

Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Department of International Relations

RECONSTRUCTION OF JIHADIST DISCOURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Hacer COŞKUN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2014

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KABUL VE ONAY

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ABSTRACT

Coşkun, Hacer. Reconstruction of Jihadist Discourse in the Middle East after the First World War, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2014.

The politics of the Middle East is occupied by *jihadist* discourses because of its motivating role in military campaigns. *Jihad* is a Qur'anic term, which means it was determined in the Qur'an during period of Prophet Mohammed. However it is always subject to different interpretations according to situations they faced with. The classical military *jihad* was modified by state leaders in their state actions. The policies of state leaders shape the *jihad* understanding of Muslim or non-Muslim states. However the criteria of *jihad* were mostly changed after the First World War within states of the Middle East. Beside state leaders, the actors of non-state actors define their modern understanding of *jihad*. Different from classical understanding of *jihad*, contemporary *jihad* cannot be explained within a legal framework. This is why it is called as *jihadism*. The discourse on *jihadism* is constructed by the Middle Eastern actionist groups-whether justified or un-justified in international system- according to their needs.

The main of aim this thesis is explain how *jihad* discourses are constructed and given the meaning within identity of the Middle East after the Fisrt World War.

Keywords

jihad, jihadism, constructivism, discourse construction, non-state actors, Hamas, Hezbullah, Welfare Party

ÖZET

Coşkun, Hacer. Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Orta Doğu'da Cihad Söyleminin Yeniden Oluşturulması, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2014.

Orta Doğu siyaseti, askeri faaliyetlerdeki motive edici gücünden dolayı, cihad söylemleri ile doludur. Esasen cihad Kur'ani bir terimdir ve cihadın çerçevesi Hz. Muhammed tarafından Kur'an-ı Kerim'de belirlenmiştir. Ancak, zaman içinde siyasi durumlara bağlı olarak farklı cihad tanımları oluşmuştur. Klasik askeri cihad, halifeler tarafından ülkenin içinde bulunduğu duruma göre tanımlanmıştır. Nitekim halifeler aynı zananda devletin başında bulunurdu. Hem İslami hem diğer ülkelerin cihad anlayışı halife kabul edilen İslam devletleri liderlerinin politikaları tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Orta Doğu'da oluşan ulus devlet sistemi ile cihadın anlamı ve çerçevesi neredeyse tamamen değişmiştir. Devlet liderlerinin yanı sıra, devlet-dışı yapılanmaların liderleri de kendi cihad tanımlarını oluşturmuşlardır. Klasik cihad anlayışından farklı olarak, çağdaş cihad günümüz yasal sistemi içinde yer almamktadır. Bu yüzden, bu tanımları açıklamak için "cihadçılık" ifadesi kullanılmaktadır. Cihadçılık, uluslararası sistem kapsamında meşru ya da meşru olmayan şekilde, Orta Doğulu politik gruplar tarafından kendi ihtiyaçları ve istekleri doğrultusunda oluşturulmaktadır.

Bu tezin amacı, birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasıda Orta Doğu kimliği çerçevesinde cihad söyleminin nasıl yeniden oluşturulduğunu ve anlamlandırıldığını açıklamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

cihad, cihadçılık, sosyal inşaacılık, söylem oluşturma, devlet-dışı aktörler, Hamas, Hizbullah, Refah Partisi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GIA Armed Islamic Group in Algeria

IDF Israel Defence Force

IR International Relations

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

IMF International Monetary Fond

NGO Non-Governmental Organizations

NOP National Order Party

NSP National Salvation Party

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

VP Virtue Party

WP Welfare Party

9/11 September 11

\$ Dollar

% percent

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Islamic movements are presented as anti-modern, anti-democratic and violent activities which are backward-looking and enemies of Western culture and Western state systems in the global media. Surprisingly, current Islamists would probably agree with this statement to criticize modern Muslims specifically for neglecting Islamic values and practices. The current fundamentalist Islamic approach ignores the Islamic values which order social and political solidarity of humanity. However, it is hard to say that religion Islam is what is seen today.

Although there is a growing Islamic literature that challenges the current mainstream negative definition of Islam, the trauma of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks¹ seem to have reinforced the unfavorable tendency in global public mind to associate Islamism with anti-modernism and terrorism. Especially after 9/11, the global media intensified on the news about devastating attacks of radical Islamic groups. All this data suggests that non-Muslim public perceives Islam as a religion supporting violence.

In today's world, the most crucial debate lies on whether Islam commands aggressive continuous war against non-Muslims or it is based on enduring the world peace. For that point, it should be underlined that a religion is not defined as terrorist supporting motivation. Moreover, Islam is not the only religion which has been abused by radical groups. In South East Asia, Hindu radicalism generates violence, Jewish radicalism and Christian fundamentalism has engaged in overwhelming violent attacks in Europe and the United States² as well. However radical Islam is regarded as the threat which poses a political challenge in the modern world like no other radical religious movement.

¹ September 11, 2001 atatcks, refered as 9/11, were four coorporated attacks by al-Qaida to twin towers of World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon which was the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in Washington D.C. The attacks killed 2,996 people and caused at least \$10 billion in property and infrastructure damage in the USA. From that point the USA started up doctrine of war against terrorism which highly affected the world policy. See: CBC News, "Bin Laden claims responsibility for 9/11" on October 29, 2004 retrieved on 17. 12. 2014 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bin-laden-claims-responsibility-for-9-11-1.513654

² Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar, *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.1

On another occasion, literally Islam roots from *salam* that means peace. The crucial main aim of the holy text of Islam, Qur'an is that it orders enduring peace and avoiding use of force except self defense. None of the verses of Qur'an justifies the agrresive attacks or un-reasonable struggles. The problem is that some radical groups may manipulate Islamic verses according to their own wishes in order to create a just framework for their activities.

Essentially, any religion including Islam cannot be equated with terrorism. What has been observed is the manipulation of religious doctrines and the usage of religion as a tool by radical sinister groups. In order to understand how Islam is exploited in current world politics, analyzing changes in discourse on *jihad* can demonstrate the best examples. *Jihad* is the most crucial term which is used in every effort about Islam whether welcomed or blamed. The Islamic rules on war and peace are considered to be based on *jihad* understanding. Islamic political groups are in need of applying *jihad* to justify their actions. Therefore, the studies about discourse on *jihad* can present main Islamic perspective about war and peace.

This study focuses on how the Middle Eastern political actors run Islamic discourse on *jihad* as a political device in recent global political and social situation by using main framework of Constructivism. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is how *jihad* is utulized to mobilize the Middle Eastern people especially after the First World War. This study will also address following questions: How *jihad* is constructed after the First World War in the Middle Eastern politics? What are the changes in meaning of *jihad* throughout the history? What are the different usages of *jihad* in the Middle Eastern nation states? Finally, how the current discourse on *jihad* is applied by the most dominant jihadist groups in the Middle East?

Indeed *Jihad* is a Qur'anic term. It means that the definition of *jihad* is determined by Qur'an and it cannot be changed or re-interpreted according to Islamic rules. The rules and conditions of *jihad* were determined by Prophet Muhammed in the light of Qur'anic verses. In that scope, *jihad* was divided into two categories: inner *jihad* which belonged to individual's duty and collective *jihad* which requires the military of state. However, in today's world, collective *jihad* no longer carries its traditional meaning. It showed that the political actors use discourses, even it has clear meaning, according to political

conditions. This study will analyse this usage of *jihad* in a particular time and geography.

The concept of *jihad* has been applied by early Islamic states and empires to motivate people and generate legitimacy for their state affairs. On the contrary, contemporary radical Islamic movements have used discourse on *jihad* for destruction of current international system, overthrow state borders among Muslim societies and reconstruct *sharia* rules. Current Islamic radicalism contributes to violence and division within the Islamic world itself. Therefore, Islamism is perceived as a threat to liberal-democratic ideals of world system. That misperception occurs because leaders in Muslim societies use Islamic discourses for their interests. Since discourse change from *jihad* to *jihadism* reflects how Islam has been manipulated as a political device in the Middle East, this study will present significant understanding about how Islam is affected by the Middle East politics.

In addition, study on *jihadism* is necessary in order to understand straightforward definition of *jihad* which has already lost its meaning in recent history. The international community has confronted with destructiveness of *jihad* affairs many times but the biggest one is 9/11 in 2001. Due to all these devastating attacks, *jihad* has been called synonymous with terrorism or warfare. However, it is well known that *jihad* begins with verses of Qur'an, and early and imperial expansion of Islam cannot be explained with terrorism. Therefore, *jihad* can be more complicated term than association of it with aggressive campaigns. This study shows also the reason behind that misunderstanding.

This study is divided into four chapters. After this introductory part, the first chapter will show how identities and discourses shape the politics of the Middle East. In order to understand *jihadist* motivations, identity motivations of the Middle Eastern states should be presented. The constructivist approach can be utilized to analyze discourse on *jihad* after the First World War because of its focus on identity and discourse formation. Generally, Constructivism argues that all human activity, including politics, is understood by the meaning that people give to their world and that such meaning is

intersubjectively constructed with the events and institutions in the world³. In order to explain position of *jihadist* organizations in international relations, Constructivist idea of International Relations draws a framework by applying reasonable questions. By explaining identity, non-state actors and discourse construction process, Constructivism presents a framework about how *jihad* is modified to attract people's attention and support. The studies of Alexander Wendt's on norms in society and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's writings on international norm dynamics and political change will compel these analyses. With the rise of constructivism in International Relations in the 1970s and 1980s, norms have made a marked return. Power of ideas shape understandings of national interests.

In the second chapter, conceptual and historical framework of *jihad* will be analyzed. Since jihad begins with history of Islam, the basis of jihadist arguments, even today, is located in Qur'anic verses and hadiths. At the same time, the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad must be examined as early examples of *jihad* applications are found in those times, and then the ramifications of the great Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries followed that guidance. Even if this study does not aim to present religious features of jihad, understanding definition of jihad lies in religious sources. The second part of this chapter will present different definitions of jihad throughout the history. Islam begins with peaceful proclamations, now continues with aggressive discourses. More importantly, the calls for *jihad* were considered as a legal issue within framework of international norms even in the time of political Islam in the Middle Eastern states which were established within nationalism. However, in today's world, *jihad* discourses have not any valid, peaceful or solidarity supporting features. This tremendous shift can only be seen in historical process of Islamic military campaigns. In different historical period, different international characters gave different meanings to jihadist practices. Therefore, definition of jihad can be studied in its historical context.

The third chapter analyzes political and social conditions of the Middle East after the First World War which led to changes in discourses of Islam. The most dramatic effects

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³ Brenda Shaffer, *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 2006) p.50

of the war were experienced in the Middle Eastern societies. The map was totally changed in the region. In addition to historical ones, the new states emerged. The homeland of Islam was introduced with secular state structure. The new system changed not only political features but also social values of the Middle Eastern societies. The new leaders were able to establish new order and gained the support of the people. People were aware that the old system had already been corrupted and was not reliable. However, Islam had never abandoned the Middle Eastern politics. Islamic discourses have always played a crucial role in lives of societies even when it lost its domiminance in the politics. In this chapter, the usage of *jihad* will be examined in three periods: consolidation period of nation-states, reign of political Islam and the period of radicalization of Islamic discourses. *Jihad fatwas* (religious declaration) have been used by state religious staff and non-governmental *ulemas* (Religious men) to motivate people and gain support of people. All kinds of *jihad* discourses will be analyzed within social and political framework and different usages will be compared. The socioeconomic conditions that result in changes of Islamic discourses will be included.

The final chapter will analyze how *jihad* motivations attract people's interests in the post-First World War in the Middle East by using three important examples: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Welfare Party in Turkey. Actually, current International Relations studies regard Al-Qaida in Afghanistan as the most dominant jihadist organization especially after attacks on the Twin Towers of World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. In addition, the activities of Al-Qaida attract reflections of the Middle Eastern leaders and people either by supporting /contributing or blaming/rejecting the actions. Al-Qaida will not be analyzed in that study because it is not a Middle Eastern organization, but its effects on the Middle Eastern jihad activities will be included. Besides, three Middle Eastern parties which are formed in response the regional and local political developments are chosen to strengthen the arguments of this study. First, Lebanese Shii'te movement Hezbollah is unique organization which has recognized and illegal branches in Lebanon politics. Even if it has entered into political campaigns as a legal party, the organization has never dissolved its military branch to continue its military jihad. Second, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya-Islamic Resistance Movement) which has pursed its jihad for gaining independence and establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine territories will be illustrated in this study. *Jihad* propaganda for Palestinian cause had already started as soon as Jewish settlement began in the Middle Eastern territories, and it reaches its peak point with activities of Hamas. Finally, Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) in Turkey and its *jihad* propaganda within framework of Turkish secular structure will be indicated. Of course, the *jihad* propagandas of Welfare Party are much more different than other political organizations because of its focus on social lives of people rather than regime types of the domestic state. Welfare Party as fully legal organization under its state system showed that *jihad* is not totally rejectionist ideology. All three organizations blame foreign international powers for pressure on Muslim societies but their focus will be different.

In conclusion, the current *jihad* call of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham organization will be mentioned. The last *jihad* call is not so different than contemporary *jihad* discourses. The main aim is the reconstruction of the caliphate which was abolished by new Turkish Republic in order to unite all Muslims against other allies. The changes after the First World War in the Middle East have been perceived as threats against the well-being of Islam and Muslim identity. This perception has affected behaviours of Middle Eastern organizations and *jihad* has become the tool for alarming all Muslims to take necessary precautions.

CHAPTER 1:

CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF JIHADISM

This chapter defines and conceptualizes how Islamic discourse on *jihad* is politicized after the First World War in the Middle East. The answer will be searched within the framework of Social Constructivism of International Relations (IR) with its hypothesis about identity, non-state actors and construction of discourses.

Constructivism is the approach derived from sociology that has been applied to the dicipline of International Relations. It is characterized with emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action⁴. Having been active in studies of IR since the late 1980s and particularly since the mid-1990s, the constructivist approach is based on criticism of traditional neo-realist and neo-liberal theories (rationalist theories)⁵.

Constructivism does not dismiss material and strategic interests in international relations. On the contrary, these interests are defined in the context of norms, ideas and identities. Constructivism only adds moral values to be considered in analysis of state affairs. The international relations are seen as social life and state and non-state actors are perceived as social actors which are shaped by the international society⁶. This study will use Constructivist assertions about identity, non-state actors and discourse construction.

In this chapter, firstly Constructivist approaches about identity, non-state actors and constructed discourses in international relations will be examined and then Middle Eastern identity, non-state actors and discourse construction will be explained by using main arguments of Constructivism.

⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism", *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill, at al. (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2001), p.189

⁵ Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention", *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1996) p.3-4

⁶ Halim Rane, *Reconstructing Jihad amid Competing International Norms* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.118

1.1. BASIC IDEAS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

1.1.1. Identities and Interest in the World Politics

One of the main contributions of constructivist theory is its emphasis to concepts of identity and interest in the world politics. Contrary to rationalist theories, Social Constructivism does not define interest as a fixed and given material thing (geography, distribution of power, technology, etc.); rather it talks about socially constructed interests of actors⁷. It should also be noted that Constructivism rejected the state-based international system arguing that in international relations interests of non-state organizations addition to interests of states should be taken into consideration. Therefore, Constructivism offers more social and idea-based explanation which can help to understand acts of international actors. Values (ideas, interests, norms, rules, knowledge, etc) should be taken into consideration because of its role as determining factor for behavior of international actors⁸. Constructivists assert that "what actors do in international relations; the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas, rather than by objective or material conditions."

Constructivist mentors contend that identity factors are always critical for analysing International Relations. Identity (self- perception) is defined as the reason of all actions since it is the explanation of how they are perceived by significant "others" For Constructivist perspective, the main target in international relations is the identity of state in other names, collective identity. The state identity determines the "self" according to "others". The background reasons of the acts of states cannot be understood without considering their identity determinants. As leading Constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt states that "Identities are the basis of interests." According to constructivist assumption, identity depends on historical, cultural, political, and social backgrounds of actors. Contrary to realist paradigm which argues that material structures like balance of military power have causal effect on states behavior,

⁷ Mahdi Mohammad Nia, "Understanding Iran's Foreign Policy: An Application of Holistic Constructivism" *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2010), p.150

⁸ Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism", *Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 252

⁹ Ibid., p.263

¹⁰ Mahdi Mohammad Nia, op.cit., p.151

constructivists claim that "systems of shared idea, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action." Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain behavior 12. Therefore it can be said that without interests, identities are unnecessary and without identities interests have no direction. The emergence of identity is based on interaction among actors. Development of identities such as friend or rival, competitor or ally is formed by social interactions of international actors 13. The identity of a state determines its preferences and consequent actions 14. State figures out others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice.

Constructivism views international politics through the lens of identity, that is, the specific and more or less stable set of meanings that agents attribute to themselves. Since such meanings derive in large part from one's surroundings, identity can also be defined as "a social category that an individual member either takes a special pride in or views as a more-or-less unchangeable and socially consequentially attribute." When applied to the state, the concept of identity refers to the collective understanding that shapes the assumptions and goals that underlies its policies.

According to constructivists, different identities construct different international systems. Wendt argues that "If states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the system will be anarchic. If they identify with a world state it will be hierarchical... And if they identify with each other, such as that they have a collective identity in which each is bound to cooperate with the other, they would constitute a decentralized authority system."¹⁶

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¹¹ Christian Reus-Smit, op. cit., p.217.

¹² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.231

¹³ Jennifer Sterling- Folker, *Making Sense of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p.118

¹⁴ Ted Hoph, "Promise of Constructivism" *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer, 1998) 175 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,"

International Organization, vol.54, i.4 (Autumn 2000).p 848

¹⁶ Alexander Wendt "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 2, (June 1994)p. 393

1.1.2. Constructivism and Non-State Actors

Constructivist perspective does not neglect the centrality of states in shaping international system. However, importance of non-state actors should be underlined due to their effective roles on state behavior¹⁷. Some mainstream theoretical literature on regime neclects the presence of non state actors whether they are business or social movement organizations. Non-state actors and their preferences should be given more emphasis than rationalist theories do.

The power of non-state actors in international politics can be drawn witin framework of their impresses on decision making process of national states. In addition, the non-state organizations re-shape the discourses in order to give meaning to a certain practice ¹⁸. The actors formulate or re-evaluate the rules and norms to understand the world around them, and to position themselves in relation to others. Their activities and economic situations give them important power to influence the world events. In recent world politics, the power of non-governmental organizations can not be neglected in that situation.

According to Constructivists, the political activities of non-state actors in international politics consist of following three processes: naming, framing and campaigning. 'Naming' refers to the process of defining properties, events, processes, etc. in certain politically relevant ways; 'framing' to the process of bringing elements together in a more or less coherent story; and 'campaigning' to the process of spreading this story into societies and political systems in order to challenge and change dominant political discourses¹⁹.

Another important point for development role of non-state actors is called as transnationalism. From 1990s, active performances of transnational civil society have functioned in global level and affected the decisions of national states and international organizations. Their activities permit the direct expression and pursuit of a variety of

¹⁷ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.9

¹⁸ Maarten A Hajer, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p.42-70

¹⁹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

human interests²⁰. The effects of these movements are not to replace the states but to embed their interests into state agendas.

In Constructivist perspective, the role of non-state actors is well-defined. If values are determinant factor in international relations, non-state actors keep strategic place because of their discursive power. Although neo-liberalism accepts presence of non-state actors, it cannot determine the way how they shape the international relations.

1.1.3. Importance of Discourse in Constructivism

The final point for Constructivism involves study of discourse (narratives, rhetoric, speech acts, etc). If the social world is linguistically constructed, discourses should be analyzed in order to understand international movements. From constructivist perspective, discourses are socially constructed via social interactions of actors²¹. Therefore, globalization (since it catalyzes social interactions) makes discourses more affective. Since the fundemental target of that study is about globalization, the effect of globalization on discourses will be explained.

The central theme about globalization is its character of diffusion. Diffusion is about how particular organizational model, practice, norm, strategy or belief spreads within population²². Even if there is adversity of the model in globe, over time that diversity yields to conformity and convergence around single model. There used to be various state structures, economic activities, free trade models in the globe, however now the world is organized around nation-state, market economy and multilateral international organizations for trade agreements respectively²³. Norms of humanitarianism, citizenship, military intervention, human rights, trade and environmental have helped to organize world politics, define purpose of state behaviors and shape the appropriate activities.

²⁰ John Gerard Ruggie, "Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Practices" *Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series*, July 2004, p.33

²¹ Jennifer Sterling- Folker, op.cit., p.120

²² Michael Barnett, op. cit., p.264

²³ Ibid.,p.265

In Constructivist analysis, there are four important way of diffusion in globe ²⁴: First, it can occur from coercion or strategic competition. Colonialism and great power imposition impositions were central in the spread of capitalism. Secondly, formal and informal pressures can make states adopt superior models because doing so will bring them their needed resources. To survive and sustain their activities, states are ready to adopt and reform their institutions. For instance, the Third World states accepted IMF's recommendations not only for trusting it but also for wishing to receive loan. Thirdly, during period of uncertainty, the state leaders tend to choose models which are perceived as successful or legitimate. For example many Third World governments have adopted less military based defensive system because they wanted to show that they were part of the club. Fourthly professional associations and expert communities expand organizational model in globe. Once a standard is established by consensus of experts, they communicate the standards to others. Hence they become an agent of diffusion. The diffusion is ended with internationalization of norms. Proper behaviors establish and diffuse among population²⁵.

The international organizations play important role in diffusions of norms and values to other geographies. The agents educate the behaviours of the society to act properly within new situation. International institutions have the ability to socialize agents in the society. Socialiation is defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community²⁶. The socialization ends with internalizations of the norms in given society. The society learns what are appropriate behaviors and the people begin to think that these behaviors are right things to do.

Emanuel Adler,"Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.3, i.3, (1997) p.319-363

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* vol.50 i.4 (1998) p.904

²⁴ Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?" *The Annual Review of Sociology*, vol.33, (2007) p. 449–472 and also

of International Relations ,vol.3, i.3, (1997) p.319-363
²⁵ Rodger A. Payne, "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction" *European Journal of International Relations*,vol.7, i.1 (2001) p.37–61 and also

²⁶ Kai Alderson "Making Sense of State Socialization" *Review of International Studies* (2001) v.27 i.3 pp:415

Schimmelfennig determines the role of agents in socialization as intergovernmental reinforcement which refers to a situation in which an international institution offers the government of the target state positive incentives on the condition that it adopts and complies with the institution's norms²⁷. Behavioral adaptation in line with community norms is more likely under the following conditions: (1) Targeted governments expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance (Intergovernmental Reinforcement). Targeted societal actors expect the costs of putting pressure on the government to be lower than the benefits of conditional external rewards and these actors are strong enough to force the government to comply with the international norms (Transnational Reinforcement)²⁸.

1.2. MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR FROM CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

1.2.1. Construction of the Middle Eastern Identity after the First World War

Identity determines who are "us" and who are "others". Stimulated by industrial revolution, European development created a new political system which included new concepts such as nationalism, self-determination, or institutionalism. Different from other movements, the new European political identity aimed to impose European values to everywhere in globe. European leaders thought that the European values could bring peace in the world. However, the Middle East societies had not institutions who internalize the European values. Therefore, it can be normal for the Middle East societies to reject the new system.

Destructing two World Wars led to changes in perception of war in international politics. The leaders of winning states began to create a new world system in which war should be avoided and the peace would be aimed among international relations. The Western norms (liberal democracy, humanitarianism, nationalism and the most importantly secularism, etc) were seen the only values that can prevent war; therefore

²⁸Frank Schimmelfennig *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 273:

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²⁷ Jeffrey T. Checkel *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p.10-11

the leaders of powerful Western states collaborated with other state leaders to establish Western norms in each part of the world.

In the 19th century Europe, boundaries of existing states were re-drawn according to each population's unique culture, history, language or religion. When unification was achieved on one common identity, other differences were considered as multicultural diversity so peace was caught²⁹. The Western identity created new norms which would dominate all globe. However, not all parts of the world welcomed the new international norms. Especially the identity of the Middle Eastern people could not fit with Western based international norms, which led to the emergence of many conflicts between the Middle Eastern states and the Western powers.

European elites saw that the peace can be achieved only in this way and they developed an idea that the other territories should follow them for world peace. It is the time when European leaders began to impose their state norms to other societies. However, their imposing initiatives would be considered as effors restricting other's freedom and hurt them. Because this initiative was saying that "we are really right, you are wrong." However this feeling of realness will not able to heal any problem in other territories of the globe.

In the twenty first century, the world has witnessed a historic change in the approach to war and peace. Efforts to persuade the public to support policies and ideologies have become an increasingly important activity of government in democracies, demanding ever greater resources, skill, and attention. Ideas now have to be presented, argued, and defended in public discourse. Therefore in order to prevent prospective wars, democratic values should be imposed in other geographies. However, different societies would show different reactions to new international order.

²⁹ Matthew J. Hoffmann, "Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle" *Technical Report, Department of Political Science and International Relations* (The USA: University of Delaware, 2003), p.7

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²⁹ Astrid Boening, "Euro-Islam: A Constructivist Idea or A Concept of English School" *EUMA Report*, vol.4, i.12 (May 2007), p.3

³⁰ Ruper A. Neimeyer, "Deconstructing 9/11: A Constructivist Commentary" *The Humanistic Psychologist*, vol.30, i.3 (August 2010) p.293-305

Like other parts of the world, the Middle Eastern politics have also changed tremendously in this period. At the dawn of the twenty-first century the Middle East and North Africa comprised a world of nearly 400 million people, divided into twenty-one states. The majority of these states, eighteen in all, were Arab, while three others were Turkish, Iranian and Israeli. On its frontiers were other countries, historically and strategically separate, but linked by culture, belief and trade³¹.

After the Second World War, the Western societies enjoyed rights and privileges as never before in the history³². However what was the new situation means for Muslims in the Middle East was a crucial question. The new Muslim nationalist leaders in the Middle East had to abandon almost all traditional ruling values to adopt a new system. The transformation was not irritable since nationalist leaders had already gained the support of their citizens. People were ready to support anything whether traditional or modern that can rescue them from economic and social problems. However, all expectations ended with the failure of the nationalist leaders. The background of crisis in the Arab world is that all existing varieties of Western norms lack not only social and institutional but also cultural roots³³. Therefore these institutions would not meet the demand of Muslim societies.

The Muslim scholars began to talk about confrontation between Islam and the West against Western domination in globe. As an illustration, Khurshid Ahmad determined the shape of Islamic economics. Edward Said's Orientalism provided Islamic ideas challenge to Western scholars³⁴. Debate about religious identity, ethnic revivalism, diverse political discourses as well as questioning of modernity became core topics in Middle East intellectual searches. The confrontation between universal ideology of Islam and modern national discourses brought tension in Middle East societies. During

³¹ Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.75

³² Akbar S. Ahmad, "Postmodernist Perception of Islam: Observing and Observer" *Asian Survey*, vol.31, i.3 (March, 1991) p.214

³³ Bassam Tibi, "Political Islam as a Forum of Religious Fundamentalism and the Religionisation of Politics: Islamism and the Quest for a Remaking of the World" *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, v. 10, i. 2 (June 2009) p.111

³⁴ Bassam Tibi "Islam, Freedom and Democracy in the Arab World" (ed.) Michael Emerson, *Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood* (2005), Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, p.97

that time numerous academics, many Islamic experts disregared their role of neutral observers and became active participants.

Although tolerance and compassion are accepted as the key elements in Islamic ideal, lack of proper understanding distorts perceptions which results in the negative images of Islam. After emergence of Political Islam in the Middle East, the negative images of Islam in the Western media have been appeared: establishment of the OPEC, hijacking passenger planes by Islamist activists, attacking Western embassies, Islamic leaders like Gaddafi and Khomeini who were shown as embodiments of evil, etc³⁵. All these media images made Islam threatening and fanatic in the eyes of global public.

Western politicians and academicians failed to understand how the Middle Eastern societies would react to these new values. Firstly, they thought that religious wars had already been ahistoric. Crusade or fatah conquest era is over and will not be continued³⁶. The international community accepts modern international law and religious expansionist movements are not included in this new system. Secondly; Western elites condemned Arab Muslim societies for not bypassing religious political culture. Many intellectuals living in democratic societies are failed to see the relations between religiously grounded cultures and political cultures³⁷.

Since Western politicians failed to understand why the Middle Eastern people moved towards Islamic system, they produced a misperception about Islam arguing that Islam is the reaction, so threat, to the new democratic system. Nonetheless, the Islamic movements emerged with the aim of toppling local governing rulers in Muslim societies. At first, the purpose was not international system or states outside Middle East. The international relations of the Middle East formed under that main misunderstanding.

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³⁵ Akbar S. Ahmad,op.cit., p.216

³⁶ Walid Phares, *War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave McMillan,2007) p.56

³⁷ Ibid.,p. 57

1.2.2. Non-State Actors in the Middle East

After the First World War in the Middle East, the traditional political actors defined themselves within changing conditions and new actors were born as well. Like other geographies of the world, the Middle Eastern political system has hosted modern kinds of non-governmental organizations addition to national states. However the Middle Eastern politics also harbor active violent non-state actors which target elimination of national states contrary to other liberal states.

The traditional Middle Eastern system had a kind of civil society organizations called as waqf which were community based on self-enduring groups, guilds, and religiously oriented charity and educational institutions funded by Islamic endowments. Nevertheless, within nation-state system, professional organizations, trade unions, cultural clubs and Islamic organizations came into existence³⁸. In the 1950s and 1960s various professional organizations and trade unions had significant influence but the Islamist associations have become the most important part of current Middle Eastern societies.

The Middle Eastern civil society contributes to regional networking and fostering new cooperation. Besides, globalization further increases awareness and stimulates the growth of networks with actors external to the Middle East³⁹. Being the most strong civil groups, Islamist NGOs and movements can contribute to placing regional issues on the agenda and also to creating a new regional dynamic to challenge traditional state structures. These movements are Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, Islamist groups in Iraq, or Hamas in the Palestinian areas, and many more. Although very different in their settings, they all represent regional resistance and challenge the deficits in democracy and the development problems in the existing state structures⁴⁰.

Walter Laqueur states that a strong emphasis on *jihad* as holy war stems largely from general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Arab nations, combined with fear of

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³⁸ Michael Schulz, "The Role of Civil Society in Regional Governance in the Middle East" in *Civil Society and International Governance*, ed. David Armstrong at al.(New York: Routledge, 2010) p.171-172

³⁹Ibid., p.168-169

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.177

and resistance to western influences⁴¹. The dissatisfaction with the corrupting influence of the West contributed to the group's radicalization.

1.2.3. Discourse Construction in the Middle East After the First World War

After the First World War, when the winners of war headed by Woodrow Wilson, determined the ideal world system, they failed to realize perceptions of people and characters of societies. Unfortunately, colonial masters made many mistakes in drawing lines; they could not read the situations and consequences⁴². British diplomat and historian Harold Nicholson wrote about a tragicomic event in a post-War meeting of winners in 1919. "In the meeting Balkans were carved up, during which Prime Minister David Lloyd George mistakes the standard geographer's colors green (for valleys) and brown (for mountains) for Greeks and Turks and, pointing at Scala Nova, colored green, tells the Italian delegates, 'You can't have that; it's full of Greeks!' Full of green valley; I told him, but very few Greeks."

The military *jihad* came out as a consequence of this colonial period. The new *jihad* was emerged as a response to colonialism and imperialism as well as to capitalism and modernity.

After the First World War, like other parts of the world, Middle Eastern societies were introduced with idea of nationalism which became dominant force in globe. For European societies, nationalism has become the most prominent political force throughout the history so Europeans used nationalism in very effective way. With the help of nationalist discourses, common culture and history were emphasized⁴⁴. First of all, in 1814 the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule started a nationalist history. National self-determination was perceived as the condition for the progress of liberty. Secondly, Europe determined its state borders with nationalist discourses. European boundaries

⁴¹ Walter Laqueur, *No End to War, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: The Continuum Publishers, 2007) p.49

⁴²Walid Phares, War of Ideas, op.cit. p.42

⁴³ Harold George Nicholson, *Peace-Making: 1919* (New York: Harcourt and Brace & Co., 1939), Chapter IV

⁴⁴ Benjamin Babar, *Jihadism vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) p.211

could be shaped by nationalist characteristics⁴⁵. Thanks to hopeful achievements, European intellectuals have put the religious values in less important level.

In the same period, international community set modern norms of international legal system. The Muslim World was divided into autonomous dynasties and emirates. However, new ideal principles were not accepted by the extreme totalitarian and fundamentalist elites in the Middle East. Falling under new borders and colonialist regimes, intellectual elites clashed over global ideological features⁴⁶.

The period between 1920 and 1945 witnessed the first experiment in democratic ideals which encountered reversals in Europe with the emergence of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Bolshevik Russia. The withdrawal of the United States from the League of Nations further weakened the very first international organization to seek a sound coexistence among nation-states. Western Europe was facing the rise of Fascism and the totalitarian East, as well as juggling the weight of its own sizable colonies in Africa and South Asia; the USA was absenting itself through isolationism; East Asian tensions were building; Latin American development was isolated and struggling against the rise of populism and militarism; and Muslim identity conflicts were evolving ⁴⁷. With all of these tensions in play, the world was heating up for a global conflict and one of the results was the Second World War.

Meanwhile, the colonial masters encourage the formation of Western style nationalist secular states in the Muslim lands. The old Middle Eastern political powers could not gain chance to get an active role, which led them aggressive opposition activities including arm struggle⁴⁸. The new Middle Eastern states were established with divided and weak foundations. Consequently, it is inevitable that the Middle Eastern people regarded Western powers as source of all political turmoils in their lands.

For radical Muslim groups, Western policies towards Muslim societies cannot be explained with peaceful purposes. Global *jihadists* argue that the Muslim world is suffered by prolonged and aggressive assaults from West, like Crusades. In addition,

46 Walid Phares, War of Ideas; op.cit., p.115-116

⁴⁵ Ibid., p-211-220

⁴⁷ Ibid n 116

⁴⁸ Sarah E. Zabel, "The Military Strategy of Global Jihad" *USAWC Strategy Research Project*, (March 2007) p.4

these groups would not be opposed only foreing powers but also rejected the local governmentments which accept Western systems. Also, current Western-inspired Islamic governments were seen as harming Islam and future of Muslim societies⁴⁹.

The Muslim groups's resistance to change would lead to emergence of aggressive groups which do not recognize the new international norms and principles. The nationalism cannot regulate the identity of the Muslim societies since Islam orders unity of all Muslims under *umma*. The new radical groups validate their policies arguing that Christianity has always fought against Islam. Hence the Islamist movements which adopt doctrine of *jihadism* see themselves as a part of continuation of these conflicts. The *jihadists* constitute a threat to nations and governments in world politics so pose threat to existing international security. The *jihadist* wars have damaged security of all societies and civilians in globe including Muslim because the idea of *jihadism* conflicts with new form of Muslim states as well. Globalization has diffuses the new norms in globe and Muslim elites have modified new system to their states, even they never give up using Islamic values in political sphere totally.

Contemporary *jihadists* have also been waged against Muslims themselves. In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, *jihad* was fought between two Muslim states. During the Gulf War, Iraq declared a *jihad* against the USA-led coalition that included many Muslim nations. In Algeria, Egypt and Afghanistan (after the Soviets left), there have been *jihadist* wars waged that pitted Muslims against Muslims⁵⁰. The contemporary *jihadists* define themselves to be as real Muslims, all others should be target of their war. The basic arguments of these early scholars lay difference between *jahilliya* and true Islam period. The current nationalist states are defined as societies which are unaware of Islam (like Arab societies before Islam). The only solution is returning the dynamics of the early Islamic period which is described as golden age of Islam. Islam cannot be lived only with being conservative and praying. Opposed the Westernized modernization, the

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⁴⁹ Ibid,. p.6

⁵⁰ Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, *Jihad and International Security*, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006) p.10

scholars supported the Islamic model of modernization⁵¹. The religion should be the catalyzing item to awake the society and struggle against infidels.

The most dramatic event of *jihadism* is of course, the Al-Qaida attacks to Twin Towers and Pentagon in the USA in September 2001. The attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 drew intellectuals' attention, to the phenomenon of international '*jihadist*' terrorism. Since then, a wide-ranging debate has developed both in public as well as among various experts but focuses on the ways in which threats are being perceived, rightly or wrongly, in different national publics⁵². The academicians use the word "*jihad*" as militant construction which pursues dogmatic and violent practices⁵³.

All these arguments show that political dimensions of the Middle East cannot be understood without considering its identity. Aini Linjakumpu states that "It is possible to understand political Islam better by considering the meaning of identity. Particularly since the Cold War, the debate about identity has been lively because it is thought to have a specific role in generating conflicts. People's self-understanding and identity have thus become increasingly essential in directing political research and practices. ⁵⁴"

Conclusions

The Middle Eastern political identity was re-shaped after the First World War and many new conflicts emerged as a result. Thus, it is highly needed that identities and norms of the Middle Eastern politics should be evaluated in order to understand the reasons of emergence of *jihadist* organizations. All activities are percived within the framework that people give to their world and that such meaning is inter subjectively constructed with the events and institutions in the world. As a result, culture and material interests are seen as a nexus that cannot be separated. Constructivists claim that culture shapes

⁵¹ Anthony H. Johns and Nelly Lahoud, *Islam in World Politics*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) p: 13-14

⁵² Christoph O. Meyer, "International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization? A Constructivist Approach to Understanding Cross-national Threat Perceptions and Responses" *Cambridge Review of International Relations*, vol.22, i.4 (18 December 2009) p.647-666

⁵³ Benjamin Babar, op.cit., p.40

⁵⁴ Aini Linjakumpu, *Political Islam in The Global World* (Great Britain: Ithaca Press, 2008) p.15

foreign policy decisions, because politics in general and the interests of a state are shaped by shared meanings held by people in a state⁵⁵.

For example; the September 11, 2001, attacks on the USA triggered a heightened resurgence of emphasis on culture and, especially, of religion in foreign policy research and among the press and policy- makers. The events indicate that culture is a leading factor in foreign policies of states, especially in the case of Islam's role in the foreign policies of Muslim-populated states⁵⁶. All these events can be understood within constructivist perspective.

In the light of this background, it is clear that Middle Eastern political structure has been moulded after the First World War, which led to the emergence of new conflicts. The most crucial discourse, *jihad*, has been modified within that political and social atmosphere. In the subsequent chapters, what kind of Middle Eastern structure is established and how *jihad* is used within that political framework will be examined.

55 Brenda Shaffer, op.cit., p.13

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⁵⁶ Ibid., p.12

CHAPTER 2:

DEFINITION OF THE JIHAD

It can be argued that, one of the most significant concepts in history of Islam is *jihad*. The roots of *jihad* can be traced to the outset of Islam. Even after the first one hundred years, *jihad* would remain a primary means of expansion in Islam. *Jihad*, like other words taken from a religious context, has a long history and a complex set of meanings. In that chapter, a conceptual and historical framework of *jihad* will be displayed in order to show historical process of transition of jihad and how it has been defined throughout the history of Islam.

This chapter analyses what are the different meanings of *jihad* and in what circumstances those meanings were used. Initially, different definitions of *jihad* and *jihadism* which is the recent politicized of *jihad* will be demostrated. Then, historical process of *jihad* will be examined.

2.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1. Definition of Jihad

"Jihad" is a very controversial term. Many people have a conflicting idea that jihad means war or holy war. In the dictionary, it is defined as a religious duty imposed on Muslims to spread Islam by waging war⁵⁷. In that context the opposite of jihad should be "peace" however no document supports this argument. Therefore, jihad cannot be equal to "war" or "holy war" and "war" becomes inadequate explaining Islamic jihad. Jihad is beyond "war" and needs to be defined more clearly.

About definition of *jihad*, not only Western opinions but also Islamic scholars do not share a common understanding⁵⁸. Probably no term in Islamic context has that much different definition. For example, Daniel Pipes defines *jihad* as a "legal, compulsory,

⁵⁷ Enclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/303857/jihad Retrived on 21 05 2014

⁵⁸ Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006) p. 3

communal effort to expand the territories ruled by Muslims at the expense of territories ruled by non-Muslims⁷⁵⁹. However, another important researcher Walid Phares regards *jihad* as theological and ideological thing. Theologically it is constant effort on behalf of *Allah*. Ideologically, he defines jihad as a concept to mobilize the wars in Muslim states throughout the history⁶⁰. For Islamic community, the term *jihad* is defined in two conflicting ways. Hanbali School⁶¹ describes *jihad* as spending personal power and energy in the way of *Allah*. On the contrary, Maliki School defines *jihad* as battle against *Kafir* (infidels) and war against infidels⁶².

Etymologically speaking, the Arabic word *jihad* literally is rooted by "*jhd*" which means "striving for something." In Islamic discourses it is frequently followed by "*fi sabil illah*" (in the path of *Allah*). With this formation, it refers effort made for the sake of *Allah* and his cause⁶³. On the other hand, striving for individual or national power, dominance, glory, wealth, prestige or pride cannot be considered as *jihad* in Islam⁶⁴. Therefore it can mean any kinds of effort to promote benefit or to prevent any kind of evil.

The *jihad* has external and internal aspects as mentioned in hadiths⁶⁵ of Prophet Muhammed. The external *jihad* is called as lesser *jihad* (*al-Jihadu 'l-asghar*) against infidels. It is to fight in arm struggle against oppression. On the other hand, internal *jihad* is called as greater *jihad* (*al-Jihadu'l-Akbar*) which is against one's own lusts⁶⁶. It is defined as struggle of each Muslim to overcome their faults and wrongful actions. To

⁵⁹ Daniel Pipes, "What is Jihad?" *Washington Post*, December 31, 2002, retrieved on 10.05.2013 from http://www.danielpipes.org/990/what-is-jihad

⁶⁰ Walid Phares, War of Ideas, op.cit. p: 33-35

⁶¹ Hanbali is one of the four classical schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. The Sunnis are mostly followers of the four recognized schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. A minority are Salafi/Wahhabi, who historically arose from Hanbali school. Among the Shi'is, the Ja'faris or Ithna'ashari ('Twelver') are thebiggest group, followedby the Zaydis and the Ismailis.

⁶² Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op.cit., p.43

⁶³ Diane Morgan, *Essential Islam: A Comprehensive Guide to Belief and Practice* (London: Greenwood Publication, 2010) p.87

⁶⁴ Richard Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden* (London and New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.27

⁶⁵ Sayings and acts of Prophet Muhammad.

⁶⁶ Dictionary of Islam, http://answering-islam.org/Books/Hughes/j.htm retrieved on 10.05.2013

sum up, *jihad* is defined as personal struggle in the way of *Allah* to keep evil away from himself and holy war against infidels⁶⁷.

Jihad and its grounds begin with Qur'an, which caused many misunderstandings because of conflicting interpretations of Qur'an by Western scholars. Qur'anic declaration of *jihad* cannot be reduced to military struggle. Some Western scholars⁶⁸ argue that the Qur'anic verses on *jihad* have contradictory meanings because verses were given for different situation within 23 years. Also, these scholars divide interpretation of *jihad* into military base and peaceful base. However, these arguments do not reflect the meaning of *jihad*. First, the Qur'an should be read as a whole, and not selectively quoted out of context. For example, Reuven Firestone quoted a Qur'anic verse like following in order to show war-supporting aspect of Islam:

Kill them wherever you find them and turn them out from where they have turned you out, for fitna is worse than killing, but do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. But if they fight you, kill them. Such is the reward of the unbelievers. (2:191)⁶⁹

However, the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought gives a broader meaning for these Qur'anic verses:

Fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Allah love not aggressors./And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out, for tribulation is worse than slaughter. And fight not with them at the inviolable Place of Worship until they first attack you there, but if they attack you (there) then slay them. Such is the recompense of disbelievers. / But if they desist, then. *Allah* is forgiving, merciful. /And fight them until tribulation is no more, and religion is for God. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except against wrong-doers. /The forbidden month for the forbidden month, and forbidden things in retaliation. And one who attack you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you. Observe your duty to *Allah*, and know that *Allah* is with the pious (2:190-194)⁷⁰

Reuven Firestone divided the *jihad* verses of Qur'an into four categories: verses expressing nonmilitant means of propagating or defending the faith; verses expressing

⁶⁷ Islamic Dictionary from http://www.islamic-dictionary.com/index.php?word=jihad retrieved on 10.05.2013

⁶⁸ Diane Morgan, *op.cit.*, p.89; Richard Bonney, op.cit., p.23, 45; Michael Bonner, op.cit., p.43

⁶⁹ Reuven Firestone, *Jihad the Origin f Holy War*, (The USA: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.84 ⁷⁰ Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* (Jordan: Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute Publication, 2002) p.13-14

restrictions on fighting; verses expressing conflict between *Allah*'s command and the reaction of Muhammad's followers; and verses strongly advocating war for *Allah*'s religion⁷¹. The problem with Firestone's separation is that he read the verses as if they have no continuations or beginnings. Even, he does not read the whole verse instead a part of them. However, the verses have meanings when they are read within concept of Qur'an. Otherwise, the verses lose their meanings. In the Qur'an, *jihad* only means "strive" for the sake of *Allah*. Qur'an orders people to strive their property, life, soul, etc. in the path of *Allah*, not includes wars.

Within the context of Qur'an, *jihad* is the action which aims solely divine command. *Jihad* is readiness to sacrifice everything including life for *Allah*'s cause. Amir Ali who is an important contemporary Islamic scholar describes *jihad* with twelve senses to be found in Qur'an: "recognizing the God and loving him most (Q 9:23, 24), resisting pressure of parents, peers and society (Q 25:52), staying on the straight path steadfastly (Q 27:78), striving for righteous deeds (Q 29: 69), having courage and steadfastness to convey the message of Islam (Q 41:33), defending Islam and community (Q 22: 39-40), helping allied people who may not be Muslim (Q 8: 58), defense through preemptive strikes (Q 2: 216), gaining freedom to inform, educate and convey the message of Islam in an open and free environment (Q 2: 217), freeing people from tyranny (Q 4: 75), removing tyranny, treachery, bigotry or ignorance and replacing them with justice and equity (Q 4:58, Q 7: 181, Q 16:90). For him *jihad* can be performed with pen, tongue, hand, media, or if necessary with arm⁷².

To conclude, *jihad* starts with spiritual exercises not struggle against non-Muslim hostility⁷³. Then Qur'an establishes its grounds as a struggle for a godly order apart from communal concern, even if the motivation was grounded in Islamic revelation. Therefore, if warfare has any worth, or if it is unjust or if it is not based on Islamic principles, the war cannot be regarded as *jihad* within Qur'anic perspective⁷⁴. Thus, not all war is *jihad*, and not all *jihad* is war.

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⁷¹ Reuven Firestone, op. cit., p.69- 90

⁷² M. Amir Ali, "Jihad Explained" *Institute of Islamic Informationa nd Education* http://www.iiie.net/index.php?q=node/33 retrieved on 18.05.2013

⁷³ Paul L. Heck, "Jihad Revisited" *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol.32, i.1 (2004) p. 96-98

⁷⁴ Abi Zakaryya Al Dimashqi Al Dumyati, *The Book of Jihad*, trans. Noor Yamani, n.p. n.d, p.98

The second source for interpretation of *jihad* is hadith which is saying of Prophet Muhammad. Conception of *jihad* is more detailed than in Qur'an. No terms except *jihad* has so different branches that can be any actions. Almost every hadith collections, there is a section about *jihad*. The reason can be explained with following hadith: When Prophet Muhammad was asked to name of best practice, he answered as "belief in *Allah*". And for the second best, he replied as *jihad*⁷⁵.

Once Prophet Muhammad and his companions immigrated to Medina, he took the power to govern the new Islamic state and became responsible for both spiritual and material needs of society. For that reason, the military version of *jihad* started with *hijrah* (emigration)⁷⁶. The legal framework of *jihad* was drawn in military campaigns of the Prophet. The commitment to *jihad* had to be voluntary and the motivation had to be pure: no booty⁷⁷.

Qamarrudin Khan stated that it is only fighting in the way of *Allah* that is *jihad*. The way of *Allah* means the defense of religion, and it does not mean war for territorial conquest, and it also does not mean defense of secular power. And in any case *jihad* does not mean aggressive war⁷⁸.

In the hadiths, *jihad* was shown as redemptive tool for salvation. Islam is considered to be for entire world because Prophet Muhammad says: "I have been sent to human race in its entirety.⁷⁹" Some scholars of hadith argue that paradise is under shadows of the swords and *jihad* is one of the gates of heaven⁸⁰. Another hadith says that the sword wipes away sins⁸¹. However, prominent hadith experts⁸² state that Prophet Muhammad always praised non-violent *jihad* saying that "the best *jihad* is to struggle against your

⁷⁵ Diane Morgan, op.cit., p.87

⁷⁶ The Hijrah refers to emigration of Prophet Muhammed and his companions from Macca to Medina in order to form the first Islamic state after reaching a consensus with Medainian tribe in 622. The Muslim scholars consider that date as beginning of history.

⁷⁷ http://hadis.ihya.org/kutubusitte/konu/157.html

⁷⁸ Qamarrudin Khan, *Political concepts in Sunnah: A Treatise on the Political Concepts of the Holy Prophet* (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1988) p.124

⁷⁹ Michael Bonner, op.cit., p. 49

⁸⁰ Richard Bonney, op.cit., p. 34

⁸¹ David Cook, *Undertsanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) p.15

⁸² Al-Nasa'i al-Sunan (Kitab al-Ba'yah) ; Ibn Majah's Sunan (Kitab al-Fitan) and Abu Dawud (Kitab al-Mulahim)

soul and your passion in the way of *Allah*." Returning from a battle, Prophet announced that "We have from lesser *jihad*." **84

Like Qur'anic meaning, the *jihad* in hadiths cannot be reduced to military base. According to well-known hadith stated by Bukhari who was the most important hadith expert, a man asked permission to Prophet to join in the military *jihad*. The Prophet asked him whether his parents were alive. When the answer was affirmative, Muhammad said to him that he had to perform his *jihad* by serving and carrying for them⁸⁵.

In the light of Qur'anic verses and hadiths, subsequent Islamic scholars defined *jihad* throughout the history. The term *jihad* is interpreted by Islamic scholars in different periods throughout the history. The first definitions were made by early Muslim scholars who studied hadiths of Prophet⁸⁶. Ibn al-Jawzi, Malik bin Anas, Bukhari, Ibn Khaldun Ibn Rushd studied on hadiths and reserved a chapter for *jihad*. Generally, in the early studies, spiritual *jihad* was encouraged for every individual. On other occasion, the military *jihad* was considered as collective duty rather than individual obligation. Ibn Rushd emphasized the role of Imam to conduct military *jihad*. Performance of military *jihad* should be conducted by governing elites. The later scholars interpreted *jihad* according to these researches.

Medieval Islamist philosopher al-Farabi questioned the wars whether just or unjust. He put *jihad* in just category because of aiming good of nation and civilization of other nations for better life⁸⁷. Ibn Khaldun⁸⁸ considered *jihad* as just addition to dynastic wars against rebels. His mean with *jihad* was sole divine *jihad*⁸⁹.

83 Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, op.cit., p.7

85 Diane Morgan, op. cit., p. 87-88

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.10

⁸⁶ Since sayings of Prophet hadn't been written during his time, the hadiths collections had been conducted years after his death. By this way, the verses of Qran were not confused with these sayings.

⁸⁷ Paul L. Heck, op.cit, p. 100

⁸⁸ This distinguished Muslim philosopher of the fourteenth century was the first to conceptualize the history of humankind as ilm al-umran/science of civilization. See Bassam Tibi, *Politcal Islam World Politics and Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2008) p.3

⁸⁹ Diane Morgan, op.cit, p.91

Another medieval cleric Ibn Taymiyya studied and defined *jihad* as the most important duty of a Muslim together with pray⁹⁰. Ideas of Ibn Taymiyya are bases of Islamic movements even today especially for al-Qaida's ideology. However, this doesn't mean that he has aggressive discourses. Unfortunately, his ideas had subjected in different manipulations throughout the history. The Professor of Hanbali School (the most conservative sect of Islam), Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) was employed in Memluk state of Egypt to preach *jihad* because of his studies statecraft and good governance⁹¹. He was the first to issue a *fatwa* declaring that the Mongols were apostates due to their failure to implement sharia law⁹². Ibn-Taymiyyah also established a new basis for legitimizing *jihad*: "When the enemy has entered an Islamic land, there is no doubt that it is obligatory on those closest to the land to defend it, and then on those around them . . . for the entire Islamic land is like a single country. In addition, in pursuing the *jihad*, violence was acceptable: "If with the *Kuffar* (unbelievers) there are pious people from the best of mankind and it is not possible to fight these *Kuffar* except by killing them, then they are to be killed as well. ""

The founding father of the most contemporary sect of Islam (Wahhabism), Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab (1703-1791) declared *jihad* against "bad" Muslims seeing as he had been frustrated by the moral decline of his society and called for returning to the pure and orthodox practice of the fundamentals of Islam, as embodied in the Qur'an and in the life of the Prophet Muhammad⁹⁵. He described the bad Muslims and declared *jihad* and them and bad Muslim society. He was the first scholar who defines *jihad* as if it is against Muslim society who lived un-Islamic life.

Even if the classical *jihad* understanding had basic common features, it did not determine methods or reasons of war. In *jihad* movements, the existing universal rules

http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_3_chap1.htm retrieved on 25.01.2014 ⁹⁵ Febe Armanios, "The Islamic Tradition of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" *CRS Report for Congress, Middle Eastern Affairs* (January 24, 2008) p.2-3

⁹⁰ Töre Sivrioğlu "İbn Teymiyye'nin Siyaset, Hukuk ve İktisat Teorisi" *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol.20 (2013) p. 93-95

⁹¹ Devin R. Springer at al, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009) p.28- 29 and Richard Boney, op.cit.,p.111-113

⁹² Devin R. Springer at al, op.cit.,p.29

⁹³ Ibid., p.29

⁹⁴ Religious Scope, "Defence of Muslim Lands"

of war were accepted as means of jihad. Generally, the reasons of just war⁹⁶ were regarded as the best practice of jihad. Grounds and reasons of classical jihad were interpreted in different framework withing existing political and social situation. The ideas of early scholars would be a ground for many Islamic organizations and states in later times. However, it is clear that all the early definitions would be re-interpreted and modified by each organization according to their interests. It would be envisioned in various ways on the report of social commitments and historical circumstances.

2.1.2 Definition of *Jihadism*

The word *jihadism* is a modern etymology; it is not native to history of Islam. It has also very short history compare to jihad. Shortly, it can be said that the situation after the First World War led to emergence of *jihadism*. During the First World War, *jihad* call of Ottoman Caliph (Mehmet Reshad V) was rebounded from Arab world and that was end of imperial jihad period. Both Ottoman Empire and Western states realized that the caliphate had already lost its validity. After abolishment of caliphate by new Turkish Republic, the caliphate position became a history⁹⁷. Hence, the new definition of *jihad*, which is called as *jihadism* was shaped within that framework.

Definition of *jihadism* is also developed within Salafi doctrine; *jihadism* roots back to this ideology. Salafism, sometimes called neo-fundamentalist Islamic ideology, has inspired most of the leaders of contemporary Islamist terrorist movements. Salafism appeared in Egypt in twentieth century. The ideology argues that the pressure on Islamic society by Westernism should only be removed with returning to Islam⁹⁸. Although the Salafies are usually eager to use modern technology, they reject modern Western values, which are presumed to have as result a form of barbarism⁹⁹. Sunni fundamentalist

⁹⁶ The just war, defined as the right to go to war and right conduct in war, was backed to Saint Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas (354-430) asserted that the war should be just only it served to Christianity and God. Saint Augustine (1225- 1274) employed the ideas of Thomas Aquinas centuries later in existing political situation and defined the reason of war that war must occur for a good and just purpose rather than for self-gain and it should be under command of state leaders. See: Metin İşçi, Siyasi Düşünceler Tarihi (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012), p: 178-194

⁹⁷ Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000) p.41

⁹⁸ Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism Theory and Practice, (New York and London: Routledge, 2008) p.23

⁹⁹ Daniel UNGUREANU, "Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology" "Al.I. Cuza" University of Iasi (Romania), project number PNII-IDEI 1993/2008, p.143

contemporary goals are to restore the perfection of early Islam practiced by Prophet Muhammad and his companions, who are Righteous Ancestors, to establish an utopian society based on Salafi principles, by imposing their interpretation of Islamic law on all members of society; annihilating local variants of Islam in the name of authenticity and purity; transforming Islam from a personal faith into an authoritarian political system, establish a pan-islamic caliphate governed according to the strict principles of Salafi Islam¹⁰⁰.

In the post-World War Middle East, the *jihad* was defined in three different ways: spiritual *jihad*, defensive *jihad* and aggressive *jihad* (*jihadism*). Spiritual *jihad* (*jihad alnafs*) has been developed by religious leaders called as Sufis. Actually, Sufism has deep roots in the history of Islam. Although the sufi movement lost its popularity in Muslim societies, they were able to survive in contemporary world. For them, the basic idea about *jihad* is that one should begin with struggle against own being (*nafs*), which is called as inner (greater) *jihad*¹⁰¹. Sufis for centuries have engaged themselves and the world in pursuit of inner *jihad*. They argued that it has been their way of getting closer to *Allah*, achieving inner peace and getting closer to *Allah's* creations¹⁰².

The defensive *jihad* and aggressive *jihad* are based on same idea: the post-war situation in the world was not favor of Islam. Dominance of Western powers diminished the Islamic power. The common idea is that Islam and Muslim societies had already lost their power. As a result, the main concern of every Muslim should be protecting the Islam. In addition, since the states of Muslim societies have become secularized, the duty of protecting religion should be yielded to each individual. In other words, states are no longer responsible for maintaining Islamic culture. Therefore, each Muslim should take the responsibility. Within that framework, *jihad* has become the duty of individual in order to protect Islam. However, the way how Islam is protected is presented in different ways. The scholars have proposed different methods to motivate people by interpreting *jihad* according to their own situation. One group of scholars, especially early scholars after the First World War, displayed a moderate definition

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¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.144

Annemarie Schimmel, *The Mystical Dimesnions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: the University of North Caroline Press,1975) p.112

¹⁰² Shahid Athar, "Inner Jihad" http://sufismjournal.org/practice/practice.html, retrieved on 25.05.2014

proposing to stay silence in that global situation. That group developed defensive jihad. On the other hand, more pessimistic scholars defined jihad to encourage people rescuing Islam from its weakness. They argued that since Islam is under attack, the jihad orders to do something. That group presented aggressive jihad.

The first group of Muslim scholars engaged in conformist thinking in the nineteenth century to adjust to the new situation. Among them, the most important figure is the Islamic Moroccan scholar Ahmed bin Khalid al-Nasiri (1835-97) who was also a pioneer of this movement. Nasiri was the first Muslim theological scholar of his age to honestly acknowledge the lack of unity in the Islamic community, as well as Islam's weakness in the face of its rival powers 103. He admits the umma's inability to pursue jihad for the expansion of the Islam. Acording to him, Muslims are in a condition of weakness and disintegration. Therefore the obligation to jihad is suspended through necessity, but not abandoned. Under contemporary circumstances, Muslims may forget to wage war against unbelievers, because they are not in a position to win it 104.

The Islamic establishment, al-Azhar University reinterpreted jihad within the framework of development from colonial rule to the creation of sovereign states in the world of Islam to discourage the use of force. The definition of defensive jihad which was proposed by Al-Azhar scholars can be considered as pacification of jihad¹⁰⁵. The head of al-Azhar, Sheykh Mahmut Shaltut argued that war is not a proper instrument for pursuing Islamic cause. Muslims must adjust that war is immoral so living in peace with non-Muslims is necessary 106. Another prominent sheikh of al-Azhar, Jadul-haq Ali Jadulhaq reinterpreted concept of *jihad* and emphasized that *jihad* in itself doesn't mean war. Jihad is every way in everyday: jihad against ignorance, jihad against poverty, *jihad* against illness and disease, etc¹⁰⁷.

In contrast to Islamic conformism of pacifist scholars, re-interpretation of jihad in aggressive meaning emerged in discourses of Muslim Brotherhood. This movement of jihad is called as jihadism, and Muslim Brotherhood is considered as presenter of

¹⁰³ Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam" in *Islamic Political Ethics*, ed. Sohahil H. Hasmi (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002) p.181

¹⁰⁴ C.Richard Pennel, *Morocco Since 1830:A History* (London: C. Hurst &Co., 2000) p.14-16

¹⁰⁵ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam World Politics and Europe* (New York :Routledge, 2008) p.55

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.56

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p:57

jihadism. The founder, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) who was Egyptian school teacher interpreted *jihad* as an irregular war¹⁰⁸. Actually, at first, Hasan al-Banna was not enthusiastic for war and he established Muslim Brotherhood as a social organization. However, later, his discourses were influenced by establishment of British mandate in Palestine (1918-1948), creation of Israel and social and economical deficiencies of Arab nationalism¹⁰⁹. So, he felt that Arab weakness could only be reversed by returning to the path of true Islam.

Al-Banna advanced the doctrine about Allah's ultimate and absolute sovereignty and Islam's lordship as organizing principle for state regimes 110. According to him, because the Muslim lands were occupied, jihad was necessary. Muslim must revolt the invaders and reject un-Islamic governments¹¹¹. However, Banna did not reject every Western doctrine or advocate a closed system. In his doctrine, Muslims needed to develop themselves and keep up with peace in the world¹¹². In his "Risalat al-jihad" al-Banna laid the grounds for the reinterpretation of jihad as irregular war, not for an Islamic revival as the later generations of Muslim Brotherhood argue. In contrast to pacifying jihad, al-Banna argues first that jihad is an "obligation on every Muslim" adding that jihad and gital (fighting) can indiscriminately and interchangeably be referred to in the meaning of "use of force." In contrast to al-Azhar, al-Banna did not downgrade the status of fighting/qital for the benefit of upgrading the non- military jihad against such evils as ignorance, poverty and disease. In fact, he is exactly the opposite in drawing a distinction between lower jihad/ al-jihad al-asghar and higher jihad/al-jihad al-akbar, criticized the Muslim scholars who consider the physical fighting/qital to be a lower jihad. Any downgrading of qital to a lower jihad is a misunderstanding of the duty of gital, al-Banna believes that the true essence of the jihad is: "the great reward for

¹⁰⁸ Nazih Ayyubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (New York: Routhledge, 1991) p.130

¹⁰⁹ Devin R. Springer at al. op. cit., p.31

¹¹⁰ Ahmet S. Mousalli. *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999) p.120

¹¹¹ Devin R. Springer at al, op. cit., p.31

¹¹² Ahmet S. Mousalli, op. cit., p.131

¹¹³ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam World Politics and Europe*, op.cit. p.59

Muslims is to fight, to kill or to be killed for the sake of Allah". This is the spirit of *jihadist* Islam, which provides the religious foundations for *jihadism*¹¹⁴.

Jihad was seen an obligation by Hasan al-Banna. He suggested that Muslims must undertake jihad, it cannot be ignored. However, Al-Banna always denied that the greater jihad occur in the heart or the spirits while the most sacred jihad was against presence of tyrannical rule¹¹⁵. On the contrary the supreme martyrdom was achieved when one was killed in the way of Allah¹¹⁶. For him, Islam concerns with the question of jihad and the mobilization of the whole ummah into one body to defend right cause¹¹⁷.

In his early career, Hasan al-Banna was a moderate Islamist rather than fundamental activist, he hadn't been favor of aggressive or expansionist ideas. The goal of the Islamic jihad should be defensive for him. He was supporter of rules of jihad which were developed in early age of Islamic conquerings. It should be underlined that jihad includes concept of the mercy¹¹⁸. Women, children or old men cannot be killed. Wounded, religious staff and peaceful people who do not resist should be protected. However, developments in the Middle East (acceptance of Western secular state structure, establishment of the State of Israel, etc) led to changes in his opinion about Muslim's duty of *jihad*. He began to emphasize the need of military response only when Muslims are under attack. However, he was fully conservative about superiority and necessity of military *jihad* and every Muslims should be involved ¹¹⁹.

Another member of Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb highly influenced the future jihadist movements. Sayyid Qutb (1906- 1966) was an Egyptian teacher as modern Islamists and went to the USA to continue his academic career 120. However, his experiments in the USA (1949- 1951) shaped his opinions about conservative Islam and its relations with West. In his early teaching years, he was moderate Islamist who wrote

¹¹⁴ Ibid,p.60

¹¹⁵ Nazih Ayyubi, op.cit., p.130

¹¹⁶ Richard Bonney, op.cit., p.213

¹¹⁷ Reinhard Schulze, op.cit., p.95

¹¹⁸ Richard Bonney, op.cit., p.214

¹¹⁹ Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan Hudeybi and Ideology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) p.45

¹²⁰Devin R. Springer at al, op. cit., p.33

about his confusion about culture and morality of the West. In early 1950s, Qutb was preoccupied with the issues of social justice and economic development. Besides, until 1951, he had not been member of Muslim Brotherhood¹²¹. After 1952 Free Officers Revolution in Egypt, he was banned from Egyptian politics because he was member of Muslim Brotherhood, and he was supporter of establishing an Islamic state contrary to Nasser's policies. Because of his objections, he was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor in 1954. Within these years, his writings became increasingly radicalized. Even though in 1964 he was released owing to his health problems, one year later he was executed again due to his conspiracy to overthrow the regime. He produced more extreme, single-minded and action-oriented ideas that reflect his frustration and anger towards revolution¹²².

Sayyid Qutb strictly insisted that society that accepts un-Islamic rulers and un-Islamic way of life is living in *jahiliyya*. Also, most of so-called Muslims are in reality infidels. *Jahiliyya* is the Qur'anic term for Arabia before Islam. Therefore, Qutb describe *jihad* as an obligation of each person individually rather than general obligation ¹²³ when there is a threat against Islam. In his the most famous book, Signposts (Signposts along the Way, *Ma'alim fi al-tariq*) he explained why Muslims need to engage in *jihad*:

"We are today in a *jahiliyya*. Everything around us is a *jahiliyya*: people's perceptions, beliefs, habits and customs. Even much of what we think of being Islamic culture or Islamic philosophy is in fact the making of this *jahiliyya* ¹²⁴. To declare divinity of the God alone, it is necessary to full revolt against all shapes of human rulership. It means the destroying of the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of God on the earth. Supremacy of divine law should replace human law ¹²⁵."

Qutb asserted that theoretical principles of Islam had always been stipulated according to necessity of time and space¹²⁶. His interpretation of *jihad* was a perpetual struggle

Continuum International Publishing Group, 1990) p.96

¹²¹Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundemantalism the Story of Islamic Movemet* (London:

¹²² Nazih Ayyubi, op. cit., p.134-135

¹²³ Michael Bonner, op. cit., p.162

¹²⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, trans. A.B. al-Mehri (Birmingham: Maktabah Book Sellers and Publishers, 2006) p.21-22

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.81-83

¹²⁶ Youssef M. Choueiri, op. cit., p.98

against forces of unbelief, injustice, falsehood, i.e., *jahiliyya*. He criticizes secular rationalism in Muslim societies, arguing that Islam cannot be lived in a society under *jahiliyya*¹²⁷.

Pakistani journalist/author Abu Al-A'la Mawdudi developed his ideas in India during 1937-1941 British rule when orthodox Muslims felt beleaguered in all fronts. During those times he wrote about the need to healing Muslim society from Western influence and corrupt¹²⁸. Mawdudi wrote on *jihad* in the cause of *Allah* (*jihad fi sabil Allah*) and he proposed that *jihad* should be a world revolution since Islam cannot be limited with national boundaries. The objective of *jihad* was to eliminate the un-Islamic system and replacement of Islamic system of rule. According to him, the aim of Islam was to realize a universal revolution¹²⁹. For Mawdudi, *jihad* was used as a war which should be waged solely in the name of *Allah* against enemies of Islam. *Jihad* can be described as supreme sacrifice of life and it was duty of all Muslims. When an Islamic state was under attack, every Muslim is appointed for *jihad*¹³⁰.

Mawdudi called for implementation of *sharia* and Islamic state which should be based on Islamic ideology rather than Muslim state. He argued that science and technology should be developed within Islamic context in order to avoid Westernization and secularization of the society¹³¹. Mawdudi's discourses on *jihad* led him to be imprisoned several times. Against Muslim League which was legal authority in Pakistan, he formed *Jamaat al-Islami* party which was transferred into central Islamic group in Pakistan. The organization studied on doctrines for future generation through use of schools, mosques, publications and social programs¹³².

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¹²⁷Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.217

Nazih Ayubi, op. cit., p.128


¹²⁹ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.200

¹³⁰ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.209

¹³¹Nazih Ayubi op. cit., p.130

¹³²Devin Springer at all, op. cit., p.30

Figure 1: Differences between Jihad and Jihadism



2.2. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1. Early Islamic Times and Emergence of Jihad

Islamic thinking on war and peace started with interpretations of Qur'anic verses on *jihad*, *harb* and *qital*. In the Qur'an, the word *jihad* literally occurs; it appears to refer not to warfare, but rather to disputation and efforts made for the sake of God's cause. Therefore to understand legal military framework of Islam; other verses about fighting, treatment to non-Muslims, relations with other countries should be considered. Since the idea of collective *jihad* determines the political relations, only *jihad* discourses in military campaigns will be examined.

Starting point for narratives of military *jihad*¹³³ begins with Prophet Muhammad's *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina in 622¹³⁴. In his early Mecca years, Prophet Muhammed was not a leader or was not responsible for a community of Islam had not been established yet. Prophet became leader of a state and Islamic community was formed. For that reason, material needs of Muslims such as military force or legal law emerged, and Prophet Muhammed became responsible person to deal with them. He

¹³³ Since this research is about *jihadist* discourse in International Relations, the spritual developments on *jihad* will be excluded. The history of collective *jihad* in states will be the main focus

¹³⁴ Michael Bonner, op.cit., p.15

had to consider about material needs of all Medinian people¹³⁵ (whether Muslim or not). Therefore, military campaigns started after establishment of Islamic state (*al Dawla al Islamiya*).

After forming of the Islamic state, warfare policies and military campaigns of new state were shaped based on *jihad* understanding in order to mobilize Muslims. Within this framework, *jihad* as a state of mobilization developed its military and strategic dimensions¹³⁶. Prophet Muhammad and the new Islamic state engaged in five domestic battles and several caravan raids against Quraysh tribes, military campaigns to external lands until his death in 632¹³⁷. During those years, Islam was considered as a religion and a state system. Therefore, from the beginning, Islamist movements carried both religious and political cause¹³⁸. By the time of the Prophet's death, most of Arabia had been unified under the banner of Islam¹³⁹. Thanks to successful conquests, Islam was introduced in different lands of Arabia. It is needless to say that the religion would not gain opportunity to spread without conquests¹⁴⁰. The Qur'an provides doctrine of *jihad*, and practical criteria of *jihad* were set during these conquests.

During Prophet time, the *jihad* was presented as spiritualized warfare as it was displayed in the Qur'an. In early years of Islam, crucial terms related with *jihad* such as who was fighter, what is fighting, prohibitions of fighting and fates of prisoners were determined ¹⁴¹. The most important criterion for *jihad* was that it must be just for sake of *Allah* and no earthly aim can be carried out.

During those years, many *hadiths* were formed about treatment towards non-Muslims. In this contexts, *Jihad* was defined, regulated and made legal. Muslims were supposed to always act in accordance with these regulations. Also, many important questions were clarified about military activities: whom were the Muslims permitted to fight? Or what should be done when Muslims meet their polytheist enemy? As said by

¹³⁵ Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, op. cit., p.5

¹³⁶ Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.22

¹³⁷ David Cook, op.cit. p.6

¹³⁸ Walid Phares, Future Jihad, p.21

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.24

¹⁴⁰ David Cook, op.cit., p.13

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.15

Shamseddin al-Sarakhsi who was the greatest jurist of classical age, interpret Qur'an and categorized the phases of *jihad* into four steps¹⁴²:

- 1. Call them to Islam; if they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them. Then (if they accept Islam) call them to move from their homes to the home of the *muhajirun* (immigrants); if they do this, then they will have the rights and the responsibilities of the *muhajirun*. If they refuse, then designate their home, and inform them that they will be like the Muslim Bedouin, *Allah*'s law, which is incumbent upon the believers, will be incumbent upon them, but they will not have any right to the movable or non-movable spoils, except when they fight at the side of the Muslims.
- 2. If they refuse, then call them to pay the *jizya* (poll tax). If they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them.
- 3. If they refuse, then ask *Allah* for aid against them, and fight them. If you besiege the people of a fortress, and they desire to surrender unconditionally (*ala hukm Allah*), do not accept this from them, but let them surrender according to your judgment, and do with them what you wish afterwards.

Prophet never gave up praising the spiritual *jihad* though. Returning from a battle, he stated that "We have returned from the lesser struggle to the greater struggle." Even if the necessity of war for Islamic conquests was not regretted, spiritual endeavors were always encouraged.

After his death, Muslim armies engaged in global conquests including Arabian Peninsula, ancient Fertile Crescent and other parts of the world *jihad* assumed the outlines of these global conquests. Guidance of Qur'an and Prophet's *hadiths* were followed in military campaigns during those times¹⁴⁴. Within few years, Arab Muslims conquered strategically and economically important cities. Entire peninsula was got unified and armed¹⁴⁵. The leaders never gave up idea of divine cause and guidance of Qur'an and *hadiths* in their conquests. The first caliph, Abu Bekr (632–634) defined framework of *jihad* as follows: (1) be led a by spiritual person; (2) be declared only in

¹⁴³ Royal Aal al-bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, op.cit.,p.7

¹⁴² Richard Bonney, op.cit.,p. 25

¹⁴⁴ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe*, p.51

¹⁴⁵ Michael Bonner, op.cit., p.58

defense in the cause of Allah; (3) intend to restore peace and order; (4) cease when the enemy surrenders; (5) use minimum force necessary; (6) enemies cannot be deprived of food or water. 146

While *jihad* was an obligation, the conditions of it were underlined clearly. The first condition occurs when the Muslims were in physical danger of being attacked. *Jihad* comes to be the legitimate call for mobilization and action under supreme religious leader of Islam¹⁴⁷. Secondly, *jihad* should be pursued to promote, propagate, and conquer for Islam¹⁴⁸. The aim should be Islam and no other gains can be considered. The early conquests of Islam carried Islamic values rather than state objectives. Muslim engaged in wars with great motivations just because *Allah* ordered them to do so¹⁴⁹. With early victories' motivation, Islam expanded fast¹⁵⁰. Early Muslims never waged *jihad* just for *jihad*, the ultimate aim of *jihad* was to introduce Islam in every parts of the globe¹⁵¹. Prophet Muhammad succeeded in establishing a divine and moral message for all Muslims. Islam prevailed wide geographies, long histories and varied cultures. It indicated ability to meet social and moral needs of diverse societies for a long period of time under different historical and regional conditions¹⁵².

Conquest was not a unique characteristic of the Islamic expansion or of Arab invasions. At different times many nations simply conquered others and settled their own populations on foreign lands. That is the core of world history¹⁵³. However, it should be noted that Islamic law condemns all warfare that does not qualify as *jihad*, specifically any warfare among Muslims. The classical *jihad* strictly prohibited the targeting of civilians, in particular children, women and the elderly. Finally *jihad* was never a sign of honor for a man to demonstrate his power to someone who is weaker¹⁵⁴.

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¹⁴⁶ Diane Morgan, op.cit., p.90

¹⁴⁷ Walid Phares, Future Jihad, p.23

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.24

¹⁴⁹ Michael Bonner, op. cit., p. 60

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.61

¹⁵¹ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe*, p.52

¹⁵² Walid Phares, Future Jihad, p.25

¹⁵³ Ibid., p:35

¹⁵⁴ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe*, p:52

2.2.2. Jihad in Imperial Time

During early years of Islam, classical *jihad* accepting was formed to inspire military campaigns of Muslims. The grounds for *jihad* had already been established when Islamic imperial states appeared. Thirty years after Prophet's death, Islamic empires were formed and the Islamic laws and principles were drawn by religious scholars. To express Islamic *jihads*, different schools emerged evaluating Islamic principles according to their way of lives¹⁵⁵. The ground of Islamic imperial conquests lied down division of world into two: Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) where jurisdiction of Islam was enjoyed and Abode of War (*dar al-Harb*) which should be converted to Islam. This conception can be explained with political and territorial terms but not with religious base because neither Qur'an nor *hadiths* make this kind of division¹⁵⁶. In addition this division which emerged in imperial Islamic states so should be read within framework of imperial culture. The division implied that since Muslim states would be ally of each other, possibility of war would be low. In contrast, the abode of non-Muslims should be wieved as land in question and hostilities can break out at any time¹⁵⁷.

As stated before, following death of Prophet Muhammad in 632, great conquests were continued by caliphs during thirty years. After a civil conflict, Umayyad Dynasty came to power in 661¹⁵⁸ as authority over caliphate position and imperial time began in history of Islam. The most important elementary point to remember is that the Qur'an did not stipulate a specific form for the state or the government, nor did the Prophet Muhammad appoint a successor for himself¹⁵⁹. Therefore, this change in the structure of state system can be acceptable for Islamic legal scheme as well. On the other hand, *jihad* became a state activity under command of caliphate. Atlhough sufis and religious scholars applied *jihad* for spiritual development, the ordinary *jihad* was cogitated as state affair. The state army had duty to go *jihad* not every indivual obligation.

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¹⁵⁵ Richard Bonney, op.cit., p.71

¹⁵⁶ Paul L. Heck, op.cit., p.127-128

¹⁵⁷ Royal Aal al-bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, op. cit., p.25

¹⁵⁸ Michael Bonner op. cit., p.119

¹⁵⁹ Nazih Ayyubi, op. cit.,p.6

Imperial time of *jihad* can be regarded as a combination of political and military aspects of Islam¹⁶⁰. After great conquests of caliph period, emergences of different dynasties developed different *jihad* understandings and use them to advance their own position. This mainstream approach was continued by Abbasid Empire and other consequent empires. Religious aspects of *jihad* disappeared and political and territorial grounds fulfilled its blanks. *Jihad* was serviced for state ideology¹⁶¹. Although they engaged in wars under the name of *jihad*, their imperial wars cannot be *jihad* because their soldiers were paid but *jihad* should be done voluntarily. Simply, conquests became Arabian rather than Islamic¹⁶².

With imperial expansions, Islam reached large areas from Atlantic coast of Africa to India of Asia¹⁶³. Since religion became imperial tool for Islamic states, emperors employed religious scholars (ulama) to preach *jihad* in their military campaigns¹⁶⁴. Especially policies of Umayyad Empire led to emergence of different evaluations of Islamic principles including *jihad*. Those different approaches were seen in evaluation of *jihad* as well. For instance, Maliki School proposed one of the first objecting evaluations on *jihad* contrary to classical scholars. Imam Malik bin Anas who was the founder of the school, argued that *jihad* could not be a principle that determines the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims¹⁶⁵. Since unbelievers should not be subject of war, *jihad* cannot legitimate every military movement towards non-Muslims¹⁶⁶. Famous representative of Maliki School, Ibn Rushd interpreted *jihad* as collective duty rather than personal obligation¹⁶⁷.

Crusaders of Christian world brought concept of defensive *jihad* for Muslims. Against Cicilian Armenia which was considered as last Crusader state, Mamluk emperor of Egypt employed Ibn Taymiyah to preach *jihad*^{168.} The Crusades should be met by *jihad*, now on the defensive purpose. *Jihad* was perceived as the savior of Islam from both the

¹⁶⁰ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.128-130

¹⁶¹ Paul L. Heck, op. cit., p.128

¹⁶² Michael Bonner, op. cit., p.60

¹⁶³ Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe, op.cit. p.51

Richard Bonney, op. cit.,p.128-130

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.71

Stephen Collins Coughlin; "To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Exteremes Say about Jihad"
 Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (July 2007) p.155
 Ibid.. p.67

¹⁶⁸ Davin R. Springer at al, op. cit., p.28

Christian crusaders and the pagan Mongols¹⁶⁹. To sum up, during imperial time, *jihad* was interpreted as collective duty of state authority rather than individual obligation. Therefore, it should be waged under caliph authority and with state army. Since the state had the army, collective *jihad* activities also should be kept by state leaders on behalf of people.

There was also the Sufi movement's doctrine of *jihad*. The Sufis (a mystical sect of Islam) understood the greater *jihad* as an inner struggle against the base instincts of the body but also against corruption of the soul, and believed that the greater *jihad* is a necessary part of the process of gaining spiritual insight¹⁷⁰. Today, most Muslims see *jihad* as a personal rather than a political struggle, while physical actions taken in defense of the realm are considered the lesser *jihad*. Historically, rooted back Caliphate Ali time, Sufi activities and teachings had impressive effects on Islamization of many territories¹⁷¹. The rise of Islamic civilization coincides strongly with the spread of Sufi philosophy in Islam.

When Ottoman Empire was established, Islam had already long history. However, one of the founding principles of Ottoman State was *ghaza* (*jihad*) understanding as religion was important principle (*sharia* rule) for legality¹⁷². Under the banner of Islam, Ottoman armies crossed the Bosporus into Balkans, gained the capital of Eastern Christianity, Istanbul, and Christian world could not stop this march¹⁷³. Turkish conquers also expanded towards Anatolia, Asia and other Islamic lands. The conquering of Mecca and gaining the caliphate made Ottoman rulers as global authority¹⁷⁴. Islam enjoyed a large degree of success during the conquests of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries¹⁷⁵. The Ottoman caliphate lasted until 1923 and important conquering lasted until that time. Until the First World War, *nida'ul jihad* (call for

¹⁷⁵ David Cook, op. cit., p.49

¹⁶⁹ Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.42

¹⁷⁰ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.92

¹⁷¹ Sayyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) p.192

¹⁷² Ibid., p.128

¹⁷³ Walid Phares, *Future Jihad*, op. cit., p.42

Yılmaz Yurtseven, "Osmanlı Klasik Döneminde İdeoloji, Din ve Siyasi Meşruiyet" *Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* vol.11, no.1-2 (2007) p.1262

jihad) was officially state business in Ottoman Empire. While *jihad* can be a religious duty per see, calling for it was only right of the caliph or his representatives ¹⁷⁶.

2.2.3. Reconstruction of *Jihad* in Modern World

When European colonialism started, the Middle Eastern territory had been controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Since the Empire was losing its power, the Middle Eastern lands had been captured by British and French colonialists. When the First World War started in 1914, Ottoman Empire entered the War with side of Axis Powers to protect its territories ¹⁷⁷. The first thing what Sultan of Empire, did for the Middle East was declaring a *fatwa* calling for *jihad* that every Muslim had to participate in against the Allied Powers. Since Sultan occupied the caliphate position which was considered as religious leader of whole Muslims, he had right to declared *jihad* to unite Muslims if there is any threat against Islam. However the *fatwa* did not cause significant Muslim defections from the Allied cause, nor did it prevent the Arab revolt against Muslim rule ¹⁷⁸. That dramatic event showed that Ottoman caliphate had already lost its rein over Muslims. All Muslim local leaders in the Middle East realized that the postwar situation of politics would be modified according to new realities. With new dynamics of world order, the nation-states and democratic regimes began to be established and the new system would not be based on pure Islamic principles.

With abolishment of caliphate imperial time *jihad* understanding came to end since it was based on call of caliph. Rebellion against *jihad* call of caliph for the first time in the history showed that from now on state centered *jihad* would not be valid for Muslim societies. However, this rebellion was not considered as ending of Islam in state affairs. Even if Arab societies rebelled against the Sultan of Ottoman Empire who was also their religious leader, that reaction was towards just Ottoman state, not towards Islam. The reaction was just towards Ottoman rulers. It should be pointed that even if Ottoman Empire had been the most important authority of Islam, the emerging reaction cannot be

¹⁷⁶ Walid Phares, Future Jihad, op.cit. p.44

¹⁷⁷ Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since World War I*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) p.39

¹⁷⁸ Douglas E. Streusand, "What Does Jihad Mean?" *Middle East Quarterly* vol.4, no.3 (September 1997) p. 9-17

towards superiority of Islam itself. Therefore; it is not surprising that independence from colonial powers and establishment of their nation-states were achieved with help of *jihad* understanding. People were united by Islamic *jihad* calls and independence movements started ¹⁷⁹ against colonial powers.

Corporating with local Arab leaders and acquiring guidance mission for political development of the Middle Eastern societies, European leaders seized direct or indirect control in the Middle East. However, not every local leader accepted the European domination or when the new states achived enough power to govern themselves they did wish to acquire full independence. Within independence movements, *jihad* played a role in the first responses against this colonial domination. Revival of *jihadist* movements was seen in struggles against colonial powers in Muslim world. The first example was experienced in Algeria against French domination. Abd-al- Qadir started liberation movement by uniting people under religion. The Islamic movements against colonial power continued towards Libya, Egypt, etc. In that framework, *jihad* gained another meaning. At the beginning of 19th century, *jihad* became defensive warfare during independence time.

Middle Eastern Muslim societies used *jihad* discourse to rescue their societies from colonial powers. However, after gaining independence, new leaders did not accept Islamic principles for foundations or consolidations of new states. Saddam Husain in Iraq, Naser in Egypt suppressed all religious oppositions to their rules. The process was same in Algeria, Iran, Turkey, etc. as well¹⁸¹. With the adoption of nationalist ideas, the short *jihad* period ended. The change came with abolition of caliphate in new Turkish Republic in 1924.

The new *jihad* understanding was shaped within this situation. Scholars redefined *jihad* according to defensive base and taught it to very big masses especially young groups ¹⁸². These philosophical leaders worked for not only forming an ideological framework but also establishing state or non-state organizations which empowered their influences.

¹⁷⁹ Michael Bonner, op. cit., p.159

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¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p.160

¹⁸¹ Sayed Hossein Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism" *Political Science Quarterly* v:110, i.2, Summer 1995, pp:261-262

¹⁸² Michael Bonner, op. cit., p:164

The war should be started against not only Muslim enemy states but also corrupted regimes in Muslim countries¹⁸³. Also the new *jihad* organizations do not need universal caliph to call for it. That understanding could not become popular in its early times because of popularity of nationalist leaders. However, when nationalist leaders lost their popularity in the society, the Islamic groups could occupy the governing position by using these ideologies.

The new *jihad* understanding has special features different from traditional one. Firstly, it has transnational aspect. Economical and political borders cannot be effective for *jihad*. *Jihad* is seen everywhere Muslims live. Secondly, Muslim world does not need to be depended on a single center for declaring *jihad*. Also Islam does not need a charismatic leader who could provide spiritual unity and revolutionary activity.

Jihadist movements always reject the borders of national states among Muslim societies. They emphasized the needs of transnational Islam which unites every Muslims in the world. Regardless of their geographies, they fight against international imperial powers. Since they reject the belonging a state, none *jihadist* movement is bound by any international ethic of war. They always prefer irregular war in their operations.

Conclusions

Islam has always been in center of the Middle Eastern politics and *jihad* is the most influential term not only in historical times when Islam was dominant ideology but also in contemporary world when religion-based states were outdated.

The classical *jihad* was defined as duty of state leaders under approval of religious leaders (the caliph). According to traditional Islamic understanding, only caliph was considered as the authority to call *jihad* for Muslims. Also the *jihad* could be called just for religious reason. On the other hand, when classical *jihad* had lost its validity, the new version of *jihad* which is called as *jihadism* is defined as a tool for non-state radical organizations which are fighting against not only foreign power but also Muslim states.

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¹⁸³ Ibid., p: 163

The classical *jihad* is a Qur'anic term which is determined by Qur'anic verses and criteria were drawn by Prophet in early conquests. However, throughout the history, the discourse was modified and re-evaluated by state appointed scholars to legalize their military campaigns. In addition, when state leaders abondened the apply *jihad*, non-governmental- radical- organizations produce their own *jihad* meaning which is called *jihadism*. The *jihadism* is considered as duty of each Muslim regardless of their nations. In addition, all kinds of tactics can be used whether religiously acceptable or not to achieve greater solution. The change can be seen after the First World War Middle Eastern societies.

CHAPTER 3:

JIHAD IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS OF MIDDLE EASTERN NATION-STATES

Islam in contemporary times has confronted with real and serious changes to its identity in a rapidly transforming the Middle East espeacilly after the First World War. Contemporary *jihad* discourse has been modified according to that situation. Almost all political actors produce their own *jihad*, to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their people.

Usage of *jihad* discourse began with legitimizing efforts to national states and in twentieth century it carries terrorist identity in it. In addition, Muslim fundamentalist violence has been directed against not only non-Muslim powers but also Muslim states which don't share same concerns with them¹⁸⁴.

In this chapter, how *jihad* has been used as a political tool will be analyzed. The *jihad*, and Islam in the Middle East after the First World War has three turning points: Dominance of nationalist ideologies (post-First World War), political Islam (1970s and 1980s) and globalized world (1990s to today). The political actors modified the discourse on *jihad* according to situations. Therefore, three basic *jihad* understanding occurred different from classical discourse on *jihad*. This chapter presents political developments that affect the usage of *jihad* during these three periods and how *jihad* was adopted according to these developments.

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¹⁸⁴ Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2004) p.92




Figure 2: Construction of *Jihadism* in three periods after the First World War

3.1. EMERGENCE OF NATION- STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

3.1.1. Political Formation and Consolidation of Nation-States in the Middle East

One of the most tremendous effects of the First World War were seen in the Middle Eastern territories. The promise of independence motivated the Middle Eastern local leaders for rebelling against their caliphate, the Ottoman Sultan. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire opened the way for the establishment of a modern state system in the region and the modern era in the Middle Eastern history began¹⁸⁵. Before the First World War, the Middle Eastern territories were under control of three powers: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Ottoman Empire. After peace treaties and mandate system, new states were established (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). During those years, British and France played determinant role in formation of the new Middle East¹⁸⁶. Different kind of colonial rule, the establishmenet of mandate system, was established. Only Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen exercised full sovereignty at the first time¹⁸⁷. Other states were formed within mandate system which

¹⁸⁵ Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politcs of the Middle East* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003) p. 18

¹⁸⁶ William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (The USA: Westview Press, 2008) p.193-194

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p.171

allowed European powers became dominant in those lands. In addition, local national builders came into scene¹⁸⁸: most notably Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Muhammad V in Morocco, and Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia unite their societies to shape their full sovereign states. On the other hand; members of the Hashemite and Ibn Saud clans entered into strategic alliances with the British, or, in a few instances, with the French, or with both. All these domestic and foreign actors determined the new political and social shape of the Middle East.

The new state leaders established their modern institutions of power and appropriation. Even if the new leaders were dealing with independence of their states, they were not willing to engage in military conflict with European powers since they were relied on European masters economically and ideologically¹⁸⁹. Therefore the new institutions in the Middle East were based on European principles. These institutions provided employment for growing numbers of people, and mobilized people in line with the wishes of the rulers¹⁹⁰. To consolidate their power, the new leaders went on process of cultural and ideological change. The most dramatic change was adoption of secularism for building tolerance between communities or of creating a civic and legal space independent of the state. The most dramatic instance of this secularization was the abolition by Ataturk, in 1924, of the institution of the caliphate¹⁹¹.

By 1960, almost all Muslim states had gained their independence except from the republics under Soviet rule and Bosnia (outside Middle East). Arabic nationalist movements, Jamal Abdul Nasr in Egypt, Baath Party in Syria and Iraq, Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, Houari Boumediene in Algeria defined traditional religious groups and institutions as reactionaries and obstacles to modernization¹⁹². These national states were affected by the Cold War and could not form a unitary foreign policy. Islam was not able to become a unifying force. Thus a single foreign policy among Muslim nation states could not emerge. While some states were placed in the Eastern block, many of them, especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey supported Western block.

¹⁸⁸ Mehran Kamrava, op. cit., p.38-39

¹⁸⁹ William Cleveland, op.cit., p.195

¹⁹⁰ Fred Halliday, op. cit., p:87

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.88

¹⁹² Gilles Kepel, *Cihat: İslamcılığın Yükselişi ve Gerilemesi*, trans. Haldun Bayrı, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001) p.50

Another determinant for establishment of new system was Arab nationalism¹⁹³ which constituted important base for legitimacy. The awakening of the Middle Eastern societies to adopt modern world was realized by the motivation of pan-Arabism instead of Islam. In that time, Christian Arabs as pioneers of Arab nationalism became part of the state system¹⁹⁴. After the First World War, the Middle Eastern territories were introduced with Arab nationalism instead of Islamic *umma* (community) and new structure was formed within a secular framework¹⁹⁵. Creation of a national history, each state sought to assert its own individual identity and historic validity¹⁹⁶. After control of Ottoman Empire, the binding idea of Islamic *umma* was replaced by Arab nationalism which provided legitimacy for social revolution.

Developments during the First World War changed the shape of the Middle Eastern social and political system. Starting from Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Mac-Mahon correspondence¹⁹⁷ (1915–1916) during the First World War which resulted in Arab revolt against Ottoman Sultan, British and France effects shaped the policies of the Middle East. The end of the First World War brought new determinants for world order within Wilsonian principles and the League of Nations such as self-determination, nationalism, mandate system, etc. In the Middle East, after acquiring governance, Arab nationalism removed Islamic ideologies from ruling governments. Whether founders of state or subsequent leaders, the nationalist leaders such as King Faisal, Gamel Abdel Naser, Riza Pahlavi did not allow Islamic movements to act in political sphere. The most important example was forbidding of Muslim Brotherhood even the leaders of it played active role in Free Officers' coup in 1952¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹³ Arab nationalism is the idea that the Arabs are a people linked by special bonds of language and history and their political organization should reflect this reality.

¹⁹⁴ Ernest Dawn, "Origin of Arab Nationalism" in *Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi, at al. (Colombia: Columbia University Press, 1991) p.3

¹⁹⁵ Reingard Schulze, op.cit., p.123

¹⁹⁶ Fred Halliday, op. cit., p.87

¹⁹⁷ Husayn-McMahon correspondence consisted of ten letters between Sharif Husayn ibn Ali, a leader of the Arab nationalist movement and king of the Hijaz, and Sir Henry Mc- Mahon, Britain's high commissioner in Egypt. The declaration called for an independent Arab state.

¹⁹⁸ Mehran Kamrava, op. cit., p. 90

Another determinant of the Middle Eastern history was establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine territories. In the light of the Balfour Declaration¹⁹⁹ issued on November 2, 1917, the British officials drew the Palestinian mandate system²⁰⁰ as part of Syrian territory. During 1930s and 40s, due to the tragedy that Jewish people faced, Jews migration to Palestine increased tremendously. As soon as British forces left the lands, Israel state was established. The creation of State of Israel in the War of 1948²⁰¹ was considered as the achievement of the Zionist objective²⁰². The Arab rejections against Israeli cause became very visible from that time and became the symbol of Arab unity.

The new Middle Eastern states consolidated themselves under these conditions. The Islamic groups of the Middle East were highly affected by new trends. During interwar years, Arab political activities were mostly devoted themselves to achieve independence from foreign control. Against colonialism, Islamic organizations had extensively participated in national liberation struggles²⁰³. However anti-colonial struggle generated a new set of rules which were quite westernized. After colonial period and the First World War, political dimensions of Islam were largely excluded from evolution of politics in the modern Middle Eastern states²⁰⁴. Therefore the relation between politics and Islam did not get chance to evolve normally. New institutional groundwork of the modern Muslim states reflected contemporary European values. However these institutions were not related to the political culture, experience, structure and society of Muslim population²⁰⁵. Although this problem was not recognized in the early years of

¹⁹⁹ British Foreign Minister Lord Arthur James Balfour officially declared to Lord Edmond de Rothschild that Great Britain would look favorably upon the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

²⁰⁰ Mehran Kamrava, op. cit., p. 42-45

²⁰¹ The first conflict between Arab states and the new State of Israel, the Arab- Israel War began as a civil conflict between Palestinian Jews and Arabs following the announcement of the United Nations (UN) plan of November 1947 to partition the country into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international enclave in greater Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs were incensed by the plan, which they considered a violation of their right to self-determination. Arabs attacked Jewish settlements and Jewish attacks against Palestinians. By June 1948, both sides accepted UN armistice and the conflict ended temporarily.

²⁰² William Cleveland, op. cit., p.245

²⁰³ Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe, p.55

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p.56

²⁰⁵ Graham E. Fuller, *Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.119

new states in the Middle East, in upcoming years, it would determine the Middle Eastern politics.

3.1.2. Jihad in the Period of Political Formation and Consolidation of Nation-States

The new leaders of the Middle Eastern states built secular state structure for society although during wars of independence. Islamic identity had been primary vehicle for mobilization of people. Even secular Republic of Turkey applied Islam as defining element of territorial contours²⁰⁶. However political consolidation was achieved through nationalism rather than Islamic identity. The new condition caused a separation between Islamist intellectuals and state powers. Intellectual Islamists felt uncomfortable and distant from that Westernized lifestyle²⁰⁷.

The Middle Eastern post- First World War period was not only consolidation period of new states but also reshaping period of Islamic movements. It was clear that end of the Ottoman Empire was also end of Islamic reign as well as end of caliphate in Muslim world politics. Within that situation, new Islamic movements had to determine their policies in order to gain support of society and restoration of caliphate. Madkhali (Jami) in Yemen, Albani Salfists in Albenia, Suris in Saudi Arabia, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Clubi, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad were some examples in modern Islamic movements. However, since the nationalist leaders were so effective that people trust them, the Islamic movements of those years could not create impressive effect on their societies. At the same time, during those years none of the Middle Eastern states announce *jihad* officially. Within that situation, no effective *jihad* calls were observed. However, the *jihad* calls and argumentations of those years would be the source of many Islamic activities of subsequent decades.

After the First World War, in the Middle East, the only Islamic state was Saudi Arabia. The ideolgocial foundations of the state rooted back to teachings of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) who was a religious leader and Muhammed Muhammed

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²⁰⁶ Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality", *World Policy Journal*, vol.21, i.3 (Fall 2004) p.3

²⁰⁷ Graham E. Fuller, op. cit., p.120

ibn Saud (1735-1765) who was the leader of an Arabic tribe and adopted ideologies of al-Wahhab in state affairs. In 1935, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud (1880-1953) defeated all his rivals, united all tribes under banned of modern state of Saudi Arabia²⁰⁸. Wahhabi teachings separate religious imams from state leaders, so Saudi leaders did not claim to be leader or representative for all Muslims over the globe. Conservative mood of Wahhabism reflected in Saudi state system. Even the state was Islamic and Sharia rules were applied, the state leaders were not imams. During the 1990s, Salafist movement separated into two ideological strains: Conservative Wahhabis which Saudi Arabia pursued and progressive and highly politicized perspective which radical Islamist movements followed²⁰⁹.

The existing state leaders of Saudi Arabia did not announced a *jihad* call against current developments in Muslim societies. However, they pursued the Islamic cause and *jihad* calls of founding fathers of state. Wahhabism declared restless *jihad* against any kinds of Islamic curroption and advocated to follow practices of beginning years of Islam. Wahhabi understanding talks about perpetual *jihad* to abandon every modern un-Islamic ways of life and return to early ages of Islam. The Saudi leaders after the First World War pursued their *jihad* policies in their societies and began to support other Sunni organizations for expansion of Salafi doctrines in Muslim world. Saudi leaders would become very effective in emergence and development of political Islam in the Middle East and strengthening of Muslim communities all around the world. Especially after Arab-Israel War in 1973 that created an oil crisis in globe, the Saudi Arabia would gain huge economic opportunities to support sunni Islamic movements. Like Egypt in pan-Arabism, the activities of Saudi Arabia would become the symbol of Sunni political Islamic ideologies.

The second *jihad* cause of those years was seen in establishment and development of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*). When Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate, all Muslim societies shocked. Although it had been just a symbolic position and already lost its validity, Muslims lost the symbol of their integrity. The most famous Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, was formed in order to

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 ²⁰⁸ Beverley Milton- Edwards, op. cit., p.20 and Larbi Sadiki, "Saudi Arabia" in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (New York: Routledge, 2003) p.31
 ²⁰⁹ Jarret M. Brachman, op. cit., p. 53

restore caliphate position in 1928²¹⁰. Founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), the Muslim Brotherhood was a Salafi movement and adopted orthodox Sunni methods²¹¹. Hasan al-Banna and other members worked for the restoration of the caliphate and the application of Islamic law in government. The founders of Muslim Brotherhood opened social services, produced ideological writings to guide all Muslims and to solve the problems of Muslims not only in Egypt but also all over the Middle East²¹². By the 1950s, the organization had established an international infrastructure for communicating, mobilizing, recruiting and fundraising²¹³.

Political workings of Muslim Brotherhood started with combating against British colonial control in Egypt in 1936. They support 1952 Free Officers' Coup, however new regime banned Muslim Brotherhood and six of its members including Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were assassinated because of their opinions against government in 1966²¹⁴. After this date, Muslim Brotherhood grew in underground. To implement their influence, Islamic organizations focused on social aids, hospital facilities, education, media and publications²¹⁵. Even if Muslim Brotherhood was not able to attract support of people in its early times, its networks and literatures would be the base for later Islamic movements which would be dominant after 1960s²¹⁶. By 1970, Islamic movements would become stronger and the early leaders of Muslim Brotherhood provided intellectual ground for Islamic movements. Their harsh discourses and *jihad* explanations²¹⁷ would adopted by almost all Islamic movements.

The Islamic movements, especially Muslim Brotherhood concerned with not only their local community but whole Muslim societies in world. The Muslim Brothers saw

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²¹⁰ Jarret Brachman op. cit. p.23

²¹¹Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.211-212

²¹² Aini Linjakumpu, op. cit., p.60

²¹³ Jarret Brachman, op.cit., p:23

²¹⁴Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood" *Foreign Affairs* vol.86, i.2 (March- April, 2007) p.107-121

²¹⁵ Michael Bonner, op. cit., p.163

²¹⁶ Barry Rubin, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p.39-57

The early leaders of Muslim Brotherhoods defined defensive *jihad* as duty of all individual rather than collective duty. Since Muslim identity is under attack, there is no need to wait for reactions of leaders. Every Muslim should take the responsibility and join the *jihad* movements regardless of a leader. To sum up, defending Islam against foreign attacks is the responsibility of all Muslims. Therefore, *jihad* becomes defensive warfare.

themselves as representatives of Islamic world²¹⁸ replacing the *caliphate* position. They not only executed their functions in Egypt, but also opened agencies in different countries.

Thirdly; the longest-running *jihad* in the Middle East is the struggle against Israel for the Muslim holy lands. In 1948, a month before the Arab states declared war on the new state of Israel, the ranking cleric of Egypt, Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf, issued a fatwa declaring that all Muslims should participate in the *jihad* to "rescue" Palestine because the true intention of the "Jewish Zionists" was to "dominate all Islamic states and to eliminate their Arabic character and their Islamic culture." Even the avowed secularist, Yasser Arafat, issued a call to *jihad* to wage "holy war" to liberate Jerusalem. Besides, the scholars of Muslim Brotherhood declared *jihad* against presence of "Zionist entity" in Palestine. All these *jihad* calls were announced by religious scholars to emphasize the upcoming threat for Muslims in and around Palestine²²⁰. These scholars had no armies so they could not be the leader of military campaigns. However all the calls would become source of military campaigns against state of Israel.

Lastly, Sufi movements of those years pursued *jihad* in spiritual developments of the society. The Middle Eastern governments never ignored religious identities for their societies even if they built a secular structure. The new states took the responsibility of the engagement of main religious affairs and appointed state religious staff for guidance of people about religion. The religious staff highlights the Islamic credential of the state and issue *fatwa* in support activities of state²²¹. The religious duties of the state cover mosque management, leading the prayer, celebration of important religious festivals, teaching of religious education in schools, and the issuing of fatwa requested by the state²²², within the guidelines set by the state. On the other hand, non-state Islamic organizations were permitted in the society as long as they did not pose a threat to

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²¹⁸ Reinhard Schulze, op. cit., p.127

²¹⁹ Rudolph Peter, *Jihad in the Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton:Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996) p.105

Richard Bonney, op.cit., p.270

²²¹ Abdullah Saeed, "The Official Ulema and Rreligious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State" in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (New York: Routledge, 2003) p.24

²²² Gilles Kepel, op. cit., p.56

secular structure of state²²³. The most important groups were sufi communities and their *Da'wa* (calling to Islam) cause. *Da'wa* (calling to Islam) is the classic strategy to change society to truly Islamic one. It suggested that Islamic change in society will over time lead to change in the political order itself²²⁴. The most prominent Da'wa movement in the world is the *Tablighi Jama'at* in Pakistan²²⁵. In the Middle East, Nur (Light) movement in Turkey is the second influential Islamic movement in globe. Founded in 1926 by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1876- 1960), Nur movement expanded their activities all around the globe. In Da'wa oriented movements, Sufi movements occupy different place in society. Sufism is inner and emotional aspect of Islam²²⁶. These movements don't establish political parties, instead dedicated themselves to raise Islamic consciousness of the society.

In proceeding years, some unpleased religious leaders began to show their reactions by forming their organizations against the system. That period witnessed the transformation of the sufis into guerilla fighters or army commanders²²⁷. Many of the new sufi leaders would call for *jihad* describing it as not only personal enhancement but also struggle against *fitnah* that was foreign occupation or Muslim rulers²²⁸. The arm struggle targeted not only external imperialism but also the domestic rulers who allied with Western powers. This revolutionary and revisionist vision showed supreme rejection of the existing political order²²⁹.

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e511 retrieved on 16.12.2013

http://www.iikv.org/academy/index.php/sympeng/article/view/1015/1988 retrieved on 16.12.2013

²²³ Graham. E Fuller op. cit., p.121

²²⁴ Oxford Islamic Studies Online, "dawah"

²²⁵ Alex Alexiev, Tablighi Jammat: "Jihad's Stealthy Legions" *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.11, i.1 (Winter 2005) p.3

M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Sufi Conception of Jihad: The Case of Said Nursi"

²²⁷ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.172

²²⁸ Ibid., p.173

²²⁹ Grahem Fuller, op. cit., p.125

3.2. JIHAD BETWEEN 1970s AND 1990s

3.2.1. Political Situation

The period from 1970s experienced emergence of Political Islam which would determine political process of the Middle Eastern history. Political Islam, Islamic resurgence and revival are often used interchangeably with concepts like "Islamism", "fundamentalism", "neo-fundamentalism", "Khomeinism", "traditionalism", "Arabism", "puritanism", "rebirth", "reassertation", "awakening", "reformism", "renewal", "renaissance", "revitalization", "militancy", "activism", "return to Islam", "upsurge", and "reassertation"²³⁰. Throughout the history, Islam has always been in the political sphere even in particular times when it lost its dominance. Religion and politics were brought together in the historical Islamic state by way of the state appropriating religion²³¹. Political Islam was the final version of Islam in political sphere.

Generally speaking, Political Islam is about establishment of Islamic state through political action because Islam is considered as an all-compassing religion and regulates all aspects of the life²³². Since Islam is considered as not only religion, the actors of Muslim states thought that political area cannot be separated from Islam.

After 1970s, nationalism as a mobilizing ideology in the Middle Eastern states lost its popularity and Islamic movements fulfilled that power vacuum. 1970s of the Middle East were marked by the sudden emergence of political Islamist movements in most of the Middle Eastern nation states²³³. This resurgence was based on several economic and political developments in the Middle Eastern societies due to failure of nationalist leaders. The most important factor was devastating results of Arab- Israeli wars especially in 1967. After War in 1967²³⁴, the Arab leaders faced with humiliating

²³⁰ John Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) p.283

²³¹ Nazih Ayyubi, op. cit., p. 5

²³² Muhammed Ayoob, "Political Islam" op.cit., p.1

²³³ Gilles Kepel, op. cit., p.61

Arab-Israel War in 1967 (5 June–10 June 1967): Third major Israeli-Arab war, after the War of 1948 and the Suez-Sinai War of 1956. The Israeli army had defeated the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armies in six days. Israel tripled its territorial area by the occupation of the West Bank (which included East Jerusalem), a part of the Golan Heights, the Sinai Desert, and the Gaza Strip. See: Claude Faure, *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Culture, History, and Politics* (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005) p.33-35

troubles. Within six days, all Arab main army was destroyed and the state of Israel expanded its territories almost triple. The border tensions between Israel and three of the frontline Arab states: Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates were heightened. Palestinians were becoming increasingly suspicious that Israel would become a permanent reality²³⁵. Refugee problems, economic disputes, lost of strategical lands brought domestic security crisis. As a result, nationalist Arab leaders lost their carismas in their societies and Islamic movements found a way to be active²³⁶. Many poems and novels were written questioning the reasons of the defeat and the bill was charged to existing leaders.

Another ground for emergence of Political Islam occurred after Arab- Israel War in 1973²³⁷. During the war, the Arab leaders used their oil as "political weapon" and limited exports to the USA and Western nations claiming that they were allied with state of Israel. In September 1973 Arab oil exporting countries decided that they would decrease the oil exporting at %5 every month²³⁸. As a result of this embargo, the global oil price dramatically increased. In July 1974, the embargo ended totally but the price never returned its beginning level. The price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly 12 US Dollar per barrel (in 1973 the petroleum price was 2, 74 \$ and in 1974 it was 11, 65 \$)²³⁹. The result was enormous wealthy for petrol exporting states- especially for Saudi Arabia- and conservative groups in those countries²⁴⁰ since they executed oil revenues.

During mid-1970s, the Islamic conservative people in petrol exporting countries had overwhelming earnings which made them dominant in their societies and in political life of their countries. The unfortunate thing was the states which gave them powerful position which could not be controlled by existing authorities. Those groups would use

²³⁵Mehran Kamrava, op. cit., p.115-116 and

Mohammed Ayoob, "Oil, Arabism and Islam" in Islamic Politics ed. Andrew. C. Kimmens (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1991) p.10

L. Carr Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (Colombia:Colombia University Press, 2000) p.123

²³⁷ Arab-Israel War in 1973 (6 October–24 October 1973): Fourth major Arab-Israel war. On 12 September 1973, an Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance was sealed. Some part of the Israeli air force was rapidly destroyed since Israel was in Yom Kippur which is holy day for Jewish people. See: Ibid., pp:35-37

²³⁸ Türel Yılmaz Şahin, *Uluslararası Politikada Ortadoğu* (Istanbul: Barış Kitap, 2011), p.211-213

²³⁹ CBC News, "The Price of Oil – in Context" on June 9, 2007. Retrieved in 17.11.2014 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/oil/

²⁴⁰ Gilles Kepel, op. cit., p:14

their economic power in political sphere also. Economically developed these people started to play active roles not only in their countries but also in other Muslim geographies and their activities born crucial results. At the beginning when they were not radical, the Islamic groups were supported by many Middle Eastern state leaders and the USA especially in Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Malaysia against Soviet regime during 1980s but the created power turned into opposition threat to supporting leaders.

The most beneficiary state from increment in oil prices became Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi group which held the oil revenues of the country. That unprecedented sudden wealth brought a global prestigious position for Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi organizations developed themselves and began to work for spreading Islam all over the globe. The rich Wahhabi organizations opened Islamic agencies and established Islamic associations to help people who endure Islamic life all around the world where Muslims live. These organizations built mosques, published books and distributed cassettes from African savannas to Indonesian rice lands and European suburbs. Secondly, big migration to Saudi Arabia started because of new job opportunities. The new immigrant workers were especially religionist people who had Islamic way of life. These people returned their countries with a good wealth and established a luxury and Islamist ideology. As expected, this new aristocracy would not develop good relations with their nationalist governments²⁴¹.

The country where Political Islam was lived in most apparently was Egypt²⁴². After Arab- Israel War in 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat modified aggressive policy of his state against Israel towards possible negotiations. In order to reduce reaction of the society, he initiated more economic freedom policy which was called as infitah (the open door)²⁴³ and gave freedom to Islamic organizations which had been banned after the coup in their activities. Within that framework, the Islamic movement in Egypt would have significant role throughout the twentieth century and inspired modern revivalism and fundamentalism globally. Sadat also managed to get fatwa to support the

²⁴¹ Gilles Kepel, op. cit., p.79-83 and Reinhard Schulze, op. cit., p.200-201

²⁴² William Cleveland, op. cit., p. 415

²⁴³ Nazih N. Ayubi, op. cit., p.270

Egypt-Israel peace treaty²⁴⁴ but this initiative did not work. While the international community would grant Sadat and the other parties to the agreement the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts, as far as Egypt's radical Islamists claimed that Sadat signed his own death warrant²⁴⁵. To counterbalance its opponents, Nasserists and leftists, Sadat freed all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and permitted Islamic activities, which resulted in gaining enormous power of fundamentalist Islamic organizations²⁴⁶. Sadat failed to understand arisig situation and he realized the deadly force of opposition was too late²⁴⁷.

The policies of Anwar Sadat in Egypt redounded enourmous power to Islamic groups. Egyptian *Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad)* organization²⁴⁸ became the most powerful group in Egyptian society, especially among young students. By 1977, the conflict between Islamic groups and Anwar Sadat became visible and radicalized, which resulted in assasination of Anwar Sadat on 6th October 1981. The assassination was end of the story rather than beginning of any revolution²⁴⁹ neither the assassination could not become any ground for any movement towards establishing a *sharia* state. Even if this initiative became failure, it gave a signal those ideologies of Political Islam had already gained the support of the Middle Eastern people.

Failure of pan-Arabism²⁵⁰ showed that secularism did not serve for benefits of the Middle Eastern society. The policies of secular governments drew reaction of people, which resulted in emergence of political Islam. Whether secular or Islamic state structure, Islamic parties started to be seen in political arena by modifying themselves

²⁴⁴ Ibid, p.271

²⁴⁵ Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op. cit., p.11

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.271-272

²⁴⁷ Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought From the Prophet to the Present*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) p.307

²⁴⁸ Egyptian Islamic Jihad (also formerly called simply Islamic Jihad or "al-Jihad") was founded in 1979 by Mohammed Abd al-Salam Farraj in Cairo. The organization aimed establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt and eventually world domination by Islam in a renewed Caliphate. Since Muslim Brotherhood was banned by the government, Al-Jihad became dominant organization in Egyptian socety. See: Encyclopedia of the Middle East from http://www.mideastweb.org/

²⁴⁹ Gilles Kepel, op. cit., p.87-94

²⁵⁰ Pan Arabism is a secular Arab nationalist ideology during the 1950s and 1960s. The principal instrument of Pan-Arabism in the early 1960s was the Ba'ath party, which was active in most Arab states, notably Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. see: "Pan-Arabism" http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/pan-arabism.html#ixzz2xMxk1e1P

according to existing legal framework. Even if secular type state systems were adopted, the new governments did not totally forbid Islamic movements and led them pursue their functions. Islam is the most important determinant factor of the Middle East societies therefore none of the leaders could not ignore all Islamic movements in order not to attract public anger.

Another face of Political Islam occurred in Shi'ite Iran with an Islamic Revolution which showed that the imported ideologies were not able to achieve modern well being for the society. Even if the role of religious staff was reduced or Sharia implemented areas were almost erased in the societies, Islamic sensibility of the people had not disappeared any time²⁵¹. The 1979 Islamic Revolution emerged as reaction against centralizing and modernizing policies of Pahlavi's Reza Khan and his son Muhammad Reza who pursued pro-Western, even pro-Israeli policies ²⁵². The inconsistent policies of Pahlavi rulers hesitated Iranians and then revolution became inevitable. By the late 1970s, the writings and recordings of sermons by fundamentalist clerics like Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati were being widely circulated among the Iranian people. Such writings were not only a critique of authoritarian rule but contained an agenda for change that gave people hope. Finally, the hesitaded Iranian groups together started a revolution and toppled the Pahlavi rule in 1979²⁵³. Ayatollah Khomeini and his companions gained the control over other groups and established an Islamic form of Republic²⁵⁴. The Revolution brought a new epoch to Political Islam. Revolution revealed the possibility of Islamic state, and catalyzed the conflict between Shi'ite and Sunni sects of Islam.

After overthrow of the Shah, the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran established Islamic government. Combining Shi'ite traditions with contemporary system, the Constitution is unique in world history. Actually, the Constitution, de jure, achieved the aim of integrating religion and politics²⁵⁵. Khomeini adopted the idea that only an Islamic government can be relied upon to implement Sharia and the government

²⁵¹ William Cleveland, op. cit., p.413

²⁵² Antony Black, op. cit., p.310

²⁵³ Mehran Kamrava, op. cit., p.148- 154

²⁵⁴ Reinhard Schulze, op.cit. p.234

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p.320

is legitimate as long as it promotes the application of the religious codes²⁵⁶. After coming power, he developed the Islamic version of 257 imperialism, or dependency theory. According to his view, the rest of the world, including Muslims is living in an order which is governed by big powers²⁵⁸.

After the Revolution, the new leaders of Iran pursed expansionist foreign policy to export the Islamic revolution. They supported Shia groups (Hezbollah, Shias in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, etc) which were challenging their existing governments. In response, a Sunni coalition was formed among Gulf countries since they perceived Iranian policy as a threat to their sovereignty. The Iranian Revolution was introduced to the world politics as Islamic revolution rather than Shi'ite revolution. The aim of the Iranian leaders was to export revolution to other Muslim states. To pursue exporting revolution, Iranian leaders began to support Islamic groups, especially Shi'ite groups. However, that policy of Iran was perceived as threat to their independence. Reaction of other Middle Eastern states determined the road map of political Islam. The clash between Sunni political Islam backed by Saudi Arabia and shia political Islam led by Iran dominated the Middle Eastern politics. The Iran- Iraq War (September 1980 to August 1988) was the most important result of that conflict. Iraq under Saddam Hussein declared war against Iran after took the supports of Gulf countries in 1980²⁵⁹. The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988 but the conflict between Iran and Sunni states did not.

Turkey experienced the different Political Islam which was the most local attempt in the Middle East. In Turkey, with the establishment of the secular republic, not only political aspects but also cultural values were re-shaped after hesitation of the First World War. The reformation movements of 1920s included the aim of controlling the religious activities of society²⁶⁰. The first initiative was unifying all religious activities under control of official Presidency of Religious Affairs. More importantly, instead of independence religious schools, official theological schools (imam-hatip okulları) were

²⁵⁶ Antony Black, op. cit., p.317 lbid., p.321

²⁵⁸ Ibid, p.321

²⁵⁹ Ibid.,p.237

²⁶⁰ Dankwart A. Rustow "Türkiye'de Islam ve Politika" (ed.) A. Adnan Adıvar *Türkiye'de Islam ve* Laiklik, (Istanbul: İnsan yay. 1995) p.71

established and the state raised its own religious people²⁶¹. The rural people chose these schools for their children, which caused the increase in number of theological schools. During 1950s and 1960s, rural children gained a chance for education and conservative intellectual people became involved in not only guiding religious activities of society but also different agent of state bureaucracy and administration. These educated religious people would constitute ground for political religious activities in 1970s. Organizing of Turkish political Islam during 1970s began with the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) within freedoms of 1961 Constitution. The leaders were Mehmet Zahid Kotku and Necmettin Erbakan who were from Iskenderpasa Religious Community which was not happy with Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) even if it was a conservative party²⁶². The parties of Political Islam in Turkey were banned and closed but organization was never dissolved. The organization has always played active roles in Turkish politics.

The difference of Turkish Political Islam was that it has not intented to change the Turkish nationalist state system even secular structure. The actors of Turkish political Islam wanted to change the policies of exiting state. According to their agenda, instead of pursuing Westernized policies, the relations among Muslim countries should be developed and Muslim identity of Turkish Republich should be more emphasized during decision making process.

3.2.2. Jihadist Discourses Between 1970s and 1990s

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Islamic revivalism was apparent across the Muslim world. This had a significant impact on the political arena as well. This populist version of Islam has empowered thousands who have taken the demand of the Islamic call to heart²⁶³. Revivalism contributed to a rising of Muslim consciousness. The Islamic discourses again got involved in shaping of the Middle East after 1970s. The process of secularization and modernization, promoted by states and social change alike, produces a counter-reaction which resulted in emergence of political Islam which

²⁶¹ Yıldız Atasoy, *Turkey, Islamists and Democracy* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005) p. 38 ²⁶² Ibid., p.61-65

²⁶³ Fred Halliday, op. cit., p.89

satisfied the society but disappointed the some Islamist groups. The new governing force changed not only politics of the Middle Eastern states but also formation of radical Islamist groups.

From 1970s, religion was viewed as a ground for political order. However, the political Islam did not carry revisionist ideas except for Shi'ite Iranian state. The Sunni Islam, dominant in the Middle Eastern states, orders obedience to ruler and support *status quo* of order. When the time came to 1970s, the new states had already been established and the Islamic governments did not carry the goal of changing the existing state formation. When they came to power, political Islam accepted national states and abandoned the fundamentalist views which deny legitimacy of nation by supporting supra-national community of believers (*umma*)²⁶⁴.

Political Islam did not bring full success to the Middle East because of different characteristics of societies. The most important thing is that it did not gain the support of radical Islamist groups. The new parties adopted themselves in existing state systems. No one except Khomeini changed the state system when they came to power. Although they used ideas of Muslim Brotherhood or other extremes as background for their propaganda, all gave up radical discourses and stop war against Western values. None of the political parties in power used *jihadist* discourses in their political activities and their foreign relations.

Divorcing *jihadist* discourses from political sphere in the Middle East, the new political parties acted within existing framework. No states carried the aim of expansion of Islam through military campaigns. This new rotation of governing Islamic parties drove a wedge with radical Islamist groups who were not happy with existing state system. The most important hesitation was seen in debate on secularism. When we came to 1980s, there was only one state that was ruled according to *sharia* laws, Saudi Arabia.

As it was argued, 1970s and 1980s witnessed the resurgence of political Islam in the Middle East politics; however the movements did not use discourse of *jihad* in their political activities. In three major events, *jihad* was used during period of political

²⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism" *The Middle East and North Africa Report* no.37 (March, 2005) p.6

Islam: Assasination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, takeover of Grand Mosque (*Kabaa*) and the Iran Iraq War.

Assasination of Sadat (October 6, 1981)²⁶⁵ was considered as the beginning point of period of political Islam. Contrary to Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt was favorable to Islamist groups. He tried to modify the state system according to sharia rule. He even oversaw the 1980 constitutional amendment which made Islam the 'religion of the state' and sharia the 'main source of legislation', le allowed religious groups to act freely. Within that atmosphere, an influential name in Egypt, Abdullah Faraj founded Jihad Organization (al- Jihad or al-Jama'at-Jihad) in 1979. Faraj also wrote a short book called "The Neglected Duty" in order to explain his views²⁶⁷. He argued that "It is obligatory upon the Muslims to raise their swords against the rulers who are hiding the truth and manifesting falsehood, otherwise the truth will never reach the hearts of the people." For Faraj, jihad had been neglected by the Islamic ulema despite its strategic importance for wellbeing and future of Islam and Muslims. Jihad should be duty of every Muslims against all kinds of threats to Islam even if the threat is coming from state leader²⁶⁹. Faraj criticized other groups for their gradualist strategy and involvement in existing political system. He insisted that active, immediate, above all, violent *jihad* was the only strategy for achieving an Islamic state. In tactical terms, Faraj argued that the assassination of Egypt's president (called the 'evil prince' and 'the Pharaoh'²⁷⁰) would be an effective first step in a revolution that would seize power and establish an Islamic state²⁷¹. His fatwa was followed by a member of al-Jihad and in October 1981 Anwar Sadat was assassinated. The police in Egypt started a huge investigation and the new leader Husnu Mubarek banned all opposing movements again.

The second seminal event in the *jihad* movement occurred in November 1979, when 2000 Islamic fundamentalists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the annual hajj

²⁶⁵ Devin R. Springer at all, op. cit., p.33

²⁶⁶ Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, *Islam and Political Legitimacy* (New York: Routledge, 2003) p.7

²⁶⁷ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.288

²⁶⁸ Devin R. Springer at all, op. cit., p.41

²⁶⁹ David Cook, op. cit., p.107

²⁷⁰ Michael Bonner, op. cit., p.163

²⁷¹ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.291

and held hundreds of pilgrims in hostage²⁷². It showed that even Islamic state of Saudi Arabia was not immune from Islamic resurgence. When Saudi royal family established the state of Saudi Arabia, other tribes accepted its legitimacy. However, some groups felt defeated themselves formed *Ikhvan* (Brotherhood- not Muslim Brotherhood in Epypt) organization which was a radical critic of the Saudi monarchy for not being religious enough²⁷³. In Madina, a group of students had already assassinated King Faisal in 1975. Therefore, many members of *Ikhwan* were arrested. The leader of *Ikhwan*, Juhaiman b. Muhammad al-Utaibi (1940–1979) who planned to announce himself as *mahdi* at the end of the pilgrimage month on 20 November 1979, declared a *jihad* against Saudi royal family. In the morning of 20 November, the heavily armed group occupied the Kaaba²⁷⁴. The rebellion was violently suppressed. With the help of French security forces, the Saudis were able to bring the situation under control though 250 people died and many more were wounded²⁷⁵.

The Iran- Iraq War (1980-1988) was the most important *jihad* cause of new state of Iran. Although Muslim countries of the Middle East were inspired by Iranian Islamic revolution, they felt themselves in threat coming from export revolution ideology of Iran. Finally, supported by Gulf countries and other Sunni states of the Middle East, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on September 22, 1980 because he wanted to contain the Shi'ite revolution in Iran. Saddam also defined the battle as a "heroic *jihad* and martyrdom for the cause of right," adding that "the heroic Iraqi armed forces and the great Iraqi people are fighting today against a clique linked by inheritance, thoughts and activity to the Persian empire that was destroyed by Islam.". Thus Saddam argued that the Iranians were not "true" Muslims and that Muslims were now obliged to fight not just for Iraq but also to defend "the ideals for which the prophet Mohammed and his great supporters waged holy war." The eight-year war resulted in a million casualties and ruined the economies of both countries²⁷⁷. Thinking that he fought for all Sunni

²⁷² Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op. cit., p.12

²⁷³ Nazih Ayyubi, op.cit.,,p.99

²⁷⁴ Reinhard Schulze, op.cit.,,p.228

²⁷⁵ Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op.cit.,,p.12

²⁷⁶ Ibid n 18

Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1991) p.250

states, Saddam Hussein claimed that all countries were responsible for Iraq's war dept, which would cause further crisis.

At the same time, nonviolent *jihad* activities were also strengthened by religious people during 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly the theological connections between *dawa* (preach and call) and *jihad* have been made by street and neighborhood preachers. This populist version of Islam was empowered thousands who have taken the demand of the Islamic call to heart. They in turn see it as their duty to bring fellow Muslims back to the "straight path" which is offered by Islam. Their message was based on principles of reform and nonviolence. In places like Jerusalem and the West Bank dawa members worked in the refugee camps as well²⁷⁸.

On the other hand, the most crucial debate about Islam in politics occurred outside of the Middle East, in Afghanistan when Soviet regime occupied the cunrty in 1979. With declaration of call for *jihad* by Abdullah Azzam²⁷⁹, the Afghan cause became concern of all Muslims. Not only Muslim states also the USA involved in Afghan *jihad* and supported strengthening of Afghan mujahids. The arrows of *jihadist* mujahids who had been trained and armed by the US forces, turned against Western powers and resulted in the most destructive attacks including 9/11 in 2001. The beginning of Taliban regime in 1996 brought new dynamics in modern Islamist policies. As much as Khomeini made the Islamic term *fatwa* popular, so did bin Laden with *jihad*²⁸⁰.

²⁷⁸ Beverley Milton-Edwards, op.cit.,,p.69

Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam became the major Arab advocate of the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1989. See: Devin R. Springer at al. op.cit., p.42-43

²⁸⁰ In order to understand *jihad* movements in Middle East, developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan regimes should be considered. In Pakistan, *jihad* was always in the center of politics and affected all Muslim worlds including Middle East. In July 1977, the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was replaced by Ziya ul Hak with a coup de'at. The new Islamic government became important ally of America in Afghan *jihad* against America. The Afghan *jihad* was able to win support of Mawdudi and Islamic Pakistan.

3.3. JIHAD IN GLOBALIZED WORLD

3.3.1. Political Developments in the Middle East

As mentioned above, the oil crisis in 1973 brought unpresedented economic wealth in oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries especially in Gulf region. Dramatic increase in petroleum barrel price started up huge economic development which reinforced the authorities of existing governments and rulers²⁸¹. Good salaries distributed to workers and extensive social public services appeased the public cristisims to rulers. Within that situation, a degree of stability was acquired but it would not last so long. Ongoing Palestinian crisis and recurrent wars in Gulf region addition to reductions in global oil prices distructed the political stability and dissatisfactions of oppositions came in the scene.

The 1990s of the Middle East politics were occupied by Palestinan problems. Palestinian- Israeli conflict entered a negotiation process however unresolved negotiations disappointed Muslim states. By 1999 there were three items remaining: the status of Jerusalem; the return of the Palestinian refugees; and the future of Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas. But the peace processes which had been drawn up in the international arena proved unsuitable to local conditions in Palestine²⁸².

On 28 September 2000 the situation escalated once more. A short visit by the leader of the Israeli opposition, Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount was followed by violent clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinian demonstrators. The view of Israel was that Palestinian organizations had used the visiting as an opportunity to call for uprising that they had been planning for some time. Notwithstanding, the uprising came exactly five years after the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement, which specified a transition period of five years for the agreed solution. After only a few days this uprising was seen as the continuation of the first intifada of 1987–1993²⁸³.

The second, or al-Aqsa, intifada broke out in late September 2000. Unlike the first uprising, this one was pre-planned. Yasser Arafat had broken off negotiations at Camp David in July and a return to the armed struggle was inevitable from this date. The

²⁸³ Ibid., p.291

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²⁸¹ William Cleveland, *History of Modern Middle East*, op.cit. p.518

²⁸² Ibid., p.290

timing of the uprising was coordinated with Ariel Sharon's 'provocative' visit to the al-Agsa Mosque²⁸⁴. Yasser Arafat planned the emergence of second intifada however he could not predict the outcome. Second intifada resulted in enpowerment of radical Islamic movement of Hamas as a determining actor in the Palestinian issue.

Hamas was founded in 1987 by a group that included Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, the most prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, as well as Abdullah Azzam, the leader of the *jihad* in Afghanistan. The mission of Hamas was summed up in its motto: "Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur'an its Constitution, Jihad its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes." In pursuit of its stated goals, since launching first suicide attack in Israel in 1993, Hamas has been linked to hundreds of terrorist attacks. Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in the January 1996 parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority and as of this writing is the majority party of the legislative body 285 .

The Gulf War in 1991 occupied crucial point in the Middle Eastern political agenda. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) had devastating effects on Iraqi economy and Saddam Husein thought that allied countries of Iraq had to take their responsibilities to recover Iraqi economy. Claiming its territories, in the early morning hours of August 2, 1990, approximately one hundred thousand Iraqi troops occupied the small sheikhdom and its capital city, Kuwait City²⁸⁶. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait followed months of mounting tensions between Iraq and its southern neighbors as well as the USA. To counter Iraqi invasion Operation Desert Storm by the UN was launched on January 16, 1991, with a massive bombardment of Iraqi troop. Within a week, the Iraqi ground forces were surrendered²⁸⁷.

Reductions in oil revenues, increasing war expenditures, and unending political disputes resulted in stiffen of opposion groups in the Middle Eastern countries. However this time, the existing leaders did not allow the emergence of oppositional groups and suppressed all of them harshly (in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, etc.)²⁸⁸. The oppressive regimes of the Middle Eastern countries were established in the politics. Within that

²⁸⁴ Ritchie Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars* (London: Pearson Longman, 2004) p.309

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p.189

²⁸⁵ Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op.cit., p.33

²⁸⁶ Mahran Kamrava, op.cit., p.183

²⁸⁸ Raymond Hinnebusch, op.cit. p.214-215

situation, many Islamic groups became militarized and reactionary against existing regimes. In secular Middle Eastern states, the non-governmental Islamic groups were able to survive even if they were highly affected by global changing trends. Islamic groups have been able to analyze the global affairs in world politics and produce discourses in line with new trends²⁸⁹. In addition, the societies of these states especially lower class and rural people never gave up their religious identities. In countries where Political Islam was witnessed, radical Islamic groups emerged as well. Islamic movements could not respond expectations of conservative groups; neither meet the economic demands of citizens. These hesitations would breed radical aggressive non-governmental religious organizations²⁹⁰. The result was that Islam became a tool in radical hands in the Middle East.

The failures of Political Islam run the Middle Eastern politics towards a radical situation. The religious parties, when they came to power, could not respond to economic needs of people. Especially in Turkey, the lower class supported Islamic movements to be freed from economic hegemony of elites of the society. They regarded that Western powers allied with secular-nationalist governments controlled economies so less Westernized economic system was needed²⁹¹. However, the activities and policies of Islamic parties were not enough to heal economic statue of lower class. In addition, the Islamic parties did not turn the nationalist secular state structure to an Islamic one (except Iran). Nationalism still divides Muslims contrary to umma understanding which propose the unity of all Muslims under banner of Islam. Therefore radical Islamic movements were not happy with policies of ruling Islamic governments since they did not modify state according to sharia rules. After 1989, the classic Islamic discourse disappeared altogether, giving way to a multi-functional 'post-Islamism'²⁹².

One of the most important incident affecting event of the Middle Eastern politics was experienced outside the Middle East, was 9/11 attacks on Twin Towers and Pentagon in the USA²⁹³. After withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Taliban gained the control in the country to establish an Islamic state. During that time, the

²⁸⁹ Reinhard Schulze, op.cit., p. 281

²⁹⁰ Gilles Kepel, op.cit. p.404

²⁹¹ Gilles Kepel, op.cit. p.399

²⁹² Reinhard Schulze, op.cit.,,p.281

²⁹³ Jarret Brachman, op.cit, p. 148

leader of al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden became influential name for forming politics of Afghanistan. His *fatwas* (especially in 1996 and 1998) against the Christian word especially against the USA affected both Afghan people and all radical Muslim groups all over the world. In 1998, he called *jihad* against America to protect the future of Muslims. On September 11, 2001 under *jihad* cause, the most shocking attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon were realized²⁹⁴. To respond these attacks, The USA government declared a war against terrorism (although the government under George Bush underlined that they were fighting against terrorism not Islam, the US attacks were considered as against Islam itself). After al-Qaida attacks, the US government started operation in Afghanistan and then a war against Iraq was launched in 2003.

3.3.2. *Jihadism* after 1990s

By mid-1990s, the thought of global *jihad* school had developed the philosophy of *jihadism*. Although the world has different kinds of *jihadist* organizations, all have common argument. The *jihadism* argues that there is a global conspiracy functioning to destroy Islam. They say that Christian West and their ally Zionist Israel are working to destroy Islam. It is clear that Muslims are suffering from aggression of Zionists and Crusaders²⁹⁵. There are unending economic, military and cultural pressures on Islamic world.

Hesitated religious groups by international and local developments changed their means of policy towards aggressive tools. From 1990s, Islamist fighters have become international and global. Each day *jihadist* militants implement new combat tactics, technique and procedure against the Western world, especially against the USA and existing local leaders as well. The radical religious organizations were using violence and terrorism; and argue that they were figting under banner of *jihad*. From now on, *jihad* as military tool has been used by non-state actors to gain legitimacy to their aggressive actions. This form of war is a threat to international security since it is

²⁹⁵ Abubaker A.Bagader "Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World" in *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*, ed. Akbar S.Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (New York: Routledge, 1994) p.124

²⁹⁴ Richard Bonney, op.cit., 376

against existing stability. In the course of a politicization of Islam, the call to a *jihadist* revolution is used for mobilizing the followers²⁹⁶.

The transformation of political Islam into radical Islam, involving in conflicting civilizations, contributes to militarizing the claims to be accomplished in irregular warfare. *Jihadism*, particularly through its acts of terrorism, is based on political Islam, which is not indicative of all religious extremism. At issue is rather a new warfare. The irregular war of *jihadism* – unlike classical *jihad* – is a war without rules and without a limit of targets. This new type of *jihad* indicates a radical change in international affairs. Politically, it is related to a politicization of Islamic universalism that strives for a new Islamic world order²⁹⁷.

The *jihadism* has little religious significance to Muslims. Unlike early *jihad* movements, the *jihadism* which is a military and political version of *jihad* started in Central Asia. In Afghanistan, against Soviet occupation, a *jihad* had been called during 1980s by Azzam. Saudi Arabia became the most important supporter of that *jihad* and provided important military and economic supports to Afghan mujahidds. However, current *jihad* call of Osama bin Laden in August 1996 received different response than case in the past²⁹⁸. Then, *Jihadism* would become equal to Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Beginning of mid-1990s witnessed the rise of Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The second wave of Afghan *jihad* is different than previous one which was called right after Soviet invasion²⁹⁹. *Jihadism* this time has an exploitive environment.

In Sudan; Muslims in the north had been waging *jihad* against the largely Christian-Animist south. But in 1992, just after bin Laden moved there, the Sudanese regime extended the call to *jihad* to including the country's Nuba Muslims as well because they opposed the fundamentalist vision of the ruling party. The government declared that anyone who resisted the regime was an apostate and would be sentenced to death³⁰⁰.

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²⁹⁶ Bassam Tibi, "Radical Islam and International Security", ed. Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar, op.cit. p.21

²⁹⁷ Ibid 22

²⁹⁸ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.323

²⁹⁹ Jarret M. Brachman, op. cit., p.8

³⁰⁰ Ibid,, p.19

The radical Islam posed a threat towards not only non-Muslim societies but also their states because the fundamentalists rejected every element of the modernity project. The political leaders in the Middle Eastern countries, especially secularist ones, realized that fundamentalists as a threat used Islam for existing political, economic and moral orders³⁰¹. In some countries radical Islamist groups declared *jihad* against ruling authority. For example in Algeria, a group of Islamists immediately declared *jihad* against the regime. After Algeria gained independence from France in 1962, one political party effectively dominated the system-the National Liberation Front. However, in 1991, an Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), became so popular in the society. The existing Algerian regime decided to close the party because it would carry a risk losing power. Soon after, more radical Islamist group- the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) - emerged and justified their social and military activities as defensive *jihad*³⁰². In neighboring Tunisia, and Yemen radical Islamist declared *jihad* against Western powers³⁰³. Over time, the *jihad* would expand all globe including non-Muslim states such as Europe and the USA. In short, *jihad* had gone global.

This new version of *jihad* is totally different than traditional view. Global radical Islamist groups have developed their philosophical grounds based on *jihadism*. Global *jihad* emerged in international scene after Al-Qaida's attack of 9/11 in 2001 and it has become synonymous with terrorism. The most important thing about *jihadism* is that it has been developed by non-state Islamic organizations (radical and global) rather than Muslim states.

Governing political Islam has not confronted with public opposition but radical Islamist organizations which have been hesitated by policies of governments. Islamic governments did not change their state system and cut their foreign relations with non-Muslim states especially the USA. The radical Islamic groups are not happy with activities of their governments and develop their policies not only against dominant Western powers but also Islamic states ally with them.

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303 Ibid., p.22, 28-29

³⁰¹ Beverley Milton-Edwards, op. cit., p.71-72

³⁰² Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, op. cit., p.21

The Islamist parties when came to power attempted to reconcile tradition and modernity. They tried to preserve aspects of tradition while adopting modern conditions. However, the radical Islamic groups were not satisfied with this reconciliation. Radical Islamic discourse has two basic slogans: "Islam huva al-hall" (Islam is the solution) and "al-Qur'an dusturna" (The Qur'an is our constitution)³⁰⁴.

The new version of *jihadist* praxis is the ability to use technology. Every concerned people can find huge amount of digital articles, writings, personal stories, etc on the internet. Every concerned people can follow the links on the web discussion forums, learn recent attacks, or discuss future goals of *jihadist* movements. The web page of al-Qaida contains three thousand books of respected *jihadist* thinkers. These scholarly texts provide core doctrines and religious legitimating for their violent approach ³⁰⁵. *Jihadist* thinkers group spread basic parameters of that ideology in order to reach all Muslims. Their messages now become available on variety of media including cassette tapes, large books, CDs, internet web pages, etc. Their documents are translated into multiple languages by their translation bureaus ³⁰⁶. The teachings convince Muslims to commit or to support their violent acts by emphasizing global conspiracy to destroy Islam and response it.

There are several basic arguments to justify occurance of *jihadism*. The main argument is that there is a global conspiracy towards Islam. *Jihadist* leaders think that Muslims living in Christian countries have to face many challenges in every aspect of their daily lives. For that reason, Muslims cannot persist to practice their religion in the West. Western civilization is in a state of perpetual war with Islam and the proof can be seen in everywhere. Western civilization works on mind control and social engineering. Western schools, Muslim children also have to go, provide corrupted education. In the Western Education system, intermingling between boys and girls are welcomed. Students learn anti-Islamic subjects such as evolution, cloning, etc. Children are instructed to celebrate Valentine Day, Halloween, Christmas or Thanksgiving, etc. The Western economics promote lending money or interests. By the way, un-Islamic economic activities become essential in global economic system. International trade is

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p.11

³⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.1-6

Jarret M. Brachman, op. cit., p.14

used to exploit Muslim wealth and labor force. Under these circumstances, a compromise with West is impossible for Muslim communities. The only solution is preparation of war³⁰⁷.

All *jihadist* organizations define their enemies to determine their stands. There is a global conspiracy to destroy Islam and every Muslims must be involved in active *jihad*. For them, Islam is under attack by the new world order. Jews and Western powers, particularly the USA, wage war on Islam with a variety of weapons, including military, economic, informational and political. Muslims must see these enemy alliances and define their positions according to that situation.

Jihadists argue that Islam has deviated from true path and Muslims face humiliation, aggression or persecution³⁰⁸. The new activists criticize traditional *jihadist* scholars claiming that historical ideology of *jihad* had been exclusively preoccupied with individual behavior and distract the attention of Muslims from more urgent issues. The new ideology is also different than Sayyid Qutb's idea of *jihad*. Qutb initially disposed to wage *jihad* against "nearer enemy" that is the local regime before the global *jihad* against "further enemy" namely Israel, the West and especially the USA³⁰⁹.

As long as Muslims wait passively, the violence on Islam continues. However, Islam is the religion which is favor of fighting and dieing. Islam is where every believer is a warrior³¹⁰.

³⁰⁷ Walid Phares, War of Ideas, op.cit. p.61-62

309 International Criris Gruop, op. cit. p. 4

³¹⁰ Jarret M. Brachman, op.cit., p.5

³⁰⁸ Jarret M. Brachman, op. cit., p.5

3.3.3. The Latest *Jihadist* Discourse

The most recent development which has been seen in Iraq and Syria is the *jihad* declaration of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa-al-Sham) announcing an independent Islamic state and it occupies and restoration of the caliphate for Muslim unification³¹¹. The group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared as the caliph and "leader for Muslims everywhere"³¹². The organization was composed of some radical Islamic organizations during the Syrian Civil War. The group was formed in 2004 under the name of "the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad" (Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad) with the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who was the current leader of al-Qaida. Since 2010 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, also known as Abu Dua, has became the leader of the organization. When he conflicted with Afghan leaders, al-Baghdadi declared seperation and changed the name of the organization as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in 2013³¹³.

In March 2011, the demonstrations against Bashar al-Asad regime led to civil war in Syria. Within a short time, radical groups such as Hezbollah, Al-Qaida in Iraq joined the struggle and the conflict grew rapidly all over the country. At the same time, the sectarian conflict in Iraq led to disobedience of some groups. Within that frame, Iraqi branch of Al-Qaida organization declared its independence from Al-Qaida and announced its new state under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. The *jihad* declaration calls every Muslim to join the organization to fight for the sake of new caliph.

ISIS controls many recruitment and logistics networks. Further, those who have fought with ISIS have made connections with one another and will likely keep in touch when they return to their places of origin. The solidarity and brotherhood establish through fighting on the front lines and endure their relationships, which will be important for the future of the *jihadist* movement. ISIS continues to build its prestige and legitimacy

³¹¹ Adam Withnall, "Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with 'restoration of caliphate' in Middle East" *The Independent*. Retrieved on 29.06. 2014

³¹²BBC News, "Isis rebels declare 'Islamic state' in Iraq and Syria" Retrieved on June 30, 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28082962

³¹³BBC News, "Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)", Retrieved on June 30, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084

within the overall movement. Muslims join them³¹⁴. The organization, employs employing social media with effectiveness. Indeed, the extent of ISIS's political and media outreach aimed at garnering local support is unprecedented in the history of global *jihadist* movements³¹⁵. It shows that Muslims are ready for establishment of the caliphate.

The *jihad* approach of ISIS is different than other current *jihadist* movements. Many Muslim groups, governmental or non-governmental, do not accept the validity of call for *jihad* in Syrian dispute because the dispute is political, not religious³¹⁶. The parties of the conflict were Shi'ite groups and Sunni groups or ideological opponents of Bashar al-Asad. Some religious leaders issued fatwa for blaming ISIS for creating disputes among Muslims³¹⁷. In other words, the conflict is not between Muslims and non-Muslims so there is no threat to Islam.

Contrary to other *jihad* movements, that one targets the Muslims and Syrian and Iraqi people rather than foreign powers. Many Islamic groups are tolerant to other groups however ISIS does not show this tolerance to even other sects of Islam except Sunnis. It closed all churches in Racca. The religios places of Alevis and Shi'ites have been bombed³¹⁸. Within this *jihad* call, Muslims have been killed; non-Muslim communities in Syria and Iraq have been attacked. Even if the organization announces its objections to foreign powers, especially Great Britain and the USA, ISIS target Muslim civilians and local groups living within Muslim states.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 139

³¹⁴ Aaron Y. Zelin "The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement" *Research Notes of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (June 2014) no. 20, p. 7

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham" *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Middle East Forum*, v.6 (January, 2014), p. 6

³¹⁶ Muhammed bin Ali, "Jihad in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS" RSIS Commentaries no. 194, Nynang Technologies University, Retrieved on 19.12.2014 from http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/24352

³¹⁷ Recep Tayyip Gürler and Ömer Behram Özdemir "From Al-Qaeda to Post-Qaeda: The Evolution of ISIS" *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* v.1, i.1 (May 2014) p.138

Conclusions

The usage of *jihad* is determined by political situation and international developments whether by state leaders or non-state organization leaders. During consolidation period of nation-states in Middle East, the new leaders tried to control religious affairs in the society. They appointed official religious staff and used *jihad* as a tool for spiritual development of Muslims. From beginning of 1970s, when political Islam became dominant ideology, *jihad* was used as a legitimizing discourse for state actions. Finally, after mid 1980s, radical Islamic groups claiming that they are responsible for future of Islam have used *jihad* for gaining more member for their actions. From that point, *jihad* was called with radical and aggressive attacks of fundamental Islamic organizations.

In the contemporary Middle East, *jihad* has been used by radical Islamic organizations especially for Palestinian cause against both state of Israel and allied powers of Israel. In subsequent chapter, the main organizations that determine *jihad* as their final cause will be examined.

CHAPTER 4:

EXAMPLES OF JIHAD ACTIVITIES

In the previous chapter, it is stated that current discourse on *jihad* is applied by the Middle Eastern political actors based on their policies. Although traditional *jihad* understanding has its own characteristics, new discourses are determined by each groups according to their interpretation in order to take a legitimate base for their actions and collect people to their organizations. This is why this discourse is called as *jihadism*. Since *jihadism* is formed by those political actors, in this chapter three basic types of *jihadism* will be evaluated: Defensive *jihad* in legal political arena, military *jihad* rejects all existing political situations and a political *jihad* occured within secular framework.

These discourses on *jihad* are the basic types applied in the current Middle Eastern politics. Firstly, Hezbollah as a Lebanese Shi'ite organization has pursued its policies within *jihadism* with non-state military agent and legal political parties. With its military branch and legal political agents, Hezbollah pursues political and military *jihads* at the same time. Secondly, Palestinian Hamas rejects all political establishments in Palestine territories whether it is Jewish or Palestinian secular parties. Rejecting all existing political settlements, Hamas has pursued its own policies within *jihad* understanding. Finally, Welfare Party in Turkey has pursued a political *jihad* within a secular state structure. Accepting the laic identity of Turkish Republic, the party applies *jihad* in their social policies. Among them the Welfare Party is the only organization which utilized *jihad* in legal methods within its national legal structure. Therfore, it showed the possibility of combination of *jihad* with existing secular state structure.

In this chapter, these three basic understandings that form *jihadism* in the Middle East and their effects on other groups will be examined. Since these three movements have been shaped in different political situations, the general atmosphere in the countries will be presented in this chapter. Then the establishment and formation of the organizations will be explained. Within this outline, the *jihad* calls, discourses and usage of these organizations will be presented.

4.1. HEZBOLLAH

4.1.1. Political Situation in Lebanon

The modern state of Lebanon, independent from France in 1943, emerged with a National Pact (*mithaq al-watani*) which presents sectarian based state system³¹⁹. The state has a unique nature which involves diverse mosaic of numerous communities. The Presidency, Prime Ministry and the Speaker of the Parliament were devoted Christian, Sunni and Shia communities respectively. Since the system was based on their population rate and the division of governmental branches was strict, the changing conditions on population did not reflect into political system.

The Shi'ite community was the third largest community in Lebanon and lacked degree of influence on the political system. A small group of Shi'ite community lived in Beirut while mass lived in southern Lebanon and in the north Beqaa Valley. Historically, the Shi'ite communities in Arab world (mainly Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) were suspected and kept away from ruling power³²⁰. This conjuncture shaped the political features of Lebanon Shi'ite after 1940s.

High birth rate and increase in population in Lebanese Shi'ite community brought economic problems and migration of young population to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Latin America and oil producing states of Gulf. On the other hand, the wars in Palestine and Jordan led to increase of refugees who were eager to work with cheap prices in southern Lebanon. In addition, radical Palestinian groups arrived in Lebanon continued their political propagandas³²¹ which triggered the Israel attacks in Lebanon lands. In 1969 Musa al-Sadr (Imam Musa- 1928-1978) came to prominence with Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council as a chairman. The Council worked for military, social, economic and political rights of Lebanese Shi'ites for awakening. Another achievement of al-Sadr was reducing of authority and influence of Shi'ite elites (*zua'ama*)³²². The most important branch of the Council was its military office which was called as

Eltan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God* (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.

³²⁰ Augustos, Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short Story* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) p.12-13

³²¹ Ibid., p.13-14

³²² Ibid., p.16-21

Amal³²³- Lebanese Resistance Battalions, established on July 6, 1975 by al-Sadr³²⁴. The functions and activities of Amal led to eruption of civil war in 1975³²⁵.

The civil war reduced al-Sadr's power because Musa al- Sadr was not military man, his weapons were words³²⁶. He was not seemed to be destined by the violence. In August 1978, he flew to Tripoli to attend the ceremony of Libyan leader Muammer Gaddafi but he never arrived and no one saw him again³²⁷. No one knows his destination.

The enigmatic disappearance of Imam Musa strengthened radical Shi'ite organizations during civil war. The Amal also gained support of the Shi'ite middle class and represented an aggressive violence againt the power of *zu'ama*. Amal also had to fight against PLO and Israel since both of them posed a threat for Shi'ite community in southern Lebanon. When Palestinian guerillas became powerful in southern Lebanon, Israel invaded these lands of Lebanon, Litani Operation in 1978 to push Palestinian guerrillas north of the Litani River, and displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from this region³²⁸.

As the civil war came to end in the late 1980s, Amal became weak and inadequate. The Shi'ites had to challenge Israeli invasion and PLO guerillas at the same time. The events of civil war, Israeli occupation and Palestinian guerillas and deployment of American and French troops near Shi'ite cities convinced many Shi'ites that urgent and harsh reaction were needed³²⁹. Since Amal lost its influence, alternative movements emerged and the most important one was Hezbollah. Contrary to Amal movemet, Hezbollah paved the way for the emergence of radical elements in the Shi'ite community³³⁰. Indeed Amal was also a religious based organization however it supported peaceful ways and peaceful negotiations even if it had to fight militarily during civil war.

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³²³ Amal is both the Arabic word for "hope" and the Arabic acronym for the Lebanese Resistance Brigades.

³²⁴ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.55

The war ended in 1989

³²⁶ Augustos, Richard Norton, op.cit, p. 21

³²⁷ Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard "Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress" *Congressional Research Service*, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf retrieved on 08.06.2014

³²⁸ Augustos, Richard Norton, op.cit, p. 21-22

Martin Kramer," Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad", *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol.47, i.8 (1994) p.20-22

³³⁰ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.47

Hezbollah went beyond and adopted much more radical religious discourses. Of course, Hezbollah's military campaigns became much more destructive and aggressive than previous Shi'ite movements. The establishment aim of Amal didn't include being a challenge to local Shi'ite movements. On the other hand, Hezbollah was formed against not only foreign occupations in Shi'ite Lebanon lands but also against ineffective domestic Shi'ite movements.

4.1.2. Hezbollah

The expansion of violence in southern Lebanon and supports of Islamic Republic of Iran within its framework of exporting revolution headed to a secret foundation of Hezbollah in 1982 in Beqaa³³¹ with sponsorship of Iran. The name of Hezbollah which means Party of God derived from Qur'anic verse of "those who form party of God will be the victors³³²". Contrary to Amal, Hezbollah adopted radical slogans, pan-Islamic discourses and conservative religious trends to gain sympathy of Shi'ite community. The movement also joined the struggle against Israel occupation. Between 1983- 1985, Hezbollah initiated diverse suicide killings, bombings, kidnappings, attacks, etc. against Israel forces, American Embassy and Multinational Forces in Beirut³³³. Israel had no choice but withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, which totally completed in 2000.

With starting of Israeli invasion, Abbas al-Musawi among founders of Hezbollah was appointed to form organizational structure of Hezbollah for subsequent military campaigns. The organization, Islamic Resistance (*al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya*), Hezbollah involved in serious attacks, kidnappings, suicide bombings, etc³³⁴ in order to resist against both foreign pressure of Islam and domestic pressure on Shi'ite community. All these attacks made Hezbollah known domestically and internationally as well as the main rival of Amal representing leadership of the Shi'ite community. By the 1990s, Hezbollah had carried out most of the attacks, each of them appearing to have been characterized by careful planning and well-practiced. One of the most

³³¹ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.57-62

³³² Martin Kramer, op. cit., p.23

³³³ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.66

³³⁴ A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation" Third World Quarterly, v: 14, i: 2 (1993)

important examples came in 1985 when an American passenger jet was hijacked in Beirut airport³³⁵. Lasted for sixteen days, this incident drew international attraction.

In the early 1990s, Hezbollah stopped violent operations because these operations did not improve status of organization in Shi'ite community any more. The organization focused on social activities including family supporting advising, medical assistances, educations, culture to become challenge to social services of the Amal³³⁶. Hezbollah's social service section was designed to addresses all aspect of Lebanese Shia society.

Hezbollah had to challenge not only against foreign powers but also Amal in order to gain Shi'ite community. The struggle between Amal and Hezbollah escalated into real war between 1988 and late 1990. Both sides especially Hezbollah adopted almost every kind of battle tactics: heavy weapons, terrorist acts, bombings, explosive devices, etc. The war ended with the First and Second Damascus Agreements in 1990³³⁷.

The civil war in Lebanon ended with National Reconciliation Accord (Ta'if Agreement) on November 5, 1989 and the new order for ruling system was shaped. The first parliamentary election was held in 1992 and Hezbollah entered into competition under *Kulta al-Wafa Lal-Mukuma* Party (Loyalty to Resistance Block, referred as *al-Wafa*)³³⁸. Actually, crucial conflict emerged among Hezbollah members whether entering in election competition which meant recognition of the new system. On July 3, 1992, Hasan Nasrallah announced that the party would compete in the upcoming election³³⁹ supposing that revolutionary transition to Islamic society is not impossible and gradual reformation is necessary³⁴⁰. In that point, pragmatist Hasan Nasrallah who was successor of al-Musawi, was able to enter election process without keeping military forces of Hezbollah.

Magnus Ranstrop, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997) p.94

³³⁶ James B. Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power" Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department, *Report 10*, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525243.pdf retrieved on 09.06.2014

³³⁷ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.76-81

³³⁸ Augustus Richard Norton "The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics" *The International Spectator*, vol.42, i.4 (December 2007) p.475–491

³³⁹ Eltan Azani, op. cit., p.101

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p.99




Figure 3: General Structure of Hezbollah

Source: A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation"

Within the election campaign, Hezbollah talked about not only religious rhetoric but also Lebanese economic problems, social inequalities, personal freedoms and opportunities, etc³⁴¹. The result showed the victory of Hezbollah and the organization entered the political area of Lebanon. The party gained 12 seats in the Parliament, which

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³⁴¹ Ibid., p.102

made Hezbollah as a legal political entity³⁴². Hezbollah started to engage in local (municipal) election in 1998. It demonstrated a strong base in Beirut³⁴³.

Although Hezbollah reduced terrorist attacks and involved in political sphere, its military campaigns against foreign occupation did not end totally. Since Isreal Defence Forces (IDF) presence continued in Lebanese soil, absolute independence required continuation of military campaigns against foreign occupations. In 1996, after Hezbollah fired katyusha rockets into Israel in retaliation for the killing of Lebanese civilians, the IDF launched a major campaign into Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" finished with horrible slaughter at Qana³⁴⁴. The withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon lands finally came on May 24, 2000.

The six-year period between withdrawal of Israel and eruption of Second Lebanon Civil War (2006) was a relatively quiet, peaceful time of Lebanon history. However, some minor conflicts and relatively small casualties never abandoned in Hezbollah and Israel.

The second Lebanon in 2006 fired the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination by a car bomb explosion in Beirut, on February 14, 2005 catalyzed the tensions between supporters of Syria and Shi'ite groups. Felt itself under threat, IDF again attacked Lebanon lands and again encountered with reaction of Hezbollah. The war that broke out between Israel and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006 lasted thirty-four days³⁴⁵.

4.1.3. Jihadist Discourse of Hezbollah

Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh defined Hezbollah as "the first and foremost a *jihadist* movement that engages in politics, and not a political party that conducts *jihad*." Hezbollah defines itself the first and foremost as a '*jihadist* movement' or a 'party of the resistance' whose paramount function is the liberation of Lebanese territory from Israeli

³⁴⁴ Augustos Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short Story* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) p.84-85

³⁴² A. Nizar Hamzeh, op. cit., p.321

³⁴³ Ibid, p.103-104

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p.132-143

³⁴⁶ A. Nizar Hamzeh, op. cit., p.320

occupation by means of armed resistance³⁴⁷. They called their *jihad* as defensive *jihad* in the cause of *Allah*.

The *jihad* understanding of Hezbollah is based on their expression the relation between oppressors and oppressed³⁴⁸. They claimed to launch *jihad* for oppressed against oppressors. *Jihad* should be in defensive purpose to protect Islam if there is an attack. Therefore, the military attacks of Hezbollah against Israeli forces and other foreign powers such as the UN or the USA were considered in framework of *jihad*. The military branch of Hezbollah which is responsible for operations and attack are named as "Islamic Jihad".

Hezbollah announced its program with Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World in February 1985 to mark the first anniversary of the assassination of Sheyhk Raghib Harb (1952–1984)³⁵⁰. The Open Letter determines the objectives of Hezbollah and party's political ideology. The Declaration includes subjects of oppressors and oppressed, Islamic state, relations with Christians, anti-Zionism (Hezbollah never used the word "Israel" instead preferred "Zionist entity"), anti-imperialism, *jihad* and martyrdom³⁵¹. Basically, it emphasizes that "Islam is the answer". Objective of the Hezbollah was to free Lebanon from influence of imperialist power.

Each of us is a combat soldier when the call for *jihad* demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent³⁵².

The *jihad* was described as a legitimate and religious responsibility. In the Hezbollah Charter, it is said that "The dignity can only be upheld with sacrifice of blood. Freedom is not given rather it is gained with costly sacrifices.³⁵³". Hezbollah has belief in

³⁵² Augustos Richard Norton, op.cit., p.38

³⁴⁷ Amal Saad Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion* (London:Pluto Press, 2001) p.112

³⁴⁸ Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's Identity Construction* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011) p.41

³⁴⁹ Sarah Cohler, "Hezbollah: Analysis of Violence" in American Diplomacy, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2011/0104/comm/cohler_hezbollah.html retrieved on 19.05.2014

³⁵⁰ Lebanese resistance leader and Muslim cleric

³⁵¹ Joseph Alagha, op.cit., p.15

³⁵³ Joseph Alagha, op.cit., p. 42

necessity of achieving security and peace so rejects all forms of occupations. It emerged as Islamic freedom fighter movement.

Political violence is therefore morally and religiously legitimized as defensive *jihad* if its paramount aim is self-preservation³⁵⁴. According to Hezbollah's definition of the concept, "any act which exerts effort in God's cause is *jihad*". The causes are "the cause of the people, the cause of the oppressed, the cause of pride, honor and glory, the cause of the defense of the land, the cause of the defense of the sacred, of religion and of the values of humanity", Hezbollah regards the protection of the umma from external danger, or defensive *jihad*, as a far more pressing concern than other religious rituals such as praying or fasting 356.

From establishment to late 1980s, Hezbollah moved aggressively to strike at Westerners and Western influence in Lebanon because of Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Against Israeli invasion, Hezbollah called Islamic *jihad* as responsibility for them. Suicide bombings and hijackings were the most famous and common protests of the movement. The 1980s became a decade of extraordinary violence in Lebanon.³⁵⁷ The state of Israel had no choice but withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 as result of Hezbollah's attacks.

Since its founding, Hezbollah rejected the idea of independent Lebanon instead of calling for integration of Lebanon in Islamic state³⁵⁸. For state system, Hezbollah advocates Iranian model of Islamic state in Lebanon. According to them, since Islam is the religion of peace, all people (Muslim, non-Muslim) can live in peace under Islamic state umbrella. Hezbollah had not an agenda to impose Islam on non-Muslims because Qur'an orders that there is no compulsion in religion³⁵⁹. Hezbollah explained this idea about state system for Lebanon, in Open Letter also. The letter just mentioned that Lebanon should be free from external and internal dominance and choose its own fate.

³⁵⁵ Tony Badran, "Hezbollah's Agenda in Lebanon" *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol.8 (2009) p.54-59

 $\underline{\text{http://web.archive.org/web/20060821215729/http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm} \ retrieved \ on \ 22.2.14$

³⁵⁴ Amal Saad Ghorayeb, op.cit., p.25

Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "Hezbollah: A State within a State" *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol.8 (2009) p.71-73

³⁵⁷ Augustos Richard Norton, op.cit., p.41-43

³⁵⁸ A. Nizar Hamzeh, op. cit.,

³⁵⁹ Institute for Counterterrorism,

"If they are allowed to choose freely, they will only choose Islam." But the letter did not present any shape the political design for Lebanon³⁶⁰.

Conversely, Hezbollah cannot be described as a progressive Islamic *jihadist* movement. Although, its primary purpose has been military and resistance against Israel, the Party has executed many social services for all Lebanese people whether Muslim or not under name of spiritual *jihad*. Since 1989; Hezbollah entered another *jihad* called as "political *jihad*". It calls this kind of *jihad* as greater *jihad*. Hezbollah mentions about two *jihads*: defensive *jihad* and greater *jihad* which are integrated to each other. Hezbollah insisted that these *jihads* should be pursued together, if one of them is missing, the other becomes meaningless³⁶¹.

As it can be seen, Hezbollah pursues its *jihad* propaganda within existing state system. The organization criticizes the policies of governments but not denies its legality. However, Hezbollah always has an agenda that the political structure of Lebanon should be transformed towards Islamic system. For those reasons, it is hardly said that Hezbollah can be a terrorist organization. It acts in politics, functions in social services but at the same time it does not give up military means against state of Israel. Within that framework, Hezbollah pursues peaceful *jihad* domestically but applies defensive *jihad* against foreign powers. It does not regret existing politics; it acts in the politics but its agenda talks about change of the system.

³⁶⁰Augustos Richard Norton, op.cit., p.39 ³⁶¹ Joseph Alagha, op.cit., p.21

4.2. HAMAS

4.2.1. Palestine and PLO

Palestinian issue is the most severe problem of the Middle Eastern politics. The discussion roots back to ancient times; however the current international phenomenon can be started with the Balfour Declaration announced for supporting Jewish presence in Palestine territories by British government³⁶². After Britain acquired post First World War mandate system over Palestine, Zionist settlement began. Although in the Balfour Declaration rights of existing population were protected, reality showed that conflict was inevitable as long as Jews population increased. The initial resistance of Palestinian community took the form of protests and non-cooperation with British authorities³⁶³. When British withdrew from Palestine in 1948 and when Arab states showed their rejections against Jewish presence in Palestinian lands, establishment of the state of Israel was declared³⁶⁴. The Arab states showed their rejections by military attacks. However, the new state of Israel did not face with totally united Arab army because some Arab states did not want to ruin their moderate relations with the West especially the USA. During 1950s, the state of Israel consolidated its legitimacy in domestic and international sphere, so Arab states and Palestinian society was not satisfied. Palestinian cause was important for Arab states because it was determinant symbol for pan-Arabism. The newly established national states in the Middle East worked for uniting people and gaining legitimacy with pan-Arabic discourses. As the leader state of pan-Arabism, Egypt drew also the leadership of Palestinian cause to protect Arab solidarity. Struggle against Israel became determinant for pan-Arabism so the failure brought the end of the pan-Arabism³⁶⁵. Since Palestine problem cannot be ignored at the same time, Arab League formed Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in May 1964³⁶⁶ in order to govern national liberation of Palestine.

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³⁶² Raymond Hinessburg, op.cit., p.155

³⁶³ Ibid n 156

³⁶⁴ Gregory S. Mahler and Alden R. W. Mahler, *The Arab-Israeli conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reade*, (New York: Routledge, 2010) p.106

³⁶⁵ Adeed Dawisha, *Arap Nationalism in Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) p.135

³⁶⁶ Raymond Hinessburg, op.cit., p.60

The Egypt-centric Arab regimes realized that there was no solution but engages in war against Israel. In June 1967, Arab states started the war with great hopes but Israel finished the war within six days with humiliation of Arab states. The results of war brought the end of pan-Arabism³⁶⁷. After 1967 defeat, PLO could not control the local organizations so the Fatah movement headed by Yasser Arafat took the authority of PLO. From now on, the Palestine problem became problem of Palestinians and the control of PLO was taken by al-Fatah local organization headed by Yasser Arafat.

Even if other Arab countries contributed their supports to Palestinian cause, PLO executed Palestinian politics as main actor. Although it had not ben recognized in international arena during its early years as a legal authority, with the beginning of peace process after early 1970s, PLO gained its legitimacy as representative of Palestinian Authority³⁶⁸. As PLO did not have well organized army, the military forces of Arab states continued to foster Palestinian forces. Within that situation, PLO managed the clashes and announced *jihad* several times.

Palestinian issue is full of *jihad* calls, almost each action of the state of Israel, was met by a *jihad* call. These calls did not necessarily announced by a religious leader, even local muftis called for *jihad*. The first *jihad* call was announced after British mandate established in Palestine soil. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, proclaimed a *jihad* call to form a secret resistance organization. This call would be the ground for following *jihad* actions. PLO announced that it would move forward on the path of the *jihad* until complete and final victory would be attained³⁶⁹.

The outbreak of first intifadah³⁷⁰ in December 1987 had two contradictory effects on Palestinian movement³⁷¹: The first one was that PLO moved towards peace negotiations which meant recognition state of Israel. The second result was radicalization and

³⁶⁸ Gregory S. Mahler and Alden R. W. Mahler, op. cit., p.20

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p.156

³⁶⁹ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.271-272

³⁷⁰ In 1987 the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had endured for twenty years, and Palestinians had been subjected to humiliating occupation policie. When the cumulative humiliation, anger, and frustration of the Palestinians came to a head beginning in December 1987 in the popular rebellion against the occupation that came to be known as the(first) Intifada ("uprising"; literally "shaking off"), the intensity of the outrage was almost uncontainable. See: Claude Faure, op.cit., p.186

³⁷¹ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p.306

Islamization of Palestine movement including founding of Hamas. With the establishment and strengthening of Hamas, Palestinian cause would be more Islamic and *jihad* calls would be more reactionists against existing structure.

4.2.2. Hamas

As Muslim Brotherhood's Palestinian branch, Hamas marked the political revival of the Islamic movement in the West Bank and Gaza not only against Israel but also secular PLO³⁷². A famous Hamas slogan says that Palestinian cause is not about soil and land but it is about faith and belief³⁷³.

Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was formed by Hasan al-Banna's brother Abd al-Rahman al-Banna in 1945 in Jerusalem³⁷⁴. Brotherhood established religious schools, charity associations, social clubs, and etc organizations to upbring an Islamic generation. In 1973, Sheyhk Ahmet Yasin established "*al-Mujamma'al Islami*" (Islamic Center) and all major religious organizations and institutions were united under Center's umbrella³⁷⁵. Although Brotherhood's social services were very active in Palestine, the movement was criticized owing to its ineffectiveness in fighting against occupation. To fulfill this failure, *Islamic Jihad* was formed in 1987 in Gaza refugee camp during early times of intifada³⁷⁶. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the first priority is the Islamic transformation of society, armed struggle (*jihad*) can be undertaken after the society is reformed, after secular ideas are abandoned and Islam adopted³⁷⁷. However military *jihad* should be continued without waiting for Islamization of society.

Eruption of intifada in 1987 led to changes in policies of almost all organizations mostly Muslim Brotherhood. Although the intifada emerged simultaneously without any organizational group leading, Islamic Center gained an opportunity with forming Hamas

³⁷² Ziad Abu- Amr, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Bacground" Journal of Palestine Studies,

vol.22, i.4 (Summer, 1993) p.5

³⁷³ MeirLitvak, , op. cit., p.148

³⁷⁴ Ziad Abu- Amr, op. cit., p.6

³⁷⁵ Ziad Abu- Amr, op. cit., p.7

³⁷⁶MeirLitvak, , op. cit., p.149

³⁷⁷ Ziad Abu- Amr, op. cit., p.9

in December 1987³⁷⁸. Hamas means "zeal" in Arabic and is the acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance Movement). Although Hamas was continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood, they could not be considered as same organizations. Basically, Muslim Brotherhood focused on social institutions and education of the youths to mature the society ready for *jihad* while Hamas argued that *jihad* should be started simultaneously and revolutionary³⁷⁹.

The main political activities of Hamas were social welfare services, political campaigns against secular PLO and guerilla attacks target Israeli soldiers³⁸⁰. The immediate goal was replacing Israel with an Islamic Palestinian state³⁸¹. The military attacks of Hamas began as soon as it was established. In December 1991, Hamas carried out the first big violent attacks. Since then, the organization committed countless military attacks, suicide bombings, military and civilian targets, etc. 382 During Second Intifada in 2000, Only Hamas alone was responsible for 281 acts of violence³⁸³. The last big war, Gaza War, between 2008 and 2009, lasted very severe especially for civilians. In domestical sphere, Hamas did not give up compete in political sphere against secular al-Fatah. Although it boycotted 2005 presidential election, it did participate in municipal election in the same year and won one third of the election places. In 2006 presidential elections, Hamas won 76 seats of 132 totals³⁸⁴. However Al-Fatah continued its political leadership in an interim government so Hamas leader Ismail Haniya formed a new government. The political conflict between two actors ended with Saudi-sponsored negotiations in Mecca with an agreement on a signed by Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of Fatah and Khaled Mashal on behalf of Hamas in February 2007³⁸⁵.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p.10

³⁷⁹ Ibid., p.11

³⁸⁰ Andre Nusse, *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*, New York: Routledge, 1998, p:35-36

³⁸¹ Ibid., p: 21

³⁸² Matthew Levit, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2007, p:11

³⁸³ Ibid, p: 12

³⁸⁴ SETAV, http://setav.org/tr/secimler-sonrasi-filistin/yo<u>rum/549</u> retrieved on 06.06.2014

³⁸⁵ Shlomo Brom, "The Palestinian National Unity Government" in Canada Press, February 24, 2007, retrieved on 05.05.2014 from http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/inss022407.htm




Figure 4: The Organizational Structure of Hamas

Source: Michael Broning, The Politics of Change in Palestine (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), p.43.

4.2.3. Jihadist Discourse of Hamas

Hamas's philosophy and strategies about Palestinian problems and social welfare, role of women, relations with other religious and nationalist movements, etc were defined in its Charter which was issued on August 18, 1988. Instead of focusing on transforming the society, the Charter paid attention of Palestinian problem and *jihad*. Article 13 of the Charter says that "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by *jihad*. The initiatives, options and international conferences are waste of time³⁸⁶." Article 15

³⁸⁶ Muhammed Maqdsi, "Charter of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol.22, i.4 (Summer 1993) p.126

explains why *jihad* is obligatory for liberation of the Palestine: "In the struggle against the Jewish occupation of Palestine, the banner of jihad must be raised.³⁸⁷"

At the same time, Hamas sharply criticized secular PLO and whose political program supporting establishment of Palestinian state coexists with Israel and PLO's cooperation with the UN. Hamas called for establishment of Islamic state and rejected all Zionist activities including Israel state³⁸⁸. Rejecting the peace with Israel, Hamas proposed the peace within Islamic framework which means the complete liberation of entire land and living under an Islamic government. Only under the shadow of Islam, followers of all religion live in peace and security under umbrella of Islam³⁸⁹. The initial leadership of Hamas consisted of Sheyk Ahmet Yasin and the other six founding members³⁹⁰.

The main policy of Hamas was directed against US-PLO dialogue. Sheyhk Yasin proclaimed that the only action in that circumstance was *jihad*. He called for *jihad* that is an individual duty for every Muslim. For him, Palestine as a whole could be liberated only by armed struggle. There was no way but *jihad* to escape Palestinians from foreign occupation. Therefore, the negations were always meaningless.

The Palestine-Israel conflict is the one of the central issues in today's world relation between Islam and the West. The threat posed by the state of Israel is the unique in history of Islam and today is the center concern in global *jihad* for Muslim world. Although Palestinian *jihad* had started before establishment of Hamas, these days the organization occupies the leadership position in global *jihad* against Israel.

Once it was established, Hamas presented itself as a link in the chain of holy war against Zionism and Israel in defense of Palestine. A primary aim of Hamas was to establish an Islamic state in the territory of Palestine whose liberation was to be achieved by holy war. By Hamas, *Jihad* was considered as not only as a duty that

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p.127

³⁸⁸ MeirLitvak, op. cit., p.149- 150

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p.155

³⁹⁰ Abu-Amr, op. cit., p.13

devolved on individual Muslims but also as the sole legitimate way to retrieve Palestine in its entirety³⁹¹.

When Fatah gained powerful position in Palestine, the leaders had called for *jihad* and armed struggle against Jewish settlements. In addition, Fatah's concept of guerrilla warfare for the liberation of Palestine challenged Nasser's doctrine of Arab unity. However, in mid-1980s, PLO which was controlled by Fatah abandoned guerrilla warfare against Israel and drifted toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict³⁹². Unending negotiations and adopting of national secular policies caused to emergence of Hamas as a challenge not only state of Israel but also PLO. Hamas and many Muslims in Palestine did not believe in successfulness of negotiations because negotiations meant living together with Zionists in Muslims' homeland. Therefore, the Muslims' right to establish an Islamic state in the territory of Palestine would be impossible. Hamas also rejected any attempt to achieve a political settlement of Israel³⁹³. Since "Zionist entity" (like Hezbollah, Hamas never uses state of Israel) is occupier so it has to leave these lands. Contrary to Hezbollah which is eager to live with non-Muslims under the Islamic state umbrella, Hamas rejected any political settlement together with Zionists.

While PLO was ready to negotiate on borders of 1967, Hamas, as declared Article 11 of its Charter would seek to return the lands of Palestine. The central difference between PLO and Hamas was that their use of religious discourses. While PLO has Palestinian nationalist structure, Hamas totally rejects secular ideologies. For Hamas, the Qur'an was 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. Without a commitment to Islamic values, the struggle with Israel would not succeed. Finally, the Palestinian state envisioned by Hamas would come into being through a holy war (*jihad*), encompass all of Palestine, and implement the Islamic law (sharia)³⁹⁴.

The military wing of Hamas named as Izz al-din al-Qassam Brigades was formed in 1991 and suicide attacks, car bombing and other terrorist attacks against Israel were activated to be used. These attacks made tension increase between PLO and Hamas

³⁹³ Ibid., p.52

³⁹¹ Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, (Colombia: Columbia University Press, 2006) p.50

³⁹² Ibid., p. 51

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p.15

because PLO realized that these attacks damaged the peace process. Also, international community was not happy with these attacks because peace process can't go on under that circumstance. Many states and international organizations including the UN declared Hamas as a terrorist organization. However, Hamas never forgot attacks in the way of *jihad*.

The perception that Islam was under political attack by non-Muslims, coupled with the rise of radical Islam in the Arab world, rekindled the debate over the use of *jihad* as a fundamental duty. The interpretation of a defensive *jihad* the principal religious duty of a Muslim became increasingly popular.

The eruption of second intifada after Arial Sharon's provocative al-Aqsa Mosque visit, in 2000, showed that peace negotiations would not bring a concrete solution. During that intifada movement, Hamas played leader role with its martyrdom operations³⁹⁵.

Some religious leaders gave legitimacy to martyrdom operations. For example, the scholars of al-Azhar declared their support as follows: "When the Muslims are attacked in their homes and their land is robbed, *jihad* for *Allah* becomes an individual duty. In this case, operation of martyrdom is primarily obligation and the highest form of *jihad*..." On the other hand, these operations were not welcomed by Muslim religious leaders. The leaders of Muslim Brotherhood issued a fatwa stated that these operations can be regarded as suicide which is unlawful in Islam³⁹⁷.

Briefly it can be argued that one of the most aggressive *jihad* policies was followed by Hamas in the Middle East. Like Hezbollah, Hamas's *jihad* was called as defensive *jihad* against foreing powers. Presence of foreign powers in Palestine was considered as the reason of all problems for Muslims. Therefore Hamas does not accept any situation in Palestine except for establishment of an Islamic state in holy lands of Islam. The difference is that Hamas does not act in the existing political system; instead it established its own system. While Hezbollah pursues its social services as a political actor, Hamas does it as a state.

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³⁹⁵ Richard Bonney, op. cit., p. 314

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 316

³⁹⁷ Ibid., p.315

4.3. TURKEY AND WELFARE PARTY

4.3.1. Turkey's Laisism Dynamics

When the Republic of Turkey was announced on October 29, 1923 and laisism was officially proclaimed in 1928 with the removal of the second article of the 1924 Constitution, which declared Islam the official religion of the state. Finally, the principle of laisism has been a non-amendable article of the Constitution since February 1937³⁹⁸.

Kemalist ideology who formed the modern Turkey, aimed to form a secular and strong nation-state by rejecting national unity on the basis of Islamic solidarity. A major institutional step in this secularization process was abolishment of the Caliphate on March 3, 1924³⁹⁹. In the Republican period, Islam no longer served as a legitimating ideology and its legal, educational, and constitutional status have been radically changed with modernization steps.

The laisism did change not only politics but also culture of Turkish society. All these changes would not be welcomed by all parts of the society so normally the reaction movements have occupied a place in Turkish modernization history. The reactionary Islam and movements were considered to be involved in *irtica* (reactionist movements) for years.

The term religious irtica as Islamist reaction was first used in March 31 Incident which is known as an Islamic revolt against the Young Turk government. On April 13, 1909 (March 31 according to the Ottoman Rumî calendar) some soldiers in Ottoman army revolted and arrested their officers, killed many of them for demanding *sharia*. The uprising was suppressed by Action Army branch of Ottoman military force and the leaders were executed and Sultan Abdülhamid II was deported to Salonica⁴⁰⁰.

³⁹⁸ Alev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) p.16

³⁹⁹ Muhammed R, Feroze; "Laiklikte Aşırılık ve Ilımlılık" in *Türkiye'de İslâm ve Laiklik*, ed. Andrew MANGO at al.(Istanbul: Insan Yayınları, 2000) p.23

⁴⁰⁰ Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*,trans. Yasemin Saner (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2009) p.149-154

During Republican era, the Sheikh Said Rebellion in February 1925, which had both a nationalist and religious nature, constructed the outbreak of religious irtica against progress, demanding the old order. The rebellion had been completely put down by November. The Law for the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu*) in March 1924 was adopted and Independence Tribunals (1925–1927) were established. The opposition, Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which was accused of encouraging religious reactionaries, was closed down. ⁴⁰¹

Seven years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the Menemen Incident occurred as another important religious *irtica* movement in December 1930. The radical laik reforms, such as the outlawing of the Sufi orders (*tarikat*), including the Naqshbandi, were attracted the reaction of religious leaders. In Manisa, Dervish Mehmet who proclaimed himself as *Mehdi*, collected a group for his uprising against secular order. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay was put in charge of ending the disturbance. The moderate Kubilay tried to stop the uprising with peaceful way but he was murdered so a harsh intervention came and revolt was stopped⁴⁰².

The notion of religious *irtica* was articulated as a threat to secular identity of Turkey. Therefore, the gap between conservative people and modernist elite has not been disappeared any time. The religious conservative people were considered as *mürteci*, *gerici* or *yobaz* (bigot) while Kemalists were seen as infidel and collaborators USA and the West by each other. The religious irtica movements were seen in different places and all suppressed. However, each of them was able to increase the gap between laisism and religion.

During multi-party period, the establishment of a party which represented the religious interests began with National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP*) (1970–1971) and later with the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi- MSP*) (1972–1980) under leadership of Necamettin Erbakan. These two consecutive parties played a key role in the re-politicization of Islam in Turkey by enlarging the channels of political

⁴⁰¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change* (London: Routledge, 2005) p.17

⁴⁰² A. Cenani Gürbüz, *Türkiye'de İsyanlar, Olaylar ve Bölücü Faaliyetler* (İstanbul: Bilge Karınca, 2006) p.134-239

representation⁴⁰³. Although some parties such as Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) or Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) utilized religious discourses, they were not considered as Politicaln Islamic movement in Turkey since their focus were not religios identity itself.

The MNP was the first of several Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan. However, the MNP's existence was short-lived. The party was shut down after a military intervention in 1971 on the grounds that it was against the secular nature of the state 404. The founders of the MNP and its successors came out of the National View (Milli Görüş) movement which sought a return to traditional values and institutions⁴⁰⁵. Their goal was to build a "national (Islamic) order" and put an end to the process of Westernization. The MSP was founded in October 1972 to fuse Islam and Turkish nationalism. The party's proposed solution to Turkey's problems was returning to Islam's teachings⁴⁰⁶. In 1973 election, the MSP gained third place with 12 percent of the vote and 11 percent of the seats in parliament. Erbakan formed a coalition government with the People's Republic Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)⁴⁰⁷, becoming deputy prime minister under Bülent Ecevit. After the coalition collapsed, the MSP joined the National Front governments headed by Süleyman Demirel in 1975 and 1977. After the military coup in 1980, the MSP was closed down, and Erbakan and his companions were banned from political activities for ten years. However, the party reemerged in 1983 under a new name- the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* -RP)⁴⁰⁸.

⁴⁰³ Ahmet Yıldız, "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook" *The Muslim World*, vol.93 (April, 2003) p.187-209

⁴⁰⁴ Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larabee, *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey* (Pittsburg: RAND Corporation, 2009) p.40

For background about the National Vision (*Milli Görüş*) movement and its philosophy, see Fulya Atacan, "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP," *Turkish Studies*, vol.6, i.2 (June 2005) p.187-199.

⁴⁰⁶ Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larabee, op. cit., p.41

⁴⁰⁷ The People's Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)

⁴⁰⁸ Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larabee, op. cit., p.43-44

Figure 5: Turkish Parties of National Vision Movement

Party Name	Foundation Date	Closing Date	Leaders
National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)	January 26, 1970	May 20, 1971	Necmettin Erbakan and MehmetZ.Kotku
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)	October 11, 1972	September12,1980	Süleyman Arif Emre Necmettin Erbakan
WelfareParty (Refah Partisi)	July 19, 1983	January 16, 1998	Ali Türkmen Ahmet Tekdal Necmettin Erbakan
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)	December17,1997	June 22, 2001	İsmail Alptekin Recai Kutan
Prosperity Party (Saadet Partisi)	July 20, 2001		Recai Kutan Mustafa Kamalak
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)	August 14, 2001		Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ahmet Davutoğlu

4.3.2. Welfare (Refah) Party

Bounded to religious ideas of mentors of *Nakshibendi*, the Welfare Party increased its votes in the municipal and parliamentary elections of the mid-1980s and the 1990s⁴⁰⁹. The Party argued that material development would be incomplete without a prior achievement of spiritual development; and, like its predecessor parties, it regarded the Turkish people's conversion to Islam a thousand years ago as the starting point of Turkish history.

⁴⁰⁹ Banu Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.144

With the Homeland Party headed by Turgut Ozal during 1980s, Turkey had been introduced with great liberal economic moves. However, Ozal's export-oriented accumulation strategy and endeavors to control inflation had turned out to be a failure. The movement of political Islam argued that they would become an alternative to the malfunctioning state only in the 1990s, through successful framing activities of movement actors. Islamist entrepreneurs seized the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an opportunity to establish strong organizational networks and lay the foundation for gaining power in the 1990s⁴¹⁰.

At the same time, the corruption scandals under the governance of the mainstream political parties caused that the Welfare Party was regarded by the public as the cleanest of all major political parties. The party argued that the bad economic situation and the idea of materialism were leading to moral decay in the society, manifest in prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, and corruption⁴¹¹.

The disappointed middle-class Turkish people were attracted towards discourses of the Welfare Party. Against corrupted liberal economy and friendly relations with infidels, the Welfare Party proposed just order (adil diizen) and national consciousness (milli suur) with spiritual development based on Islam and material development based on industrialization as well as with an independent foreign policy from Western influence⁴¹².

The WP, which received only 4.4 percent of the vote in the 1984 local elections, became the leading party by securing 21.4 percent of the vote and 158 seats in parliament in the 1995 general elections. In the 1990s, the social democratic parties, while primarily emphasizing human rights, freedom, and democratization, did not propose viable solutions to the socio-economic problems of Turkish citizens. In the 1991 elections, the WP ranked fourth, by winning 16.9 percent of the votes and sixty-two seats in parliament, a major improvement over the 7.2 percent and zero seats in 1987.

⁴¹¹ Banu Eligür, op. cit., p.35.

⁴¹⁰ Alev Çınar, op. cit., p.6

⁴¹² M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.213

In the March 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party received 19 percent of the vote and won the mayor's office in 28 municipalities, including Turkey's two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 national elections, Welfare came in first with 21.6 percent of the vote and formed a coalition with the right-of-center True Path Party (the successor to Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party), with Erbakan as prime minister. The conflict between the ruling secular elite and Islamist activists emerged and politics of Turkey divided sharply⁴¹³ after these results. Instead of pursuing policies to reduce social tensions, Erbakan further polarized Turkish society along secular-Islamic lines. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council, which was dominated by the military, presented Erbakan with a list to implement for protecting secularism and then Erbakan had to resign from government. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed down, and Erbakan and his key lieutenants were banned from politics for five years⁴¹⁴.

As continuation of the WP, the Virtue Party (VP-Fazilet Partisi) established in December 17, 1997. However, ideologies of the VP were not as radical region- based party as its mentor party. Therefore the VP was not considered as a party of political Islam but a liberal-conservative party. Under leadership of Virtue Party, the members of the movements divided into two groups: traditionalists and modernists. After the closure of the VP in June 2001, the first group formed the Prosperity Party (Saadet Partisi) on July 20, 2001. The latter emerged as a new political entity named Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) on August 14, 2001⁴¹⁵.

4.3.3. *Jihad* Program of the Welfare Party

The definition and usage of *jihad* in the Welfare Party is very different than the previous two organizations. The Welfare Party was fully legal party which did not involve or support terrorist or illegal actions according to Turkish Constituon. It acted within Turkish legal framework and none pof its documents there was any statement about

⁴¹³ Ibid., p.215

⁴¹⁴ Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larabee, op. cit., p.43-44

Ahmet Yıldız," Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook" *The Muslim World*, v. 93, no.1 (April 2003) p.189- 190

discruction of the laic system. For that reason, the Welfare Party can be considered as the best practice which could combine religious identity of people with secular system.

Basically, the *jihad* calls in Turkey were not used as a military weapon against regime or foreign powers. The Islamic movement, national vision, calls Turkish citizens to live Islam, of course independent from Christian foreign influence, under umbrella of Turkish Republic. The national vision movement has never attempted to change the regime; on the contrary the leaders of the movement argue that true Islam can be lived in Turkish Republic as long as foreign imperialist fashions are excluded from the society. Unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, the WP focuses on the Muslim identity of society rather than state structure. Therefore, their *jihad* calls of the WP target foreign social values in Muslim societies.

The WP challenged the Westernist and secularist ideology of the state and developed an alternative national ideology that takes East-oriented Ottoman-Islamic nationalism as its constitutive base⁴¹⁶. The Party regarded Western civilization and Zionism as the source of all evil and the reason for the country's underdevelopment problem. The leaders of the party argue that West regarded Islam as an obstacle to its exploitation of the Muslim world. Hence, imperialism and Zionism had been working for two centuries to inject the idea of imitating the West into the Turkish people's minds. As challenging the Western domination, idea of National View (*milli görüş*) was presented^{417.} The term *milli* (national) did not refer to the modern secular concept of nationalism. It referred to the Ottoman *millet* (national) system. Thus, in the WP's terms, *milli* referred to a religious community of Muslims (umma)⁴¹⁸. The Party stated that "Laisism is not an enmity towards religion. To the contrary, it is a principle that protects freedoms of faith and will from all sorts of violations."

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http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJIT AL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/199400049%20REFAH %20PARTISI%20PROGRAM%20VE%20TUZUK%201985/199400049%20REFAH%20PARTISI %20PROGRAM%20VE%20TUZUK%201985.pdf p:37 retrieved on 19.05.2010

⁴¹⁶ Alev Çınar, op. cit., p.11

⁴¹⁷ Ümit Cizre, Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London and New York: Routledge, 2008) p.20

⁴¹⁸ Banu Eligür, op. cit., p.145-146

⁴¹⁹ Refah Partisi, Refah Partisi Tüzük ve Programı, *TBMM*,

The Welfare Party criticizes the existing western based system of the country arguing that it was a top-down imposition, not representative of the Turkish nation's will. Existing Turkey's Western-oriented policy should be replaced by a policy on worldwide Muslim unity. The national consciousness can be achieved through spiritual development based on Islam and material development based on industrialization. As a Muslim country, it was argued, Turkey had nothing to learn from the West⁴²⁰.

Necmettin Erbakan blamed Western civilization criticizing that it could never help anyone as following:

What is it that we call the modern world? Is it America? Is it the West? Do not those dissolve because of capitalism, as was the case of the Eastern bloc that suffered because of communism? What is the reality? Even though the US has great global wealth, while exploiting millions of people through the monopoly and cartel of big holdings and multinational corporations, do not 3 million people live on the streets? Is not its youth going through a fast decay towards alcoholism and drug addiction? Do not gambling, alcohol, prostitution, and all sorts of immorality spread fast? Does not AIDS, which is one product of moral decay, spread like the illness of cancer and threaten the entire society? What will you gain by imitating such societies, where all thinkers are shouting help! Is not there anyone who can save us?" Their situation looks like a bus with a bomb rolling from a cliff. 421

The second important motto of the Party during 1990s was "just order" which was based on critique to capitalist socio-economic formation. Just order implied social solidarity, the prevention of wasteful expenditures, justice in taxation, equal treatment of all in the allocation of state credits, the abolition of interest⁴²².

The just order is not about totally economic policies of the state but it is a national policy related with education, culture, and the arts; economics; and social issues. In his book, Necmettin Erbakan states that under the just order, youth, who would ensure the supremacy of the Allah over unfairness, would be educated with a consciousness and spirit of the *jihad* and warriorship (*mücahit*)⁴²³.

Although it carried Islamic values, the Welfare Party was not an Islamic party as Hamas or Hezbollah. It was formed under the legal codes of Turkish Republic and its validity

⁴²⁰ Banu Eligür, op. cit., p.147

⁴²¹ Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam ve İlim* (İstanbul: MGV Yayınları, 2013) p.74-75


⁴²² Ahmet Yıldız, op. cit., p.208

⁴²³ Necmettin Erbakan, op. cit., p.76

was not questioned. At the same time, the party was not formed according to *sharia* laws neither its party policy was not considered as a party perceived to be Islamic. According to the Welfare Party's Defense presented to the constitutional court during the closure suit, "Welfare Party is a service party, a political organization, not a religious or philosophical school." Therefore the National Vision movements has pursued political *jihad* without changing the regime.

Conclusions

Figure 6: Examples of *Jihadism*



The common point for *jihadism* is that it is shaped by new emerging non-state actors. The modern usage of *jihadist* discourse is seen totally different than classical understanding. In modern usage, the non-state actors are the main determinants for shaping framework of *jihadism*. The new *jihadist* actors draw their own *jihad* according to existing situations and their needs. Therefore, contrary to classical understanding, the *jihadism* has no common definition and usage.

The modern usage of *jihadism* cannot be placed in classical *jihad* understanding. It has its own dynamics rather than classical *jihad*. In today's world, *jihadism* cannot gain legitimacy since it has no legal roots. Within that framework, *jihadism* is considered as even a threat to international security. Even, many Islamic organizations use *jihad* just

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⁴²⁴ Ahmet Yıldız, op. cit., p.209

for their aggressive actions against international security. Therefore, non-Muslim communities regard *jihadism* as equal to terrorism.

Three important Islamic organizations which have crucial affetces not only their countries but also other Muslim societies in different geographies of the world show that there in no single common definition of modern *jihad*, called as *jihadism*. Hezbollah contructs a *jihad* within its both military campaigns and political activities. Hamas never considers legality of its activities arguing that *jihad* can be enough for legality. Finally, Welfare Party in Turkey acts within a laik structure and focuses on personal developments of Muslims. Within that framework, it can be said that these contemporary definitions are different than classical *jihadist* discourse.

CONCLUSION

Jihad is a multi-faceted phenomenon both in theory and in practice. It is not a single, all-embracing concept that has been applied within the long history of Islam. John Esposito argues correctly that:

[T]he history of the Muslim community from Muhammad to the present can be read within the framework of what the Qur'an teaches about jihad. The Qur'anic teachings have been of essential significance to Muslim self- understanding, piety, mobilization, expansion and defense. Jihad as struggle pertains to the difficulty and complexity of living a good life... Depending on the circumstances in which one lives, it can also mean fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching and, if necessary, armed struggle or holy war⁴²⁵.

From the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century until the last Ottoman Sultan in the twentieth century, *jihad* was regarded as a state business. No call for *jihad* could be made or superseded outside from caliph authority. *Jihad* could not be proclaimed for personal reason (it should aim to rescue all Muslims or protect the Islam) too.

In historical classical Islam, Islamic expansion was carried out within the framework of *jihad*-wars. The Islamic tradition of jihad legitimates waging war within framework of ethical reasons and ethics of war. These formative *jihad* wars were essential to the history of the first Muslim societies. The Islamic empires successively dominated major parts of the world, with the goal of enhancing the territoriality of *dar al-Islam* through classical *jihad* and ultimately of mapping the entire globe in accordance with this model. This classical *jihad* was continued by the Ottomans until the seventeenth century.

The First World War changed the international norms and values by declaring any kinds of war unacceptable. Therefore dividing the world into a rival Islamic and a non-Islamic territoriality is no longer a reality of our world in current world system. However, the new system that service for benefits of Western dominant powers could not respond to needs of other societies. In addition, Muslim scholars perceived the new

⁴²⁵ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War, Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.26-28

international values as threat to future of Muslim identity. In history of Islam, the *jihad* discourse were developed by state leaders and governing elites. On the other hand, *jihadism* has never gained legitimacy in contemporary world. It has to reject foreign dominant powers and governing elites who allied with foreign powers. Within that situation, the doctrine of *jihad* gained its meaning.

Although nationalist leaders gained the support of their people in early times, 1970s witnessed the rise of Islamic discourses. The problem with nationalist regimes was that the new values could not be applied the Middle Eastern nation states with their precise meanings. The nationalist leaders, although they had came to power after elections, became local dictators in their countries. The oppositional movements including religious ones were banned. The economic liberalism could not be managed. The most importantly, the uncertainty about role of religion in state affairs and society relations were never solved. When nationalist movements did bring structural problems, Islamic resurgence found a way to come into power⁴²⁶. During dominance of nationalist leaders, strengthening of oppositional religious groups to involve political sphere had been suppressed by harsh state interventions. Yet religious groups continued their activities illegally or apolitically. Many youths were educated in schools of Muslim Brotherhood in different countries such as Palestine, Egypt, Syria, etc. the writings of mentors were distributed all over the Muslim world. Therefore, the ground for Islamic resurgence was completed. Even current *jihadist* activists were grown thanks to these schools.

Within that framework, a *jihad* cause was a develop to form an opposition against not only foreign powers which tried to control politics of Muslim societies but also local leaders who were ready to corporate Christian powers. This thinking is transformation of classical *jihad* into the contemporary idea and practice of *jihadism*. The overall context is the contemporary politicization of religion in the countries of Islamic civilization as they are undergoing a severe crisis situation, both structural and moral. The enemies of Islam were redefined and *jihad* was re-shaped different than classical doctrine of *jihad*.

The contemporary Islamist call for global *jihad* in world politics does not respect national borders between Muslim societies. The new Islamic organizations aim to reach

⁴²⁶ İhsan D. Dağı, *Ortadoğu'da İslam ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu, 2000) p.205

all Muslims regardless of their geographies. *Jihadism* is the call for political movement based on transnational religion. At its beginning the movement aimed to topple local regimes which were called as un-Islamic. However, over time the call has changed. From the first assault on the World Trade Center in New York back in 1993, followed by 9/11 and combined with the assaults in Europe between 2004 and 2006⁴²⁷, *jihadism* took a global shape. The phenomenon is explanation of "revolt against the West" simply as an anti-globalism.

The *jihadist* movements pose a crucial threat for Muslim and non-Muslim societies in two main ways: First is the problem of political order. Islamic fundamentalism as a politicization of religion emphasizes cultural differences to expression. In this regard they criticize the concept of order while underlying of a conflict among existing civilizations. In terms of security, *jihadists* apply religious grounds for their global cause. The *jihadists* fight with armies in irregular war as well as declare a war of ideas. So the second problem is that it accours as holy terror and irregular war. *Jihadists* resort to violence within the framework of irregular war to enforce their concept of order. The concept of holy war is considered to be an irregular war of non-state actors.

The main question of this thesis is how *jihad* is modified for mobilized people in the Middle East after the First World War. In the light of all these information, it is clear that *jihad* discourse was modified under different circumstances:

The classical *jihad* understanding gave the duty of waging *jihad* to Islamic armies under the caliph authority. The traditional military *jihad* was considered as a state affair. Since the caliph was also head of the state, the duty of protecting and enduring Islam belonged to the caliph. Traditionally, the state laeader who controlled the Mecca and Holy lands for Muslims was regarded as the caliph. Other Muslim leaders were given the duty of *jihad* by the caliph and their military struggles were realized under *jihad*. Within that framework, the Ottoman Empire declared *jihad* to unite all Muslim armies against the Allied Powers. However, the Arab armies under Ottoman rule did not response even if they never thougt about giving up Islamic principles in state system. Cooperated with British and French powers, the Arab tribal leaders desired to establish their own Islamic states after gaining independence from Ottoman rule. None of the Muslim leaders

⁴²⁷ Walid Phares, Future Jihad, op.cit., p.126-127

wished to abondened the Islamic princles in the state system nor rejected the authority of the caliph in Islam. Therefore, the rejection targeted just the political authority of the Ottoman Empire. Arab leaders did not see this *jihad* call for protecting Islam since they did not see any threat to Islam. On the contrary, they thought that they need British and French powers to protect Islamic identity of Arab georgraphies. Under that circunstances, the Arab leaders did not feel a necessity to response *jihad*.

During independence period, *jihad* calls were realized by national leaders even if they were not religious leaders. Since the caliphate position had already been abolished by new Turkish Republic, there was no need to get support of the caliph. At the same time, the new leaders were not coming from religious staff so they could not represent religious authority. However the leaders were aware of Muslim identity of society and power of religion to unite and motivate people for the sake of independence struggle. Independence movements were presented as struggle or resquing Islam from Christian domination. Since the Middle Eastern territories had always Islamic states, reestablishment of Islamic rules became motivating force to unite people. The leaders presented their struggle as *jihad* for re-establishment of Islamic states. At the same time, *fatwas* supporting the movement were announced by religious men. Within that scope, some independence movements announced *jihad* and others emphasized the religious importance of their causes. However, since the new leaders were not religious experts, the new states became more nationalist than religious. They adopted Western typed state systems instead of religious based.

After the First World War, the most important factor for *jihad* declation was Western involvement in the Middle East especially Jewish settlement in Palestine territories. Altough concrete war had been terminated in the globe, developments in Palestine led to continuation of military conflict in the Middle East. In order to support military conflicts, the religious umma announced *jihad* emphasizing the wellbeing of the Muslims in the Middle East. These *jihad* calls carried more defensive purpose since Muslim political actors and scholars realized that the Christian world had already gained the supremacy over the world. Therefore, the Muslim scholars and politicians used *jihad* to endure their sovereignties in the Middle East, and gain a political power in international relations.

In globalized world, the aim of *jihad* has turned towards aggressive purposes to eliminate all possible threats against well being of Islam. When Islamic Republic of Iran abondened the policy of exporting revolution, the state sponsored *jihad* has come to end. Instead, the non-state or sub-state organizations have pursued *jihadist* aims acting as representative of all Muslims in globe. *Jihad* idea carries establishment of an Islamic state and reconstructing the caliphate to unite all Muslims against threats. Current *jihadist* organizations have military and political branches, whether legal or not, to fight against global dominat ideologies over Islam. They have issued *fatwas*, pursued operations and established social services to reach Muslims and gain supports.

Jihadism has been constructed by contemporary actors according to their needs. Hezbollah acts in both legal political sphere of Lebanon and non-state military activities, and it explains both of them within *jihad* framework. Hamas calls for *jihad* in order to establish an Islamic state in Palestine against state of Israel and secular structe of Palestinian Authority. Welfare Party in Turkey accepts the secular feature of the Turkish Republic and pursued a jihad for Islamic developments of persons rather than state.

All these show that *jihad* has numerous functions throughout the history: as a state policy, a doctrinal tool, and an instrument with which dozens of wars, invasions, conquests, and resistances have been waged. The meaning of *jihad* has been determined by time and space according to situation. Analyzing this kind of phenomenon gives an idea about agenda of Muslim societies.

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