



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**THE ROLE OF 'WORLDVIEW' IN JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE CASE OF MAVI MARMARA**

Serkan Berk KARADENİZ

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2015

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
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KABUL VE ONAY

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
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ÖZET

Karadeniz, S. Berk. *AKP Dış Politikası Mavi Marmara Vakası'nda 'Dünya Görüşü'nün Rolü*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2015.

Dünya görüşü, özellikle felsefe olmak üzere, pek çok bilim dalında kendisine yer bulmuş bir kavramdır. Siyaset bilimciler ve siyaset psikologları tarafından henüz tam olarak benimsenmemiştir ve dış politika karar alma süreci üzerine etkilerinden genellikle kişilik kavramının etkileri olarak bahsedilir. Dünya görüşü; bir bireyin dünyayı algılaması, gerçekliği algılaması ve neyin doğru olduğuna inanması olarak tanımlanabilir.

Dünya görüşünü değişik analiz seviyeleriyle ve karar alma sürecini açıklamak üzere geliştirilmiş pek çok modelle ilişkilendirmek mümkündür. Birey seviyesi ve devlet seviyesi analizlerde ve Graham Allison, Irving Janis ve Barbara Kellerman tarafından geliştirilmiş dış politika karar alma süreci modellerinde gözlemek mümkündür. Bu modeller incelendiğinde karar vericilerin dünya görüşlerinin karar verme sürecinde etkisi ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Türk dış politikası Soğuk Savaş'ın sonundan bu yana önemli değişiklikler yaşadı ve 2002 yılından bu yana görevde bulunan AKP hükümeti, uzun süreli hizmet dönemi çerçevesinde, uzun süre değişmeden kalabilen, tutarlı bir dış politika karar alma süreci yaşamasını sağladı. Eski başbakan danışmanı ve inceleme dönemindeki dışişleri bakanı Davutoğlu'nun ve dönemin Başbakanı Erdoğan'ın dünya görüşleri uluslararası ilişkilerin algılanmasını, dış politikanın

oluřturulmasını ve uygulanmasını etkilemektedir. Bu iki řahsın dünya görüşleri incelendiğinde görülebilir ki dünya görüşleri, teorik modellerden Akil Aktör, Baskın Lider, Biliřsel İşlem ve Küçük Grup İşlem modellerine göre tepki veren ve bunlarla örtüşen bir şekilde çalışmakta ve karar alma süreçlerini etkilemektedir.

Gazze'ye yardım amaçlı Gazze Filosu seferinin ve bu filonun hareketlerinin sonucu ve ardılı olarak yaşanan Mavi Marmara olayının gerçekleşme aşamasına gelmesinde, uygulanmasında, olaylar sonrası alınan tavırlarda AKP'nin dış politikasına yön veren Erdoğan ve Davutođlu'nun dünya görüşleri, olayların şekillenmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutođlu, Mavi Marmara, Gazze Filosu, AKP, Ak Parti, dünya görüşü, dış politika karar alma modelleri, analiz seviyeler,; dış politika yapımı, Türk dış politikası.

ABSTRACT

Karadeniz, S. Berk. *The Role of 'Worldview' in JDP's Foreign Policy in the case of Mavi Marmara*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2015.

Worldview is a concept that has found a place for itself in many different sciences, especially philosophy. It is not totally adopted by political scientists and political psychologists yet, and its effects are generally referred as effects of personality in the decision making process in foreign policy making. Worldview can be described as one's perception of the world, interpretation of reality and what him/her believes to be true.

It is possible to link the concept with different levels of analysis and with many models developed to describe the decision making process. It may be seen in the individual-level analysis and state-level analysis and can be observed in the models of foreign policy decision making developed by Graham Allison, Irving Janis, and Barbara Kellerman. When these models are analysed, the impact of worldview of the decision-makers becomes clear in the decision making process.

Turkish foreign policy has experienced important changes since the end of the Cold War and the JDP government which is serving since 2002 has enabled the country to experience a long-term, consistent policy making process in foreign policy. Former prime minister's adviser and the then foreign affairs minister Davutoğlu's and the then prime minister Erdoğan's worldviews affect

the way international relations are perceived, how foreign policy is made and how it is implemented. When the worldviews of these two key decision-makers are analysed, it can be seen that the pattern fits on the Rational Actor, Dominant Leader, Cognitive Processing, and Small-Group Processing models.

The worldviews of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have helped shape the realization, execution, implementation of the events in the voyage of the Gaza Flotilla aimed at helping the city of Gaza and the Mavi Marmara Incident that took place as a consequence, and follower of this fleet's movements.

Key Words

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Mavi Marmara, Gaza Flotilla, JDP, AKP, Ak Parti, worldview, models of foreign policy decision making, levels of analysis, foreign policy making, Turkish foreign policy.

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List of Abbreviations

JDP (AKP) Justice and Development Party

EU European Union

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HMC (YAŞ) High Military Council

IS Islamic State

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCAFP National Committee on American Foreign Policy

NSC (MGK) National Security Council

OBM Organisational Behaviour Model

RAM Rational Actor Model

SC Security Council

TGNA (TBMM) Turkish Grand National Assembly

US United States

USA United States of America

UN United Nations

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will analyse the relationship between Turkey's decision-makers' 'worldview' and foreign policy decision making processes in Turkish foreign policy under the guidance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu through the Mavi Marmara Incident that took place in 2010 during the Gaza Flotilla humanitarian aid campaign. The study will search for an answer to the question that whether 'worldview' is a significant determinative aspect, in other words the root cause, in foreign policy decision making process of Republic of Turkey in the given period. Furthermore, the effect of the decision-makers' 'worldviews' will be analysed so as to understand whether the 'worldviews' act as a boundary in the context of value maximising decision making process. The consistencies and inconsistencies will be tried to be clarified between the key decisions and the decision-makers' 'worldviews'.

Firstly, the theoretical framework will be set starting with a discussion of level of analysis problem in international politics focusing on the individual level of analysis. Following this, literature reviews regarding political decision making, decision making models in political science and international relations will be lined up to set the limits of theoretical framework and to make sense of the main decision making model that is chosen for the study, for a correct perception on the following chapters of the thesis.

Graham T. Allison's classification method used in his work "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis" - which covers the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational Behaviour Model and the Governmental Politics

Model - will be explained as they were saturated with rational expectations theories that are inherited from the field of economics. The reason behind this is because Allison's models were adopted by the field of international relations as main classification of decision making models. Additionally, current and other decision making models will be explained in the theoretical framework chapter.

Secondly, the concept 'worldview' will be analysed in terms of epistemology and history of the concept itself. Later, the concept will be defined by covering different definitions and approaches from different fields such as psychology, political psychology, philosophy, philology and theology. After the desired definition of the concept to be used in the thesis is identified, the basic connection will be shown between the concept 'worldview' and political decision-making in general. In order to do this, along with the works of key scholars that studied 'worldview', unorthodox secondary sources will be used such as modern movements and approaches and cults that have to do with the concept 'worldview'.

Lastly, decision making process of Turkey's foreign policy in the example of the Gaza Flotilla journey and the Mavi Marmara event that was part and unfortunate conclusion of the flotilla's voyage. The reason for such an analysis is to be made is to see whether worldview actually helps in the making of foreign policy decisions and in their implementation. The thesis aims at showing that the role a person's or a group's worldview plays a crucial role in the foreign policy decision-making process and to prove that, it will focus on the Gaza Flotilla example.

CHAPTER 1: WORLDVIEW AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION- MAKING PROCESS

This thesis aims at understanding the impact of worldview of leadership cadres on foreign policy decisions and actions of Turkey. To this end, the thesis will look at the idea of worldview, analysing different issues concerning the issue of worldview and ranging from levels of analysis to different foreign policy models, and will try to show the impact of worldview on Turkish foreign policy during the Gaza Flotilla - Mavi Marmara Raid period in mid-2010 as the fleet's preparation, voyage, and the resulting events show a clear example of worldview's impact on foreign policy decisions and actions.

The academic discipline of International Relations relies on theoretical frameworks to create a scientific analysis and to derive meaning from the events, acts, and interactions in the international system. To this end, there are explanatory, problem-solving theories and critical theories that exist. K. J. Holsti (1988) argues that any model, conceptual framework or framework of analysis is created to help improve understanding of the field by ordering facts and concepts into some meaningful shape. When we collect facts or describe events, what we do may help us understand the facts and events we take under consideration, but only collecting facts and events cannot lead to an overall understanding of the field of international relations. According to Holsti (1988), for a general understanding of the field of international relations, we need a framework of concepts which we can call organising devices. Organising devices can be specific like time, place, and subject, or they can be more abstract like the concept of "power politics". With the help of these organising

devices, the boundaries of the subject can be established, relevant issues can be put together and useful facts can be chosen for better and to the point analysis (Holsti, 1988, pp. 11-12).

According to Singer (1961), in any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always numerous ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis. In both the physical and social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system (Singer, 1961, p.77). This choice enables the researcher to better understand and evaluate the subject of study. To better make that choice, the researcher needs to have some certain material to create frameworks for analysis. These materials are the levels of analysis, units of analysis, and theoretical tools.

1.1. LEVEL OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In foreign policy analysis, the issue of levels of analysis is an important part as it focuses on where to look while trying to make sense in analysing a country's foreign policy or what is happening in the international system. According to Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993), levels of analysis are tools to explain the system and the question of levels of analysis should arise "in any attempt behaviour within the system" (Buzan et al, 1993, p. 33). The idea of levels of analysis is an abstract construct but is necessary to see how sources of impact affect behaviour. Levels of analysis as a concept was first used by Kenneth Waltz in his 1959 book *Man, the State, and War* and developed by J. David Singer (1961) in his article and book chapter of the same name and date.

The level-of-analysis issue in the study of international politics and war was raised initially by Waltz (1959) and Singer (1961). In his 1959 book *Man, The State and War*, Kenneth Waltz outlined a classification system based on three layers which could be used to categorize or characterize all theories of conflict and war. His First-Image Theory explained state behaviour and international politics from the point of view of the individuals; his Second-Image Theory explains them as a result of causal developments at the national level that is made up of state and society; and, his Third-Image Theory argues that outcomes are governed by international structures (Hobson, 2000, p.11).

In 1961, in his article titled “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, Singer (1961) improved on the model constructed by Kenneth Waltz and argued there were two levels of analysis. Singer argued that the researchers of International Politics should focus on either the State Level or the International System (Systemic) Level of analysis. He included the Individual Level as a subdivision of the State-Level system (Singer, 1961, 80-88 passim). When these two approaches are analysed, it can be seen that Kenneth Waltz chose to approach the issue of ‘levels of analysis’ in terms of war explanations drawn from the analytic levels of the individual, the structure of separate states, and the structure of the system of states. On the other hand, Singer's discussion was focused on the two levels of the state and international system, with the explanatory level of the individual merged within the state level (Geller & Singer, 1998, p.20).

However, in time, the Individual Level of Analysis which focuses on individual decision-makers who can be a single person or a group (e.g. a

cabinet of ministers or a group in the bureaucracy) emerged as a different level of analysis rather than being a part of the state system. These levels of analysis are typically “used to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states –the dependent variable” and explaining the behaviour of the state “could entail taking into account factors at all of these levels of analysis (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, p. 14).

In his book *International Politics* KJ Holsti (1988) argues that any model, conceptual framework or framework of analysis is created to help improve understanding of the field by ordering facts and concepts into some meaningful shape. Neack (2008) believes the choice of the level of analysis depends on how much clarity the researcher wants in their work. The complexity of the study may require a combination of levels of analysis as each level limits one’s understanding as it answers some questions. However, it may leave some other issues in question. One level of analysis may not hold all the answers to all the questions about issues in international politics (Neack, 2008, p.11). Nuri Yurdusev distinguishes between levels of analysis and units of analysis, and, claims that there are three logical units of analysis which are a 1) a single individual as the actor, 2) groups made up of different actors, and 3) universe or humanity as an actor that covers everything. Even as the researcher chooses more than one unit of analysis, all units fall into one of these categories (Yurdusev, 2008, p. 7).

In sum, levels of analysis can be described as “the different aspects of and agents in agents in international affairs that may be stressed in interpreting and explaining global phenomena, depending on whether the analyst chooses to

focus on “wholes”... or on “parts” (Kegley and Blanton, 2011, p. 18). At the moment, in general, there are three levels of analysis that are described. These are:

- The Individual-Level Analysis,
- The State-Level Analysis, and,
- System-Level Analysis.

The Individual - Level Analysis looks at the decision-makers as it is based on the view that it is people who make policy. It involves the human decision-making process (Rourke, 2008, p. 65). According to Neack, states speak with one voice in the international affairs and in this context; the focus is on individual leaders who make decisions on behalf of their countries (Neack, 2008, p.30). In making foreign policy decisions, cognitive factors such as using heuristic devices or seeking cognitive consistency; emotional factors; psychological factors; biological factors ethology and gender; and perceptions play their role at this level (Rourke, 2008, p. 66-69 passim). It can be said that the personality, perceptions, choices and activities of the individual decision-makers are the subject of this level of analysis. The reason this level of analysis is crucial to understanding international developments is that people make foreign policy; scholars might look at the roles of different leaders; influential individuals in the bureaucracy or in power positions in politics or economy may influence the final decisions of the leader of a country (Holsti, 1998, p.). For instance, individual level of analysis can explain the start of the Second World War by analysing the role of Adolf Hitler in the events leading to war or it may

look at the role of George W. Bush to make conclusions about the Global War on Terrorism in the 2000s. It may evaluate different parts of the Cold War by studying Stalin, Kennedy, or Gorbachev and the bureaucratic circles that affected their decision-making processes. This level of analysis also includes cognitive theories which explain foreign policy by analysing how leaders perceive the world. Rourke's works mentioned above provide examples for this issue.

The State-Level Analysis focuses on a larger scale than individual level of analysis. Policy-making has to take place in the context of a political structure and the most important of the political structures is the state. The political structure, political forces, and subnational actors within a country lead their government to adopt one or another foreign policy (Rourke, 2008, p. 78). The state-level analysis contains the authoritative decision-making units that govern foreign policy processes of countries and the internal attributes of these countries. These shape and limit the leaders' foreign policy choices (Kegley and Blanton, 2011, p. 19). At this level, type of government, the situation in which the decision is to be made, political culture, political actors and bureaucracies and the links between them, interest groups, voters have inputs and affect the final foreign policy decision (Rourke, 2008, pp. 79-90 *passim*). According to Neack (2008), analysis at the state level involves examining different features of a country to see which of those factors shape its foreign policy. Neack argues that this level of analysis is the one that most directly borrows from the perceptions of comparative politics and regional area studies. The focus at this

level is what takes place within states that ultimately has an impact on what takes place between states (Neack, 2008, p. 83).

The System-Level Analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the “external restraints on foreign policy,” and studies social-economic-political-geographic characteristics of the international system and how these characteristics influence the actions of countries and other actors in the international arena (Rourke, 2008, p. 91). The international system is a state-centric system has a horizontal authority structure and therefore is anarchical. As a result, scope, level, and intensity of interactions among the actors, power relations among the actors, and economic realities play a major role at this level of analysis (Ibid., pp. 91-97 passim). According to Neack (2008), the principal aim of analysts using this level is to get “outside” national borders in order to discuss the interactions of states with other states, transnational actors, and within international organizations (Neack, 2008, p. 131).

As the levels of analysis problem is part of the larger agent-structure debate in International Relations, there are other levels of analysis proposed by different theoretical approaches such as the Classical Marxist class-level analysis or the gender-level analysis of the Feminist Theory of International Relations.

This study will generally focus on the Individual-Level and State-Level Analyses. The reason for this choice is that Turkish foreign policy generally develops according to the choices of the political leader of the country and the political elite who affect the decisions of the political leader, generally the Prime

Minister. The Individual-Level Analysis is based on the leader making decisions based on rationality or bounded rationality, discussed below. The State-Level of Analysis, on the other hand, includes what Robert Jervis calls the level of Bureaucracy, the stage where, in the State-Level Analysis, the organizations bargain with each other to create a foreign policy decision. The bureaucracy and members of the ruling elite in a country also negotiate with each other in order to form a general foreign policy decision making format for their country. This character emerges as the foreign policy behaviour of the country in the long run. As a result, the role of bureaucracy, discussed below, is also an important factor in foreign policy decision making process.

1.2. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

According to Mintz and DeRouen (2010), “foreign policy decision making refers to the choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make, that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 3). Foreign policy decisions involve high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk (Renshon & Renshon 2008, p. 509). Most of what is discussed in terms of international relations is about the actions of states and their leaders. As it is necessary for a researcher to understand how the decisions are taken, foreign policy decision making has to be analysed. The decisions may be intuitive or calculated, and may be reactive or pre-emptive. If how decisions are made is understood, the events in the international are can be understood and even predicted accurately. Foreign policy decision-making consists of four components. These are:

- Identifying the decision problem,
- Searching for alternatives,
- Choosing an alternative, and,
- Executing that chosen alternative. (Robinson and Snyder 1965, p. 437 cited in Mintz and DeRouen, 2010, pp. 3-4).

This process can be approached from different points of view. There are two major approaches to the foreign policy decision-making process. First of these is the Rational Actor model which argues each individual has its own interest in mind when making decisions. The second approach is the Cognitive Assumption model. The Cognitive Assumption model is used less often but has been gaining acceptance in the recent years (Kellerman, 1983, p. 361). The Cognitive Assumption model is the basis of Kellerman's proposed additional models.

Many academic approaches to decision-making process use the rational actor assumption. According to such Realist researchers as Waltz and Mearsheimer, the states act as unitary actors. They try to maximise their gains and minimize their losses when they exist in the anarchical structure of the international system. When a state and its leaders act in a rational manner to maximise their gains and minimize their losses, it is considered the best, the ideal way to act within world political system. This idea is actually borrowed from the field of Microeconomics as economic decision-makers try to buy to a cheap price, sell their belongings to a high price, hence making profit and maximising their wealth. The same idea is correct for any state in the world political stage (Tetlock, 1992, p. 527).

The advantage of the rational model is that it allows a single decision-maker or a group of decision-makers to analyse information and decide on what to do and reach an optimal outcome. The decision-maker depends on the bureaucracy to prepare the information background and also to implement the final decision when it is made.

On the other hand, the psychological theories help a researcher to understand the way how leaders make foreign policy decisions. The principal focus of cognitive psychology is on how people obtain, process, and store information, therefore is directly relevant to decision-making process. So, personality theories explain the effects of personality attributes and personality profiles on foreign policy decision-making. The Cognitive models generally argue that the rational actor assumption cannot be realised in real life situations, in practice. Robert Jervis' book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976) is the most well-known book of that group of assumptions. Dynamics as mental shortcuts and other processes are argued to show the mind's inability to carry out the complicated calculus of the rational model, because there is either bias or errors in human behaviour. Cognitive processes should not be seen as "irrational" but rather as more realistic interpretations of how the human mind really works (*Ibid.*, 524-526 *passim*).

Cognitive models also take into account the high costs of information gathering, time pressure, ambiguity, memory problems, misperceptions, organizational structure, and other factors that enter into most decisions.

1.2.1. Graham Allison's Three Models

Graham Allison tried to describe the way the United States administration behaved during the Cuban Missile Crisis on a scientific level. At the end, Allison came up with three distinctive models to explain how and why the US administration acted the way it acted during that crisis. He also created a general framework for analysing the decision-making environment. Graham Allison, in his book *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, explained there were three models of decision-making which are:

- The Rational Actor Model,
- The Bureaucratic Politics Model, and,
- The Organizational Behaviour Model. (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, p. 280)

1.2.1.1. The Rational Actor Model

Model-I or the Rational Actor Model argues that foreign policy choices are the controlled actions of unified, rational governments, based on credible calculations of utility and probability, to achieve definable state goals. Most diplomatic historians and many students of current affairs and military strategy adopt this model as it provides a good framework for analysis. This model, as Allison puts it, does not necessarily seek to analyse any governmental action, or a leader's decision, with the assumption of a calculated, rational choices as a single body. Instead, the Rational Actor Model aims to achieve consistency. This is the case in the economics theories, decision and game theories. The Rational Actor Model looks for consistency regarding the goals and objective,

furthermore “consistency in the application of principles in order to select the optimal alternative” (Allison: 1999, p. 17).

The essence of this model is based on the everyday assumption of human purposiveness, meaning, “what human beings do is at least ‘intendedly rational’”, or human behaviour is a purposive and goal-directed activity (Allison: 1999, p. 17). In this sense, it is possible to say that, when a decision-maker, makes or executes a decision, the decision-maker is expected to make a choice from the given alternatives considering the possible outcomes with a result of maximizing interests. So the rationality notion is not an argument about morality and ethical values but, more than these, an interest maximizing choice made by a decision-maker. Therefore, an action itself can look irrational to individuals but from the scope of this model, that action could be a rational choice when the beneficiary consequences are maximised by that action. In economics theories, a rational mind is defined as a value or profit maximising mind rather than a mind with moral concerns.

As a result, as Allison stated, the main aspects of this model are;

- 1) Goals and Objectives of a given agent: The utility function of the interests and values of the agent;
- 2) Alternatives: A choice from a set of alternatives should be made;
- 3) Consequences: Every alternative is connected to a set of outcomes and consequences; and,

4) Choice: The rational choice is the alternative whose rank is highest in the interest maximising function. (Allison: 1997, p. 19)

However, when this model is seen in a more complex manner, a separation as “comprehensive rationality” and “bounded rationality” occurs. The difference between comprehensive rationality and bounded rationality is the bounding stimulants. When comprehensive rationality is considered free of these other factors and stimulants, bounded rationality bears the different variables of information, conceptualization of the situation and the abilities of information processing of the given decision-making agent. As emphasized by Allison, in order to

“Deduce the comprehensively rational choice in a given situation; we need to know only the choosing organism’s goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. We need to know absolutely nothing else about the organism. In contrast to deduce the rational choice in the same situation, we must know the choosing organism’s goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses.” (Allison: 1997, p. 20)

As can be seen from the Figure-1 below, the Rational Actor Model focuses not only one explanation of rationality, but draws its rational assumption from three different layers of rationality. Moreover, the unit of analysis also plays an important role in the explanation of the model. Therefore, Allison manages to enable researchers with more than one possible adaptation of his model.

Application of the Rational Actor Model




Figure - 1: Application of the Rational Actor Model (from Allison: 1999)

1.2.1.2. The Organizational Behaviour Model

Model II (organizational processes) reflects the theory that foreign policy can best be understood as the choices and outputs of a group of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations within the government that are looking out for their own interests and following standard operating procedures. The sub-units of the state act according to pre-determined procedures to produce an output. The state is still essentially a unitary actor, but in this second model, the government has no choice of following new courses of action.

According to Graham Allison, governments consist of large organizations to respond to a wide variety of problems and as a result responsibilities are

divided. To arrange this vast system of organization, coordination is necessary and for coordination, standard operating procedures are necessary. Standard Operating Procedures are simply rules according to which things are done. As any organization big enough is too complex to develop new responses to similar cases and as they are expected to be coherent in their responses to the outside world, organizations develop Standard Operating Procedures which dictate what to do in any given scenario. As a result, governing becomes easier but it also becomes less innovative and less flexible (Allison, 1997, 156-164).

Institutions usually work within their standard operating procedures and they modify them in time depending on their experience. The main difference of this model from the Rational Actor Model is that it assumes limited amounts of information, time, and other resources for decision making. Also, when the organizational structure makes a decision, it is done without full concentration and there is also limited imagination involved (Hughes, 2000, p. 178).

1.2.1.3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

Model III, the Bureaucratic/Governmental Politics Model, declares that foreign policy is the result of serious competition among decision-makers and bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government bureaucracy, each with their own perspective on the issues at hand. It is the negotiating and bargaining of the individual actors that results in the final outcome.

According to Allison, each national government is also a large arena for intra-national games. Political leaders are supported by bureaucratic leaders

and when they are joined together they create a circle of central players who are the main decision-makers. Lower level of officials, the press, non-governmental organizations, and the public are the secondary players in this game of politics. As a result of this formation of the political structure of a country, there is a constant struggle between holders of different decision-making posts because, as rational actors themselves, they want to maximise their positions and their influence in decision-making mechanism. This competition may be between individuals in high positions or between organizations they represent in the decision-making environment (Allison, 1997, p. 255-256).

Allison argues that to “explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behaviour emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion” (ibid, p. 257). The reason for this series of coalitions, bargains, and compromises is that, with the words of Allison, “power equals impact on outcome,” which means if a person or organization is considered as politically powerful this person or organization has to have a strong control on the final decision taken by a government. As a result, to have more influence for themselves and the organizations they represent, the people in the circle of central players are involved in a constant series of bargaining, negotiations, shift alliances, and try to look more important than they are (Allison, 1999, pp. 259-273 *passim*). The essence of Bureaucratic/Governmental Politics is this wish to be perceived as more important.

Therefore this third model depicts the decision environment as an environment of conflict among different groups. Each of these conflicting groups may have a clear set of values and objectives, however, their priorities differ due to the interests of their own institutions. As the agreement is reached through a group of compromises among the involved groups, the outcome also shows their relative strength (Hughes, 2000, p. 178).

However, this situation may also bring serious problems. The first is that the constant negotiations may cause problems in the inner circle, and secondly and more importantly, the final decision can be more politically correct than rationally necessary thing to do. This situation may lead to groupthink, which is analysed below.

1.2.2. Additional Models by Kellerman and Janis

When the three models proposed by Graham Allison are analysed, it can be seen that each model is intended to supplement the other two models, and therefore there is no such situation like one model replacing the other two models but the three models should be seen together. However, one of the models may be more effective in explaining a certain situation than the other two, depending on the conditions. Allison also believed additional models can be constructed (Allison, 1971, p. 6).

Two scholars, Barbara Kellerman and Irving Janis created such additional models. Even though there are other scholars who proposed different approaches to decision-making, their approaches are somewhat different from Allison's approach. For instance, Robert D. Putnam's "two-level-game" model

argues that foreign policy decision-makers find themselves opposing two games at once, one of these in the domestic and the other in the international political arenas (Hughes, 2000, p. 178).

Barbara Kellerman argues that Graham Allison's models were useful in determining how decision-making is conducted and how the decision-making environment works. However, she also argues that additional models are needed when the available resources are analysed and comes with three new models. These additional models proposed by Barbara Kellerman are:

- the Small-Group Process Model,
- the Dominant Leader Model, and
- the Cognitive Process Model.

1.2.2.1. Small-Group Process Model

The Small-Group Process Model is based on the idea that many important executive decisions are made in a small group of limited membership. According to Kellerman, the role of small groups is important because policy-making decisions are made in the cabinet, in the National Security Council, or in the Supreme Court in the US and all of the above in Turkey (Constitutional Court replacing Supreme Court in Turkey), and all these groups contain about 20 important decision-makers in their combination. The important distinction of the small group from the organizations Allison discusses is that every person in the small group knows every other member of the group and therefore how they think, what they like, who is powerful and who is weak in a given situation. Kellerman sees governmental action as a small-group resolution. It is also

assumed that the group's members have the power and/or influence to make choices and decisions and the final decision depends on the alliances and animosities within the group, the position and influence of the leader in the group. When a decision is finally reached, the members would have used their political and personal resources would have made face-to-face bargaining and discussions, and therefore the final decision is the amalgam materialising from multiple sessions of negotiations, therefore it is not the rational choice of a unified group (Kellerman, 1981, pp. 352-354).

1.2.2.2. Dominant Leader Model

In the Dominant Leader Model, the leader is the main decision-maker. This model does not deny the role of organizations and their standard operating procedures, but emphasises the role of the leader as the first among equals in the decision-making group. There are two key factors in this model. Firstly, the leader's personality and character are crucial in the final decisions and how decisions are made. Secondly, the environment in which the decision is made is very important, too.

The leader's personality and character are important because the decisions depend on the decision-maker's abilities, preferences, problems, rules, and the leader's general style (e.g. authoritarian, democratic, liberal). A leader who believes in proven methods, who dislikes opposition to their ideas, who comes from a certain cultural-religious-ideological worldview and who is authoritarian

would decide differently than a leader who wants to do something innovative or new, who listens to those that oppose his ideas, who is a liberal.

Also, the leader works in a certain political and social environment. There are, in terms of political environment, two sets of settings. The first set of settings are based on the domestic and international 'objective environment' which is made up of facts such as the majority the leader's party holds in the parliament, the popularity of the leader in opinion polls, when the next elections will be made, the financial, diplomatic and military capabilities of the state the leader governs. On the other hand, there is the second group which is the 'subjective setting' of the political environment. The image of the leader becomes important in this setting and this setting includes the subjective ideas people have on the leader such as his creating an image of trust, his cognition as legitimate or illegitimate by domestic and international public opinion, the ideas of progress, reassurance, and action the leader creates.

As a result, in this model, a government decision is seen as the individual choice of a leader who is dominant in the existing political system and this leader acts on experience and therefore is not rational. Rather than the rational decision-making process, there is an either implicit or explicit cost-benefit analysis and the final decision depends on the union of personality, sociocultural factors, and conditions existing at that moment in time that feed the leader (ibid, pp. 357-358).

1.2.2.3. Cognitive Process Model

The Cognitive Process Model proposed by Kellerman, on the other hand, looks at the psychological process of decision-making. In opposition to the Rational Actor Model, in a situation of crisis, decision-makers cannot identify and evaluate all the positive and negative consequences of all the possible courses of action. As a result, the decisions are made considering the decision-maker's previous experiences and existing beliefs. People tend to protect their ethical, philosophical, and behavioural stands while making new decisions so that other people do not criticize their decisions. Therefore, objectivity becomes limited, generalizations are made, and things are simplified. Government actions and decisions are seen as choices constrained by shortcomings of human mind. As all the details of a problem cannot be understood by the human mind, wrong, defective decisions may be taken and therefore mistakes may be made in the implementation of these decisions (ibid, pp. 361-363).

1.2.2.4. Groupthink Model

Groupthink is a term formed by social psychologist Irving Janis in his books *Victims of Groupthink* (1972) and *Groupthink* (1982). Groupthink process is identified by Janis as a "quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1972, p. 9). Janis examined the tendency for social pressure to enforce conformity and consensus in cohesive decision making groups. Groupthink decisions are easier to reach, more simplistic, and

less complex than non- groupthink decisions because in general, discussions are limited to a only a few groups of alternative actions (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, p. 207).

As a result, Groupthink is often visible in poorer or even catastrophic decisions such as the failure to foresee the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, escalation of the Vietnam War, and Watergate scandal. A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when its members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions, and when there are no clear rules for decision making (Yoonho Kim, 2001, 170). As can be seen from Figure-2 below, in groupthink, the conditions that exist before the decision is made are affecting the final outcome because they not only create stress on the members of the group, but also they create an environment unsuitable for a rational decision making process. This situation limits, if not eliminates, the possibility of a successful outcome from the gathered committee.




Figure-2: The Groupthink Model (from I. Janis, Groupthink, 1982).

Janis mentions three types of characteristics of groupthink: 1. those producing an overestimation of the group (illusion of invulnerability; belief in inherent morality); 2. those producing closed-mindedness (collective rationalizations; stereo-typed images of out-groups); and, 3. those producing pressures toward uniformity (self-censorship; illusion of unanimity; direct pressures on dissenters; self-appointed mind guards) (Hart, 1991, 259.). As identified above within the categories, Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink within these three categories. These are as follows:

- 1) Illusion of invulnerability which creates unnecessary optimism which leads to taking extreme risks.
- 2) Collective rationalization which results in members disregarding warnings and do not reconsider their hypotheses.
- 3) Belief in inherent morality which causes the group to believe they and their cause are just and right and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
- 4) Stereotyped views of out-groups which considers outsiders, other groups, other interest seekers as negative or even as the “enemy,” so no effective response can be made in a conflict.
- 5) Direct pressure on dissenters which forces the members of the group not to voice arguments against any of the group’s views.
- 6) Self-censorship which leads to suppress any member to voice doubts and concerns against the perceived group consensus.
- 7) Illusion of unanimity which leads members to believe their decision is unanimous and hence correct.
- 8) Self-appointed ‘mind-guards’ who try to protect the group and the leader from problematic or contradictory information.

When these symptoms exist in a group, groupthink is likely to happen when that group is trying to make a decision. Groupthink happens when groups are highly interconnected and when they are under considerable pressure to make a superior decision. When pressures for the group’s decision to be unanimous are seen as overwhelming, members become less motivated to realistically

evaluate the alternative courses of action available to them. These group pressures lead to carelessness and irrational thinking since groups experiencing groupthink fail to consider all alternatives and seek to maintain unanimity. Decisions shaped by groupthink have low probability of achieving successful outcomes (PSYSR, 2013, p. 2).

According to Janis, consensus -seeking is a necessary element in all collective decision processes, especially when unanimity is required. At a certain point in the planned process, discussions need to end and actions taken. In this respect, there is not too many differences from processes of individual decision-making, where decision-makers start to reinforce their favourite alternatives according to Soelberg (1967) and to Janis and Mann (1977). However, consensus-seeking becomes excessive when it takes place too early and in a very restrictive way. The group generally does not consider a reliable alternative plan, and this point actually creates the main weakness of the groupthink approach, because in groupthink, group members are mostly decision-makers who are closed-minded, stereotyped, arrogant and morally unaffected.

1.3. SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ELEMENTS

To sum up, researchers of international relations make use of levels of analysis, units of analysis, and different theories to solve the problem of explaining foreign policy making and foreign policy behaviour of countries. In terms of understanding the international system and the roles played by individual countries in the international system, researchers may use multiple

levels of analysis and different models. The variety of levels and models enables the researcher to use different levels and models to explain and to draw conclusions from different events that take place in the international arena.

Graham Allison's three models of foreign policy decision-making and the models later added to his work by Kellerman and by Janis provide a framework of analysis for researchers of international politics. The involvement of either an individual, a small group of influential people, a bureaucratic mechanism or the interaction of these different elements may create clues to the way foreign policy is made and implemented.

As Barry B. Hughes argues, ideas and foreign policy may relate. For instance, Goldstein and Keohane point to three types of beliefs. These are worldviews, principled beliefs, and, causal beliefs. Of these, worldviews shape understanding of the world; principled beliefs make ethical statements about acceptability of a situation; and, causal beliefs explain connections in the world (Hughes, 2000, p. 168). Beliefs can shape policy in three ways which are: a) acting like road maps; b) acting as focal points to settle problems of coordination; and, c) acting by creating long-term influence through institutionalization. As a result, individuals and governments rely on ideas to make foreign policy and they use their own ideas, their own worldviews, and the theories they follow in shaping their policies. They may use gender or class connections, rationality and bounded rationality, crisis management techniques and other heuristic devices to form their policies (Ibid, pp. 168-180 passim). However, when the role of principled and causal beliefs are analysed, it can be argued that these are in fact related to one's worldview and are affected by and

yet do not have a constructing effect on worldview. As a result, this thesis will focus on the idea of worldview instead of these two kinds of beliefs.

In this context, the role a person's or a group's worldview plays a crucial role in the foreign policy decision-making process. The next chapter of this thesis will analyse the issue of worldview and how it affect decision-making and how it is related to foreign policy. In the following parts of this study, a combination of different levels of analysis and the theoretical models of Allison, Janis, and Kellerman are going to be used in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy.

1.4. SCOPE OF THE THESIS

The scope of this thesis is the analysis of the concept of worldview along with foreign policy levels of analysis. As the current leadership cadres that govern the course of Turkish foreign policy are in power since 2002, it is not easy to analyse the whole course of Turkish foreign policy in such a long period effectively. However, there are pivotal moments within the JDP rule that can exemplify the party's foreign policy approach as well as show clearly its leaders' decision-making state of mind. One of these examples is the rightfully much publicised and very much discussed voyage of the Gaza Flotilla and the following incident of Mavi Marmara raid.

When these two connected events are analysed, the aim of this thesis is to be able to explain the Turkish foreign policy decision making process and the foreign policy act conducted during that period in terms of the impact of worldview of the foreign policy decision makers of that period, namely the then

Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Davutoğlu. To this end, documentary research will be conducted both to establish a theoretical framework for expressing the significance of worldview in foreign policy decision making process, and, to establish a narrative of the events through newspaper articles and news accounts. The thesis will therefore follow a procedure of documentary research by analysing three mainstream newspapers, namely Hurriyet which represents the Kemalist tradition, Yeni Şafak which represents the JDP approach, and Zaman which represents the then JDP supporting Gülen Movement so that there can be a consistent range of data to describe what actually happened and to link these events to the decision makers' worldviews.

CHAPTER 2: WORLDVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the definition, conceptual history, epistemology and the desired use of the concept 'worldview' regarding this thesis. The distinctive aspect of this study is the key concept 'worldview' and the underlined relationship between this concept and foreign policy decision-making in Turkey's last eleven year period that had been covered by the political party in power called JDP.

However, the purpose of this research is to clarify the effect of the concept 'worldview' in political decision-making within the defined borders, and given agents. Since the decision-making process in general bears such various

variables, it is nearly impossible to cover all the aspect of a decision-making process. In this regard this study can only be suggestive rather than conclusive because of this ambiguous context. 'Worldview' is a broad and complicated term which is used in different contexts for different purposes with different meanings. Its breadth makes it powerful but at the same time makes its meaning harder to distinctively pin down without arranging to definitions that are vague and uninformative, defining it as something like an interpretive lens or fundamental perspective on reality (Nilsson, 2013, p. 67). As it is hard to pin down this concept in such a strict and clear distinctive manner, it is possible to observe, in a way, the effects it causes on one's choices and decisions from a narrow perspective.

As it is explained in the upcoming section, the emerging and early uses of this concept reflects to a very specific, narrow definition, and does not necessarily reflect the desired definition to be used in this study, instead the current use of the concept refers to a vastly general, broader meaning if it is not prefixed with another concept to limit its meaning, such as "a religious worldview" or "a spiritual worldview". Since the single-handed use of the concept refers to a general concept in every term it has been used, this brings up two different possibilities regarding the scholar studying the concept. Firstly, the single-handed use of the concept is proper to be used in any given context. Secondly, by using specific prefixes it is possible to narrow the meaning of the concept and reflect to a more specific, to the point definition.

The main scope of this study when it comes to 'worldview' is not to determine the kind of worldview used by the Turkish foreign policy decision-

makers but to determine the effects of this concept on to the decision-making process bearing this broader meaning.

2.2. EPISTEMOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

The term 'Worldview' is the loan translation of the German word "Weltanschauung" that is composed of "Welt" (world) and "Anschauung" (view) (Online Etymology Dictionary, [Etymonline], 2001). The word "Weltanschauung" (Worldview) was first used by Kant in his work Critique of Judgement in 1790 and later on by Hegel in Phenomenology of Mind in 1807 to strengthen the meaning of Kant's and Fichte's basic moral experience into an understanding of a moral world order. Also, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Nietzsche, studied the subject in the 19th century from various perspectives. However, for Kant, based on the quotations from his works, the word 'Worldview' simply meant "sense perception of the World" or in other words, the world as perceived by human senses (Naugle, 2002, pp. 58-59). The word "Weltanschauung" was adopted by Kant's successors very quickly even it had very small importance for Kant himself, and became a concept that refers to intellectual perception of the universe through the perspective of a human knower and according to the Oxford English Dictionary made its way to the English language in 1868 as "worldview" (Naugle, 2004, n p.).

To give an idea on the modern history of the concept 'worldview', one of the important studies on the concept was held by Gombert by early 1900's. Götze's "Euphorion-Artikel" in 1924 was another important study that also inspired

Dornseiff to produce a detailed examination of the concept in 1945. In 1955 the magisterial German Dictionary covered a long analysis of the concept and in 1967 a significant doctoral dissertation was produced by Meier titled "Worldview: Studies toward a History and Theory of the Concept" (Naugle, 2002, p. 56).

The concept of 'worldview' has been defined mostly by philosophers, psychologists, theologians and linguists (the literature shows that linguists rather deal with the epistemology of the concept instead of its meaning) which give the concept many different meanings. On the other hand, political scientist, rather than referring the concept, referred personality, or effect of personality on decision-making process which can be tied to the decision-makers' worldview when the right definition is chosen. The aim of this study is to extend the approach of the political scientists' reference to one's personality in decision making carrying it to a level of the effect of worldviews on decision making process.

Nilsson (2013) categorises the concept by referring to the key scholars covered the history of the concept. According to Nilsson (2013), while Naugle (2002) researched the philological, philosophical, theological and scientific literature of history of worldview, Koltko-Rivera (2004) surveyed the psychological history of the concept. Nilsson (2013) also refers to the importance of the distinction of the concept and especially of its perceptions. While Kant first definition was "a person's inner phenomenal perception of the outer noumenal world" Freud's later definition was "an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one

overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place”. Even though Freud’s perception of worldview still finds a place in the modern use of the concept, the modern use is generally closer to Kant’s definition. The main distinction in these two definitions is that, while Freud’s definition refers to a more conscious, selective, deliberately constructed perception, Kant’s definition refers to unconscious, unchosen, indeliberately adopted perception (Nilsson, 2013, pp. 67-68). Nilsson refers to a more Kantian perception in terms of the concept; the presumption is that one’s worldview, to some extent is developed unconsciously by being exposed to many different variables and experiences. Actually, when we look at the development of foreign policy decision makers, we can see that the environment they are subjected to since their childhood has an important contribution on the final worldview’s occurrence.

According to Sagberg & Røen (2011) ‘worldview’ is a total perspective of one that sees and interprets the world (Sagberg & Røen: 2011, p. 359). Gamble (2011) describes ‘worldview’ as a term that stands for how one interprets reality or what one believes to be true and it is possible and easier to change than personality itself (Gamble, 2011, para. 1 - 5). Project Worldview defines the concept as:

“a worldview is a conceptual framework and a set of beliefs used to make sense out of a complex, seemingly chaotic reality based on your perceptions, experience and learning. Besides incorporating a purpose or "raison d’etre," it provides an outlook or expectation for the world as it exists or is perceived to exist—one that you base predictions about the future on. It continually evolves—indeed, you spend the rest of your life testing and refining it, based on feedback you get. As it develops, it increasingly it becomes the source of your goals and desires, and as such it shapes your behaviour and values.” (Project Worldview, n. d., para. 1)

People believe that, as Koltko-Rivera (2004) argued, worldviews are “sets of beliefs and assumptions that describe reality” and worldviews are made up of assumptions concerning human nature, the meaning and nature of life, and the composition of the universe itself (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 3). Moreover, “worldviews guide people’s thinking about what exists or what ought to exist, what is valued or should be valued, what are acceptable ways of knowing, what tasks should be achieved and appropriate means toward those tasks, and future goals one could and should pursue. Worldview assumptions may not be proven or even provable, but they serve as a superordinate epistemic and ontological foundation for other beliefs, and a lens to interpret the world” (Ibid, p. 4).

More specifically, worldviews handle people’s thinking about what exists or what needs to exist, what is valued or needs to be valued, what are acceptable ways of knowing, what tasks should be achieved and the nature of appropriate means those tasks, and future goals a person may pursue. According to Strom, worldview assumptions may not be proven or even provable, but they function as a super ordinate beginning point (Strom, 2013, p. 354).

M. Hand argues there are two important understandings of the concept of worldview. Firstly, Hand claims the term is used as an equivalent of a theory of meaning of life. Secondly, Hand claims the word is used to describe a conceptual scheme, that is, a system of basic concepts or categories that enable experiencing. There is a suggestion that claims categorical systems differ between social groups. This idea lies principally on the idea that nature is understood on a person’s native language (Hand, 2012, p. 531).

Brunning and Lambe (2009) argued and also Kearney (1987) noted that when examining the concept of worldview, self, other, relationship, classification, causality, space, and time were the necessary aspects that affected any human worldview. Kearney also noted that different individuals form different explications of reality based upon their experience; concepts, symbols, and social organization were a part of the environment, and an individual's explication of reality was based upon their experiences with the different concepts, symbols, and social organization (Brunning & Lambe, 2009, p. 141). West and Turner (2000) have argued that a worldview "provides people with a lens for seeing and making sense of the world they inhabit" (West & Turner, 2000, p. 60).

Research shows that 'worldview' in its modern use is one's perception of the world and reality as well as what one thinks to be true. Furthermore, 'worldview' plays a crucial role in a person's decisions, if it is not the origin of decisions it is a symbiotic part of the decision. This research's main argument derives from this definition and perception of the concept 'worldview'.

2.3. EMERGING AND DEVELOPMENT OF ONE'S 'WORLDVIEW'

A person's worldview emerges with beginning of that person's life and develops interconnectedly with that person's experiences. Gamble (2011) in his movie called "Thrive the Movie" about preserving world resources for a better future that is motivated from a perspective of worldview, analyses this development in detail. As shown in the figure below, one's worldview is developed through many factors such as environment, governance,

infrastructure, education, economics, health, justice, media, relations, science, spirituality and arts.



Figure-3: The Aspects Creating One's Worldview (From Gamble, Thrive Movement, 2011).

As a child, as one grows and experiences the world, one also experiences relationships, and hence categorizes, discriminates, and generalizes about what the senses reveal. One develops the sensory experiences and memories with abstract generalized perspective in forming concepts. For example, after touching many similar but different objects - rectangular blocks, apple, soccer ball, volley ball, toys, globe, etc. – one will develop a concept of "roundness" that some of the objects examined fit with while others don't (Project Worldview, n d., para. 2). Worldview is a lot like this behaviour in a more intellectual,

abstract perception. For instance, for a person to develop a sense of “proper dressing” is very much related for that person to grow in an intensely conservative neighbourhood or in the centre of a cosmopolitan metropolitan city. To better understand the relationship between experiences and development of worldviews and make a distinction between Psychological Schemes and Worldviews, Strom’s figure of summary of Koltko-Rivera’s (2004) distinction between Schemas and Worldviews is very useful. As seen at the figure below, worldview is a monolithic, abstract and hypothetical concept derived from broader assumptions with cultural expressions and values, which would result a radical change in one’s life if changed or disconfirmed. This distinction also underlines that ‘worldview’ is not measurable like psychological schemes or patterns but it is easily observable.

Distinguishing criterion	Schemas	Worldviews
1. Schemas and worldviews seem to refer to different entities.	Schemas regard “everyday objects and actions” (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 26) such as <i>chairs</i> or <i>going on first dates</i>	Worldviews address “abstract concepts and hypothetical objects” (p. 26) such as <i>human nature</i> or <i>the ideal partner</i> .
2. Schemas and worldviews form differently.	Schemas form from generalized direct experience with objects or processes, such as one’s history with first dates and their seeming similarities.	Worldviews form from generalized direct experience with objects or processes but also from abstracting broader assumptions handed down in cultural expressions and values such as “boys will be boys” or “all is fair in love and war.”
3. Schemas and worldviews are structured differently conceptually.	Schemas are monopolar (e.g., on <i>chairness</i> from “much like a chair” to “nothing like a chair”).	Worldviews are multi-polar (e.g., human nature may be assumed to be good, evil, or both.)
4. Schemas and worldviews differ in their ease of disconfirmation.	Schemas may be easy to difficult to disconfirm (e.g., “ <i>That</i> first date was nothing like <i>most</i> first dates. Hmm, odd.”).	Worldviews are difficult to extremely difficult to disconfirm (e.g., “I assume people are naturally good, but those people appear evil. How can that be?”).
5. Schemas and worldviews differ in the severity of relational consequences should either be disconfirmed.	Schema disconfirmation (e.g., going on an odd first date) may lead to assimilating the experience into one’s original schema or discounting the date as “not like most first dates.”	Disconfirmation of a worldview assumption (e.g., no longer believing people are inherently good) could be life altering in how one relates to others.

Figure – 4: Summary of Koltko-Rivera’s (2004) Distinction between Schemas and Worldviews in Human Experience (Strom, 2013, p. 355)

By observing, abstracting, recalling memories, discriminating, categorizing and experiencing loads of different events, one fits their concepts and ideas into a framework. By new experiences generates new insights that will result one’s conceptual framework to change. One’s comprehensive conceptual framework in other words worldview will develop according to this change in the conceptual framework. Nilsson (2013) claims that Koltko-Rivera’s model provides the result

of experience is gained through a sequence of processes, where the first sensation of a stimulus is arbitrated, and acquired meaning through culturally assimilated structures and conceptual framework that is worldview; action is generated from a sequential process as an impulse from the motivational core (that provides information on what should be done and how) derived from worldview and agentic core that is the root of personal will (Nilsson, 2013, p. 66).

2.4. PERSONALITY, WORLDVIEW AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING

When political decision making is the case, there should be a great understanding of political psychology and the field of political psychology is the primary field to be covered. In order to understand political behaviour, looking at the broad spectrum of theories, concepts and frameworks that the psychologists brought, usually the emphasis is either on factors that are inside the person (e.g. urge to power) or on factors that are in the environment or the situation (e.g. social class). The result is, political behaviour is influenced by properties of both the decision-maker and the situation (Barner-Barry & Rosenwein, 1985, p. 7). According to Smith (1968) the decision-maker's political behaviour corresponds one or more of the three functions for the decision-maker:

- Relating things in the world to the decision-maker's motives, interests and values.
- Mediating the relationship between the decision-maker and other people.
- Resolving inner conflict (Smith, 1968, p. 19)

This study will mainly be focusing on the first factor by extending the concept to certain definitions given in the first two sectors of this chapter and defining it as 'worldview' of the decision-maker. Before moving any further, in the table below, taken from the work of Barner-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) we can see the representative factors to understand and explain political behaviour in detail.

Personal Factors	Habits	Environmental Factors
Motives	simple	Microenvironment: eyeball to eyeball relationships
needs	complex	normative structures
drives		norms
impulses		sanctions
Emotions		roles
anxiety		interpersonal structure
guilt		personal style
depression		Microenvironment: immediate but imaginary
Cognitions		reference groups
attributions		Macroenvironment
personality		Organisational structure
motivations		position
relationships		division of labor
categories		Economic
stereotypes		class
implicit theories		mode of production
codes (schemas)		The Sea
cognitive maps		history
perceptual screens		culture
ethnocentrism		
Hybrids		
beliefs		
attitude		
value		
ideology		
self-esteem		
identity		
Faculties		
skills		
abilities		

Table – 1: Representative factors political psychologists have called on to understand and explain political behaviour (from Barner-Barry & Rosenwein 1985, p. 10)

These factors given in the table above to explain political behaviour are also another, in-detail list of the factors that affect the development of the decision-makers' worldview and the cores that generate action mentioned in the previous section that are motivational core and agentic core.

Barner-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) claim that the most important function of a government is to make decisions however these decisions are not made by

the government but people (decision-maker) that are acting on behalf of the abstract entity of government. It is possible to assess these decision-makers as ordinary people that are trying to do a sensibly good job within rational choice (see chapter 1, rational actor model or rational choice theory). But when this is the case why there are so many mistakes and bad decisions made? This is inevitable because of the different worldviews of different decision-makers, one person's good decision can be another's worst and this is the reason of political conflict (Barner-Barry & Rosenwein, 1985, pp. 237-240).

Decision-making in general is a complex mental process and this complexity reflects on political decision making in the sense of the complexity of information that should be processed by the decision-maker. Furthermore, a more difficult complexity is value and interest complexity. Any given political situation bears values and interests, and any given decision-maker is bound to make their decisions in a value-maximising manner based on the rational actor model (Barner-Barry & Rosenwein, 1985, p. 238). Steinbruner (1974) points to a problem generated by a decision effecting more than one value, and a trade-off relationship between values (one value being sacrificed in order to gain a greater one), uncertainty and the sharing of authority between decision-makers, as "complex decision problem" (Steinbruner, 1974, p. 16).

One of the main problems addressed in this research is to determine the volume of the concept 'worldview' versus different inputs to the decision-makers decision in Turkey's last 11 years of JDP period in terms of foreign policy decisions. What this study tries to figure out is when the concept of 'worldview' is added to the equation of decision-making in the scope of value and interest

maximising, if 'worldview' works as an obstacle in the decisions when compared to values and interest gains clashes with the decision-makers' worldview. The analysis will focus on if the decision-makers of Turkey could leave the boundaries of their 'worldviews' to maximise the value and interest gain of the country, or if their perception of value maximising is a total match with their 'worldviews' or both.

2.5. WORLDVIEW, LEVELS OF ANALYSIS, AND DECISION-MAKING MODELS

Worldview is the key to understand their environment to all the people, because one's worldview is shaped by cultural and social background and the political environment one lives in. As a result, it has to have links with the theoretical environment of decision making.

Firstly, worldview has a link with the levels of analysis which are tools to understand the political environment. A person's worldview affects that person's behaviour. Therefore, it can be argued that worldview has a direct link with the Individual-Level Analysis. In that level, the scope is a person and/or a very small group of individuals who act as decision-makers. As a result of the limits of this level of analysis, worldview has the most important impact at this level, because it is connected to how a person places himself in the world. W. Strom (2013) argues that each worldview represents a 'frame of identity' and creates a useful basis to understand a person's relational experiences (Strom, 2013, pp. 368-369). So, it can be claimed that the individual-level analysis covers worldview as

an element on which the decision-maker's decision making capabilities are based.

Secondly, worldview is also related to State-Level Analysis because at this level people interact with each other and form opinions according to their cultural worldviews and through cultural worldview they create a common image of society and life that helps through some mental barriers (Dewa et al., 2013, p. 5). As there is political and economic interactions at the state-level to gain political interests and influence, worldview can be seen as very important in this level, too.

In the System-Level Analysis, the existing world order becomes important in terms of worldview. For instance, in a Balance of Power system, worldviews of the representatives of great powers cannot be very different from each other's because they all aim at reaching the same goal. In a Bipolar or a Unipolar world order, however, the cultural values, ideological choices, and economic orientation of the hegemonic state or of the superpowers that compete become crucially important and therefore the difference in the worldviews become very clear and it can be argued that worldview has a strong presence in these settings as well.

In terms of decision making models, worldview is an important factor that affects the outcome in many models. In all of Allison's three models, worldview has a notable place. In the Rational Actor Model, the decision-maker makes an analysis based on an objective analysis of the data available at that moment and decides. In this case, the decision-maker has to believe in scientific,

methodological, objective thinking and this is directly related to his/her worldview. In Organizational Behaviour Model, the organization in question has standard operating procedures which are formed by the leaders of that organization and therefore these procedures are a reflection of these people's worldview. In the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the participants must believe in the value of their ideas and also in the value of the institutions they represent. They also must understand the value of the relationship they establish with the leader who is the final decision-maker. Even the belief that where you sit determines your worth in the decision making process is a reflection of one's worldview. Therefore, worldview is active in all of Allison's models.

Irving Janis' Groupthink Model is based on compromise and how people do not want to violate what they believe is the common will of the group. It can therefore be related to the concept of worldview, because, according to Stafford (2008), "Humans are seen as rational creatures who, on some level, engage in cost-benefit analysis: a weighing of the pros and cons of interpersonal interaction and relationships" (Stafford, 2008, p. 378). As Groupthink is based on cost-benefit analysis, then, worldview can be seen as a part of this model as well.

In Barbara Kellerman's models, the Dominant Leader Model, the Small-Group Process Model, and the Cognitive Process Model, are all linked to worldview in different degrees. In the Dominant Leader Model, the decisions are made by one leader and the entourage of this leader accepts the decisions without discussion. The political relationship described in this model exists because people's worldviews permit such a leader to emerge. In Small-Group

Process Model, Kellerman sees the government as a small-group and as they form a government coming from a political party, this collection of individuals also must have similar worldviews as they represent an ideology within a country's political system. In the Cognitive Process Model, the decision-maker who has little time to process the information to decide, and who therefore cannot apply the Rational Actor Model, decides on his/her beliefs, ideology, distinction of right and wrong, that is, according to his/her worldview.

All the models discussed in this thesis, therefore, have direct or indirect relationship with worldview. The impact of worldview in all decisions made according to one of these models is strong and therefore worldview has a direct contact with the levels of analysis and decision-making models.

2.6. TURKISH DECISION-MAKERS AND WORLDVIEW

According to Tayfur and Göymen (2002), the primary institutions involved in decisions and policy making in Turkish foreign policy have always been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff. The other institutions involved in the processes have mostly assumed a secondary role (Tayfur & Göymen, 2002, p. 110). Obviously, the office of the Prime Minister is in the most influential position in decision-making in Turkey, but these two institutions contribute greatly to foreign policy decision making process.

Since the beginning of the Republican Era in 1923, the republican leadership strongly believed that religious philosophy had to be replaced by scientific thinking if the new state was to achieve modernisation and progress

(Alpay, 2008, p. 7). The worldview of the founding leaders of Turkey was based on Western values, and believed in the strength of scientific and modernist view. Alpay (2008) argues that creating a single national identity and a secular state were the two basic pillars of the state ideology, that is, Kemalism. The state elite with the military in the lead, believed to be the guardians of Kemalism, and consider pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish politics as the main antagonists of the Turkish state and the military, self-admitted guardians of the regime, intervened in the democratic process three times (Ibid, pp. 7-8). The 1961 Constitution institutionalized the guardianship role of the military as it established the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK). The membership of this council comprised of the president of the Republic, prime minister, and ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and interior affairs as well as the chief of staff and the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and the gendarmerie. The MGK was to act as an advisory body to the government on internal and external security threats to the country (Heper, 2005, p. 35). However, the 1999–2002 coalition government and the JDP government that followed it displayed strong political will to re-structure the Turkish legal system and politics in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria with the aim of opening accession negotiations with the European Union. As a result of this will, the military members were removed from the State Security Courts, the number of the civilian members of the MGK was increased, and the MGK was turned into an institution that no longer recommended measures but conveyed its views upon request. Consequently, the secretariat of the MGK was denied of its executive powers like requesting reports from government agencies on how

they were dealing with the threats for which the MGK had recommended specific measures (Ibid, p. 37). As a result of these developments, the role of civil decision-makers became prevalent in the system.

However, the lessening of the role of the military meant the increase in the role of a single-leader model. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister since 2003, has a firm control on domestic and foreign policy of the country. Görener and Ucal (2011) argue that Erdoğan's subjective interpretation of reality in accordance with his worldview and his tendency to filter all policy options through his deeply held beliefs and values seems to be taking a toll on Turkish foreign policy. They claim that leaders like Mr Erdoğan are generally closed to contradictory information and do not want to consider alternatives. As a result, their worldview prevails to the consideration of alternatives and monitor the environment extensively for cues before making any decision. These leaders have a principled approach to politics and are confident that what they know and what they want to achieve in the end are right. The authors use his relations with Israel as a display of his individual take on morality. Turkey's firm bilateral military cooperation relations with Israel since 1950s have experienced a dramatic downturn during Erdoğan's premiership (Görener & Ucal, 2011, pp. 372-373).

In this context, the role of the leader has become far more important than ever in the Turkish political system as the military is out of the political equation. In this case, Erdoğan and his government's former Foreign Policy Adviser and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof Davutoğlu are the two most influential people in the making, implementation and defence of foreign policy in the

country and as Görener and Ucal argue, the leader's worldview is a key element in determining the final decision made in foreign policy.

Finally, it can be argued that in the period since the multiparty politics began in Turkey, there was a strong influence of the Turkish Military Forces on politics and foreign policy decision-making process. After the constitutional and legal reforms in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria, the role of the military in the decision making process was reduced to an all-time low. Now, the civil authority assumes the main role in foreign policy decision making. However, the main decision-makers are the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, and, as a small-group process, this group of two is heavily affected by their understanding of right and wrong and their worldviews. Moreover, the role of the prime minister as the Dominant Leader is crucial in the current Turkish foreign policy making and implementation. As a result, worldview plays an important role in Turkish foreign policy decision making process as it has done during the period where the worldview of the military forces was the most important element in Turkish foreign policy decision making process.

CHAPTER 3: THE GAZA FLOTILLA CAMPAIGN: THE MAVI

MARMARA CASE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Turkish foreign policy is experiencing an interesting period since November 2002 because a government stayed in power for more than ten years without a break. This continuity created an opportunity for making and implementation of foreign policy easier, more consistent and more effective. Moreover, Turkey

also remained in the centre of very important international changes. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Kurdish Problem, the changes in Turkish legal acquis and the Arab Spring have been events that dramatically affected Turkey's foreign policy (Oran, 2013, pp. 61-70 *passim.*). In spite of its decisive position in a westernized system, Turkey remained in an expansively new international environment that had significant political instability (Bilgin, 2003, p. 112). The ethnic crisis that surrounded Turkey brought new challenges that it needed to cope with. Turkey is surrounded by and seaway connections to Africa, Europe and Asia with the neighbours having different political, regime and ideological goals (Barysch, 2010, 5-6 *passim.*). This means that the interest of different powers intersect in Turkey's geography, which significantly portrays Turkey strategic essentiality. Turkey is also surrounded by the geo-politically troubled regions of the world politics. The existing international political realities of the regions from Northern Caucasus at the north to Kuwait in the south created contradictory situations that required a varied and yet consistent responses and the JDP government's long term stay in power eased to at least create the necessary image of stability in Turkish foreign policy. The Abkhazian and Chechnian struggles for autonomy and their pursuit for international recognition, Azeri's partial Armenian invasion and Iraq's chronic Kurdish question are some of the inconsistencies in the chaotic Eurasia territories. Strategic position of Turkey makes its foreign policy a vital tool in the politically volatile geography (Criss, 2010, 21). Later, the problems in Libya, Egypt, and Syria were added into this list of regional problems that affect Turkey. In this context, worldviews of the key decision-makers of Turkey stands out as a very

important notion since worldview acts as a pillar in a person's decisive actions. The significance of worldview is generated from the broad spectrum of important decisions that need to be made. These decisions determine the position to be taken by the country.

In order to further analyse the effects of the concept 'worldview' to the decision making process of the decision makers of Turkey, it is very important to; a-) Define the general concepts and development of the JDP foreign policy understanding and b-) To analyse significant standings and reactions in relation with this understanding, to the Mavi Marmara Incident by the key decision-makers, as well as the perception they created in the three mainstream news agencies. Their perspective will be used as a method in terms of analysing the mentioned effect. These mainstream sample newspapers are chosen according to each of their close standing as Hürriyet which represents the Kemalist tradition, Yeni Şafak which represents the JDP approach, and Zaman which represents the then JDP supporting Gülen Movement. Moreover, the speeches given by the main decision makers will also be provided as support/evidence to their motivation in terms of decision making processes. In terms of documentary research, over 5000 news pieces and columnist articles are swept from the afore mentioned newspapers, and around 20 samples are selected by relevance and closeness to the main argument of this thesis. Despite the fact that, the concept 'worldview' is a very subjective term, it is still clearly distinguishable by monitoring the standing and outcome of a decision making figure through a single event or chain of events by simply using reason and logic. The main objective here is to determine if the key decision makers of

Turkey acted entirely according to national interests or the individuals 'worldview' and their own perception of reality even though it clashes with national interests. Also, the standing of the mainstream media organs, and other states standings to the decisions of these individuals is a way to determine if the actions/decisions taken by these individuals is reflecting an interest maximising, real-politic based standing and correlates with the decision making models/theories mentioned in the first chapter or they reflect the sole 'worldview' of the key decision makers.

According to Mufti (2011), the emergence of Turkey as a role model country in relation with the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the US failure to democratize the Muslim world according to a western perception (worldview) strengthened Turkey's position in its foreign policy (Mufti, 2011, p. 51-52). The strategic environment within the region resulted into regional powers seeking close alliance with Turkey (Öniş, 2010, p. 5). The invasion of Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing in March 2003 also provided a significant chance for Turkish rapprochement with Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Syria. This is an indication of the influence of the pro-Islamic worldviews of the decision-makers on Turkish foreign policy. In relation with these, Turkey has increased its credibility and confidence in taking political initiatives and foreign relations within its geography. The country tends towards the use of diplomacy and soft-power instruments in regional and international matters (Kalın, 2011, p. 5). Another important element of this period was the relations with the European Union and the resulting reforms. The claim for EU membership and the decisive stance for the reforms which are not totally compatible with Turkish leadership's

and public majority's conservative worldviews have increased Turkey's credibility on the international arena as well as improving bilateral relations in the region (Aras & Fidan, 2009, p. 198). Turkish foreign policy positioning is a continuous adaptation of defence with unique emergency procedures and tools (Aras, 2009, p. 5). This implies that Turkish foreign policy is built to oppose threats to its territory and its legitimacy. But this implication very much relies on the perception of threat by Turkish decision-makers which is also directly connected to their worldviews. It is possible to observe major differences between the western perception of threat and the Turkish perception in a number of cases.

3.2. THE ROOTS OF JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDERSTANDING FROM NEO-OTTOMANISM TO STRATEGIC DEPTH

The The JDP is ruling Turkey since Autumn 2002 and in that period has accepted Prof Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth concept as the main basis of its foreign policy. According to Meral and Paris (2010), JDP has had both the domestic support to radically rethink Turkish foreign policy and the intellectual depth to do so under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who started as chief advisor to Erdoğan in 2003. Prof Davutoğlu later became the minister of foreign affairs in 2009. Davutoğlu has argued that Turkey needs to have "zero conflict" with all of its neighbours and must develop "strategic depth" in all of its relations by using soft power and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. This means that while Turkey should pursue EU membership and continue its ties with United States and NATO, it will also talk to Middle Eastern states, as well as non-state actors like Hamas, to solve all regional disputes

including the never-ending Armenia and Cyprus issues (Meral & Paris, 2010, p. 80).

The foreign minister envisions a proactive Turkey that will be a mediator, guarantor, and stabilizing force in the region. In early 2010, Davutoğlu said that unlike the Cold War, when Turkey was part of the frontline of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union, it is now at the centre of a variety of regional constellations. Such a pivotal location, in Davutoğlu's vision, means that Turkey should play a more active role in constructing global stability (Ibid., p.80).

Karadeli (2007) argues, when the Strategic Depth concept is analysed, it can be seen that it is a concept that is influenced by AT Mahan's and Sir HJ Mackinder's theories and that it develops the Neo-Ottomanism idea and puts it into a geographical, historical, and cultural perspective (Karadeli, 2007, p. 42). According to Davutoğlu (2007), strategic depth is made up of a country's geographical location, depth of historical experience, and its political and social experiences (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 7-8). According to Davutoğlu (2007), Turkey is a "pivotal country in the strategic focus of global and regional strategies" but on the other hand, is also in need to reposition itself within changing dynamics of the world order. As a result, Turkey needs to use strategic depth idea to go with this need of repositioning itself because Turkey needs to change the tensions it experiences into a new, dynamical, proactive foreign policy. This new foreign policy is to transform the country into a regional and global power (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 9).

The new understanding of Turkish foreign policy defined by Prof Davutoğlu is made up of three methodological and five operational principles. Through the use of these principles, there are five goals to be reached. The first of the three methodological principles is visionary foreign policy in which Turkey would try to play a role in international conflicts even if these conflicts do not affect Turkey per se, because visionary foreign policy requires proactive diplomacy. The second principle is to have a consistent and systematic framework which would enable Turkey to pursue a foreign policy based on the same principles in all regions of the world. The third methodological principle is to develop a new diplomacy and discourse that will enable the spread of Turkish soft power into the region.

These three methodological principles are backed by five operational principles which are: a) balancing democracy and security; b) zero problems with the neighbours policy; c) proactive and preventive diplomacy; d) multifaceted foreign policy; and, e) rhythmic diplomacy, that is, effective contribution to all possible institutions and problems by Turkey.

These principles are expected to lead to five goals to be fulfilled by 2023. These goals are: a) EU membership by 2023; b) regional integration in terms of security and economic cooperation; c) playing an active part in the resolution of regional conflicts; d) representation in all global arenas; and, e) having an important presence in all major international institutions and becoming one of the top-10 economies in the world (Oran, 2013, pp. 139-140).

The very first test for the new foreign policy approach of JDP came in early 2003 with the Iraq Crisis. On 1st of March 2003, the motion that requested Turkey open a second front against Iraq in Turkey's south-eastern border with that country was rejected by the majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Turkey's refusal meant improvement of Turkey's position in the Middle East as the motion lacked international legitimacy. This event also proved out to be a turning point in Turkey's relations with the United States and with Middle Eastern countries. The Turkish government that had bargained for a 32 billion dollar grant and credit package in exchange for helping the US and its allies in the Iraqi operation lost important credit regarding the US government but later became a strategic partner for the US in the region. The terrorist attacks by al-Qaida in Istanbul on 15 November 2003 and the loss of trade volume with Iraq were the immediate negative effects of the new approach in Turkish foreign policy (Karadeli, 2007, pp. 42 – 46 *passim*). On the other hand, this series of events fortified the independent and strong image of Turkey in the Arab world and changed its relations with the Middle Eastern countries for the better with the exception of Israel. Turkey emerged as a regional power and arbitrator in time. Oran (2010) argues that Turkey's refusal to participate in the operation against Iraq created much sympathy in the Arab World. Turkey, Iran and Syria drew closer because of their common Kurdish problem and JDP government's harsh criticism of Israel strengthened this feeling of sympathy (Oran, 2010, p. 929). At the same time, Turkey became involved in the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (formerly Greater Middle East Project) and became a democratic partner along with Italy and Yemen. Turkey was at

first presented as a model for the region but when this was not supported, Turkey was relabelled a source of inspiration. At the time, PM Erdoğan declared Diyarbakır would become the heart of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (Ibid, p. 921).

According to Alessandri (2010), from 2003 on, Turkey has engaged all its neighbours in international relations. The Turkish diplomacy was not limited to only allegedly giving Turkey a role in the Middle East or to boost Turkey's image in the Muslim world. Alessandri argues that Turkey started a new period of cooperation with Greece, tried to solve the Cyprus problem by supporting the Annan Plan in 2004, and has acted as a stabilizer in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region. Turkey offered to mediate between Georgia and the Russian Federation in their 2008 conflict, tried to arbitrate the frozen conflicts of the Caucasus region, and, alienated Azerbaijan by trying to open relations with Armenia. Turkey also is competing with Iran and Egypt for influence in the Middle East while Turkey and Iran are cooperating in some issues that create a common ground of interest for both countries (Alessandri, 2010, pp. 8 – 9).

Turkey appeared to focus on the Middle Eastern region from the start of 2004 while working on improving relations with the European Union. Bashar Assad visited Ankara for three days in January 2004, and this visit was followed by visits from the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon and with the selling of Turk Telecom to a Lebanese firm and of property to the Gulf countries' nationals. All of these relations contributed greatly to the rise of Turkey as a regional power and arbitrator. These steps towards the regional countries were made not only because of the Neo-Ottomanist and Strategic Depth focus in

Turkish foreign policy, but also as a result of the economic and political requirements existing at that time (Karadeli, 2007, p. 47).

Barrinha (2011) argues that “Turkey’s goals of being one of the ten largest economies in the world by 2023 ... the second largest European economy by 2050 ... and a great power in the international system in a few decades have given a strategic direction to Ankara’s international activity.” (Barrinha, 2013, pp. 1-2). To reach this position of influence, Turkey tried to make new moves. A major novelty was an increased diplomatic traffic that included the countries traditionally disregarded by Turkish diplomacy. For instance, during his first year as foreign minister, Prof Davutoğlu took part in 100 foreign visits: 28 to Europe, 27 to the Middle East, 18 to the Balkans, 9 to Asia, and 8 to the United States (Meral and Paris, 2010, p. 80). The country worked to obtain a temporary membership to the United Nations Security Council and achieved it by establishing positive contacts with African, Middle Eastern, and South American countries. Sözen (2010) points out that when JDP came to power, it had successfully capitalized on the Neo-Ottomanist movement of the early post-Cold War Özal era and successfully exploited the political stability of being a one-party government and the fruits of the economic program (originally designed by Kemal Derviş) on the domestic front while combining all these with a concrete foreign policy vision and a normative strategy of becoming a pivotal country as Davutoğlu had envisioned. In the post-Cold War world, new horizons were opened for Turkey and JDP followed a new set of principles based on the vision of Prof Davutoğlu (Sözen, 2010, p. 119).

According to Sözen (2010), on two occasions, the first being the invitation of the Hamas leader Khalad Mashal and second occasion being the invitation of Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese leader who is charged by the International War Crimes Tribunal, to Turkey, the JDP foreign policy received a lot of criticism in the media. These events were seen as contradictions with usual Turkish foreign policy orientation and they were clean breaks of the current Turkish foreign policy from the traditional one. In the first instance, Turkey's intention to help integrate Hamas into the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is quite clear. The legitimacy of this move was based on Hamas' election victory and its election-win related legitimacy. This move should be seen as a part of Turkey's multidimensional and multi-track policy. This move also improved Turkey's position as mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The invitation of Sudan's al-Bashir was problematic and incompatible with either the traditional or the current principles of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey aimed at getting Sudan's support for Turkey's bid to secure a UN Security Council membership. However, this move, although rational and explicable from a very realist perspective, was too costly on the prestige of Turkey as a democracy. Lastly, Sözen (2010) argues that JDP's Islamist reflexes in domestic politics and Turkey's relative lack of financial resources are the potential factors that can limit the success of the new Turkish foreign policy vision and strategy in the future (Sözen, 2010, 119-120).

According to Zarakol (2012), that Turkey's international profile was rising as an indisputable fact of the 2000s. After more than a decade of impressive economic performance and relative political stability under three terms of JDP

government, Turkey seemed to have set its sights on regional leadership. After pursuing a humbler “zero problems with neighbours” policy during the JDP’s second term, which involved focusing on trade growth and establishing cordial relations with anyone who would, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan appeared to claim the mantle of leadership of the new Middle East and other regions which were historically under Ottoman influence. This ambition could be seen in Erdoğan’s victory speech at the wake of his party’s historic third time electoral landslide in June 2011. During the speech, in addition to citizens of Turkey, Erdoğan greeted the “sister people” of “Baghdad, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, Nicosia and others,” whom he believed would be “eagerly watching Turkey.” Moreover, Erdoğan declared his party’s victory to be a victory of hope for all oppressed people, adding that “Sarajevo has won as much as Istanbul; Beirut as much as Izmir; West Bank and Gaza as much as Diyarbakır” and that “the Middle East, the Caucuses and the Balkans had gained as much as Turkey.” Since then, the JDP government has backed this message in its foreign policy choices (Zarakol, 2012, pp. 740-741).

Turkey’s strained relations with Israel started to worsen even further after 2009. On 29 January 2009, in the session titled “Gaza: Peace Model in the Middle East” of the Davos meetings, a crisis was experienced between the Israeli President Peres and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan. As Erdoğan protested Israeli leader and the Davos meetings, Turkey’s position in the Middle East began to improve geometrically. Arab intellectuals accused their leaders of being less brave than Erdoğan, and hence Turkey’s and JDP’s prestige peaked in the Arab world (Çakmak, 2012, 318-319). Later in 2009, Turkish authorities

declared the cancellation of the international part of the Anatolian Eagle Manoeuvres and prevented an Israeli participation to the military exercises without creating an important diplomatic problem. However, when on 12 January 2010, the Israeli deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon treated the Turkish Ambassador to Israel disrespectfully; another crisis erupted between the two countries (Ibid, p. 378).

The Israeli-Turkish relations came to a point of halt in May 2010. On 31 May 2010, the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, on its way to Gaza with humanitarian aid material, was raided by Israeli troops in international waters, 9 of the passengers and crew were killed and several dozens were injured during the raid. The ship was then taken to the Israeli port of Ashdod and returned to Turkey in August 2010 (Ibid, pp. 383-384). These very serious negative developments between the two countries improved the standing of Turkey as an important power in the Middle East, especially in the eyes of the Muslim populations of different Middle Eastern countries. The position of regional power and influence thought out by Prof Davutoğlu was by then looking feasible and attainable. Turkey had a strong economy, a steady economic growth which surpassed the majority of the EU member countries despite the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. The country had a temporary membership at the UN Security Council, new embassies and trade relations with many African countries, a new political stance in the Middle East, which all meant Davutoğlu's vision of creating a hinterland for Turkey in the region, might become possible.

Turkey also tried to act as an arbitrator between Iran and the Western world in the Iranian uranium enrichment crisis in 2010. Turkey attempted to find an

internationally acceptable solution to the dispute involving Iran and the Western alliance over the Iranian nuclear program. According to Öniş (2010), Turkey displayed an unusual degree of pro-activism during the course of 2010 in its search to find a diplomatic solution to the problem and Brazil also joined Turkey in these efforts. Iran was eventually convinced by Turkey and Brazil to sign an agreement on the low-enriched nuclear fuel swap in May 2010. With the Agreement signed by Turkish, Brazilian and Iranian Foreign Ministers Davutoğlu, Amorim, and Motaki, Iran committed to give the 1200kg of 3.5 per cent enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 20 per cent enriched uranium it will receive from Western countries. However, the Vienna Group, the EU, and the Obama administration found the Tehran Agreement suspicious, and United Nations Security Council approved the fourth sanction package against Iran even after the Tehran Agreement (Öniş, 2010, p. 6). Still, Turkey's role in this crisis showed its ambitions to become a regional leader and its commitment to Davutoğlu's foreign policy goals.

However, with the Arab Spring which began in Tunisia on 28 December 2010 and which still continues, Turkey found itself in a difficult position. According to the US-based National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), Turkey, along with Iran and Saudi Arabia, tried to become the major regional force which can affect the outcome of the Arab Spring popular uprisings that covered the countries of North Africa and Near East. According to the NCAFP, The "crypto-Islamic government" of Turkey tried to create a political, cultural and commercial "hinterland" for itself in a region that successive governments in Ankara had ignored since the 1920s as Turkey now

needed this hinterland for several reasons. First of these reasons was to prevent Iran to become the dominant power in the region. Secondly, Turkey needs to become the leader of the region to replace its failed ambition to become a full member of the European Union and to create a new anchor for its foreign policy. Turkey hence tried to gain a voice in the “Arab Spring” countries, especially Libya, Egypt, and Syria, largely through the Muslim Brotherhood movement in these countries. In 2011, Erdoğan visited most of the Arab capitals to promote his doctrine of “a secular state in an Islamic society” (NCAFP, 2011, pp. 293-294).

Aliboni (2011) believes that at the beginning of 2011, Turkey’s independent strategic course of action in the Middle East was seen by the West as risky but in harmony with Western interests and to some extent even helpful as Turkey was able to do things that Western countries could hardly do in the region. However, after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey has taken a new direction which suggests that Ankara has noticed the nationalist strategic change underway and wants to be a leading factor in it, trying to have a dominant position in the regional scramble along with Iran, Egypt and, Saudi Arabia (Aliboni, 2011, p. 9). Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated in his speech in early 2012 in Kayseri that

“ ...as the children of a generation whose grandfathers fought to the bitter end in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and in the defence of Medina so as to defend those holy lands, it is the 100th year of our withdrawal from the Middle East. Now after a century, we are passing through a period when, in the entire Middle East, great things are expected again from Turkey and a considerable wave of

excitement emerges in the places where the name of our Dear Prime Minister is just mentioned... Whatever places we have lost and lands we pulled out of between 1911 and 1923, we will meet our brothers once again in these lands between 2011 and 2023. This is a compulsory historical mission (Erdem, 2012, p. 436).

At the first stage of the so-called Arab Spring, long-established leaders were ousted in Tunisia and Egypt. In Libya, the change came with the involvement of the United States, United Kingdom and France, as well as NATO forces against the ruler Colonel Gaddafi. At the end of the regime change, these three countries engaged in transitions and, for the first time in decades, they had relatively free and fair elections. The Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, which had been suppressed to varying degrees under previous regimes, particularly benefitted from the new political freedoms and showed strongly in the first democratic elections. In no country, however, did they achieve a majority of seats; in Libya they did not even prove to be the strongest party. In Yemen, after the resignation of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, a caretaker government formed from the former ruling party and the main opposition parties was formed for a two-year transition period in which a new constitution is to be drafted and free elections are to be organised (Asseburg, 2013, p. 48). During the change of government in Egypt, Turkey was assertive, with PM Erdoğan being the first international leader to call for Mubarak's resignation (Barrinha, 2013, p. 13). While trying to establish good relations with the new regimes, Turkish hesitation to be part of the Libyan uprising created a backlash for Turkey which was enjoying an elevated position within the Arab world before

the Arab Spring uprisings took place. Turkish support for the Libyan rebels arrived too late and created question marks in the Arab public opinions. In Libya, Turkey faced difficulties in reconciling an aggressive economic policy with an active diplomacy that avoided interfering in the internal affairs of other states. The 20,000 Turkish workers who were living in Libya and the \$15 billion worth of projects that the Gaddafi regime granted to Turkish companies, contributed to Turkey's initially middle-of-the-road attitude towards the turmoil in that country and the Turkish government even attempted to work as mediator between Gaddafi and the rebels. That position changed with time as it became clearer that Gaddafi was going to be overthrown sooner or later. Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to Benghazi, still during the civil war, and Turkey's donation of \$200 million to the National Transitional Council were signs of this change of understanding (Barrinha, 2013, p. 13).

Syria, just like Libya, was ruled by a regime which had not changed in terms of its government understanding since the Cold War and the major features of the old regime were fully preserved. Basically, the present Syrian regime was the same as the one created by Hafiz Asad more than forty years ago. This is equally true for foreign policy. The new leader initially accommodated the USA after 9/11 but soon the old siege mentality prevailed. As the US-led invasion of Iraq caused problems for Syria, it became closer to the Russian Federation and the Russians modernized Syrian army installations. The new Damascus–Moscow relationship enhanced considerably Asad's international position and domestic repressive capability (Tudoroiu, 2013, pp. 309-310).

In the still continuing Syrian revolt, Turkey, feeling Libya has lost some credit to Turkish foreign policy, has been forced to take a stance that largely undermined the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria. Turkey tried to benefit from its proximity to the Syrian to convince it to start structural reforms that could meet the protesters' demands during the initial stages of the revolt. The fact that Bashar Asad did not follow Turkey's advice showed Turkey's limits in terms of influencing the security of the region. The hesitant reactions to Ankara's support for the Syrian armed opposition, and the less-than-clear articulation with both Qatar and Saudi Arabia regarding that support contributed to the general feeling that Turkey has conflicting interests in the Middle East, appearing to be a guest in someone else's region. The Arab Spring has revealed all the contradictions that Turkey's diplomacy faces.

According to Barrinha (2013), Turkey shows its NATO allies it can have an independent or autonomous foreign policy, often co-ordinating its actions with the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. On the other hand, it is still seen by its Arab neighbours as part of that Western Alliance and it needs its support when dealing with Syria. It also tries to be a moderator in the region but takes sides, even heavily confronts such countries as Israel or Syria. Finally, Turkey has tried to promote a status quo policy that guarantees the region's stability, while supporting rebel movements in countries such as in Libya and Syria. In a post-Arab Spring assessment of Turkey's role in the region, Ahmet Davutoğlu rejects any incompatibility between Turkey's simultaneous push for both democracy and stability claims there is no contradiction between the Turkish emphasis on democratic demands and the Turkish foreign policy

principle of zero problems with neighbours. Barrinha (2013) argues that in practice, such a balance is difficult to establish, and supporting the demands of the Arab people eventually leads one to pick sides, and accept the inevitability of confronting those who stand on the opposite side of the barricades (Barrinha, 2013, pp. 12-13).

Despite considerable material costs, Turkey has taken a clear stand against the Assad regime in Syria, backed the coalition against Gaddafi in Libya and supported Mubarak's ouster prior to that. It is not surprising, therefore, that many are hailing a new period of regional leadership for Turkey. For instance, in 2011, soon after the inception of the Arab uprisings, Mohammed Ayoub predicted a "Turco-Persian future" for the Middle East, and argued that current developments are in favour of Turkey and Iran. However, the events that took place in June 2013 in Turkey, as well as the Turkish position in the Libyan and Syrian uprisings caused doubts to emerge concerning Turkey in the Arab public opinion. Moreover, Turkey has little influence in Tunisia; the situation in Egypt remains uncertain; and Turkey has been side-lined in post-Gaddafi Libya, despite having made the costly choice of opposing Gaddafi at the expense of Turkish construction contracts. Finally, despite Turkey's frequent and vocal reprimands, Assad keeps hanging onto power in Syria, seriously undercutting Turkey's claims of influence in the Middle East. In sum, Turkey's push for regional leadership has met a few obstacles on the road since the inception of the Arab uprisings. The eagerness with which Turkey jumped in the political fray in the Middle East will undoubtedly affect the way Turkey is perceived in other regions; some countries may be less likely to do business with such an

interventionist Turkey. According to Zarakol (2012), there are still two problem areas that are visible in Turkey's handling of the fallout of the Arab Spring process and there are two issues to address if Turkey is to become a major actor in the international system of the twenty-first century: 1) Turkish capacity for effective foreign policy communication does not yet match Turkish ambition; 2) Unaddressed domestic problems will undercut foreign policy ambitions (Zarakol, 2012, pp. 740-741).

3.3. THE GAZA FLOTILLA HUMANITARIAN AID CAMPAIGN

In the recent years, Turkish government could not keep up with the major events emerged in the region as it was expected from a ten year-plus single party government. Also, Turkey, as a state, failed to maintain its diplomatic strength being caused by above mentioned pro-Islamist worldview of its key decision-makers. This notion also indicates to the perception of threat by different individuals as it was mentioned in the previous paragraph. Especially during Erdogan's last years as premier and his transfer to the office of the President of the Republic followed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Prof. Davutoğlu's appointment as Prime Minister, the controversial consistency was lost both domestically and in terms of Turkish foreign policy making abroad. In other words, the position that the Turkish Government had taken during the Gaza Flotilla Campaign's Mavi Marmara event was consistent and similar to its position taken during the emergence and growth of IS in terms of the pro-Islamic worldview of the key decision makers. As the standing of the Turkish decision-makers to the emergence and actions of IS is a subject of another study, it is possible to say that the effect/perception created by that standing, in

terms of the results, was right the opposite to the support generated by the standing to the Mavi Marmara incident. It is possible to say that, in terms of Gaza Flotilla Campaign, the main atmosphere in Turkey and in the international arena, especially in the beginning of the event was very positive and supporting. Despite Israeli states objection and warnings in terms of not letting the Flotilla to actually leave Turkey, the support given to the aid/peace mission from the public opinion and other states, even the western world was very positive. When the news pieces in three main newspapers, Hurriyet, Yeni Şafak and Zaman are observed, it can be observed that there were 50 states plus numerous activists and civil society organisations supporting this humanitarian aid campaign. The amount of support is extremely higher than the kind of support Turkey had been taken from other actors in terms of its standing with IS.

On May 22nd, 2010 Hürriyet which is the closest streaming mainstream newspaper to main opposition in Turkey, gives the news with the title "Our Course is Palestine, Our Load is Humanitarian Aid" which is also the name of the whole aid campaign. In the article it is stated that the ship "Mavi Marmara" belongs to People's Rights and Freedoms Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH) that is going to accompany 2 other ships carrying medical supplies, cement, iron, kindergarten supplies, etc., to Palestine set sail. The president of İHH in his speech mentioned that a great example of togetherness is displayed by all segments of Turkey in this blessed cause. He also stated their determination as an organisation in terms of the blockade they might encounter, as well as stated that the passengers are ready to pay any price during this journey. The whole

Gazza Flotilla is consisted of 9 ships that are shared as; 3 ships from Turkey, 2 from England, 1 from Kuwait, Algeria, Greece and Ireland. Also, the campaign is supported by 50 states plus thousands of civil society organisations and activists (Hurriyet, 2010). On May 28th, 2010, Yeni Şafak, mainstream newspaper for the ruling JDP, gives the news with the title “Mavi Marmara” Sets Sail to Gazza”. In the article, it is stated that the Mavi Marmara ship leaves Antalya shores in the midnight right after customs procedures for the 560 passengers is complete by the midnight to meet 8 other ships that are carrying humanitarian aid supplies to Gazza. It is expected that the ships would arrive to Gazza by May 29th around noon (Yeni Şafak, 2010). Lastly, on 23rd of May, 2010, Zaman which is the known mainstream media organ for Gulen movement, gives the news with the title “Humanitarian Aid Ship Sets Sail to Gazza Despite Embargo”. In the article it is stated that 500 passenger capacity ship sets sail to meet 8 other ships with a huge ceremony from İstanbul. The president of the İHH Foundation claims that the embargo will be penetrated with or without Israel willing. One of the guards for Mescid-i Aksa, Sheik Raif Sala thanks Turkey for a good 500 years aid to Palestine (Turan, 2010).

As it is possible to observe from the three mainstream newspapers articles about the aid journey’s start (there are more repeating articles, too both in these sample newspapers and more) that there is no criticism or lack of support to this aid mission from any part of the society in the beginning. It is important to make note of this point, right at this stage because as the future coverage of the media swept when the Mavi Marmara event actually occurs and from that point on, the standings or reactions to the Mavi Marmara event from the President-

Government camp, the Main Opposition and the Gulen movement will reveal the effects of the concept 'worldview' to the decision-making processes of the key decision makers.

3.4. THE MAVI MARMARA INCIDENT

From In the night that is connecting 30th of May to 31st of May, 2010, the flagship of Gaza Flotilla, the Mavi Marmara was intervened by Israeli elite force Şetayet 13 members in the international waters close to Israel and Palestine. Earlier that day, a naval base in Iskenderun, Turkey was also attacked by terrorists. As it was stated by the government that the attackers were members of the PKK, originating from the tension between Turkey and Israel there were also claims that Israeli intelligence service MOSSAD also had a part in this attack.

The incident was covered by the three mainstream newspapers as follows;

On May 31st, 2010, foreign news service of Hürriyet uses the title "Operation to Aid Ships from Israel: At least 10 Deaths". In the article, it is stated that the spokesman for the Israeli Army said a military operation was induced to the flotilla that was sailing 75 miles away from the shore in the international waters. He also claimed that the Israeli soldiers faced armed resistance. The aftermath of the operation was, at least 10 passengers died and many injured. He also stated that 4 Israeli soldiers suffered minor injuries. Following the Mavi Marmara raid, rest of the ships were raided and taken under control of the Israeli military forces. While broadcasting about the event and dead and injured passengers was suspended, the Mavi Marmara ship had been taken to the docks in the city

of Ashdod (Hürriyet, 2010). On the same day, Zaman covers the news with the title “Early Intervention to the Ships from Israel”. Journalist K. Bayhan (2010) who delivered the news from the Mavi Marmara stated in his article that, two warships that are belong to the Israeli Navy forces approached to the Gaza Flotilla and transmitted the message stating not to approach to the blocked territory, otherwise all necessary actions would be taken in order to keep the blockage intact. Despite the message, the article continues as the Flotilla is not changing its course and continuing its way with great determination. It was also reported that Şetayet 13 elite commandoes are waiting aboard to cease control of the Flotilla by using force (Zaman, 2010). Following this article, Zaman also reported the piece from Cihan News Agency with the title “Israel Attacked to the Ships that are Carrying Aid Supplies to Gaza”. In the article, it is stated that the Israeli forces intervened the Flotilla carrying aid supplies to Gaza. Also, while the Vatican’s statement that it was a grievous incident and it was being closely monitored was covered, the condemnation from Argentina and Denmark was reported. The request from Argentina for an international investigation and the condemnation to the excessive force used by Israeli forces by Denmark was reported additionally to the protest took place by 500 activists in front of the Israeli Embassy in Belgium was covered (Zaman, 2010). Yeni Şafak, covers the news with the title “Mavi Marmara is at the Docks of Ashdod”. In the brief article it is reported that the Flagship of Gaza Flotilla had been taken to the docks of Ashdod after the intervention of the Israeli forces which is resulted by the death of 10 passengers and more than 50 injured. It is claimed in the article that,

Turkish diplomats are trying to identify the wounded by going from hospital to hospital in Israel (*Yeni Şafak*, 2010).

Additionally, when the brief article of *Hurriyet* about a British activist becoming Muslim aboard the *Mavi Marmara* is observed this states that the 63 year old English citizen Peter Venner had been converted to Islam on the way to Gaza by his own will (*Hurriyet*, 2010) it is seen that there is an unconditional support to such an humanitarian purpose regardless of the Kemalist tradition of the *Hurriyet* newspaper.

It is possible to say that, until this point, unanimity of thought can still be observed from the coverage of the three newspapers that are coming from different traditions. Only minor differences in terms of choice of specific words in the coverage could lead to a minor separation in terms of their sense of journalism but this still would not affect the main outcome. This separation could be further analysed under the subject of Peace Journalism which could be a subject of another study. To make note, the first coverage of these newspapers are before the Turkish government actually reacted to the situation in terms of timeline. In order to make a clear and distinct point and better clarify the aim of the study, the first official from the Turkish Government and the perception that it created in these newspapers should be analysed further.

In his speeches, then Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan on May 31st and June 1st, 2010 which one of them was given in the airport at Chile right after the *Mavi Marmara* raid and the other at JDP group meeting. In his first speech, Erdoğan stated that a violent attack in the international waters had been carried out to

the ships that left Turkey with the aim of bringing aid supplies to Gaza by Israeli forces by disregarding the rules of international law. Then, continued that he would like to inform firstly the authorities of the states whose citizens are on these ships as passengers and the world society that the ships were strictly controlled before take-off and there are no other passengers than the supporting civilians and activists and no load other than humanitarian aid supplies aboard the ships. He mentioned that, it is not possible to share the statements of Israeli authorities that armed resistance took place on the ships against Israeli soldiers. These statements are not reflecting the truth, clearly they are lies and there are more than 32 states citizens accompanied with many members of parliaments from different states aboard as well. He also stated that our Ambassador to Israel had been called back and Turkey immediately requested a Security Council (Wikisource, 2011). The following day, in his speech in the JDP group meeting Erdoğan comprehensively reacted to the Mavi Marmara event stating that, he would like to address not only to Turkish public but also to the whole humanity and their minds and conscious and share his emotions with an open heart. He states that in Mediterranean waters, human conscious had taken the biggest wound in history by stopping the white flagged aid ships with use of excessive force. Again, we strongly damn this unlawful, violent attack and ceasing of these civilian aid ships. We accept this incident as an attack to the main philosophy of the United Nations, they will not get away with it and they will pay for their actions. Later, he continued by stating the actions and precautions taken regarding the incident such as alarming the relative organs of the state, the above the ordinary meeting of the UN Security

Council requested by Turkey that is followed by a declaration of a condemnation to Israel and his requests for an international investigation with possible penalization. He also called for conscious from the Israeli public and renewed his call for lifting the embargo over Gaza (Wikisource, 2010).

Before starting to analyse the perception and reactions in the sample newspapers and their columnists, another important aspect is to make note of the interview that was held by Joe Lauria with Fetullah Gülen that was published in the Wall Street Journal regarding the Mavi Marmara incident on June 4th, 2010. Lauria (2010) used the introduction in his article as “Imam Fethullah Gülen, a controversial and reclusive U.S. resident who is considered Turkey's most influential religious leader, criticized a Turkish-led flotilla for trying to deliver aid without Israel's consent.” Gülen’s own words regarding the incident in the interview are as follows: *“What I saw was not pretty, it was ugly. Mr. Gülen said organizers' failure to seek accord with Israel before attempting to deliver aid ‘is a sign of defying authority and will not lead to fruitful matters. It is not easy to say if they are politicized or not, he said. He said that when a charity organization linked with his movement wanted to help Gazans, he insisted they get Israel's permission. He added that assigning blame in the matter is best left to the United Nations”* (Lauria, 2010).

This interview shows that, despite the similar worldview of Fetullah Gülen and Tayyip Erdoğan, individuals may end up on different ends in terms of their decisions. While Mr. Gülen shows an approach which considers Israeli sensitivities Prof. Davutoglu and Erdogan’s approach is compatible with their belief of Turkish-Ottoman influence in the Middle East and in Islamic solidarity.

The columnist of Yeni Şafak, H. Albayrak (2010) who shares the similar worldview with the key decision makers of Turkish Government wrote in his column an open letter to Fetullah Gulen emphasised the point argued by Erdogan. Albayrak who was also a passenger in Mavi Marmara also underlined the issue of Islamic solidarity and criticised Gülen further because he did not show clear and unconditional support to their cause (Albayrak, 2010).

Mehmet Y. Yılmaz (2010) in his column in Hürriyet defined the Israeli attack on Mavi Marmara as banditry but claimed statements blaming Israel harshly and claiming Mavi Marmara will be avenged will only escalate the situation and proposed that the matter should be considered under diplomatic and peaceful solutions (Yılmaz, 2010).

The same situation was discussed in the Zaman daily by author Ali Bulaç. Bulaç (2010) argued that Israel was at fault for attacking the Mavi Marmara that is only carrying humanitarian aid supplies. However he also criticised the Erdoğan government by saying it was at fault because either the government did not know about Israel's intentions or it knew them but let the flotilla take its journey even though it knew it would be attacked (Bulaç, 2010).

To sum up, the Mavi Marmara incident is not only shaped by the worldview shared by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu but also people who tried to comment on what has happened during the raid on the ship also took from their own worldviews to determine where they stand vis à vis the incident and the government's response to the events. When the Gaza Flotilla left Istanbul, the initiation of this trip was made possible by the firm belief of Erdoğan and

Davutoğlu on the leadership position of Turkey in the Middle East and their worldview that supported Muslim charity and solidarity. As a result, they let the flotilla leave Turkey and did not take any back steps on that issue during the flotilla's journey and the Mavi Marmara raid incident. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu shared a worldview that supported the idea that Turkey's image in the region was one of a benefactor for the whole Muslim community and so they supported the IHH activity to help people restrained in the city of Gaza. Later, when the Israeli forces attacked the ship and killed and injured many Turkish citizens they did not back down from their initial position for they both believed in the Turkish strategic depth in the region and had therefore had to show that to the whole world.

On the other hand, when we look at the newspapers' approach to the situation, it can be seen that each newspaper followed their and their readers' worldview while analysing and criticising the events that happened. As a result, the Kemalist *Hürriyet*, the government supporting *Yeni Şafak*, and the Gülen Movement's *Zaman* daily newspapers relayed the developments and their columnist commented on the developments either criticizing or supporting the country's major decision makers basing their arguments on their and their community's worldviews. Therefore, it can be argued that not only the decision makers but also their critics and supporters use their worldview to make sense of the world and to express their ideas. However, because as the then prime minister and the then foreign minister Erdoğan and Davutoğlu had nearly absolute control over the making and implementation of Turkish foreign policy, their worldview becomes far more important than anyone else's worldview on

the outcomes that bind the country in the international arena. However, as the critics and supporters also contribute to the making of public opinion on any political subject, their evaluation of a subject may also influence the decision-making process. However, with the JDP in government for 8 years at the time of the Gaza Flotilla crisis, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's worldview had a far greater impact on the making and implementation of foreign policy decisions without fear of interaction from any outside influence because their worldview began to shape the party supporters' and the general public opinion. Such a privileged position enabled them to do things according to their worldview and hence apply foreign policy decisions without any fear of negative backlash.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been a study of Turkish foreign policy during the Mavi Marmara Crisis of 2010 that took place under the JDP government in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the Prime Minister and Ahmet Davutoğlu was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Firstly, the aim of this study has been to analyse JDP foreign policy behaviour, choices, and actions from the perspective of worldview of the leading cadres of the Republic of Turkey. To be able to look at Turkish foreign policy from the worldview approach, an analytical framework had to be constructed.

Chapter 1 of this thesis focused on the theoretical framework of decision making and the paths decision-makers follow. To this end, the chapter looked at the levels of analysis in international relations and established that analysis of decisions on foreign policy can and should be based on Individual-Level analysis with an emphasis on the State-Level analysis. When making of Turkish foreign policy is analysed, it can be seen that, given the right international environment, either the prime minister, or the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs make the decisions and implement them as the will of the ruling government. They also take input from different political and civil elements in the country.

In addition to the levels of analysis, this study also focused on the actual making of foreign policy decisions and therefore made use of behavioural models formed by Graham Allison, Barbara Kellerman, and Irving Janis.

Graham Allison's work tried to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis and based on that crisis explained different inputs, thought patterns, and interactions that affected final foreign policy decisions and the implementation of these decisions. Allison's Rational Actor Model, Organizational Behaviour Model, and Bureaucratic Politics Model are the major elements that are applied in International Relations and show how a single individual may decide rationally, how different people from different backgrounds are shaped by their work environment and its standard operating procedures, and how the interaction of different organizations affect the final outcome at the decision table. Based on Allison's work, Irving Janis proposed the Groupthink Model which shows how people are willing to compromise to what they think is the majority idea and this models reflections can be seen in a variety of foreign policy decisions from time to time. Barbara Kellerman, on the other hand, developed Allison's models and added three new models of her own, these models being Small-Group Process, Dominant Leader, and Cognitive Process Models. Of these, the Dominant Leader Model which argues a dominant leader's personality, background, and ideas, that is his or her worldview in short, is very effective in the making of any decision. This model also argues the leader is affected by the environment in which the decision is made. Small-Group Process Model is also relevant to the use of worldview as an element in decision making process and these two models, as well as Cognitive Process Model which concentrates on the decision-maker's background and worldview because, as Kellerman argued, the leader has very limited time making the decision and cannot deal with a purely rational analysis of all relevant data.

In Chapter 2, the thesis began to emphasise the concept of worldview. In this chapter, the concept of worldview was analysed according to its historical origins, general use and definition, and how it affects political, sociological, and cultural experiences of human beings and vice versa. As worldview is a key concept in the conduct of our daily lives, it also dominates the way a decision-maker makes decisions. Concerning worldview, there are very important contributions in the field since the foundational works of Immanuel Kant and Sigmund Freud. As Koltko-Rivera argued, worldviews guide people's ideas concerning what exists or what ought to exist, what is valued or should be valued, what are acceptable ways of knowing, what tasks should be achieved and appropriate means toward those tasks, and future goals one should pursue (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 4). Worldview acts as a lens to interpret the world, therefore is actually crucial in the study, understanding, and in fact, making of foreign policy decisions.

In Chapter 3, this study looks at the very clear and well-discussed case of the Gaza Flotilla and Mavi Marmara and tries to establish a connection amongst the models discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of worldview in chapter 2, and the Turkish foreign policy decision making process. When this study analysed that specific period of foreign policy making JDP period of foreign policy making in Turkish history, it can be argued that the decisions made during the Gaza flotilla raid, it can be argued that worldview of the leading cadres, especially of the then Prime Minister Erdoğan and the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu, affect the decisions made, implemented, and defended during this period. After Prof Davutoğlu switched from prime minister's adviser to minister,

the effect of his worldview, his academic background, the ideas he defended academically before becoming an implementer of ideas affected Turkish foreign policy to a great extent. Also, the worldview of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also affected the way the JDP governments have handled foreign and domestic affairs. The evidences of this situation are apparent in the Gaza Flotilla events as well as other issues of the same period in Turkish foreign policy.

The distinctive aspect of this study is the key concept 'worldview' and the underlined relationship between this concept and foreign policy decision-making. The concept of worldview has been defined in different disciplines by different scholars and in political science; it is used under the heading of 'personality' and took a secondary place. As a person's worldview affects the way that person thinks, interacts with others, it also affects how decisions are processed and implemented. As a result, a leader's or a governing small group's (which may be called the elite of a country) decisions, these decisions' implementations and justification depend on their worldview as well as the international system and domestic and international political background. The dominance of worldview may change from the model that is used and that can be identified, and therefore, for instance, a person who uses the Rational Actor Model may be less influenced by his/her worldview compared to a person who uses Dominant Leader or Cognitive Process Models.

The worldview of the JDP leadership differed from the previous leaders of the country because they have a less strict understanding of secularism and they have constructed their foreign policy on the ideas of Prof Ahmet Davutoğlu.

In addition to the end of the Cold War and the dominance of the concept “war against terror,” the JDP benefited from its leading cadres different worldviews in international overtures that the problems with Armenia were taken to a minimum, negotiations and trade started between the two countries construct to the point examples of this new approach in Turkey’s conduct of international relations.

Secondly, the development of cordial relations with African and Islamic countries is another example of the effects of the JDP leadership’s worldview on Turkish foreign policy. The application for and attainment of a temporary membership at the UN Security Council, the bolder approach in foreign policy towards the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the ease in disturbing Turkey’s ties with Israel, the relations established with the Hamas, and Sudan’s Al-Bashir are reflections of the JDP leadership’s worldview in the making and pursuit of foreign policy.

As a result, when the JDP foreign policy initiatives are analysed, it can be said that policy making and policy implementation are greatly affected by the JDP leadership’s worldview, negative and positive. As their worldviews differs from previous governments’ decision-makers’ worldviews, and they had a stronger grip on power than previous governments so that they had a ruling period which surpassed a decade hence giving them the possibility of creating a cohesive, strong, long-lasting foreign policy, JDP had a very strong impact on Turkish foreign policy making. Additionally, the international order helped Turkey’s ability to establish better connections with the countries it had previously neglected, manage an economic growth that enabled Turkey to help

friendly groups around the Mediterranean and Near Eastern geography, and have a stronger say in the United Nations. As a result, the impact of leaders' worldviews was far more evident and clearly recognizable during the JDP period so far compared to, for instance, to the coalition government periods of the 1970s or the 1990s.

It can finally be claimed that Turkish foreign policy is affected by worldviews of Turkey's key decision-makers and its intensity depends on the period the government rules, the international environment, economic and political capabilities and affiliations of the government and therefore of the country, and the way the leadership acts in unison. As Erdoğan and Davutoğlu form a team of very close worldviews and ambitions, Turkish foreign policy formed during the JDP period, especially during the premiership of Erdoğan, the effects of the leader's and the small group of decision-makers' worldviews have become even more significant. It can therefore be concluded that during the JDP rule in the last decade, the concept 'worldview' has had a very strong effect on Turkish foreign policy in terms of conceptualization of the world, making of the decisions, and implementation of these decisions.

In the Gaza Flotilla campaign, the different worldview of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu is very distinctively identifiable. Their difference is distinctive because they emphasized Islamic solidarity and charity side of the flotilla's campaign even in the process of the flotilla's emergence as an idea, and, Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth Doctrine was mainly based on his worldview. His doctrine, affected by his worldview, in return, affected the way Turkey handled the incidents of flotilla's journey and the Mavi Marmara raid. As Davutoğlu believed

in the still-continuing impact of the Ottoman culture in the region and Erdoğan believed in the importance of Islamic charity towards the suffering Muslims and in Islamic solidarity, the Turkish foreign policy stance in these related events was not shaped on the basis of Turkish membership of NATO nor on Turkey's alliance with the Western world. Instead, it was shaped based on the ideas of Islamic solidarity and charity and on Davutoğlu's belief on proactive Turkish foreign policy and the need for a Turkish sphere of influence in the Middle East region. As a result, Turkish foreign policy during the Mavi Marmara crisis was not shaped as foreign policy aimed at keeping the balance intact with Turkey's fellow NATO member countries; did not aim at humouring the United States' demands, and nor did it form on how the relations with Israel may turn out to be in the long run, all of these being part of the foreign policy considerations of post-war Turkish foreign policy.

As a result, the outcome of the Mavi Marmara crisis has been radically different compared to the general foreign policy attitude of Turkey since the 1940s. This outcome was shaped by the worldviews of Davutoğlu and Erdoğan that are similar to each other's but at times radically different from that of their predecessors in their respective posts. The Turkish response to the events in the Gaza Flotilla and Mavi Marmara incidents show that a course of action that differs from the traditional implementation of Turkish foreign policy was in practice and that the major factor which set apart Erdoğan and Davutoğlu from their former colleagues was they perceived the world and how this perception in return affected their decision-making process in domestic and international politics.

To sum up, if the Gaza Flotilla incident is different from the mainstream Turkish foreign policy undertakings, it is because of the fact that the two principle decision-makers of Turkish foreign policy were thinking differently from their predecessors. Their emphasis on Islamic solidarity and the Turkish/Ottoman cultural influence in the region and how this influence needed a reboot shaped the decisions made, events that took place, and the outcomes of these decisions and actions. Consequently, it can be argued that the worldview of the two decision makers of Turkish foreign policy has affected the initiation, development, and outcome of the events in May-June 2010.

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Tarih: 14/06/2015

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Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 110 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 14/06/2015 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı % 17 'dir.

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Status: Masters Ph.D. Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.



Doç. Dr. Havva KÖK ARSLAN
(Title, Name Surname, Signature)

EK-2: ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU



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ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY**

Date: 14/06/2015


Thesis Title / Topic: The Role of 'Worldview' in JDP's Foreign Policy in the Case of Mavi Marmara

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.


14/06/2015

Date and Signature

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ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL


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