



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING
YELTSIN'S ERA FROM A NEO-CLASSICAL REALIST
PERSPECTIVE**

Duygu Hekimgil Işkın

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2023

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The jury finds that Duygu Hekimgil has on the date of 17 April 2023 successfully passed the defense examination and approves his/her Master Thesis titled "An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Era From a Neoclassical Realist Perspective".

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Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, Dr. đr.yesi Kadri Kaan RENDA danıřmanlığında tarafımdan retilildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

Duygu Hekimgil Iřkın

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ÖZET

Hekimgil, Duygu. *Yeltsin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasının Yeni-Klasik Gerçekçilik Bakış Açısıyla Analizi*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2023.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Rusya-Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ilişkileri değişmişti, çünkü Rus dış politikası, ABD ile çatışan çıkarlar ve o sırada Rusya'nın ekonomik, politik ve sosyal durumu nedeniyle çıkmaza girdi. Neredeyse yarım yüzyıllık güç dengesi ve iki kutupluluktan sonra, Rusya tarafından Batı yanlısı bir yaklaşım benimsendi. Böyle radikal bir değişim yeni soruları gündeme getirdi ve insan doğası ya da uluslararası sistem gibi gerçekçi teori açıklamaları, Rusya'nın özellikle NATO'ya yönelik değişen politikalarını açıklamada yeterli olmadı. Bu tezde örnek olarak ele alınacak konular, Rusya'nın ekonomik ve siyasi durumunun zorunlu kıldığı birkaç olay haricinde hiçbir zaman esnek olmadığı NATO'nun doğuya doğru genişlemesi; Rusya için hem ABD hem de eski Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği devletleri ile ilişkili olarak güvenlik ve güç dengesi açısından öneme sahip nükleer güvenlik ve silahsızlanma sorunlarıdır. Rusya'nın bunlara yaklaşımı yeni klasik gerçekçilik teorisi ile ilişkili olarak incelenecektir. Bu tez, dış politikayı etkileyen çeşitli faktörlerin olduğunu savunmaktadır ve bu nedenlerin analizine teorik bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşır. Sadece bir değişken olan uluslararası yapıyı değil, lider imgeleri, stratejik kültür, devlet-toplum ilişkileri, yerel kurumlar gibi diğer değişkenlerle birlikte dikkate alır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Neo-klasik Realizm, Neo-realizm, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Rus Dış Politikası, Lider İmajları, Stratejik Kültür, Uluslararası Yapı

ABSTRACT

Hekimgil, Duygu. *An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Era From A Neo-classical Realist Perspective*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2023.

Relations between Russia and United States of America (USA) changed in the post-Cold War period because Russian foreign policy came to an impasse by colliding interests with the USA and the economic, political and social situation of Russia at the time. After almost half a century of balance of power and bipolarism, a pro-western approach was adopted by Russia. Such a radical change raised new questions and realist theory explanations like human nature or the international system were not adequate in explaining the changing Russian policies towards the US. The subjects that will be taken as cases in this thesis are NATO enlargement, to which Russia has always been inflexible apart from a few times which were mandated by economic and political situation; nuclear security and disarmament problems which were important to Russia in terms of security and balance of power with both USA and former Soviet republics. The Russian approach to these cases will be studied in relation to NATO policies. This thesis argues that there are various factors affecting the foreign policy and focuses on the analysis of these reasons from a theoretical point of view of neo-classical realism. It takes into account not only one variable, which is the international structure, but leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, domestic institutions.

Keywords

Neo-classical Realism, Neo-realism, Post-Cold War Russian Foreign Policy, Leader images, Strategic Culture, International Structure

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

BSEC: Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

CPSU: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organization

EBRD: European Bank of Reconstruction and Development

EU: European Union

FSB: Federal Security Service

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GRU: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INF Treaty: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

IR: International Relations

KGB: Russian Committee for State Security (*Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti*)

MoD: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

START I: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I

START II: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II

UN: United Nations

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: World War One

WWII: World War Two

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INTRODUCTION

Historically speaking, it can be said that the “Russian Federation” and “the United States of America” (USA) have mostly differed in their understanding of international relations and have been referred to as long-standing rivals by most scholars. Twentieth century, especially the second half, was marked by a race between these two superpowers and an international structure¹ which was constructed around them following the Second World War. The rivalry and competition between these two major powers could be observed in almost all aspects of international relations such as the military, economy, nuclear weapons, security, ideology, culture, politics, and even space race. The world was divided into two and other states found themselves in a bipolar world. This political polarization could be observed in even discourse as “eastern or western”, “communist or capitalist”, “NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or Warsaw Pact”.

International relations (IR) as an academic field is in search of the reasons for the behaviour of states along with their relations with each other. Realism suggests that Cold War can be characterized by quest for power and supremacy. Neo-realism suggests that the international structure determines state policies and relations because the states act with the purpose of maximum security. Different types of liberalism offer more peaceful approaches and consider the regime types, international institutions and trade relations to explain the main determinant in inter-state relations, which concludes that the states with the same (liberal-democratic) regimes or mutual commercial interests are more inclined to exist peacefully. Neo-classical realism takes both

¹ Kenneth Waltz (1979, p.100-101) gives three characteristics of international structures "Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered. [...] Structures are defined, second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units. [...] Structures are defined, third, by the distribution of capabilities across units." He argues that "The prominent characteristic of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization" (p.89). Waltz associates international structure with anarchy which means a lack of central authority. For a discussion on the various definitions of anarchy, see Helen Milner (1991), 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique', *Review of International Studies*, 17(1), pp. 67–85.

the international structure and domestic variables to explain state foreign policy and make its analysis and at this point, taking Russia as a non-Western example and analyzing it from a western-oriented theory would contribute to the literature. When “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)” dissolved in 1991 and when the competition for hegemony, which was characterized by bipolarism for almost half a century, was lost for Russia’s part, it had deep effects in the study of IR for existing realist theories could no longer explain the situation and the changing Russian policies towards the West. It was declared as the absolute victory of the West against communism (Fukuyama, 1989) or the victory of Wilsonianism² (Kissinger, 2004, p.781). Bilateral relations took a completely different turn and the balance of power, which had been ensured for almost half a century, came to an end.

The almost ten-year period that will be studied in this thesis, from 1991 to 1999, starts with the ending of Cold War, characterized by transformation into a unipolar world. Russia was left in a new state characterized by loss of power both economically and politically and had to make serious changes in its Western policy. In line with this loss of power, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, President of the new Russia, adopted a pro-Western policy in his first years, especially in its relations with the USA. However, different ideologies regarding the Russian identity caused several problems inside the country combined with economic problems. Especially the conservatives³ blamed Yeltsin for disregarding the Russian identity and culture by acting as a partner of the West and making concessions in mutual relations. They ultimately forced Yeltsin to take different actions towards the West, leading to a rotation in his foreign policy. This change in the foreign policy is going to be analyzed within the scope of this thesis through the lens of neo-classical realism.

² Principles or practices advocated by Woodrow Wilson (Merriam Webster). It regards democratic values along with the right of states for self-determination (Throntveit, 2011, p.445).

³ The representatives of the Communist Party, traditionalists, conservatives or hard-line communists as referred by some scholars all refer to the anti-Yeltsin Group in the Duma.

This thesis takes as its basis the argument of a profound shift in foreign policy in the 1990s. In more specific terms, this thesis questions the reasons for Russia's pro-western approach between 1991 and 1993 and analyzes the change observed after these two years. It asks the question of why Russian foreign policy converged with the USA at some point after the Cold War and diverged from the West later on. NATO and disarmament are two issues related to security that have been widely discussed for decades and have been highly important issues for Russia historically. The nature of their relations after the post-cold war, however, was more cooperative compared to different times in history and compared to other issues of the 20th century, even the number of treaties and meetings between Russia and USA outnumbered the others. Thus, they are evaluated as paradigmatic cases on which assumptions of neo-classical realism can be tested. As an example, NATO intervention in Kosovo was an important conflict of interest for Russia-USA relations. Russia evaluated it as an act of intervening in the internal system of an independent Yugoslavia, blaming the US for violating the principle of not intervening in other states' internal affairs whereas the US saw it as a humanitarian intervention. This change in Russian foreign policy, after a Western-oriented approach, cannot only be explained by looking at the change in the international system⁴ as neo-realism suggests or solely by the fact that Russia lost its strength as classical realism suggests. In doing so, it is taken into account the hypothesis of neo-classical realism which bases state foreign policies on both internal and external factors and explains them in line with the internal problems of Russia like its economy, oligarchs and domestic political changes at the time in terms of strategic culture, perceptions of threat, military doctrines and leader perceptions. At this point, it is important to take into consideration the internal factors that neo-classical realism determines as the relations between the state and society and the institutions within a state which have an impact on the decision-making process. This thesis aims to find out if these internal factors

⁴ Barry Buzan defines international system as such: "International system (Hobbes/Machiavelli/realism) is about power politics among states and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory" (Buzan, 2014, p.12).

had an impact on Russia to change its foreign policy or which factors made greater impact than the others.

In the writing of this thesis, qualitative research methods will be applied and comparative historical research along with documentary analysis will be used. Newspaper articles and speeches of Russian diplomats will be analyzed. As primary resources, Yevgeny Primakov's memoir book *"Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium"*, Boris Yeltsin's *"Struggle For Russia"*, *"Midnight Diaries"* and *"Against the Grain: An Autobiography by Boris Yeltsin"*, Andrei Kozyrev's *"The Firebird: The Elusive Fate of Russian Democracy"* along with various articles will be used. In order to support the arguments to be specified in this study, other resources like newspaper articles and news in Turkish, English and Russian, various academic articles, speeches, interviews, journals, magazines, reports and published theses will be used. NATO and UN archives will be analyzed including the years 1990-1999.

Historical data will be collected from the archives of official institutions of Russia and USA like the Russian Foreign Ministry, the US Department of State, the White House and all these documents will be studied with a historical-comparative research method. The Russian foreign policy in the 1990s will be studied in two periods, one of which can be seen as pro-western and the other is more Russian identity-oriented. In doing so, changing Russian approach towards the West during 1990s will be analyzed.

A wide range of sources have been studied and analyzed for the background literature of this thesis and these sources can be classified under two general titles as theoretical and as foreign policy analysis. Different theories had different approaches to the Russian case. Morgenthau (1948) sees the states as power-seeking entities and puts human nature at the center of anarchy for he sees them as always greedy for more power. Waltz (1979), on the other hand, puts the international structure at the heart of his evaluation and believes that it is the external conditions that determine the conflictual nature of state

relations. The loss of realism's credibility, which is normally expected to explain relations as a coherent theory, can be dated back to the dissolution of USSR and Russia's non-confrontational approach for the USA, which was not to be expected according to realism. According to classical realism, Russia was expected to join alliances and confront USA. Waltz, on the other hand, bases his claims on only the international system at the time in which USA was the sole power; however, he could not explain the reason for Yeltsin's shift in his discourse and some aspects of foreign policy and why he started to act in more confrontational terms compared to his first years as the president. Sondhaus made the analysis that Yeltsin had surprised the realists when he agreed to the independence of fourteen Soviet republics (Sondhaus, 2006, p.34). As an offensive structural realist who believed that, Mearsheimer's theory, although it is mostly successful in contemporary politics, did not perfectly explain the Russia of the 90s because Russia, having lost its power, chose to continue reducing and limiting its arms through bilateral treaties signed with the USA (Mearsheimer, 2001). Neo-classical realism may be evaluated, in this sense, as a theory which enriches the assumptions of neo-realism or structural realism. Meibauer sees neo-classical realism as capable of explaining variations of foreign policy because it combines neo-realism with unit-level variables (Meibauer, 2021, pp.5-6). Allen Lynch believes that Russian foreign policy in the 90s can be better explained by taking into consideration domestic factors. He adds that the Russian solution to these under Yeltsin was through "unilateral and nationalist" means at different times (Lynch, 2001, pp.7-8).

Russian foreign policy study, on the other hand, has always attracted the attention of scholars because its strategic culture and historical identity give it a different nature compared to classical western cases. In Russian foreign policy, the concept of identity is used more often when compared to other states' policies. Different scholars evaluated Russian foreign policy from different aspects; however, the main point they agreed on was its unique "identity", which had an effect on its policies. Different evaluations of identity existed which can be evaluated within the scope of strategic culture and named as western-

oriented, Eurasianist and more nationality-based or conservative. Alexander Sergunin evaluates Russian foreign policy by linking it with identity because Russia does not see itself as part of only Europe or the East although there are groups, even in the State Duma, that give more emphasis to either one. He evaluates the Russian foreign policy as swinging between the two extremes as either pro-Western or anti-Western. He names the Europe-oriented developments as Alexander I's anti-Napoleonic coalition, Litvinov's collective security strategy in the 1930s, Gorbachev's Common European House Concept and Kozyrev's early period (Sergunin, 2016, p.16). His understanding of Russia as a *sui generis* case is also supportive of the main hypothesis of this thesis. Alexander Tsygankov evaluates Russian identity and Russian relations with Europe as two major elements because Europe is seen "as the other one" and how Russia defines itself comes from that understanding of difference as "the one other than the other" (Tsygankov, 2018, p.8). Magda Leichtova sees this shift in Russian policy and its aftermath resulting from the disappointment of Russia to be an equal of the West in economic and political terms caused Russia to reevaluate its position and appoint bureaucrats like Primakov who looked for opportunities to protect its interests in the spheres of influence and by forming alliances with China or some Middle Eastern states (Leichtova, 2014, p.23). She describes Yeltsin's policy with the USA as power-partner (Leichtova, 2014, p.51), which could not be finalized in success. This power-partnership could be implemented successfully because US interests in the European region and Russian Near Abroad stood on opposite sides to each other.

The impact of domestic institutions is another aspect of Russian foreign policy study. Tsygankov also focuses on the decision-making process in Russia, which has an effect on foreign policy. He makes a deep analysis of the organizational changes as SVR which was established as separated from the KGB to be renamed (The Foreign Intelligence Service) and FSB (Federal Security Service) formed in 1995 which was responsible for domestic and military intelligence and GRU (General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia) formed in 1992 which was the military intelligence of the Ministry of Defence.

According to the law, they were responsible for providing the necessary information to the President for his decisions (Tsygankov, 2018, pp.155-163). The Ministry of Defence was the other organization which found itself highly competent in the post-Cold war Russia following its establishment in 1992. Tsygankov states that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time neglected relations with the post-Soviet space and this is where the Ministry of Defence (MoD) got the primary role (Tsygankov, 2018, p.8,171). As these were primarily concerned over the “Near Abroad”, their analysis is not thoroughly done within the scope of this thesis.

The impact of the elite or groups of interest is also important for understanding Russian foreign policy. Bobo Lo makes a comprehensive evaluation and states that different groups followed different interests according to their agenda such as Primakov and Gazprom pushing for a close relationship with Belarus and oligarchs advocating liberal economy interests and integrating it to the world economy (Lo, 2002, p.152). One claim made regarding the oligarchs is that they want to keep good relations with the West and they seek access to western markets. Mcfaul makes the claim that getting western aid would both help Russia make economic progress and decrease the amount of taxes to be paid by the oligarchs; thus, they were supportive of western money flow (Mcfaul, 1998, p.26). The same policy was seen in Russian foreign policy towards Bosnia and it was demanded by these groups that Russia had to find a common path with the West. This study will try to analyze the impact of Russian oligarchs on the cases of disarmament and NATO expansionism and compare their impact with strategic culture or leader images.

Regarding the case study of this thesis, NATO was probably the most visible problem in which USA and Russia conducted different policies. Shearman states that NATO was not a threat only on military terms but one of prestige, status, identity and domestic politics (Shearman, 2001, p.257). Although there were a few attempts such as the Partnership for Peace Programme of 1995 within the scope of NATO, the nature of their relationship was always

conflictual. The following NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 was also evaluated as far from Russian desires because Russia hoped for no troops or nuclear weapons on the territories of new members and the right to veto any deployment, which were not granted under the act (Thorun, 2004, p.57). Sergounin makes the evaluation that the issue of NATO was probably the only issue that brought all Russian elites together except for liberals like Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov who thought that NATO expansion would not pose a threat to Russian security (Sergounin, 1997, p.55). Their impact had already decayed up until the 1993 victory of Zhirinovsky, which marked a transition to a more Eurasianist foreign policy and the issue of NATO enlargement was to be seen as a major problem for Russia. Another issue that involved NATO was the issue of Bosnia. The State Duma passed a resolution for ending sanctions on Serbia during the war in Bosnia and it evaluated that Yeltsin had close to none effect on changing the direction of the events and the signing of the Dayton Accords brought NATO as well as USA a complete victory (Kubicek, 1999, p.553). Thus, NATO was always an issue of common ground for the Russian foreign policy.

The change regarding Russia's foreign policy and its approach to NATO along with its "Near Abroad" relations took an important turn following the appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is evaluated by some scholars as the founding father of "the great power school of thought" for his realist understanding regarding the international affairs and viewing Russia as an influential world power (Kuchins & Zevelev, 2012, p.150) and as "the policy of alternatives" by some (Selezneva, 2002, p.15). Primakov aimed at creating alternatives for the West which would give Russia a balancing power and means to make it an equal world power who was not dependent on one state. His views took greater sympathy by the ideological fractions within the State Duma compared to those of Kozyrev and his Eurasianist approach gave Yeltsin the chance to ease the criticism of the parliament who had already lost much of his popularity due to economic problems and the voice of the Communists in the Parliament. His ideas constitute an important part of this

thesis in comparison with Kozyrev and will be discussed under the leader images concept.

Making a general analysis, this thesis aims at analyzing the coherence of neo-classical theory through applying its main arguments to a unique and non-western case, which is post-cold war Russia. In this sense, it would be of significant contribution to the literature firstly because by applying a western-oriented theory to a non-western case would render its arguments more generalizable and secondly because Russia is evaluated by some scholars as a unique example in which today's highly centralized Russia does not allow for domestic elements to affect its functioning (Romanova, 2012).

Chapter I of this study will be dedicated to IR theory and a general framework. The neo-classical approach combines the international system with various factors resulting from the internal situation of the states in order to make an analysis of foreign policy and search the reasons of state behaviour in various situations.

Chapter II of this study will focus on a detailed history of the collapse of USSR and the problems it had generated. Some of these problems go way back before the dissolution of the USSR but evolved into a more complex structure like NATO enlargement and disarmament. These will be analyzed first from a Russian foreign policy perspective and its response to the containment policy of USA, including the Russian Near Abroad.

Chapter III of this study will be a composition of history, theory and an overall assessment of foreign policy changes through a neo-classical realist look. This analysis will be made through a deductive approach.

The last chapter, Chapter IV will be a case study. Disarmament and NATO issues will be analyzed in line with the arguments of neo-classical realism with a special emphasis for leader images and strategic culture.

CHAPTER I

THEORATICAL FRAMEWORK: REALIST THEORIES IN IR

History is a collection of complicated bilateral or multilateral relations of nations and related events that take place as a result of conflicts or agreements over a long period of time. These conflicts or agreements are affected by the behaviour of decision-makers determined by their level of understanding, perceptions and cultural background, the nature of relations between the political structure of a state and its society or its history. State behaviour is the final output. International relations in this sense can be explained as an academic study of state relations and IR theories give a conceptual and theoretical toolkit to explain and understand what happens in international politics.

International relations theories make progress and test themselves through evaluating the process and the results of the events. The Cold War, as mentioned above, is a clear example of how international relations theory is a live mechanism which feeds on the developments of the world order. Theories which were developed in the Cold War and before were inadequate to explain the post-Cold War. The creation of a unipolar world, which would evolve into a multipolar world in the following years, required a new look into different mechanisms and dynamics. The classical realist argument on search for power and hegemony was not adequate in explaining the new world order and new realist ideologies were born, which would be explained in this thesis as neo-realism and neo-classical realism. In order to understand the suggestions of neo-classical realism, it is vital to understand the basic arguments of classical realism and Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism.

1.2. CLASSICAL REALISM

Historically, realism can be divided into three main streams: Classical realism beginning with Thucydides, Neo-realism or structural realism of Waltz (1979)

(Baylis & Owens, 2007) and neo-classical realism which became popular at the end of the 20th century.

Realism may be thought to be the most credible IR theory because its arguments can easily be proven with solid examples from the history and even today from the current events. A very simple realist argument is the role of the states as the primary actors of an international system and that quest for power is always the main determining factor of relations among the states. In this sense, it can easily be claimed that the internal order of the states cannot be transferred to the international arena as peacefully and that is why it turns into anarchy, making the world order almost impossible. While defining realism, a metaphor is used to define the nature of the states. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen give the metaphor of a jungle world order in which the animals cannot be caged to turn it into a zoo (Sørensen & Jackson, 2007, p.38). Realist thinking, in this sense, rejects the idea of harmony among the nations; but focuses on an anarchic and egoist understanding of relations.

In order to understand realism and its arguments better, it is very important to understand what realism puts forward and rejects in the first place. It puts its main emphasis on the states as the main actors, the existence of anarchy as an organizing principle and the balance of power, which leaves the states in an obligatory situation to search for more power. It does not give much importance to the domestic system but sees the international system as the main determinant. States create this system and Mearsheimer refers to these states as billiard balls on the table, some of which are bigger than the others (Mearsheimer, 2022). The idea that realism rejects basically is idealism which emerged following the outbreak of World War I. This idealistic approach foresaw a world order in which states were willing to prevent war because they already knew the destruction that it caused and that human beings were rational enough not to repeat the same mistakes. The role of power seeking was totally ignored. For this reason, the realist approach is claimed to respond to the

arguments of the idealist approach, which lost its credit (Baylis&Owens, 2007, p.86).

There are many realist writers such as E.H.Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederic Schuman, George Kennan but the father of modern realism may be claimed to be Hans J. Morgenthau as “a human nature realist” (Mearsheimer speech, 2015). Morgenthau puts the struggle for power at the center of IR. He claims that the quest for maximum power is universal and states always take it into consideration that any miscalculation or an increase in the power of other nations might result in power loss Morgenthau calls “inferiority” (Morgenthau, 1948, p.155).

He gives two concepts which are at the heart of the discussion of world politics in mid-20th century, as the balance of power which he describes as the struggle for power and normative limitations, which is international law. He adds that none of these are capable of maintaining peace, which is the basis of realist thinking. He also adds that international politics is a competition to acquire more power which he describes as a way of dominating other people and defines political power as the authority and the relations sustained with the people (Morgenthau, 1948, pp.8-13). He counts the elements of power, which provide the necessary background for power search as “geography”, “natural resources”, “industrial capacity”, “military preparedness”, “population”, “national character”, “national morale” (it refers to how much a state can be insistent on its foreign policy during times of both peace and war) and the quality of diplomacy. He names geography and natural resources as the least prone to change regarding a nation’s power (Morgenthau, 1948, pp.80-86).

He puts the balance of power at a strategic place for the survival mechanism of nations and names it as a device for the nations to defend themselves when their independence and existence are under threat as a result of a positive change in other states’ (Morgenthau, 1948, p.157). States can increase their aggression if they feel a threat to their existence. History is actually full of

examples of this aggression; such as “Hitler’s Germany” or “Mussolini’s Italy” were all examples of hostile policies, not cooperation as idealism foresees (Morgenthau, 1948, p.23). Thus, he claims that power is always the immediate aim both for the state and the international relations and is always the main element of international relations.

Another critique of idealism, E.H.Carr, compares realism with liberalism he calls utopianism and discusses certain concepts related to theory such as power, history, interest, politics, ethical standards, war, foreign policy, anarchism etc. and claims that it is fatal to ignore power in politics (Carr, 1946, p.97) and adds that the liberals are misreading the history and misunderstanding the essence of international relations and he completely rejects the concept of the harmony of interests within the scope of international morality (Carr, 1946, p.60). He refers to this understanding of IR as utopianism. He claims that a harmony of interests can never be accomplished because it is against the nature of human beings and those that are “better-off” will try to maintain their power while “the have nots” will always try to change it, thus harmony is never possible (Carr, 1946, p.65).

The first concept to be understood within realism is *raison d’état* which means the reason of the state and it reflects the idea that the leaders have to act with the idea of their nation’s security. It is the basic rule of behaviour in the international arena, directing the politician on things to do for the welfare of his state (Meinecke, 1997, p.1). For him, they must act in compliance with this idea of security because war could be a legitimate tool in a threatening environment. The survival of a state depends on its tools of security.

The second concept that is challenged by the realists is the existence of universal moral principles and values. It is the argument of the realists that state leaders are obliged to behave out of the limits of morality and goodness of humanity. It is the main task of the state leader to defend the interests of his own state, not with the goodness of all. The realists often claim the existence of

another concept which is “dual moral standards”. It claims that the internal moral standards could be different from external standards among the states. Thus, it is not the moral duty of a state to behave in compliance with the interests of other states and international society (Williams, 1923, p.17).

The third concept is anarchy defined by egoist human nature. It is used in the sense that in the international world order, there is no central authority, which can lead the whole mechanism. According to this understanding, the lack of a control mechanism or the absence of discipline cause the system to be an anarchic one. Self-help is another concept, which stresses that each state has to defend its own interests.

History shows us that states have looked for different systems that could limit this anarchy and set up an order in the world. International law, ideally tries to provide the same scope of relations. It aims at steering this anarchic system. This is another important concept through which idealists try to maintain peace in the world. The existence of international organizations such as the “European Union (EU)”, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”, “United Nations (UN)” is claimed to be a guarantee of peace by them. The League of Nations was founded following WW I in order to create a forum for solving international disputes. The aim was to prevent war which had destructive outcomes. The idea was accepted and it was founded however, it did not provide for neither USA joining the League nor it preventing the invasion of Poland by Germany, which triggered WW II. This is where the realist analysis comes into place, claiming that national defence and deterring potential aggressors are more realistic when it comes to international relations. The aggressive behaviour of Germany can easily be explained by the heavy conditions imposed on them through the Treaty of Versailles. It was not in the best interest of Germany and all it had to wait for was to regain its military and economic strength. Once it did, Germany became more aggressive. Thus, negotiation and diplomacy could not bring security and survival.

Francis Fukuyama draws a compact image of the realist idea in international relations very clearly by stating that states act with the ideology of achieving great power in line with the national interests, leading to intense competition and conflict (Fukuyama, 1989, p.15).

This description gives a compact framework of realism including power, national interests, competition and conflict. The next stream of realism, Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism or structural realism will be detailed in the following part.

1.3. NEO-REALISM

Within the scope of this chapter, Kenneth Waltz's "Neo-Realist Theory" and how he modified traditional realism will be explained. In most general terms, Waltz claims that how the international system is shaped is the main determinant in explaining relations between the states and their behaviour. Neo-realism claims that the existence of anarchy (it is a principle of organization) causes domestic politics to lose their impact on state behaviour and states behave according to the international system. The most important features of the political systems that need to be taken into consideration while distinguishing international and domestic political systems are:

(1) (the "first tier"). This ordering principle refers to the relation of states and how they exist together as separate units. Waltz calls it the anarchy (Waltz, 1979, p. 91).

(2) "(the "second tier")". The degree of differentiation among the states which are units. He claims that anarchy forces states to have the same obligations and duties. States are units with the same goals and the second tier refers to how they differ from each other. (Waltz, 1979, p. 93).

(3) “(the “third tier” or “surface structure”)”. This refers to how much power the states hold or their capabilities along with their distribution. He gives this tier primary importance because any change in the total capability of a state results in systemic changes. (Waltz, 1979, p. 97).

In order to understand his theory, it is important to understand two types of realism which belong to the neo-realist school, which are offensive realism and defensive realism. Offensive realism gives primary importance to the concept of security. It puts forward the idea that states are capable of everything in order to strengthen their security and expand their sources accordingly. “Coercive means” are emphasized and if a state fails to provide for its security, other states will expand their forces against their threat (Khanna, 2013, p.420). Maximizing military resources is an important act for offensive realists.

John Mearsheimer, a structural realist, asks the question of why states act in search of power and how great powers see each other. He answers by mentioning that the international system puts the security-seeking states in a position act aggressively. He bases these on certain features of the international system which are the lacking of an over-arching system (anarchy), the amount of military capability, uncertainty of other states’ intentions and plans, survival and the states as rational and strategic actors and lastly the self-help system (Mearsheimer speech, 2022). He states that the motives of states come from their fear of remaining less powerful in comparison with their rivals and they seek world hegemony because it is the only preventive means. Offensive realism gives no importance to domestic political situation or ideologies. States are always in search of opportunities for more power at any cost and that is why multi-polar systems are more inclined to war making it the most dangerous system (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.6).

Defensive realism does not give importance to military or deterrent power as its main objective but keeps itself secure against other nations at a necessary level. For Mearsheimer, defensive realists claim that the international structure

leaves little room for the states to look for more power and instead it creates a system in which they have to protect the already-existing balance of power (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp.7).

According to Khanna, both strands accept that human behaviour affects international relations, that states give highest priority to protection of national interests, and that they are protected by power. The only difference between the two is that offensive realists are always in motion to increase their protective means, which is military resources, and defensive realism uses its sources to maintain its peace and sovereignty. Waltz's neo-realism has a defensive realism approach. He explains state behaviour and system as a whole. It is distinctive from classical and modern realism in the following ways (Baylis&Owens, 2007):

- Neo-realism follows a deductive approach theory. Waltz explains the defects of an inductive approach (Waltz, 1979, p.4). He calls this "inductivist illusion", in which he claims more data will not end in more knowledge of causes, it will only create more sets of data because the problem has infinite subpieces along with how they may be combined (Waltz, 1979, p.4). With this explanation, he makes the first correction of realist approach of Morgenthau and takes the international system as superior to its components. Thus, he claims that in order to understand the behaviours of the international system, one has to start by going through the system, and then specify the behaviour of the states. In this approach, states react to the system, it is not the other way. This approach is against that of Morgenthau who puts state behaviour at the center of the system. He claims that states act by going after their own interests and search for more power determines the world system which is anarchic and chaotic. Thus, his theory is an inductive theory, concluding that the system is formed by the act of the states whereas Waltz sees the roots of state behaviour in the international system (Khanna, 2013, ch.2-3). States are compelled to act in certain ways.

- Concepts like moral values, human nature and ethics are completely rejected. He is different from Morgenthau in that Morgenthau gives an emphasis to a greedy human nature whereas Waltz ignores this completely. According to him, the international system is the main determinant and claims that how power is distributed is the central focus of analysis (Khanna, 2013, ch.2-3). It is again the structure, not the states that determine the order; because states are compelled to act in certain ways.
- The international system is anarchic. This system is interpreted differently by different understandings of realism; however, the one thing that they all agree on is that the system lacks an overarching authority and it is like a jungle as in the example given above. Neo-realists give an emphasis to the importance of the concept “balance of power”. For them, military sources are an important part of a state’s existence not only because of defensive purposes but for acquiring a status and a place as hegemony is another very important concept (Baylis&Owens, 2007, p.140). As in the example of the Cold War, major powers always balance each other. This balance is useful in the sense that it does not turn into a balance of terror, the result of which is complete destruction. This balance prevents other countries from entering into competition and causing harm to each other.
- Search for security is another important feature of the international system. It causes different countries to compete with each other as they are obliged to increase their power for their security. As it is an anarchic system, every step for more security is made at the expense of other states, causing competition and chaos. This cyclical structure creates the anarchic system.
- The states are units of the system. According to Waltz, states as unit have to conduct similar duties and functions such as national defence,

order in their political system and more. The totality of these units equals a system. In this system, state leaders act as the prisoners of the system. This is where the lack of moral values is given emphasis because the fundamental aim is to defend the self-interest of the state and the following behaviour could be amoral or unethical according to others. The search of the states for more security and more power according to these interests create a chaos in which states have to balance each other. This creates “a deterrent factor”.

The last stream of realism which is the main realist theory to be used within the scope of this thesis, neo-classical realism, will be mentioned in the following part.

1.4. NEO-CLASSICAL REALISM

Neo-classical realism in most general terms is a foreign policy analysis approach that tries to understand inter-state relations and how states respond to opportunities and limits defined by the international system. It is not a systemic theory which aims an empirical analysis like neo-realism but it aims at building a foreign-policy theory (Lobell et al, 2009 p.19) with soft-positivist methodology which means some level of testing is possible in social sciences (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.105). The metaphor of a billiard ball is used to define neo-classical realism, claiming that the ball moves in line with its internal dynamics as well and does not move “along a trajectory that depends only on external impact” (Romanova, 2012, p.1). Neo-classical realism can be described as a tool which explains state politics such as how states act at times of crisis, their foreign policy decisions, how they react to the signals and developments of the international system in line with their strategic choices and how they shape the international structure. It combines the international system and state level variables. It sees the system as an independent variable, the unit level factors (“leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations and

domestic institutions”) as the intervening variables and the foreign policy as the dependent variable. The basic argument of neo-classical realism is that it is vital to understand the relation between material power and foreign policy behaviour because an increase in power results in stronger foreign policy outputs. Thus, there is a causal link. (Rose, 1998, pp.165-167). How it constructs the factors which determine this causal link is what makes neo-classical realism different. It can be evaluated as an approach with various levels, a theory combining realism and constructivism which gives importance to how the ideas are perceived. Emphasizing only the international structure is far from logical because it completely rejects the human factor. Kenneth Waltz’s emphasis of the international system and classical realists’ emphasis on human nature are referred to as incomplete because the theories that take human nature as a determinant can’t explain why war does not always occur or why states which have varying systems choose to act in compliance in certain situations (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.174).

Neo-classical realists do not reject the importance of the international system for states determine their policies according to the threats and opportunities but does not put it at the center of the whole system because state decisions affect the system as well. What they try to do at the very beginning is to form the causal relevance of the international realm to the domestic level variables and present an alternative theory to explain international phenomena as an alternative to constructivism, liberal approaches and structural realism (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.16).

Neo-classical realists do not also reject the importance of different actors, but see the states as the main actors in the international system. They add that these other actors become influential only when they are supported by other states. The UN example is given to this situation for it is not effective when the permanent members use their veto right. It is influential in shaping the behaviour of the states through its reinforcing mechanism and competition however it does not have a dictating role (Ripsman et al., 2016, pp.35-36). The


second point is anarchy, which leads to an uncertainty of the system. Anarchy affects the system by “encouraging behaviour that puts the fearing states in a worse position” (Jarvis, 1978, p.167). Thus, the causal chain linking material capability and state behaviour is not rejected but it is not seen as the main determinant of international relations. Anarchy in that sense is not the major cause of relations but it is factor which contributes to the determination of conditions (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.43).

Realist thinking sees the international system as a main determinant because states have to determine their actions according to the conditions that the system creates. It is not only determinative but also restraining. Neo-classical realism adds another dimension and asks the question of how the leaders evaluate these signals coming from the international system, which will be explained in the following part.

A realist claim may be used in this sense to understand the international system, it is the reference to “particular economic and political practices as a result of the preferences of the dominant states” (Zakaria, 1992, p.27). This solid structure is an independent variable formed by the contributions of the states. The first argument regarding state behaviour of neo-classical realism is that the causal element still lies in the international system but how these are interpreted and implemented are subject to change. States respond to international conditions however they do not do solely in an automatic manner. Thus, it can be inferred that only determining the international structure as a source bringing outcomes is inadequate. International structure must be evaluated as a variable which is at the top of unit variables because it is the most general unit. Its analysis depends on various sub-variables, which affect the way it is perceived. What is lacking in the theories regarding the international structure comes from the idea that international structure is a separate form, which determines state behaviour. What forms it is actually the interactions and foreign policies of states for each other. Thus, it is both restrictive and permissive in terms of its functioning. It is restrictive because a

state can't ignore the international structure and their freedom is limited and it is permissive because it is shaped directly by state behaviour. Neo-classical realism puts forward two key systemic variables as clarity, which is a key systemic variable distinguishing neo-classical realism from structural realism regarding the openness of signals; and a state's strategic environment which is explained by the level of threats a state faces and if the threat is bigger, the strategic environment becomes more restrictive (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.52) Other intervening variables are relations between state and society, and the impact of internal institutions. Leader images are considered as critical because they affect how the state responds to signals and it affects the decision mechanism of a state. Taliaferro states the following: "Defensive neo-classical realists assume that the relative power distribution is always subject to change and leaders face ambiguous information" (Taliaferro, 2000, p.141). It is a cognitive explanation including factors such as how they read history, personality traits along with their beliefs and perceptions (Ripsman et al., 2016, pp. 59-62).

Figure I: Variables of Neo-Classical Realism



Source: Author's own figure

Although neo-classical realism takes one of its main arguments from structural realism, thus not rejecting it completely, they add that taking the international structure as the only reason of inter-state relations is deficient because it does not explain the opportunities or limits to the states and it lacks clarity and certainty (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.19). Zakaria makes a similar comment and states that despite many attacks from the liberals, Marxists, pacifists, environmentalists and deconstructionists, realism remains as the “fundamental method of analyzing world politics” (Zakaria, 1992, p.21). They count the defects of structural realism as such:

- Leaders may not always understand the signals of the system as they are even if they are open and easy. Schweller calls this “underbalancing” and gives the example of Charles I who was very sure of his regime’s strength that Schweller calls “a folly” and refers to his failure as resulting from his inability to perceive the danger presented (Schweller, 2004, p.159).
- The system may not send open signals all the time about threats and opportunities.
- The leaders may not always give response to these signals in a rational manner even if they understand them correctly.
- States can’t always manage their resources in an efficient and effective manner.

In addition to the constraints of structural realism which takes as its only tool the international system, they add that taking into consideration only the *innenpolitik* approaches is equally unhelpful because they do not tell the foreign policy approaches and the reasons behind them. Gideon Rose explains one problem of *innenpolitik* theories (which gives some of its basic arguments to liberalism) as its deficiency in forming a coherent state behaviour. It argues that democracies and non-democracies act in certain ways. According to him, these

theories can't explain why similar systems act differently while dissimilar states act alike in similar situations (Rose, 1998, p.148).

Neo-classical realism focuses on how a systemic signal is understood through unit-level variables such as how the decision-makers perceive them; thus offensive realism is inaccurate in its argument of constant power search at all costs (Rose, 1998, p.153). Similarly defensive realism makes an emphasis to the good nature of international anarchy, which does not require a constant perception of threat, but promote strengthening the states' position for possible threats for a balancing purpose. Foreign policy activity results from the behaviour of rational states and conflicts occur when a threatening environment occurs. Ideologically, defensive realism is more similar to the neo-classical understanding of international structure than offensive realism.

It is very rare that states determine their foreign policy in accordance with the domestic conditions. They note that although both domestic and international pressures affect the course of events, neither are completely determinative (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.4). Thus, neo-classical realism is an approach which combines structural realism, innenpolitik approaches and constructivism.

The overall mission of neo-classical realism is explained as making a more general analysis by explaining that realist argument is not wrong but it is missing some elements including the impact of domestic institutions, strategic culture and leader perceptions. They accept the structural realist argument that states determine their foreign policies in line with the threats and opportunities of the international system and their need for survival in an anarchic world is not rejected. What they reject is that states take the changing circumstances and conditions in the international arena as the sole cause of their behaviour. Thus, there is not a mechanic response system. They divide the neo-classical realists into two groups, the first of which argues that it is possible to take clear signals from the states, however as they are handled and evaluated by decision makers and in domestic institutions, it becomes a possibility that they are

misunderstood and leaders may not always respond correctly. The second group bases its claim on the assumption that simply explaining the irregularities does not have to be the ultimate action but it is possible to explain different foreign policy choices.

There is a term used regarding neo-realist understanding, “structural modifiers”, which is used to refer to certain variables that exist as a part of the international system but are not equally structural. These are “geography”, “the rates of technological diffusion”, and “the offense-defense balance in military technologies”. These are interpreted as changing the system’s structure, the anarchy and distribution of power and the possible external behaviour of states. Neo-classical realists use certain criteria to assess a state’s resources such as its GDP (Gross Domestic Product), how much that state spends on its defense, the size of its military resources and the amount it spends on development activities, its population and territory along with its natural resources (Ripsman et al., 2016, pp.40-44).

Strategic Culture is claimed to have an effect on the way the state perceives and reacts to the signals sent by the system and any material capability changes. Strategic culture is studied in two meanings, the first of which is “the organizational culture” and the second with reference to traditions and beliefs of the society (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.66).

State-society relations refer to how harmonized the state and society are. It also includes the extent to which the society supports the decision-makers regarding foreign policy choices when there are certain disagreements as well as the degree that they support national security objectives. These factors contribute to how the state leaders use the state power in line with their priorities (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.71).

Domestic institutions refer to the formal structure of institutions or bureaucratic processes which are often characterized by law. It may also be called the

regulations and rules that determine the system. As a result, these institutions determine by whom and how policy is formed as well as who can veto them.

Neo-classical realism takes the state as its main actor. That is the reason other actors like groups, corporations or NGOs are not taken as primary by neo-classical realism.

Gideon Rose names neo-classical realism as realist because of its emphasis on material power capabilities and makes it neo-classical because it adds other inner state factors. According to him, neo-classical realism argues that a state's foreign policy is determined on the first level by its place in the international system and by its relative material power capability; however, how this capability affects foreign policy behaviour is not direct as they have to pass through a number of intervening variables (Rose, 1998, p.146). The foreign policy choices are claimed to be shaped by leaders' perceptions and understanding which are both shaped by underlying dynamics affected by culture, history, strategic choices, economic ideology, national character and how the leaders sees these material capabilities (Rose, 1998, p.148). Another sub-factor that shapes foreign policy is how the national resources can be allocated for foreign policy. This is affected by society and the leaders are bound by the limits of allocation and cannot act independently. These are all systemic factors. Still, the effect of internal factors cannot surpass the limits of the international structure and the states are bound by the international system. What neo-classical realism does as innovative can be summarized as combining realist and constructivist ideologies.

To make a summary, neo-classical realism is an approach which aims at identifying and explaining foreign policies of the states and analyzing the underlying reasons by taking into consideration not only the external factors as neo-realists but also the internal factors as influential in state behaviour.

1.4.1 Criticism Of Neo-Classical Realism

While studying the criticism of neo-classical realism, it is of primary importance to make one point clear. According to neo-classical realists, neo-realists focus on explaining the repeating patterns as a result of the interaction of units while neo-classical realists focus on explaining foreign policy (Lobell et al., 2009, p.21). Kiraz in his article lists three main points of criticism against neo-classical realism. These are:

- Neo-classical realism acts as a complementary tool for neo-realism
- Neo-classical realist has a reductionist nature
- Neo-classical realism is still in a developmental process

Neo-classical realism is evaluated to fill in the theoretical gaps in IR, and is exposed to criticism in three ways. Kiraz makes the first emphasis on the claim that neo-classical realism is not a theory but an approach that fills in the gaps of neo-realism (Kiraz, 2020, p.680). Rathbun calls it “the outgrowth of neo-realism” (Rathbun, 2008, p.296). He adds that states are not independent from their internal ideas and domestic political variables and this helps them manage their capabilities; the second is that structural realism does not reject their existence, it only sees them from a biased point of view (Rathbun, 2008, p.296). For him, neo-classical realism explains an output which can’t be explained in line with the systemic stimuli, which can be seen as the exceptions. Ripsman explains this difference from his own point of view and defends neo-classical realism in these terms:

- The basis of neo-classical realist thinking is that the state is evaluated as an important unit by reducing the sole impact of the international structure. Thus, the international system is not the only determinant (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.31). Thus, he somehow accepts the complementary nature of neo-classical realism.

- Neo-classical realism is claimed to be a theory aiming at explaining foreign policy and it is not a corrective theory which aims at covering for the gaps of structural realism. Along with that, they do not reject that neo-classical realism makes a good contribution to the literature regarding international relations. (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.31-p.183)
- Ripsman evaluates Waltz's approach to IR in terms of how the states respond to the international system and he gives the answer as the relative power of states, which he calls "material capabilities" (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.17).

Thus, neo-classical realism is constructed as a theory aiming to explain foreign policy while neo-realism was aimed at explaining international politics.

The second criticism regards the "reductionist" nature of neo-classical realism. This is tied with the claim that Waltz's emphasis on the international structure puts unit-level variables at a very low level of importance and makes them unimportant for foreign policy. John Mearsheimer supports this theory and he explains this with reference to anarchy (Mearsheimer speech, 2015). Kenneth Waltz actually makes an emphasis on such theories and claims that in a reductionist system, it is not possible to foresee the results because the interaction of the units is capable of bringing endless possibilities (Waltz, 1979, p.53). He gives the example of a negotiator who is expected to bring peace to a conflict but can't always do so and adds that if the results are dependent on the features of the actors and the situation that they are in, the general results can't be achieved by examining the actors' features (Waltz, 1979, p.78). Additionally, once the system is examined in a reductionist manner, it can only be explained with the features of the bigger units (Waltz, 1979, p.81). Neo-classical realism, however, takes systemic stimuli, as its starting point. There is no rejection of the impact of international structure. It only adds that the relative distribution of power is not the only determinant of state behaviour (Kiraz, 2020, p.680). It is rejected by neo-classical realists that neo-classical realism is a reductionist

theory. Neo-classical realism is claimed to evaluate the characteristics of the units as national behaviour produced as a result of the international system. (Lobell et al, 2009, pp.21-22).

The last criticism may be called a continuation of the first argument above. It is that neo-classical realism is at a developmental stage and thus not a complete theory in itself. At this point, Kiraz makes the analysis that this does not make neo-classical realism insufficient in the explanation of events. This is why its developmental stage is mentioned (Kiraz, 2020, p.680). Neo-classical realism in this sense sees itself as a well-functioning theory because it follows a scientific path in terms of testing its hypothesis, specifying its predictions, and studying comparatively regarding its explanatory power (Lobell et al, 2009, p.23).

In the next chapter, historical background for the post-Cold War period following a brief Cold-War summary will be given in order to understand what the situation in Russia was and it will be used to analyze the underlying factors for Russian foreign policy towards the USA within the scope of what neo-classical realism names as “internal factors”.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE COLLAPSE OF USSR

In order to understand the post-Cold War Russia, it is of vital importance to evaluate the historical events starting from the Cold War because its mid and long term effects determined the conditions Russia was in the 90s. The Second World War, which lasted from 1939 to 1945 and divided the world into two as the Allies and the Axis powers, was the starting point of Cold War relations. The Allies, which brought the US and the Soviet Union together, was a political alliance against the rising fascism of Germany, Italy and Japan; superseding the reciprocal interests of the US and USSR, because Hitler was a threat to both major powers. When this threatening situation came to an end with Germany's loss of war; bilateral relations of the US and USSR started to tense and their focus turned to each other again. Falling into a disagreement regarding their goals and wishes and blaming the USSR for ideological expansion regarding Germany and Eastern and Central European countries, USA adopted a containment policy towards the USSR. Cold War witnessed a chain of common problems, starting with Berlin. After Berlin was left in the zone which was under the control of the USSR, the US increased its military sources, leading to a confrontation and the foundation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 justified by the article that an attack on one would be an attack on all (Baylis and Owens, 2007, p.99). Cold War retaliations continued with communist victory of Mao Zedong and when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, which were interpreted as communist offensive. When Stalin died in 1953, Khrushchev became the president and his policy was seeking coexistence while pursuing confrontation (Baylis and Owens, 2007, p.100). This period was marked by an arms race defended and justified by security concerns.

Nuclear armament continued to grow and other crises took place including the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to place ballistic missiles in Turkey and Italy and USSR shipped nuclear missiles to Cuba; and the Arab-Israeli war as an indirect

confrontation in 1973 when USA supported Israel and USSR aided Egypt and Syria.

With the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to a nuclear destruction, the mutual need of reconciliation arose and led to the start of a *détente* period. In 1979, the USSR intervened in Afghanistan, at the time of a civil war between the Mujahideen supported by USA and the communists supported by the USSR, which marked the beginning of what was called the second cold war (Baylis & Owens, 2004, p.102). This tension between the East and the West continued and intensified and a turn in mutual relations finally happened in 1985 with Gorbachev's coming to power.

2.1. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The Soviet economy can be claimed to have lived its most prosperous time until 1970s. Marxist communists supported economic development because increased life standards and the provision of needed products would make people spend their energy on higher aims. Thus, they supported capitalism for it would bring fast economic development (Kotz&Weir, 2007, pp.74-76). Until the problems started to be felt, the Soviet system had a developed technology, industry and high militarization. The discontent felt for the Soviet system paced up with the recession in the Soviet economy and this led to the introduction of a reformist understanding. This had begun with Khrushchev partially when he tried to implement the Kosygin reforms⁵ and would be revitalized by Gorbachev. Before Gorbachev was elected, Yuri Andropov who came in after Brezhnev contributed to making the basis for Gorbachev's reforms. He was well aware of his time's problems and he organized a campaign for increasing discipline, motivation and efficiency; he supported open discussions for the Soviet economy and to recover it until his death 15 months after his assignment (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.93). What pushed Gorbachev for reforms was primarily the

⁵ A comprehensive reform program started by Alexei Kozygin including increased freedom for the enterprises (Schroeder, 1990, p.37).

economic stagnation in the USSR. There were related problems such as the low quality of the products, difficulty of reaching these products as well as finding sufficient raw material or looking for the needed material in the black market, environmental destruction, increasing agricultural problems caused by bad weather conditions as well as problems of reaching high quality agricultural products especially in the 70s, problems related to the delivery of goods by railway, the decreasing motivation and work discipline of the population, technological problems and problems of keeping up with the electronic and computer technologies in the West (Kotz&Weir, 2007, pp.78-90). This is tied to the reason that any country that transits from agriculture to industry loses its pace finally and slows down in growth (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.78). The developments in technology and industry caused the Soviet Union to find itself in an industrial decline. Regarding the society, alcoholism and corruption started to increase at a fast speed (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.85). There appeared a need for a higher technology for increasing the efficiency of production and Gorbachev was forced to implement a policy of what he called “a profound transformation” (Goldman, 1985, p.80). This recession in the Soviet economy is tied with various problems; however, there is no consensus on the true reason. They are counted such as the difficulty of implementing the central plan, weakened work discipline, plans of some groups for stopping the economic development after 1975, problems related to railway and oil production, bad weather, negative tendencies of the population, high militarization and more (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.85). Along with that, most people, whose level of education had also increased, had access to basic needs such as an apartment with a proper kitchen and sewage system, a TV and a refrigerator, a well-functioning transportation system and sufficient nutrition (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.91). As it was no longer within the power of the USSR as an isolate empire to compete with the West and continue its existence, a policy towards transition to the world market and warmer relations with the West seemed impossible to escape and other policies such as “glasnost” and “perestroika” were adopted.

When the speeches he made in the Central Committee Plenum of the Soviet Union Communist Party are analyzed, it can be inferred that he believed in a transition of the old system because he was both a supporter of socialism while at the same time he believed in a developed technology and economy and he thought that this could only be achieved through nuclear disarmament and democracy. The following statements are taken from the speeches he made from 1985 to 1987, and can be used to develop an idea on the basics of his policies and where they stemmed from. The following paragraphs are taken from a collection of his speeches he made as the General Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party Central Committee on February 25, 1986 at the 27. Congress:

The history of societies is formed not by coincidental arrangement, innovation movements by a development process compatible with natural laws and thus the development of the world confirms that Marxism-Leninism is the primary way out. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.33)

The expression of social development is found in the development of international communist movement and labour movement, taking new democratic society movements further and in anti-war and anti-nuclear weapon movements. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.35)

Militarism is the ugliest and most dangerous monster of the 20th century, by its force, the most developed scientific-technical thoughts are wasted for weapons of mass-destruction. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.37)

There is no future for the policy of war and military confrontation. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.39)

Gorbachev was in search of renewing the old system and making reforms by changing the old and non-functioning burden which was taken by the state such as the economic system and the armament race. He detailed the responsibility taken by the Communist Party, which can be exemplified as increasing the role of the center over the management of economy, determining the pace, development rate and balance of economy, expanding the independence of businesses and unions, increasing their responsibilities to maximize their productivity, re-establishing physical technical hardware, improving the credit

system, financing and pricing, reforming the businesses into contemporary organizations and democratizing the management in all means (Gorbachev, 1989, p.65). The following statements are his own words regarding perestroika and glasnost:

It is impossible to solve the new problems in this field without establishing a flawless, effective and flexible management system which will allow for the realization of opportunities provided by a radical perestroika and socialism in an economic mechanism. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.64)

Success in many fields will depend on the work of central economy organs and before all Gosplan (Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet, English State Planning Committee)⁶. Gosplan is a candidate to be a true scientific economy union, as completely separated from daily economic problems. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.66)

What matters for us is the dissemination of glasnost. It is a political problem. Without glasnost, democracy, political creativity of masses, their participation in the management will not be possible. If you wish as well, this will be the guarantee of the state which feels responsible for the problems of millions of workers, collective workers and intelligentsia and the starting point of perestroika psychologically for our team. (Gorbachev, 1989, p.68)

As may be inferred, a liberal position was so adopted by Gorbachev that even the Bush administration was criticised by the liberals in USA for not supporting the Gorbachev administration more vigorously (Hough, 1990). Although Gorbachev aimed at softening relations with the West, a balanced relationship was still his policy. The expansion of NATO and nuclear safety were always sensitive issues from the eyes of Russian politicians. Thus, Gorbachev had to take his steps accordingly. Gorbachev began to call for a post-Cold War security structure in which he would put the unified Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. President Bush did not want to diminish the US pre-eminence in the European Security (Sarotte, 2010, p.110). NATO was seen by the US as the guarantee of security in Europe. Various meetings were held between the two parties with the aim of ensuring security and disarmament. In 1986, a

⁶ Gosplan: It was the Board which governed the planned Soviet economy.

summit was organized in Reykjavik where Reagan and Gorbachev came together. As a result of the summit, in 1987, the USSR and USA made an agreement regarding “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)”.⁷ In December 1987, a third summit was organized in Washington, D.C. and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, the fourth and last summit, which produced no tangible results, was in Moscow.

Worsening economic conditions forced Russia to look for solutions from the West and Gorbachev was harshly criticized for his attempts of seeking economic assistance from Western Germany due to worsening economic conditions (Sarotte, 2010, p.110). This was interpreted as a bribe for NATO to expand eastward which was to the interest of USA.

Separations from the USSR began accordingly in November 1988, with Estonia declaring sovereignty in August 1991 Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and others. Economic stagnation worsened in Poland, which finally led to the loss of the communists in the elections or the failing system in the USSR, under the Gorbachev regime. The same events were observed in Hungary, which led to an arrangement between the communists and the opposition leading to a dismantlement of 150-mile barbed wire along the Austrian-Hungarian border, permitting East Germans to flee to the West (Ambrose&Brinkley, 1971, p.363). Such demonstrations and emigrating people caused the leader of East Germany Erich Honecker to fall from power in October and the Berlin Wall on November 9 (Leslie, 2009, p.21).

In December 1988, Gorbachev made a speech at the United Nations, and said that the USSR would pull its forces back from Eastern Europe.⁸ Three summits were organized, bringing Bush and Gorbachev together, the first of which was

⁷ Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>.

⁸ Wilson Center Digital Archives. Please see: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/%20116224%20.pdf>.

in Malta, officially ending the Cold War; second in Washington in which the issue of a reunified Germany was discussed with no results; third in Moscow in which START I was signed in 1991 (Savranskaya&Blanton, 2016). Thus, 1989 marked the communist end in Europe as well as the beginning of the dissolution of the USSR.

Boris Yeltsin in his memoir book "Struggle for Russia" wrote that in February of 1991, he proposed that Gorbachev should resign; however, the tension inside the country was so high. The events were heating up in the Baltic republics and TV broadcasters were scaring the public with the end of the Soviet Union and civil war. The Russian leaders' behaviour were seen as "destructive and negative" (Yeltsin, 1994, p.22) Soon after the Warsaw Pact was abolished and in December of 1991, the USSR was dissolved and a Commonwealth of Independent States was founded. In the next part, political and economic situation in Russia after the dissolution of USSR will be analyzed.

2.2. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA AFTER THE DISSOLUTION

Gorbachev's policies in general did not bring tangible results, causing discontent inside the country, as well as marking the end of the Soviet Union, which led to a coup attempt in August 1991. Just like Yeltsin, Gorbachev had to face serious opposition from conservative hardliners who supported the old system of Russia in terms of communist ideology inside the country. The reform program, loss of old USSR states, and his general policy to dissolve the central power of Russia inside the USSR caused great discontent.

Andrei Kozyrev wrote that he saw Gorbachev's perestroika and his attempts of healing the economy "as a window being opened in an airless room" because he did not believe in his intention to challenge and change the system (Kozyrev, 2019, p.9).

Boris Yeltsin in his book *“Struggle for Russia”* wrote that there was ongoing anarchy in the country although there were governmental institutions and law-enforcement agencies because the conveyor-belt system of the administration was not working probably and therefore the machinery of the government would not function; adding that no economic, political or financial reform would solve the problems instantly (Yeltsin, 1994, p.15). He was critical of Gorbachev, referring to him as “sick of perestroika” for not taking the necessary measures to prevent it. Boris Yeltsin referred to Gorbachev as someone who did not want to undergo perestroika, but merely wanted to preserve the system, the harshly centralized government and not give independence to the republics. He asked for his resignation (Yeltsin, 1994, p.23). He added that although Gorbachev was “an advocate of socialism with a human face”, he was still afraid of renovations and the strength of the system (Yeltsin, 1994, pp.16-17). He gave two reasons for his criticism of Gorbachev. The first one was what he called a moral reason for Gorbachev’s double dealings during the tragedy in Vilnius in which Gorbachev claimed to have no knowledge about the military using violence to suppress the demonstrations in Vilnius in January of 1991 and for burying “the 500-day program” (A program for transition to market economy managed by Yavlinsky and Shatalin) which was, for Yeltsin, the only economic hope at the time (Yeltsin, 1994, p.23). Losing his popularity, Yeltsin wrote, Gorbachev invited the heads of the republics to a dacha⁹ in Novo-Ogaryovo where he proposed to sign a new union treaty that would weaken the influence of Moscow on them. He also proposed “a new Constitution after which the existing legislative bodies, the Congress of People’s Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet¹⁰ would be dissolved and direct elections for a new president would be held” (Yeltsin, 1994, p.26). He was also critical of perestroika lacking a conceptual integrity (Yeltsin, 1991, p.139) and that it did not affect the nomenklatura; they were old-headed and nobody spoke against the General

⁹ A dacha is a country house in Russia. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/dacha>.

¹⁰ Highest legislative organ in the USSR, responsible for appointing the highest ranks such as the Supreme Court, the Procurator General and the Council of Ministers.

Secretary (Yeltsin, 1991, p.18) and Gorbachev was afraid of implementing the perestroika against the bureaucrats of his time (Yeltsin, 1991, p.128).

Yeltsin named his rivals for his first election as Nikolai Ryzhkov who was the prime minister under Gorbachev, whom Yeltsin saw as one of the traditionalists who wanted to keep the system as it was; Vadim Bakatin¹¹ who had resigned from the administration and was causing confusion and hesitation in people; and lastly the radicals who opposed the idea of democracy completely, against Gorbachev and Yeltsin himself, advocating imposing order with an iron fist and removing the old apparatchiks (bureaucrat) from power such as Albert Makashov, Amangeldy Tuleyev and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (Yeltsin, 1994, p.33-34).

August 1991 witnessed a coup attempt in Russia by the supporters of the old system in Russia or “the communist hardliners” as referred by some, inside the country, who blamed Gorbachev for Russia’s weakness in economy, loss of the Soviet states, and the new treaty proposed by Gorbachev, and thus, they wanted to take Gorbachev down. Yeltsin counts the coup plotters as KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, ‘Committee for State Security’) Chairman Krychukov, Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov, Oleg Shenin in charge of party personnel and organizational affairs, Oleg Baklanov who was the politburo¹² member in charge of military-industrial complex and Valentin Pavlov (Yeltsin, 1994, p.48). Gorbachev was detained in his house by the hardliner KGB agents and finally the coup attempt turned unsuccessful. Andrei Kozyrev evaluated the coup attempt as the “highest moral and political point” reached by the Russians (Kozyrev, 2019, p.36). Roy Medvedev summarizes the effects of the attempted coup event of 1991 as the removal of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the dissolution of the USSR and Gorbachev’s fall from power (Medvedev, 2000, p.46). Following the coup attempt, Gorbachev lost his influence and had to resign, making a historical speech, in which he

¹¹ Last chairman of the KGB in 1991.

¹² The executive committee for the Communist party in Russia.

advocated his actions and success as giving an end to a totalitarian empire who could no longer exist peacefully.¹³ Although KGB was closed in 1991 and had no official functioning for Yeltsin's time, it had a deep influence on the path leading to his election.

Russia-US relations can be divided into two eras following Gorbachev, one with closer relations with the West during Yeltsin's presidency and the other being a moderate policy at first turning into a more aggressive one in the following years during Putin's presidency.

Following Gorbachev, political, social and economic changes were already under way and Russia could not continue to survive with pre-existing conditions. Although it seemed like USA was going to dominate the new unipolar order after the dissolution; Russia pulled itself back together with new and strict policies that effectively produced results during Putin's presidency. Putin would be the one who would truly solve Russia's many problems to a certain extent. Taking historical facts into consideration, Yeltsin era was a time of transition, which caused a great economic depression along with an identity crisis, a decrease in Russia's population, and an uneven distribution of resources through the monopoly of vouchers.

Ten major issues can be summarized, as contributing to priorities of Russia during Yeltsin's presidency, which more or less contributed to its relations with the USA:

- Membership in Western institutions such as IMF
- Counter-balancing threats that could come from various states such as territorial disputes with Japan regarding the Northern Territories¹⁴
- Economic reconstruction (a main objective of Kozyrev) and cutting military budgets safely

¹³ Gorbachev resigns as president" (1991). Please see: <https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1991-2/the-end-of-the-soviet-union/the-end-of-the-soviet-union-texts/gorbachev-resigns-as-president/>.

¹⁴ Japan reacts to the invasion of the Northern Islands in 1949 and expresses their wish on returning them to Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, please see: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html>).

- Nuclear stability and reduction of nuclear weapons
- NATO enlargement
- Iran (sales of arms and technology which started at the time of Gorbachev)
- Iraq (over the Persian Gulf and Gulf Cooperation Council countries)
- Israel (trade relations and Russian population living in Israel)
- Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Afghanistan (spread of radical Islamism)
- Bosnia and Kosovo (Reactions came from the members of the Communist Party in Russia when Serbia sanctions were supported in 1992; Duma supported the Serbs. Russia and USA had different opinions on the issue as USA opposed to the Serbian aggression (Kumar & Doshi, 2001, p.1254). Russia supported the proposed Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1992 to divide Bosnia into regions for Muslims and Serbs but it was rejected by the Serbs (Cutts, 1999, p. 6).

Two elections were made in post-cold war Russia in 1991 and 1996 and Yeltsin won them both. He referred to himself regarding his first election as “the first freely chosen president of Russia” (Yeltsin, 1994, p.41). When he was first elected, Yeltsin was referred to as “a Western-style politician” due to his policies towards the West and especially USA. In addition to conducting close relations with the West, Yeltsin conducted a policy of multi-diplomacy and sent Russian forces as a peace force to Yugoslavia or he accepted the existence of NATO forces in Nagorno-Karabagh¹⁵.

The new world system after USSR’s fall forced Russia to integrate itself to the world system. It was a time of uncertainties and Russia was in a new state to be determined by loss of its geography, a collapsed economy, a decrease in its population, and a political chaos. Thus, Yeltsin was assigned to solve these problems after the elections and had to build a new state from zero as the first president of the new Russian Federation.

¹⁵ A conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabagh region.

Yeltsin's main approach to Russia's problems, especially the economy, was to completely reform the system not transform it like Gorbachev had intended. The time of Yeltsin can be characterized by the war of conservatives in the State Duma who were representatives of the Communist Party and anti-communists because the main reason of the conflict was to stem from either the criticism of pro-western policies or the anti-acts of the communist representatives inside Russia for blaming Yeltsin.


On November 6, 1991, Yeltsin signed a Decree on the Activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By this degree, the Communist Party was to stop all its activities and their offices, cars and property were to be nationalized¹⁶. In this degree, Yeltsin accused the Party of masterminding the August 1991 coup and undermining democratic institutions. As a result of this decree, Communist Party deputies made a move towards evaluating the decrees of Yeltsin and some anti-communist deputies led by Oleg Rummyantsev made a countersuit on which the Constitutional court ruled itself competent (Brzezinski, 1993, pp.683-685).

Having had to handle a problematic economic structure and a failed system, Yeltsin had to make radical decisions and implement shock therapies to revive the system. Economic transition was the first in the to-do list and a capitalist transformation was intended. In a few years, he managed to accomplish some changes. Russian companies were owned and controlled by the state and the public were also allowed to possess private property and firms; the government was collecting tax and its currency could be used in trade in foreign exchange markets (Desai, 2005, p.96-97). His difference from Gorbachev was that the Yeltsin administration demanded a faster transition (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.250). This shock therapy, to be implemented for four years, meant a swift transition from a central economy to a liberal economy, which caused a massive destruction in Russia's economy. He had appointed Yegor Gaidar to be his

¹⁶ Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library. "The Activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and The Communist Party of The RSFSR Stopped Under the Decree of the President of the RSFSR". 6 November 1991. Please see: <https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619693>.

chief aid in economics. Yegor Gaidar's strategy was a free and independent Russia that could realize its own transition separately (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.250). Privatization (to be implemented by Anatoly Chubais), budget cuts, tax reforms, financial credit policy, price liberalization and a strong ruble were some of his goals. A series of meetings were made with the IMF and Russia showed its willingness to conduct this new transition plan. With this new system, there was no longer state control over the prices and state expenses were planned to be decreased. Privatization was started and it was aimed to increase industrial production by private industry hands and the state would no longer be the only hand. His shock therapy aimed at using the country's economic resources more efficiently (Goldman, 1992, p.80). Goldman adds that price liberalization was introduced except for twelve basis products, which pulled the strings of economy even tighter and caused higher prices. The consumer prices had increased 1.411 times in 1995 compared to 1991 and 3668 times compared to end of the year 1990 (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.173). Thus, economic problems were one dimension of the problem. The table below indicates the decline of Russian GDP (Gross Domestic Product) which started to recover in 1997 (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, p.108).

Figure II: Russian economy since the fall of the Soviet Union



Source: (Stoner, 2009, p.6)

Desai gives three outcomes of this fast policy implementation, leading to a large public discontent in the country. Yeltsin's plan caused seriously increasing prices of basic goods, loss of people's savings from the Soviet time and the government payments for pensions or state officials etc. were interrupted; and lastly voucher privatization caused an uneven ownership (Desai, 2005, p.96). Regarding his position as the president, Yeltsin himself confessed before the 1996 elections that it was possible for the Russian people not to forgive him for shock therapy and in a way accepted his failure regarding this implementation (Yeltsin, 2000, p.39). According to Zimmerman, Yeltsin succeeded in liberalizing the prices which helped reduce the lines in retail, he stabilized the value of ruble from 1994 to 1997, took membership in the IMF, took foreign investment, reduced the impact of state control and contributed to the establishment of banks and enterprises (Zimmermann, 2002).

Connected with the economic problems of Russia, on the other hand, organized crime and corruption increased in the country (Kotz&Weir, 2007, p.185). Kotz adds that gangster type murders increased, there were reports of murdered bankers, arson and bombing towards banks. There was almost no control over corruption and it could be seen in all fields like raw material import and bribes were the regular implementation on the borders. Along with these problems, and the economic situation, Russian population started to face serious declines in its population growth. Although most parties supported a capitalist economy, they started to be divided among themselves due to the results of the shock therapy. The way that Yeltsin implemented his policies was criticized. Yeltsin had to face oppositions. The divisions inside the Russian political system were the Atlanticists, who were more western-oriented and Eurasianists, who were more in favour of balancing Russia's characteristic features with western structures. A third party was more traditional and comprised of members of the Communist Party. The common point that brought them together was that the western-oriented policies of Yeltsin had failed. These were called the red-brown coalition, which was the alliance of the far-left (communists) and the far-right (nationalists).

In the *Journal of Economic Integration* of 2006, it is stated that during the 1990s, the basic problem which prevented political stability was the conflict of interests between the executive (the president and ministers) and the legislative (the parliament) bodies of the government (Fic and Saqib, 2006, p.769). Viktor Chernomyrdin (former head of Gazprom) replaced Yegor Gaidar who was a reformer due to increasing opposition from the Duma. As the prime minister, he spoke against the bombing of Iraq by USA, increased arms sales to Iran, and supported the Russian-speaking population in the near abroad (Freedman, 1997, p.95). This caused serious opposition and differences of opinion in the country. The counter-acts against Yeltsin were represented by Alexander Rutskoy¹⁷ and Ruslan Khasbulatov¹⁸, which finally led to the White House crisis in 1993. Called also “the Constitutional Crisis”, the event took place following the corruption claims regarding Vice President Rutskoy and his dismissal from the office by Yeltsin, which was claimed to be illegitimate according to the law as the President had no such right. This led to the impeachment attempt of Yeltsin and Yeltsin’s attempt to dissolve the Parliament by a decree. To take care control of the flaming oppositions, Yeltsin tried to dissolve the parliament and sent the police to surrender the White House¹⁹. The Russian army which was neutral at first, followed Yeltsin’s orders and tanks opened fire. Those who resisted were arrested and Yeltsin called for early elections as well as passing a new constitution which gave the president expanded power. Thus, Yeltsin’s power became more consolidated. This also led to the end of “the Supreme Soviet of Russia”. This led to a crisis which finally resulted in the “dissolution of the parliament”; “parliamentary elections” and “a referendum on a new constitution” in 1993 resulting in the split of the parliament as the reformers (30 percent), centralists (30 percent) and nationalists (40 percent) (Fic and Saqib, 2006, p.769). This unconformity between the executive and legislative powers created a problematic structure which made the adoption of new reforms

¹⁷ He was the vice president from 1991 until his arrest in 1993. He harshly criticised Yeltsin with corruption claims.

¹⁸ He was a strong Russian politician who criticised Yeltsin and led an anti-movement against him.

¹⁹ *Dom pravitelstva Rossiyskoi Federatsii*. The White House is a government building in Moscow which is used as the primary office of the government of Russia and the official workplace of the Russian Prime Minister.

difficult due to their unaccountability towards each other and caused problems regarding the state decision-making processes (Fic and Saqib, 2006, p.769). In 1994, the State Duma passed the law for general amnesty and it turned out to strengthen the opposition against Yeltsin, evaluating it as a victory against him. The year 1994 witnessed another armed conflict in Russia when the Russian government attempted to suppress the Chechen separatism, which continued for two years. This event took great criticism from West as it was seen as violent and “a violation of human rights”. Yeltsin was criticized by being compared to Gorbachov who was criticised by Yeltsin himself for his military actions to suppress movements in the Soviet sphere (Alekberov, 1995, p.153). General Dudayev was the first President of a Chechnya whose independence was declared in 1991 following the example of the states that left the USSR. Having strengthened its military might by buying the weapons from the Soviet army, which was the case in all separated ex-Soviet states (Alekberov, 1995, p.155). The war brought enormous economic losses amounting to 5.5 billion US dollars (Pain, 2001, p.7) which made Yeltsin lose his popularity even more. Andrei Kozyrev, who was seen as the representative of Atlanticists, said that many people believed in the use of force for they criticised the Dudayev regime (The New York Times, 1995)

1996 was another important year in Russian history for elections would be held following harsh economic conditions and criticism for Yeltsin. This was also the time that Yeltsin's relations with the oligarchs intensified. Although Yeltsin claimed that it was these businessmen that came to him with their offer because it was against their interests if the Communist party won the elections, there was the fear that all their assets would be nationalized (Yeltsin, 2000, p.95). There was high privatization and according to Yeltsin, the West was afraid of lending money to Russia, which showed the country's economic situation. In the elections Yeltsin won against the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov who was referred to as “anti-Western and confrontational” by Zimmerman. In his memoir, he adds that following the elections, there were

many positive developments like the value increase of Russian enterprises (Yeltsin, 2000, p.96).

The year 1997 witnessed a set of other events. When Yeltsin was elected for a second time, he appointed Chubais²⁰ to form a new “green team” with young leaders in order to bring economic reforms. He thought that the old system in Russia, which was associated with negative production capacity, the no-longer-functioning manufacturing sector and the collective agricultural system, was not suitable for the new Russia (Yeltsin, 2000, p.82). During the presidency of Chernomyrdin, the crisis in Asia took place and the petrol prices fell sharply. The economic discontent was growing in Russia with unpaid wages, long lines and complaints from the public; finally causing the Duma to say that they would not give their vote of confidence for Chernomyrdin, which was another conflict of Yeltsin with the Duma. Chernomyrdin stated that he would resign if a vote-of-no-confidence was given by the State Duma (CNN News, 1997)

Another important year the year 1998 was also a critical point in Yeltsin’s presidency because Russia at the time faced a major economic crisis which changed the internal dynamics radically. Russia implemented an economic programme from 1995 to 1998 for lowering inflation and providing for economic growth, which was successful at the beginning in terms of a low inflation along with rising and relatively stable oil prices until mid-1997 (Fic and Saqib, 2006, p.765-766). The decline in Russian economy is explained by two shocks in the *Journal of Economic Integration*, the first of which was the repeating devaluations in East Asian countries in 1997 causing the outflow of capital from Russia, and a sharp decline in oil prices from 1998 onwards. This weakness in oil price in 1997 intensified by mid-1998 and Russian economy could not handle a second wave of capital outflow from the country. The fiscal imbalance which resulted from the internal and external obligations, Russian economy became highly vulnerable (Fic and Saqib, 2006, p. 766). This collapse in economy is mentioned to be the result of the policies of Chernomyrdin government, which

²⁰ He was appointed as the First Deputy Prime Minister to Chernomyrdin on March 17, 1997 (Yeltsin, 2000, p.84).

borrowed money from abroad along with the fall of oil prices and the investors pulling the money back from Russia Due to the 1997 Asian crisis. The resulting chaos and collapse of the ruble caused a sharp decline in the Russian GDP, high inflation, unemployment and consumer shortages (Simes, 1998, p.15).

Making a summary of Russia's internal dynamics for the post-Cold War period of Yeltsin's presidency, we can count Yeltsin's basic problems as a collapsed system, economic problems and internal political conflict arising from different views on Russia's identity and foreign policy approaches. These factors, although counted as internal issues, had great effect on Russia's foreign policy approaches because a weakened state had to conduct softer policies towards its almost half a decade rival USA.

CHAPTER III

A NEO-CLASSICAL REALIST APPROACH TO RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Evaluating the beginning of the 1990s, it can be said that Yeltsin's Russia faced many problems both internally and externally. It was a time of uncertainties because Russia's historical approach to itself as a superpower and Yeltsin's approach to relations with the West were complete opposites. The major problem between the two was that Russia's power had weakened economically, geographically and politically. With the dissolution of USSR, half a century of bipolarism had come to an end in the favour of capitalism, making the USA the sole remaining major power. Post-communist Russia was in a state it had never experienced before for it had lost its power to claim its historical goal of supremacy. Thus, it can easily be said that a profound change in Russian foreign policy was to be expected. The important question to be asked is what reasons were behind the change in Russia's behaviour apart from the historical facts such as the dissolution of USSR and the existence of a weakened state. Neo-classical realism answers this question by making an analysis of various factors, which are international system, leader images, strategic culture, domestic institutions and state-society relations. This chapter is devoted to explaining external and internal factors which had impact on the change in Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

3.1. EXTERNAL FACTORS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

In order to understand what the term "international structure" meant for Russian foreign policy, it is important to analyze the international structure in the post-Cold War period. Charles Krauthammer makes a description of the status of states at the time by describing Germany and Japan as great powers due to their economy and the Soviet Union with military, diplomatic and political power though in decline. He names the USA as the single world power by supporting his arguments

with how USA acted regarding the Persian Gulf crisis²¹ while naming Europe as far from being a world power due to its disjointed responses to the case. He adds that the USA had sufficient power to have an impact (Krauthammer, 1991, p.24). He calls multilateralism at the time a “pseudo-multilateralism” due to its actual bipolar structure as mentioned above (Krauthammer, 1991, p.25). Wohlforth cites the meaning of unipolarity as a structure in which “a state’s capabilities can not be counterbalanced” (Wohlforth, 1999, p.9).

Taking into consideration the situation of Russia after the dissolution of the USSR to be marked by territorial loss, economic decline, political chaos and social unrest; it can be inferred that Russia’s approach to other states as well as international organizations was shaped in line with its new situation. Transition into a free market and new ideas about developing closer relations with the West despite the mask of communism started to be mentioned in Gorbachev’s time with the policies of perestroika and glasnost. This made Gorbachev popular in the eyes of the West following the time of Brezhnev under whom the iron curtain was more visible and state-control was more sharply felt. Although Gorbachev was not as pro-Western as Yeltsin, he was appreciated by the West to such a point that Yeltsin was criticised for his popularity was outweighing that of Gorbachev. The French socialist politician Jean-Pierre Cot insulting Yeltsin for being “a demagogic personality” surrounding himself with a few social democrats and liberals and right-wing extremists and criticising him for shadowing Gorbachev’s popularity was made news in October of 1991.²² The end of the 1980s under Gorbachev was the starting point for Russia’s integration into the world and closer relations with the West.

Following Gorbachev’s loss of popularity and Boris Yeltsin’s election as the president, Yeltsin was seen as the symbol of a democratic Russia. The losses brought after the dissolution of the USSR led to searching for the answer in close cooperation with the West. Yeltsin’s anti-communist personality made him a leader

²¹ Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 in order to acquire its oil reserves following the cancellation of its debt to Kuwait. It is referred to as the major international crisis of the post-Cold War period.

²² The Bolshevik Who Came In From the Cold: Boris Yeltsin staved off the Coup and Toppled the Communists. But Is He a True Democrat or a New Kind of Demagogue? October, 6, 1991. latimes.com.

and convinced people that cooperation with the West, a democratic Russia and free market in this sense were the answers to the problems of Russia. Yeltsin called the 20th century a century of fear and nightmares due to totalitarianism and added that the August coup was the collapse of the last empire of fascism (Yeltsin, 1994, p.42).

The point classical realists, neo-realists and neo-classical realists agree on is that the structure of the international system is anarchic. Kenneth Waltz calls it the “self-help system” and that states must provide for their own security (Waltz, 1979, pp.107-115). Neo-classical realists use this term to refer to the absence of an overarching structure and they do not reject the protectionist nature of states. When the USA was left as the sole power, it was natural for Russia to feel itself under threat and at risk. Not only Yeltsin’s pro-western attitude but also the conditions Russia was in at the time required Yeltsin to act in close cooperation with the West and especially the USA. Although Russia was lacking the strength and determinism to counter-balance USA directly at the time which was the beginning of the 1990s, protecting its close borders and controlling the ex-Soviet territory were never completely abandoned. On the other hand, USA had also adopted its role as the major power in the 90s and made this official through the document for Pentagon’s Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1994-99 stated that “maintaining highly capable forces was critical to sustaining US leadership, and preventing the rivals from challenging critical interests was of primary importance (Defense Planning: Guidance. EX 1994-1999, p.5).

USA’s claim for leadership as mentioned above and the meaning of “critical interests” could not be ignored by Russia taking into consideration its new dynamics. Thus, Russian foreign policy was marked as a “western and liberal approach” from 1991 to 1993 to conduct friendly and safe relations. Graham Smith made a very clear explanation of Russia’s foreign policy approach at the time when he said that giving up on its expansionist policies, Russia chose to protect its interests by cooperating with the West and giving importance to taking part in international organizations (Smith, 1999, p.491).

When the USA remained as the sole power and declared how it would behave regarding its interests officially as mentioned above, discussions started to flare up again in the analysis of international relations. Evaluating the post-Cold War era, Wohlforth was one who claimed that the presence of USA as a major power did not necessarily have to be prone to conflict. He based his claim on three arguments, the first of which was that the system was unambiguously unipolar, the unipolarity was prone to peace and it was durable (Wohlforth, 1999, pp.7-8). This can be evaluated as a claim which neo-realism would both support and doubt because neo-realists evaluate a unipolar structure as a system of order because one single power has the material capabilities and on the other hand it has the potential to force other states to take counter action in order to balance that power and unipolarity may eventually lead to multipolarity. Neo-realism had strong arguments to explain the Cold War because it was an era of rivalry, fierce competition and quest for hegemony. Balance of power and balance of terror theories along with the suggestions of offensive realism had logical basis in this sense. However, neo-realism failed in the post-Cold War world when it was inadequate to explain why alliance and cooperation in Europe did not decline despite the fact that the Soviet threat had disappeared (Ikenberry, 1998, p.44). The continuance of institutionalism and the nature of relations within this scope challenged the neo-realist view.

Neo-classical realism, on the other hand, defines the international system with the parametres of anarchy, relative power, material capabilities and in line with a competitive nature of states. However, it does not conclude that the international structure dictates some outcomes as neo-realism suggests. Where neo-classical realism is successful is that it can explain foreign policy although the system does not send open information about possible threats and opportunities (Lobell et al., 2009, p.41). When Russia adopted a pro-Western approach, this was not in compliance with the suggestions of hegemony search of neo-realism solely, however could be explained with neo-classical realist suggestions of domestic variables which will be explained in detail in the following part. The situation of the economy, the impact of ideological fractions

within Russia, the impact of domestic institutions, elite groups and the most important strategic culture affected the determination process of Russian politics.

In 1993 and 1994, Russian foreign policy started to change. This change will be analyzed at a deeper level in the next part because mostly the internal dynamics led to this change. When the communist party came first in the 1995 Duma elections (following December 1993 elections), and he faced a major defeat, Yeltsin was forced to make a radical change and appoint conservative or Russian nationalist politicians like Primakov in 1996 because voices and criticism started to be heard from the State Duma. Yeltsin's health problems are evaluated as another reason that pushed him to find common grounds with the Communist Party representatives in Duma. Faced with the danger of losing his popularity, Yeltsin adopted a new policy towards the West. While doing so, he used the rhetoric of a historically powerful and unique Russia, which was unwilling to lose its influence in the spheres of interest including the CIS states²³, NATO, Chechnya and the European border. The following excerpts can be given as examples to understand a shifting Russian foreign policy.

As Boris Yeltsin explained (1994):

History demonstrates that it is a dangerous delusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital [...] If the objective is to bring NATO up to Russia's borders, let me say one thing: It is too early to bury a democratic Russia. Russia also expects its security to be taken into account. (LA Times, 06.12.1994).

Yeltsin said the following words at the State Duma in 1994:

But Russia has the right to act firmly and toughly when necessary to defend its national interests. (Washington Post, 1994)

²³ Commonwealth of Independent States which was established following the dissolution of USSR based on cooperation.

Another newspaper article gave Yeltsin's response to Clinton's criticism of the situation in Chechnya (1999):

Clinton allowed himself to pressurise Russia yesterday. He must have forgotten for a moment what Russia is. We have a full arsenal of nuclear weapons. (Washington Post, 13.12.1999).

Understanding from his words, the approach that Yeltsin conducted in second first term can be inferred to result from not only the reactions of the Communist Party representatives in the State Duma, blaming Yeltsin for disregarding the historical Russian identity but also due to the fact that he started to lose his popularity with the economic problems that started to flare up. Differences of opinion regarding the Russian identity led to the flaring up of an ever-existing ideological war between the liberals and the conservatives, which finally paved the way to reshaping Russian behaviour.

As a general conclusion, it can be argued that although Yeltsin changed his approach to USA publicly, he did not conduct a hostile approach. Rapprochement with the USA continued with the meetings such as G7, Helsinki Talks (meeting of Clinton and Yeltsin), START II in 1993 and NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997.

Russian relations with other countries need to be evaluated in order to understand Russia's standing in relation to USA. Freedman states that Russian policy towards Iraq was supportive of the US position in 1993 but Yeltsin had to change his route from supporting the anti-Iraqi embargo²⁴ to the criticism of US bombing of Iraq. The Russian Duma voted for lifting the sanctions although Yeltsin was unwilling for fear of damaging relations with USA. He adds in his article that Russia had three major reasons for healthier Iraqi relations. First, it would be a sign to the world that Russia was not an unimportant factor, second Iraqi debt to Russia could be regained only if the sanctions were lifted and the

²⁴ Ambargo was implemented on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait with UN Resolution 661. UN Archives S/RES/0661 (1990).

last one was the oil and gas relationship needed for the Russian factories could be provided only if the sanctions were lifted (Freedman, 1997, p.94).

Russian relationship with Iran can also be evaluated as a counter-act against the USA. Russian relations with Iran at the time was another area of conflict regarding western relations. Robert O. Freedman explains three basic reasons for Yeltsin's Iran policy. First, Iran was an important market for the sales of arms, second relations with Iran would mean independent relations from USA and third Iran was an ally to control Azerbaijan²⁵ (Freedman, 1997, p.94). The most eminent problem with Iran was the supplying of Russian missile technology which was a major irritant in the US relations. Although Russia expelled an Iranian diplomat for trying to smuggle missile technology and promising to stop selling "dual use" equipment to Tehran, it deeply affected mutual relations (Freedman, 1997, p.93).

The last example of Russian relations to counter USA was China. Their relations had a restart following the dissolution of USSR when the Russian Federation was recognized by China in 1991. Yeltsin visited China in 1992 and they signed "a Joint Statement on the Basis of Mutual Relations", in 1994 Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Russia and they signed the Second Sino-Russian Joint Statement, in 1996 they came together and planned to establish strategic coordination and partnership and signed the third Sino-Russian Joint Statement Relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China; 1996). Russian relationship with China, Iran and Iraq should be taken into consideration because the international system at the time was policy of balance as a determinant of international relations.

Making a general summary of what the post-Cold War international structure meant for Russia, it can be said that Russia had lost an important amount of its territory, thus losing its protective borders it had formed in the Soviet era, had left some of its weapon storage in what were now new-born states, and it was

²⁵ Russia needed Iran's help in keeping Azerbaijan under control to prevent the spread of separatist movements like in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

faced with NATO enlargement right next to its border, which was a major problem and USA was now the sole power in the world, which was capable of acting as a threat to Russia under NATO. Yeltsin had to wait for some time before he could lead counter-acts against the USA such as cooperation with Iran and Iraq. It can also be inferred that Yeltsin never turned US relations into a hostile one but he adopted a stronger rhetoric especially in his second term. He still continued NATO, disarmament and cooperation meetings with the USA. What was influential in determining these policies in addition to the international structure will be analyzed under the title of internal or unit level factors in the next title.

3.2. INTERNAL FACTORS: STRATEGIC CULTURE, LEADER IMAGES, STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

3.2.1 Strategic culture

Neo-classical realism takes into account not only the international system as a determinant of foreign policy, as mentioned above, but other factors which can be called internal because they affect the way states act or behave. The first of these internal factors is the strategic culture. As a systemic variable, strategic culture refers to the importance and intensity of the threats exposed to and how the state evaluates these threats.

Jack Snyder described strategic culture as “the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation. He added that Soviet Union’s unique history, political institutions, and strategic situation produced a unique mix of strange beliefs and a unique pattern of strategic behaviour based on those beliefs (Snyder, 1977, pp.8-9).

Strategic culture comes from a constructivist nature because it is made of beliefs, traditions, attitudes and habits with regard to use of force and what

shapes those beliefs. It is used in two meanings, one of which is narrower and the other more general. The general term is used to refer to a broader notion including beliefs, worldviews and shared expectations. The other meaning of strategic culture refers to organizational culture such as that of the military as a bureaucratic organization (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.79). Thus, Russian identity needs to be understood with respect to strategic culture. This identity is identified with several ideologies from the Soviet times such as “the center of world revolution”, “the great Russian people”, leading to the concept of the “Russian World (Russkiy Mir)” today. “Access to prestigious and responsible professions and positions being hampered for ethnic groups, the Russian-dominated army in WW II, curtailing education in local languages and increasing Russian-dominated education, making a propaganda of the Russians in the communist party and expressions of “the great Russian people” and “the great Soviet people” being used interchangeably” can be given as examples regarding the historical understanding of Russian superiority (Podoprigora and Krasnopevtseva, 2019, pp. 169-170).

Going back to the nineteenth century discussions between the Slavophiles who emphasized the unique character of the Russian civilization and Westernizers who argued that Russia should learn from the rationalism of the West (Zevelev, 2016, p.4). Zevelev evaluates that “Russians feel themselves belonging to an entity which was bigger and more important than just an ethnic group” and that it was found difficult to see Ukraine and Russia as independent nations, separate from Russia (Zevelev, 2016, p.7).

Zevelev makes an emphasis on the Russian understanding of identity and uniqueness and adds that after the USSR collapsed, Russians had a hard time recognizing the neighboring newly independent states, Ukraine and Belarus in particular, as separate nations. This may be taken as having become a part of the Russian strategic culture over time.

Jack Snyder in his *"The Enigma of Soviet Strategic Policy"* gives three different explanations regarding the Soviet strategic policy, which are very helpful in understanding the scope of what is called "the strategic culture".

The first one is "seeking superiority". Soviet Union was after superiority in strategic arms to confront USA and keep itself secure at the existence of a war. This is tied with two elements of strategic culture, which are expansionist historical ideology of Russia and second the military strategic concept which never saw the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD)²⁶ as desirable. The Soviet behaviour, and the strategic culture, was marked by the Russian desire to catch up with USA in the arms race and balance quantitative advantages. The ultimate goal for both these underlying strategies were achieving superiority.

The second one is political compromise, which suggested that the Soviet behaviour resulted from logrolling among important political and bureaucratic personalities. The different opinions of different parties are influential in decision-making processes and thus the formation of strategic culture.

The third and last one is the organizational process which is used to explain Soviet behaviour, claiming that it is a result of a routine, half-conscious behaviour of the Soviet military-industrial establishment and adds that the choices of the Kremlin alone are so bureaucratically filtered that observable behaviour is too inadequate to make an inference from. The underlying reasons are more important (Snyder, 1977. pp.88-89).

Neo-classical realists suggest that strategic culture is influential in forming the reactions of the states and decision-making along with policy implementation are conditioned domestically. It is claimed that a country's strategic culture affects how the states perceive signals and how the political leaders understand

²⁶ Mutual deterrence between countries possessing nuclear weapons, based on the capacity of each to inflict major damage on the other in response to a first strike. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/mutual-assured-destruction>.

them. Thus, dominant ideologies enter the scope of strategic culture. The behaviour of Lenin and Stalin viewing the West as a threat can explain their unwillingness to cooperate with the West, explaining Soviet ideology (Ripsman et al., 2016; pp.46-82).

Boris Yeltsin is known for his critical views regarding Gorbachev and his actions. He described the reaction of the army to the Gorbachev period and added that one reason for this was the alteration of the country's strategic mission. He wrote:

Enormous displeasure was growing in the army as well. There were numerous reasons: the winding down of the defense industry, the alteration of the country's strategic mission, concessions to the West on disarmament, the completely unprepared withdrawal of forces from East Germany, and the necessitated participation in ethnic conflicts in the Soviet republics, which threatened the life and limb of Soviet military personnel and their families. (Yeltsin, 1994, p.50)

In this sense, Yeltsin's period can be analyzed totally differently because of economic and political problems, although for a short period of time, had come before Russian ideology. It was starting to evolve into a more Western-oriented one from a superiority-seeking Soviet ideology, which took counter measures against USA. Accordingly, the first step Yeltsin took was to establish a team of young reformers including Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, Andrei Kozyrev, all of whom took part in very important changes in the system. For two years, he would follow a western-oriented, strong Russian policy and try to make strong bonds with the West, especially the USA. Close relations with the West led to other benefits such as Russia joining the IMF and World Bank in 1992; economic assistance; a softer NATO policy regarding its enlargement and adopting the Partnership for Peace and an agreement regarding nuclear weapons between USA, Russia and Ukraine.

It can clearly be understood that his first two years was marked by a positive approach to westernism marked by an international liberalism. As liberalism suggests, democratic states are always natural partners because they share the

same goals and these states are equal. Russia followed this kind of a policy, although not completely and successfully, and saw itself as the equal of the western states.

What made Russia different from the Western states, which can be inferred as a reason why Russia could never fully integrate itself to the western system, is that a deeper ideology always prevailed in the Russian system which was communism. This ideological fraction never left Russian politics, even after the collapse of USSR.

In an interview made by Pedma Desai in 1999 with Anatoly Chubais, Chubais evaluates the ideological clash between the the reform-supporters and the conservatives. He makes an emphasis that the battle between the Communists and non-Communists determined the last decade in Russia and that it was not easy to leave behind the habits of a communist life (Chubais, Anatoly. Interview conducted by Pedma Desai. 1999).

Robert Freedman gives three major factions within the State, which neither Kozyrev nor Primakov were able to control, which enter the scope of strategic culture of Russia in the post-Cold War period. Various ideologies regarding how Russia's foreign policy must be shaped can be discussed as a change in strategic culture and how these changes directed the Russian foreign policy can be linked to the understanding of Russian identity, referred to as "geopsychological identity" (Hamburg, 1996, p.201). These streams can be classified as the following:

- The Atlanticists who supported a pro-American foreign policy except on NATO as well a swift economic reform and cooperation with independent ex-USSR states at a normal level.
- The Eurasianists who supported a balanced Russian foreign policy and a slower economic reform.
- The Chauvinists, a grouping of ultra-nationalists and old-line communists who are completely anti-American. (Freedman, 1998)

When the foreign policy approaches of the Yeltsin era are studied, it is highly easy to see that differences come from the understanding of how Russian identity is perceived. These approaches can be classified as Atlanticism, the Kozyrev Doctrine, Eurasianism, Primakov Doctrine and Near Abroad (blizheneye zarubyezhe) Policy. The Near Abroad Policy was not a foreign policy that was implemented on its own; but, it was a policy implemented under different roofs. After the dissolution of USSR, with the separation of many countries, the Russian-speaking population who lived under those separated states remained out of Russian border. The Near Abroad Policy was a policy which was used as a term to refer to these regions and to claim that they were not out of the focus of Russia although the USSR dis not exist anymore.

Atlanticism as a foreign policy approach can be understood as a pragmatist approach because a system which was vigorously defended had collapsed. This policy was widely implemented between the years 1991 and 1993. They supported "Yeltsin's economic reforms, strengthening ties with Israel, supporting sanctions against Iraq and cooperating with the Near Abroad countries"(Freedman, 1997, p.94). Kozyrev, who was Yeltsin's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 1996, was a very important figure. He was known for his opposition against the conservatives in Russia and he emphasized his pro-western preference every time. Kozyrev states that the death of the Cold War and the birth of a new democratic Russia was his dream (Kozyrev, 2019, p.3).

He also took international criticism for his actions regarding the enlargement of NATO, the Chechen War and UN's actions in Bosnia, which caused great discomfort. Atlanticists saw Russia as an inseparable part of the Western democracy and that Russia could not be left out. Kozyrev's following statement on NATO and partnership with the West is a clear example of the Atlanticists in Russia:

In the early 1990s, the rapprochement of Russia with the West and integration of East European states into Western economic institutions were accepted even by hardliners in Moscow. Yet, the adversary image

of NATO was—and is—the last line of their defense, as it guaranteed them a privileged position in the power structure of the “ceased fortress,” whether it was called the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. To be sure, turning the two opposing military machines into allies was a monumental task. Yet it could be achieved. (Kozyrev, 2019, p. 453).

Eurasianism was a very wide policy which was interpreted differently by different groups. Primarily, it pointed out that Russia was never a European state but was unique. Instead, Russia had to choose a third way which was neither the West nor the East (Yavlinsky evaluates the Russian image in the eyes of the West as a “second-class democracy” due to its history (Yavlinsky, 1998)), which resulted from the disappointment caused by the reluctance of the West to admit Russia to its institutions and the amount of financial assistance provided to Moscow compared with those of Eastern Europe (Sergunin, 2000, p.4). According to Eurasianist thinking:

- CIS and Eastern Europe must be a priority for Russia.
- Cooperation with the Third World was recommended compared to Western relations.
- Keeping good relations with the West is equally important (Sergunin, 2000, pp.5-6).

Russian identity crisis was mainly a result of two opposite approaches in Russia being “Westerners” and “Slavophiles” (Shevel, 2015, p.6). These Slavophiles were also Eurasianists who were skeptical about the supremacy of the West and was putting forward a Russian supremacy in the region as a unique power. In the most general terms, it was supporting the idea of a unique Russia leading positive relations with the West and acting on a democratic system based on institutions without losing its characteristics as a unique identity. Firstly, it came out against the Atlanticists as a stream supported by the conservative groups in Russia. They had the belief that Russia should focus more on its relations with the Middle East and China as well as the Near Abroad instead of solely focusing on USA and Europe (Freedman, 1997, p.95).

The traditional ideology of the Russian nationalists or conservatives always prevailed in the Russian system, with much or less support or popularity from time to time. They supported a strong Russia which had the resources to keep the Russian citizens living in the areas of interest under protection, assume its place as a world power and adopt a confrontational approach against USA and Israel” (Freedman, 1997, p.95). They advocated the idea of a unique Russia. The most prominent example can be given as the Duma’s attempt to denounce the dissolution of the Soviet Union on March 15, 1991 (RFERL, 1996). As an example, Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov was a conservative leading member of the State Duma, who was arrested later due to the August 1991 coup to be amnestied in 1994 (Yeltsin, 1994, p.299), Boris Yeltsin in his “Struggle for Russia” gives various examples of how different ideological strands effected the state policy in Russia. He claims that Gorbachev had also lost control of the parliament and the Supreme Soviet was controlled by Lukyanov whose team was opposed to economic reform, the new Union Treaty, and Gorbachev’s perestroika as a whole (Yeltsin, 1994, p.50). Yeltsin referred to his ideology as “national salvation” and claimed that they took advantage of the economic crisis and designed a step-by-step model for a Union-wide state of emergency paving the way for the coup d’état (Yeltsin, 1994, p.24).

Taking strategic culture as an influencer of both decision making in foreign policy and planning for the future, it is of primary importance to discuss and interpret leader images, which is a connected term.

3.2.2 Leader Images

Leader images need to be taken from a constructivist point of view as well because it is highly effective in perceiving the systemic stimuli and in short term cases. It is emphasized by Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell that when it is needed to come to a swift response, a leader can show the greatest potential while forming policy because the other actors are not included in the process (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.91). Personal life, level of education, traditions, beliefs,

perceptions all affect the leader's images and create an outcome which would eventually affect the policies.

Taking into consideration the new status of Russia, the post-Soviet propaganda of the new leader Yeltsin when he first came to power need to be exemplified regarding the sensitive issues such as the status of old Soviet states and the Near Abroad Policy. The following part is from Yeltsin's "Struggle for Russia", he refers to the Czech Republic and Poland regarding Soviet relations and their new status:

Turning to the former Soviet empire, I met many times with Lech Walesa, president of Poland, and Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic. I will say there are certain psychological difficulties in communicating with them. Hanging over us is the cursed legacy of the USSR, which was a self-styled "Big Brother" to the other countries. Havel and Walesa are obliged to keep a certain distance in dealing with Russia-they owe it to their peoples. I understand that. (Yeltsin, 1994, p.138)

Regarding Russian history in the post-Cold War period, strong figures of Russian bureaucracy in addition to Yeltsin were Andrei Kozyrev who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia from 1990 to 1996 and Yevgeny Primakov who was the Foreign Intelligence Chief from 1991 to 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1998 and the Prime Minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999. Their policies were referred to as doctrines carrying their names and had deep effects on Russian foreign policy.

3.2.2.1 Kozyrev Doctrine as a leader image

"The Kozyrev Doctrine", also known as the doctrine of the Atlanticists, had a few main features. One of them was that the post-Soviet region was an area of Russian interests and if a threat was perceived, steps would be taken to defend them. Russia was not only planning to defend its interests in these regions; but it was also planned to weaken their horizontal relations and relations with the third parties to increase their dependence on Russia (Litera, 1994, p.47). His

foreign policy was also based on the conviction that Russia could gradually acquire world power only by relying on a strategic partnership with the West for Russia was a nuclear power and USA needed a strong and stable Russia (Duleba, 1998, p.18). He clearly stated his ideas on the death of the Cold War and the birth of a new and democratic Russia, which he calls his dream (Kozyrev, 2019, p.3).

He wrote a paragraph of the speech he made in Kremlin in 1991 following the failure of the August 1991 coup, which clearly depicts his idea of partnership with the West to bring Russia closer to democracy:

Citizens of the free world! Today we earned the right to call ourselves and to be called free. We've just defeated a brutal attempt to throw us back to the humiliating position behind the Iron Curtain. "In foreign policy, democratic Russia should be as natural an ally of the democratic United States and other Western countries as the totalitarian Soviet Union was their enemy. (Kozyrev, 2019, p.29)

Andrei Kozyrev was referred to as the leader of the Atlanticists with his pro-Western orientation. Kozyrev is known for his pro-Western approach and as someone in favour of Russia as a strategic partner of USA and may be identified with the pro-Western foreign policy of Russia. His ideas were dominant in the Russian foreign policy from 1991 to 1992 because the tendency in the end of the Cold War was becoming a part of Europe and integration into the western world to become a world power. Kozyrev outlined his policy by joining the club of recognized democratic states with market economies on a basis of equality, evaluating the partnership as the principle source of international support for Russian reforms (Sergunin, 2000, p.2). In his book, he gave a conversation he had with Boris Yeltsin in which he proposed the full recognition of Baltic States as a step to transition to a democratic Russia.

In the UN Document numbered A/50/PV.6, Kozyrev expressed his views of the status of Russia and the importance of UN as an important organization in the world as follows:

If half a century of experience of the United Nations teaches us anything, it teaches us first of all that only the equality of states and respect for the diversity of cultures, religions and national traditions can serve as the basis for security and prosperity in the modern world. This is the essence of the United Nations Charter, which identifies both common ideals and goals and equal rights and obligations for all states without “double standards.” (UN Document A-50-PV-6, 26 September 1995)

He was positive regarding Western institutions and expressed this idea repeatedly. On many occasions, Russian high-level officials expressed their ideas that it was possible for Russia to joining NATO as a member one day (Sergunin, 2000, p.3). Thus, Kozyrev's foreign policy approach may be summarized as such:

- Russia must avoid international isolation by cooperation with international organizations working on collective. The Kozyrev Doctrine distinguishes the countries of East Europe (blizhneye zarubezhiye) and Central European countries (dalneye zarubezhniye)
- Russia must actively take part in this security system as otherwise would lead to confrontation in Europe (Duleba, 1998, p.15-16).

Kozyrev in his article *“Partnership or Cold Peace”*, stated that the strategy of rapidly expanding NATO without transforming it in the first place posed a risk for the demarcation of Europe as well as encouraging the growth of the communist ideology in terms of anti-Western behaviour. Thus, he drew a map in his own terms regarding the Russia-NATO relationship and determined three important steps (Kozyrev, 1995, p.4):

- The issue of how the West sees the domestic situation along with the foreign policy and agreement on common terms
- Building a strategic foundation for partnership between Russia and the West

- Establishing mechanisms and structures for cooperation between Russia and NATO.

He expressed his ideas on cooperation with the West while adding that long years of mutual alienation with the West resulted in an irrational Anti-American and Western sentiment and the only way to change this was conducting mutually beneficial partnership to demonstrate that the well-being of Russia lied in cooperation with the West. He made the following speech at the 3583th meeting at the Security Council on 26 September 1995:

First of all, it is necessary to improve the partnership among the Security Council members, particularly the permanent ones. I should like to assure members that democratic Russia will not abandon its chosen path of achieving its national and state interests, not through confrontation or diktat, but through equal partnership in keeping with its role and responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council (UN Security Council Archives, 26 September 1995).

He connected this with the fact that public opinion played a major role in Russian foreign policy unlike the West. He was in favour of the West leaving its Cold War policies and integrating Russia into the commodity and technology markets and take Russia's interests into consideration as an exporter of arms. By transformation, Kozyrev meant the deepening of relations with NATO and added that Russia should become an integral part of the alliance's transformation. He also added that the transformation inside Russia would be realized either through a civilized manner or by a firm hand like in the Soviet period. For Kozyrev, the essence of the transformation of NATO was that it should have become an institution of maintaining security and stability in close cooperation with Russia other than a counter-Russia alliance. If agreement on general principles and mechanisms could be achieved then Russian objections would be withdrawn (Kozyrev, 1992, pp.4-13).

In his article "The Lagging Partnership", Kozyrev stated that USA and other European states were Russia's partners and they were common enemies of the communist USSR. He added that partnership was the answer and implementing

it was the only means of creating a peaceful and democratic world with not confrontation (Kozyrev, 1994, p.59).

Kozyrev criticized nationalism and called it “a no less danger than nuclear conflict” and the Soviet foreign policy because it was embedded in secrecy and its criticism was in no way possible. He added that Russia of his time had a choice to make, “proceed with the reforms or face the danger of slipping into another form of extremism” and that Russia was needed in Europe as a strong member of the family (Kozyrev, 1994, pp.62-63).

Along with defending its interests in the region, the formation of a community, new political and military alliances, acting as a roof over the CIS states, and defending the Russian speaking population were some of his goals. Russian regional interests could be observed in a speech made by Yeltsin made at the Congress of the Civic Union in 1993. He believed that Russia was supposed to act as another “the guarantor of peace” and stability on the territory of the former USSR (Litera, 1994, p.51).

It was based on the belief that Russia had certain distinctive features, making it different from the West (A Eurasianist state) with a certain role in the post-Soviet space (Smith, 1999, p.491). In 1992, Russia took place in two organizations namely the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) aimed at functionalizing the Black sea politics in the post-Soviet countries (Yılmaz, 2019, p.236). The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for collective security and cooperation and foreign policy coordination on international and regional security issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, 2022).

Although this time was a romantic time with the West, protests started to be heard from different groups in Russia, claiming that Kozyrev was weak and could not protect the Russian interests. Although Kozyrev adopted a more assertive tone regarding Russian interests in his later term, he never gave up on his integration ideals. Yeltsin had to come by with them and Kozyrev started to change his policies. Faced by compelling conditions, the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 (following reformist Sergey Kiriyenko who was refused two times by the Duma and Victor Chernomyrdin) instead of Kozyrev as the minister of foreign affairs was the signalling of a new transition from a pro-western approach to a nationalist one. The general feeling was that he shifted his priority from the West to the former Soviet republics and Russian influence.

3.2.2.2 Primakov Doctrine as a leader image

In the UN Document "Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov Makes Russia's "Near Abroad" His First Top Priority", it was written that Yevgeny Primakov was considered to be a close associate of former USSR President Gorbachev and, among other things, he was a member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council in 1990/1991. He was born in 1929, became widely known in the West when Gorbachev sent him as his special envoy to Iraq in late 1990, prior to the outbreak of the US-led war against Saddam Hussein; Primakov was by training and inclination, a Middle East expert and had spent several years in the region (he was a fluent Arab speaker). In the late 1980s, Primakov was also a member of the Soviet parliament, the Supreme Soviet, and was a member of the CPSU's governing Central Committee (Heitmann, 9 January 1996). He also worked as the Director Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1985-89), First deputy chairman of KGB, then director of Soviet Central Intelligence Service (1991), Director Russian Foreign Intelligence Service since December 1991 (Yeltsin, 1994, p.300).

Yevgeny Primakov, following Kozyrev, shared the same goal with his predecessor. It was to ensure that Russia would take place in the international

system as a strong actor and they only differed in their methods of achieving this. Primakov defends his position towards the West by basing his claims on the idea that Russia had to lead an effective foreign policy in order to determine its place in the world and was against the idea that Russia was too weak to lead an effective foreign policy and thus focusing on internal problems would lead to better outcomes (Primakov, 2008, p.198). Kozyrev was in favour of establishing closer ties with the USA whereas Primakov defended the unique identity of Russia and following the interests of Russia was the primary goal. A unipolar world was not acceptable in this sense. His policy of knitting closer ties resulted in closer relations with China, Iran and Iraq. The two main areas of interest for Primakov can be counted as NATO and the Russian Near Abroad. The Primakov Doctrine viewed Russia as “an important actor with an independent foreign policy” and a concert of major powers was important. He gave primary importance to the post-Soviet space and Eurasian integration. He opposed NATO enlargement and put an emphasis on partnership with China (Rumer, 2019, p.6).

Primakov always made an emphasis on the importance of CIS states and he never denied their importance for Russia. In the first term of Yeltsin, independence of these states was adopted as a policy however Primakov expressed their importance for Russia with the following part of a speech he made at the 6th plenary meeting in UN. His words “ensuring the becoming of CIS an important centre of world economic development and international stability” would mean Russia would not consider them as totally separate. The speech is as follows:

In our relations with the other CIS countries, we resolutely oppose both the idea of restoring the Soviet Union, an idea based on the denial of the sovereignty of the Commonwealth States and narrow-minded national isolationism. We stand for the voluntary integration and unification of the members of the Commonwealth and hold that it should not be isolated from the rest of the world. (UN Document A-51-PV.6, 24 September 1996, pp.13-14)

The UN document titled “Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov makes Russia’s “Near-Abroad” his first top priority” includes an outlook section, which makes a useful and compact summary of his policies. The excerpts to be given as examples also make great examples of the suggestions of neo-classical realism. The first excerpt marks the importance of not only the new images defended by Primakov but also the importance of domestic institutions, which neo-classical realism gives importance to as an intervening variable:

Primakov’s focus on the unsettled conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union appears to have at least two implications. First of all, the Russian leadership is reinforcing its leading role in achieving peaceful settlements of these regional conflicts. Secondly, Primakov’s activities should be seen within the context of the domestic political situation in Russia, i.e., the reinforcement of Moscow’s hegemony within the CIS is welcomed by a wide range of parliamentarians of the newly-elected Duma. In other words, this policy may be supportive of Yeltsin’s re-election desires. (UN Document 96-0126, 9 January 1996)

With these remarks made by H. Heitmann, it is made clear that Russia was following a more independent policy as opposed to the previous one between 1991 and 1993 and an isolated Russia could not be expected. It is also emphasized how the Russian Duma supported relations with the CIS states and was confirmed by “a wide range of parliamentarians”. The importance of various ideological fractions can’t be ignored in Russian politics as mentioned in the previous chapter. The emphasis on “Russian leadership” and “hegemony” is another issue which is evaluated as Russia’s approach by the West. Thus, Russian discourse definitely changed. The possible outcomes of this new approach by Primakov is interpreted by the West in the same document as deemphasizing its cooperation in world affairs with the USA (UN Document 96-0126, 9 January 1996).

This comment can be evaluated from the point of view of neo-classical realism and can be given as an example of how leader images affect international relations, although it is not the sole variable. Neo-classical realism makes an emphasis on leader images as both a determinant of behaviour, like that of

Primakov's Eurasinist policy as well as emphasizing how a leader perceives international stimuli determines the foreign policy. In this sense, the background of the leaders, traditions, beliefs are influential in the making of leader images. The following can be evaluated as both the Eurasianist approach of Primakov as well as his leader images:

It can also be expected, not least due to Primakov's political and professional background, that Russia will attempt to play a more active and assertive role in the Middle East where it has been almost totally sidelined by the Clinton Administration. As a first step, Russia may be much more inclined to push for a lifting of the sanctions against Iraq - possibly setting the stage for a clash with Washington (and London), but not with Paris, Bonn, Rome, etc. (UN Document 96-0126, 9 January 1996)

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was the beginning of a decade of sanctions against Iraq. It was also obvious that Russia played an intermediary role and was never supportive of sanctions Iraq. This was primarily due to economic reasons. On September 1990, Bush and Gorbachev came together in Helsinki and they united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. In November 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said that USSR and US shared a common platform on the Gulf issue and the Soviet leaders warned Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz on a tough resolution unless they leave Kuwait (Jacobs, 2001, pp.153-156).

Freedman stated that Russian policy towards Iraq was supportive of the US position in 1993 because Yeltsin had to change his route from supporting the anti-Iraqi embargo to the criticism of US bombing of Iraq. The Russian Duma voted for lifting the sanctions although Yeltsin was unwilling for fear of damaging relations with USA. He added in his article that Russia had three major reasons for healthier Iraqi relations. First, it would be a sign to the world that Russia was not an unimportant factor, second Iraqi debt to Russia could be regained only if the sanctions were lifted and the last one was the oil and gas relationship needed for the Russian factories could have provided only if the sanctions were lifted (Freedman, 2001, pp.60-70). Thus, Russia was not

supportive of US sanctions however was not in a position to damage its US relations and Primakov acted as a negotiator between the two parts.

The domestic groups that were influential in Russia definitely had an important effect on the making of politics. Lukoil, which partly belonged to the US, can be given as an example because it had a direct conflict of interest with the Foreign Ministry when the Caspian Sea states (Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) when the policy for preventing the independent development of oil resources was adopted; resulting in the joining of Lukoil to a "US-led consortium" for building an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Novorossisk (Freedman, 1997, p.98).

The ideological battle between the westerners and Communist Party representatives could be seen in all aspects of Russian political life in the post-cold war period. One example can be given as that of Yeltsin's election problem, which resulted from the rising voices of the traditionals in Russia, blaming Yeltsin for Russia's situation. The following remark can be given as an example of this situation from the eyes of the West.

On the United Nations Security Council, the Russian position will possibly undergo a further hardening - Yeltsin surely has to ensure that he is no longer being accused by his numerous critics at home of being, at best, a compliant "junior partner" of the United States in this important body. (UN Document 96-0126, 9 January 1996)

Primakov was basically interested in balancing the power relations of Russia and the USA. He developed his policies in this direction and the Russian foreign policy was formed with a completely different objective. Primakov in his meeting with USA representatives stated that Russia did not intend to pound its fist on the table; however, this did not mean it would support NATO's expansionist policies (Primakov, 2008, p.204). Russia's membership in various organizations in the East can be discussed in relation to this approach. As an example, Russia joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998, which

aimed at liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment. Russia's aims for membership are given as such:

- The importance of Asia and Pacific in Russian foreign policy
- Preventing one-sided distancing from the US and Europe politically and economically
- Accelerating the economic and social development of Siberia and Far-Eastern regions
- Increasing the variety of products in Russian exports
- Encouraging procedure unity in the fields of customs, standards and certificates (Yilmaz, 2019, p.228)

Another such attempt by Russia was Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which was founded in 2001, following the Shanghai Five by China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan with the aim of increasing trust among member states, disarming border areas and promoting regional cooperation (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2023).

The Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association makes a summary of the policies of Primakov as the following:

- Reevaluating the implementation of START I and II. If NATO is enlarged, START II will not be ratified.
- Revision of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe regarding the limitation of the numbers of conventional armaments.
- Relations with China and the strategic partnership, both Russia and China expressed their discontent on NATO enlargement eastward and their choice of a multi-polar world.
- The formation of an independent policy regarding the Balkans and the Near East.

- Giving security guarantee to the Baltic States. These were given to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia.
- Russia could develop mutual relations with certain in contrast to NATO. Russia could reduce its relations and create a new formation which could finally tear apart the western integration structures. (Duleba, 1998)

Primakov was the Prime Minister of Russia between 1998 and 1999 before he was relieved of his duty. Yeltsin in his "Midnight Diaries" referred to Primakov as a successful and loyal politician; however, he wrote that he had a clash of ideas with Primakov as the Prime Minister because he was inclined to pulling Russia towards socialism while Yeltsin had worked a lot on drawing the curtain against communism in Russia. He added that this idea was what pushed to him to ending Primakov's prime minister duty and plans of appointing Vladimir Putin (Yeltsin, 2000, pp.230-236).

It is important to study the "near abroad policy of Russia" within the context of leader images and strategic culture. This was also called the "national security zone" (Dawisha, 1996, p. 331). This understanding puts forward the idea that ex-Soviet territories enter the scope of Russia's spheres of influence and Russia will not accept any threat to its existence through these states and will not be completely independent from either the internal or external affairs of these states. This policy can be evaluated as entering the scope of other foreign policy approaches because of its historical basis.

3.2.3 Domestic Institutions

The last two variables are domestic institutions and state-society relations, which must be evaluated as intertwined because a state's ability to implement decision-making processes is displayed through "the central institutions of the state and various economic, societal and political groups" (Ripsmann et al., 2016, p.33). They put great emphasis on the harmony of state and society

because the decisions that are taken by the state directly affect the lives of the people. Thus, in the next part, while discussing the impact of influential groups, the impact of domestic institutions will be studied as well.

Foreign policy decisions may be relatively less influential on people's lives; however, when economic dimensions are taken into account, they can't be ignored. What they call distributional competition among societal coalitions is a very important element because they may have an important amount of power on the state dynamics. Examples of these can be clearly seen in post-Cold War Russia. As mentioned above under the title of strategic culture and leader images, the existence of various ideology fractions within Russia caused great political disorder within the state, eventually leading to a coup attempt and a changed regime. These groups, which can be counted as Atlanticists, Eurasianists, traditionalists, oligarchs or elite groups, conducted their agenda in certain institutions, both public and private, had their impact on politics more or less. This cohesion between the state and society can be observed in many dimensions such as disagreements, "support for general public policy or national security objectives" because they "affect whether state leaders have the power to extract, mobilize, and harness the nation's power" (Ripsmann et al., 2016, p.71). Zimmermann states that Russia did not have the necessary power to mobilize the resources effectively due to high inflation, crime rates, ethnic conflicts etc (Zimmermann, 2002, p. 149). This restricting effect was explained quite well by Yeltsin when he evaluated the Congress of People's Deputies as the starting point of his journey and emphasized the importance of domestic institutions in his own terms:

Starting in 1989, with the first popularly elected Soviet parliament, known as the Congress of People's Deputies, we began our protracted battle with the system. For the first time in Soviet history, we fought legally and we won. We won so that some day we could come into this office, which was to become known as the White House (Yeltsin, 1994, p.19).

As a security service, which no longer exists under its name at the time, KGB which was closed in 1991, can be used as an example of both how domestic

institutions affected Soviet policy and even led it until Yeltsin's election and how it contributed to Yeltsin's popularity increase as well how it helped shape the strategic culture. Thus, it can be discussed within the scope of the communist ideology the KGB bureaucrats had and their continuing role in the state Duma. The actions of KGB were widely described and mentioned by Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin in their memoirs. Evaluating their remarks, it is understood that it was not only an intelligence service but a strong representative of the old system which continued its battle with the reformist Yeltsin period.

In most general terms, KGB functioned as the Committee of State Security to protect the state security from foreign threat, discovering, preventing and suppressing the activities of foreign powers, especially their intelligence service, which menaced the interests of the state. The largest departments of the KGB were those of government communications, the 8th main department, the operations department and other technical services (Shebarshin, 1993, p. 2830). The role of KGB and its activities within the State will be analyzed with the writings of Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin.

Andrei Kozyrev commented on the role of the KGB in affecting politics when he evaluated the Russian fate naturally connected that of KGB and referred to the bureaucrats inside as exhausted with the old system because they were already blaming the backward system on them. He said that they were even positive regarding the reforms with their power preserved (Kozyrev, 2019, p. 34).

It can be inferred from this comment that its officers were highly influential in directing Russian politics. In Boris Yeltsin's "Struggle for Russia", he summarizes how the KGB was involved in politics in different parts of the book. How the KGB affected the course of events can be summarized with a few examples as such:

- The KGB recorded his and Gorbachev's talks on fate of USSR, which triggered the August coup.

- The entire government security service was under the control of KGB's ninth directorate and General Plekhanov who was the chief of the ninth directorate had protected the coup plotters, neglecting his professional duty according to Yeltsin.
- KGB's third chief directorate and the directorate to protect the constitutional order were putting together special groups to dispatch to the Baltic Republics before the coup attempt in 1991. KGB Chairman Kryuchkov gave his deputy Lebedev a list of people to be kept under surveillance and arrested if necessary.
- The Seventh Directorate of KGB was assigned to monitor the situation in Yeltsin's datcha.
- According to KGB reports, Gorbachev had lost the trust of broad sections of the Soviet populace and had begun to lose authority among the major Western politicians as well. A KGB memo submitted to Kryuchkov stated that "those close to G. Bush believe that M. S. Gorbachev has practically exhausted all his possibilities as leader of such a country as the USSR. ... The Bush administration and governments of other Western countries are trying to identify a possible candidate to replace Gorbachev.
- The chief protagonists of the plot-KGB Chairman Kryuchkov; Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov; Oleg Shenin, in charge of party personnel and organizational affairs; Oleg Baklanov, politburo member in charge of the military-industrial complex and space program; and Valentin Pavlov, prime minister, had met the previous day, August 17, at a secret KGB location in the southwest part of the capital.

As Yeltsin also writes in his memoir, KGB was always a powerful and influential institution. An emphasis is always made for the ideological and organizational impact of the KGB on state politics. Vadim Bakatin, who was the last chairman

of the KGB, made an emphasis on the role of the KGB in the hearings held in late 1991 and early 1992 by “the Russian Supreme Soviet Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Coup”, led by Lev Ponomarev, “a reformist lawmaker and co-chairman of the Democratic Russia Movement. He said that the coup d’état was prepared and implemented by the KGB (Waller, 1996, p.116).

Speaking in the same hearings Yevgeny Primakov, who was the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service at the time, evaluated the actions of the KGB in line with its organizations regular duties however added that “an ideological intelligence” was in always place, because the leaders at the time worked under a communist ideology and KGB had to comply with the orders (Demokratizatsiya, 1996).

While discussing the role of domestic institutions, it is important to see its impact in terms of constant challenges coming from the internal dynamics of a system weakens a country’s strength and makes that country lose power of conviction in the international system (Romanova, 2012, p.2). Thus, to understand Russian politics, it is important to be informed on the political system of Russia which is described as below at the Duma official website:

The Constitution of the Russian Federation establishes the principle of the separation of powers as Article 10 states that state power in Russia is exercised on the basis of separation into legislative, executive and judicial branches. State power is exercised by the President, the Federal Assembly (the State Duma and the Federation Council), the Government and the courts. The President is the head of the state, elected for six years by the citizens of the Russian Federation and may only be impeached by the Federation Council only on the basis of charges of high treason or another grave crime brought by the State Duma. Executive power is exercised by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister, also the Chairman is appointed by the President. The State Duma is one of the chambers of the Russian parliament, the Federal Assembly. It is a legislative authority that consists of 450 members elected for five years and its main tasks are adoption of federal constitutional and federal laws, control over the activity of the Russian government, appointment and dismissal of heads of the Central Bank, Accounts

Chamber and High Commissioner on Human Rights, declaration of amnesty, and issues of international parliamentary cooperation.²⁷

The role of domestic institutions may be classified as government and constitutional structure, regional governments, justice, security, health and welfare, education and culture. Within this scope, the Russian Duma, in which various noises of various ideological strands were represented, can be used as an example of the impact of domestic institutions as an official system. As it can be seen as the common place of the Atlanticists and the conservatives, it was always very influential. Gorokhov²⁸ mentions the changing Russian policy regarding NATO following:

The State Duma of the Russian Federation more than once has spoken out against NATO expansion in appeals and declarations of 25 December 1996, 12 and 14 March 1997, and 23 May 1997. In particular, the declaration of the State Duma "On the Relations Between the Russian Federation and NATO," of 23 May 1997, states that "the Basic Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between Russia and NATO in some way allays, but in no way removes the existing anxieties in Russian society of the consequences of the possible expansion of NATO and of the threat of weakening Russia's security and its role in European affairs." Suspicions concerning NATO's intentions are aggravated by the alliance's attempts to deviate from adopting a basic act with juridical and legal guarantees that provide a pledge not to expand the NATO military machine to the Russian border (Demokratizatsiya, 1998, p. 72).

Thomas Graham in his article "From Oligarchy to Oligarchy: The Structure of Russia's Ruling Elite" published in 1998, writes the following regarding the distribution of power and Yeltsin-Duma struggle:

Despite the power/property link, a post-Soviet oligarchic system did not emerge immediately because the location and structure of power was in dispute. Specifically, there were two main centers of power, the presidency and the parliament, that were locked in a bitter struggle for supremacy by the middle of 1992. This struggle retarded the formation of large political/economic coalitions, as key players, particularly those with major economic assets, hedged their bets in the power struggle. The

²⁷ Status and powers, composition and Regulations of the State Duma. Please see: <http://duma.gov.ru>.

²⁸ He is the Russian Deputy.

situation changed only in late 1993, after Yeltsin had forcefully disbanded the parliament and a new constitution, providing for a strong presidency, was ratified in a popular referendum. (Smith, 1998, p.329)

The ideological battle between the two sides increased the impact of the State Duma was so high that it had the power to accelerate or delay the processes. Regarding his election process as the prime minister, Primakov, in his *Russian Crossroads: Towards the New Millennium*, expressed regarding his appointment, that he made no generous promises and he was not in a magical position to change the country's economic situation and still he received 317 votes and he wrote the following regarding the difficulties he faced:

It was clear to me that the government would be unable to function without close ties to the Duma. But how could those ties be developed? In some countries this question is solved simply by creating a governmental majority. In others, such as the United States, the elected president supervises the formation of the government. In a number of countries, a parliamentary plurality creates a coalition government. In Russia there were no constitutional or political provisions for any of these solutions. That is why I gave the highest priority to the candidates' professionalism when I formed the government. But membership in the parties and movements represented in the State Duma could not be ignored either. At the same time, it was vital to prevent the government from becoming hostage to those parties (Primakov, 2004, p.206).

September-October 1993 events can be given as another example. The opposition led by Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov started to grow in the Parliament blocking most of the president's initiatives, which led to a paralysis of governing (National Security Archives, 2018 Yeltsin Shelled Russian Parliament 25 Years Ago, U.S. Praised "Superb Handling"). This major confrontation since the collapse of USSR was between the executive represented by Boris Yeltsin and the legislative represented by the Supreme Council (Supreme Soviet) headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, regarding the reforms. This confrontation turned into an internal disturbance and White House was fired by the tanks (Ria Novosti, 03.10.2018).

Understanding from his remarks, Yeltsin was supported by USA in his actions towards the Parliament. His pro-western policies caused discontent within the Parliament in which the voice of the conservatives was also strongly heard. The Ria Novosti explains the course of events, which can be translated as such:

On September 21, 1993, at about 20.00, Boris Yeltsin published a decree in a televised address to citizens, declaring that it was impossible to continue cooperation with the legislative branch due to the transformation of the Supreme Council into "the headquarters of the implacable opposition," which "pushes Russia to the abyss." He announced the appointment of a new parliament for December 11-12, 1993. 30 minutes after the president's address, Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, spoke on television. He called Yeltsin's actions a "coup d'état." At 22.00 an emergency meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation was held, at which a resolution was adopted "On the immediate termination of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin." At the same time, an emergency meeting of the Constitutional Court, chaired by Valery Zorkin, began. The court concluded that presidential decree No. 1400²⁹ does not comply with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and serves as the basis for the removal of Yeltsin from office or the enactment of other special mechanisms of his responsibility in accordance with Article 121-10 or 121-6 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. After the opinion of the Constitutional Court was delivered to the Supreme Council, he, continuing his meeting, adopted a resolution on assigning the execution of the powers of the president to Vice President Alexander Rutsky, as well as the appointment of an emergency session of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation on September 22, 1993 with the agenda "On the coup d'état in the Russian Federation." The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution "On the termination of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin B.N.," in which it confirmed the termination of Yeltsin's presidential powers from 20.00 on September 21, 1993, and a resolution "On the exercise of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation by the Vice-President of the Russian Federation Rutsky A.V.," in which he stated the transfer of presidential powers to Alexander Rutskoy. On September 27, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the functioning of executive authorities during a phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation," in which, in particular, he subordinated the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation to the Council of Ministers - the

²⁹ Decree "On the stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the Russian Federation" signed in 1993 to dissolve the Parliament. Decree number one thousand. Yeltsin says he signed this decree to put an end to the destructive dual power (Yeltsin, 1994, p.4).

Government of the Russian Federation on all issues, with the exception of those referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation. On September 28, 1993, by 6 o'clock, the House of Soviets was completely blocked by additional police and internal troops. (Ria Novosti, 03.10.2018)

Boris Yeltsin was accused by Rutskoy of corruption. Yeltsin's reaction to the events, which ended up with his dissolving the Parliament, can be translated as such:

I told him: why don't you hand over the documents to the prosecutor's office? After all, the fuss about everything, the Prosecutor General treats him very well, but there are no cases in the prosecutor's office. Maybe the reason is that there is little criminal in the documents that Rutskaya faces. He cannot gather alone more than all law enforcement agencies. After all, thousands of investigators work... Analysts say that he brought us practically nothing to win the elections," so he answers the question of what he could repent of in the time that has passed since the start of reforms. He also regrets that it was not possible to "more clearly formulate the goals of the reform, break it in stages, clarify it so that everyone understands it wisely. (Yeltsin Media, April 16, 1993)

The events turned out to be a problem not only for Yeltsin but for the USA because of the support they gave to Yeltsin for his reformist understanding. Yeltsin appointed his Foreign Minister Kozyrev to meet with four ambassadors to explain what he planned. US Ambassador Thomas Pickering commented on the events and the look of the West in 2007, under the title oral history collection. He says:

House by the parliament, he had Foreign Minister Kozyrev meet with the US, UK, French and German Ambassadors to tell us what he planned. The inability on his part to stop their incessant modification and changing of the constitution on one hand and his interest in moving the process toward reform on the other, led to a stalemate and even worse. We met the foreign minister late in the afternoon on a day late in September before the crisis broke out. The foreign minister said very clear this was what the president is going to do.My view was that one could have been a slavish adherent of excessive legalism in Russia. But it was all based on the old communist structure and the old communist constitution with all its peculiar arrangements from the democratic perspective. Or one

could have said, "OK, this is an opportunity for change, we've got to support Yeltsin." But he's trying to create revolutionary change inside a hugely difficult bureaucracy in a situation where our former largest enemy is now about to try and move in a direction that makes that confrontation much less dangerous.....Strobe called me and said, "What's your recommendation? Do we support Yeltsin?" I said, "Strobe, it's a no brainer. We have no other alternative in this situation as difficult as it is." He said, "Well, that's not completely clear from here." I said, "Well, it is from here. Use my name, if you need to. But this is the direction in which we have to go. The fact is that the guy has said he will go to elections, it is an extremely important basis for supporting him even if we don't actually have the Russian constitution entirely on our side. (Ambassador Thomas Pickering Oral History Excerpt, 2007)

Evaluating the words of the ambassador, it can be concluded that the events led by differences of opinion within the Parliament also contributed to US relations of Russia. USA openly supported Yeltsin against the Communist Party representatives.

In his memoir "Midnight Diaries", Yeltsin wrote that while he was sick in the year 1997, the Communist Party representatives in the State Duma tried to pass a law restricting the president with strict regulation limiting the days he could not work and his dismissal from duty on some conditions (Yeltsin, 2000, p.79). He added that his ability to govern the state was being questioned ever since 1990.

Another conflict with the State Duma was on the assignment of Kiriyenko as the Prime Minister. Duma rejected him twice until a third time in which Yeltsin threatened of dissolving the Duma and Duma stepped back. The Duma did not trust Kiriyenko and it was another conflict with Yeltsin.

In the next part, state-society relations, as the last variable will be studied in detail.

3.2.4 State-society Relations

The structure of the state and connected domestic political institutions determine the policy processes within a state and these determine who contributes to policy information and who vetoes them. Thus, different institutional structures affect how to respond to systemic pressures (Ripsman et al., 2016, p.75). In the case of Russia, institutions or groups of impact policy formations more deeply because they have historical roots that are embedded in the system. Additionally, Gorbachov and Yeltsin's reformist ideas, especially in the field of economy, accelerated the privatization process and contributed to the formation of a new group which may be called "the privileged group".

In a well-functioning democracy, it is expected that policy decisions be taken via the executive branch under the control of the legislative branch, which does not let any outside effects shape policies both inside and outside the state. Russian influential groups or nomenklatura included the ministers, deputy ministers, department heads in the former Soviet government members and staff of the Central Committee of Communist Party, the Politburo, private companies like Lukoil, regional party and government bosses, managers of the State Bank of the Union of USSR, military and secret-service top brass who supervised the production and export of military related goods and services (Braguinsky, 2009, p. 316). Arbatov names the ruling elite in Russia, who determined the foreign policy, as the CPSU Central Committee departments, the upper levels of the foreign affairs and defense ministries and the military-industrial along with the KGB leadership (Arbatov, 1993, p.7).

Regarding the role of the elite groups in Russia, a debate started first on the influence of the democratic institutions in Russia. The question to be asked which one is more influential in the making of politics. Two approaches are mentioned by Coulloudon regarding the functioning of the system and whether it is democratic or not. The first is that the Communist regime's collapse caused the lack of influence of institutions such as the Constitutional Court, giving an important role that these institutions play in state building. The second is that

the Russian president had the supremacy over laws and legislative documents. but also of interest groups likely to act as advisers to this same executive power Regarding the role of the elite and the structure of the executive power, she cites that “under President Boris Yeltsin the nomenklatura survived as a socio-professional group that administered the state, possessed and distributed its riches, and shared the same political and economic interests” (Coulloudon, 1998, p.536). In another paragraph, she cited the claim of Grigory Yavlinsky³⁰ that the ministers of the Yeltsin government were agents of large monopolies and various oligarchic clan groups in Russia (Coulloudon, 1998 pp.535-537).

Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell explain how a particular socio-economic interest group, economic sector or coalition could affect the implementation of policies and if these policies can be changed according to the preferences of the dominant group. Two underlying reasons are given for this. Either the state leaders are a part of a dominant coalition and see everything from a point of view of parochial interests or they tend to strengthen their position by satisfying the demands of the powerful positions or groups (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.72). Another dimension they add to this is whether the state is strong enough to resist domestic challengers which will be explained for Yeltsin’s period and how different streams within the State affected his policies towards USA.

With the notion of neo-classical realism that privileged groups are influential in the making of politics, oligarchs will be analyzed as an important group that influenced the Russian political life under state-society relations. When the atmosphere that prepared the basis of the rise of oligarchs in the Russian system is evaluated, it can be said that they gained power when the communist-to-capitalist change was started including a change from a state-controlled economy to an open economy and democracy. This communist ideology and a state-controlled economy were seen as obstacles to free market and the new system was to be called oligarchic capitalism (Braguinsky, 2009, p. 308). The transfer of power to oligarchs started when Yeltsin wanted to provide a fast

³⁰ Russian economist and politician who pioneered the 500-day economic program of Yeltsin for transition into free market.

transition to free economy and he started privatization attempts, which led to the acquisition of power by certain people or groups called the oligarchs. Braguinsky divides the post-communist oligarchs into two, the insider nomenklatura elite who controlled the assets it had been controlling since the previous regime; and the outsider entrepreneurial oligarchs who started their business which were previously ignored under planned economy. This insider nomenklatura gained more economic independence and they started to exploit their positions for personal gain following the decaying of the communist system after Stalin's death (Braguinsky, 2009, p. 309-312).

This privileged group created under the Yeltsin government is examined under three categories, the first of which was the banking groups which grew with state money such as "Menatep, Most Group, Kredobank, Mosbusinessbank, and Inkombank" (Coulloudon, 1998, p. 539). They were also influential in creating a consortium through which they could give loans to the government in exchange for shares, also called "the loans-for-shares programme". The second group is exemplified through the businessmen who were appointed high positions within the government such as Sergei Kiriyenko, former executive in oil an company, as the Prime Minister in 1998. The last group was the self-made businessmen who benefited from Yeltsin's policies like Berezovsky who was the owner of a "financial-industrial group", who used his power to become a political advisor because he saw this as the path leading to power (Coulloudon, 1998, p. 541).

Freedman also names some other actors who affected Russian policy in Russia's regions of interest as:

- The first is Viktor Chernomyrdin who had relations with "Lukoil", "Gasprom" and "Transneft" and Freedman adds that their power continued until Putin's time.
- The second is Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais who had an impact on the establishment of Russia-Belarus relations.

- "The Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet" was signed in 1997 and the division of the Black Sea Fleet was finalized based on nationalized fleets. In addition, they contributed to dividing the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine, which was Russia's opening gate to the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions.

-The third is the Russian Arms Sales Agency "Rosvooruzheniye" selling arms without considering any potential consequences, giving the example of proposing to sell SAM-300 to Cyprus, which increased tensions with Turkey.

-The forth and the last one is the steps taken by the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia headed by Yevgeny Adamov, encouraging the sales of nuclear technology to Iran, which was a major issue of conflict with USA (Freedman, 2001, pp. 210-212) Another important issue of conflict with USA was when Minister Viktor Mikhailov wanted to sell "a gas centrifuge system" which would enable Iran to develop nuclear weapons (Freedman, 1997, p.99).

Yeltsin wanted to open Russia to a free economy and he started privatization in order to support his system. Following a set of failed attempts to transit the economy into a free market, however, Yeltsin started to lose his popularity after 1996. Rising prices, a failed economy, a decrease in production and loss of Russian ruble all caused Soviet nostalgia and forced Yeltsin to look for outside help. He had to turn to outsider oligarchs, creating a change for the oligarchs to forge their political ties with the government, allowing an important amount of valuable assets and political power to be concentrated in the hands of a few privileged oligarchs. Yeltsin rewarded them with a large scale asset reallocation, as well as a number of high level appointments (Braguinsky, 2009, p.321). In the Forbes magazine, in 1996, Berezovsky said "It is no secret that Russian businessmen played the decisive role in President Yeltsin's victory".³¹ On the other hand, Yeltsin explained his relationship with the oligarchs in his book "Midnight Diaries" and referred to a meeting he made with Berezovsky,

³¹ Godfather of the Kremlin (1996). Please see: www.forbes.com.

Gusinsky, Khodorovsky, Potanin and Friedman; he stated that they were in a position to support Yeltsin because (metaphorically) they had the fear of being hanged on the lampposts by the communists or change their position, which gave Yeltsin the impression that they were ready to support him at all costs (Yeltsin, 2000, p.41). Thus, oligarchs can be counted as a very influential group that affected the political and economic system inside, eventually affecting the Russian actions outside as well.

The oligarchs are thought “to weaken the Russian economy by stripping assets from Russian firms, sending money abroad and weakening Russian democratic institutions, causing tremendous inequality through their capture of federal and state politics” (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005, p.131). They describe an oligarch “as a businessman who controls sufficient resources to influence national politics” (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005, p.131). The oligarchs in Russia found enormous support in terms of the shares of very big enterprises in exchange for supporting Yeltsin financially (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005, p.297). It is said that the August crisis of 1998 affected Yeltsin’s oligarchs and destroyed them, which caused a new redistribution of property between 1998 and 2000. The property was removed from previous owners in exchange for the cancellation of debts through either nationalization or reprivatisation (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005, p.303).

Another related issue is the degree to which political institutions allow the state to reach decisions autonomously from society (Ripsmann et al, 2016, p.71). The decision-making mechanism within a state is not dependent on one factor or person. It is mostly a collective action. If this harmony cannot be provided, inter-state or foreign policy decisions will be difficult to implement as it requires immense human, material, and monetary resources (Ripsmann et al, 2016, p.72).

To make a general summary of the internal factors shaping the Russian policy, it can be inferred that the strategic culture and leader images were the main determinants of the Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and domestic

institutions and state-society relations were influential in terms of internal politics, which directly affected foreign policy. How these policies were actively implemented regarding the case of NATO and Disarmament issues will be discovered in the next part under the title of case study.

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY: DISARMAMENT AND ENLARGEMENT OF NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD FROM A NEO-CLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE

The two main issues, which will be studied under this chapter, are of major importance for Russia regarding its Western relations because they regard Russian security. Disarmament was connected to weapons of mass destruction, some of which had been left within the borders of the ex-Soviet states, which was a problem for Russia and some of which were still under the Russian control, which was still a problem for the USA. The existence of NATO, on the other hand, continued to be a threat for Russia due to its expansionist policies and Russian security concerns.

4.1. DISARMAMENT

In the UN Document numbered *A/47/92*, Andrei Kozyrev mentioned the importance of disarmament for Russia with the following words:

As our experience shows, it is an extremely difficult matter to eliminate on one's own the distorting effects of a military economy. Compliance with obligations under existing agreements is costing Russia alone an amount which exceeds the national income of some relatively developed countries. It is therefore of the utmost importance today to have an effective strategy of international partnership for the practical elimination of weapons and the retooling of military industries. Russia is not asking for special treatment for itself. Such as partnership is needed by all countries, developed and developing alike (UN Document *A/47/902*, 4 March 1993).

Gorbachev's presidency ended with a chain of problems leading to Yeltsin's election, such as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (1989), removal of the leading role of the Communist Party from the Constitution (1990), disintegration of all union power structures (1990—1991), proto-secessionist tendencies in Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltics (Breslauer, 2002,

p.125). Surrounded by such problems and being elected for his pro-Western propaganda, Yeltsin conducted a rapprochement policy with the West, especially the USA. However, this did not completely end the problems which could be potentially dangerous for Russian security.

One dimension of Russia-US relations evolved within the scope of nuclear arms and their efforts to balance these. A number of visits and meetings were made with the purpose of negotiating the status of arms. Yeltsin expressed his views on the issue of disarmament and the importance he gave with the following paragraph, calling the process of signing the Nuclear Arms Treaty in 1992 as the arrival of a new world order:

An End to enmity. Once sworn enemies, superpowers permanently at war, Russia and the United States had to respond quickly to a world no longer resembling that over which these two giants had presided for fifty years. George Bush and I signalled the arrival of a new world order by signing a nuclear arms treaty on June 17, 1992, and Bill Clinton continued in the same conciliatory vein at our first meeting in Vancouver, April 1993 (Yeltsin, 1994, p.168).

The most important steps in limiting the arms can be counted as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed.

Gorbachev adopted the policy of using arms control as a tool for improving relations between the East and the West, which led to the start of conventional arms limitation talks leading to the signing of the CFE Treaty in 1990 (Bolving, 2000, p.32). The CFE Treaty was signed by "Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, Denmark, France, Germany, the Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America". The treaty explains its objective as ensuring security and cooperation in Europe, refraining from use of force in their relations in general from the use of force against territorial integrity or political

independence of any state or against the UN Charter, making an emphasis to the need of preventing any military conflict for peace and security in Europe and peaceful cooperation³² (Bolving, 2000, p.38). As a treaty which had been signed with the Soviet Union was amended in Tashkent in 1992 (Kumar & Doshi, 2007, p.1245).

Mutual reduction of nuclear warheads was always a sensitive issue for both USA and USSR and SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and SALT II treaties were signed between them in 1972 and 1979 respectively, although they could never be ratified due to Cold War tensions such as the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR. START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), signed in 1991 between USA and USSR limited the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads. START II was signed to complement START I with more limits on strategic nuclear weapons for each party.³³ Signed between Yeltsin and Bush in January of 1993, both parties agreed on the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads by 2003. This was interpreted as a Russocentrist step at the time because NATO enlargement discussions were more at a diplomatic level. The pressure of USA “on Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to give over their nuclear warheads to Russia pursuant to the Lisbon Protocol to the START I treaty of 1992” was a confirming act on behalf of Russia regarding the rightfulness of the foreign policy line (Duleba, 1998, p.18). Andrei Kozyrev evaluates the START II Treaty as an important guarantee against nuclear danger (UN Document A/48/PV.6, 1993).

The existence of nuclear weapons is evaluated by Edward Luttwak, as John Mueller cites, as having led to a world without another world war because rational minds see the terror of nuclear weapons and that the probability of a world war resulting from nuclear weapons is hindered due to its devastating consequences (Mueller, 1988, p.55). One may ask why two states continued spending huge amounts of money on their military supplies and defense

³² Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990). <https://www.osce.org/>.

³³ START II. <https://www.nti.org/>.

budgets while knowing that using these resources as nuclear weapons would bear unreturnable consequences leading to the destruction of both sides. If the parties are unwilling to use these weapons to destroy each other then why do they keep these and use them as bargaining chips in terms of limiting each other's sources?

Both neo-realists and neo-classical realists agree that security dilemma exists in the international system. It occurs when the interest of one state is in conflict with the interest of another state and this dilemma is a direct outcome of the anarchic structure of the international system. States send some signals and their intentions can never be completely perceived. Alan F. Philipps gives a clear example of this perception of threat by other states and adds that for the first years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. was the only country with the nuclear weapons and used this three times to get what it wanted first in March 1946 when the Soviet occupying troops were still in northern Iran and tanks were at the border in Azerbaijan and they agreed to leave Iran. The second was in 1946 when "a U.S. military aircraft was shot down over Yugoslavia" after which the firing against USA stopped and the last one was in 1949 access to Berlin by land was cut by the Russians for U.S. and allied troops and they restored access after being threatened. This situation changed when the Russians could deploy nuclear weapons in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and Russia could reciprocate (Phillips, 2001, p.130).

During the Cold War two powers were in search of balancing each other and realizing their hegemonic purposes. John Mueller explains the Cold War as "an outgrowth of various disagreements between the U.S. and the USSR over ideology and over the destinies of Eastern, Central and Southern Europe" (Mueller, 1988, p.64). Thus, this armament race could be rationalized based on a logical ideology. However, the changes in the post- Cold War period gave birth to new ideologies and the discourse started to change. Classical realist theories could no longer explain why Russia decided to conduct friendly relations with the West and even softened its policies regarding the

enlargement of NATO, a historical enemy, while realists always claim search for hegemony and power.

After the dissolution of USSR, around 35.000 nuclear weapons had remained across old Soviet states, “3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus only” (Allison, 2012, p.2). This constituted a threat for both the USA and Russia for concerns of security and the possibility of nuclear weapons captured by enemies. Thus, the USA passed the Nunn-Lugar Act (1991) with a budget of \$400 million for “destroying nuclear, chemical and other weapons, transporting, storing, disabling and safeguarding weapons to be destroyed and establishing verifiable proliferation safeguards” (Kelly, 1996, p.1). Russia and USA sat on the same table again as both had their own concerns and interests because leaving nuclear weapons at the hands of other states whose security could not be completely ensured and possibility of a capture of these weapons by a terrorist group or enemy was unwanted and a worse scenario. Although they agreed on the transfer of nuclear weapons, USA intended to account for the nuclear weapons before they were destroyed however Russia refused (Kelly, 1996, p.4). When Russia refused to destroy its nuclear arsenal, mutual agreements on limiting their use in return for other agreements in different areas became the answer. Considering that the first response of Russia to the agreement became the rejection of completely destroying its arsenal, the strategic culture of Russia which is associated with supremacy may come to mind. The responses given to the threats by the states and how they perceive them make up the core of strategic culture.

When the USA failed in its attempt to completely destroy the nuclear weapons owned by Russia and when Russia lost its power in other fields, the issue of disarmament became a bargaining chip for both sides. A number of visits and meetings were held in which the parties discussed their future plans on the issue of disarmament. They can be given as follows:

- The Washington Summit was held in 1992, in which both parties agreed on reducing their countries' strategic nuclear arsenals by 3,000-3,500 warheads by the year 2003. The START process officially began to be followed by the ratification of START II in 1996 and then in 2010 with an agreement signed between Obama and Medvedev, which was the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which aimed "to cut the number of deployed nuclear warheads on both sides by roughly 30 percent, down to 1,550" (Nuclear Weapon Archives, 2020). In addition, USA and Russia signed "The Camp David Declaration" for friendship and partnership (New York Times, 1992).
- A Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement was signed between Bush and Yeltsin in June of 1992 and Yeltsin attended G7 meeting in Munich and the economic aid for Russia was discussed., "The Freedom Support Act (1994)" was signed for giving Russia \$4 billion as aid and some Cold War restrictions were lifted (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2022).
- In 1993, Yeltsin and Clinton came together in Vancouver to declare "new democratic partnership", and USA promised an additional aid of \$1.6 billion to Russia for economic crisis (US Department of State, 2022).
- In 1994, Yeltsin and Clinton came together in Moscow agreeing that their countries' strategic nuclear missiles would no longer target each other and that the U.S. would purchase \$12 billion of low-enriched uranium from Russia over 20 years, after Russia converts it from highly enriched uranium. The Budapest Memorandum was signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, United States and the United Kingdom for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (US Department of State, 2022). Russia-USA negotiated over the

Russian withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states in exchange for the continuing of foreign aid and signed an agreement with Lithuania in 1992 and Latvia in 1994 (Kumar & Doshi, 2001, p. 1251).

- In 1994, Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. agreed that Ukraine would give back the nuclear weapons and sign the NPT; in exchange, the U.S. and Russia would negotiate security guarantees with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (US Department of State, 27.10.2022). Primakov made an emphasis on the importance of this agreement with the following words:

Hence the essential need for the entire international community to give a universal dimension to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Those few countries that have so far remained outside the Treaty must, in our view, come to grips with their responsibility. They must realize that their own security is an integral part of global security, and they must assume those obligations to which over 180 States have already committed themselves as parties to the Treaty (UN Document A-52-PV-7, 22 September 1997, p.19).

In addition, Clinton and Yeltsin came together at the Moscow Summit in 1995 and discussed the selling of nuclear weapons to Iran, which was a high concern for USA. Yeltsin accepted to cancel the gas centrifuge to Iran (Freedman, 1997, p.102).

- In 1996, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was adopted but not put into force due to vetoes from several states. It aimed at banning all nuclear explosions. Grigoriy Berdennikov, who was the ambassador and one of the top Russian diplomats with an area of expertise in nonproliferation and arms control, expressed his views on the harms of vetoing the draft in the Conference on Disarmament and that CTBT was a necessary stage in the process of disarmament, which was important for showing Russian behaviour in the issue of disarmament (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1996).

- In 1998, Yeltsin and Clinton met in Moscow and agreed that “each country would remove 50 metric tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programs”; and both leaders agreed to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (US Department of State, 27.10.2022).

The variables of neo-classical realism, international system and strategic culture, can be directly linked with arms policies. Leader perceptions can be linked as well because Yeltsin's approach at the time was close relations with the West. State-society relations and domestic institutions have less impact on Russian foreign policy because as a military and security issue, tangible factors are more influential. Strategic culture is the number one factor with tangible consequences and will be evaluated in terms of ideological fractions in Russia. Disarmament was a sensitive issue which was seen as loss of power by the conservatives or was used as a bargaining chip by Yeltsin in line with the tendencies within the state.

Strategic culture is handled as a two-sided concept by Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell as an organizational culture such as that of a military organization or as a more general concept like beliefs and worldviews (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.66). Disarmament in this sense will be evaluated in relation to the understanding of national security.

It is also useful to analyze strategic culture as the military culture which shapes the national security policy. After the dissolution of USSR, the USA never gave its assurance that Russian borders were now safe and they would not be contained by other states. Still, Russia sought to adopt itself to the Western world as an equal partner and conducted a softer military policy. This can be understood when the Russian military doctrines are studied. The military doctrine of 1993 provides the following:

- Security is of primary importance for Russia and the way to achieve this was seen as a strong foreign policy with the world, particularly regions of interest.
- Russia was ready to cooperate with various organizations with the objective of preventing conflicts and providing peace.
- Russia was ready to reduce nuclear arms in order to prevent a destructive war and for providing peace. Russia was also ready for future eliminations of nuclear arms.
- Russia was ready for the implementation of “the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons”.
- Russia was always ready to take place in the process of solving the conflicts peacefully and was committed to following basic rules of international law such as “respect for the sovereignty and integrity of states and non-interference (Russian Military Doctrine, 2.1.1993).

The UN document CD/1242 dated February 4, 1994 included the joint statement of the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in which Kozyrev mentioned the commitment of Russia regarding the proliferation of mass destruction weapons in order to contribute to world peace and stability (UN Document, 1994, p.14).

As can be understood, Russia was willing to strengthen its relations and join the liberal states as an equal partner and disarmament was a state-approved policy which seemed to ignore its historical goal of supremacy. The prevention of war, respect for the territorial integrity of states and the elimination of weapons were given primary emphasis. Still, Russian interests in its near abroad could be observed in the same doctrine with references to cooperation with CIS states as

well as Central and Eastern Europe in the military science and defense fields, the possibility of deployment of Russian troops in certain situations (Russian Military Doctrine, 2.1.1993).

Thus, it can be easily inferred that the Russian security understanding still prevailed and included the near abroad states (CIS and Eastern Europe) while its new conditions required cooperation and agreement with the West. As mentioned above, the interests of the Russian federation were still not ignored and could even necessitate troops and relations with the CIS states were still of primary importance for Russia. This approach to Russian security was reemphasized in the Russian 1997 National Security Concept. That stronger Russian policy was seen regarding cooperation with CIS states, the rejection towards an enlarging NATO, the possibility of a counter attack towards Russia regarding NATO, the importance of conflicts in the CIS states and their potential for affecting Russia and the importance of the Russian language (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 Dec 1997).

This emphasis on the Russian language was the part of Russian policy in its relations with the ex-Soviet states, namely its near abroad. From his remarks, it can be clearly understood that Russian relations with the ex-Soviet States are still of primary importance. An address by Kozyrev can be given as follows:

Against the background of the latest provocation in Riga, directed at some Russian officers, the Saeime of the Republic of Latvia, ignoring international opinion and CSCE and CE recommendations, has "on the quiet" passed the most recent piece of legislation infringing the rights of several hundred thousand residents of the Republic - a law on municipal, regional and district council elections which gives the right to vote only to "100 per cent" citizens. Over a third of the country's permanent residents, many of whom were born and have been living in this land for decades, are deprived by the law of the appropriate means to express their will even at the local government level. Denial of the political rights of these people is thus being elevated to the rank of law of Latvia. Latvia's new Law on local governing bodies which is of a discriminatory character on a purely ethnic basis with respect to several hundred thousand Russian-speaking people. The Russian side considers this Law as another

evidence of aggressive nationalism threatening Latvia itself both with social tension and possible confrontation with neighbouring countries. The Minister believes that in such a serious situation the mechanism of preventive diplomacy must be used more actively to avoid unpredictable consequences (UN Digital Library, 1994).

As can be seen from some of the articles of the 1997 security concept, a stronger discourse regarding the Russian interests is in use and Russia openly expressed its security expectations and the issues it saw as sensitive. The importance given to Russian language which was an important part of identity or any threat in the CIS states directly would affect the Russian security. It is also seen that there was no reference to NATO in 1993 whereas it was emphasized with its name in the 1997 concept. Thus, a change in the pro-Western attitude of Russia was to be expected in its foreign policy.

The other meaning of strategic culture needs to be examined in relation to worldviews and beliefs, which can partly be connected with leader images. As Russia has a deep communist culture, it will be useful to evaluate the reactions of different ideological fractions which are the Atlanticists, Eurasianists and Traditionals to Russian security approach and the issue of disarmament.

Making a general summary, it can be said that the Atlanticists in Russia were represented by politicians such as Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais and Gennady Burbulis while they were countered by traditionals or conservatives represented mostly by the members of the Communist Party such as Zhirinovskiy as the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Kuryuchkov who was one of the leaders of the August coup and Gennady Zyuganov who lost to Boris Yeltsin in 1996 elections. Eurasianism in this sense can be claimed to exist in between these two counter ideologies and thus, it is very important to analyze how they responded to different cases affecting the Russian foreign policy. The most influential Eurasianist was Yevgeny Primakov whose ideology was very strong in terms of leading Russia's foreign policy.

To start with, it will be useful to analyze the ideological battle between the Atlanticists and the communists and how their relationship affected the disarmament process. This can also be given as an example of how domestic institutions affected the politics. The ratification of the Start II can be given as an example of the conflict between Yeltsin and the Duma.

In the early years of Yeltsin, Russia approached the USA not as a threat but as a partner which could help Russia economically. The belief that Russia could exist as an equal, democratic partner of the Western states was very strong. On the other hand, Russia was quite weak as it had lost a huge amount of its territory, then called the CIS states, and thus it was vulnerable for threats. Thus, the primary issues for the post-Soviet Russia regarding disarmament can be counted as the situation of the CIS states, which was the Russian Near Abroad, the existence of nuclear weapons in old Soviet states and the internal reaction to the concessions given by Russia. This situation caused discussions and disagreements within the Duma in the shape of ideological fractions and paved the way for the development of Russian foreign policy in the end. In the news published on 30 January 1996 in the Russian Newspaper *Kommersant*, the reaction of State Duma can be translated as such:

And although the treaty has already been ratified by the US Senate (with the provision that if it is not ratified by the Duma, the decision is withdrawn), judging by the results of yesterday's hearings, a reciprocal gesture of goodwill from the Duma may not follow. According to the chairman of the committee on geopolitics Alexei Mitrofanov, there are several problems regarding Russia. Firstly, this is the transition of the United States in the field of missile defense from deterrence tactics to the systematic creation of a global defense system against nuclear strikes, which contradicts the Soviet-American missile defense treaties. Secondly, these are the financial difficulties that Russia faces today in the implementation of the treaty. Most of the participants in the hearings insisted that Russia lacks any holistic program for the development and financing of strategic nuclear forces. In addition, the meeting expressed the opinion that it is unprofitable for Russia to ratify the treaty, since the agreement obliges it to change the structure of the nuclear triad - to the marine component, which is today in critical condition due to chronic underfunding. Alexei Mitrofanov told a

Kommersant correspondent that the committee he heads will try to submit to the State Duma Council the issue of ratifying the treaty by March 22. At the same time, he stressed that, according to his estimates, today in the Duma there are somewhat more opponents of ratification than its supporters. Therefore, the parliament, according to Mitrofanov, is likely to make a half-hearted decision: either ratify the treaty only in the first reading, or declare its readiness to ratify it only after the presidential elections in Russia. That is, in any case, the final ratification of the treaty is postponed (Kommersant, 30 January 1996)³⁴.

Although Yeltsin wanted the treaty to be ratified, the fractions in the Duma refused to ratify the START II treaty. Differences of opinion within Duma affected the policies to be implemented as neo-classical realism suggests. This is a clear example of how strategic culture as well as leader images affected the functioning of policy formation according to neo-classical realism.

Theodore M. Hirsch and Bonnie D. Jenkins in the *International Lawyer* stated that Yeltsin had made a speech regarding START II whereas the Duma expressed the opposite. The Chairman of the Duma, Gennady Seleznev (a member of the previous Communist Party), justified this through "a shortage of funds". This meant that a serious budget was to be spent on the destruction of weapons and Russia at the time had no such resources (Hirsch & Jenkins, 1999, p.478). Another important figure in the Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov also mentioned that it would be premature for the Russian State Duma to ratify START II given the deterioration of the situation in Iraq³⁵. To summarize, in the UN Monthly Report on Disarmament Activities of February 1998, Russia's situation is given as such:

President Boris Yeltsin, in his state of the nation address to both houses of the parliament, called for the urgent ratification of the START II. Ratification by Russia of START II would clear the way for both Russia and the United States to commence negotiations on START III, which would make further inroads into both sides' massive nuclear arsenals. President Yeltsin also stressed that the recent Russian-US accord to adapt the existing ABM treaty by

³⁴ Kommersant. State Duma on START II Treaty. Please see: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/125719>.

³⁵ Bombing of Iraqi targets suspected of producing nuclear weapons by the USA and the UK.

placing limits on anti-missile weapons systems would enable them to pass on to concrete discussions on the figures for a START III treaty (Note to the Secretary General, 3 March 1998).

The problems encountered towards the end of the 90s were explained in the Nuclear Disarmament Commentary published by the NGO Committee on Disarmament at the United Nations as an impasse on nuclear disarmament because Russia had a claim that Russian interests were being disregarded by the US by the enlargement of NATO, the building of a national ballistic missile defense system which was banned in 1972. Combined with the Iraqi attack in 1998 and the NATO attack on Serbia contributed to the case (Epstein, 1999). The official discourse, however, was showing support for the process of disarmament. Vladimir Petrovsky who was the Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative summarized the address by Primakov in the Conference on Disarmament conducted on June 5, 1997. He quotes the approach of Primakov to the issue of ratification by the State Duma:

With regard to other disarmament issues, Mr. Primakov reiterated Russian commitment to eliminating chemical weapons Duma's intention to ratify the Treaty, possibly by autumn 1997...He stressed that Russia wanted the Conference on Disarmament to maintain and enhance its negotiating dynamics, and hoped that it could overcome present difficulties in defining the organizational aspects of its further work... He recalled that Russia had declared a moratorium on exporting non-self-destructable and undetectable mines in December 1994, and that it was considering the possibility of its extension (Press Release DCF/300, 5 June 1997).

In the same conference, Primakov said that it was not easy to agree on signing the Founding Act and that Russia still had a clear stance regarding NATO enlargement because it was possible that it would bring new dividing lines in Europe. He added that signing this agreement aimed at decreasing the possible negative effects of that kind of an enlargement and implementing it practically and in line with its provisions would contribute to increasing security in Europe (Press Release DCF/300, 5 June 1997).

Making a summary of the issue of disarmament, it can be inferred that Russia ever completely abandoned its role as a strong state even when it was faced with post-Cold War conditions and the policy it conducted towards the USA was shaped in accordance with its interests and the issue was used as a leverage to counter balance their relations. The basic determinants which were useful in explaining Russian behaviour were the international structure, strategic culture and leader images in a more limited sense which were exemplified with Primakov and ideological fractions in line with the strategic culture. The international structure was shaped by the Iraqi problem, the issue of Serbia and the US approach, which shaped the Russian policy. Disarmament was used as a bargaining chip by Russia. Primakov, on the other hand, adopted a role which gave primary importance to Russian interests while the traditionalists in the Duma directed the politics through working mechanisms as explained in the ratification of START II. Thus, internal politics in Russia were directly linked with foreign policy. The same evaluation can be made regarding Russian strategic culture.

4.2. NATO ENLARGEMENT

During the Cold War, security in Europe was based on a balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact in military terms (Bolving, 2000, p.31). When the USSR dissolved, NATO was left in a situation to reconsider its mission because the structure of Europe and the security needs had changed. The separation of former USSR states created a new geography outside the control of Russia and thus NATO was in a state to determine its new position. In the Final Report for the NATO Fellowship by Dannreuther, it was stated that NATO responded to this new situation with two policies (Dannreuther, 1997, p.3). The first was an internal reform by reducing and restructuring its military forces and structures to make it more capable of responding to a post-cold war structure; giving the example of Yugoslavia; and second expansionist policies to include the former USSR territories, providing the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit in which Central and Eastern European states were invited. Regarding the US approach to NATO,

Mearsheimer states that USA acted with a liberal understanding that democracies do not fight each other and justified the enlargement of NATO through “locking in democracy’s gain” in Central Europe as constructing a Europe with a shared commitment after the end of the Cold War was the spirit (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.1). “The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)” was founded to include former Warsaw Pact members for cooperation (NATO, 2022) followed by “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” founded in 1997 to build a security forum. Although he acted with a liberal and democratic understanding of IR, Clinton was acting on behalf of USA’s interests. Thus, he did not believe that NATO enlargement was a direct threat to Russian interests. The following table shows the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the years that they acceded NATO. Due to their historical ties and geographical closeness, they were never left outside the scope of Russian policies.

Table I: NATO-Warsaw Pact Signatories

WARSAW PACT SIGNATORY COUNTRIES	
• Albania (withdrew in 1968) • Bulgaria • Czechoslovakia • East Germany • Hungary • Poland • Romania • Soviet Union	
	Dissolved in 1991
NATO SIGNATORY COUNTRIES	POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT
• Belgium (1949) • Canada (1949) • Denmark (1949) • France (1949) • Greece (1952) • Iceland (1949) • Italy (1949) • Luxembourg (1949) • Norway (1949) • Portugal (1949) • Spain (1982) • Türkiye (1952) • The Federal Republic of Germany (1955) • The Netherlands (1949) • The United Kingdom (1949) • The United States (1949)	• Albania (2009) • Bulgaria (2004) • Croatia (2009) • Czech Republic (1999) • Hungary (1999) • Estonia (2004) • Finland (2023) • Latvia (2004) • Lithuania (2004) • Montenegro (2017) • North Macedonia (2020) • Romania (2004) • Poland (1999) • Slovakia (2004) • Slovenia (2004)

Source: “Member Countries of NATO” (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm)

Geographically speaking, Russian Western border close to the European region was now open to threat according to the Russian perception and thus NATO, as explained earlier, was considered a direct threat. It is a certain fact that protecting its areas of interest or the region close to its borders, is and has been essential for Russia. Although Russia had to conduct softer policies towards the Western countries and especially the USA in the first years following the Cold War, Russia never openly agreed to the enlargement of NATO close to its border. Loss of its territory, worsening of the economic conditions, social and political problems within the state caused Russia to lose power. Russia, still trying to recover from the post-cold war effects was not in a position to counter-attack USA directly. By making remarks regarding its openness to cooperation, Russia was trying to neutralize its position. The same can be interpreted from the behaviour of the USA in the 90s because although USSR was no longer to a threat, USA was still looking for more ways to expand to the east and increase its security. Thus, relations were very open to conflict and had a threatening nature for Russia although negotiations especially with the USA would continue for a long-time during Yeltsin's term. Both parties came together in many summits in order to discuss the situation and the expectations of both parties. These summits can be counted as the 1999 Washington Summit, 1997 Madrid Summit, 1997 Paris Summit, 1994 Brussels Summit (proposal for the membership of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland by Clinton who aimed at a European integration through Europe; but Russia refused it (Ambrose&Brinkley, 1971, p.424), 1994 Budapest Summit and the 1991 Rome Summit. Russian involvement in NATO will be handled within the scope of NATO enlargement and NATO partnership.

It can be inferred that Boris Yeltsin's policies during the first years of his presidency were shaped according to his ideas on the situation in the USSR and how the people wanted to see the new Russia. This idea of a European Russia was the reason he gained his popularity in the elections. Changing circumstances in the economic welfare of Russia and the failed political and social system caused the discontent of people, giving birth to rising voices

regarding a turn to a Western Russia. Appointing his ministers and officials based on their ideas on the integration of Russia with Europe, the most prominent of whom was Andrei Kozyrev, he supported a pro-western policy in his first years as the president. He made his decisions accordingly and his decisions regarding integrating Russia with the West was what caused the following collapse of the Russian economy along with political developments. The basic reason was that Russian economy was not ready to transit into a free market economy yet.

Russia was in a situation in which it was forced to accept the existence of a hegemonic power or at least act softly in its relations with the USA as it was the only remaining power. Thus, there was a change not only in the behaviour of Russia but also in the discourse. While post-Soviet Russia was supportive of close relations with the West, especially the USA, in the first term of Yeltsin, the issue of NATO enlargement was always a highly important issue for Russian interests and the reactions of high-level Russian officials to the issue will be used to understand the changing Russian foreign policy in two terms of Boris Yeltsin. The following excerpts are taken from Russian President Yeltsin's and Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev's own memoirs as examples of that discourse:

Boris Yeltsin's remarks in 1991 supporting integration and dialogue:

This (partnership) will contribute to creating a climate of mutual understanding and trust, strengthening stability and cooperation on the European continent. We consider these relations to be very serious and wish to develop this dialogue in each and every direction, both on the political and military levels. Today we are raising a question of Russia's membership in NATO, however regarding it as a long-term political aim. (New York Times, 21.12.1991)

Andrei Kozyrev wrote on NATO in his book supporting integration and dialogue:

On December 19, NATO opened its ministerial meeting, intending the next day to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to promote cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. While welcoming the idea, we felt it necessary

to make clear both the transition to the Russian Federation and our approach to NATO. That day Yeltsin signed a letter addressed to the secretary-general of the alliance. It opened with the assessment that deep reforms in Russia had created unprecedented opportunities for mutual trust with NATO based on common values. That statement alone was a signal departure from the traditional Soviet stance—namely, that both sides of the Cold War were equally responsible for changing their policies. Now we recognized that Moscow had to choose democratic values, after which one could expect Russia to stop confronting NATO and, as a result, NATO to cease confronting Russia. “Today we do not ask for Russian membership in NATO, but regard it as our long-term political objective,” Yeltsin wrote, in one of the first political declarations of new Russia. (Kozyrev, 2019, p.63)

Boris Yeltsin’s remarks in 1997:

A legally binding document should contain precisely formulated guarantees of Russia’s security interests. In the first instance, that NATO’s military infrastructure will not advance to the East and that foreign troops and conventional weapons will not be moved beyond those territories where they are currently deployed. (Washington Post, 17 March 1997)

This change in the discourse or the reasons that forced Yeltsin on NATO will be analyzed in line with neo-classical realism argument. It can be said that the international structure, strategic culture, leader images were visibly influential regarding the NATO case. On the other hand, domestic institutions and state-society relations were also influential although not like the previously given variables, they had less impact in the form of administrative processes like State Duma.

Russian behaviour will be understood more clearly if the conditions within Russia are studied first. The economic crisis and the rise of prices for basic goods along with the internal system were the basic reasons for the worsening situation and the discontent of the public. Roy Medvedev summarizes the post-Cold War situation as such:

Social programs began to be terminated. The financing of health, education, culture, and science was cut back sharply. Many plants in the military-industrial complex stopped working. Because of the dissolution of the USSR, the army and navy began to fall apart, as

did the transport, electric power, and airline systems. The former union-wide security and legal systems also disintegrated. (Medvedev, 2000, p.23)

Russia did not possess sufficient power to manage its own economy let alone the burden of arms race and security expenses as opposed to USA. Neo-classical realism puts forward the following assumption:

Like other variants of realism, neo-classical realism assumes that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty. Anarchy – the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government – is the permissive cause of international conflict. Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves (Ripsman et al, 2016, p.4).

It was in such a situation that IMF (International Monetary Fund) and EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were involved in the Russian economic process for recovery. Thus, the issues that were highly sensitive during the Cold War had to be saved for later, though not ignored, and Yeltsin had to focus more urgently on the inner-state issues. NATO can be evaluated as such an issue and the shock therapy, as an example, was more urgent an issue at the time because Yeltsin wanted to protect his popularity. The changing discourse until 1993 can be explained from this perspective.

The second variable of neo-classical realism, strategic culture can be counted as the major and most effective determinant of mutual relations with USA regarding NATO. This is in more general terms because of the fact that Yeltsin changed his discourse on NATO when he started to lose his popularity as it was a highly popular topic in US relations and he used it as a tool of propaganda. In other words, it was a topic of discussion between the Atlanticists and the Communists. Wiltenburg counts the strategic culture of Russia as such:

- Russia sees itself a great power and in turn demands to be treated as such. This Russian power is defined by military and nuclear capabilities.

- Russia has a historical sense of insecurity. That is the reason Russia has authoritarian leadership and highly capable armed forces.
- Russian strategic culture allows for reaching out of state borders for possible conflicts and it also allows for use of its armed forces if necessary. (Wiltenburg, 2020, p. 8-10)

Strategic culture in this sense is closely related to Russia's understanding of security. As Wiltenburg points out, Russia believes that the possibility of a conflict outside Russia's borders can impact Russian decisions; second, Russia's notion of the sphere of interest has historical roots and can't be ignored and it can be linked to the Russian speaking community in those regions is vital for Russian security notion. The ideological fractions in Russia belong to strategic culture. The Atlanticists, Eurasianists and the traditionalists or the conservatives had different views regarding the issue of NATO.

The Atlanticists' image of Russia, which can be evaluated by neo-classical variables of leader images and strategic culture, was that Russia was "an equal partner of the West" and European security without Russia could not be sustained. This idea led to the understanding that Russia was ready to make concessions and Russia would not pursue its interests in the region by use of force or military intervention. The whole process would be conducted by mutual discussions and political means.

As long as the Russian economy allowed for pro-westernism to prevail in Russia, the Atlanticists had more power. Atlanticism is described with the objective of integration with Europe, joining the world finance system and developing close relations with two major actors of the West, USA and Germany (Stankevich, 1992, p.48). In his first term, we can see that Boris Yeltsin appointed pro-western bureaucrats like Yegor Gaidar whom Boris Yeltsin referred to as being seen by the Western governments as the guarantor of economic reforms and who was responsible for privatization in Russia, Andrei Kozyrev and others some of whom Yeltsin counts as Andrei Nechayev (the first Minister of

Economic Development of new Russia), Alexander Shokhin (Former Minister of Labour). The Atlanticists defended a new world order in which Russia-USA relations were not characterized by ideological and military war but by cooperation and mutual understanding. Yuli Vorontsov, who was the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations transmitted a message of Boris Yeltsin to Secretary-General which showed the Russian view supported by the Atlanticists. It was that Russia, the United States and NATO countries would not confront each other with nuclear weapons like the Cold War and they were supposed to show mutual efforts to keep away from this confrontation (UN Document A_47_79: Letter from B. Yeltsin, 28 January 1992).

The ideological difference between the Westerners and the Communists was always sharply felt in Russian history, including post-Cold War Russia. Roy Medvedev highlights the fact that it is very important for changes to be accepted by the society to be successful. He adds that one of the reasons for the failure of Yeltsin's economic reforms, in addition to other reasons that he counts, was its inability to reach the whole society. He titles this as "Growing Resistance by the Population". He states that when the reformists did not take national traditions into consideration, they caused not only a wide unhappiness but also resistance (Medvedev, 2000, p.67).

These ideas within Russia regarding the status of NATO can be analyzed within the framework of leader images. The pro-western bureaucrats supported the idea of integrating Russia to a Western institution, evaluating it as a democratic act. The Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev who was in Yeltsin's team of experts was supportive of close relations with the West and especially the USA and he wanted to see Russia as an influential international actor. His ideas dominated the Russian foreign policy especially between 1991 and 1992. He saw relations with the West as a policy to be followed to achieve this purpose. Although the Atlanticists believed that the impact of Russia on CIS states could be reduced Kozyrev was more central in his ideas regarding the CIS states. In a speech Kozyrev made and was published in the Russian Newspaper

“Kommersant”, Kozyrev mentioned that the anti-American approach was a childhood disease and that Russia and the West needed a jointly implemented strategy (Kommersant, 1992). He saw the pathway to this through adjusting to the democratic structure of western civilizations. Although he did not publicly support NATO expansion and stated numerous times that NATO enlargement was not the key to a single Europe, he was supportive of a NATO structure which gave Russia an equal status. In his speech at the acceptance of the Russian Partnership Programme, Kozyrev stated that promoting international organizations was of primary importance because it would contribute to creating an inclusive European security system (Kozyrev, 31 May 1995). Kozyrev expressed Russian determination on respect for territorial integrity, integrating Russia with the West through organizations and joining free market economies (Kozyrev, 2019, p.64).

As can be understood from his remarks, Kozyrev did not openly ask for Russian membership but always supported a system which could make Russia a part of Europe and a part of the democratic world and referred to NATO as impressive. Atlanticism in Russia was an influential ideological fraction which could be observed in some other levels within the society. Sergey Karaganov who was the chairperson of an influential and opinion making Council on Foreign and Defense Policy supported the parallel accession of Russia to NATO along with Eastern European countries and not admitting Russia equalled isolating it, excluding Russia would result in confrontation (Duleba, 1998, p.17).

Another important step in terms of partnership within NATO was the Partnership for Peace Program started in 1994. It was a U.S. initiative launched to develop strong links between NATO and ex-Soviet states and the inclusion of neutral but strong states for promoting the security of Europe. It aimed at cooperation both in political and military fields for common projects and thus improve NATO's structure (US Department of State Archives, 19 June 1997). It took vast criticism in Russia for constituting a direct threat to Russian borders and evaluated as a hostile approach by the hardliners. In the NATO document dated

22 June 1994, conclusions of discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Kozyrev are summarized as:

The Alliance and Russia agreed to pursue a broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power, through: - sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters having a European dimension; - political consultations, as appropriate, on issues of common concern; - cooperation in a range of security related areas including, as appropriate, in the peacekeeping field (NATO Archives, 22 June 1994).

When the system started to fail as a result of an inadequate infrastructure such as the economy, political chaos between the Communist Party representatives and the Atlanticists, increasing prices, fall of the value of the Russian ruble, Boris Yeltsin was forced to change his policies in order to keep his power intact. Thus, he sought the help of the oligarchs, which led to their uneven and hostile control over the Russian economic and political system.

His appointment of Yevgeny Primakov was a step towards meeting the needs of the traditionalists who were gaining power in the state Duma. When Andrei Kozyrev's pro-western policy was seen as unsuccessful following a chain of failed policies, a more traditional approach was adopted with the appointment of Primakov. The ideas on NATO were shaped accordingly. Eurasianism, which can be placed between the Atlanticists and the Traditionalists in Russia, can be exemplified with the ideas of Primakov on the issue of NATO. In his speech he made at the UN 7th plenary meeting on 22 September 1997, he said:

A beneficial effect on the improvement of the European climate has already been exerted by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, which was born out of the agonizing quest for compromise. This document will have broad international resonance and will doubtless play an essential role in European politics. Of course, the signing of that document has not changed our negative view of NATO's enlargement, which, on the

one hand, totally ignores current realities and, on the other, is fraught with the risk of creating new dividing lines (UN Document A-52-PV-7, 22 September 1997, p.19).

From a Russian point of view, NATO enlargement was opposed as a principle, states Dannreuther in his report, and he provides three negative consequences of the enlargement given in the 1993 "Perspectives on the Enlargement of NATO and Russian Interests" (Dannreuther, 1997, p.8).

- The enlargement required a strengthening of defence capabilities which would give harm to the Russian budget as well as supporting isolation feelings by stimulating anti-western ideas.
- NATO enlargement was a threat to Russian interests in the CIS regions and especially the Baltic States were in a contradictory position to Russian interests. This enlargement would violate the principle of military presence in the near-abroad.
- An expanding NATO would eventually become an element of "bloc politics" and new confrontation lines in Europe.

The approach of Yeltsin to NATO as a partner did not last long because soon it was realized that the West was not planning to integrate Russia to its organizations or lead NATO in line with Russian interests and the West was aiming at "confidence-building measures" and "arms control agreements" (Antonenko, 1999, p.127). Described by some as a western romanticism, this policy did not last long for it was not realistic in terms of creating a single Russian and European cooperation with common interests. Yeltsin's policies were harshly criticised by some groups as unrealistic and ignorant of Russian interests. He was also criticised for remaining passive with regard to the independent states in which a large population of Russians lived and it was thought that Russia had to ensure the safety of these people and protect them against outside intervention. He started to lose his popularity. His critics were

advocating economic, military and political integration within CIS states and adopt an interventionist role (Dannreuther, 1997, p.3).

When the voices of the traditionalists started to be heard more often, Russia's foreign policy started to shift. The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept and the 1993 New Russian Military Doctrine put forward a pro-Russian understanding of international relations and gave Russia the status as the builder of a system on equal terms and as a guarantor of interests.

In the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, using political means for Russian security, protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population, providing beneficial external conditions, mobilizing financial and technological support for the state economy, conducting good relations with the CIS and Russian role as a great power were emphasized. It was of primary importance to conduct friendly relation with all states and solving disputes (Melville and Shackleina, 2005, p. 32).

In the Russian Military Doctrine of 1993, it was explicitly stated that the enlargement of NATO towards the East, including the Baltic States threatened vital Russian interests. Integration with the near-abroad was vital again and a passive attitude would not be adopted. Collective resolution was the ultimate key to the problems. In its approach to NATO, conducting relations based on the idea of collective security was supported and a military based NATO was rejected (Dannreuther, 1997, p.7). Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov's statement in May 1997 that the issue of the Baltic States and NATO was a condition for future East-West cooperation (Blank, 1997, p.1) could be given as a clear example of this approach.

The years from 1995 to 1996 witnessed a new NATO crisis. Dannreuther gives three reasons for this crisis. The first reason was the Russian opposition to NATO intervention in Yugoslavia; the second was the publication of a NATO enlargement study giving no right to other countries the right to veto on the

decisions of enlargement; the last one was the period of elections in which the nationalist atmosphere was so strong and thus Russia could not tolerate an aggressive NATO enlargement (Dannreuther, 1997, p.20). Russian Minister of Defence, Igor Rodionov said the following words regarding NATO enlargement to the East:

Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, the issue of Russia and NATO relation is one of the most important and pivotal issues when we talk about composing, forming a new model of pan-European security. Just like in Bergen on the 26 September this year, today I have stated our basic approach to this problem and the position is as follows: NATO enlargement to the East is unacceptable for Russia and of course very logical questions are in order here: Why is it that the highest political management of Russia is so very much against NATO enlargement? What are Moscow's arguments? Have they any basis? Talking today to Ministers of Defence of NATO countries, I tried to answer these questions (NATO Archives, 18 December 1996).

Primakov's policies can be considered as more effective and stronger than those of Kozyrev in terms of countering the West. An open objection to the enlargement of NATO and a coherent Russian policy was adopted, although the problems were not completely solved. He talked about three alternatives for NATO enlargement when he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned, the first one was to completely come against NATO expansion which could result in the return of Cold War and no peaceful solution; the second was leading softer policies regarding NATO and following the NATO supporters inside and the third was to protect the Russian interests and minimize the negative and threatening results (Primakov, 2008, p.208).

Regarding the NATO case, some agreements are very important and need to be analyzed as well. One of them is "the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation" signed in Paris in 1997 between Russia and NATO countries. Regarding the agreement, Boris Yeltsin said the following words:

What we're going to do now, ladies and gentlemen, is to put our signatures to a historic, in my view, document, which is the Founding Act -- the Founding Act on Mutual Relations Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We will do that jointly and this will determine the new quality in the relations between Russia and NATO. It will protect Europe and the world from a new confrontation and will become the foundation for a new, fair and stable partnership, a partnership which takes into account the security interests of each and every signatory to this document, to the Founding Act (NATO Archives, 27 May 1997).

The principle that it set out was as the following:

NATO and Russia share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and The Russian Federation, 27.05.1997).

This agreement in general terms supports democracy, peace, respect for law and human rights and aims at limiting use of force against independence or integrity of states and should follow the norms specified above (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and The Russian Federation Signed, 27.05.1997).

Among various agreements on security and peace in Europe, a very important part is constituted by "the Charter for European Security" signed in 1999 in Istanbul as well. Having a restrictive impact on Russia in terms of the Russian spheres of interest, article 8 of this treaty can be considered as opposed to Russian claims in the CIS area. It states:

Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence (Charter For European Security, November 1999).

Bolving, evaluating this, states that Russia does not follow the provisions of the Istanbul Charter as to NATO. Thus, it normally should not insist on its responsibility regarding its security in the OSCE area. The OSCE participating states including Russia and NATO countries have agreed to do so (Bolving, 2000, p.42).

Another important step was the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established in 1997. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was “a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and partner countries” aiming at providing the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in which Russia was a partner country (NATO: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 21 November 2022).

When the selected post-Cold War period is evaluated as a whole, it can be easily stated that the above-mentioned notions of Russia always were under discussion no matter which direction Russian foreign politics chose to go in terms of the West or the East. The enlargement of NATO, Russian impact in the Near Abroad, US relations and the issue of mutual decreasing of nuclear arm threads were always spoken by two different ministers with two different approaches as Kozyrev and Primakov. It can be concluded that certain topics have always been spoken for Russia’s side and the political stream did not change these.

4.2.1 Kosovo

Another important issue with regard to NATO was Kosovo, bringing Russia and USA face to face again in their foreign policies. Kosovo was an issue which attracted international attention, causing both Russia and USA to implement different and counter policies.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded in 1943 during WWII and was made up of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It was ruled by Marshal Josip Tito following the end of the WWII and was comprised of Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox citizens. Ethnic nationalism began to rise following the death of Tito and disintegration began. Serbian nationalism started to rise in 1992, which led to a referendum on independence followed by the sieging of Sarajevo and the intensification of ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims, resulting in thousands of deaths.³⁶ NATO conducted its first major crisis response operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and implemented the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement³⁷, which marked the end of the 1992-1995 war in the country.

Kosovo war took place in 1998 between the Serbs and the Liberation Army of Kosovo. The first seeds of war were thrown when the Serbians were left as a minority in the region with the rise of the Albanian population with the direct result of a change in their place in social, economic and political life and when Serbs started to lose their privileges. The lack of safety of the Serbians who lived in an economically backward region, which also witnessed ethnic cleansing by the Albanians accelerated the removal of Serbs from the region (Nikolic, 1998, p.13).

With increasing voices from Kosovo regarding independence caused the rise of Serbian nationalism. When Milosevic took power in Serbia in 1987, he changed

³⁶ Kosovo War History. Please see: Srebrenica.org.

³⁷ Peace Agreement to end the Bosnian War signed in 1995. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf.

the constitution and abolished the status of Kosovo, causing mass demonstrations and protests. It was followed by a referendum which was thought as illegitimate by the Albanians and the people favoured an independent Kosovo. In a generally peaceful environment of demands for their rights, the Liberation Army of Kosovo was born, providing armament by collecting money from Albanians around the world and armed events began to be observed. When the security forces were killed in the protests, Serbian police intervened. Their brutal acts took the attention of the international community.

Russian approach to Kosovo can be explained from two perspectives. Kozyrev and Primakov's ideas on the issue can be evaluated as in harmony with the Russian interests and strategic culture.

Andrei Kozyrev wrote on how the presence of Russia in the region was at its best interest. He wrote:

As well as this, the Russian president had agreed to contribute some troops to the peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia as a part of the NATO-led operation, but formally under American rather than NATO command. Participation in the operation was, of course, in Russia's interests: Russia should be seen to have a role in the peace settlement in the Balkans instead of engaging in self-isolation from mainstream European politics. Yet the American president almost begged for Russian participation as a favor. I felt a twinge of satisfaction at not being the only one having to tolerate my boss's mischief-making and public rudeness for the sake of the success of the summit and international cooperation (Kozyrev, 2019, p.320)

Yevgeniy Primakov states in his book that when Yugoslavia was dissolved in the 90s, the world, including Russia, responded to this case with no concerns and could not foresee what the future held in terms of regional dynamics (Primakov, 2008, p.263). He counts "four no's" for Russia's part which were NATO's armed operation towards Belgrade separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia, increasing of the sanctions against Yugoslavia and the protection of Kosovo's status with no autonomy (Primakov, 2008, p.271).

Russia was part of a group that aimed at reconciling both sides through diplomatic means. Boris Yeltsin and Slobodan Milosevic came together in Moscow and it was emphasized that Kosovo crisis had to be solved peacefully based on mutual dialogue; international institutions like NATO, UN, OSCE and EU asked Serbia to stop its violent actions in the region. UN resolutions no 1160, 1199 and 1203 were passed regarding the measures to be taken, including embargoes, an urgent ceasefire demand and the retreat of Serbian forces; endorsement of the agreements between Yugoslavia and Nato and OSCE with Yugoslavia (Nikolic, 1998, p.7).

On March 24, 1999, President Boris Yeltsin suspended Russian cooperation with NATO and recalled his chief military representative to the alliance to protest the airstrikes on Yugoslavia, wrote the Washington Post. Yeltsin said that he would suspend Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace, a military cooperation program involving 27 non-NATO countries as well as the Russian-NATO cooperation program, as a result of which Primakov made a mid-air turnabout en route to Washington to Moscow. Washington Post made the news of Russian officials who commented on the problem. As may be expected from the nature of events, the biggest criticism came from the Atlanticists. It was evaluated by different groups in Russia in different ways. A member of the Westerners in Russia, Grigory Yavlinsky who was one of the conductors of the 500 Day Program, criticized his decision and called this "the Cold War style", adding that USA should be protested within USA. Vladimir Lukin, a former Russian ambassador to Washington and chairman of the foreign relations committee of the lower house of parliament, evaluated Kremlin as "overly-involved" in the Balkans and that IMF was widely important for Russia. He made the suggestion that emotional outbursts on the Balkans should not make other interests forgotten. Andrei Kozyrev also criticised his action and stated that "the Russian side found itself in a situation of supporting a dictator [Milosevic] who does not understand anything but force and who conducted ethnic purges in Kosovo and drove the situation there into a blind alley. (Hoffmann, Moscow Recalls NATO Delegate in Protest, Washington Post, March 25, 1999)

Evaluating the ideas of various groups in Russia, it can be understood that Primakov could not ignore other groups despite his doctrine which gave high importance to Russia's gains in its spheres of interest.

With the worsening of the situation, which was caused by the passive response of Serbia to the case and the strengthening of the Kosovo-Albanian separatists; counter measures were suggested by USA Great Britain and some European countries (Primakov, 2008, p.265). Russia was leading a mediatory policy and approved the temporary arms and military technical weapons. The USA and Great Britain were insistent that a NATO intervention should be launched by putting forward Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), which was issued once for the Korean War and they demanded that it was issued again for the Kosovo case (Primakov, 2008, p.270).

In 1999, an operation by NATO was realized with the objectives of deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, ensuring public safety and order, demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army, supporting the international humanitarian effort and coordinating with the international civil presence. KFOR derived its mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.³⁸

Russia was against the NATO intervention from the very beginning for a NATO-centric Europe was not wanted. In this sense, Russia and China expressed their discontent with regard to US actions in the region which they interpreted as a quest for hegemony. The UN and NATO were seen as USA's tools to spread its own understanding of values to regions of interest. A second reason for rejecting US presence in the near-abroad was the cultural closeness with the Serbs in terms of a common religion and Slavic origin.

³⁸ NATO's role in Kosovo. 19 May 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm.

With regard to Kosovo, Russia had to conduct its policies on a balanced level because of its economic situation. Russia used its membership in the Contact Group and the UN Security Council to act as a mediator between the two sides and imposed sanctions on Serbia within the UN resolutions 160 and 1199 while at the same time signing the Moscow Agreement with Milosevic who promised to start peace talks with the Albanians (Vicere, 2019, p.107). Despite these efforts, Russia could not prevent the intervention of NATO in Kosovo and could only send its troops to Pristina towards the end of the war before NATO troops, which reflected Russian concerns for the position of Serbian population under a different supervision as well as its own reputation as an influential actor. Russian policy in Kosovo was determined with fears of a western Serbia which would be kept under US influence.

To sum up, it can be inferred that Russia wanted to protect its interests in the region and apply their near-abroad policy in Kosovo; however, the situation in which Russia was in at the time in terms of internal problems made this difficult. Thus, Russia could not prevent the NATO intervention but did not conduct a completely pro-Western policy as well. Russian policy can be thought of as shuttle diplomacy, which resulted from its conditions at that time.

Erik Yesson in his "NATO and Russia in Kosovo" calls the Russian policy "a rhetorical inconsistency" (Yesson, 1996, p.11). He states that Boris Yeltsin changed his position when he initially said "Russia would not allow itself to be drawn into war". He seemed to be distant from an area of western influence through NATO. However, opinion polls of the time revealed that most people, including the State Duma, were against a NATO intervention in Kosovo. High level statesmen of the time warned President Yeltsin that NATO's intervention could shift the internal power towards the communists and cause an anti-western ideology rising in Russia. Starting from a low level of intervention, Yeltsin was forced to be involved. Russia recalled its chief military representative from NATO's European military headquarters, expelled NATO representatives from Moscow, ended all cooperation with NATO's Partnership

for Peace and withdrew two signals officers responsible for communications between NATO and the Russian SFOR³⁹ contingent in Bosnia (Yesson, 1999, p.13). His behaviour was not consistent in all aspects. Although his approach to the West was supportive, and because he probably could not act openly due to the internal dynamics, he had to follow a balanced policy in which he would not openly criticize the Serbian leader. Speaking from a realist point of view, Yesson gave two reasons for Russia's western approach. The first one was that Russia was economically weak to pull itself into an isolated area to pursue an anti-western independent foreign policy and the second one was that there were financial benefits provided to Russia such as IMF, EBRD, Paris Club of government creditors and third the situation created by NATO was not a direct threat to the Russian security. Speaking from a neo-realist point of view, which will be explained in the further parts, the system compelled Yeltsin to act differently.

³⁹ Stabilization Force in Bosnia sent by NATO.

CONCLUSION

Summarizing the Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, it can be said that Yeltsin led two different policies in two different terms. In the first one, which was like the after-birth period of post-Soviet Russia, surrounded by various problems both inside and outside including the loss of territory, economic and industrial decline, storage of nuclear weapons in post-Soviet territories, and even the enlargement of NATO with ex-Soviet states like Germany, Russia had to lead friendly relations with the USA and was more prone to making concessions. Yeltsin opened Russia to the free market, implemented shock therapy measures and created a privileged group by allowing the assets to be privatized, which led to serious discontent with the general public and certain ideological fractions in Russia. Faced by severe criticism, the voice of the conservative fraction within Russia started to rise in the Duma and Yeltsin had to adopt a different strategy to keep his political position. Although Russia did not openly react to the USA until after the Putin administration, still not as early as his first terms, Russia prioritized the ex-Soviet states and acted in accordance with its near abroad policy, which had been abandoned in Yeltsin's first term, giving independence to ex-Soviet nations.

In accordance with Yeltsin's foreign policy understanding, he appointed his team in line with these two different approaches. He appointed Andrei Kozyrev as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kozyrev was known as the representative of the Atlanticism fraction in Russia and worked in order to bring Russia to the position of an equal partner of the West and the democratic system. According to him, Russia was a major power which could be a part of the European security system within organizations like NATO or UN and its presence could not be ignored. He believed that the Russian culture was based on European culture (Kozyrev, 2019, p.451). His successor was Yevgeny Primakov who was appointed following the internal problems within Russia and Yeltsin's shift in his policies. He was known for his Eurasianist thinking and he advocated a

powerful and independent Russia which had the power and the means to protect its high interests and was powerful enough not to make concessions. He did not see the USA as an unchanging partner but he turned his compass towards the CIS states along with China and Iran. He conducted a strategy for balancing relations with the USA.

Within Russia in which ideological fractions always had an impact on Russian politics, the impact of the conservatives was always the highest. Even after the collapse of USSR, when the communist ideology failed as a state system, their impact was never completely abandoned. Evaluating the whole post-Cold War period, the main reason for the internal disorder within Russia was the ideological battle between the traditionalists or the communists and the westerners and this was observed in many occasions such as NATO, disarmament or the ratification process of START II.

This thesis argued from the beginning that in order to make a strong foreign policy analysis, not only the external factors but also the internal factors need to be considered. The impact of international structure is accepted by all streams of realism with only a few differences in their interpretation. It is an undeniable variable because the states have to comply with the conditions that it creates. They cannot exist separately from this structure. The question to be asked is if the international structure is the sole determinant of the scope of international relations. Neo-classical realism does not aim at combining the international outcomes with internal features but short-term foreign policy choices can be explained quite well. When the post-Cold War Russia was studied in terms of foreign policy and relations with the USA, it was seen that the international structure determined the scope of relations however it was not the sole cause of state behaviour as neo-realism suggests. It was only effective because of the anarchic structure it creates and the stimuli that it sends. As an example, NATO was an international organization which was founded with the purpose of acting as an overarching structure bringing the states together. Russia's losing an important amount of its territory left Russia in a new situation faced with various

security concerns such as that of nuclear weapons and ex-Soviet states joining NATO which included Russian Near Abroad. NATO and this ex-Soviet territory were the issues that Russia and USA struggled for. As explained before, Russia chose to conduct softer relations with the USA and was making some concessions. However, the structure of the international environment was not sufficient to explain the changing Russian foreign policy starting from 1993. Although the international structure was still the same, this foreign policy shift with USA, which was marked by the voices rising by the traditionalists, which resulted in the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as the most visible sign of this change.

The first variable is the leader images, which put forward the importance of how a leader sees the events and responds to them from a personal point of view. The traditions, education, background, beliefs and even the environment that the leader was raised in is influential. When the most important officials in post-Cold War Russia are studied, such as Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev and Yevgeny Primakov, it can be observed that Russian foreign policy in their time and relations with the USA were shaped in line with their personal views. Kozyrev and Primakov can be taken as the representative of two different ideological fractions as that of Atlanticists and Eurasianists while Boris Yeltsin adopted each at different times. As they were in the executive position responsible for making decisions regarding the state behaviour, they were studied as primary examples. Kozyrev writes in his book about how his ideas were shaped regarding the Soviet system:

It was a warm spring Sunday morning and I bought a copy of Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* in a bookshop in mid-Manhattan. I sat on a bench in the sunshine in Central Park reading until darkness fell. I then left the book on the bench, afraid to take it back to the Soviet mission where I had my room. The book thrilled me. It was a wonderful, exhilarating piece of Russian literature and poetry. But why was it banned in the Soviet Union and its author denounced as a hostile dissident? After all, none of the main protagonists had any political views to speak of, nor did they engage in anti-communist activity. The question gnawed uncomfortably at me for days. Gradually the answer came to me. Pasternak's crime was that the

book celebrated personal freedom, the idea that a human being had the right to be independent from the state. Doctor Zhivago was a stark illustration of how completely that idea was at odds with the Soviet system (Kozyrev, 2019, p.9).

He states how his ideas were shaped when he bought a book which changed his ideas on the system especially while taking into consideration that he aimed to work in close cooperation with the USA. His role in the Belovezh records⁴⁰, major arms control agreements and close relations with the USA. This was not the sole reason as may be well known however it stands as a useful example. How the perception of Yeltsin affected Russia is quite easy to demonstrate because his ideology was the first shaper of new Russia after the fall of USSR. His remarks on freedom, his friendly talks with the youth of Russia and his approach to the old ideology is what made him very popular in the eyes of Russians. In a speech he made in 1994, he said that he was the representative of the new independent Russia while Gorbachev represented the old power (Yeltsin, 1994, p.35). He made his comment on the features of the president of Russia for the year 2000 and added that he would need to continue democratic reforms in Russia, not go back to the totalitarian system and assure Russia's movement to a modern society (Yeltsin, 2000, p.48). His leader image was definitely a pro-western one although he had to change his policy towards USA and the CIS states after his loss of popularity in 1996 and the victory of the Communist Party in winning over 40% of the seats in Duma (Yeltsin, 2000, p.38). Still, he was always a reformer and that change was only through his diplomats like Primakov. He changed his rhetoric more than he changed his basic ideas.

As a very strong diplomat, Yevgeny Primakov represented the Eurasinist ideology of Russia very well. He believed in a strong Russia and the need for the protection of Russian interests. His ideas were so strong that his appointment was not rejected even by the traditionalists. In his book "At the Crossroads", he states that he sees Russia not as a threat to the world stability and that Russia has changed since the Cold War although its image is

⁴⁰ On the demise of the USSR and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Please see: <https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619792>.

underestimated. He adds that he would count himself lucky if he could change the American readers' perception of seeing Russia with a prejudice (Primakov, 2004, p.8).

When these are taken as examples of their ideas on the role of Russia, it can easily be argued and proven that they conducted effective policies in their time and made strategic decisions. Their approach to the role of Russia determined the scope of relations with the USA and NATO at the time.

The second variable, the strategic culture of Russia, which had been formed over time, which the leaders directly or indirectly observed shaped the leader perceptions and the understanding of the Russian attitude. Compared with the variables of leader images and strategic culture, it can be inferred that the remaining variables of neo-classical realism had less impact on the formation of Russian foreign policy or in other words their impact was more on internal politics, which indirectly had an effect on foreign policy, in the form of leader images. The oligarchs in Russia, as an example, did not directly get involved in the NATO issue, or directed it, but they supported Yeltsin in the elections, leading to his election and finally the Russian behaviour. Russian intelligence service, KGB, as another example, was not directly responsible for foreign policy making, however, their inclusion in issues such as KGB Chairman Gennady Kryuchkov's attempted coup in Lithuania, effected Russian behaviour outside its borders. A direct link in relations with USA is very difficult to find. When the post-Cold War Russia is studied in terms of changes in the foreign policy, it is very clear that the major reason was personal on the side of the president and political on the side of the conservatives in Russia. It would be difficult to answer the question of why Russia made such a sudden return in its behaviour towards the USA if Yeltsin's fear of losing the elections was ignored. Economic problems and bilateral relations can surely not be ignored; however, the situation would be completely different if the reason was primarily economic because Yeltsin adopted a Eurasianist foreign policy in the end.

It can be inferred that the issues which had been historically on the table continued to exist in the post-Cold War period, with the only difference of the status of the major players. Russia was still concerned about Western armament and the enlargement of NATO in its European border and USA was still in search of containing Russia. With various internal factors such as the economy, internal politics and related chaos, which affected how the Russian behaviour was shaped at the time, contributed to how Russia responded to these threats and the USA.

The question that remained unanswered in this sense why Yeltsin had to resign as the president although he adopted both an Atlanticist and a Eurasianist foreign policy at different times. He openly acted against the communist system and was elected for it or he came against the August coup while at the same time he sent troops to the parliament. Was he forced to quit because of his unsuccessful policies or were there other dynamics that he was unable to control? Is that what he meant when he asked for forgiveness for the dreams that never came true? (Yeltsin Resignation Speech, 31 December 1999)

In order to find the answer, Russian dynamics must be studied in more detail because, as also neo-classical realism suggests, the assumption of Waltz that the international structure determines state behaviour does not fit to the Russian case. That is the reason it was called the end of neo-realism by some scholars as it was insufficient in explaining Russian behaviour towards the USA and the issue of NATO right next to its border. Russia did not act in line with its historical supremacy claim and even officially recognized the independence of ex-Soviet states and accepted some countries' NATO membership.

The internal dynamics of neo-classical realism, more or less, were all influential in Russian politics. However, the research on post-Cold War period in this thesis led to the conclusion that strategic culture and leader images were more influential than the other two. In fact, strategic culture can be counted as the strongest determinant of Russian behaviour. By this, the ideological fractions

need to be considered. Leader images, on the other hand, were the second most influential factor because Yeltsin's foreign policy changes and behaviours were compatible with his concerns as a politician.

It is important to point to a few limitations which contributed negatively to the topic of this thesis as well. The main limitation was that there are not many resources which analyze the Russia of the 90s although there are resources that study Russian foreign policy and neo-classical realism separately, as the difficulty of reaching the old archives of Russian newspapers because most Russian newspapers do not have organized archives. From a theoretical perspective, some scholars see neo-classical realism as a foreign policy analysis study and not as a theory like classical or neo-realism. They criticize neo-classical realism in the following terms. John Mearsheimer states that a theory can not explain everything and he gives neo-realism a success rate of 75%, in other terms neo-realism has 25% chance of failure in explaining things (Mearsheimer speech, 2021). The basic criticism is that it only completes neo-realism and that it is still at a developmental stage. Even so, neo-classical realism makes an extensive analysis of any internal factors capable of contributing to an international output, which is foreign policy. Neo-classical realism does not reject the arguments of neo-realism on a very general basis, but it criticises its standing in terms of a determined output, which is connected to relative material power and anarchy along with the hierarchy among the states. Neo-realism in this sense cannot sufficiently explain why states with the same regime act differently or different systems act alike. In this sense, neo-classical realism does not leave out any potential factor, from official to constructivist processes. Thus, it can be evaluated not as a reductionist but as a holistic approach.

When Russian foreign policy is studied from a theoretical perspective, there is a stream that sees neo-realism as the only one that prevailed in Russia. The reasons are given as the role of a strong central power, as its harmony with the state interests to legitimize state behaviour and the belief that state interests

and security come before everything (Romanova, 2012, p.2) Taking this argument as the basis of a supportive argument for neo-classical realism as well, the most general comment that can be made on Russia is that Russia never saw itself as a delegate state but as a major superpower which determined the rules of the game. In fact, when the whole Russian history is taken into account, it can be seen that post-Cold War Russia was the second time in history that Russia had a softer approach towards the West after the Tsarist Russia.

As the last comment on Russian discourse and foreign policy, it can be said that Russian dynamics and behaviour can't be explained solely by the international structure or by the internal factors of neo-classical realism. This is because Russian identity contributes quite seriously to the Russian image both inside Russia for Russian people and the outside world. That is the reason that post-Cold War Russia makes a perfect example for neo-classical realism because more or less, each factor can be applied in the analysis of Russian behaviour.

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APPENDIX I: HIGHLIGHTS OF COLD WAR ERA

<u>1945: Yalta Conference, Potsdam Conference</u> <u>1945: Japanese surrender (atomic bomb on Nagazaki)</u> <u>1945: Germany surrenders to USSR</u>	Meeting of the USA, UK and USSR. Discussions of Europe and Germany (demilitarization, division into zones, and unconditional surrender)	<u>1961: Construction of Berlin Wall</u>	
<u>1946: Iron curtain speech by Churchill</u> <u>1946: Operation Crossroads</u>	ABLE and Baker. Nuclear weapon tests by the USA	<u>1962: Cuban Missile Crisis</u>	
<u>1947: Truman Doctrine</u> <u>1947: Marshall Plan</u>	Support for democracies against communist threat in Greece and Turkey Financial support for western Europe	<u>1963: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</u>	Prohibiting nuclear weapon tests
<u>1948: Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia</u> <u>1948: Truman's Loyalty program</u> <u>1948: Brussels Pact</u>	To catch cold war spies to transfer the sources of the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) to NATO	<u>1969: Apollo 11</u>	Lands on the moon
<u>1949: NATO established</u>		<u>1972: Nixon visits China</u>	Diplomatic warm-up
<u>1950-1953: Korean War</u>	Stalin supports North Korea	<u>1972: SALT I</u> <u>1979: SALT II</u>	
<u>1954: KGB established</u> <u>1954: H-bomb Castle-Bravo test</u>	Thermonuclear weapon test	<u>1975: End of Vietnam War</u>	USSR had supported the North and USA the South
<u>1955: Warsaw Pact</u>		<u>1979: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan</u>	
<u>1956: USSR intervention in Poland, Hungary and Afghanistan</u>		<u>1985: Gorbachev elected</u>	Perestroika and glasnost
<u>1957: Vostok and Sputnik</u>	Launched into space		
<u>1958: Mercury project</u>	Human spaceflight Project of US		
<u>1959: The Kitchen Debates</u>	Exhibition of US life and products in Moscow as a result of cultural agreements		

Sources: Truman Library, J.F.K Library, Office of the Historian-Department of State of the United States of America

APPENDIX III: LIST OF RUSSIAN BUREAUCRATS AND THEIR POSITIONS MENTIONED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS

<u>Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov</u> : Former General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party between 1982-1983.
<u>Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin</u> : Last Chairman of KGB in 1991.
<u>Oleg Dmitriyevich Baklanov</u> : Deputy to the Supreme Soviet, one of the supporters of the August coup in 1991.
<u>Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev</u> : Former General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party between 1964-1982.
<u>Gennady Eduardovich Burbulis</u> : Secretary of State until 1992. He was responsible for economic and political reforms.
<u>Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin</u> : Minister of Gas Industry of the USSR and the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation between 1992-1998.
<u>Anatoly Borisovich Chubais</u> : Minister responsible for privatization in 1991, Deputy Prime Minister for economic policy in 1996.
<u>Yegor Timurovich Gaidar</u> : Prime Minister of Russia in 1992. Administrator of the “shock therapy” in Russia
<u>Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev</u> : General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR between 1985-1991. President of the USSR from 1990 to 1991.
Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov: He led the Supreme Soviet of Russia against Yeltsin. One of the important actors of the 1993 Consitutional Crisis.
<u>Sergey Vladilenovich Kiriyenko</u> : Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from April-August 1998.
<u>Andrei Vladimirovich Kozyrev</u> : Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation between 1991-1996.
<u>Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov</u> : Leader of the August Coup in 1991.
<u>Alexander Ivanovich Lebedev</u> : Member of Russian Communist Party Central Committee between 1990-1991.
<u>Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov</u> : State Duma Deputy. One of the supporters of the August coup in 1991.
<u>Albert Mikhailovich Makashov</u> : Ran for presidency in 1991. Member of the Communist Party.

<u>Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov</u> : Minister of Russia for the Ministry of Atomic Energy from 1992-1998 and a member of the Security Council
<u>Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov</u> : Reformist and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in 1998
<u>Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov</u> : Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in 1991. One of the supporters of the August coup in 1991.
<u>Lev Aleksandrovich Ponomarev</u> : Led the investigation of the Causes and Circumstances of the August coup; he was a reformist lawmaker and co-chairman of the Democratic Russia Movement.
<u>Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov</u> : Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia between 1996-1998. Prime Minister of the Russian Federation between 1998-1999.
<u>Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin</u> : Prime Minister of the Russian Federation between 1999-2000.
<u>Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov</u> : Minister of Defence between 1996-1997.
<u>Alexander Vladimirovich Rutskoy</u> : Vice President of Russia from 1991-1993. One of the important actors of the 1993 Constitutional Crisis.
<u>Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov</u> : Communist rival of Yeltsin in 1991 elections.
<u>Gennadiy Nikolayevich Seleznyov</u> : A former member of the previous Communist Party. Chairman of the Duma from 1996 to 2003.
<u>Oleg Semyonovich Shenin</u> : A former member of the Communist Party of USSR. One of the supporters of the August coup in 1991.
<u>Amangeldy Gumirovich Tuleyev</u> : He ran for the presidency in 1991 and 1996.
<u>Grigory Alekseyevich Yavlinsky</u> : Author of the 500 day program. He ran for presidency against Yeltsin in 1996.
<u>Dmitri Timofeyevich Yazov</u> : Former Minister of Defence. One of the supporters of the August coup.
<u>Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin</u> : First President of the Russian Federation (1991-1999).
<u>Yuli Mikhailovich Vorontsov</u> : Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN between 1991-1994
<u>Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy</u> : Member of the State Duma between 1993-2000.
<u>Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov</u> : Member of the State Duma. He ran for presidency in 1993, 1995, 1996.

Sources: Yeltsin Center
Wilson Center Digital Archives
Yeltsin, B. (1994). *"Struggle for Russia"*.
Yeltsin, B. (2000). *"Midnight Diaries"*.

APPENDIX IV: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU
HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA	
Tarih: 15/03/2023	
Tez Başlığı: Yeltsin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasının Yeni-Klasik Gerçekçilik Bakış Açısıyla Analizi	
Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:	
1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır, 2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir. 3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir. 4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, mülakat, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.	
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kurul/Komisyon'dan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.	
Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.	
Tarih ve İmza	Adı Soyadı: Duygu Hekimgil Işkın Öğrenci No: N21220787 Anabilim Dalı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Programı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER-TEZLİ YL Statüsü: ☒ Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Doktora
<u>DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI</u>	
Uygunudur.	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kadri Kaan Renda _____ (Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)	
Detaylı Bilgi: http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr Telefon: 0-312-2976860 Faks: 0-3122992147 E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr	



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**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Date: 15/03/2023

Thesis Title: An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Era From A Neo-classical Realist Perspective

My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
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I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

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Student No: N21220787

Department: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Program: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-WITH THESIS

Status: ☒ MA ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Approved.

Asst. Prof. Kadri Kaan Renda

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APPENDIX V: ORIGINALITY REPORT

 HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU
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Tarih: 15/03/2023
Tez Başlığı : Yeltsin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasının Yeni-Klasik Gerçekçilik Bakış Açısıyla Analizi Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 107 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 13/03/2023 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 8'dir. Uygulanan filtrelemeler: 1- ☒ Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç 2- ☒ Kaynakça hariç 3- ☒ Alıntılar hariç 4- ☐ Alıntılar dâhil 5- ☒ 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim. Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim. Tarih ve İmza Adı Soyadı: DUYGU HEKİMGİL İŞKİN Öğrenci No: N21220787 Anabilim Dalı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Programı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER-TEZLİ YL
<u>DANIŞMAN ONAYI</u> UYGUNDUR. Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kadri Kaan Renda _____ (Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Thesis Title : An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Era From A Neo-classical Realist Perspective
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Student No: N21220787

Department: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Asst. Prof. Kadri Kaan Renda

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)