Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of Peace Studies

NATO INTERVENTION IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Asset ZAKIROV

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2019

NATO INTERVENTION IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The jury finds that Asset ZAKIROV has on the date of 10.09.2019 successfully passed the defense examination and approves his/her Master's Thesis titled "NATO Intervention in the Libyan Crisis and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect".

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Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ayşe Ömür ATMACA** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

23.09.2018

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ABSTRACT

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The events that occurred during the Arab Spring in early 2011 triggered the world community. Violent socio-political processes and changes in the ruling regimes of the Middle East and North African countries, particularly in Libya, led to the emergence of a political and moral dilemma for the Western World. In this context, this thesis examines the importance and influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention and response regarding this issue, as well as the questions of the motives behind the military operation in Libya. To this end, the thesis specifically discusses the positions of some key NATO members, namely USA, France, UK, Germany, as well as Italy, regarding the intervention in Libya based on the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization of Resolution 1973.

Keywords

NATO, Arab Spring, R2P, Libya, UNSC, Resolution 1973, Pillar III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AP	Arab Partnership
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PfP	Partnership for Peace Program
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RwP	Responsibility while Protecting
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
US	United States
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

In the period from 2010 to 2012, a series of political events in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) gained a place in history as the Arab Spring. In December 2010, a young street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi committed an act of self-immolation in Tunisia that resulted in a wave of protests which later swept the whole country. After several weeks of protests and riots, having lost the support of the army, President of Tunisia Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was compelled to leave the country (Chrisafis, 2011).

Only 11 days later on January 25 protests began in Egypt. On January 25, riots, pogroms, arson, and clashes with the police began which ended up with the death of hundreds of demonstrators. As in the case of Tunisia, the Egyptian army did not stand on the side of President Hosni Mubarak, and on February 11, the Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman reported the resignation of Mubarak on national television who has ruled the country since 1981. After the resignation of Mubarak, the authority was transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces under the rule of Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi (McGreal & Shenker, 2011).

The most dramatic situation evolved in Syria where many cities were fallen to ruins, causing the death of a number of people, and millions were compelled to flee to other countries, while the radical terrorist organization called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) locked down a large part of the country (Żuber & Moussa, 2018).

At the same time other states in the region, in particular monarchies, were able to avoid the significant consequences of the protests. For example, in Morocco, it was possible to suppress the tensions of the demonstrations by implementing reforms and signing a new constitution, while in Jordan it was possible to do this by changing the government (Yom, 2017).

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya could not manage only with small losses. Waves of protests against Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled the country for over 40 years, started

in the city of Benghazi, later moved to the whole country and escalated into a full-scale civil war between Gaddafi supporters and rebel groups using aviation and heavy weaponry (GOV.UK, 2011).

After the opposition took control over Benghazi, it reported the formation of the Transitional National Council. Supporters of this group proclaimed themselves to be the 'authority of the revolution' and considered themselves the only legitimate state power in the country (Maru, 2012, p. 68).

Supporters of Gaddafi fought against the participants of the revolution with rather tough measures, subsequently causing immediate international intervention. The key actor undertaking the concept of R2P among the external participants in the Libyan crisis has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the military-political Alliance, which includes the United States and a number of leading European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy (Carati, 2017).

The United Nations Security Council under Resolution 1973 decided to prohibit the supply of arms to Libya, freeze Gaddafi's bank accounts, and prohibit moving outside the country (Pommier, 2011, p. 1066). Later, when the situation in the country became even more aggravated, several more points were added to the sanctions: no-fly zone was implemented over the country, and a decision was made to use all possible measures and means to protect civilians (UNGA, 2011).

In the light of these events, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the intervention in Libya was justified on humanitarian considerations and referred to the principle of the so-called 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) (Omri, 2011). The principle of R2P was first presented in the documents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) established by the government of Canada in December 2001 (ICISS, 2001). The concept of R2P was further confirmed and developed in the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* set out by the UN Secretary-General in 2004. Furthermore, in the 2005 report entitled *In*

Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All Kofi Annan called the UNGA to embrace the R2P, that is, defining the concept as a basis for the implementation of collective action against mass atrocity crimes. Subsequently, the main provisions of R2P were consolidated in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document adopted by the heads of state and government of 170 countries. According to the concept of R2P, "state sovereignty is understood not only as a state privilege but also as an obligation according to which a state is obliged to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of all people within its territorial boundaries. In case a state is unable to meet this obligation, the international community is obliged to assume responsibility for the prevention of human rights violations" (ICISS, 2001).

In the period from 2005 to 2011, despite the fact that there were various kinds of humanitarian crises, it is worth noting that the case of Libya is the first model of the action of R2P through military intervention under the UN sanctions.

In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 from March 17, 2011, a coalition of NATO and EU states carried out a number of humanitarian operations in order to stabilize the situation in Libya on the basis of the R2P principle (Bellamy, 2011). Some argue that the UN Security Council approved this initiative within a clearly defined mandate, that is, it authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone over the Libyan airspace in order to protect the population of Libya because the official government of the country was not able to perform this operation (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012).

There were mixed reactions from the international community to the implementation of R2P. Along with the positive feedback about the successful implementation of R2P such as the UN Security Council effort in resolving the post-electoral crisis in Kenya in 2008 (Langer, 2011, p. 13), some experts such as Vitaly Churkin criticized the actions of the coalition for a loose interpretation of the wording of the Resolution, as well as for open violation of the principles of international law (Mateiko, 2016, p. 54).

Given such context, research questions of this thesis are as follows: "Did the principle of R2P implemented by NATO during the Libyan crisis aim at protecting the population from atrocity crimes?", and "What are the motives and goals behind the Alliance's intervention in the course of events?".

Based on these questions, the thesis benefits from primary sources of the study, which can be divided into several groups. The primary group includes NATO official documents that are pertinent to the subject matter of the study. Thus, one can distinguish the official document of NATO on the strategic concept from 1999 and 2010, by which the process of development and transformation of the North Atlantic alliance are studied. Analyzing and studying these documents, the tendency of policy development and changes in the NATO strategy in the context of global threats, as well as current political dangers and study the mechanism for resolving and preventing transnational threats can be also identified.

The secondary group of sources includes the NATO communiqué on the course of events of the Arab Spring. The determination of the official position of the North Atlantic Alliance, which defines the strategy of NATO in resolving conflicts in the region can be achieved through the analysis of the communiqué.

The texts from public speeches of such officials as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nicolas Sarkozy, representing the USA, the EU and NATO are included in the third group of sources, where the issues concerning changes in strategy and transformation of the Alliance at the turn of the 20-21st centuries were raised. The use of texts from public speeches by officials of diplomatic departments is justified by the fact that they reflect the official positions of these states on the events of the Arab Spring.

Systematic analysis provides an opportunity not only to determine the positions of heads of states of NATO regarding the issue of participation in the regulation of armed conflict in the countries of the MENA region, but also makes it possible to

define the strategy and approaches of NATO member countries on the issue of the use of R2P in resolving the crisis in Libya.

The fourth group of sources involves the official documents of the UN Security Council on the issue of conflict settlement of the Arab Spring protests, as well as the UN decisions regarding military operation in Libya against government armed forces of Gaddafi.

In the case of secondary sources, the emergence of the Arab Spring protests, systematic analysis of the development of the events was carried out in the work of Gelvin (2015). The author reveals and clarifies in the questions-and-answers format all aspects of the revolutionary protests that influenced the region of the Middle East. Exploring the situation of Libya during the uprisings, Gelvin (2015) explains why this country is considered 'weak' and why such status is important in understanding the situation in the country. Additionally, the author discusses the humanitarian intervention of external forces in the country and their influence on the further development of the situation.

In Kenneth's (2011) work, the question of the political structures of the Arab countries and their democratization was touched upon, and a study and comparison of various revolutionary movements were carried out according to the state-by-state analysis method. Moreover, the intentions and interests of the superpowers during the revolutionary movements in the Arab region, in particular, the policy of NATO in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime in Libya were interpreted in Petras' (2012) and Forte's (2012) works.

Additional literature on this topic was found important in researching this issue such as the work of Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (2013), as well as Peter's (2012), who give answers to such questions as what was the EU policy in promoting democratization in the region and what was the position of the EU as a whole in the light of the events of Arab Spring.

It is well known that NATO has become one of the main external participants in the events of the Arab Spring having a special place in the system of modern world politics. Since the founding of the Alliance, the issue of politics and the development of NATO has been in the focus of interests of many scholars. This was determined by the importance of the military and political dimension of NATO, as well as by various aspects of the confrontation during the Cold War.

The process of political changes and the development of the direction of NATO's activities is reflected in the works of such scholars as Gordon, Shapiro (2004), Croft (2000) and Bailes (2004). The works of these scholars address the development of the strategy and direction of NATO during the post-bipolar period. Furthermore, the new organization of NATO strategies in modern changing conditions also addressed in the research. As for example, in Hulsman's (2001) work the question of the US and NATO discussions on the place and role of the North Atlantic bloc in the context of global threats is raised. Hulsman also discusses a number of important issues related to the interaction of the US and European states in modern conditions and the distribution of the Alliance's role in ensuring European security.

The conceptual framework of R2P implemented during the crisis in Libya was used as a base for the study. The source basis of the study includes NATO's strategic geopolitical concepts, individual reports and articles of the North Atlantic Treaty on the creation of the Alliance, as well as NATO doctrinal provisions. Sources of analysis of the conceptual framework and practical implementation of R2P include public speeches and texts from official meetings, as well as reports from state representatives. In the process of studying, the concept of R2P, UN Security Council Resolutions, certain provisions, and norms of international law embedded in the UN Charter were also considered.

An analysis of the US foreign policy strategy at the beginning of the 21st century is presented in the works of Donnelly (2006), Peterson (2004), Lieber (2005) and Fehl (2008). Moreover, it is also important to understand the significance of the essence of the presidential strategy of the US administration, which was put forward in the

geopolitical doctrines of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. A more detailed study of the official doctrine of Washington was presented in the works of Schmidt (2008) and May (2010).

Regarding the literature on the concept of R2P, which was first introduced in ICSS in 2001, it should be noted that the notion attracted the attention of many scholars to examine it. After the consequences of the Libyan crisis, the status and role of the R2P concept had attracted critical reactions in the international arena. Thus, there were discussions and disputes on the legitimacy and practicality of the concept, which are still being on the agenda. For instance, Chesterman (2011) believes that the R2P concept is of particular importance in resolving conflicts, but at the same time, we need to know that it should be evaluated as a compromise solution, not having any legally binding character. According to Kinsman (2011), the use of R2P during the crisis in Libya is an inaugural way of applying the concept, while Goldstein and Western (2011, p. 48) claim that as a key element in humanitarian intervention, R2P has become an integral part of conflict management tools. Evans (2017) believes that the R2P has been continuing to grow "as a principle, or normative standard, in a way that would have been unimaginable for the earlier concept of 'humanitarian intervention' which R2P has now almost completely, and rightly, displaced" (p. 2). Moreover, Adams (2016) claims that "R2P is not just an idea, but a practical guide to action".

Among the critical opinions about the practicality of R2P, many scholars believe that the legal position of the concept remains unclear, and imposing the concept on duty for the international community is also inappropriate. One of such critics is Cunliffe (2010, p. 81), according to whom the notion 'responsibility to protect' has become a 'duty of care', so he comes to the conclusion that the implementation of the concept in such a character can cause great damage and have an adverse effect on international relations. Bellamy (2005) claims that "considering the crisis of confidence that some of the leading proponents of humanitarian intervention are facing, there is a real danger that the call for responsibility to protect will evaporate

amid controversies about where this responsibility lies" (p. 33). Hehir (2019) believes that "R2P has at crucial points been manipulated by states to cohere with their pre-existing interests". Furthermore, according to Gözen Ercan (2014), "without structural transformation of the international political system..., no one can guarantee effective implementation of the international community's responsibility to protect" (p. 50).

Despite the significance and relevance of the study of the approaches and the role of NATO on the settlement of the Libyan crisis, there are few special and comprehensive studies on NATO policies and strategies for resolving the political issue so far. Therefore, this circumstance requires the relevance and need for further study of the topic of NATO's policy in the settlement of the Libyan crisis during the Arab Spring. In addition, since the use of the R2P concept can be either effective or ineffective in the settlement of a conflict, the topic still remains relevant and requires further systematic analysis.

Pursuant to this, the main argument of this thesis is as follows: the implementation of R2P by NATO during the uprisings in Libya can be characterized rather as a broad spectrum of economic and geopolitical interests in the MENA region, primarily related to the achievement of dominance in the region and linked to the aim of ensuring energy security to the member countries of the Alliance.

In the course of the study, a qualitative approach will be applied to provide a detailed analysis of the conflict events during the Arab Spring, as well as to analyze the concept of Responsibility to Protect, its history, background, development, and its criticism. Document analysis method will be used to analyze the development of NATO strategies in the Post-Cold war period. The method of case study will be used with regard to the Libya crisis. This method of analysis also made it possible to identify the most significant aspects of NATO intervention in the Libyan crisis.

The thesis is organized in the following way: chapter 1 builds up the conceptual basis for the study of the notion of R2P, and briefly outlines the examples of its application

in practice. The chapter also raises the issue of criticism of the concept, thereby giving examples of its implementation in particular cases, demonstrating its success or failure. Chapter 2 gives detailed information about the transformation and development NATO strategy in the post-Cold War period, and its geopolitical vector aimed at establishing a new political strategy for the Alliance. The chapter also discusses the security policy of NATO, which was a priority function of the Alliance, the main component of which was the control over military-political crises in the international arena, especially in MENA region. Chapter 3 discusses the political side of the conflict of the Arab Spring events within the framework of the geopolitical priorities and goals of NATO in the MENA region. The chapter also focuses on the investigation of the role of NATO in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically, particular emphasis was placed on the crisis in Libya, since the active intervention of NATO with regard to the scope of its armed forces, as well as to the implementation of the concept of R2P which was of great importance in the settlement of the crisis and ensuring security in the country.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The chapter examines the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Accordingly, the chapter traces the process of its emergence, development, as well as its key features and legal framework. In particular, the chapter aims to provide an analysis of the transformation and practical implementation of the concept in the post-bipolar period. Furthermore, the chapter presents the role of R2P in the international community, as well as criticism based on arguments from both supporters and opponents.

1.1   RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

After a series of events such as civil war in Somalia (1992), ethnic genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the bombing raids of the former Yugoslavia (1999) to prevent ethnic cleansing, and attempts to resolve them by means of humanitarian intervention there was created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) led by the Canadian Government, where the report on 'Responsibility to Protect' was first presented, which became the basis for the conceptual justification for the intervention of the international community (ICISS, 2001). This concept has been recognized by the international community on the margins of the 60th session of the UN General Assembly Summit (Haslett, 2014, p. 179).

The main distinguishing feature of R2P from humanitarian intervention is the aspect that humanitarian intervention implies the involvement of military force, while R2P is rather of a preventive nature, the purpose and the main idea of which is, as previously stated, to prevent the commission of such crimes as genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which are expressly prohibited

in international law (UNGA, 2005, p.30). Bellamy believes that since international law prohibits such crimes, then the concept of R2P should be applied through the UN, moreover he claims that the R2P cannot be a new legal norm or principle, but it is rather a political intention to effectively use already existing norms (Bellamy, 2011). In addition, according to the R2P principle, military intervention is used as a last resort only when all means of resolving the conflict have failed, whereas humanitarian intervention allows the use of military force during humanitarian operations without UN authorization. At the same time, Alvarez emphasizes that there is a good chance that R2P may become a concept of a generally binding character, thus, it can expand the circle of potential grounds for interference in the internal affairs of states and may lead to a rethinking of their sovereignty (Alvarez, 2008, p. 281).

Today, the R2P concept is one of the most debated and controversial issues in modern international relations, since the concept features a strong link between the issue of respect for fundamental human rights, the prevention and resolution of international conflicts, and the maintenance of international peace and security (Gözen Ercan, 2016, p. 21). Due to the absence of legal regulation of the concept, active discussions and debates arise concerning its ideas and practices in modern crisis situations that can be a threat to the international security, both at the state level under the framework of the UN and in the doctrine of international law.

Thus, as a result of the emergence of internal armed conflicts with the highest form of violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, in the framework of the UN Security Council, it was decided to create the legal and political prerequisites for developing the R2P concept. This concept was supposed to answer such contentious questions as: what measures should be taken in case of gross violations of human rights at the intergovernmental level if the use of force is prohibited by international law? How should the international community respond to massacres and genocide if the use of peaceful means has not led to any effective results? What measures should be taken in the event of such catastrophes?

In the ICISS report where the formulation of the concept of R2P was first proposed, the main emphasis was placed on the fact that "ensuring security is not a military issue and does not constitute a confrontation between the state and individual sovereignty" (ICISS, 2001, p. 8). The key components that reveal the content and idea of this concept were "the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild" (ICISS, 2001, p. XI).

In the *Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* set up by the UN Secretary-General in 2004, this concept was confirmed and further developed. Furthermore, the definition of the correlation of the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens and the collective responsibility of the international community was also mentioned in the report (UNGA, 2004, p. 6). It is also stated in the report that sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection against mass murders and sexual assaults, ethnic cleansing through exile and intimidation, intentional infliction of conditions for starvation and the emergence of fatal diseases (UNGA, 2004, p. 56). Only when Governments are unable or unwilling to provide such protection, the international community should take responsibility, thus helping to resolve conflicts through peaceful means, including preventive measures, and it also should respond to violence, and if necessary, contribute to the reconstruction of a disrupted society. Military intervention should be implemented as an extreme measure only authorized by the UN Security Council (UNGA, 2004, pp. 56-57).

Mention should also be made to the address of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding the principle of R2P which was raised in his report to the General Assembly in 2005 entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. In paragraph 7 of this report, Kofi Annan identified the R2P principle as the basis for the implementation of collective action to combat genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition, the Secretary-General, supporting the idea of taking appropriate measures to combat such crimes, pointed out that "this responsibility lies with each individual State, whose duty is to protect its

population" (UNGA, 2005a, p. 35). Moreover, according to Kofi Annan, attention should also be paid to the fact that "if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations" (UNGA, 2005a, p. 35). More importantly, according to the Secretary-General, "when such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required" (UNGA, 2005a, p. 35).

The further development of the R2P concept was reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The part of the document devoted to the R2P concept was entitled "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UNGA, 2005b, p. 30). The document also included paragraphs 138 and 139, in which the main provisions of the principle of R2P were indicated. The responsibility of individual states was identified in paragraph 138, while the international community's responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was set out in paragraph 139. Moreover, paragraph 139 says that the international community has "the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UNGA, 2005b, p. 30). In addition to this, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document also states that "we are *prepared* to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, *through the Security Council,* in accordance with the Charter, *including Chapter VII*, on a *case-by-case* basis…should *peaceful means be inadequate* and national authorities are *manifestly failing* to protect their populations" from atrocity crimes (UNGA, 2005b, p. 30).

In the UN Secretary-General's report entitled *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* from January 12, 2009, there were established the Three Pillars of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (UNGA, 2009). Pillar I identifies that the State

entails the primary responsibility to protect the population from crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing which have been indicated in paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. In the context of Pillar I, it is also emphasized that this responsibility derives from "the nature of State sovereignty and from the pre-existing and continuing legal obligations of States" (UNGA, 2009, p. 9). According to Pillar II titled "International assistance and capacity-building", the international community has the responsibility "to assist States in fulfilling their respective obligations" (UNGA, 2009, p. 9). Pillar III stresses the responsibility of Member countries in taking "collective action in a timely and decisive manner in cases when a State is clearly unable to provide such protection" (UNGA, 2009, p. 9). Moreover, given the degree of the UN Security Council's engagement on the implementation of R2P, special attention should be paid to Pillar III, which involves providing assistance to ensure a collective response of the international community in cases when a State is not able to implement measures specified in Pillar I to protect its own population. Thus, Pillar III calls on the UN Security Council to implement a wider range of measures, including pacific and coercive enforcement measures (UNGA, 2012). Pacific measures can be implemented by the authorization of the Chapter VI provisions of the UN Charter, which specifies such pacific settlements of disputes as negotiation, mediation, inquiry, judicial settlement or other peaceful measures (UN, Introductory Note). Chapter VIII specifies that such "regional arrangements" as NATO, the African Union and the Arab League "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes…" (UN, Introductory Note). In addition, in the event when a State is unable to comply with the indicated dispute settlement measures, the UN Security Council may also implement more coercive measures under Article 53 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as military embargoes, boycotts, imposing sanctions and referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Similarly, the Security Council may also authorize the conduction of military operations such as the deployment of troops or the establishment of a no-fly zone (UNGA, 2009, p. 9).

The concept has been concretized and further developed in the reports of the UN Secretary-General at the 63rd, 64th, 66th and 67th sessions of the UN General Assembly and in an interactive dialogue of state representatives. In particular, at the 66th session of the UN General Assembly, the delegation of Brazil presented the so-called concept of 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP), which should be applied in parallel with the concept of R2P on the basis of agreed principles and procedures (UNGA, 2012, p. 13). This concept was created to define the distinction between 'collective responsibility', which is not applied by coercive measures, and 'collective security' in order to avoid the hasty use of force (UNGA, 2012, p. 15).

1.2   CRITICISM AND PRACTICE OF THE R2P

Probably the most serious criticism of the concept of R2P and its practice in settling international disputes was expressed in the opinion that the concept is considered "a kind of 'Trojan horse', that is, becoming a rhetorical pretext for influential international actors in the implementation of large-scale biased invasions" (Bellamy, 2005, p. 31).

Since the R2P concept implies key parameters for ensuring international security, when using this concept as a guide to action, it is required to establish the most specific and clear legal aspects, in particular, the implementation of military force by the foreign actors in the internal affairs of states under the auspices of the UN or other international structures. Any imprecise and vague interpretation of the content of the concept can lead to serious international consequences. As for the structures that can use R2P in the settlement of crises, first of all, it is necessary to mention the UN active implementation of this concept.

A controversial point regarding the R2P concept is the issue of the use of force under Pillar III. According to some experts, the application of the R2P concept by the international community through the use of military force in the internal affairs of states is an outright violation of sovereignty (Haslett, 2014). Others argue that the

use of R2P is the only effective measure that can be implemented in a timely and decisive manner during mass atrocities (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012).

In 2004, Foreign Policy magazine published an article by George Soros, in which the issue of people's sovereignty in the context of the implementation of the R2P concept was raised. According to Soros, "sovereignty is an anachronism, and this concept was created in bygone times when the society consisted of rulers and subjects of the state, in fact, not citizens. This concept became the groundwork of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648. Today, despite the fact that not all states adhere to democratic views towards their citizens, the principle of sovereignty is characterized by external interference in the internal affairs of nation-states. But the true sovereign is a state that gives the appropriate powers and rights to their governments. If the government abuses the powers entrusted to it and citizens are deprived of the rights and opportunities to remedy such situations, then external intervention is justified" (Soros, 2009).

The reference to the concept of R2P under Pillar III was realized during the Darfur crisis in 2006. Accordingly, UN Security Council Resolution 1706 was adopted which proposed the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations under the pretext of providing humanitarian assistance. The document, in particular, stated that due to "all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur", the early deployment of UN and African Union forces should be realized in the region "in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement" (UNSC, 2006). However, while the R2P concept does not require any consent from the targeted states, Resolution 1706 implied 'consent of the Government of National Unity', which subsequently did not receive approval from the Sudanese government, thereby becoming an uncontrolled barrier to the international community (Schulz, 2009, p. 150). Furthermore, the UN emphasized that the primary responsibility for humanitarian action rests primarily with the African Union, while the Union did not have sufficient capacity and resources. Thus, in the case of Darfur, there was a deadlock in the international community regarding the concept of R2P, more

precisely, who should actually be responsible for reacting to intra-state conflicts and to what extent, which ultimately ended as an example of an insufficient and a poor plan of the implementation of a peace agreement and a conflict resolution (De Waal, 2007, p. 1049). Moreover, as Lee Feinstein (2007) said, "if Darfur is the first 'test case' of the Responsibility to Protect there is no point in denying that the world has failed the entry exam" (p. 38).

During the civil war between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2007, the country's civilians remained unprotected, which ultimately provoked widespread calls for the UN Security Council to implement R2P. However, the UN Security Council did not adopt an appropriate resolution, citing the internal matter of the conflict, thereby putting 150,000 civilians at risk (Bellamy, 2011, pp. 60-62)

Despite the fact that the case in Kenya is considered as a successful example of the application of the R2P concept, according to Bellamy, the concept was used 'loosely' during the crisis, which raises serious doubts about its content and scope of its use. Moreover, Bellamy (2011) claims that the concept was used more like a "diplomatic tool than a catalyst for action" (p. 89).

It is also noteworthy the statement of Vitaly Churkin who was Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN, where he makes it clear that "the R2P concept is rather unclear and somewhat vague in nature and it exists in the form of a framework that does not represent a universal political and legal content" (Saikin, 2012). Additionally, according to Churkin "special attention should be paid to the substantive part of the concept, since the concept deals with the legal nature of the justification for the use of force, and therefore, it is necessary to apply a balanced, non-confrontational approach that will ensure the security of the entire international community, based on the fundamental principles and norms of international law" (Mateiko, 2016, p. 54).

The most controversial point regarding enhancing the legitimacy of the R2P concept was the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, which introduced the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya authorizing the "use of all necessary measures to protect civilians" (Evans, 2012). Moreover, during the Libyan crisis the UNSC for the first time authorized the "use of force against wishes of a functioning state" (Bellamy, 2011, p. 263).

Furthermore, after analyzing the course and results of the Libyan crisis, it is clear that during the NATO intervention in the country the first priority was given mainly to military operations without waiting for all the means of peaceful resolution of the conflict to be implemented. Thus, NATO's broad interpretation of its mandate led to criticism that the R2P was "being used for regime change" (Torun, 2017, p. 49). According to Western and Goldstein (2011), the concept of R2P should include new elements that meet Western interests, namely, the priority of military operations and the "remove a corrupt leader", which "has become more the rule…than the exception" (pp. 48-49). Today, there is a consensus in the academia about the failure of the implementation of the R2P concept regarding the Libyan crisis, which not only led to a large number of victims among citizens, but also to the actual split of the country.

The implementation of the concept in practice can also be seen during the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire but it has not been publicized in comparison with the situation in Libya. After the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire, Resolution 1975 was adopted by the UNSC on March 30, 2011, according to which supporters of candidates for the presidential post were responsible for considerable human rights violations (UNSC, 2011). Resolution also stated that the most important task of the state is the realization of the responsibility to protect the population. In addition, the UN Security Council extended the mandate to conduct a peacekeeping operation in the country using all necessary measures, and if necessary using up to heavy weapons (Oved, 2011).

Consequently, it can be said that the conflicts in 2011 in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, were based on the application of the R2P concept. Taking into account two examples of experience in using the concept, it can be emphasized that the key propagandist of R2P were great powers. In the case of Libya, the way the operation was conducted was criticized regarding the issue of intervention and the leading interveners. Some critics believe that during the NATO intervention in Libya and France-led intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, the interveners overstepped the Security Council mandates because the regimes were changed in countries by using disproportionate force, which increased the risks of threats to the civilian population, ignoring and directly rejecting the political dialogue in the settlement of the conflicts (Cohn, 2011). As Evans (2012) states "Their complaints have not been about the initial military response … but what came after, when it became rapidly apparent that the three permanent member states driving the intervention (the US, UK and France, or "P3") would settle for nothing less than regime change, and do whatever it took to achieve that". In addition, countries such as Russia and China argued that regime change should never be part of the toolkit to respond to genocide and mass crimes (Emerson, 2011).

Regarding the use of the concept of R2P, it is believed that the notion is quite often used by Western experts, furthermore, it is also argued that this concept cannot be positioned as a new legal norm or principle. Rather, this principle can be called an interdisciplinary international 'political catchword', which defines and justifies a list of actions that the international community and states should perform to ensure the protection of civilians, based on existing political and legal principles and norms (Stahn, 2007, p. 120).

1.3   CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the essence of the concept of Responsibility to Protect lies under the principle that sovereignty is 'not a privilege' of a state, but its 'obligation'. If this obligation is not fulfilled, that is, if a state is unable to protect its population in

the event of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, then international intervention is necessary (ICISS, 2001). However, discussions are ongoing today that have not yet led to a consensus on the meaning and content of the concept. It is believed that the implementation of the notion of R2P can lead to an extensive international political, legal, as well as economic implications that can be both positive and negative in nature. For instance, the application of R2P can be called successful when the basis of the intervention complies with the norms and principles of international law, as well as when it helps to establish peace and order in the country, eliminating or reducing the scale of human rights violations. However, a negative scenario can include the discrepancy between the declared motive and the real objective of the interventionist state in the realization of the operation as in the case of NATO intervention during the conflict in Libya. It is argued that during the intervention in Libya, NATO had its own motives for carrying out the humanitarian operation under the flag of Responsibility to Protect. Moreover, it is also believed that the illegitimate nature is reflected in NATO's intention to achieve rather political than humanitarian goals that led to negative consequences in the country.

Accordingly, it is to be noted that more careful attention should be paid to the analysis of the legal component of the concept of R2P, as well as to the NATO as a military-political bloc and its strategic vector in order to understand the abuse of power in the practical implementation of the notion.

CHAPTER 2

NATO ENLARGEMENT POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The chapter focuses on the process of transformation of NATO and its Strategic Concept at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, aimed at the formation of a strategic vector in accordance with the new global challenges and political realities. With regard to the changes in the world political system, the key tasks of the Alliance have become to set new goals and objectives, as well as to establish a new strategic direction. Accordingly, the analysis of the transformation of NATO, as well as the development of its Strategic concepts provides discussion on the Alliance's policy towards Middle East and its strong economic, political, and security interests in the region. Furthermore, the analysis also gives detailed information about NATO's main directions which were based on three important tasks such as collective defense, crisis management, and security through cooperation. The chapter also discusses the security policy of NATO, which has become a priority function of the Alliance, the main component of which was the control over military-political crises in the international arena, especially in MENA region as an example of the implementation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect during the Libyan civil war.

2.1   OVERVIEW

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military-political alliance that includes a number of leading European countries such as UK, Germany, France, and others, as well as the USA and Canada. The Alliance was created with the idea of confronting the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, as well as ensuring security in Europe and strengthening partnerships and cooperation between the United States and the capitalist states of the Old World (NATO, 2006).

After the collapse of the socialist bloc, NATO established a strategic vector for the broadening of its activities. The new strategic direction of the Alliance in the post-bipolar era was developed throughout the 1990s. In the light of the changes in the world political system, the new strategic direction of the Alliance was intended to the formation of NATO as the leading organization for ensuring the military-political, geopolitical and economic security of its member countries (NATO, 2006).

Defining a new strategic approach in using the military and political potential of the Alliance for conflict management and solving political issues became one of the key tasks of NATO after the events in the USA on September 11, 2001. After the announcement of the US administration about the global fight against international terrorism, NATO and its strategic concept have faced dramatic changes and led the American and Alliance's forces to participate in military operations against terrorism. In addition to NATO's desire to expand its political allies, the Alliance intended to democratize political systems in those countries where the authoritarian regime had not changed for decades (NATO, 2006, p. 49).

2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF NATO STRATEGIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The collapse of the socialist bloc in the last decade of the 20th century, the vanishing of the USSR from the geopolitical map of the world, the abolishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the end of the Cold War and the continental confrontation of two military-political alliances led NATO to reform the organization in conformity with the new political realities. During these events, the new task of NATO has become the formation of a new political strategy, the establishment of a new course in ensuring the security of the North Atlantic Organization. In line with changes in the political, geopolitical and military situation in the world, it was necessary to revise the goals, methods, and forms of the Alliance's activities. Thus, one of the main objectives of NATO has become "the legitimization of the organization's activities in

the system of international relations. NATO's strategy shifted from the traditional military-political course, which was aimed at confronting the USSR and preserving transatlantic solidarity and partnership, to a new strategy that was more global in nature" (Carter B., J. Perry, & D. Driscoll, 1993).

During the transformation of the Alliance related to its remarkable expansion, it should be noted that in the late 1990s after the end of the Cold War, the so-called fourth expansion of NATO began when such countries as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined the Alliance. The Alliance's extension process continued in the 2000s with the result that Croatia and Albania were admitted to NATO membership in 2009, thus the Organization included 29 states, which made it possible to consider NATO as the largest military-political alliance.

One of the first documents where the main directions of the transformation of the Alliance were identified was the London Declaration, which was adopted at the NATO summit on July 5-6, 1990 (NATO, 1990). The London Declaration stated that after the fall of the Berlin Wall a new era began in Europe and the whole world, and NATO's core function was to get into a position of a tool in providing transatlantic security environment. Moreover, NATO was also responsible for achieving the integration of the former socialist states into the Western community (Aybet, 1999, p. 2). It is also necessary to note that the London Declaration had a significant influence on the development trend of the military-political strategy of NATO member states. Particularly, the official document of the declaration stated that "the prospects for military expansion are associated with an increase in the mobility and versatility of the armed forces of the Alliance and the formation of multinational contingents" (London Declaration, 1990).

Concerning the process of transformation of NATO in a geographical context, it is worth emphasizing the fact that the strategy to expand the activities and responsibilities of the Organization is not only to increase the number of member states. Thus, the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was presented at a summit

meeting in Brussels on January 11, 1994, within the framework of NATO, the purpose of which was to implement practical and relevant activities between the Alliance and the states, as well as its members. In addition, the Program's goal was also to involve in the activities of the Alliance those states that are in the focus of NATO's geopolitical interests. According to the PfP, partner states had to "refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, respect existing borders and resolve conflicts by peaceful means" (Kříž, 2015, p. 22). It should also be noted that the majority of Eastern European countries as members of the PfP made some kind of first steps for the subsequent membership in NATO. At the same time, the Program allowed the Alliance to switch to a policy of establishing its influence on the global geopolitical space and projecting its military power (Hamilton, 2004, p. 60).

These events arise from the fact that the expansion of the NATO strategic vector in the post-bipolar era is aimed not only at increasing global ambitions of the military-political bloc, but there are two main directions of the strategic development that the Alliance sought to achieve. The first vector of strategic development is reflected in NATO's desire to expand its influence in the East, especially closer to the borders of Russia (E. Kanet & Maxime Henri André, 2012, p. 85). This strategic vector was carried out within the political tradition of the Cold War and was aimed at ensuring security in Europe. The second vector of strategic development of NATO as a global military-political actor is the Alliance's inclination to achieve political influence in any region of the world. NATO was guided precisely by this strategic vector in carrying out operations concerning the states of MENA region, in particular, in the events of the 'Arab Spring' (Shea, 2015, p. 5).

In addition, when studying NATO's military-political strategy in the post-bipolar period, special attention should be paid to the expansion of the Alliance's functions. Since NATO sought to implement its military-political and peacekeeping operations in Europe and beyond, in particular, outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic region, primarily in the region of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South Asia. These

military-political operations of NATO were aimed at combating local and regional instability, violations of human rights, ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To a large extent, these transformations of NATO were due to the Alliance's need to stabilize the situation in Eastern Europe in a military-political sense (conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia) and to prevent international terrorist threats (Dubovyk & Rodrigues, 2010, p. 68).

Along with the transformation of NATO to expand the bloc and change its organizational structures, there were also changes in the military-political strategy. For example, in November 1991, the first unclassified Strategic Concept of NATO (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept) was created and published in Rome (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). Crucially, according to the NATO approach, the Alliance adheres to the Strategic Concept as the basis of a policy in which its goals are formulated. The official Strategy document sets out guidelines for the use of military means within the framework of the Alliance's objectives and security functions (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991).

During the Cold War NATO strategic documents set out the main goal and strategic mission of the bloc, which was the confrontation towards the USSR and its allies under the Warsaw Pact. The scope of NATO's strategic directions was identified within the framework of the deterrence doctrine which was developed in Washington during the initial period of the Cold War.

The NATO 1991 Strategic Concept stated that the main objective and mission of the Alliance was still to ensure the security of member states. This objective will be achieved through "strengthening and expanding the security of the whole of Europe by means of cooperation and partnership with former adversaries" (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 18). Accordingly, adhering to the direction in the military-political aspect, the main vector of the NATO strategic development remained to ensure the security of the Western community. Moreover, the goal of the North Atlantic Alliance was now focused on preparing for new security threats. According to NATO's

assessment of the military-political situation in Europe, the Alliance's 1991 Strategy was quite favorable for applying, above all, a political approach to security. Thus, the 1991 Strategy reaffirmed the decision that was made in London that the emphasis of the Alliance is now focused on a political area rather than on a military (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991).

NATO's new direction based on political security was one of the priority functions of the Alliance. Control over military-political crises, as well as measures and steps to prevent and resolve them, were considered as one of the Alliance's primary directions in the implementation of the new strategy. At the same time, "the prevention and resolution of these crises should be implemented by means of the use of a wide range of political and other measures, including military measures" (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991).

One of the essential aspects established in the Alliance's 1991 Strategy was the "rejection of the use of the term 'threat', which was later replaced by the concept of 'risk'" (Dorsman, Ediger, & Baha Karan, 2018, p. 17). In the Strategy document, the unstable situations in Eastern Europe, conflicts outside Europe, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were described under the term 'risk' (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). After the end of the Cold War, the strategic vector of NATO was re-directed to the non-European space. A vivid example of the reorientation of NATO's strategy is the Alliance's actions in the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean during the events of the Arab Spring. Since 1991, NATO has decided to take responsibility for ensuring security outside the traditional geographical areas of its influence.

Political changes in Europe and the world, military-political crises in the Balkans, as well as destabilization in other regions of the world and preparations for the transition of a new stage of NATO expansion determine the need to revise the Alliance's 1991 Strategy. Thus, the main task of the Alliance was henceforth the establishment of a military-political instrument for ensuring collective security in Europe (Brenner, 1998, p. 42).

The NATO strategic documents of the early 1990s (London Declaration, Alliance Strategy 1991) were actually due to the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance into a pan-European bloc and the establishment of its influence on the entire European continent, thereby further spreading its military-political influence at the global level. To this end, the Mediterranean Dialogue program was launched in 1994, the goal of which was to facilitate the adaptation of NATO to the post-Cold War era conditions (NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, 1994). In addition to NATO members, 7 countries such as Algeria, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia also participated in this program. The Mediterranean Dialogue also reflects NATO's idea of the importance of ensuring security in Europe and the Mediterranean region (NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, 1994).

The events organized by NATO within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue program were aimed at strengthening regional security and changing the negative perception of NATO among the Mediterranean countries (Santis, 2010, p. 143). In the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue, all NATO member states were offered the same basis for cooperation and discussion by the Alliance. This aspect had a significant characteristic in the events held within the framework of the Dialogue. Member states of the Dialogue were free to choose the intensity and scale of their participation in the program, thereby having the right to launch an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. The countries participating in this partnership program received partial or full funding from NATO (Keagle & Petros, 2010, p. 49). As mentioned earlier, the program includes two dimensions: political and practical. The political dimension includes discussions, in particular, related to the Mediterranean Dialogue, between representatives of NATO and the countries of the region. Speaking of practical dimension, it covers activities related to the annual Work Programme and also includes activities such as seminars, conferences, meetings with observers, military ship calls at ports in the countries of the region, as well as other activities related to ensuring security and building the confidence of participating countries through cooperation and partnership (Santis, 2010, p. 143).

In light of these events, the Alliance's new strategic planning document was introduced in 1999 in Washington (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999). The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept was committed to reflecting the relationship between NATO's policies and the actions of its armed forces. The 1991 Strategic Concept was the stage of NATO policy transformation, while the 1999 Strategy was an implementation of the Alliance's military strategy on the eve of and during military operations in the Balkans and other regions of the world. So, in other words, after the end of the Cold War, NATO took as its basis the problem of preventing armed conflicts and stabilizing crisis situations in various parts of the world. This goal was set at the time of the adoption of the 1991 Strategy and was only expanded and strengthened in the 1999 document. A vivid example is the Alliance's activities in resolving conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and the intervention of NATO in stabilizing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years of 1994-2004 (Dukanovic, 2010, pp. 105-106; NATO)

In relation to these events, the crisis of 1999 in the former Yugoslavia, which led to the implementation of humanitarian intervention under the auspices of NATO indicated the fact that the North Atlantic bloc has the right and responsibility to conduct military operations without UN sanctions (Roberts, 1999, p. 104). It should also be acknowledged that the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, as well as the implementation of the concept of R2P in Libya, although carried out somewhat in accordance with a different military-political scenario, lend weight to such a position.

In addition to the operation to stabilize the crisis in the Balkans, the question of expanding the bloc was also considered one of the most crucial matters for the development of NATO and management of its strategic direction. By 1999, it was decided that in the framework of the new stage of expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would be included in the organization (NATO, 1999). Despite the complexity of implementing a policy of expanding the North Atlantic Alliance, it can be said that the leading politicians of the Western states made quite optimistic claims about the strategy of

the military-political bloc. For example, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1999) claimed that "NATO is entering a new era and its energy and vision are oriented to the future, and NATO is a defensive alliance, not a global policeman" (pp. 1-4). Thus, in the process of adopting new states into the organization, Albright (1999) believed that this expansion policy would not be the last, since the principle of spreading the Organization's influence would be taken as a basis in applying the new configuration of the block (pp. 1-6).

The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept clearly outlined NATO's military-political plans to strengthen its influence, to adopt the status of a world organization responsible for the global security of the Alliance. The document also reflected provisions stating that NATO plays a significantly important role to achieve sustainable, peaceful and just order in Europe with "the inextricable transatlantic link between the security of North America and Europe" (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999).

For the purpose of the study, it is particularly important to mention about the fact that, according to the Alliance's 1999 Strategy Concept, the Mediterranean region was considered as an area of special interest of the Alliance. The document indicated that security in the European region is directly related to security and stability in the Mediterranean region. In the course of the events of the beginning of the 21st century, such statements indicated that already at that time the authors of the Strategy assumed the possibility of military-political influence on the Mediterranean countries (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999).

The Strategic document, which was adopted almost at the same time as the bloc's new military-political course, pointed to NATO's transformation from a military organization aimed at implementing a deterrence policy in Europe to a global military-political bloc, which, if necessary, has the right to intervene in regional conflicts in order to ensure an order that meets the interests of the member states. Another aspect worth mentioning is the fact that the 1999 Strategy Concept is probably one of the first documents of the Alliance aimed at military-political planning

of the bloc, which describes in detail the prospect of a terrorist threat to the Alliance's member states and its military infrastructure. In addition, the Strategy's document clearly states that such threats to measures to be taken in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999). It is also worth mentioning that these provisions have been implemented after the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 (Gordon, 2002).

The Strategic document focused on increasing the effectiveness of NATO in political and military actions. The document very often uses the term "crisis" to refer to actions in which NATO intervention is realized. And also the Strategic document states that the member countries of the Alliance should be ready for rapid response, effective action and intervention to resolve various crisis situations (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999).

Thus, all these actions and operations implemented after the adoption of the 1991 Strategy gained a broader understanding and further development of security in the 1999 Strategy. On the one hand, the strategic document summed up the Cold War, and on the other hand, it set the development task for NATO, as a political alliance of Western countries. The newly formed structures of NATO were aimed at ensuring interaction with non-member states, thereby extending the political and military standards of the organization (EAPC). As a result, the main idea of the Strategic document, which called for the transformation of NATO's direction from the military to political aspects, generally reflected optimistic views on the further development of the Alliance.

During the 1990s, NATO sought new challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, including potential threats that could ensure the relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance in the new system of international relations. The main directions that were indicated in the Strategic Concepts, as well as in the London Declaration could only indicate the directions of such security challenges that allowed the establishment of a new coalition identity of NATO. However, a full-fledged formation of a new strategic approach of the Alliance could have been achieved by increasing the number and

volume of such political crises, which led to an imbalance in international relations after the collapse of the bipolar system.

The 1999 Strategy expressed the solidarity of NATO member countries in front of potential and already existing crises. Thus, the Strategic document directed NATO to implement actions, including military forces, in resolving crisis situations that had a potential threat to international security. Moreover, after 1999 the Alliance was ready to take responsibility for resolving this type of crises and conflicts within the framework of the 'preventive diplomacy' doctrine (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999). In conclusion, it can be said that the main provision of the 1999 Strategic Concept document was the transformation of NATO towards the global expansion of political influence and military power. Taking into account all changes in the military-political system of the Alliance, it can be claimed that the conceptual guidelines and provisions of the Strategic documents show the formation of a 'new' NATO as an organization ensuring unipolar order in the world.

Also noteworthy was the fact that after 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) significantly expanded the range of issues related to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Apart from that, after the events of the Arab Spring, a number of partner countries joined the Mediterranean Dialogue expressing a desire to deepen cooperation and partnership within the Program (NATO, 2015).

In 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept titled "Active Engagement, Modern Defence". According to the new strategic document, NATO has set new values and objectives, which included "collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security" (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010). One of the most important elements of the document was the crisis management of NATO, according to which the Alliance adheres to a holistic approach, participating in all stages of crisis situations. The document states that "NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability

in post-conflict situations…" (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010, pp. 7-8). In addition, another key element of ensuring NATO's security was cooperative security, which was based on cooperation between the Alliance and non-member countries, as well as other international organizations.

Thus, the new strategic document of NATO adopted in Lisbon in 2010, largely retained the main features and principles of the military-political bloc as indicated in the previous document of 1999. The new Strategic Concept has kept the desire to consider NATO as a global policeman whose task is to prevention crisis situations, to resolve them, including through military and political intervention, as well as to maintain stability in the post-crisis period (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010).

2.3   NATO EXPANSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN ELEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

At the beginning of the 21st century, new challenges and threats confronting NATO have emerged, which became the cause of further transformation of the Alliance's policy and strategic vector. The North Atlantic bloc began to focus on the security challenges and threats regarding terrorism. The senior leadership of the Alliance and its leading member states as one of the main directions of the strategic concept have begun to pay significant attention to development and enhancement of the capacity to control such global risks as an increase in migration flows, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an increase in the number of local armed conflicts, and threats in cybersecurity. Thus, NATO as a global security organization has launched a new vector for the development of transformation processes aimed at increasing operational efficiency, as well as the development of a political and military response to new challenges.

The transformation of the North Atlantic bloc in the post-Cold War era was largely carried out through interactions with its military-political leader US, and the leading European member countries. At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States

played a key role in the activities of NATO strategic transformation. The main events that determine the practical and political interaction between the US and NATO at the beginning of the 21st century are the coming to power of the US President George W. Bush on January 2001, as well as the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is worth saying that these two events, which have a political relationship with each other, had a fundamental influence on the direction of the US and NATO policies giving the need for further cooperation and developing a common strategy in ensuring security and in overcoming global threats. Thus, the foundations of political engagement between the United States and NATO became known as the "Bush Doctrine" (Monten, 2005, p. 112).

The Bush Doctrine was adopted in order to prevent the emerging transnational terrorist threats. Based on these guidelines, the United States followed a policy aimed at protecting national interests from emerging threats. Therefore, in order to protect the US national interests, the Bush administration implemented the policy of intervention, including military, in the internal and external affairs of other states based on the model of 'preventive actions'. According to the US policy, this kind of intervention with the use of military force in crisis situations and in resolving political conflicts was considered justified, since it led to effective results. Thus, the Bush administration gave preference to the use of force, placing economic and diplomatic means to sidelines (Molier, 2006, p. 44).

The policy of preventive action has become the main instrument of the United States in the mission to spread democracy. According to the George W. Bush administration, the democratization process was directed specifically at a specific region — the Middle East, since the United States tied many of its interests to the region based on both political, which was aimed at preventing and fighting terrorist threats, and economic sphere, aimed at governing the energy market (Molier, 2006, p. 45).

The Middle East region has been identified as a priority by the administration of George W. Bush. Since the reform of the Islamic society and the democratization of

the Middle East were the key factors in the convergence of systems and the growth of potential allies, additionally, it could help to ensure the security of US national interests. Therefore, 'the spread of democracy in the Islamic countries of the Arabian Peninsula', rhetorically, has become an integral part of George W. Bush's policy of reducing threats of the US national interests. According to George W. Bush's address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union: "As long as the Middle East remains a place where tyranny, anger, and despair are happening, there will be men and movements in the region that will threaten the security of America and our friends. Therefore, America will adhere to the forward strategy of freedom in the greater Middle East. We will challenge the opponents of reform, confront supporters of terror and expect high standards from our friends" (George W. Bush, 2004). Despite the fact that the Bush Doctrine did not have a great influence on the NATO strategic documents, it contributed to the involvement of the North Atlantic bloc in operations outside its traditional regions as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) program. Thus, NATO assumed command of troops in southern Afghanistan in 2006 (Nevers, 2007, p. 49).

It is worth noting that during this period, NATO begins a policy of expansion towards the "southern dimension", including the region of the Greater Middle East. Thus, in 2001 NATO develops the Southern Dimension of European security program (Brzezinski & Walls, 2002). The document of the program defines the principles of NATO's activities to ensure security in the region, as well as the Alliance's policy of cooperation with the Black Sea countries, and the expansion and influence to the South (Asmus & Jackson, 2004, p. 17).

In 2002, the United States began to show particular interest in cooperating with NATO, supporting the idea of the Alliance's expansion, since the United States intended to use this for its own purposes in the Middle East region (Donelly, 2006; Fehl, 2008). NATO expansion would help the US find strategic allies among European states, in addition, it would also allow the US to use the Alliance as its

foreign policy tool that could be used both in the European region and beyond (Hassan, 2008, p. 269).

In the course of developing a strategic concept for the expansion of NATO, the fact that the Istanbul Summit of June 28-29, 2004 determined the further development of the Alliance against Global Terrorism through the development of a common strategy and agreeing on the common positions of NATO member countries is equally important. As a result of the meeting that took place at the summit, the main priority regions of NATO that are part of the political interests of the Alliance were identified, which included Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Greater Middle East (Istanbul Summit Special, 2004).

According to Burns (2003), who spoke about the initiative of the Greater Middle East, the concept envisaged the transformation of the Muslim world of the Middle East into American-European values, that is, transformation into democratic, secular and well-informed societies. In the light of the events of the Arab Spring, it is worth highlighting the fact that these changes in the political life of the Muslim countries of the Middle East were considered necessary for building free societies in the region. As part of the Greater Middle East program, the US administration recognized these changes in the region in the form of implementation civil society institutions with such important elements as: open, free and fair elections, the right of every citizen to participate in the formation of political power, freedom to form political parties and use mass media, development of economic life through its liberalization and reduction of state control, as well as the development of small and medium-sized businesses (Burns, 2003).

However, since the announcement of the US initiative for 'democratization' within the framework of the Greater Middle East program, the strategic plan of the US has received wide resonance in the MENA region. The leaders of the Arab states very negatively assessed the initiative of the Bush administration, referring to the fact that the process of democratization should be the result of the evolutionary development of the states of the MENA region, but not the imposition of a Western model.

Moreover, the skepticism of the American initiative to democratize the region was justified by the intentions of the Bush administration to intervene in the internal affairs of MENA states that were more likely to focus on political and economic factors using 'democracy' as an instrument in achieving its own national interests (Dalacoura, 2010, p. 71).

During this period NATO began to pay more and more attention to the region of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In the framework of the 'southern dimension' program, the Alliance began to focus on countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. A good example is President Obama's address regarding the Middle East region in Cairo in 2009, during which he mentioned some aspects of the US foreign policy towards the region. In his speech, Obama expressed the need to stop the negative perception of Islam in the West and its association with terrorism. Obama also noted that "extremists took advantage of ongoing tensions among a small but at the same time a powerful minority of Muslims. The events of September 11, 2001, and the long-term involvement of these cruel extremists in violence against civilians have led to the consideration and perception of Islam as inevitably hostile not only against the United States and the West but also in human rights" (Obama's Speech in Cairo, 2009). Thus, Obama highlighted the main reasons for the separation between the majority of the Muslim world and the minority of extremists who damage the reputation of Islam. The new political view of the US administration towards the Islamic world and the further development of relations with NATO became the basis for more effective cooperation. The initiative of the American administration to achieve democracy in the authoritarian dynastic regimes of the countries of the Middle East through the use of peaceful means was just one of the political directions of the US strategic concept, which did not change its main vector in the region (May, 2010). The political events in 2011 during the Arab Spring caused a completely new look at the US and NATO regarding the Middle East region. A more detailed discussion of the issue and the emphasis on the events of Arab Spring will be placed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

The main factors that led NATO to transform its direction and approaches in determining the strategic concept and priorities were such events as the collapse of the Soviet bloc; crisis situations in several regions of the world, particularly in Europe and the Balkans, caused by an imbalance in international relations; threats and risks in global security, particularly, terrorist threats. It should also be emphasized that the transformation of NATO's strategic approaches to security was mainly closely linked to the political views of the United States, which was one of the leading member states of the Alliance.

Speaking about the modern strategic directions of NATO, the Alliance adheres to a comprehensive, expanded understanding of security, within which the interests of the member states are realized and protected. Also, in the new strategic settings of NATO, the range of actions to control the forces and resources of the bloc has been significantly expanded. In other words, NATO acts as a global organization and coalition cooperation to ensure world security, with no restrictions on the geographical framework. With the inviolability of the provisions of the Washington Treaty, the main goal of NATO remains the involvement of non-member states of the Alliance in the sphere of its interests. Eventually, it is worth highlighting the strategic position of NATO, which determines the military nature of the Alliance, expressed in its readiness for intervention, aimed at protecting the interests of the North Atlantic bloc, spreading, and strengthening the political, military, and economic influence of the leading Western states.

At the beginning of the 21st century, in search of new strategic directions, NATO carried out its activities to expand both the political and geographical spheres. Thus, the Alliance undertook the transformation of its understanding of the security of military operations outside the established areas of responsibility. Implementation of the concept of R2P during the Libyan crisis, which will be described in detail in the next chapter of the thesis, reflects this trend of transformation of NATO policies and strategies.

2.4   CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that since the end of the Cold War, the strategic concept of NATO has experienced a significant transformation. The analyzed documents of the NATO strategic concepts reflect the transformation of the Alliance's vector towards a new coalition strategy, the main goal of which is to address global crises and international conflicts through cooperation with non-member states that are at the forefront of geopolitical interests of NATO. In relation to the modern strategic approaches of NATO, global crises include not only military threats but also regional conflicts in those states that are in the political interests of the Alliance. Therefore, NATO began to pay a significantly growing attention to the Middle East and North African region, subsequently, the Alliance began to intervene in the Libyan crisis in 2011 in the framework of the concept of Responsibility to Protect the appropriateness and effectiveness of which are still being questioned among the academia.

CHAPTER 3

NATO INTERVENTION IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R2P

The chapter provides the analysis of NATO's role in resolving the conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. Special attention was paid to the crisis in Libya in connection with the Alliance's efforts to achieve a political settlement of the conflict and to ensure security in the region, carried out on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 with the primary purpose of the protection of civilians in Libya. In addition, playing a key role in resolving the Libyan crisis and overthrowing the Gaddafi regime, NATO's operations are described as open military-political interference in the country's domestic policy. The chapter also discusses the main goals and motives of NATO member states such as the USA, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, which played a key role in Libyan military actions. The thesis argues that under NATO's intervention under the flag of Responsibility to Protect implemented for a settlement of the Libyan crisis lies the Alliance's member states' desire to achieve their own national interests rather than protecting Libyan population.

3.1   UNREST DURING THE ARAB SPRING AS A SOCIO-POLITICAL CRISIS

The events of the so-called 'Arab Spring' caused the transformation of social and political changes in the Middle East and North Africa to a new stage. During the mass protests, a socio-political transformation has undergone almost all states of the region. The main event that led to the beginning of the Arab Spring were protests in Tunisia and Algeria in late 2010. As a result, Tunisian President Ben Ali was overthrown and political reforms began in Algeria. The events in Egypt are mainly characterized by massive population tensions and government attempts to suppress

them. Tensions ended with the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime, after which political instability began between the Muslim Brotherhood and other political parties. The coup d'état of 2013 is characterized by the transfer of power to Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who later announced the suspension of the Constitution. It should also be stressed that the events of the Arab Spring, for the most part, influenced the political regimes of the countries of the region as was the case with Morocco, Kuwait, and Jordan where political reforms were carried out, as well as with Bahrain and Yemen where military intervention was organized against extremist groups (Gelvin, 2015, p. 26).

It should be acknowledged that problems related to the socio-economic sphere have become one of the internal factors in the emergence of the conflict in the region. In the last few decades in a number of countries of the region, there has been a significant increase in social stratification, expressed in a huge gap in the economic situation between the poor and the rich. Moreover, in almost all Arab countries the unemployment rate has risen substantially, reaching in some of the countries up to 30% among youth (World Bank, 2019). What is also important, among the able-bodied unemployed citizens there were mostly young people under the age of 25 who had a higher education, but actually had no employment opportunities (World Bank, 2015). In response to these issues, it can be said that widespread dissatisfaction was caused by the ineffective policies of the Arab governments towards young people. Moreover, it was this segment of the population that played the main role in the political movements in the region in order to achieve democratization (Gelvin, 2015, p. 21). Another reason for the outburst of discontent in the Arab world was corruption, nepotism, abuse of powers of the ruling elites, who for a long time occupied senior positions in the government, thereby not giving opportunities and prospects for the self-realization of young people (Paasonen & Urdal, 2016).

Another reason for the sharp increase of mass protests and discontent among the population during the Arab Spring can be attributed to political factors related to the

system of government, which mainly corresponded to the interests of the ruling elites, rather than the ordinary population. Apart from that, the long-term and unchanging government, which monopolized the entire sphere of activity, and robbed the entire wealth of the country for the sake of its interests, thereby losing the ability to effectively allocate resources and manage the country was another significant factor of the peoples' uprisings (Sika, 2012).

It is also necessary to add that one of the important factors that negatively influenced the economic situation of the region was the global financial crisis of 2008 (Kienle & Louër, 2013). At the same time, it cannot be argued that only the economic factor provoked violent protests of citizens in the region since the protesting countries of the Arab Spring had significant differences in the standard of living and in economic indicators in general. For example, in Tunisia, the main cause of tensions was corruption, while in Bahrain, the driving factor was the opposition between Sunnis and Shiites (Dalacoura, 2012).

A common feature of the events of the Arab Spring was the mechanism of the political organization of the population, which contributed to the unification and organization of various social groups. Because of the tough authoritarian regime in the countries of the region, ordinary citizens were not able to speak through the political structures of the country, so the protesters turned to non-traditional methods of organizing political power, which had not previously been used in practice to organize and coordinate political actions against the ruling regimes (Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012). The Internet and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter became the tool during the events of the Arab Spring. Internet services which were supposed to be used as means of communication have become a kind of organizational tool for coordinating and conducting political actions. For instance, in such countries as Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates social networks usage rate reached up to 77% of the total population, which was a substantially high number for the region at that time (Mourtada & Salem, 2012, p. 270). Thus, it can be said that the Internet has played a significant role in the events

of the Arab Spring. Firstly, social networks became the so-called tool for mobilizing protest groups during the uprisings, which became a 'negotiating mechanism' for the organization of peoples' protest movements. Secondly, during the protest waves, the Internet became the only source of reliable information, while the functions of the traditional media were severely limited. Finally, because of the flow of information regarding the ongoing tensions in the region, the Arab youth developed their own specific worldview and their own opinion, which psychologically pushed them to participate in the protests. As mentioned earlier, it was the young people who became an active driving force during the uprisings in the Arab countries thanks to the global network (Paasonen & Urdal, 2016).

However, during the mass uprisings in Tunisia, the government realizing the seriousness of the danger of Internet resources decided to prevent tensions in the country by severely censoring the Internet and blocking social networks. Therefore, the information portal Al Jazeera was actively working as a replacement of social networks articles and reports of which were perceived as complete confidence among the population (Wilson & Corey, 2012).

A vivid example of it would be the interpretation of the information portal Al Jazeera regarding the events in Tunisia related to the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi. On December 17, 2010, Al Jazeera published an article that reported on the tragic death of a Tunisian unemployed citizen who provided himself with food by selling vegetables on the street (Timeline: Tunisia's uprising, 2011). According to the channel, his goods were confiscated, then he was beaten by the police. As a result, Bouazizi committed suicide as a sign of protest through public self-immolation. A few days after this event mass protests against unemployment in the country began. Later, the economic demands of citizens turned into political ones: the protesters now demanded a change of Ben Ali's regime whose policies did not satisfy the population. Thus, it can be said that mass media has become the main driving mechanism during the events of the Arab Spring (Mourtada & Salem, 2012).

In the case of Egypt, the social situation of the country was in a worse condition than in Tunisia. The situation reached a critical state when the population began to rise against the ruling regime of Mubarak, who with his family seized power over the government and appropriated the national wealth of the country. A distinctive feature of the Egyptian uprising is that the demonstrations in the country were characterized by the efficiency and expediency of representatives of different groups of the population who participated in the protests (Al-Amin, 2011).

In the region of the Middle East and North Africa, there was a social problem associated with the low living standards of citizens, moreover, there was a corruption of the state system in the MENA countries for many years. The political power of the region, adhering to the authoritarian regime, did not allow countries to democratize or did it slowly. Therefore, educated, having their own political views the youth was set up to counter the political system, seeking to achieve democratization and political freedom of the country (Mourtada & Salem, 2012).

Given the above aspects of the development of events in the Arab Spring, it is possible to determine the nature of the conflict in the region by dividing countries into two groups. As already mentioned, the socio-political changes that swept Egypt and Tunisia were mainly related to internal factors. While the situation in Libya and Syria developed under the influence of external intervention in the face of international actors who were striving to achieve their political goals (Elhusseini, 2014).

Talking about the external factor, it is necessary to underline the fact that the MENA region is in the sphere of the economic and geopolitical interests of the United States, the EU, and NATO member countries. The presence of these actors in the region played a leading role in the development of conflicts of the Arab Spring (Elhusseini, 2014, p. 23).

One of the reasons for the attractiveness of the North African region to Western countries was the political and economic sphere, which plays an important role in the development of the modern economy. More importantly, in addition to the

military-political importance of the region, there was also the significance of the Suez Canal, which opens the shortest access to the Persian Gulf region and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the MENA region is also famous for its rich availability of oil resources. The political position of the region, as well as control over the oil resources of MENA, acquired particular importance in the development of the strategic concept of NATO. Economic competition with China, which is the largest consumer of hydrocarbons, has become a necessary aspect of NATO's strategic competition. Therefore, the United States and NATO sought to achieve control over the political power of the region and to form a new political regime, which would become the so-called bridge for the development of American and NATO foreign policy (Zulfqar, 2018, p. 125).

The issue worth special attention is the situation prevailed in Libya since the degree of interest of external actors in the country's energy resources is of a particular nature. The main energy partners of Libya were Italy and Germany. The political and economic interest of these countries in Libya has its historical roots and certain economic reasons. For example, Italy's relations with Libya were built on stable ties based on the experience of the colonial past. Speaking about economic relations, Italy was an active investor in the country. While Germany also sought to establish an economic partnership through the investments in order to consume Libyan oil (Pradella & Rad, 2017, p. 9).

In the case of France and the United Kingdom the situation had a different path since they did not manage to achieve an economic partnership with the Gaddafi regime, as a result of which their political position regarding the regime of the Libyan dictator was determined (Pradella & Rad, 2017, p. 9).

Thus, the intervention of external actors in the political conflict in Libya can be divided into two groups: the first group includes the so-called "interventionists" whose goal was military-political interference in the internal affairs of Libya and the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in order to maintain the status of a great power in the international arena (France and the UK), while the second group includes

"neutralists" who adopted a waiting position during tensions in the country in order to maintain partnerships with NATO and the United States, as well as to sustain economic interests in the region (Pradella & Rad, 2017, p. 10).

Taking into account the above aspects it can be highlighted that the conflict during the events of the Arab Spring had a common feature among the states of the region expressed in their desire to change the ruling authoritarian regime. Thus, this event can be called a form of socio-political transformation aimed at democratizing the political regime. Moreover, the development of events during the Arab Spring has a number of features reflected in the complexity of the internal and external factors, since the nature of the events which began with socio-economic and political expressions developed into armed conflicts, as a result of which civil war began. At the same time, the strategic interests of NATO and the United States in the region, as well as the policy of democratization of the Greater Middle East forced these actors to intervene and using military-political actions in the heightened processes of the Arab Spring tensions.

Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the Arab Spring was a kind of process of social and political changes that led to the transformation of semi-authoritarian and authoritarian political regimes. In many countries of the region during the Arab Spring, this transformation arose as a result of political tensions which grew into mass anti-government uprisings, in some states even into open armed wars between government and citizens (Elhusseini, 2014, p. 23).

On top of this, it is also worth mentioning that despite the fact that the Arab Spring was a conflict of a local nature, the development of events also has direct links with the intervention of external actors. Having their own economic and geopolitical interests in the region, such actors as NATO, the EU, and the USA, played an important role in the internal political processes of the conflict. Consequently, the events of the Arab Spring can be viewed as a new foreign policy dimension which is a part of the strategy for creating a new world order organized by the Western communities such as NATO and its leading countries.

3.2 NATO ENFORCEMENT IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LIBYAN CRISIS

Particular importance should be given to political transformations in Libya, which grew into an armed clash of the parties and led to the NATO intervention in this issue. In 2011, in the light of the events of the Arab Spring, Libya also launched anti-government movements aimed at overthrowing the authoritarian regime of Gaddafi, who has ruled the country for more than 40 years (Forte, 2012, p. 12).

It is worth noting that since Libya gained its independence in 1951 it was one of the poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world with a population of no more than 1.5 million people, about 90% of whom were illiterate and uneducated. However, in 1969, after Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power the Libyan Arab Republic was proclaimed. Gaddafi provided the country with high economic growth, according to the World Factbook Libyan per capita income for 2010 was 14.000 US dollars, which was considered a very high figure among the MENA countries (World Factbook, 2010). In addition, Gaddafi contributed to the liquidation of all foreign military bases in Libya, and it was decided to nationalize the entire ownership of the country, including the oil sector, freeing them from external influence (Aghayev, 2013, p. 193).

However, despite the fact that Libya was rich in oil, meeting many of the economic needs of its citizens, the political situation in the country remained unstable. Along with Gaddafi's policy of ensuring economic welfare in the country, the colonel also adhered to the traditional political structure, which had been rooted for many years. Tribalism still remained in the country, which numbered about 2,000 tribes and 50 of which were the main tribes that played a significant role in the country's socio-economic and political structure. Moreover, in some regions of Libya, tribal law was a priority over the country's national legislation. Libya, rapidly developing economically, was still left behind regarding the country's political situation (Aghayev, 2013, p. 194). At the same time, rampant corruption remained in the highest levels of power and mismanagement of distribution of export funds still

existed among these tribes, where there was a big difference in income. On top of this, socio-economic problems such as unemployment accounted for 20.7% in 2009, being the highest rate among Middle Eastern countries (Reuters, 2009). According to Freedom House, which assesses the level of freedom of the mass media and the possibility of exercising political rights, the situation in Libya in 2010 was estimated as extremely low (Freedom House, 2010). Gaddafi's regime also banned dissident movements in the country, creating secret services that controlled them, and the death penalty was imposed for founding political parties (Ayhan, 2011, p. 498). All these factors flared up against the backdrop of the events of the Arab Spring, which became a trigger for the emergence of the protests in Libya.

After more than four decades in government, the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime took place in less than a year. In February 2011, a group of rebels raised against the Gaddafi regime, launching protests in the city of Benghazi, which eventually spread to all cities in Libya. During the armed clashes between the government and the opposition rebels, over time, mass protests turned into a civil war. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program report, a total number of deaths during the uprisings in Libya in 2011 accounted for 3762 people (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2011). It is worth mentioning that during the discussion of the situation in Libya on February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council decided to take measures to resolve the conflict by adopting Resolution 1970, which dealt with imposing sanctions against the Gaddafi regime (UNSC, 2011).

On February 24, 2011, during the discussions on the Libyan situation, NATO expressed its position on the issue. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stressed that the Alliance will monitor developments in the region and that the NATO armed intervention in the Libyan conflict will not be implemented without the appropriate UN authorization. After several days of NATO discussions on Libyan issue, the member states could not come to an agreed decision. Moreover, during the discussions, countries such as Italy, Germany, and Turkey expressed their negative positions regarding the armed operation in Libya. However,

David Cameron proposed to create a no-fly zone over the country in order to prevent the air attacks of Gaddafi's air forces (Black, 2011).

The situation in Libya during the events of the Arab Spring escalated dramatically, becoming more aggressive and violent in its nature. Accordingly, on March 2, 2011, during the military operations of the rebel forces, it was managed to gain control over the oil port of Brega, which was one of the strategically important locations in Libya. However, after a few days, Gaddafi's air force retailed back at the oil port, causing serious damage to both the rebel forces and their military equipment (Shadid, 2011).

Moreover, in his speech on radio in February, Gaddafi referred to the demonstrators as "cockroaches" and "rats", and he publicly called his supporters to go out to the streets and attack these "cowards" showing them "no mercy" (BBC News, 2011). Consequently, Gaddafi forces began taking control over the city of Benghazi.

After a series of attacks of Gaddafi's government forces in the city of Benghazi, NATO decided to intervene in the conflict. Thus, French President Sarkozy proposes to create a restricted air space over Libya, which will allow taking control of the Libyan air force, thereby preventing attacks on rebel forces (Watt, 2011). The idea was also justified by the American administration, which sought to create prerequisites for intervention in the armed conflict in Libya under the pretext of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime (Branigin, Sly, & Raghavan, 2011). On March 12, the Arab League appealed to the UN expressing support for the idea of creating a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect civilians. A few days later, the corresponding resolution on the no-fly zone was presented by the Lebanese Ambassador to the UN Nawaf Salam, which was later supported by France and the United Kingdom (Denselow, 2011).

NATO's strategy to resolve the Libyan crisis has become both political and military in nature. Political nature implied NATO's obtaining the legitimacy of the operation in the form of a UN Resolution. The main goal of NATO's political approach was to overthrow the Gaddafi regime and achieve the possibility of holding legitimate

political elections, as well as democratizing the Libyan political regime, while the military approach was supposed to be used as a complementary measure, and was aimed at the achievement of political goals (Carati, 2017).

On the eve of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 regarding the no-fly zone, US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates said that the creation of such a zone in the country involves airstrikes on Libyan military targets as a preventive measure (CBS News, 2011). Moreover, the Resolution on the air force action over Libya complied with the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect', which was unanimously adopted in September 2005 during the World Summit. Thus, on March 17, 2011, according to the results of the final vote, the UN Security Council in favor of adopting a Resolution on the no-fly zone over Libya 10 members voted for, while 5 members abstained from voting (China, Russia, Germany, Brazil, and India) (The Guardian, 2011). It is also important to note that the UK and France played a key role in the adoption of this Resolution with the support of the USA and Lebanon (Branigin, Sly, & Raghavan, 2011). Regarding NATO's intervention in the settlement of the conflict in Libya, the main importance should be given to such states as the USA, the UK, and France. Thus, the United States, the UK, and France expressed their joint position that the Gaddafi regime should be overthrown, and all necessary measures would be taken to achieve this goal (GOV.UK, 2011).

An important feature of the adoption of Resolution 1973 was the aspect that it implied not only political considerations but also humanitarian ones, which became an important factor in giving international legitimacy to NATO military operations in Libya. According to the Resolution, direct armed intervention by foreign states into the territory of Libya was prohibited, but it was allowed to take all necessary measures to create a restricted flight zone. This interpretation implied the legitimacy of the use of military forces in order to suppress Libyan air defenses. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also said that the enforcement of the no-fly zone will allow NATO to implement military operations against Libyan air force

facilities, which will reduce the threat of government military forces against the rebels (Fitzgerald, 2011).

At the Paris Summit on March 19, 2011, with the participation of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Arab League, the implementation of the NATO operation against the Gaddafi regime was discussed. Thus, it was announced the start of NATO intervention through the use of military force against the Libyan regime and it was decided to carry out a series of actions to realize it.

3.2.1 The United States of America

Before analyzing the US approach and role on the Libyan crisis, it is worth mentioning that in the US National Security Strategy from May, 2010, the main goal of the US was emphasized, which was the maintenance of global leadership, as well as the realization of national interests. The document reported the intention of the United States in the development of "moral leadership, economic competitiveness and military might" to achieve and maintain leadership positions in the global arena. Moreover, according to the Strategic Document, for the realization of these objectives, the United States must shape "a new sustainable international order". In addition, the document attaches particular importance to the region of the Greater Middle East in the context of the fact that universal values should be spread throughout the world, including MENA region (United States, 2010).

According to American experts, one of the main goals of the United States in the Libyan crisis was the economic motive of the United States to gain full control over the Libyan banking system, which would allow the US to minimize the economic decline connected with the difference between the Dinar and the Dollar. All trade operations in Libya were carried out through the Central Bank, which was independent from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, thus, the Dinar was used as the main currency (Vandewalle, 2012, p. 154). Moreover, by prioritizing the objective to achieve the status of world power in the international

community, the United States could not abstain from participation in the events of Libya, since this might spoil the reputation of the United States. In addition, the United States also sought to exclude China from access to Libyan energy resources (Chossudovsky, 2011).

The victory of the Gaddafi regime could have caused significant damage to the American economy since there was a threat of cutting off the access to Libyan oil. Additionally, according to the US administration, apart from gaining control over the oil industry of Libya and getting access to energy resources in general, in case of a successful operation to overthrow the Gaddafi regime, the United States could potentially gain complete control and influence on the political situation in the strategically important MENA region. Based on these motives, the United States implemented its policy as a coordinator of intervention in the Libyan conflict (Igwe, Abdullah, Kirmanj, Fage, & Bello, 2017).

Another important aspect of the US intervention in Libya was the economic situation in the country. The US external debt reached 14 trillion dollars, which was a record figure by the beginning of 2011, moreover, the budget deficit increased by trillion dollars (Sahadi, 2011). This economic situation could affect the global economy, thereby resulting in a new global financial crisis. Having taken these factors into consideration, the US administration planned to intervene in the Libyan crisis in order to recover the economic situation in the country (Igwe, Abdullah, Kirmanj, Fage, & Bello, 2017, p. 8).

However, on the eve of the presidential election of 2012, the administration of Barack Obama handed over the command of the military operation to France and the UK (Shrivastava, 2011). Such a decision of the White House was expected because the war in Iraq caused the United States significant economic damage, which in turn led to a negative reaction of American citizens who could possibly impact the presidential elections.

Thus, it can be observed that even if the United States was optimistic about achieving its economic and political goals in the region, the operation in Libya under the leadership of the American administration does not provide an opportunity to name this activity as a successful example of the implementation of Responsibility to Protect. The intervention of the West in Libya led to such consequences as an increase in the flow of refugees to EU countries, the formation of terrorist organizations and the proliferation of weapons, which ended up with the emergence of political chaos both in Libya and in neighboring countries.

3.2.2 The European Union

In the course of analyzing the official documents of the European Union, it is worth highlighting its position in the Libyan crisis, which was mainly based on the principle of 'policy, based on values'. At the end of the Paris summit, the EU representatives intended on Gaddafi's overthrow and the transformation of the Libyan government into a democratic political regime under the Transitional National Council. However, in case of not complying with the Resolution, the EU intended to contribute to overthrow the Gaddafi's authoritarian regime through the use of armed forces (Voltaire Network, 2011).

Considering the interests of the EU member states regarding the events in Libya, it is possible to divide states into two groups, including France and the United Kingdom as a first group, as well as Germany and Italy as a second. France and the United Kingdom, according to their joint statements, to a large extent shared the interests concerning the Libyan crisis (The Guardian, 2011). France and the United Kingdom, to a large extent, intended to regain influence on the former colony in order to strengthen their positions in the EU, as well as in the strategically important MENA region. Thus, it can be said that the French-British axis was formed, which allowed operations in Libya to be carried out in a kind of 'hybrid' format, that is, in joint efforts between the military command of NATO and the EU (Gomis, 2011). At the initial

stage of the military operations in Libya, Germany and Italy did not support the idea of the implementation of Responsibility to Protect and considered it unacceptable. However, the development of the events in Libya encouraged these two actors to participate in the operations against the Gaddafi regime.

3.2.2.1 France

France began to show a great interest in the MENA region after Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in 2007. One example is the statement by Sarkozy about the proclamation of the region as a zone of his national interests, which was witnessed as the return of the influence of France in the former colonies (Cumming, 2013, p. 25). In connection with a significant decrease in the American influence in the region, France intended to become a new main actor replacing the United States. Operations to expand the sphere of influence in the region began in 2009 with the establishment of a French military base in the UAE (Dsouza, 2009). The crisis in Libya was considered by the French administration as another opportunity to increase military presence in the Arab region. So, the joint effort of France and Britain in conducting military operations based on military doctrine was indicated in the White Paper on Defense (2007). According to the White Paper (2007), French policy was coordinated on the basis of the principle of "strategic neighborhood" , the main task of which was to strengthen the position of France in the international arena, as well as the realization of the political and economic interests of the country in the MENA region, in particular in the Mediterranean (Lin Noueihed, 2013).

The focus on the strategically important region of MENA allowed France to occupy key positions in the region, which contributed to gain access to the energy resources. France sought to gain access to the oil fields of Libya. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and the coming to power of pro-Western powers to a large extent was a certain guarantee for France in the development of its energy sector, which was supposed to contribute to the country's economic growth. Another important factor

of involving France in intervention in the Libyan crisis was the geopolitical location of the African state. Libya shared borders with four francophone states like Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, and Niger (Birch Gold Group, 2016).

Moreover, the French leadership also sought to re-establish its position in the region after a series of events that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia, where mass protests also took place, since France saw Egypt as its partner in the region. In addition, it was also necessary for France to strengthen its position among the EU countries, in other words, France desired to demonstrate the significance of its role in the region as opposed to UK and Germany (Forbes, 2011).

Sarkozy's intention on the intervention in the Libyan conflict was justified with his statement that "the strikes would be solely of a defensive nature if Mr. Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-violent protesters" (Watt, 2011). However, despite all the positive intentions of France, according to Chivvis, the policy of France to carry out the military operation in Libya was doomed to failure, because the French administration implemented an ineffective strategy which did not have clear political goals that considered all the specifics of the African region. Moreover, possible consequences of intervention that could lead to such issues as an increase in the number of terrorist organizations, an increase in the flow of migrants, etc. have also not been taken into account by the French leadership (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). As a result of the French military operations in Libya, Sarkozy's domestic policy did not achieve the planned results. There was a significant decrease in public opinion support on the eve of the presidential election in France. If in spring 2011, the French public opinion supported the idea of military intervention in Libya, by the beginning of summer, the majority of the population were categorically opposed to conducting an armed operation aimed at overthrowing the Gaddafi regime (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012). Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy could not foresee the negative consequences of the Libyan campaign, which led not only to an increase in public discontent but also to a significant rise in a number of migrants coming from the MENA region, which had previously been restrained by Gaddafi's

policy. This outcome of the event demonstrates the lack of coordination of the political and military strategy of France, which also points to the inconsistency of the objectives of the operation and the inefficient allocation of resources for their implementation.

As a result of the implementation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect in Libya carried out on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which did not lead to the expected results becoming an example of a violation of international law, there were large losses of hundreds of civilians in Libya. Subsequently, the French Defense Minister Gérard Longuet, stating the inconclusive results of the operations carried out, called for the start of the negotiation process on this issue (Longuet, 2011).

3.2.2.2 The United Kingdom

The interests of the UK on intervention in the Libyan crisis were shared with the interests that of France. Based on the National Security Strategy (2010), which indicated the national values of the country, namely, the spread of democracy, tolerance, freedom of speech, respect for norms of international law, the United Kingdom implemented a policy of forming change at the global level. In addition to this, the document also stated that Britain's intention was to raise political and economic relations with the countries of MENA to a new level and to restore long-term historical ties with the region. However, on the eve of the Libyan events, David Cameron's statement regarding the UK's position on the military intervention of the region turned out to be unexpected for politicians and the armed forces of the country (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012). According to Cameron, the implementation of measures to resolve the Libyan crisis was part of the national interests of the UK (Black, 2011). Furthermore, Cameron also stated his intention to impose economic sanctions, as well as to conduct a military operation, citing the fact that the Gaddafi regime poses a threat due to its unpredictability and its desire to support terrorist

groups. It should be also noted that it was the UK that became the first EU state, which recognized the opposition as a legitimate government body. Moreover, William Hague stated that the strategically important region of MENA is a key factor in ensuring the national security of the UK, and the refusal to conduct an operation to resolve the Libyan crisis will be considered as a strategic mistake of the country's foreign policy (Mulholland, 2011).

Along with France, the UK also actively supported the idea of establishing a no-fly zone and conducting a military operation in Libya, considering these operations as the only way to effectively resolve the conflict, which had already developed into a civil war. After the end of the Libyan military operation, the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, commended the results achieved. According to Philip Hammond, the total cost of the Operation Ellamy, which was aimed at the implementation of the armed operation, amounted to 212 million pounds, which was three times less than the figure planned before the start of the operation (GOV.UK, 2011). Moreover, according to Cameron, who initiated the military action against the Gaddafi regime, the implementation of military intervention in Libya made it possible to overthrow the regime of one of the most brutal dictators, thereby providing invaluable assistance to Libyan citizens who have a chance for a better future (Ministry of Defence, 2011). Upon the termination of Responsibility to Protect in Libya, the British Government adopted the Arab Partnership (AP), which reflected Britain's intention to assist in democratizing the MENA region by supporting the media and non-governmental organizations. The AP indicated the main goals and objectives for building stable relations with MENA: allocating 110 million pounds for political and economic reforms in the region for the period from 2011 to 2015, building a democratic society with employment prospects, as well as protecting and promoting human rights (GOV.UK, 2015).

Thus, it can be concluded that the UK and France had 'unifying' interests in the Libyan crisis, which became not only the desire of these countries to regain their previous authority in the former colonies, but also the policy of maintaining the status

of great powers in the international community. For France and Britain, in order to achieve these goals, it was necessary to adhere to a policy similar to US strategy, which was to demonstrate the ability to intervene in international conflicts.

3.2.2.3 Germany

In spite of the fact that the Franco-British relations in resolving the Libyan crisis were established on the principle of cooperation, the Franco-German relations had some tensions that led to Germany's refusal to support the EU member states regarding the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, thereby changing its strategic vector similar to the direction of Russia and China. Thus, Germany became the only member state of the EU and NATO, which abstained from voting on the adoption of Resolution 1973, not supporting its NATO allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to intervene in the Libyan crisis (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 395).

In the foreign policy of Germany, the MENA region was not always under the main focus. In the document of the Security Strategy for Germany (2008), the region was indicated as a foreign policy vector of a peripheral nature until the beginning of the 2000s. However, in recent decades, Germany has begun to show a significant interest in a strategically important region, based on three main reasons: cooperation in ensuring energy security, in combating terrorist groups and in illegal migration issues (A Security Strategy For Germany, 2008).

Based on the increasing influence of other non-regional actors like the USA, France, the UK, Russia, and China, German leadership also had to strengthen its positions in the MENA region. Thus, during the decision making processes on the intervention based on the concept of the Responsibility in Libya, Germany began to pay more attention to consolidating its position among the EU states rather than at the global level. An example would be the statement by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, in which he heavily criticized the French position on the conduction of military forces in Libya, commenting on this decision as being dangerous and having

serious consequences both for the Arab world and for the whole region (Russian Today, 2011).

In turn, there were debates about the position of Germany on the adoption of Resolution 1973 in the German government itself. According to former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the decision of the German leadership to abstain from voting for supporting the idea of establishing a no-fly zone over Libya joining the NATO allies was an "absurd mistake" (Rousseau, 2011). However, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her support for the EU, holding the position of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime, but unlike France and the UK, Merkel insisted on additional negotiations on this issue. Angela Merkel was interested in the further actions of NATO in case the introduction of a no-fly zone would not give any positive results. Furthermore, the chancellor was also interested in NATO's intention to intervene specifically in the Libyan conflict, which had not been carried out in other countries involved in events of the Arab Spring (Spiegel Online, 2011). At the same time, stressing that Germany's abstention in voting on the adoption of Resolution 1973 does not reflect Germany's position as neutral, Angela Merkel said that "we stand firmly on the side of our allies and NATO" (The Local, 2011).

To sum up, it can be emphasized that there was no consensus regarding Germany's position on the conflict in Libya. During the Libyan military operations, Germany could not come to one compromise solution: on the one hand, Westerwelle considered the adoption of Resolution 1973 erroneous, on the other hand, Merkel did not want to spoil allied relations with NATO member states. As a result of inconsistency in the decision-making process, the German leadership decided to abstain from voting on Resolution 1973. It can also be highlighted that during the Libyan operations Germany lost more than it gained. Moreover, without supporting its NATO allies, but at the same time supplying its military aircraft and insisting on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, Germany could not show its influence in the region and in the international arena in general, on the contrary, provoking fierce disputes and debates among its own citizens. According to German Foreign Minister Frank

Steinmeier, the intervention in Libya under the concept of R2P was international community's "big mistake", as a result of which the situation in the country deteriorated, thereby increasing the flow of migrants from this region to the EU countries (RIA News, 2015).

3.2.2.4 Italy

Initially, Italy's position on the application of R2P in Libya was similar to Germany's, that is, the country also denied the possibility of the implementation of the operation. However, it is worth noting that the position of Rome has changed in the opposite direction after meeting with US President Barack Obama (IANS, 2011). Moreover, on the eve of the meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi supported the decision to intervene in the Libyan crisis. The Italian leadership made this decision in order to re-establish relations with France, with which there were diplomatic tensions caused by the decision of Rome to issue a residence permit to Libyan migrants, which could further enable refugees to move freely within the Schengen zone (Squires, 2011). Consequently, Italy's position on the crisis in Libya was based on the restoration of bilateral relations with France, without which another conflict could arise within between them that could escalate into a pan-European conflict.

In addition to building relations with its EU ally, Italy also intended to gain access to energy resources in the North African region. Moreover, being the largest importer of Libyan which accounted for 28% (Statista, 2019), Italy could not fail to play a key role in military actions in the country, since Rome's goal was to provide uninterrupted supplies of Libyan energy resources.

However, at the end of military operations, as in other EU countries, Italy faced an uncontrolled flow of migrants from MENA region, which was considered to be one of the most serious consequences of the events of Arab Spring and Libyan crisis in particular.

3.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R2P IN LIBYA

Having analyzed the goals and motives of NATO member countries on resolving the Libyan crisis, it was revealed that the real desire of NATO was to achieve its national interests under the implementation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect aimed at protecting Libyan citizens from the authoritarian Gaddafi regime. In other words, it can be said that all NATO military operations, in particular, the USA, France and the UK, were primarily based on the desire of these states to fulfill their national interests and strengthen their positions both in the MENA region and in the international arena (Petras, 2012).

The active participation of the United States in the conflict in Libya was rather dictated by geostrategic considerations, which consisted in the return of US military bases with a view to conducting future military operations in MENA, and also in the desire to get full access to the region's energy resources (South China Morning Post, 2014). Regarding the EU countries, in particular, France and the UK, which were the initial initiators of the implementation of the military operation in Libya, the intervention of these countries, as was mentioned before, is explained by their desire to confirm their status as great powers and the military might of NATO (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012).

Taking into account NATO actions in Libya, which were supposedly based on the principle of the Responsibility to Protect with purely humanitarian motives, it is believed that instead of carrying out military intervention in the country, a more effective measure of resolving the conflict would be to use a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country, since civilians were not targeted by Gaddafi's troops (Carati, 2017). Furthermore, if NATO had arranged peace negotiations between Gaddafi and the opposition, the situation might have had a different scenario, that is, the Libyan crisis would have a chance to be successfully resolved through peaceful dialogue between the two sides. Thus, this could have

prevented the occurrence of civilian casualties, as well as the emergence of large-scale political chaos in the region as a whole (Kuperman, 2013, p. 197). However, after the military intervention of NATO based on the R2P principle under the mandate of the UN Security Council, Libya, from one of the richest countries of MENA with a high economic growth turned into a place of military and political chaos, which led to devastating consequences.

3.4   THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R2P IN LIBYA: LESSONS LEARNED

Based on the example of the implementation of the concept of R2P in the Libyan crisis, it can be claimed that the first lesson learned from the issue will be that the R2P concept is exploited by superpowers. According to Moses (2013), most interventions within the framework of the R2P concept have been carried out by great powers, the main motive of which was to achieve their national interests (p. 130).

During the Libyan crisis, coercive measures within the framework of R2P were first used under the approval of the UN Security Council, despite the abstention from the vote of Russia and China. Such actors as the USA, France, the UK, Italy, and Germany played a key role in intervening in the conflict. However, as has already been identified in the process of writing this thesis, the initial reason for the intervention of these actors was not to protect the population from mass atrocities and ensure security in the region. Rather, the intervention under the auspices of the R2P concept was eroded by the self-interests of these states, the pursuit of power and the achievement of political and economic goals (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012). Moreover, NATO-led military operations that were initially aimed at protecting civilians from mass atrocities but had resulted in providing military support to the Libyan opposition forces in order to overthrow the Gaddafi regime brings into greater doubt the Alliance's real intentions (Paris, 2014, p. 581).

A similar dynamic occurred in Syria, where rebel protests against the Bashar al-Assad regime escalated into a civil war that also involved the international community's intervention. However, unlike the Libyan case, despite the fact that the Syrian crisis also led to the crime against humanity, the UN Security Council was at a deadlock in any attempt to adopt a resolution in the name of R2P. Most Syrian-related resolutions were rejected by Russia and China, and those that were passed were limited in scope due to the relatively innocent nature of the observation missions. This leads to learning another lesson, which is the inconsistency of the implementation of R2P. Regarding Syria, the inaction of the international community is characterized by the political unwillingness of actors such as Russia and China to conduct any form of foreign intervention. Russia and China justified their decision by the fact that the intervention of the international community would entail the same consequences as in the case of Libya (Guimarães & Carvalho, 2017). According to the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yuchang: "We should not forget the lessons we learned from Libya...It has been vividly described as a successful surgery with a dead patient" (Liu & Zhang, 2014). Moreover, it is worth noting that Russia vetoed the UN Security Council Resolution by citing the negative experience of using R2P under Pillar III during the Libyan crisis, thereby masking its own geopolitical, economic, and military interests regarding Syria (Averre & Davies, 2015).

Another lesson learned from the Libyan crisis is the military nature of the implementation of the R2P concept, although according to the ICISS report, the concept involves the use of military force as a last resort in the event that other non-coercive measures have failed. That is, the ICISS document emphasizes that every "diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must have been explored" (ICISS, 2001, p. 36).

Some proponents of the R2P concept believe that the international community's decision on conducting military operation in Libya was a prime example of the appropriate use of last resort and that the international community had no alternative measures but to use military force to stop Gaddafi's troops (Evans, 2011). Moreover,

in paragraphs one and two of the UNSC Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17, 2011, an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful resolution of the Libyan conflict were indicated. Following this, in paragraph four of the Resolution 1973 there was a clause on the use of military force in the event when the objectives of paragraphs one and two are not achieved (UNSC, 2011). Such a course of actions was supposed to be a logical flow of the Resolution. However, on March 18, 2011, when the Libyan government proposed an initiative to ceasefire and suspend military operations with subsequent peace negotiations, the Libyan opposition, as well the United States, the UK, and France, refused to hold a political dialogue. British Prime Minister David Cameron also commented that "we will judge him by his actions, not his words" (GOV.UK, 2011).

Another important point is the fact that paragraph one of Resolution 1973 highlights the role of the African Union in the peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis. Thus, on March 19, 2011, the African Union offered to hold peace talks with the aim of reaching an agreement on the ceasefire, carrying out the necessary reforms to resolve the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to civilians. However, the UN and the United States did not allow the African Union to carry out the mission, as a result of which this initiative has been withdrawn (De Waal, 2011).

Thus, despite the fact that the Libyan regime responded to the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 with its readiness to conduct political negotiations that could have possibly affected significantly the scenario of the conflict, the above-mentioned initiatives have never been explored. Instead, NATO military operation has further aggravated the conflict resulting in negative consequences.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis of the events in Libya, it can be concluded that the military operation under the slogan of R2P has ended with a full failure: the number of victims among Libyan citizens increased several times, the country was among the "failed

states" (Goldstone, 2008), losing the capability to carry out state functions, military operations in the country increased the number of terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the entire region.

However, despite the failure of NATO's intervention in the Libyan issue, it can be said that the Alliance was able to achieve its political goals, which were the control of NATO member countries over the energy resources of the strategically important MENA region, raising its position as a world power. It should also be noted that the implementation of the R2P was not provided for under the Charter of the Organization, and the conflict in Libya did not pose any threat to the Alliance's member countries. Therefore, in order to achieve its political goals, the leadership of NATO carried out military interventions, based on its own interpretations of the vague wording of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 covered by Pillar III, which provided the Alliance the use of coercive measures. In this way, the NATO member countries, having enforced a military operation in Libya, did not pay enough attention to its consequences, which resulted in an increase in the number of ISIL fighters in Libya, uncontrolled arms trafficking, and an increase in the number of migrants to the EU states.

CONCLUSION

In the period of the end of 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, NATO policy was based on the new strategic direction, which focused on the political and economic interests of its member states. According to the strategic vector, being a global military-political alliance, the task of NATO was to realize the interests of its member countries. Main factors of the transformation of NATO's political and military direction, which led to the formation of a new strategic vector were the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts, the threat to global security, and the increasing threat of terrorism. Thus, a new NATO Strategic Concept was developed, according to which the Alliance's new goal was to counter global risks through interconnection and cooperation with non-member states, as well as with states beyond the geopolitical borders of the Alliance.

The Strategic Concept of NATO was aimed at engaging the sphere of influence of the Alliance beyond its traditional borders, as well as on the factors that influenced the transformation of NATO's policy towards the Middle East and North African region, which was of particular interest of NATO member states. Accordingly, particular attention should be paid to the crisis in Libya, which was increasingly violent in its nature, resulting in an escalation into a civil war in the country and in overthrow of the government. By adopting the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the operation to close the airspace over Libya for humanitarian purposes, NATO conducted military actions in accordance with the principle of Responsibility to Protect under the Pillar III, which states that the collective military action can be realized by the international community in case when a state fails to protect its population from mass atrocities. Resolution 1973 envisaged a joint military-air operation to close the airspace of Libya in order to protect the civilian population of the country from military strikes by Gaddafi's troops.

The study revealed that NATO's intervention in the Libyan crisis under the principle of R2P, which was intended to prevent the conflict by means of establishing a no-fly

zone over the country, was primarily based on the NATO member states' national interests rather to make economic benefits out of the situation and ensure energy security for European member countries.

The armed conflict in Libya was both political and military in nature. NATO's political actions to resolve the crisis are reflected in its efforts to overthrow the Gaddafi regime and conduct fair elections of a political regime that had to lead to the democratization of the state system. The military nature is manifested in the armed intervention of NATO and the support of the rebel forces, which played a significant role in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime.

In other words, NATO's approach to resolve the crisis in Libya, on the one hand, involved settlement of the crisis by establishing a democratic regime the country, which supposedly could improve the situation, on the other hand, under the pretext of humanitarian goals NATO's priority objective was to fulfill its political and economic goals rather than maintaining democratic idea. Moreover, the implementation of R2P by NATO did not only fail to halt the commission of atrocity crimes but had further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Libya. Thus, answering the first research question, it can be said that NATO's intervention in the Libyan crisis did not aim at protecting the Libyan population from atrocity crimes, as was mentioned earlier, the initial plan of the Alliance was to achieve its own national interests.

Despite NATO's statements about strict compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which consisted of: a) preventing military actions against civilians; b) withdrawing all military forces; and c) providing all sorts of humanitarian aid, it is argued that NATO's priority goal was to overthrow Gaddafi regime, which will facilitate access to energy resources, rather than protecting civilians. Thus, NATO intervention can be described as "less about protecting the population and more about changing the regime" (Forte, 2012).

It can be concluded that as a result of military interventions in Libya, NATO was able to achieve its stated political and military goals, which were to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. Accordingly, the answer to the second research question can be drawn here. The implementation of R2P during the Libyan crisis by imposing a no-fly zone over the country and introducing armed forces to some extent could assist to protect Libyan citizens from mass atrocities. However, after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, NATO faced new challenges such as political instability in the country, proliferation of arms, growth of terrorist organizations, as well as an increasing flow of refugees. More importantly, through implementing these military operations NATO planned to strengthen its position in the region as a world power, as well as to gain access to energy resources in the region. Consequently, it can be argued that priority purpose of NATO was to achieve economic and political objectives under the pretext of R2P rather than maintaining the idea of democracy and ensuring protection of Libyan citizens.

It can be said that the civil war in Libya became a kind of test for the effectiveness of the concept of Responsibility to Protect in the framework of the Pillar III, which involves the use of force as a last resort when peaceful means are inadequate and a state does not cope with the protection of its population. The Three Pillars, which were put forward at the initiative of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon offer a wide range of measures that can be applied by the international community to prevent mass atrocities (UNGA, 2009). However, given the consequences of the experience of using armed force during the Libyan crisis, there is a critical question regarding the applicability of Pillar III and the concept of R2P as a whole. To date, there is no guide on how to appropriately use armed force as a last resort, leaving all decision-making processes to the UN Security Council. Accordingly, the implementation of the R2P concept in the framework of the Pillar III requires common criteria and standards based on the appropriate use of armed force. Moreover, there is a need for a structural transformation of the international political system due to lack of the guarantee of the effective implementation of R2P (Gözen Ercan, 2014, p. 50). Thus,

the prospect of a future application of the concept of Responsibility to Protect still remains questionable. It is recommended that the international community, particularly, UN Security Council establishes common standards for assessing each risk, determining the degree of urgency and scope of the risks concluding that a state is unwilling or is not able to fulfill its responsibility to protect its population from atrocities crimes.

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
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APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

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1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
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4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

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23.03.2018
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ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

APPROVED.

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Tarih: 23/09/2019

Tez Başlığı: Libya Krizi'nde NATO Müdahalesi ve Koruma Sorumluluğunun Uygulanması

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1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
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Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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Tarih: 23/09/2019

Tez Başlığı : Libya Krizi'nde NATO Müdahalesi ve Koruma Sorumluluğunun Uygulanması

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 98 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 23/09/2019 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 18 'dir.

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