Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Department of English Language and Literature English Language and Literature Programme FATHERS AND SONS: MEN AND MASCULINITIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH NOVEL Zübeyir SAVAŞ Ph. D. Dissertation Ankara, 2024 FATHERS AND SONS: MEN AND MASCULINITIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH NOVEL Zübeyir SAVAŞ Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Department of English Language and Literature Ph.D. Dissertation Ankara, 2024 KABUL VE ONAY Zübeyir SAVAŞ tarafından hazırlanan “Fathers and Sons: Men and Masculinities in the Contemporary British Novel” başlıklı bu çalışma, 18.12.2023 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Doktora Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir. Prof. Dr. Mine ÖZYURT KILIÇ (Başkan) Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM (Danışman) Doç. Dr. Alev KARADUMAN (Üye) Doç. Dr. Zeynep Zeren ATAYURT FENGE (Üye) Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN (Üye) Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylarım. Prof.Dr. Uğur ÖMÜRGÖNÜLŞEN Enstitü Müdürü YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarım bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır. Tezin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinleri yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim. Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan “Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge” kapsamında tezim aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır. o Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ….. yıl ertelenmiştir. (1) o Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ….. ay ertelenmiştir. (2) o Tezimle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. (3) ……/………/…… Zübeyir SAVAŞ 1“Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge” (1) Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü tezle ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir. (2) Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internetten paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir. (3) Madde 7. 1. Ulusal çıkarları veya güvenliği ilgilendiren, emniyet, istihbarat, savunma ve güvenlik, sağlık vb. konulara ilişkin lisansüstü tezlerle ilgili gizlilik kararı, tezin yapıldığı kurum tarafından verilir *. Kurum ve kuruluşlarla yapılan işbirliği protokolü çerçevesinde hazırlanan lisansüstü tezlere ilişkin gizlilik kararı ise, ilgili kurum ve kuruluşun önerisi ile enstitü veya fakültenin uygun görüşü üzerine üniversite yönetim kurulu tarafından verilir. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler Yükseköğretim Kuruluna bildirilir. Madde 7.2. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler gizlilik süresince enstitü veya fakülte tarafından gizlilik kuralları çerçevesinde muhafaza edilir, gizlilik kararının kaldırılması halinde Tez Otomasyon Sistemine yüklenir. * Tez danışmanının önerisi ve enstitü anabilim dalının uygun görüşü üzerine enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu tarafından karar verilir. ETİK BEYAN Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim. Zübeyir SAVAŞ hv To our lovely son, Yusuf Çağan… v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the extensive and challenging process of pursuing my doctorate, I have been accompanied and supported by a distinguished group of individuals whose contributions have been vital to the successful completion of this thesis. Their collective wisdom, support, and encouragement have been the bedrock upon which this work stands. First and foremost, I am grateful to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM, for her exceptional expertise, understanding, and patience that guided my research. Her influence was significant throughout my academic odyssey. Similarly, I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Mine ÖZYURT KILIÇ who would always encourage and support me during such a demanding and challenging process. Besides, I extend my gratitude to committee members—Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alev KARADUMAN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zeynep Zeren ATAYURT FENGE, and Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN—for their astute feedback and rigorous scrutiny, which have significantly contributed to my research. Secondly, I want to sincerely thank the esteemed professors who have significantly influenced my academic path. The foundational guidance and lasting inspiration from Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali ÇELİKEL, who has been a mentor and a friend beyond measure, has been a cornerstone of my scholarly formation. The wisdom imparted by Prof. Dr. Burçin EROL, Prof. Dr. Deniz BOZER, Prof. Dr. Huriye REİS, Prof. Dr. Hande SEBER, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinan AKILLI, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem KAYA, and Assist. Prof. Dr. İmren YELMİŞ have profoundly enriched my intellectual fabric. The camaraderie and shared intellectual pursuit with my fellow scholars, especially Cansu ÇAKMAK ÖZGÜREL and Hüseyin ALHAS, have been sources of comfort and joy in this often-solitary journey. The spirit of collaboration and the consistent support provided by research assistants Alican ERBAKAN, Arzu ÇEVİRGEN, and my academic colleagues Assoc. Prof. Dr Başak AĞIN, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zümre Gizem YILMAZ, Assoc. vh Prof. Dr. Kerimcan YAZGÜLER, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Baysar TANIYAN and Dr. Şafak HORZUM have been indispensable throughout my investigative endeavours. Furthermore, the unwavering support and understanding from my family have been the cornerstone of my perseverance and success. To my wife, Hatice, whose love and encouragement have been my constant motivation; to my mother-in-law, Münüre, whose sacrifices have paved the way for my achievements; to my parents, Fatma and İrfan, who have provided endless support; and to my brother Oğuzhan, who has always believed in me—your collective strength has been the source of my resilience. I must also express my profound thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr Murat GÖÇ-BİLGİN, whose guidance and patient teaching have been instrumental in navigating the academic rigours towards the completion of this thesis. I am immensely thankful for your significant contributions to my growth and scholarly work. Your impact has been immeasurable to all who have been a part of my academic odyssey. vhh ÖZET SAVAŞ, Zübeyhr. “Babalar ve Oğullar: Çağdaş Brhtanya Romanında Erkekler ve Erkeklhkler” Doktora Tezh, Ankara, 2024. Bu tez, çağdaş Brhtanya romanında babalar ve oğulların farklı temshllerhnh hncelemeyh amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda John McGahern’hn Amongst Women (1990), Nhck Hornby’nhn About A Boy (1998) ve Magghe Gee’nhn The Wh1te Fam1ly (2002) adlı romanlarında göze çarpan baba/oğul hlhşkhlerh eleşthrel erkeklhk teorhlerh perspekthfhnden ele alınmıştır. Her ne kadar femhnhst lhteratürde Adrhenne Rhch’hn Of Women Born’u ve Elahne Showalter’ın A L1terature of The1r Own’u ghbh anne/kız ve anne/oğul hlhşkhlerhne dahr çok sayıda eleşthrel çalışma bulunsa da, edebh eserlerde babalar ve oğullar arasında cereyan eden hlhşkhlere dahr sorgulamalar genellhkle gölgede kalmıştır. Öte yandan son otuz yıldır, erkeklere/erkeklhklere dahr dhshplhnlerarası ve eleşthrel bhr profemhnhst yaklaşım gelhşthrhlmhş olmasına rağmen, eleşthrel sorgulamalardan azade olan çeşhtlh erkeklerhn/erkeklhk hallerhnhn otorhte ve hkthdar hlhşkhlerhnde süregelen ayrıcalıkları hala büyük ölçüde gözlerden uzaktadır ve erkeklerh ve erkeklhğhn kurumsallaşmış halh olan babalığı eleşthrel bhr gözle hncelemek edebhyat araştırmalarında henüz yeterhnce hlgh görmemhşthr. Bu tez, çağdaş Brhtanya romanında babalar ve oğulların farklı temshllerhnh analhz ederek lhteratüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma boyunca ele alınan romanlardakh babalar ve oğullar arasında süregelen çatışmalar nethceshnde tarafların farklı hhmal ve şhddet bhçhmlerhnhn fahllerh ve mağdurları oldukları gözlemlenmektedhr. Böylece tarafların bhrbhrlerhyle, dhğer erkeklerle, kadınlarla ve çocuklarla daha uzun ve sağlıklı hlhşkhler kurma ‘yetershzlhğh’ hayal kırıklıkları hle sonuçlanır. Romanlardakh erkek karakterlerhn ghderek artan düş kırıklıkları Thatcher sonrası Brhtanya’sının sosyopolhthk ve sosyoekonomhk şartları bağlamında tekrar yükselen ‘erkeklhk krhzh’ söylemlerhnhn belhrlh özellhklerhnh yansıtmaktadır. Böylece, çalışmaya konu olan romanlardakh baba ve oğul fhgürlerh arasındakh çatışmaların, geçen yüzyılın son bhrkaç on yılında yenhden hnşa edhlen modern ve geleneksel erkeklhkler arasındakh çekhşmeyh ve erkeklerhn yhthrdhklerhne hnandıkları hkthdarlarını gerh kazanma mücadeleshnh yansıttığı öne sürülmektedhr. Araştırma, bhr yandan geleneksel ahle yapısının ve süregelen hegemonhk erkeklhk hdeallerhnhn ahle hçh çatışmaları önlemek hçhn yeterlh olamadığını ortaya koyarken bhr yandan da neolhberalhzmhn başat hdeolojh halhne geldhğh günümüzde çağdaş ahle, (yenh) baba ve (yenh) erkek khmlhklerhnh benhmseyen erkeklerhn dhğer erkeklerle, kadınlarla ve çocuklarla olan hlhşkhlerhnde hlerhch bhr tavır takınmaktan zhyade yenh tahakküm bhçhmlerhnh hnşa etme çabasında olduklarını hddha etmektedhr. Anahtar Sözcükler: Babalar ve Oğullar, Erkekler ve Erkeklikler, Erkeklik Krizi, Çağdaş Britanya Romanı, Amongst Women, About A Boy, The White Family vhhh ABSTRACT SAVAŞ, Zübeyhr. “Fathers and Sons: Men and Masculhnhthes hn the Contemporary Brhthsh Novel” Ph.D. Dhssertathon, Ankara, 2024. This dissertation aims to explore diverse representations of fathers and sons in three contemporary British novels: Amongst Women (1990) by John McGahern, About A Boy (1998) by Nick Hornby, The White Family (2002) by Maggie Gee from the perspective of critical studhes on men and masculinities. Relationships between mothers and daughters and mothers and sons in literary studies have already been whdely dhscussed hn femhnhst scholarshhp, most parthcularly hn Adrienne Rich’s Of Women Born and Elaine Showalter’s A Literature of Their Own whhle affinities between fathers and sons have often been overshadowed. Men as sons and fathers have remained out of critical interrogations; thereby, men’s ongoing privilege in their relations with authority and power has been hidden in plain sight. Nevertheless, with the emergence of critical theories on men and masculinities in varied interdisciplinary fields, men have become the object of interrogation. Even so, scrutinising men and fatherhood as an institutionalised form of masculhnhthes has yet to catch enough attention within literary studies. This thesis addresses thhs parthcular gap by analysing peculiar representations of fathers and sons in the contemporary British novel. Throughout this study, it is observed that there is an ongoing conflict between fathers and sons whereby they are both the perpetrators and victims of different forms of violence and neglect. These men’s ‘inability’ to form longer and healthier relationships with other men, women, and children ends in disillusionment. A growing sense of disenchantment among men in the novels reverberates specific attributes of the ‘masculinity crisis’ in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic context of post-Thatcherite Britain. It is further argued that the conflicts between fathers and sons reflect a broader struggle between traditional and modern notions of men and masculinities and the battle for regaining their (lost) power in the last few decades of the previous century. While the traditional family structure and enduring ideals of hegemonic masculinity are not sufficient to prevent family conflicts, it is argued that contemporary notions of family, (new) fathers, and (new) men, as defined in the current period when neoliberalism has become the dominant ideology, seek to construct new forms of domination rather than a progressive stance in men’s relations with other men, women, and children. Key Words: Fathers and Sons, Men and Masculinities, Masculinity Crisis, Contemporary British Novel, Amongst Women, About A Boy, The White Family hx TABLE OF CONTENTS KABUL VE ONAY ……………………………………………………………………..i YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI ……………………..ii ETİK BEYAN……………….…………………………………………………………iii DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………v ÖZET…………………………………………………………………………………..vii ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………..viii TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………ix INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………...1 CHAPTER I: “ONLY WOMEN COULD LIVE WITH DADDY”: IRISH MASCULINITIES AND FATHERHOOD IN JOHN MCGAHERN’S AMONGST WOMEN………………………………………………………………………………..44 CHAPTER II: “YOU NEED A FATHER, DON’T YOU?”: THE NEW MAN, THE NEW LAD, AND THE ABSENTEE FATHERS IN NICK HORNBY’S ABOUT A BOY…………………………………………………………………………………….83 CHAPTER III: “THEY DOLE IT OUT, WE PASS IT ON”: THE CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHERS AND SONS IN MAGGIE GEE’S THE WHITE FAMILY……………………………………………………………………..119 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………157 WORKS CITED……………………………………………………………………..165 APPENDIX I: ORIGINALITY REPORTS………………………………………...185 APPENDIX II: ETHIC BOARD WAIVER FORMS...…………………………….187 1 INTRODUCTION Every single human being has been destined to have a father. Whether caring, devoted, tender, benevolent, charitable, kind, violent, brutal, cruel, abusive, absent, present, or distant, owning a father is indispensable. The history of humanity is bursting with stories about fathers and sons. However, when scrutinised in detail, a considerable number of these stories embrace hatred and vengeance. Zeus tricks Cronus and kills him to survive; Adam discriminates between his sons, Abel and Cain; Noah shames Ham; Abraham intends to sacrifice Isaac for his God; Jacob leaves Joseph at the mercy of his other notorious sons; Icarus denies his father’s word and flies higher to his death; and, Jesus’s God remains a mere spectator when he is crucified. Besides, the history of literature is also bulging with stories that revolve around conflicting relationships between fathers and sons. Oedipus kills his father, replaces his throne and marries his mother. To some extent, in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, misfortunes are portrayed as the outcomes of the perpetual rebellion of a prodigal son against his father. Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov is the story of a patricide. In Herman Hesse’s homonymous bildungsroman, Siddhartha leaves his father in desolation and can find peace only after letting his defiant son go for his way. The hatred and violence between the father and the son hardly dissolve when Troy, the angry father of Cory Maxon, dies in August Wilson’s play, Fences. In Arthur Miller’s post-war play All My Sons, Joe Keller is responsible not only for his son’s death but also for leaving families of the whole generation with a sense of despair due to his never-ending greed. Composed of five semi-autobiographic novels by Edward St Aubyn, the Patrick Melrose compilation narrates the accounts of an abused son. After falling victim to David Melrose’s long-lasting abuse, Patrick becomes a disengaged and violent father figure for his children. Orhan Pamuk’s The Red-Haired Woman simultaneously takes patricide and filicide as its core themes. Once he leaves his surrogate dad to his death, Cem ultimately becomes a victim of filicide. 2 Suffice it to say that mythological narratives and literary cults seldom mention merciful and obedient parental relationships, yet they frequently accommodate brutal fathers and rebellious sons. For this reason, such complex and perplexing relationships between fathers and sons can be observed in contemporary literature. Particularly in the second part of the twentieth century, the historical roles attributed to men and fathers metamorphosed due to profound changes in the family institution resulting from rapid political and socioeconomic developments. Still, the renowned clash between the punitive father and the disillusioned son prevails significantly in various literary works. Accordingly, this dissertation aims to assess diverse representations of fathers and sons in three examples of contemporary British novels: Amongst Women (1990) by John McGahern, About A Boy (1998) by Nick Hornby, The White Family (2002) by Maggie Gee from the perspective of critical studies on men and masculinities. Considering that each novel comprises either violent or neglecting fathers and disillusioned sons, this study explains that different forms of violence and disillusionment in these novels stem from particular masculinity traits. It is argued that the renowned yet erratic conflict and hostility between fathers and sons accentuate the clash between traditional and modern norms of masculinities and reflect particular discourses of ‘masculinity crisis’ prompted by complex, unstable, and obscure power relations. The vicissitudes of traditional masculinity norms might not help mitigate the ongoing conflict between fathers and sons. Along with the metamorphosis of the values associated with masculinity, fatherhood roles have tangled in new forms of abuse due to the construction of the ‘new man’ and the ‘new fatherhood’ as a product of the neoliberal condition in Britain. In particular, investigating fathers requires defining men, and “[a]ny study of fatherhood must also be concerned with masculinity” (King, Family Men 5). Fatherhood, often acclaimed as a crucial, lifelong role for men, is a prominent signifier of manhood and masculinity. Prevailing over its biological definition, fatherhood denotes the institutionalised form of manhood. Yet, defining man is a complex phenomenon as “the more anthropologists, sociologists, and historians explore the meanings of being a man, the more inconsistent, contradictory, and varied they become” (Stimpson xii). Despite being a relatively new phenomenon, research on the role of men as fathers has received 3 substantial attention since the 1970s. This period marked the emergence of second-wave feminism and the women’s liberation movement, which introduced critical terminologies and concepts relating to gender dynamics and the unfair distribution of social responsibilities between men and women (Connell et al. 1). After Simon de Beauvoir’s influential statement as “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, woman” (The Second 330), a considerable amount of literature has been written by liberal, Marxist, and radical feminists to question the position of women and men’s oppression and violence against women in Western societies. To name a few, Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique1 (1963), Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics2 (1969), and Gayle Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex3” (1975) disputed over inequalities and segregation between men and women and problematised men and masculinity in broader aspects during women’s liberation movement. Beyond those theoretical explanations, the women’s liberation movement of the twentieth century arose out of a broader political agenda, including the rise of the New Left, the 1 In her seminal work, Betty Friedan epitomises the current position of women in the United States. She argues that women find themselves unexpectedly broken, subsided, and depressed despite the irrefutable achievements of first-wave feminism. She mainly focuses on the false image of the happy, white, middle- class woman stereotype created in the 1950s in the United States. Friedan discusses an apparent disparity between the idealised norms for women and their daily lives. She calls such discrepancy “the feminine mystique” and further assumes that it ends up a “schizophrenic split” for women. Thus, focusing primarily on the marriage institution and any married women's oppressive tasks, Friedan calls for “a much larger sex- role revolution” (370). 2 According to Kate Millett, family is the smallest part of the socialisation process wherein men often perpetuate the ostensible submissiveness of women. However, inferiority is not the biological reality of women, but rather male imposition. Millett simply assumes that sexual relations are inherent in power relations and male supremacy is indeed a fallacious argument. Referring to a number of literary texts, in Sexual Politics, Millett lays bare the prevalent, systematic violence of men to control women throughout history. 3 In her well-known work, Gayle Rubin maintains that women have long been the objects of systematic power relations. She questions the neglect of women in Marx and Engels’ formulation of exploitation. She rejects structuralist views about men, women, and culture, coining an influential term called “sex/gender system” to interpret women's historical subordination, which inevitably causes disparities among all people. Rubin also denounces Marxist readings of class struggles as both Marx and Engels ignored women's invisible labour and overlooked the ramifications of gender hierarchy in social inequalities. She further objects to Claude Lewis Strauss’s theories on kinship. To Strauss, humanity owes its culture to the incest taboo, as a result of which men exchanged women and enhanced kinship networks. In contrast, Rubin asserts that Strauss’ arguments are “exegetical” rather than a universal truth. She insists that “there is an economics and a politics to sex/gender systems which is obscured by the concept of ‘exchange of women’” (“The Traffic in Woman” 205). 4 Civil Rights Movement, and the Vietnam War protests (Burgin, “Understanding Activism” 19; Kent, Gender and Power, 261; Krolokke and Sorensen, “Three Waves of Feminism” 8; Murphy, “Introduction” 9). During the 1960s and 70s, as a social and political movement, women’s liberation gained momentum through uprisings and riots in the United States and student upheavals in France and third-world countries. Because the significance of the mutual relationship between individual experiences and politics was deciphered, many women struggled to gain equal rights in distinct spheres of society. The popular jargon of sex roles helped raise novel questions against the aspects of gender- based roles to eliminate segregation in public and domestic spheres. Meanwhile, consequent reverberations of women’s liberation among distinct men and male groups were immediate. Men from diverse groups in the United States and some European countries responded to women’s achievements in theory and practice. These groups reacted towards women’s liberation in disparate ways. The most visible disparity among these perspectives is related to their proximity to the problems regarding gender equality and sexism in a given society. However, those approaches emerged from a single movement, namely the men’s liberation movement. Men’s liberation movement has triggered specific enquiries on men and masculinities. Men’s self-questioning about their position of authority and power concerning women was not arbitrary. Instead, many men focused on the unequal distribution of gender roles, as the women’s liberation movement significantly impacted men. As a consequence of feminist documentation of gender inequalities, the historical power of patriarchy was opened to debate, and men, for the first time, became the object of critical enquiries, thereby launching their liberation movement since any dispute over patriarchy and criticism of asymmetrical sex roles4 would concern men as well. Several consciousness- 4 Throughout the introduction, the terminology of ‘sex roles’ and ‘gender roles’ are not used interchangeably. Instead, they are deliberately emphasised in some parts to highlight the notions among distinct movements and approaches towards men and masculinities. Several activists and scholars of the men’s liberation movement and men’s studies borrowed the jargon of ‘sex roles’ from the earlier enquiries on men and women triggered by the first and the second waves of feminism. However, along with the emergence of third-wave feminism, queer studies, and gay and lesbian studies, critical theories on men and 5 raising groups of men paved the way to male liberation in the United States during the 1960s and 70s (Messner, “The Limits” 256). Those groups enabled many men to meet in male-only gatherings and express their individual experiences of being a man and their implications for women in contemporary Western societies. Through distinct enquiries and arguments, some male liberationists perceived that while “the ‘female sex role’ had oppressed women, […] ‘the male sex role’ also harmed men” (Messner, “Forks in the Road” 8). The mutual point male liberationists tended to underline was the idea that liberating men was distinctly more than understanding the male oppression of women, as men were also oppressed and victimised by their roles. Following women’s liberation and its achievements, men’s endeavours focused simultaneously on “freeing men from the patriarchal sexual dynamics they now experience with each other” (Pleck, “Men’s Power” 64). Accordingly, the essential purpose of male liberation groups was to identify the harm men cause to women and figure out how they could overcome the burden of their inherited roles. Highlighting the commitment to rigid male roles such as being the power holder, ruler, policy maker, breadwinner, decision maker, and adventurer, and due to the implicit impositions and harms of those roles upon women, children, and other men, male liberationists sought for liberation, a sort of refinement for the betterment of social life in general. Encouraging men to develop healthier relationships with women, children, and other men, the fundamental motivation behind men’s liberation was to diminish sex-role stereotypes as they “limit their ability to be human” (Sawyer 170). To mediate a more liberal, equal, and fair social order, sex roles were to be questioned. However, the men’s liberation movement’s basis for gender equality is controversial, as it is in the sex-role paradigm. Male liberationists revolved around the idea that a certain amount of amelioration in men’s and women’s conditions could be achieved by rectifying men’s ‘burdensome’, ‘oppressive’, and ‘detrimental’ roles in a given society. It is recognised that men assume instrumental tasks by creating a false symmetry in role masculinities have avoided using ‘sex role’ jargon and approached relations between men and women and among different men through the lens of social constructionism rather than biologic essentialism. For further details about the emerging fields, terms, and distinct approaches towards men and masculinities, see Joseph H. Pleck’s essay, “The Theory of Male Sex-Role Identity: Its Rise and Fall, 1936 to the Present”, and Harry Brod’s essay, “The Case for Men’s Studies” in The Making of Masculinities: The New Men’s Studies (1987). 6 sharing, wherein expressive tasks are often feminised. Men frequently benefit as these instruments include financial and institutional power. Being identified with instrumental roles which required rationality, men disdained to be emphatic for women’s conditions. They diminished their culpability in using assumed power by overemphasising their roles’ financial, emotional, and physical burdens5. Eventually, men “maximised the potential gain that [they] might expect from liberation” (Messner, “The Limits” 261). Hence, one might observe that male liberationists mainly concentrated on the difficulties of men’s and boys’ experiences. They did not pay sufficient attention to women and their mutual problems with men, thereby overshadowing the political implications of male power in gender relations6. Even some major male liberationists overlooked the unequal distribution of gender roles and were inclined to claim sexist assumptions for the remaining problems regarding gender relations and offered their solutions to the benefits of men. A further problem with the men’s liberation movement is that it stimulates a particular focus on the white, middle-class men, their burden for the breadwinner role, and their practical difficulties with their female partners. Not only the gay men but also the black, the poor, the macho, and the unemployed are discarded from their attention (Messner, “The Limits” 264). Hence, the men’s liberation movement, deliberately inclining towards monolithic, limited, excluding interrogations with essentialist and partly sexist 5 Questioning detrimental features of male roles for men, or subsequent cultural impositions of traditional masculinity norms, some male liberationists documented particular struggles that men often experience in their personal lives and reached accusative conclusions against women. In this regard, Marc Fasteau, one of the leading figures of the Men’s Liberation Movement, indicated men’s difficulty in displaying their emotions and inclined to accusative claims on feminist achievements. To Fasteau, men indirectly suffer from feminism since feminist ideals enable women to liberate, help them communicate and express their inner feelings with each other easier, whereas “[t]here is nothing among men that resembles the personal communication that women have developed among themselves” (“Why Aren’t We” 20). Indeed, men are curved by social restrictions, which complicate emotional displays. Fasteau further points out that women achieved a certain degree of intimacy in their relationships. At the same time, “men [have been] taught not to communicate [their] personal feelings and concerns” (“Why Aren’t We” 20). For these reasons, Fasteau concludes, men are incapable of developing deep relationships with their peers, and the ultimate responsibility rests with women and feminism. 6 For a more detailed analysis of the men’s liberation movement, see Michael A. Messner’s essay titled “The Limits of ‘The Male Sex Role’: An Analysis of the Men’s Liberation and Men’s Rights Movements’ Discourse”, Joseph Pleck and Jack Sawyer’s “Men’s Power with Women, Other Men, and Society: A Men’s Movement Analysis” in Feminism and Masculinities edited by Peter F. Murphy. 7 assumptions in gender relations, overlooked the inequalities among distinct men and their relationship with peculiar women and children. Consequently, in less than two decades, the movement was divided into two opposite fractions, namely the sexist and the anti- sexist approaches, regarding their reaction towards feminist movements and fundamental differences in their perception of masculinity. As mentioned above, since the early 1970s, feminist movements have polarised men’s reactions, considering their stance on gender equality. The men’s rights movement represents the sexist wing of the enquiries about men and men as fathers. Defenders of the men’s rights discourse advocate male supremacy and voice concern about the victimisation of men. Their arguments revolve around contemporary problems that some men experience, such as the slaughter of men in wars all around the world, the shortness of overall life expectancy of men to women, and the sharp increase in unemployment rates among men owing to women’s inclusion to the workforce soon after the emergence of contemporary feminist movements7. In men’s rights discourse, gender equality is unnecessary for the mutual benefits of a given society. Even if gender equality is necessary, feminism “is anti-equality and seeks to privilege women over men” (Jordan, The New Politics 195). Pillars of men’s rights mainly argue that feminism, exceptionally liberal feminism, caused inequalities, and men need to regain their lost rights. They hinge on “the fundamental premise that men as men are subject to numerous generally unrecognised injustices of a legal, social, and psychological nature” (Clatterbaugh, Contemporary Perspectives 61). Supporters for 7 Herb Goldberg and Warren Farrell are famous men’s rights movement authors. Once an outstanding figure among the male liberationists, Farrell’s ideas vacillated to the essentially sexist wing afterwards. In 1993, Farrell published The Myth of Male Power (1994), claiming that male power is a myth and is nothing more than a feminist falsification. In the same vein, Herb Goldberg, in his best-seller book The Hazards of Being Male: Surviving the Myth of Masculine Privilege, argues that being a male in modern societies is hazardous, women are more privileged in the contemporary world, both imposed sex roles and the related laws work against men. Although their arguments are irrelevant to this dissertation’s main point, it is crucial to grasp opposite claims for further discussion. For a full-length criticism of the men’s rights movement in profeminist discussions, see Michael A. Messner’s Politics of Masculinities: Men in Movements (1997); Kenneth Clatterbaugh’s book Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity: Men, Women, and Politics in Modern Society (1990) and Bob Connell’s essay “Men at Bay: The ‘Men’s Movement’ and Its Newest Best-Sellers” in The Politics of Manhood. Ed. Michael S. Kimmel (1995). 8 men’s rights are inclined to equate opportunities that men and women have in common in the public and private spheres. Although similar issues have already been mentioned and questioned in the men’s liberation movement, supporters of men’s rights differ in that they withdraw entirely from gender symmetry, and their “discourse most often display a blatant disregard for widely accepted sociological, economic, and psychological studies” (Messner, “The Limits” 266) that have long revealed bias and segregation of women. Moreover, the men’s rights perspective often goes to extremes to wink at remarkably diverse inequalities among the sexes. Pillars of this perspective even reject and manipulate the reality that the sexual and domestic violence of men victimises women. Although some members in these groups allegedly defend gender equality, the men’s rights supporters mainly propose that the inequalities aroused by the second-wave feminists not only burden men with overwhelming responsibilities but also cause them to suffer from economic and psychological problems, as women disrupt men’s domination in professional life in contemporary society. Therefore, the primary target of those groups is to provoke men unaware of their ‘disadvantageous’ position in their families during marriage and post-marriage. They advocate the ‘rights’ of men and men as fathers in various concerns, such as divorce, alimony, and custody issues. Although there are some different fractions among those groups, for most supporters, gender equality is not a sincere aim, and their standpoint is, to a great extent, a backlash8 against feminism and feminist achievements. Eventually, it might be safe to assert that the men’s rights perspective is based on several manipulative assumptions and over-generalisations in the name of liberating men from their alleged burden and threats that they confront, such as lower life expectancy, higher suicide rates, anxiety and stress disorder caused by the breadwinner role, more significant numbers of killings in wars in comparison to women, and briefly the premise that more compelling tasks have been historically given to men. The men’s rights perspective, 8 Susan Faludi, in her Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Woman, defines backlash as “an attempt to retract the handful of small and hard-won victories that the feminist movement did manage to win for women” (Faludi, Backlash, 2006, p. 9-10). 9 however, often tends to avoid the nature of unequal gender relations and unfair share of power, which have long been constructed for the benefit of men, as “[m]en do hold most of the power in society […], generally control governments, armies, corporations, professions, political parties, and social movements” (Connell, “Men at Bay” 75). As can be seen from the examples regarding men’s frequent dominance in decision-making mechanisms and their hegemony of accessing economic resources in comparison to women both at the global and local level, assumptions for the ostensible sufferings of men might not be relevant for most men. Considering these developments, men also organised several support groups as fathers due to the emergence of new thoughts and perspectives about gender since the “shifting relationship of the state and individual also raised questions relating to the family and fatherhood” (King, Family Men 200). The father support groups have functioned efficiently in creating public opinion and enacting laws concerning family, divorce, custody, alimony, and rights for fair contact arrangements9. As experienced in the men’s liberation movement, fathers’ groups and organisations flourished in distinct strains regarding their attitudes towards major social problems such as gender inequalities, racial discrimination, and economic barriers that fathers occasionally encounter. Hence, they developed into mixed fractions under the umbrella title of the Fatherhood Responsibility Movement (Flood, “Backlash” 261). The difference among several organisations and groups crystallises in their perception of parental rights, responsibilities, and gender equality. Highly influential in Britain during the 1990s, the fathers’ rights groups launched several initiatives that provided volunteer assistance to separated husbands and biological fathers. Those initiatives later transformed into a movement. Three essential claims behind the formation of the fathers’ rights groups and men’s retreat therein are tedious and severe struggles inherited by separation or divorce, the loss of connection with children, and the 9 Richard Collier’s Masculinity, Law and Family (1995), Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon’s Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (2008), Susan Boyd’s “Demonizing Mothers: Father’s Rights Discourses in Child Custody Law Reform Process” give full accounts of the contemporary debates on Father’s Rights Groups and their effects on legal procedures in Britain, Canada, and the United States. 10 economic instability of fathers caused by custody laws. This particular movement of fathers corresponds to the men’s rights movement and indicates a genuine backlash against former achievements of feminist activism. However, some fathers’ rights groups refuse such accusations regarding them as anti-feminist women haters. Taking an alleged gender-neutral approach, those groups insist on the assertion that “fathers are deprived of their ‘rights’ and subjected to systematic discrimination as fathers and as men, in a system biased towards women and dominated by feminists” (Flood, “Separated Fathers” 235). Although this argument seems to have few conceivable features, it mainly fails to capture inequalities and opportunity gaps between men and women at the intersection of professional life, domestic labour, sexualities, and reproduction. The men’s support groups ignore that there are still several structural inequalities between men and women in public and domestic spheres. For example, when fathers leave their partners after or during pregnancy, their condition is generally far better than women. Numerous women still possibly suffer from social oppression, lack of security, and economic difficulties with their children after separation. Moreover, one should interrogate men’s institutional power in familial relationships to understand structural inequalities between men and women. Individual stories and experiences of men regarding suffering after a break-up are not always valid to recognise inequalities since “there are as many differences among fathers as there are among men and among fatherhoods as there are among fathers” (Jordan, “Dads Aren’t Demons” 421). Therefore, noticeable enquiries about fathers need to focus more on the construction of fatherhood than victimisation and crisis discourse of men in family relations. During the last few decades, the women-hating men’s rights movement and the sexist father’s rights groups were not the only reactions of men who assumed their ‘rights’ to be in ‘crisis’ due to the novel conditions that appeared in Western societies. Political discourses that develop on men and men as fathers in the wake of feminist achievements are prevalent in another sexist approach, the mythopoetic men’s movement. Contrary to the men’s rights movement, adherents of the mythopoetic men’s movement do not assume themselves to be male supremacists, as they concede an unequal 11 relationship between men and women10. However, displacing and omitting women, the movement is “a world of and for man” (Ferber 35). The mythopoetic men’s movement was triggered by small gatherings and retreats in the United States during the 1980s. In those gatherings, held either in the woods or at convention centres, many men danced, played the drums, chanted, wrestled, spoke aloud, roared, and cried along with symbolic initiation rituals. With the influence of new age movements that emphasise a return to ‘the roots of the inner self’ and ancient narratives, those men seek to find ‘the core of their masculinity’ in themselves. In less than ten years, those retreat groups spread across the States and “thousands of men—most of them white, middle-aged, heterosexual, and of the professional class—had attended mythopoetic events” (Messner, “Essentialist Retreats” 17). Diverse therapeutic and spiritual methodologies were implemented during mythopoetic gatherings to rediscover and nurture ‘genuine masculinity’. These events also rendered myth and poetry potent instruments for self-discovery and individual growth. Thus, mythopoetic gatherings, Messner argues, brought about “a collective ritual structure within which individual men can explore, discover, and reconstruct their inner selves” (“Essentialist Retreats” 18). In their perspective, such ceremonies and rituals enabled them to explore their feelings and emotions as men and to understand each other better since they perceived masculinity as ‘a collective inner truth’. Adherents of the mythopoetic movement sought to foreground masculinity as the core of their maleness and claimed their right to enact masculinity in their inimitable manner. Rather than focusing on legislative, legal organisations and academic studies, the mythopoetic men’s movement tends to bring a spiritual perspective to masculinity and “embraces a traditional, and conservative, rendering of psychoanalytic theory” (Kimmel and Kaufman, “Weekend” 22). The mythopoetics consolidated men’s historical yet allegedly decaying power by premising the nature of masculinity in Jungian psychoanalytic theory and the archetypes. The mythopoetics mainly dispute that masculinity is recently in crisis. To overcome such a crisis, men must procure their 10 For detailed enquiries, discussions and debates on the Mythopoetic Movement, see The Politics of Manhood: Profeminist Men Respond to the Mythopoetics Men’s Movement and the Mythopoetic Leaders Answer Ed. Michael S. Kimmel. 12 ‘genuine masculinity’, which has long been lost, particularly after the modernisation of family life. According to the mythopoetic adherents, men have been ‘softened’ in the post-industrial era due to the changing production and consumption means, thereby losing their genuine bond with the conceivable roots of traditional masculinity and other men simultaneously. The Mythopoetic Men’s Movement peaked with the publication of Robert Bly’s Iron John: A Book About Man in 1990, the national best-seller nonfiction for months in the same year. In his book, Bly refers to several ancient stories and myths and notably focuses on the well-known German fairy tale, the Iron John11. He uses Iron John as a metaphor for the condition of modern men and men as fathers, who had already lost their bounds with the ‘true essence of masculinity’. To Bly, modern men have particular difficulties perceiving their masculinity, and the Industrial Revolution is responsible for this flaw. He further suggests that owing to urbanisation and industrialisation, numerous men as fathers lost their close affinity with their sons, as they had to spend long hours in factories or mines. Bly emphasises that owing to the harsh conditions in the realm of heavy industry, the rigorous demands of the work often resulted in a distancing from the communal lifestyle once enjoyed by large families. Previously, extended family units, including fathers, uncles, and grandfathers, often resided under one roof, fostering more significant social interaction. Working on the farms, hunting, and doing local sports often allowed them to “spend much time with younger men and brought knowledge of male spirit and soul to them” (Bly, Iron John 16). However, due to the substantial change through urbanisation, 11 Iron John is a tale of an eight-year-old prince who lives happily with his family in a castle. Once, an intruder brings about some difficulties in their town as he spreads fear and terror by killing the king’s hunters one by one in the wood. The king does not give up, calls for the best-ever hunter and sends him to catch the brute. It is found out that the intruder is a long-haired and bearded man who lives in a swampland. They drain the swamp, see the man, and then cage him in the castle. After several events, the adolescent prince cannot resist his instinct to help the caged man, steals the keys under his mother’s pillow and sets the wild men free. When they go into the wood together, the wild man promises the prince the greatest treasure ever on the condition that he will never see his family again. After several comings and goings, the wild man repeatedly tests the boy’s loyalty. The boy fails several times and gets a wound for each failure. Throughout the tale, the boy is initiated to adulthood or ‘manhood’ by the wild man, finds his princes, saves his country, becomes the king and lives happily with his family. 13 either extended families declined, or men in those families started to work far from home, resulting in younger boys losing their opportunity to acquire the skills of former generations. Bly further argues that the Oedipal bounds of the boys with their mothers distracted them from the father. Boys failed to know their fathers better, as they knew them through the eyes of their mothers; therefore, the sons would “learn the female attitude toward masculinity and take a female view of [their] father[s] and of [their] own masculinity” (Bly, Iron John 24). Thus, he offers men to recall former initiation ceremonies and masculine practices to remember and reconstruct their manhood. As the historical father- son relationships have been forgotten, in the contemporary world, boys would only find such opportunities through particular rituals held in sports and military activities, which enable them to be partially initiated. Because these practices are insufficient to heal their ‘wounds’, therapeutic procedures of mythopoetic gatherings might help men mitigate their ‘crises’ and construct healthier relationships with women, other men, and children to reconstruct social order and overcome gender segregation in a given society. However, more extensive than being advisory self-help discourses, there are some crucial political implications of the mythopoetic men’s movement in general and of Robert Bly’s fictive Jungian application in particular. On the one hand, Bly’s call for healing men’s ‘wounds’ stands for the desire to reconstruct men’s self-confidence in the guise of criticism against industrialisation, capitalism, lost traditions and assumed values. Still, on the other hand, he highlights the necessity of traditional masculinity norms that threatened men and men as fathers due to feminist questionings of men’s historical authority and power. Bly’s suggestions, therefore, imply an urge to resist contemporary feminist achievements and consolidate men’s historical power in gender relations. His constant references to archetypal masculinity show that he somehow clings to the masculinist ideology of the men’s rights perspective. Bly’s application of Jungian perspectives in his analyses of men and masculinity results from then-contemporary debates on sex role theories among men’s liberationists. To discern particular archetypes as ahistorical qualities of maleness, Bly goes back to ancient myths and fairy tales, and he comes “to 14 see these stories as offering a theory of psychological growth” (Schwalbe, “Bly” 89). In a broader context, the mythopoetics constantly cite myths, legends, and folk tales “to uncover repeated behaviour patterns that count as archetypal or universal” (Clatterbaugh, “Mythopoetic” 47). They strive to construct collective norms and ideals about being a man in contemporary societies, wherein the meaning of traditional manhood and conventional fatherhood has already been obscured due to vast socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments. Through the neoliberalisation of the previous nation-states and particular feminist achievements, men have begun to lose their privileges of the uncontested power of patriarchy and find themselves in dire crises in modern Western societies. The crisis men suffer, as the Mythopoetics argues, will not be solved unless they regain their lost ‘rights’. On the contrary, in the course of this study, it will be explained that there has never been a real masculinity crisis, yet masculinity per se is indeed in a plurality of crises since it could only exist on account of peculiar crises (Edwards, Cultures 14; Hearn, “A Crisis” 164; MacInnes 46). The contemporary discourse of the masculinity crisis is not a novel phenomenon12. Discussions concerning ‘men in crisis’ revolve around definitions of masculinity, prescribed norms, and attributing certain qualities and roles to men in a particular setting. Because masculinity (as well as femininity) and its expected qualities are subject to social constructions in historical conditions, they are open to debate 12 In his article “The Crisis of Masculinity in Seventeenth-Century England,” Michael Kimmel discerns the roots of the contemporary crisis of masculinity in seventeenth-century English pamphlets and further assumes that political chaos often results in social crises which lead to a redefinition of masculinity and men’s ostensible roles in the family institution. In this regard, the alleged masculinity crisis in Britain dates to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, when dramatic social and political events such as the beheading of Charles I, the establishment of the Cromwellian Protectorate, the Restoration with Charles II, the Glorious Revolution, and the ongoing sectarian conflicts between Catholics and Protestants took place respectively. Acute conflicts followed such outbreaks in social organisations. They had severe ramifications for men and precipitated crises in the family institution, often deemed a reflection of public institutions wherein men had the top place. In the same vein, Karen Harvey informs that men were often portrayed as the household patriarch since “the vision of masculinity [was] very much about patriarchy in the classic sense of the rule of the father in the house” (298). However, many men and men as fathers did not hold the power of household patriarch, and they shared some of their power with women who contributed to the economy of their homes. Thus, “the gap between ideals of patriarchal manhood and social practice has given rise to a model of anxious masculinity in the historiography of this period” (Harvey 299). Accordingly, despite the renowned analogy between the ruler of the institutions and the father of the household, distinct definitions of masculinity emerged in early modern Britain, a period marked by a significant shift in power relations and the new definitions of fatherly roles in the family as a source of men’s crises. 15 (Buchbinder 4; Connell, Gender in World Perspective 74; Kimmel, “The Crisis” 90; Tosh 19). Any crisis discourse trapped in the sex role paradigm will remain in a vicious circle due to the fluidity and volatility of norms and definitions. The traces of masculinity crisis throughout history appear, Reeser suggests, “when many men in a given context feel tension with larger ideologies that dominate or begin to dominate that context” (Masculinities in Theory 27). In other words, in a particular setting in history, when the privileges of men were under dire threat, divergent and often conflicting discourses on the masculinity crisis emerged for men to regain their hegemony and control over women, children, and other men. To this end, some explicit motivations behind crisis discourses in contemporary Western societies reverberate men’s anxiety about being visible in gender relations. In the last few decades, men have been the object of extensive social sciences and legal research enquiries from feminist and profeminist perspectives. Various feminist campaigns and thoughts pinpointed distinct aspects of men. They proposed multiple analyses for men and men as fathers to highlight the harms caused by men in specific contexts. Monolithic denunciation of being men and traditional masculinity has been questioned, the legal status of men’s rule has been challenged, and current developments have restricted men’s power domain. Feminist analyses uncovered that individual practices, politics, and policies require improvements to overcome gender inequalities. These are unexpected, rough, even arduous issues for many men to overcome, simultaneously triggering multiple discourses of masculinity crisis. It is still safe to argue that men often hold the entire apparatuses in terms of power and privilege. Plenty of institutions and decision-making mechanisms have historically been formed, designed, and run either by men or for the benefit of men. Thus, Michael Kimmel suggests, therein lies the problem as men manage to remain invisible in these power relations. The “invisibility” of men’s power, he further puts forward, “reproduces inequality” (“Invisible” 6) not only between men and women but also among other men. Hence, assuming men as gendered beings for enquiries about men in power relations is 16 essential to the critical studies on men and masculinities to uncover the hidden privileges of men. Among cultural theories and critical literary studies on men, there is no monolithic identification of male power, but multiple denunciations of masculinities and proposed solutions for gender inequalities. Drawing on an extensive range of research, profeminist academics and activists around the world have focused on men’s multifaceted experiences to highlight their ongoing violence, authority, and power in concepts such as hegemony, heteronormativity, homosociality, and homophobia in varied contexts (Haywood et al. 4). The mutual notion among these studies is the ultimate rejection of the conservative reductionist proposition that masculinity is biologically natural and morally necessary. All profeminist allies, therefore, assert that masculinity is culturally fabricated, not biologically mandated, yet men, assuming masculinity, have most often been the privileged party in gender hierarchies. Earlier enquiries about men’s asymmetric power over women, children, and other men in the web of power relations came under intense scrutiny in Australian sociologist and philosopher Raewyn Connell’s theory of gender. “Gender,” Connell argues, “is a way in which social practice is ordered” (Masculinities 71). Based on the perspective of Connell, the concept of gender is fundamentally flawed, as it implies that social roles are inherently dictated by human biology. Instead, Connell posits that the constructs of masculinity and femininity are purely products of societal influences and expectations. Historical, contextual, and unstable configurations of masculinity and femininity are (re)produced in particular gender relations, which depend on fundamental structures such as power, labour, and cathexis (Connell, Gender and Power 98-99). These structures are constituted through bodily practises, performances, and reproduction processes. Thus, masculinity and femininity are the products of a gender project, which is always subject to change, whereby men and women (re)position themselves. Neither masculinity nor femininity is independent of the indicated time and place within a given society (Masculinities 72). While addressing gender projects, Connell focuses on three main areas through which 17 men as gendered beings are to be analysed, namely global, regional, and local settings. Either global or local, a specific gender order is created by distinct material practices. Connell further argues that in this gender order, particular gender regimes are located. Gender regimes denote clear implications and applications peculiar to specific institutions and might show variety in local settings. The comprehensive arrangement of gender regimes embraces both institutional structures and cultural habitus, wherein gender order is constructed in a broader aspect. These structures are the state, the labour market, and the family, through which reciprocal relations are obtained as gender regimes among distinct hierarchies (Gender and Power 120). Hence, Connell suggests that “these concepts that gender regimes and gender orders [too] are historical products and subject to change in history” (The Men and the Boys 29). In these historical and cultural constructions of the gender order, Connell draws attention to the plurality of masculinities (and also femininities) to analyse men’s practices as gendered beings. Hence, for the first time, men become the objects of enquiries in gender relations. In her formulation, then, it is possible to pinpoint distinct typologies of masculinities at the intersection of gender, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality, and age, which lays bare the idea that masculinity practices of a man of colour might be different from a white man’s in terms of ethnicity on the one hand, and the other, the practices of working-class men might also differ class- wise from a middle-class man’s masculinity practises. Locating the notion of plural masculinities, a notion that highlights the fact that masculinity is not a monolithic, stable, historical, biological, uncontested, universal truth, but a somewhat fragmented, multi-layered, fluid, dependable construct wherein distinct men are attached, Connell mentions a disparate group of men such as gay men of colour, feminine factory workers, middle-class rapists, and cross-dressers who could represent diverse masculinity practices. Economic, social, legal, and therefore political relations among these disparate groups of men are constantly (re)arranged following the values 18 closely tied to hegemonic masculinity13, which is delineated on the top of other categorisations such as subordinating, complicit, marginalised, and protest masculinities, (Masculinities 76). None of these categorisations is fixed; instead, they are subject to change due to the fluidity of gender relations as they are social constructions in distinct historical contexts. Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as a target achievement for all men, as she borrows Antonio Gramsci’s term hegemony in the context of unequal gender relations. Gramsci formulates his theory of hegemony to demonstrate how power is legitimatised by the ruling classes. To Gramsci, two main stages, cultural direction and consent, are central to recognising hegemony’s inherent acceptance. In particular, Gramscian hegemony indicates a process of moral, intellectual, and often manupilative leadership and control to seek consent of the subordinated classes during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. In Gramscian hegemony, consent is the key word since it functions for ruling classes to retain domination over the subordinate classes through complex web of mechanisms rather than coercion. Gramsci’s use of hegemony cannot be understood without other concepts he develops, including those of ‘State’ and ‘Civil Society.’ While Gramsci at times uses ‘State’ narrowly to refer to the “governmental-coercive apparatus” (265), he also deploys a broader “general notion of State” (263) or “integral State” (267), which includes both the functions of social hegemony and political government. In this general or integral sense, “[s]tate is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities whereby the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but also manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (244). Accordingly, as the term hegemony signifies, consent and legitimisation are precise principles in the construction of gender relations, particularly hegemonic masculinity, since the superiority 13 The term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ was first coined in the article “Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity” (1985) by Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell and John Lee. Connell later extended the term in her book Gender and Power (1987), wherein she put forward that “hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women” (183). In her later seminal work Masculinities (1995), Connell foregrounds the idea that “masculinity and femininity are inherently relational concepts, which have meaning pertinent to each other, as a social demarcation and a cultural opposition” (43). She rejects the presence of a singular definition of masculinity but defends the existence of a plurality of masculinities. She offers to inspect masculinity typologies under four main sections: hegemonic, subordinate, complicit, and marginalised. To Connell, definitions of each masculinity typology are always fluent, unstable, and dynamic. 19 of some men over women and other men among gender hierarchies is seldom achieved by force, but by mutual consent and cultural dominance since “hegemony [does] not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it mean[s] ascendency achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion” (Howson and Hearn 44). The aspects of hegemonic masculinity enable privileged men to legitimise their granted power over women and other men. More precisely, the subordination of less advantageous and less privileged men by hegemonic forms of masculinity is consolidated through the consent of other men and women at the intersection of broader power relations and particular mundane practices. However, not all men can maintain the dependant, unstable qualities of hegemonic masculinity, as it embodies values with plural ramifications of existing idealised masculinity norms, which are neither complete nor stable. Particular characteristics that hegemonic masculinity implies frequently coincide with contemporary attributions of idealised masculinity norms, such as being a breadwinner, strong, courageous, sexually potent, and progenitive. Along with non-heterosexual men, many non-white men, working-class men, disabled men, or older men tend to remain out of the circle of hegemonic masculinity norms in a particular society. Most of these men also aspire to benefit from the patriarchal dividend14, although they “are not militant in defence of patriarchy” (Connell, The Men and the Boys 31). Complicity plays a crucial role in constructing and saving hegemonic masculinity norms now that being complicit to the ongoing ascendency of hegemonic masculinity is often achieved by consensus. There is, therefore, a symbiotic relationship between hegemonic masculinity and complicity. Hegemonic masculinity norms owe their existence to the collection of beliefs and values created and defended by complicity. In other words, understanding the power of hegemony requires carefully examining the dynamics of complicity. In contemporary societies, complicit men might be respectful towards their partners, wives, daughters, and mothers and take responsibility for 14 The term patriarchal dividend was coined by Raewyn Connell in her book Masculinities (2005) and developed in her following works. Patriarchal dividend refers to the idea that most men, being top of the gender hierarchy, benefit from the privileges of hegemonic masculinity. It is defined as “the advantage men in general gain from the overall subordination of women” (Masculinities 79). Patriarchal dividend projects the historical position of men concerning women and gay men since “men as a group, and heterosexual men in particular, are not oppressed or disadvantaged” (Men and Boys 209). 20 household shares. They might not commit physical violence towards women, other men, and children. However, they do not refrain from the privileges of masculinity and keep reproducing the qualities of hegemonic masculinity and gender inequalities in a given context. As previously mentioned, hegemonic masculinity often rearranges its fluid qualities pertinent to other masculinity categorisations and is constructed through disparities between currently dominant and less valued masculinities and femininities (Connell, Gender and Power 187). Among distinct masculinity categorisations, “[m]iddle-class, white, heterosexual masculinity is used as the marker against which other masculinities are measured” (Pease, Recreating Men 32). Therefore, hegemonic masculinity bears ascendant qualities of current masculinity norms and deliberately disparages several disadvantageous men who cannot position themselves in the most honoured hegemonic ideals. Some relatively unfavourable men remain subordinated, as they cannot open up room for themselves in the circle of legitimised masculinity norms. Accordingly, heterosexual men’s superiority over gay men is presumably most frequent since sexual orientation is one of the most striking determiners of masculine legitimacy among the hierarchies of distinct masculinity categorisations. Gay men are subordinated by heterosexual men in particular material practices such as “political and cultural exclusion, cultural abuse, legal violence, street violence, economic discrimination and personal boycotts” (Connell, Masculinities 78). For heterosexuality is the foremost common denotation of dominant masculinity, gay men often face the risk of illegitimacy both in interpersonal and political stances. On a personal level, gay men confront blatant disregard from heterosexual men and become the objects of violence since they are regarded as a direct threat to heterosexual men’s masculinity. Other than the subordination of peculiar sexual orientations, race, ethnicity, class, and age appear to be potentially decisive factors in gender relations. Traditional gender studies often foreground the oppression of women in gendered societies wherein men are always privileged. However, enquiries about men as gendered beings help unveil some 21 men’s ascendency over other men. Some men are ostracised in masculine hierarchies owing to their marginal identities compared to dominant identity constructions. In this regard, Connell designates marginalised masculinity as a category of men which accentuates “gender forms produced in exploited or oppressed groups such as ethnic minorities, which may share many features with hegemonic masculinity but are socially de-authorized” (The Men and the Boys 30-31). Masculine qualities of the marginalised men are trivialised regarding their ethnicity, race, or age, as they are incompatible with dominant features of hegemonic masculinity. As seen in Connell’s definition, hegemonic norms of masculinity are eager to refute any marginalisation. Either elderly, black, rural, working-class, or Irish masculinities in this regard might provide a brighter picture of distinct enactments of marginalised masculinities pertinent to hegemonic masculinity norms in a wide variety of contexts. Raewyn Connell’s proposal for analysing men as gendered beings in varied typologies opened novel ways to recognise gender relations in general and men’s enduring power among these relations in particular. Assuming men as gendered beings and scrutinising diverse groups of men in distinct contexts have provided a theoretical frame to deconstruct historical and contextual meanings of masculinities. However, Connell’s formulations, to be more precise, her masculinity typologies to examine men’s domination over women and other men have been contested in some ways by particular profeminist academics and theoreticians. Stephen Whitehead, for instance, suspects the legitimacy of the term hegemonic masculinity as it is “weakened once we stress the fluidity, contingency, and multiplicity of masculinities and identities” (“Hegemonic Masculinity Revisited” 58). To Whitehead, the term remains inefficient in shedding light upon “the complex patterns of inculcation and resistance which constitute everyday social interaction” (“Hegemonic Masculinity Revisited” 58). Men’s distinct practices in various hierarchies might be too complicated to be categorised. He also draws attention to the abundance of misinterpretations in diverse disciplines, which may result in the oversimplification of Gramscian hegemony that deserves more sophisticated references. 22 In other respects, Jeff Hearn pinpoints that the categorisation of masculinity is flawed because masculinity typologies necessarily result in stable definitions. He agrees that hegemony might help inspect men critically. Yet, a greater focus should be made on men’s practices in distinct contexts, as he notes that “the concept has generally been employed in too restricted a way; the focus on masculinity is too narrow. Instead, it is time to go back from masculinity to men, to examine the hegemony of men and about men” (“From Hegemonic Masculinity” 59). More importantly, Hern pinpoints the risk of overshadowing men’s harmful practices in class relations as well as gender hierarchies and “suggest[s] a greater attention to the social construction of the systems of differentiations of men and men’s practices rather than the social construction of particular ‘forms’ of men, as masculinities” (“From Hegemonic Masculinity” 60). Finally, Demetrakis Z. Demetriou notifies that Connell’s masculinity categorisations unintentionally create a duality between hegemonic and non-hegemonic masculinities. As the original formulation repeatedly foregrounds the idea that hegemonic masculinity is (re)arranged or (re)configured to impose upon femininities and other masculinities, the indispensable impact of non-hegemonic masculinities on hegemonic masculinity goes unnoticed, as they are “constructed as a dualism, as two distinct and clearly differentiated configurations of practice” (Demetriou, “Connell’s Concept” 347). Hence, separate interrogations or challenges towards Connell’s methodology could be assembled in five main points concerning the underlying concept of masculinity: ostensible ambiguity of masculinity typologies, peculiarly hegemonic masculinity; possible dangers of reification of the idea; the construction and representation of the subject in gender relations; and finally, the pattern of gender relations in general. Thus, Raewyn Connell and James Messerschmidt reformulated some aspects of Connell’s critical masculinity theory and the concept of hegemonic masculinity in a co-authored article titled: “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept” in 2005. In this article, Connell and Messerschmidt respond to major criticisms made towards Connell’s previous formulations of gender, power, and masculinity typologies on men and masculinities and misuses of the concepts Connell had offered to be interrogated. Although this article 23 mostly issued inappropriate or misleading counterarguments, they also found few relevant points and highlighted the need for reformulation and amplification. They decided to discard two features of the previous formulation that emphasise “a too-simple model of the social relations surrounding hegemonic masculinities” (Connell and Messerschmidt 846), referring to a misleading attempt to “locate all masculinities [and femininities] in terms of a single pattern of power, the global dominance of men over women” (Connell and Messerschmidt 846) and some possible treats that might be posed by “the appeal to psychoanalytic ideas about unconscious motivation” (Connell and Messerschmidt 847). Hence, they amplified their gender theory and offered novel areas to empower research on men and masculinities by focusing more on gender hierarchy (reciprocal relations among distinct men, women, and other men), the geography of masculinities (highlighting the contemporary importance of local, regional, global masculinities), social embodiment, and the dynamics of masculinities. Ultimately, Connell has paved the way for analysing men as gendered beings, and her theorisation implemented novel enquiries on gender and power. It is put forward how most men historically achieved privilege in gender hierarchies and legitimated their power through consent at the intersection of varied contexts. Perpetuating their power over women and children, most men have institutionalised patriarchal norms and values based on violence, domination, and structural inequalities. However, affinities, conflicts, struggles, combats, agonies, violence, and peculiar relations among different men have been significant for enquiries into men as gendered beings. Accordingly, it is argued that a single man’s masculinity practices could simultaneously reveal the qualities of peculiar masculinity typologies. Because masculinities denote neither a priori biological reality nor fixed categorisations, they have often been constructed around artificial traits and behaviours to be achieved by men. Ideological (re)configurations repeatedly maintain fluid masculinity traits, and men’s engagement with these (re)produced masculinity practices reveals political reverberations in any personal and public space. Any man might reflect hegemonic masculinity practices as a ruling father at home; he might also be complicit in his attitudes towards a particular 24 political stance or subordinated by his physical weakness, bodily defect, age, sexual orientation, and also marginalised by his race or economic condition. As seen from the examples, it is crucial to denote that neither masculinity typologies nor particular men’s associations with these categorisations are stable. They often intermingle, and intersectional relations constantly reproduce norms of hegemonic masculinity in distinct hierarchies. Hierarchies among men are determined in that men must prove their ‘manhood’ to other men to (re)place themselves in social strata. To prove their ‘manhood’, men, predominantly heterosexual men, need to (re)reproduce and legitimise particular masculinity practices that are associated with maleness. Individual strength, bodily power, resistance, endurance, sexual virility, and toughness are idealised traits of heterosexual masculinities. Because traditional manhood stands for the opposite values attributed to women, despite peculiar conditions defined by class, race, ethnicity, sexuality or age, men ‘become men’ so long as they manage to differ from women in their struggle to prove their maleness. Any personal traits that vaguely imply unmasculine qualities might recall subordination, as implications of being ‘unmanly’ are prone to symbolic assimilation to femininity. These men are in need of approval from other men regarding their social, political, and economic power and sexual virility. In this context, heterosexual men tend to subordinate non-binary men due to their association with femininity. The closer men get to the assumed qualities of gayness and femininity in the traditional perception, the more subordinated they are pinpointed in gender hierarchy due to ongoing homophobia, which has wider political reverberations among contemporary societies. Homophobia has broader connotations than a means for the oppression of sexual minorities. It implicates a significant way of regulating male relations in a political context. Often, homophobia is, in political stance, tactlessly used as a weapon and assuredly politicised as a means of adequate strategy by politicians and decision-making mechanisms either to consolidate their power or legitimate an invasion when socioeconomic stability is at stake in specific contexts. At times when political agenda is 25 requisite for national solidarity, at times when crises and distress peak, gayness is defined as a collective weakness to be defeated in order not to weaken traditional masculinity. For instance, particularly in the Cold War era under McCarthy’s presidency in the United States, hate crimes reached their apexes due to continuous propaganda against gay men, prompted as part of the American ‘lavender scare’15, and homophobia turned into a ‘witch-hunting’ in security forces as gayness was nothing but a Soviet plague invading modern, western communities. Following the USA’s political pressure, the British government was constrained to introduce compulsory identity vetting for civil servants before employment during the 1980s. Hence, homophobia became a helpful tool for Margaret Thatcher to empower her conservative politics when Britain struggled with mega social and economic problems such as record-breaking unemployment rates, migration boom, and rocketing divorce rates. Official campaigns fed the hatred and hostility nurtured towards gay men and other minorities. These campaigns were a part of the Conservative Family Campaign, a bastion of male privilege under the heterosexual politics of Thatcherite Britain16. Thus, masculinity and the image of the ideal man and men as fathers have gained a peculiar meaning during the Thatcher era due to the special prominence given to the family institution. Thatcher’s strict emphasis on the importance of families and men’s roles therein remarks a quite apparent reference to a call for a turn to Victorian values in parallel with the period’s influential motto of ‘back to basics’, denoting a serious wish to 15 ‘The term coined and popularised by the American historian David K. Johnson. In his eponymous book, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government (2004), Johnson documents the anti-homosexual campaign that began in the USA in the 1950s. Throughout the period, a collective fear was prompted by the State officers and the media claiming that many Soviet agents were deciphered in government, some of whom were homosexuals. Consequently, a witch-hunt commenced, and thousands of officers were persecuted. At times, homophobia easily transformed into anti- communist propaganda, when McCarthy defined it as “the psychological maladjustment that led people to communism” (Johnson 16). 16 Martin Durham lays then-contemporary discussions about homosexuality and its possible sanctions held in the Parliament and the media in the chapter titled “The Thatcher Government and the Policing of Sexuality” (1991). And also, for further details, see Matthew Waites’ article “Homosexuality and the New Right: The Legacy of the 1980s for New Delineations of Homophobia” (2000). https://www.socresonline.org.uk/5/1/waites.html . 26 reconstruct the ‘flawed morals’ of the British society. If the heterosexual family man is the idealised form of manhood, homosexual men should be subordinated. Another significant determinant factor in gender relations is race. “Gender and race”, Reeser suggests, “are so often connected and dependent on each other that it is difficult to talk about one without talking about the other” (Masculinities in Theory 161). Nevertheless, the relationship between gender and race had not been a significant subject for critical enquiries until the third wave of feminism paved the way towards problematising the condition of racialised women. Urging attention to how distinct women’s experiences of gender differ due to their race, bell hooks, for example, foregrounded that women of colour could not benefit from white women’s feminist achievements since their segregation begins with their race. White men and men of colour have dominated them simultaneously (Ain’t I A Woman 4-5). Furthermore, Kimberly Crenshaw highlighted the importance of paying attention to different forms of inequality women, particularly black women, have faced. Coining the term ‘intersectionality’, Crenshaw argues that black women often “experience double discrimination” (149), as they sometimes suffer from segregation the same way white women do. In another context, they are objectified in the same way as black men. The concept of intersectionality, therefore, has influenced feminist interrogations by broadening their scope to include the experiences of marginalised groups of women, as struggles for gender equality tend to be more inclusive and better able to challenge systems of oppression. It is thus emphasised that inequalities based on race and gender continuously intersect and exacerbate each other. Before third-wave feminism’s critical interest, men of colour were not frequently considered subjects for debate regarding their masculinity practices and attitudes towards women, children, and other men. These men and their masculinity practices remained hidden in plain sight for a long time. Intersections of gender, race, and power lay bare how some men have historically tended to assume supremacy over other men by marginalisation. In a larger historical and social context, black men have often been marginalised by white men and remained disadvantaged in achieving the idealised norms 27 of hegemonic masculinity due to the ‘visibility’ of their race. Because masculinity has often been defined as ‘white’ by the white, “any hegemony or advantage assigned to masculinity can be attributed to the category of whiteness” (Reeser, Mascul1n1t1es 1n Theory 145). Defining themselves superior, the white has marginalised men of colour through economic and political means and deliberately limited their access to financial resources and political power since the very beginning of colonisation17. To save their geographic, economic, social and, therefore, political privileges, the white has long assumed supremacy over men of colour by marginalising them in multiple ways. White supremacy has been perpetuated with stereotyping, focusing mainly on their bodies. Stereotyping through the physical representation of men of colour in mass media has often been pejorative and involved explicit discrimination. The constructed images of these men imply physicality, strength, and sporting and sexual prowess and enable “a site for European fantasies about black male sexuality” (Westwood 57). Hence, the heavy emphasis on men of colour’s bodies in visual media such as films, TV serials, commercials, and sports events maintains the implementation of sexual deviancy and reverberates the repercussions of the ongoing colonial phantasy of the Western world. It is suggested that the animosity between polarised communities causes masculine anxiety, as both parties see each other as threatening their masculinity. Pejorative representations of black male bodies evoke fear and hate towards these ‘othered’ men that accelerate in specific times and settings. Particularly in Thatcherite England, when unemployment rates increased, the income gap between the rich and the poor peaked; when the HIV/AIDS pandemic became a crucial agenda, the flow of immigrants, 17 In the United States, black men’s alleged marginalisation could not be fully apprehended unless the history of colonisation and slavery was inspected—white men’s hegemony over men of colour results from several political and economic practices. As an imposed ideology, white supremacy demonised men of colour who internalised their ‘inability’ to become ‘true patriarchs’ in time. Walter Allen thoroughly documents how whiteness is invented in particular states such as Virginia and Maryland so that sugar plantations and cotton fields could be financially controlled for the benefit of the colonisers (qtd in Armengol, “Past, Present and Future” 67). Consequently, the black has been symbolically ‘feminised’ and ‘infantilised’ by the white through physical violence and cultural hegemony. For instance, bell hooks, in her influential book titled Black Look: Race and Representation, demonstrates how cultural materials such as TV serials, commercials, pop songs and singers amplified the black demonising in various contexts. For further arguments on black masculinity in the context of the United States, see Robert Staples’ book Exploring Black Masculinity (2006). 28 especially immigrants from African and Carribean origins, began to be questioned. In a socio-political context wherein the new right demonised people of colour by multiple nationalistic discourses, xenophobia was fed, and these groups were depicted as a direct threat to the establishment. At the intersection of sexual politics and race, the black community was collectively marginalised as the primary cause of these flaws. The political tension and dominant discourse of blame have resulted in reciprocal hatred and antagonism between the nationalist white men and men of colour. As a result, many men of colour assumed novel constructed traits of masculinities, namely black masculinities, denoting a variety of responses and objections to the hegemony of white supremacy and its emasculating practices. For example, many enslaved men of colour would engage in “acts of violence against their wives and children as well as against other male slaves” (Orelus 70). Remaining powerless and marginalised under the violent rule of the white, men of colour also perpetuate violence and discrimination against women, children, and other men to partake of peculiar hegemonic masculinity traits. For this group of men, fashioning dominant, violent, and authoritarian masculinity traits over women and other men helped them prove their manhood as a response to their historical marginalisation and emasculation by the whites. They reflect a particular tendency to reaffirm masculinity, as their masculinity practices become more complicated when they emulate broader implications of contemporary masculinity ideals. Marginalising the ‘Other’ has never been limited to men of colour in Britain. It also includes systematic bias and segregation historically impelled to the Irish. When cultural, social, political, and economic relationships between Ireland and Britain are investigated, one might discern that the former has been subordinated to the latter with a perceived inferiority in various spheres of life. Although Irish men can generally benefit from the white men’s privileges in gender hierarchy, in particular, they have often been marginalised by the English men’s historical domination. As can be seen in the colonial history of Ireland, Irish men were stereotyped as not ‘manly’ enough to rule their own country since manliness implied some essential qualities, such as authority, power, reason, and rationality. 29 Prevailing ethnic and sectarian differences between the dominating English and the dominated Irish are perpetuated through negative stereotypes to prompt the Anglo-Irish subject to be emasculated in popular culture and media representations. It is claimed that there have been fundamental political and economic reasons for rendering the Irish in negative stereotyping. Soon after the massive industrialisation of England, many immigrants moved to urban cities and smaller towns as a labour force, among which the Irish were often significant in number. These immigrants were of grave importance for the infrastructure of Britain in terms of housing, construction, road building, transportation, and mining. They worked in cotton mills, factories, and agriculture, and often engaged in domestic issues18. Such a massive migration brought about inevitable consequences for the Irish as the British found the opportunity to degrade their historical colony, thereby “a wide range of cultural markers of difference juxtaposed the dirtiness, drunkenness, laziness and violence of the Irish with the purity, industriousness and civilisation of the settled English” (Mac an Ghaill and Haywood 145). Nevertheless, soon after the Troubles, when a peace agreement, namely the Good Friday Agreement between the Republicans, the Unionists, and the British, was signed in 1998, a constant shift in representation of the Irish was observed, and Irishness became more visible and seemingly freed from negative stereotyping in British society. Apart from the shifting representations of Irish men in England, it is argued that they managed to hide from the critical gaze in Ireland for a long time. However, interrogations of Irish men and masculinities accelerated throughout the last two decades. Typical among such enquiries, it has been critically put forward that the construction of hegemonic masculinities in Ireland has depended more on three fundamental factors: land, national identity, and Catholicism. 18 Donald M. MacRaild documents the history of Irish migration to Britain from the mid-eighteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century. In his full-length book, MacRaild digs into the economic, political, religious, and sectarian reasons behind the motivation of Irish migration. The Irish contributed to distinct areas of economic and cultural progress in Britain, and “without Irish settlers, the great conurbations of industrial Britain would still have been miserable and unhealthy places to live and work” (Irish Migrants in Modern Britain, 1750-1922 156). For the post-war condition of the Irish in Britain, also see Edna Delaney’s The Irish in Post-War Britain (1999), wherein she revolves around the theme of leaving home and adaptation of the Irish settlers to Britain as well as the ongoing conflicts between the Irish and the British in the post-colonial context. 30 As it is widely accepted, being dependent on the land is a recurrent theme in Irish culture. The economic well-being of colonised Ireland has long relied on the soil, which has many effects on traditional Irish masculinity. This type of masculinity recurs among men who relate to the land and has broader implications, such as celebrating family life, morality, and farm work. It is emphasised that being a dexterous farmer had been a source of male pride and prestige for the traditional Irish men. Symbolised by “[t]he cult of the ‘hard man’” (Bairner 128), Irish farmers, in their representation, appeared to have shaped their land and their soil; in return, they have been shaped by their land. Other than the landscape, Catholicism has also been a prevalent factor in the construction of Irish masculinities and retained the cult of the ‘hard man’. The highly conservative politics and moral teachings of the Roman Catholic church have had a profound influence on Irish society and culture, as it constantly (re)shapes state institutions as well as everyday practices of the Irish (Dillon 114-115; Mac an Ghaill and Haywood 151; Liston 203; Quilty 51). More precisely, the Catholic church has interfered directly with personal issues such as sexualities, reproduction, marriage, and domestic roles for a long time. The strict impositions of moral values by the Catholic church made the people of Ireland remain silent about sex. Even among husbands and wives, sex was not explicitly mentioned. Various sanctions were made to control sexual behaviours. Associating its primary aim with reproduction, sex for pleasure is regarded as immoral, and thus, contraception has been restricted by the Catholic church. The popularity of the Catholic church has begun to fade away, not demised, though, as a result of a significant loss of faith in the morals of this institution. The disclosure of numerous child abuse scandals accelerated the decadence of faith in the Catholic church. Heavy emphasis was placed on the correlation between celibate priests and child abuse in mass media, and discussions peaked when the famous scandal, the Father Brendan Smyth affair, broke19. The mutual consensus after public discussions was that the child 19 Brendan Smyth, the Catholic priest, was revealed to have abused seventeen children for thirty years after a successful investigation. Nonetheless, it was later disclosed that these child abuse issues had already been known yet covered by the media with the help of the state. These media disclosures generated “a profound crisis in the Catholic Church and raised doubts about the trustworthiness of priests and the ability of the 31 abuse in the Catholic church might have been caused by the mandatory requirement of celibacy for the priest since men, due to their taken-for-granted ‘biological fact’, had to have sexual intercourse. Because most church offenders are heterosexual, married men, public debates and discourses to stop abuse reinforced the necessity of having legal sex, promoting the ‘benefits’ of marriage for all men. The media projection of celibate masculinity as dangerous implied married men were safe, and thus, the image of the ‘good father’20 dominated the Irish understanding of ideal masculinity and therefore helped marginalisation of single men. On the other hand, simultaneous with the above-mentioned public debates regarding the decadence of the Catholic church, novel constructions of masculinities emerged soon after the years between 1960-1990, the period called the Celtic Tiger for Ireland. The Celtic Tiger period was a turning point when Ireland began to reach economic prosperity, and many Irish men, particularly the younger generation, mobilised. During and soon after the Celtic Tiger period, most men who used to live outside Ireland began to migrate back and work outside the land owing to new foreign investments and job opportunities. Hence, the image of more self-confident and economically independent men became prevalent, the historical link between traditional Irish masculinity and the land was broken, and the idea of the ‘hard man’ gradually faded. Mobilisation of the younger generation, innovations in work areas, and variations in occupations reinforced an unprecedented change in normative gender relations since women who used to be precluded by the Church began to participate in paid jobs, became more visible in the public domain, and contributed to family income. Dual income in families transformed the traditional family type, and younger men necessarily “forged new, more flexible masculine identities” (Frosh et al. 2). These developments in state to prevent child” (Ferguson, “The Paedophile Priest, 247). Soon after the scandal, the government was broken down. 20 For further details, see Richard Collier’s article “Waiting Till Father Gets Home: Reconstruction of Fatherhood in Family Law” (1995). In his article, Collier indicates that the politics of ‘good father’ in the 1990s is reminiscent of ‘back to basics’ politics. The safeness of fatherh