Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Program of Political Science

EVALUATING THE ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (PAKISTAN) TOWARDS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES FROM LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

Jamal SHAH

Ph. D. Thesis

Ankara, 2015

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
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Ankara, 2015

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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ÖZET

Shah, Jamal. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan)'daki Kültürel Grupların Kültürel Farlılıklara Yönelik Tutumlarını Liberal Perspektiften Değerlendirmek, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2015.

Sosyal teoriler çoğulluktan kaynaklanan sorunlara makul ve genel bir çözüm getirmeyi hedefler. Ancak herkesin üstünde hemfikir olduğu bir teori henüz ortaya konmamıştır. Eğer teoriler alanda eksik olan ampirik araştırmalarla desteklenirse çoğullukla ilgili bir çok soru cevaplandırılabilir. Bu tez bu doğrultuda bir çabadır. Çalışma, Pakistan'ın Khyber Pakhtunkhwa eyaletindeki kültürel grupların kültürel farklılıklara yönelik tutumlarını bazı liberal akademisyenlerin teorileri ışığında değerlendirmektedir. Bu değerlendirme 9 lisan ve din grubundan 2977 anket ve 80 kişisel mülakat ile elde edilen veri temelinde gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Tez, KP'deki kültürel grupların üyelerinin çoğunluğunun asimilasyona, kozmopolitanizme, parçalanmış çoğulculuğa yönelik olarak negatif fakat karşılıklı etkileşime dayalı çoğulculuğa yönelik pozitif bir tutum aldığını ortaya koydu. İnsanların tutumları, Kukathas tarafından ileri sürülen teorinin varsayımlarının bazılarını desteklerken bazılarını da reddetmiştir. Örneğin, katılımcıların çoğunluğu gruplarından ayrılan üyelerin gruptan herhangi bir katkı almaması gerektiğine; liderlerinin kendi taleplerini temsil etmediğine; devletin çeşitli gruplar arasında tarafsız olması gerektiğine; KP toplumunun azınlıklara karşı genel olarak hoşgörülü olduğuna inanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Kukathas'ın azınlıklara azınlık hakları verilmemesi fikri KP'deki kültürel grupların tutumları tarafından desteklenmemiştir.

 Benzer biçimde, katılımcıların çoğunluğu Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh ve Modood'un varsayımlarının bazılarına olumlu bazılarına da olumsuz tavır sergilemiştir. Örneğin, katılımcılar, kültürün bir grup için önem arzettiğini; eğer bu kısıtlamalar insan haklarını tehdit ederse gruplara içsel kısıtlama yapma hakkı verilmemesi gerektiğini; bu grupların grup hakları ile korunması gerektiğini ve kültürün muhafaza edilmesi gerektiğini söylemişlerdir.

Bu araştırmayı tamamladıktan sonra KP toplumunun başlangıçta düşünülenden bir parça daha hoşgörülü ve liberal olduğu ortaya çıktı.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kültür, Çolkültürcülük, Pahtunlaştırma, Müslümanlaştırma, Devlet tarafsızlığı, Grup hakları, Tanıma, Hoşgörü, Çıkar uçurumu.

ABSTRACT

Shah, Jamal. Evaluating the Attitudes of Cultural Groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan) towards Cultural Differences from Liberal Perspective, Ph. D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2015.

Social theories try to give a plausible and generalized solution to the problems/challenges arising out of plurality but no agreed upon mechanism has been developed so far. Many questions related to plurality can be answered if theories are complemented by empirical research which is deficient in the field. This dissertation is an attempt in that direction. It evaluates the attitudes of cultural groups in KP, Pakistan, towards cultural differences in the light of the theories of some of the liberal scholars by conducting a field survey for collecting data through 2977 questionnaires and 80 personal interviews from 9 religio-linguistic groups.

The dissertation shows that majority of the members of cultural groups in KP showed a negative attitude towards assimilationism, cosmopolitanism and fragmented pluralism but a positive attitude towards interactive pluralism. The attitudes of the people support some, but reject others, of the major assumptions of the theory set out by Kukathas. For example, majority of the respondents upheld that those members who exit their group should not receive any benefit from the group; that their leaders do not represent their demands; that state should be neutral among various groups; that KP society is generally tolerant towards minority groups. However, Kukathas's claim that minority rights should not be given to minorities was not supported by the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP.

Similarly, majority of the respondents had a positive attitude towards some, but not others, of the assumptions of Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood and said that culture has importance for a group; that groups should not be provided with internal restrictions, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights; that groups should be protected by the provision of group rights; and that culture should be preserved.

After conducting this research it came out that KP society is a bit more tolerant and liberal than what it was thought to be.

Key Words

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Modern states are faced with multiple challenges both from within and without. Externally, they face the challenge of globalization with its cultural, economic and political dimensions and impacts. Globalization is a challenge for states because some people consider it as harmful while others support it as beneficial for the states. How to cope with both of these claims is really a challenging task. Internally, states struggle with the rising tide of religious, value, ethnic and cultural plurality. Irrespective of the form of accommodation or the violent outcome which a pluralist state may take, plural states face similar structures of conflict: the posing of a fundamental challenge to the idea of homogenous nation-state, a standard created by the Westphalian nomenclature of the states. Plurality poses a challenge to modern state because some people may not be comfortable with heterogeneity and may support homogeneity by assimilating minority groups which may be considered as a threat to national integrity and security. On the other hand, minorities may challenge this assimilative thinking and policies of the majority and may want their identity to be respected, recognized and be provided with group rights.

This internal challenge of socio-cultural and religious diversity sometimes poses serious threats to a uniform and agreed upon national identity and national integration. Many questions related to justice, equality, uniform and color-blind policies, religio-cultural minorities, and the degree to which cultural diversity should be accepted, tolerated and accommodated may arise which require an agreed-upon political solution. Plurality sometimes gives rise to certain conflicts which are difficult to settle, for example, the head scarf issue, the humane slaughter of animals and the cremation of the dead bodies of Hindus etc. in western countries. It has also contributed to an increase in the level of minority nationalism in various states which has gained momentum in the second half of the 20th century. According to Walker Connor, powerful minority nationalisms can be found "in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Western Europe (France), Eastern Europe (Romania), North America (Guatemala), South

America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic (Israel)" (cited in Kymlicka, 2001a: 275).

In the past three decades, the question of minority rights has made many inroads in political theory. Will Kymlicka (2001a: 17-9) has mentioned several reasons for this activism. For example, the collapse of communism which unleashed a wave of ethnic nationalisms in Eastern Europe and dramatically derailed the optimistic assumptions that liberal democracy would emerge smoothly from the ashes of Communism; the nativist reaction against immigrants and refugees in many Western countries; the increasing level of political awareness and mobilization of indigenous peoples due to the draft declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples at the United Nations; and the growing threat of secession within several Western democracies, from Canada (Quebec) to Britain (Scotland), Belgium (Flanders), and Spain (Catalonia). Similarly, the explosion of media, globalization, rising awareness of people through education especially in developing states, and the saturation of the feelings of exclusion in terms of hate and stigmatization of minorities have exposed the problems which may arise in a multicultural society. Nathan Glazer (1997: 147) includes other developments that helped opened the way for multiculturalism like the remarkable expansion of the women's movement; the change in sexual mores; and the declining self-confidence or arrogance of the United Sates. However, he maintains that the principal reason for the rise of multiculturalism in the US is the unsuccessful attempts of the US to assimilate African-Americans. Glazer believes that a build-up of frustration among the Black population over the perceived failure of civil rights reforms has strengthened the resolve of many Blacks to stand in opposition to any form of assimilation (Glazer, 1997: 94). Thus, the ideology of multiculturalism was coined as a rejection of the harsh demands for the complete assimilation of minorities and as a means to change institutional arrangements in order to raise minority cultures to parity with the culture of the majority (Alba and

Nee, 2003). Multiculturalism debates provide for a renegotiation of socio-cultural space for minority groups many of whose members envisioned multiculturalist doctrine as a means to press their case for equal treatment (Gitlin, 1995).

Plurality has become a 'fact' that moral and political philosophy cannot bypass while proposing the terms of stability and fair co-operation in society. As Christopher McKnight (2000) declares, the universalibility of moral judgments is not a cross-cultural feature; diversity must be accepted as a fact and be recognized as existed. In this sense I consider the existence of cultural differences in a society as an issue which may exacerbate the stability and integrity of a society. The problems which may arise out of these cultural differences need to be addressed on the basis of general conception of equality and justice. Multiculturalism is considered as one of the policy, and I think a viable and plausible one, which has been applied by many of the Western states to cope with the rising tide of plurality. I take multiculturalism as a policy or approach of accepting the fact of multiculturality. Multiculturalism can be taken in both broader and narrow sense. In a narrow sense multiculturalism refers to a government policy in dealing with plurality by actively promoting, preserving or supporting cultural diversity using a range of instruments from subsidy to preferential treatment, a view supported by Kymlicka. In a broad sense, multiculturalism is the name of policies ranging from benign neglect and toleration, a view supported by Chandran Kukathas, to actively supporting, preserving, respecting and recognizing minority groups. I take multiculturalism in broader sense which covers the theories of Kukathas and Kymlicka laying at both the extremes of multiculturalism spectrum.

Multiculturalism is a policy which may contribute to stability in a pluralist society beset with problems arising out of plurality, though some may object to it, specifically in Asian and Eastern European states, who may say that the provision of minority rights may pose a threat to the security and stability of the state. They may also argue, specifically in the case of the states which were formerly colonized, that the existing minorities have taken many benefits from the former colonized masters and have collaborated with them, so equality requires that

minorities should not be provided with minority rights[1]. Consequently, some of the states will not give greater autonomy, power or resources to minority groups which are perceived as threat to national integrity and security and are doubted as disloyal. Such states will not accommodate groups which are thought as collaborators of foreign enemies, the phenomenon which political scientists call as the 'securitization' of ethnic relations (Waever, 1995).

However, if minorities have genuine and legitimate grievances and those grievances are practically heard, accommodated and removed, then such a policy may not only increase the self-esteem of the members of the minorities but may also create in them a sense of belonging to the state. The possible justification for multiculturalism as an approach to plurality is that, if taken prudently, it may establish a harmonious and stable pluralist community. If a society is homogeneous we need not to worry about its stability. It is heterogeneity which may create problems where we have no justification for either forcible assimilation or physical elimination of minority groups.

Yet we have a fundamental problem with normative theories of multiculturalism in the form of their reliance on an essentialist conceptualization of cultures which cannot be sustained and justified. Cultures are not homogeneous and fixed, specifically at broader and national level. They have internal variations and external overlaps and it is a common observation that in every group beliefs and practices are heterogeneous, sometimes diverse, varied and contested. As Alan Patten (2011) says, cultures are more acceptable when they are conceptualized as fluid, interactive, overlapping, internally contested and heterogeneous, though at local level they may be homogeneous. Taking culture/group as varied and heterogeneous also rejects their essentialist existence which shows that any attempt to protect different cultures becomes oppressive to many people within groups who do not hold and practice all or some of the beliefs and values that are supposedly constitutive of the group's culture (Benhabib, 2002: 4).

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[1] See for example W. Kymlicka (2001). Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe. In W. Kymlicka & M. Opalski (Eds.), *Can liberal pluralism be exported? Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe* (13-105). New York: Oxford University Press.

However, this does not mean that there are no distinct cultures. The members of groups have a broad consensus on certain generalizations which makes the group distinct from others. As Patten (2011) says "a distinct culture is the relations that people share when….they have shared with one another subjection to a set of formative conditions that are distinct from the formative conditions that are imposed on others".

Now how will liberalism face the facts of modern society which is composed of not only a variety of groups having different cultures and languages (cultural pluralism) but also disagreements on a variety of issues and values including the definition of good life, right, justice and equality etc. (value pluralism)? The answer to this question is important because our main concern in this dissertation is the evaluation of the attitudes of people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Pakistan) towards pluralism and cultural differences from liberal perspective. Liberalism has been defined in different ways. However, there are certain basic principles which all the liberals hold as important. Martha Nussbaum (1997: 62) is of the opinion that

> "Liberalism holds that the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or the nation or the religious group; analytically, because such entities do not really efface the separate reality of individual lives; normatively because the recognition of that separateness is held to be a fundamental fact for ethics, which should recognize each separate entity as an end and not as a means to the ends of others".

Generally, liberalism holds that individual has certain basic rights and liberties that ought and need to be the focus of political theories and state actions. This means that individuals are free in what perceptions of good life to choose, what to think, what to say, what to do provided that by doing so they do not obstruct others' rights to do the same and that the state should not interfere with this freedom unless individuals harm others or impede their lives in some way while exercising their rights and liberties. Thus, liberalism considers individual as an end in itself. This can also be construed as prioritization of right over good. Individual should not be deprived of his rights on the plea that his or her right violates some perception of good. This is explained by Michael Sandel (1998, 185) as "First, the right is prior to the good in the sense that certain individual rights trump or outweigh considerations of the common good. Second, the right is

prior to the good in that the principles of justice that specify our rights do not depend for their justification on any particular conception of the good life". This is also the ground for the state to be neutral among various perceptions of good life. In this dissertation liberalism is taken in classical sense where the individual's rights and liberty are taken to be inviolable and should be interfered neither by other individuals nor by the state keeping in view the harm principle.

The problem and in some way a challenge for the liberal scholars is how to treat, accommodate and harmonize disagreements which may arise out of plurality of culture, language and religion. The non-interference and non-discrimination models cannot provide a plausible solution to the issue of plurality (see for example Tok, 2003). The scholars in the field have provided their own solutions to this problem/challenge. One among those solutions is to respect and recognize the cultures and groups' attachments of others and to fairly accommodate them in power-sharing. Multiculturalism is broadly the name given to such policies of developing new model(s) of democratic citizenship based on accommodation, general conception of equality, rectification of past injustices while respecting human rights ideal. Both inclusion (in power-sharing and adequate representation) and exclusion (free to develop and preserve their culture and to act according to their own perception of good life) of minorities should be adopted as a formula if national integrity is to be attained. This policy may create a sense of belonging among the smaller groups which may thwart the separatist tendencies and may bring stability to the state. However, in some case, as I said earlier, it may be objected and will be considered as disintegrative formula.

Liberalism is sympathetic to multiculturality because of its strong belief in the significance of individual's freedom to have a life of his/her own, even if that way of life is disapproved by the larger society. Liberalism believes in the ideology that minorities' ways are to be tolerated rather than suppressed within a liberal society. This affirms Kukathas's belief that people are not required to live by values they cannot abide, nor forbidden to live by values which they cherish (Kukathas, 2003: 76). However, the fundamental liberal issue is how to find some ways in which minorities with different cultures and traditions might live together without coming into conflict with each other.

Liberals disagree among themselves on how to treat minorities' cultures and practices. The first approach is that of some of the liberals who are strongly against multicultural practices of tolerating minorities' practices and place emphasis on the protection of individual rights and believe that any illiberal practice of the minorities should not be tolerated at all.[2] The second approach is that of Kukathas who supports benign neglect and freedom of conscience and says that groups should neither be hindered nor promoted[3]. Kukathas's (2004) multiculturalist approach to the fact of cultural diversity is neither an attempt to prevent diversity from emerging in society by isolating it from others, nor to strive to prevent plurality to arise by assimilating minorities into one group. It is an approach to accept diversity and remain unconcerned whether the minority groups want to remain undigested or assimilate into the larger society by the open choice of the members of the group. The third group is comprised of the liberals who strongly defend a version of multiculturalism where state should give recognition to group rights and offer special protections to minority cultures. They support that the liberal state should ensure that minority groups have the resources for their sustenance which means not simply subsidizing their activities but also ensuring that they are not discriminated[4]. As Charles Taylor (1994) sees it, the emerging prominence of multiculturalism, particularly in America and Canada, is used as a strategy for redressing historical injustices experienced by specific social groups like the injustices suffered by indigenous populations in various states, colonized population under white colonial regimes, or women in patriarchal societies. The demand to rectify past injustices by many minority groups may be the very reason for the increased demand of multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994). How group rights can be justified will be discussed in 2nd chapter in which I will also critically analyze the theories of the prominent scholars in the field.

Pakistan, like other nation-states, is also faced with the problems of plurality and, like other developing Eastern states, is a neglected area as far as research regarding plurality is concerned. No serious attempt has been so far made to study

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[2] See for example Brian Barry (2001). *Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[3] See Chandran Kukathas (2003). *The liberal archipelago: A theory of freedom and diversity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[4] See for example Will Kymlicka (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences and the status of multiculturalism in Pakistan with the result that the available research in the field is scarce and deficient. This dissertation is an attempt in that direction. Its main concern is the evaluation of the attitudes of the cultural groups towards cultural differences from liberal perspective in one of the provinces of Pakistan namely Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). However, there are also some of the actual multicultural practices adopted by the state (province) which show how minorities are treated by the KP government and the majority group which controls the state apparatus. Along with the evaluation of the attitudes of the cultural groups towards plurality in KP, these multicultural practices are also highlighted. The dissertation also tries to test the attitudinal status of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the basic assumptions of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh, and Modood. As Kukathas and Kymlicka position their theories at both the extreme of multiculturalism spectrum leaving those of Taylor's, Parekh's and Modood's to lay at the middle, I will mainly focus on Kukathas's and Kymlicka's assumptions, touching Taylor, Parekh and Modood only where necessary.

One of the main objections regarding studies like the present one is whether the liberal multiculturalist theories and models adopted by the Western scholars for the Western liberal societies can be applied to the societies outside the West which may not be liberal. This is a difficulty which raises genuine objections to which I give some space. Theoretical literature, examples and practices of multiculturalism and minority rights in the West, often promoted by Western scholars, governmental institutions and international organizations, have influenced many countries outside the West (He & Kymlicka, 2005: 1). In the face of increasing interactions and globalization, theories and literature have an influence on many people, communities and nations. This is the case with liberal literature too. People develop social and cultural meanings and narratives in response to available knowledge, which in the modern times mostly come from the West. There is a steady dispersal of liberal values and ideas due to globalization. The availability of knowledge related to plurality, multiculturalism and identity politics has brought about multiple discourses of these terms in the Eastern states many of which try to adjust some of their behaviors, policies and

practices in respect of minorities to these theories of liberal multiculturalism. The debate about whether 'Western' liberal models of multiculturalism are relevant in the 'East' is sometimes made problematic by the existence of the 'Asian values' debate. Asian values are hypothesized as opposed to the Western liberal-democratic political system which is grounded in ideals of individualism and competition, while Asian societies are established on the ideals of communitarianism which gives weight to respect, harmony and paternalism. But He and Kymlicka (2005: 6) reject this line of thinking saying that 'Asian values' phrase has been invoked by the Asian leaders to justify their authoritarian rule and suppression of political dissents. Majority of the Asian authors stress the adoptability of mutual learning and cross-cultural influences and these mutual learning and cross-cultural influences have actually shaped public debates in the region[5]. Peoples in Asia and other non-Western states have historically been open to a wide range of outside influences, adopting and modifying various aspects of the religion, law and culture that were brought to them by various means like traders, missionaries, colonial officials, and now international agencies and experts. He and Kymlicka (2005: 7) argue that the people of Asia show a strong desire to understand their local debates in the context of global trends and international norms.

This means that it is not the 'Asian values' factor but some other potential obstacles rooted in the specific historical, demographic, economic, and geopolitical circumstances of the region that make the application of Western models of liberal multiculturalism difficult in the Asian context. At least five of such major obstacles can be mentioned. Firstly, the legacy of colonialism where majority group considers the minority group(s) as collaborator of the colonialists and is unwilling to accord minority rights to it/them. This is against the perception prevailed in the West where minorities are seen as disadvantaged and as suffered by historical injustices; secondly, the legacy of pre-colonial hierarchies; thirdly, geopolitical security where minorities are mostly seen as collaborators with a neighboring enemy state; fourthly, sequencing issues where in West the claim for multiculturalism and minority rights has been started after the adoption and consolidation of political democracy and market economies but in Asia these two

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[5] See for example W. Kymlicka & B. He (Eds.) (2005). *Multiculturalism in Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press.

process go hand in hand; and fifthly, categorization of the minorities[6]. Thus, it is not the matter of values but of the perceptions, specifically related to the security of the state, that produce hurdles in the way of applying the western liberal multiculturalist model(s) in the East (Kymlicka, 2005: 43-4).

Thus, Western models may have restricted relevance to several Asian contexts in the face of these obstacles but the question is: what are the possible democratic alternatives? The minority groups have gained greater activism and the states in the region are compelled to dig out some plausible solutions to the problems arising out of plurality. Most of the alternatives which have been tried in the region were associated with either the suppression of minority political mobilization, or with the hope that minority mobilization will eventually disappear with the emergence of economic development and modernization. But the end result is disappointment because, as He and Kymlicka (2005: 13-4) say, the former is viewed as highly illegitimate, while the latter is increasingly difficult to uphold. It is specifically because of the absence of any clear alternatives or well articulated theories and models of the democratic management of plurality that direct much of the attention to Western models to fill the academic vacuum and to articulate conceptions of multiculturalism that are more truly reflective of the circumstances in the region.

Thus, the multicultural policies adopted by the West have mostly become international points of reference. These theories have quickly spread around the world mostly in modified form, thereby providing the expressions, terminologies and conceptual apparatus for the new global discourse of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2005: 29). Liberal multiculturalism model acquired an international footing when people in the East learnt that the old practices of assimilation, exclusion, alienation and suppression have not worked in the West and are replaced by liberal multicultural practices. Global diffusion of a human-rights consciousness has not only given courage to minorities to press for multicultural claims of equality and differentiated rights but is also mostly invoked by the states

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[6] For more detail on these problems see B. He & W. Kymlicka (2005). Introduction. In W. Kymlicka & B. He (Eds.), *Multiculturalism in Asia* (1-21). New York: Oxford University Press, page 7-12.

that minority will not harass its own members and will not violate basic human rights. Thus, we have to accept the internalization of minority rights debates. State policies towards minorities are seen and evaluated in a global context in the light of global trends applying global discourses which, as Kymlicka (2005: 45) says, is dominated by the liberal multiculturalism adopted by the West. The international discourse of cultural plurality slowly circulates the states outside the West and the states outside the West are slowly adopting these discourses and practices albeit in much modified form which will get strengthened with the consolidation of liberal democracy in these states. Though there are problems like the categorization of the groups, the non-consolidation of democratic values and the securitization of the minority's relations, liberal democratic models may be applied, albeit in modified form, to judge the status of the minorities' relations in non-Western states. Moreover the ongoing debates within liberal multiculturalist theories on issues such as the importance of cultural identity, conceptualization of person, establishment of criteria for multiculturalist justice, and requirements of multiculturalist justice etc. are to a great extend valid, and explanatory for non-liberal states and societies too (Tok, 2002). Again, in the present research I am not interested in the application of Western theories to the society of KP as such but rather with the judging, evaluation and testing of the KP society in the light of the theories developed by the western scholars.

Actually, every province of Pakistan needs an empirical survey to evaluate the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences and then to give a full attitudinal picture of the people towards plurality in Pakistan as a whole. I have chosen to start from KP because the degree of plurality here is higher than the other provinces of Pakistan. KP is home to more than 25 linguistic[7] and 5 religious groups. Again, the collected data is considered to be more reliable because being the resident of KP, the respondents did not consider me a stranger and might have given me correct information than the researchers from the other provinces. Furthermore, being quite familiar with the people and places in KP, the survey is also less costly in terms of money, time and resources. However, one of the main limitations of this choice may also be taken into account which is the issue of objectivity vs. subjectivity. In social research and specifically the one

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[7] See Tariq Rahman, Language policy and localization in Pakistan: Proposal for paradigmatic shift. Retrieved from http://www.apnaorg.com/research-papers-pdf/rahman-1.pdf.

which is conducted on a group to which the researcher belongs, the issue of subjectivity intrudes one way or the other, intentionally or unintentionally, though researcher will try utmost to avoid biases and subjectivity. I am a Muslim and Pakhtun and have tried utmost to be objective and to avoid any subjectivity in this research. If subjectivity has sometimes intruded that should be considered as unintentional and unconscious.

To empirically evaluate the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences, I took 5 linguistic minority groups, 3 religious minority groups and one dominant Pakhtun group. Linguistic groups are taken because in the subcontinent the linguistic rather than caste or clan-based affinities is the powerful mobilizing factor in the enunciation of demands for regional and sub-regional autonomy (Jalal, 1995: 223-4). Kymlicka (2001a: 217) is also of the opinion that language is one of the primary markers of people's identity, and so people take any degradation in the public status of their mother-tongue as an assault on their identity. Kymlicka (2001a: 215) goes on saying that language is extremely important in the construction of democratic political communities and the language-demarcated political communities remain the main forum for participatory democratic debates and for the democratic legitimization of other levels and forums of government. Similarly, Feroz Ahmad (1998: 241) also argues that in applying the concept of ethnic group to the conditions of Pakistan, language would be the main defining feature of an ethnic group. Since all linguistic groups have more or less distinct cultures, in addition to many overarching cultural characteristics that they share in common, the criterion of culture would also be satisfied. However, Ahmad (1998: 238) argues that most constructed social categories have the problem of defining the boundaries, and all the individuals or elements cannot be neatly assigned to water-tight compartments. Defining linguistic group is not as easier as is thought to be and one has to make borderline-arbitrary decisions, and that in many cases there simply does not seem to be a single right answer to the question "what is a group?"

I will use the term 'linguistic group' in this dissertation to mean a group having its own language and culture and its members use that language as their first language and secondly, follow group's culture. Those who have forgotten their

group's language and have adopted another language and culture do not constitute to be the members of the group whose language they have forgotten. They may ethnically belong to their former group but not culturally. Again, in this study I will not take ethnic groups but rather cultural groups. Ethnicity is mostly related to the idea of a biological lineage and a common inheritance (Patten, 2011) while culture is considered as the product of a common socialization process. Members of a group share a common culture if they have been subjected to about a common and distinctive socialization process.

As there are more than 25 linguistic and 5 religious minority groups in KP, all of them are difficult to be the focus of my research. I have taken 5 linguistic and 3 religious minorities as the domain of my research. For selecting linguistic minorities, I have adopted three criteria as a test. The first criterion is the population of the linguistic minority groups and here I have taken 200,000 as a bench mark for selecting a group, leaving further smaller groups for future research. The second test is the geographical representation where I took groups from the South, middle, East, West and North of KP. The third test is the activism in airing their demands through media and group mobilization. These tests were qualified by 5 linguistic groups namely Seraiki in the South, Hindko in the middle and East, Kohistani and Gujar in the middle and West and Chitrali in the North of KP. For religious minorities 3 groups were taken. They were Christian, Hindu and Sikh. Christians and Hindu were taken because they seem to be targeted for any wrong done against Muslims or Islam in the West and India respectively. Because of the heated national temperature, the Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan become objects of suspicion and are required to prove their loyalty to their respective states. This puts an enormous strain on these minority populations and on their constitutional rights.

1.1.   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

KP has the highest level of plurality as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan. No study has been done in the past to investigate the attitudes of the cultural groups towards cultural differences and the treatment of minority groups by the state and the dominant Muslim and Pakhtun group in KP. A survey under

the name "Sociolinguistic survey of Northern Pakistan" composed of 5 volumes (where first volume covers languages of Kohistan; second volume languages of Northern Areas; third volume Hindko and Gujari; fourth volume Pashto, Waneci, Ormuri; and fifth volume languages of Chitral) edited by Clare F. O'Leary was published in 1992 by National Institute of Pakistan Studies (Quaid-i-Azam University), Islamabad. However, the main concern of this survey was to study the origin and characteristics of the various languages and dialects of Northern Areas of Pakistan. This was a descriptive study of the various languages to verify the diversity and similarity within these languages and dialects of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, a part of which comes under KP. This survey does not explore the attitudes of the people towards plurality in KP. It does not say how different minority groups are treated by the dominant group and the state.

Another study was conducted by Syed Wiqar Ali Shah in 1999 under the title "Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-47". But this study is restricted to the complex political and ideological developments in North-West Frontier Province (present KP) in the last decade of the British rule in undivided India. Again, it mainly focuses on one political movement, Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of Allah) and examines the emergence of modern styles of agitational and democratic politics among the Muslims of KP during 1937-47.

The present dissertation empirically explores the position and attitudes of various linguistic and religious groups (including the dominant Pakhtun group) to the various questions regarding culture and cultural differences asked through questionnaire and interview (for questionnaire and interview schedule see Appendices 1, 2 and 3) in KP. It addresses the main question "What are the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences from liberal perspective?" Through this question I will look into the attitudes of the cultural groups and people in KP towards culture and cultural preservation, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism etc. I will also judge and evaluate the attitudinal status of the cultural groups and people in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the theories of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood.

In order to fully understand the main questions, the following sub-questions are also addressed.

1. Why, if any, culture has importance for the groups in KP?
2. Whether various groups in KP wish to blend in the dominant Pakhtun culture or try to maintain their particularities?
3. Has there been any attempt for Pakhtunization and Muslimization in KP?
4. Do the groups have demands for internal restrictions and external protections?
5. Should culture be preserved? If yes, then, whether it should be preserved by the members of group or state or both?
6. What do members of a cultural group think about new comers? Should people who come to live in another group adopt the values, traditions and language of that group?
7. Do women have equal rights as men in the groups in KP?
8. Whether diversity has remained stable, increased or decreased and whether diversity is celebrated or abhorred in KP?
9. Do some groups feel discrimination on the basis of religion or language in KP?
10. Whether the demands of minorities have been practically heard and fulfilled in KP?
11. Is there any gap between the demands of the members and leaders of the groups (interest gap) in KP?
12. Whether the groups are in favor of color-blind approach in KP?; and
13. Whether the members have the right to exit and still take benefits from the group in KP?

Similarly, the following hypotheses are tested.

1. An "interest gap" exists between the members and leaders of a group.
2. Pakhtun society is generally tolerant towards minority groups.
3. Culture is important, not as a source of making meaningful choices but as a sign of identity.
4. Financial position of a member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

5. The level of education of a member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

6. Age is positively related to the emphasis given to culture and assimilation.

7. More positive attitude toward intermarriage and inter-group relationship (if any) tend to support assimilation.

8. Young people, people with high education and minority groups have greater support for multiculturalism; and

1.2. METHODOLOGY

In order to find answers to the research questions, three research tools, namely, questionnaire, interview and personal observation were used. Questionnaire and interview schedule were constructed in English language. Questionnaire was pilot-tested by distributing 20 of them among my friends and other professionals. However, majority of the members of the targeted groups were not comfortable with English, so for them questionnaire was translated into Urdu which they were quite familiar with. Before distributing these Urdu questionnaires among the respondents, a pilot-testing was conducted where a few of these translated questionnaires were distributed among the members of the targeted groups so as to know whether the translation is clear. Confusion, if any, was rectified and cleared.

Throughout the field-work it has been my objective to collect representative data. Keeping that purpose in mind I approached people belonging to every walk of life including students, their parents, faculty members belonging to universities, colleges and schools, lawyers, shopkeepers, males, females, and members of the police force etc. The main areas where the target group is settled were spotted and data in the form of questionnaires were collected from the spotted areas.

For the determination of sample size from each group the following formula for simple random sample was applied.

$n = z^2 p(1-p)/e^2$ or $z^2 pq/e^2$ (taken from Cochran, 1977: 75-6)

Where n = Simple random sample size.   z = Confidence interval = 95%
whose value in z table is 1.96   p = probability of response = 0.50
e = margin of error = 5.5%.   q = 1-p

Now n = 1.96*1.96*0.5(1-0.5)/0.055*0.055= 317. Thus, the estimated sample size is 317.

For each of the minority group 450 questionnaires were distributed among the population of the various spotted areas for which the lower limit was kept as 317 while for the dominant Pakhtun group 550 questionnaires were distributed among the Pakhtuns for which the lower limit was kept as 400.

For the collection of data I went to the region where the target group is in majority. I went to the universities, colleges and schools (both public and private) located in that area. In the university I selected departments and classes by random selection and distributed questionnaires among students there. I gave three questionnaires to each student- one for himself and two for his or her parents to be filled by them. Similar was the case with the colleges. In schools I distributed the questionnaires among the staff members only. I gave two questionnaires to each staff member-one for himself and one for his family member to be filled by the family member. Similarly, I distributed the questionnaires to the educated shopkeepers, lawyers and other members of the group. I personally distributed and collected the questionnaires. During my stay in the group I took interviews from the common members, intellectuals and members who claimed to be the leaders of the group. These instruments were complemented by the observation made by me during my stay in the group.

I took my start from the Seraiki group, situated in DI Khan city, Tank and Paharpur in the extreme South of KP (see the map of KP on page 21) on 21st March, 2013 which lasted till the 3rd of April, 2013 (14 days). From this group I collected 345 questionnaires the detail of which is given in Tables 1 and 2. Out of 345 questionnaires 9 (6 M[8] + 3 F) (4 E + 5 U) were discarded being ambiguous, improperly or partly filled. Similarly, 9 members were interviewed including

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[8] Here M means male respondents, F means female respondents, E means questionnaires filled in English, and U means questionnaires filled in Urdu.

intellectuals, member of the KP Provincial Assembly and leader of the Seraiki National Party.

Table 1: Questionnaires collected from Seraiki males and females

Questionnaires/Area	DI khan City	Tank	Paharpur	Total
Male	93	48	56	197
Female	68	43	37	148
Total	161	91	93	345

Table 2: Questionnaires collected from Seraikis in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	DI khan City	Tank	Paharpur	Total
English	82	25	31	138
Urdu	79	66	62	207
Total	161	91	93	345

The second linguistic group surveyed was Hindko. This group is situated in the East of KP covering Haripur, Havalian, Abbottabad and Mansera. Here I collected 341 questionnaires the detail of which is given in Tables 3 and 4. Out of the total 341 questionnaires 10 (4 M + 6 F) (3 E + 7 U) were discarded. Along with these 11 members of the Hindko group were interviewed including members such as retired Vice Chancellor of the Engineering University, Peshawar, leader of the Tehreek-i-Soba Hazara (Movement for the establishment of Hazara Province), Ph.D. scholars and students. I remained in the Hindko speaking area from April 7, 2013 to April 17, 2013 (11 days).

Table 3: Questionnaires collected from Hindko speaker males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Haripur	Havalian	Abbottabad	Mansehra	Total
Male	29	34	47	42	152
Female	34	37	61	57	189
Total	63	71	108	99	341

Table 4: Questionnaires collected from Hindko speakers in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Haripur	Havalian	Abbottabad	Mansehra	Total
English	21	36	51	34	142
Urdu	42	35	57	65	199
Total	63	71	108	99	341

The third group from which the data was collected is Chitrali. This group is situated in the extreme North of KP consisting of one district divided into Upper and Lower Chitral and the same division was kept for this study too. I remained there from April 21, 2013 to May 3, 2013 (13 days). Here I collected 367 questionnaires the detail of which is given in Tables 5 and 6. Out of 367

questionnaires 5 (2 M + 3 F) (4 E + 1 U) were discarded. Similarly, 12 interviews were conducted with the members of Chitrali group.

Table 5: Questionnaires collected from Chitrali males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Upper Chitral	Lower Chitral	Total
Male	56	113	169
Female	105	93	198
Total	161	206	367

Table 6: Questionnaires collected from Chitralis in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Upper Chitral	Lower Chitral	Total
English	93	117	210
Urdu	68	89	157
Total	161	206	367

Survey for Gujar linguistic group was conducted from May 7, 2013 to May 30, 2013 taking 24 days. From this group 370 questionnaires were collected the detail of which is given in Tables 7 and 8. Out of these 370 questionnaires 13 (4 M + 9 F) (8 E + 5 U) were discarded. Similarly, 7 interviews were conducted with the members of the Gujar group.

Table 7: Questionnaires collected from Gujar males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Dir	Dir Kohistan	Swat Kohistan	District Kohistan	Total
Male	49	29	71	60	209
Female	40	32	32	57	161
Total	89	61	103	117	370

Table 8: Questionnaires collected from Gujars in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Dir	Dir Kohistan	Swat Kohistan	District Kohistan	Total
English	31	23	29	25	108
Urdu	58	38	74	92	262
Total	89	61	103	117	370

The last linguistic minority group surveyed was Kohistani. Survey for this group was conducted from May 7, 2013 to May 30, 2013 (24 days) and August 3, 2013 to August 6, 2013 (4 days) taking a total of 28 days. From this group 317 questionnaires were collected the detail of which is given in Tables 9 and 10. Out of these 317 questionnaires 9 (3 M + 6 F) (5 E + 4 U) were discarded. Again, 10 interviews were conducted with the members of the Kohistani group.

Table 9: Questionnaires collected from Kohistani males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Dir Kohistan	Swat Kohistan	District Kohistan	Total
Male	59	48	77	184
Female	47	35	51	133
Total	106	83	128	317

Table 10: Questionnaires collected from Kohistanis in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Dir Kohistan	Swat Kohistan	District Kohistan	Total
English	16	21	26	63
Urdu	90	62	102	254
Total	106	83	128	317

The Christian religious minority group is distributed throughout the province. However, the main areas where it is settled are Swat, Mardan, Topi (Swabi), Nowshera, Peshawar, Kohat and Abbottabad. From this group 325 questionnaires were collected the detail of which is given in Tables 11 and 12. Out of 325 questionnaires 8 (3 M + 5 F) (6 E + 2 U) were discarded. Again, 10 interviews were conducted with the members of this group. Survey for this group was conducted from June 3, 2013 to June 21, 2013 and took 18 days.

Table 11: Questionnaires collected from Christian males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Swat	Mardan	Topi	Nowshera	Peshawar	Kohat	Abbottabad	Total
Male	19	36	18	26	29	21	23	172
Female	12	17	11	25	38	20	30	153
Total	31	53	29	51	67	41	53	325

Table 12: Questionnaires collected from Christians in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Swat	Mardan	Topi	Nowshera	Peshawar	Kohat	Abbottabad	Total
English	6	14	7	13	21	8	11	80
Urdu	25	39	22	38	46	33	42	245
Total	31	53	29	51	67	41	53	325

Map of Khyber Pakhtonkhwa (Pakistan)

(Retrieved from http://www.pakistantravelforum.com/threads/khyber-pakhtunkhwa-kpk.64/)

Hindu group is also a scattered one in KP. However, the main areas where Hindus live are Dargai, Topi, Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Kohat and Bunir. From Hindu group 229 questionnaires were collected the detail of which is given in Tables 13 and 14.

Table 13: Questionnaires collected from Hindu males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Dargai	Topi	Mardan	Nowshera	Peshawar	Kohat	Bunir	Total
Male	14	16	26	18	27	23	7	131
Female	10	13	21	13	22	15	4	98
Total	24	29	47	31	49	38	11	229

Table 14: Questionnaires collected from Hindus in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Dargai	Topi	Mardan	Nowshera	Peshawar	Kohat	Bunir	Total
English	2	1	8	6	12	4	1	34
Urdu	22	28	39	25	37	34	10	195
Total	24	29	47	31	49	38	11	229

Out of 229 questionnaires 6 (2 M + 4 F) (5 E + 1 U) were discarded. The survey was conducted from June 23, 2013 to July 20, 2013 taking 27 days. At the start of my field work, I was of the opinion that Hindu members would be of sufficient number from which the required number of questionnaires would be collected. However, during the field work I found that their population is small and most of them have converted to Sikhism. So due to their small population I collected a lower than 317 questionnaires from this group. Similarly, only 4 interviews were conducted with the members of Hindu group.

Like the Christian and Hindu communities, Sikh community is also scattered throughout KP. The main areas where Sikhs are concentrated are Mingora, Dargai, Bunir, Mardan, Charsadda, Peshawar and Nowshera. From Sikh community 342 questionnaires were collected the detail of which is given in Tables 15 and 16. Out of 342 questionnaires, 6 (2 M + 4 U) (4 E + 2 U) were discarded. A total of 6 interviews were conducted with the members of Sikh community. Survey for this group was completed in 24 days from July 11, 2013 to August 3, 2013.

Table 15: Questionnaires collected from Sikh males and females

Questionnaires/Area	Mingora	Dargai	Bunir	Mardan	Charsadda	Peshawar	Nowshera	Total
Male	23	6	70	27	14	31	10	181
Female	20	3	64	24	9	27	14	161
Total	43	9	134	51	23	58	24	342

Table 16: Questionnaires collected from Sikhs in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	Mingora	Dargai	Bunir	Mardan	Charsadda	Peshawar	Nowshera	Total
English	2	0	21	16	1	9	3	52
Urdu	41	9	113	35	22	49	21	290
Total	43	9	134	51	23	58	24	342

For the dominant Pakhtun group the areas spotted were DI Khan, Abbottabad, Kohistan, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Charsadda, Mardan, Mingora, Dir and Chitral. A total of 419 questionnaires were collected from this group the detail of which is given in Tables 17 and 18. Out of 419 questionnaires 12 (5 M + 7 F) (8 E + 4 U) were discarded. The survey for this group, as was simultaneously conducted along with other groups, was completed in 4 months and 29 days starting from March 21, 2013 to August 18, 2013. A total of 11 interviews were conducted with the members of the dominant Pakhtun group.

Table 17: Questionnaires collected from Pakhtun males and females

Questionnaires/Area	DI Khan	Abbottabad	Kohistan	Bannu	Kohat	Peshawar	Charsadda	Mardan	Mingora	Dir	Chitral	Total
Male	21	24	13	21	17	28	14	29	25	17	18	227
Female	15	22	10	18	14	21	11	25	19	13	24	192
Total	36	46	23	39	31	49	25	54	44	30	42	419

Table 18: Questionnaires collected from Pakhtuns in English and Urdu

Questionnaires/Area	DI Khan	Abbottabad	Kohistan	Bannu	Kohat	Peshawar	Charsadda	Mardan	Mingora	Dir	Chitral	Total
English	5	7	2	6	4	11	5	6	3	1	3	53
Urdu	31	39	21	33	27	38	20	48	41	29	39	366
Total	36	46	23	39	31	49	25	54	44	30	42	419

Similarly, interviews were conducted with the members of the targeted groups. Some of the members refused to be interviewed because of their tough schedule. Similarly, I felt difficulty in interviewing the female members of almost all of the religio-linguistic groups in KP. Strict observance of veil (*purdah*) in KP society does not permit a female to talk with a male whom she does not know. However,

none of those interviewees who agreed to be interviewed was reluctant that his/her identity should be kept secret. Interviewees were informed of their rights of participation and were convinced that the information obtained from them would never be used but for this research purpose. Interviews were conducted with members of groups belonging to various walks of life e.g. common people, educated, uneducated, lawyers, leaders etc. Interviews were conducted in Urdu and Pashto languages and no interpreter was needed for these languages. Most of the interviews were recorded though some of the interviewees requested for not recording certain bit of information. These interviews were conducted in the homes and offices of the interviewees. The duration of interviews varied from 30 minutes to about two hours with an average duration of 45 minutes. These interviews provided a rich source of information and the data collected through questionnaires regarding various questions were complemented by the opinion expressed by the members of the targeted group through these interviews.

Thus, at the end of the field work which lasted from March 21, 2013 to August 18, 2013 taking 4 months and 29 days, 2977 questionnaires were collected after discarding the ambiguous and partially filled questionnaires out of which 1591 were filled by males and 1386 by females and 833 were filled in English while 2144 were filled in Urdu. The total number of interviews conducted with the members of all the targeted groups was 80. The detail is given in Table 19.

Table 19: Total number of questionnaires collected, discarded, filled by the male and female members and the number of interviews conducted in each group

Name of the Group	Questionnaires collected	Questionnaires Discarded	Remaining Questionnaires	Male	Female	Interviews conducted
Seraiki	345	9	336	191	145	9
Hindko	341	10	331	148	183	11
Chitrali	367	5	362	167	195	12
Gujar	370	13	357	205	152	7
Kohistani	317	9	308	181	127	10
Christian	325	8	317	169	148	10
Hindu	229	6	223	129	94	4
Sikh	342	6	336	179	157	6
Pakhtun	419	12	407	222	185	11
Total	3055	78	2977	1591	1386	80

1.3. DATA ANALYSIS

After the data in the form of questionnaires were collected, I thoroughly checked all the questionnaires and discarded those which were ambiguously filled, half filled or doubtful. In this way a total of 78 questionnaires were discarded (Seraiki 9, Hindko 10, Chitrali 5, Gujar 13, Kohistani 9, Christian 8, Hindu 6, Sikh 6 and Pakhtun 12). The remaining questionnaires, 2977 in number, were entered in the SPSS statistical program and were analyzed by simple descriptive statistics, cross tab, co-relation in terms of Pearson, Kendall's tau-b and spearman tests for obtaining answers to the various research questions and testing the hypotheses. Though SPSS model have some limitations for complex analysis, for the analysis of the present data it worked accurately and the results were correct. Interviews were analyzed through content analysis. The recorded and written material of the interviews were carefully analyzed and the important statements and quotations of the interviewees were coded which provided important insight and information regarding the various issues put before the interviewees of the targeted groups. The findings obtained from the analysis of the data of the questionnaires were cross-checked with the finding of the interviews.

1.4. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of this dissertation is to empirically evaluate the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences in one of the provinces of Pakistan namely KP. It also evaluates the attitudinal status of KP society in the light of the theories expounded by Kukathas, Kymlicka, Parekh, Taylor and Modood. It tests some hypotheses and basic assumptions for general understanding some of which are related to the theories of the prominent scholars in the field, specifically, Kukathas and Kymlicka. It shows how some of the linguistic and religious minorities are treated by the dominant Muslim and Pakhtun group. It shows what the targeted groups think of culture: whether culture is important and if yes, why? Whether the people are in favor of culture preservation and if yes, who should be responsible for such preservation? The dissertation shows whether there are any assimilationist, cosmopolitanist, fragmented pluralist or interactive pluralist tendencies in KP society. The nature of the group rights and their status is

elaborated. The dissertation shows the status of the rights of women as compared to men in different groups. It shows whether discrimination on the basis of language and religion is experienced by the linguistic and religious minorities in KP. The opinion of the members of the targeted groups regarding state neutrality has been documented. It also shows the internal differences of interest between the elite and common members of the group in KP. The dissertation is a valuable contribution in the field of attitudes toward plurality and multiculturalism because it empirically tests the KP society in the light of the theories in the field and tries to obtain first hand information from the people who are affected by the state policies.

Again, the study is significant because the data generated will assist in evolving appropriate measures and alternative policy options and guidelines that will enable the KP government and society to evolve effective mechanisms and strategies for addressing and accommodating the genuine demands of minorities. Secondly, the findings generated will also help to expand the frontiers of knowledge by adding to the existing literature in the field of cultural differences in KP.

1.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was conducted in the Pakhtun society in KP and does not depict the overall Pakhtun society which also includes the Pakhtuns of Baluchistan Province and the Tribal Agencies which are seven in number and are known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These agencies have their own administration with its head known as Political Agent (PA) and have representation in the central legislature. Again, I am a Muslim Pakhtun and introducing myself at the start of the interview and even during the interview, if the interviewee knew that I am a Muslim Pakhtun, he might have hidden or given wrong information. Again, KP has received about three million Afghan refugees during Afghan war (1979-88) who are still living there. The study does not take into consideration those refugees. The study takes the most prominent religious and linguistic groups into account and leaves out the groups which are minor and least prominent for future research.

Furthermore, I am not interested in the history, formation, languages, religion and culture of the targeted groups as such but rather, firstly, with the evaluation of the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences in KP and secondly, with how these cultural and religious groups are treated in KP by the members of the group, government and the dominant group. Again, the findings in this study should be taken as specifically related to KP and cannot be generalized to the whole of Pakistan. For the study to be generalized to the whole of Pakistan or to other situations and people, similar studies need to be carried out in other provinces of Pakistan. Similarly, as I said earlier, one of the limitations of my method is the issue of objectivity vs. subjectivity. In social research and specifically the one which is conducted on a group to which the researcher belongs, the issue of subjectivity intrudes one way or the other, intentionally or unintentionally, though researcher will try utmost to avoid biases and subjectivity. I am a Muslim and Pakhtun and have tried utmost to be objective and to avoid any subjectivity in this research. If subjectivity has sometimes intruded that should be considered as unintentional and unconscious.

1.6. BASIC CONCEPTS

Some of the terms which are used in this dissertation are defined below to make it clear how they should be understood within the domain of this dissertation.

1.6.1. Assimilation

This vision as an approach to diversity rests on the importance of substantive moral bonds as the basis for moral cohesion. It pressures individuals to lose the characteristics of prior outsider identities and to adopt the society's core values. This vision deals with differences by removing them. Differences are understood as something dangerous, to be rid of or at least minimized. However, a phenomenon will be considered assimilative when minorities/outsiders are forced by the dominant group to adopt the values, culture and religion of the dominant group.

1.6.2. Cosmopolitanism

It, as Hartmann & Gerteis, (2005) say, recognizes diversity, but is skeptical about the restrictions that group membership places on individuals and defends plurality only if it allows and expands individual rights and freedoms but is silent about groups and group rights.

1.6.3. Fragmented Pluralism

This version of plurality, which is the closest to being the opposite of assimilation, believes in the existence of a variety of distinctive and self-contained mediating communities. Here, group membership is essential rather than partial and voluntary. Pressure for conformity to group's values is strong here.

1.6.4. Interactive Pluralism

Interactive pluralism recognizes the existence of distinct groups and cultures but tries to cultivate common understanding across these differences through their mutual recognition, ongoing interactions, cross-cultural dialogue and exchange with an emphasis on respect of differences.

1.6.5. Chitrali

A Chitrali is a person who uses Chitrali language as his first language and follows the general culture of Chitrali group. Like other languages, Chitrali language is also considered as having various dialects, but like every other language Chitrali language has commonality to a great extent and in the present dissertation linguistic groups are taken as such without considering their internal groupings and dialectic differences. Again, as I am mostly interested in culture (original or adopted) and not ethnicity, I do not include those members in a Chitrali group who may be ethically Chitrali but have forgotten Chitrali language and have adopted any other language and culture as their first language and culture. For example, a person may be ethnically Chitrali but may have adopted Pashto language as his first language and Pakhtun culture as his working culture. Thus, he is ethnically Chitrali but culturally Pakhtun and in this study he is treated as Pakhtun as he has been assimilated willingly and voluntarily in the Pakhtun culture. Same definition is given to the members of other linguistic groups like Gujars, Hindko speakers, Kohistanis, Pakhtuns and Seraikis.

1.6.6. Comprehensive Liberalism

In this study comprehensive liberalism is presented as liberal political arrangements in the name of certain moral ideals, such as autonomy, individuality or self-reliance. This is what has been presented by Bican Şahin (2010: 86) who says "A comprehensive liberal opines that we cannot possibly build a liberal social order without a commitment to deeper values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within a liberal social order's political framework".

1.6.7. Culture

I take culture in the sense used by Parekh (2000: 142-3) where culture is considered as "Historically created system of meaning and significance or a system of beliefs and practices in term of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives". However, culture is taken as non-essentialist which runs the risk of the problems of internal variations and external overlapping. Culture should be considered as a consensus on certain generalizations which makes a group distinct from others.

1.6.8. Interest Gap

It refers to the difference, inconsistency and variation between what the common members of the group demand and what its leader(s) propagandizes to be their (common members of group) demands.

1.6.9. Muslimization

Muslimization is the tendency on the part of the dominant religious group (Muslim) in KP to forcefully assimilate religious minorities into its rank.

1.6.10. Pakhtunization

Pakhtunization is the tendency on the part of the dominant linguistic group (Pakhtun) in KP to forcefully assimilate other minorities into its rank.

1.6.11. Political Liberalism

Political liberalism is the ideology of remaining neutral among the various perceptions of good life. The policy under political liberalism will neither support

nor suppress any perception of good life, group or culture. It will refuse to take sides in the moral and religious controversies that arise from comprehensive doctrines.

1.6.12. State Neutrality

It means that the state will remain neutral among the various comprehensive perceptions of good life. It is sometimes equated with political liberalism. I take neutrality as anti-discrimination and anti-perfectionism which means not imposing any perspective of good life and a full inclusion of minorities in public affairs as presented by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2002: 57). It is the equal liberty of every individual to pursue any perception of good life. It is the perception that the state should not discriminate those who have a different religion or language.

1.6.13. Toleration

It is, to apply Şahin's (2010: 5-8) views, an act of non-interference in another's activities though one has power to control those activities. However, rational persuasion is not intolerance. I will use toleration to mean as leaving all the minority groups to act according to their own religion, culture and traditions without any hindrances or interferences from the dominant group and state. However, violation of universally recognized human rights on the pretext of group autonomy should not be allowed or tolerated.

1.7.   OUTLINES OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter 2 unearths the strategies to be adopted for minimizing the problems arising out of plurality in multicultural states. It addresses the question of who is a right-bearing entity-individual, group or both. Again, it evaluates the theories of Taylor, Parekh, Kymlicka, Kukathas and Modood regarding the treatment of minorities within a pluralist state. These scholars are selected because they are the most prominent and well known in the field. They have the same objective but different means to arrive at it and try to provide different responses to diversity. At the end of the chapter, I will elaborate my theoretical position regarding the issues of plurality under liberalism.

Chapter 3 shows the state of plurality (i.e. ethnic and religious diversity) in Pakistan, predominantly a Muslim state, and shows the causative factors which have aggravated the problems arising out of plurality in Pakistan. The chapter shows that the state sponsored ideology of Islam; the adoption of Urdu as national language without taking all the ethnic groups on board based on consensus; high degree of centralization of power with the evasion of provincial autonomy under the federal structure where the ethnic groups could preserve their culture; and a weak and controlled civil society are the factors which have marginalized the religio-linguistic groups and have aggravated the problems that emerged against the background of plurality. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the position of civil society in Pakistan and shows that it has remained underdeveloped and weak throughout the history of Pakistan except since Pervaiz Musharraf's era (1999-2008), though a self-appointed authoritarian leader, where many civil society organizations showed their presence. This section is incorporated because the treatment of plurality in a state has a direct link with the status of civil society in that state. The second section deals with the minorities' issues and shows how they have been affected by the state policies and state-sponsored ideology. The third section elaborates descriptively the religio-linguistic landscape of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) which is the main research area of this dissertation.

Chapter 4 empirically explores the positions and attitudes of various linguistic and religious groups (including the dominant Pakhtun group) to the various questions asked through questionnaire and interview in KP. It addresses the main questions "What are the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences from liberal perspective?" The chapter shows the attitudinal status of KP society in the light of the theories expounded by Kukathas, Kymlicka, Parekh, Taylor and Modood?" Besides the main questions, some sub-questions are also addressed and hypotheses are tested.

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by recapitulating its main themes. It shows that cultural groups in KP reject assimilationism, cosmopolitanism and fragmented pluralism but support interactive pluralism. It also evaluates the attitudinal status of the KP society in the light of the scholars in the field specifically Kukathas and Kymlicka. It shows that this study supports some of the

major assumptions of Kukathas. For example, majority of the respondents said that there is 'interest gap' in their group; that the state should be neutral among the various conceptions of good; that those members who exit their group should not receive any benefit from the group and that KP society is culturally tolerant towards minority groups. Similarly, some of Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood assumptions are also fulfilled by the KP society. For example, majority of the respondents in KP gave importance to culture and said that it should be preserved; that groups should not be provided with internal restrictions, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights; and that groups should be protected by the provision of group rights. The conclusion also provides some recommendations and future research and policy directions.

CHAPTER 2

LIBERALISM AND MINORITIES: A THEORETICAL PICTURE

In the last few decades there has been a great push toward the recognition of group rights for minorities. Besides a number of reasons which explain this rising interest in the issue, the general criticism of the liberal theory is the prime one. Liberalism is criticized for ignoring the issue of how belonging to groups affects individual autonomy and equality. Group rights are seen as a device legitimating a wide range of claims raised by minorities in pluralist states. The striking fact is that plurality has become a major source of political clash and violence in the world. Most conflicts of our time are internal arising out of ethno-cultural strife, which often deteriorate into massive violations of human rights and incalculable sufferings (Casals, 2006: 1). It was believed that liberal education and modern means of communication would link people together across states and continents and the relevance of cultural identity would progressively vanish. Moreover, the application of the universal framework of rights would properly address the demands of minorities and would cause a steady assimilation of citizens resulting in blending of all cultures and the emergence of a single cosmopolitan society (Kymlicka, 2001a: 204-205). However, this optimism has been proved to be flawed and identity consciousness has increased rather than decreased. Neither globalization nor democratic transformation has helped to avoid ethno-cultural conflicts (Casals, 2006: 3).

Now how will liberalism cope with this phenomenon? Liberalism is primarily concerned with the jurisdiction allowable to an agent within which it exercises its rights. However, the problem is "who is the recipient of rights-individual, group or both?" This chapter will show very briefly how the above problem could be solved within the liberal tradition. However, the main objective(s) of the chapter is to investigate and evaluate the theories of Charles Taylor, Bhikhu Parekh, Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas and Tariq Modood regarding the treatment of minorities within a pluralist state in the subsequent sections. It answers the questions how these scholars have treated the problems of plurality. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each theory? I take these scholars because they are

the most prominent and well known in the field. They have the same objective but different means to arrive at it and try to provide different responses to diversity.

2.1. THE DILEMMA OF GROUP RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The dispute over whether rights should be given to group or individual is a dispute between communitarians and liberals. Communitarians believe that it is the community, rather than individual, state, or nation that should be the main focus of analysis and the centre of our enquiry (Frazer, 1998: 112); possessing particular virtues; and a publicly sanctioned conception of the good life and, as William M. Sullivan (1986: 10) says, "The question of which lives are valuable is necessarily a public concern and each of us has good reasons for taking a public interest in other people's lives". This line of thinking reflects dissatisfaction with the classical liberalism where only individual is the centre of analysis. Liberalism is criticized as excessively individualistic; producing a peculiar view of the self; that society should be neutral regarding different conceptions of the good and that liberal society is atomistic (Neal & Paris, 1990). Despite internal differences, communitarians share the view that excessive individualism has helped to produce anxious, competitive, and incoherent lives, and a society which is both unlovely and potentially self-destructive (Lund, 1993).

Now, for liberals, rights act as guarantees that individuals, and not communities, are allowed to actually endorse conceptions of the good life (this endorsement is internally motivated), and that the individuals will have the freedom to revise the conception of good life (Kymlicka, 1995: 152; Mill, 1978: 57; Rawls, 1985). For communitarians, revisability is not necessarily a positive trait and those who reject their current projects and beliefs are exercising an empty freedom. For Michael Sandel, the distance from conceptions of the good that we need in order to revise them is 'always precarious and provisional'. To think otherwise, to 'imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments', is 'not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth'. Thus, we treat people as equals by subordinating their reflectively endorsed beliefs to a list of unendorsed virtues and an unrevisable conception of the common good (Sandel, 1998: 179, 183). For communitarians equality means

the freedom to flourish which requires being part of a community that engages jointly, rather than individually, in the business of endorsing and revising conceptions of the good life. Again, the successful claim for individual rights will protect citizens against public scrutiny of their performances in the constitutive roles; will shake citizens loose from the shared values and virtues which they need as criteria against which to compare their present projects, and permit them to sacrifice an essential interest in the good life to present needs (Lund, 1993). Communitarians criticize that men and women in liberal society no longer have access to a single moral culture and have no consensus and no public meeting-of-minds on the nature of the good life (Walzer, 1990; MacIntyre, 1984: 17).

Communitarians strongly criticize the belief of the liberals that the individual stands in direct relationship with the state (Frazer, 1998: 112). They also doubt the uniform application of some values (liberty, equality, fraternity and authority) as standard for all societies. Every society may give a different definition of liberty, equality and authority. For communitarians, autonomy and justice have different meanings for different groups. For Benjamin R. Barber, autonomy is attained by participatory democracy as he says "Without participating in the common life that defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals" (Barber, 1984: xxxv). Similarly, for Michael Walzer (1983, 313) "A given society is just if its substantive life is lived... in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members".

However, eminent communitarians are committed to liberalism (Walzer, 1990; Neal & Paris, 1990; Lund, 1993). They are inconsistent in their support for the community as Alasdair MacIntyre says:

> "The fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community" (MacIntyre, 1984: 221).

On the other side, liberalism believes in the commitment to human rights which outweighs all but the most extreme considerations of the overall good; rights are attributed mainly to individuals; and the concept of the right is distinguished from that of the good (Thigpen & Downing, 1987). Liberals believe that there is no middle ground between humanity as a sand-heap of separate organisms and the

state as an outside power (Sabin, 1950: 475). Liberalism believes that there should be no intermediate entity or community imposing a particular perception of good between the state and the individuals; that no way of life can be considered to be superior to another; and effort to impose any particular way of life on individuals is considered to be illegitimate. Liberals repudiate the view that liberal individualism is inconsistent with the idea of a self as situated within a community. While treating individual, liberalism neither necessarily discourages community-regarding behavior nor promote selfishness (Neal & Paris, 1990). However, Communitarians blame liberals for not understanding individual as 'self' in social relation, a charge that is unfounded. Liberals understand individual as 'self' in social relation but with the contingent, and not essential conception of shared relation, terms which Patrick Neal & Davis Paris (1990) define as

> "A contingently shared relation is a relationship between two or more antecedently defined separate selves which…..does not penetrate the identity of the separate selves to the point that the identity of each becomes partially or wholly constituted by the relation itself. An essentially shared relation penetrates this deeply; when two selves essentially share a relation, the identity of each self is partially or wholly constituted by the relation".

One of the difficulties, however, with communitarians is that they do not give a clear definition of the community. It is portrayed as a set of relationship between persons; an entity with boundary and a particular location or a thinking subject (Frazer, 1998: 118; Bell, 2005 & Waldron, 1995: 95). A further question is "What is being promoted when we promote community?" Whether it is the existence of the community, its rules and customs or the individual autonomy and wellbeing? And it is this question which places communitarians on the defensive side. The mobilities in terms of geography (changing the residence frequently), social behaviors (acting and behaving differently as our parents did), marital status (increasing rate of divorce, separation and remarriage) and political loyalty (declining loyalty to leaders, parties and movements)[9] in developed states, especially in the US, have given a hard time to the communitarians to press for the

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[9] For detailed discussion on mobility see Michael Walzer (Feb., 1990). The communitarian critique of liberalism. *Political Theory, 18*(1), 6-23.

group rights and consequently, have provided fewer if any justifiable alternatives to liberalism in modern societies.

But the rising intensity of group based claims has also put a challenge to liberalism. Many of the minority groups have pressed for the claims of recognition and group rights in the form of multiculturalist policies. It is the idea that identity and cultural membership are morally relevant factors that should be recognized and protected through specific rights which are reinforced by justice and equality between groups, rather than between individuals, and that neither the individual human rights nor the democratic majoritarian decision making are sufficient to properly address group demands. Group rights are characterized as solidarity rights of the whole peoples of a group rather than individuals. But, in fact, most of the normative texts attribute rights to the members of minority groups rather than to the group itself. That is why most scholars do not feel the need of the revision of traditional doctrines of human rights (Pejic, 1997), saying that group rights are not required because they could also be derived from other individual human rights and that constitutional rights and liberties, toleration and state neutrality provide a framework that is flexible enough to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different groups in democratic societies. How group rights will be justified is discussed in section 7 of this chapter.

2.2. CHARLES TAYLOR AND THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES

Taylor's logical, consistent and concise essay is usually considered as the classic work of a theory of recognition and has instigated a general interest in the idea of recognition which for him is a 'vital human need' (Taylor, 1994: 26). Indeed, the struggles over "who we are" are means of enhancing self-respect and self-esteem, self confidence and dignity. Recognition, for Taylor, is important because it is related to identity which is a person's understanding of who he or she is, of his or her fundamental characteristics as a human being. Feelings of self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect are possible only if we are positively recognized for 'who we are'. As our identity is partly shaped by recognition "So a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible

picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor, 1994: 25) and "Can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred" (Taylor, 1994: 26). Due to non-recognition, the targeted group develops a sort of inferiority complex which is internalized and the group cannot liberate itself even though the hurdles in the way are removed.

Thus, judging the present day cultural conflicts in pluralist societies, it has become very challenging to support the restriction of identity within the limits of the private sphere alone and all conflicts including those over economic distribution are the various manifestations of a fundamental struggle for recognition (McNay, 2008). This recognition is an important condition of social life as Axel Honneth argues:

> "The reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when one has learned to view one-self, from the normative perspective of one's partners in interaction, as their social addressee....since it is only by doing so that they are able to express socially the continually expanding claims of their subjectivity" (Honneth, 1995: 92-93).

Taylor rejects monological view of identity formation developed by Jean Jacques Rousseau, Herder and John Stuart Mill and takes that our identity is made in a dialogical process as he argues:

> "We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression…..But we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us… [as] 'significant others'. The genesis of the human mind is, in this sense, not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical" (Taylor, 1994: 32).

For Taylor, as proceduralist neutrality of liberalism cannot accommodate minorities, it must be modified to give way for the politics of difference. Taylor is the supporter of preserving the basic political principles of the society but expounds that as societies are becoming more permeable and multicultural, there are "Substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with

their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles" (Taylor, 1994: 63).

Taylor justifies the fair treatment of minorities on the basis of equality. He argues that when we talk about equality in the context of race and ethnicity, we are actually appealing to two different, though related, concepts of equal dignity, and equal respect. Equal dignity appeals to people's humanity that applies to all members in a relatively uniform way. But if equal dignity focuses on gender-blindness and color-blindness, equal respect implies that differences are also important in conceptualizing and institutionalizing equal relations between individuals because they have group identities and these may be the ground of existing and long-standing inequalities such as racism, discrimination and considering others as inferior which would have affected their dignity. For Taylor, the politics of difference is the logical extension of the politics of equal dignity. Each culture should be presumed to have equal worth and "If withholding the presumption is tantamount to a denial of equality, and if important consequences flow for people's identity from the absence of recognition, then a case can be made for insisting on the universalization of the presumption as a logical extension of the politics of dignity" (Taylor, 1994: 68). Thus, equal respect should be given to particularities because difference-blind principle is not always neutral and "The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture (Taylor, 1994: 43). Again, every legal system is the expression of a particular form of life and not merely a reflection of the universal content of basic rights (Habermas, 1994: 124). Thus, public sphere is not always neutral nor could it be purely secularized (Galeotti, 2002: 124; Parekh, 2000: 201-202, Modood, 2013).

For Taylor, there are two versions of liberalism: the politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference. For the proponents of the politics of equal dignity, the politics of difference 'violates the principle of nondiscrimination' while for the proponents of the politics of difference the politics of equal dignity "Negates identity by forcing people into homogenous mold that is untrue to them…. The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture" (Taylor, 1994: 43). One of the main assumptions of procedural liberalism, which Taylor

objects, is that human dignity consists mainly in autonomy: the ability of each person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good life (Taylor, 1994: 57). The politics of difference, on the contrary, is connected with the ideal of authenticity, whereby each individual is considered to have a unique identity, an original way of being human, his or her distinctiveness from everyone else, to which he or she must be true. And Taylor says that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity (Taylor, 1994: 38). This authenticity can be compared with Mill's *individuality* and Will Kymlicka's notion of the right to *revise* and *question* but where Mill and Kymlicka give this authenticity to the individual, Taylor is ambivalent in giving it to the individual. He is the supporter of group recognition and it seems that he gives it to the group.

Taylor favors certain rights to be given to minorities in order to avoid discrimination but does not provide a convincing justification for doing so. He is also not clear about what types of rights should be given and whether the rights are contextual. However, he is right when he says that affirmative action should be taken on temporary basis to rectify past discrimination and injustices "That will eventually level the playing field and allow the old blind rules to come back into force in a way that doesn't disadvantage anyone" (Taylor, 1994: 40). But, some minority rights are to be given on permanent basis which minorities consider as part of their religion and culture, for example, a Sikh or a Muslim woman will require a permanent right to wear turban or headscarf respectively. These rights cannot be given on temporary basis. The violation of these sorts of rights might disturb peaceful co-existence in a multicultural society-a fact not highlighted by Taylor's theory.

According to Taylor (1994: 59), a society with strong collective goals can be liberal, if it distinguishes the fundamental liberties which should never be violated and ought to be unchangeably well-established, on the one hand, from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy, on the other, provided that it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and provided that it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. It is on these grounds that Taylor rejects the politics of equal dignity inaugurated by

Rousseau because Rousseau supports the notion of equality of esteem which requires a tight unity of purpose which is incompatible with any differentiation.

However, Taylor's theory has a sort of paternalistic germs. He seems to give preference to the group rights over the individual rights and tries to constrain the autonomy of the future generations, thus, enforcing conformity at the expense of individual specificity as he (1994: 58-59) states:

> "But it [Quebec's cultural survival] also involves making sure that there is a community of people here in the future that will want to avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language. Policies aimed at survival actively seek to *create* members of the community, for instance, in their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers. There is no way that these policies could be seen as just providing a facility to already existing people".

It is this point where Taylor is critical of Kymlicka's solution to the problem of plurality which is the position of maintaining liberal neutrality, and since individuals need certain basic cultural goods to pursue the good life, neutrality requires accommodating certain groups by granting them differential rights so that their members are able to pursue good life (Kymlicka, 1995: chp. 4). Taylor (1994: 41) argues that this solution works only for existing people who find themselves trapped within a culture but doesn't justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generations. In my opinion, it not only hampers the autonomy of the future generations to decide for themselves the perceptions of good life, but also is purely an essentialist approach to culture. It binds the community members to pass their culture to the future generations without clarifying whether the present generation is under an obligation to do so. K. Anthony Appiah (1994: 163) is also scared that the creation of a black politics in which black identity is given emphasis and celebrated can provide a sense of self-esteem, confidence and dignity to black communities but at the same time it can also lead to a proper way of being black, one which all members of the black community must demonstrate in order to partake in this positive self-image. Such expectations of behavior can lead, Appiah notes, to one form of tyranny being replaced by another. Taken to the extreme it can also lead to separatism through creating an 'us-and-them' group mentality which may prevent dialogue between groups.

2.3. BHIKHU PAREKH'S TREATMENT OF MINORITIES

Parekh's contribution to the ongoing debate on multiculturalism has been developed out of his wide knowledge in political philosophy and political engagement with issues of equality and minorities in Britain and India, touching both eastern and western views and has developed a point of view distinct to that of North American academic liberalism. His readings regarding plurality take the middle path avoiding any extreme position. Parekh goes a step further than Taylor on the issue of recognition and presses for a change in the attitude of the dominant section of society towards the minorities. For him, misrecognition can only be rectified by both undertaking a thorough critique of the dominant culture and drastically restructuring the existing inequalities of economic and political power. It requires needed changes in all the major areas of life. A plural society cannot remain stable unless it ensures that its various communities are justly recognized and have a just share in economic and political power (Parekh, 2000: 342-343).

According to Parekh (2000: 7-9), though minorities were long existing, four factors put the issue of plurality on the philosophical and political agenda in modern times. These are firstly, the refusal of minorities to accept a subordinate position; secondly, the rising importance of culture; thirdly, economic and cultural globalization and the threat to and of cultural homogeneity; and fourthly, the assimilationist motto of the modern states.

Rejecting both naturalism (the view that human nature is unchanging and unaffected in its essentials by society and culture) and culturalism (the view that human beings are culturally constituted) for giving an incoherent account of human life and multicultural society because one stresses shared humanity but ignores culture while other stresses culture but ignores shared human nature, Parekh (2000: 10-11) argues that human beings are cultural and natural at the same time; both like and unlike and like in unlike ways, sharing a common human identity but in a culturally mediated manner and neither similarities nor differences are ontologically prior or morally more important. Again, rejecting moral monism (the view that there is only one way of good life) of Greek thinkers, Christian theologians and classical liberals like Locke and Mill as a

flawed response to plurality, Parekh theorizes that people are culturally embedded because cultures mediate and modify human nature in their own different ways and no vision of the good life can be based on an abstract conception of human nature alone. "A way of life cannot be judged good or bad without taking full account of the system of meaning, traditions, and the moral and emotional resources of the people involved" (Parekh, 2000: 47). Again, all human beings do not carry the same nature. We can talk of human beings' distinct individual natures (as the Hindus and Buddhists do); their nature as members of a certain cultural communities; and their nature as members of the human species. To liken human nature with only the last one is to take too narrow a view of it. Human beings are the products of both universality (common features) and differences (cultural embeddedness). No theory of human beings will be complete unless it is accompanied by a theory of culture.

But simultaneously, Parekh also rejects the very rigid view of the culture. Finding flaws in the pluralist theories of Vico, Montesquieu and Herder, Parekh takes issues with them for the obvious mistakes they made for taking culture to be an integrated, static and organic whole, ignoring its internal diversity and tensions, and dissociating culture from the wider political and economic structure of society (Parekh, 2000: 50-79). For Parekh, no culture is homogeneous and some members of a group may follow all its practices and beliefs other might follow few and they might follow these for social, cultural or religious reasons. As the system of beliefs and practices of a culture is continuously contested, subject to change, and is not a coherent whole, its identity is never settled, static and free of ambiguity (Parekh, 2000: 145-148). Cultures do not have a single overarching principle which an outsider can uncover and use to individuate and define them. Their identity is complex and diffused, cannot be summed up in a neat set of propositions, and can only be grasped by a deep and intimate familiarity with them (Parekh, 2000: 149). However, besides these features, cultures are distinguished from each other both by the content of their beliefs and practices and the manner in which these are internally related and form a reasonably recognizable whole. But as culture is one of the several factors shaping its members, they are not determined by it to be unable to take a critical view of it or rise above its beliefs and practices and reach out to other cultures (Parekh,

2000: 157). Here Parekh's position supports Kymlicka's principles of questionability and revisibility of the existing needs. While rejecting the extreme naturalism (which gives no room to diversity) and culturalism, this view, according to Parekh, retains their valid principles and finds a secure space for culture within a wider theory of human beings. This is what he says:

> "When we understand human beings in this way, we do not automatically assume that others are either basically like us as the concept of human nature encourages us to do, or totally different as the concept of cultural determinism or culturalism implies. We approach them on the assumption that they are similar enough to be intelligible and make a dialogue possible, and different enough to be puzzling and make a dialogue necessary. We, therefore, neither assimilate them to our conception of human nature and deny their particularity, nor place them in a closed world of their own and deny the universality they share with us" (Parekh, 2000: 124).

Parekh values culture contingently. He values it because human beings have value and as human beings have worth, it extends to those which they value; and consequently, we have to give value to what human beings give value. For Parekh, this means two things; negatively we should not treat them as worthless and give harm to them; and positively we should cherish their self-respect and self-worth (Parekh, 2000: 130). A culture derives its authority from the willing allegiance of its members, and it vanishes if they no longer follow its system of beliefs and practices hence a culture cannot be preserved by force or artificial means (Parekh, 2000: 169). Thus, while respecting culture, Parekh extends respect to individuals' autonomy but "We can judge and criticize their choices and ways of life and, if after careful consideration and listening to their defence we find their choices perverse or unacceptable, we have no duty to respect and even a duty not to respect these choices" (Parekh, 2000: 176). In the same way, if a culture gives stability and meaning to human life, displays creative energy etc., it deserves respect but if after intense and sympathetic study of it from within, we conclude that it does not offer its members the overall quality of life, we will not accord it much respect (Parekh, 2000: 176-177; 2008: 44). Thus, for Parekh (2000: 336-337) culture is important because "human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world, organize their lives and social relations in terms of its system of meaning and significance, and place considerable value on their

cultural identity". Since each culture is internally plural and fluid, not the whole and provides only a part of the totality of human existence, it requires others to better understand it and expand its intellectual and moral perspective. Again, life is likely to be richer if one has access to other cultures and since each culture is inherently limited, a dialogue between them is mutually beneficial.

Parekh (2000: 165-167) argues that as no culture can contain the total of human experience and life, a range of cultures can only complement and correct each other and it is this view that allows us to step outside of our own rigid circle and rationally assess our life experiences. However, this view is also wanting. It is the support for multiculturality and not multiculturalism. Many people will severely object to diversity for the sake of internal unity and integrity. For that reason a homogeneous society will be the best one. Again, every religion and culture may consider itself as a complete code of life and will not be happy to borrow from others. Thus, a case for diversity cannot be made. However, if diversity is there, then we should make a case for how to ameliorate its negative effects.

Parekh's case for cultural diversity is that "Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it might be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life…Different cultures, thus, correct and complement each other, expand each other's horizon of thought…[and] The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are options for us" (Parekh, 2000: 167) thus, helping individual to look at his culture from the outside and figure out its strengths and weaknesses. It provides a climate for fruitful dialogue which is a satisfactory way to produce universal moral values (Parekh, 2000: 129).

Parekh argues that as the state cannot be morally as neutral as the proceduralists imagine (Parekh, 2000: 202), the state should be a community of communities instead of being a single people, "Each enjoying different degrees of autonomy but all held together by shared legal and political bonds". Like Kymlicka, Parekh moves for a culturally based federal structure with its inescapably ill-shaped legal and political arrangements and like Kukathas, he presses for the

sovereignty of the state to involve several centers of authority instead of one, exercising overlapping jurisdiction and reaching decision through negotiations and compromises (Parekh, 2000: 194).

As Parekh is concerned both with unity and diversity of the multicultural society, he argues that for maintaining unity and diversity, collectivities should be given rights but all collectivities do not qualify for collective rights. There are basic requisites for collectivity to qualify for collective rights which are (a) the collectivity should mean a great deal to its members, enjoys a moral status in their eyes, and they wish to preserve it; (b) its existence is vital to the fundamental interests of its members; (c) it is deeply insecure and would not and could not integrate into mainstream society without certain guaranteed rights; (d) it has long been subjected to systematic oppression; (e) it lacks the confidence and the ability to compete with the rest of society; and (f) it has the potential to make a valuable and unique contribution to the wider society (Parekh, 2000: 217-218). However, all these prerequisites are too ambiguous. Every community would mean a great deal to its members and its existence would be of vital interest to its members irrespective of the fact whether it is large or small.

To maintain unity and stability in a multicultural society, Parekh stresses for the need of a common culture maintained by a multiculturally oriented system of education, which uncovers common grounds behind differences. Such a culture can emerge and enjoy legitimacy only if all the constituent cultures are able to participate in its creation on equality basis. In order to facilitate the emergence of such a common culture, both private and public realms need to promote intercultural interaction. In such a society unity and diversity are not confined to public and private realms respectively, but interpenetrate and permeate all areas of life. Again, multicultural society must have a national identity to cultivate a common sense of belonging among its diverse communities allowing for multiple identities, should not consider the minorities as outsiders, and respect and accept them equally valuable.

Parekh gives his own procedures for evaluating whether the disputed practices to be tolerated or not. According to Parekh (1996, 2000, 269-273), the relations between majority and minorities should be adjusted on the basis of Operative

Public Values (OPV) which provide the only generally acceptable starting point for a discussion on minority practices. These values are not coherent and static but changing and are sometimes subjected to opposite interpretations, so they should be reassessed periodically so as to provide a chance to minorities to adjust their practices to it. The OPV should be justified and the rejection of the minority practices should be explained. On the other hand, minority should also justify its practices. The dialogue should focus on the both; the majority and minority values. If the minority defends and justifies its disputed practice, the practice should be allowed; if not the OPV will prevail. Jürgen Habermas's normative conceptions of the constitutional state and deliberative politics also propose that only those collective goals on which there is collective agreement are acceptable. It is the collective agreement which provides the framework within which ethical differences must be accommodated (Cooke, 1997).

However, as Melissa S. Williams (2000: 137) argues, the judgment that another's arguments are reasonable is much more a contingent matter. Again, if OPV are not beyond criticism and are often contested and only provisionally or pragmatically accepted by some of its members, not neatly summarized, not easily individuated etc., as Parekh says, it will provide an unworkable and temporary stability to multicultural society and the members who object to them will be uneasy to obey them, mostly under compulsion. Parekh's case for OPV is vague. Sometimes he makes them as a standard and judge minority practices on the basis of them as he says "When a minority practice offends against the society's OPV, it merits disapproval" (Parekh, 1996). But at the same time he says that minority's way of life deserve respect and its practice should not be disallowed only because it offends OPV because firstly, the practice would mean much to the minority and will require its exploration and secondly, because the OPV are not beyond criticism and might present a particular conception of the good life (Parekh, 1996). This explanation of the OPV is too vague and problematic and renders the OPV, on which the whole structure of his theory is based, unreliable mechanism for dealing with plurality. He provides the solution that the OPV should be periodically reassessed but the problem is "who will assess them?" Again the dominant group will have the upper hand in redefining the OPV and, thus, will maintain its dominant position.

Parekh, thus, questions the dominant liberal view which is Anglo-American oriented and takes a contextual and culturally embedded approach to cultural differences and tries to limit liberal individualism and state neutrality with justification. He appreciates diversity as the human condition of contemporary liberal societies. However, his theory does not do full justice with the minorities' issues because he says that if the dialogue between the minority and majority over disputed practice collapses and the matter is urgent, the majority values should be promoted for at least three reasons "Firstly, they are woven into its institutions and practices, form part of the lived social reality, and cannot be changed without causing considerable moral and social disorientation; secondly, while a society has an obligation to accommodate the immigrant's way of life, it has no obligation to do so at the cost of its own; and thirdly, immigrants also need the wider society's goodwill and support to overcome the resentment and hostility their presence tends to provoke" (Parekh, 1996: 266). Again, dialogue requires special tactics, use of language and capabilities which minority may lack while defending their genuine case.

2.4. WILL KYMLICKA'S APPROACH TOWARDS DIVERSITY

Kymlicka, one of the most influential and highly read scholar in the field who gives a convincing defence of minority rights within the liberal framework, begins his theory by highlighting the deficiencies of the traditional human rights approach; insisting that justice requires that the approach should be complemented by taking into account the group-differentiated rights for minorities which he broadly categorizes into national (caused by occupation of the already existing self-governing groups; colonization; and voluntary association) and ethnic (caused by individual and familial immigration)[10]. He gives emphasis on this categorization because each category needs different treatment and ignoring it can shield states from international scrutiny (Kymlicka, 1995: 21-22).

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[10] This categorization is an attempt to simplify a very complex situation. It leaves many gray areas which require contextual treatment like African-American, Roma, Russian minorities in the Eastern European states, guest workers, illegal immigrants and Highlanders in Thailand etc.

To do justice to minorities, three types of group rights should be given to them namely self-government rights (for national minorities); polyethnic rights or more accurately accommodation rights (like Sikhs' exemption from wearing helmet; Jews to wear yarmulke etc.) which tend to promote integration into the dominant society; and special representation rights[11]. Many of the minority rights claimed by groups are legitimate which protect them from real or potential injustices that might result from the state's nation-building efforts (Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). Representation right will help in avoiding mistrust that might be there between the constituents belonging to minority groups and the representatives belonging to majority group and also help in generating better communication between the constituents and representatives[12]. Again, political representation will lead to some rough justice in the distribution of jobs and services; is a key to a more general representation of all major sections of the plural society (Glazer, 1995: 130); and will guarantee that minorities' interests are taken into account in decision-making processes (Levy, 1997). Kymlicka (2007: 18, 45-47) believes that liberal multiculturalism[13] in the form of accommodating and recognizing minorities in turn helps in expanding human freedom, strengthening human rights, diminish ethnic and racial hierarchies and deepen democracy. In short, all the goals of international community including, peace and security, democracy and economic development, reduction of poverty depend on the recognition of minority and indigenous rights. I think this is too much an expectation from the act of recognition of minorities because recognition can also cause negative results.

By presenting a liberal defence of minority rights, Kymlicka (1995: 52; 1989: 175) argues that minority rights are consistent with the liberal principles of

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[11] In *Politics in the vernacular* (2001a: 6), Kimlycka gives a stronger defense for minority rights saying "Minority rights are increasingly seen precisely as 'rights', the violation of which can be an assault on basic dignity and respect."

[12] For a detailed discussion on this issue see J. Mansbridge (2000). "What does a representative do? Descriptive representation incommunicative settings of distrust, uncrystallized interests, and historically denigrated status". In W. Kymlicka & W. Norman (Eds.)(2000). *Citizen in diverse societies* (99-123). Oxford: Oxford University Press and also M. S. Williams (2000). "The uneasy alliance of group representation and deliberative democracy". In W. Kymlicka & W. Norman (Eds.) (2000). *Citizen in diverse societies* (124-152). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[13] In *Politics in the vernacular* (2001a: 47), Kymlicka calls his theory as liberal culturalism, which says that liberal-democratic states should not only recognize the common set of civil and political rights of citizenship, but should also adopt various group-specific rights or policies which aim to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups.

freedom and equality because cultural groups have two types of demands; those against its own members which could be used to restrict their liberty (internal restrictions); and those against the larger society to protect itself against the impacts of its decisions (external protections). The former demands are not while most of the latter are consistent with the liberal principles for the promotion of fairness among the groups. The former restrict the autonomy of the members of minorities while the latter protect it. Even in the case of external protections liberals cannot accept any such right which might enable one group to exploit or oppress other group(s). These protections are legitimate only if they uphold equality among groups by rectifying disadvantages suffered by members of a particular group (unequal circumstances i.e. the situations which are not the products of choice but brute chance). In short, liberal justice requires freedom within the group and equality between the groups (Kymlicka, 1989: 240-141, 1995: 152, 2001b: 27-28).

Kymlicka recognizes individual autonomy as the vital liberal principle. Good life is led only if it fulfills two conditions namely; 'it is led from the inside in accordance with one's beliefs'; and 'one be free to question those beliefs, to examine in light of whatever information, examples and arguments one's culture can provide' (Kymlicka, 1989, 12-13; 1995: 81). These conditions should be fulfilled by 'requiring students to learn others' way of life through *compulsory education*' (Kymlicka, 1995: 82, emphasis my own). However, this is contradictory. Though it allows for examining the beliefs in the light of whatever information one's culture can provide but one is compelled to learn others' way of life through mandatory education which is a violation of his or her liberty. The learning must be optional and not compulsory. Anyhow, Kymlicka (1995: 75) makes minority rights compatible with liberalism by arguing that individual liberty is tied in some important way to membership in one's national group and that the "Cause of freedom finds its basis in the autonomy of the national group" thus, making freedom dependent on societal culture which he defines as:

> "A culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language" (Kymlicka, 1995: 75-76, 2001b: 17).

Kymlicka provides a liberal defence of group rights by saying that societal culture provides the medium of autonomy and autonomy means making choices amongst various options and societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us (Kymlicka, 1995: 83, 1989: 165-169). However, only national minorities and not immigrants (because they have left their country by their own choice) have a right to it. But, this definition of culture (which for Kymlicka has instrumental and not intrinsic value) projects it to be the one which is "Powerful enough to be a part of economic and political life and institutionally complete meaning that it contains a full range of social, educational, economic, and political institutions encompassing both public and private life". It leaves those cultures out of circle which are not in the position to exert themselves to be part of the public institutions, thus, not addressing their genuine demands and complaints. Again, it visualizes a community which is a bit homogeneous, with no internal diversity, having no minority culture within the societal culture.

Kymlicka also defends minority rights on the basis of equality; past agreements; the value of cultural diversity arguments (1995: 108-123); and as a response to the nation-building process of the state (2001a: 1-2). Minorities might have been unjustly treated by the economic and political decisions regarding language, drawing of political boundaries and distribution of power of the majority group and providing them with group rights will rectify those injustices. However, each of these arguments works best when supported by others. Again, for Kymlicka (1995: 124-6), the validity of group rights is further strengthened by the acceptance by the liberals of the present world's division into different states which is a tacit acceptance of cultural membership.

Kymlicka (1995: 176-181, 2001b: 27-33) argues that polyethnic demands of immigrants and representation demands of disadvantaged groups are demands for inclusion, recognition and accommodation by the larger society. However, he is cautious about the self-government rights of minorities. Self-government demand which is 'the complete case of differentiated citizenship' may pose a threat to the integrity of a state and the policy of common citizenship. But refusing genuine self-government rights might also "Aggravate alienation among national minorities and increase the desire for secession" (Kymlicka, 1995: 183). Thus, as also argued by Graham Smith (2000), in modern identity politics, national

recognition and self-government is one of the most difficult demands of territorially concentrated national minorities for democracies to accept and accommodate and self-government to the extent of secession, unless it occurs by mutual agreement of all the concerned parties, should be resisted by means of force to avoid the possible genocide, oppression and ethnic cleansing (if any) of internal minorities and wars between states. For all these reasons, secession cannot be claimed as a minority right to self-government over its homeland which cannot be secured unless secession is allowed.

However, Kymlicka's theory is based on comprehensive liberalism. He supports minority rights on the condition that minority's culture must not only allow for, but also promote individual autonomy. If it does not provide that opportunity and by itself is not governed by the liberal principles, it does not deserve to be respected or practically heard (Kymlicka, 1995: 153). The whole structure of his theory is built on autonomy and every justification of minorities revolves around it, making his liberalism, like that of Rawls's and Mill's, a comprehensive one. Thus, any form of group rights that restricts the civil rights of the members of the groups is inconsistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality (Kymlicka, 1995: 165). But, as Kukathas (1992) says, many cultures do not put such importance on choice making. Many cultures, including those of a number of the indigenous people, do not place such importance on the individual's freedom to choose his ends (Tok, 2002). Often, the individual and his interests are dominated by the community. Moreover, the individual might be expected to accept uncritically the long-standing practices of the cultural group. Critical reflection needs play no part in their conceptions of the good life. Again, Kymlicka notes that some groups limit the freedom of individual members to revise traditional practices, and restrict religious liberty etc.; and these sorts of internal restrictions cannot be justified or defended within a liberal conception of minority rights (Kymlicka, 1995: 153). Yet this stance (as he himself recognizes) leaves Kymlicka open to the objection that his reconciliation of liberal theory with minority rights qualifies these rights "In such a way that they no longer correspond to the real aims of minority groups" (Kymlicka, 1995: 153). Though, he regards groups as equals, interacting with one another like independent states, in the end his theory does not permit that.

Kymlicka justifies minority rights on the plea that as societal culture is an important medium for promoting individual's autonomy, it should be protected and preserved. Now the problem is what to do with the groups which do not value autonomy? Should we impose our liberalism on them? Kymlicka says that except voluntary immigrants we have no justification to impose forcibly liberalism on them. If the non-liberal group is a self-governing authority living in a state, we can do nothing except persuasion, education, internal reforms and applying non-coercive means to liberalize the non-liberal culture (Kymlicka, 1995: 165-166). Imposing liberal values on foreign state and national minorities is nothing but aggression or paternalistic colonialism (Kymlicka, 1995: 167). Like Parekh, Kymlicka (1995: 171) proposes a dialogue between the liberal majority and illiberal minority in case of disputed practices. In *Multicultural Odysseys* (2007), Kymlicka adopts a more liberal attitude towards the treatment of minorities, allowing them less space to violate any of the basic human rights and liberal principles. He goes on saying that "Interpreting multiculturalism as a right to preserve authentic cultural traditions….may inhibit constructive relationship between cultures (by privileging cultural purity over cultural hybridity); may erode the freedom of individual within the group (by privileging authoritarian or conservative elite over internal reformers); can be invoked to deny the existence of universal human rights; and may threaten the space for civil debate and democratic negotiation [dialogue] over cultural conflicts" (Kymlicka, 2007: 102-103). Again, as Modood (2013: 32) and Tok (2002) also explain, Kymlicka justifies minorities rights on the bases of societal culture being a precondition for the individual autonomy and for that purpose he recommends rights for the national minorities but he cannot justify why to give rights to migrants because they have left their societal culture and are now a part of the new societal culture which they should integrate into and which does not explain why they should have rights.

2.5. KUKATHAS'S APPROACH TOWARDS MULTICULTURALITY

Chandran Kukathas, with anarchical tendencies and liberalism of the limited state, presents an original and distinctive view based on a wide knowledge of theoretical literature, actual cultural practices and the politics of multiculturalism in a number

of states. Taking issues with almost every scholar in the field, he is closer to classical liberal except that the principal point of divergence is that the state in his theory is no more than one kind of community among others, with no superior authority. He is mainly interested in finding out the principled basis of a free society having cultural diversity and group loyalties and the treatment of minorities by the institutions created by such a society. He is not concerned with the question "What the state or government does with problems arising out of plurality?" but with the sort of arrangement within which people having different perceptions of good life could co-exist rather than cohere. Such arrangement is an open society–an association among other associations- allowing for a variability of human arrangements; the freedom of association (and dissociation) and mutual toleration of associations none of which is privileged. A free society is not united by any shared doctrine, has no hierarchical arrangement of authorities but is a depiction of an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions with a range of authorities, each independent, responsible to its subjects (Kukathas, 2003: 4, 1992: 116), and reluctant to intervene in other's affairs (Kukathas, 2003: 8, 19). The very essence of liberalism, according to Kukathas, is the multiplicity of authority. If there is a final authority determining what ways are morally acceptable, liberalism is lost (Kukathas, 1997: 92).

For Kukathas, a free society is the only answer to the situation of plurality where the groups with different propensities can live together with harmony and no group has the right to compel any one to become or remain its member but rather the individuals have the right to form, reform and transform the group (Kukathas, 2003: 93). This is the freedom of association and dissociation arising out of the freedom of conscience which requires that none can be compelled to live under circumstances he or she morally objects to. Rejecting Rawls's and Kymlicka's claims of justice as the criterion to settle conflicts in a multicultural society, Kukathas (2003: 76) argues that people differ on what right conduct is, and do not agree on a universal definition of justice. Thus, to live in harmony in a society, differences and dissents must be tolerated. If individuals form a community which is quite illiberal, restricting their freedom, but its members wish to continue to live by its terms, the outside community has no right to intervene to prevent those

members acting within their rights. However, this right is not that of the community per se but the acquiescence of its members (Kukathas, 2003: 96).

Kukathas is not in favor of granting group rights to minorities because he believes that all human associations, cultural groups and ethnic identities are not fixed but highly mutable which change with economic, legal, and political circumstances. Most of the groups are the artificial creations of environmental factors, most importantly of political institutions, like colonial authorities, missionaries or a response to the appearance of immigrants, which helped in merging peoples into coherent ethnic entities (Kukathas, 2003: 78-79). Declaring culture as of no fundamental importance in the sense as Kymlicka posits, Kukathas's theory stands in opposition to Kymlicka's stance arguing that not only groups' identity is a political handicraft rather than simply cultural one but also that groups have internal differences. And it is precisely this phenomenon that makes the distinction between ethnic and national minorities difficult. Again, there are internal divisions within the groups; and also between elites and masses, who may have quite different interests (interest gap). That is why groups need not to be given special rights because what minorities are demanding is decidedly difficult to determine (Kukathas, 2003: 33, 87, 1993: 156, 1992: 110-14). Thus, the starting point of Kukathas's theory is individual rather than societal culture. Collectivities matter only instrumentally and should be valued only when they contribute to individual's interests (Kukathas, 2003: 86). Kukathas rejects groups to be protected by rights on the basis of their mutability, arguing that to be a right bearer the entity must be constant and it is the individual that has that quality (Kukathas, 2003: 90). But Kukathas does not explain the stability of the individual. Whether it is the physical body of the individual that is stable (which can be objected to), or the mind and thought of the individual (which are not)? However, for Kukathas, group has only reducible rights, for example, it views the Amish community as having authority over its members only when it gives its members freedom to live under the authority of that community if they so wish. But the Amish community has no right to deny its members the freedom to leave. Now the problem is what could be done if the Amish or, for that matter, any other group does not give its members that right. What should the broader society do? That will be an illiberal society with the rights of individual (so fundamental for

Kukathas) violated. Would that not be injustice to the members of that society to compel them to coercive membership?

Kukathas's litmus test for the liberal society is toleration which should be unlimited and independently valued. The more an association tolerates differences, the more liberal it is; and the more it suppresses dissent, the less liberal it is (Kukathas, 2003: 24). Toleration is to allow individual to act according to his conscience-freedom of conscience which is at the heart of Kukathas's theory. To act according to one's conscience is the fundamental interest one follows because, according to Kukathas, "Among the worst fates that a person might have to endure is *that he be unable to avoid acting against conscience-that he be unable to do what he thinks is right*" (Kukathas, 2003: 55, emphasis in the original) and it is this freedom of conscience, for Kukathas, which allows for plurality-a phenomenon not to be valued but a symptom requiring political solutions (Kukathas, 2003: 69).

Kukathas argues that most of the scholars particularly Rawls and Kymlicka make two essential mistakes. Firstly, they try to resolve the problems of plurality by pointing to an appropriate conception of justice which is impossible because different groups might disagree deeply about what justice is. Even individual autonomy, which is highly valued by Rawls and Kymlicka, is rejected by many traditional cultures. Secondly, they believe that a political society must be governed by a state. For Kukathas, neither a state nor a national identity is necessary in the face of human differences. For him, society should not be organized around a single perception of good which could be the criterion to judge other communities and where toleration of other communities' practices depend on how much those practices deviate from the standards set by the larger society under that single perception of good. Other communities should be tolerated independently as a condition of freedom of conscience. Toleration is important because it also checks moral certainty (Kukathas, 1997: 79). As we are not 100% sure of the correctness of our beliefs, others should be tolerated for that reason and also because everyone might have different perceptions of good life who will act according to his conscience which should not be violated and it is not violated when there is no body with the power to determine and enforce authoritatively what is true and there is no one to whom conscientious belief is subjected

(Kukathas, 2003: 129- 133). Even if a practice is intolerable, the established authority should not intervene because persuasion is preferable to force and there should be interaction between the communities. Here Kymlicka's position is that non-intervention in the internal affairs of the minority which imposes internal restrictions on its own members is contrary to the principles of liberalism while Kukathas argues that non-intervention is the very principle of liberalism.

Kukathas does not give any special place to the state in his theory which, according to him, is not an important good in itself. The role of the state is to serve as an umpire looking to the questions that may arise in a plural society, and attempts to maintain the order in which these groups can coexist. The state or any other political society has no special claim for social unity. All communities, majorities as well as minorities, have equal standing to live according to their ideals. Under this interpretation, the state is a third party to whom the players turn for a ruling. It is not to create a just order but to preserve order for freedom (Kukathas, 2003: 211-13).

As far as state-groups relation is concerned, Kukathas (2003: 237) is the firm supporter of 'benign neglect'-a refusal to be guided by the goal of equality in social policy or institutional design. His multiculturalism is multiculturalism without fear or favor. It neither suppresses nor promotes groups. It is a stance that is against the idea of cultural construction. Again, benign neglect equips the state only with the maintenance of law and order within which the individuals are free to pursue their goods as Kukathas argues:

> "The liberal state should take no interest in the character or identity of individuals; nor should it be concerned directly to promote human flourishing; it should have no collective projects; it should express no group preferences; and it should promote no particular individuals or individual interests….. The liberal state is indifferent to these matters. Its only concern is to preserve the order within which such groups and individuals exist" (Kukathas, 2003: 249-50). "Liberalism might well be described as the politics of indifference" (Kukathas, 1998: 691).

However, Kukathas's theorizing is more philosophical and international. In the national domain, there cannot be a variety of authorities which might set different standards without risking clashes. It is the society of states to which Kukathas gives unlimited autonomy except the right of their members to exit. This will

leave the minorities at the mercy of the states because the members of minorities might not be able to exit or permitted by other states to enter. That is why Kukathas's theory is more a theory of international rather than domestic society with a maximum regime of toleration[14] as he argues that "The demands to view the [state] as something 'thicker' should be resisted" (Kukathas, 2003: 164).

Again, there is much in his theory which leaves individuals at the mercy of their own groups and especially where the groups in question are non-liberals which might violate the basic human rights so forcefully endorsed by Kukathas. In some cases exit may be practically impossible making the archipelago as the 'mosaic of tyrannies' (Green 1995: 270; Barry, 2001: 143, 150). Though, Kukathas met this criticism, but not convincingly, saying that every individual looks to his pluses and minuses and the various obstacles in the way of exit are 'opportunity costs' which are always there. But when cost is too high, freedom of exit becomes an empty slogan. It is one thing to have a right, quite another to be capable of exercising it. Kukathas devalues groups being fluid and changeable initially giving priority to individual being fundamental but he ends up giving enormous power to the group over individuals. Criticizing Kukathas, Kymlicka (1995: 155-8) says that it is the individual toleration which is more characteristically a liberal principle Kukathas leaves behind than the group toleration he arrives at.

Kukathas's toleration is among the groups not within groups. If toleration is that much fundamental it should take a universal seat. Again, he downgrades justice to be a formula to decide, but tacitly brings justice or its principles to his theory. Universal individual's freedom of association, dissociation and toleration, being benefits to be accorded to all groups equally, are nothing but the principles of justice. Again, Kukathas rejects autonomy based concept of the liberal state, but his concept of toleration based on the freedom of conscience is but a means to an autonomous life for which he criticizes Rawls and Kymlicka.

However, his theory rejects the moves for forced assimilation and unity construction by the state. There might be diversity because human beings differ

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[14] For this point also see Nafiz Tok (2003). Two liberal models of cultural pluralism. *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 58*(4), 174-192.

and to honor the freedom of conscience, individuals should be allowed to take ways they in good faith consider right.

2.6.   TARIQ MODOOD'S MULTICULTURALISM

Tariq Modood deals with post-immigration ethnicity and racial equality, taking multiculturalism as the political accommodation of immigrants to the western countries from outside the West. He does not restrict multiculturalism to liberalism but also argues that culture or groups are not holistic or closed and unchangeable; that multiculturalism must be built upon anti-essentialism; that it is "Rooted in recent ongoing policies, politics and other real-world developments" (Modood, 2013: 17). For Modood, multiculturalism should not be tightly confined to the walls of liberalism. "It is the child of liberal egalitarianism but, like any child, it is not simply a faithful reproduction of the parents" (Modood, 2013: 7). The problems in the modern liberal democracies should be dealt with by respectful and critical engagements, sometimes going beyond our starting –ism or isms and cannot be dealt with by simply taking this or that. While developing his multicultural citizenship framework, Modood totally downgrades the role of ideologies being divisive in nature producing the either/or position and are not conducive for fostering dialogue, respect for differences, seeking common ground and negotiated accommodation (Modood, 1998a, 2010b, 2013: 120).

Though considering Kymlicka as the most prominent scholar in the field, Modood takes issues with him by arguing that his theory does not take religious minorities at equal footing with linguistic minorities because Kymlicka criticizes liberal neutrality of the state but mostly from the linguistic and cultural sides, thinking it to be correct and unproblematic as far as religion is concerned but incorrect and problematic where language and ethnicity are involved (Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Modood, 2013: 24-5). For religious minorities, Kymlicka proposes only exemptions, which according to Modood is a secularist bias. Downgrading state neutrality, Modood (2013: 28) proposes for the state to forge a new and positive relationship with the marginalized religious minorities.

Modood argues that culture is not a medium of individual autonomy, like the societal culture of Kymlicka, but an identity (constituted not only from the 'inside' but also from the 'outside' of the group) that matters to people marked by differences. Identity is more important than culture which multiculturalism should take into account (Modood, 2008, 2010b, 2013: 39-40). We should respect and recognize people's sense of belonging, regardless of the fact whether that identity is a context of choice or not (Modood, 1998b, 2008b, 2010b). Modood, being more committed to groups than culture, or at least an internally differentiated 'groupness', goes for the politics of recognition and accommodation of differences. Minorities not only develop a form of distinctness but also alienness or inferiority that makes equal membership in the wider society difficult, leading to the formation of group and unequal 'us-them' relationship. Multiculturalism rectifies inferiorities and alienness (Modood, 2013: 34-36). It is a process where difference ceases to be problematic (Modood, 1998a, 2010b, 2013: 151). It protects minority identities from misrecognition, external pressure to reform, and allowing people to be themselves. It involves, on the one hand, a respect for historically prior majoritarian identities and tries to expand the same respect to minorities, on the other, emphasizing on the sense of nationality and commonality (Modood, 2013: 155).

Modood argues that as different groups have different tendencies, priorities, economic and skill profiles and cultures etc., there should be an array of specific policies, a complex of policies and multicultural institutional arrangements to meet common and diverse vulnerabilities, needs and priorities. Multicultural accommodation for immigrants in the West is a two-way integrative process not only of the individual but also of the group which helps to create new form of belonging to the new country and the country of origin-thus hyphenated identities like British-Muslims (Modood, 2005, 2008b: 67-8, 2010b, 2013: 42-45). This accommodation rectifies negative differences by positing positive differences by challenging stereotypes and structural biases through group mobilization, dialogue, mutual learning, negotiations, accommodation, structural reform, and by appreciating the fact of multiplicity and groupness in the public space underpinned by the concept of equality of dignity and respect. However, this accommodation should involve a matrix of policies both specific and universal,

some applying at central level while others at local level etc. and will require a multicultural equality and integration (Modood, 2005: 64-6, 2010b, 2013: 52-7).

Though might be fluid (which is the major defence of Kukathas for not providing group rights to minorities), the identification with and continuation of a group does not depend on the participation in the activities and behaviors associated with it. A Muslim while not observing the tenets of Islam may still claim to be a Muslim. We not only differentiate different groups like Sikh and Hindu but also that there are multiple ways of being Sikh and Hindu. Groups and identities are not univocal concepts; no less than game or family resemblance[15] which are internally differentiated but still hold unity (Modood, 2013: 96-8). Individual has multidimensional identities. We should not place emphasis on a single aspect, ignoring the others. "We cannot assume that being Muslim means the same thing to the Muslims" (Modood, 2003, 2008a, 2006: 43-6, 2010b, 2013: 124, 133-4). So, Modood's justifications for the group are that there are differences/groups; based on different social attributes (like race and religion, etc.); not all groups are groups in the same way; they have different priorities; and the above features will vary between individuals within the groups and so not all groups' members are members in the same way (Modood, 2008b, 2010b, 2013: 110). Therefore, minority rights should be given to the disadvantaged minorities but they will take varied forms to accommodate the differences between members of a group.

Going beyond the liberal framework of toleration and state neutrality (because state cannot be neutral and toleration presupposes majority-minority relation), Modood's multiculturalism is based on the active support for cultural differences, active discouragement against hostility and disapproval and the remaking of the public space by the inclusion of the marginalized minorities (Modood, 2009b, 2013: 58-9; Modood & Kastoryano, 2006). Modood's understanding of multiculturalism is, I think, based on the reading of Taylor [though Modood (1998b) takes issues with him because of excluding Muslims in his politics of recognition on the plea that Islam does not recognize secularism]. Modood's readings show the germs of classical liberalism, though not openly declaring

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[15] For the detail of the concept of family resemblance see L. Wittgenstein (2009). *Philosophical investigation*s, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Blackwell.

himself as such, and strengthen my opinion that identities and culture should be taken as important and given space in the public domain not because of their intrinsic values, but because they are important to the bearers of those cultures and identities, people who should be included into the polity with respect and equality. And to recognize the practices of minorities in the public space is not necessarily to accept them as morally good or bad; just or unjust but to give them a presence and the acceptance of the fact that they are present requiring societal redefinition with limits to allow for the fundamental human rights and observing harm principles. This, being a two-way process having plural and composite character, will lead to multilogical process (Modood, 1994, 2008a, 2009b, 2013: 61-3).

For Modood, multiculturalism poses four challenges to the liberal democratic egalitarianism. Firstly, it concerns collectivities and not just individuals; secondly, it is not color, gender or sexual orientation-blind and violates the private-public distinction; thirdly, the assertion of marginalized minorities to take pride in their identities rather than considering them as ascriptive and taking them to the public space which, for the liberals, were initially divisive and deviations from the political identity; and fourthly, the assertion of some religious groups, particularly Muslims, to take the difference to the public space violating the secular structure of the polity. Thus, to stick to multiculturalism, we have to modify the notion of secularism by redrawing the public-private boundary to adjust disadvantaged religious minorities in the public space (Modood, 1994, 1998a, 2003, 2009b, 2009c, 2013: 63-6). Modood's approach, then, is for an extension of a politics of differences to accommodate *appropriate* (he does not define what appropriate is) religious identities; a reconceptualization of secularism from the concept of neutrality and the strict public-private divide to a moderate and evolutionary secularism based on institutional adjustments; and a pragmatic case by case negotiated approach-both contextual and practical-to deal with conflicts (Modood, 2003, 2008a, 2009b, 2009c, 2013: 72-3; Modood & Kastoryano, 2006).

Distinguishing radical and moderate secularisms (and defending the latter as accommodative/inclusive of the differences), Modood argues that just as theocracy and mainstream Islam, and theocracy and modern Christianity can be differentiated, in the same way it is possible to distinguish between radical or ideological secularism which argues for an absolute separation between state and

religion and moderate form which applies for "The relative autonomy of politics so that political authority, public reasoning and citizenship do not depend upon shared religious conviction and motivation" that exists particularly in Western Europe, except France, where it has compromise with Christianity. As the states in the West have tacit links with Christianity and secularism is mostly particularistic for each country there, the accommodation of the marginalized faiths requires pluralization and revision of the state–religion link to be made accommodative of the marginalized religions by the process of multilogical engagement (Modood, 1994, 1998b, 2003, 2009a, 2009c, 2010a).

Institutional accommodation and integration must go side by side to make multiculturalism a success. We cannot put emphasis on the strong group identity without a move for national identity. However, the national identity requires a 'rethinking of the national story' and taking the minorities as important character where all citizens have not just rights but a sense of belonging to the whole as well as to their groups (Modood, 1998a, 2003, 2008a, 2013: 164-7). Therefore, anti-essentialism cannot evade the existence of group and identities. In individuating people and culture our most basic and helpful guide is not the idea of essence, but the possibility of making historical connections, of being able to see change and resemblance (Modood, 1998b). Identities have shifted from the behavioral to associational and in the recent years have become fluid and changeable with the political climate, "But to think of them as weak is to overlook the pride with which they may be asserted…and their capacity to generate community activism and political campaigns" (Modood, 1998b, 2010a).

Borrowing from Taylor, Modood (2009b) argues that multiculturalism is based on the key normative concepts of equality (which is to be applied to both individuals and groups) and difference. Equality should be interpreted broadly to cover equal dignity which is applied to all members in a relatively uniform way (like uniform citizenship), and equal respect. This emphasizes that difference is also important in conceptualizing and institutionalizing equal relations between individuals. Considering toleration and neutrality as insufficient to do justice in a multicultural situation, Modood's multiculturalism is beyond toleration and state neutrality because it is based on the active support for cultural differences, active discouragement against hostility and disapproval and the re-making of the public

sphere in order to fully include marginalized identities along with a struggle for encouraging a vision of commonalities, of what is shared across differences, and the remaking of citizenship and national identity (Modood, 2009b).

2.7.   LIBERALISM AND THE ISSUES OF PLURALITY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

Most democratic states are nowadays facing a crucial challenge: how to accommodate minorities' interests while preserving the stability of the political society and the universal structure of individual rights. The liberal tradition has serious difficulties with this question because according to a widespread view, group rights and individual rights are deeply incompatible. This observation explains the potential problem of adopting a model of differentiated citizenship based on asymmetrical rights. This problem requires us to rethink the interpretation of the basic principles and values that sustain liberalism. The widespread idea that group rights can only be justified from a communitarian perspective that assigns value to the group over the individual is rejected as flawed. Liberal theorists normally oppose group rights because besides skepticism over the satisfactory criteria to define 'minority' and 'community', the right-holder must have a moral agency, which the group does not have. Thus, rights are assigned to those who have mind and certain capacities; groups, as a body, are short of minds and the capacity for rational thought; consequently, have no basic need for the ascription of moral rights. Only individuals are capable of reasoning, have values, make decisions and take actions, and the decisions and values of a group are always the product of the individuals' actions and decisions. Thus, all group interests originate from individual ones; individuals, not groups, have interests and are considered to be the potential holders of moral rights.

However, it must be clear that due to the rising demands of minorities and problems associated with plurality, the link between communitarianism and group rights, on the one hand, and between liberalism and individual rights, on the other, is unable to account adequately for those problems. The liberal theory needs to be remodeled just to address some of the apparent problems faced by minorities in a pluralist society. I think that the earlier liberals took a rigid universal view of the

rights because they were not faced with the problems of plurality so prominent since the last few decades and the minorities were not as assertive in the past as they are now. Nathan Glazer (1995: 126) also argues that "The language and theory of the protection of human rights developed in a time and place (England in the 17th century) when the issue was seen as one of deprivation because of conscience, individual decision and action, rather than one of deprivation because of race, color or national origin".

Groups are considered fluid and changeable and this is perhaps the central challenge that constructivist social theory (that groups and identities are malleable) presents to political theory generally and to the proponents of multiculturalism particularly; however, that does not erase the very fact that groups exist. It is, as Modood (1998, 2013: 85-6) argues, like a person who possesses an essential "I" which so changes from the childhood till the end of his life or a language which may have many dialects and undergoes changes but still we cannot deny the existence of that language. We cannot say that group is essential (having an essence) but neither is it a fiction. It cannot set aside the fact that modern democratic societies have a variety of groups demanding accommodation. Aijaz Ahmad (1995) also criticizes that hybridity of groups and identities fails to address adequately the social and political continuities and transformations that underline individual and collective action in the real world. Again, the fact that group-identities are not perfectly defined, and have been created and recreated through multiple influences in permanent evolution does not mean that identity and identity claims are unimportant (Waldron, 2000: 161).

Thus, we have to remodel liberal theory but it does not mean to prioritize traditional forms of living. It is not a theory of anti-liberal collectivism making collectivity more important than individual and, therefore, allowing for the suppression of the individual rights and freedom. Again, as Kymlicka (2001a: 21) says, most debates about minority rights are not 'debates between a liberal majority and communitarian minorities, but debates amongst liberals about the meaning of liberalism' and minority rights are discussed within the liberal framework (Tok, 2002). This theory just means that insofar as liberalism tends toward instability and dissociation, it requires periodic communitarian correction.

This model may indeed depart from dominant view of liberalism, but not from some central liberal ideals associated to the value of the individual.

However, the problem is that mostly all minority groups aspire not merely to neutralize their diversity, or to attain equal treatment despite their differences with the majority, but to preserve and develop a distinctive cultural identity, often through separate institutions or jurisdictions (Casals, 2006: 75). Cultural minorities do not accept the recognition of a special temporary status, but of a lasting one giving specific rights to their members specifically by virtue of this membership. Thus, the recognition of group rights produces an asymmetrical distribution of rights, which poses difficulties for liberal theories. Again, the problem with the provision of group rights is that it would give the illiberal groups a *carte blanche* to mistreat all or certain categories of its members. However, this is not a conclusive argument to reject the legitimacy of group rights altogether. The demands raised by groups are often justified and not illiberal in nature. Furthermore, setting the claims of illiberal minorities as a justification for rejecting group rights would clearly be inadequate to account for the problems that multiculturality poses in most democratic states. Majorities and minorities disagree over the traits of political systems of representation and linguistic regimes, over issues of territorial and political borders, over education curricula and public subsidies for cultural activities and religious schools, the choice of state symbols and holidays, etc. The dominant approach fails to take these issues on the basis of justice and offer convincing answers to them.

But minority rights should be considered as special rights that individuals have by virtue of their belonging to particular and identifiable groups. The existence of minority group rights as moral rights can be rejected on their face value as against the liberal tradition; however, their recognition might be justifiable only as long as they are adjusted and understood in terms of individual rights. For example, the representation of a minority in parliament, though legally attributed to group as such, in the end, founded on the individual right of all citizens to political participation. Or, the special right to land accorded to the members of a group might be legally given to group, but this right can be founded on the fact to protect individual interests. Or, right to cultural protection of a collectivity is the right of protection of the members of the group to protect their culture.

Thus, those group rights are acceptable which are reducible to individual and those which are irreducible, as against Vernon Van Dyke (1995: 38); not based on the consent of the members of the group; and where the members of the groups have no right to exit, cannot be justified under liberal theory. Furthermore, the variables of interdependence (the identity and well-being of the members and the group are linked) (Fiss: 1976); recognition (recognition of important commonality); and multidimensional complexity (common bond of language, religion, ethnicity, race and historical experience)[16] provide the criteria whether a group should be considered as right-bearing entity. Again, social group is accepted as an artifact of individuals and, contra Owen M. Fiss (1976), it has no distinct existence of its own apart from its members. This means that communities are important and have, if they, value because of their contribution to the well-being of individuals whose lives have the final and ultimate value. Michael Hartney (1995: 206) calls this view as value-individualism as against value-collectivism-community has value independent of its contribution to the well-being of the individuals. It does not mean that groups do not matter but, as Kukathas (1992) says, rather that there is no need to depart from the liberal language of individual rights to do justice to them. Thus, an attractive political theory must accommodate the claims of ethno-cultural minorities, on the one hand, and the promotion of responsible democratic citizenship, on the other.

We have to recognize group/culture because it is the artifacts of its members who value their group and culture. It shows their identity though liberal cultures will be autonomy promoting agents, but not the non-liberals. Culture has instrumental not intrinsic value. We have to recognize the value of cultures for their members, but they may not be valuable for others. Taylor goes a step further in recognizing cultures by arguing that "we all *recognize* the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their *worth*" (Taylor, 1994: 64, emphasis in the original). But we may recognize the existence of the culture and its value for its members. I may and may not recognize the equal values of all cultures nor does a culture impose any duty on me to recognize its value. I may, in good faith, only recognize its existence and its value for its people. People may

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[16] The criteria are not exhaustive. For more detail see Darlene M. Johnston (1995). Native rights as collective rights: A question of group self-preservation. In W. Kymlicka (Ed.) (1995). *The rights of minority culture* (179-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

give equal respect to all cultures on the assumption that those cultures are of value for their members but may and may not be of equal value for outsiders. Again, all cultures may not be of equal value from liberal perspective. Some cultures, for example, racism and anti-Semitism, ought not to be respected. However, each culture has some importance for its people, if not for others, and should be recognized as such and comments should be passed on such cultures only after objectively studying them with a universally applicable vocabulary.

However, recognition should not be stretched to the level of unilateral government support for securing the goals of a particular cultural group, such as the French Canadians in Quebec, for cultural survival firstly, because the dominant culture might not have received such support and secondly, it will require the government to spend tax-money of some persons for the cause of others. Liberal and neutral democratic states are under obligation only to help disadvantaged groups defend their culture against interference and attacks from the dominant cultures. I think we recognize a group by the fact that it exists. It is the construct or artifact of its members who as 'persons' cannot be denied recognition, that group's identity has value for its members and it is that significance of identity that we accord recognition to. This sort of recognition is general, subject and mediated[17]. Again, essentialist form of recognition which assumes that groups and culture are fixed is also rejected (Kukathas, 1992; 2003: Ch. 2; Maclure, 2003, Modood, 2013). Quebeckers struggle to be recognized as Quebeckers, equal with and different from Anglo-Canadians. However, the internal differences and heterogeneity of Quebec's identity makes every form of fixed, unalterable or authentic recognition contestable and problematic. Citizens often have overlapping and sometimes contrasting identities or forms of subjectivity.

Thus, culture is important as identity marker for its members and we should give weightage to this factor. Kymlicka's support for culture is conditioned on the autonomy promoting capacity of the culture but as Tok (2002) says it does not explain why a liberal minority within a liberal majority wants recognition and group rights. Again, if societal culture is an important framework within which an individual can make viable choices, there is also the chance of individual acting

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[17] For more detail on recognition see Peter Jones, Toleration, recognition and identity (page, 10-14). Retrieved from cfs.unipv.it/seminari/jones.pdf

on the basis of dominant opinion prevailing in that culture rendering individuals not acting from the inside. Though choices might be made in cultural context but, as Jeremy Waldron says (1995: 106), meaningful options might come to us from a variety of cultural sources. An individual migrating to Turkey from Pakistan may make viable choices in the Turkish societal culture, though it is not the culture he was born in. We need cultural environment but that needs not to be homogeneous. We make our choices in the context which make sense to us and, as Waldron (1995: 108) says, we do not need a single context to make all our choices. Thus, culture has importance as a context of identity, it needs protection and preservation but it should be the responsibility of the members of the group to preserve and protect their culture, not that of the state. If the state protects and preserves all the cultures then the state is under compulsion to protect and preserve minority cultures but if it does not protect all the cultures then it should protect none. If a particular culture is decaying because its members are not giving proper attention to its protection because they feel it is becoming unattractive, it needs not to be supported by the state utilizing the revenue coming from the pockets of others. It is, as Waldron (1995: 100) says, like the death of a fashion or a hobby and not the demise of the thing that people really need.

However, in majority of the cases cultures are kept dearer by the members of a group and it is on this ground that group rights should be addressed. To address the problems arising out of value pluralism we have to adopt the policies of toleration, securing equal citizenship rights and state neutrality, though state cannot be remained completely neutral and it does take an active part in cultural and identity construction. It is not always neutral and in the guise of neutrality it promotes the dominant culture. However, state neutrality should be taken as anti-discrimination and anti-perfectionism which means not imposing any perspective of good life and a full inclusion of minorities in public affairs. It is the equal liberty of every individual to pursue any perception of good life and where the state should not discriminate those who have a different religion or language.

However, to solve the problems arising out of cultural plurality we need multicultural policies. Some of these policies should be on temporary basis to maintain a level playing field. For example, representation in various state institutions to the members should be on the basis of merit. However, this may not

always be possible because of the prejudices of wider society or major political parties; the structural biases of established institutions; the low self-esteem of minority communities; or the lack of as good institutions in the minority areas as those of the majority areas. There is then a strong case for some form of affirmative actions in favor of the excluded communities.

Similarly, some minority rights are to be given on permanent basis which minorities consider as part of their religion and culture. For example, a Sikh or a Muslim woman will require a permanent right to wear turban or headscarf respectively. These rights cannot be given on temporary basis. The violation of these sorts of rights might disturb peaceful co-existence in a multicultural society. Again, some of the polyethnic rights can be defended on the basis of justice and fair play, others could not. For example, the funding of the immigrants language programs or arts groups is too heavy a demand which the state should not do business with because it will be the improper use of the tax payers' money. What the state should do is to avoid any external interference or restrictions in the group's initiatives to maintain and promote its language or arts programs.

Similarly, some minority groups are oppressive and the belief in the universal human right approach helps avoid those oppressions. Multiculturalism policies must work within the frame work of liberal-democratic constitutionalism and accommodating diversity must be submitted to liberal democratic constraints. Multiculturalism policies are a double-edged sword. They are beneficial as well as disappointing. As Kymlicka (2007: 165-166) says, on the one hand they have normalized the ethnic politics, operating within the peaceful and constitutional channels ensuring peace, stability and rule of law; helped deepened liberalization and democratization; challenged inherited racial and ethnic hierarchies; reducing cultural stigmatization, economic disadvantages and political marginalization; on the other hand, it has provided a sanctuary to the minorities to preserve their illiberal practices by limiting the liberty of their members and making new forms of hierarchies. We have to keep in mind that while minority rights may be innocent or even beneficial, they are the first steps towards a much more risky form of minority rights, involving separatism, or oppression of internal minorities. Once we evolve practices for the protection of minorities as matters of principle,

then these practices must have a logical extension to the internal minorities (though it is difficult and non-ending).

Again, I think no single theory can justly address the problems of plurality. We have to apply an integrated, case by case and contextual approach to plurality and it is not necessary to apply a universal solution. However, it should be kept in mind that while giving group rights in the form of separate territorial jurisdiction and cultural autonomy to a community within the federal structure, individuals or a group of individual who deviate from the general culture, religion and behaviors of the larger group should be given legal protection. Adequate steps should be taken to ensure that the newly constructed majority within the region does not follow policies and programs that exile, discriminate or annihilate internal minorities within the region. As I said earlier, political recognition of diversity is not free from difficulties. It poses as many problems and difficulties as it solves. Protection of internal minorities is undoubtedly an important issue which the strategies of multicultural accommodation must address. Thus, as Kymlicka (2001b: 52) argues, political autonomy and territorial jurisdiction for cultural communities may have to be linked to protection of internal minorities and their rights to live, work, and retain their distinctiveness within the region. However, at the same time the issue of internal minorities should not be made the only plea to deny recognition to diverse cultural communities. The issue of recognizing diverse religio-cultural communities should be taken seriously and be looked from all the sides because refusing to politically accommodate differences will pose threat to the unity and integrity of a multicultural state and only escalate ethnic conflict and violence.

In the next chapter, I will give a general picture of the situation of plurality and minority position in Pakistan since its emergence on the 14th of August, 1947. It shows how minorities are treated and enumerates the factors which have aggravated the position of minorities in Pakistan. I also give a descriptive religio-cultural analysis of KP society and mention the main religion-linguistic groups there.

CHAPTER 3

PAKISTAN AND THE TREATMENT OF PLURALITY

Pakistan got independence on August 14, 1947 and was territorially divided into two parts, East and West Pakistan, separated from each other by about 1,000 miles of Indian territory. It was composed of four provinces; North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Sindh, Punjab, and East Bengal; Baluchistan (which attained provincial status in 1970); Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the capital city of Karachi. To manage diversity, federalism was the commonsensical structure for a country composed of ethnically distinct regions. Urdu was declared as the national language because of its association with the Muslim nationalist movement in Northern India[18] though only about 7% of Pakistanis speak it as their first language (Adeney, 2007: 101; Ayres, 2009: 189). In 1971 East Pakistan got separated and emerged as a new independent state named Bangladesh. The present Pakistan is composed of four provinces namely the Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan; the capital city, Islamabad; Northern Areas; and FATA.

Two interpretations are presented for the creation of Pakistan. The first and well-known one is directed at the religious aspect of the partition (Muslims and Hindus are two different nations based on religion). The second one is a secular interpretation of the creation of Pakistan: the Muslims of undivided India wanted to liberate themselves from the political and economic domination of Hindus. Here religion played only a role of identity marker (Markovits, 2002: 5; Talbot, 1998: 5; Cohen, 2004: 56). Nighat Said Khan (2002: 139) also demonstrates that Pakistan was a rejection of Hindu dominance rather than an affirmation of Islam.

The previous chapter dealt with the theoretical solutions of prominent scholars to the problems arising out of pluralist states. This chapter shows the state of ethnic and religious plurality in Pakistan, predominantly a Muslim state, in the light of that theoretical background and shows the causative factors which have aggravated the problems arising out of plurality in Pakistan. The chapter also

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[18] For more on this issue see Alyssa Ayres (2009). *Speaking like a state: Language and nationalism in Pakistan.* Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 1.

attempts to provide the probable solutions to the conflicts that may emerge out of religio-ethnic diversity. The chapter shows that the state sponsored ideology of Islam; the adoption of Urdu as national language without taking all the ethnic groups on board based on consensus; high degree of centralization of power with the evasion of provincial autonomy under the so-called federal structure where the ethnic groups could preserve their culture; and a weak and controlled civil society are the causes which have marginalized the religio-linguistic groups and have aggravated the problems that emerged against the background of plurality.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 shows the position of civil society in Pakistan and shows that it has remained underdeveloped and weak throughout the history of Pakistan except since Pervaiz Musharraf's era (1999-2008), though a self-appointed authoritarian leader, where many civil society organizations showed their presence. This section is incorporated because the treatment of plurality in a state has a direct link with the status of civil society in that state. Section 2 deals with the minorities' (both ethnic and religious) issues and illustrates how minorities have been affected by the state policies and state-sponsored ideology. Section 3 elaborates descriptively the multicultural composition of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) which is the main research area under this study. In fact, every province of Pakistan needs an empirical survey to test the attitudes of the cultural groups towards cultural differences and their multicultural status which will enable us to present a full picture of the status of plurality in Pakistan as a whole. I have chosen to start from KP because the degree of plurality is high in KP than any other province of Pakistan. KP has more than 25 linguistic[19] and 5 religious groups. Again, the data collected by me was thought to be more reliable because being the resident of KP the respondents did not consider me a stranger and would have given me correct information than the researchers from other provinces. Furthermore, being quite familiar with the people and places in KP the survey was thought to be less costly in term of money, time and resources.

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[19] See Tariq Rahman, Language policy and localization in Pakistan: Proposal for paradigmatic shift. Retrieved from http://www.apnaorg.com/research-papers-pdf/rahman-1.pdf.

3.1. STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN

In this section the term state is used to mean the decision making bodies of those institutions which exercise the power and will of the Pakistani state. It is mostly called the establishment and includes the high brass of civil and military bureaucracy, chief executive (Prime Minister and President, depends on whether the military is in direct or indirect control) and his/her core cabinet. On the other hand, by civil society I mean those voluntary autonomous socio-economic, linguistic, and cultural institutions and groups which are concerned with activities that fall outside the domain of state; and maintain their autonomy by applying different forms of pressure on the state, if necessary.

Since 1947, Pakistani civil society has been controlled by the state institutions during civil, martial law and mixed civil-military governments alike. The political culture of Pakistan to enable its society to take control over the arbitrary functioning of the state has remained underdeveloped and inadequate. The imposition of the official ideology has hindered the growth of a viable civil society and restricted the fundamental rights of the citizens (Kamran, 2008: 17). Aqil Shah (2004: 358-9) argues that "The nature, composition, and development of civil society in Pakistan have been shaped by a long periods of military rule". The ruling elite, Shah (2004: 360) goes on, purposefully depoliticized and controlled the public sphere. Provincial autonomy and decentralization were skewed on the plea of defence imperatives and threats to national security posed by hostile neighbors: Afghanistan to the West and India to the East. Hasan Askari Rizvi (2000b) argues that it is the dominance of the coercive arms of the state over parliamentary ones that impedes the development of democratic initiatives and civil society more than any other development. Since 1947, Iftihar H. Malik (1997: 4) explains, the state has developed but not the civil society and this development of the state has come at the expense of vital civil institutions 'including pluralism, an independent judiciary, a free press and other think-tanks and activist groups outside the public sector' with the result that the non-representative power centers (bureaucracy and military) control the reins of society. Though there are no radical turning points on the basis of which we can categorize the major phases of civil society in Pakistan, it could be fluidly divided

into three phases: Fully Controlled (1947-78), Controlled and Islamized (1979-99) and Mild Moderate (since 2000).

3.1.1. First Phase: Fully Controlled Society (1947-77)

During this phase the civil society in Pakistan has time and again tried to exert herself at certain occasions like her activism during the first presidential election of Pakistan in 1965 in favor of Fatima Jinnah; during 1968-9 when labor unions, students, engineers, doctors, and lawyers joined hand and brought down Ayub Khan's military-backed dictatorial regime.; and during 1977 election in favor of Pakistan National Alliance. However, this activism and vitality of civil society has remained momentary. In this phase both the civilian (1947-58, 1971-77) and military (1958-69 and 1969-71) governments have exerted their strict control over the civil society organizations. However, the important point was that there was no significant difference between the methods of the civilian and military governments because both used and abused the same apparatus of the state through preventive ordinances and laws to keep the civil society mute and emasculated.

Muslim League (the founding party of Pakistan) sought to establish Islamic and national unity. To justify its claim of being the sole representative of the Muslims, Muslim League adopted a harsh approach towards opposition parties and other civil society organizations which were denounced as traitors. During 1947-58, Muslim League's leadership started equating the party with the nation; "If you destroy the League you destroy Pakistan" (Fatima Jinnah, cited in Sayeed, 1996: 83). During this period the civilian rulers used and abused the apparatus of the state to punish opposition leaders and dissenters through repressive rules, laws, and ordinances like section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code; Public and Representative Officer Disqualification Act (PRODA) of 1949; and Security of Pakistan Act of 1952 to control and rather stunt the growth of civil society.

Similarly, during the first Martial Law under General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958-69) the same tactics were applied to downgrade the civil society organizations. Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) of 1959; Take-

over of Progressive Papers of 1959; Press and Public Ordinance of 1963; Political Organizations (Prohibition of unregulated activities) Ordinance of 1962; and Defence of Pakistan Ordinance of 1965 (for explanation of these ordinances see Shafqat, 1997: 38-9; Rizvi, 2000a: 64-5, 101-2; Newberg, 1995: 79) were mostly used as political instruments to strengthen the authoritarian hands of the state. Civil society organizations were restrained fearing that these organizations will nurture an active society which could question the policies of the state (Rehman, 2006).

Even during democratic era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) a dominant party system was created with the intention to emasculate and mute the opposition rather than working with the spirit of accommodation and tolerance for the creation and consolidation of federal, parliamentary and democratic structures. Z. A. Bhutto, being an elected civilian executive, was as hostile to local autonomy as the military and bureaucratic rulers in the past and followed the policy of centralization of power and interference in the provincial domains (Niaz, 2010: 279). Z. A. Bhutto amended the constitution in May 1974 to empower the executive (Bhutto) to declare illegal a political party or any organization which is seen as functioning against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. This amendment was used against National Awami Party (NAP), a party working for the rights of the minorities, along with Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), in 1973 (Siddiqi, 2012: 64-7), which ushered into an era of militancy and increased nationalism in Baluchistan.

3.1.2. Second Phase: Controlled and Islamized Society (1978-99)

During this phase Pakistani society went through a phase of increased and radical Islamization program initiated by General Zia-ul-Haque's Martial Law regime (1977-88). Besides controlling the society under various ordinances, he injected Islamism in a section of Pakistani society resulting in dangerous ramifications for religious minorities. Women were confined to the four walls of the house and their lives controlled (Qasir, 1992: 118; Khan, 2002: 142-3). A large number of Sunni *Hanafi madrassa* (Islamic schools) were established with the support of

Jumaat-i-Islami (and Saudi Arab) which resulted in the opening of *Shia madrassa,* thus, initiating a wave of sectarianism in Pakistan (Hilali, 2002). Ahmadis (a religious minority) were criminalized by amending the Pakistan Penal Code (see sections 295 A, B and C and 298 A, B and C of Pakistan Penal Code)[20]. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haque started banning political parties and other civil society organizations when they protested against his rule; imprisoned individuals who challenged his edicts and nullified the jurisdiction of the courts when they objected to his use of force. The doctrine of necessity (that Martial Law is justified on the basis of necessity) was introduced to emasculate civil society (Newberg, 1995: 26). Zia also banned media, student and labor union organizations, the violation of which was punishable with fourteen years imprisonment, confiscation of property, and twenty five lashes (Rangachari, 2011: 118). Zia's 1981 Provisional Constitutional Order was a profound weapon against civil society which placed all the power in the hand of executive. Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) was amended to prosecute newspapers' editors for stories written against the government (Siddiqa, 2007: 85). All orders and actions taken by the regime were deemed to be valid and could not be called into question in any court (Newberg, 1995: 180-1), thus, crippling the court of its power; the rights of the individuals violated and the leaders of the opposition brutally treated.

The democratic era during 1988-99, where both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ruled alternatively for two uncompleted terms, was not different from the previous one in terms of state-society relations. The society remained controlled and Islamized with opposition muted. The NGOs were threatened and bills were introduced in the Parliament to control their activities (Shah, 2004: 363-4).

3.1.3. Third Phase: Mild Moderate Society (since 2000)

During this phase the civil society in the form of bar councils, women associations, labor unions, and chambers of commerce with national standing started to show their presence and activism. General Pervaiz Musharraf initiated the concept of "Enlightened Moderation" (to practice Islam moderately as against

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[20] Zia Islamization is discussed in the next section

fundamentalist version) and propagated it through media and educational institutions to dilute the effect of increased Islamism of Zia. Many extremist Islamist organizations like the *Jaish-i-Muhammad, Lashkar-i-Taiba*, *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan*, *Tahrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan* and *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad* were proscribed[21]. Media associations like the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE), Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) are quick in opposing state's policies that seek to curb press freedom. Various NGOs provide valuable services to the society (Shah, 2004: 368-9; Iqbal, 2012). Similarly, the Women Protection Bill was passed on November 15, 2006 by the Parliament to provide greater protection to women's rights (Noreen & Musarrat, 2013). The All Pakistan Women Association (APWA) and the Women Action Forum (WAF) gained greater activism and vibrancy. APWA works for improving the lot of women in Pakistan. The association strongly criticizes the violation of women rights and has risen voice against the practices of *swara* (a custom where a female is forcibly married to a member of aggrieved party as a compensation for the misdeed of the male member of the family in order to resolve the feud) and honor killing. During this phase the society gained a sort of greater independence and the freedom which Musharraf had given to the civil society organizations was used even against Musharraf's unconstitutional actions. When Musharraf sacked the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftihar Chaudhry, the civil society organizations showed greater activism and compelled Musharraf to reinstate him (Iqbal, 2012).

Various reasons/arguments can be offered for the weak and controlled position of society especially in the first and second stages. The dominant position of military is one factor under whose hegemonic rule societal groups have remained stagnant and fragmented (Shafqat, 1997: 8-9, 255; Shah, 2004). Frequent military interventions, suspension of the political process and the weakness of democratic institutions and norms have hindered the development of civil society in Pakistan. Army has remained a decisive force in Pakistani politics due to Pakistan's hostile relations with India[22] and Afghanistan (Rizvi, 2000a: 51-7; Talbot, 1998: 124).

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[21] South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan. Retrieved from http://www.satp.org/.

[22] Indian National Congress had accepted the idea of Pakistan as an independent state only a transitory one and the Congress still adamant to the idea that there would be one independent nation on the subcontinent in the form of united India. For more information see M. Aziz (2008). *Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state*. London & New York: Routledge, 10-11.

According to Malik (2008: 145) and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002: 137), another important factor for the dominant position of army is the cold war where the US purposively supported Pakistan army to combat communism. Saeed Shafqat (1997: 12) argues that it is the relative strength, and not only the weakness of the political institutions as Samuel P. Huntington (1968: 196-8) claims, of the military in Pakistan that has encouraged its intervention into politics and under its hegemonic control, no autonomous class, group or political structure has been allowed to function. Stephen Philip Cohen (2004: 130, 158) demonstrates that neither Pakistan's army has the potential to solve Pakistan's problems, nor is it willing to give political institutions the opportunity to learn and grow. It has shown low tolerance for the mistakes of others and assumes that it must veto any civilian decision that affects 'national security', a concept defined so broadly to include economic policy, budgets, and domestic issues. The military is involved in gaining economic autonomy which is also a cause of its strength. It has founded various institutions like Fauji Foundation, Army welfare Trust, Shaheen foundation and Bahria Foundation for the welfare of the military personnel[23].

The immense power of bureaucracy (which is Punjab dominated) in Pakistan is also a factor responsible for the under-developed position of civil society in Pakistan. Muslim League's inability to harmonize the diverse political and ethnic entities in Pakistan has given bureaucracy the power not only to implement the policies (which is its real function) but also to initiate and formulate them (which is the jurisdiction of the political institutions) (Kamran, 2008: 29; Waseem, 1994: 83; Jalal, 1995: 19). The mentality that 'the society should be controlled and governed and it is the bureaucracy that will do that' is also a factor that retards the development of a viable civil society in Pakistan.

An independent judiciary is an asset for democratic society where various religious, ethno-linguistic and cultural groups can gain justice and equity. Pakistan has acquired a complicated judicial history. Her courts have become increasingly sensitive to political pressures to bend their rulings in favor of the military or civilian governments and have pretended that military coups are legally and constitutionally justified under the 'doctrine of necessity' which has remained an

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[23] For a detailed analysis on this issue see Ayesha Siddiqa (2007). *Military inc.: Inside Pakistan military economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

anathema restricting Pakistani judiciary to be independent and pro-democracy, thus, constricting civil society and fundamental rights of the people (Hussain, M. & Hussain, A., 1993: 55; Newberg, 1995: 91; Kamran, 2008: 11, 51-2). The position of Judiciary in Pakistan is contextual and its scale has often tilted towards the party in power. Its decisions in various cases depend on the internal power position in Pakistan. During military rule, judiciary has decided the cases in favor of the military regimes and those decisions have really retarded the process of democracy, for example, the judgments in Tamizuddin case (1955) cancelling the writ issued by the Sindh High Court against the Governor General's order of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the Supreme Court's judgment declaring that the order was constitutional (Choudhury, 1969: 86-7) and the decision in Dosso's case (1958) which legitimized Ayub Khan's Martial law. However, there are judgments which helped in promoting democracy, for example, judgment in Usif Patel case (1955) which barred the Governor General from drafting the constitution by his National Convention (Choudhury, 1969: 90); the decision in the Asma Jilani case (1972) declaring the transfer of power from Ayub Khan to Yahiya Khan as usurpation reversing the judgment in Dosso case; the judgment in Benazir Bhutto's case (1988) declaring political parties to be fundamental rights of a citizen and are essential for democracy; and the judgment in Haji Saifullah's case (1988) which restricted the power of the president to dissolve the National Assembly (Choudhury, 1969: 86-90; the News International, July 22, 1993).

Similarly, the centralization of power in the center against the fact that Pakistan is a multicultural society is also a cause of the emasculated civil society where the religious and ethnic demands of the minorities are seen through the prism of security and defence of Pakistan. Each of Pakistani leaders has stressed the importance of a strong center and criticized the idea of greater provincial autonomy with intolerance toward regionalism. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) said "If you want to build yourself up into a nation, for God's sake give up this provincialism" (cited in Cohen, 2004: 205).

Thus, civil society in Pakistan during both military and civilian rule till recently was muted, stunted, depoliticized and Islamized with less ability to bring about positive changes. Military rulers went to ban political parties, disqualify

politicians, suppress dissents, and emasculated the judiciary. Media that published matters likely to endanger the defense, external affairs, or security of Pakistan were banned specifically during Ayub Khan's regime (1958-69) which is considered as a "Watershed in defining relations between state and society in Pakistan, as its main political legacy was centralization of state authority" (Jalal, 1995: 55). Thus, the main obstacles impeding progress towards a truly functional civil society are the unstable democratic process, bureaucratic centralization, non-independent role of judiciary, the dominant role of the Army, lack of respect for civil rights and freedoms, the ideological structure of state control and a weak political culture.

3.2. COPING WITH ETHNO-RELIGIOUS PLURALITY IN PAKISTAN

Government statistics show that 96.28 percent (hereinafter %) of Pakistan's population is Muslim [Sunni 77% and Shia 23% (Adeney, 2007: 138)], Christians 1.59 %, Hindus 1.6%, Ahmadis 0.25%, Scheduled castes 0.25% and others are 0.07 % (www.census.gov.pk/religion.htm). So far Pakistan has got three constitutions (1956, 1962 and 1973) all of them are federal in structure and Islamic oriented. Each province has a distinct ethnic group in majority and is anxious to get maximum autonomy to rule itself. Pakistan ethnic groups are not contained only in Pakistan. Baluch has transnational existence between Pakistan and Iran, Pakhtuns between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Mohajirs and Sindhis between Pakistan and India.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, it were the state sponsored ideology of Islam; the adoption of Urdu as national language without taking all the ethnic groups on board based on consensus; high degree of centralization of power (powerful state); and the underdeveloped civil society that have aggravated the conflicts arising out of religio-ethnic plurality; disadvantaged the ethnic minorities of the smaller provinces and marginalized the non-Muslim communities. These issues are tackled in turn to show how much each policy has harmed and marginalized the ethnic and religious minorities in Pakistan.

3.2.1. Centralization of Powers

The centralizing tendencies in Pakistani political system can be seen from the very beginning. Jinnah had held three most important positions: as Governor-General of Pakistan; as President of the Muslim League; and as President of the Constituent Assembly as well as its legal adviser. Jinnah was not responsible to the Constituent Assembly; he was empowered to adopt and modify any part of the 1935 Indian Act; the advice of ministers was not binding on him and could legislate for any province (Kapur, 1991: 24; Sayeed, 1996: 253-71). The views of state elite (both western and Islamic traditionalists) and ethnic elite at the time of independence were opposed to each other. The former were in support of centralization while the later were in favor of provincial autonomy who (ethnic elite) saw 'nation-building' efforts by the state elite as 'nation-destroying' (Amin, 1988: 72). According to Samina Ahmad (1997: 91), the state elite co-opted selected segments of the ethnic elite and use coercion to suppress dissents. The emphasis on unity brought the federal structure on paper with substantive unitary bias. Centrist state structures have reinforced a sense that Pakistani nationalism is being imposed from the above in the service of the 'Punjabisation' of the state.

This policy of authoritarianism and centralism was continued by the successive governments (Talbot, 1998: 53-65). Each of the Pakistan's constitution has kept the central government so powerful that provincial autonomy (the demand of the ethnic groups) has been reduced to a farcical status. Multinational federalism is a method to empower minorities and is a means of reducing the problems caused by pluralism (Kymlicka, 2005: 40; Ahmad, 1997). Pakistan has partially adopted multinational federalism but in most of the cases the federation is skewed toward the center which has the powers to control the subjects falling within the jurisdiction of the provinces (Articles 142-143, 148-149 and 232-235 of the 1973 Constitution)[24]. This centralization (seen by the smaller ethnic groups as a domination of the Punjab) accentuated the ethnic divide in the country and has been resented by the smaller provinces (Kukreja, 2003: 21). Democratic leaders (Z. A. Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif) also emulated the military

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[24] Such Emergency provisions were also incorporated in 1956 Constitution (Art.191-196) and 1962 Constitution (Art. 32).

rulers in authoritarianism and unwillingness to share power which resulted in divisions and alienation of the smaller provinces.

The solution to Pakistan's problems caused by its multiculturality lies not in maintaining a strong center, but in developing a consociational type of arrangement of power-sharing taking cultural plurality of the state into account which has been barred by the traditions of political intolerance. This requires that non-dominant ethnic groups should be both included and excluded in major policies affecting them. They should be included in power sharing and representation but at the same time be excluded to develop and preserve their culture and language. The smaller provinces supported the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan in the hope of negotiating a constitutional arrangement based on strong provinces and a weak centre (Jalal, 1995: 15) which was incorporated in the Pakistan Resolution of March 1940 that stated that the future Pakistan will consist of 'independent Muslim states' in which the constituent units would be 'autonomous and sovereign'. The smaller ethnic groups complain that centralization of powers in the federal set up dominated by the Punjabis and Mohajirs, Shahid Kardar (1992: 308) explains, has brought about political, economic and cultural suppression and has blocked their development.

Tahir Amin (1988: 8-9, 237) demonstrates that if the state develops a method of sharing power with all the ethnic groups, the effectiveness of ethno-national movements will decline while in the absence of power-sharing mechanism, the movement gains strength. If the state elite monopolize power and pursue unitary policies, the ethnic elite react to the policies of the state and begin to formulate secessionist ideologies. For example, Pakhtuns had nationalist struggle for a separate state on the eve of and after independence but afterwards the struggle lost its strength due to their increasing share in power and representation in state institutions (Amin, 1988; Jalal, 1995: 193-4; Kukreja, 2003: 127). Ernest Gellner (1964) argues that when discriminated, the members of the marginalized group(s) are bound to revolt and their discontent can find national expression. Tariq Rahman (1996: 179) and Ted Robert Gurr (1993; 2010) also demonstrate that ethno-nationalism is generally a response to perceived injustice. Conflict may reveal the trust deficit on the state authorities and in most of the cases ethnic conflicts are the consequence of state policies of over-centralization and

dominance of one ethnic group in power hierarchy. Christophe Jaffrelot (2002: 31) is also of the opinion that self-determination movements reinforce their activism in reaction to the over-centralization and authoritarian methods of the state while the co-option of ethnic leaders or the making of alliances between their parties and national parties tend to defuse the centrifugal tendencies. However, for Pakistan the problem with the accommodation and autonomy to the provinces is linked with the national security. Baluchi nationalism is linked with Iran, Pakhtuns with Afghanistan and Sindhi with India contributing to the concentration of power in the center (Kapur, 1991: 5-9).

Positively, as Western liberal democracies have recognized three broad categories of minority rights: self-government rights; special representation rights in the legislature or bureaucracy; and accommodation rights of providing legal recognition to particular customs or practices (Kymlicka, 1995: 27-33), we can find elements of all the three rights in contemporary Pakistan, where autonomy has been given to different ethnic groups in the form of province by the federal constitution; special representation in the form of quota for different ethnic groups, women and minorities has been specified and protection for the practices of certain groups like Sikh and Hindu have been safeguarded. These practices are the symbols of the area of convergence with the liberal theory of minority rights. However, quota system is applied on the basis of geographical regions represented by provinces and other administrative units, rather than on neatly defined ethnic groups which sometimes go against the interests of the targeted groups. The smaller ethnic groups complain that neither quota system is implemented in spirit nor provincial self autonomy is honored by the center. According to quotas introduced in 1973, Punjab gets 50%, KP 11.5%, Urban Sindh 7.6%, Rural Sindh 11.4%, Baluchistan 3.5%, Northern Areas and FATA 4%, and Azad Kashmir 2%. However, ethnic groups are not properly represented in some state institutions, for example, their representation in the federal bureaucracy in 1983 were 55.7% (Punjab), 11.6% (KP), 20.2% (Urban Sindh), 5.1% (Rural Sindh), 3.1% (Baluchistan), 3.4% (Northern Areas and FATA) and 0.9% (Northern Areas)

(Kennedy, 1987: 194). In 1985 the Zia regime had about 56% of the posts in the federal government secretariat held by the Punjab[25] (Jalal, 1995: 190).

The inequitable representation of Bengalis in the bureaucracy and military increased conflict between the two wings of Pakistan and as Keith Callard (1957, 172) notes, for many Bengalis the real issue was not to secure provincial autonomy but to obtain fair recognition of the claim of the East Pakistan to equality with the West Pakistan. The unfair representation between East and West Pakistan and the violation of the public mandate in post-1970 election strengthened Bengali nationalism which resulted in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's formulation of a six-point formula[26] that voiced the long-held Bengali demands for justice, socio-economic recognition and fair representation in state institutions. The non-recognition of the justified socio-economic and linguistic demands of the Bengalis by the central government resulted in the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971[27] leaving Punjab the overwhelmingly dominant province in the rest of Pakistan. The case of Bengali separatism illustrates that cultural features and language issue were not alone responsible for the increasing sense of separatism in East Pakistan but also socio-economic imbalance, deprivation and inadequate power-sharing which are also the main issues requiring rectification in the present Pakistan[28].

Pakistan's problems caused by plurality arise from the grievances of particular ethnic groups like Sindhis and Baluchi from the central government dominated by Punjabis. Small ethnic groups complain about the dominance of the Punjab on

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[25] For a better understanding of the political, economic and representative status of Baluchis and Sindhis see Ayesha Jalal (1995). *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp, 191-9.

[26] The six points of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman are (a) the government be federal and parliamentary in nature,(b) its members would be elected by universal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the basis of distribution of population; (c) that the federal government would have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense only;(d) that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts; (e) that taxation ought to be levied at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants; that each federal Unit is authorized to control its own earnings of foreign exchange; and (f) each Unit is permitted to raise its own militia or paramilitary forces (Rizvi, 2000: 194-5).

[27] For detail on the causes of the Fall of Dhaka see Ian Talbot (1998). *Pakistan: A modern history*. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 186-213.

[28] For detail on the proportion of the military and central secretariat elites between East and West Pakistan in 1955, see Ian Talbot (2002). The Punjabisation of Pakistan: Myth or realities. In C. Jaffrelot (Ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation?* (51-62). New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, pp. 45-5.

such issues as fake census, spending comparatively more on Punjab, unfair distribution of resources and the dominant role of the army. The high representation of Punjabis in the military and bureaucracy has contributed to a greater sense of deprivation among the general population outside the Punjab. The policy of allocating agricultural land to the retired officers of the armed forces in the area from where the ratio of appointment to the military is negligible has also resulted in the demographic change which the residents of the areas have strongly resented accusing the military (primarily representing Punjab) of invading their land (Siddiqa, 2007: 169-70).

Mohajirs and Sindhi regionalist forces since 1998 have severely criticized the domination of Pakistan by Punjabis (the Punjabi military) and Pakhtun who are considered as a common enemy and the primary villains (Adeney, 2007: 150-60; Ganguly, 2010: 89-90; Ziring 1991, 123). Sindhis are concerned about their access to positions of power and marginalization of their cultural and linguistic identity (Rahman, 1996, 116). Sindhi nationalists regard the One Unit period (where the four western provinces were merged into one in 1955 and which was a major outbreak in the rise of ethnic consciousness) as "One of the darkest epochs in the history of Sindh for it was during this time that Sindh came under the whole-hearted influence of the dominant Punjab and…the Mohajirs" (Siddiqi, 2012: 84). According to G. M. Syed (1994: 66-7), One Unit was wrong because it abolished the separate national identity of Sindh, and thus its right of self-determination was violated. This destruction of the historic provincial polities aroused regionalism and ignited distrust against Punjabis. Sindhis and Baluchis are also concerned about their land which is mostly being grabbed by the outsiders. New irrigated land carved out of Sakhar Barrage in Sind was mostly sold out to Punjabis and not to Sindhis (as against the case in Punjab where new irrigated lands were sold to Punjabis) (Waseem: 1994: 40). Today about 40% of Sindh's prime agricultural land is held by non-Sindhis, mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs (Ahmad, 1998: 71).

Baluch nationalism is more economic oriented than cultural one. It is directed at having adequate share at economic pool and power-sharing and is mainly the result of the authoritarian intervention of the center in Baluchistan on behalf of the military with the object to deprive the locals of their land. Baluchis are also

underrepresented in senior positions at the centre. During 1947-77 there were only 4 Baluchis in the central cabinet. During 80s the key posts in the bureaucracy were still in non-Baluch hands (Kardar, 1992: 316). Baluchis strongly resist the grabbing of prime farm land by the Punjabi settlers and the exploitative attitude of the center in harnessing the national resources of the province (Kukreja, 2003: 133). Consequently, Baluch nationalism gains momentum due to lack of power sharing and inadequate representation in the national politics.

Thus, the need of the day is to honestly implement the multinational federalism scheme with practical autonomy to the provinces. Both inclusion (in power-sharing and adequate representation) and exclusion (free to develop and preserve their culture) of the non-dominant ethnic groups should be adopted by the Pakistani state elite if national integrity is to be attained. This policy will create a sense of belonging among the smaller provinces and will thwart the separatist tendencies.

3.2.2. Imposition of Urdu as a National Language

The second causative factor creating a sense of deprivation among the smaller ethnicities was the imposition of Urdu as a national language without taking all the groups on board. Jinnah's insistence on making Urdu as the national language was resented by many ethnic groups which pride in their own language. In connection with the state language Jinnah said to Bengalis "Ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language" (Jinnah, 1962: 85-6). Talbot (1998: 1) argues that "Language and religion, rather than providing a panacea for unity in plural diversity, have opened a Pandora's Box of conflicting identities". He (1998: 26) further argues that "Attempts at strengthening Urdu as part of nation building enterprise proved counterproductive as was demonstrated most clearly in East Bengal". In October 1947, two months after independence, a "State Language Committee of Action" was founded in East Pakistan to protest against Bengali language's exclusion from the new official forms, currency notes and stamps of

Pakistan. Street demonstrations took place at Dhaka University in December, 1947 to oppose the new Education Conference's recommendation which held Urdu to be the only state language of Pakistan (Ayres, 2009: 42). In Sindh, G. M. Syed founded the Jiyae Sindh Mahaz (JSM) in 1972 in response to linguistic politics. The issue of language and identity in Sindh has posed serious challenges to the integrity of Pakistan[29]. After independence, Sindhis were surprised, like Bengalis, to find that their language had been denied of its formal official role and would be subservient to Urdu. Sindhi nationalists consider the decline of Sindhi medium schools and the replacement of Sindhi by Urdu on the official buildings like railway stations etc. as a part of general conspiracy (Talbot, 1998: 164). However, this Sindhi language activism has also resulted in Mohajirs' nationalism. Bhutto's programs for greater recognition of Sindhi language[30] deeply hurt and enraged the Mohajirs (Kukreja, 2003: 144). The rise of Mohajir ethnicity is mainly explained as a result of the struggle by the Sindhi nationalists to impose Sindhi as an official language of Sindh (Rahman, 1996 chap. 7).

The riots in East Bengal in 1952 and Urdu-Sindhi controversy leading to brutal riots in June 1972 are illustrative of the fact that unilateral imposition of Urdu as a lingua franca was seen by the ethnic groups as an onslaught on their cultural heritage. Language was one of the main issues for East Pakistanis in the beginning and was a factor in bringing about the division of the country in 1971 (Ayres, 2009: 41). For the centrist political elites Urdu as a national language and Islam as identity became the foundation for engineering a common national outlook within the multi-national state of Pakistan. The policy pursued by the government was the policy of one state, one government, one economy, one language and one culture which marginalized many non-dominant groups (Chowdhury, 1988: 50-2; Amin, 1988: 73).

Pakistani elite equate the word nationality and the recognition of ethnic languages with secession and consider it as a threat to the integrity and survival of Pakistan. Rightists and national elite particularly Punjabis have always looked through the

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[29] For more on the Urdu-Sindhi controversy and the resultant violence and bloodshed see Alyssa Ayres (2009). *Speaking Like a State Language and Nationalism in Pakistan.* Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, pp 48-55.

[30] For more information on the policy of the government toward the Sindhi language see Tariq Rahman (Nov., 1995). Language and politics in a Pakistan province: The Sindhi language movement. *Asian Survey, 35*(11), 1005-1016.

prism of national integration with the application of Islam and Urdu as tools to achieve it and have mostly ignored the pluralist structure of Pakistani society. The elite of Pakistan thought the linguistic identities inherently dangerous and detrimental to the national unity. Though, Pakistan has a federal polity, provincialism continued to be a dirty word in the political vocabulary of the central leadership. Rather than emphasizing on logical and egalitarian politics based on accommodation and consensus, various regimes in Pakistan have sought to carve out an overarching Pakistani identity at the expense of ethnic pluralism (Kukreja, 2003: 116).

3.2.3. State Sponsored Islamic Ideology

The forerunners of Pakistan movement hoped that Islam would provide a coherent focus for national identity and would supersede the country's considerable ethnic and linguistic variations. This aspiration has not been fulfilled. The rivalries between Sunnis and Shia, ethnic disturbances in Karachi, the fall of Dhaka (1971) can all be traced to the loss of Islam as a common vocabulary and a unifying force. Ayesha Jalal demonstrates that "If Islamic sentiments were the best hope of keeping the Pakistani provinces pulling in the same direction, their particularistic traditions and linguistic affiliations were formidable stumbling blocks" (stated in Embree, 2011: 227-8). Islamic ideology has been used to deny the ethnic minorities fair power sharing and legitimate rights in the name of national integration and homogeneity which has resulted in strong ethnic and tribal identities demanding recognition of their cultural and linguistic distinctions. After independence, Jinnah thought the unity of Pakistanis as vital to Pakistan's survival, arguing that "If we begin to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis etc., first and Muslims and Pakistanis only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate" (Jinnah 1962, 104). However, the earlier leaders of Pakistan were a bit mild in the application of Islam and the cost to the religious minorities was low. The (personally) secular Jinnah and the Muslim League wanted Pakistan to be a state for Muslims, rather than an Islamic state[31] to be

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[31] For the controversy over the concept of an Islamic state in Pakistan see Ishtiaq Ahmad (19987). *The concept of an Islamic state: An analysis of the ideological controversy in Pakistan*. London: Frances Pinter.

guided by Islam (Cohen, 2004: 161). Jinnah made it clear that "In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims (Hindus, Christians and Parsees) but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens" (Merchant 1990: 12). Jinnah was portraying a tolerant vision of Pakistan. The role of Jinnah in undermining the Shariat Application Bill of 1937 and in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Bill of 1939, as Francis Robinson (2007: 86) explains, is reflective of the fact that his was a strict secular vision of Pakistan. Similarly, Jinnah's speech of 11 August, 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan also gives a secular picture of Jinnah where he said "We are citizens and equal citizens of one state. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state… you will find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be a Hindu and Muslim would cease to be a Muslim, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizen of the state" (Ahmad, 1964: 403-4). This speech shows that citizenship was prime identity and transcended religious and ethnic belonging. This demonstrates that the bureaucratic, military and judicial state subfields, to use Pierre Bourdieu (1999) terminologies, were stronger than political field in the early days of Pakistan and Islamism was not the state ideology. However, as the bureaucratic, military and judicial state subfields of Pakistan started declining in power and the political subfield started gaining power, a shift occurred where Islamism was applied as state sponsored ideology[32]. The latter rulers institutionalized and constitutionalized Islam as a dominant identity (though it was mostly instrumental) as is shown by the Islamic character of the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution[33] passed in March, 1949 provided that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. This Resolution was strongly criticized by the religious minorities who thought that they were reduced to second class citizens. Under the 1973 Constitution, Pakistan is Islamic

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[32] For more information on how Pakistani state resorted to the application of Islamism see Sadia Saeed (2010). Politics of exclusion: Muslim nationalism, state formation and legal representations of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan (Ph. D's Thesis). University of Michigan, US., chap. 4 and 5.

[33] For the full text of the Objectives Resolution see Pakistan (1949). Constituent Assembly of Pakistan debates. Karachi, Vol. V, No. 5, pp. 100-1.

Republic {Article (hereinafter Art.) 1} and Islam is the state religion (Art. 2). The President (Art. 41.2) and Prime Minister (Art. 91.3) shall be Muslims (similar provisions for the President were given under Art. 32 (2) and 10 (a) of the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions respectively). State, instead of becoming a neutral agency, came to decide who is to be a Muslim and declare Ahmadis a religious minority (Art. 260). Educational policy in Pakistan from the very beginning is based on Islamic ideology. "[Pakistan's] education is to be inspired by Islamic values"[34].

However, it was General Zia-ul-Haque (1977-88) who made concerted efforts to Islamize Pakistani state and society with the political rationale to legitimize his regime[35] which adversely affected many groups including women and religious minorities. *Shariat* benches were established to give verdict whether a law is wholly or partly Islamic. The regime ensured to make Islamic Education a compulsory subject till graduation. Hudood Ordinance was promulgated to give Islamic punishment for theft and robbery etc. (Kamran, 2008: 121). In 1979, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims (not by non-Muslims) was banned and its violation was made a punishable crime (The Prohibition Order, 1979). Under the *Zina* Ordinance, the adulterers (both man and woman) will be flogged with hundred strips if unmarried and stoned to death, if married (The Offence of Zina Ordinance, 1979). The ordinance inflicted great injustice on women in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) were amended through Ordinances to declare anything causing dishonor to the Holy Prophet (SAW), his family, companions and Islamic symbols a cognizable offence (Shah, 2012; Kamran, 2008: 123). Section 295 B of PPC makes the defiling etc. of Holy Quran punishable by life imprisonment; 295 C mentions that the use of derogatory remarks etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet (SAW) be punished by death and fine; 298 B mentions the misuse of epithets description and titles etc. reserved for certain holy personages or places by *Ahmadis* as punishable acts; and 298 C makes an Ahmadi calling himself Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith or outraging the religious feeling of Muslims

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[34] Education Division Government of Pakistan. (1952). *Six-Year National Plan of Educational Development for Pakistan*, 2 vols. Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, Part I, p 111.

[35] To further understand the rationales and both internal and external considerations that impelled Zia to initiate the process of Islamization see Bidanda M. Chengappa (2004). *Pakistan Islamization, army and foreign policy*. New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, p. 4.

or posing himself a Muslim a punishable crime. These ordinances criminalized Ahmadis and restricted their freedom of religion. These amendments have attracted severe national and international criticism (Shah, 2012). Minority sects have felt greater uneasiness with the project and have demanded the modification of blasphemy law to avoid religious repression.

General Zia's policies were worst for civic institutions and religious tolerance (Malik, 2008: 169). Zia's Islamization alienated religious minorities in the country due to constant use of Islam in its literal sense which threatened their civic rights. Increased Islamization also brought about increased doctrinal and sectarian diversities, resulting in the evolution of militant and extremist groups which have not only worsened the law and order situation but have also become a constant threat to the stability of Pakistan (Shah, 2012).

Time and again constitutional guarantees have been promised to religious minorities. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan came into being on August 10, 1947 and within two days it set up a committee to advise the National Assembly on the fundamental rights of the citizens and matters relating to minorities (Choudhury, 1969: 59). The Objectives Resolution (1949) provided that adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop and safeguard their cultures and legitimate interests. Article 36 of the 1973 Constitution says that the state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities including their due representation in federal and provincial assemblies. Articles 51/4 and 59/f reserve 10 seats in the National Assembly and 4 in the Senate respectively for the non-Muslims. Similarly 3, 3, 8 and 9 seats are reserved for the non-Muslims in Baluchistan, KP, the Punjab and Sindh Provincial Assemblies respectively (Art. 106.1). None of the constitution (1956, 1962 or 1973) of Pakistan has made any discrimination on the ground of race, color or religion in respect of citizenship or of fundamental rights except that the head of the state shall be Muslim (and also the Prime Minister under the 1973 constitution). This is because Pakistan is an ideological state and the reservation of these posts is the logical outcome of the ideology of Pakistan. Besides this, the fundamental rights given in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (Art. 9-28) are the inalienable rights of all the citizen of Pakistan irrespective of race, sex, religion, caste or residence. Since September 2000, the Government has taken positive

steps towards ensuring religious freedom and tolerance, including the official celebration of the festivals of 10 religious minorities, the introduction of a five percent quota in federal employment for members of religious minorities and the establishment of a 24-hour hotline to report acts of violence against religious groups (UNHCR, 2012: 4).

However, religious minorities feel discrimination due to the state association with the Islamic ideology. The blasphemy law has hit them severely. They demand that in case the blasphemy law is not repealed, the government must take all appropriate measures to prevent its misuse and to ensure that these laws are not used as instruments of discrimination and abuse. Similarly, amendments to sections 295-298 of the PPC are to be made to include the concept of 'mens rea' or adding intention of the accused when the crime is committed etc.[36] (Faruqi, 2011: 7-10).

I hypothesize that state neutrality and independence of judiciary are the best institutional tools to avoid the marginalization of religious minorities. The instrumental use of religion for political gains and a weak civil society, along with others, are the factors which pose enormous challenges to minorities in Pakistan. Again, a greater awareness of the obligations and attributes of pluralism is an urgent need. Pakistani elite must recognize the plural nature of the society rather than imposing a unitary nationhood. Loyalties to the state can be augmented through representation and Baluchis and Sindhis' alienation and separatist tendencies can be reversed if they are fairly represented in state institutions. It is only through the establishment of viable representative democracy (both formal and substantive) that Pakistani polity will have the capability to address the genuine demands of the non-dominant groups. Again, increase in the number of provinces from 4 up to 15 will not only resolve the problem of domination of Punjab which is termed as the Punjabisation of Pakistan but would also help in acquiring good governance, thus, addressing the grievances of the smaller provinces. However, as with the Eastern European state, provincial autonomy in Pakistan is linked mostly with security and the minority rights are seen through

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[36] For the possible reforms to ameliorate the position of religious minorities, see Iftikhar Haider Malik (2002). *Religious minorities in Pakistan*. UK: Minority Rights Group International.

the security lenses but the demands of the smaller provinces and ethnicities are to some extent genuine and it is hard to determine where domestic resentment ends and foreign instigation, incitement and encouragement begins. Furthermore, the homogenization project was not the strategy followed by Pakistan only, most of the Asian states, according to Baobang He and Will Kymlicka (2005: 1-3), followed the path as a response to hostile environment; secure national integrity; and the belief that plurality will fade away in future. But, this model failed and many centrifugal forces started claims from demanding autonomy to secession. The Acehnese in Indonesia and Tamil in Sri Lanka were the strong supporters for independence but the policies of these states alienated them and contributed to their nationalism. Feroz Ahmed (1995: xii, 160-1) also argues that suppression of diversity in the name of national unity is counter-productive to the aims of suppression and that unity must be sought within the cultural and ethnic diversity of Pakistan.

The reasons of why Pakistan has not been able to accommodate the diversity, as Talbot (1998: 1, 19) also argues, have their foundations in the tendency of the governments' elite to view all dissents as law and order issues rather than a political issue and an attempts of the successive regimes to forcibly impose a national identity rather than achieve it by consensus. The imposition of a monolithic Islamic national identity with the hesitation of the center to fully allow for the enjoyment of multiple affiliations by various ethnic groups has confounded the task of integrating provincial sentiments. Unfortunately, the powerful Pakistani ruling elite, as Malik (1997: 168) demonstrates, has remained reluctant to accept the plural composition of society and have reduced it to law and order problem rather than part of governability. To adequately address the marginalization of the smaller provinces for state integrity, prosperity and development, Pakistan needs to reassess her policies and federalism to give greater voice to the smaller provinces. Diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict and civil wars. It is the behavior of the dominant groups and the state that make the conditions for disturbance, disintegration and secession etc.

3.3. RELIGIO-LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

This part of the chapter gives a descriptive picture of the religious and linguistic groups in KP. Linguistic groups are chosen because in subcontinent the linguistic rather than caste or clan-based affinities is the powerful mobilizing factor in the enunciation of demands for regional and sub-regional autonomy (Jalal, 1995: 223-4). As there are more than 25 linguistic[37] and 5 religious minority groups in KP, it is very difficult to make all of them the focus of my research. I have taken 5 linguistic and 3 religious minorities as the domain of my research. For selecting linguistic minorities, I have adopted three criteria as a test. The first criterion is the population of the linguistic minority groups and here I have taken population strength of 200,000 as a bench mark for selecting a group, leaving further smaller groups for future research. The second test is the geographical representation where I took groups from the South, middle, East, West and North of KP. The third test is the activism in airing their demands through media and group mobilization. These tests were qualified by 5 linguistic groups namely Seraiki in the South, Hindko in the middle and East, Kohistani and Gujar in the middle and West and Chitrali in the North of KP. For religious minorities 3 groups were taken. They were Christian, Hindu and Sikh. Christians and Hindu were taken because they seem to be targeted for any wrong done to Muslims or Islam in the West and India respectively. Because of the heated national temperature, the Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan become objects of suspicion and are required to prove their loyalty to their respective nations/states. This puts an enormous strain on these minority populations and on their constitutional rights.

KP which is one of the four provinces of Pakistan was created under a commissioner in 1901 (Dichter, 1967: 3) and a Governor's province in 1932 (Rahman, 1995). The total area of KP is 39,900 square miles (Shah, 1999: 1) bounded by Hindu Kush to its North, Baluchistan and Dera Ghazi Khan district of Punjab to its South, Kashmir and Punjab to its East and Afghanistan to its West (see map of KP on page 21). Pashto is spoken by 56% population of the province followed by Hindko, Seraiki, Chitrali, Kohistani, Gujri and other minor languages. Most of the rural population is agriculturalist (Shah, 1999: 6). The

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[37] See Tariq Rahman, Language policy and localization in Pakistan: Proposal for paradigmatic shift. Retrieved from http://www.apnaorg.com/research-papers-pdf/rahman-1.pdf.

non-Muslims mainly live in towns because of the nature of their professions requiring urban environment.

Provinces in Pakistan have no separate constitution. Powers have been divided constitutionally between the center and the provinces in such a way that the powers of the center are enumerated (federal legislative list composed of Part 1 having 53 subjects and Part 2 having 18 subjects) while the residuary powers rest with the provinces. Provincial language and culture are the domains of the provinces. The provincial government has governor as nominal executive appointed by the president and a real elected executive called the Chief Minister and a cabinet on parliamentary pattern. There is a 124-member Provincial Assembly legislating on residuary power for KP. KP has 24 districts which are administrative units. KP is home to many linguistic and religious groups which have increased the level of plurality in KP. The major linguistic groups of KP are:

3.3.1. Pakhtuns

Pakhtuns have majority in KP and most of them are Sunni Muslims. An intensely egalitarian and individualistic ethos exists among Pakhtuns (Lieven, 2011: 421; Rahman, 1995). Bernt Glatzer (2002) is of the opinion that Pakhtun's ideal of equality is based on the tribal system which demonstrates that all Pakhtuns are born equal. Social and economic inequality is not given by nature or birth but is achieved individually. No Pakhtun willingly admits himself less equal than other. This sense of equality is evident in the structure of the men's council (*Jirga*) composed of lineage elders where decisions of importance are reached. Every experienced male person of the society has the right to attend, speak and vote in *Jirga* which traditionally has neither leader nor chairman. Decisions are reached only through consensus. Once a decision is reached in a *Jirga*, it is binding on every participant (Glatzer, 2002).

Pakhtuns are mainly identified with adherence to a male-centered code of conduct, the *Pakhtunwali*, which governs all their actions. In many ways *Pakhtunwali* is "A body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and institutions" (Roy, 1990: 35). Palwasha Kakar (n.d.) points out that the

observance of *Pakhtunwali* is not universal and variations in practical application of the code exist, both on regional and class basis. Again, Richard Tod Strickland (2007) demonstrates that although originally a Pakhtun code of conduct, *Pakhtunwali* has since expanded and now affects the cultural practices of other ethnic groups within the region. It tends to function optimally, as noted by Thomas Barfield "In a community of political equals where differences in wealth and power are not too great. It cannot easily survive where power differences are permanent or where an individual has no power to demonstrate autonomy" (cited in Kakar, n.d). Pakhtuns do not seem to have emphasized their language, Pashto, as much as the ideal of *Pakhtunwali* as an ethnic identity-marker in pre-modern days (Rahman, 1996: 133). Adherence to this code is central to identity as a Pakhtun though it has no written and defined record (Glatzer, 1998; Naz, 2011, 112-30; Khan, 2011).

Foremost in *Pakhtunwali* is the notion of honor (*nang*). Without honor, life for a Pakhtun is not worth living. Honor demands the maintenance of strict sexual decorum and good repute of one's family. One outcome of this code of ethics is that women are mostly restricted to private family compounds in much of KP. Closely related to honor is the principle of revenge (*badal*). Offenses to one's honor must be avenged, or there is no honor. Another major dimension of *Pakhtunwali* is hospitality (*melmastia*) which extends to giving refuge to anyone, even to one's enemy, for as long as the person is within the limits of the host's home and he is willing to sacrifice his own life to defend his guest. Forgiveness (*Nanawati*), another aspect of *Pakhtunwali*, is meant to preserve the lives of the losers (Mohiuddin, 2007: 41-5). Similarly, council of elders (*Jirga*), bravery (*turah*), defense of property, veil for female (*pardha*), and giving women in marriage to the wronged party to settle the dispute (*swara*) are also the features of *Pakhtunwali* (Naz, 2011; Khan, 2011; Dupree, 1984; Strickland, 2007; Hiro, 2002: 181). [38]

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[38] For more on Pakhtunwali see Palwasha Kakar (n.d). Tribal law of Pushtunwali and women's legislative authority. Retrieved from http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf, also see Richard Tod Strickland (2007). The ways of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali. *Canadian Army Journal 10*(3), 44-55.

Tariq Rahman (1995) argues that Pakhtuns have given more emphasis to *Pakhtunwali* as an ethnic identity marker than Pashto as a language. Shabir Hassan Khan Joshi (1965: 341) points out that the Pakhtuns of India who do not speak Pashto are Pakhtuns because of practicing *Pakhtunwali*. However, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Pakhtun nationalist and the founder of nationalist organization, Khudai Khidmatgar[39], emphasized Pashto to be developed and be the identity marker of the Pakhtuns as he said

> "A nation is known and recognized by its language and without a language of its own a nation cannot really be called a nation. A nation that forgets its own language will eventually disappear from the map altogether" (Khan, 1969: 88-9).

For many of the Pakhtuns, Pashto is one important mark of identity and they are proud of it. Akbar S. Ahmed (1986: 109) argues, "Language is jealously preserved by Pathan groups as their language. Pushto is a key criterion defining Pukhtun ethnicity".

Pashto has various dialects some of which are unintelligible to the people speaking other dialects in an inter-dialectic communication. However, all these dialects form a single language. Hassam M. Yousufzai and Ali Gohar (2005: 12, 24) argue that although their dialects may change from place to place, in the present day, Pakhtuns are an ethno-cultural group of people sharing a single language known as Pashto or Pukhto (also usually used as *Pakhtunwali*). Daniel G. Hallberg (1992a: 8) is of the opinion that "Whatever the actual case may be, it does appear that there is a standard written form of sorts in existence today which serves to somewhat overshadow the differences that exist between some of the various dialects".

Pakhtuns are divided into tribes called *qawm* and sub-tribes or clan called *khel*. Pakhtuns are not absolutely homogeneous in origin. Normally the linkage structure is patrilineal but sometimes matrilineal structure also intrudes. The members of other groups can gain membership of Pakhtun group due to

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[39] The members of the movement used red shirts which were branded by the British and later by the Pakistani governments as revolutionary, Soviet-inspired and supporter of the irredentist claim of Afghanistan (Pakhtunistan). In the process Pashto promoted by the movement was also looked as anti-government and anti-state and was discouraged (Rahman, 1995). The British also discouraged Pashto to be the language of the domain of power. They promoted Urdu to be the official language of the province (see for example Chaudhry, 1977: 38, 43).

intermarriage etc. The rule of patrilineal descent is sometime broken either by statements that a tribal ancestor was of unknown origin but adopted by a Pakhtun, or by female links or sometimes by a combination of both[40].

Islam is the defining force of Pakhtun society and is considered as a constituent element of Pakhtun culture and identity. The Pakhtun nationalist movement 'Khudai Khidmatgar' (servants of Allah) takes its name from this philosophy of vital role of Islam in the Pakhtun society (for detail see Shah, 1999). Both Islam and *Pakhtunwali* serve as the basic pillars of socio-economic, political and religious relations and tend to ensure social harmony. *Pakhtunwali* governs ideology, legislation, political authority and private and public domain of Pakhtuns who consider *Pakhtunwali* and Islam as identical and see the former as an expression of a true and practical form of the latter. Pakhtuns think that *Pakhtunwali* has a religious identity and Islam itself is *Pakhtunwali* (Glatzer, 2002). However, in the case of Pakhtun women *Pakhtunwali* takes dominant position as compared to Islam. Pakhtun society has strict rules and codes regarding women's role in society. Their social roles, habits and activities are regulated by societal norms and codes whose violation by Pakhtun women is considered as causing disrespect and dishonor to their families. Some of their rights given by Islam are denied to them like spouse selection which is considered by Pakhtuns as against Pakhtunwali. Similarly, divorce is against *Pakhtunwali* though Islam allows it. Women are afraid of divorce because it deprives them of re-marriage and stigmatizes them for the rest of their life. However, women who want divorce cannot dissolve the marriage even if it becomes a burden for them. Again, though Islam has given the right to property and a share in inheritance, women in Pakhtun society do not have proper share in inheritance (Naz et al., 2012).

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[40] This is exemplified by the story of Prince Shah Hossain, son of the non-Pakhtun Kings of Ghor (western Central Afghanistan) who fled to the pasture lands of Sheykh Bayt, a son of Qays Abdurrashid, the apical ancestor of the Pakhtuns, and latter on married Bibi Mattu daughter of Sheykh Bayt. For more information see Bernt Glatzer (2002). The Pashtun tribal system. In G. Pfeffer & D. K. Behera (Eds.), *Concept of tribal society* (265-82). New Delhi: Concept Publishers.

Table 20: Divergence between Islam and Pakhtunwali

Social issue	Islam	Pakhtunwali
Proof of Adultery	Must be proven by four Eyewitnesses	May be proven based on hearsay alone
Divorce	Relatively easy to obtain	Almost impossible to obtain
Right of Women to Inherit Property and Money	Sanctioned	Mainly not allowed

(Taken from Strickland, 2007)

As far as the fulfillment of the demands of the minorities are concerned, the present study shows that Pakhtuns are willing to accept majority of the demands of the minorities like anti-discriminatory measures; culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; exemptions from certain rules and practices; public respect for minority groups; adequate representation in public institutions; cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and the preservation of land belonging to their groups. However, they were reluctant to support certain demands of the minorities like 45.2 % of the total respondents (407) belonging to Pakhtun group said that additional rights and resources should not be given to minorities, 53.6% were against the teaching of minorities' languages in educational institutions and 20% said that minorities' presence should not be acknowledged in the definition of provincial and national identity.

3.3.2. Seraikis

The idea and the name "Seraiki" are relatively recent phenomena. Prior to 1960s, Seraiki was referred to as Multani or Bahawalpuri dialects of Punjabi, or a Western Punjabi (Lahnda) dialect. Alyssa Ayres (2009: 56) shows that only with the emergence of Pakistan and the development of a sense of deprivation against the backdrop of greater Punjab has resulted in a distinct nationality of Southern Punjab (where majority of Seraikis live). The areas of greatest concentration of Seraiki speakers in Pakistan are the Southern part of Punjab (Districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, Rahimyar Khan, Muzaffar Ghar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalnagar, Vehari and Mianwali). In KP Seraikis are mainly settled in Dera Ismail Khan District (Bahawalpuri, n.d.: 1).

Seraiki movement for a separate province was started in 1960 which claims cultural and linguistic distinction. The movement feels the greatest deprivation of Seraikis at the hand of Central Punjab. However, it was in 1971, when Bahawalpur Suba Mahaz (Bahawalpur Province Front) movement got momentum. Again, All Pakistan Seraiki Conference was held in 1975 to promote Seraiki language. With the recognition of Seraiki as a separate language by the government in the 1981 Census, its position was at least raised and gave Seraiki activists strength to reinvigorate their claims for a separate Seraiki province. Contemporary Seraiki-identity movements (Seraiki Qaumi Movement, Seraiki National Party and Pakistan Seraiki Party) demand primarily socio-economic redressal of grievances, which include complaints against the federal government's allocating land to non-Seraikis from Seraiki areas; preservation of their land and more radio and TV programming in Seraiki language (Rahman, 1996: 188-9). The Seraiki National Party demands a division of provinces in Pakistan on linguistic basis which is considered by the nationalist Punjabis as an attempt to weaken Punjab (Ayres, 2009: 58-9).

As far as the demands of Seraikis in KP are concerned, the present survey shows that 48.81% of the Seraikis settled in DI Khan, KP demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 12.50% culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; 10.12% exemptions from certain rules and practices; 53.57% additional rights and resources; 44.05% public respect; 62.50% adequate representation in public institutions; 53.57% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 42.86% the teaching of their language in educational institutions; 30.65% cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 30.95% of the Seraikis demanded the preservation of land belonging to their group.

The above statistics show that anti-discriminatory measures, additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions, the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity and the teaching of their language in educational institutions rank higher in the demand list of Seraikis.

3.3.3. Hindko Speakers

Hindko-speakers live primarily in five districts. Four of these districts are in KP (Mansehra, Abbottabad, Peshawar and Kohat) while one district (Attock) is in the Punjab. According to 1981 census report, 305,505 households of the nation (2.4 percent of the total) speak Hindko as their mother tongue (Rensch, 1992b: 5). Jonathan S. Addleton (1986: 58-9) says that "Hindko is the most significant linguistic minority in the NWFP [KP], represented in nearly one-fifth (18.7%) of the province's total households."

Members of Hindko-speaking group do not belong to a single ethnic group. A large number of Hindko speakers in Mansehra and Abbottabad districts are ethnically Pakhtuns. These include the *Tahir Kheli* Pakhtuns, who claim to have migrated to Hazara from Afghanistan during the eighteenth century. Many other Hindko speakers are the Pakhtuns migrated around 1515 A. D. from Swat who are said to have formerly spoken Pashto (Rensch, 1992b: 10-1). There are other formerly Pashto speaking Pakhtuns like the *Yousufzai*, the *Jadoon* and the *Tarin*, who after migrating to Hazara have adopted Hindko instead of Pashto as their mother tongue (Caroe 1958:339). Many of the Hindko speakers are *Awans*, *Moughals, Bulghadris, Turks* and *Qureshis*. Some of the Gujars have also adopted Hindko as their first language (Rensch, 1992b: 11).

The empirical findings of Calvin R. Rensch (1992b: 66-71) suggest that Hindko speakers do not have a very positive attitude towards Pashto and are less willing to intermarry with Pakhtuns and Gujars. The main reason was the unintelligibility of these languages by the majority of the Hindko speakers. However, the present study shows a very positive attitude of the Hindko speakers towards marriage with the members of other linguistic groups. Again, the research findings in Rensch's (1992b: 73) case showed that the Hindko speakers were ambivalent and considerably less enthusiastic in teaching their children in Hindko. However, the Hindko community felt no threat to their language from the dominant language (Pashto) in the province (Rensch, 1992b: 77). Rensch (1992b) also demonstrates that Hindko speakers (with various percentages) use Pashto, Urdu, Panjabi and Gujri in addition to Hindko while interacting with the members of these linguistic

groups. It shows a high degree of bilingualism (or multilingualism) in this community.

Hazara Tehreek (Hazara Movement), with Baba Haider Zaman as its leader, demands a separate province for Hazara region of KP where Hindko speakers are in majority. However, Baba Haider Zaman demands a new province on the basis of good governance rather than on the basis of language (personal communication, April 12, 2013). However, in 1957 the Central Government Commission conducted a survey in Hazara to ascertain whether or not Hazara should be disassociated administratively from the KP. A large number of the area's most educated and informed citizens (practically all of whom were non-Pakhtun in origin) were interviewed. The opinions were almost universally in favor of the area retaining its formal ties with KP (Dichter, 1967: 73-4).

As far as the demands of the Hindko speakers from the state and society are concerned, the present survey shows that 44.11% of the Hindko speakers demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 2.42% culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; 56.80% additional rights and resources; 45.01% public respect; 63.75% adequate representation in public institutions; 48.34% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 37.16% the teaching of their language in educational institutions; 23.26% the cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 24.77% of the Hindko speakers demanded the preservation of land belonging to their group.

The above statistics show that anti-discriminatory measures, additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions, the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity and the teaching of their language in educational institutions rank higher in the demand list of Hindko speakers.

3.3.4. Gujars

Gujars could be found in reasonable number in Swat, Dir, Chitral and Indus Kohistan of the KP province. They are traditionally pastoralists, moving with their animals. However, besides migratory Gujars there are completely settled Gujars and who could be found now-a-days in every state institution including national and provincial assemblies. The current federal minister for religious affairs, Sardar Muhammad Yousaf is a Gujar from KP. Majority of the Gujars are agriculturalists and dairy farmers with large livestock who live in their traditional ways. Most of those Gujars who are permanently settled in the plain areas have passed through language shift from their own language to the dominant Pashto language for expediencies. All of them (with negligible exception) have forgotten their own language (Gujri) and have for generations adopted Pashto as their first language. They have adopted the culture and language of the Pakhtuns. However, this cultural shift is not the outcome of external compulsions (imposition by the dominant Pakhtuns) but of internal compulsion (for social and economic expediencies by the Gujars themselves). Those who are not permanently settled in one area take their animals during the winter session to the plain or settled areas where weather is not that much cold and return to higher mountain pastures in the summer.

Majority of the Gujars have low socioeconomic status as compared to other ethnic groups around them (Ahmed, 1986). They usually work as tenants or servants to these other groups. Though many of the settled Gujars own land, their economic position is not satisfactory. A smaller portion of them are educated and few hold high positions in state institutions. Gujars take pride in their language and ethnicity, but outsiders tend to devalue them and their language. During my field work in the Gujar areas, I found no or fewer and sub-standard primary and high schools in their areas and only a fewer number of educated women.

Hallberg & O'Leary (1992: 100) point out that generally Gujars appear to take pride in their identity as Gujars and in their history, culture and language. In KP the Gujars have maintained their language, Gujri, in Gujar majority areas (Dir, Dir Kohistan, Swat Kohistan, Upper and Lower Kohistan and even Mansehra). Jamshed Gujar (personal interview, May 17, 2013) elaborated that there is a Gujar

Association based in Lahore which publishes a magazine called *The Gujar Gazette*, which helps in promoting and uniting Gujars as a people. Gujar conventions are regularly held and Gujri radio programs help in promoting Gujri language, literature, and music.

Majority of those Gujars who speak Gujri as their first language use Pashto as a second language while interacting with Pakhtuns. Hallberg & O'Leary (1992: 111, 168) elaborates dialectic differences in Gujri but the differences are not remarkable and Gujars from various areas can understand each other in Gujri. Hallberg & O'Leary (1992: 126) pinpoints the high ethnic and identity consciousness among the Gujars. They argue that "Gujars are distinguished by a strong and unified ethnic identity and they seem to regard the language spoken by various Gujar communities as one unifying and distinguishing feature of their common ethnicity. Gujars regard their language as having regional variance, but as one common tongue".

According to the present survey 5.04% of the Gujars demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 47.90% additional rights and resources; 81.79% public respect; 79.55% adequate representation in public institutions; 41.17% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 21.85% the teaching of their language in educational institutions; 3.64% the cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 5.88% of the Gujars demanded the preservation of land belonging to their group. These statistics show that additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions, and the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity rank higher in the demand list of Gujars.

3.3.5. Kohistanis

Kohistan (a Land of Mountains) includes the upper valleys of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers and the valley of the Indus. Several ethnic groups live in Kohistan predominant among whom is the Kohistani people, who speak a variety of dialects and languages, sometimes given distinct local names but often called

simply Kohistani (also named as Bashgharik, Dir Kohistani, Bashkarik, Diri, Kohistana, Dirwali, Kalami Kohistani, Gouri, Bashkari, Gawri and Garwi) (Rensch, 1992a: 3, 5-6).

As said earlier, Kohistan is also inhabited by other linguistic groups. There are Pakhtuns, Gujars and Chitralis living in many Kohistani speaking communities and many Kohistanis communicate with them mostly in Pashto, Gujri or Chitrali (Rensch, 1992a: 17). Biddulph long ago anticipated the replacement of the Swat Kohistani languages by Pashto (stated in Rensch, 1992a: 48) because Kohistanis had become bilingual by adopting Pashto as a second language but that could not come to be true since the Kohistani language is in vigorous use alongside Pashto because of the strong positive attitudes of the Kohistani people toward their own language. Many Kohistanis also feel that knowledge of other languages (Pashto and Urdu) is a vehicle for upward mobility. Kohistanis do not feel any threat to their language by the dominant Pashto language as well (Hallberg, 1992b: 114-5). The results of Rensch's study (1992a: 61) also shows that Kohistanis expressed no negative feelings towards exogamous marriages and reflect a general feeling of appreciation for all other groups and languages.

There are many other minor linguistic groups (internal minorities) in Kohistani speaking regions. They are **(a)** Badeshi or Badakhshi which is a variety of Persian language spoken in Bishigram and Chail Valley (Swat, Kohistan); **(b)** Ushojo Speaking Group who live in twelve villages of Swat Valley: Bishigram, Shepiza, Kas, Derai, Nalkot, Karial, Sore, Tangai Banda, Kappal (Kafir) Banda, Moghul Mar, Tukai, and Danda (Decker, S. J., 1992: 76-9); **(c)** Chilisso is spoken by a small group of people living right in the middle of the majority Shina-speaking population in scattered locations on the Eastern bank of the Indus River in District Kohistan (Hallberg, 1992b: 121); **(d)** Gowro (also called Gabaro and Gabar Khel language) is spoken by a small group of people on the Eastern bank of the Indus River in District Kohistan (Hallberg, 1992b: 130-1); **(e)** Bateri (also named as Bateri Kohistani, Baterawal, or Baterawal Kohistani) is spoken by a group of people on the Eastern bank of the Indus River in an area called Batera (Hallberg, 1992b: 133-8); **(f)** Shina (also called Sina and Shinaki) speakers are found in the Kohistan District where Shina is spoken in the three valleys of Jalkot, Palas, and Kolai on the Eastern bank of the Indus River (Radloff, 1992: 99-100).

As far as the demands of Kohistanis are concerned, the present survey shows that 3.25% of them demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 72.08% additional rights and resources; 21.43% public respect; 84.74% adequate representation in public institutions; 62.66% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 34.10% the teaching of their language in educational institutions; 11.04% cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 20.80% of the Kohistanis demanded the preservation of land belonging to their group. These statistics show that additional rights and resources, adequate representation in public institutions, and the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity rank higher in the demand list of Kohistanis.

3.3.6. Chitralis

Chitrali (also called Qashqari, Arniya, Patu, Kohwar and Kashkara) is the prominent language of District Chitral. Most researchers are of the opinion that the original Chitralis came to Chitral as part of the Aryan invasion of South Asia (Decker, K. D., 1992: 28). Chitralis living in unirrigatable places and depend on livestock for their livelihood. About 65% percent of Chitralis practice the Sunni sect of Islam; the other thirty-five percent are Ismaili (Decker, K. D., 1992: 30).

Lowari Tunnel is the major developmental project of Chitralis. Chitral is connected with the rest of Pakistan through a dirt road which remains closed throughout the winter because of heavy snowfall. A tunnel has been started in 1970s but is yet to be completed. Chitralis face difficulties through the winter, and particularly toward spring, as supplies become depleted before the pass opens again.

As Chitrali is the dominant language in Chitral, speakers of the minority languages have to learn Chitrali for pragmatic purposes: Business and interactions. Inter-group marriages are also practiced. There is little dialectic variation and Chitrali is linguistically quite uniform throughout the Chitrali speakers. They have a very positive attitude to their language (Decker, K. D., 1992: 41).

There are other minor linguistic groups (internal minorities) in Chitral. Kendall D. Decker (1992: 11) gives an estimate of their population as: Eastern Kativiri 3,700 to 5,100 (spoken in the Bashgal Valley of Chitral); Shekhani 1,500 to 2,000 (spoken in the small villages of Langorbat and Badrugal in Chitral); Dameli 5,000 (spoken by a group of people mostly settled in Dameli Valley in Chitral); Gawar-Bati 1,300 to 1,500 (spoken in Arandu in District Chitral and Barikot, Dokalam, and Pashingar at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas); Phalura 8,600 (spoken in eight villages on the Eastern side of the Chitral Valley near Drosh in Southern Chitral); Yidgha 5,000 to 6,000 (spoken in the Lutkoh Valley of Western Chitral mostly by the followers of Ismaili sect); Madaglashti Persian 2,057 to 3,000; Wakhi 450 to 900 (spoken in Yarkhun region located in Chitral and majority of its speakers belong to the Ismaili sect; and Kalasha 2,900 to 5,700 (the speakers of Kalasha, which is an important ethnic group living in Chitral, are settled in the four valleys of Chitral: Rumbur, Bumboret, Birir and Urtsun. In 1989, the government granted permission for Kalasha to be used as the medium of instruction in new Kalasha-staffed schools. Kalasha language is an integral part of the Kalasha identity and giving up their language is equated with becoming a Muslim) (Dichter, 1967: 43).

According to the present survey 10.50% of the Chitralis demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 51.38% additional rights and resources; 40.33% public respect; 66.85% adequate representation in public institutions; 48.34% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 36.18% the teaching of their language in educational institutions; 16.57% cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 16.29% of the Chitralis demanded the preservation of land belonging to their group.

Ethnic division in KP, like in other parts of Pakistan, has been blurred by migration. Many Hindko, Seraiki or Gujri speakers while migrated to the Pakhtun dominant areas have adopted Pashto as their language. In the same way many Hindko and Seraiki speakers in Abbottabad and DI Khan are Pakhtuns by origin. This means, as Tariq Rahman (2002: 36) also argues, that people learn languages for pragmatic reasons, they give less importance to their languages. This is the case with many linguistic minority groups in KP who have adopted Pashto as their

first language and in most of the cases have even forgotten their former first languages.

Besides linguistic minorities, KP is also a home to religious minorities. We have Kalash in Chitral; a very small minority of Ahmadis mostly in Mardan. However, only Christians, Hindus and Sikhs have been selected for the present study. During the survey I observed that Christians and Hindus were feeling a sort of apprehension because they believe that they would be targeted for any wrong done against the Muslims or Islam in the West and India respectively.

3.3.7. Christians

Christians are mostly settled in Swat, Mardan, Swabi, Nowshera, Peshawar, Kohat and Abbottabad districts of KP. During my field work I found that most of them are leading a tough life in financial term. Most of the Christians are associated with the profession of sweeping and lead a life of poverty. Majority of them are illiterate and live in slums (*Kacha abadi*). Few of them have got education and still very few of them are on high posts in state institutions. While interviewing Nauman Yousaf, a Christian, he said "Our major weakness as a group is illiteracy and I think that is our major demand from the state to provide us opportunities for education. Most of the members of our group are sweepers because they have no education" (personal communication, June 4, 2013).

The demands of Christian from the state and society of KP are mostly economic in nature as the present survey shows that 15.77% of the Christians living in KP demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 4.42% culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; 75.08% additional rights and resources; 59.62% public respect; 82.33% adequate representation in public institutions; 8.83% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 11.99% cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 59.31% of them demanded the preservation of land belonging to their groups.

These statistics show that the demands for additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions and the preservation of land belonging to their groups rank high in the demands list of Christians in KP.

3.3.8. Hindus

Hindus are mostly settled in Dargai, Swabi, Bunir, Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar and Kohat districts of KP. Their lives are more miserable than the Christians. Illiteracy prevails in Hindu community in KP. A very few of them are in state institutions. They are usually doubted for their loyalty to Pakistan and are targeted for any wrong done against Muslims in India. This perception places heavy strains on this community and on its constitutional rights. While interviewing Haroon Sarab Diyal, a Hindu and intellectual, he said "Nobody remembers our sacrifices for Pakistan. Pakistan is my land, my country and my home. When I go for a foreign trip I feel restlessness for my country. Many Hindus have contributed to the development of this country but, alas, we are not recognized as faithful and sincere to this country" (personal communication, June 27, 2013).

The demands of Hindus are also mostly economic in nature as the present survey shows that 6.28% of the Hindus living in KP demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 11.21% culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; 84.30% additional rights and resources; 71.30% public respect; 78.92% adequate representation in public institutions; 30.94% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; 9.97% cultural consideration in drawing constituencies; and 73.54% of them demanded the preservation of land belonging to their groups.

These statistics show that the demands for additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions and the preservation of land belonging to their groups rank high in the demands list of Hindus in KP.

3.3.9. Sikhs

Sikhs are mostly known for their five Ks i.e. Kesh (hair are kept uncut), Kangha (a comb made of wood), Karra (a metal bracelet), Kachera (a sort of underwear) and Kirpan (a curved sword)[41]. They are mostly settled in Mingora, Dargai, Bunir, Mardan, Charsadda, Peshawar and Nowshera districts of KP. Most of them are associated with the profession of homeopathy (*hakeem*) and business etc. Compared to Christians and Hindus, Sikhs are leading reasonably good lives and are respected. Majority of them are quite satisfied and do not feel any sort of threat from the dominant Muslim group. For example, while interviewing Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, he said "I have felt most of the time positive discrimination. I claim that if I and a Muslim go to a state institution, I will be better entertained than the Muslim. I am quite happy here and never in my life have I ever felt any negative discrimination" (personal communication, July 14, 2013).

But their demands are also mostly economic in nature as the present survey shows that 3.57% of the Sikhs living in KP demanded anti-discriminatory measures; 13.69% culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies; 83.63% additional rights and resources; 55.36% public respect; 93.75% adequate representation in public institutions; 40.77% the acknowledgement of their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity; and 88.10% of them demanded the preservation of land belonging to their groups.

These statistics show that the demands for additional rights and resources, public respect, adequate representation in public institutions and the preservation of land belonging to their groups rank high in the demands list of Sikhs in KP.

The next chapter gives an empirical evaluation of the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences from liberal perspective. It also evaluates the attitudinal status of the cultural groups in KP in the light of the basic assumptions of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood. It also tests some of the hypotheses.

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[41] Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/sikhism/customs/fiveks.shtml

CHAPTER 4

THE ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: AN EVALUATION FROM LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter empirically explores the position and attitudes of various linguistic and religious groups (including the dominant Pakhtun group) to the various questions regarding culture and cultural differences asked through questionnaire and interview (for questionnaire and interview schedule see Appendices 1, 2 and 3) in KP. It addresses the main question "What are the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences from liberal perspective?" Through this question I will look into the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards culture and cultural preservation, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism etc. I will also judge and evaluate the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the theories expounded by Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood.

The main question is very comprehensive and will be fully understood if the following sub-questions are addressed too.

I.   Why, if any, culture has importance for the groups in KP?

II.   Whether various groups in KP wish to blend in the dominant Pakhtun culture or try to maintain their particularities (support for multiculturalism)?

III.   Has there been any attempt for Pakhtunization and Muslimization in KP?

IV.   Do the groups in KP have demands for internal restrictions and external protections?

V.   Should culture be preserved? If yes, then whether it should be preserved by the members of group or state or both?

VI.   What do members of a cultural group think about new comers? Should people who come to live in another group adopt the values, traditions and language of that group?

VII.   Do women have equal rights as men in the groups in KP?

VIII.   Whether diversity has remained stable, increased or decreased and whether diversity is celebrated or abhorred in KP?

IX. Do some groups feel discrimination on the basis of religion or language in KP?

X. Whether the demands of minorities have been practically heard and fulfilled in KP?

XI. Is there any gap between the demands of the members and leaders of the groups (interest gap) in KP?

XII. Whether the groups in KP are in favor of color-blind approach?; and

XIII. Whether the members of groups have the right to exit and still take benefits from the group in KP?

Similarly, the following hypotheses are tested.

I. An "interest gap" exists between the members and leaders of a group.

II. Pakhtun society is generally tolerant towards minority groups.

III. Culture is important, not as a source of making meaningful choices but as a sign of identity.

IV. Financial position of a member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

V. The level of education of a member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

VI. Age is positively related to the emphasis given to culture and assimilation.

VII. More positive attitude toward intermarriage and inter-group relationship (if any) tend to support assimilation; and

VIII. Young people, people with high education and minority groups have greater support for multiculturalism.

In order to answer the above questions and test the hypotheses, data was collected in the form of questionnaires, interviews and personal observation in KP (Pakistan). Groups were selected according to the formula set out in chapter 1. A total of 9 groups were selected including 5 linguistic (Chitrali, Gujar, Hindko, Kohistani, and Seraiki), 3 religious (Christian, Hindu and Sikh) and the dominant Pakhtun. Total number of collected questionnaires was 2977. A total of 80 interviews were conducted with the members of the targeted groups. Data were analyzed using SPSS statistical model.

This chapter is divided into 7 Sections. Section 1 deals with the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards culture and cultural preservation; Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 deal with the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism respectively; Section 6 discusses the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards the feelings of discrimination and women's rights and; Section 7 evaluates the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the theories of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood.

4.1. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS CULTURE AND CULTURAL PRESERVATION

A number of questions were asked in the questionnaire regarding the attitudes of the members of the targeted cultural groups towards culture and cultural preservation. The first question was "Why, if any, culture has importance for the groups in KP?" The answer to this question demonstrated the attitudes of the members of various groups in KP towards the value of culture. As shown in Table 21, 97.92%[42] of all the respondents were agree with the statement that culture has importance for a group.

Group wise analysis also shows the same picture. In all the groups more than 96% of the respondents underscored the importance of culture for a group. Some of the groups went as higher in percentage as 99% in underscoring the importance of culture for a group, for example, Gujars 99.15%, Christians 99.38% and Hindus 99.10%.

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[42] Out of 97.92%, 48.54% were strongly agree, 39.07 agree and 10.31% near to agree. In the text of this chapter I will use the word "agree" to mean the aggregate of "strongly agree", "agree" and "near to agree" while the word "disagree" will mean the aggregate of "near to disagree" "disagree" and "strongly disagree". In the respective tables a full view of the responses has been given and the values of all the above terms have been given separately. But in the text only the aggregate of the positive side and negative sides have been given and it should be considered as such in the whole of this chapter.

Table 21: Culture has importance for a group

Groups/	Choices	SA[43]	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	199 54.97%	117 32.32%	34 9.39%	6 1.66%	1 0.28%	4 1.10%	1 0.28%	362 100%`
	Hindko speakers	151 45.62%	135 40.79%	35 10.57%	3 0.91%	0 0%	5 1.51%	2 0.60%	331 100%
	Kohistani	149 48.38%	110 35.71%	43 13.96%	5 1.62%	0 0%	0 0%	1 0.32%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	169 41.52%	183 44.96%	42 10.32%	6 1.47%	1 0.25%	2 0.49%	4 0.98%	407 100%
	Seraiki	179 53.27%	122 36.31%	26 7.74%	6 1.79%	1 0.30%	1 0.30%	1 0.30%	336 100%
	Gujar	219 61.34%	106 29.69%	29 8.12%	0 0%	2 0.56%	1 0.28%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	95 29.78%	177 55.49%	45 14.11%	1 0.31%	0 0%	1 0.31%	0 0%	319 100%
	Hindu	109 49.10%	81 36.49%	30 13.51%	2 0.90%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	222 100%
	Sikh	175 52.08%	133 39.58%	23 6.85%	5 1.49%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	1445 48.54%	1163 39.07%	307 10.31%	34 1.14%	5 0.17%	14 0.47%	9 0.30%	2977 100%

The second question regarding culture which was explored was "Why culture is important for a group?" For Kymlicka (1995: 83, 1989: 165-169) culture is important because it provides the medium of autonomy which means making choices amongst various options which the societal culture not only provides, but also makes them meaningful to us. Similarly, for Modood culture has importance for the people because it shows the identity (constituted not only from the 'inside' but also from the 'outside' of the group) that matters to people marked by difference (Modood, 2008, 2010b, 2013: 39-40). The present dissertation judges the position of KP in respect of the theories of Kymlicka and Modood. Kymlicka's assumption is not supported in KP but Modood's is because the attitudes of the majority of the people in KP are that culture is important not because it provides the range of options from which we choose but because it shows the identity of the members of a group. As shown in Table 22, 86.53% (P_1 89.05%, P_2 9.51%, P_3 1.32% and P_4 0.12%)[44] of the total respondents said that

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[43] SA stands for "Strongly Agree", A for "Agree", NA for "Near to Agree", U for "Undecided", ND for "Near to Disagree", D for "Disagree" and SD for "Strongly Disagree".

[44] P shows priority. P_1 means first priority, P_2 means second priority, P3 means third priority and so on.

culture is important because it shows our identity. Group wise analysis shows that Gujars (97.62%) and Chitralis (94.69%) are highly attached to the identity side of the culture.

Table 22: Why culture is important for a group

Options/Priorities	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4	P_5	P_6	Total
Shows our identity	2294 89.05%	245 9.51%	34 1.32%	3 0.12%	0 0%	0 0%	2576/2977 86.53%
Provides range of options	87 12.89%	156 23.11%	303 44.89%	95 14.07%	33 4.89%	1 0.15%	675/2977 22.67%
legacy of our forefathers	346 23.78%	928 63.78%	145 9.97%	27 1.86%	9 0.62%	0 0%	1455/2977 48.87%
We are made by our culture	67 9.14%	152 20.74%	237 32.33%	157 21.42%	120 16.37%	0 0%	733/2977 24.62%
gives meaning to individual life	118 17.28%	124 18.16%	212 31.04%	115 16.84%	113 16.54%	1 0.15%	683/2977 22.27%
Don't know	5 83.33%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 16.67%	0 0%	6/2977 0.2%

However, besides identity, there is another reason for the importance of culture for groups in KP and that is the claim that 'culture is the legacy of our forefathers'. 1455 (48.87%) out of 2977 respondents supported this claim. Only 24.62% said that they are made by their culture. Similarly, 683/2977 (22.27%) of the respondents said that culture gives meaning to their life. Only 22.67% (P_1 12.89%, P_2 23.11%, P_3 44.89%, P_4 14.07% and P_5 4.89%) of the total respondents believed that culture provides a range of options from which we choose and even here it is the first priority of only 87 (12.89%) out of 675 respondents. This means that Kymlicka's claim is not while Modood's is supported by empirical evidence in KP.

The same results as above also came from the interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups. For example, Nusrat Tehsin, a Seraiki, said "Culture is important for a group. It has a role in our life. It represents our traditions and us. It identifies us. It shows what and who we are" (personal communication, March 29, 2013). Similarly, Gobind Ram, a Sikh, gave his opinion as "Culture is important for a group because it shows its identity. For example, we are Sikhs. We wear turbans and have long beards. These show that we are Sikhs and are treated accordingly" (personal communication, July 15, 2013). In the same way Naseha, a Chitrali, said "Culture has importance for a group because it shows group's identity" (personal communication, May 2, 2013).

Thus, in KP majority of the people (2576/2977 i.e. 86.53%) believe that culture is important because it shows their identity while 1455/2977 i.e. 48.87% say that it is important because it is the legacy of their forefathers. Some of the interviewees also gave the same opinion but only after second to identity, for example, Malik Gul Sher, a Kohistani, argued "Culture is important for a group because it shows its identity and that it is the legacy of the forefathers of the members of a group" (personal communication, May 22, 2013).

The third question regarding culture was whether culture should be preserved. The preservation of culture was highly emphasized by the respondents. As Table 23 shows, a high percentage of 98.35% on average of the total respondents was of the opinion that culture should be preserved.

Table 23: Culture should be preserved

Groups/ Linguistic Groups	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
	Chitrali	176 48.62%	152 41.99%	27 7.46%	1 0.28%	2 0.55%	2 0.55%	2 0.55%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	172 51.96%	125 37.76%	24 7.25%	7 2.11%	1 0.30%	2 0.60%	0 0%	331 100%
	Kohistani	191 62.01%	99 32.14%	13 4.22%	3 0.97%	0 0%	0 0%	2 0.65%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	232 75%	133 32.68%	33 8.11%	2 0.49%	0 0%	2 0.49%	5 1.23%	407 100%
	Seraiki	217 64.58%	89 26.49%	23 6.85%	1 0.30%	2 0.60%	1 0,30%	3 0.89%	336 100%
	Gujar	224 62.75%	89 24.93%	38 10.64%	3 0.84%	1 0.28%	2 0.56%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	133 41.82%	137 43.08%	47 14.78%	1 0.31%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	318 100%
	Hindu	118 52.91%	82 36.77%	21 9.42%	2 0.90%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	223 100%
	Sikh	159 47.32%	156 46.43%	19 5.65%	1 0.30%	0 0%	1 0.30%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	1621 54.45%	1062 35.67%	245 8.23%	21 0.71%	6 0.20%	10 0.34%	12 0.40%	2977 100%

Religious minorities were highly supportive of the preservation of culture. 99.43% of the respondents representing religious minority groups (Christian, Hindu and Sikh) said that culture should be preserved. This line of thinking supports the views of Kymlicka, Taylor and Parekh who support the preservation of culture.

The fourth question is "If culture is to be preserved, then whose responsibility it is to preserve it". As Table 24 shows, 68.33% on average of the total respondents (2940) were of the opinion that culture should be preserved by both the state and the members of the group. The highest support (83.23%) for the preservation of culture by both the state and the group came from the Sikh community. Sikhs were followed by Christians (71.92%). All of the interviewees with negligible exception supported the view that culture should be preserved by both the state and the members of a group. For example, Sadia Irshad, a Hindko speaker, said "Culture need to be preserved and this is not only the responsibility of the state but also of the members of a group" (personal communication, April 9, 2013).

Table 24: Who should preserve the culture- state or group or both?

Groups/	Choices	By State	By Group	By Both	Don't know	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	59 16.53%	60 16.81%	217 60.78%	21 5.88%	357 100%
	Hindko speakers	37 11.35%	55 16.87%	221 67.79%	13 3.99%	326 100%
	Kohistani	56 18.42%	40 13.16%	206 67.76%	2 0.66%	304 100%
	Pakhtun	83 20.85%	32 8.04%	275 69.10%	8 2.01%	398 100%
	Seraiki	34 10.30%	48 14.55%	229 69.39%	19 5.76%	330 100%
	Gujar	85 24.08%	58 16.43%	209 59.21%	1 0.28%	353 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	51 16.09%	31 9.78%	228 71.92%	7 2.21%	317 100%
	Hindu	32 14.41%	36 16.22%	147 66.22%	7 3.15%	222 100%
	Sikh	23 6.89%	30 8.98%	278 83.23%	3 0.90%	334 100%
	Total	460 15.65%	390 13.27%	2009 68.33%	81 2.76%	2940 100%

This dissertation also tests some hypotheses 4 of which are related to culture.

Hypothesis 1: Culture is important, not as a source of making meaningful choices but as a sign of identity.

As shown in Table 22, 86.53% (P_1 89.05%, P_2 9.51%, P_3 1.32% and P_4 0.12%) of the total respondents said that culture is important because it shows their identity.

The same results came from the interviews. As shown above, majority of the interviewees said that culture is important because it shows their identity. Only 22.67% (P$_1$ 12.89%, P$_2$ 23.11%, P$_3$ 44.89%, P$_4$ 14.07% and P$_5$ 4.89%) of the respondents believed that culture provides them with a range of options from which they choose and even here it is the first priority of only 87 (12.89%) out of 675 respondents. This hypothesis was applied not to test Kymlicka's assumption but rather to test KP society in the light of Kymlicka's theory. The findings here show that culture will be valued as an autonomy promoting agency in the West but not in KP. This means that KP society does not support Kymlicka's claim but Modood's, making the above hypothesis to be true in KP that culture is important because it shows our identity. Tok (2002) also theorizes on the same line by arguing that identity based approach to culture is more relevant than the autonomy based approach. This means that in KP mostly cultures are identity-context, to use Tok (2002) terminology, rather than choice-context.

Hypothesis 2: Financial position of the member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

This hypothesis was constructed for general understanding of the relationship between the financial position of a person and his cultural attachment. It says that as the financial position of a member of a group gets better, the importance given by him or her to his cultural values and traditions decreases. He or she then gives comparatively less importance to his cultural identity. The empirical findings, as Table 25 shows, support this hypothesis in KP. The data was analyzed using three statistical tests namely Pearson, Kendall and Spearman. Correlation coefficient (represented by r) for judging the relationship between two variables varies from +1 to -1. At 0 the variables are independent of each other and there is no relationship between them. Value of correlation coefficient from 0 to 1 shows positive or direct relationship while value from 0 to -1 shows negative or inverse relationship. As the value of correlation coefficient increases from 0 to 1 or decreases from 0 to -1 the direct or inverse relation get stronger. Thus, near to 0 it is weaker while near to 1 or -1 it is stronger. Again, significance of the relation increases when the value of significance (represented by p) decreases from 0.05 to 0.00.

Table 25: Correlation between income and importance given to culture

			Income	Importance of Culture
Pearson Correlation	Income	Correlation Coefficient	1	-0.056
		Sig. (2 tailed)		0.002
		N	2977	2977
	Importance of Culture	Pearson Correlation	-0.056	1
		Sig. (2 tailed)	0.002	
		N	2977	2977
Kendall's tau_b	Income	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-0.065[**]
		Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
		N	2977	2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient	-0.065[**]	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
		N	2977	2977
Spearman's rho	Income	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-0.081[**]
		Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
		N	2977	2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient	-0.081[**]	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
		N	2977	2977

As Table 25 shows, the value of correlation coefficient is negative in all the tests. It is -0.056 in Pearson Test with p= 0.002 (significance value), -0.065 in Kendall Test with p=0.000 and -0.081 in Spearman Test with p=0.000. Though the values of r are quite small (-0.056, -0.065 and -0.081) showing that the relationship between income and importance given to culture is weaker, all the test show that as the income of a person increases his or her attachment with his or her cultural values and traditions decreases which reject the null hypothesis which says that there is no relationship between the income and cultural identity of a person and our alternative hypothesis is accepted which says that there is relationship between the income of a member of a group and the importance given by him or her to his or her culture and this relationship is negative. In all the tests the values of significance are quite less. The significance value shows the significance of the relationship. A small p value (usually less than 0.05) shows strong evidence against the null hypothesis, thus, we reject the null hypothesis while a large p value (usually greater than 0.05) shows weak evidence against the null hypothesis, thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. In Pearson, Kendall and Spearman tests

the p value is 0.002, 0.000 and 0.000 respectively which shows that this inverse relationship is statistically highly significant.

Hypothesis 3: The level of education of the member of a group and the importance given to culture by him or her are inversely proportional.

This hypothesis was also constructed for the general understanding of the relationship between the level of education of a person and his or her cultural attachment. As shown in Table 26, the values of correlation coefficient in Pearson, Kendall and Spearman tests are positive, though smaller. According to Pearson, Kendall and Spearman tests the r values are 0.061, 0.035 and 0.043 with their p values as 0.001, 0.022 and 0.018 respectively.

Table 26: Correlation between education and importance given to culture

			Education	Importance of Culture
Pearson Correlation	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2 tailed) N	1 2977	0.061 0.001 2977
	Importance of Culture	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2 tailed) N	0.061 0.001 2977	1 2977
Kendall's tau_b	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.035 0.022 2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.035 0.022 2977	1.000 2977
Spearman's rho	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.043 0.018 2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.043 0.018 2977	1.000 2977

These findings in Table 26 show that the null hypothesis which says that education and cultural importance are unrelated is rejected by the present data in KP while alternative hypothesis which says that these two are related is accepted. But the findings reject my hypothesis which says that education and importance given to culture by a member of a group are inversely proportional. The finding in

Table 26 shows the opposite i.e. the level of education of a member of a group and importance given by him or her to culture are directly related meaning that as the level of education of a member of a group increases, he or she begins to give more importance to his culture. This may be due to the fact that he or she gets more information and becomes aware of the identity politics. This may also be explained in term of using cultural identity as a tool to gain some non-cultural interests.

Hypothesis 4: Age is positively related to the importance given to culture.

This hypothesis was also constructed for general understanding regarding the relationship between the age of a person and his or her cultural attachment. The findings of the data given in Tables 27 reject our hypothesis in KP. The data when tested using Pearson, Kendall and Spearman Tests give r values as -0.199, -0.199 and -0.248 respectively with p values as 0.00 in all the three tests.

Table 27: Correlation between age and importance given to culture

			Age	Importance of Culture
Pearson Correlation	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2 tailed) N	1 2977	-0.199 0.00 2977
	Importance of Culture	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2 tailed) N	-0.199 0.000 2977	1 2977
Kendall's tau_b	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	-.0.199[*] .000 2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.0.199[*] .000 2977	1.000 2977
Spearman's rho	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	-0.248 0.000. 2977
	Importance of Culture	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-0.248 0.000. 2977	1.000 2977

These findings reject the null hypothesis which says that age and importance given to culture are independent. The results show that these variables are

dependent. I hypothesized that they are positively related but the results show that they are negatively related, thus, rejecting my hypothesis in KP.

This may be explained in term of interactions with other groups. As an individual gets older, he or she starts to have much interaction with the members of other groups for various reasons. Thus, he or she gets more information about the culture and traditions of other groups. He or she starts to get good habits of other groups and leaves the bad habits of his own culture. Though r values in all the three tests are low showing that this negative relationship is weaker, the p values of 0.00 in all the tests show that this relationship is statistically more important because the p values are highly significant.

4.2. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS ASSIMILATION

Assimilationist vision as an approach to diversity rests on the importance of substantive moral bonds as the basis for moral cohesion. It pressures individuals to lose the characteristics of prior outsider identities and to adopt the society's core values. This vision deals with differences by removing them. Differences are understood as something dangerous, to be rid of or at least minimized. However, a phenomenon will be considered assimilative only when the outsiders are forced by the dominant group to adopt the values, culture and religion of the dominant group.

The present research shows that cultural groups in KP were having a negative attitude towards any sort of assimilationist tendencies on the part of the state or dominant Muslim and Pakhtun group. This was demonstrated by the attitudes of the members of the targeted groups towards various questions asked through questionnaire, personal interviews and personal observation. The findings regarding the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards the following statements show liberal and non-assimilationist tendencies in KP.

The first statement incorporated in the questionnaire regarding the attitudes of cultural groups towards assimilation was "Groups in KP should be blended in dominant Pakhtun culture". This means whether various groups in KP wish to

blend in the dominant Pakhtun culture or try to maintain their particularities. Majority of the respondents were against the blending of various groups in KP into the dominant Pakhtun culture. As shown in Table 28, 56.3% of the total respondents said that groups in KP should not blend in dominant Pakhtun culture. 11.72% of the total respondents were undecided. An important aspect of this survey was that 39.31% of the Pakhtuns were also against the blending of all the groups in KP into the dominant Pakhtun culture.

Table 28: Groups in KP should blend in dominant Pakhtun culture

Groups/	Choice	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	29 8.01%	57 15.75%	32 8.84%	22 6.08%	42 11.06%	128 35.36%	52 14.36%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	22 6.65%	44 13.29%	36 10.88%	33 9.97%	12 3.63%	87 26.28%	97 29.31%	331 100%
	Kohistani	10 3.25%	34 11.04%	73 23.70%	62 20.13%	55 17.86%	54 17.53%	20 6.49%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	17 4.18%	75 18.43%	104 25.55%	51 12.53%	34 8.35%	88 21.62%	38 9.34%	407 100%
	Seraiki	44 13.1%	44 13.10%	40 11.90%	32 9.52%	12 3.57%	74 22.02%	90 26.79%	336 100%
	Gujar	15 4.20%	20 5.60%	39 10.92%	29 8.12%	127 35.57%	91 25.49%	36 10.08%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	7 2.19%	31 9.72%	49 15.36%	68 21.32%	55 17.24%	95 29.78%	14 4.39%	319 100%
	Hindu	8 3.60%	7 3.15%	27 12.16%	36 16.22%	45 20.27%	80 36.04%	19 8.56%	222 100%
	Sikh	19 5.65%	33 9.82%	30 8.93%	17 5.06%	14 4.17%	166 49.40%	57 16.96%	336 100%
	Total	174 5.84%	347 11.66%	431 14.48%	349 11.72%	288 9.67%	818 27.48%	570 19.15%	2977 100%

However, all of the Pakhtuns who were interviewed during my fieldwork gave their opinion that groups in KP should not be blended into one Pakhtun culture. For example, Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun, said "Unity through diversity is the mechanism which brings comparatively better harmony. Every group should be given autonomy to practice its culture and traditions. Assimilation as a mechanism of treating diversity has brought failure and should be avoided" (personal communication, August 14, 2013).

A very strong negative attitude towards blending of all the groups into Pakhtun group and culture in KP came from the Gujar (71.14%) followed by Sikhs

(70.53%), and Hindus (64.87%) (Table 28). This means that majority of the members of various groups in KP want to keep their cultural and linguistic particularities and do not want their culture to be blended into common Pakhtun culture. Gender and marital status have no significant effect on opinion regarding the blending of all groups into dominant Pakhtun culture.

The same attitude was also expressed by the interviewees of the above groups. For example, Mian Zarin, a Gujar, said "Every group should maintain its own culture, language and traditions and should not be blended into one culture. This blending of various cultures into one will destroy our identity-the basis of what we are- and is also injustice" (personal communication, May 13, 2013). Imran Khan Jadoon, a Hindko speaker, said "Every culture has a beauty and identity inherent in it. If you destroy the culture, you destroy the identity of its members" (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Sant Sing, a Sikh, argued that "Every group is happy with its own culture and traditions. Blending of all cultures into one dominant Pakhtun culture will destroy their identities and will engender more problems than solving them. It will create a sense of deprivation among the minority groups" (personal communication, July 12, 2013). Similarly, Bushra Fatima Tariq, a Chitrali, gave her opinion as "No. certainly not. Groups should not be blended into a dominant Pakhtun culture. They should have interactions and co-existence and should take good habits and customs from each other but they should keep their identity and particularities" (personal communication, May 3, 2013).

The second statement incorporated in the questionnaire regarding attitudes towards assimilationism was "Different groups in KP should not mix together". The purpose of this statement was to show whether groups in KP should mix together by non-forcible ways which will result in slowly losing their identities and forming a new one like the mathematical expression of A+B+C+D=Z. This means that groups are mixed together to form a new identity or culture not necessarily Pakhtun culture but a mixture of all the cultures living in KP. The cultural groups in KP were having a negative attitude even towards this soft way of losing one's culture and forming a new one. A high percentage of respondents (68.27%) gave their opinion that different groups in KP should not mix together (Table 29). This shows that groups should enjoy their particularities: their culture,

language, religion and traditions. These groups should not be assimilated into one group to lose their particularities through mixing. The highest support (90.49%) for the statement that groups in KP should not mix together came from Sikh community. Sikhs were followed by Hindus (88.79%) and Pakhtuns (82.56%). However, comparatively less support for the statement came from Hindko speakers, 45.32% of whom said that groups in KP should not mix together. Hindko speakers were followed by Chitralis (50.83%) and Seraikis (52.98%).

Table 29: Different groups in KP should not mix together

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	40 11.05%	97 26.80%	47 12.98%	19 5.25%	33 9.12%	87 24.03%	39 10.77%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	50 15.11%	71 21.45%	29 8.76%	23 6.95%	23 6.95%	101 30.51%	34 10.27%	331 100%
	Kohistani	59 19.16%	109 35.39%	40 12.99%	42 13.64%	16 5.19%	26 8.44%	16 5.19%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	164 40.29%	114 28.01%	58 14.25%	14 3.44%	13 3.19%	39 9.58%	5 1.23%	407 100%
	Seraiki	87 25.89%	60 17.86%	31 9.23%	31 9.23%	15 4.46%	74 22.02%	38 11.31%	336 100%
	Gujar	143 40.06%	69 19.33%	77 21.57%	27 7.56%	13 3.64%	21 5.88%	7 1.96%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	55 17.30%	78 24.53%	53 16.67%	32 10.06%	24 7.55%	67 21.07%	9 2.83%	318 100%
	Hindu	81 36.32%	108 48.43%	9 4.04%	15 6.73%	2 0.90%	8 3.59%	0 0%	223 100%
	Sikh	139 41.37%	159 47.32%	6 1.79%	9 2.68%	1 0.30%	16 4.76%	6 1.79%	336 100%
	Total	818 27.48%	865 29.06%	350 11.76%	211 7.09%	140 4.70%	439 14.75%	154 5.17%	2977 100%

A very slight gender difference was found in responses to this statement. 69.26% of the total male respondents as against 67.17% of the female respondents did not support the mixing of various groups in KP. Similarly, marriage effect was also found. 70.45% of the married respondents as against 65.17% of the single respondents did not favor the mixing of various groups in KP.

The above opinion was also demonstrated by the interviewees of the targeted groups. For example, Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, argued "We have interactions with each other and that is beneficial for us. We have quite good experiences of interactions with each other. By interacting with each other most of our

misconceptions about each other's ways and cultures are removed. However, we must retain our own particularities and should not mix in a way that we lose what we are identified with [our culture]" (personal communication, July 14, 2013). Similarly, Sayed Musarrat Shah, a Hindko speaker, said "Interaction of the members of various groups with each other is important for the smooth running of a multicultural society. Through interaction the members of various groups understand each other and each other's culture and traditions. It helps in lowering the tension which might be created in a multicultural society. But they should not mix so as to form a new culture while losing their own" (personal communication, April 7, 2013). Pakhtuns gave a highly positive response that the groups in KP should not mix together. For example, Hidayatullah, a Pakhtun, said "Groups should not mix but interact together. By interacting with each other they learn good habits from each other" (personal communication, April 3, 2013).

The third area where the attitudes of the cultural groups towards assimilationist tendencies on the part of dominant Pakhtun group were elucidated was the attempt for Pakhtunization on the part of dominant Pakhtun group. The findings given in Table 30 show that 63.69% of the total respondents (2977) were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP. The highest number of respondents (86.90%) who disagreed with the statement that there has been attempt for Pakhtunization in KP came from Sikh community. Sikhs are mainly involved in business and live in business centers and have good relations with other communities specifically with the dominant Pakhtun community. This attitude regarding Pakhtunization was also represented by the Sikh interviewees during my interviews with them. For example, Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, said "We have never been compelled to adopt Pashto language, Pakhtun culture or to embrace Islam. We are not aware of any attempt for Pakhtunization or Muslimization in KP. Every group, whether linguistic or religious, lives according to its own religion and culture" (personal communication, July 14, 2013). Sikhs were followed by Kohistanis (77.60%). Kohistanis interviewed during the survey were of the view that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP. For example, Alam Din, a Kohistani, said "Certainly no attempt for Pakhtunization or Muslimization has been done in KP" (personal communication, May 19, 2013). During my field survey I found that a large number of Kohistanis have adopted

Pashto language and have voluntarily integrated into Pakhtun culture. Only a few villages in Dir Kohistan (Kalkot, Lamotae, Patrak and Thal) have maintained Kohistani language and culture. However, this adoption of Pakhtun culture is voluntary and not a forced one. For example, while interviewing Muhammad Salam of Kohistani group, he said "We have adopted Pashto for pragmatic reasons. Again, we have marriages with Pakhtuns which compel us to learn Pashto. In this way we forgot our language [Kohistani] and have become Pakhtuns culturally" (personal communication, May 25, 2013). Kohistanis were followed by Gujars (69.75%). While interviewing Amir Shah Din, a Gujar, he said "No attempt by the Pakhtun group to Pakhtunise or Muslimise the non-Pakhtun and non-Muslim groups has been done in KP" (personal communication, May 9, 2013). All of the Pakhtuns when interviewed said that no such attempt for Pakhtunization has been done. For example, Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun, said "All the provinces of Pakistan are multicultural. KP has a good size of Pakhtuns. The need for imposing one's culture and language on others arise when the dominant group feels some threats from the minorities. As there is no such situation where Pakhtuns feel a sort of threat in KP, we have never seen any attempt in that direction. Similarly, no attempt for Muslimization can be cited in KP" (personal communication, August 14, 2013). These results also show the actual multicultural practices and policies of KP state and society.

However, Hindko speakers and Seraikis were less inclined to accept the statement that attempt for Pakhtunization has not been made in KP. Only 45.53% of the Seraikis and 39.57% of the Hindko speakers were of the opinion that there has been no attempt of Pakhtunization in KP. These two groups are struggling for their separate provinces mainly on linguistic lines. Interviews with the members of Hindko group depicted the same thoughts. For example, Imran Khan Jadoon, a Hindko speaker, said "To some extent there have been attempts to Pakhtunise non-Pakhtuns. The renaming of this province from NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa without taking non-dominant groups onboard was actually an attempt to Pakhtunise non-Pakhtun groups" (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Similarly, Baba Haider Zaman, leader of the Movement for Hazara Province and a Hindko speaker, said "From the very beginning Pakhtuns and specifically Awami National Party have made attempts to impose their culture,

traditions and language on us but we have resisted" (personal communication, April 14, 2013). Interviews with Seraikis also demonstrated the same trend as that of Hindko speakers. For example, Zafar Durani, leader of the Seraiki National Party and a Seraiki, said "The renaming of this Province [KP] from NWFP to KP was nothing less than a forced attempt to evade our identity. It was an attempt to impose Pakhtun identity including their culture, traditions and language on us" (personal communication, March 25, 2013). However, some of the Hindko and Seraiki speakers, when interviewed gave the opposite opinion. For example, Muhammad Saeed, a Hindko speaker, said "I do not see any such movement which tries and seeks Pakhtunization of the non-Pakhtun groups. Individual efforts are underway but these do not depict Pakhtunization" (personal communication, April 17, 2013). Similarly, Shumaila Rahman, a Seraiki, said "No forced attempt has been done from the dominant Pakhtun side to Pakhtunise non-Pakhtun minorities. Similarly, no attempt for forced Muslimization has been done in KP because Islam itself discourages forced conversion of non-Muslims" (personal communication, March 30, 2013).

Table 30: There has been attempt for Pakhtunization in KP

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	12 3.31%	41 11.33%	43 11.88%	46 12.71%	62 17.13%	125 34.53%	33 9.12%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	52 15.71%	73 22.05%	35 10.57%	40 12.08%	23 6.95%	82 24.77%	26 7.85%	331 100%
	Kohistani	0 0%	0 0%	34 11.04%	35 11.36%	70 22.73%	96 31.17%	73 23.70%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	0 0%	2 0.49%	58 14.25%	80 19.66%	97 23.83%	122 29.98%	48 11.79%	407 100%
	Seraiki	50 14.88%	47 13.99%	58 17.26%	28 8.33%	28 8.33%	64 19.05%	61 18.15%	336 100%
	Gujar	2 0.56%	10 2.80%	60 16.81%	36 10.08%	34 9.52%	100 28.01%	115 32.21%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	0 0%	6 1.88%	61 19.12%	54 16.93%	52 16.30%	128 40.13%	18 5.64%	319 100%
	Hindu	1 0.45%	6 2.70%	20 9.01%	47 21.17%	43 19.37%	93 41.89%	12 5.41%	222 100%
	Sikh	0 0%	2 0.60%	28 8.33%	14 4.17%	53 15.77%	165 49.11%	74 22.02%	336 100%
	Total	117 3.93%	187 6.28%	397 13.34%	380 12.76%	461 15.49%	975 32.75%	460 15.45%	2977 100%

As far as gender wise differences are concerned, males were highly disagreed (66.75%) with the statement regarding Pakhtunization than females (60.17%). Similarly, a significant difference was found in the opinions of married and single respondents regarding the attempt of Pakhtunization in KP. More married (68.73%) than single (56.25%) respondents disagreed with the statement that there have been some attempts for Pakhtunization in KP. This means that marriage slightly changes the opinion of the people regarding the efforts of the dominant Pakhtun group to Pakhtunise non-Pakhtun groups.

The fourth area where attitudes of the cultural groups towards assimilationist tendencies on the part of dominant Muslim group were investigated was the attempt for Muslimization on the part of dominant Muslim group. In this regard the results of the survey show that compared to Pakhtunization, less number of respondents were of the opinion that Muslimization has not taken place in KP. As shown in Table 31, an average of 53.85% of the total respondents (2977) was of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP. Once again, contrary to the commonly held perception, 71.73% of the Sikhs were of the opinion that no attempt for Muslimization has been done in KP. Sikhs were followed by Hindko speakers (60.12%) and Kohistanis (60.06%). These results also show the actual multicultural practices and policies of KP state and society.

A slight marriage effect on the attempt for Muslimization was observed with a slightly higher percentage (55.75%) of singles than married (52.67%) was of the opinion that there has been no attempt of Muslimization in KP. This also shows that marriage slightly changes the opinion of people.

These data are supported by the interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups. For example, Ameet Kore, a Sikh, said "There has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP. The Muslims have their own way to preach Islam but that is not a forced Muslimization. Everyone is free to follow his/her religion" (personal communication, July 25, 2013). Sayed Musarrat Shah, a Hindko speaker, said "We have neither seen, nor have heard or read that any planned attempt for Muslimization in KP has ever been done. If it has been done by a handful of people, it does not represent the KP society as a whole" (personal

communication, April 7, 2013). Tayyaba Bibi, a Kohistani, argued "No forced attempt for Pakhtunization and Muslimization in KP has ever been done. Islam does not allow that" (personal communication, May 27, 2013).

Table 31: There has been attempt for Muslimization in KP

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	21 5.80%	61 16.85%	49 13.54%	21 5.80%	54 14.92%	113 31.22%	43 11.88%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	22 6.65%	35 10.57%	39 11.78%	36 10.88%	22 6.65%	103 31.12%	74 22.36%	331 100%
	Kohistani	0 0%	10 3.25%	67 21.75%	46 14.94%	50 16.23%	75 24.35%	60 19.48%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	1 0.25%	28 6.88%	105 25.80%	63 15.48%	64 15.72%	99 24.32%	47 11.55%	407 100%
	Seraiki	41 12.20%	48 14.29%	40 11.90%	18 5.36%	17 5.06%	79 23.51%	93 27.68%	336 100%
	Gujar	1 0.28%	42 11.76%	75 12.01%	31 8.68%	58 16.25%	54 15.13%	96 26.89%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	1 0.31%	46 14.42%	140 43.89%	30 9.40%	26 8.15%	59 18.50%	17 5.33%	319 100%
	Hindu	3 1.35%	28 12.61%	105 47.30%	26 11.71%	19 8.56%	33 14.86%	8 3.60%	222 100%
	Sikh	0 0%	5 1.49%	51 15.18%	39 11.61%	74 22.02%	110 32.74%	57 16.96%	336 100%
	Total	90 3.02%	303 10.18%	671 22.54%	310 10.41%	384 12.90%	724 24.32%	495 16.63%	2977 100%

However, as shown in Table 31, Hindus and Christians were of the opinion that there have been attempts for Muslimization in KP. An average of 59.71% of them responded that there have been attempts for Muslimization. The strongest response came from Hindus, 61.26% of them said that there have been attempts for Muslimization in KP. Hindus were followed by Christians (58.62%). However, as the above figures show, majority of the Hindus and Christians who were of the opinion that there have been attempts for Muslimization in KP fall into "Near to Agree" category (Hindus 47.30% and Christians 43.89%). This shows that even if there have been attempts for Muslimization in KP, they were of mild nature attracting no severe reaction from these two religious minorities.

However, the members of these groups (Christians and Hindus) who were interviewed during my field work gave the opposite opinion and said that there has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP. For example, Haroon Sarab Diyal, a

Hindu, said "Culture can never be imposed. It is adopted slowly and gradually. Pakhtunization or Muslimization has not been attempted forcibly. Even the language of the dominant group [Pashto] has not been imposed or made a compulsory subject. As far Muslimization is concerned, I do not see any attempt for Muslimization in KP" (personal communication, June 27, 2013). Similarly, all of the Christians interviewed said that no forced Muslimization has been done in KP. For example, Willium Ghulam, a Christian, said "There has been never an attempt for forced Muslimization in KP" (personal communication, June 9, 2013). The responses given by the interviewees are contrary to the results of the questionnaires collected from the respondents of the Christian and Hindu communities. This may be due to the fact that the question set in the questionnaire simply said "There has been attempt for Muslimization in KP". There was no mentioning of forced Muslimization. So, the respondents thought of all the attempts, forced and non-forced, for Muslimization. However, in the interviews it was made clear to the interviewees to reply whether there has been any forced attempt for Muslimization in KP. This is because non-forced attempts are permitted by every religion including Islam.

The fifth area where the attitudes of cultural groups in respect of assimilationist tendencies on the part of targeted cultural groups were judged was about new comers. What do cultural groups think of new comers? Should people who come to live in their group adopt their values, traditions and language? The answer to these questions will show the tendency of a group toward assimilation or allowing internal minorities to keep separate particularities. As shown in Table 32, majority of 60.87% on average of the total respondents (2977) said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group. This is a liberal and non-assimilationist thinking. According to them it is up to the people who come to live with them to adopt the traditions and values of the receiving group or not. Sikh community presented the highest support for this liberal view 84.82% of them saying that the non-members should not be compelled to adopt their values and traditions. Sikhs were followed by Hindus (73.54%) and Gujars (71.15%). Even 61.43% of Pakhtuns were of the opinion that non-members should not be compelled to adopt their language, culture and traditions.

A significant difference of opinion was found between married and single respondents on this issue. A higher percentage of married respondents (64.20%) than single respondents (56.42%) were of the opinion that non-members should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group.

Table 32: The adoption of our culture by those who come to live in our group

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	44 12.2%	101 27.90%	63 17.40%	11 3.04%	31 8.56%	104 28.73%	8 2.21%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	29 8.76%	65 19.64%	45 13.60%	22 6.65%	41 12.39%	100 30.21%	29 8.76%	331 100%
	Kohistani	0 0%	15 4.87%	46 14.94%	43 13.96%	53 17.21%	93 30.19%	58 18.83%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	2 0.49%	32 7.86%	89 21.87%	34 8.35%	99 24.32	123 30.22%	28 6.88%	407 100%
	Seraiki	57 17%	72 21.43%	60 17.86%	10 2.98%	31 9.23%	72 21.43%	34 10.12%	336 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Gujar	11 3.08%	49 13.73%	32 8.96%	11 3.08%	43 12.04%	164 45.94%	47 13.17%	357 100%
	Christian	6 1.89%	38 11.95%	49 15.41%	19 5.97%	57 17.92%	134 42.14%	15 4.72%	318 100%
	Hindu	7 3.14%	18 8.07%	16 7.17%	18 8.07%	37 16.59%	97 43.50%	30 13.45%	223 100%
	Sikh	11 3.27%	16 4.76%	14 4.17%	10 2.98%	21 6.25%	147 43.75%	117 34.82%	336 100%
Total		167 5.61%	406 13.64%	414 13.91%	178 5.98%	412 13.84%	1034 34.73%	366 12.29%	2977 100%

The same response as above also came from an overwhelming majority of the interviewees during my field work for this study. For example, Sundar Singh, a Sikh, gave his opinion as "The outsiders, while settling in our areas, are perfectly free to adopt or not to adopt our values, customs and traditions" (personal communication, July 30, 2013). Similarly, Hazrat Salam, a Kohistani, said "No. Those who want to come and live in our group are perfectly at liberty to adopt or not to adopt our values, culture and language. But usually for pragmatic reasons they learn our language" (personal communication, May 18, 2013).

However, the lowest support for this liberal view came from Chitralis. A majority of 57.46% of them said that the non-members should adopt their (Chitralis') values, traditions and language. Chitralis were followed by Seraikis (56.25%) and Hindko speakers (41.99%). The same conclusion can be drawn from the responses

of the interviewees from Chitrali, Seraiki and Hindko groups. For example, Hidayat ur Rahman, a Chitrali, gave his opinion as "They [outsiders] should adopt our values, culture and language. It is good for them also as they will interact with us. For us it is important because it will strengthen our culture and language" (personal communication, April 28, 2013). Allah Yar, a Seraiki, said "If an outsider wants to live with us in our areas, he should adopt our language and culture" (personal communication, March 24, 2013). Similarly, Rehana Kausar, a Hindko speaker, said "Those outsiders who settle in our group should learn our values and language. This is important for us otherwise we will be converted into minority in our own region" (personal communication, April 13, 2013).

This dissertation also tests two hypotheses related to assimilation.

Hypothesis 1: Age is positively related to support for assimilation.

This hypothesis was incorporated for the general understanding of the relationship between the age of a person and his support for assimilation. It says that age of a person is positively related to support for assimilation. The findings in Table 33 reject the null hypothesis in KP which says that age and support for assimilation are unrelated.

The findings accept our alternative hypothesis that these two variables are related in the KP context and this relationship in positive which proves our hypothesis that age is positively related to support for assimilation. The r values came out of the Pearson, Kendall and Spearman test are 0.084, 0.077 and 0.104 respectively with their p values as 0.00 in all the three test. Though the r values are smaller showing that age and support for assimilation have weak positive relation but this relationship is statistically important. This can be explained that though person at older age may give comparatively less importance to culture but even then he will support that outsider should assimilate in his group and should adopt the cultural values of his group. This may also be explained that as a person starts giving less importance to culture, he starts to support the assimilation or mixing of various groups into one. However, this was according to the data collected from the cultural groups in KP. For other areas the result might be different.

Table 33: Correlation between age and support for assimilation

			Age	Assimilation
Pearson Correlation	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2 tailed) N	1 2977	0.084 0.000 2977
	Assimilation	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2 tailed) N	0.084 0.000 2977	1 2977
Kendall's tau_b	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.077 0.000 2977
	Assimilation	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.077 0.000 2977	1.000 2977
Spearman's rho	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.104 0.000 2977
	Assimilation	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.104 0.000 2977	1.000 2977

Hypothesis 2: More positive attitude towards intermarriage and inter-group relationship (if any) tend to support assimilation.

It was hypothesized that a more positive attitude towards intermarriages and inter-group relationship tend to support assimilation. The present survey presented a very positive attitude of the people of KP towards inter-linguistic group marriages. As Table 34 shows, on average 65.94% of the respondents presented the view that they support to marry in a linguistic group other than their own. The highest support came from Kohistanis (81.49%) followed by Gujars (77.31%) and Hindus (74.89%). However, the lowest support to marry in another linguistic group came from Christians (35.22%) followed by Sikhs (59.82%), Hindko speakers (63.14%) and Pakhtuns (63.14%).

Significant difference of opinion regarding support for marriages in a linguistic group other than one's own was found between Muslims and non-Muslims with a higher percentage of Muslim respondents (70.62%) than non-Muslim respondents (54.68%) supporting to marry in a linguistic group other than their own. Similarly, significant differences were found between male and female respondents and

married and single respondents. A higher percentage of male (68.64%) than female respondents (62.84%) and a higher percentage of married (68.62%) than single respondents (62%) were of the opinion that they support to marry in a linguistic group other than their own.

Table 34: I support to marry in a linguistic group other than my own

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	86 23.78%	91 25.14%	74 20.44%	24 6.63%	4 1.10%	62 17.13%	21 5.80%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	62 18.73%	105 31.72%	42 12.69%	20 6.04%	12 3.63%	41 12.39%	49 14.8%	331 100%
	Kohistani	93 30.19%	106 34.42%	52 16.88%	10 3.25%	11 3.57%	28 9.09%	8 2.60%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	80 19.66%	111 27.27%	66 16.22%	23 5.65%	24 5.90%	81 19.90%	22 5.41%	407 100%
	Seraiki	99 29.46%	98 29.17%	43 12.80%	19 5.65%	13 3.87%	33 9.82%	31 9.23%	336 100%
	Gujar	148 41.46%	62 17.37%	66 18.49%	13 3.64%	5 1.40%	50 14.01%	13 3.64%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	36 11.32%	48 15.09%	28 8.81%	28 8.81%	11 3.46%	105 33.02%	62 19.5%	318 100%
	Hindu	45 20.18%	85 38.12%	37 16.59%	8 3.59%	7 3.14%	24 10.76%	17 7.62%	223 100%
	Sikh	101 30.06%	77 22.92%	23 6.85%	7 2.08%	7 2.08%	97 28.87%	24 7.14%	336 100%
	Total	749 25.16%	783 26.30%	431 14.48%	152 5.11%	94 3.16%	521 17.50%	247 8.30%	2977 100%

The results of the interviews also show the same trend. For example, Shah Fahad Ali, a Chitrali, said "We have intermarriages with other linguistic groups and I support it. These inter-linguistic-groups' marriages help in removing the frictions which might be created out of plurality. But we have no inter-religious groups' marriages" (personal communication, April 25, 2013). Father Shaukat, a Christian, said "Our religion does not allow us to marry in a religious group other than our own. Real Christian (one who practically follows Christianity) will not do that. Only nominal Christians (one who does not practically follow Christianity) can marry in other religious group" (personal communication, June 3, 2013). Amir Shah Din, a Gujar, said "We have marriages with other linguistic groups but not with other religious groups, though sometimes it may happen to marry with a member of other religious group. Education and media have brought a change and interactions have increased" (personal communication, May 9,

2013). Similarly, Gobind Ram, a Sikh, said "We have marriages with other linguistic groups but have no marriages with other religious groups. Religiously, we are not allowed to have marriages with other religious groups" (personal communication, July 15, 2013).

The above findings show that, except Christians, majority of the members of all the targeted groups supported to marry in a linguistic group other than their own. But the question is whether it shows the tendency towards assimilation. The findings of various other variables like "Groups in KP should blend in dominant Pakhtun culture", "There has been attempt for Pakhtunization or Muslimization in KP", "People who come to live in our group should adopt the values, traditions and language of our group" and "Different groups in KP should not mix together" show that majority of the people were not supporting assimilation. For example, 56.3% of the total respondents (2977) said that groups in KP should not blend in dominant Pakhtun culture (Table 28); 63.69% were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP (Table 30); 53.85% were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP (Table 31); 60.87% said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group (Table 32); and a high percentage of respondents (68.27%) gave their opinion that different groups in KP should not mix together (Table 29). The findings in Table 34 show that though a majority of 65.94% of the total respondents presented the view that they support to marry in a linguistic group other than their own, the hypothesis that "A more positive attitude toward intermarriage and inter-group relationship (if any) tend to support assimilation" came out to be rejected.

As far as support to marry in a religious group other than one's own is concerned, the empirical picture was quite different. As against the support for marriage in linguistic group other than one's own, a higher percentage of 83.31% of the total respondents (2977) declared that they do not support to marry in a religious group other than their own (Table 35). As Table 35 shows, the highest rejection for the support to marry in a religious group other than one's own came from the Sikh community (97.62%) followed by Hindus (95.52%) and Gujars (94.12%).

Significant difference of opinion was found between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents with a higher percentage of non-Muslim (92.58%) than Muslim respondents (79.43%) being of the opinion that they do not support to marry in a religious group other than their own. Similarly, significant difference of opinion was also found between male and female respondents and married and single respondents regarding support for marriage in a religious group other than one's own. A higher percentage of female (86%) than male respondents (80.96%) and a higher percentage of married (85.48%) than single respondents (80.08%) did not support to marry in a religious group other than their own.

Table 35: I support to marry in a religious group other than my own

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	20 5.52%	33 9.12%	35 9.67%	26 7.18%	16 4.42%	109 30.11%	123 33.98%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	21 6.34%	24 7.25%	22 6.65%	13 3.93%	13 3.93%	85 25.68%	153 46.22%	331 100%
	Kohistani	1 0.32%	3 0.97%	10 3.25%	15 4.87%	21 6.82%	109 35.39%	149 48.38%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	2 0.49%	32 7.86%	23 5.65%	13 3.19%	29 7.13%	170 41.77%	138 33.91%	407 100%
	Seraiki	48 14.3%	27 8.04%	30 8.93%	13 3.87%	23 6.85%	65 19.35%	130 38.69%	336 100%
	Gujar	3 0.84%	9 2.52%	6 1.68%	3 0.84%	52 14.57%	110 30.81%	174 48.74%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	5 1.57%	14 4.40%	15 4.72%	13 4.09%	23 7.23%	136 42.77%	112 35.22%	318 100%
	Hindu	1 0.45%	4 1.79%	3 1.35%	2 0.90%	13 5.83%	97 43.50%	103 46.19%	223 100%
	Sikh	1 0.30%	1 0.30%	0 0%	6 1.79%	7 2.08%	129 38.39%	192 57.14%	336 100%
	Total	102 3.43%	147 4.94%	144 4.84%	104 3.49%	197 6.62%	1009 33.89%	1274 42.79%	2977 100%

4.3. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS COSMOPOLITANISM

Cosmopolitanism recognizes diversity, but is skeptical about the restrictions that group membership and societal cohesion can place on individuals and defends plurality only if it allows and expands individual rights and freedoms but is silent about groups and group rights (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). The cultural groups in

KP were having a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism. The members of the targeted groups were having very positive attitudes towards group's attachment and were supporting group rights to the groups as is shown below.

Though majority of the respondents (81.73%), as shown in Table 41, said that groups should not be given the right of internal restrictions which violate human rights, groups and cultures in KP are highly valued with a strong attachment to it. This can be construed from the time they allocate to work for their group or to know more about their group, its history and culture. In order to construe response to group attachment, a statement stating "I spend much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of my group" was incorporated in the questionnaire. Table 36 shows that on average 62.14% of the total respondents said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group. This shows that groups are to some extent kept dearer by the people in KP.

Table 36: I spend much time to learn about the culture and history of my group

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	59 16.30%	115 31.77%	95 26.24%	27 7.46%	25 6.91%	30 8.29%	11 3.04%	362 100%
	Hindko speaker	45 13.60%	62 18.73%	98 29.61%	12 3.63%	37 11.18%	51 15.41%	26 7.85%	331 100%
	Kohistani	29 9.42%	35 11.36%	60 19.48%	22 7.14%	63 20.45%	78 25.32%	21 6.82%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	33 8.11%	114 28.01%	134 32.92%	31 7.62%	24 5.90%	51 12.53%	20 4.91%	407 100%
	Seraiki	61 18.15%	89 26.49%	80 23.81%	22 6.55%	22 6.55%	49 14.58%	13 3.87%	336 100%
	Gujar	79 22.13%	55 15.41%	54 15.13%	10 2.80%	59 16.53%	96 26.89%	4 1.12%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	32 10.06%	102 32.08%	102 32.08%	24 7.55%	11 3.46%	46 14.47%	1 0.31%	318 100%
	Hindu	6 2.69%	29 13%	72 32.29%	25 11.2%	32 14.35%	57 25.56%	2 0.90%	223 100%
	Sikh	20 5.95%	73 21.73%	118 35.12%	4 1.19%	64 19.05%	50 14.88%	7 2.08%	336 100%
	Total	364 12.23%	673 22.61%	813 27.31%	177 5.95%	337 11.32%	508 17.06%	105 3.53%	2977 100%

The highest response to the statement came from Chitralis 74.31% of them said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group. Chitralis were followed by Christians (74.21%), Pakhtuns (69.04%) and Seraikis

(68.45%). The lowest response to the statement came from Kohistanis. Only 40.26% of the Kohistanis said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group. Kohistanis were followed by Hindus (47.98%) and Gujars (52.66%).

Significant difference was found between the opinion of males and females with the male respondents giving more time to study the culture and history of their group (66.56%) than female respondents (57.07%). Similarly, marriage effect was also found. A very higher percentage of single respondents (70.33%) than married respondents (56.45%) were found giving much time to study the culture and history of their group.

The above results were also depicted by the interviews findings. For example, Jalaludin, a Chitrali, said "Yes. I give time to study my history, language and culture. This is not fixed. Whenever I get time in excess to my other important engagements, I do study my culture and history to know who we are" (personal communication, April 21, 2013). Muhammad Niaz Husain, a Seraiki, said "I feel happiness in studying the culture and history of my group. However, I do not have much free time for this business" (personal communication, March 22, 2013). Margaret, a Christian, said "I devote time to study my religion and I regularly observe it. I have thoroughly studied Bible. I study Christianity and its literature regularly" (personal communication, June 14, 2013).

However, majority of the interviewees from Kohistani, Hindu and Gujar groups said that they do not study their culture and history. For example, Roohullah, a Kohistani, said "We have other more important transactions to perform. I do not know when I have picked up a book or other material related to Kohistani culture and history for study. We Kohistanis are mostly uneducated and are busy in earning our bread. So, we do not have time for leisure" (personal communication, May 26, 2013). Sayed Afzal, a Gujar, said "Gujar literature is available but I have never studied it. It requires time which we do not have. Another factor is illiteracy prevailed in our group" (personal communication, May 11, 2013). Similarly, A. Ashok Chouhan, a Hindu, said "I have never studied my culture and history. I follow it and have learnt it through informal means" (personal communication, June 29, 2013).

A second justification for the cultural groups in KP having a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism is that, as shown in Table 21, 97.94% of all the respondents agreed with the statement that culture has importance for a group. The preservation of culture was highly emphasized by the respondents. A high percentage of 98.35% on average was of the opinion that culture should be preserved (Table 23). This finding supports Taylor's, Parekh's and Modood's opinion that culture needs to be recognized and preserved.

A third justification that members of the cultural groups in KP have a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism in KP is that majority of the respondents supported the provision of group rights to the minorities. These group rights, what Kymlicka calls as 'external protections', are the rights given to a group to protect it from the adverse policies and decisions of the larger society. As shown in Table 37, a majority of 86.33% on average of the total respondents (2977) supported the provision of such group rights to a group that protect it from the decisions of the larger society. This empirical finding is in accord with the theoretical framework of Kymlicka (1995: 37-8), Taylor (1994: 40) and Modood (2003, 2008a, 2006: 43-6, 2010b, 2013: 124, 133-4). The highest support for the minority rights came from the religious minorities (95.32%). On the linguistic side, Kohistanis gave their highest support for the minority rights (94.81%). The lowest support (71.99%) for the provision of minority right came from the dominant Pakhtun group. A very slight difference of opinion was found between married (87.66%) and single (84.17%) respondents showing that marriage has an effect on views regarding minority rights.

The above results were also supported by the responses given in the interviews. Nearly all of the interviewees, including the members of the dominant Pakhtun group, supported the view that minority should be protected by the provision of minority rights. For example, Nargis Zaman, a Pakhtun, said "Minority rights should be given to minorities so that they could freely follow their culture. If you are not giving them some basic rights essential for observing their culture and religion that will be injustice because they cannot adopt your culture and religion and you cannot impose your culture and religion on them. However, they should not be given, and never be given, so much internal autonomy [internal restrictions] to violate fundamental human rights" (personal communication,

August 17, 2013). Similarly, Sundar Singh, a Sikh, said "Groups should be given minority rights so as to practice and develop their culture but they should not be given that much autonomy as to violate human rights" (personal communication, July 30, 2013).

Table 37: Group should be protected by the provision of minority rights by the state

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	88 24.31%	144 39.78%	73 20.17%	21 5.80%	7 1.93%	24 6.63%	5 1.38%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	101 30.51%	129 38.97%	31 9.37%	41 12.39%	2 0.60%	18 5.44%	9 2.72%	331 100%
	Kohistani	143 46.43%	111 36.04%	38 12.34%	9 2.92%	2 0.65%	3 0.97%	2 0.65%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	114 28.01%	133 32.68%	46 11.30%	30 7.37%	44 10.8%	37 9.09%	3 0.74%	407 100%
	Seraiki	131 38.99%	98 29.17%	38 11.31%	31 9.23%	6 1.79%	17 5.06%	15 4.46%	336 100%
	Gujar	130 36.41%	150 42.02%	37 10.36%	13 3.64%	8 2.24%	19 5.32%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	122 38.36%	134 42.14%	42 13.21%	8 2.52%	2 0.63%	10 3.14%	0 0%	318 100%
	Hindu	116 52.02%	93 41.70%	5 2.24%	6 2.69%	0 0%	3 1.35%	0 0%	223 100%
	Sikh	199 59.23%	120 35.71%	5 1.49%	3 0.89%	1 0.30%	3 0.89%	5 1.49%	336 100%
	Total	1144 38.43%	1111 37.32%	315 10.58%	162 5.44%	72 2.42%	134 4.50%	39 1.31%	2977 100%

A fourth justification that cultural groups in KP do not like cosmopolitanism is that majority of the respondents supported that linguistic minorities should be given representation on the basis of their population. In Pakistan religious minorities have been constitutionally given quota in Central and Provincial Assemblies but not to linguistic minorities, though most of the representatives who are elected to the assemblies under single member constituency method from the area where a linguistic group is in majority are the members of that linguistic group. But this does not mean that the linguistic minorities are proportionally represented in the political institution, specifically the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies. The present study provides whether majority of the people of Pakhtun society are in favor of granting the linguistic minorities with proportional representation. As Table 38 shows, 84.65% on average of the total respondents (2977) gave their support for providing proportional representation to

the linguistic groups. The highest percentage in support of proportional representation to the linguistic groups came from Pakhtuns (91.40%) who were followed by Sikh community (91.37%), Hindus (90.58%) and Kohistanis (89.29%).

Significant difference was found in the opinion of married and single respondents. A higher percentage of married (86.86%) than single respondents (81.67%) said that linguistic groups should be given representation on the basis of population.

Table 38: Linguistic groups should be given representation in proportion to their population

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	73 20.17%	164 45.30%	68 18.78%	17 4.70%	7 1.93%	26 7.18%	7 1.93%	362 100%
	Hindko speaker	65 19.64%	122 36.86%	51 15.41%	18 5.44%	9 2.72%	41 12.39%	25 7.55%	331 100%
	Kohistani	132 42.86%	113 36.69%	30 9.74%	15 4.87%	7 2.27%	9 2.92%	2 0.65%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	144 35.38%	181 44.47%	47 11.55%	7 1.72%	2 0.49%	18 4.42%	8 1.97%	407 100%
	Seraiki	125 37.20%	100 29.76%	35 10.42%	19 5.65%	13 3.87%	18 5.36%	26 7.74%	336 100%
	Gujar	134 37.54%	92 25.77%	69 19.33%	23 6.44%	24 6.72%	14 3.92%	1 0.28%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	75 23.58%	142 44.65%	50 15.72%	18 5.66%	2 0.63%	24 7.55%	7 2.20%	318 100%
	Hindu	87 39.01%	106 47.53%	9 4.04%	11 4.93%	1 0.45%	7 3.14%	2 0.90%	223 100%
	Sikh	96 28.57%	200 59.52%	11 3.27%	11 3.27%	2 0.60%	11 3.27%	5 1.49%	336 100%
	Total	930 31.24%	1220 40.98%	370 12.43%	139 4.67%	67 2.25%	168 5.64%	83 2.79%	2977 100%

The responses of the interviewees also depicted the same attitude as above. For example, Mian Zarin, a Gujar, said "We need representation in various state institutions on the basis of our population" (personal communication, May 13, 2013). Jamshed Khan, a Pakhtun and Member of the Provincial Assembly, said "Yes, it is justified that linguistic groups are given representation on the basis of population" (personal communication, August 2, 2013). Imran Khan Jadoon, a Hindko speaker, said "We should be given representation equivalent to our population. Haripur is a large district but it has only one seat for National

Assembly. It should be given at least two seats" (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Similarly, Nusrat Tehsin, a Seraiki, said "Representation on the basis of population is the pre-requisite for having a harmonious environment where every community feels satisfaction and thinks that it has a fair share in decision making. Look, we have no member of the Provincial Assembly and National Assembly elected from Seraiki group from this area since Pakistan came into existence. Does it mean that Seraikis are incapable?" (personal communication, March 29, 2013). These responses show that it is desirable that linguistic groups should be given representation on the basis of population. This means the members of the cultural groups supported multiculturalism policies in KP. They supported the provision of group rights to the minorities including proportional representation to linguistic minorities.

I have also constructed three hypotheses regarding multiculturalism (the provision of group rights to minorities) which were tested. These hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1: Young people have greater support for multiculturalism (group rights).

This hypothesis says that age of a person is inversely proportional to his or her support for multiculturalism i.e. the provision of minority right to minorities. The findings regarding this hypothesis are depicted in Table 39. The r values obtained from Pearson, Kendall and Spearman tests are -0.040, -0.035 and -0.046 respectively with the p values 0.031, 0.012 and 0.012 respectively.

These findings show that young people have greater support for multiculturalism than older people. The null hypothesis which says that these two variables are unrelated is rejected while the alternative hypothesis which says that age and support for multiculturalism are related is accepted and this relation is negative, thus, proves our hypothesis for the society of KP that young people have greater support for multiculturalism.

Table 39: Correlation between age and support for multiculturalism

			Age	Multiculturalism
Pearson Correlation	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2 tailed) N	1 2977	-0.040 0.031 2977
	Multiculturalism	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2 tailed) N	-0.040 0.031 2977	1 2977
Kendall's tau_b	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	-0.035 0.012 2977
	Multiculturalism	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-0.035 0.012 2977	1.000 2977
Spearman's rho	Age	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	-0.046 0.012 2977
	Multiculturalism	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-0.046 0.012 2977	1.000 2977

Hypothesis 2: People with high education have greater support for multiculturalism (group rights).

The second hypothesis says that greater the level of education of a person, greater his or her support for multiculturalism will be. The findings in Table 40 prove this hypothesis. The r values obtained from Pearson (0.136), Kendall (0.102) and Spearman (0.124) tests with p values as 0.00 in all the three tests are all positive which show that there is a positive correlation between the level of education and support for multiculturalism. Though the r values are smaller showing that the relationship is weaker but the 0.00 p value in all the three tests shows that this relationship is highly significant. Thus, on the basis of the data collected in KP, the above hypothesis came out to be true in the case of KP.

Table 40: Correlation between education and support for multiculturalism

			Education	Multiculturalism
Pearson Correlation	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2 tailed) N	1 2977	0.136 0.000 2977
	Multiculturalism	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2 tailed) N	0.136 0.000 2977	1 2977
Kendall's tau_b	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.102 0.000 2977
	Multiculturalism	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.102 0.000 2977	1.000 2977
Spearman's rho	Education	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 2977	0.124 0.000 2977
	Multiculturalism	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	0.124 0.000 2977	1.000 2977

Hypothesis 3: Minority groups have greater support for multiculturalism (group rights).

The third hypothesis says that minority groups have greater support for multiculturalism. As shown in Table 37, a majority of 86.33% on average of the total respondents (2977) supported the provision of group rights to a minority group if those rights protect it from the decisions of the larger society. 88.60% of those belonging to minorities supported the provision of minority rights to minorities. The highest support for the minority rights came from the religious minorities (95.32%). On the linguistic side, Kohistanis gave their highest support for the minority rights (94.81%). The lowest support (71.99%) for the provision of minority right came from the dominant Pakhtun group. These findings support our hypothesis that minority groups have greater support for multiculturalism.

4.4. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS FRAGMENTED PLURALISM

Fragmented Pluralism believes in the existence of a variety of distinctive and self-contained mediating communities. This vision is the closest to being the opposite of assimilation. Here, group membership is essential rather than partial and voluntary. Pressure for conformity to group's values is strong here. The state is largely concerned with managing the incompatible rights-claims of groups without imposing any substantive moral claims of its own. This vision can be seen as a version of assimilationism in which groups are substituted for nations (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). The present dissertation shows that majority of the respondents of the cultural groups in KP presented a negative attitude towards fragmented pluralist vision because the groups are not considered as sacred in KP. The attitudes of the cultural groups, as shown in Tables 35 and 36, are much positive towards the provision of group rights but as shown in Table 41, they do not have the right of internal restrictions which violate human rights.

According to Kymlicka (1989: 240-141, 1995: 152, 2001b: 27-28) minorities have two types of demands i.e. those against its own members which could be used to restrict their liberty (internal restrictions); and those against the larger society to protect itself against the impacts of its decisions (external protections). The former demands are not while most of the latter are consistent with the liberal principles for the promotion of fairness among the groups. The former restrict the autonomy of the members of minorities while the latter protect it. Even in the case of external protections liberals cannot accept any such right which might enable one group to exploit or oppress other group. These protections are legitimate only if they uphold equality among groups by rectifying disadvantages suffered by members of a particular group (unequal circumstances i.e. the situations which are not the products of choice but of brute chance).

As shown in Table 41, a clear majority of 81.73% on average of the total respondents (2977) were against the demand for internal restrictions for a group, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights. This empirical finding is in accord with Kymlicka's assertion that the right to impose internal restrictions, if violate human rights, should not be accorded to groups (Kymlicka, 1989: 240-141, 1995: 152, 2001b: 27-28).

Table 41: Cultural groups should be left alone in their internal affairs without external interference by the state even if they violate some of the human rights

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	11 3.04%	39 10.77%	26 7.18%	20 5.52%	36 9.94%	170 46.96%	60 16.57%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	22 6.65%	43 12.99%	24 7.25%	17 5.14%	28 8.46%	131 39.58%	66 19.94%	331 100%
	Kohistanis	0 0%	1 0.32%	5 1.62%	17 5.52%	22 7.14%	118 38.31%	145 47.08%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	0 0%	8 1.97%	23 5.65%	27 6.63%	59 14.50%	197 48.40%	93 22.85%	407 100%
	Seraiki	29 8.63%	38 11.31%	28 8.33%	16 4.76%	24 7.14%	129 38.39%	72 21.43%	336 100%
	Gujar	0 0%	3 0.84%	15 4.20%	25 7%	42 11.76%	139 38.94%	133 37.25%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	2 0.63%	9 2.83%	21 6.60%	30 9.43%	54 16.98%	163 51.26%	39 12.26%	318 100%
	Hindu	2 0.90%	3 1.35%	5 2.24%	15 6.73%	24 10.76%	80 35.87%	94 42.15%	223 100%
	Sikh	0 0%	4 1.19%	6 1.79%	10 2.98%	21 6.25%	116 34.52%	179 53.27%	336 100%
	Total	66 2.22%	148 4.97%	153 5.14%	177 5.95%	310 10.41%	1242 41.72%	881 29.59%	2977 100%

The highest rejection of 94.05% of the right to impose internal restrictions, if violate human rights, came from the attitude of the Sikh community. They showed a more liberal attitude towards groups' internal rights of restrictions. Sikhs were followed by Kohistanis (92.53%), Hindus (88.79%) and Gujars (87.96%). Significant marriage effect was found with comparably higher percentage of married (84.05%) than single (78.33%) respondents saying that groups should not be given the rights of internal restriction to violate human rights.

This conclusion was also supported by all the interviewees of these groups. For example, Preet Kore, a Sikh, said "Human rights are sacred. They should not be violated at any cost. The group's autonomy should not be taken as a plea to violate human rights" (personal communication, July 28, 2013). Abdul Hameed, a Kohistani, said "Group should be given minority rights so that it can develop its culture. It should be given autonomy but not at the cost of human rights" (personal communication, May 20, 2013). Komal Chanda, a Hindu, said "Autonomy should be given to a group but with certain limits. They should not be given liberty to violate human rights" (personal communication, July 6, 2013).

Similarly, Mian Zarin, a Gujar, said "Group should be allowed to maintain internal restrictions but within the parameters of human rights" (personal communication, May 13, 2013).

However, Hindko speakers and Seraikis scored less than average on the scale rejecting the right to impose internal restriction for a group. 67.98% of the total Hindko speaking and 66.96% of the Seraiki respondents gave their opinion against granting a group the right to impose internal restrictions, if those restrictions violate human rights. These are the groups which struggle for their separate provinces in Pakistan and they may think of having strict control on the internal minorities when they get a separate province.

As second justification for the fact that the cultural groups in KP did not support fragmented pluralism is their attitude towards new comers. As shown in Table 32, majority of 60.87% on average of the total respondents (2977) said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group. According to the respondents it is up to the people who come to live with them to adopt the traditions and values of their group or not. This is a liberal and non-assimilationist thinking. This line of thinking is also against fragmented pluralism which is a version of assimilationism in which groups are substituted for nations.

A third justification for cultural groups in KP having a negative attitude towards fragmented pluralism is that, as Table 36 shows, though 62.14% of the total respondents said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group, 5.95% were undecided while 31.91% were not spending time to learn about the culture and history of their group. This finding shows that groups are not considered as sacrosanct.

4.5. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS INTERACTIVE PLURALISM

Interactive pluralism recognizes the existence of distinct groups and cultures but tries to cultivate common understanding across these differences through their mutual recognition and ongoing interactions. The main purpose is the cultivation

of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange with an emphasis on mutual recognition and respect of differences. Like fragmented pluralism, it recognizes the importance of groups in society but with a difference in emphasis. Both fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism stress the role of groups, but the later stresses groups in interaction with each other and group differences are celebrated. The present study shows that in KP cultural groups supported interactive pluralism.

The empirical results given in Table 42 show that in KP 93.05% of the total respondents declared that different religious and linguistic groups in KP should live together and have various interactions with one another. The cultural groups think that groups should not be kept in isolation without having any interaction with each other.

Table 42: Groups in KP should live together and have various interactions

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	121 33.43%	157 43.37%	54 14.92%	8 2.21%	8 2.21%	12 3.31%	2 0.55%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	106 32.02%	143 43.20%	45 13.60%	9 2.72%	6 1.81%	19 5.74%	3 0,91%	331 100%
	Kohistani	144 46.75%	111 36.04%	27 8.77%	21 6.82%	1 0.32%	4 1.30%	0 0%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	165 40.54%	156 38.33%	61 14.99%	15 3.69%	1 0.25%	6 1.47%	3 0.74%	407 100%
	Seraiki	146 43.45%	124 36.90%	30 8.93%	9 2.68%	12 3.57%	9 2.68%	6 1.79%	336 100%
	Gujar	121 33.89%	140 39.22%	74 20.73%	13 3.64%	4 1.12%	5 1.40%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	96 30.19%	140 44.03%	67 21.07%	6 1.89%	3 0.94%	6 1.89%	0 0%	318 100%
	Hindu	117 52.47%	84 37.67%	9 4.04%	6 2.69%	0 0%	5 2.24%	2 0.90%	223 100%
	Sikh	174 51.79%	151 44.94%	8 2.38%	3 0.89%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	1190 39.97%	1205 40.48%	375 12.60%	90 3.02%	35 1.18%	66 2.22%	16 0.54%	2977 100%

The highest response to the statement came from the religious minorities. Sikhs were at the top 99.11% of them said that different religious and linguistic groups in KP should live together and have various interactions with one another. Sikhs were followed by Christians (95.28%) and Hindus (94.17%). A comparatively

lower response to the statement came from Hindko speakers (88.82%) followed by Seraikis (89.29%).

No significant gender wise difference of opinion regarding the above statement was found. However, a slight difference of opinion was found between the married and single respondents with a higher percentage of married (94.03%) than single respondents (91.67%) declaring that groups should have interaction with one another.

The above results were supported by the interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups. For example, Father Shaukat, a Christian, gave his opinion as "We feel very good in KP. We have good interactions with other groups and particularly with the dominant Pakhtun group. When we meet Pakhtuns, they [Pakhtuns] do not feel that we belong to Christian community. We meet quite normally" (personal communication, June 3, 2013). Waheeda Rahman, a Hindko speaker, declared "We have inter-group interactions. Interaction is beneficial because it helps in understanding one another which reduces the number and severity of the problems arising out of plurality" (personal communication, April 11, 2013). Ravi Kumar, a Hindu, said "Interaction is very beneficial. It helps in reducing the tension which might be created out of plurality. We learn from each other and acquire the good habits of each other. For example, we live here in Mardan. We have good relations with Muslims. We meet them on *Eids* while they come to us on *Devalis*" (personal communication, July 13, 2013). Gulab Din, a Chitrali, said "Interaction among various groups is beneficial for groups. They learn good habits from each other and trash their bad habits" (personal communication, April 29, 2013). Ihsanullah, a Seraiki, said "Groups should have various interactions with each other. This is the way to learn from each other" (personal communication, March 21, 2013). Similarly, late Israrullah Gandapur, a Pakhtun and Ex-Law Minister of KP, said "Problems will snowball if the groups live in isolation. Understanding the culture of other groups and communication and interaction among them will help in reducing the tension arising out of religio-cultural plurality" (personal communication, March 28, 2013).

A related phenomenon with the one as above is whether diversity has remained stable, increased or decreased and whether diversity is celebrated or abhorred in KP.

Data were collected on the subject whether the people of various groups like to meet and make friendship with the members of other groups. A more positive attitude of the members of a group towards the statement "I like meeting and making friendship with members of groups other than my own" shows that they do not consider their group to be exclusionist. They like to maintain their diversity but at the same time like to have interactions with the members of other groups. A more rigid view of not meeting and befriending non-members shows that diversity is strictly maintained and co-operation and interactions are avoided.

The present study shows that a great majority of the respondents (93.92%) liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups (Table 43).

Table 43: I like meeting and making friendship with members of other groups

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	128 35.36%	139 38.40%	67 18.51%	16 4.42%	3 0.83%	4 1.10%	5 1.38%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	80 24.17%	164 49.55%	54 16.31%	9 2.72%	6 1.81%	14 4.23%	4 1.21%	331 100%
	Kohistani	84 27.27%	110 35.71%	104 33.77%	6 1.95%	3 0.97%	1 0.32%	0 0%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	131 32.19%	141 34.64%	80 19.66%	21 5.16%	4 0.98%	23 5.65%	7 1.72%	407 100%
	Seraiki	159 47.32%	113 33.63%	38 11.31	3 0.89%	2 0.60%	13 3.87%	8 2.38%	336 100%
	Gujar	115 32.21%	172 48.18%	65 18.21%	2 0.56%	0 0%	3 0.84%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	92 28.93%	138 43.40%	83 26.10%	1 0.31%	2 0.63%	1 0.31%	1 0.31%	318 100%
	Hindu	44 19.73%	118 52.91%	48 21.52%	6 2.69%	1 0.45%	5 2.24%	1 0.45%	223 100%
	Sikh	100 29.76%	186 55.36%	44 13.10%	2 0.60%	0 0%	4 1.19%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	933 31.34%	1280 43%	583 19.58%	66 2.22%	21 0.71%	68 2.28%	26 0.87%	2977 100%

As Table 43 shows, some of the groups like Gujars, Christians and Sikhs went as higher as 98.60%, 98.43% and 98.21% respectively in asserting that their

members like meeting and making friendship with the members of other groups. The group showing comparatively less support for meeting and having friendship with members of other groups was Pakhtun (86.49%).

As far as the position of diversity is concerned, Table 44 shows that 64.90% of those who liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups said that their opinion has remained the same while 25.99% of the total respondents said that their opinion has been changed. This shows that mostly diversity in KP has remained the same and stable. The highest stability was found in the Christians (71.70%) followed by Pakhtuns (71.07%) and Hindko speakers (70.09%) while comparatively lower stability was found in Kohistanis (52.60%) followed by Chitralis (55.52%).

Table 44: Whether diversity has remained the same or changed

Groups/	Choices	Remain the same	Changed	Don't Know	Total
Linguistics Group	Chitral	201 55.52%	110 30.39%	51 14.09%	362 100%
	Hindko	232 70.09%	60 18.13%	39 11.78%	331 100%
	Kohistani	162 52.60%	130 42.21%	16 5.19%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	289 71.01%	78 19.16%	40 9.83%	407 100%
	Seraiki	224 67.27%	72 21.62%	37 11.11%	334 100%
	Gujar	234 65.55%	94 26.33%	29 8.12%	357 100%
Religious minorities	Christians	228 71.70%	55 17.30%	35 11.01%	318 100%
	Hindus	152 68.16%	54 24.22%	17 7.62%	223 100%
	Sikhs	208 61.90%	121 36.01%	7 2.08%	336 100%
	Total	1930 64.90%	773 25.99%	271 9.11%	2974 100%

Marital status had an effect on the attitude towards the position of diversity. Comparatively smaller percentage (62.26%) of those who were married than singles (68.89%) respondents who liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups said that their opinion has remained the same.

As far as the position of changed opinion is concerned, a highest percentage of 97.43% (in the case of Christians, Hindus, Kohistanis and Gujars, it was 100% while comparatively less percentage of 86.11% and 93.33% was found in the case of Seraikis and Hindko speakers respectively) of those respondents whose opinion had changed said that their opinion had been changed positively (this means that before their opinion is changed they were not meeting and making friendship with the members of other groups while after the opinion is changed they are).

To a question "Whether diversity is celebrated or abhorred?" a statement construing the same response was incorporated in the questionnaire stating "I enjoy being with people from other groups". The empirical finding regarding this question in KP shows that on average 89.69% of the total respondents (2977) stated that they enjoy being with members of other groups (Table 45). This estimate shows that in KP plurality is celebrated up to a maximum degree.

Table 45: Whether diversity is celebrated or abhorred?

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	81 22.38%	150 41.44%	96 26.52%	10 2.76%	3 0.83%	15 4.14%	7 1.93%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	55 16.62%	153 46.22%	63 19.03%	13 3.93%	10 3.02%	27 8.16%	10 3.02%	331 100%
	Kohistani	48 15.58%	81 26.30%	155 50.32%	18 5.84%	3 0.97%	3 0.97%	0 0%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	74 18.18%	139 34.15%	119 29.24%	36 8.85%	13 3.19%	24 5.90%	2 0.49%	407 100%
	Seraiki	85 25.30%	114 33.93%	75 22.32%	14 4.17%	11 3.27%	22 6.55%	15 4.46%	336 100%
	Gujar	116 32.49%	146 40.90%	83 23.25%	8 2.24%	2 0.56%	2 0.56%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	62 19.50%	141 44.34%	105 33.02%	3 0.94%	1 0.31%	5 1.57%	1 0.31%	318 100%
	Hindu	20 8.97%	110 49.33%	70 31.39%	13 5.83%	1 0.45%	6 2.69%	3 1.35%	223 100%
	Sikh	75 22.32%	207 61.61%	48 14.29%	3 0.89%	0 0%	1 0.30%	2 0.60%	336 100%
	Total	616 20.69%	1241 41.69%	813 27.31%	118 3.96%	44 1.48%	105 3.53%	40 1.34%	2977 100%

Table 45 depicts that the highest response came from Sikh community where 98.21% of the respondents stated that they enjoy being with members from other groups. Sikhs were followed by Christians (96.86%) and Gujars (96.64%).

Comparatively, lower response to the above statement came from Seraikis (81.55%) who were followed by Pakhtuns (81.57%) and Hindko speakers (81.87%).

As far as the gender effect is concerned, a higher percentage of male (91.58%) than female respondents (87.52%) were of the opinion that they enjoy being with members of other groups. Similarly, marital status had a slight effect on the above statement. A slightly higher percentage of married (90.48%) than single respondents (88.58%) said that they enjoy being with members of other groups.

The interviews results also show the same trend as above. For example, Toti Rahman, a Gujar, said "While meeting with the members of other groups we feel happiness because you have to impress others by your character and good relations. Isolationism and reluctance to meet others may defame your group" (personal communication, May 14, 2013). Malik Izat Khan, a Kohistani, said "I like meeting with the members of others group and I feel happiness and enjoyment while with them" (personal communication, May 21, 2013). Nauman Yousaf, a Christian, said "I feel joy while interacting with the members of other groups. I learn something new from them about their culture. This interaction clears many of my misunderstandings about their religion and culture" (personal communication, June 4, 2013). Zia Pervaiz Mirza, a Christian, said "In a diverse society you see different colors of life. Everywhere you see a new color. In nutshell a diverse society is very pleasant and enjoyable" (personal communication, June 6, 2013). Similarly, Khawar Mahmood Tenoli, a Hindko speaker, said "I feel very comfortable living with the members of other groups" (personal communication, April 16, 2013).

4.6. ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS THE FEELINGS OF DISCRIMINATION AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Data was also collected on the question whether some groups feel discrimination in finding, applying and interviewing for a job or in educational or other institutions on the basis of religion or language. The responses to discrimination felt on the basis of language and religion were not the same in all the groups. It was found that some of the linguistic groups feel discrimination on the basis of

language however, majority of the religious minority groups responded that they feel no discrimination on the basis of religion. As Table 46 shows, on average 61.05% of the total respondents (2570) belonging to linguistic and religious minority groups gave their opinion that they feel no discrimination on the basis of religion and language. The highest percentage of respondents came from the Sikh community 80.95% of them were disagree with the statement that they feel discrimination on religious grounds. Sikhs were followed by Kohistanis (79.55%) and Gujars (78.15%). However, the lowest response to the statement came from Seraikis 65.48% of them said that they feel discrimination on the basis of language. Seraikis were followed by Hindko speakers (54.98%) and Christians (30.19%). However, 75.18% of the Pakhtuns said that the linguistic minorities are not discriminated against on the basis of their languages. On the other hand, for religious minorities the opinion of the majority of Pakhtuns that religious minorities are not discriminated on the basis of religion was lower (56.27%) than for the linguistic minorities (75.18%). This means that more Pakhtuns think that religious minorities are a bit more discriminated compared to linguistic minorities.

Table 46: Discrimination felt on the basis of religion or language

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	4 1.10%	29 8.01%	42 11.60%	41 11.33%	77 21.27%	136 37.57%	33 9.12%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	35 10.6%	80 24.17%	67 20.24%	30 9.06%	32 9.67%	54 16.31%	33 9.97%	331 100%
	Kohistani	0 0%	1 0.32%	20 6.49%	42 13.64%	70 22.73%	123 39.94%	52 16.9%	308 100%
	Seraiki	59 17.6%	78 23.21%	83 24.70%	23 6.85%	24 7.14%	42 12.50%	27 8.04%	336 100%
	Gujar	1 0.28%	3 0.84%	51 14.29%	23 6.44%	92 25.77%	148 41.46%	39 10.9%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	1 0.31%	3 0.94%	92 28.93%	59 18.55%	82 25.79%	71 22.33%	10 3.14%	318 100%
	Hindu	0 0%	3 1.35%	26 11.66%	41 18.39%	66 29.60%	72 32.29%	15 6.73%	223 100%
	Sikh	0 0%	3 0.89%	41 12.20%	20 5.95%	80 23.81%	149 44.35%	43 12.8%	336 100%
	Total	100 3.89%	200 7.78%	422 16.42%	279 10.86%	523 20.35%	795 30.93%	251 9.77%	2570 100%

These findings are supplemented by the views of the members of targeted groups who were interviewed during the course of fieldwork. For example, Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, said "I have felt most of the time positive discrimination. I claim

that if I and a Muslim go to a state institution, I will be better entertained than the Muslim. I am quite happy here and never in my life have I ever felt any negative discrimination" (personal communication, July 14, 2013). Some of the Christian interviewees also gave the same opinion. For example, Ashir Yousaf Masih, a Christian, said "No. I have not felt any discrimination in KP rather we are fairly treated and gain more respect from the Muslim community. Pakhtuns are broadminded and are quite accommodative" (personal communication, June 16, 2013). Kohistani interviewees also gave the same response. For example, Husan Bannu, a Kohistani, said "We are not discriminated against and have never felt that we are minority in KP. Everywhere we are respected and we do not feel that we are neglected or discriminated in KP on the basis of our language" (personal communication, May 29, 2013). Most of the interviewees from the Gujar group said that they are not discriminated on state level but on societal level. For example, Sayed Afzal, a Gujar, said "I feel some discrimination from society side but from state side we are not discriminated. We are well received in state institutions. Now-a-days, we have improved our position. We have many well educated members in every state institution and the societal level discrimination is being reduced" (personal communication, May 11, 2013). Similarly, majority of the interviewees from Chitrali group also gave the same response. For example, Kamal Abdul Jamil, a Chitrali, said "We feel very comfortable with Pakhtuns. We have never felt that our rights have been denied to us or violated. Neither have we sensed any discrimination" (personal communication, May 1, 2013).

Some of the interviewees from Hindko and Seraiki groups were of the opinion that they have not experienced any discrimination at state and societal level. For example, Muhammad Nisar, a daily wager Hindko speaker, said "I have felt no discrimination in any institutions, neither from state nor from society. I have never felt that I am living with Pakhtuns. Everything is normal with me" (personal communication, April 15, 2013). Similarly, Ihsanullah, a Seraiki, said "I have spent much time in Pakhtuns dominated areas. I have many Pakhtun friends and we have constant interactions. I have never felt being ignored or discriminated" (personal communication, March 21, 2013).

However, majority of the interviewees from Hindko, Seraiki and Hindu groups said that they feel a sort of discrimination in KP. For example, Rehana Kausar, a

Hindko speaker, said "We feel insecure in our region simply on the basis of our language. In state and autonomous bodies we are discriminated against" (personal communication, April 13, 2013). Baba Haider Zaman, a Hindko speaker, said "Here in KP we feel discrimination. We are treated as slaves. We are looked down upon" (personal communication, April 14, 2013). Similarly, Saeed Akhtar Siyal, a Seraiki, said "The policies pursued by the center [Peshawar] have remained discriminatory. This region [Seraiki dominated region] is deliberately ignored simply on the basis of language. The demand for a separate province to be named as Seraikistan is the result of a trust deficit. The Pakhtun leaders are a hurdle in the way of our development" (personal communication, March 23, 2013). Another Seraiki, Malik Ali Asif, said "We have a Department of Pashto in Peshawar University, but Gomal University, formed in 1974, has no Department of Seraiki. This is what we feel a sort of discrimination" (personal communication, March 27, 2013). Similarly, Komal Chanda, a Hindu, said "Personally I have felt discrimination in applying and gaining jobs. The people [Pakhtuns] who are uneducated discriminate us on the basis of our religion. But still there are goodhearted educated people who are quite normal. In state institutions, I do not feel any discrimination. However, on the society side I sometimes feel discrimination" (personal communication, July 6, 2013). Again, a few Christians also said that they sometimes feel discrimination, for example, Ambreen Johnson, a Christian, said "Christians feel a sort of discrimination from the societal side. We are compelled and even warned in our homes not to discuss anything which will mentally harm Muslims" (personal communication, June 17, 2013).

Majority of the Pakhtun interviewees were of the opinion that minorities are not treated well and are sometimes discriminated against. For example, Amanat Shah, a Pakhtun and former Member of the KP Provincial Assembly, said "Sometimes we feel and there are cases where minorities, both religious and linguistic, are discriminated and are the victims of prejudices and stereotyping. However, this discrimination is experienced more by linguistic minorities than religious minorities. This situation needs overhauling and rectification so that we treat minorities and their cultures with respect and dignity. However, minorities also have to stand for their rights and mobilize themselves. They have a sense of deprivation and inferiority complex which need to be overcome" (personal

communication, July 4, 2013). Nargis Zaman, a Pakhtun, said "As per my experience at school, college and university level, I have seen that we [Muslims and non-Muslims] have always kept a gap between us. This is also relevant for Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns. I don't know why it is so. But I think that we have been constantly fed by our society that gap must be kept and that they [non-Muslims] belong to a different religion or so. I believe that they do not enjoy their rights fully and are not treated well. Religious minorities feel discrimination at society level while at state level they are treated equally" (personal communication, August 17, 2013). However, Rahim Dad Khan, a Pakhtun who has remained twice as the Senior Minister of KP, was of the opinion that discrimination is a class oriented phenomenon. He said "Here in KP we have backwardness and the backward, poor and destitute persons irrespective of the fact whether they belong to dominant or non-dominant group are discriminated" (personal communication, August 6, 2013).

Significant difference of opinion regarding discrimination was found between married and single respondents of the minority groups. A higher percentage of married respondents (64.38%) than single respondents (55.73%) were of the opinion that they feel no discrimination on the basis of religion or language. Similarly, significant gender and marital status wise differences were found among the Pakhtuns regarding the discrimination of religious minorities. A comparatively higher percentage of Pakhtun male (60.36%) than female respondents (51.35%) said that religious minorities are not discriminated on the basis of religion. While for the linguistic minorities, 78.38% of Pakhtun male and 71.35% of female respondents said that linguistic minorities are not discriminated on the basis of language. Similarly, a much higher percentage of married Pakhtun (60.78%) compared to single respondents (48.68%) said that religious minorities are not discriminated on the basis of religion. For linguistic minorities too 78.82% of Pakhtun married and 69.08% of single respondents were of the opinion that linguistic minorities are not discriminated on the basis of their languages.

A related question with the one as above is "Have the demands of linguistic and religious minorities been practically heard and fulfilled by the state?" The answer to this question will show the attitudes of the religio-cultural groups towards the

fulfillment of their demands by the state. I have mentioned the demands of the religious and linguistic minorities which run high at their demand lists in Chapter 3, but whether their demands have been given any serious thought by the state. The present study shows that a little more than half of the total respondents declared that the demands of the minorities are practically heard and fulfilled. As Table 47 shows, on average 56.63% of the total respondents (2977) gave the above opinion. The highest percentage of respondents (85.12%) who claimed that their demands have been practically heard and fulfilled came from the Sikh community who were followed by Christians (65.09%) and Gujars (59.38%). The percentage of Pakhtuns who claimed that minorities' demands have been practically heard and fulfilled was 70.52%. However, the lowest percentage of respondents (34.14%) who claimed that their demands have been practically heard and fulfilled came from Hindko speakers who were followed by Seraikis (37.20%) and Kohistanis (46.75%).

Table 47: Have the demands of minorities been heard and fulfilled by the state

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	37 10.22%	56 15.47%	99 27.35%	41 11.33%	21 5.80%	89 24.59%	19 5.25%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	23 6.95%	35 10.57%	55 16.62%	20 6.04%	41 12.39%	103 31.12%	54 16.3%	331 100%
	Kohistani	22 7.14%	42 13.64%	80 25.97%	40 12.99%	65 21.10%	42 13.64%	17 5.52%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	61 14.99%	91 22.36%	135 33.17%	45 11.06%	22 5.41%	52 12.78%	1 0.25%	407 100%
	Seraiki	37 11.01%	26 7.74%	62 18.45%	25 7.44%	47 13.99%	80 23.81%	59 17.6%	336 100%
	Gujar	40 11.20%	57 15.97%	115 32.21%	11 3.08%	83 23.25%	38 10.64%	13 3.64%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	46 14.47%	86 27.04%	75 23.58%	27 8.49%	18 5.66%	53 16.67%	13 4.09%	318 100%
	Hindu	16 7.17%	19 8.52%	86 38.57%	22 9.87%	29 13%	43 19.28%	8 3.59%	223 100%
	Sikh	17 5.06%	103 30.65%	166 49.40%	19 5.65%	10 2.98%	12 3.57%	9 2.68%	336 100%
	Total	299 10.04%	514 17.27%	873 29.32%	250 8.40%	336 11.29%	512 17.20%	193 6.48%	2977 100%

The findings of the interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups show a mix response about the above statement. Interviewees from Sikhs, Chitralis, Gujars and Christians said that most but not all of their demands have

been practically heard and fulfilled. For example, Sundar Singh, a Sikh, said "Our demands have been partially fulfilled" (personal communication, July 30, 2013). Father Shaukat, a Christian, said "Most of our demands are practically heard and have been fulfilled" (personal communication, June 3, 2013). Similarly, Assia Bibi, a Gujar, said "Our demands are heard and partially fulfilled" (personal communication, May 16, 2013).

However, interviewees from Hindko, Seraiki, and Hindu groups said that their demands have not been given proper hearing. For example, Baba Haider Zaman, a Hindko speaker and leader of the Movement for Hazara Province, said "Our demands were/are neither properly heard nor implemented. We have been neglected in every field. The result is that we have started a movement for a separate province to be named as Hazara. Had our demands been heard and fulfilled, we would have not started this movement for a separate Hazara province. If the deprivation of various linguistic groups is not removed, the results would be dangerous" (personal communication, April 14, 2013).

Majority of Seraikis who were interviewed said that their demands have not been given serious thought. For example, Zafar Durani, a Seraiki and leader of Seraiki National Party, said "Our demands are not given priority. They are just only heard but not honestly implemented. This attitude of non-seriousness given to the demands of Seraikis has engendered the demand for a separate province. Again, most of the food stuffs go from DI Khan and are used somewhere else. We contribute good revenue. The dominant group [Pakhtun] takes resources from here [DI Khan] which are utilized for the benefits of others" (personal communication, March 25, 2013).

Similarly, Hindus also complained that their demands are heard but not fulfilled. For example, A. Ashok Chouhan, a Hindu, said "I do not think our demands have been properly heard and fulfilled. As I told you [interviewer] earlier, we have problems in accommodation. Majority of us are living in rental houses. Government's colonies are made for Muslims but not for religious minorities. At least the government should take our confiscated temples from the confiscators and should build a colony for us. Similarly, *Eids, Christmas* etc. are celebrated on

media but our religious events are not given time in media" (personal communication, June 29, 2013).

The interviewees from the dominant group also recognized that the serious demands of the minorities are not wholeheartedly fulfilled. For example, Maulana Muhammad Qasim, a Pakhtun and former Member of the National Assembly, said "Minorities are to some extent right that their demands are heard but not properly fulfilled. At central level some of their genuine demands are not fulfilled. In theory we have given them rights and passed many projects for their uplift but there are problems in their practical implementation. Majority of the demands of the minorities is genuine and need to be fulfilled" (personal communication, August 4, 2013). Similarly, Rahim Dad Khan, a Pakhtun and former Senior Minister of KP, said "Religious minorities are treated according to the constitution. Fundamental rights and liberties have been guaranteed to them and they enjoy them. At state level they are treated equally. But sometimes international events affect our relations with religious minorities. For example, any mistreatment of Muslims in India will aggravate the position of Hindus in Pakistan. Again, at society level we see some cases where religious minorities are ignored and are not given proper respect. There is no problem with linguistic minorities as far as respect to their culture is concerned. However, their [linguistic minorities] economic demands are not properly implemented" (personal communication, August 6, 2013).

Similarly, this study also evaluated the attitudes of the targeted religio-linguistic groups in KP towards the status of women's rights in each group i.e. whether women have equal rights as men in the groups. On the status of women's right, significant variation in attitudes was found among the various religio-linguistic groups. As shown in Table 48, on average, a majority of 59.46% of the total respondents were of the opinion that women have equal rights as men in KP.

The highest claim of women having equal rights as men in a group came from Sikh community (92.86%). Sikhs were followed by Hindus (71.30%) and Chitralis (69.89%). However, the lowest support for the statement that women have equal rights as men in a group came from Hindko speakers (42.90%) followed by Kohistanis (46.43%) and Pakhtuns (46.93%). It can be said that

though in certain linguistic groups (Chitrali, Seraiki, Gujar) and all the religious minority groups (Christian, Hindu and Sikh) the rights of women are safeguarded and they have about equal rights as men, in KP, the dominant group (Pakhtun) and certain other linguistic group (Hindko speaking and Kohistani) do not give equal rights to women and they are not treated as equally as men.

A slight difference of opinion was found between male and female respondents. A higher percentage (61.28%) of male than female respondents (57.36%) was of the opinion that women's rights are equal to men in KP society. Similarly, marriage effect was also found. A higher percentage of single respondents (63.42%) than married respondents (56.86%) were of the opinion that women have equal rights to men in KP society.

Table 48: Women have equal rights as men in our groups

Groups/ Linguistic Groups	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	77 21.27%	103 28.45%	73 20.17%	11 3.04%	13 3.59%	55 15.19%	30 8.29%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	36 10.88%	55 16.62%	51 15.41%	8 2.42%	35 10.6%	95 28.70%	51 15.4%	331 100%
	Kohistanis	23 7.47%	44 14.29%	76 24.68%	23 7.47%	62 20.1%	50 16.23%	30 9.74%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	42 10.32%	81 19.90%	68 16.71%	9 2.21%	35 8.60%	135 33.17%	37 9.09%	407 100%
	Seraiki	77 22.92%	51 15.18%	65 19.35%	16 4.76%	30 8.93%	59 17.56%	38 11.3%	336 100%
	Gujar	16 4.48%	88 24.65%	100 28.01%	9 2,52%	40 11.2%	89 24.93%	15 4.20%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	58 18.24%	75 23.58%	41 12.89%	18 5.66%	23 7.23%	67 21.07%	36 11.3%	318 100%
	Hindu	34 15.25%	60 26.91%	65 29.15%	3 1.35%	22 9.87%	36 16.14%	3 1.35%	223 100%
	Sikh	120 35.71%	154 45.83%	38 11.31%	3 0.89%	10 2.98%	9 2.68%	2 0.60%	336 100%
	Total	482 16.19%	711 23.88%	577 19.38%	100 3.36%	270 9.07%	595 19.99%	242 8.13%	2977 100%

The above results were also complemented by the interviews conducted during the field work with the members of the targeted group. For example, Gobind Ram, a Sikh, said "In our group women have the same rights as men. There is no difference" (personal communication, July 15, 2013). Masaud Anwar, a Chitrali, said "Yes, women are treated equally but in some cases women's rights are

ignored" (personal communication, April 26, 2013). Similarly, Ann Mehwish, a Christian, said "Theoretically and practically women in Christian society have equal rights as compared to men" (personal communication, June 13, 2013). However, interviewees of some groups like Hindko, Kohistani and Pakhtun said that their group does not give women equal rights as men. For example, Juma Faqir, a Kohistani, said "Women do not have equal rights as men in our group" (personal communication, May 23, 2013). Muhammad Ashraf Tenoli, a Hindko speaker, said "A gap is there between the rights of men and women in our group. Women have rights but not as equivalent as those of men" (personal communication, April 8, 2013). Similarly, Fazal Malik, a Pakhtun, said "Women have not been given the status they deserve in our Pakhtun group. They are treated as subordinate to men and have been given inferior position with most of their rights violated" (personal communication, August 13, 2013).

4.7. EVALUATING THE ATTITUDES OF CULTURAL GROUPS IN KP TOWARDS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEORIES OF KUKATHAS, KYMLICKA, TAYLOR, PAREKH AND MODOOD

This dissertation also tries to test the attitudinal status of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural difference and the management of plurality in the light of the basic assumptions of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh, and Modood. As Kukathas and Kymlicka position their theories at both the extreme of multiculturalism spectrum[45] leaving those of Taylor's, Parekh's and Modood's to lay at the middle, I mainly focus on Kukathas's and Kymlicka's assumptions, touching Taylor, Parekh and Modood only where necessary.

I start from the theory expounded by Kukathas. The findings obtained from the data regarding various statements, as given below, show that the KP society

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[45]As I have mentioned in chapter 1, I take multiculturalism as a policy or approach of accepting the fact of multiculturality. Multiculturalism can be taken in both broader and narrow sense. In a narrow sense (one extreme) multiculturalism refers to a government policy in dealing with plurality by actively promoting, preserving or supporting cultural diversity using a range of instruments from subsidy to preferential treatment, a view supported by Kymlicka. In a broad sense, multiculturalism is the name of policies ranging from benign neglect and toleration, a view supported by Kukathas (other extreme), to actively supporting, preserving, respecting and recognizing minority groups. I take multiculturalism in broader sense which covers the theories of Kukathas and Kymlicka at both the extremes.

supports some of the basic assumptions set out by Kukathas. For example, Kukathas, while presenting his theory of liberal society emphasizes the possibility of individual's exit from communities or associations whose authority the individual does not accept (Kukathas, 2003: 24-5). Kukathas proclaims that toleration requires that no recognition be given to any authority's claim to deny an individual's freedom to exit an association in which he cannot in good conscience remain (Kukathas, 2003: 37) because essential to the liberal standpoint is the belief that individuals should not be forced to act against their conscience i.e. to act in a way they consider wrong. In this regard, a society is a liberal one if individuals are at liberty to reject the authority of one association in order to place themselves under the authority of another (Kukathas, 2003: 25). This is, in fact, the 'no-right' of any authority to coerce people into becoming or remaining members of a community or association (Kukathas, 2003: 97). However, Kukathas's theory gives no right to individual to get benefits from the group/association which he has left. The group can deny him his property or any other benefits from group. The present study tests the position and status of KP society in the light of this assumption set out by Kukathas. It tests whether the people in KP accept the claim of the members of a group to get benefits from the group after they have left it. However, it must be kept in mind that this test is specifically for KP society. It cannot be generalized to other situations unless tested there. As Table 49 shows, on average 55.93% of the total respondents (2977) were of the opinion that those members who exit their group should not receive any benefit from the group. The group allows the dissenters the right to exit but not the right to receive benefits from the group after they have left it. Thus generally the KP society fulfills the criteria for a liberal society set out by Kukathas.

The highest percentage of respondents denying the members who exit the group the right to get benefits from the group came from the Sikh community (81.25%) which was followed by Hindus (78.92%). However, the lowest response came from Chitralis 42.54% of them said that they cannot tolerate their members getting benefits from their group after they have left their group. Chitralis were followed by Seraikis (44.94%) and Hindko speakers (45.62%). One important finding was that non-Muslims (69.18%) were more assertive than Muslims (50.43%) in not

tolerating the members who exit the group to get benefits from the group. Similarly, significant difference of opinion was found between married and single respondents with a higher percentage of married (58.41%) than single (51.92%) respondents denying the members who exit the group the right to get benefits from the group.

Table 49: I tolerate if a member of my group leaves my group and still claims benefits from my group

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	37 10.2%	79 21.82%	52 14.36%	40 11.05%	18 4.97%	102 28.18%	34 9.39%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	18 5.44%	70 21.15%	34 10.27%	58 17.52%	15 4.53%	93 28.10%	43 12.99%	331 100%
	Kohistani	12 3.90%	31 10.06%	66 21.43%	11 3.57%	17 5.52%	98 31.82%	73 23.70%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	22 5.41%	69 16.95%	50 12.29%	39 9.58%	33 8.11%	136 33.42%	58 14.25%	407 100%
	Seraiki	35 10.4%	70 20.83%	54 16.07%	26 7.74%	19 5.65%	68 20.24%	64 19.05%	336 100%
	Gujar	25 7%	51 14.29%	74 20.73%	19 5.32%	24 6.72%	124 34.73%	40 11.20%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	24 7.55%	61 19.18%	42 13.21%	34 10.69%	14 4.40%	99 31.13%	44 13.84%	318 100%
	Hindu	1 0.45%	7 3.14%	28 12.56%	11 4.93%	10 4.48%	93 41.70%	73 32.74%	223 100%
	Sikh	6 1.79%	21 6.25%	20 5.95%	16 4.76%	14 4.17%	127 37.80%	132 39.29%	336 100%
	Total	179 6.01%	459 15.42%	420 14.11%	254 8.53%	164 5.51%	940 31.58%	561 18.84%	2977 100%

The findings obtained from the interviews were also supportive of the above results. Majority of the interviewees of all the targeted groups were of the opinion that they allow their members to exit the group but not to receive benefits from the group after they have left it. For example, Sant Singh, a Sikh, said "It is up to the members of our community to remain in our group or to exit it. But I cannot and do not tolerate if a member of my community leaves my group and still derives benefits from it" (personal communication, July 12, 2013). Ravi Kumar, a Hindu, said "I allow the members of my group to leave my group. But they should not receive any benefit from my group after they have left it" (personal communication, July 13, 2013). Fazal Elahi, a Chitrali, said "The members of my group have the right and should have the right to exit my group but I cannot

tolerate that they should receive benefits from my group once they have exited" (personal communication, April 24, 2013). Similarly, Jimmy Matthew, a Christian, said "No. I do not support that a member of my group leaves my group and still receives benefits from my group" (personal communication, June 20, 2013).

The second assumption of Kukathas on the basis of which KP society is tested is the attitudes of cultural groups towards state neutrality (color-blind approach). Difference-blind liberalism offers a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can meet and coexist. A liberal society must remain neutral on the question of good life and restrict itself to ensuring that the state deals equally with all. It is the concept of benign neglect of which Kukathas is the firm supporter. Benign neglect is the concept of a refusal to be guided by the goal of equality in social policy or institutional design. His multiculturalism neither suppresses nor promotes groups. It is a stance that is against the idea of cultural construction (Kukathas, 2003: 237). According to Kukathas (1998: 691) "Liberalism might well be described as the politics of indifference".

But the problem is that the state does take an active part in the formation of culture and identity construction. It is not always neutral and in the guise of neutrality it promotes the dominant culture. Minority rights are demanded simply to rectify these un-chosen situations. Kymlicka, while criticizing the concept of benign neglect, says "Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. Once we recognize this, we need to rethink the justice of minority rights claims" (Kymlicka, 1995: 108). Kymlicka says that 'benign neglect' is not neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups. It is hardly benign because "It ignores the fact that members of a national minority face a disadvantage which the members of the majority do not face" (Kymlicka, 1995: 110-11). Parekh (2000: 179) and Nafiz Tok (2003) also expound that state is not a culturally neutral instrument of order and stability but is embedded in a particular vision of political order and relies on a concealed assumption of cultural homogeneity. Taylor (1994: 62) is also of the opinion that liberalism is "A

fighting creed" and "Can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality. The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture" (Taylor, 1994: 43). Galeotti (2002: 55) also thinks on the same line saying that it is true that liberal neutrality is not so neutral after all, and the secular state not so thoroughly secularized (Galeotti, 2002: 124).

I take neutrality as anti-discrimination and anti-perfectionism which means not imposing only one perspective of good life and a full inclusion of minorities in public affairs as presented by Galeotti (2002: 57). It is the equal liberty to pursue any perception of good. It is the perception that the state should not discriminate against those who have a different perception of good, religion or language.

The attitudes of the respondents of the targeted groups about the state neutrality in KP is given in Table 50 which shows that on average 92.07% of the total respondents (2977) declared that the state should be neutral among the various conceptions of good, religions and cultures and should treat all the groups equally without any discrimination.

Table 50: The state should be neutral among different religions and cultures

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	163 45.03%	125 34.53%	61 16.85%	10 2.76%	0 0%	3 0.83%	0 0%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	134 40.48%	115 37.74%	44 13.29%	30 9.06%	2 0.60%	5 1.51%	1 0.30%	331 100%
	Kohistani	139 45.13%	114 37.01%	36 11.69%	19 6.17%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	123 30.22%	151 37.10%	89 21.87%	22 5.41%	7 1.72%	14 3.44%	1 0.25%	407 100%
	Seraiki	140 41.67%	104 30.95%	33 9.82%	29 8.63%	8 2.38%	12 3.57%	10 2.98%	336 100%
	Gujar	203 56.86%	104 29.13%	39 10.92%	10 2.80%	1 0.28%	0 0%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	105 33.02%	143 44.97%	33 10.38%	33 10.4%	2 0.63%	1 0.31%	1 0.31%	318 100%
	Hindu	82 36.77%	114 51.12%	22 9.87%	4 1.79%	0 0%	0 0%	1 0.45%	223 100%
	Sikh	231 68.75%	88 26.19%	7 2.08%	9 2.68%	0 0%	1 0.30%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	1320 44.34%	1057 35.51%	364 12.23%	166 5.58%	20 0.67%	36 1.21%	14 0.47%	2977 100%

The highest percentage of respondents came from Hindus 97.76% of them gave their opinion that the state should be neutral. This shows the hidden apprehension of the majority of Hindus that their lives and property could be secured by the political arrangement in which the state is neutral. Hindus were followed by Sikhs (97.02%), Gujars (96.92%) and Chitralis (96.41%).

Majority of the interviewees from the targeted groups were also of the opinion that state should be neutral among various perceptions of good life. For example, Imran Khan Jadoon, a Hindko speaker, said "This is very wrong that you protect Islam but are indifferent towards Christianity or Hinduism. If you protect or support one religion or culture, you must protect all and if you can't protect all then protect none. State must have a neutral and impartial standing" (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun, said "Religion is a personal matter of a man. State is like a father and citizens like children. The father should not discriminate among his children and should give his children equal rights irrespective of the fact whether one child is Christian, other is Hindu and still another is Muslim etc. The state should treat all the citizen equally and should be neutral among various perceptions of goods" (personal communication, August 14, 2013). Similarly, Abdul Latif, a Chitrali, said "State should remain neutral among various groups. As the members of all the groups are the citizens of the state, they should have the same rights and perform the same duties" (personal communication, April 27, 2013).

However, the leaders of the Islamic political parties were the firm supporters of the state supporting Islam. For example, Amanat Shah, a Pakhtun and a member of Jamiat- Ulama-i-Islam-a religious party, said "As our state was founded in the name of Islam, it should keep Islam in mind while conducting its business and should be tilted towards Islam" (personal communication, July 4, 2013). Similar opinion was expressed by Haji Habib ur Rahman, Minister for Zakat of KP (personal communication, August 8, 2013) and Siraj ul Haq, Senior Minister of KP (personal communication, August 8, 2013) (both Pakhtuns and member/Amir of Jumat-i-Islami-a religious party). They were of the opinion that the state must support Islam and minorities should be treated within the limits of Islam.

The third assumption of Kukathas under which KP society was evaluated is 'interest gap'. Kukathas, while expounding his theory of a good society, says that a starting point of a good theory is not the good or interest of some particular group, community or association because human societies are mutable and there is plurality of interests within a society (Kukathas, 2003: 85). Most of the groups are not homogeneous at any given time. Within all communities there are often important differences and conflict of interests. Internal division may take two forms (i) divisions between subgroups within the larger community; and (ii) divisions between elite and masses which may have quite different interests. Thus, Kukathas takes individual rather than group as the starting point of his theory and takes collectivities only instrumentally good. They matter only if they contribute to the wellbeing of the individual (Kukathas, 2003: 86).

The present study tests the status of KP society regarding interest gap. It tests this Kukathasian assumption of internal division within a group between the elite and masses in groups in KP. The study tests whether a division is really found between the elite and masses. However, it must be kept in mind that this test is specifically for KP society. It cannot be generalized to other situations unless tested there. As Table 51 shows, a majority of all the respondents (61.14%) replied that their leaders do not represent their demands, thus, showing internal divisions of demands/interests within the groups between the elite and the masses. The highest percentage (75.91%) of respondents who presented the above opinion came from Gujar community which was followed by Hindko speakers (66.47%) and Kohistanis (65.91%). A comparatively lower response came from Chitralis 51.93% of them said that their leaders promote their own interests at the expense of theirs (masses). Chitralis were followed by Pakhtuns (52.58%) and Sikhs (58.63%). A slight difference of opinion regarding 'interest gap' was found between male and female respondents. A comparatively higher percentage of female (62.55%) than male respondents (59.90%) was of the opinion that 'interest gap' exist between elite and masses of a group.

Table 51: Our leaders represent our demands

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	0 0%	54 14.92%	83 22.93%	37 10.22%	57 15.75%	91 25.14%	40 11.05%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	7 2.11%	39 11.78%	43 12.99%	22 6.65%	36 10.88%	100 30.21%	84 25.38%	331 100%
	Kohistani	0 0%	3 0.97%	83 26.95%	19 6.17%	46 14.94%	103 33.44%	54 17.53%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	0 0%	24 5.90%	141 34.64%	28 6.88%	71 17.44%	107 26.29%	36 8.85%	407 100%
	Seraiki	16 4.76%	32 9.52%	58 17.26%	28 8.33%	41 12.20%	81 24.11%	80 23.81%	336 100%
	Gujar	2 0.56%	13 3.64%	51 14.29%	20 5.60%	98 27.45%	114 31.93%	59 16.53%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	0 0%	9 2.83%	70 22.01%	46 14.47%	60 18.87%	83 26.10%	50 15.72%	318 100%
	Hindu	0 0%	5 2.24%	45 20.18%	40 17.94%	55 24.66%	61 27.35%	17 7.62%	223 100%
	Sikh	0 0%	15 4.46%	93 27.68%	31 9.23%	61 18.15%	110 32.74%	26 7.74%	336 100%
	Total	25 0.84%	194 6.52%	667 22.41%	271 9.10%	525 17.64%	850 28.55%	445 14.95%	2977 100%

The findings collected from the interviews conducted with the members of targeted groups also reflected the same attitude. For example, Muhammad Nabi, a Gujar, said "Yes. Our leaders are not always trustworthy and try to promote their own narrow interests at the expense of those of the masses" (personal communication, May 12, 2013). Muhammad Zahid Khan, a Hindko speaker, said "Our leaders are selfish. They are not sincere to the masses. They exploit the masses to promote their own narrow interests" (personal communication, April 17, 2013). Farooq Akhtar, a Seraiki, said "Leaders are always selfish. They promote their own interest at the cost of ours. There is always a gap between what they promote and what we want to be promoted" (personal communication, March 26, 2013). Fazal Azim, a Chitrali, said "We don't see that our leaders work for the fulfillment of our demands. There is a big gap between what they demand and what we demand. They have their own axe to grind" (personal communication, April 23, 2013). Similarly, Sechem Rafiq, a Christian, said "Yes, a big gap is there. They [leaders] are not our true representatives" (personal communication, June 7, 2013).

However, the leaders of various groups, when interviewed, said that there is no such difference of interests between the leaders and masses of a group. For example, Baba Haider Zaman, a Hindko speaker and the leader of the Movement for Hazara Province, said "There is no difference between the demands of the masses and leaders' demands. Here in Hazara every one demands one thing: a separate province of Hazara. This is the only demand of both the leader and the masses of the Hindko group" (personal communication, April 14, 2013). Baba Haider Zaman is the leader of Hazara *Tehreek* (Hazara Movement) for a separate province. He might see his own interest in the creation of a separate province and links his own demands with those of the masses. Similar response as that of Baba Haider Zaman was given by Zafar Durani who is the leader of Seraiki National Party (personal communication, March 25, 2013).

The fourth assumption of Kukathas under which KP society was evaluated is 'toleration'. Kukathas also support toleration (though the word toleration may mean differently to different people in KP but as a whole they mean that the minority should be left free without interference to develop and act upon its culture and religion). For Kukathas, to live in harmony in a society, differences and dissents must be tolerated (Kukathas, 2003: 76). Kukathas's litmus test for the liberal society is toleration (to allow individual to act according to his conscience). The more an association tolerates differences, the more liberal it is; and the more it suppresses dissents, the less liberal it is (Kukathas, 2003: 24) and KP society is considered by the majority of the respondents as tolerant. This also shows the multicultural policies of the KP government and society.

As shown in Table 52, 82.77% on average of the total respondents (2977) agreed with the statement that KP society is culturally tolerant towards minority groups. The highest assertion that KP society is tolerant came from Sikh community (95.24%) followed by Gujars (86.55%) and Chitralis (86.19%) while the lowest support for the tolerant nature of KP society came from Seraikis (70.24%) followed by Hindko speakers (72.21%).

Table 52: Pakhtun society is culturally tolerant towards minority groups

Groups/	Choices	SA	A	NA	U	ND	D	SD	Total
Linguistic Groups	Chitrali	67 18.51%	157 43.37%	88 24.31%	27 7.46%	5 1.38%	17 4.70%	1 0.28%	362 100%
	Hindko speakers	47 14.20%	94 28.40%	98 29.61%	26 7.85%	21 6.34%	40 12.08%	5 1.51%	331 100%
	Kohistani	73 23.70%	98 31.82%	85 27.60%	23 7.47%	27 8.77%	2 0.65%	0 0%	308 100%
	Pakhtun	119 29.24%	154 37.84%	83 20.39%	29 7.13%	19 4.67%	3 0.74%	0 0%	407 100%
	Seraiki	54 16.07%	91 27.08%	91 27.08%	22 6.55%	20 5.95%	44 13.10%	14 4.17%	336 100%
	Gujar	96 26.89%	106 29.69%	107 29.97%	26 7.28%	11 3.08%	11 3.08%	0 0%	357 100%
Religious Minority Groups	Christian	56 17.61%	123 38.68%	88 27.67%	31 9.75%	14 4.40%	6 1.89%	0 0%	318 100%
	Hindu	28 12.56%	70 31.39%	72 32.29%	8 3.59%	27 12.1%	17 7.62%	1 0.45%	223 100%
	Sikh	79 23.51%	156 46.43%	85 25.30%	2 0.60%	13 3.87%	1 0.30%	0 0%	336 100%
	Total	619 20.79%	1048 35.20%	797 26.77%	194 6.52%	157 5.27%	141 4.74%	21 0.71%	2977 100%

Interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups also showed the same results. For example, Ashfaq Ahmad, a Chitrali, said "Pakhtuns are very tolerant toward us. We feel no threat to our culture and language from Pakhtuns, never" (personal communication, April 22, 2013). Ann Mehwish, a Christian, said "Though there are some elements which are intolerant, as a whole the KP society is tolerant. Again, minorities are treated comparatively well in KP than other provinces of Pakistan" (personal communication, June 13, 2013). Jamshed, a Gujar, said "We are treated well in the Pakhtun society. Not only is our group but other minority groups are also treated well" (personal communication, May 17, 2013). Komal Chanda, a Hindu, said "Pakhtun society is both tolerant and intolerant but the ratio of tolerant Pakhtuns is higher than intolerants. Mostly illiterate Muslims create problems while the educated Muslims are quite normal" (personal communication, July 6, 2013). Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, said "Pakhtun society is tolerant toward religious minorities. When we have marriage and death's ceremonies, the Muslims vacate their Hujras (places where guests are entertained) for us which we use for three days. The government also cares for our betterment and we freely enjoy our rights and freedoms" (personal

communication, July 14, 2013). Maulana Muhammad Qasim, a Pakhtun, said "We have never heard that non-Muslims have ever been treated badly. Pakhtun society is tolerant and has not imposed its culture, language and religion on other groups" (personal communication, August 4, 2013).

However, Kukathas's claim that minority rights should not be given to minorities is not supported by this study because as shown in Table 37, a majority of 86.33% on average of the total respondents (2977) supported the provision of group rights to minority groups. Similarly, a majority of 84.33% on average of the total respondents in KP supported the provision of proportional representation right to linguistic minority groups (Table 38)

The present dissertation also tests the following two hypotheses related to Kukathas's theory in KP.

Hypothesis 1: Pakhtun society is generally tolerant towards minority groups.

As shown in Table 52, 82.77% on average of the total respondents (2977) agreed with the statement that KP society is generally tolerant towards minority groups. The same attitude was also expressed by the interviewees of the targeted group, thus, approving my hypothesis that KP society is generally tolerant towards minority groups.

Hypothesis 2: An "Interest gap" exists between the members and leaders of a group.

The study tests whether differences are found between the demands/interests of the elite and masses of groups in KP. However, as I have mentioned earlier, this test is specifically to judge KP society in the light of the basic assumption of Kukathas. It cannot be generalized to other situations unless tested there. As Table 51 shows, a majority of all the respondents in KP replied that their leaders do not represent their demands, thus, showing internal divisions within the groups between the elite and the masses. An average a majority of 61.14% of the total respondents (2977) were of the opinion that their demands and their leaders' demands are different which proves the given hypothesis. The findings collected from the interviews conducted with the members of the targeted groups as given

above also reflect the same attitude and ultimately proves our hypothesis and also test Kukathasian assumption in KP that an 'interest' gap exist between the leaders and masses of a group.

Similarly, some, but not other, of the assumptions of Kymlicka's theory are also seen as fulfilled by the KP society. For example, his theory is based on the fact that culture is important for a group because it provides a range of options from which we choose. The empirical study in KP supports this claim with a high percentage. As shown in Table 21, 97.94% of all the respondents agreed with the statement that culture has importance for a group. However, here the ways are parted. Majority of the respondents in KP said that culture is important not because it provides a range of options from which we choose but because firstly; it shows our identity and secondly; it is the legacy of our forefathers. As shown in Table 22, 86.53% (P_1 89.05%, P_2 9.51%, P_3 1.32% and P_4 0.12%) of the total respondents said that culture is important because it shows our identity. This line of thinking support Modood's assumption in KP who says that culture has importance for the people because it shows the identity of the group that matters to people marked by differences (Modood, 2008, 2010b, 2013: 39-40). The present study empirically rejects Kymlicka's assumption but accept Modood's assumption in KP by saying that culture is important not because it provides the range of options from which we choose but because it shows the identity of the members of a group.

Again, Kymlicka is against the right of internal restrictions for a group, if these internal restrictions are intended to be used against the fundamental human rights (Kymlicka, 1989: 240-141, 1995: 152, 2001b: 27-28). KP society supports this Kymlicka's assertion. As shown in Table 41, a clear majority of 81.73% on average of the total respondents (2977) were against the demand for internal restrictions for a group, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights. Again, Kymlicka (1995: 37-8), Taylor (1994: 40), Parekh (2000) and Modood (2009b, 2013: 58-9) are in favor of external supports for minority groups in the form of group rights and this claim for minority rights is also supported by the present study in KP. As shown in Table 37, a majority of 86.33% on average of the total respondents (2977) supported the provision of group rights to minority groups if those rights protect them from the decisions of the larger society. Kymlicka

supports proportional representation for minority groups which the present study also supports. As Table 38 shows, 84.65% on average of the total respondents (2977) gave their support for providing proportional representation to the linguistic groups. Again, the religious minorities have been given representation rights (there are three seats for religious minorities in KP Provincial Assembly) and polyethnic rights, for example, Sikhs have the right to perform their religious practices/symbols like wearing of turban and having kirpan while in Pakistan Army and KP police.

Again, Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood are against any forced assimilationist tendencies. The attitudes of the cultural groups and also the actual practices and policies for managing plurality in KP society are against any tendency towards assimilation. For example, as shown in Table 28, 56.3% of the total respondents said that groups in KP should not blend in dominant Pakhtun culture. Even the softened way of losing one's culture and forming a new one by mixing of groups together to form a new identity, not necessarily Pakhtun, was rejected by the members of various groups with a high percentage of respondents (68.27%), as shown in Table 29. Again, 63.69% of the total respondents (2977) were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP (Table 30). Similarly, an average of 53.85% of the total respondents (2977) was of the opinion that there has been no attempt of Muslimization in KP (Table 31). Again, as shown in Table 32, majority of 60.87% on average of the total respondents (2977) said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, tradition and language of their group. These findings show liberal and non-assimilationist tendencies in KP.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation evaluated the attitudes of the religio-linguistic groups in KP towards cultural differences, plurality and the policies and practices adopted by the KP state and society for managing diversity and tried to add to the existing literature empirically by conducting a field survey for collecting data through 2977 questionnaires and 80 personal interviews. Currently this is the only known study of this nature which has ever been conducted in Pakistan. Though this study cannot be generalized to the whole of Pakistan and has some limitations (see chapter 1), at least this dissertation gave a picture of the attitudinal status of the cultural groups towards cultural differences in one part (KP) of Pakistan. Study of the similar nature in other parts of Pakistan will contribute to further expand the frontiers of knowledge in the field and will enable us to give generalized assumptions not only about Pakistan but also about the developing states having the same nature of plurality as exists in Pakistan.

This dissertation empirically explored the attitudes of the various religio-linguistic groups towards various questions related to culture and cultural differences asked through questionnaire and interview in KP. It addressed the main question "What are the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences from liberal perspective?" Through this question I looked into the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards culture and cultural preservation, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism etc. I also judged the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the theories of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood.

Before the main question was addressed a foundation to this study was given in the second and third chapters. The second chapter of the dissertation gave a theoretical picture of the justification of minority rights within the liberal framework and explored the question of who is the rights' recipient-individual, group or both. It was argued that due to the rising demands of minorities and problems associated with plurality, the link between communitarianism and group rights, on the one hand, and between liberalism and individual rights, on the other,

is unable to account adequately for the problems arising out of plurality. The liberal theory needs to be remodeled just to address some of the apparent problems faced by minorities. It does not mean that collectivity is more important than the individual and, therefore, freedom and individual rights should be suppressed for the sake of collectivity but, as Kymlicka (2001a: 21) says, it should be considered as a debate about minority rights amongst liberals about the meaning of liberalism. In this sense the existence of group rights may be justifiable only as long as they are adjusted and understood in terms of individual rights. Thus, those group rights are acceptable which are reducible to individual and those which are irreducible; not based on the consent of the members of the group; and where the members of the groups have no right to exit, cannot be justified under liberal theory. This means that social group is accepted as an artifact of individuals and it has no distinct existence of its own apart from its members. It is important and has, if they, value because of its contribution to the well-being of individuals whose lives have the ultimate value (Kymlicka, 1989: 140). Thus, an attractive political theory must accommodate the claims of ethno-cultural minorities, on the one hand, and the promotion of responsible democratic citizenship, on the other.

The second chapter also critically analyzed the theories of Taylor, Parekh, Kymlicka, Kukathas and Modood: the theoretical foundation of this dissertation. Taylor argued that recognition of minority cultures is important because it is related to identity which is a person's understanding of who he or she is, and "A person or group of people can suffer real damage…if the people or society around them mirror back to them a…contemptible picture of themselves" (Taylor, 1994: 25). Taylor favored certain rights to be given to minorities in order to avoid discrimination. However, besides other weaknesses as shown in chapter 2, Taylor's theory had a sort of paternalistic germs. He seemed to give preference to the group rights over the individual rights and tried to constrain the autonomy of the future generations thus, enforcing conformity at the expense of individual specificity (Taylor, 1994: 58-59). I think we should recognize a group by the fact that it exists. It is the construct or artifact of its members who as 'individuals' cannot be denied recognition, that group's identity has value for its members and it is that significance of identity that we accord recognition to. Again, essentialist

form of recognition which assumes that groups and culture are fixed is also rejected (Kukathas, 1992; 2003: Ch. 2; Maclure, 2003, Modood, 2013).

Parekh went a step further than Taylor on the issue of recognition and pressed for a change in the attitude of the dominant section of society towards the minorities. For him, misrecognition can only be rectified by both undertaking a thorough critique of the dominant culture and drastically restructuring the existing inequalities in economic and political power. It requires needed changes in all the major areas of life. A plural society cannot remain stable unless it ensures that its various communities are justly recognized and have a just share in economic and political power (Parekh, 2000: 342-343). According to Parekh (1996, 2000, 269-273), the relations between majority and minorities should be adjusted on the basis of Operative Public Values (OPV) which provide the only generally acceptable starting point for a discussion on minority practices. If the minority defends and justifies its disputed practice, the practice should be allowed if not the OPV should prevail. However, if OPV are not beyond criticism and are often contested and only provisionally or pragmatically accepted by some of its members etc., as Parekh said, it would provide an unworkable and temporary stability to multicultural society and the members who object to them would be uneasy to obey them, mostly under compulsion. Parekh's case for OPV was vague. Sometimes he made them as a standard and judges minority practices on the basis of them (Parekh, 1996). At other places he said that minority's ways of life deserve respect and its practice should not be disallowed only because it offends OPV. This explanation of the OPV is too vague and renders the OPV unreliable mechanism for dealing with plurality.

Kymlicka theorized that three types of group rights should be given to minorities namely self-government rights (for national minorities); polyethnic rights (like Sikhs' exemption from wearing helmet; Jews to wear yarmulke etc.); and special representation rights[46]. By presenting a liberal defence of minority rights, Kymlicka (1995: 52; 1989: 175) argued that individual liberty is tied in some important ways to membership in one's national group and that societal culture

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[46] In *Politics in the vernacular* (2001a: 6), Kymlicka gives a stronger defense for minority rights saying "Minority rights are increasingly seen precisely as 'rights', the violation of which can be an assault on basic dignity and respect."

provides the medium of autonomy and autonomy means making choices amongst various options and societal culture not only provides those options, but also makes them meaningful to us (Kymlicka, 1995: 83; 1989: 165-169). Minority rights are consistent with the liberal principles of freedom and equality because cultural groups have two types of demands; those against its own members (internal restrictions); and those against the larger society to protect itself against the negative impacts of its decisions (external protections). The former demands are not while most of the latter are consistent with the liberal principles for the promotion of fairness among the groups. However, his theory of cultural rights and support for societal culture has some weaknesses highlighted in chapter 2. While pressing for the polyethnic rights for the minorities, Kymlicka went too far. While some of the polyethnic rights can be defended on the basis of justice and fair play, others could not. He (1995: 38) supported funding of the immigrants' language programs or arts groups. This is too heavy a demand which the state should not do business with because it will be the improper use of the tax payers' money. What the state can do is to avoid any external interference or restrictions in the group's initiatives to maintain and promote its language or arts programs.

Kukathas was mainly interested in finding out the principled basis of a free society having cultural diversity and group loyalties and the treatment of minorities by the institutions created by such a society. He was not concerned with the question "What the state or government does with problems arising out of plurality?" but with the sort of arrangement within which people having different perceptions of good life could co-exist. Such arrangement is an open society allowing for a variability of human arrangements; the freedom of association (and dissociation) and mutual toleration of associations none of which is privileged. A free society is not united by any shared doctrine, has no hierarchical arrangement of authorities but is a depiction of an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions with a range of authorities, each independent and responsible to its subjects (Kukathas, 2003: 4; 1992: 116), and reluctant to intervene in other's affairs (Kukathas, 2003: 8, 19). The very essence of liberalism, according to Kukathas (1997: 92), is the multiplicity of authority. If there is a final authority determining what ways are morally acceptable, liberalism is lost. For Kukathas, a free society is the only answer to the situation of plurality

where the groups with different proclivities can live together with harmony and no group has the right to compel any one to become or remain its member but rather the individuals have the right to form, reform and transform the group (Kukathas, 2003: 93). This is the freedom of association and dissociation arising out of the freedom of conscience which requires that none can be compelled to live under circumstance he morally objects to. Kukathas said that groups have internal differences and divisions within the groups; and also between elites and masses (interest gap) and, therefore, should not be given special rights (Kukathas, 2003: 33, 87; 1993: 156; 1992: 110-14). Thus, the starting point of Kukathas's theory is individual. Collectivities should be valued only when they contribute to individual's interests (Kukathas, 2003: 86). Kukathas is the firm supporter of 'toleration' and 'benign neglect'.

Modood argued that we have to modify the notion of secularism by redrawing the public-private boundary to adjust disadvantaged religious minorities in the public space (Modood, 2003, 2013: 63-6). Modood's approach was for an extension of a politics of differences to accommodate appropriate religious identities; a re-conceptualization of secularism and state neutrality and the strict public-private divide to a moderate and evolutionary secularism based on institutional adjustments; and a pragmatic case by case negotiated approach-both contextual and practical-to deal with conflicts (Modood, 2003).

The third chapter gave information about the nature of plurality in Pakistan. The chapter elaborated the position of civil society in Pakistan and discussed that since 1947 Pakistani civil society has been controlled by the state institutions during civil, martial law and mixed civil-military governments alike. The political culture of Pakistan to enable its society to take control over the arbitrary functioning of the state has remained underdeveloped and inadequate. Various reasons/arguments were offered for the weak and controlled position of society in Pakistan. The dominant position of military and bureaucracy are factors under whose hegemonic rule societal groups have remained stagnant and fragmented (Shafqat, 1997: 8-9, 255; Shah, 2004). Similarly, an unstable democratic process, non-independent role of judiciary, lack of respect for civil rights and freedom, and the ideological structure of state control are the obstacles impeding progress towards a truly functional civil society. The chapter showed that the state

sponsored ideology of Islam and the adoption of Urdu as national language without taking all the ethnic groups on board have created a sense of deprivation among the smaller ethnicities. Pakistani elite equate the recognition of ethnic languages with secession and consider it as a threat to the integrity and survival of Pakistan. Rightists and national elite, particularly Punjabis, have always looked through the prism of national integration with the application of Islam and Urdu as tools to achieve it and have mostly ignored the pluralist structure of Pakistani society. State sponsored Islamic ideology has been used to deny the ethnic minorities fair power sharing and legitimate rights in the name of national integration and homogeneity which has resulted in strong ethnic and tribal identities demanding recognition of their cultural and linguistic distinctions. Similarly, high degree of centralization of power and the underdeveloped nature of civil society are also the factors which have aggravated the conflicts arising out of religio-ethnic plurality; disadvantaged the ethnic minorities of the smaller provinces and marginalized the non-Muslim communities.

Pakistan's problems caused by plurality arise from the grievances of smaller ethnic groups from the central government dominated by Punjabis. Small ethnic groups complain about the dominance of the Punjab on such issues as fake census, spending comparatively more on Punjab, unfair distribution of resources and the dominant role of the army. The high representation of Punjabis in the military has contributed to a greater sense of deprivation among the general population outside the Punjab.

In Pakistan activism and demands on linguistic lines is considered as disintegrative. Such line of thinking is also discouraged by both the state and society in KP. This was demonstrated by Siraj ul Haq, the then Senior Minister of KP when he said "Minority is a term used only for non-Muslims living in Pakistan. We cannot use that term for linguistic non-dominant groups. All of these linguistic groups have the same rights and resources and none of them has ever been discriminated on the basis of language. It is not necessary to give these linguistic groups representation on the basis of language" (personal communication, August 8, 2013). However, the present dissertation shows that majority (84.65%) of the total respondents were of the opinion that linguistic groups should be given representation on the basis of population (Table 38). Thus,

it is recommended that representation on the basis of population for linguistic groups needs to be ensured in KP. If we look to the reality we find that there are many linguistic communities not only in KP but also in Pakistan which do not have equal representation (and sometimes no representation) in state institution. For example, no representative has ever been elected to the Provincial Assembly of KP or National Assembly of Pakistan from Seraiki linguistic group living in KP since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Thus, an explicit policy of proportionally accommodating various linguistic groups in state and provincial institutions is needed to bring about a harmonious co-existence of ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse groups in KP in particular and Pakistan in general.

Thus, the need of the day is to honestly implement the multinational federalism scheme with the provision of practical autonomy to the provinces. Both inclusion (in power-sharing and adequate representation) and exclusion (free to develop and preserve their culture) of the non-dominant ethnic groups should be adopted by the Pakistani state elite if national integrity is to be attained. This policy may create a sense of belonging among the smaller provinces and may thwart the separatist tendencies. Similarly, state neutrality and independence of judiciary, along with others, are the institutional tools which may help in avoiding the marginalization of religious minorities. Again, a greater awareness of the obligations and attributes of pluralism is an urgent need. Pakistani elite must recognize the plural nature of the society rather than imposing a unitary nationhood. Loyalties to the state can be augmented through representation and groups' alienation and separatist tendencies can be reversed if they are fairly represented in the state institutions. Again, an increase in the number of provinces from 4 up to 15 may not only solve the problem of domination of Punjab but may also help in acquiring good governance and addressing the grievances of the smaller provinces. However, as with the Eastern European state, provincial autonomy in Pakistan is linked mostly with security and the minority rights are seen through the security lenses but the demands of the smaller provinces and ethnicities may be genuine and it is hard to determine where domestic resentment ends and foreign instigation, incitement and encouragement begins. Feroz Ahmed (1995: xii, 160-1) also argues that suppression of diversity in the name of national

unity is counter-productive to the aims of suppression and that unity must be sought within the cultural and ethnic diversity of Pakistan. Thus, to adequately address the marginalization of the smaller provinces for state integrity, prosperity and development, Pakistan needs to reassess her policies and federalism to give greater voice to the smaller provinces. Diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict and civil wars. It is the behavior of the dominant groups and the state that makes the conditions for disturbance, disintegration and secession etc.

Educational institutions are also instruments for making awareness and creating tolerance among the citizens. The national curriculum must strengthen the principles of tolerance, respect and peace messages. It must accommodate all the groups in the society. The religious minorities are said to complain that Islamic Studies (Islamyat) is imposed on them[47]. However, the present dissertation shows that all, but a very few, of the interviewees were of the opinion that Islamyat is not a problem for them. It is not imposed on them. It is an elective subject and they have the option of "Ethics" as an alternative subject to Islamyat. For example, Ann Mehwish, a Christian, said "Islamyat is not compulsory for religious minorities. Instead they can take Ethics as an optional subject. However, many of the educational institutions in Pakistan do not have a teacher for the Ethics so the members of the religious minorities are compelled to take Islamic Studies as an optional subject" (personal communication, June 13, 2013). Komal Chanda, a Hindu, said "Islamyat creates no problem unless it is taught neutrally. It is necessary because we live in this society and we should learn the basics of the religion of the majority" (personal communication, July 6, 2013). Similarly, Sant Singh, a Sikh, said "We have no reservation against Islamyat but the religion and culture of all the minorities should also be given a share in the syllabus. When a student studies other religions, he does not remain one-sided but becomes broadminded. When information about Islam is given, non-Muslims know about Islam but Muslims consider other religions with great doubt" (personal communication, July 12, 2013). Keeping in view the above findings, it is recommended that besides Islamyat, a share should be given to other religions in the curriculum. This will develop understanding of other religions and will help in developing inter-faith harmony.

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[47] See protection and promotion of the rights of religious minorities in Pakistan (January 16, 2009). Retrieved from http://www.fides.org/eng/documents/Memoradum_to_H.R.doc.

Another area where religious minorities feel a sort of uneasiness is the existence of blasphemy law in Pakistan[48]. While interviewing the members of religious minorities during my field work, majority of the interviewees from the religious minorities said that they have no problems with blasphemy law but it needs some modification. For example, they said that all religions should be covered by the blasphemy law and that the intention of the accused should be taken into account. For example, Ann Mehwish, a Christian, said "Blasphemy law is good but needs modifications. This law should incorporate all the religions and not only Islam. The law is good but the problem is with its implementation. The intention of the accused should also be taken into account. The law is usually used instrumentally. Sometimes the accused is punished, though he is unaware and does not have the intention to disgrace Islam, Islamic symbols and personalities" (personal communication, June 13, 2013). Similarly, A. Ashok Chouhan, a Hindu, said "There is no problem with the law but with its implementation. The intention of the accused should be taken into account while giving punishment to the accused. Again, the law should cover all the religions because no religion betrays people. Every religion is sacred" (personal communication, June 29, 2013).

As far as the dominant Muslim group is concerned, all of the interviewees from them, except those belonging to religious political parties, said that blasphemy law needs amendments so as to cover all the religions and to take intention of the accused into account. For example, Fazal Malik, a Muslim Pakhtun, said "Blasphemy law should also include other religions and the misuse in its implementation should be rectified. Most of the times, personal and non-religious disputes are dragged into the ambit of blasphemy laws. Similarly, the intentions of the accused should be taken into account" (personal communication, August 13, 2013). However, the members of the religious parties are against any modification in blasphemy law. For example, Siraj ul Haq, Amir Jumaat-i-Islami, and the then Senior Minister of KP, said "Blasphemy law is running good in Pakistan. Even Western states have given protection to Christianity. So, blasphemy law in Pakistan needs no amendment. Nobody can dare to amend it" (personal communication, August 8, 2013).

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[48] For blasphemy law see chapter 4, section "State-Sponsored Islamic Ideology".

Thus, keeping in view the above statements regarding blasphemy law, it is strongly recommended that necessary arrangement/modifications should be made in the current blasphemy law so as to avoid any misuse of it; include the intention of the accused; and also to include other religion within its ambit.

The fourth chapter focused on the main theme of this dissertation i.e. to look into the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences. It looked into their attitudes towards assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism, interactive pluralism, culture and cultural preservation etc. I also judged the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural differences in the light of the theories of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood.

The dissertation showed that majority of the respondents of the targeted cultural groups in KP had a negative attitude towards assimilationism[49]. The views of the respondents supported that the groups in KP should maintain their particularities and should not be blended into Pakhtun culture or mixed into one culture. For example, as shown in Table 28, 56.3% of the total respondents said that groups in KP should not be blended in dominant Pakhtun culture. An important aspect of this survey was that 39.31% of the Pakhtuns were also against assimilation. Even the soft way of losing one's culture and forming a new identity or culture by mixing all the cultures in KP into one, not necessarily Pakhtun culture but a mixture of all the cultures living in KP, was also not supported by the members of various groups by a high percentage (68.27%) (Table 29). 63.69% of the total respondents (2977) were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP (Table 30). However, Hindko speakers and Seraikis were less inclined to accept the statement that attempt for Pakhtunization has not been made in KP. As far as attempt for Muslimization is concerned, the results of the survey show that compared to Pakhtunization, less number of respondents (53.85%) were of the opinion that attempt for Muslimization has not taken place in KP (Table 31). Again, majority of 60.87% on average of the total respondents (2977) said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group (Table 32). It

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[49] For the definitions of assimilation, cosmopolitan, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism see chapter 4, pp. 162-4

is up to the new comers to adopt the traditions and values of the receiving group or not. These findings show liberal and non-assimilationist tendencies in KP.

This dissertation showed that cultural groups were also having negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism. Though majority of the respondents (81.73%), as shown in Table 41, said that groups should not be given the right of internal restrictions which violate human rights, groups and cultures in KP are valued, for example, on average 62.14% of the total respondents said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group (Table 36). This shows that groups are to some extent kept dearer by the people in KP. Similarly, 97.94% of all the respondents said that culture has importance for a group (Table 21). The preservation of culture was also highly emphasized by the respondents (98.35%) (Table 23). Similarly, majority of the respondents (86.33%) supported the provision of group rights to the minorities (Table 37). Again, as Table 38 shows, 84.65% on average of the total respondents gave their support for providing proportional representation to the linguistic groups. These group rights, what Kymlicka calls as 'external protections', are the rights given to a group to protect it from the adverse policies and decisions of the larger society. These findings show that cultural groups in KP do not support cosmopolitanism in KP.

Similarly, fragmented pluralist vision was also not supported by the cultural groups in KP because here the groups are not considered as sacred. Cultural groups in KP supported that groups should be protected by the provision of minority rights, as shown in Tables 37 and 38, and said that culture has importance for a group (Table 21) and therefore, should be preserved (Table 23), but, as shown in Table 41, they did not support the right of internal restrictions for groups which violate human rights. Again, majority of 60.87% on average of the total respondents said that the people who come to live in their group should not be compelled to adopt the values, traditions and language of their group (Table 32). Similarly, as Table 36 shows, though 62.14% of the total respondents said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group, 5.95% were undecided while 31.91% were not spending time to learn about the culture and history of their group. This finding shows that groups are not considered as sacrosanct.

This dissertation showed that the attitudinal position/status of KP society is nearer to interactive pluralism. The empirical results given in Table 42 show that in KP 93.05% of the total respondents declared that different religio-linguistic groups should live together and have various interactions with one another. Similarly, a great majority of the respondents (93.92%) liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups (Table 43). Again, as Table 45 shows, on average 89.69% of the total respondents stated that they enjoy being with members of other groups. This estimate shows that in KP plurality is mostly celebrated.

Discrimination felt on the basis of religion and language is a major issue in a multicultural society. However, in KP a majority of 61.05%, on average, of the total respondents (2570) belonging to linguistic and religious minority groups gave their opinion that they feel no discrimination on the basis of religion and language (Table 46). Similarly, majority of the Pakhtuns (75.18% for linguistic and 56.27% for religious minorities) said that minorities are not discriminated against on the basis of their languages and religions. However, as mentioned in chapter 4, some minority groups were apprehensive of the discriminatory behaviors of the dominant group. Thus, in order to avoid any sort of discrimination against the minorities, it is suggested that the government and society of KP should take possible steps and make possible arrangements to avoid any sort of discrimination which some of the groups specifically Seraiki, Hindko, Christian and Hindu may experience. Formulating a strong anti-discriminatory law with a strong force of implementation will be a good step forward.

Similarly, this dissertation also evaluated the attitudes of the targeted religio-linguistic groups in KP towards the status of women's rights in each group. The findings showed that a significant variation exists among the various religio-linguistic groups. As shown in Table 48, on average, a majority of 59.46% of the total respondents were of the opinion that women have equal rights as men in KP. It can be said that though in certain linguistic groups (Chitrali, Seraiki, Gujar) and all the religious minority groups (Christian, Hindu and Sikh) the rights of women are safeguarded and they have about equal rights as men, in KP the dominant group (Pakhtun) and certain other linguistic groups (Hindko and Kohistani) do not give equal rights to women as men. So it is recommended to the government of KP that appropriate steps/arrangements should be taken/made to improve the

position of women in KP. They should be given proper and adequate representation in every state institution and their rights should be legally and institutionally secured so that they in real sense enjoy their rights without any fear and hindrances.

This dissertation also tries to test the attitudinal status of the cultural groups in KP towards cultural difference and the management of plurality in the light of the basic assumptions of Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh, and Modood.

The findings obtained from the data regarding various statements showed that the KP society supported some of the basic assumptions set out by Kukathas. For example, Kukathas, while presenting his theory of liberal society emphasizes the possibility of individual's exit from communities or associations whose authority the individual does not accept (Kukathas, 2003: 24-5). The present study tested the position and status of KP society in the light of this assumption set out by Kukathas. As Table 49 shows, on average 55.93% of the total respondents were of the opinion that those members who exit their group should not receive any benefit from the group. The group allowed the dissenters the right to exit but not the right to receive benefits from the group after they have left it. However, it must be kept in mind that this test is specifically for KP society. It cannot be generalized to other situations unless tested there. Thus, generally the KP society fulfills the criteria for a liberal society set out by Kukathas.

Kukathas says that human societies are mutable and there is plurality of interests within a society (Kukathas, 2003: 85). In most of the communities there are often important differences and conflict of interests between subgroups; and between elite and masses. The present dissertation tested this Kukathasian assumption of internal division within a group between the elite and masses of groups in KP. As Table 51 shows, a majority of all the respondents (61.14%) replied that their leaders do not represent their demands, thus, showing internal divisions of demands within the groups between the elites and the masses. However, it should be remembered that this test is specifically for KP society. It cannot be generalized to other situations unless tested there.

Similarly, Kukathas is a great supporter of state neutrality. The present study also depicted the attitude of the people in KP regarding state neutrality (color-blind approach). In KP majority of the people (92.07%) were of the opinion that state should be neutral among the various perceptions of good, cultures and groups and should treat all the groups equally without any discrimination (Table 50). Again, Kukathas's litmus test for the liberal society is toleration (Kukathas, 2003: 24) and KP society was considered by the majority of the respondents as tolerant. As shown in Table 52, 82.77% on average of the total respondents agreed with the statement that KP society is generally tolerant towards minority groups.

However, Kukathas's claim that minority rights should not be given to minorities was not supported by this study as majority of 86.33% of the total respondents supported the provision of group rights to minority groups (Table 37). Similarly, a majority of 84.33% of the total respondents in KP supported the provision of proportional representation right to linguistic minority groups (Table 38).

Similarly, some, but not other, of the assumptions of Kymlicka's theory were also seen as fulfilled by the KP society. For example, his theory is based on the fact that culture is important for a group because it provides a range of options from which we choose. The empirical study in KP supported this claim with high percentage. As shown in Table 21, 97.94% of all the respondents agreed with the statement that culture has importance for a group. However, here the ways are parted. Majority of the respondents in KP said that culture is important not because it provides a range of options from which we choose but because firstly; it shows our identity (86.53%) and secondly; it is the legacy of our forefathers (48.87%) (Table 22). This line of thinking supports Modood's assumption in KP who says that culture has importance for the people because it shows the identity that matters to people marked by differences (Modood, 2008, 2010b, 2013: 39-40). Thus, the present study empirically rejected Kymlicka's assumption but accepted Modood's assumption in KP.

Again, Kymlicka is against the right of internal restrictions for a group, if those internal restrictions are intended to be used against the fundamental human rights (Kymlicka, 1989: 240-141, 1995: 152, 2001b: 27-28). KP society supported this Kymlicka's assertion. As shown in Table 41, a clear majority of 81.73% on

average of the total respondents (2977) were against the demand for internal restrictions for a group, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights.

Again, Kymlicka (1995: 37-8), Taylor (1994: 40), Parekh (2000) and Modood (2009b, 2013: 58-9) are in favor of external supports for minority groups in the form of group rights and this claim for minority rights was also supported by the present study in KP. As shown in Table 37, a majority of 86.33% on average of the total respondents (2977) supported the provision of group rights to a minority group if those rights protect it from the decisions of the larger society. Kymlicka supports proportional representation for minority groups which the present study also supported. As Table 38 shows, 84.65% on average of the total respondents (2977) gave their support for providing proportional representation to the linguistic groups. Again, the religious minorities have been given representation rights (there are three seats for religious minorities in KP Provincial Assembly) and polyethnic rights, for example, Sikhs have the right to perform their religious practices/symbols like wearing of turban and having kirpan while in Pakistan Army and KP police.

Similarly, Kymlicka (1995: 35-44) and Taylor (1994: 58-9) support the preservation of culture which was also highly emphasized by the respondents in KP. A high percentage of 98.35% on average of the total respondents was of the opinion that culture should be preserved (Table 23).

Again, Kukathas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh and Modood are against any forced assimilationist tendencies. The attitudes of the cultural groups and also the actual practices and policies for managing plurality in KP society were against any tendency towards assimilation (Tables 28,29,30,31 and 32).

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR MINORITIES)

I am Jamal Shah, PhD Student of Political Science, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. This questionnaire is the foundation of a research on the evaluation of the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan which will help in finding solutions to the problems arising out of plurality. I would like to ask you some important and valuable information about the culture and plurality on which the questionnaire is based. Furthermore, your anonymity is completely honored and information such as your name, address and phone number are not required. Again, the information collected from you will not be used for any other purpose except that mentioned here. I will be thankful for your co-operation and patience.

A. Personal Information:

Please tick the appropriate box in the following questions.

1. Would you please mention your age? _____ Years.

2. What is your gender please? (a) Male ☐ (b) Female ☐

3. Please tick the linguistic group you belong to.

   (a) Chitrali ☐ (b) Hindko ☐ (e) Kohistani ☐

   (f) Pakhtun ☐ (g) Seraiki ☐ (h) Gojar ☐ (i) Other ☐

4. Please tick the religious group you belong to.

   (a) Muslim ☐ (b) Christian ☐ (c) Hindu ☐ (d) Sikh ☐

5. What is your marital status? (a) Married ☐ (b) Single ☐

   (c) Divorced ☐ (d) Widow/widower ☐

6. If you are married, then whether your marriage is in the group you belong to or out of the group? (a) Within the group ☐

   (b) Out of the linguistic group ☐ (c) Out of the religious group ☐

7. Would you please mention your monthly income? Rupees _____

8. What is your educational qualification?

(a) None ☐ (b) Primary ☐ (c) Middle ☐ (d) Matric ☐

(e) FA/FSc ☐ (f) BA/ BSc ☐ (g) MA/MSc ☐ (h) M.Phil ☐

(i) Ph.D ☐ (j) Other, please mention _____

B. Cultural Information:

Please tick the appropriate box in the following questions.

1. Culture has importance for a group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

2. If you tick (a) or (b) in question 1, then why culture is important for a group? (Please tick one or more boxes by writing 1, 2, 3…. on priority basis). (a) It shows our identity ☐ (b) It provides the range of options from which we choose ☐ (c) It is the legacy of our forefathers ☐ (d) We are made by our culture ☐ (e) It gives meaning to individual life ☐ (f) Don't know ☐ (g) Other, please mention_____ _____

3. Groups in KP should be blended in dominant Pakhtun culture.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

4. There has been attempt for Pakhtunization in KP i.e. attempt by the dominant Pakhtun group to assimilate your group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

5. There has been attempt for Muslimization in KP i.e. attempt by the dominant Muslim group to assimilate non-Muslim groups.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

6. Cultural groups should be left alone in their internal affairs without external interference by the state even if they violate some of the human rights.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

7. Culture should be preserved.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

8. If you tick (a), (b) or (c) in question no. 7, then the culture should be

preserved   (a) By the state ☐   (b) By the members of the group ☐

(c) By both ☐   (d) Don't know ☐

9. Group should be protected by the provision of minority rights by the state.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

10. KP society is culturally tolerant towards minority groups.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

11. People who come to live in our group should adopt the values, traditions and language of our group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

12. Women have equal rights as men in our group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

13. I like meeting and making friendship with members of groups other than my own.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

14. Based on your opinion about question 13, would you please mention whether your opinion has remained the same or changed over time?

(a) Remained the same ☐   (b) Changed ☐   (c) Don't know ☐

15. In question 14, if you tick "changed", is it positive or negative? (If you favor meeting and friendship with other group's members, it is positive, if not, it is negative). (a) Positive ☐   (b) Negative ☐   (e) Don't know ☐

16. Different groups in KP should not mix together.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

17. I spend much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of my group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

18. I enjoy being with people from other groups.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

19. Different religious and linguistic groups in KP should live together and have various interactions with one another.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

20. I feel discrimination in finding, applying, interviewing for a job or in educational or other institutions on the basis of my religion or language.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

21. What demand(s) you have from the government and society of KP? (Please write 1, 2, 3…. on priority basis in the given boxes).
(a) Anti-discriminatory measures ☐ (b) Culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies ☐ (c) Exemptions from certain rules and practices ☐ (d) Additional rights and resources ☐ (e) Public respect for our groups ☐ (f) Adequate representation in public institutions ☐ (g) Acknowledging our presence in the definition of provincial and national identity ☐ (h) Our language should be taught in educational institution ☐ (i) Cultural consideration in drawing constituencies ☐ (j) the preservation of land belonging to our group ☐ (k) Other, please mention _____

22. Our demands have been practically heard and fulfilled by the state.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

23. Linguistic groups should be given representation in proportion to their population.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

24. Our leaders represent our demands (i.e. our demands and our leaders' demands from the state and society are similar)

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

25. I tolerate if a member of my group leaves my group and still claims the benefits of my group.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

26. The state should be neutral among different religions and cultures.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

27. I support to marry in a linguistic group other than my own.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

28. I support to marry in a religious group other than my own.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

Thanks for your co-operation and patience

Good luck

QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR THE DOMINANT GROUP)

For the dominant Pakhtun group the same questionnaire as that of minorities was adopted with certain modifications which are given as below.

Question 20 of the questionnaire for minorities was divided into two questions i.e. 20 and 21 which were asked as below.

20. Linguistic minorities are discriminated in finding, applying, interviewing for a job or in educational or other institutions on the basis of their languages.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

21. Religious minorities are discriminated in finding, applying, interviewing for a job or in educational or other institutions on the basis of their religions.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐ (b) Agree ☐ (c) Near to Agree ☐ (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐ (f) Disagree ☐ (g) Strongly Disagree ☐

22. Which of the following demand(s) of the religious and linguistic minorities should not be heard and fulfilled by the government and society of KP (*if you think that all of the following demands should be fulfilled then do not tick any of the following box. If you think that some of the following demands should not be fulfilled then tick them on priority basis by writing 1, 2, 3…. in the given boxes*).

(a) Anti-discriminatory measures ☐ (b) Culturally sensitive interpretation and application of laws and policies ☐ (c) Exemptions from certain rules and practices ☐ (d) Additional rights and resources ☐
(e) Public respect for minority groups ☐ (f) Adequate representation in public institutions ☐ (g) Acknowledging their presence in the definition of provincial and national identity ☐

(h)Their language should be taught in educational institutions ☐

(i) Cultural consideration in drawing constituencies ☐

(j) The preservation of land belonging to their groups ☐

(k) Other, please mention _____

23. Minorities' demands have been practically heard and fulfilled by the state.

(a) Strongly Agree ☐   (b) Agree ☐   (c) Near to Agree ☐   (d) Uncertain ☐

(e) Near to Disagree ☐   (f) Disagree ☐   (g) Strongly Disagree   ☐

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MINORITIES (IN URDU)

سوالنامہ (اقلیتوں کیلئے)

میرا نام جمال شاہ ہے۔میں شعبہ پولیٹیکل سائنس اور پبلک ایڈمنسٹریشن حاجتپی (Hacattepe) یونیورسٹی انقرہ ترکی میں پولیٹیکل سائنس کا پی ایچ ڈی کا طالب علم ہوں۔ یہ سوالنامہ خیبر پختونخواہ (KP) پاکستان کی کشیر الثقافتی (Multiculturalism) حشیت کی تحقیق پر مبنی ہے جو متنوع ثقافتوں سے جنم لینے والے مسائل کا حل معلوم کرنے میں مددگار ثابت ہوگا۔ اس سوالنامے میں میں آپ سے ثقافتوں اور کشیر الثقافت کے متعلق چند اہم اور قیمتی معلومات دریافت کرنا چاہتا ہوں۔علاوہ از یں آپ کے نام کو صیغہ راز میں رکھا جائے گا اور آپ کو اپنا نام، پتہ اور فون نمبر لکھنے کی ضرورت نہیں۔ آپ سے حاصل کردہ معلومات کو مذکورہ مقصد کے علاوہ کسی اور مقصد کے لئے استعمال نہیں کیا جائے گا۔ میں آپ کے تعاون اور صبر وتحمل پر آپ کا ممنوں رہوں گا۔

(الف) ذاتی معلومات۔

ازراہِ کرم مندرجہ ذیل سوالات میں مناسب خانے پر درست کا نشان لگائیں۔

١۔   آپ کی عمر کیا ہے ۔۔۔۔۔سال

٢۔   آپ کی جنس کیا ہے؟   (i) مذکر ☐   (ii) مونث ☐

٣۔   آپ کا تعلق کس لسانی گروہ سے ہے؟
(i) چترالی ☐   (ii) ہندکو ☐   (iii) کوہستانی ☐   (iv) پختون ☐
(v) سرائیکی ☐   (vi) گوجر ☐

٤۔   آپ کا تعلق کس مذہبی گروہ سے ہے؟
(i) مسلم ☐   (ii) عیسائی ☐   (iii) ہندو ☐   (iv) سکھ ☐

٥۔   آپ کی ازواجی حشیت کیا ہے؟
(i) شادی شدہ ☐   (ii) غیر شادی شدہ ☐   (iii) مطلقہ ☐   (iv) بیوہ/رنڈوا۔ ☐

٦۔   اگر شادی شدہ ہے تو کیا آپ کی شادی آپ سے متعلقہ گروہ میں ہوئی ہے یا باہر کے گروہ میں؟
(i) گروہ کے اندر ☐   (ii) لسانی گروہ کے باہر ☐   (iii) مذہبی گروہ کے باہر ☐

٧۔   آپ کی ماہانہ آمدنی کیا ہے؟۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔روپے۔

٨۔   آپ کی تعلیمی قابلیت۔
(i) ان پڑھ/ناخواندہ ☐   (ii) پرائمری ☐   (iii) مڈل ☐   (iv) میٹرک ☐
(v) ایف اے/ایف ایس سی ☐   (vi) بی اے/بی ایس سی ☐   (vii) ایم اے/ایم ایس سی ☐
(vii) ایم فل ☐   (vx) پی ایچ ڈی ☐   (x) دیگر۔۔۔۔۔۔

(ب) ثقافتی معلومات:

ازراہ کرم مندرجہ ذیل سوالوں میں مناسب خانوں پر درست کا نشان لگائیں۔

۱۔ کلچر (ثقافت) ایک گروہ کے لئے اہمیت رکھتا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۔ اگر آپ سوال نمبر ۱ میں (i)، (ii) یا (iii) پر درست کا نشان لگائے تو پھر کلچر کسی گروہ کے لئے کیوں اہمیت رکھتا ہے

(ازراہ مہربانی ترجیحی بنیادوں پر ۱،۲،۳۔۔۔۔ لکھ کر ایک یا زیادہ خانوں پر درست کا نشان لگائیں)

(i) یہ ہماری شناخت ظاہر کرتا ہے ☐   (ii) کلچر ہمیں چیزوں کو منتخب کرنے کا موقع فراہم کرتا ہے ☐

(iii) یہ ہمارے بزرگوں/اباؤاجداد کا ترکہ ہوتا ہے ☐   (iv) ہمارا کلچر ہم کو بناتا ہے ☐

(v) یہ انفرادی زندگی کو بامعنی بناتا ہے۔ ☐   (vi) نہیں جانتا ☐

(vii) دیگر ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔

۳۔ خیبر پختونخوا کے گروہوں کو غالب پختون کلچر میں ضم/شامل ہونا چاہیئے

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۴۔ خیبر پختونخوا میں غالب گروہ کی طرف سے آپ کے گروہ کو پختون بنانے یعنی اپنے اندر رسمونے کی کوشش ہوتی رہی ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۵۔ خیبر پختونخوا میں غالب مسلم گروہ کی طرف سے غیر مسلم گروہوں کو مسلمان بنانے یعنی اپنے اندر رسمونے کی کوشش ہوتی رہی ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۶۔ ثقافتی گروہوں کے اندرونی معاملات میں مملکت کی طرف سے مداخلت نہیں ہونی چاہیئے اگرچہ وہ گروہ بعض انسانی حقوق کی خلاف ورزی بھی کرتے ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۷۔ کلچر کو محفوظ کرنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۸۔ اگر سوال نمبر ۷ میں (i)، (ii) یا (iii) پر درست کا نشان لگاتے ہیں تو پھر آپ کے خیال میں کلچر کو کس کی طرف سے محفوظ کرنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مملکت کی طرف سے ☐   (ii) اُس گروہ کے ارکین کی طرف سے ☐

(iii) دونوں کی طرف سے ☐   (iv) نہیں جانتا ☐

۹۔ گروہ کو مملکت کی طرف سے اقلیتی حقوق کی فراہمی سے محفوظ کرنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۰۔ خیبر پختونخوا کا معاشرہ ثقافتی گروہوں کے ساتھ روادار ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۱۔ ہمارے گروہ میں دوسرے گروہوں سے آ کر رہنے والوں کو ہمارے گروہ کی اقدار، روایات اور زبان اختیار کرنی چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۲۔ ہمارے گروہ میں خواتین کو مردوں کے برابر حقوق حاصل ہیں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۳۔ میں اپنے گروہ کے علاوہ دوسرے گروہوں کے اراکین سے ملنا اور دوستی کرنا چاہتا ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۴۔ سوال نمبر ۱۳ سے متعلق آپ کی جو رائے ہے آیا ہو اب بھی ویسی ہے یا وقت کے گزرنے کے ساتھ تبدیل ہوگئی ہے۔

(i) ویسی ہی ہے ☐ (ii) تبدیل ہوگئی ہے ☐ (iii) معلوم نہیں ☐

۱۵۔ اگر سوال نمبر ۱۴ میں تبدیل ہوگئی ہے پر درست کا نشان لگایا ہے تو کیا یہ مثبت ہے یا منفی؟

(اگر آپ دوسرے گروہوں کے اراکین سے ملنے اور دوستی کرنے کے حق میں ہے تو یہ مثبت ہے، نہیں تو، یہ منفی ہے)

(i) مثبت ہے ☐ (ii) منفی ہے ☐ (iii) معلوم نہیں ☐

۱۶۔ خیبر پختونخوا کے مختلف گروہوں کو آپس میں ضم نہیں کرنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۷۔ میں اپنے کلچر اور اپنی تاریخ کے بارے میں زیادہ جانے کی کوشش میں زیادہ وقت صرف کرتا ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۸۔ میں دوسرے گروہوں کے لوگوں کے ساتھ رہنے سے لطف اندوز ہوتا ہوں

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۱۹۔ خیبر پختونخوا کے مختلف مذہبی اور لسانی گروہوں کو اکٹھا رہنا اور ایک دوسرے سے میل جول رکھنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۰۔ میں ملازمت کیلئے درخواست دینے، انٹرویو کرنے اور پانے یا تعلیمی اور دیگر اداروں میں اپنے مذہب اور زبان کی بنیاد پر امتیازی سلوک محسوس کرتا ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۱۔ خیبر پختونخوا کی حکومت اور معاشرے سے آپ کے کیا مطالبات ہیں؟ (دیئے گئے خانوں میں ترجیحی بنیادوں پر 1,2,3..... درج کریں)

(a) امتیازی سلوک کے خلاف اقدامات ☐   (b) ثقافتی طور پر حساس قوانین اور پالیسیوں کی تشریح ☐

(c) بعض قواعد و قوانین اور ان پر عمل سے استثناء ☐   (d) مزید حقوق اور وسائل ☐

(e) ہمارے گروہ کا عوام کی طرف سے احترام ☐   (f) عوامی اداروں میں مناسب نمائندگی ☐

(g) صوبائی اور قومی شناخت کی تعریف میں ہماری موجودگی تسلیم کرنا ☐

(h) تعلیمی اداروں میں ہماری زبان کی لازمی تدریس ☐   (i) انتخابی حلقہ بندیوں پر ثقافتی لحاظ سے غور و خوض ☐

(j) ہمارے گروہ کی ملکیتی اراضی کی حفاظت ☐   (k) دیگر ----------------------------------

۲۲۔ مملکت کی طرف سے ہمارے مطالبات کو عملی طور پر سنا اور ان پر عمل کیا گیا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۳۔ لسانی گروہوں کو اپنی آبادی کے تناسب سے نمائندگی دی جانی چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۴۔ ہمارے رہنما/قائدین ہمارے مطالبات کی نمائندگی کرتے ہیں (یعنی ہمارے اور قائدین کے مملکت اور معاشرے سے مطالبات ایک جیسے ہیں)۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۵۔ میں برداشت کرتا ہوں اگر میرے گروہ کا کوئی رکن میرے گروہ کو چھوڑ دیتا ہے اور پھر بھی میرے گروہ سے مفادات کیلئے دعویٰ کرتا ہے/فائدے لینا چاہتا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۶۔ مختلف مذاہب اور ثقافتوں کے درمیان مملکت کو غیر جانبدار رہنا چاہیئے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۷۔ میں اپنے گروہ کے علاوہ کسی لسانی گروہ میں شادی کرنے کی حمایت کرتا ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۸۔ میں اپنے گروہ کے علاوہ کسی مذہبی گروہ میں شادی کرنے کی حمایت کرتا ہوں۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐   (ii) متفق ☐   (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐   (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کر سکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐   (vi) متفق نہیں ☐   (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

آپ کے تعاون اور صبر و تحمل کا شکریہ

غالب گروہ سے معلومات حاصل کرنے کے لئے مندرجہ بالاسوالنامے کے چارسوالات (۴،۲۰،۲۱اور۲۲) کے الفاظ میں تبدیلی کی گئی۔سوال نمبر ۲۰ کومزید دو سوالوں (۲۰اور۲۱) میں تقسیم کیا گیااور اسی طرح اقلیتوں کے لئے سوالنامے کے سوالات نمبر۲۱اور۲۲ غالب گروہ کے سوالنامے کے بالترتیب سوالات نمبر ۲۲اور۲۳ ہوگئے۔جن چارسوالات میں تبدیلی کی گئی وہ مندرجہ ذیل ہیں۔

۴ ۔خیبر پختونخوا میں غالب گروہ کی طرف سے اقلیتی گروہوں کو پختون بنانے یعنی اپنے اندر سمونے کی کوشش ہوتی رہی ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۰ ۔لسانی اقلیتوں کے اراکین کے ساتھ ملازمت کے لیئے درخواست دینے،انٹرویوکرنے، پانے یا تعلیمی یا دیگراداروں میں ان کی زبان کی بنیاد پر امتیازی سلوک ہوتا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۱ ۔مذہبی اقلیتوں کے اراکین کے ساتھ ملازمت کے لیئے درخواست دینے،انٹرویوکرنے، پانے یا تعلیمی یا دیگراداروں میں ان کے مذہب کی بنیاد پر امتیازی سلوک ہوتا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

۲۲ ۔خیبر پختونخوا کی حکومت اور معاشرہ کو مذہبی اورلسانی اقلیتوں کے مندرجہ ذیل میں سے کونسے مطالبات حل نہیں کرنی چاہیۓ (اگرآپ اسکی حمایت کرتے ہو کہ ان کے درج ذیل تمام مطالبات حل کرنی چاہیۓ تو پھر ذیل میں دیئے گئے خانوں کوخالی چھوڑ دیں۔لیکن اگرآپ اسکی حمایت کرتے ہو کہ درج ذیل میں سے بعض مطالبات حل نہیں کرنی چاہیۓ تو پھران پرترجیحی بنیادوں پر.......1,2,3 درج کریں)

(a) امتیازی سلوک کے خلاف اقدامات ☐ (b) ثقافتی طور پر حساس قوانین اور پالیسیوں کی تشریح ☐

(c) بعض قواعد وقوانین اوران پر عمل سے استثناء ☐ (d) مزید حقوق اوروسائل ☐

(e) ہمارے گروہ کاعوام کی طرف سے احترام ☐ (f) عوامی اداروں میں مناسب نمائندگی ☐

(g) صوبائی اورقومی شناخت کی تعریف میں ہماری موجودگی تسلیم کرنا ☐

(h) تعلیمی اداروں میں ہماری زبان کی لازمی تدریس ☐ (i) انتخابی حلقہ بندیوں پر ثقافتی لحاظ سے غور و خوض ☐

(j) ہمارے گروہ کی ملکیتی اراضی کی حفاظت ☐ (k) دیگر----------------------

۲۳ ۔خیبر پختونخوا کی حکومت اور معاشرہ کی طرف سے مذہبی اورلسانی اقلیتوں کے مطالبات کوعملی طور پر سُنا اوران پر عمل کیا گیا ہے۔

(i) مکمل طور پر متفق ☐ (ii) متفق ☐ (iii) تقریباً متفق ☐ (iv) فیصلہ نہیں کرسکتا ☐

(v) تقریباً متفق نہیں ☐ (vi) متفق نہیں ☐ (vii) مکمل طور پر متفق نہیں ☐

آپ کے تعاون اور صبر وتحمل کا شکریہ

APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The following open-ended interview questions were asked from the interviewees of the targeted groups. The nature and contents of some of the questions were modified for the interviewees from the dominant Pakhtun group.

1. How does your group feel itself as a group in KP? How do you feel/think of your group in social, economic and political contexts?

2. How do Pakhtuns and Muslims treat religious and linguistic minorities in KP? I mean is KP society culturally tolerant towards minority groups?

3. Is culture important for a group? If yes, then, why it has importance for a group?

4. Should culture be preserved? If yes, then by whom it should be preserved i.e. whether by the state, members of the group or by both?

5. Should minority groups in KP be blended in dominant Pakhtun culture?

6. Do you support that different groups in KP should mix together willingly so as to form a new culture, not necessarily Pakhtun culture?

7. Has there been any attempt for Pakhtunization and Muslimization in KP i.e. attempt by the dominant Pakhtun/Muslim group to forcefully assimilate other non-Pakhtun/non-Muslim groups in KP into dominant Pakhtun/Muslim group?

8. Should minority rights be given to minorities by the state (Polyethnic, representation and self-government rights)?

9. Whether linguistic groups in KP should be given representation in proportion to their population which so far they have not been given.

10. Should cultural groups be given so much autonomy to violate some of the human rights?

11. Do you want that people who come to live in your group should adopt the values, traditions and language of your group?

12. How much time do you spend to learn more about the culture and history of your group?

13. Do you like meeting and making friendship with members of groups other than your own? Whether your opinion has remained the same or changed over time? And if changed, is it positive or negative? (If you favor meeting and friendship with other group's members, it is positive, if not, it is negative).

14. Do you enjoy being with people from other groups?

15. Do you support that different religious and linguistic groups in KP should live together and have various interactions with one another?

16. Do linguistic and religious minorities feel discrimination at the state and societal level in KP?

17. What is the status of women in your group? Do they have equal rights as men?

18. How does the government deal with the minorities' problems/demands? Have those demands been given any serious attention by the government and society? What the government has done so far for fulfilling the minorities' demands and for their uplift?

19. Do you think that the state should be neutral among different religions and cultures?

20. Do your leaders represent your demands (i.e. your demands and your leaders' demands from the state and society are similar)?

21. Do you tolerate if a member of your group leaves your group and still claims benefits from your group?

22. Do you support to marry in a linguistic group other than your own? And do you support to marry in a religious group other than your own?

23. Do you have any suggestions for the solution of the problems which may come out of a multicultural society?

Thanks for your co-operation

APPENDIX 4

NAMES, AGES, PLACES OF LIVING, PROFESSIONS AND DATES OF INTERVIEW OF THE INTERVIEWEES

1. Dr. Hidayatullah, a male Pakhtun of 35 years living in DI Khan. He has done DVM (Doctor of Veterinary Medicine) and is a lecturer in Gomal University, DI Khan (interviewed on April 3, 2013).

2. Dr. Imran Khan Jadoon, a male Hindko speaker of 36 years living in Abbottabad. He has done Doctorate in Economics and is an Assistant Professor in COMSAT University, Abbottabad, KP (interviewed on April 12, 2013).

3. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf Tenoli, a male Hindko speaker of 35 years living in Abbottabad. He has done Engineering and is an Associate Professor in COMSAT University, Abbottabad, KP (interviewed on April 8, 2013).

4. Dr. Zia Pervaiz Mirza, a male Christian of 60 years living in Peshawar. He is a bishop in St. John Cathedral Church Peshawar (interviewed on June 6, 2013).

5. Mr. Jamshed, a Gujar of 59 years living in Takkar, Takht Bhai, Mardan. He has done M. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 17, 2013).

6. Late Mr. Israrullah Gandapur, a Pakhtun of 40 years who lived in Kulachi, DI Khan. He did his M. A. in Political Science and remained twice as minister in provincial government (interviewed on March 28, 2013).

7. Mr. A. Ashok Chouhan, a Hindu of 63 years living in Risalpur, Nowshera. He has done F.A. and is retired from Pakistan Air Force. He is a religious figure (interviewed on June 29, 2013).

8. Mr. Abdul Hameed, a Kohistani of 45 years living in Doon Sehre, Dir Kohistan. He has done B. A. and is a community worker (interviewed on May 20, 2013.

9. Mr. Abdul Latif, a Chitrali of 37 years living in Opur, Mastooj, Chitral. He has done M. A. Political Science and is a politician from Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Party (interviewed on April 27, 2013).

10. Mr. Alam Din, a Kohistani of 60 years living in Swat Kohistan. He is a politician by profession (interviewed on May 19, 2013).

11. Mr. Allah Yar, a Seraiki of 32 years living in DI Khan. He has done M. Sc. Computer Science and is a government servant (interviewed on March 24, 2013).

12. Mr. Amanat Shah, a Pakhtun of 36 years living in Mardan. He did his M. A., is a politician from Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (F) Party and has remained Member of the Provincial Assembly, KP from 2002-2008 (interviewed on July 4, 2013).

13. Mr. Amir Shah Din, a Gujar of 45 years living in Sheringal, Dir Kohistan. He is Matriculate and is a contractor by profession (interviewed on May 9, 2013).

14. Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad, a Chitrali of 26 years living in Bamburat, Chitral. He has done F. A. and is a tourist by profession (interviewed on April 22, 2013).

15. Mr. Ashir Yousaf Masih, a Christian of 30 years living in Mardan. He has done M. A. English and is a Lecturer in Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan (interviewed on June 16, 2013).

16. Mr. Baba Haider Zaman, a Hindko speaker of 80 years living in Abbottabad. He is the leader of the Tehreek-i-Soba-e-Hazara (Movement for the Province of Hazara). He has been a Member of the Provincial Assembly and National Assembly (interviewed on April 14, 2013).

17. Mr. Farooq Akhtar, a Seraiki of 45 years living in DI Khan. He has done L. L. B. and is an Advocate by profession (interviewed on March 26, 2013).

18. Mr. Father Shaukat, a Christian of 57 years living in Sheikh Maltoon, Mardan. He has done Matriculation and is a bishop (interviewed on June 3, 2013).

19. Mr. Fazal Azim, a Chitrali of 50 years living in Karee, Chitral. He has done Matriculation and is a businessman (interviewed on April 23, 2013).

20. Mr. Fazal Elahi, a Chitrali of 46 years living in Karee, Chitral. He has done B. A. and is a trader by profession (interviewed on April 24, 2013).

21. Mr. Fazal Malik, a Pakhtun of 37 years living in Havalian, Abbottabad. He has done M. Phil. in English and is a lecturer in Hazara University, Mansehra (interviewed on August 13, 2013).

22. Mr. Ganga Vishan, a Sikh of 67 years living in Pir Baba, Bunir. He has done Matriculation and is a businessman (interviewed on July 14, 2013).

23. Mr. Gobind Ram, a Sikh of 52 years living in Ghorghoshto, Bunir. He has done Matriculation and is a businessman (interviewed on July 15, 2013).

24. Mr. Gulab Din, a Chitrali of 52 years living in Malkoh, Chitral. He has done M. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on April 29, 2013).

25. Mr. Haji Habib ur Rahman, a Pakhtun of 60 years living in Bunir. He has done M. Sc. in Physics, is a politician from Jamat-i-Islami Party and is currently Minister for Religious Affairs, KP (interviewed on August 8, 2013).

26. Mr. Haroon Sarab Diyal, a Hindu of 43 years living in Peshawar. He has done M. A. Islamic Studies. He is a religious scholar and is serving in a bank (interviewed on June 27, 2013).

27. Mr. Hazrat Salam, a Kohistani of 40 years living in Kalkot, Dir Kohistan. He has done F. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 18, 2013).

28. Mr. Hidayat ur Rahman, a Chitrali of 35 years living in Chagoor, Chitral. He has done M. A. Political science, History and Master of Business Administration (interviewed on April 28, 2013).

29. Mr. Ihsanullah, a Seraiki of 46 years living in DI Khan. He has done M. Sc. Computer Science and is a government servant (interviewed on March 21, 2013).

30. Mr. Jalaludin, a Chitrali of 36 years living in Singoor, Chitral. He has done B. A. and B. Ed. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on April 21, 2013).

31. Mr. Jamshed Khan, a Pakhtun of 40 years living in Takht Bhai, Mardan. He has done his M. A. in International Relations and is a Member of the Provincial Assembly, KP (interviewed on August 2, 2013).

32. Mr. Jimmy Matthew, a Christian of 35 years living in Mardan. He has done Master of Business Administration and is a bishop in Malakand (interviewed on June 20, 2013).

33. Mr. Juma Faqir, a Kohistani of 35 years living in Lamotai, Kohistan. He has done B. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 23, 2013).

34. Mr. Kamal Abdul Jamil, a Chitrali of 35 years living in Chitral. He has done M. Sc. (H) Rural Development and is a politician from Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (F), social worker and journalist by profession (interviewed on May 1, 2013).

35. Mr. Khawar Mahmood Tenoli, a Hindko speaker of 32 years living in Abbottabad. He has done Library Science and is Librarian by profession (interviewed on April 16, 2013).

36. Mr. Malik Ali Asif, a Seraiki of 40 years living in DI Khan. He has done Forestry and is working in a Non-governmental Organization. He is an intellectual (interviewed on March 27, 2013).

37. Mr. Malik Gul Sher, a Kohistani of 55 years living in Thal, Dir Kohistan. He has done Matriculation and is a politician by profession (interviewed on May 22, 2013).

38. Mr. Malik Izat Khan, a Kohistani of 52 years living in Sehre, Dir Kohistan. He is farmer by profession (interviewed on May 21, 2013).

39. Mr. Masaud Anwar, a Chitrali of 32 years living in Charoon, Mastooj, Chitral. He has done M. Sc. Computer Science and is a lecturer in Benazir University Campus, Chitral (interviewed on April 26, 2013).

40. Mr. Maulana Muhammad Qasim, a Pakhtun of 52 years living in Sher Ghar, Mardan. He has done M. A., is a religious scholar, politician from Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (F) Party and has remained twice Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan from 2002-2013 (interviewed on August 4, 2013).

41. Mr. Mian Zarin, a Gujar of 33 years living in Sher Ghar, Mardan. He has done B. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 13, 2013).

42. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun of 41 years living in Bannu. He has done M. A. Political Science and is an Assistant Professor in Government Post Graduate College, Bannu (interviewed on August 14, 2013).

43. Mr. Muhammad Nabi, a Gujar of 25 years living in Shahoor, Dir Kohistan. He has done M. A. and B. Ed and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 12, 2013).

44. Mr. Muhammad Niaz Husain, a Seraiki of 39 years living in DI Khan. He has done M. A. Political Science and Master in Education and is a government servant (interviewed on March 22, 2013).

45. Mr. Muhammad Nisar, a Hindko speaker of 28 years living in Abbottabad. He has done Matriculation, is a common member of the group and is a laborer (interviewed on April 15, 2013).

46. Mr. Muhammad Saeed, a Hindko speaker of 32 years living in Abbottabad. He has done M. Phil. and is a Lecturer in COMSAT University, Abbottabad (interviewed on April 17, 2013).

47. Mr. Muhammad Salam, a Kohistani of 54 years living in Dassu, District Kohistan. He has done F. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on May 25, 2013).

48. Mr. Muhammad Zahid Khan, a Hindko speaker of 23 years living in Abbottabad. He is an M.Sc. student (interviewed on April 17, 2013).

49. Mr. Nauman Yousaf, a Christian of 27 years living in Topi, Swabi. He is a student doing Engineering from National University of Science and Technology, Islamabad (interviewed on June 4, 2013).

50. Mr. Rahim Dad Khan, a Pakhtun of 77 years living in Sher Ghar, Mardan. He has done B. A., is a politician from Pakistan People's Party and has remained Senior Minister of KP from 2008-2013 (interviewed on August 6, 2013).

51. Mr. Ravi Kumar, a Hindu of 27 years living in Mardan. He has done M.Sc. and is a politician from Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (interviewed on July 13, 2013).

52. Mr. Roohullah, a Kohistani of 29 years living in Lamotai, Kohistan. He has done M. Phil. and is lecturer in Sheringal University, Dir (interviewed on May 26, 2013).

53. Mr. Saeed Akhtar Siyal, a Seraiki of 48 years living in DI Khan. He has done M. A. Journalism and Master of Business Administration and is a government servant and an intellectual (interviewed on March 23, 2013).

54. Mr. Sant Singh, a Sikh of 44 years living in Pir Baba, Bunir. He has done Matriculation and is a businessman (interviewed on July 12, 2013).

55. Mr. Sayed Afzal, a Gujar of 30 years living in Sheringal, Dir Kohistan. He is Matriculate and is a shopkeeper by profession (interviewed on May 11, 2013).

56. Mr. Shah Fahad Ali Khan, a Chitrali of 25 years living in Zargaran, Chitral. He has done M. Sc. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on April 25, 2013).

57. Mr. Siraj ul Haq, a Pakhtun of 51 years living in Lower Dir. He has done M. A., is the Amir of Jamat-i-Islami Party and has remained twice as the Senior Minister of KP (interviewed on August 8, 2013).

58. Mr. Sundar Singh, a Sikh of 38 years living in Swat. He has done B. A. and is a government servant (interviewed on July 30, 2013).

59. Mr. Toti Rahman, a Gujar of 50 years living in Jandool, Samar Bagh, Lower Dir. He is Matriculate and is a social worker (interviewed on May 14, 2013).

60. Mr. Willium Ghulam, a Christian of 52 years living in Peshawar. He has done M. Phil. and is a principal in a government school in Peshawar (interviewed on June 9, 2013).

61. Mr. Zafar Durani, a Seraiki of 45 years living in DI Khan. He is the leader of the Seraiki National Party (interviewed on March 25, 2013).

62. Ms. Ambreen Johnson, a Christian of 33 years living in Mardan. She has done B. A. and is a house wife (interviewed on June 17, 2013).

63. Ms. Ameet Kore, a Sikh of 26 years living in Mardan. She has done M.Sc. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on July 25, 2013).

64. Ms. Ann Mehwish, a Christian of 19 years living in Risalpur, Nowshera. She is a student doing her B. Sc. from Government Girls Degree College, Nowshera (interviewed on June 13, 2013).

65. Ms. Assia Bibi, a Gujar of 28 years living in District Nowshera. She has done Matriculation and is a house wife (interviewed on May 16, 2013).

66. Ms. Bushra Fatima Tariq, a Chitrali of 43 years. She has done M. A. in English and is an Associate Professor in Frontier College for Women, Peshawar (interviewed on May 3, 2013).

67. Ms. Husan Bannu, a Kohistani of 25 years living in Dassu, District Kohistan. She has done B. A. and is a house wife (interviewed on May 29, 2013).

68. Ms. Komal Chanda, a Hindu of 24 years living in Risalpur, Nowshera. She has done M.A. in International Relations and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on July 6, 2013).

69. Ms. Margaret, a Christian of 43 years living in Risalpur, Nowshera. She has done B. A. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on June 14, 2013).

70. Ms. Nargis Zaman, a Pakhtun of 25 years living in Takht Bhai, Mardan. She is a student and is doing M. Phil. in Political Science from Peshawar University (interviewed on August 17, 2013).

71. Ms. Naseha, a Chitrali of 25 years. She has done L. L. B. and is a lecturer in Government Girls Degree College, Takht Bhai, Mardan (interviewed on May 2, 2013).

72. Ms. Nusrat Tehsin, a Seraiki of 50 years living in DI Khan. She has done M. A. and M. Ed and is a government servant (interviewed on March 29, 2013).

73. Ms. Preet Kore, a Sikh of 22 years living in Risalpur, Nowshera. She has done F. A. and is a house wife (interviewed on July 28, 2013).

74. Ms. Rehana Kausar, a Hindko speaker of 31 years living in Havelian, Abbottabad. She has done M. A. in English and is a government servant (interviewed on April 13, 2013).

75. Ms. Sadia Irshad, a Hindko speaker of 34 years living in Abbottabad. She has done M. A. in English and is a lecturer in Hazara University, Abbottabad, KP (interviewed on April 9, 2013).

76. Ms. Sechem Rafiq, a Christian of 23 years living in Peshawar. She has done M. Phil. and is a teacher by profession (interviewed on June 7, 2013).

77. Ms. Shumaila Rahman, a Seraiki of 21 years living in DI Khan. She is a student (interviewed on March 30, 2013).

78. Ms. Tayyaba Bibi, a Kohistani of 30 years living in Swat Kohistan. She has done M. A. and is a government servant (interviewed on May 27, 2013).

79. Ms. Waheeda Rahman, a Hindko speaker of 32 years living in Abbottabad. She has done M. A. in English and is a lecturer in Hazara University, Abbottabad, KP (interviewed on April 11, 2013).

80. Professor Sayed Musarrat Shah, a male Hindko speaker of 72 years living in Abbottabad. He has done Engineering and is a former Vice Chancellor of the University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar, KP (interviewed on April 7, 2013).