



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**2011 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA: PREVALENCE OF
REALIST PRINCIPLES OR HUMANITARIAN NORMS?**

Mustafa Abbas HUSSAIN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2015

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ÖZET

Hussain, Mustafa. *2011 Libya Askeri Müdahalesi: Realist İlkelerin veya İnsani Normların Egemenliği?* Yüksek Lisan Tezi, Ankara, 2015.

Dünya, 2011 yılında başlayan ve Arap Baharı adıyla bilinen olayları şaşkınlıkla karşılamıştı. Egemen rejimlerin protestoculara karşı şiddetli reaksiyonları, özellikle Libya vakasında, Batı Dünyası için siyasi ve etik ikilemler ortaya çıkarttı. Bu bağlamda, bu tez uluslararası toplumun insani krizlere cevabında insani unsurların ulusal/stratejik çıkarlara kıyasla önemini ve etkisini incelerken esas olarak Libya'ya yapılan müdahalenin ardındaki motivasyonları sorgular. Bu amaçla, tez özel olarak Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1973 no'lu kararı temelinde Fransa, İngiltere, ABD ve Almanya gibi başlıca NATO üyelerinin tutumlarını incelemektedir. Buna göre, varılan sonuç şudur: Libya vakası Koruma Sorumluluğu'nun (R2P) uygulanması açısından her ne kadar son derece önemli bir vaka olsa da, müdahale kararının tamamen insancıl unsurlar göz önünde bulundurularak alındığını söylemek mümkün değildir, daha ziyade karar müdahaleyi yapan lider devletlerin milli çıkarlarınca belirlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Libya vakası gerçek bir R2P uygulaması örneği olabileceken aksine R2P anlayışını zora sokan ve Suriye'de güç kullanımı yönünde bir çözümün reddedilmesine temel sağlayan bir vaka olmuştur.

Anahtar Sözcükler

İnsani Müdahale, Koruma Sorumluluğu, Libya Ulusal çıkarlar, Karar 1973, Arap Baharı.

ABSTRACT

Hussain, Mustafa. *2011 Military Intervention in Libya: Prevalence of Realist Principles or Humanitarian Norms?* Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2015.

The world was surprised by the events of the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011. The violent reaction of the ruling regimes against the protestors, especially in the case of Libya, caused political and moral dilemmas for the Western World. In this context, this thesis examines the importance and influence of humanitarian considerations in comparison to national/strategic interests in the international community's responses to humanitarian crises, and questions the motives behind the Libyan intervention. To this end, the thesis specifically focuses on the positions of some key NATO members, namely that of France, the UK, the US as well as Germany, regarding United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Accordingly, this thesis concludes that despite the significance of the Libyan case in terms of the implementation of the responsibility to protect (R2P), the decision to undertake an intervention in Libya was not purely humanitarian oriented, but was rather driven by leading interveners' national interests. In this vein, while the case of Libya could have been the very first example of a genuine R2P implementation, it rather became a basis for challenging R2P as well as refusing any coercive action in Syria.

Key Words

Humanitarian Intervention, Responsibility to Protect, Libya, National Interests, Resolution 1973, Arab Spring.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KABUL VE ONAY	i
BİLDİRİM	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ÖZET	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT	13
1.1 UNDERSTANDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION.....	13
1.1.1 Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era.....	15
1.1.2 Arguments For and Against Humanitarian Intervention.....	17
1.2 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.....	19
1.2.1 Conceptualizing the Responsibility to Protect.....	20
1.2.2 Subsequent Developments	23
CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS	28
2.1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LIBYA DURING THE RULE OF GADDAFI.....	28
2.2 THE ARAB SPRING AND THE LIBYAN REBELLION.....	30
2.2.1 Resolution 1970	33
2.2.2 Resolution 1973	34
2.2.3 The Implementation of Resolution 1973.....	37
CHAPTER 3: THE PATH TO THE INTERVENTION: INITIAL RESPONSES AND MOTIVATIONS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UK AND THE US	41
3.1 FRANCE.....	41
3.1.1 French Response to The Libyan Crisis.....	41
3.1.2 Motivating Factors for France.....	44
3.2 GERMANY	47
3.2.1 Germany’s Response to the Libyan Crisis.....	48
3.2.2 Motivating Factors for Germany	50
3.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM.....	53

3.3.1 British Response to the Libyan Crisis	53
3.3.2 Motivating Factors for the Uk.....	57
3.4 THE UNITED STATES	60
3.4.1 The US's Response to the Libyan Crisis	60
3.4.2 Motivating Factors for the US	64
3.5 CONCLUSION: A SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION?	68
CONCLUSION	71
BIBLIOGRAPHY	74
APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK.....	90
APPENDIX 2: THESIS/DISSERATION ORIGINALITY REPORT	92

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AU – African Union
- BRICS – Coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
- EU – European Union
- GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council
- ICC – International Criminal Court
- ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
- IR – International Relations
- IOs – international organizations
- LAS – League of Arab States
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NSS – National Security Strategy
- NTC – National Transitional Council
- OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- R2P – Responsibility to Protect
- SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
- UK – United Kingdom
- UN – United Nations
- UNSC – United Nation Security Council
- UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
- US – United States
- WMD – weapons of mass destruction

INTRODUCTION

On 17 December 2010, a street vender in Tunisia set himself on fire after enduring public humiliation at the hands of police. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi displayed the deep dissatisfaction of citizens dealing with dictatorial leaders, high unemployment and poverty, and constituted beginning of the Tunisian uprising, which soon spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. At the end of the first wave of mass demonstrations in Tunisia, President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted from his rule and a transitional government took over to implement reformation measures. On 25 January 2011, a national revolt began in Egypt. Mass protests took place in Tahrir Square, which became a trademark of Arab political and social awakening. Demonstrators from diverse socio-economic and religious backgrounds called for an end to the government of President Hosni Mubarak, and asked for freedom, justice, a receptive non-military government, a voice regarding the management of Egypt's resources as well as the end of emergency law. The president was forced to resign and rule was handed over to the military. In Bahrain, the protestors were brutally repressed by police forces. In order to end the uprising, the government asked the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to dispatch armed forces and asked the establishment of an emergency law (International Crisis Group, 2001). The Kingdom's Western allies forced the king to authorise a foreign inspection in his kingdom, in addition to lifting the emergency law. In Yemen, the opposition movement led to protests against President Ali Abdullah Salih and a demand for his resignation. After a series of brutal attacks by military forces against the protestors, the president was forced to step down (Delacoura, 2012, p. 66).

In Syria, a series of protests began in the south of the country in March 2011, and in a short time it spread to other parts of Syria. A streak of deadly attacks was launched by the government forces against the rebels with the claim that they were fighting against terrorist organizations. Fierce fights continued between the rebels and government forces as protestors were not appeased by the formal reforms done by President Bashar al-Assad, such as lifting the

emergency law, granting many pardons, and announcing freedom of the press (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

It was only three days after the Egyptian president was toppled down that the Libyan people rioted against the forty-year dictatorship of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Protests were initially launched in Benghazi, and soon after the revolution hit the Libyan capital. The regime responded to the protests with a series of violent attacks, which soon escalated into a civil conflict, endangering the lives of civilians. In a short period of time, the Libyan opposition was able to organize itself into an interim government demanding for the abolishment of the Libyan regime.

There were various reasons for the unrest in Libya such as the dissatisfaction with the current regime, mediocre living conditions, and corruption. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the Gaddafi regime decided to use brutal military means to suppress the democratic movement in Libya. Libyan security and military forces fired at the crowds, and air forces bombed the protestors. As a result of these thousands were killed (Alison, 2006, p. 219). Due to significant breaches of human rights, which were broadcasted worldwide, the international community decided to quickly act in order to protect civilians and ensure the survival of the Libyan population.

The international reaction to the humanitarian crisis in Libya, especially when compared to the ongoing situation in Syria, has been unique. A coalition of leading Western powers intervened in Libya on the basis of a Security Council resolution only thirty-two days after the uprising started, whereas for instance in the ongoing revolution in Syria since March 2011, there has been no strong-willed action. While the Libyan intervention reignited the debates on humanitarian intervention, it first and foremost was considered as a triumph of the principle of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P). R2P was first introduced by an independent commission called the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to deal with the question of humanitarian intervention. Later, with the 2005 World Summit Outcome

Document, it was embraced by the international community. In this regard, as a principle it was established that state sovereignty also entails a responsibility of states to protect their own populations. Furthermore, when states are unwilling or unable to fulfil such responsibility, the international community has to bear the responsibility to protect the suffering population(s), and apply measures up to and including the use of force. In the period between 2005 and 2011, that is since the unanimous adoption of R2P by the members of the United Nations (UN), there has been various humanitarian crises but no examples of a UN sanctioned R2P action through military intervention. In this vein, the intervention in Libya became the very first example of a ‘timely and decisive’ R2P implementation by the international community.

Given such context, this thesis dwells on the drives for prominent European powers as well as the United States in deciding to undertake the controversial measure of humanitarian military intervention. In this regard, focusing on the specific case of Libya, this thesis compares and contrasts the approaches of key state actors, namely France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (i.e. the P3 of the UN Security Council), as well as Germany as a state abstained which from voting on the resolution that allowed for action in Libya. For purposes of analysis, the period between 15 February and 31 October 2011 is considered. While the first date marks the beginning of protests in Libya, the latter marks the end of the mission “Unified Protector.”

In this context, based on a case-study of Libya, this thesis asks two main questions: “what were the main reasons for the Western intervention in Libya?” and “whether or not international norms have been changing state behaviour in a way to increase the influence of humanitarian considerations and human rights over national interests/considerations?” In its attempt to answer these questions through a comprehensive analysis of the main reasons that motivated France, the UK, and the US to intervene in Libya and Germany to abstain, the thesis differentiates between two sorts of primary motivations for states: strategic interests and humanitarian motivations. In studying these motivations through the concerned states’ practices, the tools of neo-classical realism and

constructivism are utilised. While some scholars argue that preservation of peace and/or pursuit of humanitarian goals are the prevalent driving factors in third states' involvement in intrastate situations (see, Western 2002; Finnemore 2003; Barnett and Weiss 2008), some others posit that states are inclined to push for an intervention because of their strategic interests (see, Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007). From the latter group, Lemke and Regan (2004, p. 148) point out that 'civil conflicts are situations in which many states may have powerful incentives to try to influence the outcome.' This illustrates that an intervention is an excuse allowing states to advance their influence on vulnerable states (Lemke and Regan, 2004). Major powers may hold aims to expand their sphere of influence or pursue to control that influence (Weisburd, 1997). For instance, Fareed Zakaria argues that a state's foreign policy behaviour is driven by its access to resources as a way to keep or gain control and influence within the international system. Intervention then becomes a mechanism to influence the international community based on a nation's advancement in wealth and authority.

Furthermore, according to neoclassical realists power within the international system is founded on the exertion of authority over other nations, therefore particular states must work to gather authority abroad and gain control over international organizations in relation to their perceived power capabilities (Wohlforth. p 182). As Jeffery Taliaferro (2006, p. 38) suggests, states frequently intervene in external conflicts as to protect their perceived power and to have influence in the international system.

By intervening in an internal situation, a third states becomes able in manipulating policy outcomes after civil war comes to an end. In this vein, the intervening states can accomplish their goals (Gent, 2008), and their policies may involve the establishment of a particular type of government or economic system in the target state as well as having access to the resources of that stat. (Gent, 2008). Fazal (2007) demonstrates that foreign powers attempt to expand their influence by seeking to change leaders or reshaping a target state's political and economic system, instead of trying to conquer and annex those

states. In this regard, Gent (2007) argues that major powers can influence the domestic policies and government structures of less powerful states by way of intervening in civil war.

In the meanwhile, foreign powers may be reluctant to intervene based on material and human costs of an intervention, however anticipated gains are likely to push them towards a decision to intervene. Owen (2002) suggests that intervening powers are likely to take action in states experiencing internal conflicts that are strategically important and where future benefits may be gained.

Contiguity, alliances or colonial history are also included within strategic considerations. Neighbours, allies and former colonial powers of a civil war state have a tendency to exercise influence on the civil war state, which extends into the future (Lemke and Regan, 2004). To prevent a conflict's spill over to neighbouring states and exercise authority over the states is another way to utilize an intervention (Findley and Teo 2006). A third-party having a military alliance with a civil war state displays a vital strategic interest in the security of that state, which in turn gives reason for the third-party to intervene (Rost and Greig, 2011). Former colonial powers will support their preferred factions as a way to protect their interests in their former colonies (Findley and Teo, 2006). These characteristics of strategic interests may push forth a potential intervention within a quick time frame (Ibid).

Domestic politics too play an important role in shaping states' foreign policy. Leaders need to take into consideration internal factors like the public opinion of the population when deciding to intervene in an external situation. Such consideration may also be driven by concerns such as reelection. In this vein, a decision made based on domestic politics/concerns may lead to a political abstention from and lack of support to an intervention. Snyder (1991) and Putnam (1988) refer to how international politics and domestic politics mutually influence each other by stating: "It is fruitless to debate whether domestic

politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly both, sometimes” (Putnam, 1988).

All in all, alliances, contiguity, former colony status, ideological conflict, access to natural resources as well as domestic political consideration are indicative factors that drive a state’s decision to intervene. Anticipated future benefits based on preservation or expansion of authority is considered as primary factors for a major power to expel resources for an intervention. Nevertheless, taking strategic interests as the sole motive for intervention leaves us with an incomplete picture. In this vein, an alternative yet at times complementary approach is presented through humanitarian considerations.

Finnemore (2003) argues that the US hardly had any strategic interests when it intervened in the situation in Somalia in 1992. The reality that 300,000 Somalis had been killed by the summer of 1992, aided the Bush administration in turning its stance (Western, 2002), and making the decision to intervene in the crisis on the basis of humanitarian considerations (Finnemore, 2003).

As the norms of intervention have changed in the post-Cold War era, constructivist theory supposes that intervention is allowed, but not compulsory. Finnemore brings up the debate that the principles observed in the international system are connected to states’ interests, which can be used to explain why some states follow foreign policies to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. The difference of external and internal evaluations of violent and aggressive actions is no longer considered by some nations. Rather, a state’s domestic behaviour now reflects its external behaviour. This shows that states which violate human rights of their own people are thought to be international security threats in that the violence causes a surge in refugees and destabilizes neighbouring regions in addition to showing internal aggression can overflow into aggressive actions into the international arena (Ibid. p.135). In the 1990s, it became recognized that international security could be destabilized by domestic aggression therefore powerful nations acknowledged the need for protection of human rights. After the Cold War, international security and human rights became

standardized in international organizations particularly within the UN. In an attempt to sustain international stability, the UN was in charge of promoting and protecting the international standards and principles of the global system.

Norms encompassing international humanitarian principles have developed through time. There were no recognized standards in relation to human rights until the early twentieth century, however by the mid-twentieth century, concern for the security of human rights had become prevalent (Finnemore 2003). Arguably, the normative foundation concerning human rights was established by the UN Charter, which created the Genocide Convention in 1948 (Finnemore 2003). Following the end of the Cold War, the UN and humanitarian organizations have been the most vocal advocates insisting that it is the international community's responsibility to protect the people endangered by civil wars (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). The advancement of the UN to the forefront of advocating humanitarian norms demonstrates that states can share common humanitarian interests regarding civil wars, which is an influential motivation for civil war intervention (Weiss, 2001).

On the one hand, the moral outrage of a humanitarian disaster may influence the decisions of political leaders and key staff members towards intervening in a civil war (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995). Additionally, Jakobsen (1996) explains that UN interventions in Iraq, Rwanda, and Somalia were influenced by the CNN effect. The horrific images of people suffering from war or famine shown on television may push the international community to agree on the need for intervention.

In arguing that humanitarian considerations are influential in decision making, Finnemore uses the example of the 1993 US intervention in Somalia wherein the US had no exclusive strategic or economic interests. Another example is the intervention in northern Iraq to stop the suffering of the Kurdish minority in 1991. Constructivist scholars argue that on the basis of changing perceptions of threat and security as well as evolving international norms, humanitarian

considerations have obtained a higher status, and thus can be influential in states' processes of decision-making.

All in all, neo-classical realism and constructivism indicate that self-interest and humanitarian concerns are both incentives in a major power deciding how and when to intervene in civil wars. Accordingly, this thesis finds that despite all the changes in favour of the prominence of human rights and their international protection, it is not possible to talk about purely or prevailing humanitarian motives. A calculation of national interests as well as domestic political dynamics determines the final decision of states in reacting to international humanitarian crises.

In arriving at such a conclusion, the thesis benefits from a contextual analysis of primary sources in addition to empirical material from secondary sources. To this end, official documents, reports and resolutions of the EU and the UN, texts of official statements, press releases and conference records by the concerned actors as well as the UN that are publicly available are used as primary sources.

In terms of the secondary sources, there is a rich literature in the area of International Relations (IR) literature. A review of the literature reveals different aspects that have been covered by scholars. Adding on to the existing works discussing humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, the rapidly growing "Arab Spring" provided scholars with a new area of research. The military intervention in Libya also ignited debates in relation to the implementation of R2P and led to arguments in favour and against the principle, as well as a discussion of the moral basis of the intervention, issues of discrimination and legitimacy. The intentions of the leading interveners as well as the question of how NATO contributed to the operation and what ramifications the Atlantic Alliance may have suffered as a result of the intervention are among the topics discussed in the literature.

In the case of the literature on R2P, the main body of the academic works focused on the implementation of R2P in the armed intervention, and how the repercussions have influenced the application of humanitarian intervention. It is supposed that the intervention in Libya is the first humanitarian intervention that fit well within the framework of R2P (Pattison 2011, pp. 251-54; Weiss 2011, pp. 287-92). For instance, Jon Western agrees with Pattison and Weiss in supporting the idea that the intervention in Libya depicts a clear case of R2P in practice, and that the Libyan intervention set a precedent for the rationale of humanitarian intervention. Bellamy (2011) refers to the case as the first time the use of military force was authorised on the basis of humanitarian concerns (pp. 263-9). In addition, this intervention exemplifies the special function that the United Nations (UN) Secretariat and the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect have in requesting the UN Security Council to engage in human rights crises (Welsh, 2011, pp. 255-62).

The intervention in Libya has also been a target of heavy criticism because of the way the military operation was carried out. For instance, James Pattison and Jennifer M. Welsh address the repercussions of resorting to armed forces and the possible ethical pitfall of the intervention in Libya. According to Welsh (2011), during NATO's operation R2P was abused for two reasons. Firstly, resolution 1973 states that the Libyan government is accountable for protecting its population, thus the international community is not responsible. Secondly, the influence of the principle of neutrality was absent, as the military action in Libya was a biased intervention, due to the coalition forces taking sides with the protestors to accomplish regime change rather than the mere purpose of protecting civilians. Pattison (2011) refers to the possibility of mission creep. He claims that the primary objective of the intervention turned into regime change instead of the higher aim to protect civilians, which sets a hazardous precedent in the humanitarian intervention field. In addition, he states that the power of R2P was undermined because of the partiality the international community showed by responding to the case of Libya, but not Syria. Kuperman (2013) criticises the military operation, claiming that the intervention in Libya "increased

the duration of Libya's civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times." He adds that the intervention "exacerbated human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapon proliferation in Libya and its neighbors."

Another group of scholars engage in the legal assessment of the Libyan intervention, like Schmitt and Domestici-Met, who question the legality of the intervention. While Schmitt (2011) examines the legal foundation of how the no-fly zone in Libya was executed, Domestici-Met (2011) looks at how the international community pushed for a humanitarian intervention in Libya, but not in Syria or Bahrain (pp.45-58; pp.863-99). Various authors focus on the legitimate, and the likely implicit interests of the US and France, as well as an uninvolved actor in the intervention, Germany. Chesterman (2011) questions the rationale behind the US decision to intervene in Libya, and highlights President Barack Obama's incoherent view of humanitarian intervention (p. 279-85). Allin and Erik (2011) analyse the reasoning as to why the US was a key player in the intervention. In one respect, the European Union was incapable to operate as a unified body since its member states displayed conflicting positions, which led the US to assume a leading role in Libya (pp. 205-15). Alternatively, the crisis in Libya was a chance for President Obama to show his stance on international affairs: if civilian lives can be protected then a war can be justified (Allin and Erik, 2011, pp. 205-15). According to the authors, the war in Libya was a big chance for the West to boost its influence and institute a new regime in Libya that would accept neoliberal reforms and provide access to Libyan oil and gas reserves for international use (Bush, Martiniello, and Mercer, 2011, pp.357-63).

Lindström and Zetterland (2012) focus on the reasons why France was at the forefront of pushing for operations aimed against Gaddafi (pp. 20-5). Sarkozy's Government was slow to respond when the Arab Spring began, thus allowing for an explanation why it acted quickly in the case of Libya. On the other hand, Bouley (2012) explains the German decision to abstain from voting on resolution 1973, which authorised a no-fly zone over Libya with two reasons.

First, although an armed operation against Gaddafi was mostly accepted by Berlin, it had no desire to be engaged in military action in person. Second, despite popular opinion, the Germans openly stated they did not believe that an armed intervention would be productive (p. 5), which also reflects the reluctance of Germany in using force as a tool of foreign policy.

Other authors look at the duties of NATO during the intervention in Libya, as well as the image of the alliance in the aftermath of the intervention. The alliance is considered to have been successful based on the role NATO played in Libya. In a joint article, US permanent representative to NATO, Ivo H. Daalder and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), James G. Stavridis, portray the military operation as a "model intervention" by NATO acting swiftly, completing the mission, and distributing responsibility between member states (Daalder and G. Stavridis, 2012). However, Hallams and Schreer (2012) consider it doubtful that the intervention in Libya should alter the framework of NATO intervention (pp. 313-27). They argue that American interest in NATO is lacking, and European Allies are unable to allocate their military resources, as shown by the intervention in Libya. The authors assume that active support from the US and collaboration among European states is required for a strong future for NATO (Hallams and Schreer, 2012, pp. 313-27).

Given the brief overview of the literature, this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debates by discussing the factors that shaped the foreign policies of France, the UK, the US, and Germany towards the situation in Libya in 2011 in relation to the implementation of the responsibility to protect. To establish the necessary background for such analysis, this thesis is organized in the following way: Chapter 1 outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis and provides an overview of the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. Chapter 2 studies the international response to the crisis in Libya prior to studying individual motivations of the leading actors in the following chapter. Understanding the international context and the general responses to the crisis helps to better analyse the individual motivations of states, since foreign policy decisions of states are not immune to international dynamics. Building on such

background, Chapter 3 focuses on the Western approach to the crises in Libya and analyses the individual decisions of three prominent interveners and an abstaining European power. In answering the question whether the intervention in Libya was an outcome of prevalence of humanitarian norms or realist principles, it is important to understand the contesting nature of the two motives, which in the meantime can be complementary in leading to a shared outcome. That is to say, even though national strategies and interests may have been the driving factors for the P3 in deciding to militarily intervene in Libya, the final decision served for the fulfilment for the international responsibility to protect. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings of the thesis and provides an overview of the consequence of the intervention in Libya in relation to non-engagement in Syria.

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

This chapter aims to explain and understand the concepts of humanitarian (military) intervention and the responsibility to protect. To this end, it starts with the definition of the former. This is followed by an overview of the practice of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era in order to reveal the path leading to the construction of the principle of the responsibility to protect. Following from this, the evolution of R2P is studied.

1.1. UNDERSTANDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a long history. Arguably, the evolution of the current understanding of humanitarian intervention has been a product of the development of human rights law alongside changing perceptions of state sovereignty and of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. On the one hand, humanitarian intervention is considered to be a legitimate tool of conduct in responding to manmade atrocities. On the other hand, it has always been contested and was never legalised.

Like the approach to its legitimacy, the definitions of humanitarian intervention also vary. For instance, J.L. Holzgrefe (2005, p. 18) claims that humanitarian intervention is the “threat or the use of force across state borders by a state or a group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.” James Pattison (2010, p. 28) defines humanitarian intervention as “forcible military action by an external agent in the relevant political community with the predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting an ongoing or an impending grievous suffering or loss of human rights.” Bhikhu Parekh (1997, p. 55) considers it as “an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another

country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by *the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state*, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.” Stephen A. Garret (1999, p. 3) conceptualizes the notion as “the injection of military power –or threat to such action– by one or more outside states into the affairs of another state that has as *its purpose (or at least one of its principal purposes)* the relieving of grave human suffering.”

All of the above conceptualizations reflect the contemporary understanding of humanitarian military interventions. In the 1990s, there were those who alternatively defined “humanitarian intervention” in a wider way to also include “non-forcible means” and “non-state actors”, setting the grounds for “non-forcible humanitarian intervention” by international aid agencies, by pointing to “physical intervention with consent” and considering “NGO’s humanitarian interventions”. Such approach defines “humanitarian intervention” as an act comprising of any possible form of humanitarian action in an emergency situation, not necessarily involving the use of armed force and not necessarily against the will of the government (Roberts, 1996: 19). Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1996: 113) are among those who opt for a more inclusive understanding of humanitarian intervention, as they note:

Whereas in classic terminology “humanitarian intervention” means “forcible self-help by states across international borders to protect indigenous human rights, in the rest of the book “humanitarian intervention” means cross-border action by the international community in response to human suffering, made up of (i) “forcible humanitarian intervention”, an expanded version of the classic concept to include collective action as well as self-help and no longer confined to human rights abuse by governments, and (ii) “non-forcible humanitarian intervention”.

Kofi Annan (1999: p. 3) too advocates such broader definition as he suggests the inclusion of “actions along a wide continuum from the most pacific to the most coercive”, as well as suggesting to move the UN from “a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”.

For its purposes, this thesis adopts the definition proposed by Holzgrefe since it underpins the elements for the assessment of the military operation in Libya considering that the intervention was undertaken without the consent of the Libyan Government and to protect the Libyan population suffering from grave violations of human rights.

1.1.1. Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era

The roots of contemporary understanding of human intervention can be traced back to the Cold War era, namely to the period during which the United Nations did/could not play an active role in resolving conflicts or maintaining international stability and peace. There are various reasons as to why the UN was ineffective, and among these comes the inability of the Security Council to pass resolutions on critical security matters resulting from the ideological differences and the enmity between the US and the Soviet Union. Practiced under such circumstances, there are arguably three interventions which can be considered as precedents of contemporary humanitarian interventions: 1971 Indian intervention in East Pakistan; 1979 Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia; and 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda. In the political context of the Cold War, states opted for adhering to the fundamental principles of international law in their attempts to justify their actions. Although in all of the three cases intervening states' primary justification was self-defence, the humanitarian outcomes of the interventions had considerable impact on the evolution of the notion of humanitarian intervention in the last decade of the 20th century (Gozen Ercan 2013: 23). As Wheeler (2000: 64-5) argues: "India's, Vietnam's and Tanzania's actions were all justifiable because the use of force was the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale, and the motives/means employed were consistent with a positive humanitarian outcome".

By the end of the Cold War, there were various reasons as to why the approach to and implementation of humanitarian intervention had changed. A primary reason was the change in the balances of the international system and the end

of the heated rivalry between the eastern and western blocks, which allowed for a higher potential of cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council and eventually led to the ease of restrictions on humanitarian intervention.

Apparent and increasing number of cases of internal conflict, state fragmentation and/or state collapse raised the question of the necessity of humanitarian interventions. For example, most armed conflicts that occurred in the post-Cold War era were internal conflicts or civil wars such as those in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Northern Iraq and former Yugoslavia. The number of the UN Security Council resolutions passed based on Chapter VII increased in line with the escalation of internal conflicts amounting to mass violations of human rights. The consideration of humanitarian intervention as a policy option has also been a result of strong public opinion and pressure that was put on states to take action due to the widespread and detailed news coverage of the ongoing crises. Such impact was strengthened with the active role played by humanitarian organizations and NGOs. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, due to their impact on the concerned regions, internal clashes started to be included within the scope of threats to regional/international peace. All these factors led to the possibility of UN sanctioned humanitarian interventions.

In the 1990s, the first time the United Nations allowed for sending troops to intervene in a humanitarian crisis was in Somalia. In this vein, compared to the Cold War period, the Security Council started to interpret its powers under Chapter VII from a larger perspective, as the UN mission in Somalia described the humanitarian crisis as a threat to international stability and peace. As accepted with the case of Somalia, in cases where international peace and security were threatened by a domestic conflict, it became possible to deploy UN troops to halt the humanitarian disaster and to help to rebuild order within that state. This brought with it the possibility challenging of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states when dealing with humanitarian crises (Shehadi, 1997: 198). In this context, whenever the use of force was allowed by the Security Council, the legal grounds of such

authorisation was stated to be Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the power to the Council to determine threats to international peace and security. Such ability is also supported by Article 2(7), which establishes the principle of non-intervention in states' affairs with the exception that this principle "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (Gow, 1997, p. 171).

On the one hand, the ideological roots of humanitarian intervention are based on the Western concepts of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental liberties, good governance, and economic liberalization. On the other hand, the very same roots are a source of mistrust for many so-called Third World countries, because of the remnants of western imperialism and/or colonialism. As Geldenhuys (1998, p. 30) suggests, there is the question that whether or not through "humanitarianism recolonisation of Africa is taking place in international relations again". It is on these grounds that humanitarian intervention is approached with suspicion.

Nevertheless, the detachment by the international community in humanitarian disasters may pose as big a threat to developing nations as the pursuit of colonialism and imperialism does. In this regard, Hehir (1998, p. 38) argues that objectives and organized criteria describing how to carry out humanitarian intervention could help relieve fears of susceptible Third World states. Legitimacy of humanitarian interventions remains a larger debate within the international community, and thus, it helps to overview the arguments for and against the doctrine in understanding the path towards the assumption of a responsibility to protect.

1.1.2. Arguments For and Against Humanitarian Intervention

For those who argue against humanitarian interventions, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force, and Article 2(7), which establishes the principle of non-intervention in the internal workings of states, constitute the basis of the claims. While these principles are not denied by

those who argue for humanitarian interventions, the difference between the two groups arises from the way of interpretation of the scope of these fundamental articles. The former approach is labelled as the “statist” approach, which adopts a narrow understanding of the articles, whereas the latter is labelled as the “rights-based” approach, which opts for a broad understanding.

According to the Statist viewpoint, intervention breaches international law and constitutes an act of aggression against international peace and stability. On the other hand, for those who embrace a “rights-based” approach, “individuals have inalienable rights that must be observed and protected by all governments. As a result, all governments can be held to certain standards of behaviour involving basic human rights and democratic processes” (Crocker, Hampson and Pamela, 1996, p. 288). State sovereignty should not be a handicap before the protection of human rights and in the case that a country’s internal conflict becomes uncontrollable by the governing body, then it becomes the responsibility of the international community to take action (Crocker et al. 1996, p. 288).

According to those who are pro-humanitarian intervention, while one function of the Charter is to prevent war from happening, another function is to protect human rights. In this vein, Reisman and Baker (1992, p. 45-6) argue that

Article 2(4) is not against the use of force per se, but rather the use of force for unlawful purposes since humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the state involved and is not only consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations but also in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it is distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).

For those who oppose the idea of humanitarian intervention, the basis of the argument lies in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Accordingly, they question whether or not the issue of the protection of human rights falls within the internal jurisdiction of states and within the boundaries of states’ national sovereignty. One strand of argument that addresses such question posits that when

atrocities against civilians occur, then human rights violations become an international issue, so that sovereignty can no longer be a protective element.

While humanitarian intervention continues to be a method that is applied either unilaterally or collectively to halt mass atrocities, the main cause of all the controversy is its unilateral or unauthorised practice (Gozen Ercan 2013: 10). In this vein, from the point of both the statist approach the human rights-based approach, the UN Security Council has been accepted as the governing body which can authorise humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, an overview of international practice reveals that the responses of the international community to humanitarian crises have been mixed. The 1990s witnessed experiences of successful and unsuccessful interventions, inaction in grave crises and great debates on the legitimacy and/or legality of humanitarian intervention. In this context, in 1999 as the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan asked: "... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" (ICISS, 2001, p. vii). It was the attempt to address this question that led to the emergence of the understanding of the responsibility to protect (Bellamy, 2009).

1.2. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

An independent commission entitled the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) constructed the notion of the responsibility to protect with the intention to reconsider the argument regarding humanitarian intervention. The commission aimed to build the gap between international law and international morality by redefining sovereignty (Welsh and Banda, 2010) and by changing the debate from the existence of a "right to intervene" towards a "responsibility" defined for states and the international community.

1.2.1. Conceptualizing the Responsibility to Protect

The ICISS was formed in 2000 by the support of the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to focus on the norm of civilian protection, the political will to act when required, and the development of military and civilian capabilities. Former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, and former Algerian diplomat and UN Special Advisor Mohammed Sahnoun were the chairs of the commission. The ten other commissioners included five representatives from Western countries (Canada, US, Germany, and Switzerland). The five remaining commissioners were from South Africa, the Philippines, India, Guatemala, and Russia (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002).

In December 2001, the ICISS published its report entitled “the Responsibility to Protect”, which attempted to, “develop consistent, credible, and enforceable standards to guide State and intergovernmental practice”. As a member of the ICISS, Gareth Evans (2004) clarifies the objectives of the Report as follows: to create a norm that is credible enough not to offend lawyers or philosophers; the norm must also be robust enough not to be rejected by “either North or South, the permanent five members of the Security Council or any other major international constituency”; and the norm should be capable of “mobilizing support when a situation demanding action arises”. Furthermore, the Commission wanted to establish a norm that would be applicable within political decision-making. However, there would have to be a general cooperation and agreement among many States, which would later prove to be a difficult task (Ibid, 81).

The ICISS considered that the existing debate on armed intervention which was perceived as a “right to intervene” as a roadblock in looking ahead (Ibid, p.83). The possibility of progress required a change of understanding, and thus the Commission suggested that “the principle of non-intervention yields to an international responsibility to protect” and sovereignty implies responsibility (ICISS, 2001). The change in terminology from the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’ was articulated so that States feel obliged to protect

communities from mass atrocities (Evans, 2004, p. 82). This renewed perception showed that the protection of people's welfare was of worldwide interest and it is the obligation of States to ensure the safety of their populations. Such approach brought to the fore the importance of preventive measures.

Accordingly, the ICISS proposed that the responsibility to protect consists of the three elements, namely the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild. In this vein, it can be observed that R2P is larger than a mere understanding of humanitarian intervention. The responsibility to *prevent* focuses on the originating motives and direct causes of internal conflict and any other critical situations created by man that may pose a risk to civilian populations (Evans, 2006, p. 709). When and if the responsibility to prevent is not fulfilled, there arises the necessity to react. Therefore, the responsibility to *react* consists of a variety of non-coercive and coercive measures to be implemented in response to humanitarian emergencies. Political, economic and diplomatic sanctions are the first courses of action to be adopted when reacting to a crisis, whereas military intervention is only the very last option that should be considered in extreme cases (Ibid). Lastly, the responsibility to *rebuild* concerns the assistance given to states especially after a military intervention has taken place. Rebuilding includes activities of restoration, rebuilding, and reconciliation, therefore spending effort to understand the motivation behind the conflict that the intervention aimed to avoid or end (Ibid).

In this context, the responsibility to protect takes place at two levels. The first concerns the responsibility of states at the individual level. Accordingly, sovereignty is also perceived as a responsibility, where states are expected to prevent mass violations of human rights. The second concerns the responsibility of the international community. The Commission notes that, when the UN Charter was drafted, intervention for human protection purposes was not included as part of the security debate, therefore the international legal framework was not devised to deal with such issues in a direct manner. Therefore, the general framework has to be updated into to the needs of our

time as new international actors and security threats have become apparent (ICISS, 2001, p.114-5). In this regard, when states are unable or unwilling to fulfil their responsibility to protect their populations, then the international community needs to uphold its responsibility to protect populations.

When reacting to a case, the international community has to exhaust all other possible options before deciding to take military action (ICISS, p. 30-1). If humanitarian military intervention is to take place, the Commission argues, six criteria needs to be fulfilled. These are the right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success (Evans, 2006, p. 709). The ICISS clearly states that a justifiable “military intervention for human protection purposes must be motivated by the intention of stopping or preventing large-scale loss of life following ethnic cleansing, genocide civil war or State collapse” (ICISS, 2001, p.31). Through these restrictions, the Commission aims to prevent the abuses of the norm. In this vein, the most appropriate authority for the implementation of the international responsibility to protect is accepted as the Security Council, which under Article 24 of the UN Charter is assigned with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Ibid. p.47).

While the Commission recognizes the Security Council as the principal authority to allow the use of armed force, it also addressed the deficiencies in the functioning of the Security Council. Accordingly, considering the negative impact of the veto power of the P5 in adopting decisions, the ICISS (2001, p. 51) highlights: it is “unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern”. Thus, it advises the adoption of a code of conduct that would keep the permanent members from vetoing a majority resolution (Ibid). Additionally, the Commission suggests the consideration of the General Assembly as an alternative decision-making body in cases where the Security Council comes into a deadlock due to a veto or vetoes cast.

Regarding R2P, Tanguy (2003, 148) notes that “by evaluating interventions from the perspective of the victims rather than the interveners, it carves a new path for redefining the legitimacy and legality of interventions made in the name of human rights and humanitarianism” All in all, the ICISS in its attempt to shift the terms of the debate on humanitarian intervention by introducing a new framework for action. Although the initial responses to R2P were not necessarily negative, it is also not possible to argue that it was widely embraced when it was first introduced.

1.2.2. Subsequent Developments

The timing of the release of the report proved the acceptance of the norm difficult as it coincided with the war against terror. This negative impact was coupled with the US and British led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Evans (2008) points that, “few misunderstandings have been more persistent, or have done more damage to undermine global acceptance of R2P, than the perception that the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a good example of the responsibility to protect principle at work”. Nevertheless, the report of the ICISS had the full support of the then Secretary-General Annan. Thus, as a first step in ensuring global acceptance for R2P, Annan introduced it in his 2004 report entitled the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (Gozen Ercan 2014: 41). The report asked for the recognition of “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort” (United Nations General Assembly, 2004). While this report was the first leg of R2P’s institutionalisation within the framework of the UN, it was also the beginning of the shrinking of the scope of the norm.

The second report of the Secretary-General that included R2P was the one entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, in which Annan made suggestions regarding the UN reform. Limiting the scope of R2P further, Annan also stated that “the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better”

(United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p.126). It was during the 2005 World Summit that R2P was embraced unanimously. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the ICISS's version of R2P was not going to receive recognition of the global community of states. Thus, the norm was accepted only after some major revisions to it. The World Summit Outcome Document (hereinafter the Outcome Document) established R2P under paragraphs 138 and 139. While paragraph 138 established the responsibility of individual States, paragraph 139 established the responsibility of the international community. In the framework of the Outcome Document, R2P was limited in scope as the responsibility was defined on the basis of four crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In comparison to the original suggestions of the ICISS, paragraphs 138 and 139 narrowed R2P from containing aspects of a broad description of humanitarian disasters to four grave crimes.

While the responsibilities to prevent and react were incorporated into the new version of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild was left out. In terms of prevention, the international community limited its role to assisting and encouraging states to fulfil their responsibility towards their populations. Additionally, in Paragraph 139 member states indicated their readiness to "use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect the populations". The authority to take coercive measures was solely granted to the Security Council without listing any other alternatives. Accordingly, the Security can take action under Chapter VII on a "case by case basis" after "peaceful means" proves to be insufficient.

R2P's unanimous acceptance had been a result of the concessions made in the progress (Gozen Ercan 2014: 41). The credibility of the US and some European States was damaged after the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, therefore their acceptance of the concept was irrelevant (Evans, 2006, p. 715). Evans (2006, p. 715) argues that R2P was included in the Outcome Document thanks to the support of sub-Saharan African countries, the acceptance of the limited-

sovereignty principle by Latin American countries, and some successful diplomacy by then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin.

Nevertheless, the adoption of R2P by the Outcome Document did not grant its effective implementation. Challenged by ongoing mass violations, the new Secretary General Ban Ki-moon published his report on *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* in 2009. The report focused on the basic elements of R2P described as the 'three pillar' approach, first being the primary responsibility of each state; the second being the international responsibility to build capacity to that end; and the third being the collective responsibility to act when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect. The report reaffirmed that each State had the primary responsibility to protect, but there is also an international responsibility to "respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner" when States are not able to fulfil its responsibility (United Nations General Assembly, 2009 para. 11). In addition, the report emphasised that, "the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter" (Ibid, para. 3).

The conclusion of the report reiterated that force can only be used in "extreme cases" and must be authorised by the Security Council (Ibid., para. 56). The actions of the Security Council were addressed in two points contained in the report. Basically, the five permanent members of the Security Council were advised to not use their veto "in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome" (Ibid., para.61). Additionally, it was noted that "the credibility, authority and hence effectiveness of the United Nations in advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect depend, in large part, on the consistency with which they are applied" (Ibid, para. 62).

When the Secretary General submitted the report to the UN General Assembly, a lengthy deliberation followed. Nearly sixty Member States accepted the Secretary General's consideration that the responsibility to protect at the state-

level was established in international law (Brunnée and Toope, 2010). The same mistrusts that existed in the past towards the ICISS's version of the concept remained. Many States believed that a mutual action would "[o]nly rarely, and in extremis, ... include the use of force," and only those international crimes identified in the Outcome Document could be resolved with force (Remarks by Ambassador Rosemary A. DiCarlo, 2009). A large number of States remained uneasy about the duties of the Security Council and supported the proposition of Secretary-General that the five permanent members should refrain from using their veto in order not to block a resolution concerning an R2P situation (Brunnée and Toope, 2010).

Two prominent proponents of R2P, Evans and Arbour, argued that the concept was on the path to becoming a rule of customary international law, following the release of the Outcome Document (Welsh and Banda, 2010). Nevertheless, before the World Summit, Kofi Annan asserted that the goal should not be to establish new law, but to develop the application of already existing international humanitarian law (Ibid). Both in 2005 and in 2009, states that feared the legalization of an international duty to respond to humanitarian crises widely accepted Kofi Annan's view (Ibid). One of the states disputing a legal obligation of intervention was the US (Ibid). A few weeks before the World Summit, former ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, described the US view point in the following words:

The international community has a responsibility to act when the host state allows such atrocities. But the responsibility of the other countries in the international community is not of the same character as the responsibility of the host... We do not accept that either the United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to intervene under international law (Ibid., .p.228).

The prevalence of such approach has revealed itself in the implementation of the responsibility to protect in various cases since 2005. Since his very first report on the implementation of R2P, Ban has published five more reports to establish an effective regime for the R2P's practice. Yet, as Brunnée and Toope summarise, "all the eggs of responsibility to protect have been thrown into the

Security Council basket, a basket that has proven to be full of holes in the past". In this vein, the very first instance of the implementation of the responsibility to protect at the level of Pillar 3 in the case of Libya has been an exceptional case. Prior to analysing the path towards the intervention as well as the role played by key actors,

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

The Libyan civil war was part of a larger wave of protests occurring throughout the Middle East. Different from the other internal crises in the region, it was the only case where the international community acted very swiftly and carried out a military operation to stop the atrocities that targeted the Libyan population. In this vein, the case of Libya gained wide acceptance as the very first example of pillar 3 R2P implementation. In the light of this, Chapter 2 aims to look at the larger picture of the international involvement in the crisis in Libya prior to discussing specific motives for the key actors in Chapter 3.

2.1. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LIBYA DURING THE RULE OF GADDAFI

Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, a 27-year-old army captain, led a successful peaceful military coup against King Idris in 1969 with the motivation of ending the Libyan population's suffering in poverty, while the Libyan elite was enjoying excessive wealth. The coup was launched in Benghazi and within a few hours the takeover was accomplished. Gaddafi became the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and was named the chairman of the new governing body of Libya, the Revolutionary Command Council (BBC 1969; Bruce St John, 2008, p. 93).

Towards the end of King Idris's regime, the US had close military and economic ties with Libya. For instance, the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya was of great interest to the US (Zoubir, 2011, p. 277). Regarding the economic aspect, the US oil companies made significant profits through the exploitation of Libyan oil. Nonetheless, the military coup tipped all the balances. There were many reasons behind the deterioration of relations between Libya and the West; the most important reason being the nationalization of natural resources in the 1970s (Robert and Kourides, 1981, p. 476). Other significant factors were Gaddafi's financial support for international terrorist groups, an increasing

political and military alignment with the Soviet Union, and disagreement over a range of political issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Zoubir, 2006, p. 49).

From the end of the 1970s, there were many events that led to a severe separation between Libya and the West. After the Iranian hostage crisis, the Reagan administration began to systematically increase diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on Libya (Bruce St. John, 2008, p. 98). During the 1980s, the West accused Gaddafi for numerous terrorist attacks in Europe. In 1984, an anti-Gaddafi protest was brought to a bloody end when a British policeman was shot dead with a gun fired from inside the Libyan embassy. This led to Britain's suspension of its diplomatic relations with Libya. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of targets in Tripoli and Benghazi to retaliate the bombing incident in a West German dance hall (Bruce St. John, 2008, p. 98).

The situation deteriorated even further after the American bombings. The Libyan regime's retaliation came on 21 December 1988. A bomb exploded during the Pan Am Flight 103, while it was flying over Lockerbie, Scotland, which resulted with the death of 259 passengers and crew in addition to 11 people on ground. The second retaliation was the explosion of a French UTA airplane over Niger, on 19 September 1989 (Zoubir, 2006, p. 49). After the terrorist attacks, the US, the UK and France demanded the extradition of those who were behind the acts of aggression. Upon the refusal of the Libyan regime to extradite the terrorist suspects, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 748 in March 1992, imposing sanctions on Libya in order to pressure the Libyan regime to surrender the suspects who took part in the attacks (UNSC Resolution 748, 1992).

The Libyan dispute with the US had negative consequences on the country's economy (Bruce St John 2008, p. 97). In the late 1990s, Gaddafi decided to lead Libya out of its international isolation by extraditing the two suspects of the Lockerbie bombing. In response, the United Nations lifted its sanctions. In 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi changed its anti-Western policies,

agreeing to abandon Libya's missiles and weapons programs. In 2003 and 2004, Libya formally accepted its responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and indicated that it agreed to pay \$2.7 billion to victims' families in a letter to the UN Security Council. In December 2003, Libya announced that it decided on its "own free will" to renounce all unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. This final initiative eventually led to the US to lift the bilateral sanctions it imposed, in addition to removing Libya from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism (Bruce St. John, 2008, p. 101).

In the following years, Gaddafi became a strong supporter of the so-called war on terror, condemning the 9/11 attacks and expressing sympathy for the victims (Bruce St. John, 2008, p. 101). In 2006, the US restored full diplomatic ties with Libya. In 2008, Libya hosted the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. As the most top ranking official to visit Libya since 1953, Ms. Rice said the relations between the US and Libya had entered a new phase.

2.2. THE ARAB SPRING AND THE LIBYAN REBELLION

The Libyan revolution started in Benghazi, namely in the unofficial capital of Cyreniaca, on 15 February 2011. The protests quickly spread to the surrounding areas. It was arrest of attorney and dissident Fatih Terbil that ignited the uprising. Coupled with the police crackdown and inspired by the uprising in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, protests calling for an end to the Gaddafi regime expanded to many more cities throughout Libya.

The regime responded the protestors very harshly, including the use of aircrafts against civilians. Upon the gravity of the measures employed, Libyan diplomats and high-ranking officials resigned from office and condemned the actions of Gaddafi. In the meanwhile, they conducted persuasion efforts to convince the international community to take serious measures to prevent the Libyan regime from killing its citizens. Political leaders all over the world condemned the situation, and called for political dialogue and peaceful negotiation. However,

Gaddafi did not respond to the calls of the international community and continued the attacks against the protesters. At this point in time, the international community was hesitant to take a clear stand towards Gaddafi and his regime.

In the face of the situation that has proven to be highly problematic, the international community still had its hopes in political and diplomatic dialogue. The Arab League was the first international organisation that took a concrete initiative and suspended the membership of Libya. It also issued a statement and presented it to the UN Security Council. In its first official press statement on Libya, the Security Council explicitly welcomed the action and statements made by the Arab League. In its statement, the Council (2011) condemned the violence and use of force against civilians, deplored the repression against peaceful demonstrators, and expressed deep regret at the deaths of hundreds of civilians. The Council's President Maria Luiza Ribeiro urged Gaddafi to stop the violence, when expressing concern about the safety of people and asking the authorities to protect the Libyan population (Ribeiro, 2011).

In the following days, the EU also issued a number of statements in which it expressed its support for the UN Security Council's declarations. The EU referred to the responsibilities of the Libyan government and the international community to protect the Libyan population. The EU also pressed the international community to take tangible action to force the Libyan government from continuing to kill civilians (Ashton, 2011). Another reaction came from Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. He condemned the Libyan regime's use of excessive force against protesters. Similarly, the African Union called for immediate end to repression and violence in Libya.

Due to the continuing attacks towards the Libyan people, the Libyan Minister of Justice resigned as he declined to participate in the brutality towards civilians. The headlines around the world reported how some soldiers were brutally killed after not following orders to attack protesters, and how two Libyan air force

pilots defected their jets from the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force. The pilots were reported to land in Malta as they refused to follow the orders they were given to attack civilians (Scicluna, 2011). A week after the protests began, Gaddafi aired a dramatic video, where he announced to the world that he was willing to crush down the civilians, without remorse, in order to bring down those who defied his government.

The EU High Representative Catherine Ashton (2011) condemned the situation, urging Libya to stop the violence, expressing specific concern and offering support over human rights issues. She informed that the “EU has decided to suspend negotiations with Libya on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement and is ready to take further measures”. This was a measure adopted to convince Gaddafi to reconsider his position and retreat for a peaceful negotiation with the population of Libya.

None of these attempts succeeded in coercing the Gaddafi regime to make amendments for the violent strategies pursued or to withdraw the regime’s armed forces from assaulting the civilian population. Considering the strong stance of Gaddafi, the Human Rights Council held a meeting on 25 February, to address the human rights situation in Libya. The main issue discussed was the removal of Libya from the Human Rights Council. A prominent concern raised was the increasing number of people fleeing from Libya and seeking refuge in the neighbouring countries (UN News Centre, 2011). At the same day of the deliberations in the Human Rights Council, the Libyan representative for the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Abdurrahman Shalgham, gave a straightforward speech at the UN Security Council in New York. Speaking on behalf of the Libyan people, he condemned Gaddafi and asked for concrete support from the members of the UN Security Council (H.E. Mr. Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, 2011).

The political face of the revolution was embodied with the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya on 27 February, which was based in Benghazi and controlled most eastern parts of the country. The NTC alerted the international

community that more than half a million people would lose their lives if Gaddafi's forces were to reach Benghazi. One day later, after meeting with the head of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil, France recognised the NTC as the sole legitimate government of Libya, and asked the international community for immediate action against the Gaddafi regime. The UK was the first country to declare support for France. British Prime Minister Cameron too emphasized the urgent need for international action in response to Gaddafi's actions. In the following days, the number of states that announced the need to protect Libyan population by imposing a no-fly zone over the country increased.

2.2.1. Resolution 1970

The international community was very quick to condemn and express its disapproval of the Libyan regime's extreme use of violence. The US, France, and the UK without much hesitation reversed their decade of efforts to normalize their political, commercial and military relations with Libya, and became the leading states in organising a military campaign against Gaddafi.

On 22 February, the Secretary General's Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (2011) pointed out that the acts already committed "may well constitute crimes against humanity", and they reminded the international community of its commitment to "protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" (United Nations Press Release).

A day before the Security Council's meeting on the Libyan issue, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (2011) made a statement in which he urged the international community, in no uncertain terms, to take concrete action. After the resolution was passed, the Secretary General (2011) immediately proved to be an ambassador of further international action; he of course welcomed the sanctions taken by the latest UN resolution, but immediately continued to look forward, stating that "in itself, it cannot end the violence and oppression" and "in the coming days, if needed, even bolder action may become necessary."

With support from the United States and Germany, who would later abstain from voting on resolution 1973, France and Britain introduced a draft resolution in the UN Security Council. This resolution was pushing for multilateral sanctions against Gaddafi. The early British version of the resolution, which would have authorised states to broadly take all measures necessary to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid was rejected by Russia. Finally, on 26 February 2011, resolution 1970 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, after Russia and China signalled they had no objections to back limited sanctions against Gaddafi. The resolution clearly invoked the Libyan Government's responsibility to protect its population and imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban, asset freeze and referral of the situation to the ICC, in order to persuade Gaddafi to stop killing his own people (UNSC, 2011).

2.2.2. Resolution 1973

The discussion about starting a military action against Gaddafi intensified after Resolution 1970 was passed. During the period between Resolution 1970 and the adoption of Resolution 1973, Gaddafi's loyalist forces were advancing towards the rebel's capital, Benghazi. The sanction imposed by resolution 1970 did not have the expected effect on the Libyan regime. Libyan forces reached the outskirts of Benghazi, and if the international community would not act quickly to stop their advancement, a large-scale massacre would occur. This reason led the international community to adopt resolution 1973.

By 16 March, Gaddafi's forces were approaching the rebel's stronghold of Benghazi, and his son Saif al-Islam threatened the opposition through his speech on TV, saying that the rebellion would "be over in forty-eight hours." According to the news on Libyan national television, the army was on its way to Benghazi "to cleanse [the] city from armed gangs." Saif al-Islam was not the only person who threatened the rebels in Benghazi, Gaddafi himself declared in his speech on national television and radio, that the army was on its way to Benghazi and that "we will show no mercy and no pity to them" (Reuter, 2011).

After adopting resolution 1970 and in reaction to Ban Ki-moon's (2011) declaration that "even bolder action may become necessary," the position of concerned states on potential "bolder action" became clear. Russia was direct and quick to declare that according to them, the limits of forceful intervention had already been reached with resolution 1970. China was also swift to make it clear, through its permanent representative to the UN that the only way forward in the Libyan peace progress was, "through peaceful means, such as dialogue" (Li, 2011).

On the other side, the United States and its allies had planned and sent their military forces to the region soon after the uprising. At the beginning, the aim was to assist the evacuation of civilians, but soon they built up capabilities in the region in case the leaders decided to start a military intervention. While the US carefully monitored and discussed the developments in Libya, Britain and France were pushing for intervention. The Obama administration declared that the Gaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy and must leave (Huffington Post, 2011). France worked very hard to obtain an agreement from the Group of Eight (G8) for military action in Libya. Both France and the UK stated that Gaddafi had to step down and endorsed the importance of having him appear before the International Criminal Court. Two days after the adoption of resolution 1970, the UK officially proposed the idea of a no-fly zone over Libya and only a day after, France declared its support for the proposal.

The permanent members of the Security Council were divided among themselves. On the one hand, the UK and France were pushing for a military intervention and imposing a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya. On the other hand, Russia and China were against launching any military action. Although the US was advocating the removal of Gaddafi, it was unwilling to participate in any military intervention to realise this goal. By the end of February, it seemed that it would be very hard to accumulate the necessary support in the Security Council to pass a new resolution, which included imposing harder sanctions or a no-fly zone.

The US and its European allies conditioned military action against Libya on the basis of having international and regional support. The first organisation to back the resolution was the Gulf Cooperation Council. After a meeting in Abu Dhabi on 7 March, leaders of the Gulf States declared their support for UNSCR 1973 and asked the Security Council to take all the necessary measures, including a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya. On the 11 March, the African Union (AU) expressed its concern about the situation in Libya, and described the situation, “as a serious threat to peace and security in that country and in the region as a whole.” The African Union denounced “the indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons [...] and the transformation of pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellion.” In the meanwhile, the AU emphasized its “strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form” (Bellamy and Williams, 2012, p843).

On 12 March, during their emergency meeting, the Arab League expressed its will to communicate with the National Transitional Council of Libya and asked the United Nations Security Council “to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the Transnational National Council of Libya” (“Arab states seek Libya no-fly zone,” 2011).

On the 15 March, Obama met with his senior national security advisors in order to decide the US course of action. After discussing the situation in Libya, the Obama administration believed that a no-fly zone was insufficient to stop Gaddafi. Obama instructed the US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, to pursue a more vigorous UN resolution that would give permission to use “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. After immense efforts to convince Russia to not to veto the resolution, Russia along with China, decided to abstain from the UN vote on military action in Libya.

On 17 March, the UN Security Council voted to authorise Resolution 1973. The UN Security Council members supported Resolution 1973 with five abstentions from Brazil, China, Russia, Germany, and India. The resolution authorised the member states to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians by acting independently or through regional organizations or arrangements. The resolution also included the imposition of a no-fly zone, a strict arms embargo, freezing of regime assets, and a travel ban on Libyan officials, and at the same time, it prohibited ground military forces from occupying the Libyan territory.

2.2.3. The Implementation of Resolution 1973

In response to Gaddafi's assault on the people of Libya, the imposition of a "no-fly zone" was demanded by the Gulf Cooperation Council on 7 March 2011, and by the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on 8 March. On 12 March 2011, the foreign ministers of the Arab League voted to request from the United Nations Security Council the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. The vote, which took place during a meeting in Cairo, was backed by all member states. The Arab League appealed to the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone after Gaddafi was reported to have used warplanes, warships, tanks, and artillery to seize cities taken over, in what started out a month earlier as mass protests, by peaceful civilians seeking an end to his 41-year rule (UN Resolution 1973).

Expressing concern over the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties, the Council established a no-fly zone, banning all flights, except those for humanitarian purposes, in Libyan airspace in order to help protect civilians (BBC: 19-03-2011).

In the first weeks, many of the actors who had initially been sceptical about the imposition of a no-fly zone voiced serious critiques regarding the way it was being implemented. The first reservations were already to be heard on the day the no-fly zone started. The OIC (2011) stated that, “it supported the provision in the resolution, which excludes a foreign occupation force of any form on any

part of Libyan territory, and called for the adoption of a new resolution by the Security Council to annul the provisions of Resolution 1973 as soon as the motives standing behind its adoption have disappeared.” Although this statement cannot be characterized as a criticism of resolution 1973, it certainly voiced the OIC’s wish that the international community restrain itself in the enforcement of the resolution and expressed a demand for the mandate to be terminated as soon as possible. Four days later, the OIC reiterated this demand, calling upon “all parties taking part in the on-going military operations in Libya to exercise maximum restraint, avoid targeting civilians and housing areas and preserve the resources and capabilities of the Libyan people” (Ihsanoğlu, 2011).

The OIC was not alone in its critical position on the way substance was given to the Libyan no-fly zone. On 20 March, the Arab League’s Secretary General Amr Moussa, “deplored the broad scope of the US-European bombing campaign in Libya and said Sunday that he would call a league meeting to reconsider Arab approval of the western military intervention” (Cody, 2011). Although this statement was revoked the next day, it did mark the second regional organisation, which voiced serious objections regarding the way the no-fly zone was being upheld.

On 26 April, remarkably late for one of the biggest critics of a military intervention, the African Union publicised an official communiqué on the situation in Libya. The AU (2011) once again reminded the international community that the sole objective of UNSCR 1973 is “to ensure the protection of the civilian population,” continuing to urge all involved, “to refrain from actions, including military operations targeting Libyan Senior Officials and socio-economic infrastructure, that would further compound the situation and make it more difficult to achieve international consensus on the best way forward.” This communiqué, in line with earlier statements given by other African regional organizations, highlights the limited mandate given by resolution 1973 and the protection of the Libyan civilian population. This stands in striking contrast to the pro-active position the US, the UK and France took on the Libyan intervention.

Resolution 1973 did not mandate the removal of Colonel Gaddafi, only the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas under attack of any force. All of the large contributors to the intervention, however, had explicitly taken sides in the conflict and stated that “Gaddafi must go.” None of the regional organisations ever explicitly referred to the abdication of Gaddafi. In this vein, the prominent argument about the Libyan intervention has become the one, which posits that the main objective of the leading interveners in Libya was not the protection of civilians, but instead was enforcing a regime change. Operation Unified Protector ended only ten days after Gaddafi was captured and killed. NATO (2012) explicitly relates the death of Gaddafi to the end of the mission.

Even though a number of states refrained from vote during the adoption of UNSCR 1973 as well as expressing a grave concern regarding the degree of the force used, Resolution 1973 has been perceived as a success in terms of the implementation of the R2P norm. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon noted: “Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government” (The Star, 10-06-2014). Ramesh Thakur, a former R2P commissioner at the United Nations, said: "Resolution 1973 marks the first military implementation of the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect'". He concluded, "R2P is coming closer to being solidified as an actionable norm"(The Star 10-06-2014). Accordingly Thakur believes that the case of Libya has ensured the future of the norm.

Nevertheless, the application of UNSCR 1973 as a successful example of R2P has become highly questionable due to the way the military operation was carried out. It was also questioned whether or not the Western intervention, in what could be described as a civil war, was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council resolution. Brazil noted that, "the use of force [in Libya] has made a political solution more difficult to achieve." Mexico referred to the divisive effect the Libyan crisis was having on the international community, while Kenya said the experience regarding the implementation of the R2P so far

"has been at best worrisome, and at worst, deeply disconcerting" (Online Opinion, 10-06-2014). Russia, which abstained from the vote on UNSCR 1973, together with China, Brazil, Germany, and India, had criticised the expansion of the aims of Resolution 1973 to include regime change, may be counterproductive in future efforts to invoke R2P to achieve its stated objective, which is the protection of civilian populations, not the removal of dictators (Ibid). Given the criticisms, the next chapter dwells on the individual motivations of four prominent states in their consideration of a military intervention in Libya.

CHAPTER 3

THE PATH TO THE INTERVENTION: INITIAL RESPONSES AND MOTIVATIONS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UK AND THE US

This chapter focuses on the decision-making process leading up to the military intervention in Libya in 2011. It analyses the positions of a few key NATO member states, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The chapter pays attention to factors, which affected the decisions made by the main NATO countries, and their motivation during the period leading up to the intervention in Libya.

3.1. FRANCE

In the beginning of the crisis in Libya, France paved the way for the international community in adopting concrete measures towards Gaddafi's Regime. Along with the UK, France became a leader in forwarding the plan of military intervention in Libya. President Nicolas Sarkozy was at the forefront of getting France involved in the action.

3.1.1. French Response To The Libyan Crisis

President Sarkozy was the driving force behind France participating in the international push against Gaddafi. As Commander in Chief, Sarkozy was the final decision maker. He took the lead in the Libya crisis (Echague, Michou and Mikail, 2011, p. 333). Sarkozy was one of the first heads of state to condemn the unacceptable use of force against Libyans. He pushed for a no-fly zone to be put in force over Libya at the end of February (Watt and Patrick, 2011). The unilateral recognition, by France, of the National Transitional Council as the sole representative of Libya, irritated other EU members (Koenig, 2011, p. 10). This step by France came a day before a European Council meeting on March 11, which was called in order to find an agreement on the situation in Libya (IISS Strategic Comments, 2011). At the EU summit, it became clear that the EU nations were divided.

As the then Security Council members, although France, the UK and Lebanon failed to get European support, they circulated a draft resolution on the 15th of March, 2011, after the Arab League had called for a no-fly zone. After the resolution was adopted, Sarkozy invited several heads of state to Paris, as well as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, General Secretary of the Arab League Amr Moussa, and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, on March 19, to attend the Summit for Libya, in order to create a coalition of those willing to be involved in the proposed solution. In the same day, French airstrikes started the intervention, becoming the first jets to shoot against Gaddafi. It was reported that some allies were angered the French airstrikes had begun before the meeting had ended and were not organized with other countries (Kirkpatrick, Erlanger and Bumiller, 2011).

While some critics believed Sarkozy was attempting to take the spotlight, others claimed it was an effort to endorse the poor-selling Rafale fighter (Rettman, 2011). According to some analysts and insiders, even though there was disagreement between coalition allies of how some thought about Sarkozy's arrogant behavior, there was some concession that airstrikes were necessary and should be carried out quickly (House of Commons, 2011). Some observers stated that Paris acted quickly due to the perception of time being limited. In spite of a declared ceasefire, Gaddafi tanks continued to assault Benghazi, which created concerns that the city and civilians would perish. Aside from the anticipated bloodshed, Benghazi was a significant foundation for the revolution and the headquarters of the NTC.

The Libya Contact Group was an entity proposed by France, which consisted of a political steering committee, bringing together the foreign ministers of states supporting military intervention. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe introduced the Libya Contact Group on March 22 (Al Jazeera, 2011). At the London Conference on March 29, the Contact Group was set up in order to organize international endeavours and consider post-conflict support (London Conference on Libya, 2011). Many nations and international organizations including the UN, the EU, NATO, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic

Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, attended the assembly.

France's push to introduce the Contact Group conveyed their distrust of NATO. The proposal by France to provide a political organization to oversee the mission indicated that it would not be under control of NATO. This meant the majority of decision-making would occur in the capitals of the countries involved, specifically those providing strike missions, therefore limiting the role of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) (Cameron, 2012).

In 1966 France armed forces were pulled out of NATO's integrated military command. France was becoming integrated back into the NATO military structure in 2009, therefore the action in Libya represented an assessment of France's alliance. The French were apparently satisfied by the action because they had been included in the quick and effective operation by NATO. In the beginning, Paris had favored the operations to be driven by a coalition with the UK and the US instead of NATO. Sarkozy saw this as a chance for Paris and London to work together after the defense treaty between France and the UK was signed in November 2010, (IISS Strategic Comments, 2011).

France thought if NATO led the operation it would cause hostility with the Arab countries that consider the coalition a tool of power for the US. On March 21, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated, "The Arab League does not wish the operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility. It isn't NATO which has taken the initiative up to now" (Erlanger, 2011). Although France did not wish for NATO to have the political control of the operations, the coalition was ready to assist in the planning and execution of the intervention.

There was an immediate rejection by some French officials based on concerns that NATO could threaten their firmly held policy of "EU first". Another cause for rejection of NATO was worry regarding the bureaucratic processes slowing down action and if France's freedom of response would be blocked. Moreover, there was doubt if Germany would play a restrictive role considering its

refraining from UNSCR 1973 (Michel, 2012). Paris also had concerns if Turkey would slow down the process within NATO (Head, 2011). Because at the beginning Turkey was against NATO military intervention in Libya and this view was expressed by then Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan when he said that ‘ NATO intervention would be useless’ (BBC, 2011) France was unable to convince the UK of an Anglo-French command for all military operations in Libya and on the 31st of March 2011, NATO took sole command of all operations.

3.1.2. Motivating Factors for France

There were many factors that motivated France to take an active leadership role in the military intervention in Libya. Various opinions are expressed concerning the level of importance of these factors.

One particular argument as to why France acted quickly is because of the country’s slow and controversial reaction to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia (Célestin, Hargreaves and Dalmolin 2012, p. 295). In the beginning, the revolutionary uprisings in the French allied countries of Tunisia and Egypt were not supported by Paris. During the uprising in Tunisia, Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie spent Christmas vacations there and vowed to send France’s “world renowned” security forces to help suppress the upheaval three days before President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was forcefully pushed out of the country (BBC, 2011). In February 2011, following much condemnation for his tight connections with the Tunisian government, Alliot-Marie resigned.

A possible reason of Sarkozy’s involvement in the Libyan crisis was to attain more voters for the upcoming presidential elections in April 2012. A poll on March 13 showed disapproval ratings for the President at 71 percent, which made him the least popular right-wing president ever in France (Torsoli, 2011). Turkey’s then Europe minister Bağış openly accused Sarkozy of exploiting the Libyan crisis for his own electoral needs: “A European leader began his election campaign by organizing a meeting that led to a process of air strikes against

Libya. He acted before a NATO decision, and his act was based on his subjective evaluation of a UN resolution” (Watt, Hopkins and Traynor, 2011).

However, various domestic political blocs were showing their approval for intervention in Libya. The controversial left-wing French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy is thought to have taken an active part in getting resources and pushing for the intervention. Through a book and documentary describing the progress of events, Levy reported how he influenced Sarkozy to back the Libyan opposition (Von Rohr, 2012). Public polls began to show support for an intervention. At the start of April 2011, Ipsos administered a poll showing France had the strongest support for military action in contrast to Italy, the UK, and the US. The poll showed French support at 64 percent, with 55 percent of Americans, 50 percent of Britons, and 40 percent of Italians supporting the intervention (Ipsos, 2011).

The crisis gave the French president a chance to display his role as a world leader not only to his people, but also to the international community. It has been mentioned the President was pleased with his French nickname “Sarkozy the Libyan,” and the intervention in France was called “Sarkozy’s war” (Chrisafis, 2011). Many experts and insiders agreed that Sarkozy was the assertive during crises and in having to make quick decisions. Or perhaps he desired a special place in history. According to one of his personal advisors, Sarkozy did not want to be known in the history books for increasing the retirement age (Gourevitch, 2011).

Intervention in Libya was also possible because of the easy access geographically. The Arab League had supplied the majority of international support. France therefore had the chance to prove its role as a permanent UN Security Council Member (Financial times, 2011). It seemed to France a political resolution with Gaddafi was not possible therefore military action was the answer. Lack of military power from Libya, in addition to a low-cost air-only intervention, could cripple the Libyan regime. According to Zaki Laidi, France and other countries faced the risk that if they did nothing Gaddafi would re-

emerge with more violence against his people and probably also against governments which opposed him (Laidi, 2011).

In addition, Libya was of national interest to France as they were connected historically and geographically. Analysis stated that French influence had been weakened in North Africa by its failure to support the protestors in Egypt and Tunisia. A conclusion by New York Times editorial stated that Sarkozy “saw Libya as a chance to recoup French prestige in North Africa, a region France has long considered important to its economy and security” (2011).

There is also a debate whether oil was the motivation for the intervention. Prior to the uprisings, France imported over 15 per cent of its oil from Libya (Krauss, 2011). Although only two percent of the world’s oil production came from Libya, the oil was easier to refine because of its low sulfur content (Leonard, 2011). Europe acquired over 85 percent of Libya’s crude exports before the crisis began (International Energy Agency, 2011). Italy was the highest importer at 29 percent of crude exports, followed by 14 percent to France, 13 percent to China, and 11 percent to Germany. Libya’s exports were 10 percent of France’s total domestic oil consumption in 2010.

There is some evidence that maintaining the stability of the southern Mediterranean area and minimizing the terrorist threat from Libya were important contributing factors in the Sarkozy government’s decision. A prolonged civil war in Libya would have negative effects for France, including mass immigration, unstable gas and oil supplies, and organised crime.

French officials were worried about the growing migratory threat, which resulted from the spread of violence in Libya. In his answer to a question about the best response to refugees from North Africa, Francois Fillon stressed the importance of working towards stability in Libya and also promised to “show a very great firmness with regard to illegal immigration” (Davidson, 2013). When addressing the National Assembly, Juppé said that Libya, Tunisia and Egypt were on the right path that was ‘in our interest’ wherein the goal is a level of political and

economic development that 'permits the citizens of the South to live at home, on their land, in their country' (Ibid). From his side, Sarkozy (2011) insisted that if the Libyan people were not supported in their effort to change their political system, the situation could deteriorate and bring negative consequences like the "massive flow of uncontrollable migration and terrorism".

While energy and other economic interests probably contributed to the reasons for the intervention, they are not thought to be the main driving force. The fastest way to stabilize markets would not have been from a military intervention (Leonard, 2011). If France had been primarily motivated by oil or concern with the terror threat it could have made a deal with Gaddafi. Having burned all ties with the Gaddafi regime, however, the best way to preserve French access to oil and reduce the likelihood of future terror threats from Libya was to support and guarantee the victory of the Libyan opposition.

It should be mentioned the reaction to the intervention by European countries with oil and economic interests in Libya were varied. Germany, which was one of the largest importers of oil and exporters of arms, did not take part in the decisions forming the intervention. Another example is Italy, as the largest importer of oil and exporter of arms, entered the decision-making process very carefully. This observation shows how France's push to the forefront was a very different reaction than other European Union governments. France was able to evaluate its return to NATO's Integrated Military Command during the intervention in Libya and displayed to France that NATO could serve French interests. Pushing for military intervention offered Sarkozy an opportunity to boost his chance at getting re-elected.

3.2. GERMANY

Although Germany was one of the first EU states to call for economic sanctions against Libya, Germany was very skeptical of the imposition of a no-fly zone over the country, and it opposed military intervention at all costs. This section analyses the main factors that affected German response to the Libya crisis.

3.2.1. Germany's Response to the Libyan Crisis

Germany was among the states that pushed the EU to take strict actions against Libya. In the beginning of the Libyan uprising, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle gave the impression of being a supporter of tough actions against Gaddafi. He declared, "The time of appeals is over. Now is the time for action. Germany will take the lead while some other EU-members have been hesitant" (Dembinski and Reinold, 2011). Germany continued pushing for strict sanctions even after the implementation of UNSCR 1970. According to the German Foreign Minister, the existing economic and weapon sanctions were not strict enough and insisted that sanctions should target Gaddafi's cash flow.

However, Germany had doubts about the possibility of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 11, in the EU summit, Angela Merkel said that a no-fly zone was potentially dangerous. She revealed her doubts about the no-fly zone plan by asking "What is our plan if we create a no-fly zone and it doesn't work? Do we send in ground troops? We have to think this through. Why should we intervene in Libya when we don't intervene elsewhere?" (Tisdall, 2011) In the same summit an Anglo-French plan to endorse a no-fly zone was blocked by Germany. After the G8 meeting, the German Foreign Minister declared his opposition towards military action by stating, "We are very skeptical about a military intervention and a no-fly zone is a military intervention" (Ibid).

On the 17th of March, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973, which created the legal foundation for a no-fly zone over Libya, and demanded an immediate ceasefire to attacks on civilians by armed forces loyal to Gaddafi. The Security Council banned all flights over Libya's airspace and tightened its existing sanctions on Gaddafi and his supporters (Richard, 2011).

The United States, Great Britain, and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, and Bosnia, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal and South Africa, non-permanent members, voted in favor of the resolution. Five countries obtained from voting- Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Germany.

Westerwelle justified Germany's decision by stating that the risks of a German participation in military engagement were considered to outweigh the benefits (Koenig, 2011). The EU and NATO members were shocked with Germany's decision. Westerwelle argued that it would have been misleading to vote in favor of the resolution, but to not send ground troops (Ibid). Berlin's choice to abstain would probably affect two significant issues involving Germany- the country's desire to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the foreign policy of the European Union (Richard, 2011).

The move by Germany also made for criticism within the country and a lack of agreement among party lines (Spiegel Online International, 2011). A strong voice for the disapproval of the government was former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who told the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* "Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East". Saying the abstention was a "scandalous mistake", he continued, "German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe's future" (Pidd, 2011).

The reaction from Germany following the UNSCR vote caused even more blurred lines. Some policy makers said a military action was not a proper reaction to the crisis. On a German television news show, Defense Minister de Maizière asked sarcastically "Could the fact that we are suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil?" continuing, "We cannot remove all the dictators in the world with an international military mission" (Beste and Kurbjuweit, 2011). German Development Minister Dirk Niebel said, "It is notable that exactly those countries which are blithely dropping bombs in Libya are still drawing oil from Libya" (Spiegel Online International, 2011).

In her speech at the Paris Summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel justified the decision by stating "As everyone knows Germany will not take part in any military measures and for this reason only we abstained in the vote. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality" (Waterfiled, 2011). On March 21, Westerwelle once more justified their decision to abstain from the resolution

by saying “we calculated the risks and if we see that three days after this intervention began. The Arab League has already criticized this intervention; I think we had good reasons” (Ash, 2011).

However, Berlin did not slow the process in the North Atlantic Council. Berlin sent up to 300 German troops to AWACS for surveillance of Afghan airspace, therefore lightening the burden on NATO by loosening NATO AWACS capacities for Libya. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle presented to the German Parliament the arrangement to build up the AWACS quantity was necessary due to alliance policy and would also guarantee Afghanistan would be monitored:

“We won’t send German soldiers to take part in a military operation in Libya. But that does not mean that we are putting our allies in Libya in danger. Of course we do not want to suggest that we are neutral. We will ease the burden on our allies, even if we will not ourselves participate in military action in Libya” (Federal Foreign Office, 2011).

While some critics think Germany’s mixed signals were a sign of bad crisis management when trying to mend the relationship with its allies, and others thought it was concern over Berlin’s abstention. The policy-making process in Germany can be time consuming as it is controlled by a system of checks and balances and distribution of power. According to some analysts, Germany’s policy-making process was too slow to respond to the crisis happening in Libya. Therefore, the result was at times ad hoc decision, which did not pass through the established system.

3.2.2. Motivating Factors for Germany

Germany’s security and defense policy have been influenced by the role Germany has played in the two World Wars. Since then, the German population has thought of the German armed forces as a defensive force, and Germany has remained skeptical towards military intervention in terms of security (Rummel, 2009). This reasoning gave the former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder the ability to adopt a strict anti-war position in 2002, when Germany refused to

participate in the coalition of the willing. This political move had a negative effect on Germany's trans-Atlantic relations, but secured Schroeder's re-election in 2002.

Accusations pertaining to the abstention have been directed towards Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. Westerwelle did not act alone, but in cooperation with other officials such as, Angela Merkel, who is in control of general foreign policy guidelines. The Chancellor was therefore also responsible for the decision (Berenskoetter).

It seemed that domestic politics were the target and force of Foreign Minister Westerwelle, as he did not have much background in foreign policy. He could have viewed the crisis in Libya as a chance to strengthen his position as Foreign Minister. The ramification of voting against the allies was possibly not well understood by Westerwelle as a result of his lack of foreign policy experience.

A change in position could have been challenging for Westerwelle because he was a strong supporter of military constraint. Standing for peace could have been viewed as a cautious political move. Germany's hesitance for military action is a normal response because of the country's past. Another factor is the war in Afghanistan being perceived by the people as expensive and uncertain. The German Marshall Fund of the US performed a poll between May 25-June 20 2011, in which 51 percent affirmed that the number of German troops should be lessened (2011). In October, a poll conducted by YouGov displayed that 68 percent of participants opposed the German military in Afghanistan and 44.2 percent wanted an immediate withdrawal of German troops (Press TV, 2011).

Democratic actions taking place in the Arab world were supported by the Germany population, but the idea of military intervention was regarded very critically in Germany. According to a survey result, six out of ten Germans agreed with the decision not to intervene directly in Libya. The poll showed that the majority of people did not think a military intervention in Libya would be a

practical solution (Richard, 2011). The population's deliberations on the acceptance of a military mission have a strong influence on the consideration of the German government (Rousseau, 2011).

The federal elections that took place on March 27, just 10 days after the vote on resolution 1973, triggered the importance of public opinion. During the Libya crisis, the federal government of Germany consisted of a coalition of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) / Christian Social Union (CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP). Westerwelle is considered to be one of the least popular foreign ministers Germany has had in a long time, and his party (FDP) was under massive domestic pressure in early 2011, therefore, he had hoped that adopting a position in the UN could help his party in the elections (The Economist, 2011).

Merkel had three main reasons to support Westerwelle's approach. First, she wanted to keep FDP as a junior partner in her government and wanted to avoid its marginalization. Second, the growing domestic criticism of the 10-year German military presence in Afghanistan made the German coalition government reluctant to pull Germany into another mission (Richard, 2011). Third, both Merkel and Westerwelle believed that the time had come to emancipate German foreign policy and to halt subordinating national interests for the sake of allies (Steven, 2012). This new position was underlined by the German defense minister; he stated "We reserve the right, in Germany's interests, not to participate this time around. We cannot remove all the dictators in the world with international war" (Beste and Kurbjuweit, 2011).

Germany's reservations towards the Security Council seemingly did not produce a positive outcome. As a result of a poor election outcome, on April 3, Westerwelle resigned as leader of FDP and stepped down as deputy to Chancellor Merkel (BBC, 2011). He was, however, able to keep his post as foreign minister.

The effectiveness of a military intervention caused much doubt regarding the adequacy of an assumed lack of intelligence information about the rebels and

their intentions. Concerns about being involved in another lengthy conflict stemmed from the involvement of the prolonged fighting in Afghanistan. In a *Der Spiegel* interview Westerwelle said he did not want Germany to “venture onto a slippery slope that would lead to German troops participating in a war in Libya” (Follath, Georg and Neukrich, 2011).

Another major reason for Germany’s decision to abstain on the Libya resolution was the long-term strategic ramifications of an intervention. The other abstainers, Brazil, India, Russia, and China are all members of the BRICs bloc, and important international players, both politically and economically. These countries have potential economic interests for Germany; therefore, its decision to abstain may have been aimed to improve Germany’s relations with the BRICs bloc (Richard, 2011). The crisis in Libya challenged the German government to make a decision within a relatively limited amount of time. Although Germany took part in the military action in Afghanistan, the crisis highlighted Germany’s sustained reluctance to use forces in its foreign policy.

3.3. THE UNITED KINGDOM

After the death of Gaddafi, British Prime Minister Cameron declared, “today is a day to remember all of Colonel Gaddafi’s victims, from those who died in connection with the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, to Yvonne Fletcher in a London street, and obviously all the victims of IRA terrorism who died through their use of Libyan Semtex” (BBC News, 2011). His speech revealed the kind of relationship the UK had with Libya over the years. France was the closest ally to the UK in creating and implementing the intervention in Libya. The initial suggestion of a NFZ over Libya was made by British Prime Minister David Cameron.

3.3.1. British Response to the Libyan Crisis

In the beginning of the Libyan uprising, the UK was not as enthusiastic about intervening as France. In an interview with Al-jazeera television, Cameron stated, “I do not think we are at that stage yet. We are at the stage of

condemning the actions Colonel Gaddafi has taken against his own people” (Wintour and Watt, 2011).

On the 24th of February, it was reported that Cameron had spoken to President Obama and agreed with him to coordinate on possible multilateral measures in Libya (BBC News, 2011). After PM Cameron revealed that he had asked the Ministry of Defence to work on plans for a military no-fly zone, he had to defend the NFZ proposal after US Defence Secretary Robert Gates disregarded the idea as ‘loose talk’ and stated that it could only be created after an attack on Libya (BBC News, 2011).

The plan was also rejected or challenged by other allied countries (Hope, 2011). Prime Minister Cameron, despite being viewed as a conservative within UK politics, pushed forward the debate that it was essential for the international community to think about all options including military actions (Smith, 2011). It was reported by media on March 7, that the French and British missions to the UN had begun preparing a Security Council Resolution urging a NFZ over Libya (Ibid).

In addressing the House of Commons, Cameron said that the UK was leading the way to push for a no-fly zone over Libya. On the 10th of March, both Cameron and Sarkozy (2011) sent a letter to the president of the EU Council in which they called upon their European partners, their allies, and their Arab and African friends to draw plans for a NFZ, or other options. One day later, during the EU summit, Cameron argued with HR Ashton about the endorsement of a no-fly zone plan over Libya. Ashton’s spokesman warned that imposing a NFZ over Libya would be highly risky and could result in killing a large number of civilians (Shipman, 2011).

The UK played an important role in drafting the UNSC resolution 1973, which was approved on March 17, and imposing the no-fly zone over Libya. Two days later, the UK, along with the US and France, lead a multi-state coalition, and began a military intervention in Libya. The US wanted a limited role in the

operation, so on the 27th of March, it handed NATO control of all military operations in Libya. Although France was in favor of an Anglo-France military command, the UK preferred a NATO command. Finally, on March 31, NATO took control of all military operations in Libya.

The UK viewed NATO command and control structures as the only possibility once it was apparent the US was ready to command the military missions in the beginning only (Cameron, 2012). Whereas Paris pushed for cooperation with the UK, London wanted NATO to lead the mission as the alliance was capable of executing multinational missions. The British perspective that NATO is “the bedrock” of its defence (HM Government, 2012) was a primary element supporting that idea and it was noted that Secretary of Defence Liam Fox was an especially strong supporter of NATO. Fox (2012) explained his stance regarding the UK position having declared, “The United States will remain our number one global strategic partner and NATO will remain our preferred security alliance”. Peter Ricketts and Chief of Staff Ed Llewellyn, who had in depth insight into NATO practices, were significant players in persuading France to let NATO lead the mission. Llewellyn had acted as advisor to Paddy Ashdown when he was the High representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ambassador Ricketts had functioned as a Permanent representative to NATO (Wintour and Watt, 2011). Demonstrable need, clear legal basis, and regional support for the military intervention, were the criteria the UK delegation used to persuade NATO to accept a resolution (UK National Security Advisor, 2012).

There were, however, numerous unexpected occurrences the UK government had to deal with in the process. The UK was surprised by France’s acceptance of the National Transitional Council early in the intervention (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). London officially acknowledged the NTC on July 27, 2011, wherein France had already granted acceptance on March 10, 2011. That being said, the UK policy of recognizing states and not governments would be evaluated in accordance with the National Security Adviser’s assessment of the UK’s actions in Libya, “The UK has supported the NTC since its creation on 5 March. The UK’s long-standing policy is to recognize States, not Governments.

But in certain exceptional cases, such as happened with the NTC and Libya, HMG [Her Majesty's Government] should be ready to review and adapt such policies, even where deeply engrained, where that are clearly in the UK's interests to do so" (UK National Security Advisor, 2012).

Another unexpected event was the disinterest of the US to lead the military campaign, but instead remained out of the spotlight (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). The sudden launch of the operation by France is questionable as to if the British were involved in the decision. Some views consider the launch had been organized by both London and Paris, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) withdrew before it started (Cameron, 2012). However, it seems France carried out the airstrikes before the UK had completely organized the attack. Various views regard the French action as making some British officials tense while others presume that London was calm (Wintour and Watt, 2011).

In conforming to UNSCR 1973, leaders in London questioned if Gaddafi was a legitimate aim. While the head of the UK armed forces, General David Richards, said Gaddafi was not a legal aim, Defence Secretary Fox claimed he possibly could be. Cameron gave ambiguous answers, stating that attacks on Libya would be in accordance with the mandate of UNSCR 1973 (BBC, 2011). France and the UK held different viewpoints regarding this idea (Black and Pidd, 2011).

UNSCR 1970 imposed an arms embargo on Libya, causing a debate in regards to a breach of the resolution if the rebels were to be armed. On February 28, 2011, the initial idea of arming the rebels came from Prime Minister Cameron (Smith, 2011). Foreign Secretary William Hague explained on April 3, "We have taken no decision to arm the rebels, the opposition, the pro-democracy people, whatever one wants to call them and I'm not aware of any of our allies taking the decision to do that" (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011).

The first meeting of the Libya Contact Group was held on April 13, 2011, wherein 21 countries and representatives from the UN, the Arab League,

NATO, the EU, the OIC, and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States gathered to discuss Libya. The African Union was also there as an invitee (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011). Providing a political direction for the international effort was the main purpose of the Contact Group (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011).

The British National Security Adviser (2011) described the Contact Group as a “UK-conceived structure,” and stated the organization was essential for the cooperation of international political and diplomatic endeavors, and to provide an international voice to the mission. The Contact Group formula is regarded as a formula with a high possibility of being applied in future crises (Ibid).

3.3.2. Motivating Factors for the UK

There were three conditions that had to be reached before London accepted an intervention. The first one was a demonstrable need. This condition had been met as a civilian massacre was a perceived threat. The second condition was to have a legal basis, which had been met by UNSCR 1973, and gave legal justification for intervention. The third condition was international and regional support. In replying to a question regarding the importance of international support for intervention, David Cameron said, “I certainly want to build and maintain, in this House, throughout this country and, indeed right across the world, the widest possible coalition for the action that we are taking” (Davidson, 2013). International and domestic support were tied together when Foreign Secretary Hague insisted, “our actions are all the stronger for the breadth and determination of the international coalition, but they are also stronger for the breadth and determination of this House, which we have seen today” (Ibid). International support for intervention was displayed through the UNSC authorization (Ibid); the Arab League’s request for the UN Security Council to impose a NFZ over Libya was a clear manifestation of regional support.

A feasible answer for London’s primary role could be linked to the US’s desire for an allied country to move forward and take the lead. This was a chance for

the UK to protect its 'special relationship' with the US (IISS, 2011). Maintaining strong ties with the US has been the main objective of the UK since the end of the World War II. Since then, the UK has been working hard to preserve its privileged position within NATO, through deployment of British ships and troops around the world and also through its nuclear and intelligence ties with the US (Wallace, 2000, p. 57). The UK's claim to privileged partnership over other European states after post-WW II was based upon the claim that Britain had global interests beyond Germany, France or Italy (Wallace and Philips 2009, p. 282). The UK portrays itself as a bridge between the US and Europe. However, this view is rejected by the rest of the European countries, which have their own channel to involve in direct dialogue with the US (Wallace and Philips, 2009, p. 278).

Cameron's government believed that the Libyan crisis represented a threat to Britain's interests. On the 2nd of March, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg explained why Britain and Europe needed to engage in a strong response to violence in Libya:

This is a region vital to UK and EU interests. If people in the UK ask why, I would point at the efforts in recent weeks to rescue British nationals caught up in the turbulent events, at the level of human migration from North Africa to Europe, at the level of trade and investment between Europe and North Africa, and its importance to us in terms of energy, the environment and counter-terrorism. North Africa is just 14 miles from Europe at its closest point, what happens to our near neighbours affects us deeply (Davidson, 2013).

A significant factor regarding the approval of the intervention in Libya is that it was visible from both the public and within the political community. A positive result in Libya could have increased Cameron's chances in the general elections in 2015. Parliament supported the British military to take part in the mission with a vote of 557-13, while the Prime Minister's political opponent and Labour party leader Ed Miliband was an advocate for intervention (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). The Labour party's support reduced the political risk of

intervention. Journalists made a similar point, arguing that “Mr. Cameron does not for now risk any serious political damage as a result of the Libyan operation, especially since he enjoys the unequivocal support of Ed Miliband, the Labour leader” (Parker et al., 2011).

The Lockerbie bombing, remembered by many people, may have helped gain further support (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). It is also possible there were worries that terrorist groups would try to take over the country (Ibid). In his speech on March 14, PM Cameron asserted that by not taking action, Libya could turn into a failed state that would endanger the safety of Britain with a flood of refugees and the threat of terrorism (Davidson, 2013). Oil and gas interests in Libya are an objective some observers have pointed to as motivation for the UK to back an intervention. Countries supporting the Libyan opposition would be compensated with oil contracts, as some rebel leaders claimed (Borger and Macalister, 2011). Countries like Italy, France, and Germany, imported more oil from Libya at the start of the crisis, thus it can be debated that the UK had larger advantages in taking down Gaddafi (International Energy Agency, 2011).

The UK government’s duty to protect the Libyan people is the issue at the forefront of the discussion (BBC News, 2011). The past missteps in taking action in genocides like Srebrenica and Rwanda lingered with the Prime Minister and many of his party members (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). Similar to another European power, France, Britain had to take a proactive role to avoid another historical mistake. However, in a question regarding the humanitarian reason for intervention, Cameron was asked for the reason why Britain was not intervening in other cases where human rights were abused. In his answer, PM Cameron indicated that he preferred intervention where both moral concerns and national interest called for it, “just because we cannot do the right thing everywhere does not mean we should not do it when we have clear permission for and a national interest in doing so” (Davidson, 2013).

It is assumed by some that the recently established Franco-British defence treaty did not play a major role in the UK's motivation. However, the Libyan crisis would be an examination for the treaty. At the utmost, it showed the execution of the intervention would be a bilateral cooperation, as France and Britain had already organized effective correspondence both militarily and politically (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012).

3.4. THE UNITED STATES

Although the United States hesitated to take a stance on the crisis in Libya, the political and military contributions from the US were essential. The military engagement from the US was laid out as being restricted both time-wise and in extent. Shortly after the intervention began in Libya, Washington played more of a supporting role as it retreated from the major attacks. As a result of what has been called a "leading from behind" in the Libyan intervention, there has been some question as to whether the US wanted Europe to deal with its own issues.

3.4.1. The US's Response to the Libyan Crisis

The increasing dissatisfaction of people in the Middle East and North Africa towards their regimes was subject matter of a memo President Obama signed in August 2010 (Lizza, 2011). Obama's foreign policy team designed an approach for each country regarding US policies and the negative and positive effects of supporting either the governments or the opposition groups. During this time, the Tunisian vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, which the world observed as the beginning of the Arab Spring (Lizza, 2011). It is possible by signing the memo, Obama was aware of possible uprisings in the Arab world. The US and the rest of the world watched the sudden start of the Arab Spring with alarm.

Washington, however, waited for some time before deciding what role to play in the Libya crisis. Human rights groups, along with some members of Congress, were active voices in the US pushing for involvement in Libya. The largest viewpoint in Washington was that an intervention was not the right decision,

however Senators John McCain (R) and John Kerry (D) proposed a US action (Smith, 2011). Public opinion polls showed the American public opposed a military action. While the vast majority worried about the unfolding crisis in Libya, it was believed the US should not take the responsibility in solving the crisis.

One day before UNSCR 1970 outlined multilateral sanctions against Libya, Washington closed its embassy in Tripoli and enforced bilateral sanctions, on February 25. Obama, on March 3, declared Gaddafi was not the legitimate leader and should step down from power. President Obama has been chastised by political commentators for staying in the background and remaining indecisive during the beginning of the military campaign (Torres, 2011). Supposedly, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy were disturbed by Washington's slow approach to the intervention (Morris and Osborne, 2011).

Protests throughout the Arab world and possible terrorist attacks that would be by an action of Western powers were concerns for the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Barry, 2011). Other factors included the lack of understanding as to who the rebels were and if they were potential Al-Qaida supporters, as well as insufficient post-war planning. In evaluating the situation, Gates took into consideration the poor economic situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington was uncertain of a full military withdrawal from Iraq, which would mean that they would need more resources on that front (Smith, 2011). Among the prominent skeptics of a potential US military involvement in the Libyan crisis came Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon and Counterterrorism Chief John O. Brennan (Ibid).

Similarly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not support the campaign at the early days of the crisis. Nevertheless, later she had a change of mind, and she allied with National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Samantha Power, and US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, in encouraging an intervention. The media described them as "the

women who called for war”, due to their strong stand on calling for action against Gaddafi (Stolberg, 2011).

On 25 February, Clinton stated that an NFZ was “an option we are actively considering” (Raddatz, 2011). She said again on March 1, a NFZ was a possibility (Smith, 2011).). While she adopted a more cautious language in her later statements due to the hesitation of Defence Secretary Gates, she started to decisively support the idea of an intervention following the appeal the Arab League to the UN Security Council for military action on 12 March (Alter, 2011). Arguably, the Secretary of State’s support for an intervention was influenced by the rapidly unfolding crisis as well as a private meeting with NTC representatives in Paris. Many of Clinton’s advisors were pushing for an intervention despite the State Department’s divided status about what actions to take in Libya (Cooper and Myers, 2011). Another possible factor that influenced Clinton’s decision has to do with former President Bill Clinton’s failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and the criticisms that were faced then (Alter, 2011). The media characterized the Secretary of State’s diplomatic efforts as influential in motivating other NATO states to make the intervention happen.

Prior to the beginning of the war, even though Clinton and the State Department argued for a military intervention, the Pentagon and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates challenged their arguments. Reportedly, this was the first time Gates and Clinton had opposing thoughts (Lizza, 2011).

Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates and General David Petraeus comprised the members of the prominent circle around President Obama, regarding national security issues. Some political commentators observe that Clinton’s beliefs may have had a larger influence on the US administration considering that Gates retired and Petraeus served as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (Bloomberg, 2011).

On March 16 US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice implied that the US administration supported an NFZ (US Mission to the United Nations, 2011). It is

believed that she was a prominent player in the passing of UNSCR 1973 during which she served as the US Ambassador to the UN (Cooper and Myres, 2011). President Obama officially backed the intervention on 19 March, when he instructed US military forces to launch attacks against Libyan military targets (The White House, 2011).

Obama highlighted that no ground troops were deployed and the mission was restricted in “nature, duration and scope” when addressing the Congress about the US involvement in the intervention (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011). It was also pointed out that the campaign included European and Arab partners and had been approved by the UN Security Council (Ibid).

The fact that President Obama initiated the attack without approval from the Congress made both the Republican and Democrat members of the Congress question whether Obama had the legal right to attack. Obama was sued by a group of members of the Congress for taking unilateral military action, and suggestions were made to stop the financing for the campaign. Those that opposed the US involvement in the operation emphasized the inefficient timetable for a commitment, the unpredictable global and political ramifications of an intervention, and the lack of intelligence on the rebels (Lindsay, 2011). This also gave the Republicans a chance to characterize the democratic President as being pretentious and ignorant of the Constitution (Savage and Landler, 2011).

A case President Obama made regarding the US involvement in Libya was that the undertaking would last “days not weeks” (Cooper and Myres, 2011). The US began supporting the intervention by giving unique assets after 10 days of the initial attack. After the majority of control had been transferred to NATO, the US was still providing 80 percent of all air-to-air refueling, much of the air monitoring, and nearly all electronic warfare (Liana, 2013). Reportedly, some government officials in Paris and London noted that despite the initial statements of the US it would restrict its involvement in the campaign, the withdrawal of the US caused some alarm (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012).

According to a US official, it was believed that Washington would be involved in the operation, but have restricted engagement thinking that another state would take over the campaign, as presented early on to the coalition partners (Ibid).

Washington minimized the actions of the US in Libya. The description of Obama's foreign policy as "leading from behind", firstly stated in a *New Yorker* article, created much discussion within the US administration. People who opposed the Obama administration debated that the US should be at the forefront of the international campaign and not allow other countries to take charge. According to a State Department official, the function of the US in Libya was expressed as "not allowing the operation to fail" (Valasek, 2011).

The US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, tweeted this response regarding Obama's "leading from behind" approach: "That's not leading from behind [...] [w]hen you set the course, provide critical enablers and succeed, it's plain leading" (Cohen, 2011).

As the US commanded the political and military structure of NATO, even after it gave operational control to NATO, the effect of the US was still quite apparent. Many US military commanders had dominant roles in NATO's command and control structure during the Libyan intervention. Even though Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander of Operation Unified Protector was Canadian, his directors Admiral Samuel J Locklear III, and Admiral James Stavridis, were both American (NATO, 2011).

3.4.2. Motivating Factors for the US

It is imperative to review the official document that defines the general political and geo-strategic objectives of the US, which was released by the White House in May 2010, in the attempt to understand the motivation for the US in intervening in Libya.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), points out the aim of US foreign policy regarding the safety and security of US citizens (National Security Strategy, 2010), as the reinforcement of the US economy, and the preservation of the US military dominance. There are four primary strategic methods to achieve these goals:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges (Ibid)

The NSS encourages the pledge for universal values and indicates the significance of international cooperation, with concentration on the UN and NATO (Ibid). As the US asserts moral leadership, it supports any efforts by the international community to protect essential human rights.

The humanitarian situation seems to be an important factor in the decision of the US to intervene in Libya because one of the four general US strategic goals mentioned in the NSS was applicable in the case of Libya. The aim to respect universal values means that the US has a moral obligation to protect Libyan civilians against Gaddafi's threat of mass killings of his people whom he called "rats". In 2009, during President Obama's acceptance speech when earning the Nobel Peace Prize, he talked about "just war" acknowledging especially the prevention of genocide. He stated "There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified" (The Telegraph, 10 December 2009). The memories of past failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda could have played a major role in the US administration's reason for acting in Libya (Jackson, 2011). In August 2011, the "Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities" released by the Obama administration put into writing that preventing genocide and mass cruelties was a "core national security interest" as well as moral imperative as (The White House, 2011). This mandate ensures to build an "Atrocities Prevention Board"

that would review policy rights regarding global concerns like genocide, and lead training within government service bodies in terms of prevention (Ibid).

Although defending human rights was one of the strongest arguments that could be announced from the beginning of the considerations to intervene in Libya, President Obama made clear that Libya was an individual case and did not represent any shift in the US policy of military intervention on humanitarian grounds. He explained the uniqueness of the Libyan situation in his address to the nation on 28 March 2011 by stating:

And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what's right. In this particular country - Libya; at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Gaddafi's forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground (The White House, 28 March 2011).

International backing was highly necessary for the military intervention in Libya. During his presidential campaign in 2008, Obama stated the US would work with the international community and organize with regional partners in time of an international crisis. He claimed that it was important to have an international order advanced by the US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity to meet global challenges (Ibid).

The validity that the SC resolution provided was another important reason for Obama to give support to the intervention in Libya. The future credibility of the UN Security Council would be at risk if no action was taken (White House Report, 15 June 2011). The Arab League's appeal for an international intervention and a request for an NFZ over Libya was another substantial factor (Smith, 2011).

The US could have seen acting in Libya as a chance to enhance its perception within the Arab world. Like almost all the Western states, the US misinterpreted the beginning of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia, and continued their support for the old regimes. Even when former Egyptian president Mubarak and former Tunisian President Ben Ali started attacking their own civilians, the US remained reluctant to get involved. The beginning of the uprising in Libya gave the US a chance to change its impact and show that they supported the new movement within the Middle East. Even though Washington was slow to take a stance regarding the military response, its hesitation and backseat role could have influenced the Arab League to support the campaign (Mardell, BBC NEWS, 2011). If the US had made calls for an immediate intervention, it is possible that some member states of the Arab League would not have supported it.

Some views claim that the US administration was giving a “payback” to its European allies for their engagement in Afghanistan, which was hinted at by Secretary of State Clinton, (York 2011) when she stated;

“We asked our NATO allies to go into Afghanistan with us 10 years ago [...] They have been there, and a lot of them have been there despite the fact that they were not attacked. The attack came on us...they stuck with us. When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies...this was in their vital national interest...”

The perception that Libya would destabilize the region is another likely reason why the US was determined to take action. After Libya stopped its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and rejected terrorism in 2006, it was taken off the US’s blacklist of terrorism supporting countries. The US Liaison Office in Tripoli was promoted to an Embassy, in 2008 Condoleezza Rice became the first US Secretary of State to visit the country since 1953 (Blanchard, 2011). Concerns that Gaddafi would again start the development of WMD, or the country would become a safe haven for terrorists, were fuelled by the fighting in Libya. All these also would lead to more refugees from Africa to reach European shores.

The geography of Libya, consisting of 90 percent desert, made it a well suited place to take military action, which may have also contributed to support of the intervention. In addition, a rebel army on the ground would be of assistance for the coalition forces.

The US energy and economic interests in Libya have also been mentioned by a few observers and commentators (UPI, 2011). Europe had 85 percent of Libya's crude exports when the intervention began. Libya's crude exports to the US only accounted for five percent compared to Europe, which was about 0.5 percent of total US domestic oil consumption (International Energy agency, 2011). Internal conflict in Libya would reduce Libyan oil production severely and could damage the world economy through increased oil prices. Therefore, the already battered US economy as the world's largest economy and the second biggest export nation would also suffer from this situation.

The intervention in Libya had positive, but short term results. A four decades dictator was overthrown. The Libyan people had an opportunity to improve their living conditions in the country. The intervention in Libya cost much less than the war in Iraq and Afghanistan both in terms of blood and treasure. There was not a single US casualty, and the way the US intervened in Libya (with UN resolutions and international support) halted US unpopularity in the world, and restrained international concern over its use of force (Atkinson, 2012).

3.5. CONCLUSION: A SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION?

The factor of selectivity is a prominent detail of the intervention in Libya. Although Libya was not the only country that faced human rights atrocities during the Arab Spring, it was the only country at which the principle of the Responsibility to Protect was applied with haste, while there was no intervention in Syria, Bahrain, or Yemen.

This problematic issue proves the incongruence between moral standards and self-interest, as stated by Pattison ("The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention," p.

276). Stewart Patrick claims the United States intervened in Libya as it was an easy target and President Obama could push the standard of R2P to become a norm in international relations (Stewart Patrick, 2011). On the part of France, the intervention provided strength for Nicolas Sarkozy during his race for French presidential elections and also to enforce France's role in the international system. The Libyan intervention provided a chance for Britain to show its strength in world politics and to maintain the historical British-American partnership (Boesen and Larsen, 2011).

It seems that the international community agreed on intervention easily as Gaddafi was the rival. As an eccentric and controversial leader, in the West and Arab world, Gaddafi was depicted by the media as the villain, with Europe and the West being the protectors. The Western leaders pushing for the intervention played different roles during the decision-making process. France's President Sarkozy was at the forefront and chief motivator during the crisis. David Cameron was also in the lead, however the UK Prime Minister was more tactful in his push for an intervention. Their European colleague, Germany, abstained from the process entirely. The United States remained in the background allowing its European counterparts to be the primary decision makers. The political and military involvement from the US did however play an essential part in the intervention in Libya.

The controversy surrounding the intervention in Libya consists of opposing points of view. On the one side, Michael N. Schmitt states that the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Libya was in line with Resolution 1973 and therefore, legal. The no-fly zone was enforced following the decision of the UNSC that there was a threat to international peace as non-forceful measures could not resolve the conflict in Libya (Schmitt, 55-8). In opposition, Michael W. Doyle (March 2011) argues that the intervention in Libya displayed disregard for Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Doyle believes the civilian conflict in Libya did not hold a risk for international security and peace. He contends that the intervention was illegal, and thus a lesson on how the discretionary policy of intervention is followed by the Great Powers after the Cold War. Furthermore, Alex J. Bellamy (2011)

claims that the purpose of the intervention changed from saving civilians to regime change, which practically challenges the argument that this was an intervention undertaken for purposes of protection of civilians.

CONCLUSION

Arguably, the first time the Responsibility to Protect was implemented under Pillar 3 because a government was not able to protect its own population was the crisis in Libya. This was the first case in history that the Security Council allowed member states to do what was needed, aside from military invasion, in order to protect civilians and populated areas in Libya that were under attack of the regime. The 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya has been the focus of this thesis in an attempt to answer the question 'what were the main reasons for the European and American military intervention in Libya?'

The UNSC collectively endorsed the Resolution 1970, which clearly referred to R2P after broad and systematic violence towards the civilian population by the Libyan regime. As Gaddafi's Government continued carry out human rights atrocities, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya. With the exception of foreign occupation forces in Libya, the Security Council enabled member states to take "all necessary measures" in order to protect civilians under threat by Gaddafi's forces. NATO airstrikes against Gaddafi's army began a few days later and in accordance with resolution 1973. Some member states were dissatisfied with the NATO intervention and argued that NATO overstepped the authority of R2P.

The protection of citizens in Libya is an apparent and explicitly stated motive as to why an intervention was carried out. Protecting and preventing loss of civilian lives appears to be a true aim. Given that Gaddafi's threat to "cleanse Libya house by house" posed an imminent threat against the Libyan population, there were clear indications that larger losses of life could have occurred without an intervention. In this vein, the case of Libya became the first time a UN intervention has been carried out with the intention of protecting human rights, which strengthens the legitimacy of the R2P principle. Despite what is written on paper, it is widely debated that there were different motives behind the intervention in Libya, which have existed since the beginning. Some argue that the international community in general may have had the good intentions, the

same is not true for the leading interveners as they aimed for regime change rather than safeguarding human rights.

Despite the fact that the crisis in Libya quickly proved to be an R2P concern, the way R2P was implemented also showed how nations interfere selectively and not all the time (Current Intelligence, 27-09-2011). As Bellamy (2011, p. 22) argues, a comparison of the cases of Libya and Syria reveals that R2P crises are considered on a case-by-case basis, and the norm is not applied every time a country is in trouble, even if some aspects of the R2P can be realised.

As a result of the intervention in Libya, some scholars began to believe humanitarian interventions would become the norm in international response to armed conflicts, although in many respects this idea is false. The concept of 'realpolitik' in international relations is forgotten when applying that attitude. It became evident in this thesis that a state's interests are more prevalent in policy makers' decision to intervene in specific crises. Normative political ideals and standards are necessary elements in creating democratic self-conception. In spite of this, if the idea of engaging in a war for normative reasons is a concern of states' during the decision-making process, other considerations will be evaluated in order to understand if there are greater violations, other than normative reasons, occurring globally. Geographical interests, economics, and domestic concerns become more important than humanitarian conflicts when considering an intervention. The conflict in Libya does not prove an elevated significance in humanitarian interventions.

As mentioned previously, Martha Finnemore stresses the importance of human rights standards that have developed over the past decades. There have been fundamental shifts in the sense of a responsibility towards populations and in the importance of defending human rights in world politics. However, in seeking an answer to the second research question of this thesis, that is "have international norms generally changed in favour of the higher importance of humanitarian rights" the case of intervention in Libya rather remains an exception than a rule.

The belief that any Western government would intervene in a humanitarian crisis automatically is a misconception. It has become obvious that the concept of R2P is applied to humanitarian interventions only when taking action is not overly complicated as shown by the numerous rebellions that occurred during the Arab Spring. The application of the doctrine globally would be near impossible due to the number of humanitarian crises. The validity of the concept will decrease every time the R2P is considered, and then not executed, for a specific instance of violation.

Lastly, the quick response of the international community to the crisis in Libya is seen as a unique case. Nevertheless, it can hardly be argued the main motive of the leading states were humanitarian. An international response as in the crisis in Libya has yet to occur in the Syrian conflict. The international community still remains reluctant to intervene despite all the indicators that the Syrian authorities have failed to uphold their responsibility to protect the Libyan population.

In the light of its overall analysis, this thesis concludes that the intervention in Libya was not purely humanitarian oriented, but was rather driven by leading interveners' national interests. In this vein, while the case of Libya could have been the very first example of a genuine R2P implementation, it rather became a basis for challenging R2P as well as refusing any coercive action in Syria.

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APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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International Relations TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY

Date: *2/7/2015*

Thesis Title / Topic: *2011 Military Intervention in Libya: Prevalence of Realist Principles or Humanitarian Norms?*

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

02/07/2015
M. Ercan
Date and Signature

Name Surname: *Mustafa Abbas Hussain*

Student No: *1108129141*

Department: *International Relations*

Program:

Status: Masters Ph.D. Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

The permission from the Ethics Board is not required.

[Signature]
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mine Pinar GÖRAN ERCAN
(Title, Name Surname, Signature)



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Uluslararası İlişkiler ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 02/07/2015

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: 2011 Libya Askeri Müdahalesi: Realist ilkelere
veya İnsansı Normların Egemenliği?

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

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M. Ç. Ç. Ç.
Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: Mustafa Abbas Hussain
Öğrenci No: 1108129141
Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı:
Statüsü: Y.Lisans Doktora Bütünleşik Dr.

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

Etik Kurul iznine gerek yoktur.

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mine Pinar ÇİŞEN ERCAN
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APPENDIX 2: THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT



HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF *International Relations*

Date: *2./7/2015*

Thesis Title / Topic: *2011 Military Intervention in Libya: Prevalence of Realist Principles or Humanitarian Norms?*

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I respectfully submit this for approval.

02/07/2015

M. Ercan

Date and Signature

Name Surname: *Mustafa Abbas Hussain*

Student No: *108129141*

Department: *International Relations*

Program: *Master*

Status: Masters Ph.D. Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

M. Pinar Gözen Ercan
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mine Pinar GÖZEN ERCAN
(Title, Name Surname, Signature)



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Uluslararası İlişkiler ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 2.7.2015

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: 2011 Libya Askeri Müdahalesi: Realist

İlkelerin veya insani Normların Egemenliği?

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 700 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 02.07.2015 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 17'dir.

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Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

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02/07/2015
M. Ercan

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UYGUNDUR.

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