way for the First Gulf War by demonizing Iraqi leader Hussein because of his country's invasion of Kuwait. Among the new order's principles were collective security, stopping alleged aggression by lesser states, and 'advancing' the rule of international law. Although it also included the sovereignty of nations among the principles, it is noteworthy that the United States supported secessionist movements in the Soviet Union and provided direct military or financial aid (p.25).

Mastanduno (2005) shares the view that US power and dominance has been unchallenged in the post-Cold War era. He argues that, following the transition from a bipolar to unipolar world, no other actor can pursue parity with US power, so the United States' main goal has been to protect its unique position in world affairs. "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States sought to maintain its primacy globally and to shape the international order in key regions including Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia" (p.178). Thus, it would be appropriate to claim that the United States actually is attempting to preserve its dominance and unique position that it has created. Therefore, when needed, the United States military is used against any challenge to this new order. Thus, the consolidation of the order requires the establishment of US military bases to make it possible to access targeted zones.

Under Clinton's presidency, the United States maintained its interventionist policies. In this context, Mastanduno (2005) considers that the 1990s marked a great opportunity for the United States to defend its hegemonic position. He added that "The maintenance of international order and preservation of U.S. primacy were combined with risk avoidance" (p.183). Regarding the future of the unipolar order, Carpenter (1992) claims that it cannot last for long because Bush's new order vision will eventually lead the United States into serious conflicts (p.29).

Hurrell (2002) points out that, when the United States began military operations against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, due to attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Ethiopia, it did not even take the issue to the UNSC with the reason of 'self defense'. Russia and many other countries duly condemned the operations, and even those countries which find the United States right rejected the United States' self-defense doctrine, being particularly against such unilateral acts (p.188).

Similarly, the 1995 Bosnia and 1999 Kosovo interventions were symbols of US hegemonic aspirations. Although these operations were questioned since the United States had no direct strategic interests in the two countries, Layne (2008) points out that the real intention was to preserve the United States' hegemonic position against the emergence of rivals such as Germany. According to Layne, the aim was clear:

Questions about the future of America's European commitment, and NATO, are especially salient in the wake of the spring 1999 Kosovo war. US involvement in that conflict cannot be explained by the grand strategic concerns that are commonly thought to have been the motive for America's European grand strategy during most of the twentieth century. Historically, US policy toward Europe has been 'counter-hegemonic': Washington feared that America's security would be jeopardized if a single great power succeeded in dominating the Continent and harnessing its resources. When it became problematic that the European balance of power could operate successfully to prevent the emergence of a continental hegemon, the United States' intervened in both world wars to block Germany from achieving mastery over Europe (p.60).

Trying to legitimize its military interventions in the 1990s, the United States used the label of humanitarian intervention when crises erupted in weaker states. During the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions, this pretext was popular, but there are concerns that it violated and undermined one of the most important pillars of international law: state

sovereignty. Ayooob (2010) also questions the legitimacy of such military engagements, and arguing that respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention is essential for the international system to survive. Additionally, during the 1990s, humanitarian concerns over interventions were controversial since the era marked a challenge to the balance of global power (pp.81-7). Thus, it might be argued that these interventions were a kind of punishment mechanism against those states that did not accept US norms of hegemonic rule. Ayooob (2010) argues that UNSC members bargained among themselves over which countries should be invaded in 1994. As a result, operations were carried out by the United States in Haiti, France in Rwanda and Russia in Georgia. During UNSC voting, they approved of each others' demands. This indicates that such intervention bargaining is a symbol of advancing "strategic and economic interests in their spheres of influence" (p.88).

CHAPTER III

3. US BASES IN EUROPE

This chapter provides more concrete figures and details regarding US military posture in European countries. The most important bases will be highlighted rather than all since they have played a more active role in interventions and invasions of other countries. The chapter also considers the usage of these facilities in relation to US hegemony.

3.1 US MILITARY POSTURE IN EUROPE

US military involvement in Europe dates back to WWI, with the first deployment in the city of Koblenz in Germany. After US Third Army units first occupied the territory, 15,000 troops were stationed there. The occupation lasted until 1923 and a second redeployment campaign was launched following the end of WWII (Coffey, 2012).

Underlying how important US military bases in Europe and elsewhere have been, Vine (2009) points out that the United States undertook 200 military engagements from WWII to the occupation of Iraq. These installations also carry out other tasks, such as military support, arms selling, CIA-supported secret and open operations in numerous countries, shaping domestic issues indifferent states and maintaining the global nuclear balance (by deciding who can acquire these weapons) (p.46). All bases have similar missions, such as training military elements of the Western powers, “service and repair facilities, storage, training facilities and logistical staging posts. Bases can also be used to conduct surveillance, coordinate tasks, collect intelligence and facilitate command, control and communications” (Cooley, 2008, p.5).

Categorizing the bases helps in understanding their roles, capacities, and missions. The United States considers all its military facilities under three categories: “Main operating bases (MOBs), forward operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs)”. MOBs are the key and largest US bases in allied countries. They never lose their importance though there are realignments and redeployments in relation to changing threat perceptions against US interests. They serve as command and control centers besides being used as training points. Most of them are in European countries.

FOSEs are used to respond to new threats, such as terrorism. For instance, the United States has established a base in the Horn of Africa to launch operations against “terrorists.” They are also called “light switch” facilities, with Incirlik in Turkey being this kind of base. DOD (The United States Department of Defense) defines CSLs as stations in where no permanent US troops are located and whose position can be changed if needed (Lachowski, 2007).

Johnstone & Cramer (1991) argue that, after the Atlantic alliance was formed between the United States and Europe after WWII, the Old World was turned into to a military base for the United States. The most important goal was to counter the Soviet threat and expansion of its ideology. Overseas bases were constructed in nine European members of NATO: Turkey, Greece, Italy, Germany, Britain, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Iceland. Two ‘offshore’ bases were also set up in Greenland (Denmark) and the Azores (Portugal). The numbers of personnel at these installations are not clear, but the biggest base is Germany, which contains almost 250,000 military personnel (p.199).

In 1952, the United States military presence in Europe was made official with the establishment of the joint United States European Command (USEUCOM), later renamed EUCOM. The main purpose of this military structure was to bring US navy, air force and army components under a single command. Consequently, all possible developments in the Middle East and Africa regions fell under the responsibility of EUCOM. Stuttgart-Vaihingen in Germany became the main military headquarters of the United States army.

Under the Kennedy administration in the 1960s, the United States reconsidered its overseas position and decided to modify its military posture by reducing the number of bases (Lachowski, 2007). Instead of enhancing and increasing escalation between the two blocks, Kennedy searched for alternatives, explaining his new policy approach as follows: “We intend to have wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war”. His flexible approach allowed the United States to decrease tension with removal of a few bases (Gaddis, 1982, p.202). Kennedy then decided to pursue a more flexible Cold War policy. Sagan (1987) points out that there were claims that the Soviet Union was preparing a massive nuclear attack on US territory, but Kennedy doubted the existence of such a threat. Nevertheless, the military was trying to convince him to carry out a

preemptive nuclear offensive against the Soviet Union, but the Kennedy administration refused to approve the plan. Kennedy “responded negatively to this extremely inflexible nuclear doctrine and enacted major changes in the United States nuclear strategy, operational plans, and strategic force acquisition policy” (p.39).

The 1970s marked a different area because of the Vietnam War and the base closing policy was reversed. Because of the United States public’s harsh reaction to the war and lack of support, the negative socio-economic implications of closing further bases forced the United States to keep its main overseas bases active (p.5). Heller & Lammerant (2009) argue that, although the numbers of US bases in Europe had fallen from the peak levels of the Cold War, they still served as an agent of the United States interests, ideology and values. Especially during 1980s, “this infrastructure supported several thousand tactical, intermediate range, and strategic nuclear weapons, as well as conventional forces” (p.96). While the United States base build-up policy continued until the 1980s, when the Soviet threat gradually declined a stand still phase began. According to Gillem (2007), the United States decreased the numbers of military personnel and facilities, or removed them. Consequently, the number of the United States soldiers went down from 350,000 to 85,000 in Europe (p.179).

Between 1988 and 1995, the base closing campaign reached its peak with nearly 97 bases being evacuated (Lachowski, 2007, p.5). However, Vine (2012) reports that, following the demise of the Soviet regime and the end of the Cold War, the United States actually expanded its base network in Europe, reaching into Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 1990. For example, “the Pentagon is now developing installations capable of supporting rotating, brigade-sized deployments in Romania and Bulgaria, and a missile defense base and aviation facilities in Poland” (p.75). According to Johnstone & Cramer (1991), the end of the Cold War brought a shift in US military base policy. The Soviets and communist ideology lost importance as an adversary, being replaced by the third world south. Meanwhile, the United States demanded that Europe play more active role in sharing the burdens of military operations (p. 209).

Even though land-based military deployments in European countries were more preferred and common, the United States military also used its naval elements to promote its interests. The UK, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Italy served this goal in

Europe. While building its naval bases to counter the Soviet Union, the United States had given more importance to submarines. However significant developments in satellite and radar technology in the 1980s diminished the importance of these naval bases (Harkavy, 1989, pp.27-29). A Fact Sheet of the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) (2013), part of the United States military in Europe, gives clear statistics about the evolution of these installations. By 2015, their number is expected to reach 30,000. They will take part in military interventions that have operational skills from 26 countries. Since 2003, USAREUR soldiers have been fighting in Afghanistan.

3.2 LEGAL BASIS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Regarding the legal basis of these deployments, it is important to discuss bilateral agreements. These legal documents show that the United States needs to gain the consent of states to achieve its goals, more than use coercive power. These agreements include detailed descriptions of the deployment of troops, facilities, property rights, sovereignty over the stations, and their use in military engagements. All are considered under Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) deals. SOFA determines legal conditions, burdens, economic issues and criminal problems (Cooley & Hopkin, 2010, p.496). Abraham (2005) gives some details on these legal procedures and the context of SOFAs:

[A] SOFA agreement is in effect a legal blank check for the United States and its military personnel, waiving the application of local rules and laws from the operation of these bases, and constituting these bases as offshore sovereign entities subject only to the terms of US military justice. Conditions remove the jurisdiction of local courts to adjudicate crimes involving US armed forces personnel and bypass the need to meet local environmental, labour and human safety standards (pp. 5446-5447).

A new generation of SOFA agreements has been introduced in Eastern Europe, which even more serve US interests, since they give the United States the right to use these deployments in the case of conflict without the permission of the host country, as has happened in Bulgaria and Romania. Brown (2006) terms the process between the United States and host country regarding the establishment of military bases as “territorial privileges by concession” (p.6). According to Brownlie (1998, p.370), the establishment of an overseas military base “depends on the existence of agreement or ad

hoc consent on the part of the receiving state and not on the operation of law. However, once the occasion has arisen by consent, in the absence of variations by special agreement, the law regulates the nature and extent of the privilege.”

There are two legal pillars of overseas base deployments. The first legal basis of installations is consent, in which limits are determined by the constitutional laws of the host state. Secondly, the features of the military deployment, such as size or duration of the mission, are distinctive in forming the legal structure. Although base agreements do not mention the factors that persuade the host country to give consent, the military implementations of the visiting country give clear conviction about limits of consent (Woodliffe, 1992, p.35).

Leaving aside the 19th century method of occupying a country to gain access to a military base, Stambuk (1963) considers the role of *quid pro quo* (concession) in obtaining the use of another state’s territory. Considering sovereignty concerns, this principle relies on an unequal relation between host and visiting country, specifically the superiority of the sending state, and considers the bargaining process that can satisfy the weaker country’s demands and rights. Specifically, territorial integrity of the host country should not be infringed. Such demands may vary from military support to a common defense policy (pp.474-475). The third way to gain the right to establish a base in other countries is to create a defense partnership among states and to carry out the obligations, such as bases, this requires. Although NATO is a pure instance of this kind of partnership, US leadership and the disproportionate stationing of US bases is a reality (Stambuk, 1963, p.476).

Table 4- US Military Postures in Europe, after 2000

Service	Location	Installation Name
Air Force	Germany	Geilenkirchen AB
Air Force	Germany	Ramstein AB
Air Force	Germany	Rhein-Main AB
Air Force	Germany	Spangdahlem AB
Air Force	Italy	Aviano AB
Air Force	Portugal	Lajes Field
Air Force	Turkey	Incirlik AB
Air Force	Turkey	Izmir AS
Air Force	United Kingdom	RAF Lakenheath
Air Force	United Kingdom	RAF Mildenhall
Air Force	United Kingdom	RAF Molesworth
Army	Belgium	NATO-Brussels
Army	Belgium	Shape-Chievres
Army	Germany	Ansbach
Army	Germany	Bad Aibling Station
Army	Germany	Bad Kreuznach
Army	Germany	Bamberg
Army	Germany	Baumholder
Army	Germany	Darmstadt
Army	Germany	Friedberg/Giessen Depot
Army	Germany	Garmisch AST
Army	Germany	Giebelstadt Army Airfield
Army	Germany	Grafenwoehr
Army	Germany	Hanau
Army	Germany	Heidelberg
Army	Germany	Hohenfels
Army	Germany	Illesheim

Army	Germany	Kaiserslautern
Army	Germany	Kitzingen
Army	Germany	Mannheim
Army	Germany	Schweinfurt
Army	Germany	Stuttgart
Army	Germany	US Army Europe
Army	Germany	Vilseck (Rose Barracks)
Army	Germany	Wiesbaden
Army	Germany	Wuerzburg
Army	Italy	Livorno
Army	Italy	Vicenza
Army	Netherlands	Schinnen
Army	United Kingdom	RAF Menwith Hill
Navy	Iceland	NAS Keflavik
Navy	Italy	NAS Sigonella
Navy	Italy	NSA Gaeta
Navy	Italy	NSA La Maddalena
Navy	Italy	NSA Naples
Navy	Spain	NS Rota
Navy	United Kingdom	JMF St. Mawgan
Navy	United Kingdom	US Naval Activities, London

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sites.htm>

3.3 HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION OF BASE MISSIONS

The United States' attempts to create hegemony over the world system through military power and other means has created some contradictions regarding US-led ideals, such as democracy and freedom. Cooley (2005) shows how the United States, usually a keen defender of such values, disregarded the concept of democratization in Spain and Portugal when its bases were the issue. In Spain, for example, the United States made agreements with the authoritarian Franco in 1935 to use air and ground bases in exchange for financial aid. Following the end of Franco's rule, Spanish public opinion

blamed the United States for the late arrival of democracy. Similarly, when the United States called for self-determination in African colonies, Portugal responded that it might cancel the United States access to its base in Portuguese controlled Azores. It did not take long for the United States to change its official view on the issue, stopping its involvement Portugal's colonies (pp.80-81).

Crimes committed by the United States soldiers in these bases trigger discussions in public opinion, with some anti-US military base campaigns calling for the withdrawal of US troops. In particular, the base in Okinawa, Japan, has been at the center of debate because of the high number of crimes committed by US soldiers. Allen & Flynn (2013) reported on sex assaults by US soldiers in the region, including a rape in 1995 that caused outrage and widespread demonstrations for dismantling the installations. Additionally, some soldiers have been implicated in the sex trade and even drug related crimes in different base countries, such as Germany and Korea (p.264).

One black hole military site of the United States' is Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where alleged terrorists, captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a part of operations against Al Qaeda militants, are kept before appearing, if ever, in court. As well as accusations of mistreatment, including torture allegations, the legal status of the role of the base is frequently discussed. Yin (2005) describes the detention center as having cages where detainees are kept inside cells for 23 hours each day, with only half an hour of fresh air, while sometimes they are left under the sun for days. There are allegations that they have endured beatings, sexual abuse, torture with water, etc. After incomplete interrogations, some detainees were returned to their countries, but since 2005, the United States has held 500 detainees at the camp (pp.160-163). These include children between the ages of 13 and 16. Some adult detainees have tried to kill themselves to escape their mistreatment (Steyn, 2004, p.7).

One base where the original inhabitants were forced to leave is Diego Garcia Island, which now hosts a US naval base. Ross (2009) writes that the islanders, Chagossians, were forcibly evacuated to Mauritius and the Seychelles in 1971 without any financial support or a shelter. The island is now one of the most important US military bases since it is isolated from the rest of the world with no access except for the United States military.

3.4 FIVE KEY BASE COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

This study examines five European countries as they host strategically key military bases in their territories. The first one is Germany, which has a distinct historical background as it was the United States' enemy during WWI and WWII. Pacifying the country following the end of WWII was among the intentions of the United States and Germany's severe defeat allowed the United States to realize its aims step by step. Without delay, the United States established many military, later on nuclear and air bases.

As a traditional US ally, Britain has a different place in the military base structure because it has always hosted any kind of US military deployment. In particular, it became a US nuclear storage depot and, with its unique position as an island state, a naval base.

Italy harbors the naval headquarters of the United States, including the Sixth Fleet, which exerts control over the Mediterranean. This base has been used as a staging post many times in US-led wars or other operations.

Spain has a similar mission with certain US military sites of the United States. Since the Franco era, the country has been part of the United States' military base project, with these bases being seen as one element that caused the arrival of democracy in Spain to be delayed, as already mentioned.

Finally, Turkey has its place in the military base structure. Its strategic location allows the United States to pursue its military agenda easily. In many US-led operations, Turkish bases have been used as a supply point for US troops and air force.

3.4.1 Germany

The beginning of the Cold War marked a new era with huge changes in world politics and many European countries hosted numerous US military bases. Perhaps the most important is Germany, since the United States conducted many military interventions against other countries from German stations. Gillem (2007) considers that Germany became the central base of US and NATO since a possible conflict with the Soviets was

expected to begin in the Fulda Gap⁷ between western allied and Soviet territory. Consequently, Germany served as a jumping-off point for all US military operations till the First Gulf War (p.179).

During the Cold War, Federal Germany became the most important country regarding the global hegemonic ambitions of the United States (Krieger, 2004, pp. 181). Johnstone and Cramer (1991) describe the first mission of the United States' military deployments in Federal Germany in the 1950s as follows:

In 1950, US bases in West Germany were a mark of recovered German sovereignty. Adenauer managed to persuade the United States to hasten the change in the function of its forces from 'occupation' to 'protection.' Moreover, the better to justify the creating of a German army, the Germans demanded a Western buildup of forces in West Germany, including more US forces. In 1950, the United States had 145,000 troops in Europe. By 1955, the level had risen to 405,000 (p.214).

From 1950 to 1990, nearly 350,000 US troops were stationed in Europe, mostly in Federal Germany. US-Germany relations were at their highest level since Europe was not in a situation to defend itself against the Soviets, while the reunification of Germany was top of the Washington administration's agenda. Additionally, Germany had to be normalized and its potential to threaten European security had to be eliminated. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War indicated that these targets had been achieved. Subsequently, the structure of relations between the two allies changed, becoming weaker than in the past (Krieger, 2004, p.181).

Nevertheless, with five Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Germany still serves as a core military resource for the United States. For example, during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, US troops were transferred from these bases to the battlefields. As many African, Middle Eastern and old communist countries have been subjected to these operations, Germany plays a basic role in such interventions by hosting US deployments. Additionally, many US military personnel are trained there before transportation to war

⁷The Fulda Gap is an area between the former East German border and Frankfurt that contains two lowland corridors that tanks might come through. Named for the town of Fulda, the Fulda Gap was strategically important during the Cold War. The Fulda Gap was one of two obvious routes for a hypothetical Soviet tank attack upon West Germany from Eastern Europe, especially East Germany.

zones. Rassbach (2010) argues that though the United States intends to close some of these 293 installations in Germany, the five MOBs, Ramstein, Vilseck, Ansbach, Spangdahlem and Wiesbaden, are focused on all kinds of deployments, transfers and logistic support for US-led wars. They have huge importance in terms of US-German military cooperation. According to 2008 documents, there are 54,000 US troops in Germany. Although there has been serious opposition to these bases and US expansionism since the 1950s, mass protests have been unable to achieve any changes (pp. 121-123) Ramstein has an especially key position since US troops to be sent to other countries for military operations are transferred from here (Duke, 2009, p.7). Located in the Rhineland, Ramstein has a dual function, since it is both the central base for NATO and headquarters for US Air Force operations in Europe. Another US air base which has operated for nearly 50 years is Spangdahlem. It hosts the 52nd Fighter Wing, whose function is to train Special Forces in operations, and to provide logistics and personnel support.

Figure 2- US Military Existence in Germany



Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US_military_bases_in_Germany.svg

According to US Army documents, these bases have different tasks and, as part of changing threat perceptions and war dynamics, they can be evacuated, enhanced or redeployed under different security umbrellas, such as NATO. For instance, in 1968, the United States decided to withdraw 28,000 soldiers and relocate them as NATO forces. It

took a year to station the extra US personnel there so, as part of this policy, 12,000 troops returned to Germany for new tasks.

Germany remained one of the most important countries for the United States military during the Cold War, and following the unification of East and West Germany. However, the September 11 attacks forced US officials to reconsider base locations. The emphasis shifted to the terrorism threat following the attack, and all plans were revised accordingly. The other element that caused is consideration of these installations was that Germany stood against the Iraq war. These reasons encouraged the United States to establish smaller, cheaper installations in Eastern Europe (Piotr, 2006).

3.4.2 The UK

Britain has given US policy with support throughout the pre and post-Cold War eras, and provided a safe base for the United States' nuclear weapons. When the United States containment policy was its peak, Britain was their main storage site. In 1960, the United States and Britain agreed to deploy nuclear submarines in Holy Loch. However, since there was a domestic resistance to the decision in the UK, the allies decided to mislead public by telling them that the submarines had remained in the United States. When the base was closed in 1992, it was revealed that important portion of the population was American (Dobson, 2009, p. 29), making it clear how the base had been key for US interests.

Heller and Lammerant (2009) describe how Greenham Common nuclear base became a symbol of the United States base policy and how many missiles were deployed there. With the installation of ground launched cruise missiles in Europe, Greenham Common paved the way for this new missile deployment campaign in 1983, with 96 cruise missiles and 1,200 extra US troops being installed in the base. In the wake of the United States' declaration of the new world order in 1991, this base was closed. However, nearly 480 tactical nuclear weapons remained, sited across eight European air bases.

The United States-UK alliance is unique and unchallengeable. Besides the UK's not questioning the acceptance of US decisions in world politics, both countries fought together ideologically against the Soviet threat in various parts of the world. This

alliance so progressed that, as discussed earlier, the UK willingly turned over possession of the Diego Garcia to the United States to use as a strategic military base. Calder (2007) points out that handing over of the base to the United States, strengthened US global dominance while weakening the UK. Moreover, it gave huge advantage to the United States over its key rivals, such as Germany and Russia (p.11).

Lachowski (2007) reports how the UK headquartered the United States Navy during the Cold War. However, a later restructuring policy for the military bases resulted in a major change in this position, with the United States navy headquarters being redeployed to Naples in Italy. While the UK has lost its traditional position, the United States still plans to install an anti-missile defense system in there (p.22).

Foreign Policy (2006) describes Diego Garcia as one of the most important US military bases because of its isolated and critical position that makes it a safe haven for the United States military. As the report puts it, “It is a far more secure base for US forces than any mainland base abroad. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base”. The base was used during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq when B-52 planes carried out bombing campaigns, and again in key in post-September 11 operations in Afghanistan. As Calder (2007) reports, “Diego Garcia, a British colony originally seized from Napoleonic France, now hosts one of the most strategic American bases in the world. Despite its location deep in the Indian Ocean, Diego played crucial roles in the Gulf, Afghan and Iraq wars, delivering 65 percent of all the ordnances dropped in the Afghan conflict, for example” (p.11).

3.4.3 Italy


Italy is another country in where many US military bases were constructed during the Cold War. Besides army elements, US navy installations are also important. The Aviano and Vicenza Air Bases, and the Naples Navy Base are just two of them. According to militarybases.com (2012), the Aviano base was established in 1911 but has been used for US purposes, including training and airfield fighter exercises, since the 1950s, currently hosting a major American presence. The base had a key role in the Desert

Storm military operation against Iraq. There are allegations that the Naval Air Station at Sigonella in Sicily was used during the war on Afghanistan as a secret transfer station for detainees.

Italy's location in the Mediterranean makes it important for US military facilities. According to Duke (1989), it "makes it an ideal location from which to conduct anti submarine warfare, naval reconnaissance and surveillance activities". As a peninsula, its proximity to the Middle East and other Mediterranean countries allows the United States to launch naval forces easily from Italian ports (p.195). Although the bases are used for naval and nuclear purposes, as well as defense of other friendly countries, there have been several times when Italy has forbidden the United States to use them. For example, Duke (1989) reports that, during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Italy did not allow the United States to use bases to supply the Israeli military against Arab nations. Another dispute regarding the bases concerned the United States attacks on Libya in 1986, when Italy resisted US operations by pointing out that they are not NATO missions so military bases in Italy could not be used as launching points (p.196).

Constructed in 1951, the Naples base is home to the United States Sixth Fleet, which patrols the Mediterranean to respond to any imminent threats or to intervene in conflict areas. According to the base's official website, there are 10,000 US personnel whose function is to support other military installations operating in critical locations. Having access to 14 ports in Italy, the facility is key providing assistance to US and allied military forces.

Figure 3- Detailed Map of the United States Facilities in Europe



U.S. ARMY—16 key bases

BELGIUM
1. Benelux
2. Brussels

GERMANY
3. Ansbach
4. Baden Wuerttemberg
5. Bamberg
6. Baumholder
7. Garmisch
8. Grafenwoehr
9. Hohenfels
10. Kaiserslautern
11. Stuttgart
12. Schweinfurt
13. Wiesbaden

ITALY
14. Livorno
15. Vicenza

NETHERLANDS
16. Schinnen

U.S. NAVY—4

GREECE
17. U.S. Naval Support Activity, Souda Bay, Crete, Greece

ITALY
18. Naval Air Station Sigonella
19. Naples Naval Support Activity

SPAIN
20. Rota Naval Station

U.S. AIR FORCE—8

U.K.
21. RAF Lakenheath
22. RAF Mildenhall
23. RAF Alconbury

GERMANY
24. Ramstein Air Base
25. Spangdahlem Air Base

PORTUGAL
26. Lajes Field (Azores)

TURKEY
27. Incirlik Air Base

ITALY
28. Aviano Air Base

OTHER

NORWAY
29. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in the Trondheim Region

GERMANY
30. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Landstuhl

TURKEY
31. U.S. X-band radar as part of missile defense in Kürecik (eastern Turkey)

Source: Heritage Foundation research.

3.4.4 Spain

Until the dictatorship in Spain ended in 1975, the United States military presence was welcomed in this country. With the accord of 1953, the United States gained access to four military air bases in Spain: Rota, Torrejon, Moron and Zaragoza, besides smaller ones, such as radar sites. Rota and Morron were used actively during the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ending of the authoritarian regime in Spain marked a new era regarding the bases, and Torrejon and Zaragoza were closed in 1998 due to domestic resistance in Spain to the United States presence (Cooley & Hopkin, 2010, pp. 499-500).

While hosting US bases like other countries, Spain experienced a unique incident. In 1966, a B-52 bomber jettisoned four nuclear bombs after being involved in a crash with a tanker aircraft in the air. Three bombs exploded in the ocean near Palomares, creating radioactive pollution. One was found unexploded but it still caused some environmental problems. Politically, the incident triggered opposition in Spain to the presence of US nuclear weapons at Torrejon air base. Finally, in 1988, growing anger against the United States military presence led to an agreement between two allies, and 72 F-16s equipped with nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the base, which the United States transferred to an Italian base in Crotona (Gillem, 2007, p.173).

While the United States had negotiated its use of bases under specific conditions in other host countries, Spain had set no pre-conditions for US presence. This meant that, whenever the United States felt that a western ally was under the threat, it could, without taking Spain's permission, use all facilities to act against the enemy. By giving US personal complete freedom of action on its territory, Spain had offered a blank check to the United States military (Sanz, 2009, p. 57).

3.4.5 Turkey

According to the *Peace & Security Report* (2007), although NATO was established to defend European countries and create a transatlantic alliance, Turkey needed to be included because it shared a border with the Soviet Union and had a key position for controlling the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Bölme (2008) asserts that, prior to the approval of Turkey's NATO membership in 1952, the construction of Incirlik base had

already started in 1951. Following the deployment of the United States 7,216th air base fleet there, the base was activated in 1954. Since then, the base has been used for training and support of US troops, aircraft and other elements.

Armaoğlu (1991) points out that Turkey and the United States signed 31 military agreements between 1950-65 and scope of them were so wide that it created a crisis between the two countries. US personnel had many privileges that caused a number of disputes among Turkish and US military components. Thereupon, Turkey demanded from US to reconsider the content of bilateral base agreements and to amend them in the direction of Turkey's point of view. At the end of the negotiations, Turkey and the United States signed a secret Turkish American Agreement on Cooperation and Defense in 1969 (pp.277-78). However, with the eruption of the Cyprus crisis,⁸ Turkey abolished the base agreement and the Turkish military took control of all US bases in 1975, with the exception of NATO missions in the country. It was not till 1980 that the two sides reached an open and new agreement to use Turkish military bases for NATO purposes.

Incirlik also exemplifies how the United States violates bilateral military base agreements, caused international crises. In 1960, when a US spy U-2 spy plane was brought down by the Soviet Union over its air space, a crisis broke out among those involved. While the Soviet Union blamed Turkey for supporting such a flight by allowing the United States to use Incirlik base, Turkey denied any responsibility. It was not the last spy plane crisis either. In 1965, a second spy plane was brought down over the Black Sea; which once again had taken off from Incirlik base. The Turkish government announced that Turkey would ban US intelligence flights after this crash. However, such flights over the Middle East and other regions apart from Russia have continued (Bölme, 2012, pp.226-233).

Incirlik Air Base was used during the United States bombing campaign against Iraq in 1991. Following the Gulf War, Incirlik base gained more importance, and a UN decision led to more US and British troops being deployed there. The base was used during the operations Provide Comfort and Poised Hammer in Iraq (Bac, 2005, p.65).

⁸When Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, the US punished Turkey by cancelling arms sales and military credits to Turkey. Thereupon, the Turkish military took control of US bases by allowing only NATO missions to be carried out in 1975.

Later, however, domestic dynamics and opposition in Turkey led to its refusal to allow US troops to use its Turkish bases during the occupation of Iraq, which forced the Washington administration to consider alternative base countries. Spencer and Hulsman (2003) argue that the United States' subsequent decision to build new military bases in Eastern Europe decreased Turkey's burden as a US ally.

Spencer and Hulsman (2003) also elaborate on this issue:

Currently, the United States is too dependent on a few countries. Developing a presence in other nations of the region would decrease America's dependence on Turkey, for example, and therefore ease pressure on that vital American ally. It is important that Ankara, situated in a very tough neighborhood, not be the sole pressure point when the U.S. projects forces eastward and southward from Europe. The political situation inside Turkey might force even a generally sympathetic regime in Ankara to resist America's using Turkey as a jumping-off point, as has happened over Iraq. Basing in Bulgaria and Romania would shift some of the burden away from a hard-pressed American friend. (p.25)

In essence, Turkey has been an ally that has not allowed the United States to use its territory unconditionally. The latest instance occurred in 2003, when Turkey rejected US demands to provide a corridor for US troops during the occupation of Iraq (Lachowski, 2007, p.11). According to *Turkish Parliament's* documents, motion about sending Turkish troops to foreign countries and hosting foreign military components in the country during the six months was refused by the Parliament. Disappointed with Turkey's stance in not backing US use of its territory and bases, the Washington administration turned its focus on former Soviet air bases in the Eastern Europe, having already gained access to them before the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Posen, 2003, p.17). Although Turkey blocked transfer of US military to Iraq from Turkish territory, Incirlik remained important for the United States during the war, since almost 70 percent of air cargo for the United States troops was sent via this base (Engel, p. 26).

Turkey's resistance to the United States related to the use of Incirlik forced the United States to reconsider the size of its presence in the country, and as a part of its global relocation process, the Pentagon decided to withdraw approximately 3,000 soldiers from Turkey in 2003 (Fields, 2004, p.80). However, when the United States announced

its new project on the Middle East which is called the Greater Middle East Project⁹ under the Bush administration in 2004, Turkey declared its support for the initiative and signed a decree and put it into force which allowed allocating Incirlik base for the logistic usage of it by the United States (Arı, 2013).

Izmir air base is another important US military installation in Turkey. The base provides support, logistics, security police and medical flights, with its primary mission being to support all US and NATO units in Izmir. Additionally, the squadron manages US support to Cigli air base, a nearby Turkish air force base. Although there are no official documents confirming the presence of US nuclear weapons in these bases, it is believed that the base contains nuclear arms. The unit was activated in Izmir as the 7,266th support squadron in November 1955, to support Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force.

The other US base in Kurecik, Malatya, contains a missile radar system that was transferred to NATO command by US President Obama. According to *Sabah* newspaper, it is the first element in a ballistic missile defense system to be deployed in East European countries, although the decision regarding the missile system in Kurecik will be finally taken in 2015. With this radar system, US battleships in the Mediterranean will be warned against possible missile threats.

US military facilities are not limited to the few in Turkish cities, as there are more than 30 other military bases, facilities and installations across the. While some of them are under the NATO command and control, the United States military's strong and determining existence in these bases is noticeable, with some of these bases, such as Murdet, Karamursel and Çakmak, containing US missiles, nuclear test monitoring sites and nuclear weapon storage (Outzen, 2012).

⁹ The Bush Administration has declared an ambitious plan for deeper economic and political engagement with what the administration calls "The Greater Middle East." The professed objectives are to open markets and export democracy to the Muslim World. The Greater Middle East, according to the Administration, extends as far west as the Atlantic coast of Morocco, as far east as the Karakoram Highway of Northern Pakistan, as far north as the Black Sea coast of Turkey, and as far south as the port of Aden in Yemen. <http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/Candland/USGMEI.pdf>

CHAPTER IV

4. US MILITARY INTERVENTIONS VIA ITS BASES AND NEW BASE POLICIES FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

This chapter focuses on US military operations from its various overseas military bases. The chapter examines the changed political and security perception after the September 11 attacks and its effects on US military structure, considering the debate about US hegemony since September 9/11. Although the United States military bases have many political, economic and humanitarian effects in host countries and at global level, the chapter focuses more on military aspects of it.

Regarding the role these military facilities in Europe have played in terms of American interests and hegemony, a broader assessment is required. These overseas bases have been used as launch sites to invade a number of countries, including Lebanon, Iraq (1991), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (2003). Thus, their importance for the maintenance of US hegemony is clear. The discussion over US hegemonic power centers on the interventions launched from these bases. According to Hudson (1996), the United States hegemony in the Middle East was already hurt in different periods for several reasons:

Tens of thousands of Iraqi children who have died as a by-product of US-led UN sanctions; air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi (1986); an Egyptian airliner forced down by US fighter planes; the battleship New Jersey firing its 16-inch guns into the Lebanese mountains (1983); another warship accidentally shooting down an Iranian civilian airliner over the Gulf (1988); support for Israel, whose use of violence has repeatedly created huge refugee populations and immense human suffering; manipulation of a national movement (the Kurds) for realpolitik advantage; the arming of mujahidin (fighters) for Afghanistan with little regard for disastrous consequences (1980s); and the tendency (among some politicians and parts of the media) to demonize Islam (p.343).

In criticizing US hegemonic actions, Hudson (1996) urges the United States to be a 'benevolent' hegemon, adding that, instead of such violent steps; a hegemon should employ more reconciliation and balanced policies. Establishing security requires multilateral engagement rather than containment. Instead of a fake commitment to

democratization and human rights, the priority of the hegemon should be genuine support for its legitimacy and stability (p. 343).

4.1 LEBANON (1958)

One of the key instances when the United States used its overseas installations like a springboard was in Lebanon in 1958. The purpose of the operation was to keep the pro-Western administration in power despite strong local opposition, and a United Arab republican¹⁰ threat to the government's rule. Coffey (2012) reports that the United States used three important military bases during the intervention known as Operation Blue Bat: one was the Sixth Fleet base in Naples, Italy, the second was in Germany, and the last was Incirlik, Turkey. 5,000 US marines and 40,000 infantry were sent to Lebanon to crush the opponents, while US airbases in the three countries were also actively used for logistic support (p.5). Regarding Incirlik's role, Karasapan (1989) reports that, even though it had no connection with the NATO mission, the base was used by the United States troops to send 16,000 US soldiers to Beirut. Importantly, there was no a proper notification of the Turkish government about the process (p.6).

This operation lasted three months and left 2,000-4,000 dead Lebanese behind, and a new government. The intervention was also the first concrete instance of the Eisenhower doctrine invoked by the Lebanese leader's call for US help. It was also a complex joint operation with European allies during the hot phase of the Cold War (Çelik, 2012, p.131).

The second joint US-Europe military operation came in 1982, again in Lebanon. The politically fragile structure of this country, and Israel's attempts to clean out Palestinian communities there, led to another US military intervention. Israeli used the failed assassination attempt on its ambassador to Britain as a pretext to attack Lebanon. Following the deaths of 30,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, the Israeli army entered Syria. Neither the United States-backed Israel nor the Soviet Union-backed Syria was eager to

¹⁰In 1958, Egypt and Syria, following a referendum decided to unite under a single state called the United Arab Republic. However, in 1961, it disintegrated. Clearly, unification triggered pro-unification ideas and ideals, although some people remained totally against it. This polarization caused serious domestic disturbance, with Lebanon finding itself among the countries caught in a harsh political confrontation on this issue. Ethnic and religious division was deepened because of the unification idea and the country came to the brink of civil war.

withdraw, but they nevertheless agreed on a plan to leave Lebanon. This plan included the deployment of US and European forces in Lebanon to observe the withdrawal, with 800 US marines being stationed immediately in Lebanon, with Britain, France and Italy later joining this international 'peace' force (Hallenbeck, 1991). As to the involvement of the United States military in this process, EUCOM "played a key role in providing command and control and logistical support for the United States contingent deployed to Lebanon" (Coffey, 2012, p.6). The force that the United States-Europe alliance established was called the Multinational Force. France and Italy sent 860 troops and Lebanon was divided into two parts across the Green Line: Christian East Beirut and Muslim West Beirut. The United States' later decision to leave Lebanon triggered slaughter of Palestinians under the observation of Israel in Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian refugee camps (Forster & Cimbala, 2005, pp.34-36).

4.2 FIRST GULF WAR (1991)

Given that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 threatened the flow of oil from the Middle East to Western markets, the United States acted quickly to force Iraq to retreat by beginning military preparations. Following Iraq's rejection of US demands, the United States responded with air bombings.

The United States wanted to share the financial and military burden of invading Iraq and called for help from Western allies. Even though NATO allies were not so keen, they later gave strong economic, military and base support to the United States, creating a corridor for US troops. Although many European countries, except Britain, considered the issue as a tool for expanding US hegemony, they did not refrain from sending troops to Iraq (Forster, 2005, pp.62-63).

The Iraq war was the first following the collapse of the Soviet regime and German unification. When the United States asked Berlin to send troops to Iraq, there was a legal obstacle in its constitution requiring the approval of the Soviets. Although this problem was solved, Germany still did not take an active role in the war (Baumann & Hellmann, 2001, p.11).

Other European allies demonstrated their backing by approving the UNSC resolution authorizing the intervention in Iraq, although such support was not forthcoming for the

second war on Iraq in 2003 (Odom, 2007, p. 407). Spain was very eager to join the United States campaign, and its government gave both political and base-related support to the United States. These facilities were also used for transferring alleged terrorists captured in Afghanistan to the United States (Cooley & Hopkin, 2010). In advance of strikes, the United States sent aircraft carriers to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, but since they could not accommodate B-52 bombers, these flew from military bases in Spain and Diego Garcia to bomb Iraqi targets (Lowry, 2003, p.1).

As an US ally, Turkey also took part in the process. As Bac (2005) reports, prior to the United States invasion, Turkey obeyed all UN decisions about Iraq, such as the embargo on the Baghdad regime, and closed down the Kerkük-Yumurtalık pipeline, which had huge importance for both Turkey and Iraq's economies (p.63).

Bac (2005) adds,

Turkey tied down Iraqi troops at the Turkish border. Even though Turkey did not send troops to Iraq during the war, it joined the multilateral coalition and Iraq was required to divert military resources to the north that otherwise might have been deployed against the coalition forces around Kuwait. The United States-led coalition relied heavily on Turkish bases, most importantly Incirlik, as well as airspace, for the air campaign against Iraq. It noted that "Incirlik is one of the most strategically important footholds for the United States in the Middle East" (pp. 63-64).

The 23d tactical fighter squadron and other air units compromised the composite air wing with one hundred aircraft, carrying out air strikes from Incirlik on Iraq (Lowry, 2003, p.18). Thus, Incirlik base was used during the war for both ground and air operations.

4.3 BOSNIA (1995) and KOSOVO (1999)

Following the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, violent ethnic clashes developed, and Bosnian Croats and Serbs, with Russian backing, launched an anti-Bosnian campaign that included massacres. These mass killings led to NATO's intervention with the main aim of stopping Serbian aggression. UNSCR resolution 781 banned all military flights over Bosnia Herzegovina, which was enforced by US military assets in Italy. However, this failed to halt Serbian aggression, so a military operation was launched in 1995. The

United States 603rd air control squadron, stationed in Aviano air base in Italy played a crucial role in coordinating and carrying out military attacks on Serbian military forces. All command and control between the combined air operations, established at Dal Molin airbase, Italy, and US navy forces in the Adriatic Sea, were coordinated via Aviano (Miller, 1997, p.31). That is, most of the air strikes were carried out from military bases in Italy.

The NATO air campaign forced Serbia to sign the Dayton accord (Black, 2005, pp.245-46). Even though the operation can be seen as a NATO-led mission, the statistics show that the United States was the main force behind it. As Stewart (2005) records, 2,318 of 3,515 sorties were carried out by US forces, and the United States also positioned troops in Macedonia in case of an extended ground war. Having imposed relative peace, NATO deployed IFOR in the region, with the United States sending 20,000 soldiers from Germany and the First Armored Division (pp.441-442). Thus, once more, military bases and troops in Europe served the ends that the United States demanded.

Europe's response to this case of ethnic-cleansing in 1995 was more powerful and decisive than its military action against later Serb aggression in 1999. In the latter case, in Operation Allied Force, the United States led the intervention that forced Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo following a sustained bombing campaign. A NATO peacekeeping force was then deployed in Kosovo involving the United States, Italy, France, the UK and Germany. These operations proved that air attacks had great power to force withdrawal and end conflicts (Black, 2005). In this second air bombing campaign, the United States carried out 60% of sorties (Stewart, 2005, p.447). Coffey (2012) adds:

The United States Air Force Europe moved 64 fighter jets from bases in Lakenheath, the UK, and Spangdahlem, Germany, to American air bases in Italy. The Army V Corps, based in Germany, deployed a squadron of Apache helicopters closer to the region. With full support, this included 31 support aircraft, two infantry battalions, one signal battalion, and 5,000 supporting personnel, which travelled from Germany to Kosovo's border in Albania and carried out the campaign".

4.4 AFGHANISTAN (ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001)

While the United States' old allies did not respond to the United States' requests to share the burden in the wars it led in Afghanistan and Iraq, East European countries gave the support that the Washington administration and the United States military needed. In particular, Romania and Bulgaria never hesitated to allow the United States using their territory for occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq (Spencer & Hulsman, 2003).

Following NATO's activation of Article 5 after the September 11 attacks, EUCOM became the main actor for military operations in Afghanistan, launching Operation Enduring Freedom--Trans-Shara in 2007. It was also a base for sending troops to the battlefields of Afghanistan. Turkey's Incirlik base was once again involved in that Turkey supported the United States by allowing it to use Turkish air space and Incirlik base for its bombing campaigns in Afghanistan. Additionally, the base served as a center of refueling and relocation. Allegedly, almost 4,000 sorties were carried out from Turkish territory (Bac, 2005, p.67). Moron air base in Spain, Ramstein and Rhain bases in Germany played crucial roles in bombing Afghan targets. Following this, C-17 aircrafts from Ramstein, Germany, began dropping food and medical aid to Afghans (Coffey, 2012).

The United States' new base policy of expanding into the former Soviet Union's backyard was successful, with Karshi Khanabad air base in Uzbekistan hosting 2,000 US soldiers during the war against Afghanistan. Pakistan and Oman also played major roles in the campaign by granting access to US air forces (Stewart, 2005, p.466). In the first days of the attacks, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was also used actively, while special operations forces from Saudi Arabian bases carried out operations against Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan (Lambeth, 2005).

4.5 IRAQ (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, 2003)

This war created a debate about "new" and "old" Europe. In the first days of the campaign, the leaders of Italy, Poland, Hungary and Portugal wrote a letter to the United States and the UK praising them for taking the lead in Iraq, while Germany and France opposed it harshly. It resulted in the United ??? labeling the latter group of

states as ‘old’ Europe. Disagreements over the use of NATO capabilities in Europe to support US military plans created another crisis between the allies (McGoldrick, 2004, p.13). The emphasis on new Europe was an expression of the advent of a new type of alliance between the United States and Eastern Europe. During the war, these countries’ support was impressive. Regarding the role these states played in the invasion of Iraq, *Global Military* writes as follows:

The United States refueling aircraft were based at Bosnia’s Sarajevo airfield, and the United States military also used the Bulgarian port of Burgas, the Romanian port Constanta and the Romanian military airfield of Mihail Kogalniceanu. These countries were being considered for new American bases, probably small installations with rotating troops. These bases would be capable of quickly striking targets in the Middle East or Central Asia, which are closer to here than is Western Europe.

While the first Gulf War in 1991 aimed to force the Saddam regime to withdraw from Kuwait, the 2003 attack, Operation Iraqi Freedom, aimed to topple the regime. According to Coffey (2012), the March 2003 intervention was a joint move by the United States and its European allies. Once more, US bases in Germany were used to launch the invasion, and V Corps were deployed in Kuwait for combat. As the 3rd Infantry Division led the corps, 20,000 troops entered Iraq (p.8). Piotr (2006) points out that, although Germany was against the war and declared that it would not take part in the occupation, it nevertheless allowed US troops to use military facilities on German territory (p.14). The other military base which was used during the war was Aviano in Italy. The 173rd air bone brigade sent 1,000 paratroopers to Iraq as a leading group (Coffey, 2012, p.8).

Even though Spain’s Moron airbase and Rota naval station were also used in this operation under the NATO alliance; US-Spanish relations were tested during the occupation because of the Spanish government’s radical decision. At first, Spain had supported the United States and sent troops, but when the government changed and Zapatero took office, Spain withdrew its troops. This triggered an escalation of tension

between two countries, although the United States was not banned from using the two bases¹¹ (Cooley, 2008, p.1-2).

The key incident leading up to changing of occupation of Iraq plans was Turkey's decision refusing to give permission for US troops to use Incirlik base as a transit point. Stewart (2005) argues that the Turkish parliament's resolution forced the United States to review its deployment and war plans (p. 477). "With the Turkish option gone, a US conventional ground attack would have to originate in Kuwait and progress 300 miles to Baghdad and then perhaps 200 more to the vital oil fields around Mosul" (Stewart, 2005, p.477). Outzen (2012) describes the effects of Turkey's decision: "The failed parliamentary motion (or *tezkere*) chilled the United States-Turkish military and diplomatic relations for the better part of a decade. Turkey would go on to provide modest support in Iraq (e.g., restricted over flight access and transit for noncombat supplies via ground convoy), but its abstention greatly complicated the American-led war effort" (p.4).

4.6 SEPTEMBER 11 AND NEW BASE BUILD UP

There is an argument that the Bush administration used the September 11 attacks as a pretext to strengthen its hegemony and continue its new base installation campaign. Astrada (2010) argues that the new military buildup after the attacks contributed to the United States' hegemonic stance. (p. 52). This era also marks the United States' direct engagement in military interventions without any humanitarian pretexts by focusing on US security interests. The Rhetoric of Bush aligning US existence with military interventionism led to the violation of many countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ikenberry (2002) argues that the new US policy under the Bush administration, such as its war on terrorism and preemptive strikes against countries not cooperating with US interests, led to a unipolar world. These policies were also contradictory to the norms of the international community, suggesting a neo-imperial vision (p.44).

¹¹In 1986, Spain banned the US from accessing its bases when US war planes carried out a bombing campaign against Libya.

Following the September 11 attacks, the G.W. Bush administration adopted a new base build up policy in many regions besides Central Europe, such as the Eastern Europe. A report by *CRS Report for Congress* (2005) describes this project as follows:

President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). Roughly 70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the United States. Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and South Korea and new bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe. These locations would be closer, and better able, to respond to potential trouble spots.

This base reassessment policy is motivated by a changing threat perception. The new challenges for the Pentagon are considered to be religious radicalism, drug trafficking and 'rough' states, mostly in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus (Campbell & Celeste, 2003, p.98). Regarding the United States' changing military posture, *Defense Review Report* (2001) suggests that overseas bases were first built to contain the Soviet Union and protect US interests and later on they were enhanced against new threats. It states that the new strategy of the United States focuses on missile defenses and counter-terrorist operations in other regions. The report frequently mentions deterrence and rapid strike, while emphasizing the planned installation of new temporary and cheaper bases as well as additional military facilities in Central Europe. (pp.25-27).

The clearest disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen in 2003 when the United States decided to intervene in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. Britain, Poland, Spain and Italy sent troops to Iraq, while France and Germany remained opposed (while Spain also later withdrew its forces). The United States' 'with us or against us' rhetoric deepened the divergence between the United States and certain European states (Sloan, Sutter and Yost, 2004, pp.66). It can be argued that the war was a turning point for the United States' new basing system. According to Fields (2004), several factors shaped its base policies:

The unified German, French and Belgian opposition to the United States-led war effort was obvious. The denial of access to Austrian rail lines to transport US troops and equipment en route to Iraq, slowed the overall theater deployment. The Swiss and Austrian denial of over flight permission- complicating US flights from airbases in Germany and Britain to the

Middle East and Italy. The intentional delays of the Italian government in permitting the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade, based at Aviano Air Base, to deploy to the Iraqi theater (p.82).

The Atlantic alliance was weakened because of the United States' changing threat perceptions, various disagreements and tensions with European partners. The new base policy instead included former Iron Curtain countries, with the United States making bilateral agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which modernized old military bases for US deployment (Piotr, 2006, p.19)

Deepening divisions forced the United States to seek additional partners that would not reject its plans and demands. Thus, not only Eastern Europe but also other countries within the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence became the targets of a new kind of US military expansionism after September 11. For example, as Posen (2003) points out, the United States made base agreements with Kyrgyzstan and other Asian countries to obtain the right of use for these facilities in accordance with US military interests, as it also did in the Balkans (p.17).

The United States has had no difficulty deploying its forces to new host countries as an alternative to the core European countries as every Eastern European state was eager to provide the United States with new military bases. According to Spencer and Hulsman (2003), the Taszar base in Hungary which had served the United States before in its bombing campaign in Kosovo was considered by the current US administration to be a new site for US deployment. Bulgaria also invited the United States to establish a new base structure, giving it the freedom to use the ports of Varna and Burgas, which would allow it to access the Black Sea. Additionally, training was also transferred to these countries. For instance, the Iraqi opposition was trained in Hungary under the umbrella of the NATO ally.

Kosovo, with Camp Bondsteel, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Eagle Base, granted access, and although they could not provide optimum conditions for wider and important operations, they are still functional (CRS Report for Congress, 2005). Poland is also a new US base partner, and its military and political participation in the Iraq war demonstrates the changing perceptions of the alliance. Poland has become a loyal partner of the United States and its interests in the region as it is at the center of the

United States' missile defense system to be deployed against Iranian and Russian threats. When the Washington administration offered it to Poland, the country welcomed the idea and talks began between them (Domisiewicz & Kaminski, 2007).

Even though the missile defense system is a NATO-based project, the motivation comes from the United States, and it provides the most important financial, military and technical support to the host countries. NATO's official documents (2012) make clear that NATO undertook the mission in early 2010 to defend Alliance against missile threats and Turkey, Romania, Poland, The Netherlands and Spain take part in this ballistic missile defense project. *Aktüel* magazine also mentions that these bases will be deployed in Romania, Poland and Turkey. The project envisages that Turkey will include a radar system to detect missile attacks on Europe, but not missiles targeted on Turkey itself. Romania and Bulgaria will have anti-missile systems to respond any attack and the project will be completed by 2018. Additionally, battleships will patrol the Mediterranean to destroy possible missile threats.

Following the September 11 attacks, the United States began searching for additional military bases in Eastern Europe, with the Pentagon agreeing with Bulgaria to construct four installations, with the Bezmer air base seeming the most important. As with some other countries, Bulgaria retains no any control or jurisdiction over the station. Although the government in Sofia has asked the United States to inform it before using the base in conflict, the United States has no such obligation (Hugus, 2007). Other bases installed in Bulgaria since September 11 include Novo Selo shooting range, Aitos logistic center and Graf Ignatievo air base. Akkaya (2009) reports that,

Under the agreement, no more than 2,500 U.S. military personnel will be located at the joint military facilities. Most training rotations will have small numbers and will be of short duration. Possible types of units are armor, mechanized infantry, airborne infantry or light infantry. The type of equipment they will use will depend on the unit and the training requirements. The treaty also allows the United States to use the bases “for missions in third country without a specific authorization from Bulgarian authorities.” The Bezmer Air Base is expected to become one of the major US strategic airfields overseas, housing American combat aircraft (p.6).

Bezmer air base is included in *Foreign Policy* (2006) journal's list of the most important US bases. Although far smaller than the major military complexes of Western

Europe, the United States prefers this installation because it is out of sight, less costly than the old Europe bases, and closer to critical areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, this facility will serve as the first point to provide all kinds of military support and supplies to US combat forces. Perhaps the most striking US demand of these Eastern European countries is for them to obey its rules and comply with US interests, when compared to its Central European base countries.

The relocation of US forces from countries in Western Europe, such as Germany and Italy, to two new crucial bases in Bulgaria and Romania under the Joint Task Force-East (JTF-East) is a continuing process. The issue has been discussed by Bulgarian journals and news agencies, too. While *Standart News* (2007) announced that the Bezmer military base in Bulgaria would be one of the six most important bases for the United State, *Sofia News Agency* (2007) revealed that the United States plans to move its air base from Aviano, Italy, to the Graf Ignatievo air base in Bulgaria.

Like Bulgaria, Romania is also a preferred host country in the east, and part of the United States' ad-hoc base policy. Tertrais (2010) explains how the United States arrived at its revised base policy. In particular, disagreements between the United States and Europe about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars forced Washington to make a cost-benefit analysis about its large permanent military facilities and to find smaller partners, such as Romania and Bulgaria, which are in need of monetary aid (p.142).

Romania has also joined the list of US military base hosting countries. It has agreed that four military facilities can be used by the United States military, Mihail Kogalniceanu air base near the Black Sea being activated. Nearly 3,000 troops are planned to be deployed in these bases (Hugus, 2007). Mihail Kogalniceanu played an important role in occupation of Iraq as a stopping off point for US troops, there are also allegations that it was used for CIA operations and the transfer of captives from Afghanistan and elsewhere (Ditz, 2009).

Being less costly and more beneficial for US interests and more easily mobilized in the case of war, Cincu, Smardan, Babadag and Mihail Kogalniceanu bases in Romania are called the Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E), and allow the United States army to access critical locations due their proximity to these regions (Akkaya, 2009).

As a part of its new base strategy, the Bush administration has changed the course of base establishment by reinforcing its East European wing, while its Central Europe structure has declined gradually during Obama's presidency. According to NATO documents, by 2008, only three percent of nuclear weapons remained in Europe compared to the 1970s, stationed in five countries' bases, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands (Kristensen & Norris, 2010, p.65). Similarly, the United States is planning, by 2014, to close many military bases and withdraw 70,000 personnel, besides decreasing the number of facilities from 850 to 550 while enhancing its bases in former Soviet Bloc countries (Lachowski, 2007, p.12). However, according to US Marine General Jones (2003), the reduction of these older bases and their personnel does not mean that they are not important anymore. Certain installations, such as Ramstein, Germany, are still irreplaceable and remain strategically significant.

4.7 US HEGEMONY DEBATE REVISITED

According to some scholars, 1970 marked a decline in US hegemony in connection with the rise of new superpowers. However, the post-September 11 assessments suggest that there has been resurgence in US hegemony, at least in terms of military power. Paul (2005) asserts that many countries are dissatisfied with the United States' current unilateral policies, such as intervention in other states that do not share the same vision as Washington, and fears are surfacing, triggered by the absence of a balancing element to US foreign policy (p. 47).

However, there are also different views about the future hegemonic position of the United States. Goh (2010), for example, considers the issue from a critical perspective; arguing that US's post-September 11 military and political drive has actually damaged its perceived hegemonic power. The legitimacy of its actions are questioned and, while its military dominance is increasing, its soft power, which includes values, ideology and culture, is losing ground (pp. 78-81). Consequently, because the United States is no longer a consent-based hegemon, its allies increasingly question US foreign policies. US rhetoric about democracy and freedom is unable to find passionate supporter, which makes it difficult for the United States to use its military bases as much as before (Bölme, 2012, p.65).

Using Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Litowitz (2000) describes the term as mostly "invisible, subtle and consensual" (p.515). US policies after the events of September 11 have been more focused on military power as a part of hegemony's coercion apparatus. The invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and other military engagements and interventions in the territories of many countries, such as Pakistan, in pursuit of 'terrorists' are clear instances of coercion, which is a pillar of hegemony, but at risk without the most important pillar-consent.

Focusing more on terrorism, WMD and asymmetric threats, Biddle (2005) considers that US actions may trigger anti-US policies that will open a debate about its legitimacy deficit in the UN as happened in the Iraq case. Similarly, an economic challenge in response to unilateral US actions may destroy its competitive position and make it fragile (p.9). Arguing that unilateral policies lead to the paradox of the hegemon, Cronin (2001) points out that "hegemons have the material capabilities to act unilaterally, yet they cannot remain hegemon if they do so at the expense of the system that they are trying to lead" (p.103). He emphasizes that the United States-led Iraqi operation in 1991, which continued despite widespread protests by public opinion and the opposition of a number of powerful states in the UNSC, was a key sign of its unilateral tendencies. This is a symbol of the paradox, since the hegemon is also the creator of an order that regulates economic, political and military issues in the system, while at the same time neglecting and violating them. Cronin (2001) underlines that the hegemon's leadership position and its material capabilities contradict since the system has different expectations regarding the hegemon's dual structure (p.104). Claims about multilateralism during the process of gaining the UN's resolution to wage war against Iraq are disproved by Krauthammer (1990), who argues that the UN has not capability to defend weaker states' rights and adds, "In the Gulf, without the United States leading and prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred. Nothing would have been done: no embargo, no 'Desert Shield' operation, and no threat of force" (p.25). Regarding unilateral US actions, Cox (2002) asserts that the lack of a counter-superpower led the United States to rise as hegemon. Japan's slowing economic development, China's lack of all necessary elements to be a hegemon in the world order, Europe's weaker military structure, and Russia's insufficient economic assets have left the United States as the only hegemon (p.270).

Regarding US attempts to legitimize its unipolar military engagements, Cox (2002) argues that starting the Afghanistan War in 2001 allowed the hegemon to test its material ability to act alone achieve its goals. As a result of this step, the United States is to be a burden (p.272). This has led to warnings to the United States not to act like a hostile military superpower: “Historically, all great powers have eventually declined. No unipolar system has ever been permanent. (...) This eventual decline may not happen quickly, but sooner or later, one must assume that the United States, too, will lose its current predominance” (Biddle, 2005, p.17). Asserting a decline in US hegemony, especially, after second Iraq war, Arrighi (2005) characterizes US global supremacy as 'bubble'. Arrighi (2005) elaborates on this issue:

Far from laying the foundations of a new American century, the United States occupation of Iraq has jeopardized the credibility of US military might; it has further undermined the centrality of the United States. It would have been hard to imagine a more rapid and complete failure of the neo-conservative imperial project. In all likelihood, the neo-conservative bid for global supremacy will go down in history that punctuated the terminal crisis of US hegemony.

In discussing the absence of a counter-power to balance US predominance over the world order, Paul (2005) argues that, although the neorealist perspective envisages that the United States will be challenged by other powers in the system, which will lead to a multipolar world, there is problem with this perspective since, because of uncertainty about the advent of such a balance when issues such as free riding are considered, it does not seem easy to create a balanced system (p.49).

In an official assessment regarding the United States' future role as hegemon, the *United States National Intelligence Council's (NIC's) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (2008) report envisages that the international system's nature may become multinational with no single hegemon dominating world politics (pp.81). The report's conclusions are as follows:

It will have less power in a multipolar world than it has enjoyed for many decades, and to a lesser extent, military power, the United States will no longer have the same flexibility in choosing among as many policy options. The United States interest and willingness to play a leadership role also may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world's leader are reassessed by American voters (p.93).

The United States' first break with the alliance system by unilateral military, political or economic steps was seen in the first Gulf War. Although UNSC authorized military operations, George Bush had been determined to act alone, even if a consensus had not been reached. Before using pure military strength, the United States had to deter Iraq since hegemonic structure required this. At the same time, the military contribution of other countries was not a sign of multilateralism (Podliska, 2010, p.150). Similarly, Krauthammer (1990) makes a distinction between real and apparent multilateralism. The former is one among equals in terms of economics, military power and political standing, as it was created during WWII by the 'Big Three.' On the other hand, in the latter case, all actions are determined by the superpower, which looks for a multilateral mask to cover its movements. The reason for seeking such a deception is to convince public opinion in the United States since legitimacy is important for them (p.25).

The post September 11 policies of the United States mark a new period in US unilateralism and hegemony. President G. W. Bush's rhetoric of 'with us or against us' and the 'axis of evil' in response to terrorist attacks has caused a disproportionate use of military power. According to Barry (2003), this policy has aimed to prevent the rise of any rival. In totally dismissing collective security, the new doctrine focuses solely on US domination of the world system. George W. Bush's unilateral actions have demonstrated its effects on treaties, too. For example, while President Bill Clinton agreed to establish the International Criminal Court, Bush retracted the United States' signature from the agreement, paving the way for illegal detentions and investigations of captives who seized in Afghanistan and elsewhere (pp.28-29).

Considering the issue from a different perspective, and pointing out how the United States constructed a new threat perception in the 2000s, Mastanduno (2005) argues as follows:

The United States foreign policy after the defeat of the Soviet Union seemed at times to be in search of the next great threat. For a short time (...) Japan and China were at the center of U.S. attention, for economic rather than military reasons. The attacks of September 11 turned the U.S. foreign policy community in a different direction. (...) policymakers agreed that the central challenge to U.S. national security was found at the intersection of terrorism of global reach, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction. The perception of threat is

articulated most clearly in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy of September 2002 (p.182).

Changing US policies and threat perceptions had created a divergence between the United States and Europe. US' unipolar movements and lack of legitimacy in its decisions to wage war or hold military operations on different parts of the world urged Europe to reconsider its security policies and to establish a new security structure besides NATO, meaning more independent European security policy. According to Hoffman (2009) when European countries decided to establish their army under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999, it was not welcomed by the United States. Despite of the discomfort that the United States felt on the development, ESDP has actively been taking part in military operations since it was activated in 2001. ESDP includes six countries which are not members of NATO. At this point an overlap between the two organizations might be mentioned since "Both institutions engage in crisis management interventions to address violations to international peace and security. These crisis management mandates comprise the so-called "Petersberg tasks": humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat-force tasks (including peacemaking)" (pp.45-46).

Peters (2004) argues that ESDP is a sample of US' contradictions in its relations with Europe and adds that "The United States wants "fair" burden-sharing, meaning that the Europeans are contributing significant capabilities to Western security, while also claiming hegemonic leadership within the West, denying Europeans any stronger voice in security affairs." He also points out that although Europe wants to play more significant role in military decision-making process, it is not so eager to increase its military expenditures (p.382). Hoffman (2009) compares the NATO-ESDP struggle to 'turf battles' and adds that, under the leadership of France, some ESDP countries have ambitions to make the organization an alternative to NATO. (p.47). Even though the relation between NATO and ESDP cannot be defined with a fierce competition or full-scale cooperation, it is assumed that establishment of ESDP is a product of the reaction against the United States' unipolar policies and ESDP is symbol of the deterioration of transatlantic relations.

Keohane (1984) wrote that European countries were less eager to define their interests with the United States' interests. Similarly, they thought that they were not obliged to do so to get included in the United States' security umbrella against the USSR. Thus, "the subjective elements of American hegemony have been eroded as much as the tangible power resources upon which hegemonic systems rest" (p.49). So, it might be claimed that while establishment of Atlantic alliance was a supportive element of US hegemony, a deterioration in the alliance pointed out a decline in hegemonic leadership.

CONCLUSION

The study finds that the military apparatus of the United States has played an important role in its hegemonic posture and expansionism following WWII. A Europe, which was collapsed economically, politically and militarily, was in need of the United States' support and aid. While the United States backed Europe politically with Truman Doctrine and economically with Marshall Plan, the policy was resulted with the United States to penetrate Europe by establishing many military bases there. The other reason that make Europe felt obliged to the United States support was threat perception that the USSR caused. Feeling stuck with communism threat and post-war problems, Europe allowed the United States to expand its values, ideology and to establish military bases in the continent. However, prior to military bases in Europe, the United States' practices in Latin America were heralding the implications in the old continent. With the Monroe Doctrine, all European elements were excluded from Latin America and the United States executed many military operations and deployed military installations there.

The key research question of the study was how the United States military bases in Europe did contribute to US hegemony? So, given that military deployments and engagements are part of coercion, which is one of the two pillars of hegemony, while the second is consent, it might be argued that the United States has used its coercive power frequently in terms of its various military invasions, interventions and other operations. By neglecting UNSC decisions or objections from its allies, the United States ignored consent pillar of hegemonic order which caused a tension between transatlantic relations.

Considering the Marxist-Gramscist perspective as the theoretical anchor, the study found that hegemony is more than focus on state and material capabilities as realist approach envisaged. Although various problems that the approach experienced in the 1970s led to recognition of the importance of non-state actors, such as international organizations, emphasis on force proved some deficiencies in neo-realist perspective's hegemonic order perception. The other approach, world-system theory explains the hegemonic structure as more of an economic order in that the power controlling the economic system also leads the whole structure. However, the capitalist nature of the

system does not allow it to remain under the control of a single country or region because capital is not limited by national or regional borders.

Regarding the theoretical approach that this thesis is mainly built on, the Marxist-Gramscian perspective, it understands the hegemonic order through more complicated and sophisticated conceptions. It argues that a combination of material capability, ideologies, culture, ideas, non-state actors and the bourgeoisie together creates the hegemonic order. It differs particularly from the neo-realist approach, in that the Gramscian point of view focuses on consent more than coercion. That is why this theory is placed at the center of this study. Since the United States focused on its material capabilities rather than soft power, its hegemony is confined to fade. Neglecting the consent pillar of hegemony may result in decline followed by the collapse of its world leadership. This study therefore argues that US power will meet more challenges in the future so long as it continues to impose its coercive power on the system.

Regarding the origins of US hegemony, following the war against Spain in 1898, the United States gradually constructed its world leadership. Although it maintained a more isolationist policy till the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, its initiatives to create a world system following the end of WWII, such as UN, indicates that hegemonical behavioral patterns can be traced back to here since first condition for establishing hegemony is to make an order in accordance with the hegemon's interests. The penetration of US hegemonic order into Europe was mostly achieved through the Marshall Plan, which aimed to rebuild the war-torn continent. This indicates that that US hegemonic expansionism had not neglected the consent dimension of hegemony, at least in this early phase of its development. Culture, ideology and ideas, as Marxist-Gramscian perspective emphasizes, also helped it realize its hegemonic aspirations. However, the United States also used coercion frequently. This study claims that the end of the Cold War created a unipolar world that allowed the United States to act alone and impose its decisions through its military power, but this created a legitimization debate. Many scholars agree that the first Gulf War in 1991 signals the advent of the United States' unilateral era in the system, while events after September 11 are the second mark of its break from consent and respect for the order that it has built.

Although the base contest between the United States and the Soviet Union reached its peak during the Cold War, its origins go back further, to the United States' Monroe Doctrine. While for some, the doctrine was as the United States' reaction to colonization, in essence it helped support US expansionism in the Americas in place of the Europeans. By excluding old Europe, especially in South America, the United States developed its military, political and economic domination in the region. The doctrine allowed the United States to claim legitimacy in its coercive movements. Justified by the doctrine, invasions, coup d'états and the imposition of military bases were steadily carried out. This also demonstrated the retreat of Europe in the face of rising American power. Since then, US hegemonic expansionism has not been limited to South America. The Panama Canal construction aimed to access the Chinese market to enhance the United States' aspirations of world domination. The Wilson era had similar codes as a part of its hegemonic form, in that the United States used carrot-and-stick policies to exert control over South America, and economic aid for the United States' 'backyard' was supported by military engagements.

The solution that the United States needed to stop German and Japanese expansionism came with the atomic bomb dropped on two Japanese cities. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were then used to restore old Europe and make it a loyal ally in accordance with US interests. The end of WWII marked the beginning of a new era in world affairs: the Cold War, which divided the globe into two blocks while triggering a contest in the political, economic and military arenas. The Soviet Union also followed the same path as the United States in attempting to export its values, ideologies. However, although both superpowers pursued similar hegemonic aspirations, it was the United States that was more successful in expanding its values. In particular, the United States' containment of the Soviet Union through military installations in Europe allowed it to impose its cultural, economic and political codes on the old continent. The Cold War, paradoxically, promoted US hegemony rather than weakened it. The full cooperation of Europe with the United States in every aspect should be emphasized against the eastern bloc. As Meiertöns (2010) explains, whatever the Truman Doctrine meant for Europe and the rest of the world, it can be accepted as the basis for the pre-emptive war that became a key policy of second Bush's presidency. The doctrine clearly implied that even indirect aggression would be enough to justify war against any

country. The Cold War years also marked the association of the consensual and coercive sides of the hegemonic order. While the Truman Doctrine pacified Europe and contained Soviet expansionism towards the West, the Eisenhower Doctrine moved the rivalry into the Middle East in 1957. From this followed many US military interventions, such as in Lebanon, a coup in Iran, and operations against Libya. This confrontation with the Soviet Union again strengthened the United States' hegemonic position and contributed to its military expansion.

This period also saw a dramatic nuclear armaments race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Eastern and Western Europe, and also Turkey, became encircled with nuclear missiles, warheads and nuclear facilities. The 1962 Cuba crisis, which created the most serious confrontation, led to a relative *détente*. However, this policy was not successful since both sides had different ambitions regarding the process, in particular concerns about the other's secret military intentions, which meant that the main purpose of *detente*, decreasing the arms race, did not work as intended.

Nuclear deterrence allowed the United States to advance its interests and leadership in Europe while the continent was equipped with nuclear weapons. Europe could be called the Trojan horse of the United States in realizing its political and military goals via military and nuclear bases. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era saw the start of US unilateralism. Old confrontations, threats, challenges were replaced by the hegemon's national and international interests. The ending of the Cold War order left the United States as the world's single economic, political and military power. This study argued that the post-Cold War period transformed US foreign policy, causing it to focus on new threats, such as terror and the incoherent policies of Third World countries. For the United States, it was time to subdue any secondary states that failed to cooperate with the hegemonic order of the system. The first test for the United States was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and it took the opportunity by creating a coalition to attack on Iraq. Thus, US claims about a new world order seemed justified. Some military bases in Europe were also relocated and others closed down. On the other hand, some were expanded into former communist countries, such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. US rhetoric now pitted the new Europe against the old. Although this new perspective allowed the

United States to act unilaterally in world politics, the consent pillar of hegemony was often neglected or eradicated.

As Vine (2009) points out, the United States carried out almost 200 military operations from WWII to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, with military facilities in Europe being the main bases for directing and supporting these engagements. Arms sales, CIA-supported secret and open operations in numerous countries, spanning the domestic issues of different states, and maintaining the global nuclear balance (by deciding who could acquire these weapons) were routine duties of these installations (p. 46). The confusing aspect was that, even when the United States and European countries disagreed over a particular military intervention; there was still question about the United States use of its European bases. These bases had to be kept open to US troops and weapons in the case of a controversial war. Thus, the hegemon kept its allies in accordance with its interests despite discord. In this, Europe was paying the price for Marshall Aid, which had reconstructed Europe and eliminated old enmities, paving the way for the creation of the European Union. This study also considered the legal basis of US overseas bases. Interestingly, there is a gap in international law on this issue, but the United States solved this problem by reaching bilateral agreement called SOFAs. These pro-hegemon agreements were like giving a blank check to the United States because they turned the United States bases into legal black holes in that no host country has full control or knowledge about them.

This study argues that some European countries were in a key position as military bases, especially Germany and Britain. While Britain was a traditional ally of the United States and its policies, Germany's previous hostile attitude was transformed into that of a key partner following the declaration of its main military base position for the United States army in Europe. Many crucial wars, invasions and interventions were realized through the use of sites in Germany. Britain had a different mission in this scheme in that US naval and nuclear elements were based with the reliable ally, Britain.

Not surprisingly, there are many instances in which the United States maintained its unilateral stance, although sometimes through coalitions with specific European countries in exchange for economic assistance and support for domestic administrations. This allowed the United States to engage in actions worldwide using its military base-

structured advantage. Significant and controversial examples include actions in Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Liberia and Libya. These actions raised more questions about US hegemony and way of its implementation. Policies of the United States following the September 11 attacks fueled the hegemonic order debate since coercion, with military means, turned to be a permanent way of conducting relations with the rest of world. By implementing its political and military agenda around the world accordingly; unilateral actions and military interventions, a deterioration in Atlantic alliance left the United States alone and weaker in terms of hegemonic leadership.

US base posture was also reviewed with Eastern Europe being chosen as the new overseas headquarters for the United States military and its operations. It is clearly that disagreements between the United States and Europe, its old allies, over certain military interventions, such as in Iraq, led the United States to reconsider its base policies. Besides these difficulties in gaining European countries' support for launching military campaigns, a cost-benefit analysis also made the Washington administration prefer Eastern Europe states as safer and cheaper partners. In addition, local jurisdiction of these countries over US military facilities and personnel appears to be weaker than its central European partners. This includes launching military operations from these new bases in other countries without needing the permission of the host base state and immunity from the host country's legal system for US personnel who commit crimes in the host territories. However, the SOFAs that are signed between the host and the United States benefit the host countries since they are in need of economic aid and support. This means that the terms of agreements over the presence of foreign military components can be softened to the United States' advantage compared to the agreements previously made with more developed countries, more driven by the rule of law, such as Germany and the UK.

The Marxist-Gramscian perspective emphasizes a dual structure to hegemonic power and its maintenance: coercion and consent. Consent for US military engagements following September 11 seem to be lacking, in that unilateral US actions failed to gain widespread support even from those allies in Europe hosting large military bases and sharing common values and ideology with the United States. Nevertheless, without the

support of a UN mandate or international public opinion, the United States undertook many military operations and engaged in large-scale wars. That is, its previous efforts to win hearts and minds, in other words, consent, lost ground leaving coercion as a military power the only distinctive feature of US foreign policy. However, as Machiavelli earlier suggested with his semi-man semi-animal centaur, coercion and consent should act in harmony to establish hegemony. Ignoring the need for balances and allies, the United States has acted alone; which it may hurt its hegemonic power in the long term.

The United States' totally changed direction has led to a debate about its new hegemonic posture and its implications. Some scholars see 1970 as marking the start of a decline in US hegemony in connection with the rise of new superpowers. However, other post-September 11 assessments have claimed that there has been resurgence in US hegemony, at least in terms of military power. Many countries are dissatisfied with the United States' unilateral policies, such as intervening in those states that do not share Washington's vision, and there are increasing fears triggered by the absence of a balancing element against US foreign politics. However, the United States has ignored these concerns and criticisms while continuing its unilateral international agenda. Yet, by focusing on military power as a part of hegemony's coercion apparatus; it seems that the United States is inviting a backlash. As Biddle (2005) argues, by focusing more on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and asymmetric threats, the United States may trigger anti-US policies that will open a debate about its legitimacy deficit in the UN, as already happened regarding Iraq.

Finally, this chapter drew attention to the problems that US military bases cause in host countries. Crimes committed by US personnel, including rapes, murders and traffic accidents, have become common, especially at the Okinawa base in Japan. In addition, the use of these facilities for interrogation and transferring war captives, such as Guantanamo Bay, and allegations captives are exposed to torture and other mistreatment has led to questioning of the United States' hegemonic position.

The overall conclusion of this study is that the United States' military posture in Europe and elsewhere has served its interests as a mechanism to expand its hegemonic ambitions. From the study's Marxist-Gramscian perspective, during the Cold War, both

pillars of hegemony, consent and coercion, were used in parallel. However, when the end of the Cold War left the United States as only superpower able to impose its agenda, it began to neglect consensual element of hegemonic leadership. Subsequent unilateral US actions and military engagements have led to increasing debate and bitter criticism about its hegemonic role, even by its allies.

This unilateral era was marked first by the first Gulf War of 1991 and then by the invasion of Iraq following the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001. This study also found that, during the Cold War, all the United States' military bases in Europe, whether nuclear, navy, air or ground, remained available to play a crucial role in eliminating the communist threat and defending pro-western regimes worldwide. Most of these wars, supported by the network of bases, ended in favor of the hegemon's interests. However, the cost of the overseas bases approximately 250 billion dollars annually to the United States that although there is not a fixed document on the issue. Even though the cost increases permanently, these military bases assisted the rise of US hegemonic power. However, this study argues that the United States' more recent unilateral engagements using these bases, such as the second Iraq war, signal the beginning of the decline of hegemon. The key point is that, without gaining the consent of others, it seems impossible for a hegemon to maintain the system it controls through coercion alone for long.

About the future of US hegemony and the United States military bases all around the world, a contradiction occurs. Even though the number and locations of bases increase permanently, a decline in US hegemony due to lack of consent in executing world politics in the global level, it is more possible the United States to face with resistance against its interests. Additionally, by changing its base policy according to differing threat perceptions in different periods, the United States has used these military installations regularly and in parallel with its interests. Whenever the United States has experienced problems accessing the alliance's military base system, it created new military deployments in different countries than those in Europe that have served its global ends. While it is easier to establish these bases in undeveloped and developing countries, developed and democratic countries are in seek of more legitimacy which causes the United States has a limited access to these bases and countries.

A trend of deploying these bases in Eastern Europe and Asian countries (both are old Soviet satellite regions) is a symbol of the decline in US hegemony since the United States has dominance in determining the scope of bilateral military base agreements with them while Central European countries are more suspicious about these bases and, in some cases, do not share the same vision in the terms of these bases' worldwide usage. So, unless the United States revise its position as a hegemon and relies on consent of other states, its hegemonic order might be damaged and military bases serve for nothing. Moreover, future of the United States-Europe relations in terms of military bases has the potential of deterioration due to the United States' unilateral policies in its military operations on different regions of the world. It is also indication of the decline in consent power of US hegemony. The other point that arises questions about the future of US hegemony is that the United States has no preponderance in material sources and capabilities anymore and less eager to align its interest with to those of Europe. Similarly, Europe is not in need of that much of protection of the United States against the Russian threat as it was during the Cold War. So, the more political cooperation declines between two sides, the more US hegemony decays.

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