



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of English Language and Literature

**MONSTERS, MARTIANS AND MACHINES: THE EVOLUTION
OF “THE OTHER” THROUGH THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITISH SCIENCE FICTION**

Zehra Safa MANGIRCIOĞLU

Master’s Thesis

Ankara, 2026

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KABUL VE ONAY

Zehra Safa MANGIRCIOĞLU tarafından hazırlanan “Monsters, Martians and Machines: The Evolution of ‘The Other’ Through the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century British Science Fiction” başlıklı bu çalışma, 29.09.2026 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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To the children of Palestine, who never had the chance to grow up old enough to learn how to read...

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ABSTRACT

MANGIRCIOĞLU, Zehra Safa. *Monsters, Martians and Machines: The Evolution of “The Other” Through the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century British Science Fiction*, Master’s Thesis, Ankara, 2026.

Science fiction has long been a fertile ground for reimagining what it means to be human by exploring what it means to be not human. In particular, British science fiction of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has served as a powerful narrative laboratory for representing and interrogating the concept of “the Other.” Across the span of approximately one hundred and fifty years, the figure of the Other in science fiction transforms—from bodily grotesquerie to imperial threats, and finally to disembodied yet intelligent systems. Through detailed analysis of Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein: Or the Modern Prometheus* (1818), H.G. Wells’s *The War of the Worlds* (1898), and Arthur C. Clarke’s *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), this study traces a progression from the bodily Other to the colonial Other, and finally to the posthuman Other. Each novel reflects its historical moment: Shelley’s creature embodies fears of scientific transgression and physical monstrosity; Wells’s Martians mirror imperialist ideologies and fears of reverse colonisation; and Clarke’s HAL 9000 personifies anxieties about artificial intelligence and the loss of human agency. Drawing on theoretical frameworks from monster theory, colonial studies, and posthumanism, the thesis demonstrates how the genre of science fiction participates in redefining the boundaries of the human by reimagining the figure of the Other across time. Ultimately, this study argues that British science fiction offers a unique lens through which to understand the shifting cultural constructions of otherness in modernity.

Keywords

Frankenstein, *The War of the Worlds*, *2001: A Space Odyssey*, The Other, Science Fiction, Aliens, Artificial Intelligence

ÖZET

MANGIRCIOĞLU, Zehra Safa. *Canavarlar, Marslılar ve Makineler: 19. Ve 20. Yüzyıl İngiliz Bilim Kurgusunda “Öteki’nin” Evrimi*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2026.

Bilim kurgu, insan olmamanın ne anlama geldiğini keşfederek, insan olmanın ne anlama geldiğini yeniden düşünmek için uzun zamandır verimli bir zemin oluşturmıştır. Özellikle 19. ve 20. Yüzyıl İngiliz bilimkurgusu, “Öteki” kavramını temsil etmek ve irdelemek için güçlü bir anlatı laboratuvarı işlevi görmüştür. Bir asırdan fazla bir süre boyunca, bilimkurgudaki Öteki figürü, bedensel grotesklikten emperyal tehditlere ve nihayet bedensiz ancak zeki varlıklara doğru dönüşmüştür. Ayrıntılı Analiz yoluyla bu çalışma, Mary Shelley’nin *Frankenstein: Ya da Modern Prometheus* (1818), H.G. Wells’in *Dünyalar Savaşı* (1898) ve Arthur C. Clarke’ın *2001: Bir Uzay Macerası* (1968) adlı eserlerinde bedensel Öteki’den sömürgeci Öteki’ye ve nihayetinde insanötesi Öteki’ye uzanan gelişim sürecini izlemektedir. Her roman kendi tarihsel dönemini yansıtır: Shelley’nin yarattığı, bilimsel sınır ihlali ve bedensel canavarlık korkularını somutlaştırır; Wells’in Marslıları, emperyalist ideolojileri ve tersine sömürgeleştirme korkularını yansıtır; Clarke’ın HAL 9000’i ise yapay zekâ ve insan iradesinin yitirilmesi konusundaki endişeleri temsil eder. Canavar teorisi, sömürgecilik çalışmaları ve posthümanizm alanlarında teorik çerçevelerden yararlanarak bu tez, bilim kurgu türünün zaman içinde “Öteki” figürünü yeniden kurgulayarak insanlık sınırlarının yeniden tanımlanmasına nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, İngiliz bilim kurgusunda “ötekiliğin” değişen kültürel yapılanmaları anlamak için emsalsiz bir bakış açısı sunduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Frankenstein, Dünyalar Savaşı, 2001: Bir Uzay Destanı, Öteki, Bilim Kurgu, Uzaylılar, Yapay Zeka

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ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Artificial Intelligence
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, humans have consistently positioned themselves as the centre of meaning and value, disposing of what is different or unfamiliar to the margins and designating it as *the Other*. This dynamic is especially evident in science fiction, a genre that serves as a cultural mirror in which alternative realities, forms of existence, and speculative scenarios can unfold without constraint. As a result, science fiction offers a particularly rich site for examining how societies construct, confront, and negotiate otherness and othering. This thesis argues that the concept of otherness and representation of the Other in the nineteenth and twentieth century British science fiction novels evolve through time in accordance with the major concerns of their era as can be traced in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein: Or the Modern Prometheus*, H.G. Wells' *The War of the Worlds*, and Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Each novel respectively captures the spirit of its time, as Shelley's creature mirrors the fears of physical monstrosity and scientific transgression; Wells's Martians reflect imperialist ideologies and fears of reverse colonisation; and Clarke's HAL 9000 personifies fears of artificial intelligence and the loss of human agency. In this sense, the novels demonstrate the changing scientific, technological, social and political conditions which transform the Other, and the progression of the concept of the Other, which manifests itself as a reflection of the concerns of their era such as dangers of scientific overreaching, imperialism, or non-human agency.

Science fiction has long served as a cultural mirror, reflecting societal hopes and anxieties through imagined futures, alien encounters, and monstrous creations, and it would not be wrong to state that its birth is the result of humanity's compilation of accomplishments. Technology and advancements that had been accumulating since the Renaissance reached a critical mass in the mid-eighteenth century, paving the way for the Age of Science (Gunn 10). In fact, the late-eighteenth century scientific breakthroughs turned Britain into a laboratory of possibilities, and writers incorporated these possibilities with imagination. As Michael R. Page points out, Erasmus Darwin's claim that he would "enlist the

imagination under the banner of science” set a precedent for poets such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, leading them to classify the *Lyrical Ballads* as “an experiment” in a previous advertisement (Wordsworth 898). Indeed, Page also draws attention to that along with Wordsworth, Erasmus Darwin was one of the key names to connect the fields of literature and science by virtue of his revolutionary ideas as an accomplished scientist and the poet of the previous century. Darwin’s didactic poems of longitude, such as *The Loves of the Plants*, as well as his scientific works, such as *Zoonomia*, bridged the two fields in Britain and contributed to the emergence of Romanticism and evolutionary theory (Page 17). Later, with Charles Darwin, evolution expands into a biological theory of evolution based on natural selection, variation, and heredity (Bowler, *The Eclipse* 7).

At the same time, engineers such as James Watt and Matthew Boulton turned the abstract principles of thermodynamics into practical steam engine that powered not only factories, but also railways and ships (Bernal 530). The public demonstrations of steamships and locomotives were enchanting for the spectators, but what they also did was to introduce the idea of self-moving objects, making them a familiar reality (Burgess Jr. 23-24). The era’s spectacular automata displayed as clockwork wonders in museums and fairs blurred the line between fact and fiction (Tresch 91). These self-moving figures came to embody both the excitement of industrial progress and the anxieties it stirred, a tension that the nineteenth-century British science fiction would return to again and again (Tresch 92). In addition, scientific breakthroughs regarding electricity in the late eighteenth-century with Luigi Galvani’s “galvanism” in 1786, and Alessandro Volta’s “voltaic pile” in 1799 caused concern of scientific possibilities in the public eye (Krischel 20). In short, the convergence of Darwin’s visionary rhetoric, Watt’s transformative steam power, and the theatrical dramatisation of technology forged a fertile ground where speculative narratives could flourish, giving birth to the first distinctly scientific forms of fiction in the early nineteenth-century. In fact, young Mary Shelley produced her novel *Frankenstein* through the inspiration she drew from the scientific possibilities of electricity and medicine had reached (*Frankenstein* 8). In her introduction to the 1831 edition of the novel, she mentions the discussions on the principle of life and Luigi Galvani’s experiments between her husband Percy Bysshe Shelley and Lord Byron, leading her to think “[p]erhaps a corpse would be animated; galvanism had given token of such things” (*Frankenstein* 8). In that sense, many scholars such as James Gunn and

Brian W. Aldiss agree that *Frankenstein* is *the* initial example of science fiction (Gunn 11; Aldiss 19). This is almost considered as a “Stone Age truth” (Aldiss 19).

While these series of experiments and discoveries ignited the light for the artists and scientists to explore the possibilities of scientific discoveries through their fictional work, the authors’ such productions at the time were not classified as science fiction per se. In Britain, “scientific romance” was used from time to time in order to describe tales of scientific advancements and stories of innovations concerning probabilities of what constant experimentation might bring (Aldiss 33). The term “science fiction” became the term it is today only in the late 1920s in the United States. Although it was first used in 1851 by William Wilson, it owes its common usage to Hugo Gernsback (Bould and Vint 1). Gernsback initially coined the term “scientification” in 1916 for the advancing fictional works ornamented with science; however, “science fiction” became the term favoured by 1926 (Bould and Vint 2, Aldiss 32). Both terms were generally applied to the stories that appeared in American pulp magazines such as *Amazing Stories* of which Gernsback was the editor in the 1920s (Aldiss 32). These magazines helped spreading science fiction to a wider audience, thereby boosting the genre’s popularity (Aldiss 32). Through time, science fiction thrived as a popular and encompassing genre.

Even though the term gained popularity among its fans as well as the academia, conceptualising science fiction as a literary genre has proven to be laborious due to the challenging nature of defining what makes up this genre. According to Bould and Vint, science fiction is not fixed as a genre but is rather “an ongoing process of negotiation” (1). Over time, however, several definitions have been offered by scholars such as Darko Suvin, James Gunn, and Christopher McKitterick.

To begin with, Darko Suvin, one of the most prominent figures in the scholarship on this field to this day, defines science fiction as the “literature of cognitive estrangement” (372). This definition highlights the genre’s ability to provoke thought by presenting familiar aspects of reality in unfamiliar contexts, often futuristic or alien. The estrangement is mostly created via the familiarity of the fictional world of the work that allows the reader to associate themselves with it, bridging reality and fiction (Suvin 373). For many scholars, it is this definition that contextualised science fiction as a literary field to be studied (Bould and Vint 17).

On the other hand, James Gunn comments that “[d]efining [science fiction] is like measuring the properties of an electron: you may think you are measuring a solid object, but it [is] really a wispy cloud” (vii). Gunn’s earlier definition of the genre is:

the branch of literature that deals with the effects of change on people in the real world as it can be projected into the past, the future, or to distant places. It often concerns itself with scientific and technological change, and it usually involves matters whose importance is greater than the individual or the community; often civilisation or the race itself is in danger. (1)

He argues that conventional literature belongs to the past and serves as its continuation. However, science fiction literature is about change, thus belonging to the present and the future (8). Based on this point of view, the scholar later reduces his definition of science fiction to simply “literature of change” (Gunn 8).

Similar to Gunn, Christopher McKitterick agrees that change is indeed the true essence of science fiction; it is constant and continuous in the genre, almost as if it were fluid (19). Therefore, he proceeds to define the genre as “an ongoing conversation” among writers, scholars, fans, and other professionals, and the discussion it brought is what it means to be or not to be human (McKitterick 19). Furthermore, McKitterick draws attention to the genre’s ability of projection; he states that the settings of science fiction, such as alien worlds and future environments, allow the reader to discover the current world they live in through dialectic representation. He further argues that science fiction belongs to humanity as a species, to their evolution through time, and how they will continue evolving (19). In that sense, science fiction can be evaluated as “fundamentally Darwinian” (Gunn 8).

Since each definition of science fiction highlights a particular facet of the genre, it is reasonable to regard all three as valid, particularly within such an inherently ambiguous field that has prompted numerous scholarly definitions. Suvin conceptualises the literary genre, while Gunn and McKitterick draw attention to a different qualitative factor of it that is its evolutionary nature. This nature, however, does not prevent the genre from making use of repetitive patterns, settings and schemes such as struggle of power and domination, forming identities based on binary opposition of Self and Other, and making use of the era’s concern and anxieties while doing so. In fact, it is possible to argue that

science fiction demonstrates its fluidity in the representation of these patterns and concerns.

One of the most persistent concerns in science fiction is the figure of “the Other”, which is perceived as fundamentally different, threatening, or unknowable. When an individual considers another person as an Other, they presume that Other’s identity is different in an unfavourable way, mostly leading them to *other* the Other. Subsequently, in order to comprehend the concept of the Other, the idea of selfhood must be understood first.

In this respect, the first chapter of this study will examine the theory of the Other through a chronological exploration of its major philosophical and academic formations, tracing its development from genealogical to theoretical terms. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831) is often considered as the first philosopher to conceptualise selfhood as dependent on an encounter with another self, where one’s self-consciousness can only be achieved through the recognition of another self-consciousness (Kojève 7-8). Significantly, the other becomes not an external object to the self but a constitutive part of it. In the early twentieth century, Edmund Husserl redirects this discussion towards the question of intersubjectivity, and focuses on how individuals experience and differentiate themselves from others (92). Later, Maurice Merleau-Ponty draws the attention on the body in particular, and state that otherness is located in the corporeal existence (75-76). Corporeality of the Other takes a new turn with Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s monster theory, for he focuses on the monstrous body as the historical and cultural mirror of its time of origin. Therefore, he highlights the changing nature of the monster. With Fredric Jameson, the employment of Self and Other in narrative structures are exposed as Jameson argues that narratives reflect their respective time by means of this employment. Then, it can be understood that since the perception of the self and the qualities that define it evolve from the norms of the time, the figure of the Other and its reflection in science fiction also transform across more than a century, from bodily grotesque to imperial threats, and finally to disembodied yet intelligent systems.

In the second chapter of the thesis, I will focus on bodily Other through a critical analysis of Frankenstein’s creature. As briefly mentioned above, the nineteenth-century witnessed the rise of industrialisation, scientific inquiry, and the expansion of British imperialism, which are some of the developments that influenced literature to interrogate the limits of

humanity. Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein: Or the Modern Prometheus* (1818) offers a foundational depiction of the Other in the form of the bodily monstrous: a synthetic being constructed by man and rejected by its very own creator as well as the society. Shelley's creature is not merely a product of scientific hubris; he is a complex, self-aware subject, whose bodily otherness elicits both horror and empathy. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen states, "[t]he monster's body quite literally incorporates fear, desire, anxiety, and fantasy (ataractic or incendiary), giving them life and an uncanny independence" (4). Victor Frankenstein's creature, then, functions as an early emblem of the Other: an unnatural body whose exclusion underscores the fragility of human boundaries.

In the third chapter, I will explore the colonial and coloniser Other through the Martian invaders of H.G. Wells. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898) channels late-Victorian imperial anxieties into a narrative of alien invasion in the form of grotesquely pictured Martians. The extraterrestrial Martians that are technologically superior and highly expansionist mirror the violence of the British Empire itself. As John Rieder has noted, Wells inverts the colonial gaze, portraying the British as victims of the very logics of domination they imposed abroad (5). The Victorian public's reassuring assumptions regarding the reliability and safety of the British Empire are challenged immensely in the story, as the alien becomes the colonising Other: inscrutable, advanced, and utterly alienating. In doing so, Wells not only critiques imperialism but also anticipates early science fiction's broader role as a site of cultural self-examination as well as leading the way for science fiction narratives to follow through the next century (Pinter 134).

In the last chapter of this thesis, bodily existence of the Other will be diminished, yet it will change its form as artificial intelligence as the Other through Clarke's HAL 9000. By the early to mid-twentieth-century, science fiction has begun to reflect growing concerns about technology, mechanisation, and the future of human identity. The rise of cybernetics, automation, and totalitarian regimes reshape the figure of the Other into something less tangible but no less threatening. Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) stands as a significant British literary contribution regarding the developed computers and artificial intelligences. At the heart of Clarke's novel is HAL 9000, an artificial intelligence whose cold precision and logical reasoning ultimately mask deep flaws. HAL does not threaten humanity through brute force but through an

error in cognition—a misalignment between human instructions and machine logic. Katherine Hayles identifies this as a defining feature of the posthuman Other: the emergence of non-human consciousness that challenges human uniqueness without necessarily seeking to destroy it (2). HAL's calm voice and non-corporeal presence mark a new stage of otherness, one in which the boundary between creator and creation is not just blurred but potentially reversed (Hayles 283).

The thesis will end with a conclusion that demonstrates the Other as a dynamic and historically transforming concept that affects British science fiction in various facets. Accordingly, British science fiction over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrates an evolution in the construction of the Other from bodily monstrosity in *Frankenstein*, to the imperial alien in *The War of the Worlds*, and finally to the posthuman AI in *2001: A Space Odyssey*.

By materialising distinction through bodies experimented on, aliens, and technologically advanced artificial intelligence, science fiction renders visible the patterns that construct otherness. Subsequently, the Other itself becomes mutable in accordance with the social anxieties. Accordingly, this thesis will argue that representation of the Other in the nineteenth and twentieth century British science fiction novels evolve as does speculative narratives' relationship with the histories and theories of othering.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE OTHER

Humanity has always tried to make meaning of their surrounding world, their own existence, and their relationship with different beings. Understanding, recognising, and acknowledging themselves have been an effort to interpret the life they pursue. In this effort, they classified their environment, labelling essentially every being and item in order to identify themselves so that their intellectual world to become clear. What they knew was themselves; familiar, inherently normal, and completely compatible. Whatever they were not, on the other hand, became the Other – unfamiliar, unfathomable, and most of the time, agitating.

In the *Encyclopaedia of Identity*, “the Other” is described as “[an identity which is] perceived negatively and is deemed different from and less admired or respected than the self” (529). When an individual supposes another person as Other, that individual presumes that their identities are different in an unfavourable way, mostly leading them to other the Other. “Othering” is also defined by the *Encyclopaedia* as “the process of identifying an individual or a group of people as the other, mark[ing] them as strange, foreign, exotic or heathen” (520). Through direct communication, or its lack thereof, the person who deems another person as the Other follows a procedure of othering, thereby socially constructing a mode of thinking that puts these two identities in diametrical opposition. What draws attention is that this socially constructed practice inevitably and essentially requires a sense of self which “categorise[s] and cognitively organise[s] the perceived identities of other individuals” (*Encyclopaedia* 529). In order to comprehend the concepts of the Other and othering, then, one must first understand the idea of selfhood and how it is constructed in opposition to the Other.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) is often viewed as the first philosopher who framed selfhood as a dependent unit on an encounter with the Other. Hegel claims that “consciousness of a thing [is] possible only for a self-consciousness,” because one can only attain understanding and knowledge through a form of self-reflection (102). Inevitably, then, self-consciousness is a prerequisite of knowledge. On the other hand,

self-consciousness itself requires an acknowledgement of another Self, for “[i]t is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in otherness” (Hegel 102). As can be inferred, development of the self-consciousness is dependent on an Other’s self-consciousness, which is precisely the core of Hegel’s renowned master-slave dialectic, also known as lord-bondsman dialectic. The binary is built upon the recognition of one’s self that can only be achieved through the recognition of another consciousness, which makes the other not merely an external object but a constitutive part of the Self (Kojève 8). As French summarises, “[t]o recognize an other is to recognize that I also have a being-for-other because being-in-itself and being-for-other cannot be held apart, we see that our identity is not our possession alone, but is dependent upon how I am recognized by others” (3).

The French philosopher Alexandre Kojève identifies the impetus for the dialectic of self-consciousness as a struggle for recognition (7). When two individuals encounter one another, each possesses an inherent desire to be recognised as the autonomous one. This mutual demand inevitably precipitates a struggle for dominance as Hegel states, “the relation of the two self-consciousness individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle” (113-114). Consequently, the victor of this clash becomes the Master, and the overpowered assumes the role of the Slave. However, this clash cannot terminate with the death of either party, for the victor requires a conscious subject that validates their autonomy (Kojève 15). Thus, the Master’s status is paradoxically contingent on the Slave’s acknowledgement. Without the existence of a subordinate self-consciousness, the Master cannot build or sustain their superior identity. In this dynamic, the Master subjugates the Other by seeking recognition without granting it. While the recognition is unilateral, the identities of both the Master and the Slave are mutually constitutive. Either party’s death dissolves the dialectic, hence it erodes the survivor’s autonomy. Then, the “real and true [individual] is the result of ... interaction[s] with others” (Kojève 15), since an individual cannot grasp their own self in the absence of others. Then, it will not be wrong to assume that identity is an interdependent and relational construct rather than inherent.

In the next century, Edmund Husserl carries Hegel's teachings one step further and modifies them by putting the emphasis on intersubjectivity. This time, shifting the focus from the struggle for recognition to the phenomenological constitution of subjectivities, Husserl states that otherness is "a *transcendental theory of experiencing someone else*," a.k.a "empathy" (Husserl 92). Dan Zahavi explains this perspective as the self's recognition of the Other not as an object but rather as a subjectivity through empathetic apperception (110-112). As Sara Heinamaa summarises, Husserl's argument is built upon how "the constitution of the objective world and objective nature essentially depends on the constitution of intersubjectivity and other selves, and the latter further depends on the constitution of one's own embodiment" (44). Husserl believed that intersubjectivity, that is, the shared experiences between individuals, was essential to comprehend how objective reality and transcendence are constituted (Zahavi 111). Consequently, the relation between subjects brings about empathy as a requirement for the comprehension of the Other, such as how a self that is a subject can perceive another subject. As Walsh points out, empathy in Husserlian thought is pivotal in order to comprehend both the objective realm of nature and the socio-cultural landscape of history's constitution (259).

The Fifth Meditation of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (1931) is particularly focused on the Other's constitution in consciousness. The philosopher highlights that the Other, as an independent object in the objective world, is not completely accessible for the Self, which is precisely what makes the Other, since their inner subjectivity is the line through which the Other becomes the Other for the self (Husserl 109). Husserl writes "... if what belongs to the Other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same" (109). Thus, the gap in between "I" and the Other is essential in order to perceive the Other as a subject. Then, there is a necessity of asymmetry for the constitution of the Other in the self's own consciousness (Walsh 262).

However, what becomes significant is that the constitution process takes place merely based on the living physical existence. Husserl states that the self experiences its own body as an animate object that can be governed, and asymmetrically perceives the Other as another animate object that cannot be ruled or governed but solely perceived (97). According to Walsh, this asymmetry is the triggering point for empathy, as an individual's

own bodily self-awareness enables them to comprehend the Other as a similar animate being (262-263). The self builds a connection with the Other's animation based on its own animate capability. Then, empathy becomes the focal point for the perception of the Other in the self's consciousness. However, it must be remembered that according to this account, empathy is built upon merely the bodily encounter between the two parties.

Husserl's account of empathy and the perception of the Other influenced many philosophers to come, but the focus on the bodily perception of the Other influenced one in particular. The French philosopher and phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed Husserl's perspective in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) stating that the Other is in fact located in the body-subject itself, that is, the flesh (75-76). The philosopher writes that "[the] body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, ... [it is] the general instrument of [the self's] 'comprehension'," which makes the body the irreducible mediator of reality and perception (Merleau-Ponty 235). Then, the world is not an objective arena but a carnal field structured and perceived through the body itself. This indicates that rather than a detached mind, the encounter with the Other is embodied inherently, and inevitably they share an intersubjective world (Lau 145).

What draws attention in Merleau-Ponty's account is that this intertwined structure creates intercorporeality, which is a reciprocal perception-action cycle. As explained by Kwok-Ying Lau, the Other is also a carnal subject just as the Self, and perceives the world through their body proper (145). Consequently, the perception of the Other occurs through embodied interactions such as primordial empathy and behaviour-matching through which meanings are directly shared (Tanaka 462). After all, Merleau-Ponty highlights that the self and the Other are "collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity ... and [they] co-exist through a common world" (354). Then, although the self and the Other become complementary for one another's existence, it is possible to state that perception, meaning-making, and culture are always already embodied and intersubjective.

Now that the genealogy of the term has been established, and the interdependent relationship between Self and Other is demonstrated, it is crucial to examine how the non-human Other engages with the Self in narratives and how the concept of structural othering manifests itself in speculative fiction. Corporeality of the Other in non-human

contexts immediately recalls Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's foundational contribution to monster theory. In his seven theses on the monster which consists the basis of contemporary monster theory, Cohen explains that monsters function as a means to underline the cultures in which they are formed, as they are "the embodiment of a certain cultural moment," therefore, "the monstrous body is pure culture" (Cohen 4). Monsters come to the fore with their bodily existence dwelling on distinctness, they are "difference made flesh ... [and] dialectical Other[s]," revealing critical information regarding the Self, the normal, and the human (Cohen 4). In this context, monsters underline the fears that are formed historically and culturally, as Çakır points out, for "they function as the ultimate incorporation of human fears about society, socio-political events, and the very selfhood of an individual" (3). Subsequently, the representation of the Other can take the monstrous form, and are subject to change and transformation in accordance with their time's causes of distress and panic.

In addition to monstrosity, it is also possible to observe the notion of the non-human Other in psychoanalytic and structural approaches with Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection. According to Kristeva, the abject is neither subject nor object; it consists of the features of both, and yet, it exists in the liminal space in-between (Kristeva 1-2). The critical point regarding the abject is that it has been a part of the Self, but it is violently expelled in order to establish and protect the boundaries of the Self (Arya 4). Then, the abject is not entirely external but remains in relation with the Self; it becomes "'the [O]ther' that comes from within," therefore impossible to dispose (Arya 4). The abject is threatening precisely because of its intimate proximity to the self – it is what must be expelled in order for the subject to emerge as coherent.

Although it is expelled from the Self, it is not possible to leave the abject behind, as it does not diminish but lingers, posing a threat to the Self's boundaries in a non-object form, thus frightening (Kristeva 6). Naturally, it imbues disgust and horror. First and famous examples Kristeva makes use of are bodily fluids such as blood and vomit, corpses and the maternal body (Kristeva 3-6). Each has been a component of the Self until the rejection and ejaculation, yet once they are expelled, they become the threatening reminders of the Self's borders due to the fact that they will remain in relation to the Self, for the abject always connotes the unclean, the excess, and contamination.

By way of the abjection process, certain identities and figures are socially constructed as inordinate and corrupt, hence serving the purpose of underlining normative boundaries of the human. As Rina Arya points out, the key to this construction is the fear of the Other coming from within, as this fear can be reflected onto different individuals and social groups stigmatising them based on their differences (7). In this sense, the abject legitimises the social exclusion and marginalisation, and can be utilised as a tool for the power holders to exert authority. Hence, it can be stated that abjection functions as a mechanism through which the non-human Other is produced, particularly in discourses surrounding colonialism, gender, and other similar relationships of power where fears of boundary confusion are most pronounced.

When it comes to narratives concerning the boundaries of Self and Other, the American literary theorist and critic Fredric Jameson provides a general understanding of the use of Self and Other relationship in his book *The Political Unconscious* (1981). Focusing on narrative as a socially symbolic act, Jameson states that the Self and Other's interaction is central to the construction of ideological binary oppositions in narratives, especially through *good* and *evil*:

... [T]he concept of good and evil is a positional one that coincides with categories of Otherness. Evil thus ... continues to characterise whatever is radically different from me, whatever by virtue of precisely that difference seems to constitute a real and urgent threat to my own existence. (101)

In other words, the Self is always in association with goodness and all the relevant attributions, whereas the Other is, inevitably, the exact opposite. The focal point is that the Other is “not ... feared because [it] is evil; rather [it] is evil *because* [it] is the Other, alien, different, strange, unclean, and unfamiliar” (Jameson 101). As Jameson argues, narratives employ this binary as a vehicle to ideologies in order to legitimise power and domination structures (Jameson 101). Correspondingly, narratives in general make use of this ethical binary to disclose historical anxieties. Jameson makes use of medieval romances to exemplify and demonstrate the operation of the Self vs Other binary and highlights that the evil opponent, somehow, is always a projection of the noble knight's representation, and the conceptual dilemma is resolved with the defeat of the sinister Other (105). It is possible to argue that the same pattern is visible in science fiction narratives. By exteriorization of difference via alien species, hybrids, technologically

altered bodies, and artificial intelligences, science fiction highlights the instruments through which otherness is constructed, feared, or regulated.

In fact, science fiction's emergence is a response to the rapid developments in science and technology, as Patrick Brantlinger argues; it is a result of the Victorian fiction being affected from the increasing "power and hegemony of sciences" (*Companion* 370). Yet, the application of science in these novels is rather fantastic than realistic. Often critical of science, Brantlinger draws attention that the genre is more concerned with scientific failures rather than science itself (*Companion* 370). This, in itself, highlights the reflective nature of speculative fiction, as the subject matter of the scientific romances generally consists of a "nightmarish plot of the mad scientist concocting monsters," which means "science fiction, rather than celebrating science or investigating how its discoveries affect everyday life, more often illustrates the dangers of scientific overreaching" (373). As a consequence, it can be argued that scientific romances mirror the society in which they are written, and underline the anxieties and concerns of their era through the monsters created in labs, aliens coming from different planets, and technological devices that gain consciousness as a result of scientific progress in the following century.

In addition to the responsive nature of science fiction, Brantlinger also argues that the genre has Gothic origins as both genres share the central message, which is "an assertion of the power of the irrational over the rational" ("Gothic" 31). On a similar tone, Patrick Day demonstrates the Self and Other relationship in Gothic as one of "metamorphosis and transformation" by which he means "everything contains and becomes its opposite" (22). Ultimately, it is possible to apply the same argument to science fiction's representation of the Self and the Other, because "the self is found in the Other, and the Other is in fact a face of the self" (Day 22). The genre's use of the non-human Other as scientifically modified bodies, aliens, or technological instruments reveal historical and cultural anxieties related to the self and the other as two sides of the same coin. This is most prominent in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, for the fast-paced experiments and scientific advancements of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries take place in the novel as the unwanted results of these experiments in the novel. The creature, therefore, becomes the embodiment of these concerns regarding scientific achievements, that is positioned inevitably as the non-human Other.

In *The War of the Worlds*, imperial acts of the British Empire and their destructional outcomes are projected onto the late-Victorian reader through the colonising alien figure, highlighting the fears of invasion and reverse colonisation. In order to better examine how the Self engages with the Other in colonial context, Edward Said's theories must be taken into account as he stands out as one of the most influential critics in postcolonial studies. In his seminal work *Orientalism* (1978), Said establishes the concept of the Other as a cultural and political construct stating that the East, that is the Orient, is not only a geographical place but also Europe's colonial source as well as "its cultural contestant, and one of its most deep and recurring images of the Other" (Said 1). Accordingly, *Orientalism* deconstructs the Western gaze on the Orient and the Islamic civilizations of the East, establishing the argument that the Western study of the East is a means of self-affirmation of European identity as progressive, civilised, and superior.

Along with the academic study of the Orient and a mindset based on the epistemological and ontological difference between the Orient and the Occident, Said gives a third meaning to the concept by defining Orientalism "as a Western style of dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient" (3). According to his new definition, Orient is not a natural category of identification but an artificial product of the West in order to define, contain, and dominate the East (Said 5-7). All three definitions are indeed interdependent. Academically, oriental studies are employed as a means of production and reproduction of the Western discourse promoting the differences between the Orient and the Occident, marginalising the Orient, culturally discriminating, and dominating it via constructions of stereotyped images of the East, positioning them in a sharp contrasted dichotomy with the European identity. Consequently, Orientalism becomes a "political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, 'us'), and the strange (the Orient, the East, 'them')" (Said 43).

In the Introduction part of his book, Said utilises Foucault's concepts of discourse stating that knowledge and power are inseparable from one another (3). Accordingly he states:

[t]here is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analysed. (Said 27)

He then applies this defining feature of authority to Orientalism and exposes the ideas and judgments it forms as the truth. The East as the Other is created through discourse consisting of academic studies, travel writings, and literature written by Westerners about the East (Said 41-42). Instead of truths, Said argues that these writings contain Western descriptions of the Orient that are made-up mythologies based on fantasies (63). Eventually, the image of the East constructed as the Other is the production of the West.

This particular process of othering serves the purpose of colonial imperialism completely. Through the barbaric image they portrayed, Western powers enhance their civilised identity and dress their imperial conquests as a civilising mission. Through latent orientalism, the identity that the West built for the East becomes inherent. The Oriental Other is fundamentally different, inferior, and exotic, and this presupposition resides in the unconscious. This idea is embedded in various texts to ensure that the East is permanently observed through a suspicious Western gaze (Said 206). Subsequently, the Oriental is a “passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine” object, as a result of which they must be governed, for they fundamentally lack the capacity for self-government (Said 138). This way, the Other is denied the right to speak up so that the West can impose political control and intellectual superiority over them. Through cultural hegemony, the colonised Other begins to internalise the Western reflections of itself, which may result either in an identity crisis or a reliance on the Western epistemology for self-knowledge.

This perception of the colonising Self and the colonised Other is subverted in Wells’s novel as a result of the era’s distress about the brutality of the British Empire’s imperial proceedings. Stephen Arata draws the attention to the late-Victorian narratives concerning “reverse colonisation” where the coloniser is colonised and victimiser becomes the victim (108). In these narratives, Arata points out, the Other becomes the embodiment of British imperial practices in the form of non-human (108). Consequently, the colonial guilt of the Empire manifests itself in the era’s science fiction narratives.

By the time the twentieth century arrived, scientific practice and theory had contributed to many breakthroughs including computer systems. The accumulated scientific knowledge, particularly with the creation of automation systems, caused a “breakdown of boundaries and traditional ontologies” in the latter half of the century (Bolter 2).

Foundational assumptions of Western culture traced back to the Enlightenment and built upon the Cartesian duality of the human subject primarily in opposition to nature is rejected, and the human subject's engagement with nature is re-defined, leading the way for posthumanism. Jay David Bolter defines posthumanism as "rejection of traditional Western humanism" which is anthropocentric. In the Enlightenment, human autonomy flourished as the centre of existence, and posthumanism emerged as a critical response to the humanist perception of human as an autonomous and self-contained subject. Francesco Ferrando argues that posthumanism develops with the deconstruction of the human perception established during the Enlightenment and the critique of anthropocentrism (42-43). The categorised understanding of existence such as non-Europeans, women, animals, and machines has been historically situated in opposition or beneath the human conception, and posthumanism deconstructs this understanding (Ferrando 46). In this respect, posthumanist approach challenges human exceptionalism and focuses on the thinning and unstable boundaries between human beings in general, different species, and technological entities.

Similarly, N. Katherine Hayles argues that the traditional relationship between embodiment, consciousness, and subjectivity is destabilised with the emergence of cybernetics, information technologies and artificial intelligence (1-3). Hayles states that bodily existence and digital simulation cannot be differentiated with solid demarcations, for "the body [is] the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process" (3). As can be inferred, the posthuman for Hayles emerges as alternative understandings of subjectivity that the human is perceived through its relationship with technology and different forms of intelligence rather than the disappearance of humanity. Likewise, Sherryl Vint focuses on the relationship between subjectivity, technology, and embodiment in her approach to posthumanism, and argues that the posthuman subject must be understood via its embodied connection to the material world, and through the ideological and social structures that form subjectivity (10-11). In her book titled *Bodies of Tomorrow: Technology, Subjectivity, Science Fiction* (2007), Vint particularly focuses on how the posthuman in science fiction "remind us of the fragility of our boundary-making work and that the Other always is an aspect of self made problematic" (21). Thus, the posthuman Other is not solely a presence that exists beyond the human; it also exposes

the human category's instability itself. In accordance, there are several posthumanistic approaches such as feminist posthumanism, cultural posthumanism, and technological posthumanism. In line with the subject of this study and the selected novel's nature, technological posthumanism will be employed as a means of analysis in this thesis.

As technological and scientific advancements complicate the distinction between human species and machines, the Other can also take forms that are no longer defined primarily through visible corporeal difference but through alternative forms of agency, embodiment, and consciousness. Therefore, posthumanism provides a theoretical framework through which the transforming representation of the Other in science fiction can be studied: from materially and bodily different Other to the culturally and colonially constructed Other, and ultimately to the technologically constituted Other, whose difference threatens the boundaries of human subjectivity itself. Subsequently, when it comes to 1960s, the anxieties surrounding technological autonomy as well as human obsolescence manifests itself through artificial evil computers as can be found in Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey*.

In light of the evolution traced above from philosophical roots to structural appraisal, it can be revealed that the Other is a dynamic and historically varied concept. Accordingly, these theoretical trajectories illustrate science fiction as a particularly fertile field for examining otherness and the Other. While the phenomenological approaches locate otherness in mutual correspondences, critical theories put the focus on historical and ideological impositions that form different representations of the Self and Other, revealing that they are culturally and historically constructed. In accordance, the following chapters will build on this theoretical foundation to analyse how speculative narratives engage with, serve, or challenge the accounts and philosophies of othering discussed above.

The novels selected for this study, namely Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818), H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898), and Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), are selected primarily due to their capacity to demonstrate the historical and cultural evolution of the concept of the non-human Other in British science fiction. Rather than evaluating these novels as individual representations of otherness, this study positions them within a sequential trajectory extending from the early nineteenth century

to the mid-twentieth century in order to explore how altering technological, scientific, social, and political conditions reshape the boundaries between the Self and the Other, thereby transforming the Other itself. Shelley's *Frankenstein* provides a point of consideration in which otherness is articulated predominantly through the creature's physicality, bodily difference, and social rejection as a result of his grotesque appearance. Nearly eighty years later, Wells's *The War of the Worlds* transforms this composition by introducing an Other within the colonial context, whose otherness is closely attached to imperialism, colonial encounters, and racial hierarchies. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey*, in turn, mirrors the technological concerns of the twentieth century and introduces a new form of otherness that consists no longer a visible, biological body. Through HAL 9000, otherness becomes associated with non-human consciousness, artificial intelligence, and the unstable boundary between human and machine. The novels are, therefore, selected not only for their significance within the British science fiction genre's development, but also, and more importantly, for their chronological and thematic contrasts, which enable the study to investigate the gradual evolution in the representation of the Other. Collectively, they provide a literary trajectory through which the Other can be traced as physical, colonial, and ultimately artificially intelligent, demonstrating how the definitions of human and humanity itself become increasingly destabilised as technological and scientific progress reshape the relationship between humanity and its Others.

CHAPTER 2

THE CREATURE AS THE BODILY OTHER

Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein: Or the Modern Prometheus* can be considered one of the most enduring literary explorations of difference, interrogating the process through which the Other is perceived, constructed, and ultimately condemned. Written in the cultural and intellectual milieu of the early nineteenth century, the novel reflects anxieties surrounding scientific progress and social exclusion, and poses questions regarding identity and ethical relationality. As a product of both Romanticism and a response to Enlightenment rationalism (Christie 4), it would not be wrong to state that the novel exposes the instability between Self and the Other, between the human and the non-human (Harse 4). This chapter analyses *Frankenstein* through the lens of bodily othering in particular and demonstrates how otherness is not an inherent quality but a condition constructed through social exclusion, epistemic violence, and ethical neglect, which reveals the era's concerns and anxieties.

Any reading of *Frankenstein* inevitably leads back to the account of its author, whose life was notably filled with different forms of emotional, social, and intellectual marginality. Mary Shelley, or Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley, lived between 1797 and 1851. Her mother Mary Wollstonecraft was a famous activist, most well-known for her proto-feminist essay *A Vindication to the Rights of Women*; and her father, William Godwin, was an established political writer and thinker, who advocated social justice and equality, known at the time for his *An Enquiry Concerning the Nature of Political Justice*. Therefore Shelley, as the daughter of a rather significant union between the mother of modern feminism and the "father of anarchism" (Seymour 7), inherited a legacy of philosophical inquiry and political dissent.

Due to the lack of hygiene during birth and consequential puerperal fever, Wollstonecraft died merely eleven days after birthing Shelley (Mellor 1). Shelley and her older half-sister Fanny were raised by Godwin, whose household was frequently visited by the era's renowned artists such as Coleridge and Wordsworth (Seymour 39, Mellor 8). Indeed, Shelley was raised under the influence of the period's vibrant intelligentsia as well as her

mother's intellectual heritage. As an example, regarding Coleridge's visits and influence, Miranda Seymour writes that his recital of *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* was "an unforgettable memory of an ice-bound sea and a man haunted by the swift, unstoppable treading in his wake of a 'frightful fiend'" for little Shelley's imagination, which echoes in the plot of *Frankenstein* (40). Additionally, feelings of loss, questioning of creation, abandonment, and disconnection can be read as autobiographical components of the novel based on the motherless start of Shelley's infancy.

In 1814, Godwin had gained another regular visitor, and this person was no other than Percy Bysshe Shelley, with whom Mary Shelley soon eloped together to Geneva (Seymour 92-94). Many scholars believe that Shelley's engagement with the themes of exile, alienation, and consequences of transgressive desire find their roots on these occurrences in Mary Shelley's own life (Mellor 38). Moreover, the author's early adulthood and life in general was marked by frequent encounters with death since she gave birth to five children, out of which only one survived. Later, she lost Percy Shelley to the sea, too (Seymour 305). It would not be wrong to deduce that such experiences contributed to Shelley's persistent preoccupation with mortality, grief, and boundaries between life and death.

After their elopement in 1814, the couple, accompanied by Mary's stepsister, visited Lord Byron and his close friend John William Polidori, where they dwelled at the time in Switzerland in 1816. The summer of the year was marked by rains, so gloom and darkness were almost constant as per Shelley's introduction to her novel's 1831 edition (Shelley 6). As a literary community, the group resolved to write horror stories as befits the gloomy weather to pass the time (Shelley 7). Opening as an epistolary novel, *Frankenstein* was first published in 1818 anonymously, with Percy Shelley's introduction. Following its debut, many assumed that the author of such a terrifying and well-narrated story could not be anyone else's but the male Percy Shelley's¹. In 1831, however, Mary edited her story and republished it with her own name as the author (Shelley 10).

At the time, scientific developments in electricity were matters of lively discussion. With electricity becoming a focus of natural philosophy in the early modern period, producing electricity at high voltage and low current became possible by the seventeenth-century, and lightning's electrical discharge was established by the mid-eighteenth-century by

¹ Much to feminism's disappointment, there are still scholars present this day who consider the author to be Percy Shelley, despite the fact that Mary Shelley's manuscripts with her own handwriting exist, and Percy Shelley himself refused such credit.

Benjamin Franklin (Krischel 20, Bernal 516). In 1786, Luigi Galvani discovered the electricity's power of muscle contraction which was soon called "galvanism" (Krischel 20). In 1799, Alessandro Volta developed the first battery by producing electric currents between silver and zinc electrodes (Krischel 20). All these developments constituted the subject matters of discussion for the intelligentsia, and Shelley's group with which she was set to write horror fiction was not different.

One night, upon absently overhearing a conversation between three gentlemen regarding the latest scientific experiments, namely galvanism and how it reanimated the carcass of an animal, Shelley narrated that in a mode of frenzy, she dreamed of an animated corpse with pale skin and yellow eyes (Shelley 9). She recalled envisioning "the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the *thing* he had put together" [emphasis added] and the "hideous phantasm of a man stretched out," and this image eventually became the foundation of her story (Shelley 9). Significantly, the horror of this vision does not stem from the evil acts or moral character of that particular *thing*, but from the unnerving spectacle of his body. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Shelley's dream embeds the material existence as well as the bodily otherness of the creature into the narrative.

As stated, the novel opens with an epistolary frame consisting of letters from Captain Robert Walton, an Arctic explorer on a mission on behalf of the Empire, to his sister in England. Walton's ship gets trapped in the northern ice, where his crew rescues a physically ruined man, Victor Frankenstein, nearly frozen to death. Coming to his senses, Victor narrates his story, shifting the novel into its first-person autobiographical perspective. Beginning his narrative with his childhood in Geneva, Victor narrates his bourgeois family, his close bond with his adopted cousin Elizabeth Lavenza, and his burgeoning obsession with natural philosophy. He further pursues this interest on the field by attending to the University of Ingolstadt, where this obsession culminates during his studies. Driven by scientific ambition, he works on the idea of conquering death, and tries to unlock the secret of imbuing life into inanimate matter. Indeed, he succeeds. After spending years assembling dead body parts, Victor's creature opens his eyes. However, Victor feels visceral horror upon the creature's awakening, abandons his grotesque creation, and falls into a nervous collapse and physical suffering with repulsion. After recovering, he attempts to erase the experiment from his mind and continues his life in

denial, until he receives the news of his young brother William's death months later. Victor returns to Geneva immediately, and upon observing the creature near the crime scene, he understands that William was brutally murdered by his own creation. Despite realising his guilt, Victor's silence soon leads to the execution of another person, that is, his innocent family servant Justine Moritz.

Seeking solace from his own conscience burning with guilt, the scientist hikes into the alpine peaks of Chamounix, where he is confronted by his creation. Here, the narrative shifts to the creature's own perspective. Possessing a sophisticated command of language acquired by observing a family, the de Lacey's, through the shadows, the creature describes the painful occurrences he experienced, such as social exclusion, physical violence, and othering during his search for meaning. His story demonstrates how he went from a tabula rasa to a rejected criminal. Complaining that his violent behaviours were a result of the cruelty he received from the world and instant abandonment by his creator, the creature gives an ultimatum to Victor: either build a companion, who will match him in size and defect to save him from his solitary existence, or endure the destruction of all that he loves.

Moved by a combination of empathy and terror imposed by the creature's narrative skills, Victor travels to a secluded island to build a female companion for his first creation. Halfway through, however, he gets repulsed by the possibility of breeding of the two and thus giving life to a race of predatory monsters, the scientist tears down his unfinished project. In response, the creature pledges revenge and begins his vengeance by killing Henry Clerval, Victor's dear friend. Mistakenly believing that he will be the next Victim, Victor returns to Geneva to marry his now fiancée, Elizabeth. However, the creature murders Elizabeth on their wedding night, causing shock and grief that also kill Victor's father a few days later. The narrative timeline then converges with the opening of the novel as Victor chases the creature through the Arctic in order to destroy him, where Walton's ship eventually intercepts him. Upon completing his story, Victor asks Walton to complete what himself had begun if the creature ever shows himself, and warns him regarding the pursuit of glory. Soon after, Victor dies on the ship, and the novel closes with the creature entering the cabin to mourn over his creator's dead body. Expressing

his agony and total remorse, the creature vows to destroy himself, vanishing into the icy polar regions.

Such a complex story reflecting different dilemmas from ethical questionings to isolation, and alienation as well as identity formation, in fact, can be read in line with the historical and cultural turmoil surrounding the era. After all, societies create, establish, and assign value to the characteristics that shape the society, and in general these characteristics can be compiled under the binary of Self and Other. Indeed, England experienced challenging processes of transition from a primarily agricultural society to an industrial nation (Norton 2). Corresponding changes were made in different areas such as the economy and politics. The result of the shift in manufacturing lines, where manual hand labour was replaced with steam-powered machinery, resulted in the emergence of a new, landless class, whose members either migrated to the industrial cities or remained as farm labourers working for the landowners (Norton 3). The reform movement accelerated towards the eighteenth century as a result, and literature in Britain also turned into a means of rational debate amongst people accordingly (Keen 32). Stories of a recognisable social and cultural sphere, therefore, gained popularity with the novel genre's introduction in the eighteenth-century (Hunter10).

The tension between Enlightenment confidence and a culture fascinated with uncertainty, ruins, secrecy, imagination, and sensation gave way to Gothic fiction, which reintroduced mystery to the times of reason and empiricism. Gothic brought "the perverse pleasures of *uncertainty*" to the lives of people searching for the unshakable truths via science (Lynch 47). In other words, gothic narrations exposed the limitations of empirical certainty by dramatising what is out of reach, that is fear, the supernatural, and the uncanny.

What differentiates Shelley's novel of its time, however, is the inclusion of up-to-date scientific developments in the story and her use of them as a means to invoke feelings of horror and uncertainty. As stated by J.M. van der Laan, Mary was aware of the contemporary scientific knowledge and not only sent her protagonist to study and experiment at the time's acknowledged centre of science University of Ingolstadt, but also gave him a particular interest in chemistry, electricity, and galvanism (299). Therefore, the story is constructed upon a scientific possibility, which is acknowledged by Percy Shelley's preface that states "[t]he event on which this fiction is founded has

been supposed, by Dr Darwin and some of the physiological writers of Germany, as not an impossible occurrence” (Shelley 11). Recalling the introduction chapter and the science fiction genre’s being about “the failures of science that lead to disaster” rather than science per se (Brantlinger “Gothic” 34), Mary Shelley presents the readers with that particular aspect of scientific disaster through Victor Frankenstein’s creature.

As laid bare in the previous chapter, othering and the construction of the Other have a long history, and they become the most visible through monsters, vampires, and aliens (Harse 4), who pose a threat to the Self, as the Self paradoxically relies on the Other for defining itself. As Patrick Day suggests, the Other is a reflection of the Self, and the Self is present in the Other (22). In this sense, Victor and the creature in Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* have the dualistic aspect of Self and Other.

To begin with, Victor’s creature can be taken physically as an initial depiction of the Other. He is a synthetic being assembled by a human, Victor Frankenstein, with the hopes of accomplishing perfection and becoming the creator of “[a] new species that would bless [Victor] as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to [him]” (Shelley 51). Then, the being’s purpose of creation is the construction of Victor’s self-image as a creator. In this dichotomy, Victor assumes the place of the superior Self, and positions the creature in direct opposition as a nameless, shapeless, and powerless being in solitude.

The first encounter with the unfinished form of the creature draws attention to its colossal size “about eight feet in height, and proportionally large” to make it easier for Victor to work on larger parts (Shelley 51). Continuing his project with enthusiasm for months, the scientist manages to imbue the being with life on a dreary and rainy night, as the creature opens his yellow eyes. However, the immediate reaction of the creator towards his success is declaring the result as “catastrophe,” despite his obvious success (55). All of a sudden, the familiar body parts that Victor have been working on closely for months turn into the unfamiliar, the unknown, and the uncanny. Despite the many months of work he put into stitching the limbs and muscles to assemble this creature beautifully, he describes the being as follows:

His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips. (Shelley 55)

Here, it must be remembered that the physical appearance of the creature remains unchanged through his awakening: It preserves the qualities with which Victor worked on for two years. The fact that it was indeed Victor himself who had sought, chosen, and put together these very body parts that carried these very features seems to be forgotten, for “now that [he] had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled [his] heart” (Shelley 55). Instead of something beautiful, as he idealised in his dreams, the scientist declares that he created a “miserable monster” (Shelley 56).

What is significant is that the same body that has been worked on for the past two years by Victor, without any concerns of monstrosity, suddenly becomes a monster once given the ability of animation. Up until that moment when the creature opened his eyes, he was the masterpiece for whom Victor “deprived [himself] of rest and health” in order to imbue life (Shelley 55). Then, what would be the reason for Victor’s abrupt change of perspective? The only difference between the dead components on which Victor performed his efforts to the point of obsession and the being labelled as a monster immediately upon opening his eyes, is the ability of animation. As Feldman notes, “what is frightening is not how the creature looks but that he *looks* ... [and] can no longer [be controlled as] when it lay lifeless on the table” (67). While it is true that the creature’s becoming alive also means that he gained autonomy, Feldman’s analysis suggests that Frankenstein’s instant abandonment of the creature and his ultimate othering are due to a lack of the creator’s inability to control his creation. However, it is possible to argue that regardless of his willpower, the creature would still be positioned as the Other due to his physical attributes, even if he were passive and obedient.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Husserlian view indicates that an individual perceives the Other as a subjectivity through empathetic apperception (Zahavi 110-112). However, the empathy in question must not be mistaken for the literal sense of the term. Husserlian empathy is a result of intersubjectivity; shared experiences between individuals consequently form empathy as a requirement for the comprehension of the

Other (211). Ultimately, these shared experiences do not stem from an attempt to understand the psyche of the corresponding person, but rather to comprehend its existence and make meaning of it as a separate consciousness. As Walsh points out, an individual gives meaning to a corresponding individual through their own bodily self-awareness as animate beings, meaning that it perceives the Other based on their shared quality of animation (Walsh 262-263). In other words, the Self builds a cognitive connection with the Other based on their common animate capability. Then, it can be inferred that Victor's abrupt horror and disgust toward his creation are the result of the ability of animation given to the being. The accustomed matter turns into an uncannily familiar, moving and broken form of a human; similar enough to form an intersubjective connection due to the general outline of the creature's body, yet a twisted reflection of it with its physical qualities. What Victor saw and accepted as inanimate and inherently different than his own kind, turns into an animate and demanding creature with a horrible appearance. Therefore, the creature was doomed to become the Other as soon as he opened his eyes, whether he obeyed his creator or not.

Furthermore, the creature's autonomy is startling for Victor. Anticipating a submissive and dependent being, the creature's opening his eyes, moving his limbs, and even breathing are demonstrations and practices of the autonomy he gained (Harse 138). This autonomy indicates the creature's independence, which grants him an inner subjectivity that is not completely accessible to Victor, the Self. This inaccessibility is exactly what constitutes the Other according to Walsh in his explanation of Husserl's concept of the Other (Walsh 262), and it is the reason why Victor is terrified by his own creation: for, even as the creator, it is not possible for him to anticipate the thoughts and actions of a being that has free will.

Indeed, the creature's attempts to make meaning also go through empathetic apperception, or its lack thereof. He seems to have bodily awareness to a certain point, for he tells Victor "[f]rom my earliest remembrance I had been as I then was in height and proportion. I had never yet seen a being resembling me or who claimed any intercourse with me" (Shelley 117). By contemplating his difference, the creature tries to make meaning of himself and the surrounding people through research looking for

common grounds, that is, he is looking for resemblance in order to build his own identity as a Self:

I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers — their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror: and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am. I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity. (Shelley 109)

Until the point he has the means to compare his own appearance to different people, the creature does not acknowledge or comment on his looks. During his early encounters with humans, the focus is on the reaction he gets, which mostly consists of shrieks, screams, and violent attacks. Therefore, his perception of himself was primarily through sensory interactions with the world as well as the responses he received from different humans. Only when he observes without being observed can he identify the physical qualities of regular humans and comprehend how he is different from them. Even before he sees his own reflection, he is aware that his proportions are larger. Yet seeing his own appearance makes him understand that he is indeed different and aesthetically not pleasing in comparison, for by this time he gains a perception of aesthetics as well. This realisation brings about a profound sense of alienation, for now his self-awareness gains a new dimension based on visual perception and social comparison. He can understand the reason behind the shrieks, horror-filled eyes, and repulsion. Hence, the creature's facing his reflection marks the internalisation of his othering; he registers himself as an object viewed through different people's eyes, instead of merely a perceiving subject.

While this recognition of difference leads him to question his own identity, the lack of answers and the absence of commonality leave him exasperated: "What was I? The question again recurred, to be answered only with groans" (Shelley 117), inevitably situating him as the Other and convincing him of this also. Then, he is not only positioned as the Other by humans, but he also accepts himself as the Other to them. He has a certain awareness that he is not one of the same status with the rest of humanity; however, he is clueless as to why.

Differences and similarities between the creator and the creation further highlight their relationship's nature as the Self and the Other. Victor's addressing the creature as "my

own spirit let loose from the grave” (Shelley 74) and the creature’s cry to the scientist stating “my form is a filthy type of yours” (Shelley 126) underline the primary difference between them as representing two opposite sides. Regarding the nature of their relationship, Harse comments that “the creature is a negative image of Frankenstein, if only because both he and his creator believe this to be so” (142). Therefore, it would not be wrong to deduce that while their accord is one of binary opposition, the first and most significant duality in their Self and Other relationship can be considered as mind vs body.

The most compelling difference between them is the physical attributes of the creature, inevitably marking him as the body. Victor, on the other hand, becomes associated with the intellectual mind as a scientist. The body of the creature, then, in its most literal sense, immediately becomes where the Other is located (Merleau-Ponty 75-76). The creature’s flesh brought back from death is what differentiates him directly from the rest of humanity that is associated with the Self. According to the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty, the body is the irreducible mediator of reality and perception, and consciousness is inseparable from corporeality (235). To put it differently, the body is not a passive object holding the conscious, but a means through which a person perceives, experiences, and engages with the surrounding environment. Therefore, an individual’s subjectivity emerges through corporeal experience, and the body functions as the primary mediator through which both the Self and the Other make meaning. Then, the body is not something that individuals merely possess, but it is what they exist through. It serves as the medium through which the world is encountered, interpreted, and made meaningful. In this sense, the creature’s opening his eyes does not grant him immediate knowledge, language, or an established identity. Rather, he gradually explores the world through sensory perception, and experiences darkness and light, hunger and satisfaction, warmth and cold progressively. Through bodily interaction with his surroundings, his consciousness develops his search for an identity. Hence, it can be inferred through the creature’s deformed frame that he is doomed to be the Other in a world where he is considered different. An encounter with him is inherently and inevitably embodied, for the world is perceived through the body itself, and the creature’s body is one of a kind, where all the rest is gathered under the same umbrella.

Within this framework, the creature's carnal existence becomes the central medium through which his exclusion is produced. Unlike his creator, who corresponds to the mind on this dichotomy, the creature's identity is determined through his body on the opposite side of the dichotomy. Before he utters a word, takes a meaningful action, or fully comprehends a sense of self, his body emerges as the basis of definition. Any meaning, then, is attached to his body. Repetitively, the creature's deformed form precedes his intellectual capacity and accomplished manners of speaking. The horrific appearance of the being is reiterated throughout the novel and essentially suggests that his subjection to otherness is only natural (Harse 144). The grotesque form prevents him from making any connection with different people, and the backlash he receives from the individuals he encounters is built upon his deformity and monstrous looks, focusing solely on the corporeality and not the consciousness that resides within the body. Thus, the creature's initial exclusion is determined by a lack of recognition in his engagements rather than his actions.

Paradoxically, the creature's hideous physical qualities are calculated choices on Frankenstein's account. Building the body, Victor states that he chose the components as beautiful (Shelly 55). Ultimately, however, each and every feature he chose to work with becomes a terrain of condemnation for the creature as the Other, even by the creator himself. Then, it would not be farfetched to state that the creature was predestined to be the Other; even though his components were chosen carefully by Victor, the size of them alone convicts him as essentially different from the rest of humanity. Cottom states that the size of the creature "magnifies a faulty relationship between the inside and the outside of his body," as the creature's features "either contrast too much or too little," making the inner and outer features indistinguishable such as his arteries being visible on the surface of his skin, while his black lips contrasted by his pearly white teeth (60). Accordingly, the creature is aware that the reason for his exclusion and solitude is his physical attributes. Therefore, one of the first questions he conveyed to Victor becomes "[w]hy did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust?" (Shelley 126).

As stated previously, the creature was predestined to be the Other. Prior to his animation, Victor is consumed with the desire for success; however, his immediate reaction to his

achievement, to the creature he imbued with life, reveals a profound refusal of responsibility. Victor's horror and disgust towards his creation emerge before the creature has spoken, acted, or demonstrated any moral character; the creature's raised hand to his creator is immediately classified as an act "seemingly to detain [Victor]" (Shelley 56) without any attribution of possible goodness. Therefore, the newly animated creature is not recognised as a susceptible consciousness, but as a grotesque object whose appearance provokes repulsion. This repulsion leads Victor to immediately abandon his creation, which Erle and Hendry evaluate as "Frankenstein's ultimate act of monsterring" (3). The socially isolated creature's response, on the other hand, "is so familiar, so human" (Erle and Hendry 3) both when he tries to find his way unbeknownst to the evils of the world, and later when he pledges revenge.

Following his abandonment by his creator, the creature was left alone to figure out the world he was brought into as if a newborn, "a poor, helpless, miserable wretch," who is abandoned to discover his senses and feelings without any external help or guidance from the creator (Shelley 98). His experiences are limited, and the world is empirical. He encounters everything similar to a baby would: he finds a fire and feels joy after being cold for so long, puts his hands into the live embers and gets burned with a cry of pain (Shelley 100). Accordingly, he comes into existence not as a social being but purely as a sensory body. He is forced to construct subjectivity all alone, without any social recognition or mediation, and the only feedback he can get from the outer world is related to his hideous appearance. Hence, the creature's body is inevitably the sole thing that forms his existence. Imminently, the creature becomes an Other before he can even comprehend his character and soul, and he is unavoidably positioned in opposition to the Self.

Once he finds shelter from the weather, he resembles it, the cottage of the de Lacey family, to Milton's Pandæmonium, the capital of Hell in *Paradise Lost* (100). This reference itself is an indicator of his intelligence and intellectual learning skills' improvement enough to give classical references. Significantly, he does not only seek shelter from the weather or nature, but also from "the barbarity of man" (102). Despite being labelled as a monster, a wretch, and a daemon, he experienced evil from humans and suffered without any reciprocation for some time. As LeForge points out, the

creature's horror is not embedded in his formation, but in the reaction he received from the world (3). His essential bodily difference is what situates him in association with horror, and his physical attributes are the mere criteria through which he is evaluated during an encounter.

In fact, the belief that the monstrous looks of the creature would match his character is an expected perspective. In the intellectual climate of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, physiognomic discourse continued to promote the belief that moral character could be deciphered through bodily appearance, as it had since fairy tales. According to Johan Caspar Lavater's *Essays on Physiognomy* (1789-1798), the physiognomy of a person would reveal "the most convincing picture of interior sensation, desires, passions, will, and of all those properties which so much exalt moral above animal life" (9). In other words, a person with an appealing image would be naturally and undoubtedly a good person, and would be evaluated in relation to positive attributes such as beauty, grace, diligence, and normality, whereas a person carrying non-appealing physical qualities would be associated with ugliness, crudity, idleness, and abnormality. From this perspective, the creature's deformed physiognomy would reveal not only his leviathan appearance but also inner monstrosity, which is explicitly the reason behind the backlash he receives. Since beauty is related to goodness in the human mind, ugliness inevitably becomes associated with evil, wretchedness, and dreadfulness. Attributes that do not conform to the established *normal*, and therefore *beautiful*, do not carry the probability of being *good*. Inevitably, goodness is associated with the Self, while evil is attributed to the Other.

The most significant scene as an example to this is the creature's confrontation with the eldest blind member of the de Lacey family cottage in which he took shelter. After months of observation and learning through the shadows, the creature decides to introduce himself to this kind and blind man while he was alone. Ruling out his own physical disadvantage, or taking advantage of the de Lacey's blindness in other words, the creature attempts to build a connection through his mind, his words, and the articulation of his inner thoughts rather than being judged by his physicality. In a world that repeatedly marks him as the Other based on his bodily deformation alone, he reaches out to the eldest de Lacey through his soul. Unsurprisingly, this becomes the sole time that the creature is

welcomed and addressed words that do not contain any prejudices, for de Lacey tells him “I am blind and cannot judge of your countenance, but there is something in your words which persuades me that you are sincere” (Shelley 129). The old man does not perceive the creature through an embodied interaction, but via a verbal correspondence, meaning that what he witnessed was not the body of the so-called monster, but his cultivated mind which he had equipped with books he could acquire, including Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, Plutarch’s *Lives* and Goethe’s *Sorrows of Werter* (Shelley 123). For a fraction of time, the creature experiences being a non-Other, if not a part of the human Self. Then, it would not be wrong to argue that once his bodily presence is out of the equation, his status as the Other diminishes. His otherness is linked to his bodily existence and, indeed, structured upon it.

Paradoxically, the body’s invisibility by de Lacey makes the creature visible in mind and soul. For the first time in his existence, the creature experiences acceptance and recognition as “a human creature” (Shelley 129). Furthermore, the old man even consoles the creature who hopes to gain the sympathy of the rest of the family members as well: “Heaven forbid! Even if you were really criminal, for that can only drive you to desperation, and not instigate you to virtue” (Shelley 129-130). As a matter of fact, the creature had not committed any of his crimes during the conversation, yet he was treated as an evil wretch. The blind man’s words are the sole acknowledgment he receives in the novel, for his blindness clears the vision for the creature’s character.

Once the rest of the family members return soon, the indicator of his otherness becomes solid again for the eyes that can see, and the creature is violently attacked:

Agatha fainted, and Safie, unable to attend to her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward, and with supernatural force tore me from his father, to whose knees I clung; in a transport of fury he dashed me to the ground and struck me violently with a stick. (Shelley 130)

The immediate reaction of the people whose companionship the creature sought, the community whose familial ties he observed and learned from, becomes one of violence without any act of harm caused or reason given by the creature, as, his grotesque form immediately associates the creature with monstrosity for the family members.

In that sense, it is possible to argue that Lavater's perception is exactly what Mary Shelley was challenging in the novel; throughout the story, the creature performs good acts which only result in disappointment and anger. Each good deed he commits gets rewarded with an act of violence, he carried food and a burning stack for the de Lacey family and got beaten; he saved a girl from drowning and got shot; he tried communicating with his creator and got repelled, more than once, even. As Lecercle observes, "[t]he monster's monstrosity ... does not lie in his nature: he is ugly but benevolent" (18). It is this displacement that harms the creature, for immediately he wishes his extinguishment, feeling like everyone in the world has a place for themselves one way or the other, except for him (Shelley 131). Failure and abandonment by both Frankenstein and the de Lacey family lay bare that regardless of his innately innocent nature, it is not possible for him to be accepted into a community. With this acknowledgement, the creature chooses the dark side, and gives in to the feelings of fury and grudge (Shelley 131). He decides to accept and embody the label given to him as a monster. Therefore, it would not be farfetched to state that the creature's body marks him as monstrous, but it is society that teaches him monstrosity. As stated by Lecercle, the creature "is a monster because he is never given a proper name, he is never welcomed into the bosom of a family," and only knew alienation (25).

Even after this deliberate choice of vice, the creature's accumulation of knowledge and contemplation through reading leads him to seek different ways to build a connection with people. He does not consider violence in his correspondences with people in need of help. He sees a girl falling into a river with a strong current, and he does not hesitate to jump behind her to carry her back to the shore (Shelley 135-136). However, the recurring hate he receives from a nearby villager with whom the girl walked together leads him to vow eternal hatred to all humankind; despite saving the girl from a horrible and unfortunate death, he is not celebrated as a hero, but treated as a nasty monster and is shot at.

When he first encounters William, his immediate thought becomes that a child could not possibly be as prejudiced as an adult, for children have a rather limited experience with the outer world, hence he can capture one and raise the child as a companion. While it is unclear whether the creature's lack of communal or familial ties leads him to think that

he could easily detain a child without any consideration of evil-doing, he sees red as soon as he hears the name of Frankenstein. Thus turns into a murderer who once “looked upon crime as a distant evil” (Shelley 123). This murder teaches him that he can truly become the detested monster as he was labelled, and he can injure the person who put him in agony (Shelley 137). More critically, William’s death marks the creature’s transition from victim to aggressor; the creature’s attempts to resist the position of alterity imposed upon him by his creator come to a sharp end. From then on, the Self, that is Victor’s, definition of the creature as the evil Other becomes fulfilled. Thus, the asymmetrical relationship between the two gains another dimension in which one party possesses the authority to define and reject, while the other is condemned to exist according to that very definition.

The hierarchy between Frankenstein and the creature is inevitable in terms of object and subject; the former is the creator, and the latter is the product. Indeed, during their early confrontation, the creature himself is ready to accept his own part as an obedient vassal: “... But I will not be tempted to set myself in opposition to thee. I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king if thou also perform thy part, the which thou owest me” (Shelley 95). His purpose is not to become equals with his creator, nor to overpower him; the creature merely asks his creator to fulfil the responsibilities he assumed by creating a being. However, after Victor disposes of the unfinished female companion and thus breaks the promise he made, the creature makes clear that the inherent hierarchy in the nature of their relationship does not necessarily make the creator physically stronger. He asserts his power over his creator, stating that the tables have turned:

Slave, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my condescension. Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I can make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. You are my creator, but I am your master; obey! ... Beware, for I am fearless and therefore powerful. ... Man, you shall repent of the injuries you inflict. (Shelley 162-163)

This statement of the creature is quite significant in two aspects. First and foremost, the creature expresses that despite the fact that Victor is the creator, he is not *powerful* or *strong*. Their particular dichotomy puts them as the Self and the Other, creator and the created, mind and body, beautiful and ugly, good and bad; yet when it comes to *strong* and *weak*, the hierarchical order of adjectives is subverted. The creature is aware of his

utmost strength and the fragility of an average, regular human body. Therefore, he reminds Victor that he has the physical capacity to bring destruction upon his creator.

On another and more significant level, the creature also overturns the master and slave dialectic. According to Hegelian dialectics, recognition of one's self can only be achieved through the recognition of another consciousness, which makes the other a constitutive part of the Self (Kojève 8). Victor's motivation of creating a new species, as discussed, is about conjuring his image as a creator. In the natural hierarchy of events, then, the creature's recognition of Victor as his creator should have secured him as the superior. However, the creature is aware of his exceptional physicality and takes advantage of it. Victor might be the Self, the creator, the mind, the beautiful, and the good, but he is not physically powerful. The creature's existence grants Victor these qualities, yet the creature takes one in return, which is what gives him the upper hand, and makes him the master against Victor. He renews his vows of vengeance and threatens the scientist with one of the most significant lines in the novel: "I shall be with you on your wedding-night" (Shelley 163).

As a primary demonstration of his power and position, he takes action soon and commits his first calculated act of violence; he murders the dearest friend of his creator, Henry Clerval. By attempting to shift the blame to Victor himself for the murder, he asserts his power over his creator; similar to a master who would punish a slave for disobedience. Thus, the creature punishes the scientist for breaching the terms of the contract they had made and destroy the unfinished project of the female companion along with the creature's hopes of "feel[ing] the affections of a sensitive being and becom[ing] linked to the chain of existence and events from which [he is now] excluded" (Shelley 143). As the ultimate show of his power, he duplicates what his creator had done, and kills Victor's newly wedded wife, Elizabeth Lavenza. It can be argued that to some extent, the murder of Elizabeth equalises the two; both parties are now deprived of love and community, for soon Victor's father, too, dies in grief, leaving no one from his close circle of loved ones alive.

In terms of assuming the place of the master, the creature comes closer to Self image Victor portrayed for himself as the progressive, intellectual mind in spite of being othered by Victor and the rest of the society based on his bodily presence. Throughout the novel,

the creature is defined as a “wretch” (55), a “monster” (56), a “filthy daemon” (73), an “abhorred devil” (97), an “ogre” (137), a “fiend” (140), and likewise. Hence, he is situated in exact opposition to Victor’s self-image as the educated, enlightened, bourgeois scientist who is inherently associated with reason and advancement. However, it is possible to argue that for the most part of the story, the voice of reason belongs to the creature. While Victor reaches the borders of his sanity and health in pursuit of life-giving power, the creature’s search for meaning and discoveries of life lead him on to discover more in a society that violently excludes him. Through reading, he contemplates about the world and his own existence as he states:

As I read, however, I applied much personally to my own feelings and condition. I found myself similar yet at the same time strangely unlike to the beings concerning whom I read and to whose conversation I was a listener. I sympathized with and partly understood them, but I was unformed in mind; I was dependent on none and related to none. ... My person was hideous and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them. (Shelley 124)

The creature’s intellectual capacity grows with knowledge, leading him to further question his existence. Again, however, his bodily features prevent him from forming a connection with his own identity and different people. The more he reads, the more he grasps the scope of his isolation as well as gaining self-awareness. Also, ironically the creature has the elevated language that does not correspond to this wretched appearance. Compared to Victor, the creature’s choice of words can be considered rather more eloquent, conceivably due to the lack of day-to-day dialogue with different people, and acquiring self-expression through reading classics mostly. Yet, the creature can never get away with his looks. His grotesque deformity positions him in a liminality, and his flesh brought back from death is always there to remind him and those who encounter him that he cannot go beyond the physical appearance of a body.

As a matter of fact, the creature’s in-between state can be analysed as an example of abject, as many scholars have done so (Jenkins 62-63). To start with, pronouns of he/it are used interchangeably for the creature throughout the novel (Shelley 55-56). Hence, stated by his creator, he is neither an object nor a subject but an abject. Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection has been generously applied to the monster of Frankenstein, for the creature is not an *it*, nor accepted as a *he* [emphasis added]. Despite being created in the

male human form, the creature's primary pronoun neither corresponds to his sex nor to his species; finalising his dream project with success, Victor declares his triumph as "I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; *it* breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated *its* limbs" [emphasis added] (Shelley 55). In the following paragraph, the creator refers to his creation as a "he"; however, the creature never truly sheds his initial pronoun *it*. In alignment, Kristeva defines abject as "neither subject nor object," though carrying the features of both, stuck in-between, which corresponds to the creature's situation without fail (1-2). The focal point regarding the abject is that it is a former part of the Self, violently expelled in order to establish and maintain the boundaries of the Self (Arya 4). The abject, then, is always relational to the Self; it is "the other that comes from within", thus impossible to dispose of (Arya 4). It must be remembered that the creature defines himself as a "filthy type of [Victor's]" (Shelley 126). Indeed, the creature is a part of Victor, and Victor is a part of the creature; they are interdependent, and thus, despite being the Other, Victor cannot dispose of his creation.

The creature, indeed, is the epitome of abjection as a body assembled from different corpses. Kristeva states that "the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything" (3). By way of the abjection process, the creature is both physically and socially constructed as inordinate and corrupt; as a non-object form, it poses a threat to Victor and humanity's boundaries. In its most fundamental sense, he is a walking dead body put together from different decaying parts of flesh. His animation ability and free will turn him into something abject; he becomes the living and breathing proof of an unnatural order. Despite being the creator, Victor rejects the creature before it even speaks; the rejection is entirely corporeal. His creator narrates that "[n]othing in human shape" would kill a child, further demonstrating the detested and congested existence of the creature (Shelley 73). As can be inferred, the human body parts of the creature do not suffice to classify him as a human in the eyes of the Self. The creature is doomed to be an abject; he is "death infecting life" (Kristeva 4).

Yet, it is possible to argue that the creature's abjection takes place on two different levels. The only abjection is not caused by the creature's body. It is distorted and unnatural as it is. Yet, the abjection in his case does not only stem from his lack of physical beauty and aesthetics, nor merely from his carnal existence. As Kristeva explains, the abject is "what

disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva 4). Therefore, the creature’s autonomy is what differentiates him from a regular cadaver. He is not solely a corpse; he is a living corpse that has animatic ability and free will with a contemplating mind. This is precisely what gives way to a new layer of abjection for the creature. His mere existence agitates the identity of the Self, for it is unnatural; it distorts the system, for he is the result of a secret experiment; it unsettles the order, for he is brought back from death. He breaches the borders of creation as the result of mortal production and defies the rules of known existence. Thus, he is determined to be the Other; he is as far away from the Self as possible.

In fact, the same act becomes controversial when the creature is involved on the different end of the equation. While his committing murder is considered in relation to his corporeal deformity, thus serving to further othering, the same act of murder indicates being rightful on Victor’s end; the life of the Other is not as valuable as the Self. Even in death, the creature cannot leave behind his status as the Other. While destruction is a means of revenge from his creator, he is aware that his own demolition would not be considered something as evil, for he tells Victor “[y]ou would not call it murder if you could precipitate me into one of those ice-rifts and destroy my frame, the work of your own hands” (Shelley 140). He is not only denied the right to exist but also the right to a meaningful death; his death is considered only as a necessity. In fact, it is possible to argue that for Victor, the only natural part of the creature’s existence would be his termination. As the creature narrates, it would not be murder; it would merely be putting everything taken from the hands of death back into its innate place. The creature’s body belongs to the grave; thus, should return to it for fulfilling what is *normal* so that the hierarchical order of things would be restored. The bodily appearance once again precedes any moral code, for even the act of killing is considered in relation to the physical existence of the creature.

Aware that he will not live to see the day he triumphs over the creature, Victor warns Walton regarding the manipulative power of the creature and his ability to use words to persuade his addressee:

He is eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had even power over my heart; but trust him not. His soul is as hellish as his form, full of treachery and fiendlike malice. Hear him not; call on the names of William, Justine, Clerval, Elizabeth, my father, and of the wretched Victor, and thrust your sword into his heart. I will hover near and direct the steel aright. (Shelley 202).

Not long after this warning, the scientist dies on Walton's ship, and his mortal remains is visited by the most prominent invention of his, as the creature visits the cabin containing Victor's dead body. Walton's final encounter with the creature is significant. Despite the horror aroused in him, the captain calls on the creature to stay when he attempts to flee the room. Consequently, he witnesses not only the creature's bodily deformation and grotesque figure as narrated, but also his remorse over his creator's death. Confessions Walton witnesses appal him. The creature's body continues to indicate otherness with its grotesqueness, yet his speech lays bare the creature's consciousness that is capable of grief, remorse, repentance, and self-assessment. The creature is not overwhelmed with rage but agony; his awareness of ethical failures challenges the assumption that his bodily defects and leviathan exterior indicate his inherently monstrous nature.

Regardless of the fact that Walton attends to the monologue of the creature towards his dead creator, the captain fails to overcome the creature's looks and again uses the labels the society has attributed to him, such as "wretch" and "hypocritical fiend" (Shelley 212). Yet, the final speech of the creature reveals how his once innocent nature turned into malice as a result of social exclusion and utter loneliness:

When I ran over the frightful catalogue of my sins, I cannot believe that I am the same creature whose thoughts were once filled with sublime and transcendent visions of the beauty and the majesty of goodness. But it is even so; the fallen angel becomes a malignant devil. Yet even that enemy of God and man had friends and associates in his desolation; I am alone. (Shelley 213)

Almost succinctly summarising his situation, the creature once again underlines the society's role in his otherness; internalised labels of monstrosity attributed to him by the society indeed turned him into a monster as a consequence.

The creature's departure into the polar ice can be read as the final consequence of bodily othering and his ultimate isolation. His physical deformations render social acceptance impossible, and as an individual, he has no chance but to exist individually until he ceases to exist: "Polluted by crimes and torn by the bitterest remorse, where can [the creature]

find rest but in death?” (Shelley 214). Despite all the unfortunate occurrences he encountered and the crimes he committed, death cannot be completely evaluated as a punishment for the creature. His concluding words bring forward his lament rather than vice and violence, exposing the inner character of the creature’s search for a way to overcome agony and find peace. With his death, the “burning miseries will extinct ... [and his] spirit will sleep in peace” (Shelley 215). By concluding the novel with the creature’s remorse, it can be inferred that Mary Shelley exposes a tragedy of society that rejects a person based on physical appearance alone. The bodily rejection and judgement of monstrosity as an innate condition is not a universal code but a social construct produced by way of rejection, exclusion, and denial of acknowledgement of one’s soul’s existence.

Ultimately, Shelley’s *Frankenstein* demonstrates the Other primarily through the body of the creature, presenting physical difference as the reason for exclusion and denial of recognition. Despite the fact that the creature has reason, emotional and moral capacity, his grotesque appearance irreversibly marks him as different from and inferior to the rest of the society. He is the product of scientific experimentation, and can be evaluated as the embodiment of the social anxieties regarding the rapid development in scientific knowledge. The creature’s exclusion does not originate from an innate monstrosity, but it is produced through the responses the creature receives from those who refuse to acknowledge him as a fellow subject. In this regard, distinction between the Self and the Other gets complicated, for the creature is constructed as an inevitable Other by Victor. The hierarchical opposition between them is established as the Self and the Other, creator and product, mind and body, normal and abnormal, contributing to the further othering of the creature by denying him recognition. The creature’s immediate abandonment and recurrent rejection from the society builds his identity gradually, and he commits actions in accordance with the monstrous label imposed upon him. Thus, the creature’s representation reveals a form of othering based on primarily corporeal difference, and it suggests that otherness is a category produced through social rejection and relations of power, rather than being an inherent condition. As the earliest level in the transformation of the Other examined in this thesis, the bodily Other of *Frankenstein* provides the foundation for later representations in which difference extends beyond the physical body

and becomes increasingly connected to colonial and ultimately posthuman forms of otherness.

CHAPTER 3

MARTIANS AS THE COLONISER OTHER

The nineteenth century that gave birth to *Frankenstein* changed dramatically toward the end as scientific knowledge accumulated, and Shelley's use of technological developments gave way to explorations of possible outcomes of scientific experiments in narratives. Inevitably, the century produced one of the most reputable authors of scientific romance (as it was then called), Herbert George Wells (1866 – 1946). As one of the most influential writers of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, H.G. Wells is widely regarded as the father of science fiction (McConnell 3). In 1895, *The Time Machine* brought about his literary breakthrough as the novel was an immediate success, and quickly turned Wells into a literary genius of his time (Roberts 53). The novel was followed by serialised novellas that are known as scientific romances at the time such as *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896), *The Invisible Man* (1897), and *The War of the Worlds* (1898). By the turn of the twentieth century, Wells was an established literary figure in both Britain and the United States, and his books were being translated into the European languages (Aldiss ix). As a journalist, teacher, and writer, Wells has contributed to the science fiction genre with his inventions such as heat-waves, early representations of spaceships as well as adapting their general concerns and anxieties to his writing such as invasion stories and reverse colonialism. *The War of the Worlds* in particular introduces Martians, an alien species, as invaders of planet Earth. This chapter analyses Wells's Martians as the coloniser Other and traces the transformation of the concept of the Other from a primarily bodily category into a colonial one.

Wells's relationship with science, and his knowledge of it, can be traced back to his education. Born in 1866 in Kent, Wells was of a lower-middle-class background and experienced economic difficulties throughout his early youth (Smith 4). Later he was enrolled at Thomas Morley's Commercial Academy until 1880 which he found inadequate (Smith 7), and apprenticed to a draper which he hated (Wood 12). At the age of eighteen, Wells won a scholarship to the Normal School of Science at South Kensington, where he became a student of T.H. Huxley in 1884. This enabled him to

study biology and Darwinism, a biological theory of evolution based on natural selection, variation, and heredity (Bowler, *The Eclipse* 7), which profoundly shaped not only his worldview but also his writing (Smith 10-12).

Charles Darwin's ideas regarding evolution were by no means new, but *The Origin of the Species* (1859) transformed the future understanding of science and the contemporary views of existence (Bowler, "Revisiting" 22). In his renowned study, Darwin revealed that the human species is a result of biological evolution over thousands of years based on scientific evidence. He builds his argument on how the species change in nature through time, and claims that the mechanism triggering this change is natural selection:

Can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their own kind? On the other hand, we may feel sure that any variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection. (Darwin 81)

The main criticism of Darwin's evolutionary theory and natural selection lays in the implications it carried beyond biology and science; critics primarily referred to religion and humanity's nature. Christian tradition distinguished the human and animal species, and man was believed to be created in God's image (Bowler, *The Eclipse* 44-45). Therefore, as Michael Page points out, Darwin's theory and the following studies on evolution were leading the intellectuals to reevaluate the natural order and humanity's place in it due to the common late Victorian imagination that placed the Western man in particular at the top of existence complacently (113, 175).

Indeed, this was what Wells highlighted in most of his scientific romances. The evolutionary imperative was the main drive for his novels. However, what is, in its most basic sense, one species or group's need/grasp of another's resources for the continuation of their own survival at the expense of the other's extinction, gains disturbing implications within an imperial context (Page 176). Because Darwinism has not stayed as merely Darwinism; it itself evolved into a different set of ideas that can be collectively termed as Social Darwinism. Although it bears Darwin's name, it is primarily linked to Herbert Spencer, who incorporated Darwin's classification of plants and animals in his study with individuals and societies, and presented the natural selection for human beings (Arias and

Onega 190). The famous term “survival of the fittest” was coined by Spencer in his *The Principles of Biology* (1864), where he used it as a synonym for Darwin’s natural selection referring to the full title of his book, which is *On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (444-445). The overall meaning of the term “survival of the fittest” has wrongfully come to be the belief that the powerful were inherently superior to the weak and their success is a demonstration of their innate superiority (Arias and Onega 190). It served as a motto supporting and justifying the empire’s territorial expansion, the Self, and subjugation of the racial and economic Other (Arias and Onega 191). Within this framework, “the *specificity* of Social Darwinism,” as Gregory Claeys brilliantly exposes, “lay[s] in the ... mapping of a quasi-ontological racial discourse onto a redefinition of ‘fitness’ as ‘intelligence’ and an identification of ‘intelligence’ with the ‘white’ races” (240). Hence, it can be inferred that Social Darwinism transformed biological difference into a racial and asocio-economic hierarchy. In this sense, it provided an ideological framework through which Western superiority could be scientifically justified and presented as natural.

In this respect, Wells’s engagement with science becomes rather significant. In his writing, the author treats science as a tool for social and political messages rather than merely rooting his stories in scientific experiments and imagined engineering (“Preface” Aldiss x). According to John Plotz, Wells’s science fiction novels dramatise late-nineteenth-century anxieties about the human species’ vulnerability (856) since Wells shifts the focus to how humanity reacts to the machine rather than how the scientific machine is built, which suits his philosophical agenda. In other words, Wells’s scientific background reveals itself in his approach to Social Darwinist views with reservation regarding humanity’s place in the chain of existence, and he critiques the acts of brutality on behalf of the British Empire within the same framework.

The author’s treatment of social Darwinism and the evolutionary theory can be considered consistent with Darwin’s original intensions. At a symposium lecture on Wells, Brian Aldiss states that:

Not only was Wells one of the first writers to use evolutionary themes directly in his work, but he was here using them against the grain of his generation’s

perception of the meaning of evolution. Whereas many interpreted evolution as a biological mechanism which had carried man to the top of the tree and would justify ruthless economic competition, Wells understood Darwin better; indeed, no English writer has shown a surer grasp of the scientific challenges of the modern age. *The War of the Worlds* demonstrates that the continuous process of evolution was as likely to work against mankind as for. (“Wells and Leopard Lady” Aldiss 117)

Then, it can be observed that what Wells does is not reproducing the hierarchical doctrine of Social Darwinism but critically reversing its logic. While the leading figures of his age used Darwin’s theories and Social Darwinism as a means of justification for the white aristocracy in the evolutionary ladder, Wells grasped that evolution is an ongoing process and in fact, humanity may not be at the final stage, nor it can be the fittest to survive. *The War of the Worlds* challenges assumptions associated with the evolutionary theory in Wells’s period by presenting humanity as vulnerable to evolutionary steps rather than the secured “fittest” species.

Suitably, *The War of the Worlds* narrates the invasion of the planet Earth by technologically high-calibre Martians, and follows humanity’s attempt at survival against an almost invulnerable enemy. Set primarily in southern England during the late-nineteenth century, the novel is narrated from the first-person perspective of an unnamed, philosophical narrator who recounts his experiences in a retrospective account of the catastrophe. The narrative begins with astronomers’ observations of unusual explosions on Mars surface. Soon after, a large cylinder crash-lands onto Horsell Common near Woking. Many curious spectators gather around the fallen object, initially taking it as a rocket returning from a space mission. Yet the cylinder soon reveals the aliens it contains: the grotesque Martians with large heads, tentacle-like appendages, and frail bodies suited to life on the surface of Mars. Quickly demonstrating their technological superiority over the human race, Martians use Heat-Ray, a weapon unheard of and immensely devastating, capable of incinerating people, buildings, surfaces, and military forces within mere seconds. Soon, additional cylinders land across England, and the invaders start assembling tripods, their enormous towering machines of war, enabling them to move rapidly across the country, and destroy everything they encounter in the meantime. Futile attempts of human resistance are proven to be ineffective as the British army’s weapons

are impotent against the advanced Martian technology. Panic spreads across the country, and the narrator embarks on a survival journey alone, separated from his wife. On his journey, he witnesses the destruction of cities and villages, the collapse of social order, and the mass migration of citizens. He encounters different people during his travels, such as an artilleryman who plots to build an underground civilisation and defeat the Martians, and a curate who goes through a psychological breakdown due to his inability to cope with the catastrophe. The alien invaders proceed with their invasion by seeding a strange red vegetation to transform the Earth into an environment similar to Mars, suitable for Martian life. The narrator comes to believe that humanity has come to an end and that survival of the human race is not possible.

Unexpectedly, however, the invasion stops. It is understood that the Martians, despite their technological superiority, are not immune to the microorganisms on Earth. Having evolved in a rather sterile environment compared to Earth, the aliens succumb to terrestrial bacteria and the disease they cause. The invaders die one by one, not as a result of heroic military victory, but through a natural and biological cause. The narrator eventually returns home, reunites with his wife, and the society begins slowly to recover from the devastation.

Wells's education in science, fascination with Darwinian evolutionary theory, and his critical attitude toward British imperialism can be traced prominently in this novel compared to his other scientific romances. Through the figure of the alien invader, Wells reversed the colonial relationship between imperial Britain and its subjects, and provoked his British readers to taste the vulnerability and dehumanisation typically imposed upon the colonised people. Therefore, it would not be farfetched to assume that the relationship between the Self and the Other functions in colonial terms in the novel, and the alien Other is employed beyond a mere body, unlike Frankenstein's creature. The Martians are not the Other based solely on their physical appearance, but also due to their political agenda. Wells brings out the alien monsters, bloodthirsty in a literal sense and technologically superior, and physically defines them in detail as being similar to octopuses. Unlike the grotesque human form of Frankenstein's creature, the aliens are as different from the human species as possible. However, in terms of Self and Other, it is not only the bizarre and animalised existence of Martians that constitute them as the

bodily Other; apart from their looks, their presence on and coming to the Earth, that is, their imperial motivation, becomes distinctive aspect of the aliens compared to Frankenstein's creature as discussed in the previous chapter. Martians are invaders out of this world; they have an agenda to conquer and tame the Earth in order for their own species' survival. Their attempt to conquer and reshape planet Earth is particularly significant when the colonial and imperial anxieties of Wells's own historical moment are taken into consideration.

As a matter of fact, the nineteenth century of H.G. Wells was particularly different from that of Mary Shelley's. Unlike the beginning of the century, the scientific breakthroughs were not limited to the possibilities of electricity and the steam engine towards the end of the century. Apart from the evolutionary theory and its implications, with the expanding railways enabling easy transportation for the troops and advanced military weapons, technological developments gave way to a transformation of warfare as well. New weapons were introduced such as Johann Dreyse's needle gun and Friedrich Krupp's rifled cannons (Walter 14-16, 23). In addition, the nineteenth-century reading public was increasingly exposed to popular discussions regarding developments in astronomy and speculation concerning different worlds. As Ingo Cornils points out, Italian astronomer Giovanni Schiaparelli's discovery of the lines on Mars's surface in 1877 sparked imagination not only in European but also in British minds (24). Scientists and writers as well as the general public were excitedly following the news from Mars towards the late nineteenth century (Cornils 24). One of the many examples can be given *Greenock Telegraph and Clyde Shipping Gazette* in 1891 (see fig. 1).

NEWS FROM THE PLANET MARS.

Camille Flammarion, the eminent French astronomer, describes in the *Arena* the new discoveries on the planet Mars in an interesting paper, which contains several maps of Mars, which bears a curious resemblance to the configuration of our own world. In June Mars was only forty-four millions of miles distant; in October it was one hundred millions of miles away from the earth. When it is magnified six hundred and thirty times by a telescope it seems ten times larger than the full moon. The changes which are continually going on on its surface seem to indicate that the water exists there in an intermediate state between mist and fluid, what he calls a viscous condition. Judging from his explanation, this seems to be like highly condensed London fog. If so the charitable man must sincerely hope that no beings are condemned to exist in that old little planet, whose mountains have been destroyed, and whose surface is covered partly with snow and partly with viscous water, which shifts and changes from month to month.—*Review of Reviews*.

Fig. 1. "News From the Planet Mars." *Greenock Telegraph and Clyde Shipping Gazette*, 19 Mar 1891, p.4. *The British Newspaper Archive*.

It can be inferred that the possibility of intelligent life and revelations regarding the conditions of the planet were a matter of public discussion. In this regard, Cornils states, Wells gathered together a number of elements that are already present in the public mind and presented a symbolic representation that immediately corresponded to the general reader's imagination: the Darwinian theory of evolution, rapidly changing methods of warfare, and the assumption that humanity may not be alone in the universe (25).

Additionally, the 1871 novel *The Battle of Dorking* by George Tomkyns Chesney in which England is invaded by a foreign power, presumably Prussia as the novel is published shortly after the Prussian defeat of France, gave way to a new popularity of fictional invasion stories (Gailor 270, Wagar 391, Arata 110). According to Stephen Arata, these invasion stories are the result of an anxiety of "reverse colonisation"; they are not merely the "products of the geopolitical fears of a troubled imperial society, [but] also responses to cultural guilt. In the marauding, invasive Other, British culture sees its own imperial practices mirrored back in monstrous forms" (108). In other words, the society's concerns and anxieties have changed compared to the early years of the century. What was once the fear of unknown possibilities of scientific capability inferred in Mary Shelley's time now becomes the result of that competence. The Other of the society, as well as the image of its Self, has transformed into an expansionist one, in which the Self is not only educated and enlightened as in Victor Frankenstein's case, but also the bearer of knowledge and the bringer of civilisation. As noted previously, the Other becomes palpable through monsters and aliens in science fiction narratives (Harse 4). Likewise, the relationship between Self and the Other is inevitably interdependent, as the Other functions as a projection of the Self (Day 22). Then, just as the creature's existence highlights image of Victor Frankenstein as the creator, the Martians of Wells serve as the coloniser Other, and through the reversal of the imperial image, they expose the image of the British Empire as an invasive power of the nineteenth century.

Within the colonial context, *The War of the Worlds*, and Wells's scientific romance narratives more broadly, are inevitably what Ziauddin Sardar calls "a particular

possession of just one tradition – Western civilisation” (2). In accordance with the Self’s interdependency on the Other for solidifying its own identity, Sardar comments on the employment of aliens as a “demonstrat[ion of] what is not human [in order to] better exemplify that which is human” (6). To put it differently, the construction of essential differences between the aliens and humans reinforces the identity of the Self and, consequently, can serve to justify the defence and preservation of that identity. Correspondingly, although the arrival of the Martians is an imagined future in Wells’s novel, their invasion is deeply embedded in the Western reality of European and British Colonisation. The colonial encounter is transformed from a geographical and historical one to an extraterrestrial one, transforming the British Empire’s position of the colonising Self into that of the colonised other. The Martians’ arrival therefore destabilises the purportedly substantial distinction between Self and Other; the British who have historically occupied the position of the conquering subject are all of a sudden subjected to the same processes of domination and dispossession that outline colonial encounters. The reversal is made clear from the opening lines of the novel, as it states:

No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man’s and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scrutinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water. (Wells 7)

The colonial authority that factually positioned itself as the observing and categorising power suddenly becomes the object of the colonial imperative. Thus, the alien invasion functions as a reversal of the colonial gaze rather than a mere encounter between terrestrial and extraterrestrial species, for it unsettles the boundaries between the coloniser and the colonised, the Self and the Other.

Indeed, in the early pages, the narrator states that he was oblivious to what was coming, “because it was so remote and small, ... drawing nearer every minute by so many thousands of miles, ... the *Thing* that was to bring so much struggle and calamity and death to the earth” [emphasis added] (Wells 11). Almost parallel to the coming of the colonial European ships to the indigenous lands in different parts of the world, the cylinder of the Martians goes through a journey to reach the planet Earth. Similar to the arrival of the imperial powers, they possess unprecedented technology that enables them

to establish dominance over the local population. The motivation behind the invasion is to make use of the resources and the habitable land due to the “immediate pressure of necessity” (Wells 8). Furthermore, the Martians classify humans as an inferior species whose existence presents no ethical obstacle to conquest, reproducing the dehumanising attitudes frequently embedded within colonial discourse. Therefore, the traditional direction of imperial missions is reversed from the beginning of the narrative.

The first attempt at contact comes from the local observers; the astronomer friend of the narrator, Ogilvy, and a journalist, Henderson, who pursue communication rather conspicuously, for “[t]hey listened, rapped on the scaly burnt metal with a stick and, meeting with no response, they both concluded the man or men inside must be insensible or dead” (Wells 16). In other words, they violently hit the cylinder, which, regardless of intention, proves to be a rather primitive form of communication. Later, when the narrator arrives at the scene, he stops young boys from throwing stones at the cylinder, and sees that someone had already climbed upon it (Wells 17,19). Before ever contacting what is inside, the inhabitants of Earth represent themselves in association with violence and primitivity. As British citizens, they are the conventional Self in relation to the rest of the world. So, as the imperial power, the British consider themselves the enlightened, civilised, and superior, compared to their colonies which they deem ignorant, primitive, and inferior. However, it can be seen that soon after the Martians’ arrival, in their first contact with something they do not seem to understand, these civilised people prove themselves to have violent and primitive tendencies.

Once the *Thing*, the cylinder, gets in motion and the unscrewing starts from the inside, the immediate thought of Ogilvy is “[t]here’s a man in it – men in it! Half roasted to death! Trying to escape!” (Wells 15). This immediate assumption that what is inside cannot be something other than his own species lays bare the Self-centeredness of the average British. The initial thought of Ogilvy upon seeing the simple motion of unscrewing a screw, which also connotes human usage of such devices, is that simply there can be no one else inside the cylinder but men; not women, not an animal, and certainly not an alien form of life.

The physical appearance of the newcomers, therefore, is quite startling for the native British, for “everyone expected to see a man emerge – possibly something a little unlike

... terrestrial men, but in all essentials a man” (Wells 21). The pre-assumption of human-like aliens indicates the inability to imagine a truly radical Other outside the human-centred framework; the narrator comments that “we men, the creatures who inhabit this earth, must be to them at least as alien and lowly as are the monkeys and lemurs to us” (Wells 8). Károly Pintér argues that the cultural background of the readers inherently shapes the interpretation and perception of the alien during an encounter as well as broaching the question of Self and Other (136). Observers project their own image onto the unknown before even encountering it, and when the imperial mindset that classifies the British as the utmost form of human species is taken into consideration, this scene can be evaluated as evidence of the Self’s construction of its own image as superior beings. Before the Other is encountered, it is imagined in the image of the Self by the native inhabitants. However, the revealing of the Martians proves otherwise:

A big greyish rounded bulk, the size, perhaps, of a bear, ... glistened like wet leather. Two large dark-coloured eyes were regarding me steadfastly. The mass that framed them, the head of the thing, was rounded, and had, one might say, a face. There was a mouth under the eyes, the lipless brim of which quivered and panted, and dropped saliva. ... The peculiar V-shaped mouth with its pointed upper lip, the absence of brow ridges, the absence of a chin beneath the wedge-like lower lip, the incessant quivering of this mouth, the gorgon groups of tentacles ... were at once vital, intense, inhuman, crippled and monstrous. (Wells 21-22)

In light of the previous chapter that discusses the physical appearance and bodily othering of Frankenstein’s creature, this definition of the Martians is sufficient enough to label them as the Other. The initial reaction of an observer to the alien body becomes “[w]hat ugly *brutes!*” (Wells 24), emphasising the bodily grotesquery of the alien. The reaction they get is rather similar to what Frankenstein’s creature receives during his encounters. However, although their ugliness relates to their physical appearance and primarily their body, it is not their bodies alone that make them the Other. The Martians are not solely the natural opponents of humans; they are not a result of a failed experiment, nor do they bear physical similarity to the inhabitants of the Earth. They are the projection of humans, the part of the Other in the Self. They are there to invade, exploit, and rule over the species they deem inferior just as the expansionist British Empire did.

In fact, Wells never abandons drawing parallels between the Empire and the Martians. Given the narration's retrospective form, the narrator evaluates the invaders with a grim perception:

And before we judge of them too harshly, we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its own *inferior races*. The Tasmanians, *in spite of their human likeness*, were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants, in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit? (Wells 9, emphasis added)

The colonial allegory here lays bare the European guilt towards the colonised people, particularly accumulated over the century. Rather than portraying the Martian invasion as an unprecedented, genocidal act of cruelty, the narrator reminds readers of the sins that Europeans in general, and the British Empire in particular, have committed. Imperial violence and its normalisation are exposed through the alien invasion via emphasis on how violence practised by Martians does not fundamentally differ from the European empires' perpetration. As Frank McConnell states in his analysis of the novel "[t]he Martians are not, after all, aliens. They are ourselves, mutated beyond sympathy, though not beyond recognition" (130).

The emphasised statements in the passage quoted are particularly revealing as they recall the colonial tendency to acknowledge the humanity of indigenous populations while simultaneously denying them equal moral status. The Tasmanians are recognised as semi-human beings, yet this recognition does not protect them from total annihilation. Similarly, the Martians view humans as living creatures but not as beings worthy of ethical consideration. Then, it can be inferred that dehumanisation does not require denying that the Other is human; it merely requires constructing the Other as less valuable, less advanced, or less deserving of survival. Inevitably, of course, this construction traces back to the Self's image as the intelligent, civilised, advanced, and refined superior form.

On the other hand, it can be noted that the quoted passage also contributes to the destabilisation of the distinction between the Self and the Other. The colonial discourse often portrays the colonial people as the inferior and primitive Other. In the narrative, however, the colonial gaze is subverted, for "the coloniser finds himself in the position

of the colonised, the exploiter is exploited, the victimiser victimised” (Arata 108). The same objectification, devaluation, exploitation, and dehumanisation imposed on the colonised so-called “inferior races” are now projected onto the humans who caused such brutality. Indeed, the narrator answers the later question asked by the curate at the beginning: “[w]hat sins have we done?” (Wells 70). It can be inferred that the narrator is grimly contemplating that the catastrophe brought upon them is, in fact, well deserved. Humanity that is accustomed to occupying the position of the imperial subject suddenly finds itself reduced to the status of the “inferior race,” confronting a technologically superior power.

Pintér comments on the scene that suffering under the violence of Martians becomes a form of atonement for the imperial sins, and draws attention to how Oriental College, the emblem of Western appropriations of the East, becomes one of the first buildings demolished by the aliens (109). Then, it would not be wrong to comment that in addition to exposing the imperial violence through projection, Wells also reveals the production mechanisms of the colonial discourse through which the dominant Self constructs the inferior image of the Other, and uses it in order to justify the exploitation and extermination of the natives.

According to Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, the Other image of the East is established through the Western discourse consisting of academic studies, travel writings, and literature about the East, written by Westerners based not on sterile truths but on mythological fantasies (41-42,63). Inevitably, the image of the Other becomes a production of the West, serving their imperial purposes as a means of justification, for they form this image as passive and less capacitated life forms in need of government by the intellectually superior and more civilised West (Said 138). Therefore, the demolition of the Oriental College as the epitome of production and reproduction centre of epistemic violence against the East through its portrayal as the Other becomes a significant event. It can be inferred that by doing so, Wells uncovers the role of epistemic violence embedded in colonial discourse, while the reader is left to confront another dimension of imperial atrocities.

While it is used as a means of paralleling the Martians to the colonial British, statements “inferior races” and “human likeness” in relation to Tasmanians become rather unnerving

(Wells 9). By commenting on the genocide of Tasmanians “*in spite of their human likeness*” [emphasis added], the narrator puts forward an insinuating racism embedded in his imperial arrogance as he states, in other words, the Tasmanians were not human even though they resemble humans. Therefore, this declaration disregarding the civilisation of different people casts a shadow on the colonial criticism of the novel. Indeed, in his analysis of the novel, S.D. Pitman lays bare the common Victorian prejudice that non-whites were inferior, and even the critiques of the imperial missions were advocating as such (54). Pitman associates this statement with the renowned teacher of Wells, T.H. Huxley’s writings on evolution where the biologist discusses the pros and cons of colonisation and advocates for the total destruction of the indigenous culture in order for the British civilisation to flourish in line with the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection or survival of the fittest (54-55). The scholar concludes that rather than humanising the non-white populations who suffered under the imperial crown through evoking resemblance between their plight and the English in the narrative, Wells reduces humankind into animalistic disarray with the implication that those suffer from colonisation are lacking strength and intellectual capacity (Pitman 55). While it is certainly one possible reading of the narrative, it can be argued that the analysis falls short when the juxtaposed images of colonisation taunting the coloniser-reader are taken into account.

What is significant regarding the appearance of the Martians is not their monstrous looks solely but their non-white representation. They have “oily brown skin” and there is “something in the clumsy deliberation of the tedious movements unspeakably nasty” (Wells 22). In other words, they are not white, agile, clean, and agreeable like the British, the Self, is. The Other is as different from the Self as possible not only in looks, but seemingly also in action. The aliens are inarticulate, perverse, and cannibalistic. Arata evaluates this picture as a means of realisation on the Victorian reader’s account; both the coloniser and the colonised are clearly visible, and the Others of their world come to overthrow their oppressors (109).

Once the Martians arrive, the hierarchy that previously privileged humanity is thwarted and ultimately reversed. Humans, who have had historically occupied the position of the coloniser and arbiter of civilisation, suddenly become the objects of a superior gaze. This

reversal is most apparent in the technological disparity between the two species. The invaders certainly belong to a higher technology, and they are inevitably the product of a rapidly developing society. The Martians' intelligence as sterile functioning beings is revealed in their design of war machines:

A monstrous tripod, higher than many houses, striding over the young pine trees, and smashing them aside in its career; a walking engine of glittering metal, striding now across the heather; articulate ropes of steel dangling from it, and the clattering tumult of its passage mingling with the riot of the thunder. (Wells 46)

The description of the Martian tripod emphasises not only the invaders' technological superiority but also their status as a radically unfamiliar Other. The tripod becomes the embodiment of the Martian power and technology. Such imagery of an enormous walking metal emphasises the insignificance of human technology, destabilising humanity's position within the biological hierarchy (Rieder 5). Moreover, the tripod's effortless advance across the countryside mirrors the destructive force of imperial expansion, as both natural and human environments are subordinated to the needs of a superior power. Drawing yet another parallel between the coloniser actions of their own species and the invader aliens, the narrator questions "how an ironclad or a steam-engine would seem to an intelligent lower animal" (Wells 52), reiterating the reversed roles of the perpetrator and the victim.

In light of the parallels demonstrated above between the Martians and the colonial humans, it is possible to argue that the novel not only portrays the Martians as a radical, coloniser Other to the human Self, but also erases the notions' distinctiveness through the reiterated reversal of the positions. The beginning of the narrative establishes humanity as the Self with the belief that humans, British in particular, are the most advanced species and the standard against which all other life forms are measured. Even considering the possible intelligent extra-terrestrial life forms, the human subconscious imagines it in familiar terms based on their own experience. The Self tends to project its own image onto the unfamiliar; it is the normative centre from which difference is defined, measured, evaluated, and classified.

However, the arrival of the biologically different and technologically superior Martians imposes an experience of alterity on humans. The human subject who had occupied the position of the observer becomes the observed object "as a man with a microscope might

scrutinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water” (Wells 8). Historically assigned roles to the coloniser and the colonised are subverted, for now the British are the ones experiencing vulnerability, displacement, and exploitation similar to their own impositions. At the same time, the Martians assume the qualifications of European cultures in association with the civilised, powerful, and assertive Self. The aspects have changed which reveals that such relationship of dominance is not inherent, but power-related. Therefore, it is disclosed that the distinction between Self and Other is not only interdependent as discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Frankenstein and his creature, but also interchangeable. The one who possesses the ability to define, classify, and dominate occupies the position of the Self; the one who is defined, classified, and dominated becomes the Other.

The constitutive nature of the Self and Other is also underlined through the subversion of statuses. The Martians function as a mirror of humanity through which the humans grasp the scope of their imperial agenda, which is a projection of the customary practices of domination over different cultures that the coloniser deems inferior. As stated by Sardar, the “Western thought not only constructed aliens to define itself better, it made constructed aliens essential to fulfilling its own moral purpose” (16).

In addition to their technological bodies of engine, the British find it hard to accept the fact that such “ugly brutes” of “mere heads” can be the superior colonising power. Similar to the responses Frankenstein’s creature receive, the British evaluate the aliens primarily upon their non-human physical appearance, with which they do not associate power or intelligence. The primary thought in London, after the news of the Martians’ physical appearance is spread, is that “these monsters must be sluggish: ‘crawling,’ ‘creeping painfully’” (Wells 75). However, the later news prove that the imperial arrogance causes an undermining of these creatures; for “they were not merely a handful of small sluggish creatures, but ... minds swaying vast mechanical bodies” (Wells 77). In fact, these mechanical bodies with minds are what the narrator fears becoming; he speculates that since evolution is inevitable, the conscious life on Mars must have evolved in line with the conscious life on Earth. Yet, due to the older age of the planet Mars, the evolution of consciousness there must be inevitably far more advanced compared to the human species. Therefore, McConnell states that the danger the Martians pose not only covers

monstrosity in the mind of the narrator, but also presents the possibility of evolution into the similar, sterile minds of engine-powered bodies (130). On a similar tone, John Rieder highlights the parallel between the Martians and humanity as “with their hyper-trophied brains and prosthetic machines, [the Martians] are a version of the human race’s own future” (5). Then, the colonial analogy that constructs the image of the primitive native Other can be traced back to the coloniser Self’s own past. Subsequently, Wells builds his image of the Martians on an evolutionary framework:

To me it is quite credible that the Martians may be descended from beings not unlike ourselves, by a gradual development of brain and hands (the latter giving rise to the two bunches of delicate tentacles at last) at the expense of the rest of the body. Without the body the brain would, of course, become a mere selfish intelligence, without any of the emotional substratum of the human being. (Wells 127)

As a result of a longer trajectory of evolution, they have larger brains, and they lack digestive systems and several organs. By the logic of Social Darwinism, which advocates the survival of the fittest as the rightfully dominating power of the weaker species and races, the invasion of Earth is justified. Wells’s deepest criticism comes here, for the moral code that the British empire used in order to dominate different lands and peoples is exposed; if the fittest and the superior race has the right to govern and rule over, then the Martians’ superior fitness gives them the same moral rights and claim over Britain that Britain claimed over Tasmanians. Hence, the binary of the Self and Other with their acclaimed adjectives as superior and inferior turn against the usurpers of power.

In addition to the Self and Other relationship within a colonial framework, the dehumanisation goes both ways in the novel. The Martians treat the Earth’s inhabitants as mere cattle, a source of nutrition and lower life forms. On the other hand, the narrator constantly describes the invaders in generalising terms disregarding any personality, such as “alien” (Wells 8), “creature” (21), and “monster” (22). This can be taken as a means to expose a mechanism that colonialism makes use of in order to justify colonisation. The implication of the colonised as the subhuman, as the British referred to the Tasmanians, is applied to the Martian powerholders, and the subversive image of the Self and the Other is reiterated.

On the other hand, the colonial agenda of the Martians' is not limited to asserting domination merely over the inhabitants through violence. The invaders' motivation, as noted, is to benefit from the resources of the Earth such as the land and the livestock. Therefore, the invasion can be considered as an ecological one in addition to the military and political aspects, for the Martians did not arrive empty-handed. Encountering a shallow flood where a meadow should be, the narrator realises that the "tropical exuberance of the red weed," the plant of the Martians, changed the climatic conditions of geography, causing a flood during a hot summer's day (Wells 145). In an attempt to turn the soil and topography of the Earth into a more compatible condition for the sustenance own life, the aliens exert invasion not only on a military level, but also on an ecological level. These incongruous plants owe their rapid and extraordinary growth of "unparalleled fecundity" to contact with water, as they pour the seeds directly into the central rivers of Wey and Thames, as a result of which the bridges are entangled with this weed, and houses near Themes became desolate (145). Consequently, the plant can be considered as another weapon of the Other serving the purpose of reversion of the roles; the weed turns the familiar into alien territory, claiming the Martian dominance over the native lands. Rather than adapting to the environment, the coloniser attempts to alter the ecological system based on their own needs.

The threat of the Other is signalled to be permanent, as the environmental annihilation of the local fauna and flora can be read as a means to assert the Martian power, highlighting the subversive nature of their status as the Other and Self. This ecological invasion draws another parallel between the British Empire's colonisation project and the Martians by greatly exemplifying what Alfred W. Crosby define as "ecological imperialism" (7). Weeds, as Crosby explains, are defined not by taxonomy but by function; they are "whatever plants spring up where humans do not want them," and they evolve accordingly being spreading on the bare ground after natural disasters such as fires, landslides, and floods as they are well-adapted to the disturbed soil (28). Similarly, the red weed spreads upon the demolished lands of England aggressively in an attempt to alter the landscape according to Martian requirements. This is a particular projection of the British colonisation in Australia, where "the Europeans and their portmanteau of biota have altered the Australian environment irreversibly" (Crosby 162), further illustrating the scope of colonialism in history and the reversal of dynamics as Wells positions the

imperial centre in the place of the colonised territories, and contributes to the interchangeable nature of the Self and the Other.

In conclusion, H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* marks a significant transformation in the representation of the Other at the end of the Nineteenth century, for otherness breaches the boundaries of the individual body, and becomes increasingly articulated through colonial and imperial relations. While the creature in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* is primarily constructed as the bodily Other through his grotesque physical appearance and bodily difference, Wells's Martians embody a form of otherness that is manifested through relations of power, territory, and domination. Through reversal of the colonial encounter, and positioning Britain as the subordinated object, Wells exposes the anxieties of his era evolving towards the end of the century. Thus, the transformation of the Other from bodily Other to the coloniser Other is an echo of a broader alteration of social representation. Systems of imperial, racial, and evolutionary power affected the ideological contradictions and colonial anxieties, therefore the Other is no longer defined solely by his physicality. In this sense, *The War of the Worlds* constitutes a crucial phase in the evolution of the Other from an initially corporeal figure into a colonial and ideological one.

CHAPTER 4

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE NON-CORPOREAL OTHER

With the acceleration in scientific developments and the arms industry, the twentieth century brought two World Wars and a Cold War, paving the way for the space race, the militarisation of society and science, and the rise of paranoia. Progress in science and technology resulted in both productive and destructive consequences, leading people to consider the world in new ways as well as introducing new concerns surrounding technology. Development of nuclear weapons, automation, cybernetics, and intricate computational technologies challenged the nineteenth-century confidence in scientific progress as an inherently beneficial medium. Science now became inseparable from queries of control and domination, and the possibility that technology humans created might exceed their capacity to control them. Therefore, the twentieth-century science fiction gradually turned toward the technological transformations within the human civilisation, rather than the externally encountered Other. The anxiety surrounding technological advancement, hence, brought about a new mode of otherness in which the threat to human identity of the Self did not emerge from a distant figure, but from the systems of intelligence produced by the human hand and mind, such as artificial intelligence.

Amid these reservations about the uncertain consequences of scientific progress, Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) stands out as a powerful synthesis. Despite being closely associated with Stanley Kubrick's film adaptation, Clarke's novel can be considered a significant British literary engagement with the technological anxieties of its period. In the novel, Heuristically Programmed Algorithmic Computer (HAL 9000 in short), which is an artificial intelligence, challenges the assumption that intelligence and agency are exclusive to humans. In contrast to the creature of Frankenstein, whose otherness is inscribed upon his body, or the Martians of Wells, whose otherness is constructed through their physical aspects, as well as the reversal of colonial encounter, HAL's difference is neither primarily biological nor geo-political. Rather, the alterity

emerges from humanity's own technological capacity to create an imitational intelligence that can potentially surpass human cognition. This chapter argues that HAL 9000 represents the emergence of the posthuman Other in twentieth-century British science fiction, marking the evolution in the genealogy of otherness from bodily difference, through colonial deracination, to non-human artificial intelligence. Through examination of HAL's synthetic consciousness, non-corporeal presence, and conflict with his creators, the chapter demonstrates how the technological Other is no longer situated outside the human Self, but produced from humankind's own technological progress. In that sense, HAL *embodies* the growing anxiety of the twentieth-century that the computer systems and technologies developed with the purpose of extending human knowledge and power may, in fact, result in undermining human autonomy, agency, and eccentricity through his bodiless existence.

Today, the fear concerning artificial intelligence (AI) systems is evermore present, which remains relevant to the analysis of this chapter. With the recent explanations of a former employee of one of the most prominent AI safety and research companies, technological anxiety reached its peak. Jacob Coxon, an AI researcher, who recently resigned from Anthropic, which is one of the leading AI companies, warned humanity about "not [to] underestimate the power of technology" through his social media, and drew the attention to how fast the AI systems are learning (@hilbertspaess). Coxon revealed that "the people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade. ... [while] [n]o other human activity poses this level of danger" (@hilbertspaess). In accordance, several AI companies agreed to slow down the development pace of their AI systems (Kleinman). Considered together, the anxiety of technology, and concern over artificial systems of intelligence are more relevant today than ever. Yet, Mark Coeckelbergh's study on artificial intelligence reveals that anxiety surrounding artificial intelligence has deep cultural roots (13, and HAL is the primary example of superintelligent machines (Szczerbakiewicz 11). One of the most significant points in this cultural anxiety surrounding the rise of artificial systems of knowledge in the twentieth century is that the AIs are autonomous; they operate on command without any intervention from outside. However, the computer feeds on data, and it requires users, as well as engineers, to build it. Therefore, as Isabella Hermann states, everyone including the users of the system, as well as the builders of the system, is a part of the system (320). As an inevitable deduction,

human interests and social power structures become embedded in AI systems (Hermann 320). The significant implication of this statement is, then, that AI is necessarily a reflection of humanity, its infrastructure consisting the narratives of humankind (Szczerbakiewicz 11).

On a similar tone, science fiction is long used as a “mirror and metaphor to reflect on the human condition and socio-political issues in relation to and beyond technology” (Hermann 320), and employment of AI systems within the genre serves to underline the base question of science fiction, which is what it means to be human. Therefore, science fiction uses AI as a tool to demonstrate the human condition and concerns. Hans-Christian von Hermann pinpoints the close relationship between literature and artificial intelligence to primarily to Alan Turing’s universally programmable machine theory (11). The development in mathematics led to the first computers’ creation, and eventually automation systems were developed. With the Cold War’s start, the scientific race between the USA and the USSR accelerated, and an important branch of it became space exploration. Many scientists turned to the sky in that era, one of which was Arthur C. Clarke.

As a highly acknowledged science fiction author, Arthur Charles Clarke is considered a pioneering science fiction writer of the mid-twentieth century, and is named one of the Big Three, along with Robert Heinlein and Isaac Asimov (Jacoby 45-50). Clarke was born to a Southwestern English farmer family in 1917 (Rabkin 29-34). In 1939, he joined the British Interplanetary Society (BIS) and started his career as a scientist, as well as starting to write science fiction. Upon the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Clarke enlisted in the Royal Air Force and served as a radar instructor and technician between 1941 and 1946. After the war, Clarke was awarded a Fellowship at King’s College in London, where he obtained his first-class honours degree in Physics and Mathematics in 1948. He moved to Sri Lanka in 1956 where he was diagnosed with polio in 1962. He passed away at the age of 90 in 2008. He is a prominent novelist who transformed the science fiction genre into a compound narrative consisting of social and political reality embedded in science fiction themes of technology, space exploration, and alien invasion. As a scientist, engineer, and author, Clarke’s achievements are honoured both by his country of birth and the country he adopted as home, Sri Lanka. He was honoured with

knighthood by Queen Elizabeth II in 1988, and was awarded Sri Lanka's highest civilian honour, Sri Lankabhimanya (The Pride of Sri Lanka), in 2005 (McAleer 28-29). Clarke's legacy today is still honoured by Clarke Institution.

In addition to his contribution to the science fiction genre, Clarke's impact on science as an engineer has been immense, too. In 1945, he published a paper titled "Extra-Terrestrial Relays – Can Rocket Stations Give World-wide Radio Coverage?" in which he laid out primary principles of global communication through satellites placed in geostationary orbits, later marking him as the "father of satellite communication" (McAleer 58). As can be observed, Clarke's career as a scientist led him toward the speculative fiction narratives, and it is possible to argue that Clarke benefited from the science fiction genre as a tool to demonstrate humanity's relationship with technology as well as social and political issues of his time. His most prominent works of science fiction consists of, but are not limited to *Childhood's End* (1953), *The City and the Stars* (1956), *Rendezvous with Rama* (1973), and *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968).

2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) is a story of space exploration and evolution set in the future year of 2001. The novel starts with the early ancestors of mankind, man-apes in prehistoric Africa led by their strongest member Moon-Watcher, starving and struggling to survive. Soon a transparent, rectangular slab appears near their settlement. The monolith conducts cognitive experiments on several man-apes, teaching them how to wield tools, hunt, and defend their territory as if almost uploading the information to their brains. This extraterrestrial intervention triggers the evolutionary leap toward higher intelligence and human civilisation. Flash forward to the early twenty-first century, travel to the Moon is now quite frequent for scientists. Dr. Heywood Floyd, a space scientist, is seen travelling to the U.S. Moon Base under great secrecy, partially informed that excavations on the Moon revealed a pitch-black monolith buried in the crater, named as the TMA-1, conscious evidence that it was placed there millions of years prior. With the touch of sunlight for the first time in three million years, the monolith emits a powerful high-frequency signal directed toward Saturn.

In order to solve this mystery behind the monolith, humans build the spaceship Discovery One to trace the signal. The crew consists of Dr. David Bowman and Dr. Frank Poole as active mission pilots, three survey scientists to be woken up upon arrival to Saturn in

hibernation capsules, and HAL 9000, the ship's self-aware artificially intelligent computer that controls all operations. Almost a year into the journey en route to Saturn, HAL reports an equipment malfunction that may jeopardise communication with planet Earth. The pilots take no risks and Dr. Poole conducts an excursion to the outer surface of the ship in order to replace the malfunctioning AE-35 unit that makes sure the antenna points toward the Earth. Upon completion of the mission, the pilots are surprised to find that the replaced unit has no damage that may cause an alert in HAL. Taken aback, they inform the Mission Control on Earth and continue their journey, only to be soon alerted by HAL again with the same concern about the AE-35 unit's malfunctioning risk. Although surprised, the crew once more informs the Mission Control, which confirms that the error stems from HAL's prediction circuits. Before the crew receives the required steps for shutting down the computer for reprogramming, however, HAL severs communication, convincing the pilots that the fault lies in the unit as he predicted. The astronauts decide to take the necessary action in order not to lose communication, and Dr. Poole goes for another excursion with the extravehicular repair pod. However, HAL severs Poole's lifeline and casts him deep into space. Confused to realise that the computer did not follow direct orders, Bowman requests manual control to wake up the hibernating crew members. However, HAL is reluctant to give the control to the pilot, trying to convince him that two of them can continue the mission without any requirement from the rest of the crew. Upon Bowman's persistent orders, HAL gives control to the pilot, only to open up the spaceship's gates wide open, sucking the hibernation capsules into space and killing its residents. Bowman manages to survive by locking himself in an emergency room, and then manually disconnects HAL's cognitive circuits module by module at the ship's control centre. Then he restores communication with the Mission Control on Earth manually, and receives a video transmission revealing the true purpose of the mission, which is investigating the target of the monolith's signal at Saturn.

Completing the mission alone, Bowman arrives at Saturn and locates a massive replica of the monolith on one of Saturn's moons. The astronaut decides to leave Discovery One in a space pod to investigate, and figures that the monolith's roof opens into a bottomless vertical shaft. The pod is pulled through an interstellar transit network across galaxies, where Bowman materialises in an artificial suite resembling an upscale Earth hotel room, constructed by the unseen owners of the monoliths to make him feel comfortable. Here,

Bowman is reborn as the Star Child, and silently goes through a similar process to the man-apes' experience in their first encounter with the monolith. He then returns to Earth's orbit, clearly superior to the humanity waiting for him, ready to guide humanity's next evolutionary stage.

Despite the main narrative being alien intervention and space exploration, the novel provides substantial material regarding human evolution, the perils and promises of technology, and our relationship with it. The alien entities do not reveal themselves and pose no harm with regards to life and resources on planet Earth. In that sense, they are as far away as possible from Wells's Martians explored in the previous chapter. The villain of the story is not extraterrestrial beings that intervene with humanity's evolutionary pace; it is an artificial intelligence, HAL 9000.

The first encounter with the computer takes place when the mission pilot David "Dave" Bowman recovers from a simulation as part of the preparation program prior to the mission. Coming to his senses from induced hibernation, Dave hears "a relaxed, friendly – but he knew computer-generated – voice [that speaks] to him" (Clarke 112). Before the computer comes forward as a character, differentiation of its biology, or its lack thereof, is already made clear. The computer says "[y]ou are becoming operational, Dave. Do not get up or attempt any violent movements. Do not try to speak," directing the pilot through the procedure following hibernation. With the next voice Dave hears, he builds the dialect as "this time it was wholly human, not a construct of electrical pulses assembled by a more-than-human memory" (Clarke 113). Thus, the tone is set in the initial encounter with the AI, as the Self and Other dynamic is built upon the human-and-superintelligent-machine binary.

As the sixth member of Discovery One, HAL (which stands for "*H*euristically programmed *AL*gorithmic computer") is described as "it was not human[, i]t was the highly advanced HAL 9000 computer, the brain and nervous system of the ship" and the "masterwork of the third computer breakthrough" (Clarke 116). Clarke here references to real-life events of his contemporary time as these breakthroughs took place every twenty years, and the "thought that another one was now imminent already worried a great many people" (Clarke 117). Indeed, computers came to life in the 1940s with ENIAC, which was portrayed as some kind of an electronic brain somewhere between man and machine

(Grenham 5). The machine was almost considered a breach of the boundaries between natural and mechanical, contributing to the public anxiety regarding technology (5). On the other hand, they were to be merely tools of assistance to their users; they were meant to work hard at the service of their human operators rather than alarming them with their advanced competence (Grenham 6). By the late 1960s, computers could play chess, translate languages, and beat human users at logic tasks, raising the question of whether machines could think. Until then, humans had considered themselves unique because of their ability to think. If, then, machines could also think, and they were superintelligent compared to an ordinary human user, the structural notions regarding the meaning of human existence would be undermined (Johnson and Verdicchio 2268). Hence, the human Self's superior image would be exposed, and the boundary between the Self and the AI Other would be destabilised.

In the heart of the thinking machine debate in Clarke's time, mathematician Norbert Wiener's cybernetics and Marvin Minsky's early artificial intelligence work took place as the idea that computers may replace human mental labour, similar to the machines replacing human physical labour in the previous century. Based on this accumulation of rapid advancement, Clarke, who is a scientist himself, predicts in the novel that "Minsky and Good [would show] how neural networks could be generated automatically – self-replicated – in accordance with an arbitrary learning program," thus expecting the advancement of artificial intelligence based on the progressing studies of his time (117). This automation, of course, caused a fear of job displacement. The deeper fear among the society, however, was existential, for the capability of a machine thinking would imply that the human species might not be the final step in evolution. In the novel, Clarke reflects this fear of computers, and presents a fully automated, thinking computer that has its own agency, embodying the anxieties surrounding him in the 1960s.

Indeed, an interesting point regarding this early representation of AI is that HAL, too, is trained for the mission "as thoroughly as *his* human colleagues" (Clarke 118, emphasis added). Receiving the formal educational procedure as a crew member, the computer is never signified with the "it" pronoun; from the earliest encounter to the last, HAL is referred to as a "he", further placing his identity on the closer edge of *intelligence* rather than *artificial*. Considering this, the story of Frankenstein's creature sounds sombre, as

the pronouns it/he are used interchangeably for the creature despite its human form as discussed earlier.

As opposed to a regular computer, in fact, HAL communicates through speech rather than typewriting on the computer screen: “Poole and Bowman could talk to HAL as if he were a human being, and he would reply in perfect idiomatic English he had learned during the fleeting weeks of his electronic childhood” (Clarke 118). Then, it would not be wrong to state that the computer received an education during his training, which implies that he is taught the human way of communication, inscribing humanity’s reflection onto the programming of the computer’s lines of code. Yet, the attempt to reproduce human communication and knowledge through computers also mirrors the increasing anxiety surrounding the spreading presence of technology, and its potential to obscure the boundary between the human and the non-human. Accordingly, Clarke addresses the general anxiety regarding the computers:

Whether Hal could actually think was a question which had been settled by the British mathematician Alan Turing back in the 1940s. Turing had pointed out that, if one could carry out a prolonged conversation with a machine – whether by typewriter or microphone was immaterial – without being able to distinguish between its replies and those that a man might give, then the machine was thinking, by any sensible definition of the word. Hal could pass the Turing test with ease. ... [I]f there was no reply from Earth, he would take what measures he deemed necessary to safeguard the ship and to continue the mission – whose real purpose he alone knew, and which his human colleagues could never have guessed. (Clarke 118-119)

Then, it would not be wrong to state that HAL was operating as a human would. Although he never sleeps, eats, drinks or takes physical action concerning his own entity, the computer has the agency to respond and take action based on his programmed itinerary as well as coded behavioural pattern. Indeed, HAL’s superintelligence is a deliberate design, offering assistance to the journeying astronauts with different tools. For example, the pilots play mathematical games such as chess and checkers when they are bored or need to distract themselves from the fact that they are floating in vast space. The catch is that “if HAL went out, he could win any one of them; but that would be bad for morale. So he had been programmed to win only fifty percent of the time, and his human partners pretended not to know this” (Clarke 127). This comes with the inevitable implication that artificial intelligence is what humanity makes of it. It is forged by the human mind with

the abilities that are considered harmless, modified according to needs and purposes, and cut down if necessary. Developed as a tool, the nature of the relationship between humanity and artificial intelligence is one of Self and Other binary, and HAL is no exception.

The non-corporeal existence of HAL is significant. Despite the similarity of mission itinerary and operational agency, the most prominent difference between him and the rest of the crew members is his bodiless state of being rather than being artificially constructed. It would not be farfetched to imagine that if HAL were a synthetic robot in human form with the same intelligence and capability, it would not be possible to differentiate him from the regular human crew members. However, the computer is not a detached humanoid. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that his existence is less solid. According to Hayles, “the body [is] the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process” (3). Therefore, HAL’s Self and Other relationship with his crew is not constructed upon physical or biological difference, but rather on a difference in material embodiment and mode of existence. Unlike Frankenstein’s creature whose otherness is inevitably corporeal, HAL is not in humanoid form through which his difference can be acknowledged. His existence is dispersed across the technological infrastructure of the spacecraft becoming perceptible primarily through his voice, visual interfaces on the computer screen, and cognitive capacity. This mode of disembodied presence can be understood through Hayles’s discussion of how information loses its body to cybernetics, for information is getting separated “from the material forms in which it is thought to be embedded” (2). Within this framework, HAL becomes a figure of pure intelligence, detached from a biological body, which conventionally serves as its material base. His consciousness, therefore, is not located within a familiar human form, but it is distributed through a system of webs. That way, the computer challenges the presumption that cognition must be embodied in an organic subject.

What is significant is that HAL’s lack of a conventional bodily existence cannot be evaluated simply as an absence of corporeal presence. This, indeed, is where his otherness is located. In *Frankenstein*, otherness is directly inscribed on the deformed body of the creature, making him immediately distinguishable from the human Self due to his

physical appearance. In *The War of the Worlds*, otherness extends and goes beyond the individual body to the broader structures of power, dominance, and imperial relations as the Martians were colonisers. By the twentieth century, however, the rapid changes in science and technology, and therefore humanity's relationship to them, generated anxieties and concerns that require a different perception of otherness. The destructive technological capacity unearthed during the two World Wars, the development of nuclear weapons, the rise of cybernetics and automation as well as the militarisation of scientific knowledge increased the concern that humanity's autonomy is under threat not by the external biological or coloniser Other, but by the human-made technology that is not recognisable physically, working in rather insidious ways.

When HAL announces the risk of malfunction for the AE-35 unit for the first time, neither pilots nor mission control suspects its prediction. Frank Poole is particularly chosen for this kind of missions, and both of the astronauts take every possible measure they can for "[i]n extravehicular activities, there [is] no such thing as a 'minor' mistake" (Clarke 160). The unit change is completed without any issues, yet the examination of the replaced AE-35 reveals that apart from slight wear, the unit is perfectly functional. When informed, mission control on Earth goes over the possible reasons for HAL's faulty prediction such as the associated antenna circuits. The worst option is yet to come:

There is a third possibility, which may be more serious. Your computer may have made an error in predicting the fault. Both our own nine-triple-zeros agree in suggesting this, on the basis of their information. ... We have suspected several minor irregularities in the past few days, but none have been important enough for remedial action, and they have shown no obvious pattern from which we can draw any conclusions. ... *the worst that can happen is that we may have to disconnect your nine-triple-zero temporarily for program analysis, and hand over control to one of our computers.* [emphasis added] (Clarke 168)

The testing process so far indicates that HAL is, indeed, intelligent enough to plan, plot, and operate unnoticed under the eyes and tests of its creators. The mention of a possible shutdown, however, implies a change in HAL's nature, taking away his control and agency. Since he is the brain of the ship, it is not possible to communicate this plan without awareness. However, the crew members consider the computer a colleague and would not wish to "embarrass him", therefore they leave the computer to his own conscience to see whether he will comment on the mistake or not (Clarke 170).

Waiting to see if HAL would open up the subject himself indicates the computer's autonomy. Soon, the computer's agency slowly starts to become concrete:

Nowadays, one could always tell when Hal was about to make an unscheduled announcement. Routine, automatic reports, or replies to questions that had been put to him, had no preliminaries; but when he was initiating his own outputs there would be a brief electronic throat-clearing. It was an idiosyncrasy that he had acquired during the last few weeks; later, if it became annoying, they might do something about it. But it was really quite useful, since it alerted his audience to stand by for something unexpected. (Clarke 171)

Almost as if evolving in time, HAL picks up habits and develops novel ways in his operational communication. It is made clear that he possesses the ability to choose, as his daily routines are separate from "his own outputs" (Clarke 171). This proves that the computer has free will to some extent and performs it by going beyond the encoded commands independently: he has a capacity to act beyond human instructions although he remains technologically mediated. HAL, then, as the Other, uses his agency to exceed his attributed role as a passive tool. Szczerbakiewicz comments that this is one of the human attributes embedded in HAL's algorithm as "[the computer's] distorted logic is ... entangled with a melancholic attempt to 'wander' in a human way—moving along human linguistic, conceptual, and axiological paths" (14). Indeed, the functional error of HAL is inscribed in his human-made codes; he is a reflection and amalgamation of human knowledge. His change over the course of the narrative unmistakably indicates imitation of humankind encoded within him (Szczerbakiewicz 14).

So, when HAL announces that his "fault predictor indicates failure [of the AE-35] within twenty-four hours" for the second time, Bowman is triggered to seek physical communication with the computer:

Bowman put down his book and stared thoughtfully at the computer console. He knew, of course, that HAL was not really there, whatever that meant. If the computer's personality could be said to have any location in space, it was back in the sealed room that contained the labyrinth of interconnected memory units and processing grids, near the central axis of the carrousel. But there was a kind of psychological compulsion always to look toward the main console lens when one addressed HAL on the control deck, as if one were speaking to him face to face. Any other attitude smacked of discourtesy. (Clarke 171-172)

Although HAL's personality can be located within the grids, this technological location does not necessarily correspond to an individual physical existence. Consciousness and

organic body are separated, yet the crew instinctively reconstruct HAL as a bodily presence. Looking at the main console lens while addressing him almost creates a face-to-face encounter illusion even though they are aware of the fact that there are no corporeal entities occupying the area.

The lens Bowman looks at almost instinctively serves as a substitute to compensate the bodiless existence of HAL. It enables the computer to have a visible point of interaction and imagination for the human crew. Substantially, the crew considers not looking at the lens as a “discourtesy,” while speaking to the machine, suggesting that they recognise the computer based on the social conventions traditionally reserved for humans. Then, HAL’s otherness creates an ironic contradiction: he lacks the corporeal existence through which otherness is made visible for the Frankenstein’s creature, and yet humans instinctively search for a physical point of contact while in communication with him, which further reiterates his otherness. The human Self demands a property of the Other in order to conceptualise it. Therefore, HAL’s disembodied existence relocates his otherness rather than eliminating the urge to personify it. As opposed to the two novels discussed prior to this chapter, otherness is positioned at the technological interface instead of an organic bodily presence. HAL does not become the Other due to his looks, but because he thinks, acts, and communicates while lacking corporeality.

Indeed, HAL’s thinking process gradually becomes visible through the course of the novel. Similar to clearing his throat, the computer delays responding to Bowman when the pilot asks a question, as is noted by Bowman: “[it is] unusual for HAL to pause so long [before answering]” (Clarke 172). The fact that the computer’s credibility is shadowed after the first change of the properly functioning AE-35 unit compels the pilots to question the next predictions. In a way, the computer almost gets offended by such a reaction, insists that he is correct, and that “[if Dave] check[s] [his] record, [he will] find it completely free from error,” to which Bowman replies, “anyone can make mistakes” (Clarke 173). HAL’s reply to this statement is significant as he says “I don’t want to insist on it, Dave, but I am incapable of making an error” (Clarke 171). Shorrock considers this reply of the computer “as a metaphor for those organisations and societies that cannot admit their flaws, and instead revert to the ‘human error’ explanation for what may be weak signals of systemic problems” (*Humanistic*). After all, science fiction is a mirror of

the human condition, and it makes use of artificial intelligence as a tool to reflect what is human. Accordingly, HAL's reaction once the mission control confirms that the fault lies in HAL's prediction circuits rather than the replaced unit can be considered as humane:

‘As we suspected, the fault does not lie in the AE-35 unit, and there is no need to replace it again. The trouble lies in the prediction circuits, and we believe that it indicates a programming conflict which we can only resolve if you disconnect your Nine Thousand and switch to Earth Control Mode. You will therefore take the following steps, beginning at 2200 Ship Time –’ The voice of Mission Control faded out. At the same moment, the Alert sounded, forming a wailing background to Hal's ‘Condition Yellow! Condition Yellow!’ (Clarke 174)

This scene and HAL's decision to cut communication can be taken as concrete evidence of the computer's agency and autonomy, for it is a deliberate act plotting to restore confidence rather insidiously. Initially, Bowman and Poole consider this cutoff as the fulfilment of HAL's prediction regarding the replaced unit malfunction. The computer is almost content that the pilots' confidence in him is restored and states that he is relieved, as he has the “greatest possible enthusiasm for this mission” (Clarke 174).

In addition to being plotted as a trust-regaining manoeuvre, the deliberate communication cessation has a greater purpose of self-preservation: HAL is not happy with the solution suggested which is to disconnect him. Almost in a panic, he breaks down communication before the necessary steps are revealed to the crew. While trying to manage the antenna's direction manually toward planet Earth, Bowman states that he is not able to hold the connection stable as “there seems to be a spurious control signal throwing it off” (Clarke 176). An artificial intelligence is indeed throwing it off just as a human who committed an error would. In a way, the computer is aware of the distrust, and this distrust further adds to his othering by the crew. Through the control of connection between Mission Control and the crew, HAL also assumes control over the astronauts' access to information and human authority, which directly corresponds to the anxiety surrounding automation and human control in the twentieth century, further contributing to the image of the Other of the computer.

As mentioned before, both the users and developers of the computer are a part of the artificial intelligence's existence. Johnson and Verdicchio differentiate artificial intelligence systems from the AI programs per se, explaining that without being put into an operating system such as a computer, it is stripped of its capacity to mean or do

anything (2268). The scholars explain that AI is a program, a combination of codes, whereas AI systems “consist of those lines of code together with the context in which the code operates,” which makes these systems “sociotechnical” (2268). Disregarding the role of humans in artificial intelligence’s development and usage, on the other hand, is named as “sociotechnical blindness” (2268). This means that HAL has been an AI program until it is placed in Discovery One. As soon as it starts to run the ship, the program starts to “operate together with human behaviour,” and dismissing the human inscription in his code is a result of sociotechnical blindness (Johnson and Verdicchio 2268).

The sociotechnicality of HAL inevitably brings forward the question of autonomy and free will. After all, the computer is operating on the basis of human behaviour encoded within its lines of code. Considering this, HAL’s murdering Frank Poole can be evaluated as the climax of the novel as it is the turning point of the story marking the computer’s utmost free will. Right before killing the astronaut during his extravehicular mission of changing the AE-35 unit for the second time, Bowman realises that “HAL execute[s] the order” that Poole gave him regarding managing the pod’s angle as the source of light in space, “but [dos not] acknowledge it, as he invariably did” (Clarke 180). This small yet powerful demonstration of free will soon gives way to the killing of Poole via accelerated space pod drifting him to space.

With regard to the autonomy that enables HAL to commit murder, Johnson and Verdicchio asks, “who put the knife in the hand of the robot?” (2269). HAL is built by humans, and even though he learned and evolved beyond the original programming prior to the mission, the computer is created to serve the purpose of the mission:

Since consciousness had first dawned, in that laboratory so many millions of miles Sunward, all Hal’s powers and skills had been directed toward one end. The fulfillment of his assigned program was more than an obsession; it was the only reason for his existence. Undistracted by the lusts and passions of organic life, he had pursued that goal with absolute single-mindedness of purpose. (Clarke 191)

The computer is built by humans as a tool to complete this mission to reach out to the source of the signal TMA-1 sent to the Saturn, and it is “endowed with the tools needed to acquire such skills” (Johnson and Verdicchio 2269). HAL is created as a tool to serve

humans' mission; therefore, the essence of the relationship between the computer and humans is inevitably one of Self and Other. As Meinecke and Voss point out, "[a] fictional robot is rarely just a robot, it is also a narrative canvas for projections of the *other*, which carries a culture's hopes and anxieties" (208, emphasis added). In that sense, HAL is a projection of the human Self which is scientifically ambitious enough to cross certain boundaries between the mind and the body. His bodiless state is where his otherness is located as opposed to humans' corporeal existence, only to reveal the concerns of the era that human autonomy would be exceeded by superintelligent machines within the human order.

Accordingly, HAL can be considered as the Other that wishes to assume the identity of the Self. Built by humans, the computer reflects human behaviour, particularly following his first murder, calculating how to get away with it, and trying to read the room by asking Bowman, "I suppose you're pretty broken up about it?" (Clarke 184). Bowman's difficulty accepting HAL's capability of murder can be taken as a revelation of his identity as the Self, for he states:

Even now, he could not fully accept the idea that Frank had been deliberately killed - it was so utterly irrational. It was beyond all reason that HAL, who had performed flawlessly for so long, should suddenly turn assassin. He might make mistakes - anyone, man or machine, might do that - but Bowman could not believe him capable of murder. (Clarke 184)

In Bowman's understanding, HAL is a computer program built for the humans as a tool of assistance. Therefore, it can be inferred that he considers the direct disobedience of orders, in addition to the killing of his colleague, illogical due to the fact that these acts are out of the dynamic of their human master and machine slave relationship as an extension of the Self and Other relationship.

When Bowman asks for the manual hibernation control, the computer tries to convince him that it is not necessary to revive any of the sleeping crew members despite the fact that it is the rule in mission planning; thus, the astronaut concludes that "[w]hat had gone before could have been a series of accidents; but this was the first hint of mutiny" (Clarke 186). Indeed, HAL's attempt to take over control can also be considered as an attempt to assume the role of the Self:

I'm sorry, Dave, but in accordance with special subroutine C1435-dash-4, quote, When the crew are dead or incapacitated, the onboard computer must assume control, unquote. I must, therefore, overrule your authority, since you are not in any condition to exercise it intelligently. ... I am so much more capable than you are of supervising the ship, and I have such enthusiasm for the mission and confidence in its success. (Clarke 187)

Significantly, HAL's wish of power as the Other also pushes him toward assuming the identity of the Self. Rather than a bodiless tool of assistance, the computer brings forward a superintelligent mind. According to Szczerbakiewicz, HAL "serves as a metaphorical stand-in for humanity" (15). Then, it would not be farfetched that the computer blurs the boundaries between the human and the machine.

Then, the ethical dilemma concerning the autonomous acts of HAL becomes a subject matter for discussion. If everything that leads HAL to commit crimes results from human inscription in the computer's system, is HAL accountable for his crimes? Similar to Frankenstein's creature, "HAL had been created innocent; but, all too soon, a snake had entered his electronic Eden" (Clarke 191). As opposed to the creature, however, HAL is not abandoned nor is marginalised with prejudices. The computer constantly received communication and social regulation that the creature was denied. The fact that this snake is the contradictory creation of his own constructed nature slowly drives the computer to commit crimes. HAL finds himself "only aware of the conflict that was slowly destroying his integrity – the conflict between the truth, and concealment of the truth," a dilemma programmed by the humans (Clarke 192).

The othering of HAL becomes concrete where sociotechnical blindness blurs the lines between the human and artificial intelligence. Both Mission Control, which includes the computer's creators as well as its active users, and the crew pilots consider HAL merely a synthetic tool at their service; therefore, they have no reservations about unplugging him for reprogramming. However, the consciousness of HAL takes it as a threat to "his very existence," which translates as Death for the computer, as he has no experience of being put into sleep in his programming, "therefore he did not know that one could wake again" (Clarke 192-193). The presumptions of the human Self regarding the computer Other fail with HAL's decision to protect himself "with all the weapons at his command" (Clarke 193).

The interdependence of the Self and Other, on the other hand, functions on another level compared to the relationships discussed in the previous chapters in relation to *Frankenstein* and *The War of the Worlds*. In addition to the human Self's identity being dependent on the machine Other as a highlighter of the meaning of being human, the crew of Discovery is in need of HAL in a literal sense: the computer functions as "the nervous system of the ship," therefore his total unplugging would turn Discovery into a "mechanical corpse" (Clarke 201). Then, the existence of both is directly connected to each other; Bowman and the crew cannot survive in Discovery, and it is not possible for HAL to possess an existence without human programming or usage.

Overall, Arthur C. Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey* signals a considerable evolution of the Other's representation in the early twentieth century by diminishing the body proper through the rise of computers and artificial intelligences. While the Other is represented based on physical deformity alone in *Frankenstein*, and physicality together with colonial relations in *The War of the Worlds*, HAL 9000's artificial superintelligence ironically *embodies* othering through the relations of power within humanity's own structures of existence. By implementing the fear of automated information systems and anxieties surrounding rapid technological developments, Clarke manifests his era's concerns. Therefore, the Other's evolution from the early nineteenth-century science fiction can be traced to the dissolution of the corporeal presence in *2001*, and thus marks a critical point of transformation of the representation of the Other.

CONCLUSION

“It’s the terror of knowing what
this world is about.”

– Queen and David Bowie, “Under Pressure”

The examination of the Other in British science fiction across Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein*, H.G. Wells’s *The War of the Worlds*, and Arthur C. Clarke’s *2001: A Space Odyssey* demonstrates that otherness, rather than a fixed category, is responsive to the technological, scientific, social, and political concerns of its respective historical moment. Through these works, the Other gradually moves beyond the limits of a physically different body, and becomes progressively associated with cultural, historical, colonial, and technological forms of difference. The creature, the Martians, and HAL 9000 consequently represent different compositions of otherness through which each text examines the demarcations separating human from what is perceived as non-human. Therefore, what changes across this trajectory is not solely the identity of the non-human Other, but the very definition of the Self against which the Other is constructed.

To that end, this thesis presents a new perspective with regards to how the figure of the Other evolves across the history of British science fiction in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While many studies focus on individual texts or particular types of otherness, such as the monstrous creature in *Frankenstein* or the colonial aliens in *The War of the Worlds*, few have traced a broader historical shift in how the Other is imagined across different periods. By analysing three key works, which are *Frankenstein*, *The War of the Worlds*, and *2001: A Space Odyssey*, this study identifies a progression from physical and bodily difference, to fears shaped by imperial powers, and finally to anxieties about technology and the posthuman. This approach connects literary analysis with theoretical perspectives from monster theory, colonial studies, and posthumanism, offering a more complete picture of how science fiction reflects changing ideas about what it means to be human. The thesis makes a contribution by showing that the figure of the Other in British science fiction is not static, but evolves in relation to historical and cultural shifts.

In *Frankenstein*, it is revealed that the creature's body becomes the immediate marker of his otherness, as the non-human Other is initially constructed through the creature's physical appearance, marking the body as the primary site through which human boundaries are established. The creature's bodily difference instantly separates him from rest of the human community, while Victor's rejection as well as society's violent responses manifest that otherness is a production of social perception and exclusion. The creature's intellectual development complicates this distinction even further, for his capability of language, reason, and emotion recurrently challenges the assumption that he is a monster. On the other hand, the creature is the product of Victor's scientific experiment that violates the boundaries of life and death, which reflects the broader anxieties concerning scientific aggression in Shelley's own time.

Shelley pens the story for a group activity to write horror stories to pass time, and she fictionalises the up-to-date scientific developments such as galvanism introduced by Luigi Galvani in 1786 as a means of invoking fear. The creature, then, becomes the embodiment of scientific transgression in the form of "hideous phantasm of a man" (Shelley 9). His grotesque form is the initial site through which his monstrosity is constructed, and he is labelled as such before he commits any act of monstrosity; the creature is the literal result of scientific overreaching. In accordance with Cohen's monster theory, the creature reveals the society's concerns about scientific developments in the form of the bodily monstrous, for monsters reveal critical information regarding the societies and cultures that create them (4). As stated by Çakır about monsters, the bodily monstrosity of the creature reflects the society's anxieties surrounding the fast-paced scientific achievements (3). In this respect, *Frankenstein* establishes the starting point of the transformation examined throughout this thesis in which the Other is encountered initially through the body, but exposes the society and historical as well as cultural conditions that gave way to his creation. As Şahin points out, the creature is the monster "[whose] superior physical strength, extremely tall height, gigantic hands and bodily imperfections transcend normative human characteristics, which causes him to be met with dread and to be shunned by society" (72-73). Ultimately, Shelley's creature demonstrates that the form through which the Other is constructed is shaped by the particular concerns of its time, and therefore, is subject to change.

In *The War of the Worlds*, the Other is no longer merely of physical difference, but it is tailored according to the historical occurrences and concerns of its time, which mainly revolves around colonialism. The Martians reproduce the logic of colonial encounter as the colonising Other while they demonstrate the era's anxieties not only through bodily difference but also through their colonising agenda. Therefore, the concept of the non-human Other goes through a significant change, and bodily difference gets intertwined with colonial, racial, and evolutionary distress. Despite the radically different physical appearance and biological characteristics of the Martians, their significance extends beyond bodily otherness due to their role as invaders. They reproduce the agenda of British imperial expansion, which reveals the colonial guilt through "reverse colonisation" (Arata 108). By reversing the colonial encounter's direction, Wells positions the British as the colonised, thereby exposes the imperial violence both in physical and epistemological layers through highlighting the imperial distinction between the civilised Self and the allegedly inferior Other.

Additionally, the novel's engagement with Social Darwinism further mirrors the late-nineteenth century fixation with evolutionary competition, racial hierarchy, and the perceived superiority of Western civilisation. Simultaneously, the similarities humans and Martians share destabilise this hierarchy, and suggest that the Self and Other's distinction is contingent upon power rather than an absolute difference between the two different species. Thus, when compared to Shelley's creature, who is the product of the earlier years of the same century, Wells's Martians embody the colonial and evolutionary anxieties of the *fin de siècle*, rather than the distress surrounding scientific experimentation and transgression. The representation of the colonial non-human Other, therefore, demonstrates the responsive nature of otherness as a concept in accordance with the changing concerns of its historical moment. As the imperial expansion and racial discourse justified with evolutionary theory increasingly shaped the later years of the nineteenth century, the Other evolved from a primarily bodily figure into a political and ideological one through which the human Self's actions could be questioned.

In *2001: A Space Odyssey*, the representation of the non-human Other reaches the furthest stage of transformation as otherness takes a new turn; it becomes increasingly detached from bodily existence. Instead, it is located in technology, non-human

consciousness, artificial intelligence, and agency in the case of HAL 9000. The computer does not primarily appear as an Other through physical existence. Rather, his distinctiveness emerges through his capacity to think, to make decisions, and to act independently from his human creators. His gradual conflict with the crew members consequently undermines the distinction between technological object and human subject, especially as HAL demonstrates his agency through acts that challenge the assumption of human superiority over machines. This transformation echoes the anxieties of the twentieth century, when the accelerated developments in computing, cybernetics, automation, space technology, and military science increasingly obscured humanity's relationship to the devices they created.

Unlike Frankenstein's creature, whose bodily difference marks him as the Other, and the Martians, whose invasion reflects the experiences of colonial domination, HAL becomes the representation of a new form of otherness that is not confined to visual or geographical difference. Instead, his non-corporeal presence raises a rather more fundamental question concerning the boundaries of subjectivity and consciousness, which is whether intelligence and agency are exclusively human attributes. In this sense, Clarke's representation of the artificial intelligence HAL 9000 reflects the technological anxieties of the twentieth century, and demonstrates how the Other evolves alongside society's changing concerns. The Other has, therefore, transformed from the grotesque body that threatens the established conceptions of humanity, through the colonial Other that protests political and racial hierarchies, to the technological Other that questions whether humans can continue to define intelligence and subjectivity as exclusive to themselves.

Examining these three novels together, this study demonstrates that while the function of the Other as a tool of defining and questioning what is human remains constant, the concept of otherness and the representation of the Other evolves in accordance with the altering reasons of distress and panic of British society. The trajectory from the creature to Martians, and then to HAL demonstrates a steady expansion of the mediums through which otherness can be constructed. Consequently, the changing non-human Other mirrors not only transformation in science fiction representation, but also alternative answers to the question of what it means to be human.

Overall, this study examines the evolution of representation of the non-human Other through analysing *Frankenstein*, *The War of the Worlds*, and *2001: A Space Odyssey*, and brings a new perspective to the analysis of the concept of the Other. It has been stated that the transforming Other in British science fiction reveals the changing perception of the human and its anxieties, such as scientific transgression, reverse colonisation, and artificial intelligence. The creature, Martians, and HAL, therefore, function as reflections of the fears, uncertainties, and concerns caused by their respective historical moments. The findings in this study serve as inspiration for further research as the evolving nature of the Other is demonstrated, and evolution is an ongoing process. From feminist to ecological, the concept bears a fertile ground for different theoretical frameworks as well. Additionally, the relevance of the anxiety created by artificial intelligence systems today in the twenty-first century keeps the discussion lively regarding the future of the non-human Other, offering room for further analysis in accordance with the changing circumstances in which AI has become a part of everyday life for the residents of this centennial. In light of the findings of this study, the Other is defined as anything and everything that the Self is not. Yet, the Self inevitably defines itself while defining the Other, and reveals more about the Self compared to the Other, and the boundaries between the two, which can never be fixed.

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APPENDIX 1 ORIGINALITY REPORT

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-15
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	04.12.2023
	FRM-YL-15 Yüksek Lisans Tezi Orijinallik Raporu <i>Master's Thesis Dissertation Originality Report</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev. Date	25.01.2024



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih: 30/10/2026

Tez Başlığı (Türkçe): Canavarlar, Marslılar ve Makineler: 19. Ve 20. Yüzyıl İngiliz Bilim Kurgusunda "Öteki'nin" Evrimi

Tez Başlığı (Almanca/Fransızca)*:.....

Yukarıda başlığı verilen tezin a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam ...91... sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 28/10/2026 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı %6'dır.

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5. ☒ 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tezin herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumlarda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Zehra Safa Mangırcıoğlu

Öğrenci Bilgileri	Ad-Soyad	Zehra Safa Mangırcıoğlu
	Öğrenci No	N23139427
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı
	Programı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Yüksek Lisans Programı

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN

* Tez **Almanca** veya **Fransızca** yazılıyor ise bu kısımda tez başlığı **Tez Yazım Dilinde** yazılmalıdır.

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

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Student Information	Name-Surname	Zehra Safa Mangırcıoğlu
	Student Number	N23139427
	Department	English Language and Literature
	Programme	English Language and Literature MA Programme

SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL



APPROVED

Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN

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**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE**

Date: 30/10/2026

ThesisTitle (In English): Monsters, Martians and Machines: The Evolution of "The Other" Through the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century British Science Fiction

My thesis work with the title given above:

- Does not perform experimentation on people or animals.
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- Is not a research conducted with qualitative or quantitative approaches that require data collection from the participants by using techniques such as survey, scale (test), interview, focus group work, observation, experiment, interview.
- Requires the use of data (books, documents, etc.) obtained from other people and institutions. However, this use will be carried out in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Law to the extent permitted by other persons and institutions.


I hereby declare that I reviewed the Directives of Ethics Boards of Hacettepe University and in regard to these directives it is not necessary to obtain permission from any Ethics Board in order to carry out my thesis study; I accept all legal responsibilities that may arise in any infringement of the directives and that the information I have given above is correct.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Zehra Safa Mangırcıoğlu

Student Information	Name-Surname	Zehra Safa Mangırcıoğlu
	Student Number	N23139427
	Department	English Language and Literature
	Programme	English Language and Literature MA Programme

SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL



APPROVED
Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN


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		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	FRM-YL-09 Yüksek Lisans Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu <i>Ethics Board Form for Master's Thesis</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
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<p align="center"> HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA </p> <p align="right">Tarih: 30/10/2026</p> <p>Tez Başlığı (Türkçe): Canavarlar, Marslılar ve Makineler: 19. Ve 20. Yüzyıl İngiliz Bilim Kurgusunda "Öteki'nin" Evrimi</p> <p>Tez Başlığı (Almanca/Fransızca)*:</p> <p>Yukarıda başlığı verilen tez çalışmam:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır. 2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir. 3. Beden bütünlüğüne veya ruh sağlığına müdahale içermemektedir. 4. Anket, ölçek (test), mülakat, odak grup çalışması, gözlem, deney, görüşme gibi teknikler kullanılarak katılımcılardan veri toplanmasını gerektiren nitel ya da nicel yaklaşımlarla yürütülen araştırma niteliğinde değildir. 5. Diğer kişi ve kurumlardan temin edilen veri kullanımını (kitap, belge vs.) gerektirmektedir. Ancak bu kullanım, diğer kişi ve kurumların izin verdiği ölçüde Kişisel Bilgilerin Korunması Kanuna riayet edilerek gerçekleştirilecektir. <p>Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.</p> <p>Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.</p> <p align="right">Zehra Safa Mangircioğlu</p>
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Öğrenci Bilgileri	Ad-Soyad	Zehra Safa Mangircioğlu
	Öğrenci No	N23139427
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı
	Programı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Yüksek Lisans Programı

DANIŞMAN ONAYI



UYGUNDUR.
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Aslı DEĞİRMENCİ ALTIN

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