Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

British Cultural Studies Programme

THE CHRONOTOPIC NATURE OF THINGS IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *MRS DALLOWAY* AND *ORLANDO*

Nurten BAYRAKTAR

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2020

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ABSTRACT

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Virginia Woolf's novels are acknowledged as some of the most influential Modernist works dealing with issues of self and spirituality. However, her emphasis on materiality as an essential element in life and literature, which is embedded with spirituality, was partly neglected by the critics. Nevertheless, contemporary studies on materiality in literature have offered new perspectives to re-evaluate objects in Woolf's fiction. In Introduction of this thesis, Woolf's critical ideas on materiality and spirituality are discussed with references to her selected essays. Additionally, Bill Brown's thing theory and Mikhail Bakhtin's idea of chronotope are discussed to pinpoint the temporal nature of objects to turn into things, which is coined by Brown as "occurrences" of "thingification." In this regard, thing theory and chronotope are combined to connect spatiotemporality with thingification of objects in Woolf's novels. Therefore, the chronotopic nature of things is discussed by concentrating on the material world's capability to shape and reshape the human characters in *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) and *Orlando: A Biography* (1928). In Chapter 1, the objects in *Mrs Dalloway* are analyzed to discover their potential thinghood regarding their impacts on the characters' chronotopic image located in the post-war historical chronotope. In Chapter 2, objects of historical time are investigated as the things of biographical time in *Orlando* by highlighting the novel as a mock biography. Consequently, this thesis argues that thingification in narratives is enabled by the literary chronotope by illustrating the mutated relations between object and subject as occurrences determined by the chronotopes in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*.

Keywords

Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway* (1925), *Orlando* (1928), thing theory, object-oriented ontology, chronotope, spatiotemporality

ÖZET

BAYRAKTAR, Nurten. *Virginia Woolf'un* Bayan Dalloway *ve* Orlando *Romanlarında Şeylerin Kronotopik Doğası*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2020.

Virginia Woolf'un romanları benlik ve manevilik meselelerine değinen, önde gelen Modernist eserlerden kabul edilir. Ancak maddeselliğin, manevilik ile iç içe geçmiş bir şekilde hayatın ve edebiyatın vazgeçilmez bir parçası olduğuna dair vurgusu, eleştirmenler tarafından kısmen göz ardı edilmiştir. Fakat edebiyatta maddeselliği inceleyen çağdaş çalışmalar, Woolf'un kurmaca eserlerinde objeleri yeniden yorumlamak için yeni bakış açıları sunmuştur. Bu tezin giriş bölümünde, Woolf'un edebiyatta maddesellik ve manevilik hakkındaki görüşleri seçilmiş deneme yazılarına atıflarla tartışılmıştır. Bill Brown'un şey teorisi ve Mikhail Bakhtin'in kronotop kavramı, Brown'un "şeyleşme" "olayları" diye adlandırdığı, objelerin şeylere dönüşmesindeki zamansal doğasını vurgulamak amacıyla tartışılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, şey teorisi ve kronotop kavramı, Woolf'un romanlarındaki objelerin şeyleşmesi ile mekansal-zamansallığı bağdaştırmak için bir araya getirilmiştir. Böylelikle, şeylerin kronotopik doğası, *Bayan Dalloway* (1925) ve *Orlando: Bir Yaşamöyküsü* (1928) romanlarındaki maddesel dünyanın insanı şekillendirme ya da yeniden şekil verme yetisini odak alarak tartışılmıştır. İlk bölümde, *Bayan Dalloway*'deki objelerin şeylik potansiyellerini keşfetmek amacıyla, objelerin savaş sonrası tarihsel kronotop içerisinde konumlanan karakterlerin kronotopik imajının üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde, *Orlando*'nun biyografi yazınını hicvetmesini vurgulayarak, tarihsel objeler, biyografik zamanın şeyleri olarak ele alınmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez Virginia Woolf'un *Bayan Dalloway* ve *Orlando* romanlarındaki değişen obje-süje ilişkilerini kronotopların belirlediği olaylar olarak örneklendirerek, anlatılarda şeyleşmeyi edebi krotonopun mümkün kıldığını iddia eder.

Anahtar sözcükler

Virginia Woolf, *Bayan Dalloway* (1925), *Orlando* (1928), şey teorisi, nesne yönelimli ontoloji, kronotop, mekânsal-zamansallık

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INTRODUCTION

> "Any object mixes itself so profoundly with the stuff of thought that it loses its actual form and recomposes itself a little differently in an ideal shape which haunts the brain."
>
> (Woolf "Solid Objects" 98)

Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) is a leading figure of Modernist English literature whose novels have been examined in accordance with many different aspects ranging from gender studies to various literary theories. Similarly, her essays are acquired as some of the inspirational sources of Modernist fiction in addition to some others, which are the initiative critical pieces of feminism. As a Modernist protest of the late Victorian literary traditions, Woolf claims that change is inevitable in literature because as human character changes, "religion, conducts, politics" change as well ("Mrs Brown" 321). What she suggests for authors to catch up with the changing age is not only a new tendency in narration but also a new formalist endeavor. Most importantly, Woolf expands the sources which literary creativity can draw from by liberating the "stuff" of literature ("Modern" 110). If Modernism was a call for a change of artistic expression, then it is possible to canvass any stuff in literary criticism as well. Therefore, through the pursuit of materiality in Modernist works, it is possible to enrich or even liberate the traditional critical studies on the movement. In this regard, it can be seen in Woolf's fiction and critical essays that literature is required to reflect both spirituality and materiality as a whole through which the human experience can be meaningful. As Woolf endows her narratives with the crucial moments of the human's experience in ordinary daily life, her characters' relation with the nonhuman world can offer some undiscovered aspects of her fiction. In this sense, Bill Brown's thing theory which aims to discover the differentiated relation between the human and material entities can be beneficial to understand these crucial moments in ordinary contexts presented in Woolf's novels. Brown's inquiry of objects' turning into things, coined as the "occurrences" of "thingification," suggests that the objects' potential to become things depending on their capability of shaping the human experience is a "latency," meaning that thingification is a temporal process (*Other* 62). Based on the temporality of thingification situated in the physical world, Mikhail Bakhtin's literary chronotope, which is the artistic reformulation of the spatiotemporality in narrative (*Dialogic 84*), is considerably functional to understand the particular

moments of the differentiated relation established between the human and the objects. Therefore, the major aim of this thesis is to argue that thingification in narratives is provided by the literary chronotope as Woolf situates the atypical moments of subjective experience of the objective world within the particular spatiotemporal frames in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando.*

At first glance, it might be assumed as a fallacy or a paradox to investigate Woolf's Modernism with a material-based perspective to examine objects' changing into things with an emphasis on the temporal nature of this process. However, as Woolf claims, everything can be material for literature and every *thing* can be *material* for literary analysis. Furthermore, it is surely possible to turn our attention to the new paths of thinking in literary studies as well. Karen Barad, a contemporary philosopher who is a leading figure in posthuman studies, pinpoints the negligence of matter in criticism by stating that "[l]anguage matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter" (801). Therefore, it is doubtless that we fail to contact with matter itself while dealing only with its representations. For this reason, based on Woolf's considering literature as an integration of the human's spiritual inner world with the material outer world, objects in her works must be taken as active and transformative material entities rather than focusing on symbolic or transcendental meanings attributed to them. In this way, it is possible to offer an innovative critical aspect for the studies on Modernism.

In order to understand Woolf's engagement with materiality, her labelling some of the late-Victorian novelists as "materialists" in her essay "Modern Fiction" (1921), as opposed to the "spiritualists" must be discussed. Woolf explains the problems of the conventional late Victorian novel in contrast to newly emerged Modernist technique.[1] As the term "Modernism" was not fixed yet, Woolf divides the authors as "the Edwardians"

[1] "Modern Fiction" is acknowledged as a key source material of Modernism studies along with T.S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) and Ezra Pound's "A Retrospect" (1918). While Woolf's essay focuses on novel genre, Eliot criticizes tradition for being repetitive, and offers a separation of art and artist in criticism, which is among the leading contributions to the rise of New Criticism. Pound, on the other hand, suggests that poets should use images and avoid abstraction, which pioneered Imagism in the early-twentieth-century poetry.

and “the Georgians.” Labelled as “materialists,” the Edwardian novelists such as Arnold Bennet, H.G. Wells and John Galsworthy are contrasted with “spiritual” Georgian authors, E. M. Forster, D. H. Lawrence, Lytton Strachey, James Joyce, and T. S. Eliot. Woolf claims that Bennet was among the most prolific novelists in 1910. Yet, he failed to reform his literary production with the ongoing age. What Woolf disdains is that novelists like Bennet extensively concentrate on plot and characterization. Nonetheless, this makes their novels inadequate to grasp a holistic portrayal of life: “Examine [life] for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent or engraved with the sharpness of steel” (“Modern” 106). Woolf’s describing life as an interaction of the mind with the material world (“the sharpness of steel”) is significant to understand why the Edwardians fail. Those novelists omit insignificant events and circumstances in human life including their interaction with the objects in the material world in their particular temporality as an essential experience of the human mind. Thus, Woolf claims that they cannot present a comprehensively satisfactory life in their fiction.

What Woolf suggests is that the writer is inseparable from the outer world, which means writing is a kind of “absorb[ation] [of] mental impressions from the data of the outside world” (Goldman 104). Furthermore, Woolf claims that this occurs in the mind without a pause as it is “an incessant shower of innumerable atoms” (“Modern” 106). Referring to the stream-of-consciousness technique, what is significant is not the apparent matter, but the impressions stimulated by these data. In this way, the outer world is shaped by the inner world of the writer, which forms up the experience; and this is what exactly life is for Woolf:

> Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible? (106)

Since life is composed of everlasting impressions, Woolf encourages the literary use of them:

> Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness. Let us not take for granted that life exists more fully in what is commonly thought big than is commonly thought small. (107)

As can be understood from the quotation above, Woolf implies that any impression, any experience or any event can be the raw material for fiction no matter how it is disordered or disjointed. As she declares, "nothing—no 'method,' no experiment, even of the wildest is forbidden, but only falsity and pretense. The proper stuff of fiction, every feeling, every thought; every quality of brain and spirit is drawn upon; no perception comes amiss" (110). Therefore, she celebrates the renouncement of traditional plot structures by "spiritual" novelists that liberate the mind and its relation with the physical world. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although Woolf labels the Edwardians as "materialist," she is not against the use of matter as a source for literary production. What she implies is the obsession with the pace of plot and the surface description in characterization in those novels. For this reason, as it is emphasized in the passage above, "atoms," that is matter, and prominently its relation to the mind is what she favors in literature. In other words, she discourages the use of matter as bare factual details in fiction, but she acknowledges when it is kneaded with the human mind's perception and intuition. So, it is possible to say that for Woolf objects as materiality and subjects as they appear in the form of human perception are equally necessary to manifest life successfully in fiction.

Woolf as a critic disdains the obsession with social or material details that ignores the spiritual and psychological world of the characters. However, this does not necessarily mean to exclude materiality in literature:

> While Woolf sought to remove the heavy furniture of the realist and naturalist novel in order to render the inner workings of the mind—the "atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall"—she knew that the modern novel could not flee from world of everyday things, from "the common objects of daily prose […]. (Olson, "Cotton" 43)

In other words, Woolf as a Modernist did not mean to elevate spirituality at the expense of the loss of materiality. Therefore, her ambition to "capture life" as a unity of the two is traceable in all her works. *The Waves* (1931) is mostly acknowledged as high Modernist

and Woolf's most challenging work due to its intense experimentation.[2] Its plot is structured through the extermination of time as future springs up from the past and with "now & then haunted" (*Diary* 3 118) because she "used & tossed aside all the images & symbols […] not in set pieces […] but simply as images; never making them work out; only suggest" (*Diary* 4 10-11). Thus, her use of the images by "toss"ing makes her writing suggestive and remarkably innovative in terms of using material entities in fiction as she wrote in her diary about the writing process of the novel that what she aims to "saturate every atom," and she continues as follows: "I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the moment whole; whatever it includes. […] Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that don't belong to the moment. […] I want to put practically everything in: yet to saturate" (*Diary* 3 209). So, it can be concluded that what she criticizes is the unfunctional existence of images in a literary work. Therefore, her literary experimentation opens new opportunities to reformulate these material or physical details illustrated in her novels. Similarly, Mrs Ramsay in *To The Lighthouse* (1927) is introduced to the reader as she was "cutting out *pictures* from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy stores," Orlando "slice[s] the air with his *blade,*" and Mrs Dalloway says "she would buy the *flowers* herself" (Woolf, *Lighthouse* 9; *Orlando* 1; *Mrs Dalloway* 1; emphasis added). For this reason, it would be unfair to claim that Woolf disregards or underestimates materiality.

As "[h]er work is not split between representations of inner versus outer or personal versus political" (Olson, "Cotton" 46), the same can be attributed to her understanding of spirituality and materiality. Furthermore, "her representation of ordinary experience works to reconcile two sides of a dichotomy that we usually understand as dominating literary modernism" (Olson, "Cotton" 46). Thus, drawing on the dichotomy based on either spirituality or materiality would be unfair to discuss Woolf's works, as can be concluded from the passage below:

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[2] As Woolf herself suggests, the novel is "prose yet poetry; a novel & a play" (*Diary* 3 128) as "it comprises nine italicised pastoral interludes, describing the diurnal progress of the sun across a seascape and landscape, interwoven with nine multivocal sections of interrelated soliloquies by [the six characters], from childhood to maturity" (Goldman 69). Along with the interludes, Woolf states that she seeks "writing *The Waves* to a rhythm not to a plot" (*Diary* 3 316).

> Despite her distaste for Edwardian materialism, […], Woolf does not actually reject the representation of what she calls "the fabric of things." She transforms, but does not reject, materialist or realist techniques. Her most successful works render ordinary experience, and do in fact depend on facts and fabric. (Olson, *Modernism* 48)

What Woolf criticizes about the Edwardian authors' use of objects is the so-called "reality effects"[3] "to guarantee verisimilitude," but in Woolf's fiction, objects are often metonymic to present "wider discursive networks, social processes and change." Therefore, the objects are not inferior to the mind, as "she challenges the idealist regime of verisimilitude that relegates the material world below the mental" (Morris, *Wordly* 15). In a wider aspect, James Naremore claims that a generalizing method of Woolf studies would be a mistake:

> We usually think of Virginia Woolf as a writer given to extended views of the insides of characters, as a recorder of streams of impressions. Yet it is just as much one of her habits to speak with an omniscient, highly generalizing voice which seems to brood over a large scene, subordinating individuals to the larger forces behind their lives. (125)

As suggested, in any case, equating all objects in a narrative with reality effect, allegory, symbol, or imagery would make criticism infertile. Therefore, taking the material world as agent, active and transformative can offer creative analyses of such canonical works. Thus, Elaine Freedgood in her inquiry of "fugitive meaning" of objects in the Victorian novel identifies the problem of traditional criticism dealing with the material world as follows: "The object as reality effect loses its potential as a material thing outside the conventions of representation; the object as metaphor loses most of its qualities in its symbolic servitude" (10). Thus, Woolf's objects which are more than being 'facts' or 'symbols' need to be investigated with a different perspective to come up with a new criticism of Modernism.

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[3] Pam Morris refers to Roland Barthes's discussion on the functionality of the material world in fiction. Barthes claims that objects and many other details which do not influence the plot are used to create a real and understandable atmosphere.

The perspective, which deals with materiality in Modernist literature, is embraced by many contemporary literary theorists and critics. The traditional studies of Modernism, which parallel the works with their contemporary philosophies, are "sensitive to the risks of decontextualisation," so it is necessary to "theorise modernism anew […] in our own contemporary moment"—this is an aim "to modernise theory" (Ryan 6). Furthermore, looking into matter in Woolf's writings is worth scholars' attention as she "theorises materiality throughout her work, rather than focusing only on how she alludes to, or comments on the material context in which she lived, demonstrates that the material world is not purely a concern for archivists or historicists" (Ryan 4). Indeed, Woolf's "granite and rainbow" has become an influential viewpoint towards biography writing. Here, what granite simply refers to is "facts," whereas rainbow is "personality," and both are meant to be entangled in a biography ("Biography" 232). Like the Edwardian novelists who fail to integrate spirituality and materiality as they use matter as bare facts, Woolf denounces traditional biography writing, which is unsuccessful in forging solidity or facts (granite) with personality or subjectivity (rainbow). In other words, Woolf believes that materiality and spirituality are fused into one another in life, and this must be the concern of non-fiction dealing with one's life, as well.

Although the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries can easily be associated with objects as a result of mass production and the consumerist culture, objects for Woolf are vividly used for a purpose in the eighteenth-century literature. Woolf compliments *Robinson Crusoe* as "large earthenware pot:" "By believing fixedly in the solidity of the pot and its earthiness, [Defoe] has subdued every other element to his design; he has roped the universe into a harmony" ("Crusoe" 75). As she claims that Defoe benefits from solid objects as a base for Crusoe's story of survival, her gratitude to the formal realism of the eighteenth century for its vivid description of the physical world opens a debate on the issue of materiality for Woolf studies. Nevertheless, estimating Woolf's objects as mere factual details in fiction would be misleading as she criticizes such styles in her essay "Modern Fiction." She acclaims formal realism's "interrupt[ing] romantic fantasy with novelistic fact" because sentimentalism is inadequate for novel writing (Brown, "Modernism" 15). Thus, it is observable that Woolf favors the eighteenth-century novel

for presenting life sufficiently thanks to its use of the material world as a concrete foundation on which a realistic fictional world is built.

Woolf's benefiting from the material world as a segment of human experience results from her concern to challenge the traditional novel writing. Therefore, the protesting essence of Modernism is prominent as "Woolf and her modernist contemporaries were committed to developing literary forms adequate to the demands of a new age of speed, fragmentation and uncertainty" (McHale and Stevenson 2). For this reason, it is essential to mark that Modernism as a literary movement was an attempt to change the Victorian conventions of writing as David Trotter claims, "modernism was one of the fiercest campaigns ever mounted in favour of literature" (74). However, it should be noted that Modernism was not yet a set of principles at the time in which Woolf published her works. Furthermore, Woolf herself was one of the foremost figures of the movement, thus her writing was an ongoing experience as she asks the reader to "tolerate the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure" just like they endured "the hardships of war and of the turbulent postwar period itself" ("Mrs Brown" 337). Woolf assures in her essay "Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown" (1924) that "on or about December 1910 human character changed" as "[a]ll human relations have shifted—those between masters and servants, husbands and wives, parents and children" (321). To put it differently, Modernist art and literature welcomed change, experimentation, questioning norms and concepts even it meant a detachment from the tradition. For this reason, as discussed before, Woolf's characteristic implementation of materiality and spirituality in a closely knitted way is one of the consequences of her tendency to criticize earlier literary traditions.

Woolf describes this necessity of criticism as follows: "I feel […] at the back of my brain that I can devise a new critical method; something far less still and formal than [what has been done before] […] There must be some simpler, subtler, closer means of writing about books, as about people, could I hit upon it" (*Diary* 2 172). At this point, it is doubtless that writing fiction does not suffice for Woolf as she felt a necessity to write about literature itself because she believes that literature is to be open for innovations and developments. B.C. Bell and Ohmann offer that "[s]he suggests that the word 'literature'

might well be redefined, as we find it undergoing redefinition today, to include popular or miscellaneous writing of all periods" (369). For this reason, not only the techniques or styles but also the content and function of literature need to be discussed with its content and function for the artist, the individual and the society.

Her essay "Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown" is one of the most influential sources of Modernist novel studies in which Woolf compares the two groups of authors in terms of representation of "human nature" in their works. Thus, in this essay, she uses a fictional character called Mrs Brown as a made-up sample for characterization employed by the Edwardians and the Georgians. In fact, this essay was written by Woolf as a response to Arnold Bennet's criticism of the characterization in *Jacob's Room* (1922). Bennet claims that Woolf's characters cannot "survive in the mind." Woolf accepts that her characters are not like Bennet's: "It is true that I don't have that 'reality' gift. I insubstantise, wilfully to some extent, distrusting reality—its cheapness. But to go further, have I the power of conveying the true reality?" (*Diary* 2 248). Nevertheless, this is a choice for conveying literary production for Woolf. As she suggests in "Modern Fiction," everything can be fruitful for creating fiction, she sees literary production as "a sense of discrimination between the given of experience (reality in inverted commas) and that which has to be sought after (the artistic representation of another kind of reality)" (Gualtieri 2). While the first is "cheap," the latter is valuable for her. Thus, in this essay, Woolf supplements her critical disapproval of the Edwardians by the imitation of their techniques. This is, in fact, a pseudo-competition for the characterization of an ordinary old woman between the Edwardians and the Georgians. Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as a failure of either because what Woolf emphasizes is that this is a matter of style. Therefore, she utilizes the same subject matter that is characterization in novel because both literary traditions may use the same material with different novelistic techniques. Consequently, she announces that what differs is "a set of literary conventions" or "tools" which can be renamed as literary style ("Modern" 110). Therefore, the Edwardians and the Georgians do not necessarily differ in content. Both may tell about the same human nature engaged in the same physical world but employ different styles.

In order to clarify the difference between the two styles, Woolf claims that "the Edwardian writers […] concentrate in their style of writing chiefly on the creation of contrasting, strongly delineated fictional personas. In part, this is achieved with attention to the odd and the particular" (Simoniti 65). Woolf states that the Edwardians "would make the old lady into a 'character;' he would bring out her oddities and mannerisms; her buttons and wrinkles; her ribbons and warts; her personality would dominate the book" ("Mrs Brown" 325). This brings forth the huge amount of realistically detailed descriptions: "Begin by stating that her father kept a shop in Harrogate. Ascertain the rent. Ascertain the wages of shop assistants in the year 1878" (332). It is obvious that in all these details, what is missing is Mrs Brown herself. As Vid Simoniti explains, "[t]he Edwardian style is highly descriptive and focuses on social facts, fixed psychological characteristics and material circumstances (65). Therefore, Woolf favors characterization knitted with the social and material world, and she criticizes the Edwardians for ignoring the psychology and personality of the character among all other factual details.

> The Georgian, modernist style breaks with both the creation of personas and with the detailed description of material facts. […] What replaces the Edwardian pedantry is Woolf's emphasis on the stream of consciousness. […] Her style emphasizes colliding, unconnected impressions; it uses long sentences separated by semicolons, which sometimes change their subject matter midway; it contains unexpected mixing of action and reminiscence of her characters; there is little description of social fact or of fixed psychological characteristics. (Simoniti 66)

The disputable emphasis on "materialist" writing is because the Edwardians use "material" as "fact," which makes the artistic narration dull and ordinary according to Woolf. For this reason, Modernism as a literary movement is a process of experimentation in both content and form as Simoniti explains in the passage above. Woolf, in fact, criticizes the style of the Edwardians for their strictness about some components of literature, like plot and characterization as illustrated in her aforementioned essay dealing with the human nature presented in literature. Therefore, it can be argued that Woolf does not disregard the objects' agency employed in narratives. In simpler words, she criticizes not what the Edwardians use but how they use.

In this pseudo-competition for a better novelistic characterization in "Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown," Woolf uses the same sample character because all those writers write about the

same people but with different inclinations called style. While trying to sketch Mrs Brown as a character in those Edwardian novelists' works, she claims, for instance, Arnold Bennet's novel would tell about the inadequacy of the primary schools, then the window-pane with a vision of a better world, then the railway, then the people in the street and many other details in the world outside. However, the character's inner world is not illustrated. Thus, Woolf's criticism of the Edwardians in terms of characterization is because they focus on socially realistic or some materially factual details, which end up with the lack of deep characterization. In other words, they fail to blend all these in a fictional world. The characters Mrs Brown and Mr Smith in the essay first appear at the train station having an ordinary conversation. Nevertheless, what is important for Woolf is not what they say as she investigates Mrs Brown after the departure of Mr Smith. In this way, she discloses how "a character impos[es] itself upon another person" (324). There, an old woman sits by herself after a conversation in which Mr Smith "exert[s]" his "power" "disagreeably" (323). In this example, what matters is Mrs Brown's feelings and inner thoughts, not Mr Smith's words. For Woolf, this is what makes an author write a novel: "I believe that all novels begin with an old lady in the corner opposite" (324). Therefore, Woolf openly pinpoints the necessity of psychological realism in the literary representation of "human character" or "human nature" as she says: "Mrs. Brown is eternal, Mrs. Brown is human nature" (330). If the subject matter is the same human nature, what makes the difference in style? Woolf discusses this question in her essay "David Copperfield" (1925) in which she ascribes Charles Dickens as the fundamental influencer of the Edwardians, and she claims that "[we] remodel our psychological geography when we read Dickens" (193). At this point, Simoniti questions the function of style to create a different narrative of the same human nature. By referring to Woolf's discussion on Dickens, he suggests that literary works

> do not represent different sets of general prepositions or theories about human nature [but] [i]nstead, a literary style represents a certain cognitive habit: a way of picking out certain kinds of detail over others, of interpreting people's motivations and actions in some ways but not others. (67)

If so, the attitude of both sides should be analyzed in stylistic aspects. The Edwardians, then, focus on "people's social status and pronounced character traits" (Simoniti 68), which is exactly why Mrs Brown herself is lost in their fiction. Therefore, similar to her

statements in “Modern Fiction,” Woolf criticizes the late Victorian novelists for disregarding life as a whole in which the human character corresponds to other human and nonhuman forces. Furthermore, as seen clearly in her essay, Woolf is against the general assumptions regarding the human inner world. If the outer material world is considerably effective on the human inner world, the same protesting stance can be found in Woolf’s use of materiality. Therefore, objects in her works can be investigated differently from the general assumptions that take matter as impotent entity existing only to represent the features of human characters in fiction.

Referring to Woolf’s regarding the human experience of the real world as “becoming,” an astatic and transformative mode of existence, Derek Ryan argues that her works offer complex relations between human and nonhuman entities:

> Woolf theorises the creative, immanent materiality of human and nonhuman life; that is, wary of the philosophical, ethical, and political pitfalls of individualism, binary oppositions, and transcendence, Woolf’s writing offers new conceptualisations of the material world where the immanent and intimate entanglements of human and nonhuman agencies are brought to the fore. (Ryan 4)

For this reason, Woolf’s “philosophy” to discover the “hidden “pattern” “behind the cotton wool” is crucially significant to anticipate the probability of connecting Modernism with materiality. Woolf clearly suggests that the world is a “mass,” and her idea of life as a mode of existence is linked to materiality:

> I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we —I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; *we are the thing itself*. (“Sketch” 72; emphasis added)

Moreover, it is seen that for Woolf neither art nor the artist is separate from materiality of the world. Therefore, as Banfield explains “Woolf positions herself as part of a community of subjects, accessible through language but with no transcendent position outside it; […] she understands language to be socially constructed and present only in its material utterances” (*Phantom* 29). In other words, the capability of the subject as the creator of meaning is functional only when it can be formulated in “material” meaning.

At this point, Derek Ryan warns that it would be a mistake to consider that Woolf's literature solely deals with materiality. What he claims, though, is that Woolf is concerned about "the possibility of being: the becoming of the material world" (3). Therefore, it can be claimed that for Woolf, the action of writing is "immanent" and a "creative process" (Ryan 2) like the existence of "atoms" or "patterns" as she states "I make it real by putting it into words" ("Sketch" 85). Thus, Woolf points out that writing is a process of making meanings by experiencing the material world (objects), which results in negotiation of materiality and spirituality.

Similarly, objects turning into things in this world where the human experience is located can be taken as "becoming" for that it brings a transformed relation between human and object. Thing theory, which is coined by Bill Brown in 2001, aims to reconsider the relation between the subject and object through a search for the object's agency to turn into a "thing." Distinguishing thing from object requires the material existence mutated in a new dimension shaped by an instant relation aroused between the human subject and the material entity, which must be triggered by the disintegration of the use of objects as simple tools for the humans. In doing so, the theory renounces the binary opposition between the subject and object by "discovering it disoriented or displaced" as object discontinues its regular functionality (Brown, *Other* 20). To put it differently, Bill Brown discusses the intrinsic agency of matter by reconsidering and re-evaluating object's relation to subject. One cannot distinguish a knife from being an object or a thing by chopping with it but can realize its "thingness" when used as a screwdriver because "its sharpness and flatness" become apparent, as it has never been before. In other words, by "misuse" or "dislodging," the knife becomes a thing: "For the life of things made manifest in the time of misuse is, should we look, a secret in plain sight—not a life behind or beneath the object but a life that is its fluctuating shape and substance and surface, a life that the subject must catalyze but cannot contain" (Brown, "Modernism" 3). At this point, things can be considered the "hidden pattern" "behind the cotton wool" of material existence in Woolf's words, and "a secret in plain sight" in Brown's words. To put it another way, Woolf's aspiration to discover life that holds the neglected aspects of human existence can be enhanced by an inquiry of things, which are ignored while examining only the human characters in fiction. Therefore, things as regenerative and mutative

entities which enact a different experience for human can be taken as the grid to discuss Woolf's entangling human experience with the physical world.

In order to offer a better understanding of the difference between object and thing, "thingification," which is the process of an object's turning into thing should be explained. First and foremost, thingification is bound to the existence of both the subject and object. Therefore, to dispose of the 'subject versus object' dichotomy in philosophical discussions, Brown takes thinghood as "latency" to come about at any time when a differentiated and non-habitual relation between object and subject emerges. As a result, he suggests that every 'thing' is an object due to its material nature but not every object is a 'thing.' When the object-subject nexus is constructed on use-value, as illustrated by the example of knife above, based on the object's habitual practicality for human, no thinghood is expected. However, when the pen is out of ink, it can be a thing because its functionality based on a drill, which is writing, is broken. In another aspect, when the pen is used for carving a piece of wood, it can be a thing as well for that its habitual use value is differentiated. Metaphysically, on the other hand, when the pen is overvalued, for example for being a famous poet's or a gift by someone you care, and not used for writing for a long time, it can be a thing because the value is not put on its human owner but on the thing itself. In the widest sense, thing theory looks into objects' capacity to shape or transform the human.

The aim of thing theory is not the abstraction or mystification of the object but instead keeping its materiality in a different scope. In this sense, Woolf's emphasis on the human experiencing the material world can be discussed with references to thing theory. As Brown explains, "[t]he story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation" ("Theory" 4). This idea focuses on materiality with the attempt of making the things "signifiers" regarding their potential for being immanent and unexpected occurrences experienced by the human. Therefore, the changed relationship between the human and matter arises in a new dimension which is intrinsically dynamic. Likewise, objects in Woolf's works are not

simply the material decorations or possessions but the very important part of "becoming." As Bill Brown illustrates, things are enriched with their potential autonomy *in* this subject-object nexus. By this process, an object suddenly comes into an active and divergent entity owing to its own changeability based on spatiotemporal variety. In other words, an object changes into a thing, a new form of presence, through its occurrence in a peculiar piece of time when the subject's familiar drill of using it is paused or interrupted. Thus, objects must be examined within their own spatiotemporality which holds their inherent peculiarities to transform into things.

More importantly, Bill Brown states that "[his] descriptions are ontical—addressing the world we inhabit, the what and where and how and why of objects therein […]" (*Other* 24). What is significant then is to discover the new meanings/occurrences, which appear suddenly in a peculiar temporal and spatial context because "[t]o say that objects occur is to suggest that objects have a temporality" (Brown, *Other* 62). In other words, the process of objects turning into things is temporal by nature. Even though the word "temporality" might remind of Modernist technique of narrating subjective time in fiction, in this thesis it is only used to mean that the process of thingification is related to time as a concept. As this is an "ontical" questioning, it requires taking the time-space as the core of the physical world in which things exist. Parallel to this, things in narrative must be analyzed in their relation to the spatiotemporal universe embedded in the text. Therefore, literary chronotope, which is the artistically reformulated time-space relations in fiction, forms up the base to examine things in novel. As a result, pursuing things in Woolf's novels leads this inquiry to literary chronotope. To put it differently, Woolf's stylistic use of the material world can lead us to thingification because simple objects become some things else for the individuals in particular moments in her fiction. In simpler words, the human characters and the objects must be examined in their time/space relativities to find out the unaccustomed moments of experience. Things never lose their solidity or materiality whereas they "decompose" and "recompose" the concept of being objects (Brown, "Theory" 5). Therefore, objects do not cease to exist while becoming things, and they create new impacts on the human while mutating their relation to individuals. As chronotope is the overarching spatiotemporality of a narrative, it encompasses all possibilities of material existence in addition to the characters' understanding of the

world. In other words, objects, humans, and the process of thingification are enabled and at the same time determined by the literary chronotope.

As human and material entities are equally required for such an experience positioned in the spatiotemporal universe presented in the narrative, the philosophical discussions on the subject/object nexus are briefly illustrated. With a retrospective perspective towards these discussions, Bill Brown points out that we "inhabit" the opposition of the subject and object as "a defining feature of modern thought" specifically from Descartes (Brown, *Other* 20). Similarly, Rachel Tillman disclaims dualistic thinking by suggesting that "[i]n Western thought, matter is passive in the sense that any impetus for change or dynamism must be given to it from without; it has no agency of its own" (30). As the dualist thought prioritizes the human above the material world, new efforts to figure out the imbalance in this dichotomy bring forth new approaches, which is called a "material turn" in social sciences. Distinguished in the late twentieth and the twenty-first centuries, object-oriented studies have gained a notable role in academic thought. It is no doubt that objects have always been a subject matter for centuries but these new studies differ from earlier philosophies in their approach to the material world, which is a protest to anthropocentrism. Named as object-oriented ontology (OOO; "Triple O"), some earlier philosophies in this field reject the twentieth-century dominant philosophy claiming that objects' reality is limited to the human's conception. Therefore, pinpointing idealism as the main problem, Graham Harman states that "*withdrawal* or *withholding* of things from direct access is the central principle of OOO" (6). In simpler words, studying objects as they are without the human intervention is the target of object-oriented-ontologies.

Although such studies have been enriched in recent years, it can be suggested that "material turn," in general, opposes the traditional binaries in modern thought such as "nature/culture, mind/body, subject/object, matter/language… etc." which "entail privileging one pole to the detriment of the other" (Pellizzoni 314). In other words, in the core of this new material tendency, there is a will to get rid of binary oppositions. For this reason, new materialist critics raised a new question regarding the OOOs for their prioritization of object at the expense of the human. So, instead of the OOOs, new

materialisms embraced holistic approaches to consider the ontological and epistemological concepts regarding the human and nonhuman entities. Taking both objects and the humans into consideration, Jane Bennet, one of the influential figures of new materialisms, points out that these studies can attempt to focus on either "periodic[ally]" "even if it is impossible to give equal attention to both at once" (227). In other words, even though we have to put the emphasis on one side from time to time, the key point is not to favor one. Therefore, Bill Brown introduces "thing theory" as an umbrella term referring to the studies of object-human relations in new dimensions, and to generalize the concepts he differentiates object and thing from one another to demonstrate the objects' agency of thinghood. In this regard, any kind of reshaped relation between the human and objects can be a matter of discussion for thing theory ("Theory" 7). Thus, thing theory depends on the object-subject nexus while at the same time moving away from dualistic thought, which appears as a part of the material turn in the Humanities.

The mechanistic ideas set upon the ignorance of the object in return for the prioritization of the subject is claimed to be located in the assumption of an infant's differentiating between self and other as a "triumph:'

> The difficulty might be measured by […] the ontogenetic development of the object concept itself, where the human infant achieves the distinction between object and subject as […] the triumph of overcoming 'egocentrism' of radical undifferentiation, where there is neither self nor 'objectivity.' Only gradually does the infant assimilate the environment as external. (Brown, *Other* 20)

Realization of the "external" might be the originating point—but not the justification—of "the epistemologist's idea of world outside the subject" (Brown, *Other* 20). Defined as "a transition from chaos to cosmos," it can be suggested that it necessitates spatial understanding through which "the self is freed from itself by finding itself and so assigns itself a place as a thing among things [...]" (qtd. in Brown, *Other* 20). In other words, the infant shifts from a stage where there is no sense of binary to "the coordination of a relationship" between the subject and object—or between the internal and the external (Brown, *Other* 20). Therefore, the chaotic phase in which there is no distinction based on self and other is replaced by the sense of "me" and "others." Then, this change of

perception can be taken as the initiating point of the binary between the subject and object for an individual. Therefore, the infant's realization of the object as the "external" world could only be the very basic threshold of life. So, this shift as a part of an infant's life sustaining cannot be the only causal suggestion to the overvaluation of the subject in philosophies. For this reason, Brown claims that the dominant idea favoring the subject as superior to the object requires a further epistemological discussion concerning the development of modern thought.

As Alfred North Whitehead pinpoints, it can be claimed that the relation between the subject and object might be built upon experience and this does not necessarily underestimate the object because "experience is an activity" (similar to Woolf's "becoming") in which "subject has a 'concern' for the object" (qtd. in Brown, *Other* 20). Therefore, "the 'concern' at once places the object as a component in the experience of the subject" (qtd. in Brown, *Other* 20), which means neither is expandable for the experience. At this point, Tillman claims that the traditional theories considering matter as a "separable" entity bring forth two conclusions: First, "it presupposes a substantial divisibility between matter and mind. This mind-body separation has permeated our self-understanding of what it means to be thinking subjects and led many to the conclusion that cognition and thought are not activities of matter or material bodies;" second, it "assumes that we can divide matter easily and unproblematically from other bits of matter because matter is made up of parts that are essentially isolable," which means "wholes are nothing more than the sum of their parts." If so, "the classical understanding of the atom" notifies that "functioning of parts is sufficient to explain the existence and the functioning of the whole" (Tillman 31). Then, it would mean that we can analyze the whole world by searching about all these small entities as science has already taken it as the prior method. Consequently, we are convinced enough to judge that matter is passive, easy and ready for us to perceive. This tendency to divide matter into categories ends up with a readiness to dismiss object for being made up of separate smaller entities as opposed to subject as a consistent whole. Surely, the human's relation with matter is perpetual in life as Woolf pinpoints, yet theorization of materiality somehow lacks the inherent capabilities of material existence. This new tendency to take matter as "dynamic" and significant is mostly framed by new materialisms by starting to "locat[e] and

challeng[e] two key presuppositions of the mechanistic view of matter: that matter is 'passive,' and that matter is 'separable'" (Tillman 30). Focusing on the suppositions regarding matter as passive, Tillman defines the reason for this miscalculation: conjecturing objects as naturally inactive and dissociable.

In the inquiry of matter as an active and dynamic entity, Bill Brown emphasizes the difference between object and thing, notably on the capacity of an object to become a thing. Therefore, every material being can be an object but every object cannot be a thing. He explains things as "occasions of contingency—the chance interruption—that disclose a physicality of things," when the object is "momentarily" "arrested" ("Theory" 4). In other words, an object's becoming a thing is a new dimension when we reconsider the belief that matter can "change" only when it is

> behaving according to fixed, universal, timeless law [which are all detected and defined by the human subject], or as the product of accidental interactions with other matter also behaving according to these laws. Otherwise, any additional motion or change must come from the active input of an intentional (usually human) subject. (Tillman 30)

While underestimating an object's capability of making a change to some set and predictable occurrences, we curse matter as a quiet and static being. Thus, as a side effect, we claim that object has no agency unless the subject stimulates it. Furthermore, even if there is no available subject to stimulate, an object is claimed to act only in accordance with our presupposed possibilities.

In other words, thingness makes possible to take an object as "a lively materiality that is self-transformative and already saturated with the agentic capacities and existential significance that are typically located in a separate, ideal, and subjective realms" (Coole 92). Then, it can be claimed that thing theory opens up our minds to rethink about the object as an agent, which is sufficient enough to transform into a thing because its potential is a "latency" which can be triggered at any time the conventional functionality is broken. Furthermore, this is exactly when the experience is triggered. As the painting is upside down or the dirty window stops sunlight, objects become things "when they stop working for us" (Brown, "Theory" 4). An upside-down painting would make the subject

realize the shapes and colors in such a way that different associations could be triggered. When the window gets dirty, the subject firstly realizes that the glass has a *material existence,* which turns into an obstacle to seeing outside. Although both keep the potential to mean something else for the subject, it comes into experience, which is particular to that occurrence:

> We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily. (Brown, "Theory" 4)

In order to explain thing theory within a new sense of subject-object relation, Bill Brown discusses the earlier philosophies regarding the ontological configurations of things. For instance, Kant's concept of "thing-in-itself" belongs to the noumenal world, which is beyond appearances, or the phenomenal world. Thus, the human is incapable of experiencing the noumenal world in which things exist only for themselves. As a consequence, "the being of the Kantian thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) [is] outside the spatiotemporal grid of experience" whereas "the perceptual apparatus […] can only provide apprehension of the thing-for-us (*Ding füruns*)" (Brown, *Other* 18). Although Kant's attaching value to material existence is a granting philosophy for the inquiries into materiality, this ontological division of things as inaccessible and accessible existences does not lead us to an alternative and regenerative relation between subject and object. Yet, Bill Brown explains the relation between the subject and object in the constitution of thing by using a chart in which "things" are positioned *between* "subject" and "object" as it is explained as follows:

> [T]he thingness of the constituted object is the outcome of an interaction (beyond their mutual constitution) between subject and object. The thing thus names a subject-object relation. The corollary of this point is that any object can become a thing—or, more precisely, that thingness inheres (as a latency) within any manifest object. (Brown, *Other* 20-21)

In this way, it is claimed that in this relation both the subject and object are the required components, which enables the fulfilment of the potential of thingness. In other words, any object maintains the capacity to turn into a thing, which has to be triggered by the reformed correlation between the subject and the object at any time. As Brown's chart

shows, “things […] occur only in the subject/object nexus,” although they are not “exhausted” in this relation thanks to this latency. Therefore, in the interest of “the dignity of physicality,” subject is not supposed to be discounted (“Modernism” 9). This inevitably requires a mutual negotiation of the two, which is dynamic. This reminds of Woolf’s empowering subjective impressions with the support of materiality in a way that physicality is not disposed of for the dignity of spirituality.

If the component that keeps the potential of thingness is the object, what is the active role of the subject in this correlation? Bill Brown refers to Roland Barthes’s concept of “*punctum*” and Alfonso Lingis’s concept of “imperative” to define “subjective response.” Brown explains Barthes’s idea of *punctum* of a photograph as “what captivates you” which is the “‘detail’ continuing to ‘rise of its own accord into affective consciousness’” even though you stop looking at the photograph (Brown, *Other* 22-23). Nonetheless, the triggering element may be “the object’s insistence” as Lingis suggests, “[t]hings are attractions” which “draw our perceptual movements to themselves and hold them” (qtd. in Brown, *Other* 23). For instance, the armchair is stimulating for relaxation in a bad mood or “the worktable calls for devotion to craft” (qtd. in Brown, *Other* 23). This means that the things “make demands:”

> In any case—physical or metaphysical, with the thing provoked as *punctum* or as *imperative*, or both, the two often indistinguishable—the thingness of the object, just as it is irreducible to the object form (be that thingness physical or metaphysical), threatens the coherence of the object. (Brown, *Other* 23)

At this point, the purpose of thing theory can be defined as an effort to look for thingness of objects and their ability to “elicit your attention, interrupt your concentration, assault your sensorium” (Brown, *Other* 24) Therefore, an object is a thing when it is blocked or paused in its conventional function in the eye of the subject. That is exactly how the objects impose their agency on the human.

Resuming his retrospective discussion on materiality in the Humanities, Bill Brown touches on two opposing approaches—idealism and cultural materialism. He claims that our intuitive understanding of things as “mute,” “concrete,” “self-evident,” and “matter-

of-fact" does not lead us to the "mereness of things," and neither idealism nor cultural materialism can provide a much different point. Since idealism takes "mereness" of thing in its phenomenal world and materialism puts it as commodification, Brown claims that "both accounts employ a temporal structure wherein the mereness of the thing, its present physical presence, is inseparable from its metaphysical past" (Brown, *Sense* 1). Furthermore, historicity fails to come up with a theory forged and fused by the things:

> The experience or history of specific objects, though, depends on a generalizable experience of the very thingness of both natural and man-made objects, which itself depends on our ideas—about thingness—no less than it depends on our senses (and our understanding of them). Such a point seems to digress readily toward the idea *of* things, and away from the ideas *in* them. (Brown, *Sense* 2)

Likewise, cultural materialism

> denaturalize[s] consumer practices and trace (within and between cultures) the *work* of exchange and consumption: the way value is created in specific social formulations and lodged in specific material forms, the way that people code, recode, and satisfy their material wants and needs. (Brown, *Sense* 4)

Therefore, what is intended with thing theory is "a kind of cultural and literary history emanating from the typewriter, the fountain pen, the light bulb—component parts of the physical support for modern literary production" (Brown, *Sense* 4). Then, what do the objects do in a literary text? They "make meaning, […] make or re-make ourselves, […] organize our anxieties and affections, to sublimate our fears and shape our fantasies," which makes the texts "describe and enact an imaginative possession of things that amounts to the labor of infusing manufactured objects with a metaphysical dimension" (Brown, *Sense* 4). Thus, "discourse" or the "social text" is not held as "the analytical grid" through which past and present is set on, the compass herein is "the objects that are materialized from and in the physical world that is, or had been, at hand" (Brown, *Sense* 3-4). In simpler words, Bill Brown suggests that the ideas focused on transcendental idealism or socio-cultural and consumerist contexts of objects are not generative in terms of preceding object's agency.

Regarding the perspective of thing theory in literary analysis, the aim is to research on "the indeterminate ontology where things seem slightly human and humans seem slightly thing-like," a kind of relationship that is "irreducible to ownership" (Brown, *Sense* 13).

Thus, by putting aside the dichotomy between object and subject, the questions of thing theory in literary studies are as follows: “What are the poetics and the politics of the object? How do objects mediate relations between subjects, and how do subjects mediate the relation between objects? How are things and thingness used to think about the self?” That is to say, the theory herein may pose “an experiment” “to see what happens when we objectify literary texts so that they become for us objects of knowledge about physical objects” (Brown, *Sense* 18). Furthermore Brown claims that "literature might then serve as a mode of rehabilitative reification—a resignifying of the fixations and fixities of thingification that will grant us access to what remains obscure (or obscured) in the routines through which we (fail to) experience the material object world" (*Other* 222). Thus, reviewing literary texts in this way can offer an innovative method of analysis for literary studies by leaving aside the assumption of representation of the objects as mere symbols or images which are either transcendental and symbolic in the narrative or static as a character’s belonging. Furthermore, by focusing on the unique and particular relation between objects and characters in a literary work, one can focus on the universe created by the narrative itself instead of social, political or cultural readings of texts.

To sum up what thing theory is not, it can be suggested that the transcendental ontology (Kant’s things-in-themselves), the historicity, the utilization of an object in the ordinarily practical way, idealization or commodification are not the destinations of this theory. Emphasizing the role of the objects to shape the human’s life, Bill Brown summarizes object theories as a perspective to be aware of the fact that inanimate objects form or transform human being, which either occurs when they “stop working for us” or when their value becomes untypically excessive. Brown gives the example of a glass to illustrate thinghood (“Interview”): When you drink water from the glass, it is an object. When it is broken and cannot be used as a liquid container, it is a thing because “the drill breaks” (“Theory” 4). This thinghood occurs in the level of physicality. In another aspect, when you overvalue a glass because it is a memoir, it turns out to be a fetish or a totem in the metaphysical level of thinghood: “their force as a sensuous presence or as a metaphysical presence, the magic by which objects become values, fetishes, idols, and totems” (“Theory 4”). “The magic” is that the value is excessively put on the object, not the human, and this displays the latency of thinghood in any object. Thus, the objects’

altering into things is a varied yet distinguishable occurrence which concentrates on object's latent capability to become some other things. In other words, in various modes of relation between the human and object, the same material entity may remain as an object, or become a thing, which can be different from one occurrence to another. Through the manifoldness of thinghood, objects' agency becomes varied, particular and alternated.

As explained, thing theory is a contemporary idea developed within the material turn in social sciences for drawing the attention from the human/subject to inanimate objects. Although modern thought has always looked for an ontological explanation of the two, what differs is that this theory aims to discover the temporality and the latency of objects' capability to digress from the tangible and manifest tool-value for the human. Considering objects first and foremost as material entities, Brown's theory opens up interpretations on the human-object interconnection with a focus on objects' agency to reshape the human's world. Therefore, either as broken and unpractical pieces or fetishized memoir, the glass is a material entity in an alternated manifestation in the object-subject nexus. So, by thing theory, object becomes the fundamental agent in any course when its functionality for the subject is lessened, disappeared or altered. Thanks to this, object arises as an agent in its relation to the subject. Accordingly, an object is always potentially active:

> Temporalized as the before and after of the object, thingness amounts to a latency (the not yet formed or the not yet formable) and to an excess (what remains physically or metaphorically irreducible to objects). But this temporality obscures the all-at-onceness, the simultaneity, of the object/thing dialectic and the fact that, all at once, *the thing seems to name the object just as it is even as it names some thing else.* (Brown, "Theory" 5)

Since things are temporalized, their latency in a narrative must be in accordance with the spatiotemporal universe drawn by the text, which is coined as "literary chronotope" by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) who tries to understand how the concepts of time and space work in a piece of prose. In his essay titled "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in Novel" (1937-38, published in 1975 in English), based on ancient Greek words *chronotos* and *topos*, he came up with the term "chronotope" literally meaning "time space" to define "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (84). Thus, his term chronotope can be roughly defined

as the spatiotemporal frame of a literary work—a kind of universe for a work—because "all activity, whether verbal, mechanical, human, supernatural or natural-scientific, is amenable to classification into what Bakhtin has described as chronotopes or time/space relationships" (Larsen 1). Therefore, as the elements of thingification, which are the subject and the object, are essentially chronotopic, all occurrences of thingification are intrinsically chronotopic as well. Furthermore, because thingification is a temporal process, it cannot go beyond the chronotope of the narrative. For this reason, chronotope offers the opportunity for thinghood but at the same time draws the lines for its potential in the narrative.

Focusing on various chronotopic activities, Bakhtin presents a comprehensive study of literary chronotopes starting from the ancient Greek romance to the nineteenth-century realistic novels. In this regard, Bakhtinian chronotope firstly defines generic characteristics through categorical investigation of time and space in literary text, secondly presents the historical development of literature based on these generic characteristics. His idea of chronotope is based on Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity in relation to the inseparability of time and space. However, as Bakhtin suggests that his concern is restricted to the use of time and space in literary texts, he does not focus on this inseparability but the reformulation of these phenomena in the fictional world. Bakhtin takes the idea of the inseparability of time and space "as a formally constitutive category of literature:"

> In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. The chronotope in literature has an intrinsic generic significance. It can even be said that it is precisely the chronotope that defines genre and generic distinctions, for in literature the primary category in the chronotope is time. (*Dialogic* 84)

In other words, Bakhtin claims that what makes the novel a distinctive genre is the chronotope. Although the term chronotope is mostly found too general, it is an important source of literary theory and criticism because "unlike sheer formalist or structuralist approaches to narrative time and space […] [chronotope] constitute[s] a fundamental

unity, as in the human perception of everyday reality" (Bemong et al. 3). Furthermore, chronotope can be accepted as "tantamount to the world construction that is at the base of every narrative text, comprising a coherent combination of spatial and temporal indicators" (Bemong et al. 4). Therefore, chronotope can be defined as the spatiotemporal and characteristic unity of a narrative, which is open to be formed by the plot. In this way, Bakhtin presents a literary analysis based on narrative features that leads to generic characteristics.

One of the influential ideas about the literary theory of Bakhtin's age was Russian Formalism. In the first half of the twentieth century, a group of Russian scholars, most of whom were linguists, worked on literary texts to define the characteristics of the theory. Distinctively, their methodological inquiry into the text had a kind of "schema" with the attempt of distinguishing the "literariness" of a work. What is important for the Russian Formalists was the word itself. In other words, they deliberately excluded any referentiality to the author, originality or socio-political agenda. Even though Bakhtin prefers to investigate novels with their literary history and disapproves of the attitude that ignores the historical background of texts, he hardly ever mentions the author's biography. For this reason, most scholars claim that Bakhtin's methodology to define literary chronotope is affected by Russian Formalism. To make it clearer, it is useful to anticipate how the Russian Formalists examined the texts. Differing from verse, what they pointed out in prose was the plot, "*sujhet"* termed by Victor Shklovsky as the organisation of raw material, which is story, "*fabula*" (12). Here, chronotope appears as "the only device which can relate a *sujhet* to its *fabula* in terms of spatio-temporal ratiocination" (Larsen 38). In other words, it can be claimed that through the defamiliarization of the actual time-space relation, chronotope creates the idiosyncratic time-space relativity in a literary work. Likewise, Michael Holquist explains the relationship between plot and physical time-space by stating that "[a]n event is always a dialogic unit in so far as it is a correlation: something happens only when something else with which it can be compared reveals a change in time and space" (116). Therefore, it is possible to claim that chronotope in a way shapes the *fabula* to enable *sjuzet,* which makes a literary work a literary work through defamiliarizing the actual time/space.

To understand Bakhtin's chronotope, first and foremost, it should be noted that chronotope is the widest framework of a literary text. Thus, every verbal or actional element of fiction is inevitably "chronotopic" in a work of literature. From the dialogues, action, plot and descriptions to the tone in a narrative, all "individual" elements in the formation of chronotope are both a "unifying" and "unified" "characteristics of a literary piece (Larsen 1). In other words, the chronotope is one of the definitive and far-reaching features of a work in which various and characteristic artistic applications are formed, as Bakhtin defined it as "intrinsic connectedness" which is "artistically expressed in literature" (*Dialogic* 84). As a result, the chronotope compromises the frame of a narrative, which is intrinsically shaped by and at the same time shapes the literary elements. Thus, whatever material is used or whatever technique is applied in a narrative, it is by nature chronotopic. To explain how time and space are the related units of narrative, Larsen resembles chronotope to a prism:

> […] Bakhtin advances a premise which implies that in the novel, as in the passage of historical time, all narrative activity and utterance take place within a three-dimensional matrix, two of the faces of the matrix representing [for the sake of simplification] the longitudinal and latitudinal qualities of space, and the third face representing time. The resultant container, within which all novelistic action is contained, is therefore in Bakhtin's geometrical imagery akin to a cuboid or prism. All action is deemed to be represented within time moving away from (out of) the spatial base of the prism and moving chronologically along the face of the matrix, which represents time. (Larsen 21-22)

Therefore, if a work is visualized as liquid, then time/space (chronotope) as its container shapes it by homogenizing and preserving all ingredients. Therefore, Larsen claims that chronotope is a kind of cuboid or prism by referring to its "longitudinal and latitudinal qualities of space" as it is seen in the quote above. Additionally, chronotope provides "the inter-association" to all elements to "intersect" or "coalesce" (Larsen 22). With this, chronotope enables various elements in different spatiotemporal dimensions coexisting in a narrative. What is more, they constitute chronotope at the same time. For this reason, the thesis claims that materiality in fiction, whether as objects or things, is determined by chronotope.

In a much wider perspective, time and space is the embodiment of ideas or knowledge given in a work, as Bakhtin states "[a]ll the novel's abstract elements—philosophical and

social generalizations, ideas, analyses of cause and effect—gravitate toward the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood" (*Dialogic* 250). Even in the fictitious recording of events, time and space play the most crucial role. For instance, Homer's works are distinguishable for their re-organization of time-space relativity in which all events are reduced to traceable records despite the vast scope of the setting. Bakhtin claims that this configuration of time-space is the initiation of the western novel. Thus, literary re-organization of time-space of events is exactly what novelistic chronotope is. In other words, time flows differently from the actual temporality in a novel through artistic inventions such as flashback, flash-forward, and foreshadowing in the plot structure. For this reason, Bakhtin's examination of narrative techniques used from ancient tales to the nineteenth-century novels lays bare the idea that time in narrative is a formulation provided by literary techniques. Therefore, "what Bakhtin is trying to articulate […] is not only the evolution of literary genres, but the timeliness of time itself" (Erdinast-Vulcan 120). For Bakhtin, narrative genres this way or the other represent the human experience which is categorized and structured both in theory and practice. As Bakhtin's chronotope highlights the literary history of Western writing, he claims that the novel genre has not completed its evolution. In order to trace the novel genre, he refers to the epics in which time is abstracted as there is not "even an elementary biological or maturational duration" (*Dialogic* 90), whereas novel offers a more realistically constructed and maturational time. While characters in a novel undergo some changes, the protagonist of the epic remains the same. This differentiation highlighted in Bakhtin's essays is significant in figuring out the relevance of time in the concept of chronotope as he analyzes it as the earliest techniques of novel writing.

In his study of chronotope to trace the development of Western prose, Bakhtinian chronotope which is based upon generic characteristics are often "equated with the world view of a text" (Bemong et al. 8) because "[s]pecific chronotopes correspond to particular genres, which themselves represent particular world-views [and] to this extent, chronotope is a cognitive concept as much as a narrative feature of texts" (Morris, *Bakhtin* 246). The fundamentality of chronotope to define "generic distinctions" is the use of time, which is an "assimilation of actual historical time" (*Dialogic* 85). The time employed in a piece of literature may not be the same as the actual time and this enables literature to

keep “simultaneous existence” of different periods (*Dialogic* 85). Therefore, Bakhtin examines time-space as an arena in which “understanding” is created (Holquist 29). Thus, it can be suggested that chronotope endows the literary genres with a distinctively varied use of time and space through which the meaning is embodied. At this point, it is found out that thingification is chronotopic because the meaning resulted by the changed relation between the human and the inanimate is bound to the all-pervading chronotope.

The literary chronotope functions both as the border of a narrative and as the experimental arena for a narrative. Therefore, Bakhtin formulates generic differentiation by analyzing the patternal uses of chronotope. To illustrate generic chronotopes, Bakhtin distinguishes the ancient Greek romance with its “adventure-time,” differently from the “real historical time” of realist modern fiction. At this point, it should be noted that time is the dominant element in chronotope (*Dialogic* 146). The enormous scope of Greek romance “is so perfected, so full, that in all subsequent evolution of the purely adventure novel nothing essential has been added to it down to the present day.” This characteristic use of time with “a very broad and varied geographical background” forms up the plot which enables the ultimate heroism of the protagonist who “experience[s] a most improbable number of adventures” but does not change (*Dialogic* 87). Referring to the ancient Greek romances, he claims:

> [T]he western novel […] evolved from an initial state characterized by a total absence of historical time through a number of subsequent stages which steadily displayed a fuller sense of time (e.g. time with embryonic *biographical* significance in the Roman adventure novel of everyday life and in ancient biography), to eventually arrive at the ideal of nineteenth-century realism and the conception of *real historical time* internalized by its attendant chronotope. (Bemong et al. 9)

Thus, chronotope is characteristically an “assimilation of actual (including historical) reality, that permit the essential aspects of this reality to be reflected and incorporated into the artistic space of the novel” (*Dialogic* 251-52). Therefore, it can be claimed that the re-structure of time in a narrative is how its chronotope is drawn by the narrator. Consequently, patternal formulation of time leads to a specific genre like in the ancient epic narratives with their regulation of excessively large periods. On the contrary, in realistic modern novels, for example in the *Bildungsroman*, “assimilation of real historical time and the real historical person” characterizes the narrative (*Dialogic 19*).

With regards to the dominance of time in chronotope, it should be noted that it does not necessarily have to be in accordance with actual time. In fact, this is what enables literary texts to have their own chronotopic speed. In other words, each literary work creates its own formulation of time and its correlation to space, that is, it makes its chronotope in itself and by itself. Furthermore, specific ways of using time characterize novelistic genres, and Bakhtin can draw the historical line of the developments shaping the Western novel by analyzing these specific chronotopic times.

Bakhtin's formation of the idea of chronotope is also a method of studying literary history because his investigation was an entanglement of two areas, that is, literature as a part of "human dialogue" and its connection with "the physical intersection with time and space" (Larsen 19-20). In pursuit of artistic adjustment of time and space, Bakhtin firstly looks through the aesthetic representation of the human being in accordance with the world around them. In simpler words, "human life" is perceived "as materially and simultaneously present within a physical-geographical space and a specific point of historical time" (Morris, *Bakhtin* 180). The significance of this methodology lies in the way human communication occurs. If there was no dialogue, or in a wider sense, no communication among humans, there could be no "society." If there was no correlation with time and space, there could be no "meaning" in "human life" (Larsen 20). Likewise, chronotope is grasped as "an integral way of understanding experience, and a ground for visualizing and representing human life" (Morson and Emerson 375). Similarly, "[i]t addresses not only the perception of the fictional world but also points at the spatial and temporal embedding of human action in order to offer a better understanding of how humans act in their biotopes and semiospheres" (Bemong et al. iv). Therefore, Bakhtin claims that "[t]he image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic" (*Dialogic* 85). Consequently, it is possible to claim that neither human life nor a narrative would be meaningful if there were no time-space relation. Just as the human dialogue becomes meaningful only with its relation to time/space, all elements in a literary work are meaningful with their interaction with the chronotope. For this reason, human characters in fiction are essentially chronotopic for the fact that they represent the social backgrounds of the narrated chronotope. This is the reason why epic heroes are not political or historical as the narrative does not offer a socio-cultural general chronotope.

On the other hand, as the realistic novels aim to pinpoint social and/or psychological conditions, their characters are achieved through their relation with the social, political and cultural landscapes of their narratives. In this sense, it is indisputable that subject as the fundamental unit of thingification is chronotopic as well for that human's understanding is configured within its chronotopic universe.

As Bakhtinian chronotope is basically about generic distinctions, it seems too general to be defined and framed for literary analysis. Therefore, Bakhtin openly states that what he offers is the "major chronotopes" which are "most fundamental and wide-ranging," but at the same time, there might be "unlimited number of minor chronotopes" (*Dialogic* 252). Thus, many fresh and innovative interpretations followed Bakhtin's essays. Bakhtin himself leaves the door open to be widened by newer ideas by his statement about "minor chronotopes" as he continues, "any motif may have a specific chronotope of its own" with "complex interactions among them" (252). As his former essay mostly discusses the ancient texts as the beginning of Western prose, "Concluding Remarks" offers much more substantial ideas to analyze chronotopes used in modern novel. First and foremost, Bakhtin points out the plurality of chronotopes in the eighteenth and the nineteenth-century realistic novel:

> Within the limits of a single work and within the total literary output of a single author we may notice a number of different chronotopes and complex interactions among them, specific to the given work or author; it is common moreover for one of these chronotopes to envelop or dominate the others. […] Chronotopes are mutually inclusive, they co-exist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships. (252)

Related to the historicization of chronotope and prose writing, change in the use of time is particularly significant because "the interior of literary texts" needs to be analyzed as "texts emerge from an environment—the sum total of social and ideological forces in play in their time—that is itself profoundly chronotopic" (Renfrew 123). As the ancient concept of time is not the same in the eighteenth century, by taking the Renaissance as a turning point for the birth of the modern novel, Bakhtin claims that the evolution of chronotope was a necessity:

> [I]t was necessary to find a new form of time and a new relationship of time to space. [...] A new chronotope was needed that would permit one to link real life (history) to the real earth [...] a productive and creative time, a time measured by creativity, by growth and not by destruction. (*Dialogic* 206)

In this regard, Alaister Renfrew claims that chronotopes are "also ways of understanding history, with history being understood" (123). Therefore, he suggests that if the "invention" of time in Renaissance thought is the birth of modern chronotope, "the chronotope of Victorian Britain could be seen as the (localized) beginning of the end for 'Renaissance time'" because it was the period when "a properly temporal consciousness" initiated:

> The chronotope of Victorian Britain is defined by a paradoxical temporal overload, a concentration of the scientifically and technologically driven idea of progress to the point where a new, illusory sense of enclosure and 'eternity' once again began to predominate – where a ubiquitous and overdetermined idea of 'progress' had begotten a closed and static world view. (Renfrew 124)

Renfrew continues the history line with Modernist fiction with a reference to Bakhtin's "interior infinite" "as a terminal processor of forms of time and as the initiator of a chronotope of its own" (121). Bakhtin's explanation to "interior infinite" depends on the Romantic "discovery" "of the interior subjective man with his depth, complexity, and inexhaustible resources." He further claims that "[t]he interior infinite could not have been found in the closed and finished world, with its distinct fixed boundaries dividing all phenomena and values" (*Rabelais* 44). In this sense, Modernist plot opposing to the nineteenth-century literary values with no promising concrete plotline and conclusion might be considered an elevated application of "interior infinite." For this reason, even though Bakhtin's work covers Western prose until the twentieth century, Renfrew claims that the multiplied and personified sense of time in the Modernist novel endows the narrative with innumerous minor chronotopes. For this reason, while inspecting the peculiar moments of experiencing the material world as thingification, minor chronotopes in the novels will be examined throughout this thesis. As thingification is based on a mutual existence of the subject and object, biographical time[4] of the characters in the

[4] Mikhail Bakhtin does not define "biographical time" as a concept but often uses it interchangeably with the "biographical life" narrated in fiction (*Dialogic* 90; 162; 172). Therefore, in this thesis it is taken as the overall temporality covering the characters' lifetime, which includes the past memories and the present experience of time. For this reason, the Modernist concept of subjective time is considered under the title of biographical time throughout the thesis.

novels are regarded as the minor chronotope because the subjective experience of the objective world can only be meaningful in this temporality.

The literary chronotope, in a nutshell, is the artistic installation of time and space in literary works to form up the plot. Since ancient Greek prose was the origins of the Western novel tradition, Bakhtin inquires those texts with their several spatiotemporal grids to formulate the essence of chronotope as a literary application. Although he establishes a lineage of literary history through the analysis of chronotopes in prose works, he also comes up with some motivic ones as the patternal formulation of time/space. Furthermore, these patternal arrangements of chronotope—more specifically of time—lead Bakhtin to differentiate generic characteristics in various literary works. For this reason, chronotope presents both a general investigation of literary history and an analytical technique of a single work by looking into the artistic formulation of time and space.

In this thesis, Virginia Woolf's chasing after life in her fiction as a whole with its ordinariness and bizarreness will be illustrated through an investigation of the object-subject relations in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*. In order to distinguish the peculiar moments of objects' transforming its relation to the human characters in the novels, minor chronotopes and their interaction with the major chronotope will be dealt with as the spatiotemporal base of thingification. Therefore, the major chronotope of the 1920s post-war London which deeply affects the characters' biographical time in *Mrs Dalloway* will be used as the framework of all subject-object relations including thingification. On the other hand, in *Orlando*, biographical time will be taken as the determiner of thingification for that Orlando's life-span overreaches the historical time. Therefore, it is recognizable that historical time in *Mrs Dalloway* but biographical time in *Orlando* is more dominant in terms of the objects' latency to turn into things when the novels are compared with one another.

In *Mrs Dalloway*, doubling structure of one-day stories of Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith will be discussed with regard to their different responses to post-

war London. Clarissa Dalloway is married to a Conservative member of parliament and she is in a cheerful rush of having a big party for their important guests. On the other hand, Septimus Warren Smith, a shell-shocked World War I veteran, and his unhappy wife have a totally different life. The novel does not offer a full life story, instead it reveals the characters' inner selves through their memories and reactions to the outer world. So, these pieces of information regarding their lives and understandings will be considered their biographical time. While the characters' past and present lives are hinted through free association, their making meanings out of materiality is unveiled. As a result of her technique, Woolf's stylistic multiplicity of subjectivities is organically related to the objects' agency on the human. Clarissa's concerns for social approval shape her sense of matter in a fetishistic way of overvaluation, whereas Septimus's mental problems blur his perception of ordinary objects. For this reason, in the first chapter, the 1920s London as the historical chronotope will be discussed with references to their distinctive biographical times while inquiring thingification as an outcome of the clash or co-existence of biographical times with the historical time.

Orlando encompasses much larger periods of English history and literature which are ridiculed through the protagonist's uncatchable life story. Orlando lives for centuries in which he becomes a female and witnesses the line of English literary history. He starts as a poet in the Elizabethan court, and then losing his hope in his poetry he redecorates his whole castle and his life. After being a woman, her life goes on in England where she befriends the most influential literary figures of the Age of Enlightenment and Victorian periods. As a consequence of being a female poet's sensational mock biography teasing the social and the literary norms, the objects in *Orlando* are generally used in an excessive way to ridicule the characteristics of the respective historical chronotopes. Particularly, things function as the suspending and enduring witnesses of the progressive and mathematical time while they may function differently in peculiar moments or in larger periods for being misused or trans-used as a part of Orlando's exceptional biography. Thus, in the second chapter, things in *Orlando* will be analyzed in relation to biographical time because historical time cannot be compatible with Orlando's life.

In conclusion, in this thesis, materiality in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando* will be compared in terms of their spatiotemporal aspects to argue that thingification is enabled by literary chronotopes which are differently presented in the two novels. In this regard, in order to illustrate the peculiar moments of thingification in their chronotopes, *Mrs Dalloway* whose historical time pervades the relations between human and nonhuman, and *Orlando* whose biographical time shapes the protagonist's interaction with the physical world are selected. As a result of their different spatiotemporalities, the chronotopes of the two novels bare particular occurrences in which thingification happens due to different stimuli. In this way, Woolf's use of materiality as an essential part of life she wants to portray in her fiction will be discussed in a different way to highlight that the human experience of the material world is an active and changeable process.

CHAPTER 1

THINGS OF HISTORICAL TIME IN *MRS DALLOWAY*

Published in 1925, Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* is widely accepted as one of the mature novels in Modernist literature. Set on a June day in 1923, it portrays the post-war trauma of the First World War in Britain. Nevertheless, Woolf's structuring the novel as two parallel one-day stories of Mrs Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith, a veteran, enriches her inclinations to the trauma through which she avoids agitation by questionably opposing Septimus's suicide with Clarissa's party. On this day, both take a walk in London as Clarissa goes out to buy some flowers for her party while Septimus sits in the park by his unhappy wife. Although it is noticeable that Clarissa, too, is inclined to commit suicide as "she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" (6), her cheer for hosting important guests often interferes her depression caused by not fulfilling herself as a woman at the age of fifty-two: "She could see what she lacked. It was not beauty; it was not mind. It was something central which permeated" (23). On the other hand, unlike Clarissa's enjoying the London lifestyle, Septimus and his wife Rezia feel detached and alienated from London. In this way, trivia and seriousness are interwoven in a way that the novel presents a variety of impressions. In fact, the chronotopes of the narrative endow this variety out of which Woolf creates a multiplicity of subjectivities thanks to the distinctive biographical times of the characters in Bakhtinian terms. Even though the biographical times of the characters differ from one another, historical time is effective on each. In other words, post-war trauma of the 1920s has powerful impacts on the characters' lives including their way of understanding the material world around. For these reasons, while examining the characters' interaction with the material world, the 1920s London will be discussed as the dominant chronotope because the post-war decade pervades the framework of the narrative as its historical time. As time is inseparable from space, spatial aspects of specific chronotopes such as the streets of London, the Warren Smiths' house, and the Dalloways' house will also be analyzed for a better understanding of how chronotope influences the subjects' connection with objects. Therefore, *Mrs Dalloway* will be examined in terms of the temporal chronotopes as the major historical time and the characters' biographical time,

supplemented by the spatial chronotopes with a focus on their relation to materiality, depending on the temporal and spatial dimensions of thingification.

As Modernist literature developed in a post-war urban era, London in the 1920s plays an unexceptional role in *Mrs Dalloway* as the historical chronotope. London has such a powerful impact on the narrative that it became a part of the book: "Richly fictive, [the novel] also stands apart for its cartographic fidelity to the real city of London: it is the only Woolf novel whose drafts contain sketch maps of characters' movements, and the only one whose recent editions regularly include a map (of 'Mrs. Dalloway's London')" (Saint-Amour 79). Inevitably, the post-trauma of the First World War was a part of London life at that time. "Everyone has friends who were killed in the war" (50), and ladies cannot find the best products as they used to (8), war memories are stimulated by the aeroplanes (15)… all point out the lasting effects of the war on the citizens of London. Bakhtin as well claims that chronotope is not isolated from history by emphasizing the fundamentality of time in a narrative (*Dialogic* 85). Since chronotope materializes time with the help of spatial contexts, it is associated with history:

> Time may become 'artistically visible' in the literary chronotope, and space responsive to the movements of time and plot, but time and space are the coordinates also of history. The theory of the chronotope is more than an attempt to concretize literary time; it is an attempt to conceive of history itself in concrete and material terms, but without effacing the value and importance of the particular that such an ostensible generalization might imply. (Renfrew 122)

What is astonishing for the analysis of the post-war historical references in Woolf's works is that she benefits from materiality as the indicator of the conditions before and after the war either due to their absence or difference. Along with huge impacts on the psychological balance of the characters, "[i]f war-traumatized London makes sense as the […] setting […] that trauma would seem to be specifically material" (Brown, *Other* 69). For Clarissa Dalloway, the post-war era is manifest in her shopping: "'That is all,' she repeated, pausing for a moment at the window of a glove shop where, before the War, you could buy almost perfect gloves" (8). Regarding Woolf's avoiding an explicit political stance, war trauma is revealed through damaged psychologies and differed materialities presented as a whole.

In his article concerning the secret life of things in Woolf's fiction, Bill Brown focuses on her short story "Solid Objects" which narrates the protagonist John's collecting broken pieces of material like glass, iron, and china. John is a member of the Parliament, who is not as inquisitive about making politics as used to be, and his obsession with these valueless pieces of unrecognizable objects to display on his mantelpiece is quite unusual as a hobby. As Brown suggests, John's obsession with collecting "the materials that make up the material object world" is based on "transvaluation of those materials into less and more than their familiar properties." Therefore, John "dislocate[s] material—nothing but glass—from an instrumentalist teleology and into an aesthetic scene." For this reason, Brown claims that "Solid Objects" is "not about solidity, but about the fluidity of objects, about how they decompose and recompose themselves as the object of a new fascination" ("Modernism" 3). In addition to "aesthetic absorption at the expense of the practical, the ethical" aspects of the story, Brown emphasizes the political and economic background of it (4). John's fascination with these valueless materials may refer to wartime scarcity through which the sense of value became disputable. At the beginning of the story, John misses the train on his way to deliver a political speech as he gets distracted by his fascination with some broken china. Towards the end of the story, John is about to quit politics. "Waste" becomes John's fetish to pull him off the politics where it "settles happily into an unhuman (not antihumanist) history" (Brown, "Modernism" 5). John as a pedestrian looks all the time down at the pavement in the street, at the sand on the beach to find some more pieces for his collection. Thus, his way of experiencing the city becomes unusual compared with other people. Therefore, in "Solid Objects," Woolf hints at a differentiated relationship between human and the material world which is contextualized in wartime distress and scarcity spotted in London.

To deepen the inspection of chronotopic figurations to map the objects and their process of becoming things in *Mrs Dalloway*, the nature of space and the nature of time in the narrative are the essential subject matters to be discussed. As the novel narrates a single day, Bakhtin's taking temporality in everyday cyclical chronotope only through its relation to space (*Dialogic* 248) can be applied for *Mrs Dalloway*. For this reason, time passing in the narrative is revealed through the characters' moving around in the city.

Therefore, temporality in *Mrs Dalloway* is traceable thanks to the references to spatiality as the novel "occupies a concrete space" (Boukhalfa 29). As a result, inquiring things in peculiar temporalities will also refer to the spatiality of the narrative.

Beginning with the abundance of the outer space embedded in the historical chronotope for the discussion of materiality, it should be noted that it is almost impossible to discuss Virginia Woolf's works without touching upon London. Her fascination with the liveliness of the city despite her psychological ups and downs is noticeable in her fictional and nonfictional works. In addition to her attachment to the city, early-twentieth-century English literature was highly concerned with modern urban life. In fact, city became an essential part of Modernist literature as it "came to function as a metaphor for the trajectories of narrative itself;" additionally "its new forms of transport and the chance encounters it sustains also provided powerful metaphors for human relationships" (Marcus 61). Since modernist concerns are mainly shaped by the urban lifestyle, city has a quite powerful impact on not only the feelings of the characters but also it constitutes the physical conditions of the socially dialogic interactions. Yet, Woolf's fascination with London was further than benefiting it as an urban setting as Bradshaw claims that "Woolf was exhilarated by the city's surging masses and its incessant commercial bustle, though her response to its ever-increasing traffic congestion was rather rapturous" (229). As her impressions of the liveliness of the city are variously and subjectively responsive, Woolf was in pursuit of the city as an *experience*, which is one of the key points to illustrate thingification. In other words, the individual experiences of the materiality in the city can inform us about the correlation between the historical time and the biographical time. As the monumental symbols of London city foreground the historical chronotope, the characters' response can be considered an outcome of their anticipation of the history influenced by their subjectivities which is discussed under the roof of biographical time.

For digging the potential for thingification through street wandering narrated in *Mrs Dalloway*, one of Bakhtin's categorizations of the nature of space is prominent: the known and the unknown. In his analysis of generic characteristics shaped by the chronotope

endowed in a narrative, Bakhtin looks for the novelistic qualities of ancient prose (because it is the origin of the Western novel) in which heroism plays the key role. The protagonists in these narratives dive into some unknown place where his human strength will not be enough to make him succeed (*Dialogic* 101). As thingification avoids any connotations beyond the physical world, heroic representation is not a subject of matter in this thesis. Rather, what is inferred from Bakhtinian unknown world is the concept of "random contingency" (*Dialogic* 101) which helps to make the sign work differently from an ordinary subject-object nexus. Inspired by Bakhtin's analysis of the foreign place in Greek romance as a provider of the adventures awaiting the hero, outer space in *Mrs Dalloway* will be taken as 'unknown' in which a person is out of their personal area with the aim of detecting 'random contingencies.' What is valid in Bakhtinian idea is that the process of an object becoming a thing means that it occurs not in an indefinite world, but an "unknown" moment of experience in a definite world, which is "foreign"—more literally untypical in *Mrs Dalloway*—to the subject. Unlike the hero in ancient tales, in *Mrs Dalloway*, neither the subject nor the object is necessarily to be "there for the first time" (*Dialogic* 101). Yet, the experience might occur (it does not have to) intrinsically for the first time as the ordinary interactivity between the subject and the object is broken for a moment. One of the most notable factors in this is *chance* according to Bakhtin (*Dialogic* 101). With an emphasis on the creativity of impressions stimulated by being somewhere unfamiliar, Woolf calls forth the charm of street wandering as she states that "[p]assing, glimpsing, everything seems accidentally […]" ("Haunting" 160); Bakhtin calls the same factor "random contingency" (*Dialogic* 101), and Bill Brown refers to it as "the all-at-onceness" ("Theory" 5). Therefore, the individual experience that is shaped momentarily by the impressions aroused in the outer space in *Mrs Dalloway* plays the crucial role for this quest of thingification in chronotopic "immediate reality" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 101). In simpler words, the characters wandering in the streets might encounter objects in an untypical way for the fact that outer space bears the chance factor in the process of thingification. Because things come into existence as a result of immediate and unusual occurrences of subject-object interaction, streets which are the most apparent representation of the historical chronotope are essential to discuss the effects of historical time on the characters' contact with the physical material world.

Wandering in the streets in *Mrs Dalloway* does not primarily contribute to the progress of the biographical times of any character, yet it introduces the historical chronotope in a detailed way. Therefore, Bakhtin's suggestions about the chronotope of town in realistic novels is valid for *Mrs Dalloway*:

> The markers of this time are simple, crude, material, fused with the everyday details of specific locales, with the quaint little houses and rooms of the town, with the sleepy streets, the dust and flies, the club, the billiards and so on and on. Time here is without event and therefore almost seems to stand still. Here there are no "meetings," no "partings." It is a viscous and sticky time that drags itself slowly through space. And therefore it cannot serve as the primary time of the novel. Novelists use it as an ancillary time, one that may be interwoven with other noncyclical temporal sequences or used merely to intersperse such sequences; it often serves as a contrasting background for temporal sequences that are more charged with energy and event. (*Dialogic* 248)

As Modernist literature disdains the social realist concerns of the late Victorian novel, this ordinary use of town or city is deliberate for their emphasis on durational time. Therefore, it can be claimed that Bakhtin's interpretation of time as a chronotopic unit in these novels is acceptable for Woolf's structuring the ordinary life in London as the major chronotope. Considering post-war urban space taken as the major chronotope, the Modernist city in *Mrs Dalloway* can be explained as follows:

> The overarching chronotope plays an important part in the process of interpretation, because the nature of its spatial indications (an idyllic setting, a commercial-industrial environment, a desolate landscape, the simultaneous chaos of a city) and its specific vision of temporal processes (the cycles of nature, the historical development of society, the subjective moment, the discontinuous temporal experience of a dream or of intoxication) set the boundaries within which fictional events can take place. (Keunen 421)

These qualities establish the framework of the novel because London is the key location for almost every event in addition to the characters' attachment to the city. Referring to the passage above, the "idyllic setting" and the liveliness with the "commercial-industrial environment" is displayed through Mrs Dalloway's visit to the marketplace as "the simultaneous chaos" stimulates the flashbacks to her youth, which at the same time shatters Septimus's logic. Likewise, the temporal experience influenced by wandering leads the stream-of-consciousness in a peculiar way for each character because of "the subjective moment." Indeed, the rhythms of the city "cross between apparently inward thoughts and an outside world, underscoring Woolf's concern with the connection between public and private life" (Snaith 24). In this regard, the characters' relation to

space in the streets of London are taken as ‘public,’ ‘social,’ ‘commercial,’ ‘unknown,’ ‘differentiated,’ ‘open,’ and ‘disoriented’ in Bakhtinian terms to claim that outer space offers potential for thingification with the illustrations of street wandering in the novel. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all these adjectives to describe the external chronotope in the novel are often challenged by different subjectivities offered by the variety of characters. Therefore, the characters’ biographical time shaping their personality is taken into consideration throughout the chapter since thingification is analyzed as an altered relation between object and subject through spatiotemporal aspects of the occurrences.

The significance of London as a part of historical chronotope in the novel can be examined with references to its subtle ideological shifts. Although the city is a lesser force on individuals than the country or state, attributions to London is ambiguous: “[…] Woolf remained ambivalent about whether its social divisions could be overcome through the forms of contact the city afforded, and indeed whether urban unity itself signaled a promising whole or coercive sameness” (Katz 397). Thus, the streets in Woolf’s works are full of people from various backgrounds. Politicians, housewives, married women, single women, English ladies and gentlemen, laypeople, non-English visitors or residents… are some of the characters found in *Mrs Dalloway*. One of the contradictory aspects of Woolf’s London is that her interest in modern urban life is organically related to her feminist concerns. As a female author who enjoyed wandering in London and taking notes for her works, she was keen on presenting the symbols of the city, which are mainly representatives of British imperial and intrinsically patriarchal history. Being surrounded by all those patriarchal and nationalistic structures was partly tolerated for the fact that going out was a sort of liberty for housewives:

> While London’s louring constructions of Church, State, and Government cast long and inimical shadows over Woolf’s women characters in particular, she represents the city’s streets, parks and gardens as breeding grounds of liberty and communality where the rigid demarcations of gender and class are altogether more faint and where the restraints and duties of home may be sloughed. (Bradshaw 229)

London as the capital of an empire and a democratic country at the same time bears lots of symbols associated with its past over the centuries. Yet, its public areas offer

particularly her female characters an opportunity to walk by themselves, a chance to drift away from her duties at home as a Miss or a Mrs Somebody. Thus, 'public', 'social' and 'open' nature of streets in Bakhtinian terms offers the opportunity of female liberty in Woolf's fiction. As a literary use of this ideological paradox, Woolf presents a picture "together of a character, a place, and its reputation" as "she never allows us to forget that the capital's most prestigious constructions are at the same time profoundly ideological formulations" (Bradshaw 231).

Bakhtinian chronotope, too, is not isolated from the ideological implications of the time-space covered in a narrative: "[I]t would be best to say that Bakhtin came to view all chronotopes as embodied-representational—with concrete time-place-events deeply furrowed with, and constructed through, representations and with representations always deeply rooted in chains of concrete, historical events" (Prior and Shipka 186). Nevertheless, Bakhtin distinguishes the "provincial town" in the nineteenth-century novels for their offering "no advancing historical movement" in its usual "cyclic everyday time," but rather, "it moves rather in narrow circles" (*Dialogic* 247-48). Yet, this ordinary day with no dramatic events in *Mrs Dalloway*'s London presents a divergence of post-war urban life for the fact that objects feed Woolf's indirect references to the imperial past of Britain. Thus, outer space is a fruitful arena for the discussion of materialities with their specific interactions with the chronotopes where subjectivity and publicity are merged to create the new possibilities of subject-object interaction. The fountain funded by an Indian businessman, the Buckingham Palace, the royal motor car, the monumental clocks, in other words, the symbols of London city are presented in various ways due to the characters' various responses. This is mostly because chronotope "is a category of perceiving or understanding things; in other words, it is epistemological in character" as a result of being "forms of cognition, or/and categories for representing," which brings forth "a plurality of [chronotopes]" "for different views of the world and different social situations" (Bemong et al. 107). Because it temporizes the narration for a while to present the imperial past of Britain, sudden passing of the royal motor car distracting people is a notable example for "random contingency" and the plurality of chronotopic cognition:

> Something so trifling in single instances that no mathematical instrument, though capable of transmitting shocks in China, could register the vibration; yet in its fullness rather formidable and in its common appeal emotional; for in all the hat shops and tailors' shops strangers looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire. […] For the surface agitation of the passing car as it sunk grazed something very profound. (13-14)

Referring to this passage, Leanna Lostoski takes the empire as "an agency of assemblages"[5] by pinpointing the ongoing effects of the car with the diverse materiality it sustained: "'the dead' and 'the flag' in addition to the car itself, the British government, and all of the British subjects present in the street—that constitute the assemblage of 'Empire' (59). In this context, the ideological essence of the Empire is represented "through the distributed agency of complex, heterogeneous assemblages of materialities" (Lostoski 59). Thus, it can be claimed that the effects of the passing motor car offer divergent materiality of the imperialism with its appearance at once.

In addition to the motor car as an indicator of London's imperial past, going out is differently a sort of emancipation both for Clarissa Dalloway (because external chronotope is 'social') and her daughter Elizabeth (for that it is 'differentiated') as an illustration of the ideologically shifting figurations of the city. Clarissa says that she prefers walking in London to walking in the countryside (5), and she enjoys "the capital's superabundance of sensations, its thunderous tonic" (Bradshaw 236). However, she avoids moving away from her familiar surrounding by keeping her route in Westminster. Knowing the place and the people around is some sort of guarantee for her self-confidence as she thinks about herself:

> Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought, walking on. If you put her in a room with someone, up went her back like a cat's; or she purred. Devonshire House, Bath House, the house with the china cockatoo, she had seen them all lit up once; and remembered Sylvia, Fred, Sally Seton—such hosts of

[5] Leanna Lostoski borrows the term from Jane Bennett who defines it as "the understanding of agency as a confederation of human and nonhuman elements" (21) in *Vibrant Matter* (2010). In her book, Bennett discusses the irreducible agency of objects in their independence from set assumptions. She emphasizes objects' "assemblage" where they are with human, yet "appeared as things, that is, as vivid entities not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics" (5). In this regard, Bennett's focus on vibrancy of objects to become things can be correlated with Bill Brown's theory.

> people; and dancing all night; and the waggons plodding past to market; and driving home across the Park. (7)

All her reference to "knowing people" is restricted to her familiar territory, though. Clarissa prefers to visit the places she has already known for years because she takes no notice of the city's "less desirable aspects" (Pattison 55). Despite the representation of Westminster as the patriarchal and political power, Clarissa does not seem to be concerned about it as long as she keeps her routines on the familiar ground: "For her the area round Westminster offers happiness and security, and she is unwilling to break out of the known environment even to the extent of visiting her old dress maker, now retired to Ealing in the suburbs" (Pattison 55). While other people are curious about who is in the motor car, Clarissa boasts: "Clarissa guessed; Clarissa knew of course; she had seen something white, magical, circular, in the footman's hand, a disc inscribed with a name,—the Queen's, the Prince of Wales's, the Prime Minister's?" (13) At this point, it is clear that also her familiarity with the materiality around is relieving for Clarissa. It may be even more powerful than knowing people for the fact that she guessed who is in the car thanks to a disc. Similarly, she judges people by their clothes: "The British middle classes sitting sideways on the tops of omnibuses with parcels and umbrellas, yes, even furs on a day like this, were, she thought, more ridiculous, more unlike anything there has ever been than one could conceive [...]" (13). Discussing the road as a chronotope, Bakhtin points out that "one crucial feature of the 'road' common to all the various types of novels […] covered [in his essay]: the road is always one that passes through *familiar territory* […]" (*Dialogic* 245). So is for Clarissa's use of space. Furthermore, her use of materiality can be analyzed through clothes which are always supposed to be suitable for the moment and the place as she is concerned about her hat: Mentioning Evelyn's ailment, she says: "Ah yes, she did of course; what a nuisance; and felt very sisterly and oddly conscious at the same time of her hat. Not the right hat for the early morning, was that it?" (5) Then, it is certain that Clarissa keeps herself in 'known' area where she is familiar with the people as well as the materiality around. Thus, it can be claimed that Clarissa *avoids* thinghood as a result of her refraining the unfamiliar experience which can be found in the outer space.

In contrast to her mother, for Elizabeth Dalloway, the 'unknown' chronotope represents an eagerness for an alternative life stimulated during her visits to the river for its "vibrant,

unsupervised anonymity" as explained by Bradshaw: "The Strand lies well beyond the pale of the Dalloways' smart milieu, and amidst its transgressive bustle, Elizabeth can imagine herself living a very different and more fulfilling life from that of her mother" (233). Indeed, she feels victorious for this unusual visit: "For no Dalloways came down the Strand daily; she was a pioneer, a stray, venturing, trusting:"

> She walked just a little way towards St Paul's, shyly, like someone penetrating on tiptoe, exploring a strange house by night with a candle, on edge lest the owner should suddenly fling wide his bedroom door and ask her business, nor did she dare wander off into queer alleys, tempting by-streets, any more than in a strange house open doors which might be bedroom doors, or sitting room doors, or lead straight to the larder. (100)

What charms Elizabeth, unlike her mother, is "the *sociohistorical heterogeneity* of one's own country that is revealed and depicted (and for this reason, if one may speak at all about the exotic here, then it can only be the 'social exotic'-'slums,' 'dregs,' the world of thieves)" (*Dialogic* 245). Therefore, Elizabeth's city tour is almost the same as Bakhtin's chronotope of road. As she walks down the river, Elizabeth looks at other people's houses expecting to see some peculiarities. As seen from the different experiences of the city by Clarissa and Elizabeth, London is not a monotype chronotope thanks to which materiality, as well as subjectivity, is pluralized. Therefore, Elizabeth's curiosity for different experiences of the city is contrasted with her mother's routine wanderings.

Through a range of subjective perceptions, Woolf's London reflects the ideological visibility of the period with an ambiguous narrative judgment: "London offered a collective identity less coercive than the nation or empire, but Woolf remained ambivalent about whether its social divisions could be overcome through the forms of contact the city afforded, and indeed whether urban unity itself signaled a promising whole or coercive sameness" (Katz 397). Therefore, unlike Clarissa's enjoying walking in the city rather than in the countryside, it is obvious to see that for Miss Kilman the richness of the marketplace is just an embodiment of her being outfit (94); or for Rezia the streets are gloomy and 'unknown' (18). Through a variety of characters, Woolf "test[s] the possibilities and limits of the city as a community by seeing her experiment with the differing patterns of movement in its streets" (Katz 397). In this way, Woolf simultaneously creates a multiplicity of characters' way of experiencing the city. Even if the common point is the city itself, it creates a softer "collective identity" than being a

unified nation. Indeed, some characters in the novel are not organically united to the main plotline but endow the variety of the people in the street. The two minor characters Maisie Johnson and Mrs Dempster who appear only once reflect Woolf's plurality of the people in the street. Maisie from Edinburgh finds everything queer in London, but particularly Septimus; "for that young man on the seat had given her quite a turn. Something was up, she knew" and she utters the motto-like phrase of the novel "Horror! horror! she wanted to cry. (She had left her people; they had warned her what would happen.)" (20) In a different aspect, Mrs Dempster thinks about how marriage made her life hard and yet gave her only "roses" and how she dislikes "women who were afraid of water" (21). These characters do not contact with the main characters or do not change the course of the events. They appear in the park where Septimus and Rezia are introduced by their feeling of non-belonging. Therefore, Maisie's disquiet about Septimus foreshadows his upcoming distress which will be finalized by his suicide, and Mrs Dempster represents Woolf's problematizing marriage in which Rezia, like many women, is left alone. In this way, the minor characters are functional to comment on the issues dealt with in the novel, which offers a multiplicity of subjectivities with different concerns shaped by their own experiences and by their biographical time.

As Clarissa's and Elizabeth's wandering in addition to the people in the Regent's Park illustrate, streets can be taken as a chronotopic motif for its "illustrations of different places of encounter that determine specific genres of novels" (Best 293). Indeed, Virginia Woolf often takes streets and home as two diverging façades of the personal experience of space, which is taken into consideration respectively as the "unknown" and "known" spatial motifs in this chapter. Opposing outside and inside, Woolf describes being outside as a break of one's shell: "The shell-like covering which our souls have excreted to house themselves, to make for themselves a shape distinct from others, is broken […]" ("Haunting" 156). What is outstanding in this experience of breaking one's cover is Woolf's supposition that the change of perception occurs due to our instinctual tendency of perception when we are in a different place, which is observing; "[a] central oyster of perceptiveness," "an enormous eye" (156). In other words, when one is outside the familiar place, the perception is widened because of the variety of people, places,

objects… and opens itself for some new impressions. This, in fact, affords a range of possibilities for thingification. As Woolf suggests this is the time when "we shed the self our friends know us by and become part of that vast republican army of anonymous trampers, whose society is so agreeable after the solitude of one's own room" (155). Following Woolf's search for new impressions, city/streets/outside can be considered potential chronotope for a changed relationship between subject and object urged by Bakhtin's emphasis on *chance*.

Regarding London's offering possibilities for subjectivities and materialities, Alex Zwerdling argues that the "discontinuous structure is largely determined by [Woolf's] wish to highlight historical and ideological shifts" (193). Unlike the Dalloways' enthusiasm of experiencing the city, for Septimus and Rezia wandering in London is an embodiment for their dejectedness. Although Septimus is a citizen of England, he feels disoriented and hopeless due to the trauma of war. More or less, Rezia has the same kind of feelings as she feels she has already lost her husband and now she is left alone. London feels like a welcoming home for neither as Septimus and Rezia feel miserable about where they are. Particularly for Septimus, fulfilling himself in London looks impossible because "[h]is idealism and his desire to make a mark through self-improvement fail to overcome the indifference of the city and his madness estranges him yet further" (Pattison 56). Here the omniscient narrator speaks about the city as if it were an ambush:

> London has swallowed up many millions of young men called Smith; thought nothing of fantastic Christian names like Septimus with which their parents have thought to distinguish them. Lodging off the Euston Road, there were experiences, again experiences, such as change a face in two years from a pink innocent oval face to a face lean, contracted, hostile. (63)

By *chance*, the road is blocked when a royal car appeared, and Septimus is mentally anguished: "It is I who am blocking the way, he thought. Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But for what purpose?" (11-12) It can be inferred that his existence in this place right now is the problem, which I will call *the moment of chronotopic suffering*. As Bakhtin claims that "[t]he image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic" (*Dialogic* 85), their psychological condition cannot be separated from the major chronotope. In other words, biographical time of Septimus (his own memories of war) clashes with the historical time

(the post-war actual time), and this brings forth his chronotopic suffering which is mostly triggered by their wandering in the streets of London. As a consequence, his abnormal perception of space shapes his sense of materiality. Particularly for Septimus, it can be suggested that his relation to the material world is a "retroprojection" as a result of "the amorphousness out of which objects are materialized by the (ap)perceiving subject": Bill Brown explains this as "the anterior physicality of the physical world emerging, perhaps, as an aftereffect of the mutual constitution of subject and object" ("Theory" 5). For Septimus, anything around can suddenly move or transform or speak to him, even can kill him.

Septimus is uniquely important to discuss the relation between human and nonhuman (as the wider concept of materiality) because his perception of the world around is different from the usual due to his mental discomfort. His condition can be understood as an "intermediary position" (Zlatkin 84), which can be observed by comparing what of the motor car attracts him and other people:

> And there the motor car stood, with drawn blinds, and upon them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, and this gradual drawing together of everything to one centre before his eyes, as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames, terrified him. The world wavered and quivered and threatened to burst into flames. (11)

Whereas other pedestrians are curious about who is in the car, Septimus is distracted by the pattern of the tree which reminds him of fire: "The motor car in this instance has a vitality that Septimus recognizes as threatening, but the other onlookers simply share synchronized and simultaneous thoughts as they stop what they were doing and look at the motor car" (Lostoski 59). By this unusual and unpredictable perception, it is possible to claim that for Septimus almost every object is a 'thing' because he is in a mood of "denying the external world" (Olson 73). Despite Dr. Bradshaw's advice to draw his attention to "real things" (19), real things were too worrying for him as he fears the real world's metamorphosis because the trauma makes him elude from "the identity that routines and habits establish" (Olson 73). To draw his attention to "real things," Rezia often attempts to drag him out of his indifference: "'Look, look, Septimus!' she cried. For Dr. Holmes had told her to make her husband (who had nothing whatever seriously the

matter with him but was a little out of sorts) take an interest in things outside himself" (16). In other words, the doctor claims that Septimus needs distraction to come back to the real world which can be taken as the physicality at the level of objecthood. Taking "real things" as objects in their usual way, it can be claimed that Septimus *rejects objecthood*. Indeed, not only Rezia's intrusion into his distorted sense of the world but also the actual physicality of the world annoys him:

> Happily Rezia put her hand down with a tremendous weight on his knee so that he was weighted down, transfixed, or the excitement of the elm trees rising and falling, rising and falling with all their leaves alight and the colour thinning and thickening from blue to the green of a hollow wave, like plumes on horses' heads, feathers on ladies', so proudly they rose and fell, so superbly, would have sent him mad. But he would not go mad. He would shut his eyes; he would see no more. (17)

As it is seen, the activeness around irritates him as he is stuck in his memories of the war: "He lay very high, on the back of the world. The earth thrilled beneath him. Red flowers grew through his flesh; their stiff leaves rustled by his head" (74–75). His habitual perception is shattered and cannot be redeemed. Rezia's hand is the only relation to human existence for Septimus while his perception is thrilled by nonhuman entities in the park. His "encounters with the nonhuman world of Regent's Park demonstrates Woolf's decentering of human subjectivity" because "his interactions with the nonhuman are more stimulating and meaningful to Septimus than any other human beings he encounters" (Lostoski 60). All this excessive disturbance by nonhumans (the motor car, trees, aeroplane, etc.) for Septimus is much more vigilant than the human (Rezia). In another example, as all people try to decipher the word written by the aeroplane, Septimus just sees "beauty" in it with no logical reference to the message:

> So, thought Septimus, looking up, they are signalling to me. Not indeed in actual words; that is, he could not read the language yet; but it was plain enough, this beauty, this exquisite beauty, and tears filled his eyes as he looked at the smoke words languishing and melting in the sky and bestowing upon him in their inexhaustible charity and laughing goodness one shape after another of unimaginable beauty and signalling their intention to provide him, for nothing, for ever, for looking merely, with beauty, more beauty! (16)

Another incidence of representing his broken perception, the word 'toffee' written by the aeroplane is not conceivable but a misreading is caught by his attention:

> It was toffee; they were advertising toffee, a nursemaid told Rezia. Together they began to spell t . . . o . . . f . . .

> 'K . . . R . . .' said the nursemaid, and Septimus heard her say 'Kay Arr' close to his ear, deeply, softly, like a mellow organ, but with a roughness in her voice like a grasshopper's, which rasped his spine deliciously and sent running up into his brain waves of sound, which, concussing, broke. A marvellous discovery indeed—that the human voice in certain atmospheric conditions (for one must be scientific, above all scientific) can quicken trees into life! (16)

His way of perceiving the surroundings is not in an expected way because constructing meanings out of the material world is difficult for him. Therefore, it is obvious that his relationship with the objects is different from the other characters'. For this reason, he is an idiosyncratic character for the discussion of the nexus of human and materiality. He is even terrified of orienting his perception according to the objects ('real things') around him because "this gradual drawing together of everything to one centre before his eyes, as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames, terrified him" (12). Septimus's fear of the things burning or transforming or moving can be seen as the "latency" of these objects' agency because they "amount" "to an excess" or "what remains physically or metaphysically irreducible to objects" (Brown, "Theory" 5). Through this latency, "temporality obscures the all-at-onceness, the simultaneity, of the object/thing dialectic and the fact that, all at once, the thing seems to name the object just as it is even as it names some thing else" (Brown, "Theory" 5). In fact, even if the objects stay as they are, for Septimus they are always capable of becoming some *things* else. This latent mutation of images and the mobility of physical existence brings forth temporality to his perception which itself forms up an agency for the objects 'bursting' into thinghood. In other words, he is always *on the verge of experiencing thinghood as a consequence of his chronotopic suffering.*

Septimus's indifference to the briskness of the street is compared to all other people who are open to any sort of distraction to direct their perception: "For thirty seconds all heads were inclined the same way—to the window. Choosing a pair of gloves—should they be to the elbow or above it, lemon or pale grey?—ladies stopped; when the sentence was finished something had happened" (13). At this point, it is important to figure out what other people perceive. At first, they are charmed by the gloves. Then, they are distracted by the motor car. Similar to the reaction of the people looking at the shops,

> [i]n a public-house in a back street a Colonial insulted the House of Windsor, which led to words, broken beer glasses, and a general shindy, which echoed strangely across the way in the ears of girls buying white under-linen threaded with pure white

> ribbon for their weddings. For the surface agitation of the passing car as it sunk grazed something very profound. (13-14)

Here it is obvious that the external social space is inviting for immediate perception of or unexpected distraction by the material existence of the motor car, which is conceived by Septimus in a different way. His senses are nested and make him weaken to distinguish the people and the things around in a way that "Septimus is cognizant of how all of the materialities of the park—human (the child), natural and organic (sparrows, branches), inorganic (the sky, sounds), and human-made (the horn)—constitute the assemblage of what is known as Regent's Park in that moment" (Lostoski 62). Thus, he perceives all existing things in Regent Park as an erratic mixture:

> The sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in jagged fountains were part of the pattern; the white and blue, barred with black branches. Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces between them were as significant as the sounds. A child cried. Rightly far away a horn sounded. All taken together meant the birth of a new religion. (17)

In this chronotope, no objecthood is comprehensible for Septimus. Even all of Rezia's efforts to take him to the physical existence of herself fail: "She put on her lace collar. She put on her new hat and he never noticed; and he was happy without her" (17). Her clothes, too, make her invisible for Septimus. Her unsuccessful endeavors to keep Septimus's perception in the ordinary physical world resembles a rocket:

> There was nobody. Her words faded. So a *rocket* fades. Its sparks, having grazed their way into the night, surrender to it, dark descends, pours over the outlines of houses and towers; bleak hillsides soften and fall in. But though they are gone, the night is full of them; robbed of colour, blank of windows, they exist more ponderously, give out what the frank daylight fails to transmit—*the trouble and suspense of things conglomerated there in the darkness*; huddled together in the darkness; reft of the relief which dawn brings when washing the walls white and grey, spotting each window-pane, lifting the mist from the fields, showing the red-brown cows peacefully gazing, all is once more decked out to the eye; exists again. (18; emphasis added)

As suggested in the passage above, not only her efforts (the rocket) but also her broken feelings (its sparks) are solid. Yet, Septimus cannot respond to any, which creates "the trouble and suspense of things" as stated in the quote. Darkness, where the visibility diminishes, gathers things, and this breaks the ordinary perception: "Words spoken aloud to no one may fade as sparks do in the dark, but the dark cannot rob solid objects of their solidity. Rather, night reveals what the day cannot: the ponderousness of huddled things,

their ‘trouble and suspense’” (Saint-Amour 85). When he says he will commit suicide, Rezia’s struggles to convince him about her physical existence can be also named *her efforts of materiality* for it is defined as “a shelf” which is doomed to fail to hold her tight to Septimus. Yet, he sits still in a way that his spiritual existence does not mean anything to Rezia anymore because his physical existence, “a piece of bone” (12), does not support Rezia’s physical existence (the shelf):

> […] when suddenly, as if a shelf were shot forth and she stood on it, she said how she was his wife, married years ago in Milan, his wife, would never, never tell that he was mad! Turning, *the shelf fell; down, down she dropped.* For he was gone, she thought—gone, as he threatened, to kill himself—to throw himself under a cart! But no; there he was; still sitting alone on the seat, in his shabby overcoat, his legs crossed, staring, talking aloud. (18; emphasis added)

Although Septimus’s discomfort is more illogical, Rezia’s can be defined as homesickness: She speaks to herself once by saying “‘For you should see the Milan gardens,’ she said aloud. But to whom?” (19) Therefore, the chronotope of London is ‘disoriented’ for Septimus, yet ‘foreign’ and ‘unknown’ for Rezia. Rezia reproaches her being in London with her longing for Italy: “Far was Italy and the white houses and the room where her sisters sat making hats, and the streets crowded every evening with people walking, laughing out loud, not half alive like people here, huddled up in Bath chairs, looking at a few ugly flowers stuck in pots!” (19). Here as she misses her own country’s gardens, flowers in pots are unbearable for her with no specific reason considering that England is famous for its parks and gardens. It is more important where Rezia thinks about these. In the post-war period of a capital of an empire, the fountain to which she walks is significant for being made by an Indian businessman for the fact that “[a]s so often happens in *Mrs. Dalloway,* the leaps and lateral flows of a character’s psychic life are abruptly grounded in a specific, historically annotated physical location” (Saint-Amour 86). At this point, it is also notable that due to her Italian nationality, Rezia resembles herself to the first Romans who arrived in Britain. Therefore, where she stands while thinking is notable in terms of the historical time of the Empire as she says “I am alone; I am alone! she cried, by the fountain in Regent's Park (staring at the Indian and his cross).” Additionally, who she likens herself is significant for her nationality; “as the

Romans saw it, lying cloudy, when they landed, and the hills had no names and rivers wound they knew not where—such was her darkness […] (18).

At this moment, an Italian in front of a fountain made by an Indian in London on a hot June day in the 1920s forms up a unique chronotope to boost thingification. The ancient invaders of Britain—the Romans—glimpse at the Jewel of the Crown, which will be soon the last stand of the Empire, in the post-war capital of imperialism. What is unique is that this interpretation of the fountain is peculiar to that moment of Rezia's hopelessness and soon after her walking away from her indifferent English husband in that specific park. This moment is a mixture of ideological background of the narrative and the moment of alienation in a character's biographical time. That is, it is at the same time, a unity of the major historical chronotope (the 1920s London) with a minor chronotope (Rezia's life) because "[c]hronotopes are mutually inclusive, they co-exist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships" (*Dialogic* 252). These interwoven chronotopes are enabled by the fountain, which can be taken as a *chronotopic thing* for the narrative itself. Here, the park and where she is (nearby that fountain) are eminent for the fact that it carries "the absolute power of chance" (*Dialogic* 100). What is common in these occurrences based on chance is that the experience is temporarily unique. This fountain in this park is then a "chance" or some "random contingency" to urge Rezia's loneliness soon after her husband's non-responsive attitude towards her. In a more general sense, Rezia's characterization and socio-cultural frame of the novel are mutually functional so that "chronotopes let man appear as essentially social in his character: they do not deal with individual modes of human action, but with socially conditioned action" (Steinby 121). Therefore, the fountain as a thing demonstrates that the historical time of the novel marks Rezia's biographical time.

For distinguishing outer experience as a "break" as it is described by Woolf, it is possible to claim that outside creates the potential for thingification because it is also a pause of an object's conventional functionality: "Passing, glimpsing, everything seems accidentally but miraculously sprinkled with beauty […]. With no thought of buying, the

eye is sportive and generous; it creates; it adorns; it enhances" ("Haunting" 160). At this point, Woolf's reference to street wandering brings forth new possibilities, which are unavailable in the familiar personal space. Returning home, she says "[h]ere again is the usual door; here the chair turned as we left it and the china bowl and the brown ring on the carpet" (166). Woolf describes the experience of being in an unfamiliar place as follows: "For there we sit surrounded by objects which perpetually express the oddity of our own temperaments and enforce the memories of our own experience" (155). This is a moment when one's pre-learned appreciation of objects is replaced by new impressions:

> But here we must stop peremptorily. We are in danger of digging deeper than the eyes approves; we are impeding our passage down the smooth stream by catching at some branch or root. […] The thing it cannot do (one is speaking of the average unprofessional eye) is to compose these trophies [beauty] in such a way as to bring out the more obscure angles and relationships. (157)

At this point, Brown's description of thingification as a new dynamic relation between subject and object resembles Woolf's reference to the change of perception in a new place. Similar to Woolf's emphasis on "bring[ing] out the more obscure angles and relationships," Bill Brown pinpoints that things "can be narrated as the effect (not the ground) of interaction at once physical and psychological, at once intimate and alienating. To the degree that the thing registers the undignified mutability of objects, and thus the excess of the object a capacity" (*Other* 50). Thus, while investigating particular examples of chronotopic excess of objects in the novel, London with its overreaching multiplicity of commodities can be rich. Tamar Katz claims that the variety of experiencing the city in *Mrs Dalloway* is shaped by Woolf's keen on urban "rhythms" through "the tumult of streets, the skimming and delving of the individual walker's imagination, the movement and sudden stillness of the traffic" (397). Therefore, one of the chronotopic motifs to be discussed in the external 'unknown' space is the marketplace. Almost all the characters in the novel are out to visit the marketplace where the biggest variety of objects is found. Their wandering before the shops is highly important for the narrative as well for the fact that it develops the story thanks to the impressions received during their walks: "'[L]ens of consumption' offers up for *Mrs. Dalloway* a consistent purpose for all this street-walking, for all these characters connected to shopkeepers and trade, and for the displays of Bond Street and Oxford Street" (Abbot 209). Heartened by her trip to the marketplace for some flowers, the first sentence of *Mrs Dalloway* emphasizes "the solitary nature of

the shopping trip for one of life's most necessary luxuries" (Wicke 13). Mrs Dalloway expresses her excitement: "What a lark! What a plunge!" (1) The city she enjoys is described as follows:

> In people's eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge; in the bellow and the uproar; the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuffling and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was what she loved; life; London; this moment of June. (4)

Here it is obvious that the description of London "concentrates on the city landscape and its buzz and bloom of market confusions" (Wicke 13). Mrs Dalloway defines the city with its material richness and what she likes is experiencing this materiality with all its colors and sounds. For this reason, the marketplace is taken as a chronotopic motif as a part of the major chronotope of the 1920s London to be discussed.

Besides, Woolf's writing might be taken "as a material modernism engaged throughout with the dilemmas of the urban and of modernity" in which "the sexing (female, gay) of the metropole spins about the core of consumption, its mysteries, its possibilities, its sacred rites" (Wicke 14). Therefore, Woolf's chronotopes are sexed and defined with materiality, commodity, and consumption. Referring to the impressions created by the modern city, it seems that Woolf's emphasis is on the consumption which is "active" or "even productive or creative" for that "Woolf's text is a prism to point to the multiple strands of the market, the market as a metropolitan space, and consequently how this major emblem of modernism, the city, is 'sexed' quite differently" (Wicke 14). As Bradshaw further explains:

> But it is the invigorating power of London's streets and open spaces, rather than the patriarchal sway of its great buildings and reconfigured Tube stations, that Woolf dwells on most consistently in her writings, and it is clear that she associated two thoroughfares in particular, the Strand and Oxford Street, with raucous stimulation and uplift. (233)

As specified above, the marketplace, mostly Oxford Street, Bond Street and the Strand, plays a significant role in *Mrs Dalloway* not only as a chronotope but also for highlighting the materiality it bears. That also must be the reason why the Strand and Oxford Street are two of the most recurrent chronotopes in the novel due to their reputation of being shopping spots. As Abbot claims that shopping is more than a simple sell-and-buy

relationship as "Woolf's response to the marketplace was an effort to deal with the fascinating power and commotion of commodity culture, and it operates on two levels: personal (shopping) and collective (spectacle)" (196). The basic function of a marketplace is to sell and buy some things. If not, what is the function of a visit to the marketplace? With this question, thingification can be traced in the experience of 'not buying,' and the marketplace can be taken as a minor chronotope to distinguish objecthood and thinghood in these two levels—personal and collective— which are mingled in *Mrs Dalloway*. For example, Clarissa Dalloway wants to choose the flowers by herself and does so—yet what type of flowers she bought is not specified. Therefore, what matters here is not the product bought (personal level) but the course of time she spends in the marketplace (collective level). This raises a skeptical question about the objecthood of commodity culture because "[…] *Mrs Dalloway* depicts shoppers who do not or cannot consume and shoppers who buy but do not consume" (Abbot 196). Moreover, 'buying' the flowers implies that they are not the plants but commodities in this context, but still buying is less important than presenting them. What Mrs Dalloway is obsessed with is not the flowers but the arrangement of them at home for her party as "one of the commodity culture's well-planned and well-publicized spectacles," which is partly associated with her rural past life and partly with urban consumerism (Abbot 200). In this sense, Clarissa's shopping is influenced by her biographical time as well as the dominant social culture of the major historical chronotope. As Mrs Dalloway wishes to please the eyes of her guests with her well-organized flowers, Abbot claims that "Woolf is interested in 'acommodity aesthetic' with emphasis placed on balanced patterns of shopping without spending and consumption without commodities." Thus, flowers which are some commodities in the marketplace turn out to be 'spectacle' for her party because "in Mrs. Dalloway's world was the all-purpose cordage and the 'floral arrangements'" (Abbot 200).

Although the type of flower used for house decoration was an important point for the urban upper-class community, the type is not unveiled to the reader. At this point, it is possible to claim that the objecthood of commodity culture loses its validity and becomes some 'things' to be gazed upon as a result of Clarissa's overvaluation. At that point, it should be noted that Bill Brown criticizes the conception of modernity as a simple commodity culture by stating that "[t]he tale of that possession—of being possessed by

possessions—" is "a tale not just of accumulating bric-a-brac, but also of fashioning an object-based historiography and anthropology, and a tale not just of thinking with things but also of trying to render thought thing-like" (*Sense* 5). Therefore, in order to contrast the objecthood and the thinghood of the commodities in *Mrs Dalloway*, Miss Kilman can be compared with the other upper-class characters because she cannot conceive any representation of consumerist culture. She goes to the marketplace, enters a shop and buys an ordinary petticoat only because she needs it: "[…] Miss Kilman stood on the landing, and wore a mackintosh; but had her reasons. First, it was cheap; second, she was over forty; and did not, after all, dress to please" (90). That can be considered the objecthood of a commodity for its "use value" which cannot "produce a thing" (Brown, *Sense* 51). A coat is just a coat, a cover on the body for Kilman. Therefore, unlike Clarissa's overvalued things, Kilman's coat is an object. This is at the same time an outcome of their social status, which is a mixture of historical time and biographical time. Miss Kilman is a single German woman who lost her brother fighting against the British army. So, she is not economically wealthy and socially welcomed in this historical chronotope. On the other hand, Clarissa is a typical modern and urban English woman who is married with one child. In other words, Clarissa's biographical time is perfectly fitted in this historical chronotope. Therefore, Kilman's sense of objects as simple tools to survive, at the level of objecthood, irritates Clarissa probably because she tries to justify her meaningless materialism—which at the same time unveils her dissatisfaction with her own biographical time—:

> Year in year out she wore that coat; she perspired; she was never in the room five minutes without making you feel her superiority, your inferiority; how poor she was; how rich you were; how she lived in a slum without a cushion or a bed or a rug or whatever it might be, all her soul rusted with that grievance sticking in it, her dismissal from school during the War—poor, embittered, unfortunate creature! (9)

Unlike her complaints about the difficulty of finding the best gloves or wearing the best hat for the day, not the scarcity of poverty but the abundance of richness annoys Clarissa in this case. This is, in fact, a reflection of her indecisiveness about what is valuable in life. Nevertheless, once again it is obvious that this unexpected relation between Clarissa (subject) and wealth (plenty of objects) is an outcome of the chronotopic 'image' of the character because Clarissa questions the topsy-turviness of life:

> For it was not her one hated but the idea of her, which undoubtedly had gathered into itself a great deal that was not Miss Kilman; had become one of those spectres with which one battles in the night; one of those spectres who stand astride us and suck up half our life-blood, dominators and tyrants; for no doubt with another throw of the dice, had the black been uppermost and not the white, she would have loved Miss Kilman! But not in this world. No. (9)

As can be concluded from the quote above, Clarissa's way of questioning her own life by comparing with Miss Kilman's is a discussion on the impossibilities in this historical chronotope. Therefore, it is obvious that historical time permeates the socio-economic-political image of the characters, which is an integral unit of man's chronotopic "image" as coined by Bakhtin. In this sense, the flowers as the commodities for sale in the marketplace become decoratively organized spectacle in Clarissa's house, and this reflects Clarissa's personality which can be taken as her subjective chronotopic image. What is significant is that Clarissa's chronotopic image produces thinghood for employing "a fetishistic overvaluation […] on an irregular if not unreasonable reobjectification of the object […]" (Brown, *Sense* 51). Then, thingification in this example specially occurs in a new internal chronotope, which is house. Thus, the change of the spatial chronotope supplies the latent thinghood of commodity. To put it differently, the flowers are commodity objects at the marketplace, but they are the things in Clarissa's house for her party. In other words, the flowers' inherent thinghood occurs or comes into existence in a different minor chronotope.

Although the spatial chronotopes in *Mrs Dalloway* are more elaborated to discuss the relation between the human and materiality, the plotline exhibits an extraordinary application of temporality, which offers a characteristic materialization of time in the novel: "Keyed to a single day and divided into 12 sections, the novel presents itself as a device for quantifying diurnal experience: it *is* a clock" (Saint-Amour 89). Here, it is seen that the narrative of *Mrs Dalloway* is unquestionably significant for the discussion of materiality because it stands for a *clock*. To be more solid, Big Ben as the recurrent reminder of the plotline of the novel must be analyzed as a fundamental way of materializing time. Paul K. Saint-Amour pinpoints the repetitive yet progressive interventions of Big Ben: "At more local scales, too, it emulates the clock's cyclicality by marking the hour through a system of verbatim repetitions" (Saint-Amour 89). The

sentence "[f]irst a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable" (4; 86) is repeated twice; "The leaden circles dissolved in the air" is repeated four times (4; 36; 70; 135). For this reason, the novel is defined as "a finely made clock whose little bird doesn't 'cuckoo' but instead says repeatedly and sonorously, 'The leaden circles dissolved in the air'" (Saint-Amour 89). As an outcome of free indirect style and the stream-of-consciousness technique, the narrative is maintained through a variety of subjective times. In opposition, the canonical time "serve[s] to contrast the emotional quality of their *durée*" by "comment[ing] on the place those hours have in the characters' day and by extension in their lives, because all their past is contained in the present moment" (Richter 294). In this sense, it can be claimed that objective time which is the concept of solidifying time to 'something' measurable enriches the symbolic level of the novel for being its concrete counterpart. Therefore, the unique structure of the novel as a clock "makes it even clearer that the hours in *Mrs. Dalloway*, presided over by Big Ben and St. Margaret's […], are not only part of the novel's structure but of its philosophical concern: the importance of time as the medium in which selfhood and its psychological progressions are formed" (Richter 240). Furthermore, through the chimes of Big Ben, Woolf's technique of doubling the narrative functions in the sense of temporality thanks to the co-existence of objective time and subjective times.

Richter explains how objective time shapes the narrative by compromising with the subjectivities of the characters' sense of time "with an order that is personal and psychological, yet contained within the temporal frame" (239). In this sense, Clarissa's self-revealing thoughts are outstanding when she says that "she feared time itself;" "the dwindling of life; how year by year her share was sliced; how little the margin that remained was capable any longer of stretching" (23). Her becoming less might be graspable more than ever as she walks upstairs as if she was "a single figure against the appalling night, or rather, to be accurate, against the stare of this matter-of-fact June morning" (23). In this quote, two components are significant: Her depression is a "matter-of-fact" *particularly* for this "June morning." In other words, her feelings are *materialized at this time* (the day of her party and Septimus's suicide) *in this place* (home). In a parallel way, Septimus takes time as if it was something material covered by a husk: "The word 'time' split its husk; poured its riches over him; and from his lips fell like shells, like

shavings from a plane, without his making them, hard, white, imperishable, words, and flew to attach themselves to their places in an ode to Time; an immortal ode to Time" (52). Therefore, Clarissa's fear of time is caused by her shrinking in spirit as she discovers it when she is at home a few hours before her party. Septimus's sense of time, on the other hand, is revealed to him as its cover is split on the day when his biographical time will come to an end.

Concerning materiality of time in the novel, it can be suggested that Big Ben functions as a thing not necessarily for the characters but for the narrative. In fact, Big Ben functions to "remind […] us of the contrast between the external, quantitative time and the inner, qualitative time" while "[t]he hours of the day are far from equal in length" where they are "elasticity ascribed" (Hasler 94). Simultaneity empowers a spatial elasticity as well in the novel through the co-existing events of different characters. For this reason, Bakhtin's suggestion of co-existing chronotopes (*Dialogic* 252) is illustrated through the intervention of clocks, which shows that Big Ben is a chronotopic thing for materializing objective time as a challenge to subjective time. Likewise, St. Margaret is "the clock which always struck two minutes after Big Ben" and its sound "glides into the recesses of the heart and buries itself in ring after ring of sound, like something alive which wants to confide itself, to disperse itself" (37). Therefore, the clocks can be read as *narrative things* in the novel for functioning as the mediators of subjective time and actual time, which are chronotopic by nature.

Clocks function as a thing connecting biographical time with historical time as time passing is spatialized by the characters' movements in the city. When Elizabeth looks around to check the time, she cannot find any clock but met by the "perpetual movement" of clouds (100) because "she is only experiencing in extremis what all of the novel's Londoners do when the hour is tolled (Saint-Amour 89). However, for Septimus and Rezia sense of time as well as the sense of place is problematic. The clock is described as follows as they leave Dr. Holmes's office: "Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the clocks of Harley Street nibbled at the June day, counselled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of proportion" (75). In this sense, objective time serves as a way of suppression whose effect

is described as if it was a knife "shredding and slicing" for both as their sense of subjective time deviates. On the contrary, for Elizabeth who feels differently free and hopeful in the street, clocks are not at sight. As Peter Walsh leaves the Dalloway's house he speaks to himself, which is interrupted by the chiming Big Ben: "All India lay behind him; plains, mountains, epidemics of cholera; a district twice as big as Ireland; decisions he had come to alone—he, Peter Walsh" (36). This is in fact soon after Peter's confirming to attend Clarissa's party "in a moment of vulnerability" while he "step[s] down the street, speaking to himself rhythmically, in time with the flow of the sound, the direct downright sound of Big Ben striking the half-hour" (36). Here, the actual time reminds Peter of India through Big Ben's compiling Britain's past with Peter's. Furthermore, neither the spot nor the moment of the chiming is a coincidence. It is a moment followed by Peter's seeing Clarissa in her familial house—in her husband's house. This peculiar moment makes him question his own selfhood through the "decisions he had come to alone" (36).

Because the novel consists of doubling trivia and seriousness, ordinariness in terms of materiality should be discussed as well. Ordinariness is, in fact, Woolf's method to describe her characters. Clarissa's "worldliness" is almost equal to her ordinary look and ordinary character. When Peter sees him after years, he encounters what he is familiar with: "But it was Clarissa one remembered. Not that she was striking; not beautiful at all; there was nothing picturesque about her; she never said anything specially clever; there she was, however; there she was" (57). Peter sees her in her domestic space "among her scissors and silks" (57), in a place he calls a "dungeon" decorated "with flowers and air-cushions" (58). Here, for Peter, Clarissa's domestic use of space and use of objects is an embodiment of her worldliness and ordinariness, which is also an embodiment of her concerns of social acceptance: "The obvious thing to say of her was that she was worldly; cared too much for rank and society and getting on in the world—which was true in a sense; she had admitted it to him" (57). Similarly, Clarissa describes Peter with his ordinary habits. At the beginning of the novel, she thinks about Peter Walsh but does not recall what he is doing despite his accounts in his letters:

> He would be back from India one of these days, June or July, she forgot which, for his letters were awfully dull; it was his sayings one remembered; his eyes, his pocket-knife, his smile, his grumpiness and, when millions of things had utterly vanished—how strange it was!—a few sayings like this about cabbages. (3)

Including his first appearance in the novel, Peter is displayed as playing with his pocketknife almost every time: “That was his old trick, opening a pocket-knife, thought Sally, always opening and shutting a knife when he got excited” (136). Similar to Clarissa’s room full of cushions and flowers, Peter’s obsession with his knife is a way to reflect their personalities through their connection with ordinary objects.

Projecting the ordinary moments or thoughts of a person is a must to portray a realistic character for Woolf. These are the moments of “non-being” which are aimed to be a major part of her fictions. In her essay “A Sketch of the Past,” Woolf says: “Often when I have been writing one of my so-called novels I have been baffled by this same problem; that is, how to describe what I call in my private shorthand—‘non-being’ ” (70). Often in the novel, the characters are defined by their relation to ordinary objects like Clarissa’s hats, flowers, cushions, etc. even when they do not notice those objects. These relations with objects in the simplest way can be defined as “habits,” which “do not signify something symbolic” as “they are not exceptional moments” (Olson 68). These details are the significant ingredients of Mrs Dalloway’s characterization but what is confounding is that she loads the description of ordinariness with excessive details of materiality. For instance, Septimus’s seeing Rezia in a context, which is not shaded by his mental problems is when she is observed while sewing hats. It is actually when Septimus finds a “refuge” among the usualness of the world around:

> As he opened the door of the room where the Italian girls sat making hats, he could see them; could hear them; they were rubbing wires among coloured beads in saucers; they were turning buckram shapes this way and that; the table was all strewn with feathers, spangles, silks, ribbons; scissors were rapping on the table; but something failed him; he could not feel. Still, scissors rapping, girls laughing, hats being made protected him; he was assured of safety; he had a refuge. (64-5)

This is one of the rare moments when Septimus feels safe and sound, not on the verge of experiencing the bursting thinghood: “Oh for the scissors and the lamplight and the buckram shapes! He asked Lucrezia to marry him, the younger of the two, the gay, the frivolous, with those little artist’s fingers that she would hold up and say ‘It is all in them.’ Silk, feathers, what not were alive to them” (65). It is a temporal circumstance when Septimus can anticipate the ordinariness of sewing objects in a hat-maker’s shop. Silk, feathers, scissors are all in their usual place and Septimus can observe their stillness and their objecthood.

Looking into ordinariness as a fundamental part of *Mrs Dalloway*, the house will be handled as the internal chronotope which reveals the unpublicized aspects of biographical time. Comparing the outer space with the inner, it is possible to claim that home is almost equal to the ordinary. When Clarissa hears that she is not invited to lunch by Lady Bruton, her movements in the room are described as if it was a slow-motioned film whose frame is full of the objects: "She pierced the pincushion, and laid her feathered hat on the bed. The sheets were clean, tight stretched in a broad white band from side to side. Narrower and narrower would her bed be. The candle was half burnt down […] (23). At this moment, even though Clarissa is having an emotional breakdown, every object is in its usual order. This is a moment when the hidden concerns of Clarissa's inner world is unveiled as one of the dramatic scenes in her biographical time. At that moment, it can be claimed that the objects in her room are simply at their objecthood level. In a wider sense, for Clarissa, the habitual ordinariness of everyday life is the best as she takes it also the peace in the country. She is grateful to be "a part of it," as Woolf's long yet meticulously ordered sentence below describes:

> [B]ut [the war] was over; thank Heaven—over. It was June. The King and Queen were at the Palace. And everywhere, though it was still so early, there was a beating, a stirring of galloping ponies, tapping of cricket bats; Lord's, Ascot, Ranelagh and all the rest of it; wrapped the soft mesh of the grey-blue morning air, which, as the day wore on, would unwind them, and set down on their lawns and pitches the bouncing ponies, whose forefeet just struck the ground and up they sprung, the whirling young men, and laughing girls in their transparent muslins who, even now, after dancing all night, were taking their absurd woolly dogs for a run; and even now, at this hour, discreet old dowagers were shooting out in their motor cars on errands of mystery; and the shop-keepers were fidgeting in their windows with their paste and diamonds, their lovely old sea-green brooches in eighteenth-century settings to tempt Americans (but one must economize, not buy things rashly for Elizabeth), and she, too, loving it as she did with an absurd and faithful passion, being part of it, since her people were courtiers once in the time of the Georges, she, too, was going that very night to kindle and illuminate; to give her party. (4)

It is obvious that the routines and the habits both in her biographical time and in the larger historical time are comforting for Clarissa. As discussed before, Clarissa's refraining from the unfamiliar chronotopes highlights her use of materiality in objecthood level. Therefore, her ordinariness is equated with domesticity—the very well-known chronotope—, which also explains why she is hurt when Peter calls her "perfect hostess" as opposed to his interest for "Wagner, Pope's poetry, people's characters eternally […]" (6).

Clarissa's domestic ordinariness makes Peter question what he will "experience" at the party. Yet, his expectations are not so different from Clarissa's indecisiveness about life:

> It was not beauty pure and simple—Bedford Place leading into Russell Square. It was *straightness and emptiness* of course; the symmetry of a corridor; but it was also windows lit up, a piano, a gramophone sounding; a sense of pleasure-making hidden, but now and again emerging when, through the uncurtained window, the window left open, one saw parties sitting over tables, young people slowly circling, conversations between men and women, maids idly looking out (a strange comment theirs, when work was done), stockings drying on top ledges, a parrot, a few plants. Absorbing, mysterious, *of infinite richness*, this life. (118-19; emphasis added)

When he reaches Clarissa's house, he thinks: "The cold stream of visual impressions failed him now as if the eye were a cup that overflowed and let the rest run down its china walls unrecorded" (119). This is a moment of passing from outside to inside, which is also a passing from the public world to the private world, which is Clarissa's domestic social life. Peter is already fed by his presumptions about Clarissa's party, and his senses are closed for any other impressions. This is, in fact, Peter's usual attitude to Clarissa as "the defects of her own soul" has always interested him (6). Thus, it is possible to claim that Peter's prejudice blocks his differentiated experience of the world. In other words, he *avoids* thinghood just like Clarissa. Clarissa cannot easily link a changed relation between herself and things because of her anxiety about losing her secured life, and Peter cannot do this, either, due to his pride.

Objects in Woolf's houses in general "represent firm elements of habitual, ordinary life, which a world war cannot stamp out" (Olson 80). Considering Septimus's confusing responses to objects in outer space, the house is the only place where everything is in their regular way for Septimus:

> He was alone with the sideboard and the bananas. He was alone, exposed on this bleak eminence, stretched out--but not on a hill-top; not on a crag; on Mrs. Filmer's sitting-room sofa. As for the visions, the faces, the voices of the dead, where were they? There was a screen in front of him, with black bulrushes and blue swallows. Where he had once seen mountains, where he had seen faces, where he had seen beauty, there was a screen. (105)

Furthermore, he speaks his opinions about the hat Rezia is sewing and the ribbons he chooses for the hat makes him realize the objecthood of a simple hat as he says "so real, it was so substantial, Mrs. Peters' hat" (105). Septimus's shifting to physical reality at the

level of objecthood is welcomed by Rezia when he realizes how small the hat she is sewing is:

> "It's too small for Mrs. Peters," said Septimus.
>
> For the first time for days he was speaking as he used to do! Of course it was—absurdly small, she said. But Mrs. Peters had chosen it. (104)

Therefore, the domestic ordinariness in terms of objecthood contrasts to Septimus's understanding the material world outside. So, unlike his being in the familiar space/at home, the historical chronotope, which is excessively visible in the streets of 1920s London, blurs Septimus's drawing meanings out of objects. This ends up with his experiencing the thingification triggered by historical chronotope.

As the domestic objects are arranged in a fastidious order, Dr. Bradshaw's emphasis on "divine proportion" is noteworthy for the fact that house decoration at that time was almost an obsession. The doctor suggests that "proportion" which can be renamed as "order" for Septimus is a necessity as "Sir William with his thirty years' experience of these kinds of cases, and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this sense; in fact, his sense of proportion" (73). According to Dr. Bradshaw, Septimus and the patients similar to him suffer from a wrong sense of proportion. Therefore, they are recommended some rest away from the active world as a remedy:

> Health we must have; and health is proportion; so that when a man comes into your room and says he is Christ (a common delusion), and has a message, as they mostly have, and threatens, as they often do, to kill himself, you invoke proportion; order rest in bed; rest in solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, without messages; six months' rest; until a man who went in weighing seven stone six comes out weighing twelve. (73)

The ordinariness and usualness around are said to be the ultimate solution for man's health. Yet, proportion has a sister named "conversion" who "feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the face of the populace" (74). However, this is unacceptable for Rezia. Rezia's resistance to being obedient to the doctor's recommendation is, in fact, *a resistance against ordinariness*. She disdainfully imagines Bradshaw's car to be monotypic as well, depending his 'greyness:' "[…] this man being the ghostly helper, the priest of science; and, as the motor

car was grey, so, to match its sober suavity, grey furs, silver grey rugs were heaped in it, to keep her ladyship warm while she waited" (70).

Rezia's resistance to the doctor's attempts to make Septimus an ordinary individual is materialized through her managing to tie up Septimus's writings. Waiting for their appointment, she finishes sewing the hat and ties up Septimus's papers some of which Rezia thinks "very beautiful," which can be considered as collecting the bits and pieces of Septimus's physical existence:

> Staggering he saw her mount the appalling staircase, laden with Holmes and Bradshaw, men who never weighed less than eleven stone six, who sent their wives to Court, men who made ten thousand a year and talked of proportion; who different in their verdicts (for Holmes said one thing, Bradshaw another), yet judges they were; who mixed the vision and the sideboard; saw nothing clear, yet ruled, yet inflicted. "Must" they said. Over them she triumphed. (107)

Rezia's attitude towards those ruling and judging authorities is challenged by Peter's praising "the efficiency, the organisation, the communal spirit of London" as "one of the triumphs of civilisation" (110). In this way, the sense of proportion or order is intertwined with repulsion and glorification at the same time because of Woolf's use of different characters for different impressions of the same concepts. Even for special occasions at home, objects in their perfect order are as essential as the arrival of the Prime Minister in the frame yet not for their changeability or potential thingification but only for what they are—more accurately as they are expected to be ordered under the light of "divine proportion" (106):

> […] the plates, saucepans, cullenders, frying-pans, chicken in aspic, ice cream freezers, pared crusts of bread, lemons, soup tureens, and pudding basins which, however hard they washed up in the scullery, seemed to be all on top of [Mrs. Walker], on the kitchen table, on chairs, while the fire blared and roared, the electric lights glared, and still supper had to be laid. (120)

Ironically enough, this exciting event of having a party to which even the Prime Minister attends is extremely tedious in sense of materiality. Every object no matter how much it is valuable is in the perfect arrangement, which blocks potential thingification:

> Lucy came running full tilt downstairs, having just nipped into the drawing room to smooth a cover, to straighten a chair, to pause a moment and feel whoever came in

> must think how clean, how bright, how beautifully cared for, when they saw the beautiful silver, the brass fire-irons, the new chair covers, and the curtains of yellow chintz: she appraised each; heard a roar of voices; people already coming up from dinner; she must fly! (120)

Even though Woolf is meticulous enough to use the names of each character no matter how little they contribute to the narrative, the relation between the servant and the mistress is portrayed with references to the material aspect of doing housework. Clarissa's servants admire her gift of preparing a party as the "mistress of silver, of linen, of china" (28). This is surely a metaphor to refer to Clarissa's 'overvaluation' of anything valuable for the sake of social admiration. She buys the flowers, mends her dress to be sure "her appearance there complete," and thus cooking, setting the tables, furnishing the furniture, running around and serving are left to the servants (Blair 198). Therefore, the domestic relations which are static as socially expected among the people are also reflected with references to materiality.

In contrast to the dull materiality it bears, Clarissa's house party or the chronotope of salon is particularly important for the narrative as Bakhtin's analysis of modern novel suggests that the salon is the place where "historical," "socio-public events" go along with the personal and private as "the interpenetration of state with boudoir secrets, of historical sequences with the everyday and biographical sequences" (*Dialogic* 247). The party illustrates Clarissa's and the upper-class's social practices as "the graphically visible markers of historical time as well as of biographical and everyday time are concentrated and condensed; at the same time they are intertwined with each other in the tightest possible fashion, fused into unitary markers of the epoch" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 247). For this reason, Clarissa's party is highly important and in fact this fusion is what she aims for: "it was an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom?"; then, she replies: "An offering for the sake of offering, perhaps" (89). Indeed at this party, Sally, Peter, and Clarissa come together for the first time after so many years and numerous names uttered during the party. Unlike the chance factor in chronotopic motifs of "road" or "alien world" in epic narratives, "[f]rom a narrative and compositional point of view, [salon] is the place where encounters occur" in realist novels (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 246). The attendants' views are surely skeptical in such a big gathering. Peter condemns Clarissa for being a perfect hostess, Miss Kilman thinks that Clarissa's life is "a tissue of vanity and conceit," Lady

Bruton disregards her gathering as "cutting [people] up and sticking them together" (94; 76-7). Indeed, there is

> on one side, the attack on the superficial, glittering, and tinselly quality of Clarissa's flimsy character that collapses into her love of giving parties to support Richard Dalloway's middling political career; on the other side, Clarissa's own defence of her parties as an offering to combine, to create, to bring together the continuity of different people's existence. (Blair 190)

However, it must be noted that Woolf's deliberate emphasis on the ordinariness of domestic life is extremely significant in her way of doubling the narratives as it is seen that "[t]he ordinary machinery of the party is neither left out nor subordinated; it is an equal part of the novel's final event" (Olson 83). Therefore, objects as objects, not things, are also functional for Woolf's technique of "representing ordinary experience by means of a materialist style" so that she "both spurns and embraces the inclusion of the prosaic" with an "emphasis on materialist detail [which] is always in reference to building character or building narrative" (Olson 82-83). In this sense, Woolf's domestic objects are similar to the use of objects in Defoe, Swift, Trollope, Borrow and W.E. Norris who she calls "the truth-tellers" in her essay "Phases of Fiction," as the "emphasis is laid upon the very facts that most reassure us of stability in real life, upon money, furniture, food, until we seem wedged among solid objects in a solid universe" (58). Thus, the mundane presence of objects is necessary for her realistic fiction as well. This function of objects to present static worldliness, ordinariness and usualness does not offer thingification as long as it does not establish a differentiated relationship with the human. Therefore, it is hardly possible to detect things in the domestic world presented by Woolf for that she always disdains its simplicity as an obstacle especially for female imagination.

As opposed to the ordinariness of materiality in the house, the party bares the most dramatically heightened moment in terms of its plot: Clarissa hears about Septimus's death. In contrast to the richness of materiality in outer space where the plot is dragged by passing of time with no significant events, the crucial moment of the narrative shows up in the house as Bakhtin suggests that "[i]n salons and parlours the webs of intrigue are spun, denouements occur and finally—this is where dialogues happen, something that acquires extraordinary importance in the novel, revealing the character, 'ideas' and

'passions' of the heroes" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 246). Therefore, Clarissa's hearing the news of the suicide during the party is particularly significant because it lays bare her inner depression or maybe her veiled passion. Like Septimus, death might be Clarissa's passion as she "had once thrown a shilling into the Serpentine, never anything more" (133). She wished for death, but Septimus accomplished it. Her moment of being hit by that news is when she is watching the neighbor out of the window after "she parted the curtains" (134). At this point, through the curtain being inside and outside at the same time, the narrative reveals the very core of Woolf's doubling. Here, Clarissa's being inside but watching the outside brings forth the epiphanic moment which is "expressed in spatial terms:"

> From this (liminal) standpoint, Clarissa temporarily foregoes her centrality to the major narrative and instead takes on a role peripheral to that of another. From this insecure site or intersection (neither upstairs nor downstairs, inside nor outside) she is able to contemplate her own world and that of the other, and to gain an understanding of the relationship between the two. Reading inside out, from the outside in, she understands what she terms an 'ordinary [thing]', that is, that her life runs concurrently to that of others and, most importantly, that her life is defined in relation to these other lives. (Snaith and Whitworth 50)

This epiphany as an outcome of co-existing spatial chronotopes brings forth the "threshold" which Bakhtin points out with references to "related chronotopes" of Dostoevsky's novels. Clarissa's house party is "where crisis events occur, the falls, resurrections, renewals, epiphanies, decisions that determine the whole life of a man" (*Dialogic* 248). "In this chronotope, time is essentially instantaneous; it is as if it has no duration and falls out of the normal course of biographical time" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 248), and Clarissa says "[n]othing could be slow enough; nothing last too long" (134). Thus, it can be claimed that the curtain's everyday simplicity is "momentarily arrested," by Clarissa's epiphanic moment and the object becomes a thing doubly for the chronotopic co-existence of the party and Septimus' suicide, leading to Clarissa's epiphany:

> She pulled the blind now. The clock began striking. The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with all this going on. There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun. (135)

Meeting the old lady opposite, Clarissa realizes "an agency of [the old lady's] own" which creates "a demand to be recognized as a subject" (Berman 468). Clarissa's recognition of the old lady's daily life with her insignificant movements in domestic space reflecting her

spirit supplements the narrative with another double of Clarissa. Clarissa now finds out that she should share both Septimus's and the old lady's tragedy: "This recognition enables Clarissa to understand her obligation towards Septimus and her implication in his death while marking the necessary connection between private ethical recognition and public accounting for the trauma of war" (Berman 468-69). At this point, it can be claimed that Clarissa's insight into her own resentment reveals her discontent with her biographical time situated in this historical chronotope. The old lady's slow and repetitive movements are a portrayal of Clarissa's female domesticity which gradually makes her passive. In other words, the old lady reflects Clarissa's moderate and slow-paced biographical time. In Clarissa's vision, growing old does not only mean a biological weakening but also a psychological shrinking. Septimus's suicide, on the other hand, is an echo of the age of frustration and anxiety. Therefore, Clarissa feels that she has to share the grief of both. In other words, Clarissa has to suffer because of her biographical time located in this historical chronotope.

However, Clarissa's being aware of her doubled spirituality is not unveiled through an in-betweenness of outside and inside for the first time, though. When she was sitting on the bus as a young woman who has a "theory" about "dissatisfaction," she says that "she felt herself everywhere; not 'here, here, here'; and she tapped the back of the seat; but everywhere" (111). In her middle-aged years, on the other hand, she does not look so sure about theories. As she watches the transport in the streets, her mind goes in and out of these vehicles: "She would not say of anyone in the world now that they were this or were that. She felt very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on" (6). In a moment of criticizing Kilman for being religious and loving Elizabeth too much, Clarissa looks out and sees her neighbor, the old lady, and her questioning is embedded with spatial relations:

> Why creeds and prayers and mackintoshes? When, thought Clarissa, that's the miracle, that's the mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could see going from chest of drawers to dressing-table. She could still see her. And the supreme mystery which Kilman might say she had solved, or Peter might say he had solved, but Clarissa didn't believe either of them had the ghost of an idea of solving, was simply this: here was one room; there another. (93)

This ordinariness of time passing for an old lady in the domestic sphere is the 'mystery' or the "pattern" behind "cotton wool" of everyday life ("Sketch" 72). When the Big Ben strikes, the old lady goes in as "she was forced, so Clarissa imagined, by that sound, to move, to go […]" (93). This is in fact a moment between ordinariness and seriousness while "[d]own down, into the midst of ordinary things the finger fell making the moment solemn" (93). This old lady in *Mrs Dalloway* might be another version of Mrs Brown in Woolf's essay. Through such unimportant details of life in simplistic way, Woolf chases after the reality regarding one's personality. Therefore, the "pattern" "behind the cotton wool of daily life" is "a token of some real thing behind appearances," which is put into words by Woolf to "make it whole" ("Sketch" 72). So, the old lady emphasizes Woolf's purpose of writing a complete narrative of life including both facts and subjectivities as much as possible. So, Woolf explains art as a "philosophy" in pursuit of the "hidden patterns" behind ordinariness. This is at the same time the philosophy of human existence for Woolf as "we are the music," "we are the thing." Thus, Clarissa comes to the point of revelation regarding her interrelation with Septimus, the old lady, and ultimately the whole world. So, the party brings forth the epiphany and the chronotopic significance of domestic space for *Mrs Dalloway* as Bakhtin pinpoints that the salon in realistic modern novels become a "threshold" and a "breaking point of a life" (*Dialogic* 248). The way Clarissa undergoes a "threshold" is not a direct experience because she does not see Septimus's suicide but hears about it from the Bradshaws who were her guests, which makes these social gatherings "present a concrete situation where certain kinds of action are possible; by the same token, however, they also restrict the possibilities of action" (Steinby 120). In other words, the metaphysical relationship between Septimus and Clarissa is bound to this event, Clarissa's party. Therefore, Clarissa accepts that "she forced to stand here in her evening dress" because "[i]t was her punishment to see sink and disappear here a man, there a woman, in this profound darkness […]" (134). Therefore, it can be suggested that chronotope of threshold which is described by Bakhtin as "highly charged with emotion and value" which "can be combined with the motif of encounter" occurs differently in *Mrs Dalloway*. Clarissa encounters Septimus's death at this party where her "highly charged" "emotion[s]" are triggered by parting the *curtain* to see the old lady opposite:

> She parted the curtains; she looked. Oh, but how surprising!—in the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her! She was going to bed. And the sky. It will be a solemn sky, she had thought, it will be a dusky sky, turning away its cheek in beauty. But there it was—ashen pale, raced over quickly by tapering vast clouds. *It was new to her*. (135; emphasis added)
>
> […]
>
> There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun. She must go back to them. But what an extraordinary night! *She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself.* (135; emphasis added)

Nothing substantial happens in the party, yet Clarissa goes through a significant moment of emotional intensity. Septimus's suicide in the *finale* is of a biographical time assessed by an everyday indifference of others. Yet, it is also an echo of the historical time of the narrative as suggested by Bakhtin, "[h]ere the graphically visible markers of historical time as well as of biographical and everyday time are concentrated and condensed" (*Dialogic* 246). Because the historical time is the post-war period when everybody goes through a trauma, Clarissa has to suffer as Septimus suffered from his war trauma which brought forth the end of his biographical time. Clarissa does not put a full stop to her biographical time, and maybe because of that, she feels that Septimus's death is at the same time "her disgrace" (134). Therefore, her epiphany is

> a key moment of ethical awareness in the novel—a moment of response to the claims of the life of another. But it is also a moment when Woolf emphasizes the interconnections of public and private morality: Septimus's shell shock is everyone's shell shock, his war death engages us all in the confrontation with death and our responsibility for it. (Blair 190)

So, Clarissa's existential and ethical discomfort (hidden pattern) is unveiled through her party which is a trivial event (cotton wool of everyday life). This is a striking moment as Woolf says "we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. And I see this when *I have a shock*" ("Sketch" 72; emphasis added). Therefore, doubling of death and life, Clarissa and Septimus, Clarissa and the old lady, the inner and outer spatial chronotopes, and most importantly temporal chronotopes of historical time and biographical time are endowed by the curtain which is discussed as a thing.

In conclusion, through Woolf's essential doubling structure of the whole narrative, material entities in the novel can also be doubled as objects and things. In addition to the subjective and unfixed responses to the object-subject nexus and the human-nonhuman relations in the narrative, the variety of chronotopes enriches both the objects and things. The streets of London in the 1920s as the materialized figurations of the historical chronotope offer a range of things based on chance factor to transform objects' link to the characters in specific occurrences. Domestic space as the spatial chronotope revealing biographical time, on the other hand, is almost equal to objecthood for its fixation on the principles of organizing a place. Most importantly, Clarissa's revelation at the end is a perfect embodiment of chronotopic concordance of opposing inner and outer spatialities, which is afforded by the curtain as a thing. For Woolf, "experience is never either/or, never just one thing" (Olson 80) and that is the major affirmative statement of the novel. Therefore, under the influence of the major historical chronotope of London in the 1920s, minor biographical and subjective chronotopes are examined to discover the potential for thingification, which is spatiotemporal in essence. As a consequence, in this chapter, it is discovered that all occurrences of thingification are shaped by the novel's historical chronotope which is deeply influenced by the post-war trauma.

CHAPTER 2

THINGS OF BIOGRAPHICAL TIME IN *ORLANDO*

As a tribute to Vita-Sackville West, *Orlando* (1928) presents an unusually slippery life-story of an aristocratic poet (Goldman 65). Although Woolf states that she began writing the novel as a satire, "an escapade after these [her previous] serious poetic experimental books" (*Diary 3* 131), it became her best-seller book in her lifetime. It is an astonishing rewriting of English literary history accompanied by Orlando's writing a long pastoral poem titled "The Oak Tree" which is inspired by her innumerable adventures over three centuries. Offered as a biography in its subtitle, it is an attempt to record a poet's biography that lives for centuries and transforms from a man to a woman. As Orlando's lifespan, bodily transformation, adventures, and love affairs are often blurred by the interruption of her biographer, it is discovered that Orlando does not change in personality despite all these extremities in a human's life. In this way, the parodic nature of the novel enabled by Orlando's uncatchable life-story problematizes the concepts of time, self, love, gender, literature, biography writing, and history writing. As a young and ambitious man of his age, Orlando first appears in the Elizabethan period in his familial manor house while slashing an African's head cut off by his father or grandfather in one of their imperial travels. Despite his admiration for his forefathers, his love for nature and beauty leads him to literature. Then, as a young and ambitious man of letters of this age, he writes tragedies and poems, which are high in quantity yet less in quality. Stunned by his love for a Russian princess who departs unexpectedly, Orlando's poetic melancholia comes to the forefront and continues for ages. After the beloved breaks his heart, he goes to Turkey as the British Ambassador where he transforms into a woman. Followed by this adventurist and fascinating journey to the Orient, she comes back to England and realizes her new identity, which is a noblewoman, who wants to be a famous poet. Meeting the canonical literary figures of each period, Orlando gets disappointed by these significant men either because of their dullness or misogynistic worldviews. Following her struggles to live on as a solitary woman in the Victorian age, she gets married to Shelmerdine who is most of the time far away. In the subsequent century, she becomes a mother at the age of thirty-six and at the same time publishes her poem which is acknowledged by critics and wins a prize. Through his/her life for centuries, the issues of biographical and

historical time, self as a man/woman and a poet, and the characteristics of English literature are mocked through rhetoric problems aroused by the narrator/biographer/historian. Therefore, by analyzing Orlando's perplexing life, things will be inquired with reference to their association with especially biographical time and also historical time.

Examining the materiality with its relation to biographical time is significant for that the narrative is an attempt to trace Orlando's life which surpasses the historical time. As Orlando lives for centuries but grows two decades older, the historical time can be claimed impotent for Orlando's biographical time. That is, the historical time is inadequate to understand Orlando's experiencing the world including his/her interaction with the materiality. As the historical time progresses incompetently, time passing creates multiple minor chronotopes which linger in Orlando's mind, proceeded by his/her interactions with the nonhuman world. Thus, objects become the most essential needs of *Orlando* to claim a change of time because the details regarding his/her fast-speed life is palpable only through materiality as stated in the novel, "[e]very single thing, once he tried to dislodge it from its place in his mind, he found thus cumbered with other matter like the lump of glass which, after a year at the bottom of the sea, is grown about with bones and dragon-flies, and coins and the tresses of drowned women" (61-62). As illustrated, through correlating time with the nonhuman world, s/he can make sense of the spatiotemporal grid in which s/he lives. In simpler words, the past reaches the present through her memory, and the actual physical world becomes the only base for his/her understanding the time in which s/he physically exists. In this way, objects of some minor chronotopes turn into some *things* else in different minor chronotopes with the help of atypicality and peculiarity of the related moment provided by the spatiotemporal variety in Orlando's biography. In other words, the diversity embedded in Orlando's subjective time shapes thingification.

In this chapter, Bakhtinian concepts of historical time and biographical time will be respectively taken as mathematical time and subjective time. Thus, in order to offer a better understanding of how these concepts are characteristically presented in *Orlando*,

firstly, time as a modern concept will be examined to understand Woolf's mockery of objective/historical time; secondly, Orlando's life will be analyzed from the perspective of Bakhtinian concepts of biographical time and adventure-time; thirdly, English literary history will be briefly investigated as the historical chronotopes. Consequently, this chapter aims to discuss objects in *Orlando* as an enduring yet transformative reality to discover *thingness* in particular chronotopes embedded in Orlando's excessive biographical time.

Before dealing with Woolf's use of time in the novel, how the concept of time changed in the modern age will be briefly explained. Time has been a philosophical concern to understand existence since ancient thought. Most notably, Aristotle claims that sense of time is bound to perception of change: "[…] we come to know time whenever we mark off change, marking it off by means of the before and after; and we say that time has passed whenever we have a perception of the before and after in change. […] For time is this: number of change with respect to the before and after" (22). Ursula Coope suggests that in contrast to the Platonic idea of static and "incomprehensible" Forms, Aristotelian thought supposes that nature changes, and "both change and […] mind are necessary preconditions for the existence of time" (Coope 3-4). At the same time, Aristotelian concept pinpoints time as "a universal order within which all changes are related to each other" (Coope 86). Nevertheless, the Aristotelian idea of time, as suggested by Coope, is "uniformed" and "everywhere the same" (86), which is problematic for the modernists because "real time" (as coined by Bergson) is relative and personal, not universal.

Interestingly, although the mechanical clock was invented in the fourteenth century, standardization of time was in the late nineteenth century. This gap was mostly because the personal experience of time is hard to be defined differently from universal time. Isaac Newton offered that time is "mathematical" and "flows equally without relation to anything external," but Immanuel Kant rejected this idea because it is impossible to comprehend "objective time" through experience (Kern 11). Furthermore, as Stephen Kern claims, "before the late nineteenth century no one (with the possible exception of Laurence Sterne, who explored private time in [*The Life and Opinions of*] *Tristram*

Shandy [1759]) systematically questioned the homogeneity of time" (11). Therefore, the potential heterogeneous nature of time was not a major subject matter of philosophy until almost the twentieth century because of the conceptual gap between the private experience of time and mathematical time. *Orlando*'s mocking time is actually based on this gap. Orlando's subjective time shapes the objective time in a way that any attempt to materialize time, that is measuring it by the use of an object (clock), is invalidated by his/her extraordinary life-story. For this reason, the chronotopic nature of materiality in the narrative is organized by Orlando's biographical time, which means that the objects existing as the material entities in Orlando's life are not at the level of objecthood in measurable time. As the objects are modified by Orlando's marginal life, they attain their thinghood in his/her biographical time. In other words, objects turn into things for Orlando because they are transformed by his/her subjective time.

As mentioned, standardization of time in the late nineteenth century was surely implemented for the sake of organizing industrial production and commercial relations, meaning that it was an outcome of modernization. Thus, literary figures who criticized modernity problematized the concept of objective time in their distinctive plot-structures, which will be later named as Modernist stream-of-consciousness technique. In contrast with the idea of a unified and monotype clock time, Modernist authors focused on "the heterogeneity of private time and its conflict with public time" (Kern 16). In this sense, Henri Bergson was one of the primary influential theorists for the literary figures of the age. According to Shiv K. Kumar, the most important feature of Modernist literature is that "the new novelist […] does not conceive character as a state but as a process of ceaseless becoming in a medium which may be termed Bergson's *durée réelle*" which means real time (1). Bergsonian heterogeneous and subjective real time is also a "shift from a conception of personality as built round a hard and changeless core to a realization of it as a dynamic process" (Kumar 10). What is distinguishable is that the Modernists stylized *la durée* defined by Bergson as "duration." It "has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to number" (120). *La durée* is the psychological time, which is the core of stream-of-consciousness technique, and it is a deliberate use of "inner duration against chronological time as the only true mode of apprehending aesthetic experience" (Kumar

7). Based on this dichotomy, *Orlando* presents a vivid embodiment of the contrast between personal time and clock time as the main concern of the novel is suggested as follows:

> An hour, once it lodges in the queer element of the human spirit, may be stretched to fifty or a hundred times its clock length; on the other hand, an hour may be accurately represented on the timepiece of the mind by one second. This extraordinary discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the mind is less known than it should be and deserves fuller investigation. (60)

Shiv K. Kumar pinpoints that Woolf might not have been directly influenced by Bergson but her novels are related to Bergsonian real time in terms of the narrative durational flux, which is a common point with her contemporary Modernist novelists (68). Kumar claims that among all other Modernist novelists, Woolf is the most consistent one in her way of using time:

> Time with her is almost a mode of perception, a filter which distills all phenomena before they are apprehended in their true significance and relationship. […] Her protest against the Edwardian novel was, in fact, a revolt against the tyranny of chronological time that is "matter" in favour of *la durée* that is "spirit." (68)

Bergson's theory that "time is a flux and not a sum of discrete units is linked with the theory that human consciousness is a stream and not a conglomeration of separate faculties or ideas" (Kern 24). Additionally, as Woolf does not "suggest a process of quantitative assemblage," but "present[s] duration as a ceaseless succession of qualitative changes;" her use of time reminds of Bergsonian *la durée* (Kumar 70). Similarly, in *Orlando* "time when he is thinking becomes inordinately long; time when he is doing becomes inordinately short" (60). This is the essential link between time and the mind because for Bergson time is quality, not quantity, and "inner time, or experienced time, resists attempts to spatialize [calculate] it" (Gillies 11). Thus, time passes differently when Orlando thinks by himself or does something. So, because time is long in thinking but short in action, "[…] Orlando gave his orders and did the business of his vast estates in a flash; but directly he was alone on the mound under the oak tree, the seconds began to round and fill until it seemed as if they would never fall" (60). In this way, Woolf opposes psychological time with mathematical actual-time throughout the novel. In this way, materiality of the historical/measurable time does not create an impact on Orlando.

Thus, things appear as a result of their very special and individualized relations with Orlando whose mind functions as an independent framework of temporality.

Time in *Orlando* is a complicated concept for the character, the biographer, and the reader. Thus, Woolf often confuses the reader with the relation of time passing and the changing nature—similar to the Aristotelian sense of time—during Orlando's monotonous waiting for inspiration: "Here he came then, day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year. He saw the beech trees turn golden and the young ferns unfurl; he saw the moon sickle and then circular; he saw—but probably the reader can imagine the passage which should follow" (59). However, because Orlando gets no inspiration, the sense of passing time becomes dull and repetitious:

> [H]ow night succeeds day and day night; how there is first a storm and then fine weather; how things remain much as they are for two or three hundred years or so, except for a little dust and a few cobwebs which one old woman can sweep up in half an hour; a conclusion which, one cannot help feeling, might have been reached more quickly by the simple statement that 'Time passed' (here the exact amount could be indicated in brackets) and nothing whatever happened. (59)

So, the narrator once claims that time passes and the world changes, and then claims that nothing happens, which challenges the Aristotelian idea of time. Through Orlando's inconsistent enthusiasm for life and writing, biographical time in the narrative becomes almost equal with subjective time confronting the actual passing of time. Thus, as illustrated above, the novel ridicules objective time through Orlando's inconsistent inner world. For this reason, Bakhtinian term of biographical time is used as a reference to subjective and personal time throughout the chapter, and the objects of historical time are explored as the things of biographical time.

In terms of subjective/psychological/private/real time, *Orlando*'s use of biographical time is characteristically significant for two reasons: First, the novel is a mock biography in which a human character lives mathematically for centuries; second, it contradicts itself at the end of the novel by implying that Orlando grows only twenty years older. Woolf's ironic use of time in this way illustrates what Bakhtin calls "interior infinite" (*Rabelais* 44). When the reader is convinced about Orlando's lifespan, the biographer interrupts to

problematize it by stating that "[t]he true length of a person's life, whatever the *Dictionary of National Biography* may say, is always a matter of dispute" (207). At the same time, when the biographer diversely reminds us that this is supposed to be a proper biography of a man, Orlando's lifespan hampers the credibility of the biographer. Thus, this internalized multi-layered formulation of chronotopes is formed by interweaving biographical time and historical time throughout the narrative. Therefore, time exists as a whole in a fluid and transformative way, which is afforded by Orlando's psychological time and the manipulation of his/her biography. Combined with Orlando's multiple identities of gender and social roles in addition to multiple chronotopes, thinghood will be inquired because "*the seconds* began to round and fill until it seemed as if they would never fall," and "they filled themselves, moreover, *with the strangest variety of objects*" (60; emphasis added). So, based on the strangeness of objects for Orlando, things are empowered by Orlando's biographical time which exceeds historical time.

Claiming that experienced time (*la durée*) is the real time, Bergson "locat[es] [measured] time in movement" (Banfield, "Time" 478), in other words, time is located in *spatial* experience. Unlike the flux and qualitative nature of inner time, when it is "[m]easured by standard external units, […] time neither flies nor crawls but continues to move in its well-regulated manner" (Gillies 12). Human surely needs some regulation of time to "explain, analyse, and even understand the nature of experiences," so "world is broken into segments" (Gillies 12). Similar to the measurement of time for practical purposes, Orlando's house is divided into 365 rooms with an addition of 52 stairs to connect them. These particular numeric details of the house are apparently the indicator of the time measured through mathematical calculation. Orlando enjoys his huge manor house by wandering indoors, hosting important guests and refurbishes it whenever s/he wishes. Thus, Woolf fabricates Orlando as a human character (the embodiment of psychological time) who can wander in the majestic longevity of objective time. This is an indoor *spatialized mockery* of the duality between psychological time and objective time: The house ridicules the universal calculation of time by liberating the human mind in it, which is represented by Orlando's spatial movements in the house.

Although the Bergsonian idea of time claims that "human beings truly live in *durée"* "where the growth and change occur," they "make sense of the 'real' world external to them by spatializing it and thereby rendering it immobile but comprehensible" (Gillies 14). This is exactly why we need *I'etendu* which is clock time or mathematical or objective time. Thus, by designing the house in this way, Orlando's wandering, decorating, going in and out of the house can be taken as a game of *la durée* on the playground of *I'etendu.* For this reason, Orlando's house is an intrinsic *thing for the narrative* in terms of Woolf's mockery of time via the protagonist—both of which are elements of a narrative. Additionally, because time is the dominant element of chronotope and the essence of Woolf's mockery in this 'biography,' Orlando's house is a *chronotopic thing* for cohabiting but at the same time ridiculing the objective time and the private time, which enables "interior infinite" chronotopes. Although Orlando's house is the most notable property enduring centuries, its excessiveness is ridiculed by Orlando's uncountable needs to refurbish it: "[…] when Orlando came to reckon up the matter of furnishing with rosewood chairs and cedar wood cabinets, with silver basins, china bowls, and Persian carpets every one of the three hundred and sixty-five bedrooms which the house contained, he saw that it would be no light one […]" (67). More remarkably, the gypsies are not impressed at all by her hundreds-roomed ancestral house, which embarrasses Orlando when compared with the gypsies' history going thousands of years back to when they built the Pyramids (95). Therefore, the illogical excessiveness of the house is mocked as an embodiment of the uselessness of measured time for the human mind. For this reason, Orlando's house becomes a chronotopic thing to juxtapose psychological time with mathematical time.

The house is particularly significant in revealing Orlando's private time which cannot be an expendable part of one's life to be recorded by the biographer. Unlike other female characters in Woolf's novels, for instance Mrs Dalloway and Mrs Ramsay, Orlando does not feel depressed in her house. Her relation with her property is an everlasting aspect of Orlando's life for centuries. Even after becoming a female who does not have the birth right of estates, she manages to keep it. Although "in her early novels Woolf allowed London's streets to shape her characters," the property is a fundamental part of Orlando's identity because "either as a man or a woman, [Orlando] gathers himself together and

becomes himself as he or she walks through the galleries and rooms in the house" (Larsson 141). In this way, Woolf distinguishes personal space as the person is "surrounded by objects which perpetually express the oddity of our own temperaments and enforce the memories of our own experience" ("Haunting" 156). Therefore, Bill Brown claims that "interiors are legible in the traces left by their occupants, and where collected objects contain for the collector elaborate narratives of their collection" (*Other* 66). Indeed, Orlando's house is a "museum" of her past because "[t]hough the novels never think through artifacts so exclusively, they continue to foreground the way objects mediate human relations, including the self's relation to itself" (*Other* 66). Consequently, Orlando's house has three distinguishable contributions to the narrative: It is a chronotopic thing for providing the mockery of measured time by offering the psychological time a playground, it is a part of Orlando's identity, and lastly it reflects the spirit of each period that is narrated in the novel. Thus, at the end of the novel, Orlando's house is a touristic destination which "belonged to time now; to history; was past the touch and control of the living," and the gallery is "a tunnel bored deep into the past" where she can see all great men of previous centuries, the long dinner tables, memoirs of her ancestors and so on (206). Through the house, "the past is represented spatially rather than temporally so that it still exists to be viewed from the present" (de Gay 142). In other words, Orlando's house is a spatial accumulation of her life, which is materialization of his/her biographical time.

With regard to measured time as oppression on the human mind, clocks as the materialized mathematical time are in the foreground during Orlando's moments of distress, for instance Sasha's deceit, "when the twelfth struck he knew that his doom was sealed" (33). Relatedly, the landmarks in his/her life are followed by a seven-day sleep such as Sasha's abandoning and his bodily transformation (37; 85). Thus, Orlando sleeps in *his/her* time, which cannot be logical when it is attempted to be explained by clock time. In this regard, James O' Sullivan claims that clock time in the novel "has absolute social power," because for Orlando as an individual, "it does not hold absolute personal power" (43). The clock as a tool has almost no influence for Orlando, so it fails to fulfil its function in his/her biographical time. On the contrary, clocks function as the assistance

to show that historical time passes. Once Orlando hears the night watchman crying out the time as a new age starts:

> As the ninth, tenth and eleventh strokes struck, a huge blackness sprawled over the whole of London. With the twelfth stroke of midnight, the darkness was complete. A turbulent welter of cloud covered the city. All was dark; all was doubt; all was confusion. The Eighteenth century was over; the Nineteenth century had begun. (150)

Therefore, clocks can present historical time but cannot identify Orlando's time. Then, they become tools for Woolf's mockery of objective time for the fact that they cannot transcend Orlando's personal time. With the same method of the house, the clock is a *narrative thing* in *Orlando* for assuring the inefficacy of objective time in a supposedly biographical work which is expected to narrate genuine figuration of one's lifetime. In other words, generic characteristics of biography are invalidated by the impractical clocks. Therefore, as Orlando's house is the spatially materialized mockery of historical time, the clocks are the temporally materialized mockery of universal time. For this reason, the house and the clocks as the objects of historical time become the things of biographical time for disqualifying their typical functions for Orlando.

Orlando, being a mock biography, can also be regarded as Woolf's criticism of mainstream biography writing in which only the "facts" are recorded. In her essay "The New Biography," she openly states that both facts and personality are required in a biography, which at the same time makes writing it difficult as stated, [i]f we think of truth as something of granite-like solidity and of personality as something of rainbow-like intangibility and reflect that the aim of biography is to weld these two into one seamless whole, we shall admit that the problem is a stiff one" ("Biography" 229). Based on Woolf's essay, Kathryn Miles claims that *Orlando* is the "praxis" of Woolf's theory because "the modern biographer [recognizes] his own subjective positioning" (217). With an "ironic tone" of the biographer "in which he evokes both the historical changes in the facts of Orlando's various environments (granite) at the same time as retaining that elusive quality in Orlando (rainbow) where there is always the possibility of letting the character slip 'out of one's grasp altogether'" (Ryan 27). In other words, *Orlando* presents a fantastic story of an individual—a very suitable narrative for "rainbow,"—blended with historically actual references or "granite"-like facts. In her essay, Woolf blurs the

exactitude of “granite” by suggesting that even scientific knowledge is partly doubtful and mystical and the “rainbow” may be darkened and obscured in “the hidden channels of the soul” (“Biography” 230). In this regard, it can be claimed that neither granite-like facts nor rainbow-like personality are definite. For this reason, Woolf claims that it is hard to write a biography to present “that queer amalgamation of dream and reality, that perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow” (“Biography” 235). As Orlando is the fictional counterpart of Woolf’s ideas on biography, the novel refers to the companionship of the two by stating “Nature, who has played so many queer tricks upon us, making us so unequally of clay and diamonds, of rainbow and granite” (45-6). Derek Ryan points out that “diamonds” refer to “granite” for “being hard, obdurate rocks,” and “clay” refers to “rainbow” because “the symmetry of rainbow and clay works in the sense of clay’s transformative, non-fixed form” (30). At the same time, an inverse pairing might be offered because “Woolf is playing with the overlapping possibilities for these ‘queer’ couples whereby an argument could just as convincingly be made for the rainbow/diamonds symmetry (mysticism, beauty, rarity), and the clay/granite symmetry (as naturally occurring materials)” (Ryan 30). Ryan’s comments on Woolf’s emphasis on the changeability of the relation (“marriage”) between granite and rainbow reflect the essence of *Orlando*’s mockery. After illustrating Orlando’s house and clocks as the chronotopic or narrative things to mock objective time, the analysis of the relation between chronotope and objects will be furthered in two groups: objects of biographical time to present Orlando’s personality (rainbow-effect) and the objects of historical time (granite-effect). Nevertheless, as suggested before, Orlando’s life overreaches the historical time, which means that all objects of historical time are filtered by biographical time.

For the discussion of materiality in biographical time as constituents of Orlando’s personality, the biographer’s inconsistent attitudes towards writing Orlando’s biography are noteworthy. Rachel Bowlby raises the question of the biographer’s stance by asking whether the biographer lives simultaneously with Orlando, or writes about Orlando’s past in the reader’s time (xxxvii). The biographer, indeed, sometimes writes in a very detailed way about Orlando’s private time to convince us that he lives in that period, yet sometimes he presents only some pieces of documents and cannot fill the blanks about

the details: “Again, details are lacking, for the fire had its way with all such records, and has left only tantalising fragments which leave the most important points obscure” (80). Nevertheless, the biographer also makes sure about his good intention to write as much accurately as possible by saying “[w]e have done our best to piece out a meagre summary from the charred fragments that remain; but often it has been necessary to speculate, to surmise, and even to use the imagination […]” (75). After Orlando’s sensational love stories equated with the spirit of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the second chapter begins with Orlando’s apology from the biographer for the difficulty of writing his life:

> The biographer is now faced with a difficulty which it is better perhaps to confess than to gloss over. Up to this point in telling the story of Orlando’s life, documents, both private and historical, have made it possible to fulfil the first duty of a biographer, which is to plod, without looking to right or left, in the indelible footprints of truth; unenticed by flowers; regardless of shade; on and on methodically till we fall plump into the grave and write finis on the tombstone above our heads. (37)

For this reason, both Orlando and the biographer confuse the reader for being unconvincing about the accuracy of this life-story. In this way, Woolf does not ridicule Orlando’s life but the ambition to write a perfect biography. Because the biographer is in the pursuit of “facts” based on objecthood, his/her task to follow historical time in one’s lifetime fails. Therefore, the tombstone mentioned in the quote as the material indicator of the end of one’s life can never function as Orlando’s biographical time continues for ages. As a result, the biographer’s “method” is overthrown by the disfunctionality of the tombstone to materialize Orlando’s biographical time.

The biographer, at the same time, often problematizes the concept of biographical time by commenting on the inefficient strategies for biography writing. His power to manipulate Orlando’s life recording often appears as an intruder to the narrative in “parenthetical interjections that offer embedded self-referential critiques of his/her aims, methods, and limits” (McIntire 123). In this way, the biographer is unusually “both extrinsic and intrinsic to the text” offering “both the strange intimacies of historical and mnemonic interpretation” (McIntire 123). For example, when Orlando associates Sasha with “a melon, a pineapple, an olive tree, an emerald, and a fox,” the biographer interferes in parenthesis to stop the narration in order not to bore the reader (18). This is in fact a

mockery of the attempts that use the objects to represent individuals' characteristics as these similes are irrelevant and absurd to define the beloved.

In another example, the biographer evades from the details of Orlando's stay in Constantinople by stating that "[t]here exist, even to this day, rumours, legends, anecdotes of a floating and unauthenticated kind about Orlando's life in Constantinople (we have quoted but a few of them)—which go to prove that he possessed […]" (79). Once, Orlando is moody about death and the narration is paused with parenthetical interruption to suggest that Orlando's mind does not stop, and thus the biographer must continue and "fly as fast as he can and so keep pace with the unthinking passionate foolish actions and sudden extravagant words in which, it is impossible to deny, Orlando at this time of his life indulged," afterwards, the narration resumes with the repetition of the last sentence before that interruption. The biographer's potential to be also the omniscient narrator as seen in these quotes is questionable because these parenthetical interventions are occasionally to state what the biographer fails to do. The narrator's voice belongs to the biographer when it emerges as "we," and infrequently belongs to an omniscient narrator who knows not only Orlando's thoughts but also the biographer's. For instance, mentioning the troubles of the biographer to catch up with Orlando, it is declared that no matter how difficult it is the biographer does not "invoke the help of novelist or poet" (3), in other words, he keeps his writing's essence as non-fiction. In any case, either the biographer or the narrator interrupts the narrative so often that Orlando's life and inner self are multiplied by these supplements which underestimate or exaggerate the experienced situation. Therefore, not the sense of biographical time but *recording it* is ridiculed due to the imperfect biographer. In this regard, the biographer's attempt to materialize Orlando's biographical time turns out to be an incompetent endeavor. As the biographer tries to narrate Orlando's time as a sequence of simple factual events, he records the objects but disregards the things. In other words, while the biographer aims to define "granite" to offer an appealing biography, its interaction with "rainbow" is missing. However, for the thingificaton process, granite and its referent rainbow are equally fundamental for Orlando's biography as both the object and the subject are required to form up a different relation in this process.

Orlando has multiple subjectivities as a result of remembering the past: “she had a great variety of selves to call upon, far more than we have been able to find room for since a biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or seven selves, whereas a person may well have as many thousand” (209). Orlando’s life full of different identities forces the biographer to be selective because of “the impossibility of exhaustive coverage of their subject” (Spiropoulou 79). In other words, it is hardly possible to write a good biography of Orlando. This is how Woolf prioritizes the character above the writer, biographer, historian, and ultimately time. As the biographer has to include some events and exclude others, “from deed to deed, from glory to glory, from office to office he must go, his scribe following after, till they reach whatever seat it may be that is the height of their desire” (2). This means that the biographer cannot catch Orlando’s life-power. Julia Briggs claims that Woolf’s looking for the techniques to represent subjectivity brought her characteristic use of time as “she was intensely aware of time, both as an impersonal force and as a personal experience, as shared time and individual time, as the regulated and measurable time of clocks, public and private, and of seasons and stars” (125). Thus, in *Orlando* Woolf lays bare the biographer’s failure caused by his assuming the selected moments from a person’s life as satisfactory to present a holistic picture of their life. Therefore, Woolf suggests that the biographer’s “simple duty of is to state the facts as far as they are known, and so let the reader make of them what he may” (37). In other words, “granite” is provided by the biographer, and the “rainbow” is left to the reader’s imagination. However, everlasting alterity of Orlando’s self is a protest against the biographer’s “simple duty” because the rainbow-effect in Orlando’s biographical time cannot be excluded. For this reason, the novel’s criticism of the traditional biography writing is presented as a failure of the biographer in recording the historical/mathematical time in which Orlando’s biographical time liberates itself.

Regarding the prioritization of the subjective mind in Modernist literature, memory can be considered the most important constituent of biographical time. Memory in Bergsonian idea enables the connection between the present and past experiences where the two coexist as memories act as “the floodgates of past recollections” (Kumar 80) that “rushed into the falling second, swelled it a dozen times its natural size, coloured it a thousand tints, and filled it with all the odds and ends in the universe” in *Orlando* (60). Therefore,

this "elasticity" of durational time which can stretch past and present foregrounds Woolf's playfulness with Orlando's memory. Mary Ann Gillies claims that "Woolf's moments of being are instances of pure duration" for collecting "moments during which past and present time not only literally coexist, but during which one is aware of their coexistence," which can be defined as "moments of pure *durée*" (109). These moments of being are "brief, sharp representation of a clear, extraordinary experience" whose gathering creates a flowing unity (Gillies 109). This is, in fact, one of the most visible ironies in *Orlando* because "[h]e/she careens from one adventure to the next, but rather than consigning events to a storehouse memory from which they seldom emerge, memories bubble to the surface when least expected and play a role in the current moment" (Gillies 125). In other words, for Orlando, his/her crucial memories are sharp and extraordinary. Thus, she can remember them for centuries. Orlando comes across memories:

> Memory is the seamstress [of experiences], and a capricious one at that. Memory runs her needle in and out, up and down, hither and thither. We know not what comes next, or what follows after. Thus, the most ordinary movement in the world, such as sitting down at a table and pulling the inkstand towards one, may agitate a thousand odd, disconnected fragments, now bright, now dim, hanging and bobbing and dipping and flaunting, like the underlinen of a family of fourteen on a line in a gale of wind. (46)

If memory enables the coexistence of the past and the present, it can afford "interior infinite" chronotopes of *Orlando*. More importantly for the discussion on materiality, this cohabitation of chronotopes in the narrative is enabled through objects. For example, in the 1920s, Orlando remembers Sasha's abandoning him by the seaside three centuries ago:

> […] a whiff of scent, waxen, tinted as if from pink candles, and the scent curved like a shell round a figure—was it a boy's or was it a girl's?—young, slender, seductive—a girl, by God! furred, pearled, in Russian trousers; but faithless, faithless! […] and all the shop seemed to pitch and toss with yellow water and far off she saw the masts of the Russian ship standing out to sea. (205)

In this remembrance, what triggers the recollection and also the sense of presence is misleading in both cases. At first, Orlando's sense of being in this shop at the present moment is provided by what she sees around and what she touches. However, after the shopkeeper spreads the linen, Orlando "was fingering the linen abstractedly" (205). How come fingering/touching something can be abstract? The paradox here shows Orlando's

losing the *physical and material* sense of the present moment. Then, in recollection, she smells the scent of candles and sees the Russian trousers—which are sensual too—to take her mind to the past, thinking that Sasha was passing by. Her remembering is a false one because the person in Russian trousers turns out to be just an ordinary man in the shop. In this sense, Woolf mocks the absoluteness of the *physical* world because the human mind can misinterpret under the influence of memories. In other words, she blurs the steadfast nature of "granite" such as the place and the objects by the intervention of dynamic "rainbow" affected by past experiences. This can be taken as the objects' temporal potential to turn into things for that they stop working to demonstrate the present moment in which they are at the level of objecthood, like the stuff for sale in this example. What happens, on the other hand, is that the objects' functionality is filtered by Orlando's accumulated subjective time, her biographical time, and the objects become misleading although they do not seize their physical existence. In this sense, it can be claimed that objects are misemployed, in Brown's terms they are "misused" or "transvalued" by Orlando's memory.

In this descriptive part of the novel where Orlando recalls Sasha's deceit, her memory is triggered by two elements: the objects and the place. As Orlando does shopping, the objects for sale are introduced, "'The best Irish linen, Ma'am,' said the shopman, spreading the sheets on the counter,—and they had met an old woman picking up sticks" (204-5). Then, her sensual examination of the linen is interrupted when "one of the swing-doors between the departments opened and let through, perhaps from the fancy-goods department," followed by her seeing someone "in Russian trousers" (205). This example pinpoints that memory functions not autonomously but relatedly to space and the material world. This is the temporally excessive 'thingness' of the Russian trousers at a moment when "palpable" and "knowable circle" is broken (Brown, "Interview") for Orlando. Thus, being in a shop in the twentieth century is shifted by the feeling of watching Sasha's ship floating away by the sea in the seventeenth century.

In another example where the past lingers in the present through memory is reified by an omnibus. Orlando remembers the Great Frost of 1608/09:

> Omnibus seemed to pile itself upon omnibus and then jerk itself apart. So the ice blocks had pitched and tossed that day on the Thames. An old nobleman in furred slippers had sat astride one of them. There he went—she could see him now—calling down maledictions upon the Irish rebels. He had sunk there, where her car stood. (206)

The omnibus indicates the present time which is the twentieth century, yet the nobleman and the Irish rebels are anachronistic and cannot belong to here and now of that moment. In this particular moment of remembering an extreme weather event, the discordance of biographical time with historical time is revealed by Orlando's seeing the omnibus. Thus, the omnibus can be suggested as a *chronotopic thing* in this unique plot-structure depending on the unreliability of time passing. Because historical time is progressive, the past is not supposed to block Orlando's sense of presence. However, through the idiosyncratic nature of some things for Orlando, the past can be alive. "Present is neither a violent disruption nor completely forgotten in the past" (206-7), but memory is stuck to materiality which can be confusing because "[n]othing is any longer one thing," as Orlando states:

> I take up a handbag and I think of an old bumboat woman frozen in the ice. Someone lights a pink candle and I see a girl in Russian trousers. When I step out of doors—as I do now," here she stepped on to the pavement of Oxford Street, "what is it that I taste? Little herbs. I hear goat bells. I see mountains. Turkey? India? Persia?" Her eyes filled with tears. (206)

Therefore, memory for Orlando is "unfortunately an uncertain ally" especially "when the associations invoke powerful emotions, the present may be obliterated completely by the past" (German and Kaehele 38). Thus, the power of memory on the human mind is an outcome of its attachment to materiality and the spatiotemporal reality. By the modern contemporary time at the end of the novel, Orlando's memory has been kept alive due to such *things* in particular *places* as suggested, "[…] descending *in the lift* again—so insidious is the *repetition* of any scene—she was again sunk far beneath the present moment; and thought when the lift bumped on the ground, that she heard a *pot* breaking against a river bank" (206; emphasis added). Through remembering his/her memories in anachronistic periods, "Orlando's own history, which is solidified in his memory, is also conveyed in the material image […]" (Jenkins 11). As illustrated, the objects of actual time become the things of Orlando's biographical time.

Spatial and material context is also the natural source of human's feeling here and now. For example, Orlando realizes the actual time and space "[…] as she stood with her hand on the door of her motor car, the present again struck her on the head. Eleven times she was violently assaulted" (207). In this quote, clock (materialized time) reminds Orlando of actual time, and the motor car of actual place (being in the street). For this reason, objects are noteworthy for Orlando's finding her sense of time and space in the course of her majestic lifespan. Furthermore, Henri Bergson pinpoints the self-sufficient existence of objects as opposed to "the humanist assumption that objects can only exist in the mind of human beings" by stating that "[t]he object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image" (xi-xii). Therefore, it would be a mistake to suppose that psychological time whether formulated in past or present is independent of the material world. As a consequence, not only the past memories but also the present are understandable through materiality for Orlando.

Orlando's private moments as the fundamental units of biographical time for their rainbow-effect are noteworthy also for the discussion of the objects: "Orlando is permeated with images of flight and flowing and with descriptions of and references to objects," in fact, "the objects make the passing time believable for that they suggest "movement and transience" (German and Kaehele 36). Because Orlando's idiosyncratic conception of time blurs the reality in the novel, actuality becomes traceable only via granite-like factuality. For Woolf, factuality is almost equal to objects. In her praise of the solidly realistic narratives of the eighteenth-century novel, "she [particularly] posits as an emblem of Daniel Defoe's authority, which is fiction's authority to overwhelm the reader with the wholeness of an imagined world and to interrupt romantic fantasy with novelistic fact" (Brown, *Other* 68). Based on her approval of the realistic quality of these novels, it can be claimed that objects function to make Orlando's story believable. Woolf made Orlando, not a novelist but a poet, a romantic adventurist chasing after symbols, maybe because of that 'factual' role of the novel. Indeed, the material agency of the objects is imperiled by turning into mist due to Orlando's "disease of reading:"

> It was the fatal nature of this disease to substitute a phantom for reality, so that Orlando, to whom fortune had given every gift—plate, linen, houses, men-servants, carpets, beds in profusion—had only to open a book for the whole vast accumulation

> to turn to mist. The nine acres of stone which were his house vanished; one hundred and fifty indoor servants disappeared; his eighty riding horses became invisible; it would take too long to count the carpets, sofas, trappings, china, plate, cruets, chafing dishes and other movables often of beaten gold, which evaporated like so much sea mist under the miasma. So it was, and Orlando would sit by himself, reading, a naked man. (43)

Nevertheless, his irrepressible eagerness for writing leads him to realize the textual and physical reality of literature as "it falls an easy prey to that other scourge which dwells in the ink pot and festers in the quill" (44). Although love offers the best symbols for poetic creativity, Orlando also needs very simple objects to write poetry. In the two years following Queen Elizabeth I making Orlando "her Treasurer and Steward," he writes "twenty tragedies and a dozen histories and a score of sonnets" (8-9). As none are praised, Orlando is not in the right mood for being original. Later, in her travels with the gypsies, she is fascinated by the view of Turkish mountains and captivated in a need of writing. Nevertheless, she cannot find a pen and a paper because they have no value for the gypsies who even do not have a word for "beautiful" (91). Orlando's romantic enthusiasm for the landscape is useless for the lack of such plain materials. At this point, Orlando makes her mind to go back to England because "[…] it was equally impossible to remain for ever where there was neither ink nor writing paper, neither reverence for the Talbots nor respect for a multiplicity of bedrooms" (96). This poetic and epiphanic irony openly demonstrates that literature intrinsically a textual *matter* and Orlando's poetry can finally take its share in the literary world as *the papers* of her manuscript pop out: "The violence of her disillusionment was such that some hook or button fastening the upper part of her dress burst open, and out upon the table fell 'The Oak Tree,' a poem" (189). Therefore, Orlando's manuscript is Woolf's formulating her idea of "granite" and "rainbow," this time not for biography, but for poetry. No matter how good a poet is at metaphors, "granite" is an unexpandable part of the *act of writing*.

To deepen the textual nature of written language, Amber Rose Jenkins focuses on the moment when Orlando examines the pages of a prayer book in the chapel, which offers an "oscillation between solidity and disintegration" of "Woolf's dialogic theory of textuality as an exchange between writer and reader" (1). As Orlando experiences the

tangibility of the book, she is stuck by the blood-stain, the lock of hair and the crumbs among the pages. She adds "to these keepsakes a flake of tobacco" as "the humane jumble of them all" moves "to such a mood of contemplation as gave her a reverent air suitable in the circumstances, though she had, it is said, no traffic with the usual God" (112). Until now, even though she begins thinking about faith, Orlando has been interacting with the book *itself*. Then, she as an unpleased poet of her verses comes to the point that "[w]e [poets] must shape our words till they are the thinnest integument for our thoughts" (113). By the re-definition of "words" as "integument" for thoughts, Woolf pinpoints "the interaction between the palpability of words and the intangible 'thoughts' they can convey" (Jenkins 1). Furthermore, the targeted message of a prayer, which is abstract, is halted by Orlando's preoccupation with the solidity of the book. In other words, an alternative and unforeseen transfer between the receiver and the message appears as a consequence of the subject's (Orlando) interaction with the object (the book itself)—not the meaning (semiotic representation of the physical world.) In this occurrence, the blood-stain, the hair and the crumbs of pastry block the functionality of the meaning in the prayer. Therefore, these materials "dislodge" the prayer book "from the circuits through which it is what it typically is" via the "sensuous" "aspect" of the book as it becomes "palpable, legible, [and] audible" in this particular moment when Orlando is in the chapel (Brown, *Other* 51). Thus, this is to reflect that "granite" is an unexpandable part of the *act of reading*. Therefore, Orlando's poetic practices involve a ceaseless interaction with the material world.

As Orlando's life surpasses the objective time, like a hero in an epic, Orlando's heroism can be discussed in terms of Bakhtinian adventure-time. Firstly, Bakhtin presents the typical background of ancient Greek romances because the use of adventure-time is almost the same since those heroic tales. These romances open with the introduction of a young boy and a young girl whose familial backgrounds are "mysterious," and their destiny is always prefixed to an ultimate happy marriage (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 87). Although young Orlando's search for love looks like he will be soon wedded and bedded happily, he falls in love and then goes off so quickly that love does not seem to offer any hope. In fact, it is confusing whether he looks for love or poetic inspiration as the Elizabethan literary ambience was a chase of great lines of love, especially through the

sonnet tradition. Furthermore, marriage is a must for female Orlando but her engagement and marrying Shelmerdine are given without details. Therefore, unlike an ancient hero, Orlando is not doomed to marriage even though he is in a quest for love-adventure. Much later, the Victorian sense of marriage is doubtful for Orlando because her husband is always sailing and she still wants poetry more than anything (178). Therefore, because love is not the ultimate goal of Orlando's adventure, s/he is not the type of hero in Bakhtin's analysis of Greek romances. At first, he longs for an Elizabethan sense of heroism as introduced at the age of sixteen, slashing a head of an African in his attic room. This opening scene in the novel portrays, in fact, both the political and historical chronotopes of the age. Elizabethan age was a turning point in the colonial history of Britain, and "Orlando's father, or perhaps his grandfather, had struck it [the head] from the shoulders of a vast Pagan who had started up under the moon in the barbarian fields of Africa" (1). Additionally, this is also a portrayal of young "masculine and violent" Orlando who admires "the colour and the violence, the dirt and the splendour of Shakespeare's age" (Blackstone 131-32). Orlando, the ambitious boy in this attic room in a luxurious house owned by a family who fought for imperialism hints at upcoming heroism as he "vow[s]" to be like his father or grandfather (1). With Orlando's hobby of slashing the heads and cutting the robes with his blade, "all the adventure and strangeness and danger of that romantic age are suggested" (Blackstone 132). Nevertheless, his heroism never turns out to be like his father's or grandfather's, and his blade does not go beyond cutting simple inorganic materials. Therefore, Orlando's ambition to be an English conqueror is a sort of staged play through which the idea of heroism is mocked. Because of his age, he cannot ride to Africa, and he acts as if he fought in his house with some *materials which cannot go beyond their simple use value* and their level of objecthood, as can be illustrated by a cord: "Sometimes he cut the cord so that the skull bumped on the floor and he had to string it up again, fastening it with some chivalry almost out of reach so that his enemy grinned at him through shrunk, black lips triumphantly" (2).

In fact, Orlando's heroism will be a temporal journey led by his poetic ambition. His beauty, adoration of words, hunger for emotions, love of solitude and nature distinguish him from other men (2). Paradoxically, Orlando becomes neither an imperial nor a

romantic hero for that Woolf always intermingles Orlando's simple deeds with his great expectations. McIntire points out that "Orlando's story as expressly lodged in both the fantastic and the phantasmatic," yet "consistently meet the historical real of a remembered and ongoing affair" (122). Therefore, particularly the first chapter suggesting that Orlando's adventure-time is supposed to be shaped by his ambition for conquest and love [the Elizabethan 'spirit' in total] is mocked by the subsequent chapters in which Orlando becomes a female ambassador fleeing from the country he was posted—a kind of heroism which would never be appreciated by the male English nobility who once he admired.

Based on the fact that Orlando is not an ancient romance-hero, it can be claimed that his/her heroism only lies in her endurance against time passing. At this point, it is possible to draw an analogy between ancient narratives' use of time and the modern version through a discussion of Orlando's adventure-time. Adventure-time in *Orlando* does not comply with the adventure-time of ancient narratives discussed by Bakhtin because the historical time in *Orlando* is the other side of the medallion. The "adventure-time as an entity" in ancient narratives

> is composed of a series of short segments that correspond to separate adventures; within each such adventure, time is organized from without, technically. What is important is to be able to escape, to catch up, to outstrip, to be or not to be in a given place at a given moment, to meet or not to meet and so forth. Within the limits of a given adventure, days, nights, hours, even minutes and seconds add up, as they would in any struggle or any active external undertaking. (*Dialogic* 120)

Nevertheless, adventure-time in *Orlando* is organized *within* historical time. For instance, Orlando escapes from Constantinople because a rebel against the Sultan disrupts peace in Turkey, which endangers the foreign visitors. Then, she travels with the gypsies who are totally different from the English aristocracy in their sense of value. This adventure can only be achieved *outside Britain* and its socio-cultural agenda because it requires somewhere gender is less remarkable as everyone wears unisex Turkish trousers. Therefore, this journey is meant to naturalize Orlando's bodily transformation. As seen in the example of Turkish trousers, Jenkins claims that "Woolf's literary and aesthetic interest in materiality is intricately connected to her feminist politics, and that her use of material objects within her fictions point towards alternative stories cast in the shade of

British imperialist discourses" (11). Therefore, even though Orlando's meeting the gypsies can be a "random contingency" for an Ambassador, it is not "sheer chance" with "a logic of random disjunctions in time" as Bakhtin suggests about the ancient tales. In contrast, his/her adventure is embedded with the historical spatiotemporal aspect of the event. The gypsy community is totally opposite of Orlando's countrymen, which is another aspect of her realization that she cannot be one of them. Unlike the English social hierarchy established by feudalism and stabilized by industrialism, the gypsies have no sense of social classes, law and order, and gender. Therefore, the spatiotemporal aspect of Orlando's adventure is material and also political and historical.

Orlando's bodily transformation is the most dramatic adventure of his/her heroism. Thus, Orlando's travelling abroad creates the before and after point of the narrative thanks to his conversion to a woman. Significantly, the chapters of the novel are divided according to the historical time it covers, yet with a formal reference to Orlando's adventure-time outside Britain, "an extra (third) chapter tucked between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for Orlando's transformation in Constantinople" (Briggs 119). This extra chapter reminds Bakhtin's tagging the adventure-time as "the extratemporal hiatus between two moments of biographical time" (*Dialogic* 90). Bakhtin claims that this pause in biographical time "is not measured off in the novel" because it is formed of "simply days, nights, hours, moments clocked in a technical sense within the limits of each separate adventure" (*Dialogic* 90). Considering Orlando's sleeping for a week before waking as a woman, the time passing during his transformation can be a hiatus in Orlando's lifetime. Bakhtin takes the adventure-time as a "hiatus" in the character's life for that it "leaves no trace" in personality (*Dialogic* 90). Indeed, Orlando is said to be the same in self, yet his new sex is a solid biological change. Furthermore, this journey is significant for Orlando's poetic maturation as discussed above. In this respect, time illustrated in *Orlando* does not fit the adventure-time in Greek romances in which "all of the action […], all the events and adventures […] constitute time-sequences that are neither historical, quotidian, biographical, nor even biological and maturational" (*Dialogic* 91). On the contrary, the actions in *Orlando* are simultaneously historical, biographical, biological, and poetically maturational. For this reason, the chronotope of

Orlando as a whole is a mosaic through which all specific chronotopes are challenged and ridiculed by one another.

Orlando's adventure-time is profoundly influenced by his bodily transformation and a poetic realization, which are presented through her differentiated relation with materiality. In terms of adventure-time, her travel with the gypsies is chronotopically special for that she goes through the adventures of "road" which is crucial in one's biographical time because "it fuses the course of an individual's life (at its major turning points) with his actual spatial course or road—that is, with his wanderings" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 120). The road is "the metaphor 'the path of life'" and it is realized through "setting out on the road from one's birthplace, returning home" and presented as "usually plateaus of age in the life of the individual (he sets out as a youth, returns a man)" (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 120). The road motif in *Orlando,* on the contrary, is to transform the protagonist's sex and to provide the recognition of the link between her poetic self and the English literary history. With this fascinating travel, Orlando lives the moment full but understands that she cannot belong to such a place, and decides to go back to her native country. At the end of chronotope of the road, Orlando's awareness of being a part of English literature is provided through her desired objects to write, which means nothing for the gypsies who have no sense of poetry. "The English disease" of metaphors and symbols—which also Orlando suffers from—shadows even the very basic "use value" of objects given in a narrative; "[a]s exchange values, they [objects] are indentured to a metaphorical relation in which they must give up most of their own qualities in the service of a symbolic relation" (Freedgood, *Ideas* 10). On the whole, this is also the loss of the "granite" in any kind of fiction. For this reason, "[i]n Woolf's parodic version, Orlando's 'English disease,' to her compulsive and excessive symbolisation, inscribes her—not the gypsies—in a discourse of extravagance and flamboyance; a symbolism in loose robes in which everything 'is something else'" (Koppen, *Fashion* 49). As Orlando "likened the hills to ramparts, and the plains to the flanks of kine […] [and] compared the flowers to enamel and the turf to Turkey rugs worn thin" (92),

> the English disease—the cultural compulsion to appropriate, to inscribe everything with meanings and symbolic value in one's own private drama—is opposed to the gypsies' pragmatic and practical recognition of the nature of things, while Orlando

> is exposed as camp performer in fancy dress, regarded with understandable suspicion by the gypsies (Koppen, *Fashion* 49).

Thus, the difference between Orlando and the gypsies is revealed to be a social gap at the end where they suspect one another. When Orlando puts herself in the gypsies' shoes, she can see the difference: "'Four hundred and seventy-six bedrooms mean nothing to them,' sighed Orlando" because "it was clear that the gipsy thought that there was no more vulgar ambition than to possess bedrooms by the hundred […] " (95). Whereas the gypsies wish to have whatever they need to survive, Orlando chases after romanticism: "'She prefers a sunset to a flock of goats,' said the Gipsies" (96). Therefore, Orlando's poetic maturation is granted by her realization of the difference in how she and the gypsies perceive the material world.

Following Orlando's adventure-time in foreign lands, her returning home as a woman coincides with a new period, the eighteenth century, because "nothing is known about women before the eighteenth century" (Woolf, *Room* 59). From now on, Orlando has to face the difficulties of womanhood in her aristocratic literary circle. As Maria DiBattista claims,

> Orlando is not an adventuress [which is "a counterpart to the male adventurer"] but the harbinger of a social and human type new to modernity—the female adventurer. She is the modern woman whose sense of adventure extends beyond traditional categories of gender, but also beyond the conventional understanding of what an adventure might be. (159)

With her new sex in this new age, Orlando's poetic ambition continues with her admiration of canonical men of letters. Meeting Alexander Pope, Joseph Addison, and Lord Chesterfield, she is disappointed because

> [s]he had thought of literature all these years (her seclusion, her rank, her sex must be her excuse) as something wild as the wind, hot as fire, swift as lightning; something errant, incalculable, abrupt, and behold, literature was an elderly gentleman in a grey suit talking about duchesses. (189)

Insulted by Pope's misogynistic views, the present moment for Orlando is arrested while the objects in the room become more significant than the words of a man from the "society of wits" (144): "so that even with the cream jug suspended and the sugar tongs distended the ladies may fidget a little, look out of the window a little, yawn a little, and so let the sugar fall with a great plop—as Orlando did now—into Mr. Pope's tea" (141). As

biography writing is one concern of the novel, literary traditions is another. Therefore, by mocking the respected figures of the Age of Enlightenment, it is obvious that Woolf supplements her protest of masculine sense of time with her rejection of the masculine sense of literature. As Orlando believes literature is dignified, she is shocked by the dullness of these great men. Instead, she enjoys her conversation with the prostitutes in one of her adventures disguised as a gallant (143-44).

Regarding Orlando's adventure among the prostitutes, Woolf's special use of costumes in such homeland adventures should be discussed in terms of object/thing dialectic. In her essay entitled "Middlebrow," Woolf disapproves of the dress code by stating "I dislike the correct thing in clothes" (199). Clothes are basically for covering one's body for the sake of protection. Then, decorative use (or fashion) might be assessed as a sort of over-valuation. However, *Orlando* points out another function: they indicate sex. Ironically, clothes fail to indicate sex in many cases, though. For instance, "there could be no doubt of his [Orlando's] sex, though the fashion of the time did something to disguise it" (1). Similarly, Orlando thinks at first that Sasha is a boy in a coat before discovering her bodily features (8). Following his transformation to a woman, Orlando does not think about her sex until she takes off the androgynous Turkish trousers (99). Thus, "Woolf not only embraces the sartorial within her historical fiction but also uses such detail to create cross-gendered identities […]" (English 115). By wearing ungendered Turkish trousers, she becomes genderless. By wearing a gallant's costume, she becomes a man outside late at night. By wearing long conical dresses, she becomes a lady hosting gentlemen. Thus, if sex were definitive for one's self, Orlando's would be a multiplicity of sexes and selves.

When dressing becomes confusing and misleading, typicality is ejected as Orlando realizes, "[p]erhaps the Turkish trousers which she had hitherto worn had done something to distract her thoughts […]" (99). Even though dressing is often contradicted with biological sex in the novel, their attributions to the concerns of the narrative cannot be diminished to sexual references. Referring to Woolf's distaste for correctness in clothing, its 'incorrect' way is then to break with the typicality. Thus, the costumes are active participants of Orlando's blurring many concepts such as time, biological sex, gender,

social class and self. As a result, the biographer confesses that he cannot follow Orlando's transformations of outer identity: "What makes the task of identification still more difficult is that she found it convenient at this time to change frequently from one set of clothes to another" (146). For this reason, cross-dressing or trans-dressing, which can be named as 'incorrect' by referring to Woolf's essay "Middlebrow," can be in this sense considered "an irregular […] reobjectification of the object" through which the typicality is broken (Brown, *Other* 51). Thus, dressing in Orlando is generally malfunctioning, misleading or inefficient, and occasionally excessive, which stimulates the latent thingification.

The function of clothing as an indicator of one's sex is mocked particularly at a crucial moment when Orlando wakes up as a female. Even an unsexed piece of cloth, a towel, cannot veil Orlando's body: "Chastity, Purity, and Modesty, inspired, no doubt, by Curiosity, peeped in at the door and threw a garment like a towel at the naked form which, unfortunately, fell short by several inches" (88). Therefore, the failure of the towel's use value to cover a naked body "parodies the philosophical search for bare, naked, essential truths" by "teas[ing] out the impossibility of locating immediate referent, a naked source of truth, a fact separable from fiction" (Burns 350). Thus, Christy L. Burns pinpoints the failure of covering Orlando's body as a hint of the biography and history writers' fixation on causal and factual relation between events. As Orlando's transformation cannot be explained by any cause, Woolf mocks the ambition of non-fiction writers to be accurate, logical and referential for the fact that no biographer can separate Orlando's transformation from fiction. Therefore, non-fiction writers' strictness about "bare, naked, essential truths" is invalidated by Orlando's turning into a woman, which is materialized through the towel's failure to hide her new sex. So, the crucial adventure in Orlando's biographical time which shapes her personal, public and poetic identity is momentarily exposed through the towel as a thing abandoning its basic toolness.

In terms of excessiveness of the things, Orlando's ornaments, particularly her pearls, are exceptionally remarkable as she wears them at pivotal moments. For instance, when she

wants to write just after she feels "the absence of a lover," "she soon discovers a much more effective strategy" (English 119):

> Then laying her pen aside she went into her bedroom, stood in front of her mirror, and arranged her pearls about her neck. Then since pearls do not show to advantage against a morning gown of sprigged cotton, she changed to a dove grey taffeta; then to one of peach bloom; thence to a wine-coloured brocade. Perhaps a dash of powder was needed, and if her hair were disposed—so—about her brow, it might become her. Then she slipped her feet into pointed slippers, and drew an emerald ring upon her finger. [. . .] It was a thousand pities that there was no one there to put it in plain English, and say outright, 'Damn it, Madam, you are loveliness incarnate,' which was the truth. (121)

Similarly, after discovering her new sex, she wears Turkish clothes and hangs pistols in her belt and "finally wound about her person several strings of emeralds and pearls of the finest orient which had formed part of her Ambassadorial wardrobe" (89-90). In another case, she uses the pearls to demonstrate her femininity (121). Eventually, she wears the pearls as a signal for Shelmerdine to find her as they "glowed like the eggs of some vast moon-spider" and "burnt like a phosphorescent flare in the darkness" (223). In these repetitive yet altered appearances in the narrative, the pearls are "once the currency of male adventure and then the reassuring symbol of female passivity, but they now transform into a thoroughly modern and almost supernatural accessory that welcomes back an equally androgynous mate" (English 129). So, Orlando wears the pearls for her peak emotional moments either as an adventurist or a lover, which are configured in her biographical time. As illustrated, the pearls have some illogical and strange functions, which have no connection with "use value" or "sign value" as it bears an "unreasonable" "misappropriation" for *only* Orlando. This can be taken as "misuse value" of an object to become a thing for the subject as explained, "when the object is experienced in whatever time it takes (in whatever time it is) for an object to become another thing" (Brown, *Other* 51).

Orlando's enjoying costumes to act as if she was someone else in a very convincing way offers the alternative nature of self. In the disguise of a layperson he wears a "grey cloak to hide the star at his neck and the garter at his knee" to visit London pubs (12), and in Constantinople, he is "so disguised that […] he would mingle with the crowd on the

Galata Bridge; or stroll through the bazaars; or throw aside his shoes and join the worshippers in the Mosques" (78). Obviously, costumes in their 'correct way' are uneasy and tedious for Orlando whereas disguise thrills his/her adventurist enthusiasm. Cross-dressing is an apparent way of Woolf's suggesting gender fluidity. However, further than a playful baffling of gender, Orlando becomes what she wears, or she wears whatever gender she wants to adapt herself to. Marjorie Garber claims that this is the essence of the radical and distinctive nature of *Orlando:* "Whatever Orlando is, her clothing reflects it: the crossing between male and female may be a mixture (a synthesis), but it is not a confusion, a transgression. The inside always corresponds to the outside" (135). In this sense, costumes in *Orlando* are exceptionally important since they materialize Orlando's fluid self, which cannot be simply defined with reference to gender problem: "Woolf suggests that clothes can act as a way of restructuring and refortifying the self, whether this is in confirmation of or rebellion against expectations" (English 120), as suggested in *Orlando* "[t]hey change our view of the world and the world's view of us" (123). Most strikingly, Orlando, as well as other people, is unaware of her changed sex until she wears women's clothes. So, not only clothes but also genitals are ineffective to justify one's gender. As a whole, this is Woolf's mockery of essentialism for being "without an essence" (Burns 350). As R.S. Koppen suggests, "clothing provides a material interaction between the subject and the palpable environment," and thus "it offers the subject a means of expressing the self in the material world" (*Fashion* 149). Therefore, concerning her similes of "granite" and "rainbow," clothing becomes a granite-like solid indicator of one's rainbow self, which are indispensable and unaltered in social norms, yet fluid and transformative in *Orlando*. In simpler words, clothes uniquely function as Orlando's materialized and fabricated selves.

Orlando is a combination of Woolf's "flamboyant world of fantasy and fun with the sober task of (re)writing history from a critical point of view" (Spiropoulou 75). Therefore, historiography accompanies the biography with the same purposes of mocking through ironies as "contestation […] of bio-historiographical conventions suggest a reoccupation of history from a woman's point of view and […] from single heroes to collective voices, from man to woman (artist), from the eponymous to the obscure" (Spiropoulou 95). Therefore, in addition to Orlando's playfulness with the issue of identity through dressing,

"ages of English history is indicated by her garments, now breeches, now crinolines, and reaches its *finale* in modern times at a contemporary department store which fills Orlando with expectant awe and wonder" (Spiropoulou 86). Consequently, objects in the novel offer the historical context as well as Orlando's self-fulfilling adventures.

Although the novel develops chronologically in accordance with the larger periods of English history, passing from one period to another is not based on "causal sequence," but rather given as "discontinuous" due to Orlando's sensational moments based on "contingency" (Spiropoulou 89). As the historical chronotope of the novel is presided by biographical time, historiography slips away from the typical and known one to a stunning version as a side-effect of Orlando's fantastic life. As a consequence, it can be claimed that the history line narrated in the novel is open to thinghood because it defines the periods by describing "fashions in diet, clothes, furniture, gardens, architecture, alongside the literary culture and gender" with "a number of lists of things possessed, desired or exhibited, which render the spirit of the age" (Spiropoulou 86). As illustrated by Orlando's remembering Sasha through a scent and trousers in the aforementioned discussion on memory, the stimuli are "of a random nature" (Spiropoulou 90). In this way, shopping in the twentieth century turns into a recollection of the Elizabethan merchant ships through smell: "[…] there was another slice of the world displayed with all the smells of that world clinging to it" (203). What she buys turn out to be some other *things*:

> She took a list from her bag and began reading in a curious stiff voice at first as if she were holding the words—boy's boots, bath salts, sardines—under a tap of many-coloured water. She watched them change as the light fell on them. Bath and boots became blunt, obtuse; sardines serrated itself like a saw. (203)

So, the Elizabethan merchant ships come to the forefront as an echo of Orlando's present act of purchasing in the twentieth century. This shows that historical time of the narrative is canalized by Orlando's biographical time, that is, historiography is bound to Orlando's personal experiences. In this sense, Orlando's subjective relationship with the objective world creates the meaningful bridges between different chronotopes, for instance the historical chronotope of Elizabethan period and of the twentieth century, as seen in the example.

Because the historian is not more than the biographer, the readers can only know about history as much as Orlando's deeds provide. The Elizabethan and the Jacobean periods form up the majority of the book, and the projection of the melancholia of the age on Orlando dominates her poetic inspiration. First and foremost, Orlando's adventurist personality, as well as the poetic one, is a combination of Elizabethan 'spirit,' a combination of love for beauty and solitary: "Orlando naturally loved solitary places, vast views, and to feel himself for ever and ever and ever alone" (4). Naturally, Orlando as a hero and a poet is an Elizabethan figure as he "followed the leading of the climate, of the poets, of the age itself." The period is described as follows:

> […] Violence was all. The flower bloomed and faded. The sun rose and sank. The lover loved and went. And what the poets said in rhyme, the young translated into practice. Girls were roses, and their seasons were short as the flowers. Plucked they must be before nightfall; for the day was brief and the day was all. (11)

Adapting this passage to Orlando's life, the Elizabethan age shapes his love for nature and beauty—"what the poets said in rhyme," and the Jacobean age offers his unforgettable love affair with the Russian princess Sasha—"the young translated into practice" (11). Retrospectively, Orlando's artistry is a reflection of the canonical literary production of each period. In the Elizabethan age, he writes many pieces of poetry and drama with long titles. More significantly, although he looks for the best words to describe Sasha, "[t]he language of metaphor and simile [of the period] is a language of approximation, a rhetoric which clothes or veils reality" (Marcus 123). Therefore, Orlando cannot reflect reality in his poetry because he is obsessed with metaphors and similes, which are the symbolic and abstract representations of the material world. Despite claiming there is something "concealed" in what Sasha says, his suspicion cannot go beyond metaphors; "[…] the green flame seems hidden in the emerald, or the sun prisoned in a hill" (24). Thus, the poetic tradition fails Orlando to express what is hidden behind the beloved because the period's literature was in pursuit of symbols rather than reality itself. Then, ironically, not only love but also poetry disenchants Orlando partly because his/her life is constantly in the process of a subjective experience of the physical world.

In order to discover the connection between materiality and literature in Orlando's poetic maturation, the literary traditions illustrated in *Orlando* will be briefly examined in terms of the changed sense of the nonhuman world. Even though it is possible to detect different materialities in all periods by embracing various object-oriented philosophies, this chapter's discussion is restricted to Orlando's impressions about the periods narrated in the novel. As discussed above, poetic traditions in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries barely offer the idiosyncratic nature of objects because of the ambition for metaphors. When objects are used as metaphors, they lose their "specific qualities" to "retain only those that illuminate something about the predicate to which they must yield" (Freedgood 10). Therefore, metaphorical use of objects is diminished to the symbolic value attributed by the poet, estranged by their own agentic qualities based on their material existence in the physical world. However, Orlando claims that "[i]n the eighteenth century, we knew how everything was done" (203). Barbara M. Benedict claims that the eighteenth century is a milestone for British society because objects "marched into the spaces of Britain" from "urban streets and houses" to literature. Thus, things in this period are "relocat[ed] from the periphery to the center of culture" (251). Besides, Orlando claims that unlike the cloudy atmosphere of the Victorian age, in the eighteenth century, skies were "clear and uniform" (154), and the age was "definite and distinct" (201). Clarity of the age for Orlando might be explained by referring to Benedict's argument that the scientific developments and instruments like telescopes and microscopes "transformed the understanding of objects" (251).

As a result of scientific research on nonhuman entities in the eighteenth century, objects' materiality came to the foreground. Thus, symbolic attributions to the material world which had been the literary tradition for centuries since the medieval allegorical writing lessened in this period. In this way, the ordinariness of the objects became factual knowledge. Therefore, the objects of the eighteenth century were taken as factual truth, as they "*entirely* reifies the world" (Benedict 254). Orlando, too, finds out that Addison, Pope, and Swift "collect little bits of coloured glass," and the disease of metaphors has ended now except for (anachronistically) Lord Tennyson who is "the last person to suffer from it" (136). So, objects became a field of interest in the eighteenth century in everyday domestic and public life. As Woolf's approval of Defoe's realistic objects to form up a

novelistic world is discussed before, objects are now more visible in literature as well. Focused on the essential role of objects in the eighteenth-century literature, Mark Blackwell[6] discusses "it-narratives" of the period which he defines as "an odd subgenre of the novel, a type of prose fiction in which inanimate objects (coins, waistcoats, pins, corkscrews, coaches) or animals (dogs, fleas, cats, cats, ponies) serve as the central characters" (10). In these novels, mostly for moralistic purposes, speaking or travelling objects or animals (both are defined as "it" in the English language) narrate the story. At this point, travelling nonhuman entities are remarkable for the fact that the eighteenth century was also commercialized through new methods of not only production but also transferring the products. Therefore, objects were already a fundamental part of human life in the eighteenth century when the novel as a genre became a distinguished prose writing in which objects were essential to present a realistic world in fiction. Thus, in contrast to the Victorian age, Orlando describes the eighteenth century clear.

As one of the most notable examples of the objects in a specific historical period, the nineteenth century is introduced through Orlando's watching the thick clouds followed by her realization of the excessively used objects:

> But what was her surprise when, as it struck the earth, the sunbeam seemed to call forth, or to light up, a pyramid, hecatomb, or trophy (for it had something of a banquet-table air)—a conglomeration at any rate of the most heterogeneous and ill-assorted objects, piled higgledy-piggledy in a vast mound where the statue of Queen Victoria now stands! […] The incongruity of the objects, the association of the fully clothed and the partly draped, the garishness of the different colours and their plaid-like juxtapositions afflicted Orlando with the most profound dismay. (154-55)

Her inference is fed by the 'misappropriation' of the objects she sees. She resembles the Queen's monument to a 'pyramid, hecatomb or trophy' as if it was a "funeral-pyre" (Koppen *Fashion* 77). Queen's statue is

> [d]raped about a vast cross of fretted and floriated gold were widow's weeds and bridal veils; hooked on to other excrescences were crystal palaces, bassinettes, military helmets, memorial wreaths, trousers, whiskers, wedding cakes, cannon, Christmas trees, telescopes, extinct monsters, globes, maps, elephants and

[6] Edited by Mark Blackwell, *The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England* (2007) is one of the most prolific sources for investigating objects in English literature. Focused on the mid-eighteenth century to the turn of the nineteenth, not only objects but also animals and slaves (all defined as "it" at that time) in the narratives are analysed in the contextual study of things in various theoretical, historical and cultural discussions.

> mathematical-instruments—the whole supported like a gigantic coat of arms on the right side by a female figure clothed in flowing white; on the left, by a portly gentleman wearing a frock-coat and sponge-bag trousers. (155)

This chaotically inharmonious mass of things reflects the taste of the period which embraced plentifulness of any kind of material entities. Although Orlando finds it outrageous, "[t]his ghastly heap of tasteless stuff in Orlando's road is blocking the flow of time as much as of traffic, and it is entirely unavoidable, resolutely there" (Sönmez "Victorian"). At this point, it is important to note that underestimating things to Victorian commodity culture does not produce any fruitful interpretation to discuss *things*. After all, Orlando has always enjoyed his/her extravagant, flamboyant and snobbish aristocratic lifestyle with his/her costumes and ornaments and by redecorating his/her estate with a list composed of hundreds of things to purchase. Therefore, commodity culture would not bother Orlando. Furthermore, Elaine Freedgood's discovery of ideas in Victorian things is outstanding because Victorian "abstraction, alienation, and spectacularization" are always shadowed by the idea of "commodity culture" (8). Rather than a generalizing idea of commodity culture, she defines Victorian "thing culture" as follows:

> [A] more extravagant form of object relations than ours, one in which systems of value were not quarantined from one another and ideas of interest and meaning were perhaps far less restricted than they are for us. Thing culture survives now in those marginal or debased cultural forms and practices in which apparently mundane or meaningless objects can suddenly take on or be assigned value and meaning: the flea market, the detective story, the lottery, the romantic comedy—in short, in any cultural site in which a found object can be convincingly stripped of randomness. (8)

Orlando's surprise and distress due to these discordant objects around the Queen's statue is a singular example of the unorganized presentation of Victorian things, which can be zoomed in the greatest of all "crystal palaces" referred in the novel, the Great Exhibition. The Great Exhibition shows that "Victorians liked to look at things, any and seemingly *all* things, things that were not yet commodities in a semiotic, spectacular sense" in an idiosyncratic way in which their incongruity becomes the spectacle itself: "many displays seem to have been striking only in what to us seems like their lack of apparent interest as *displays*" (Freedgood 143). Therefore, for the Victorians, the spectacle value of objects was more appreciated than their use value or representational semiotic value. Furthermore, things are found more interesting when they are extremely inharmonious.

Orlando recognizes the Victorian age first by its new climate which is dark and cloudy and second by the change of lifestyle: “Rugs appeared; beards were grown; trousers were fastened tight under the instep,” but more astonishingly “the home—which had become extremely important—was completely altered” (152). Orlando mentions that Victorian houses are filled all around from the walls to the floors. This is, in fact, a portrayal of the abundant Victorian belongings. Regarding the individual who had many things, Freedgood claims that “a mass-produced object becomes entirely individual; its exchange value is reversed and replaced by the “use value” of the clue,” so "a thing can have meaning and that *that* meaning can be made fully manifest […]”. Thus, in her quest of the “fugitive meaning”[7] of Victorian things, Freedgood claims that “commodification is undone in such interpretations” (151). Therefore, the relation between human and objects are more substantial and recognizable in the Victorian period. Therefore, Orlando is surprised by seeing rugs, glass cases, artificial flowers, mats, china ornaments, petticoats worn in August, and the uncomfortable crinoline worn by all women at that period (153). Therefore, the Victorian things were all reobjectified by their *discordia concors*.

Additionally, the commodification of Victorian literature is revolting for Orlando. Encountering Sir Nicholas Greene, now “the most influential critic of the Victorian age,” she is said that the writers of the period “turn out any trash that serves to pay their tailor’s bill” (188). Orlando does not trust Sir Nicholas for the fact that he praised the ancients and disapproved the Elizabethan literature when he was an Elizabethan poet, and now he praises the Elizabethans and disapproves of the Victorians. So, Orlando realizes that neither literary production nor criticism is as dignified as she has always believed. For this reason, the mass production of literary works is ridiculed by using the word “works” in quotation marks to define the volumes which can fit in one’s pocket (191). While Orlando reads Sir Nicholas’s articles in the newspapers she questions the failure of literature bridging to life to “be made into the other” (192). Thus, she could feel the

[7] In *The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel* (2006), Elaine Freedgood claims that “commodity fetishism” in theory is blocked by “fugitive meanings” of objects in Victorian novels. Therefore, instead of a symbolic or allegorical interpretation of objects, she focuses on “literal” aspect of the literary things. Taking objects’ essence of materiality as the ground, Freedgood looks into the social histories of objects in Victorian novels.

"ecstasy" not in the important books she just bought or articles on literature but in a toy boat on the Serpentine. In other words, *published* "works" she once admired cannot satisfy Orlando's ecstasy for life: "Nick Greene's article had plunged her in the depths of despair; the toy boat had raised her to the heights of joy" (194-95). At this point, as suggested by Douglas Mao, "the discrete object" "could exert a powerful hold on the imagination" of Orlando (17). For this reason, "as she turned from the carpenter's shop," she says "I can begin to live again," and here another "useless, sudden, violent" *thing* is referred: "I am by the Serpentine, she thought, the little boat is climbing through the white arch of a thousand deaths. I am about to understand" (194; 218). Orlando's melancholia as a part of her existential crisis becomes palpable again by an ordinary object, a toy boat.

In the twentieth century when the multiplicity of self is recognized, the objects become a matter of dispute for ontological discussions by philosophers. Similarly, nature in *Orlando* is said to bring "a perfect ragbag of odds and ends *within us*" consisting of "a piece of a policeman's trousers lying cheek by jowl with Queen Alexandra's wedding veil," which are "lightly stitched together by a single thread" (46; emphasis added). These discordant *fabrics of self* are revealed by Orlando's discovering various identities mostly through 'correct' and 'incorrect' clothing, which "execute[s] a parodic deconstruction of essentialist claims tentatively offered" (Burns 342-43). What is the "single thread" to tie all these illogically co-existing selves? It is memory as suggested, "[m]emory is the seamstress, and a capricious one at that" which "runs her needle in and out, up and down, hither and thither" (46). Therefore, the twentieth-century episode in the novel is an accumulation of the material artefacts of selves and history because Woolf "uses material artefacts as a means of engaging with forgotten aspects of the past" and [i]n order to reclaim a lost female literary tradition, […] [she] demonstrates how residual traces of the past reside in everyday materialism" (Jenkins 10).

The relation between material entities and self can be observed in journey motif set in the twentieth century as Orlando's accumulated and intertwined selves at the end of the previous four centuries are revealed while she drives the motor car through modern London. This contemporary journey of a woman should also be discussed in terms of the

relation between self and spatiotemporal movement because her journey is interrupted by parenthesis to explain either where she is going to or who she is. This is almost a metonymical scene of the irony beneath this mock biography in which self is occasionally accidental or teleological as Orlando asks, “What then? Who then?" she said. "Thirty-six; in a motor car; a woman. Yes, but a million other things as well” as she is “changing her selves as quickly as she drove—there was a new one at every corner—as happens when, for some unaccountable reason, the conscious self, which is the uppermost, and has the power to desire, wishes to be nothing but one self” (210). If Orlando’s travelling with the gypsies is the starting point of her self-revelation, her driving the motor car finalizes it by coming to a point where the multiplicity of the self is acknowledged. Furthermore, Derek Ryan pinpoints Orlando’s driving as Woolf’s combining form and content as “the brackets [which breaks the continuity of the passage] become a doorway through which ‘another self came in’, disrupting the temporal rhythm of the reader and the spatial flow of the text” (Ryan 125). While driving over bumps and turning corners, Orlando’s self-revealing is correlated with spatiotemporal dimension as illustrated, “(She was passing a clump. Here another self came in.)” (211). Thus, driving the motor-car is the key moment of the narrative:

> If Orlando’s cruising out of London in her motor-car puts into motion a range of desires seen in the connections different selves make as every corner is turned, then we need not view these selves as simply plural versions of Orlando’s identity; indeed, recalling the distinction between quantitative pluralities and qualitative multiplicities, we might say that *Orlando* transports subjectivity from plurality to multiplicity. (Ryan 127)

Similar to Orlando’s house ridiculing the calculation of time, innumerability of one’s self is ridiculed while these selves accompany Orlando’s driving in a way that a “move from quantity to quality, from plurality to multiplicity, is perfectly summed up” (Ryan 127). The improbability of counting and labelling the selves is openly stated, “these selves of which we are built up, one on top of another, as plates are piled on a waiter’s hand, have attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little constitutions and rights of their own, call them what you will (and for many of these things there is no name.)” (209). Derek Ryan further comments as follows: “The quantitatively measured figuration of plates […] proves insufficient and so the sentence continues into a further clause, as if in the realisation that these selves are already forming qualitative connections that cannot be counted, balanced,

or gathered together" (127). In relation with the abundance of Orlando's self, the chronotopic value of this journey is that the motor car is a twentieth-century invention, an outcrop of the long-termed industrial modernization of Britain—just like Orlando's multiple selves is an outcrop of her long-termed lifetime. In other words, the motor car presents the accumulation of both the historical time and biographical time of the whole novel. For this reason, it can be taken as a *metonymical chronotopic thing* to reflect the novel's generic qualities and its epistemological universe created by chronotope as Bakhtin claims.

As the *finale* of his/her desire for poetic fame, the modern poet Orlando, who is disappointed and frustrated, buries "a copy of [*The Oak Tree*'s] first edition, signed by author and artist" as "a tribute," "a return to the land of what the land has given […]" (220). Thus, Douglas Mao points out that "only perhaps one as open as the unpublished and continuously revised "Oak Tree" (as opposed to the published *Oak Tree*) might constitute a genuine conversation with the object world, a meeting of subject and object in which the distance between the two is respected and preserved" (69). Therefore, *Orlando* ends with the publication of *The Oak Tree*. What happens from the Elizabethan, young, ambitious, male Orlando to the Modernist, middle-aged, frustrated, female Orlando is an alternative and vibrant whole of experiencing the self, the life and art, which is shaped with the material world within a multiplied spatiotemporality afforded by the literary chronotope. Therefore, the biography of the poet Orlando is an exceptional work presenting alternative writing of the problematic fixations on self, womanhood, artistry and history. In other words, it is the modernist rhetoric that questions the "granite" and "rainbow" in a variety of concepts related to the experience of human existence and his meaning-making among the nonhuman entities. So, Orlando's biographical time consists of his/her deeds, emotions, passions, lovers, frustrations, all of which form up her poetic spirit. It spreads out while the subject's interrelation with the material world establishes a solid base in this fantastic life-story. Thus, when the poem is completed, Orlando reaches a full awareness of her multiple selves as well as the futility of poetry to satisfy her. For this reason, as Mao claims, Orlando's interaction with the material world is also completed with the publication of *the Oak Tree*.

In conclusion, *Orlando* is an enriched work for involving a multi-layered discussion on the issues of the human self, human mind, biography writing, history writing, literary traditions and materiality. Therefore, in this chapter, with a focus on Modernist discussion of time and its effects on the human mind, the chronotope of Orlando's biographical time is analyzed to prove that Woolf offers the granite-like facts and rainbow-like personality as they cohabit in one's written biography. Considering Orlando's incredible lifespan and bodily transformation, his/her adventure-time is investigated as a junction of the biographical time situated in the historical time. As the granite-like materiality and the rainbow-like spirituality are discussed in Orlando's biography, the potential thinghood is also investigated in the rewritten history of English literature. Consequently, in this chapter, Orlando's subjective relationship with the objects, notably her house, manuscript and clothes, is correlated with her biographical time to argue that the latent temporality of thingification is activated by biographical time for that it surpasses the historical chronotope.

CONCLUSION

This thesis offers an examination of materiality in various chronotopes embedded in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*. Materiality in Woolf's works can be analyzed in many different aspects, yet this study focuses on the latency of objects to turn into things as Bill Brown suggests in thing theory. In order to present the agency of material entities to endow significant impacts on the narrative, thing theory is used to differ things from objects in the novels. Based on a pause or a blockage in the functional relation between object and subject, Brown defines the objects that turn into things as "occurrences." For this reason, temporality of objects is taken as the principal point to discover the distinctive moments of thingification. Therefore, based on the idea that thingification is related to time as it offers a change, Mikhail Bakhtin's idea of literary chronotope, which is the reformulation of time and space in narrative, is combined with thing theory to find out when and where things occur in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*. Concerning time as the dominant element of the chronotope, moments of thingification are particularly inquired to distinguish these occurrences. Therefore, *Mrs Dalloway* with a one-day scope and *Orlando* covering a few centuries are selected to show that temporality of thingification is not bound to duration but dependent on the mutated relation between object and subject in specific spatiotemporal contexts. On the whole, even though materiality in Woolf's works is discussed by many critics, this study offers a different perspective by incorporating Bakhtin's literary chronotope with thing theory and argues that thingification in narratives is made possible by literary chronotope.

First and foremost, the initial point of this study is Woolf's claim that liberates the content of literary products: everything can be the proper stuff for literature. Therefore, materiality in her fiction is intriguing for the fact that her works are mostly discussed in terms of spirituality and psychological realism often with references to literary impressionism that relies on subjective associations of characters with reality. However, this thesis does not aim to discuss impressions, associations or subjectivity as its core topics. Taking the material world itself under the spotlight, not its impressionistic representations, personality and psychology are only discussed as long as they are interwoven with the material world in Woolf's novels. To demonstrate the closely knit

relation between materiality and subjectivity in Woolf's works, her essays, particularly "Modern Fiction," "Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown," "Robinson Crusoe," and "The New Biography" are examined to argue that she emphasizes the nonhuman world as an indispensable part of human life and literature. In this way, this research discusses the significance of materiality in Woolf's fiction while inquiring her defense of the Georgian writers' techniques to lay bare human life, mind and personality as opposed to the Edwardians' use of social and material details as bare facts which do not relate to human spirituality. In other words, it is clarified that she does not disapprove of the Edwardians for using materiality but for their failure to forge materiality with spirituality. In this way, under the guidance of Woolf's critical essays on literature, her interest in materiality as the solid base of narratives is discovered. Furthermore, her ideas on the problems of the conventional Victorian biography writing are discussed to suggest that materiality is an unexpandable part of non-fiction. As a whole, this thesis claims that materiality in Woolf's works is as fundamental as spirituality, which is an idea generally ignored in the critical analyses of Modernist works. Concerning Woolf's emphasis on the human and the nonhuman as nonexpendable units of literature, Bill Brown's thing theory is taken as the basis because things are always located somewhere between subject and object. As Brown claims that every object contains a potential for thinghood but things occur only when they are "misused," a general term to refer to what is outside of "use value," "sign value," "symbolic value," or "cultural value," the selected novels are inspected to find out the moments of misuse. Thus, in this study, thingification is analyzed as a changed connection between the object and the human to interpret Woolf's emphasis on the necessity of spirituality and materiality in fiction.

As Brown's theory is framed in the ontic nature of things, their spatiotemporal aspect is taken as the second base in this study. Thus, Bakhtin's literary chronotope is used to distinguish when and where the relation between subject and object can differ. Because Bakhtin's study of chronotope is highly comprehensive, only some of the key concepts are discussed for *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando*. In the first novel, the largest historical chronotope of 1920s London and the chronotopic image of the characters are discussed to find out the influence of chronotope on the subjects' relation to things. In the second novel, Orlando's biographical time is analyzed to investigate thingification because

his/her lifetime overreaches historical time. Under the guidance of chronotopic variety found in the novels, this study illustrates that thinghood can be discovered as an outcome of the latent chronotopic nature of material entities because thingification occurs in specific temporal contexts.

In the first chapter, the subjects' chronotopic image which is contextualized in post-war London is analyzed to argue that historical time is the force which shapes thingification in *Mrs Dalloway*. As Bakhtin claims that literary chronotope is shaped by ideology and history, London in the 1920s is examined to present an overall picture of the largest historical chronotope which determines the characters' chronotopic image while kneading their way of making meanings out of the material world. In this way, this research discovers that the streets of London supply a great amount of potential for thingification because they are the spatially materialized form of the historical chronotope. Referring to Bakhtin's emphasis on the unknown world in narratives where chance factor is effective for random happenings, the streets in *Mrs Dalloway* are found capable of providing objects' suspension to turn into things. In other words, chance factor is analyzed not for social meetings but for unexpected encounters of subjects with things. Most remarkably, Septimus Warren Smith is discovered to be on the brink of establishing changed relations with the nonhuman world at any time as a consequence of his mental discomfort. Terrified by the objects turning into some other disquieting things for him, Septimus cannot anticipate the objecthood level of the material world despite her wife's efforts to neutralize his heightened senses which blur his understanding of regular, static, and typical objects. On the contrary, Clarissa Dalloway who always prefers to stay within the limits of the known experience retains herself from things by keeping her own chronotope in the familiar foreground. Therefore, the streets are known and the objects are familiar for Clarissa in contrast to Septimus and Rezia's detachment from the city and thus from the materiality it bears. With a concern for social acknowledgement in her upper-class urban community, Clarissa fetishizes some objects such as flowers, hats, dresses and shoes, yet never goes after any new associations with the nonhuman world. Therefore, Clarissa keeps herself in her known circle with the people she knows for years and with the unconverted objects she always uses in the same way. As a consequence, it

is found out that the relation between the human and the inanimate entities is enlarged and at the same time restricted by the characters' chronotopic aspects.

Within the general structure of the narrative doubling ordinariness and oddities in the novel, not only thinghood but also objecthood is investigated to understand that objects are a part of everyday life, which is presented as the realistic element in Woolf's narrating the moments of "non-being." Therefore, the domestic chronotope is contrasted with the outer spatial chronotope to contribute to the argument claiming that the historical chronotope shapes thingification. In this way, it is argued that house is where the objecthood level is maintained as opposed to external space. However, in contrast to the ordinariness of the domestic sphere, Clarissa's house party is chronotopically important for gathering the socio-cultural background of the country with a portrayal of personal and public relationships. Moreover, the party enables the chronotope of threshold with the *finale* where Clarissa identifies herself with Septimus in a moment of her questioning life and death, which is rooted in her existential crisis. Whereas death is accomplished by Septimus instead of Clarissa's tendency to commit suicide, life is apparent in the slow movements of her neighbor who is an old lady she watches after *parting the curtain*. In this epiphanic concluding scene, the curtain is claimed to be the most conspicuous thing in *Mrs Dalloway* for providing the inner and outer spatial chronotopes as well as Clarissa's biographical time dominated by the traumatic historical chronotope. In other words, the latent thinghood of the curtain is revealed in this motivic chronotope of threshold. Therefore, it is seen that doubling composition of the narrative is recognizable in the relations between the human and the material world.

In the second chapter, objects are examined with respect to Orlando's biographical time as opposed to the dominant historical time in *Mrs Dalloway*. Since *Orlando* is a mock biography and a parodic rewriting of English literary history, things are examined as the enduring yet changeable material entities in different minor chronotopes accumulated in Orlando's biographical time. Considering Bergsonian "real time," subjective time is equated with the biographical time of Orlando whose majestic lifespan surpasses the objective time through mockery. Therefore, it is discovered that Orlando's heroic

freedom in time is materialized by the things which ridicule the concept of mathematical time. Regarding Orlando's epic-like heroism to live on for such an impossible period of time, Bakhtinian adventure-time is taken as a crucial part of Orlando's biographical time. Nevertheless, Orlando's adventure-time is differentiated from the ancient narratives because she undergoes a biological and maturational process while rediscovering the concepts of gender, social class, property, artistry, and the value attributed to materiality in this alien world. For this reason, adventure-time in *Orlando* is discussed as a characteristically alternative arena for thinghood, where the unknown world offers the subject the unfamiliar experiences of the material world.

Memory is the most essential element for biographical time in *Orlando*. Thus, it is one of the key points in this study to connect chronotopic multiplicity with materiality as the things evoke Orlando's past when they are often reobjectified or misinterpreted by him/her. Actually, because of Orlando's fantastic life story, time passing becomes identifiable only through tracing the mutability of the objects. To the greatest extent, Orlando's transformation is biological and physical, not subjective. Therefore, objects are required to explain his non-subjective transformation. In this regard, it would be a mistake to explain the alterable nature of objects as a representation of the metamorphosis of the subject. In general, because the self is the same and time is doubtful, it is claimed that we have only the objects to justify her life story. With this regard, it is discovered that the progress of Orlando's biographical time is maintained through her memories' connection with the material world. In other words, due to her unrealistic lifetime, her memories are dependent on the objective experiences of the physical world. Therefore, Orlando's mutable costumes, daily objects, house decoration, manuscript, and books are illustrated as the notable examples to claim a change in Orlando's life.

Orlando ridicules not only biography writing but also English literary history. Therefore, the historical periods covered in the novel, from the sixteenth century to the twentieth, are distinguished for the change of diet, fashion, and literature instead of political milestones. For this reason, objects in historical chronotopes are examined with references to Orlando's poetic development. In this regard, the literary traditions of the

sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries which do not satisfy Orlando are distinguished for their infertility to offer things, because all specific qualities of the objects are expelled at the expense of symbols. On the other hand, Orlando's descriptions of the eighteenth century as clear and known are analogized with the fact that objects were used to reify the world in that period as a result of the exciting scientific developments. Unlike the clarity of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century is thoroughly discordant in terms of materiality in *Orlando*, corresponding to the Victorian thing culture. Eventually, in the twentieth century, things are discussed in their relation with the recognition of the plurality in Orlando's self. Indeed, the material world became a part of ontological discussions in the early twentieth century. Therefore, it is observed that in *Orlando* materiality embedded in the narrated historical periods is parallel with the historical development of the discussions on the material world. As a whole, this chapter highlights Virginia Woolf as the literary critic by investigating the problems of Orlando's biography and the literary history mocked through Orlando's poetic endeavors. With this aim, "granite" and "rainbow" effect which Woolf claims as a necessity for a satisfying biography are discussed as the interactions between the characters and the objects.

In conclusion, in this study, things in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando* are analyzed in their respective chronotopes to suggest that objects' latency to turn into things in narratives resides in their chronotopic temporal nature. In *Mrs Dalloway,* in connection with the post-war historical chronotope, the characters' viewing the material world is investigated to find out the oddities as the examples of thingification. In doing so, historical time is claimed to be the dominant spatiotemporal force regulating the relations between the human and the nonhuman. In *Orlando,* things become fundamental entities to grant an objective base for Orlando's fantastic life which cannot be understood within the limited pace of historical time. With this regard, the things are detected as they are located in Orlando's biographical time to differentiate minor chronotopes, and this condition materializes the novel's parodic nature. As a whole, this research is a collection of the things highlighted in *Mrs Dalloway* and *Orlando* in the pursuit of their varied relations to the human in particular spatiotemporal grids to argue that materiality in narratives is formulated by literary chronotope.

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