



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

English Language and Literature

**PRE-CARTESIAN REPRESENTATIONS OF ANIMALS AND  
HUMANS IN EDMUND SPENSER'S *THE FAERIE QUEENE***

Ayşe Ece CAVCAV

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2024



PRE-CARTESIAN REPRESENTATIONS OF ANIMALS AND HUMANS IN EDMUND  
SPENSER'S *THE FAERIE QUEENE*

Ayşe Ece CAVCAV

Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences  
English Language and Literature

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2024

## KABUL VE ONAY

Ayşe Ece Cavcav tarafından hazırlanan "Pre-Cartesian Representations of Animals and Humans in Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*" başlıklı bu çalışma, 04.06.2024 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

---

Prof. Dr. Aytül ÖZÜM (Başkan)

---

Prof. Dr. Hande SEBER (Danışman)

---

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Neslihan EKMEKÇİOĞLU (Üye)

---

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Merve SARI TÜZÜN (Üye)

---

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Emine Seda ÇAĞLAYAN MAZANOĞLU (Üye)

Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylıyorum.

Prof. Dr. Uğur ÖMÜRGÖNÜLŞEN

Enstitü Müdürü

## YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI

Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin/raporumun tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarım bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır.

Tezin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinlerin yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan "**Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge**" kapsamında tezim aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır.

- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren 2 yıl ertelenmiştir. <sup>(1)</sup>
- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ... ay ertelenmiştir. <sup>(2)</sup>
- Tezimle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. <sup>(3)</sup>

13/06/2024

**Ayşe Ece CAVCAV**

<sup>1</sup>"*Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge*"

- (1) Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü teze ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulu** iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir.
- (2) Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internetten paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulunun** gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir.
- (3) Madde 7. 1. Ulusal çıkarları veya güvenliği ilgilendiren, emniyet, istihbarat, savunma ve güvenlik, sağlık vb. konulara ilişkin lisansüstü tezlerle ilgili gizlilik kararı, **tezin yapıldığı kurum** tarafından verilir \*. Kurum ve kuruluşlarla yapılan işbirliği protokolü çerçevesinde hazırlanan lisansüstü tezlere ilişkin gizlilik kararı ise, **ilgili kurum ve kuruluşun önerisi** ile **enstitü** veya **fakültenin** uygun görüşü üzerine **üniversite yönetim kurulu** tarafından verilir. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler Yükseköğretim Kuruluna bildirilir.  
Madde 7.2. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler gizlilik süresince enstitü veya fakülte tarafından gizlilik kuralları çerçevesinde muhafaza edilir, gizlilik kararının kaldırılması halinde Tez Otomasyon Sistemine yüklenir

\* Tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulu tarafından karar verilir.**

## ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Prof. Dr. Hande SEBER** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

*Ayşe Ece CAVCAV*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank my advisor Prof. Dr. Hande Seber for her constant support, guidance and insight to *The Faerie Queene* without which this thesis would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank the esteemed members of the jury, Prof. Dr. Aytül Özüm, Assist. Prof. Dr. Neslihan Ekmekçiöđlu, Assist. Prof. Dr. Merve Sarı Tüzün and Assist. Prof. Dr. Emine Seda Çađlayan Mazanođlu, for their kind suggestions and feedback.

Moreover, I want to thank The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) for the financial support they provided through the graduate scholarship programme during my master studies.

Here, I also want to express my gratitude to the faculty members of the English Language and Literature Department at Çankaya University and the Head of Department, Prof. Dr. Özlem Uzundemir, for their kindness, understanding and for welcoming me wholeheartedly.

Of course, I most sincerely thank my parents Zeynep M. Cavcav and R. Hakan Cavcav, for raising me with a sensitivity which instigated my interest in the field of animal studies, as well as my grandmothers, Ayla Esen Karapınar and Ayla Gönül Cavcav for always believing in me. My fiancé Doruk Topcu, I can never thank you enough for your invaluable support, efforts and encouragement which enabled my studies, you truly are a knight in shining armour. Last but not least, our family dog and my best friend since childhood, Bubbles, I thank you with all my heart, this thesis was made possible because I see the Lion in you.

## ABSTRACT

CAVCAV, Ayşe Ece. *Pre-Cartesian Representations of Animals and Humans in Edmund Spenser's The Faerie Queene*, MA Thesis, Ankara, 2024.

Edmund Spenser's (1552/53-1599) eminent sixteenth century epic, *The Faerie Queene* (1590-1596), truly proves to be a canonical text of English literature as it has received almost constant critical attention from the time of its first publication, to the twenty-first century. Persisting interest confirms that the poem offers valuable cultural insight to the historical period it was written in. Hence, it has been studied from various cultural and literary perspectives and scholars working on the interdependent fields of posthumanism, ecocriticism, and most recently, animal studies, have also turned their attention to Spenser's works. These contemporary perspectives potentially indicate the future course of Spenser studies, especially in relation to *The Faerie Queene*, as the poem not only represents the political structures of its time, for which it has been scrutinised, but it keenly allegorises Spenser's views on creation, existence and natural order by presenting innumerable human-nonhuman interactions. Accordingly, this thesis conducts a contemporary and extensive analysis of *The Faerie Queene*, as a whole, and with focus on Spenser's depiction of nonhuman animals and humans as a representative of the pre-Cartesian period. The main argument is that Spenser's pre-Cartesian attempt to distinguish and privilege humankind in *The Faerie Queene* falls short of a total realisation and absolute anthropocentrism unlike dualistic Cartesian discourses which flourish few decades after him in the seventeenth century. This is because, while Spenser aims to establish moral ideals and virtues to elevate humans through allegory in line with humanist thought, due to the poet's theological and ontological understanding and political position, his work indicates that postlapsarian humans are not capable of achieving these qualities through their own efforts. Only elect human characters are directed by God's grace to attain Spenser's ascribed virtues and ideals of humanity, thereby distinguishing themselves from other earthly creatures. The rest are stationed equally to or sometimes lower than animals. Thus, *The Faerie Queene* not just subverts its poet's humanist intent, but it also reflects the ambiguity and permeability of the human/animal divide in pre-Cartesian early modern discourses.



**Key Words**

Animal Studies, Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, Literary Animal Studies, Pre-Cartesian Period, Early Modern Period, Renaissance Period

## ÖZET

CAVCAV, Ayşe Ece. *Edmund Spenser'in The Faerie Queene'inde Kartezyen Düşünce Öncesi Hayvan ve İnsan Temsilleri*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2024.

Edmund Spenser'in (1552/53-1599) on altıncı yüzyılda yazdığı destan *The Faerie Queene* (1590-1596), İngiliz edebiyatının önde gelen eserlerinden olduğunu ilk yayımlandığı tarihten günümüze değin gördüğü kesintisiz ilgi ile kanıtlamıştır. Bu ilginin yirmi birinci yüzyılda devam ediyor olması eserin kaleme alındığı dönemin kültürü hakkında önemli bilgiler verdiğinin göstergesidir. Bu sebeple, eser kültürel ve edebi açıdan incelenmeye devam etmektedir ve yakın zamanda posthümanizm, eko-eleştiri ve edebiyatta hayvan çalışmaları gibi güncel kuramlar üzerine çalışan eleştirmenler de Spenser'in eserleri ile ilgilenmeye başlamıştır. Söz konusu çağdaş bakış açıları Spenser çalışmalarının gelecekte nasıl şekilleneceğinin habercisidir, özellikle *The Faerie Queene* bu bakış açıları ile incelenmeye elverişli bir eserdir çünkü bu alegorik şiir, şairinin yaratılış, varoluş ve dünya düzeni ile ilgili görüşlerini sayısız insan-insan dışı varlık etkileşimi aracılığıyla yansıtır. Bu nedenle, bu tez *The Faerie Queene*'in hayvan, insan ve insan dışı varlıkları nasıl sınıflandırdığına ve değerlendirdiğine odaklanarak eserin detaylı, çağdaş bir incelemesini yapmaktadır. İnceleme sonucu varılan ana bulgu, on yedinci yüzyılda oldukça gelişecek olan ikicil ve bütünüyle insan merkezci Kartezyen görüşlere kıyasla, Spenser'in insanlığı ayrıcalıklı kılma çabalarının sonuçsuz kaldığıdır. Spenser insanları diğer canlılardan ayıracak erdemleri irdelemeyi amaçlıyor olsa da, dini, ontolojik ve politik görüşleri esere yansımış, şairin hümanist hedefini gölgelemişlerdir. Protestan şairin belirlediği insanlık erdemlerini yalnızca Tanrı'nın seçtiği ve yönlendirdiği kişiler üstlenebilir ve geri kalanlar şiirde hayvanlar ile bir veya daha düşük seviyede konumlandırılır. Bu doğrultuda, *The Faerie Queene* Kartezyen düşünce öncesi dönemin değişken ve göreceli insan/hayvan anlayışını yansıtır.

### Anahtar Sözcükler

Hayvan Çalışmaları, Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, Edebiyatta Hayvan Çalışmaları, Kartezyen Düşünce Öncesi Dönem, Erken Modern Dönem, Rönesans Dönemi

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>KABUL VE ONAY .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ETİK BEYAN .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>ÖZET .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER I: “ASCENDING TO HUMANITY” .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>CHAPTER II: “DESCENDING TO ANIMALITY” .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>CHAPTER III: “BATTLING IN-BETWEEN” .....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>APPENDIX1. ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORMS .....</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>APPENDIX2. ORIGINALITY REPORT .....</b>	<b>100</b>

## INTRODUCTION

Up until the twentieth century, animals in literary works (much like their real counterparts) have often been overlooked or deemed secondary within the scope of humanities. The anthropocentric tendency in literary criticism was to read them as symbols or as allegorical devices rather than as representations of actual nonhuman agents. However, with rising awareness of climate change, species extinction and environmental deterioration, mid to late twentieth and twenty-first centuries witnessed a surge of interest in dis-anthropocentric and environmentally conscious literary and cultural criticisms/theories. This in turn gave rise to ecocriticism, defined in broad terms by Greg Garrard as “the study of the relationship of the human and the non-human, throughout human cultural history and entailing critical analysis of the term ‘human’ itself” (5). Also falling within this trajectory, the field of animal studies engages with the study of animal agencies and the cultural and discursive (rather than biological) construction of human/animal divisions in texts. This “animal turn” now finds shape through multiple interdisciplinary academic fields within and outside the humanities which question “the ethical and philosophical grounds of human exceptionalism by taking seriously the nonhuman animal presences that haunt the margins of history, anthropology, philosophy, sociology and literary studies” (Series Board, *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature* ii).

Many scholars of early modern animal studies such as Erica Fudge and Karen Raber point at the seventeenth century, specifically with reference to the works of French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), as the period in which a definitive barrier between humans and nature is strengthened, furthering anthropocentrism in Western thought systems. As Raber points out,

[f]or most critics concerned with animals [...] the influence of Cartesian thought on subsequent constructions of the distinction between human and animal is a crucial historical juncture. Descartes’ description of the “beast-machine” is a transformative concept responsible for banishing animals from their prior, problematic, intimate equivalency with humans. (10)

In his *Discourse on Method* (1637), Descartes declares that even the most intelligible “beast” cannot form a discourse or communicate its thoughts through language which is something even the least intelligible human can do, “and this attests not merely to the fact that beasts have less reason than men but that they have none at all” (32). Animals are reduced to soulless bodies or machines without reason or cognition, and reason “alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts,” and “it exists whole and entire in each of us” (Descartes 2). Thus, Cartesian thought establishes a definitive binary opposition or dualism between humans and all other animals, the former being indisputably superior to and innately distinguished/separated from the latter. According to Fudge, “[w]here pre-Cartesian thinking posited a link between human and animal, Descartes proposed reason as an innate, inalienable property of the human that allowed for his/her utter separation from animals which, he wrote, lack not simply reason but full consciousness” (“Beast Fables” 202). To support such arguments that together with Descartes’s works, the seventeenth century represents a notable change in the conceptualisation and cultural construction of a human/animal divide, it becomes necessary to reevaluate and analyse the cultural productions of the previous century from the lens of animal studies. Thus, enabling the comparison of sixteenth and seventeenth century representations of humans and nonhumans with emphasis on possible differences between pre-Cartesian and Cartesian periods. Within this perspective, the early modern period, especially the sixteenth century, should be at the focus of all criticisms interested in understanding the cultural construction of anthropocentric thought systems and in turn subverting them.

Therefore, this thesis aims to provide a novel and contemporary analysis of Edmund Spenser’s (1552/53-1599) canonical sixteenth century epic *The Faerie Queene* (1590-1596), as a whole and from the lens of animal studies, as the poem not only represents the political, historical and religious structures of its time for which it has been substantially studied, but it also allegorises Spenser’s pre-Cartesian views on creation, human existence and natural order by presenting innumerable human-nonhuman interactions. It will be claimed that *The Faerie Queene* draws an ambiguous and permeable human/animal divide by displaying affinities, equivalencies and fleeting differences which not only complicates but sometimes reverses the hierarchy between

humans and animals. Furthermore, it will be observed that Spenser's conceptualisation of humanity/animality, as represented in *The Faerie Queene*, corresponds to Neoplatonic, Calvinist and Lucretian thought by degree and also to the ideas of Humanist thinkers such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), therefore constituting an invaluable source for understanding and analysing multifaceted pre-Cartesian views on humans, animals, nature and nonhuman agency which differentiate from the dualistic ontology of Descartes.

The age-old question of how to define “the human,” and subsequent deliberations on how to situate other beings in relation to humans were by no means resolved nor put aside in Spenser's time. While the Renaissance often stands metonymically for the troops of humanism and human exceptionalism in our contemporary discourse, many scholars of early modern literature, especially those who are concerned with the interdependent fields of posthumanism, ecocriticism and animal studies, have established that “far from a coherent and monolithic subject of ‘humanism,’ the category of ‘the human’ was unstable and elastic” at the time (Ramachandran and Sanchez ix). This elasticity was partly because pre-Cartesian models of human ensoulment and analogous discourses on the human condition were fashioned through the Christianisation of diverse classical conventions. As Kenneth Gouwens explains, during the Renaissance, the “recovery of ancient texts facilitated renewed attention not only to the dominant voices that had championed human exceptionalism, but also to dissonant ones that had challenged human presumption to specialness and correspondingly elevated animals” (50).

Humanist thinkers such as Mirandola were influenced by the Aristotelian model of souls and the corresponding order of living beings. As Erica Fudge explains,

[t]here are in the Aristotelian model three different kinds of soul—vegetative, sensitive, and rational [...] also discussed in terms of the binary of the organic (vegetative and sensitive) and the inorganic (the rational) [...] The vegetative soul is shared by plants, animals, and humans and is the cause of [...] all natural—unthought—actions. The sensitive soul is possessed by animals and humans alone [...] and is the source of perception and movement. The rational soul houses the faculties that make up reason—including will, intellect, and intellective memory—and is only found in humans. (*Brutal Reasoning* 8)

According to this model, “higher forms of life incorporated all souls below it, so that human beings were on a continuum with nonhuman animals,” therefore, its Christianised interpretation by theologians such as St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274) and later humanists suggested that achieving “‘true’ humanity required the exercise of faith and reason” which “brought with it the corollary possibility that human beings could become indistinguishable from beasts” (Ramachandran and Sanchez vii-viii). Therefore, while humans had much in common with animals, faith and reason were still distinctive capabilities and signs of essential/innate difference as only humans possessed the immaterial/inorganic rational soul type which allowed their exercise.

In his work, *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1486), often referred to as the “Renaissance Manifesto,” Mirandola explains his understanding of the unfixed human condition:

The Father infused in man, at his birth, every sort of seed and all sprouts of every kind of life. These seeds will grow and bear fruit in each man who sows them. If he cultivates his vegetative seeds, he will become a plant. If he cultivates his sensitive seeds, he will become a brute animal. If he cultivates his rational seeds, he will become a heavenly being. If he cultivates his intellectual seeds, he will be an angel and a son of God. (113-114)

While Mirandola evidently idealises humanity and human will in contrast with animality, he nonetheless emphasises that a superior position of humanness is conditional or achievable through “cultivation.” Furthermore, there exists the possibility of degeneration or descending to the animal condition, thus drawing a complicated yet still porous human/animal divide.

In contrast with the Aristotelian convention, there was also the alternative yet similarly influential Platonic model of human cognition. Fudge explains that in Platonic thought “reason is not to be found, as Aristotle would propose, in an immaterial essence; rather, Plato suggests that it is [...] housed in the brain,” furthermore, as “the brain is the seat of reason,” “[t]his, inevitably, opens up the possibility that, because animals have brains, animals also have the capacity to reason” (*Brutal Reasoning* 87). Following this Platonic model, Greek author and biographer Plutarch (46 CE – approx.119 CE), who was also revered as an important source by early modern thinkers, would claim that “all animals, in some way or another, have a share of thought and reasoning capacity” in one of his

three treatises on animals entitled *On the Cleverness of Animals* (*De sollertia animalium*) (21). Moreover, in *Whether Beasts Are Rational, or Gryllus* (*Bruta animalia ratione uti*) which is Plutarch's version of the Circe and Odysseus myth, Gryllus who is a man transformed into a hog by Circe, argues that animals are not just capable of reasoning but also virtues are "found in them more so than in the wisest of humans" (108). Accordingly, Fudge observes that "[t]o be an animal, in this text, is to be more natural and less vicious than, and thus superior to, a human" (*Brutal Reasoning* 90).

Among the early modern authors who greatly revered Plutarch, was Spenser's contemporary, the famous French essayist and philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592). On a similar vein with Plutarch's arguments, in his essay "*An Apology for Raymond Sebond*" (1576), which is a canonical text especially for critics concerned with the study of animals in early modern literature and one heavily contested by Descartes himself<sup>1</sup>, Montaigne proclaims that "[m]an is the most blighted and frail of all creatures and, moreover, the most given to pride" (16). That is because,

[t]his creature knows and sees that he is lodged down here, among the mire and shit of the world, bound and nailed to the deadest, most stagnant part of the universe, in the lowest storey of the building, the farthest from the vault of heaven; his characteristics place him in the third and lowest category of animate creatures, yet, in thought, he sets himself above the circle of the Moon, bringing the very heavens under his feet. The vanity of this same thought makes him equal himself to God; attribute to himself God's mode of being; pick himself out and set himself apart from the mass of other creatures; and (although they are his fellows and his brothers) carve out for them such helpings of force or faculties as he thinks fit. How can he, from the power of his own understanding, know the hidden, inward motivations of animate creatures? What comparison between us and them leads him to conclude that they have the attributes of senseless brutes? (16-17)

It is evident that Montaigne's stance on the human condition is not one of humanist celebration, on the contrary, he subverts the Aristotelian order of beings by debasing anthropocentric claims of human superiority and distinction while also critiquing derogatory assumptions about the limited agency and lacking faculties of beings other than humans.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Melehy's "Silencing the animals" for a detailed discussion on Descartes' opposition to Montaigne.



As demonstrated by the diversity of these foundational discussions on the human condition, pre-Cartesian views on the stationing of beings “outside” the human category, especially animals, were also unfixed, subjective and convoluted in comparison to more definitive and straightforward categorisations later brought on by dualistic Cartesian ontologies and Enlightenment ideas which entirely distinguished and detached rational humans from a supposedly separate, irrational realm of nature and soulless, machine-like animals. In other words, “the conceptual shifts within the definition of the human” in classical discourses and their early modern interpretations were also “replicated in discussions of animals” (Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning* 85). Accordingly, it is possible to discern differing approaches towards animals and natural order within literary texts from this period. One “exemplary instance” of this is *The Faerie Queene* “as it draws on the ontological and epistemological currents of the period to explore the multiple meanings of being human,” mixing and reworking diverse conceptualisations of humanity and animality offered by philosophers such as “Aristotle, Plato, and Lucretius” (Ramachandran, “Humanism and its Discontents” 13).

Moreover, religious doctrines of the Protestant Reformation had also significantly influenced and re-shaped early modern discourses on humanity/animality. Contrasting Mirandola’s ideas with the doctrine of Protestant Reformer John Calvin (1509-1564), Fudge argues that

[for Pico della Mirandola] [d]egeneration is a God-given, but human, choice. Such freedom of choice is also offered to Calvin’s Adam, but the choice he makes reduces him to the status of the beast [...]. The Fall which depraved Adam and his posterity was within Calvinist thought irreparable by humanity acting alone. The dignity of Adam which Pico proclaimed was transformed into Calvin’s sense of humanity’s “wretchedness”. There was no sense [...] that good works can lead to heaven. Instead, there was the belief that salvation came from God alone, from the gift of grace [...]. There was a movement in Reformed ideas away from Pico della Mirandola’s man of dignity towards Calvin’s vision of humanity: “all, without exception, are originally depraved” [...] In place of the power to choose which was offered to the first man, Reformed thinkers proposed absolute powerlessness for fallen humanity. Predestination meant that the salvation or reprobation of the individual Christian was not in their own hands but was already decided. (qtd. in *Perceiving Animals* 36-37)

Within this perspective, while Mirandola posits humans in an unfixed condition on earth, either ascending to superior humanity or descending to inferior animality through their

actions, Calvinist predestination asserts that fallen/wretched humans are already reduced to the state of “beasts” from which only some elect people can be rescued through God’s grace. As the doctrine of the Elizabethan church in Spenser’s period was “predestinarian and, in effect, Calvinist” (Hume, *Protestant Poet* 4), and *The Faerie Queene* is “the major poem of sixteenth-century English humanism” (Hardison 381), it will be argued that an amalgamation of Protestant/Calvinist pessimism and humanist idealism informs the poet’s philosophical deliberations about natural order which find their place in the poem.

Spenser was born either in 1552 or 1553, a little before Elizabeth I ascended in 1558, and he died in 1599 while the queen was still on the throne. He probably came from a humble family but received a remarkable education. The poet first attended Merchant Taylors’ School under the headmaster Richard Mulcaster who greatly influenced young Spenser and according to Hadfield, both the school and Mulcaster “were associated with the generation of Protestants who had been exiled under Mary [Mary I of England] in Geneva and who were directly influenced by Calvin” (*A Life* 33). Afterwards, Spenser continued his education “at Pembroke College, Cambridge where he was enrolled as a ‘sizar,’ or poor scholar,” and received his “B.A. degree in 1573 and the M.A. in 1576” (Greenblatt 238-239). After graduation, the poet served as a personal secretary to important names such as “Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester and the queen’s principal favourite” and later “Lord Grey of Wilton, lord deputy of Ireland” (Greenblatt 239). To serve Grey, Spenser moved to Ireland around 1580, and it is now commonly accepted that the poet played a considerable part in the colonisation of Ireland by the English as well as the following atrocities marked by the “ruthlessness” and “ferocity of Grey’s regime” (Heale 2-3). “Like many of his fellow officials in Ireland, Spenser strongly approved of Grey and his policies” as suggested by his notorious political tract in dialogue form, *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, published posthumously in 1633 (Heale 3).

Besides his official occupations, Spenser was primarily a poet, and a most prolific one at that. Some of his famous works include the pastoral eclogues entitled *The Shepherdes Calender* (1579/1580), and sonnet sequences *Amoretti* and *Epithalamion* (1595). Still revered as a canonical text of the English Renaissance, Spenser’s most influential work is *The Faerie Queene*. It was dedicated to Elizabeth I, and in February 1591 the Queen

“honored [Spenser] more than she did any other poet by granting him an annual pension of £50, considerably more than he had ever made in direct payments for government service” (Mohl 670). In terms of genre, *The Faerie Queene* is categorised both as an epic and a romance since following the example of great heroic poems such as Virgil’s *Aeneid* as well as “medieval and popular romances” such as Ariosto’s *Orlando Furioso* (1532), Spenser “brings together [...] the aims of the epic with the techniques of chivalric romance” (Heale 13). *The Faerie Queene*’s immense significance among sixteenth century literature also lies within the poet’s versification, the form Spenser uses for his epic, later named “Spenserian Stanza,” is “[o]ne of the few major verse forms known to have been invented by a major poet,” which was admired and attempted by many later poets, especially by Romantics who greatly revered Spenser such as John Keats (1795-1821), and Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) (Blissett 671).

Spenser’s original intention for *The Faerie Queene* was to write twelve books but the poet was only able to complete six in his lifetime. The first three were published in 1590 to which Spenser appended a letter written to Sir Walter Raleigh which acts as an introduction or preface to the poem. Three more books were published by Spenser in 1596, and some parts belonging to the incomplete seventh book (Canto VI, Canto VII and two stanzas forming Canto VIII), called the “Cantos of Mutabilitie,” were published posthumously in 1609. Each of the completed six books consists of a “proem” which is the introductory section and twelve cantos. In his “Letter to Raleigh,” Spenser delivers his “general intention and meaning” in writing *The Faerie Queene* which is “to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline” (*The Faerie Queene* 714). He plans to achieve this end through the moral virtues each book and its corresponding knights, together with the central figures Arthur and the queen of Faerie Land Gloriana, represent and will hopefully convey to readers. These are: Book I of the virtue “Holiness” and the Redcrosse knight, Book II of “Temperance” and Sir Guyon, Book III of “Chastity” and Britomart, Book IV of “Friendship” and Cambel and Telemond/Triamond, Book V of “Justice” and Artegal, and finally Book VI of “Courtesy” and Calidore. Together with the knights, there are also innumerable human and nonhuman characters in each book, some pertaining to idealised virtues attributed to humanity, and some degenerating through vices/sins of various degrees.

More than four hundred years after its composition, *The Faerie Queene* still retains its significance today and continues to receive ample attention from literary scholars. This not only attests to the grandeur of Spenser's structural/poetic form, but even more so, it confirms that the poem offers valuable cultural and historical insight to the sixteenth century. Indeed, the epic continues to be studied from various cultural perspectives relating to issues such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion and class. During the past decade, scholars and literary critics working on the interdependent fields of posthumanism, ecocriticism and animal studies have turned their attention to Spenser's works. In 2015, the thirtieth volume of the *Spenser Studies* journal exclusively featured articles which engaged with Spenser's conceptualisation of "the human" and the "nonhuman" from diverse perspectives, including that of animal studies. In this special issue, Joseph Campana questions why Spenserians have been late to address "recent conversations about creaturely life in the Renaissance" unlike Shakespeareans who have embraced the animal turn in literary criticism (277). In response, Bruce Boehrer refers to "the sheer bulk of [Spenser's] work [which] resists detailed exposition" as well as the poet's seemingly "glib" treatment of animals ("Response" 337).

Most recently, in February 2024, editors/contributors Rachel Stenner and Abigail Shinn published the very "first sustained critical attempt to situate the poet [Spenser] in early modern Animal Studies," in a collection entitled *Edmund Spenser and Animal Life*, as a part of the book series *Palgrave Studies in Animals and Literature* (Stenner and Shinn 6). In their introduction, Stenner and Shinn note that "[a]nimal-related Spenser scholarship" is "incipient but already diverse" as it is "methodologically and theoretically eclectic, dialoguing not only with posthumanism, but with ecocriticism and studies of monstrosity" (11). This thesis, which arises from the question of how pre-Cartesian discourses positioned/defined animals in relation to humans (and vice versa), aims to contribute to these incipient, eclectic conversations by endeavouring to do an extensive and comparative analyses of Spenser's representation of animals, nonhumans and humans in *The Faerie Queene*, consequently, examining the role and agency of animals in the epic's portrayal of animality/humanity. It will follow the principle that "by recognizing the real—and active—role that animals have played in the construction of this being called the human that we can challenge Cartesianism and the worldview that follows from it, in

which animals are relegated to object status” as stated by Erica Fudge (*Brutal Reasoning* 191).

Literary scholars of animal studies, who aim to adopt dis-anthropocentric methodologies while analysing animals, recognise that exclusively reading human figures as agentic characters in a text, is a practice rooted in the Cartesian tradition. This is because, such readings are based on the dualistic and anthropocentric assumption that literary animals can only signify what is “human” or stand for human attributes. In other words, “[i]n readings of literary depictions of humans and animals, it is the animals that are generally expected to function as metaphors for humans, who are consequently seen as signifying themselves” (Lönngren 40). Therefore, they theorise on various methods to approach animals without denying or diminishing their significance. As Lönngren remarks further, “reading animal figures as metaphors for the human condition or as ‘actual animals’ may give very different results in the construction of what a fictive text is about” (37), likewise, “it is possible to formulate meanings of the very same text in ways that both reproduce hegemonic structures of power and in ways that undermine them” (39).

A metaphoric/symptomatic or “vertical” reading “suspects the text of hiding its ‘true’ meaning in its depths,” that is, displaying “*something* in order to enlighten *something else*,” and when applied to animal figures, this type of reading can render them “passive, silent, hollow, and invisible” while contributing to “notions of human uniqueness, significance, and complexity” (Lönngren 39-40). This is because the “depth model,” can present “animals as the shallow or transparent symbol and humans as the deep signified” (Stenner and Shinn 8). In contrast, metonymic/surface or “horizontal” readings allow animal figures to be understood as “actual animals” which do not exclusively signify human attributes but rather “self-signify,” such readings can also “disrupt the anthropocentric order through destabilizations of the category of ‘the human’” by drawing attention to the “likeness” of animals and humans (Lönngren 41).

These two modes of reading can converge or unify in the case of animal figures or literary animals which are “characterized by the possibility of being activated as both metaphor and metonymy” (Lönngren 45). Even in allegorical texts, including animal fables, which

seem to resist surface reading by definition, animals can both self-signify and act as metaphors for the human condition. As Oerlemans argues especially,

in the early modern history of English literature, allegorical representations of animals are characterized by doubleness and complexity; rather than transparently referring to a primarily human significance, animal allegories simultaneously hide and reveal the contested nature of the boundary between human and animal. (28)

When employed in allegory, animals are not chosen arbitrarily “to represent some aspect of human behavior,” on the contrary, “any kind of allegorical use of an animal (in a literary text or as an actual image in art or film) still relies to some degree on an awareness of the animal and its kind or species,” “even in fables some small sense of the actual animal must enter into the allegory” (Oerlemans 29-30). On a similar vein, Fudge argues that “a beast fable can be read as being solely about ‘man’” only when “an absolute distinction between humans and animals is assumed” (“Beast Fables” 203). However, a “much more indistinct notion of the human” can be found in texts from the “period before Descartes,” therefore, denying the reality and self-significance of animals in pre-Cartesian allegorical texts is a backwards projection of Cartesian ideas (Fudge “Beast Fables” 203). To avoid such an anachronistic and anthropocentric methodology, this thesis will consider *The Faerie Queene*’s animals from multiple perspectives, elaborating on their metaphoric/symbolic significance as well as acknowledging the ways in which they self-signify as nonhuman agents, since Spenser’s multi-layered allegory allows eclectic and diverse readings.

In fact, the field of animal studies is itself a relatively recent and eclectic/interdisciplinary one, often considered a subcategory or animal focused methodology within the broader framework of posthumanism. As Cary Wolfe explains, “it studies both a material entity (nonhuman beings) and a discourse of species difference that need not be limited to its application to nonhumans alone” (567). While its reach and perspectives are dynamic and diverse, they are shaped around the common aim of decentring “the human,” in other words, deconstructing and subverting human exceptionalism in literary works as well as literary criticism. In his *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Jacques Derrida subverts reductionist assumptions about clear-cut human/animal divisions or dualism by elaborating on the question of “the animal.” His argument is that “[b]eyond the edge of

the *so-called* human, beyond it but by no means on a single opposing side, rather than ‘The Animal’ or ‘Animal Life’ there is already a heterogeneous multiplicity” (Derrida 31). Thus, he challenges dualistic and essentialist ontologies which reduce the immense diversity of animals to a singular group deemed “the animal,”<sup>2</sup> only to then function as “the other” or binary opposite of yet another reductive category deemed “the human.” Such dichotomous conceptualisations are problematic because they are “at the heart of the physical and institutional violence visited on animals within Western cultures,” as “[p]lacing singular animals and the rich diversity of species within conceptual cages is the first step on the path toward literally capturing and caging animals and subjecting them to untold forms of violence” (Calarco 14). In line with this, Derrida also problematises the concepts of “humanity” and “animality” and argues that “[w]e have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures,’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity” (47). These singular opposing figures or categories cannot possibly encompass the diverse qualities of the insurmountable number of living beings they stand for or aim to patrol, thus, they are constructs of the anthropocentric and dualistic discourses which engender them.

Such discourses, Derrida observes, have of course their own history and politics, he “investigates” thinkers ranging from Aristotle to psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, including Descartes, whose ideas commonly/consequentially divide humans and animals by the means of language and linguistic ability, “all of them say the same thing: the animal is deprived of language” (Derrida 32). Among philosophers who associate humans with capability and animals with lack, Descartes is the one Derrida specifically calls attention to because he too recognises that Descartes’s beast-machine hypothesis represents a certain “mutation” away from thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne who precede him (Derrida 6). Derrida refers to this mutation or alteration between Montaigne and Descartes as “an event that is obscure and difficult to date, to identify even, between two configurations for which these proper names are metonymies” (6). In other words, “the philosophers’ names also serve as metonymies for what Derrida argues is a profound

---

<sup>2</sup> To counter measure this, Derrida invents the neologism “*Animot*” which emphasises “the rich multiplicity of animal life, as well as the complex and ambiguous nature of animals’ relationship to language” (Calarco 13).

bifurcation in the history of western metaphysics around the question of the dividing line between human and animal” because, while Montaigne stands for pre- and anti-Cartesian discourses which afford nonhuman intentionality and “interiority,”

[t]he metonymic name for the break that eventually results in the hegemony of the belief in human exceptionalism is Descartes. His *Discourse* and *Meditations* posit the non-human animal as a machine. But more, Descartes posits the body itself as an animated machine. The animal body, any animate body, is an automaton made of bones and flesh. Thus, what makes humans human—what we’ve come to call the *cogito* or reason—shows up. (Freccero 157-158)

Together with this, Freccero also notes the possibility of tracing “what might be called a shadow tradition that has not, as yet, erected a definitive barrier between the ‘orders of being’ that go by the names ‘human’ and ‘animal’” in early modern literary texts (157). Indeed, other scholars have also recognised that the diversity of early modern philosophical discourses on humanity/animality is replicated in literary works from this period.

In his influential work on early modern animal studies, *Shakespeare Among the Animals* (2002), Bruce Boehrer identifies/names a set of three interdependent approaches towards animals, humans and nature adopted by the authors of the time; “absolute anthropocentrism,” “relative anthropocentrism,” and “anthropomorphism” (6). Firstly, he uses “absolute anthropocentrism” in reference to discourses which construct a definitive distinction of all humans from nonhumans. This approach which touches upon “the Judaeo-Christian tradition” assumes that “human beings are radically—at the root of their nature—different from all other life on earth” and, therefore, “superior to the rest of earthly creation,” moreover, “this superiority, in turn, designates the natural world as an exploitable resource, with the spheres of nature and culture replicating the traditional relationship between servant and master” (Boehrer, *Among the Animals* 6-7). Similarly, “relative anthropocentrism” builds upon two spheres of presumed difference, inferior nonhumans and superior humans who are entitled to exploit them, however, the designation of beings into these categories becomes more complex and arguably more sinister. That is because, this approach “associates large and variable subsets of the human community to a greater or lesser extent with the realm of nature, while reserving full



human status only for specific, arbitrarily defined social groups,” therefore, “relative anthropocentrism adopts a much narrower definition of humankind” (Boehrer, *Among the Animals* 17). Thus, according to Boehrer’s argument, other forms of discrimination based on “nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion, social rank, and so on,” are closely associated with and consequential of anthropocentric discourses which designate some privileged groups to the full “human condition,” while excluding almost all but the “white, English, Anglican, male, mature, mentally sound, and prosperous” members of society in the context of Elizabethan England (*Among the Animals* 18).

Finally, Boehrer distinguishes the third view regarding humans, animals and nature found in early modern literature which he deems “anthropomorphism”<sup>3</sup> and contrasts with human exceptionalism. He suggests that “anthropomorphism emphasizes humankind’s animal nature and the unique capacity of human beings to sink below type—to become worse than they were created” (*Among the Animals* 27). This approach is closely related to Christian understandings of the fallen/postlapsarian human condition according to which “to be human is to live constantly in a state of devolution from one’s best self: to recognize and aspire to a standard of natural, right behaviour that the original sin has rendered unattainable” (Boehrer, *Among the Animals* 28). Moreover, the anthropomorphic approach suggests that, because of the devolutionary tendency of humans, “animals are better than we are, for they remember the fundamental principles of living—fidelity, physical courage, self-sacrifice, perseverance, contempt of pleasure, and so on—that we have chosen to forget” (Boehrer, *Among the Animals* 28). Boehrer’s observation of an “interplay” (*Among the Animals* 28) between the three approaches suggests that they can simultaneously be adopted by early modern author’s and co-mingle in their works. Likewise, it can be claimed that Spenser’s multifaceted depiction of bestialised and idealised humans as well as righteous and monstrous animal characters in *The Faerie Queene* fit into Boehrer’s concepts of relative anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. As Ramachandran argues, “Spenser’s oeuvre thus situates itself ‘in the middle,’ between the extremes of humanist celebration and critique” (13).

---

<sup>3</sup> While “Anthropomorphism” commonly refers to “[t]he attribution of human personality or characteristics to something non-human, as an animal” (*Oxford English Dictionary*), Boehrer extends this usage further.

Based on Spenser's ambition to fashion and therefore define the ideal human being, Stenner argues that

[t]he fundamental premise behind [*The Faerie Queene*] is the humanist belief that literature and culture mould us to their shapes and forms. By this logic, we are creatures who are always in a process of becoming, governed by moves and moments. The consequence of this, as Spenser recognised, is that virtues are not states of being but performances. ("Sheep, Beasts, and Knights" 167)

Indeed, *The Faerie Queene's* "continued Allegory, or darke conceit" (*The Faerie Queene* 724), perhaps at its core, is a reflection of Spenser's deep ontological deliberations about what it means to "become" human, and which actions or "performances" may or may not distinguish humans from nonhumans. In support of this, in the remainder of this introduction, it will be observed that Spenser reserves a great amount of space in *The Faerie Queene* to conceptualise the creation and condition of mortals, including humans and nonhumans, especially within the "notoriously indecipherable" (Reid 97) "Garden of Adonis" episode from Book III, Canto VI, and the thematically complementary Cantos of Mutabilitie. That is because, to understand the ontological foundation upon which Spenser constructs his own myth of the human, we must initially analyse these episodes in which he philosophises on the creation and order of living beings.

During the first half of the twentieth century, many scholars such as Edwin Greenlaw, Brents Stirling and Thomas Perrin Harrison Jr. elaborated on the philosophical, religious and scientific<sup>4</sup> significance of the Garden of Adonis, combining it with the Cantos of Mutabilitie. They were aiming to determine the possible sources Spenser made use of while drawing these convoluted episodes which allegorise and mythologise the poet's conception of earthly creation and existence. In the "Letter to Raleigh," Spenser lists some ancient and contemporary sources which inspired and informed *The Faerie Queene* such as Homer, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Virgil, Ariosto and Tasso (714-718). In addition, Edwin Greenlaw called attention to the Latin Epicurean philosopher Lucretius and his *De*

---

<sup>4</sup> For Greenlaw, "the chief interest is scientific in the sense that it has to do with the nature of things" (440).

*rerum natura* (*On the Nature of Things*) as a “chief source” for Spenser’s Garden of Adonis and Cantos of Mutabilitie, also noting that stanzas forty-four to forty-seven in Book IV, Canto X were a direct translation of “the invocation to Venus at the beginning of the Latin poem” (440-441). Although this argument was disputed over for years by many who mainly opposed the association of Spenser with a Lucretian naturalism/materialism and rejection of the supernatural, Greenlaw’s reading of the garden as an example of Spenser’s “interest in the relation of man to nature” (440) can inform the analysis of *The Faerie Queene*’s nonhumans aimed in this thesis.

The sixth Canto of Book III narrates the origin stories of Belphoebe and Amorett together with Spenser’s myth of the Garden of Adonis. Belphoebe is a character fashioned after Diana or Cynthia, the goddess of the hunt and the moon, she is also a personification of the virtuous personal and private side of Elizabeth I (*The Faerie Queene*, “Letter to Raleigh” 716). Amorett is her twin sister, their mother Chrysogonee is a fairy who conceives miraculously through sunbeams and gives birth in the forest while asleep. Goddesses Venus and Diana who are searching in the woods for lost Cupid see the new-borns and Diana takes Belphoebe to be raised in “perfect Maydenhed” and Venus takes Amorett to be raised in “goodly womanhed” (III.vi.28)<sup>5</sup>. Venus fosters Amorett in her joyous paradise on earth, the Garden of Adonis. Spenser conceptualises this Garden as the source of all that is earthly, it is the origin or “first seminary” of all mortal things which are the progeny of “dame Nature” (III.vi.30). It is situated on fruitful soil and encircled by two walls and two gates guarded by “Old *Genius*” (III.vi.31). Old Genius lets new-borns out into the world from one gate and lets those who die back into the garden from the other. The dead are planted again and they “grow afresh, as they had neuer seene / Fleshly corruption, nor mortall payne” (III.vi.33). As editor Stephens notes, this makes the Old Genius a porter of “birth and death” and the garden becomes a place of “generation and regeneration” (119 n 1). Creatures of “[i]nfinite shapes” and “vncouth formes” including humans breed in endless rows of beds and their numbers never decrease (III.vi.35). Their substance/matter derives from eternal “*Chaos*” which lies in

---

<sup>5</sup> All quotations from *The Faerie Queene*’s main text are taken from the Routledge edition by Hamilton, Yamashita, and Suzuki and cited as: (book number. canto number. stanza number/numbers).

the earth's womb and when this substance takes form, it becomes a body and the continuous cycle of life followed by death begins, the form that is the "outward fashion" varies by occasion and decays in time, but the substance remains unaltered (III.vi.36-38). Therefore, "*Tyme*"/*Time* is personified as a "[g]reat enemy" to the Garden who mars Nature's progeny with a scythe (III.vi.39). He is the bringer of death without whom "All that in this delightfull Gardin growes / Should happy bee, and haue immortall blis" which is impossible because "all that liues, is subject to that law: / All things decay in time, and to their end doe draw" (III.vi.40-41).

Spenser's ideas on earthly creation and mortality from the Garden episode are continued in the Cantos of Mutabilitie. Titaness Mutabilitie is the personification of change, and closely related to Time from the Garden because it is she who "death for life exchanged foolishlie: / Since which, all liuing wights haue learn'd to die" (VII.vi.6). Therefore, she controls all mortals who decay and change in time and challenges all other gods, claiming to rule over them as well. Mutabilitie argues that just like mortals, the immortals are subject to change, and she commands not just the earth but also the heavens. When the Titaness attempts to dethrone Cynthia/Diana, Jove tries to subdue her and fails. Therefore, the highest god/goddess, dame Nature, is called to make judgement "of their Titles and best Rights" (VII.vi.36). All gods and creatures assemble to hear Nature's decree, she is the tallest among all and her face which might be that of a lion is covered with a veil (VII.vii.5-6). Nature hears Mutabilitie's case and delivers an enigmatic response. She agrees that "all things stedfastnes doe hate / And changed be," but by their change they "Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate: / Then ouer them Change doth not rule and raigne; / But they raigne ouer change, and doe their states maintaine," moreover, "time shall come that all shall changed bee, / And from thenceforth, none no more change shall see" (VII.vii.58-59). With that, the Titaness is silenced, and all dissemble. According to editor Stephens's footnote to Book III "these cantos serve as an answer to the dilemma within the Garden of Adonis episode that all living things must change and die," by suggesting "that individual beings die precisely in order to bring their species to perfection, in a larger pattern that is eternal" (122 n 7). In the following two stanzas that comprise the eight canto "vnperfite," Spenser's poetic persona proclaims that Mutabilitie's claim to control heavens was false, however it is true that "[i]n all things

else she beares the greatest sway” (VII.viii.1). He then reworks the sickle/scythe wielding Time imagery from the Garden episode:

Wich makes me loath this state of life so tickle,  
 And loue of things so vaine to cast away;  
 Whose flowring pride, so fading and so fickle,  
 Short *Time* shall soon cut down with his consuming sickle. (VII.viii.1)

As suggested, all mortals are destined for the ravishes of time and alike in their fickleness which the poetic persona loathes. Still in the second stanza, which is also the final stanza of *The Faerie Queene*, he seems to find comfort in Nature’s statement that the ever-whirling wheel of change will come to an end one day and “thence-forth all shall rest eternally” (VII.viii.2).

What is significant about Spenser’s earthly creation myth conceptualised through the Garden of Adonis and Cantos of Mutabilitie is that he attributes the same origin or “substaunce/matter” to humans, animals and plants alike, they are only differentiated by their “forms:”

For in the wide wombe of the world there lyes,  
 In hatefull darknes and in deepe horrere,  
 An huge eternal *Chaos*, which supplies  
 The substaunces of natures fruitfull progenyes.

All things from thence doe their first being fetch,  
 And borrow matter, whereof they are made,  
 Which whenas forme and feature it does ketch,  
 Becomes a body, and doth then inuade  
 The state of life, out of the griesly shade [...] (III.vi.36-37)

This suggests that humans are not endowed with distinction by creation among “natures fruitfull progenyes.” Furthermore, their communal substance/matter that derives from Chaos is eternal whereas their distinguishing forms are innumerable as well as subject to perpetual change and decay. “That substaunce is eterne, and bideth so/ Ne when the life decayes, and forme does fade, / Doth it consume, and into nothing goe, / But changed is, and often alted to and froe” (III.vi.37). According to Greenlaw, this conceptualisation of the origin of humans,

alters in extraordinary fashion the Platonic and Christian idea of souls coming from a spiritual realm to inhabit mortal bodies to a conception as materialistic as that of Lucretius himself. For the chief point about the entire passage in Spenser is that these souls grow in the Garden of Dame Nature in precisely the same manner as the flowers and trees and all the animals. The only supernatural agencies are Nature herself, personified in much the same fashion as Lucretius, with all his denial of the supernatural in life [...] and the porter, Old Genius. (445)

It is suggested that like Lucretius, Spenser strays from a dualistic conception of mortal/earthly bodies and immortal/divine souls which differentiates and privileges humans over nonhumans. Harrison too agrees that “[m]ankind is here subject to no special dispensation, no origin more divine than that of the humblest flower” (“Divinity” 62).

Those who oppose Greenlaw’s argument about naturalism/materialism in the Garden of Adonis point to Spenser’s insistence on the special creation of humans elsewhere. For Stirling,

the creation of men along with beasts would point to naturalism in Spenser only if we consider the Adonis passage as a presentation of the poet’s total conception of the cosmos. No one, I think, will deny that in his work as a whole Spenser gave ample significance to the dignity of man. If there is any doubt about his orthodoxy in respect to a special creation, lines from the *Hymne of Heavenly Love* dispel it. (503)

The “Hymne of Heavenly Love” was published in 1596 with three other poems in the collection *Fowre Hymns* which combines some of Spenser’s earliest works with some of his last (Hadfield, *A Life* 47). Often put in conversation with Neoplatonism by scholars, the “Hymne of Heavenly Love” elaborates on divinity, heavenly creation and the condition of humankind. The following stanzas from the hymn describe the genesis of humans:

Therefore of clay, base, vile, and next to nought,  
 Yet form’d by wondrous skill, and by his might,  
 According to an heauenly patterne wrought,  
 Which he had fashiond in his wise foresight,  
 He man did make, and breathd a liuing spright  
 Into his face most beautifull and fayre,  
 Endewd with wisdomes riches, heauenly, rare.

Such he him made, that he resemble might  
 Himselfe, as mortall thing immortall could;

Him to be lord of euery liuing wight  
 He made by loue out of his owne like mould,  
 In whom he might his mightie selfe behould  
 For loue doth loue the thing belou'd to see,  
 That like itselfe in louely shape may bee. (594)

Here “man” in singular form, with reference to Adam, is made from clay in the image of God and given a soul which is the “special creation” Stirling refers to. He is to be the lord of every “living wight,” an umbrella term for mortals Spenser uses rather ambiguously while referring both to humans and nonhumans. However, the following stanza reveals that prelapsarian Adam’s distinguished lordship in heaven is short-lived:

But man, forgetfull of his Makers grace,  
 No lesse then angels, whom he did ensew,  
 Fell from the hope of promist heavenly place,  
 Into the mouth of death, to sinners dew,  
 And all his off-spring into thraldome threw:  
 Where they for ever should in bonds remaine  
 Of never dead, yet ever dying paine. (594)

With his fall from heaven to earth because of the original sin, Adam and his offspring are introduced to mortality and reduced to “thraldome,” no longer distinguished from other creatures. Putting this representation from the hymn in conversation with *The Faerie Queene*’s Garden of Adonis and Cantos of Mutabilitie, it can be claimed that the creation of humans and nonhumans described in the Garden is earthly rather than heavenly, in other words, it refers to the condition of fallen humankind, Adam’s offspring who breed on earth. Therefore, they are subject to change and the ravishes of time like all earthly creatures.

When Titaness Mutabilitie makes her case to dame Nature, she declares that the earth and all “her tenants; that is, man and beasts” are alike in their “thraldome” to change (VII.vii.19), because

For, all that from her [earth] springs, and is ybredde,  
 How-euer fayre it flourish for a time,  
 Yet see we soone decay; and, being dead,  
 To turne again vnto their earthly slime:  
 Yet, out of their decay and mortall crime,

We daily see new creatures to arize;  
 And of their Winter spring another Prime,  
 Vnlike in forme, and chang'd by strange disguise:  
 So turne they still about, and change in restlesse wise. (VII.vii.18)

In this stanza, Mutabilitie further elaborates on the circular generation and regeneration of mortals depicted in the Garden of Adonis. Here it is less ambiguously stated than in the Garden episode that death is a change of form through decay, a return to “earthly slime.” Still, there is also regeneration and new forms of life arising from this decayed substance, closely resembling the “wheele arownd” imagery of new-borns going out and the dead coming in through the doors of the Garden of Adonis (III.vi.33). For Greenlaw, “earthly slime” is one with the “substaunce” or “the first-beginnings,” “out of which new creatures arise” as in the Garden of Adonis (460). Moreover, Spenser refers to “slime” many times in *The Faerie Queene* as well as in the *Fowre Hymns* and other poems. In the first canto of Book I, monster Errour spews out vomit full of frogs and toads which is likened to the “fertile slime” (mud) of river Nile from which generates “[t]en thousand kindes of creatures” (I.i.21). The same simile is used to explain how Chrysogonee’s impregnation through sunbeams is possible, the poetic persona’s reasoning is that if sunbeams can initiate fructification in slimy/moist mud, they can have the same effect on Chrysogonee’s moist womb:

Miraculous may seeme to him, that reades  
 So straunge ensample of conception,  
 But reason teacheth that the fruitfull seades  
 Of all things liuing, through impression  
 Of the sunbeames in moyst complexion,  
 Doe life conceiue and quickned are by kynd:  
 So after *Nilus* inundation,  
 Infinite shapes of creatures men doe fynd,  
 Informed in the mud, on which the Sunne hath shynd. (III.vi.8)

In these instances, slime/mud imagery is associated with the generation of nonhuman creatures, however, Spenser extends it to describe human generation as well. As it is observed in the Garden of Adonis, all mortals derive from the same substance without distinction. Further proof of this is present, Alma’s castle from book two, which expressly represents the human body, is not made of “bricke, ne yet of stone and lime” but of “*AEgyptian* slime” (II.ix.21). It has long been established by multiple scholars that



Spenser derives this Nile inundation and fertile mud/slime imagery from the first book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, together with this, Reid also notes that in Ovid "the creation of new people does not mirror the spontaneous generation of other, nonhuman life forms: as a matter of fact, divine intervention rather than mere elemental combinatorics is required to create humans" (87). In contrast, for Spenser's human characters, the slimy substance/origin they have in common with other creatures is what associates them with the earth and therefore the original sin for which they were cast down from heaven. Bruce Boehrer also comments on this saying:

[a]s living creatures arise from the ooze seemingly of their own volition, so Spenser returns the human form to that same insensate, elementary matter. Of course, Spenser can hardly be expected to like the idea that he, too, is dirt. But it is an insight with deep roots in the Christian tradition, binding Catholicism to Anglicanism to radical Protestantism, despite all other disagreements. ("Response" 339)

For this reason, Spenser contrives multiple means to make his idealistic characters which need to be exempt from the original sin also devoid of slimy substance.

The most striking example of this is again Belphoebe, "Pure and vnspotted from all loathly crime, / That is ingenerate in fleshly slime / So was this virgin borne, so was she bred" (III.vi.3). Because of the extraordinary circumstances through which she was conceived and reared, Belphoebe is devised to be devoid of all mortal crime which is also mirrored by her impeccable chastity throughout the poem. Paradoxically, Spenser does not refer to Belphoebe's twin Amorett as "unspotted" even though they share the same origin, suggesting that she is not exempt from the original sin unlike Belphoebe. While these characters will be further examined in the following chapters, here it will be sufficient to argue that the main difference between infallible Belphoebe and flawed Amorett is that the latter was raised in the Garden of Adonis and therefore became associated with the earthly mortality and communal substance it represents. Whereas Belphoebe who is nursed by a "Nymphe" becomes associated with the immortals (III.vi.28). In fact, another character deemed "deuouide of mortall slime" by Spenser's poetic persona is also a nymph named Cymoent (III.iv.35). Cymoent is the daughter of great sea god Nereus and therefore immortal. However, she is the mother of knight Marinell sired by a human, and her immortality is contrasted by her son's mortality which

causes Cymoent great stress. Although she tries to warn him against possible dangers, it nonetheless proves to be “[a] lesson too too hard for liuing clay,” which is another reference to the shared substance of mortals that ingenerates the original sin and therefore mutability and fallibility (III.iv.26).

Through these instances it is observed that Spenser’s continued allegory in *The Faerie Queene* reflects his understanding of the fallen human condition. Because of their shared earthly origins, the descendants of Adam become equals with all mortal nonhumans in their thralldom to mutability. In other words, “Spenser proposes a mode of being which humans and non-humans share” (Stenner, “Sheep, Beasts, and Knights” 168), albeit a lowly one. For this reason, *The Faerie Queene* draws a permeable and ambiguous human/animal divide which represents the pre-Cartesian, non-dualistic, views of its author. For Spenser, neither human will, nor reason alone is enough to ensure the salvation of fallen humans because without God’s grace, they stray further from idealised humanity than animals do as his poetic persona proclaims:

And is there care in heauen? and is their loue  
 In heauenly spirits to these creatures bace,  
 That may compassion of their euilles moue?  
 There is: else much more wretched were the cace  
 Of men then beasts. But O th’exceeding grace  
 Of highest God, that loues his creatures so,  
 And all his workes with mercy doth embrace,  
 That blessed Angels, he sends to and fro,  
 To serue to wicked man, to serue his wicked foe. (II.viii.1)

Once more it is emphasised that the hierarchy between humans and animals depends solely on heavenly judgement rather than innate differences. Moreover, it is suggested that this hierarchy could easily be reversed without the heavenly care provided by God’s angels, since “wretched” humans are predisposed towards “evils.”

Therefore, the following chapters will disclose that in accordance with pre-Cartesian ontologies, Spenser does not deny that humans have much in common with animals, instead he draws a metaphorical and moral mutability from human to “beast” and “beast” to human, blurring the lines between these two categories. It is also true that as a humanist Spenser idealises humanity and tries to build principles which will fashion humankind,

elevate them to gentle discipline and distinguish them from the “dunghill kind” which he variously refers to as the “beast,” the “savage” and the “wild” throughout *The Faerie Queene*. However, in instances where the humanist in Spenser is overcome by the Protestant/Calvinist, it is possible to discern human characters failing to attain, retain and perform the very principles and virtues the poet has devised to define idealised humanity. Thus, throughout *The Faerie Queene*, we observe Spenser’s mutable characters ascending to humanity, descending to animality and altogether battling in-between.

Accordingly, in the first chapter of this thesis, “Ascending to Humanity,” the agency and role of animals in Spenser’s construction of humanity as an ideal will be explored. The epic’s predominant and benevolent animal figures such as the Lion of Book I, the equines, and Timias’s Dove from Book IV will be analysed in relation to their exemplary qualities which inform Spenser’s ascribed moral ideals of humanity. The Satyrs of Book I and Book III will be regarded as the mid-point in a spectrum of ascension to humanity because of their half-human half-animal condition and benign depiction. Finally, the salvage man of Book VI, will be studied as an elect human character who both resembles the aforementioned nonhumans and verges upon “virtuous humanity.” It will be found that the poem configures religiosity, that is conditional to a “true realisation” of Christianity, as the exclusive principle which separates humans from animals.

The second chapter, “Descending to Animality,” will explore the ways in which Spenser extends his conceptualisation of animality to entail human characters who do not comply with his moral ideals. Spenser’s symbolic and traditional association of certain animal species with the deadly sins will be studied through the episode of Lucifera in Book I, Canto IV. Human characters such as Fradubio (Book I), Gryll (Book II), and Malbeco (Book III) who physically metamorphose into nonhumans and morally descend to animality because of their “sinfulness” will be analysed comparatively. Finally, the salvage man (Lust) of Book IV, Souldan and Adicia from Book V, and the salvage nation of Book VI will be studied in relation to animality and colonialist/imperialist discourses. It will be found that Spenser’s relative anthropocentrism in *The Faerie Queene* excludes human characters which are deemed “unvirtuous” or “sinful” from humanity and equates

them with wild/savage or “harmful” animals, consequently subjecting them to the “mastery” of the poem’s elect human figures.

Finally, the third chapter, “Battling In-Between,” will read the “one-on-one” battles held between the epic’s virtuous knights and monstrous nonhuman figures as metaphors of fallen humankind’s continuous battle for redemption and salvation against sin and temptation, the conquest of which represents the realisation of a “true state of humanness” and separation from “beasts.” The Redcrosse knight, Sir Guyon, Artegall, Calidore, Arthur and a selection of their various nonhuman opponents such as Error, Orgoglio, the Dragon (Book I), Maleger (Book II) and the Blatant Beast (Book VI) will be analysed from this perspective. It will be concluded that, in accordance with reformist thought, rather than human reason and will acting alone, God’s grace directs and determines the course and outcome of these engagements for Spenser.

## CHAPTER I

### “ASCENDING TO HUMANITY”

*In such a saluage wight, of brutish kynd,  
Amongst wilde beastes in desert forrests bred,  
It is most straunge and wonderfull to fynd  
So milde humanity, and perfect gentle mynd.  
(Spenser, *The Faerie Queene* VI. v. 29)*

Renaissance thinkers and authors, especially moralists such as Spenser whose epic aims to fashion the ideal human being, were actively involved in the philosophical, religious and political configuration/construction of humanity’s characteristics, borders and constituents through their works. As Ramachandran and Sanchez recognise, “Spenser’s writing offers a vital, yet oddly neglected, archive for any engagement with early modern debates on what the category of ‘the human’ does and means” (ix). Moreover, as Sanchez notes, *The Faerie Queene*’s introductory “Letter to Raleigh,” “reminds us that each hero [in the epic] is but one part of a composite ideal human who has achieved the ‘twelve private morall vertues” (qtd. in “Posthumanist Spenser” 21), represented primarily by the character of young knight Arthur as well as other exempt/elect figures like Gloriana, Una and Belphebe. Within this perspective, it can be claimed that one meaning of “humanity” for Spenser is achievement. Instead of a pregiven one, humanity is an ideal to which one needs to ascend through the performance of and adherence to certain moral values and virtues outlined by the poet, and because of his Protestant/Calvinistic point of view, this adherence comes by the way of heavenly grace and guidance or predestination, rather than through the workings of sheer human will.

Furthermore, while *The Faerie Queene* sets “itself the task of generating images of the ideal ethical form of life for the human,” “it does so by trafficking quite extensively in and relying heavily upon nonhuman figures for definition” (Campana 278). Such nonhuman figures ranging from animals, half-human half-animal beings or mythological/fantastical creatures to bestialised humans, often function as foils, their “savagery” contrasting and highlighting the “civility/gentility” of the poem’s knights and other human characters. However, the reversal of this hierarchy is also present in Spenser’s design. In numerous instances where nonhuman savagery mirrors that of

humans or where nonhuman figures better adhere to righteous conduct, consequently surpassing humans in their humanity, borders between civility and savagery, as well as human and “beast” become intangibly blurred. As Ramachandran argues, Spenser’s allegorical fiction not just “deconstructs aspects of the human in nonhuman forms,” but it “programmatically charts a sliding scale of humanity” (14). Arguably, this sliding scale or continuum charts a moral/ethical progression from animality to idealised humanity in which both human and nonhuman actors ascend or descend according to their virtuous/righteous or sinful/unrighteous conduct. In other words, humanity becomes the highest end of a moral spectrum, therefore, out of reach for many of Spenser’s characters regardless of their species or “kind.” In the light of this, it will be claimed that Spenser’s Protestant/Calvinist mistrust in the moral capacity of fallen humans, together with his personal and political calculations<sup>6</sup>, shape his depiction of humanity as an elusive ideal to which only some elect figures can ascend in *The Faerie Queene*. Accordingly, this chapter will analyse the role and agency of *The Faerie Queene*’s animals in Spenser’s conceptualisation of humanity, also aiming to place his representation in the larger context of early modern animal studies.

*The Faerie Queene*’s Book I is often considered to be the most prominently Protestant/Calvinistic among the rest in terms of its thematic display of human defect and dependence on heavenly grace for salvation. This is because, “Redcrosse’s weaknesses, shown against” various opponents such as “Error, Orgoglio, and the Dragon, clearly demand spiritual powers of resistance not his own” (Auksi 128-129)<sup>7</sup>. Within this perspective, Una, who is one of Spenser’s idealised human characters, can be associated with these spiritual powers as she functions as a guide and reminder of truth for the Redcrosse knight during his moments of weakness and decline. She accompanies him because Redcrosse is the Protestant/Calvinistic “type of the elect Christian” (Heale 21), which means that although he is prone to error because of the fallen human condition, he is among the people chosen by God (predestined) and directed by heavenly grace for

---

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter II: “Descending to Animality,” for a discussion on the political and ideological implications of Spenser’s construction of “the human” with reference to imperialist/colonialist discourses.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter III: “Battling In-Between” for an extensive analysis of these episodes.

repentance and salvation. According to Brooks-Davies, “Una’s significance in the allegory of Book I is best understood through explication of her iconographical attributes,” “[t]he primary meaning of her name, from the Latin, is ‘oneness’,” therefore, “Una is the principle of indivisibility, Truth in its philosophical and religious aspects” (“Una” 704-705). Moreover, other iconographical details such as her white lamb, white Ass and her own whiteness covered with a black veil point to “humility” and “innocence” while also linking Una with Christ (Heale 27). Overall, it can be claimed that among other things, Una allegorically represents the “true church” (Brooks-Davies, “Una” 704-705). Ironically, she is a character repeatedly wronged by humans and helped by nonhumans, as Heale observes, “Truth may be one and indivisible, but she is by no means unmistakable to the dimmed vision of fallen man” (27).

While present only in Canto III, Book I’s Lion is arguably Spenser’s most notable animal character as he not just challenges Una’s enemies but also the dividing line between animality and humanity. The Lion first appears while desolate Una, betrayed by misguided Redcrosse, is searching for her knight in the woods with her white Ass. Tricked by the evil enchanter Archimago into believing that she is unchaste, the Redcrosse knight deserts Una to fend for herself in the previous Cantos. The knight couples with the disguised enchantress Duessa who also deceitfully convinces him that she is a virtuous but wronged lady in need of assistance. Una who is unaware of these schemes and her knight’s unfaithfulness, pitifully dwells in “wildernesse and wastfull deserts” (I.iii.3). As she lays down to rest, the “ramping Lyon” suddenly rushes forth with bloody gaping mouth, issuing towards Una as if to a prey, but in a marvellous turn of events, he shows remorse and instead kisses her feet (I.iii.5-6). Then on, the Lion becomes Una’s “watch and ward,” escorting and aiding the lady in her quest to find Redcrosse (I.iii.9). When Una is refused shelter at old woman Corceca and her daughter Abessa’s house, the Lion forcefully ensures their entry, moreover, he dismembers the daughter’s routine guest, church robber Kirkrapine, to protect Una (I.iii.13-22). Afterwards, Archimago, disguised as Redcrosse, deceives Una but his true identity is revealed when challenged by the notorious pagan/paynim knight Sansloy. Sansloy then grabs Una off her Ass, the Lion tries to save her by charging at the knight and manages to snatch his shield, however, Sansloy who “feates of armes did wisely vnderstand,” murders the Lion with an iron

sword (I.iii.42). Una, now left without her “faithfull gard,” gets carried away by Sansloy despite all her efforts, and her Ass dutifully follows the lady while they ride towards what seems to be her pitiful plight (I.iii.43-44).

Starting with Madeline Pelner Cosman’s and Arthur F. Marotti’s subsequent articles<sup>8</sup>, the symbolic significance of lions, as well as other animal imagery in *The Faerie Queene* has been studied from the 1960’s onward. Therefore, it has long been established that lions symbolise “wrath,” “strength,” “courage,” “nobility” and “watchfulness” among other things in emblematic and literary traditions which can be traced all the way back to Aristotle, and likewise found in *The Faerie Queene* (Marotti 70-72). Moreover, possible allegorical interpretations of Book I’s Lion as a representation of “the power of the kings of England,” and the heraldic significance of lions in the historical context of Britain have also been explored (Heale 28). However, as Oerlemans argues, “[a]llegory [...] is not always a way of repressing or ignoring the reality of the animal” (45). Accordingly, if the Lion is reconsidered as a self-signifying animal character in its own right, and an active nonhuman agent in the events of Canto III and Una’s story, rather than a mere emblem/token of some human appointed traits or a metaphorical stand in for a human figure, this character can provide useful insight into Spenser’s understanding of humanity/animality and demonstrate the agency of actual animals in the cultural and discursive construction of these categories.

In their initial encounter, Spenser underlines Una’s physical vulnerability as opposed to the Lion’s strength. Still, the animal refrains from attacking and eating<sup>9</sup> her, disregarding his survival instinct and hunger, therefore, diverging from his predatory inclination towards conduct that occasions his identification as “the humane lion of Book I” (Ramachandran 14) by scholars. The scene is described in the following stanza:

It fortun'd out of the thickest wood  
A ramping Lyon rushed suddeinly,  
Hunting full greedy after saluage blood;

---

<sup>8</sup> See Cosman’s “Spenser’s Ark of Animals” and Marotti’s “Animal Symbolism in the *Faerie Queene*.”

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter II: “Descending to Animality” for a discussion on human versus animal edibility and flesh in early modern literature.



Soone as the royall virgin he did spy,  
 With gaping mouth at her ran greedily,  
 To haue attonce deuourd her tender corse:  
 But to the pray when as he drew more ny,  
 His bloody rage aswaged with remorse,  
 And with the sight amazd, forgat his furious forse. (I.iii.5)

Evidently, this scene highlights Una's symbolic qualities and her allegorical function as the "one truth" which subdues all wrongs as suggested further by the following lines, "In stead thereof he kist her wearie feet, / [...] / As he her wronged innocence did weet / O how can beautie maister the most strong, / And simple truth subdue auenging wrong?" (I.iii.6). However, it can also be argued that the Lion's supposedly "humane" behaviour serves another function in revealing Spenser's conceptualisation of ideal humanity. Elsewhere in *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser associates beastliness/animality and savagery with the oppression of the vulnerable and weak by the powerful and strong:

But mongst wyld beasts and saluage woods to dwell;  
 Where still the stronger doth the weake deuoure,  
 And they that most in boldnesse doe excell,  
 Are dredded most, and feared for their powre [...] (V.ix.1)

Ironically, as the stronger Lion refrains from devouring weaker Una, it is suggested that he transcends and subverts the category of wild/savage beasts. Moreover, while the Lion substitutes for a guard in Redcrosse's absence, the animal's adherence to righteous conduct outshines that of the knight. Una herself compares the two:

The Lyon Lord of euerie beast in field  
 Quoth she, his princely puissance doth abate,  
 And mightie proud to humble weake does yield,  
 Forgetfull of the hungry rage, which late  
 Him prickt, in pittie of my sad estate:  
 But he my Lyon, and my noble Lord  
 How does he find in cruell hart to hate  
 Her that him lou'd, and euer most adord,  
 As the God of my life? why hath he me abhord? (I.iii.7)

Through this comparison, the Lion becomes an exemplary figure because his behaviour is set as a "princely" model to be looked up to while that of the knight is criticised and deemed "cruell." What is significant about the Lion's model behaviour throughout the

canto is that, apart from his initial and sudden shift of temperament at the sight of Una, none of his actions are necessarily unnatural or marvellous in the sense that they are things which might be expected of an actual guard animal such as a dog.

*Of Englishe Dogges* (1576), is an English translation/adaptation of John Caius's Latin Treatise *De canibus Britannicis* (1570) by Abraham Fleming, it is also "[t]he first book in English devoted entirely to dogs" (Marston 18). John Caius was the "leading English physician of his period," serving "Mary and Edward VI," and parts of his treatise on dogs were featured in famous Swiss physician and naturalist Konrad Gesner's (1516-1565) survey of zoology entitled *Historiae Animalium* (1555), as well as in Edward Topsell's dubious seventeenth century survey, *The History of Foure-Footed Beastes* (1607-1658) (Marston 18-19). *Of Englishe Dogges* lists and categorises actual as well as legendary dog breeds known at the time, also noting their physical and behavioural characteristics, and it features multiple breeds described in terms quite similar to Spenser's fictional Lion<sup>10</sup>. For instance, it is stated that the breed called "mastieue or Bandogge" (Bandogge/Mastiff)

is vaste, huge, stubborne, ougly, and eager, of a heuy and burthenous body, and therefore but of litle swiftnesse, terrible, and frightfull to beholde, and more feare and fell then any Arcadian curre (notwithstading they are sayd to haue their generation of the violent Lion.) [...] they are appoynted to watche and keepe farme places and coũtry cotages sequestred from commõ recourse, and not abutting vpon other houses by reason of distaunce, when there is any feare conceaued of theefes, robbers, spoylers, and night wanderers. They are seruiceable [...] to bayte and take the bull by the eare, when occasion so requireth. One dogge or two at the vttermost, sufficient for that purpose [...] For it is a kinde of dogge capeable of courage, violent and valiaunt, striking could feare into the harts of men, but standing in feare of no man, in so much that no weapons will make him shrinke, nor abridge his boldnes.  
(25)

The mastiff, as described in the Treatise, not only resembles Spenser's "fierce" (I.iii.19) Lion outwardly, but it also acts similarly since the Lion too keeps watch when Una sleeps (I.iii.15) and much like a guard/protection dog would, he pins down church robber Kirkrapine who intrudes Una's chamber at night: "And seizing cruell clawes on trembling

---

<sup>10</sup> While lions belong to the mammal family of felines, Spenser's fictional Lion carries qualities which are often associated with members of the canine family such as loyalty, courage and guarding instincts.

breast, / Vnder his Lordly foot him proudly hath supprest” (I.iii.19). Moreover, the Lion is not afraid of Sansloy and his weapons/armour but attacks him boldly and furiously just like the valiant and violent mastiff (I.iii.41). On the category of “defending dogges” or “Canes defensores,” the Treatise states that

[i]f it chaunce that the master bee oppressed, either by a multitude, or by the greater violence & so be beaten downe that he lye groueling on the ground, (it is proued true by experience) that this Dogge forsaketh not his master, no not when he is starcke deade: But induring the force of famishment and the outragious tempestes of the weather, most vigilantly watcheth and carefully keepeth the deade carkasse many dayes, indeuouring, furthermore, to kil the murtherer of his master, if he may get any aduantage. (30)

Such acts of loyalty observed in these dogs are also observed in Spenser’s Lion. Arguably, his most prominent characteristic is altruism, epitomised by his final act of self-sacrifice, the Lion selflessly guards Una throughout Canto III. While this behaviour is not naturally observed in lions, *Of Englishe Dogges* suggests that it was and can be observed in dogs, therefore, it is true that Spenser’s appointment of a lion as a guard animal is largely in line with a symbolic use of animals. Still, it should not be disregarded that the Lion is not a fantastical or anthropomorphised figure (he does not talk, look or act like a human), neither is he purely metaphorical or symbolic. In fact, he is the representation of an animal, and he behaves as such. Accordingly, it should also be acknowledged that what might be considered “humane” about the Lion, his selfless fidelity to Una which is set as an example for the human knights, is in fact animalistic behaviour that can be found in dogs.

It is plausible that zoology books such as *Historiae Animalium* and *Of Englishe Dogges* were among the plethora of sources which fed Spenser’s imagination. It is also highly conceivable that Spenser himself owned or observed guard/protection dogs such as the ones described by Caius and Fleming, as he makes use of “mastiues” (mastiffs) in a bull baiting simile elsewhere in *The Faerie Queene* (II.viii.42). Cosman also notes that “Spenser employs several ‘dog’ images,” specifically “curs, hounds, mastiffs, limehounds, and bitches” and the “[d]istinctions among the habits of each are carefully marked” (88). In either case, what is important is the possibility that empirical observation of actual animal behaviour could have informed Spenser’s design of the Lion which he

made into an exemplary figure for humane conduct, therefore, it is possible to talk about animal agency in *The Faerie Queene* and in Spenser's construction of ideal humanity. As Fudge also notes, not particularly about *The Faerie Queene*, but of early modern literature in general,

in early modern ideas about animals, it is possible to see how empirical observation begins to undercut assertions of animal irrationality; how, just as looking at human behavior can challenge the seemingly parallel binaries of human/animal and reason/unreason, so looking at animal behavior can also uproot difference. (*Brutal Reasoning* 85)

In the case of the Lion, there is a difference between the animal's altruistic fidelity and the lack thereof in Redcrosse, and this needs to be overcome by the knight in order to ascend to humanity.

Cosman further argues that “[p]erhaps Spenser's personal sympathies account for the abundance of animal imagery” in *The Faerie Queene* as many of his animal “allusions seem based on acute observation of animal habits and sympathetic delight in the order of natural life” (97-98). Indeed, the Lion is but one of *The Faerie Queene*'s exemplary animal characters, albeit the most prominent one. For instance, the white Ass is another animal compared to a human and revered for his selfless loyalty to Una:

Her servile beast yet would not leaue her so,  
But followes her far off, ne ought he feares,  
To be partaker of her wandring woe,  
More mild in beastly kind, then that her beastly foe. (I.iii.44)

When Sansloy murders the Lion and kidnaps Una to attempt rape, Una's Ass does not escape even though he is loose, instead he faithfully follows the lady. Therefore, Spenser declares that the servile animal is less of a “beast” than the lawless and lusty human Sansloy. Once more, Spenser instigates the reader to look at animal behaviour and compare it to that of humans, this time sympathetically emphasising the Ass's innocence while condemning the lusty knight's sinfulness. This representation further supports the point that Spenser sometimes reverses the hierarchy between animals and humans by observing animalistic/natural yet honourable qualities in the former and unnatural, moral

degeneration in the latter, consequently blurring the borders between animals and humans.

In fact, the Ass can be placed among a group of honourable equines found in *The Faerie Queene*. Some of which are the trusty horse of Redcrosse, aiding the fight with the Dragon, and Arthur's horse "*Spumador* borne of heauenly seed" (II.xi.19), as well as Florimell's Palfrey and Guyon's horse Brigadore. In Book III, Florimell, who is a virtuous lady from the Faerie court, rides all night without sleep because she is chased by a villainous forester, and once she is too tired to continue, "her white Palfrey hauing conquered / The maistring raines out of her weary wrest," carries her "where euer he thought best" (III.vii.2). This might be interpreted as pure survival instinct on the animal's part, nonetheless, Spenser's wording suggests that the Palfrey has control of the situation as well as understanding, and through "natiue corage" he carries "her beyond all ieopardy" until "incessant traueill spent / His force, at last perforce adowne did ly, / Ne foot could further moue" (III.vii.3). Quite similar to Una's story, a lady who is put to danger by another human is aided by a loyal animal to the best of his natural abilities, moreover, the animal is designed to direct the course of events. The second horse, who also impacts the story line, is Guyon's Brigadore. In Book II, the knight of temperance loses Brigadore because a pretence knight named Braggadochio steals him. In Book V, Guyon is reunited with the horse when the knight of justice, Artegall, determines that Brigadore does not belong to Braggadochio because the horse remembers and responds to Guyon who calls his name, "And when as he him nam'd, for joy he brake / His bands, and follow'd him with gladfull glee, / And friskt, and flong aloft, and louted low on knee" (V.iii.34). Therefore, it is suggested that the virtue of justice, as represented by Artegall, entails the recognition of animal will, understanding and memory.

Another noteworthy animal is Timias's Dove from Book IV, because she, too, influences the course of events significantly. Timias is Arthur's squire who is desperately in love with Belphebe, but when he falls out of favour, he becomes a desolate figure, hiding in the forest, until the turtle Dove comes to his aid. The Dove which has also "lost her dearest loue" becomes his companion and comforts him with her "lamentable lay" for quite some time (IV.vii.3-4). One day, Timias ties a heart shaped ruby necklace, given to him by

Belphobe, around the Dove's neck and when Belphobe spots the Dove with the jewel, the bird leads her back to Timias:

And euer when she nigh approcht, the Doue  
 Would flit a litle forward, and then stay,  
 Till she drew neare, and then againe remoue;  
 So tempting her still to pursue the pray,  
 And still from her escaping soft away:  
 Till that at length into that forrest wide,  
 She drew her far, and led with slow delay.  
 In th'end she her vnto that place did guide,  
 Whereas that wofull man in languor did abide. (IV.vii.11)

Afterwards, Timias's "dearest dred" Belphobe, pities his visibly "ruefull plight" and receives him "againe to former fauours state" (IV.vii.17). Therefore, the Dove's agency in this episode is twofold, firstly she sets a moral example of fidelity through her species' natural instinct for lifelong monogamy, and secondly, she functions as a carrier/messenger bird.

In his entry for the *Spenser Encyclopedia* entitled "birds," Andrew notes that "[t]he works of Spenser contain nearly 200 references to birds" and that he "mentions between 40 and 50 different species" (93-94). However, he suggests that "[t]hrough the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries constitute a period in which a more scientific ornithology developed, the references to birds by the poets of the period mainly reflect traditional associations" by which he means the emblematic, symbolic or iconographical (Andrew 93-94). For the dove in general, he argues that "it occurs more frequently in a symbolic manner—as the bird of Venus [...] as a less specific symbol of love [...] and in its principal symbolic role, as exemplar of fidelity," and he concludes the entry by stating that the "primary function" of birds in Spenser's oeuvre "remains that of embellishment" (Andrew 93-94). While it is common for animals in allegorical texts to be interpreted symbolically/metaphorically, that is, not as actual animals but as vessels/emblems without self-significance, scholars of animal studies such as Oerlemans argue that

[a]llegorists choose kinds of animals because we understand them to be different from each other, to possess distinct qualities that we apprehend. Because animal signifiers are not in fact empty, animal allegories reflect our sense that animals in general, and species types in particular, might stand for qualities we share with them. It is worth remembering that the earliest examples of human art (such as prehistoric

cave paintings) reflect a literal interest in animals; allegorical representations of animals are an outgrowth of that interest rather than strictly antithetical to it. (31-32)

From a similar perspective, Fudge claims that “early modern writers were fascinated by animals to an extent that is surprising in relation to the relative absence of animals in modern critical interpretation of that period” (*Brutal Reasoning* 5). For instance, poet Gervase Markham (1568-1637) who wrote treatises on animal care and sports, diligently observes in his epitome on the care of *creatures service-able for the vse of man* that “[t]urtle doues of all the rest are the louingst to their make: for you shall see them alwaies flye together, vnlesse the one of them be kild, then the other will not liue long after but pine away,” he also notes the mating and feeding habits of these animals and proceeds to describe various kinds of medicines and remedies to treat ailments in birds. Likewise, the abundance of avian imagery in Spenser’s work hints at a closer, observational approach towards these animals on the poet’s part, especially when considering the fact that the former estate and castle Kilcolman he occupied in Cork, Ireland is currently under protection as a wildfowl sanctuary<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, archaeological evidence from castle Kilcolman, associated with Spenser’s period of residence, includes butchered wild animal bone fragments which could theoretically “represent the results of hunting expeditions, a popular sport among the elite” (Klingelhöfer 148). This is another aspect worth consideration in terms of Spenser’s proximity to nature, wildlife and animals.

Overall, Spenser’s observation of exemplary animal behaviour in contrast with erroneous human conduct in *The Faerie Queene*, fits into Boehrer’s concept of “anthropomorphism” because it shows that in some aspects, animals were sometimes regarded as superior to humans by early modern authors. Accordingly, Spenser’s fallen human characters stray further away from humanity than some of his animal characters. The Lion, the equines and the Dove demonstrate that Spenser’s animals are agentic, and they possess exemplar qualities such as courage, fidelity and selflessness which can also be associated with *The Faerie Queene*’s titular virtues such as justice, friendship, and temperance. Therefore, it can be claimed that for Spenser, animals can be righteous/virtuous just as Plutarch suggests in his *Gryllus*. Furthermore, in line with Montaigne’s arguments in *An Apology*,

---

<sup>11</sup> See the official *National Parks & Wildlife Service* website for a contemporary list of wildfowl sanctuaries in Ireland: <https://www.npws.ie/protected-sites/wildfowl-sanctuaries> .

Spenser's animals are shown to be capable of understanding and communication, perhaps even more so than some humans. For instance, the Lion takes "commandement" from Una's "fayre eyes," "And euer by her lookes conceiue[s] her intent" (I.iii.9), just one stanza below, this is contrasted with Abessa who is deemed a "rude wench" because of her inability to communicate and comprehend Una, "She could not heare, nor speake, nor vnderstand" (I.iii.11).

As indicated by these instances, Spenser recognises that the moral qualities required to fashion his ideal human are sometimes found in animals. However, this is not to suggest that Spenser is completely at par with Montaigne or Plutarch. Like Aristotelians and Spenser's contemporary theologians would propose, there still is a crucial distinction between Spenser's animals and humans, that is the exercise of faith or religiosity. Arguably, when Animals such as the Lion and the Ass show loyalty to Una, this is not necessarily because of her symbolic qualities or the religious allegory that surrounds her. They show reverence to her as a fellow creature of higher standing, a master/leader. However, the religious truth Una speaks of and allegorically represents is not meant for animals but for humans only, therefore, the animals can only be her temporary companions.

For this reason, the spectrum from animality to humanity Spenser charts in *The Faerie Queene* is followed by a scale of characters, progressively ranging from animals to half-human/animals and humans, as the ideal of humanity can only be achieved by a human who recognises God and practices his religion. *The Faerie Queene*'s Satyrs, also referred to as the salvage nation as well as "wyld woodgods" (I.vi.9) and "woodborne people" (I.vi.16), represent the halfway in this moral spectrum. In Book I, Canto VI, Sansloy attempts to rape Una in the forest. However, "[e]ternall prouidence" prevents this "beastly sin" because when the nearby troop of Satyrs hear Una's desperate screams for help, they rush to her aid (I.vi.3-7). Sansloy, beholding the "rude, mishappen, monstrous rablement" (of Satyrs) "[w]hose like he neuer saw," rapidly rides away, leaving Una behind (I.vi.8). Once more, the lady who is about to be harmed by a morally monstrous human, ironically gets rescued by monstrous looking nonhumans. For Oram,



[t]he opposition of the satyrs and Sans Loy sets up two versions of the nonhuman, the satyrs happy to succor Una but unable to know anything beyond the order of nature, and the degenerate knight, whose will consents to degrade itself below the level of the beasts. (43)

The same can be said of the opposition between animals and Sansloy mentioned previously. However, the half-human/animal Satyrs are also different from said animals because it is suggested that they have some understanding of religion or divinity. As Hume argues, “the satyrs recognise in Una something which deserves worship. They possess a religious instinct, but all too soon it passes over into idolatry” (*Protestant Poet* 88). Nonetheless, Oram explains that “Spenser is the first English poet to make extensive use of satyrs, which further his investigation of the human” (40). Indeed, Spenser draws benevolent Satyrs and contrasts them with human degeneration, just like the Lion and other animal characters. Like the Lion, the Satyrs kiss Una’s feet, bending their knees backward to show reverence and they take her to their leader Sylvanus:

The woodborne people fall before her flat,  
 And worship her as Goddess of the wood;  
 And old *Sylvanus* selfe bethinkes not, what  
 To thinke of wight so fayre, but gazing stood,  
 In doubt to deeme her borne of earthly brood;  
 Sometimes Dame *Venus* selfe he seemes to see,  
 But *Venus* neuer had so sober mood;  
 Sometimes *Diana* he her takes to be,  
 But misseth bow, and shaftes, and buskins to her knee. (I.vi.16)

While the half-human/animal Satyrs are able to recognise Una’s symbolic significance and divine qualities, they associate this with their pagan belief systems and fall short of a “true realisation” of divinity, that is conditional to Protestantism for Spenser. Una spends quite a lot of time with the Satyrs during which she tries to teach them the “true religion”:

During which time her gentle wit she plyes,  
 To teach them truth, which worshipt her in vaine,  
 And made her th’Image of Idolatryes;  
 But when their bootlesse zeale she did restrayne  
 From her own worship, they her Asse would worship fayn. (I.vi.19)

Their pagan misrecognition and deification of Una continues, despite the fact that they have now been informed about Christianity, which Spenser sarcastically highlights with their worship of the Ass. Still, their reverential treatment of Una suggests that they are capable of some religiosity.

Further proof of this is present in Book III, Canto X, where Spenser displays how Satyrs approach humans other than Una. Hellenore is a beautiful gentle lady married to a rich old man named Malbecco. Jealous Malbecco keeps her hidden in his castle but when they are obliged to host young knight Paridell, Malbecco's suspicions come to life, and Paridell takes off with Hellenore. Afterwards, Paridell cruelly deserts Hellenore in the forest and she is found by the Satyrs:

The gentle Lady, loose at randon lefte,  
 The greene-wood long did walke, and wander wide  
 At wilde aduerture, like a forlorne wefte,  
 Till on a day the *Satyres* her espide  
 Straying alone withouten groome or guide;  
 Her vp they tooke, and with them home her ledd,  
 With them as housewife ever to abide,  
 To milk their gotes, and make them cheese and bredd,  
 And euery one as commune good her handeled. (III.x.36)

While the Satyrs function as saviours for deserted Hellenore as they did so for Una, it is evident that they do not show her the same kind of worship or reverence. Still, their treatment of her is not sinister or forced as suggested by the following lines:

The jolly *Satyres* full of fresh delight,  
 Came dauncing forth, and with them nimbly ledd  
 Faire *Helenore*, with girlonds all bespredd,  
 Whom their May-lady they had newly made:  
 She proude of that new honour, which they redd,  
 And of their louely fellowship full glade,  
 Daunst liuely, and her face did with a Lawrell shade. (III.x.44)

Moreover, when cuckolded Malbecco pursues and tries to convince Hellenore to come back, she refuses and choses to stay with the jolly Satyrs. The comparison between the Satyrs of Book I and III, suggests that the half-human/animals treat Una in accordance with her symbolic function, nonetheless, they are incapable of fully realising her Christian

message. Because of this, Una wants to escape from the Satyrs while Hellenore does not. Once more, emphasising that Una's religious "truth" is meant for humans only.

When the salvage nation is visited by Sir Satyrane, who is a knight born of a human mother and satyr father, Una leaves the Satyrs with his help to pursue her search for the Redcrosse knight:

But her deare heart with anguish did torment,  
And all her witt in secret counsels spent,  
How to escape. At last in priuy wise  
To *Satyrane* she shewed her intent;  
Who glad to gain such fauour, gan deuise,  
How with that pensiuie Maid he best might thence arise. (I.iii.32)

Arguably, because Sir Satyrane is born of a human mother, hence a crossbred and "more human" than his paternal ancestors, he is capable of understanding Una's message and helps her escape.

In accordance with the argument that Spenser draws a continuous spectrum of righteous characters, ranging from animals to humans, the final figure to be analysed in this chapter will be a human with animalistic qualities who both metaphorically and physically verges upon Spenser's ideal human, that is the nameless "salvage man" from Book VI. In Canto III, gentle lady Serene and knight Calepine end up severely wounded in the woods, the former by the Blatant Beast and the latter by an uncourteous knight named Turpine. In line with the pattern hitherto observed, it can be expected that through God's grace, they will be rescued by an animalistic character. Likewise, in Canto IV, a salvage man who is passing by "by fortune" and "[d]rawne with that Ladies loud and piteous shrighit," assaults and chases Turpine away from his victims (VI.iv.2). Moreover, it is discovered that the salvage man is invulnerable and consequently invincible because of some "Magicke leare" (magic lore) (VI.iv.4). The salvage man carries Serene and Calepine to his bower where he takes care of them and tries to heal their wounds for quite some time. In Canto V, he is introduced to Arthur, *The Faerie Queene*'s central hero and the only character specified by Spenser himself as the representative of all of his titular virtues in the "Letter to Raleigh" (*The Faerie Queene* 715), therefore, the ideal human. The salvage man

quickly adopts the role of Arthur's squire and aids him through many perilous fights until they depart for Arthur's main quest in Canto VIII, which is the last time either is seen as the epic is incomplete.

The salvage man's fight with Turpine is quite similar to that of the Lion and Sansloy. The naked man, just like the Lion, comes face to face with an armed figure on horseback while selflessly and courageously trying to protect others:

Yet armes or weapon had he none to fight,  
 Ne knew the vse of warlike instruments,  
 Saue such as sudden rage him lent to smite,  
 But naked without needfull vestiments,  
 To clad his corpse with meete habiliments,  
 He cared not for dint of sword nor speere,  
 No more then for the stroke of strawes or bents:  
 For from his mothers wombe, which him did beare  
 He was invulnerable made by Magicke leare. (VI.iv.4)

However, unlike the Lion, the salvage man is not necessarily "unarmed" since he is protected by supernatural/magic powers. In fact, he is the only human character in *The Faerie Queene* described as "invulnerable." This is the first clue to suggest that he is an elect figure. Moreover, this supernatural quality further associates the salvage man with the epic's ideal human Arthur. That is because Arthur is also equipped with magic, provided in the form of a blindingly bright diamond/adamant shield fashioned by Merlin "[t]hat point of speare it neuer percen could" (I.vii.33), as well as a special liquor "[o]f wondrous worth, and vertue excellent, / That any wownd could heale incontinent" (I. ix.19).

For Hansen and Grissom, the magical diamond shield represents "Arthur's indestructible virtue" (673). Likewise, the salvage man's innate indestructibility also hints at him being virtuous. In fact, Spenser continuously highlights his righteous acts. When he first encounters Calepine being assaulted by Turpine,

The saluage man, that neuer till this houre  
 Did taste of pittie, neither gentlesse knew,  
 Seeing his sharpe assault and cruell stoure  
 Was much emmoued at his perils vew,

That euen his ruder hart began to rew,  
 And feele compassion of his euill plight,  
 Against his foe that did him so pursew:  
 From whom he meant to free him, if he might,  
 And him auenge of that so villenous despight. (VI.iv.3)

Regardless of his detachment from “civility,” the salvage man is drawn to be inclined towards compassion and a natural sense of justice as suggested by his despise of evil and villainy. The same detachment results in his inability to speak:

But the wyld man, contrarie to her feare,  
 Came to her creeping like a fawning hound,  
 And by rude tokens made to her appeare  
 His deepe compassion of her dolefull stound,  
 Kissing his hands, and crouching to the ground;  
 For other language had he none nor speach,  
 But a soft murmure, and confused sound  
 Of senselesse words, which nature did him teach,  
 T’expresse his passions, which his reason did empeach. (VI.iv.11)

Because he does not speak any language the salvage man carefully tries to communicate with Serene through gestures and sounds. Still, it is stated that the salvage man’s reason impeaches/prevents his passions in this anxious and sensitive moment when uncalculated/over the top gestures might scare the wounded lady. Therefore, Spenser’s wording suggests that the salvage man is capable of temperance, that is, self-control/governance. Moreover, his continuous fidelity and service to Calepine, Serene and Arthur associate him with the virtues of friendship and courtesy. Likewise, his compassionate but modest approach towards Serene at her times of vulnerability hints at chastity on the salvage man’s part. Therefore, the only virtue he seems to be missing at this point is holiness due to his ignorance of religion and general lack of learning.

Accordingly, Serene proclaims that

[...] I had surely long ere this bene dead,  
 Or else remained in most wretched state,  
 Had not this wylde man in that wofull stead  
 Kept, and deliuered me from deadly dread.  
 In such a saluage wight, of brutish kynd,  
 Amongst wilde beastes in desert forrests bred,  
 It is most straunge and wonderfull to fynd

So milde humanity, and perfect gentle mynd. (VI. v. 29)

These lines are of utmost importance for the argument of this chapter as well as the general end of this thesis because this is one of the very few<sup>12</sup> instances where Spenser's understanding and conceptualisation of "humanity" is openly presented, and the salvage man is given as an exemplary reference for this concept. Therefore, it can be argued that the salvage man's virtuous actions, regardless of his kind (savage/brutish) and kin (wild beasts), are indicative of a superior/ideal mode of being and morality which Spenser deems humanity, consequentially blurring the borders between savagery and civility as well as "beasts" and humans. Accordingly, the epic's perfect hero Arthur starts seeing the brave salvage man as a peer and grows quite fond of him, "And with him eke the saluage, that whyleare / Seeing his royall vsage and array, / Was greatly growne in love of that brave pere" (VI.v.41). Moreover, the fact that the salvage man is an elect figure like Arthur, as suggested by his supernatural invulnerability, supports the point that an ascension to the ideal of humanity comes by the way of heavenly providence. Likewise, Spenser infers that there is more to the salvage man than what meets the eye:

That plainely may in this wyld man be red,  
 Who though he were still in this desert wood,  
 Mongst saluage beasts, both rudely borne and bred,  
 Ne euer saw faire guize, ne learned good,  
 Yet shewd some token of his gentle blood,  
 By gentle vsage of that wretched Dame.  
 For certes he was borne of noble blood,  
 How euer by hard hap he hether came;  
 As ye may know, when time shall be to tell the same. (VI. v. 2)

The promise that his story will continue hints at the possibility that the salvage man might become a truly/fully virtuous hero if educated, which entails being introduced to Christianity, unfortunately, Spenser does not fulfil this promise.

---

<sup>12</sup> Ramachandran explains that "[t]he word 'human'" was "a novelty in the sixteenth century" and that it "appears very rarely in the Spenserian corpus. There are only eight instances of it in all its forms (*humane, humaine, humanity*) across the poetry" (3).

Overall, based on the clues Spenser provides about the salvage man's virtuous behaviour as well as his innate powers and affinity for Arthur (which is mutual), it can be argued that he is one of Spenser's exemplary and elect figures. Still, because his story remains unfinished it can only be assumed that he might be destined to become a Christian, therefore, adding holiness to the rest of his virtues and consequently achieving the true state of humanity which is ascribed as an ideal by Spenser. Nonetheless, it is evident that the salvage man is on a continuum with the epic's righteous animal characters not just because he is raised among them but because he retains their honourable qualities such as courage, fidelity and selflessness. Therefore, it is possible for an "animalistic" character such as the salvage man to verge upon the ideal in Spenser's spectrum of ascension to humanity.

It has been established in this chapter that *The Faerie Queene* outlines the moral principles and virtues one needs to realise in order to truly become "human," that is to achieve an ideal sense of "humanity" as constructed/configured by Spenser. Thus, humanity becomes the highest end of a moral spectrum which is charted through various kinds/species of characters ranging from animals to humans. These characters cumulatively represent the exemplary qualities of humanity Spenser aims to convey through his moral allegory. Moreover, his observational use of animal characters as exemplars in this scale, opens new/uncharted possibilities for discussions on animal agency in Spenser's work. Likewise, this representation provides useful insight into the poet's pre-Cartesian understanding of human/animal divisions and hierarchy. His righteous animal characters such as the Lion suggest that this hierarchy could easily be reversed because for Spenser (as demonstrated in *The Faerie Queene*), humans can only be distinguished from/superior to animals through the exercise of faith. In addition, as the epic reflects its author's Protestant/Calvinistic outlook, due to their postlapsarian condition, the exercise of "true faith" and consequential salvation can only be achieved by elect/predestined humans who are guided by divine grace. Accordingly, the following chapter will explore unguided/sinful human characters who descend to animality and worse.

## CHAPTER II

### “DESCENDING TO ANIMALITY”

*What Tygre, or what other saluage wight  
Is so exceeding furious and fell,  
As wrong, when it hath arm'd it selfe with might?  
(Spenser, *The Faerie Queene* V.ix.1)*

In accordance with Spenser's relative anthropocentrism in *The Faerie Queene*, the epic portrays “animality” as ideal humanity's contested other, but it is not depicted as a state of being exclusive to nonhumans. On the contrary, animality is configured as a “lowly” order of being which is shared by animals and fallen humans who are not on the path to salvation. It signifies the lower end of Spenser's spectrum of ascension to humanity portrayed in *The Faerie Queene*. This is most evident in the epic's instances where Spenser displays the “immoral” inclinations of “wretched” humans and its consequences as these characters either appear in a state of transformation towards animal like nonhuman figures, their moral “descension” accompanied by a physical one, or they are described through the use of animal imagery, therefore, associated with various species of animals. Thus, Spenser establishes a hierarchy according to which, “sinners” and “unvirtuous” humans are stationed equally to or lower than “beasts,” consequently, blurring the lines between these orders of being. Moreover, elect figures who represent the ideals of humanity, gain ascendancy and mastery over such degenerative characters. Accordingly, this chapter will explore the ways in which Spenser shapes his conceptualisation of animality around human characters who do not comply with his moral ideals.

A similar point of view towards the “animality” of human folly and degeneration is professed by the Anglican clergyman, scholar and author Robert Burton (1577-1640) in his famous treatise entitled *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621/1624). In this influential text made up of multiple volumes, Burton aims to define and propose cures for the human ailment of melancholy. He states that

[o]ur intemperance it is, that pulls so many severall incurable diseases upon our heads [...] that which crucifies us most, is our owne folly, madnesse, [...] weaknesse, want of government, our facilitie and pronenesse in yeelding to severall lusts, in



giving way to every passion and perturbation of the minde: by which meanes we metamorphize our selves, and degenerate into beasts. All which that Prince of Poets observed of Agamemnon, that when he was well pleased, and could moderate his passion, hee was [...] like Jupiter in feature, Mars in valour, Pallas in wisdome, another God; but when he became angry he was a Lyon, a Tiger, a Dogge, &c. there appeared no signe or likenesse of Jupiter in him; so we, as long as we are ruled by reason, correct our inordinate appetite, and conforme our selves to Gods word, are as so many living Saints: but if wee give reines to Lust, Anger, Ambition, Pride, and follow our owne wayes, wee degenerate into beasts, transforme our selves, overthrowe our constitutions, provoke God to Anger, and heap upon us this of Melancholy, and all kindes of incurable diseases, as a just and deserved punishment of our sinnes. (128)

For Burton, weakness seems to be a pre-given or generic quality of humans and because of this, they are prone to be overtaken by passions and sins. Such lack of governance or intemperance results in a separation from God and unity with animals. According to Fudge, the metamorphosis from human to beast Burton refers to “must be regarded as a real and not as a figurative conception” because, based on the Aristotelian model of ensoulment, humans had their “sensitive soul” in common with beasts (“Beast Fables” 200). “[W]hen humans followed their passions (greed, lust, anger, etc.), instead of making rational choices, the sensitive soul took precedence and their truly human capacity was inactive,” therefore, “in this moment when reason was in abeyance, humans were simply animals” (Fudge, “Beast Fables” 200).

That which the “Prince of Poets” Homer, observed in his epic according to Burton’s interpretation, Spenser too observes in *The Faerie Queene*, humans and animals are in a continuum, and if humans follow their own ways, instead of conforming to “God’s word,” this not just makes them animals but also sinners who deserve punishment. Arguably, this line of thought is also related to the long-standing literary tradition of using animals as emblems/symbols of sins found in *The Faerie Queene*. In the fourth Canto of Book I, Duessa brings the Redcrosse knight to the house of Pride, the palace of false queen Lucifera, daughter of Pluto and Proserpina. “Named from Lucifer (Satan),” Lucifera represents pride and together with her six counsellors, they are personifications of the seven deadly sins (Brooks-Davies, “Lucifera” 441). The false queen travels in an emblematic coach “drawne of six vnequall beasts, / On which her six sage Counsellours did ryde, / Taught to obey their bestiall beheasts, / With like conditions to their kindes applyde” and her charioteer is Satan himself (I.iv.18). The kinds/species of animals

Spenser likens to or associates with the deadly sins are, in order ; “sluggish *Idleness* the nurse of sin” who rides “[v]pon a slouthfull Asse” (I.iv.18), “loathsome *Gluttony*” a “[d]eformed creature” riding “on a filthie swyne” (I.iv.21), “lustfull *Lechery*, / Vpon a bearded Gote” (I.iv.24), “greedy *Auarice*” “[v]ppon a Camell loaden all with gold” (I.iv.27), “malicious *Enuy*,” “[v]pon a rauenous wolfe” (I.iv.30), and finally, “fierce reuenging *Wrath*” “[v]pon a Lion” (I.iv.33). *Lucifera* herself is associated with Juno and her attribute animal “Pecocks, that excell in pride” (I.iv.17).

While the animal figures from this scene carry some aspects of the actual species they represent, more prominently, they function as emblems of their riders, the deadly sins. In a sense, they both signify the vices which cause human degeneration, and its outcome, since sinners who are guided by passions instead of divine grace will eventually become like these “beasts.” With reference to *Lucifera*’s parade, Peter Harrison argues that

[b]y the time of the Renaissance there was a general consensus about which animals represented particular virtues and vices. In Spenser’s *Fairie Queen*, for example, the peacock appears as a symbol of pride, the lion of wrath, the wolf of envy, the goat of lust, the pig of gluttony, the ass of sloth. (“Virtues of Animals,” 467)

According to Harrison, this consensus was a product of the “tropological readings of the world” which is a tradition that can be traced many centuries back to “the hexaemeral literature of the Patristic period” and the early Church Fathers (“Virtues of Animals,” 455-466). Tropological interpretation or hermeneutics asserts that “the material world” is a “venue for the moral development of human beings, populated with living reminders of virtues to be imitated and vices to be shunned,” therefore, animals, whether in scripture or real life, are to be read and regarded as “symbolic representations of certain moral or theological truths,” as their properties, “physical characteristics, behaviors, life histories, passions - all potentially [teach] some moral lesson or sign[ify] some eternal verity” (Harrison, “Virtues of Animals,” 465-466). As Harrison states further, “[i]n this radically anthropocentric view, every feature of the existence of creatures plays some role in the physical, moral, or theological development of human beings” and “[a]nimals are cyphers, insignificant in themselves, yet useful for humans at every level” (“Virtues of Animals,” 468). Arguably, there is not much of a distinction between Spenser’s tropological use of certain animal figures and his depiction of “immoral” characters in

*The Faerie Queene* because it will be observed that such humans are not just physically transformed into nonhuman figures, but they too are reduced to figurative signs, symbols or emblems of sins and vices.

In fact, Spenser depicts a spectrum of descension to animality in *The Faerie Queene* which is represented by a group of characters from consecutive Books whose immorality or intemperance and increasingly severe passions result in their metamorphosis to various nonhuman figures. This scale of “devolution” is commenced by a remorseful character from the first Book whose follies are quite similar to those of Redcrosse knight, lechery, idleness and inconstancy in love. However, unlike Redcrosse, he is not guided by divine grace, therefore, unable to compensate for his error and revert its consequences. In Canto II of Book I, after Redcrosse deserts Una to then couple with Duessa, they take cover from the sun under two trees. When the knight breaks off a branch to make a crown for her, the tree bleeds and speaks, it is revealed that this is Fradubio, meaning “brother doubt” or “amidst doubt” in Italian (Kennedy 318). Fradubio is a man transformed into a tree together with his beloved lady Fralissa, he relates the cautionary story of his past to unsuspecting Redcrosse knight, who is tricked by disguised sorceress Duessa into thinking that she is a noble lady named Fidessa. Just like Redcrosse, Fradubio was once a knight, travelling with his fair love Fralissa. One day, they encounter another couple, a knight and lady, the knight claims his beloved to be the fairest and the two battle because of this, after besting his opponent, Fradubio takes the lady “as a prise martiall” (I.ii.36).

This seeming lady is no other than disguised Duessa, and she uses “her hellish science” to trick Fradubio into doubting his beloved, he is convinced that Fralissa is a false beauty as well as a witch (I.ii.38). Fralissa is deserted and “turnd to treen mould,” while Fradubio takes Duessa for his “Dame” (I.ii.39-40). Afterwards, Fradubio discovers Duessa’s true identity by chance while she is bathing, “A filthy foule old woman I did vew, / That euer to have toucht her, I did deadly rew” (I.ii.40). Perceiving his thoughts, Duessa charms Fradubio and plants him next to Fralissa as a tree, he says, “now enclosd in wooden wals full faste, / Banisht from liuing wights, our wearie daies we waste” (I.ii.42). After hearing Fradubio’s pitiful lament, Redcrosse knight questions how long they are to remain in this “misformed” state and if he can help them, in response, Fradubio states that “We may not

chaunge (quoth he) this euill plight, / Till we be bathed in a liuing well; / This is the terme prescribed by the spell, ” and he declines Redcrosse’s offer saying ““Time and suffised fates to former kynd / Shall vs restore”” (I.ii.43).

Fradubio’s story of descension to a “less than human” state is cautionary for the Redcrosse because the knight is on the same path, hence, there is a rhetorical kinship between these “brothers in doubt” (Kennedy 318). The knight’s descension to folly begins with him doubting Una’s fidelity or “truth,” then on, various fraudulent characters like Archimago, Duessa and Lucifera function as symbols of the vices and temptations which increasingly overwhelm Redcrosse. In each Canto, the knight seems to stray further away from Spenser’s moral ideals and the virtue of holiness he represents. Overall, he is able to overcome his opponents and subdue his inner inclination to error with the help of the epic’s idealised characters like Una and Arthur, their constant aid represents him being guided by God and divine grace towards salvation as an elect Christian. According to Schneider, this is “the sixteenth-century concept of holiness,” it is “faith in action: the attempt, despite human failings, to do battle as a knight of the Cross, recognizing human limitations and the sufficiency of God” (Schneider 372-373). Indeed, when Redcrosse is about to be overcome by the personification of despair and commit suicide in Canto IX, Una reminds him that which he has forgotten, he is chosen by God so he should not feel desperate as divine grace protects him:

Come, come away, fraile, feeble, fleshly wight,  
 Ne let vaine words bewitch thy manly hart,  
 Ne diuelish thoughts dismay thy constant spright.  
 In heauenly mercies hast thou not a part?  
 Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art?  
 Where iustice growes, there grows eke greter grace,  
 The which doth quench the brond of hellish smart [...] (I.ix.53)

In the following Canto, Spenser’s poetic persona further emphasises that if any real “victory” is gained by humans, it is through “grace,” since “any strength we haue, it is to ill, / But all the good is Gods, both power and eke will” (I.x.1). Fallen humans are afflicted by ill judgement and incapable of saving themselves without God’s will, in this sense, Fradubio and Redcrosse are the same. Therefore, “[l]ike Fradubio, he cannot realize his humanity until he is ‘bathed in a living well’” (Kennedy 318).

The motif of the “living well,” which is commonly associated with baptism, is repeated in Redcrosse’s battle scene with the Dragon. In the first day of their three-day long battle, the knight is overthrown by the Dragon and by “fortune” he falls into the virtuous “well of life” which “guilt of sinfull crimes cleane wash away” and renew one “as one were borne that very day” (I.xi.30). On the sacrament of baptism in Spenser’s time, John N. Wall states that, “[t]o the English church, the Roman position on faith and works seemed to limit the power of grace and make it divisible” and “to the Roman church, the English resolution seemed to undercut the importance of human agency,” however, “[b]oth churches valued the sacraments of baptism and communion as vehicles of grace” (“Church of Rome” 162). Fradubio is also in need of baptism, which was seen as an agent of divine grace, but unlike Redcrosse, he is not fortunate enough to be renewed or redeemed. Instead, he is made into an inactive, emblematic remainder of human folly, useful for Redcrosse as a warning sign but incapable of helping himself or the lady he has wronged. Overall, the comparison between Redcrosse and Fradubio reveals that, postlapsarian humankind, in its entirety, is prepositioned to degenerate to a “less than human” state, thus, in need of temperance and governance according to Spenser’s conceptualisation.

The second Book of *The Faerie Queene* contains Sir Guyon’s quest, the elfin<sup>13</sup> knight of the virtue “temperance.” Sir Guyon serves the Faerie Queen Gloriana as a knight of her “Order of *Maydenhead*” (II.ii.42). One day, Gloriana is made aware of an evil witch called Acrasia whose mischief has “many whelmd in deadly paine” (II.ii.43). The Queen appoints Sir Guyon to stop Acrasia, and a Palmer, which is “a pilgrim who had returned from the Holy Land,” serves as his guide as well as an “allegorical figure of reason” with “religious implications” (Evans 526-527). In the final Canto of Book II, after many battles and a perilous journey at sea, the knight and the Palmer reach Acrasia’s dwelling place, the notorious Bower of Bliss “[w]here Pleasure dwelles in sensuall delights” (II.xii.1). As

---

<sup>13</sup> In his proem to the second Book, Spenser suggests that the setting of his epic, Faerie Land, is an allegorical representation of Elizabeth I and her ancestor’s “realms,” he also compares it to formerly unheard-of lands like Virginia and Peru, suggesting that it is waiting to be discovered (II. *proem*.1-5). Accordingly, while Spenser refers to “faeries” (women) and “elves” (men) in the epic, it is not always implied that these characters are fantastic/supernatural nonhuman beings, but rather, it is established that they are natives or inhabitants of Faerie Land.

they approach the island where the Bower is, they hear the “hideous bellowing / Of many beasts, that roard outrageously” (II.xii.39). The beasts charge towards them “to deuoure those vnexpected guests,” and the Palmer upholds his “mighty staffe, that could all charmes defeat,” causing their retrieval, “Such wondrous powre did in that staffe appeare, / All monsters to subdew to him, that did it beare” (II.xii.39-40).

Thenceforth, the two move forward into the depths of the island to reach Acrasia, resisting and destroying its many temptations along the way. They sneak upon Acrasia whilst she lays with her lover, a knight named Verdant who has deserted his weapons, armour and “honour” in pursuit of “lewd loues, and wastfull luxuree” (II.xii.80). The Palmer and Guyon entrap the lovers in a chain net fashioned formerly by the Palmer for this occasion, Acrasia is tied further by adamant chains to be delivered to Gloriana, but Verdant is freed after “counsell sage” (II.xii.82). Afterwards, Guyon proceeds to completely destroy the Bower of Bliss and its natural as well as artful beauties, and “of the fayrest late, now [he] made the fowlest place” (II.xii.83). On their way back to the boat, they encounter the beasts the Palmer had subdued upon arrival, they fiercely attack again, this time to rescue their mistress, “But them the Palmer soone did pacify” (II.xii.84). At this point, Guyon questions “what meant those beastes, which there did ly” and the Palmer answers that these are Acrasia’s former lovers whom she had transformed into animals (II.xii.84-85). With his “vertuous staffe,” the Palmer restores them to their former state, all are upset, “But one aboute the rest in speciall,” a former hog named Gryll “Repynded greatly, and did him miscall, / That had from hoggish forme him brought to naturall” (II.xii. 86). Guyon and the Palmer scorn “the mind of beastly man” and depart (II.xii. 87).

In this version of the Circe myth with a Christian moralising mission, Spenser appoints temptress Acrasia as a representative of lust which is subdued by temperance and religiosity. The transformation of her lovers is in line with Burton’s argument from *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, lack of governance, when coupled with the desires of the mind, result in “men’s” degeneration to the “beast.” According to Schiesari, “[t]he beastliness of desire is a common staple, since at least Plato, of moralizing discourses that prescribe moderation and restraint of bodily pleasures” (37). Therefore,

[d]esire and the beast intersect in myriad and suggestive ways, to the point of becoming figures for each other: not only is desire metaphorized as beastly, but the beast is also represented as an emblem of desire, especially forbidden or perverse desire. (Schiesari 37)

Indeed, Spenser's moralising treatment of Gryll, differs from that of Plutarch who not just allows his Gryllus to speak, but also makes him present a case in defence of animality. As Loewenstein observes, "Spenser's chief innovation— beyond the fact that he transforms Gryll, as his source texts do not—is to silence those bestial men whom Guyon 'liberates'" (251). Acrasia's lovers are associated with deadly sins like idleness, gluttony and lechery so they are deemed perverse by the devout Palmer and the poetic persona who speak in their stead, their voice is heard only in the form of a hideous bellowing in the previous stanzas. The Palmer says:

[...] These seeming beasts are men indeed,  
Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus,  
Whylome her louers, which her lustes did feed,  
Now turned into figures hideous,  
According to their mindes like monstuous. (II.xii.85)

Like Fradubio, Gryll too is reduced to an emblem/sign or "hideous" figure of lust and monstrous sinfulness, moreover, he is not just rendered immobile, his voice is also subdued, hence, it can be construed that in comparison to brother doubt, Gryll's crimes are heftier and deserve more severe punishment. Here it is also important to note that the animality of these men is not associated with a lack of thinking ability, on the contrary, it is their minds that make them degenerate. Further proof of this is present in the final stanza of Book II:

Saide *Guyon*, See the mind of beastly man,  
That hath so soone forgot the excellence  
Of his creation, when he life began,  
That now he chooseth, with vile difference,  
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.  
To whom the Palmer thus, The donghill kinde  
Delightes in filth and fowle incontinence:  
Let *Gryll* be *Gryll*, and have his hoggish minde;  
But let vs hence depart, whilest wether serues and winde. (II.xii.87)

It is evident that Gryll is not just physically “beastly,” but his mind is also “hoggish,” therefore, “to be a beast,” as Guyon suggests, is not mindlessness but rather, it is a lack of “intelligence,” that is the application or use of the mind. According to Loewenstein, Guyon’s quest, “across the Legend of Temperance, is to construct a vile difference, a difference from the creaturely that eludes him to the parodic end” (253). Indeed, Gryll’s “incontinence” suggests that the moral and religious principles Spenser draws to attempt and differentiate humans from animals are not universally applicable, hence, those humans who are incontinent are deemed one with the animals, and the rest are in a continuum with them, always likely to metamorphose.

Besides Fradubio and Gryll, the metamorphosis of yet another sinful character can be observed in the third Book, however, this is a unique case as he descends lower than the vegetative or sensitive states represented by the aforementioned mutable characters. After the futile pursuit of his young wife Hellenore, in the tenth Canto of Book III, cuckolded old man Malbecco transforms into a “less than human” (or perhaps less than alive), shadowy figure and becomes the personification of “*Gelosy*” (III.x.60). To distract Malbecco, and escape with her paramour Paridell, Hellenore sets her husband’s treasures on fire, also taking as much as she can with her. To taunt Malbecco further, she calls for his aid, pretending that Paridell is taking her away by force, torn between rescuing his wife or money, Malbecco who “saw the wicked fire so furiously / Consume his hart, and scorch his Idoles face,” decides to save his burning money (III.x.14). “Which was the dearest to his dounghill minde, / The God of his desire, the ioy of misers blinde” (III.x.15). While quenching the fire, Malbecco is overcome by inward flames, “all the passions, that in man may light, / Did him attonce oppresse, and vex his caytiue spright” (III.x.17). After a fit of jealousy and grief, he takes to the road and devises many plans to bring Hellenore back, but it is all in vain as “his woman was too wise, / Euer to come into his clouch againe” (III.x.20).

Hellenore, now deserted by Parinell and happily settled with the nation of Satyrs, refuses her husband’s desperate call back home, debased Malbecco crawls among a herd of goats to escape without being seen by the Satyrs. Afterwards, he returns to the place where he had hidden his treasure, only to find that it has been stolen, altogether defeated, Malbecco



becomes completely bewildered, “With extreme fury he became quite mad, / And ran away, ran with him selfe away” (III.x.54). For a long while, Malbecco runs, trying to run away from his desperate self, but “Griefe, and despight, and gealosity, and scorne / Did all the way him follow hard behynd, / And he himselfe himselfe loath’d so forlorne” (III.x.55). When this frantic sprint is halted by his arrival at a rocky hill, suspended over the sea, Malbecco throws “him selfe dispiteously, / All desperate of his fore-damned spright, / That seemd no help for him was left in liuing sight (III.x.56). However, he is so wasted and consumed by “selfe-murdring thought” that he becomes incorporeal, because “all his substance was consum’d to nought,” Malbecco ceases to be Malbecco and “like an aery Spright,” he falls down the raggedy cliff without getting hurt (III.x.57). Thenceforth, within a cave near the cliff, “he neuer dye, but dying liues” (III.x.60).

Multiple factors engender Malbecco’s descent to an incorporeal state; his indulgence in several sins like avarice, envy and wrath, his heretical worship and idolisation of money, and most importantly, his eventual fall to despair which signifies his denial of the sufficiency of God. Accordingly, Malbecco represents a lower order of being than animals or plants in the epic, he showcases how humans can become more wretched than all earthly creatures if they are deserted by God. According to Rao, “[t]he metamorphosis of Malbecco is a unique scene of concept-making in *The Faerie Queene*” because, “[h]e is neither changed from without by some character or god, nor tacitly transformed by the reader (as Gryll might be in some circumstances)<sup>14</sup>, but himself contracts, as a part of the narrative action, into a one-dimensional, gnawing thing: *Gealosity*” (190). In a way, Malbecco brings forth his own punishment which is much more severe than that of Fradubio or Gryll as well as irreversible, he becomes immaterial in all senses. But before he comes to this end, as Rao observes, “Malbecco suffers an astonishing profusion of beastly possibility” (190). He is initially likened to a goat with horns, tokens from Hellenore:

Vpon his hands and feete he crept full light,  
 And like a Gote emongst the Gotes did rush,  
 That through the helpe of his faire hornes on hight,  
 And misty dampe of misconceyuing night,

---

<sup>14</sup> When the Palmer proclaims “Let Gryll be Gryll” in the final stanza of Book II, it is ambiguous whether Gryll has been turned back to a hog or not, but readers can interpret it as such.

And eke through likenesse of his gotish beard,  
 He did the better counterfeite aright:  
 So home he marcht emongst the horned heard,  
 That none of all the *Satyres* him espyde or heard. (III.x.47)

Spenser continues to describe him using animal imagery, but with reference to various altering species such as bears (III.x.53) and snakes (III.x.55), at one point, he crawls “with crooked clawes” (III.x.57) and feeds on “todes and frogs” (III.x.59). For Rao,

[t]hese hints of animality emerge only partially and unsuccessfully, either because they prove badly suited to Malbecco or because they are uncertain and quick to recede. The carefully damaged invocations work to establish Malbecco’s exclusion from animal life—something that humankind is typically seen to share in, to be continuous with, following Aristotle, in most orders of being. [...] The terrible separability between animal and man prepares us for his loss of humanity which is, after all, part beast. (190-191)

Indeed, Malbecco’s metamorphosis stretches beyond Spenser’s spectrum of animality and humanity since he degenerates further below existence as a material living being and becomes a concept, jealousy.

As hitherto observed, the transformation of “immoral” humans in the first three Books of *The Faerie Queene* showcase Spenser’s religious and ontological understanding of the innate animality of fallen humans, however, his animalistic portrayal of some characters in the second volume of Books, can be read in relation to his political configuration of humanity/animality. This is because, his relative anthropocentrism excludes cultural, ethnic and racial others from the category of “the human” and equates them with animals based on ideological premises. As Stenner argues, “Spenser formulates a composite of animal and racial alterity that must be quashed for dynastic and colonial Britishness to triumph” (“Error’s Repercussions” 93). In line with this, *The Faerie Queene* draws “bestialised” characters which signify the adversary and subaltern peoples of Spenser’s Britain, such as Muslims, Catholics, the Irish, people of the “New World,” and subjects them to the “mastery” of the epic’s heroes and Elizabeth I’s representatives in the poem.

In the eight Canto of Book V, Arthur and the knight of justice Artegall, defeat tyrannical paynim/sarazin ruler Souldan (a variant of *sultan*) and his proud wife Adicia (Greek for

injustice) (Hardin 7). While travelling for “his auowed quest, / Which he had vndertane to *Gloriane*,” Artegall encounters a “Damzell, flying on a palfrey fast,” because she is being chased by knights (V.viii.3-4). This is Samient, a messenger sent by the maiden queen Mercilla<sup>15</sup> to negotiate peace with the Souldan’s wife, as it is Adicia who “counsels him through confidence of might, / To breake all bonds of law, and rules of right. / For she her selfe professeth mortall foe / To Iustice [...]” (V.viii.20). While it is customary to allow safe passage for messengers, Adicia the “proude Dame disdayning all accord,” insults and banishes Samient, also sending two paynim knights to chase after and “dishonour” her (V.viii.22-23). Arthur kills one of these knights and Artegall the other, brought together by this incident, the two knights decide to put an end to the Souldan and Adicia’s tyranny. Artegall enters Souldan’s court in the guise of a paynim knight, pretending to bring back Samient to Adicia, meanwhile Arthur waits outside and challenges Souldan to release her. Arthur is chased by furious Souldan who rides a chariot “drawne of cruell steedes, which he had fed / With flesh of men” (V.viii.28). When Arthur unveils his magically bright shield, Souldan’s horses turn back and run away, disregarding their rider who is then thrown off, trampled and torn to pieces. Realising her husband’s defeat, Adicia attempts to avenge him by stabbing Samient, but she is stopped by Artegall, she then frantically runs out into the woods like “a mad bytch” where she is metamorphosed into a tiger (V.viii.49).

According to Hardin, “[t]he Souldan suggests the purported despotism of Muslim rulers,” and “[h]is maneating horses and raging wife represent qualities of an irrationally violent tyrant.” (7). In a sense, they are the opposite of Mercilla who is described in such terms:

For her great bounty knowen ouer all,  
 And soueraine grace, with which her royall crowne  
 She doth support, and strongly beateth downe  
 The malice of her foes, which her enuy,  
 And at her happinesse do fret and frowne:  
 Yet she her selfe the more doth magnify,  
 And euen to her foes her mercies multiply. (V.viii.17)

---

<sup>15</sup> According to Seber, “Mercilla is one of the best representations of Queen Elizabeth I’s royal power, mercy and equity” in *The Faerie Queene* (141).

It is clear that Souldan and Adicia are Mercilla's "foes," hence, they are "strongly beateth downe" by the heroic knights which suggests that Elizabeth I's adversaries will rightfully suffer if they are to threaten her God given sovereignty and magnificence. Still, the epic subdues Souldan and his wife Adicia in different ways. Like Fradubio, Gryll and Malbecco, Adicia is metamorphosed to a nonhuman figure because of her intemperance. She is associated with various sins like pride, avarice, and most significantly, envy and wrath. Adicia's bewildered sprint is also quite similar to that of Malbecco since she transforms during this run or escape:

As a mad bytch, when as the franticke fit  
Her burning tongue with rage inflamed hath,  
Doth runne at randon, and with furious bit  
Snatching at euery thing, doth wreake her wrath  
On man and beast, that commeth in her path.  
There they doe say, that she transformed was  
Into a Tygre, and that Tygres scath  
In crueltie and outrage she did pas,  
To proue her surname true, that she imposed has. (V.viii.49)

As discussed earlier in this chapter, in Lucifera's parade, envy and wrath are the only two sins represented by carnivorous predatory animals, the wolf and the lion. Arguably, this is because these sins are not just harmful to those who commit them, but those around envious and wrathful people can also get hurt. Likewise, Adicia's transformation to a tiger, a carnivorous predatory animal, symbolises her cruelty towards others as an imposing royal or ruler. This is further supported by Spenser's proclamation in the following stanzas:

What Tygre, or what other saluage wight  
Is so exceeding furious and fell,  
As wrong, when it hath arm'd it selfe with might?  
Not fit mongst men, that doe with reason mell,  
But mongst wyld beasts and saluage woods to dwell;  
Where still the stronger doth the weake deuoure,  
And they that most in boldnesse doe excell,  
Are dreaded most, and feared for their powre:  
Fit for *Adicia*, there to build her wicked bowre.

There let her wonne farre from resort of men,  
Where righteous *Artegall* her late exyled;  
There let her euer keepe her damned den,  
Where none may be with her lewd parts defyled,  
Nor none but beasts may be of her despoyled [...]. (V.ix.1-2)

Adicia's despotism and wrongful usurpation of power is likened to strong wild animals which hunt and eat weaker ones; accordingly, it is declared that she is more dreadful than such beings and belongs in the woods, there, she will no longer figuratively devour and despoil humans but physically do so to animals she can prey on. Indeed, Adicia and Souldan's men are also associated with animals, this time through the use animal imagery with reference to herbivorous, non-predatory species, Artegall, "like wyld Goates them chaced all about, / Flying from place to place with cowheard shame, / So that with finall force them all he ouercame" (V.viii.50).

While Adicia and her men are both metaphorically and physically bestialised, Souldan on the other hand, is torn apart, completely eradicated by his own "beasts." This suggests that the epic places him hierarchically lower than animals:

Such was the furie of these head-strong steeds,  
 Soone as the infants sunlike shield they saw,  
 That all obedience both to words and deeds  
 They quite forgot, and scornd all former law;  
 Through woods, and rocks, and mountaines they did draw  
 The yron charet, and the wheeles did teare,  
 And tost the Paynim, without feare or awe;  
 From side to side they tost him here and there,  
 Crying to them in vaine, that nould his crying heare. (V.viii.41).

Firstly, through divine intervention, represented by Arthur's magical shield, Souldan's control over his horses gets removed, this suggests that God who ordains animals to the service of humans, can also revoke this and make them instruments of punishment. Secondly, by feeding human flesh to his horses, Souldan arguably disrupts the hierarchy between humans and animals, hence, creating furious "head-strong steeds" which scorn "all former law" including the mastery of humans.

In fact, the eating of human flesh and cannibalism are recurring themes in early modern literature, often found in tandem with the racializing, stereotyping and dehumanising discourses of colonialism and imperialism. For instance, in his later play, *The Tempest* (1611), William Shakespeare (1556-1616) draws the much-disputed character of Caliban from such a perspective, his name a "metathesis of *canibal*" and his depiction realising

the “concept of a primitive savage who has not attained the level of humanity” (Hankins 796-798). Similar characters can likewise be found in *The Faerie Queene*. In the seventh Canto of Book IV, the story of Amorett’s kidnapping by a salvage<sup>16</sup> man is told. After a tournament takes place in the previous cantos, the female knight of chastity, Britomart, and Amorett who is under her guardianship, arrive at the forest. Britomart falls asleep and Amorett wanders off into the woods “for pleasure, or for need,” this suggests that she is not exempt from blame, for what is to come, is a consequence of her waywardness (IV.vii.4). Instantly, she is “snatched vp” by a monstrous figure who rushes forth “out of the thickest weed” and her feeble shrieks are not loud enough to awake Britomart (IV.vii.4). The salvage man carries unconscious Amorett to his cave where the horrified lady discovers that she is not alone, in the dark she hears “some one close by her side / Sighing and sobbing sore” (IV.vii.10). This is “sad Aemylia,” another victim of the salvage man, she explains that they are now captives of the “vilest wretch aliue,” for the salvage man captures maids in order to rape and then eat them (IV.vii.12-19). Aemylia and an old woman have been in the salvage man’s cave for twenty days during which he has eaten seven other women, and the next day he will surely devour one of them (IV.vii.13). Sad Aemylia then relates her story, she is the daughter of a lord, and she has escaped to be with a lover of lower degree, she had planned to meet her paramour Squire in a grove but instead, the salvage man abducted her (IV.vii. 15-18). Once again, it is suggested that the lady is being punished for her wantonness, and just like Amorett, Aemylia is metaphorically overtaken and about to be completely eradicated by lust, represented by the salvage man.

When Amorett questions how Aemylia has managed to survive for this long, she explains that it is through the help of the old woman who “when he burnt in lustfull fire,” “in my stead supplide his bestiall desire” (IV. vii. 19). As the salvage man returns to the cave, Amorett flees for her life while he chases after her in the woods. Timias, who happens to be hunting with his beloved Belphobe and her nymphs in the woods, tries to help Amorett by attacking the salvage man but he is unable to best him, allegorically, this scene suggests that Timias cannot subdue lust. Belphobe, who is Spenser’s epitome of chastity

---

<sup>16</sup> Not to be confused with the other salvage man from Book VI, the salvage man of Book IV, also referred to as “greedie lust” (IV.vii.351), is a personification/representative of these sins.

and virtue, as well as Amorett's twin, interferes. Seeing her, the salvage man tries to flee "[w]ell knowing her to be his deaths sole instrument" (IV. vii. 29). She kills him with an arrow, just like the animals she hunts down, and proceeds to free Aemylia and the old "Hag" from the cave (IV. vii. 32-34).

The epic's depiction of the salvage man is a mixture of human and predatory animal, it is uncertain, as Spenser states, "whence he was, or of what wombe ybore, / Of beasts, or of the earth, I haue not red: / But certes was with milke of Wolues and Tygres fed" (IV. vii. 7). His physical features and behaviour also contribute to the ambivalence of his specie:

It was to weet a wilde and saluage man,  
Yet was no man, but onely like in shape,  
And eke in stature higher by a span,  
All overgrowne with haire, that could awhape  
An hardy hart, and his wide mouth did gape  
With huge great teeth, like to a tusked Bore:  
For he liu'd all on rauin and on rape  
Of men and beasts; and fed on fleshly gore,  
The signe whereof yet stain'd his bloody lips afore. (IV. vii. 5)

He is similar to the righteous salvage man of Book VI, as both are of unknown parentage, raised in the woods and in the company of animals. However, the former represents and adopts the progressive moral virtues Spenser ascribes to humanity, whereas the latter embodies the degenerative qualities of animality inherent in humankind. In a sense, the salvage man of Book VI is an elect character who can be uplifted from his "uncivilised" state through fortune and grace, in contrast, that of Book IV is a sinful monstrous figure deserted by God, his "cursed vsage and vngodly trade / The heauens abhorre, and into darkenesse driue," hence, he is removed from the story by Belphobe (IV. vii. 12). His "ungodly trade," is the eating of human flesh and rape, once again contrasting his righteous counterpart who "neither plough'd nor sowed, / Ne fed on flesh, ne euer of wyld beast / Did taste the bloud, obaying natures first beheast"<sup>17</sup> (VI. iv. 14). Overall, these

---

<sup>17</sup> As Fudge explains, biblically, "[n]ot until after the Flood was flesh-eating permitted by God. In Genesis 9:2 God tells Noah: 'Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you: even as the green herb I have given you all things.' Thus, while allowed, the eating of animals was also a product of the Fall and, therefore, evidence of humanity's corruption" (qtd. in "You are What You Eat" 43). Hence, Book VI's vegetarian salvage man is also associated with a pre-diluvian and perhaps prelapsarian state of "natural," uncorrupted innocence.

two characters represent the opposite ends of the spectrum from animality to humanity Spenser follows in *The Faerie Queene*, suggesting that, just as humans can ascend through God's grace, they can also descend without it. Still, more can be construed from the salvage man's cannibalism:

For on the spoile of women he doth liue,  
Whose bodies chast, when euer in his powre  
He may them catch, vnable to gainestriue,  
He with his shamefull lust doth first deflowre,  
And afterwards themselues doth cruelly deuoure. (IV. vii. 12)

Throughout this episode, the eating of human flesh is intertwined with the theme of chastity versus lust as the salvage man only targets women who are associated with wantonness in the epic and his end is brought about by the virginal Belphobe. On this level of the allegory, the salvage man is an emblem of a deadly sin, that is lechery as well as a warning sign for women. Belphobe on the other hand, is the epitome of the virtue chastity, and she is to be taken as an exemplar.

Nonetheless, the salvage man is not the only cannibal in *The Faerie Queene*. Book VI represents the virtue of courtesy, which is often associated with a civilising mission, hence, in its episodes, the political/imperialist implications of Spenser's cannibalistic figures are less ambiguously presented. In the eighth Canto of the legend of courtesy, lady Serene is captured by the salvage nation<sup>18</sup>. Due to a series of unfortunate events which take place in the previous Cantos, Serene finds herself wandering alone in "wylde deserts" (VI.viii.35). After complaining of her ill luck and blaming her knight Calepine, she lays down to sleep, "[f]earelesse of ought, that mote her peace molest," and unaware that this is where a salvage nation of cannibals dwell (VI.viii.34). While they are searching for "booty," "by fortune blynde," the salvage nation encounter sleeping Serene (VI.viii.36). Considering this to be a gift from their god, they decide to sacrifice her and then feast on her flesh. Their Priest his "bloudy vessels wash, and holy fire prepare" (VI.viii.39). Once Serene awakes, they gather round the horrified lady "like many flies," stripping her naked, the Priest directs them to build an altar and prevents them from taking her "by force" for

---

<sup>18</sup> Not to be confused with the benign salvage nation of Satyrs, the salvage nation of Book VI is a different group made up of humans.



“bestly pleasure,” “not to pollute so sacred treasure, / Vow’d to the gods” (VI.viii.40-43). Once it is “[e]uentide,” the priest gets ready to sacrifice Serene, drawing his knife while the salvage nation plays “bagpipes” and “hornes” for the ceremony (VI.viii.44-46). The woods tremble with their noise which is heard by Sir Calepine, “by chaunce, more then by choyce,” the knight finds them just in time and rescues Serene, killing the priest as well as many others who cannot “eschew” death (VI.viii.46-49).

Spenser’s depiction of the salvage nation has been studied in relation to the discursive dehumanisation of multiple colonised peoples, including the Irish and people of the “New World.”<sup>19</sup> This is because, both were associated with cannibalism by imperialist and colonialist discourses at the time. Spenser himself suggested as such in his *A View of the Present State of Ireland* in which the character of Irenius “describes the Irish in utterly nonhuman terms: they are a scattered, constantly mobile mass that cannibalizes their dead before momentarily flocking to shamrocks like grazing animals” (Lecky 141). As Lecky further observes, *A View of the Present State of Ireland*,

justifies England’s right to subjugate [the Irish] by stripping them of their humanity. The amorphous, overwhelmingly corporal quality of the Irish divorces them from English conceptions of civility while painting them as embodiments of mutable materiality (136).

The same can be said of Book VI’s salvage nation, which is drawn as a non-cultivating, salvaging, nomadic mass or body rather than individuals or distinguishable characters:

There dwelt a saluage nation, which did liue  
Of stealth and spoile, and making nightly rode  
Into their neighbours borders; ne did giue  
Them selues to any trade, as for to driue  
The painefull plough, or cattell for to breed,  
Or by aduentrous marchandize to thriue;  
But on the labours of poore men to feed,  
And serue their owne necessities with others need.

Thereto they vsde one most accursed order,  
To eate the flesh of men, whom they mote fynde,  
And straungers to deuoure, which on their border  
Were brought by errour, or by wreckfull wynde.  
A monstrous cruelty gainst course of kynde.

---

<sup>19</sup> For instance, see Moshenska and Ramachandran’s “Faerieland’s Cannibal Metaphysics.”

They towards euening wandring euery way,  
 To seeke for booty, came by fortune blynde,  
 Whereas this Lady, like a sheepe astray,  
 Now drowned in the depth of sleepe all fearelesse lay. (VI.viii.35-36)

Evidently, the salvage nation poses a great threat, not just to the cultivations of their neighbouring nations, but to their very lives, as represented by sleeping, sheep-like Serene. Moreover, this threat is a result of their own inability to produce necessary provisions for themselves, further suggesting that they are more like predatory animals than humans. Hence, their urgent eradication by a representative of “courtesy” or “civility” is justified like that of parasitic animals or wolves which jeopardise “livestock.”

Indeed, the sheep and wolf analogy brings about another aspect of the discourse of cannibalism, arguably, this practice not just blurs the borders between animals and humans by suggesting that the latter can also be “beastly,” but it also does so by reminding the edibility, fleshliness and irrefutable materiality of humans. According to Fudge, Renaissance authors such as Shakespeare, showed that decades before Descartes’s dualistic conceptualisation of a clear-cut human/animal division, “there was already discomfort at the connections that drew humans too close to the creatures they were meant to hold dominion over. And knowing that you yourself were edible was at the core of that discomfort” (“Early Modern: Flesh” 52). In her reading of *Hamlet* (1599–1601), Fudge finds that Shakespeare’s tragedy stages “a kind of calculated forgetting,” that is, the play “persistently reminds its audiences that we are flesh,” while also voicing the reassuring “faith in human immortality,” and this need for reassurance “reveals that our belief in our utter difference from animals,” the belief that we are immortal souls rather than material bodies which can be eaten like that of other animals, “is something that we have had to work at” (“Early Modern: Flesh” 45). It is an idea that humans need to calculate/construct and reiterate in order to forget the mortality of their bodies and analogous equivalency to animals as “in the consumption of the human by worms and other “lower” creatures, humans cease to be the possessors of dominion,” and because of this, “our postmortem humanity is understood to exist not in the (edible) body but beyond the realm of the physical - in the soul” (Fudge, “Early Modern: Flesh” 44). Thus, “the knowledge of human fleshiness is there, but is rejected” and when “[t]he fact of our edibility is calculatedly forgotten,” “human exceptionalism is allowed to reign supreme” (Fudge,

“Early Modern: Flesh” 53). Following this line of thought, it is important to note that Spenser too reminds his readers, time after time, that his human characters can be eaten while also calculating a way of forgetting or rejecting this reality through faith.

There are multiple instances in *The Faerie Queene* where Spenser informs his readers that humans have been eaten in the past, for example, we are told that the salvage man ate seven women and Souldan’s horses ate some people as well. However, when it comes to episodes where the act itself should be narrated in present time, that is, if someone is about to be eaten, hence, “seen in the flesh,” Spenser’s devices of divine intervention often come into play. The Lion marvellously stops at Una’s feet in Book I and Amorett is fortunate enough to come across Belphebe while running away from the salvage man. Serene is the one who comes closest to being devoured but she is also rescued by hap:

The Damzell wakes, then all attonce vpstart,  
 And round about her flocke, like many flies,  
 Whooping, and hallowing on euery part,  
 As if they would have rent the brasen skies.  
 Which when she sees with ghastly griefful eies,  
 Her heart does quake, and deadly pallid hew  
 Benumbes her cheekes: Then out aloud she cries,  
 Where none is nigh to heare, that will her rew,  
 And rends her golden locks, and snowy brests embrew. (VI.viii.40)

[...]

Tho when as all things readie were aright,  
 The Damzell was before the altar set,  
 Being alreadie dead with fearefull fright.  
 To whom the Priest with naked armes full net  
 Approching nigh, and murdrous knife well whet,  
 Gan mutter close a certaine secret charme,  
 With other diuelish ceremonies met:  
 Which doen he gan aloft t’aduance his arme,  
 Whereat they shouted all, and made a loud alarme. (VI.viii.45)

While her own screams are not loud enough to be heard, the salvage nation’s ceremonious shouts direct Calepine to their location and he is able to save Serene during what otherwise would have been her very last moment alive. The fly simile not just highlights the salvage nation’s animality but also that of Serene since it thoroughly underlines her fleshliness. The only thing keeping her from being instantly devoured is the ritual of

sacrifice and the salvage priest. While it is depicted as “perverse” or misleading one, there is a form of religiosity or spirituality within the salvage nation which provides the much-needed moment of pause for Calepine to enter the narrative as a representative of “true” Christian faith, civility and governance. Accordingly, he reverses the course of events, “sacrifizeth” the priest “to th’inferrall feends” and kills much of the rest, “swarmes of damned soules to hell he sends” (VI.viii.49). Arguably, when Spenser mutes the carnality of this episode with such spiritual imagery, this too is an example of the “calculated forgetting” Fudge observes in *Hamlet*, because faith in immortality overpowers the “haunting” reality of human edibility and makes flesh “invisible” (“Early Modern: Flesh” 50-51). Overall, the cannibalistic salvage nation and salvage man can be grouped as Spenser’s “seemingly human” characters which disrupt the hierarchy between animals and humans through multiple means. Their depiction suggests that humans are not just “bestly,” but they are “monstrous” without heavenly guidance, and they descend lower than “animality,” this serves Spenser’s justification of various forms of religious, political and self governance promoted in *The Faerie Queene* as well as his colonialist/imperialist ideas found in other texts such as *A View of the Present State of Ireland*.

Thus, it has been established in this chapter that *The Faerie Queene*’s conceptualisation of animality entails human characters who are deemed immoral by Spenser’s standards. Such characters can physically as well as metaphorically descend to animality and become bestialised/dehumanised or they can descend lower and become immaterial in all senses of the word. Transforming characters from the first volume of Books such as Fradubio, Gryll and Malbecco are associated with Spenser’s moralising mission and religious perspective. Those from the second volume, such as Adicia, Souldan, the salvage man and nation carry political or ideological implications as well. Altogether, their depiction suggests that fallen humankind is mutable, their humanity and stations are ordained conditionally by God’s grace, therefore, unfixed. Accordingly, the following chapter will observe that in Faerie Land, even elect humans need to battle constantly for salvation and redemption against sin and temptation if they are to overcome their mutability and in-betweenness, that is, the earthly materiality they share with animals and heavenly spirituality they share with immortals.

## CHAPTER III

### “BATTLING IN-BETWEEN”

*And is there care in heauen? and is their loue  
In heauenly spirits to these creatures bace,  
That may compassion of their euilles moue?  
There is: else much more wretched were the cace  
Of men then beasts. [...]  
(Spenser, *The Faerie Queene* II.viii.1)*

For the most part, scholars of early modern animal studies concur that about high Renaissance, continental discourses on and around “the human,” were moving steadily towards establishing “man” as an innately distinguished figure of autonomous will, immense possibility and rationality, and this objective was later solidified by Descartes in the seventeenth century. This much is evident in the works of Italian Neoplatonists and humanist thinkers such as Mirandola and his *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. However, while continental fifteenth century works were highly influential in sixteenth century England, it is necessary to acknowledge that Elizabethan authors and thinkers were also prominently affected by reformist ideas which often emphasised the fallen/wretched state of humankind rather than human will and potentiality. This was because, “[c]oncerned that the medieval church had made salvation possible on the basis of human merit, all the reformed traditions sought to reassert the importance of God’s initiative and to base one’s hope for salvation in God’s power to save rather than in human effort” (Wall, “Church of England” 156). The influence of the Protestant Reformation is especially true of Spenser’s work as he learned, lived, served and produced within the bounds of a manifestly Protestant Queen, nobility and culture. Spenser’s Protestantism is a significant element for consideration because his ambiguous representation of a human/animal divide in *The Faerie Queene* is shaped around the poet’s understanding of the wretched human condition which is irreparable without God’s grace. From this understanding, emerges the idea that human knights, representing faithful Christians, are in a constant battle of faith with their inherent materiality/animality and inclination towards sin and degeneration, as suggested allegorically by their nonhuman opponents and the repeated influence of divine grace on these engagements.

Therefore, in *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser's upsurging Protestantism subverts his humanist intent of fashioning the ideal human through moralising allegory, because his proposed state of "humanity" is achievable only through God's grace. Accordingly, this chapter will interpret the battles between *The Faerie Queene's* knights and their various nonhuman opponents as metaphors of the in-between, postlapsarian human condition. In this sense, the knights are directed by divine grace in allegorical battles with their earthly materiality, fallibility and animality to achieve salvation and realise immortality as elect humans. Likewise, it can be observed from various perspectives that "[a]s Spenser's knights slug it out with a vast array of non-human life, at stake is the very definition of the human" (Stenner, "Sheep, Beasts, and Knights" 167).

In her comprehensive and influential work on the poet's theological standpoint, *Edmund Spenser: Protestant Poet* (1984), Anthea Hume elaborates on the synthesis of Protestant and continental/humanist as well as classical influences in *The Faerie Queene*. Hume argues that

[t]hroughout his writing life the poet continued to reveal in his work both an enthusiasm for the humanist inheritance and a zealous, even militant Protestantism. His knowledge of the literature of antiquity and of Renaissance Italy and France has received sympathetic critical study during our own century — his debts to Virgil and Ovid, to Petrarch, Ariosto and Tasso, to Marot and du Bellay, to Renaissance Neoplatonism, mythography and iconography, have been admirably scrutinised — but the impact of his Protestantism on his imaginative writing has been treated with more reserve. Certainly the Elizabethan Protestant milieu of the 1570s and 1580s is not on the face of it the most congenial area for enquiry; yet if we neglect this part of his mental world we are likely to find ourselves in possession of views of his poems which indicate more about our own assumptions than about his. (*Protestant Poet* 1-2)

She further implies that this critical "reserve" or refrain from studying Spenser as a Protestant/Calvinistic poet is possibly engendered by a personal or subjective reluctance "to link Spenser with what appears to be an intemperate zeal, let alone with the doctrine of predestination" (Hume, *Protestant Poet* 4). As an example for this argument, Hume refers to Rosemond Tuve who elaborates on "the re-capture of Spenser from the ranks of the Calvinists and his return to a more ordinary and unobtrusive place" (Tuve 418 n 52). For Hume however, because "[t]he doctrine of the Church of England in the Elizabethan period remained 'Calvinistic'," "Spenser cannot be rescued or 're captured' from the

theology of his times” (*Protestant Poet* 4). Indeed, other scholars also recognise that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination is “now unfashionable,” still, “[i]n one form or another” it “was held in Spenser’s time by all branches of the Church” (Doerksen 556). As Doerksen further explains, in the “Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England,” which was produced in 1571:

Article 17 says that predestination ‘is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly decreed by His counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation’. (qtd. in Doerksen 556)

Arguably, one reason why this doctrine is found so unfavourable by modern critics is that it seems to diminish human agency or make it secondary and instead attribute all agency, first and foremost, to God.

This is also true of *The Faerie Queene* which according to Hume “dramatises first of all the need for salvation by grace and then the process of growth in moral virtue which necessarily follows it” (*Protestant Poet* 67). Indeed, it will be observed that throughout *The Faerie Queene*, even the elect/chosen knights of virtue fall to many errors, and salvation from their human folly, comes by the way of divine grace. Surely, the most transparent representation of this process is found in the episode where Redcrosse encounters “Error.” In the first Canto of *The Faerie Queene*, Redcrosse is seen riding together with Una to find and defeat a troublesome creature, a Dragon who has oppressed Una’s country and her parents, the king and queen of that realm. This quest was given by Queen Gloriana to inexperienced Redcrosse knight who is unaware of the many perils he will face before even approaching the Dragon and Una’s country. Shortly, they arrive at the “wandering wood,” and “*Errours den*,” as Una heedfully tells Redcrosse, Error is a “monster vile, whom God and man does hate” (I.i.13). “The Dwarfe” who accompanies them also warns Redcrosse against approaching Error’s den, saying “this is no place for liuing men” (I.i.10). Still, with “greedy hardiment,” the Redcrosse knight goes to look into the dark hole where Error lives (I.i.14). Even in these preliminary stanzas, the Redcrosse knight’s reason begins to falter, hinting at his many falls to come in Book I which are consequential of his allegorical and physical dismissal of “truth”/ Una. This is

only natural because as Brooks-Davies suggests “[t]he Fall brings spiritual blindness and a high probability of making the wrong choice” and Spenser depicts in Book I “the psychological processes which lead, in our fallen world, to the choice of evil rather than good” (“Book I” 261).

Error is described as a half serpent-half human monster, her huge knotty tail spreading all over the floor whilst she suckles her many “ill faoured” younglings of “sundrie shapes” (I.i.15). She and her brood hate light so they are startled when light refracts from Redcrosse’s armour and seeps into their den, the younglings creep into their mother’s mouth and hide. She comes out to see the source of light and tries to retreat back upon seeing the knight in armour, however, with his sword, Redcrosse keeps her from turning and “force[s] her to stay” (I.i.17). He proceeds to be the initial attacker, striking Error’s shoulder, she then wraps her tail around him and entirely constrains Redcrosse who strives in “vaine” as Spenser’s poetic persona proclaims, “God helpe the man so wrapt in *Errours* endlesse traine” (I.i.18). At this point Una cries out to her knight saying, “Add faith vnto your force, and be not faint,” with her words of encouragement and advise, Redcrosse manages to loosen out his hand and strangles Error with it who then vomits poison all over and her “spawne” swarm around the knight (I.i.19-22). In his final attempt, “[h]alfe furious,” Redcrosse approaches Error once again and striking “at her with more then manly force,” severs her head off (I.i.24). Her babies flock about the corpse and drink their mother’s blood until they themselves burst, seeing his foes thus “slaine themselues,” Redcrosse departs, and Una declares him a “Faire knight, borne vnder happie starre” (I.i.25-27). They continue to move forward for more adventures and “with God to frend” (I.i.28).

Evidently, the erroneous human knight is incapable of subduing Error without faith or God’s help. In a sense, this is an allegorical representation of the fallen human condition in general, and since Redcrosse is an elect Christian, he is able to strike with more than human force, suggesting firstly that his own powers are not sufficient, and secondly that God aids him. Of course, Error’s half human-half animal depiction is also suggestive in itself. Spenser indicates that her in-betweenness/doubleness is monstrous, hated by “men” and God, should not come in to light, and its eradication pleases Una, the epitome of



oneness and ideal humanity. Still, the poet's design of the narrative, as well as his wording, makes Redcrosse a "greedy" intruder who has "forced" Error to attack in self-defence. This goes to show that error is also within Redcrosse. Hence, the knight will continue to battle nonhuman opponents with whom he shares more than what meets the eye until his own in-betweenness is eradicated.

Indeed, in the Seventh Canto of Book I, the Redcrosse knight thoroughly embraces doubleness in the form of Duessa ("her name means two-ness, doubleness, and duplicity, in contrast to the One Truth," Una) (Hume, "Duessa" 229). Redcrosse and Duessa court and "bathe in pleasaunce" in a shady glade near a stream and enjoy drinking its waters (I.vii.4). However, he is unaware that the sacred Nymph of this stream is cursed by Diana, hence, "all that drinke thereof, do faint and feeble grow" (I.vii.5). Whilst "his manly forces gan to fayle," Redcrosse continues to court Duessa "Poured out in loosnesse on the grassy grownd, / Both carelesse of his health, and of his fame," suggesting that they have intercourse (I.vii.6-7). All of a sudden, they hear thumping and a "loud bellowing," the earth itself seems to shake for "terror" and trees begin to "tremble" (I.vii.7). The knight manages to snatch his sword, but he is unable to put on his armour or take his shield before they are approached by "An hideous Geaunt horrible and hye" (I.vii.8). This is Orgoglio, the giant son of Earth and Aeolus (the ruler of winds). As Redcrosse falls to earthly temptation, lechery and idleness, the punishment for his degeneration seems to have emerged instantly in the form of a nonhuman opponent:

The greatest Earth his vncouth mother was,  
 And blustering *AEolus* his boasted syre,  
 Who with his breath, which through the world doth pas,  
 Her hollow womb did secretly inspyre,  
 And fild her hidden caves with stormie yre,  
 That she conceiu'd; and trebling the dew time,  
 In which the wombes of wemen doe expyre,  
 Brought forth this monstrous masse of earthly slyme,  
 Puft vp with emptie wynd, and fild with sinfull cryme.

So growen great through arrogant delight  
 Of th'high descent, whereof he was yborne,  
 And through presumption of his matchlesse might,  
 All other powres and knighthood he did scorne.  
 Such now he marcheth to this man forlorne,  
 And left to losse: his stalking steps are stayde  
 Vpon a snaggy Oke, which he had torne

Out of his mothers bowelles, and it made  
His mortall mace, wherewith his foemen he dismayde. (I.vii.9-10)

It is suggested by his ancestry that, among other things, Orgoglio represents earthly materiality, he is openly described as a “monstrous masse of earthly slyme,” “fild with sinfull cryme.” As observed through the Cantos of Mutabilitie and Garden of Adonis in the introduction chapter of this thesis, Spenser conceptualises “earthly slime” as the communal substance or matter from which all earthly mortals are made, hence, it ingenerates the original sin for which humans were cast down to earth from heaven. In this sense, Redcrosse shares his substance with Orgoglio and they can only be differentiated through the knight’s faith and spirituality. However, in this moment of spiritual weakness and sinfulness, Redcrosse is allegorically as well as physically overcome by his earthly materiality which is embodied as Orgoglio.

Orgoglio attacks Redcrosse who is “Disarmd, disgraste, and inwardly dismayde,” and made “feeble” by the stream’s enchanted waters (I.vii.11). He evades merciless Orgoglio’s initial strike “That could haue ouerthrowne a stony towre,” because “heuenly grace, that him did blesse,” otherwise he would have been “pouldred all, as thin as flowre” (I.vii.12). “[A]ll his sences stound” the Redcrosse knight “lay[s] full low” and Orgoglio gets redy to strike once more (I.vii.12). At this moment, Duessa cries out to the giant and pleads for him to spare Redcrosse’s life, she suggests that Orgoglio should instead make Redcrosse his “eternall bondslaue” and take Duessa as his “Leman” (I.vii.14). Orgoglio gladly agrees, takes them to his castle, throws Redcrosse in the dungeon and adorns his new dear Duessa with a crown, royall clothes as well as a seven headed<sup>20</sup> “monstrous beast ybredd in filthy fen” to ride and strike fear onto others (I.vii.16).

Whilst the erroneous human knight descends to this wretched state, it is suggested that as an elect Christian, he did not necessarily fall from grace. The means for his rescue through divine intervention are also emerging in the form of Arthur. The Dwarf who accompanies

---

<sup>20</sup> Maclean notes that “Duessa, clad in purple and gold, and mounted on her seven-headed beast, figures the ‘mother of whoredomes’ (Rev 17.5) identified by Protestant readers with the sensually impious pomp and power of the Church of Rome” (qtd.in “Orgoglio” 518).

Redcrosse takes his now deserted arms and finds Una, he explains how her fallible knight, after many errors, eventually became “a caytiue thrall” (I.vii.19). Una and the Dwarf travel “many a wood,” and “At last she chaunced by good hap to meet / A goodly knight, faire marching by the way / Together with his Squyre” Timias (I.vii.28-29). This is the first time Arthur is introduced in *The Faerie Queene*, his own magnificence as well as that of his arms are described for multiple stanzas, it is evident that he is no ordinary knight, and in this episode, he emerges as an instrument of “good hap,” or God’s grace.

In Canto VIII, Arthur, Timias, Una and the Dwarf arrive at Orgoglio’s castle to free Redcrosse. Arthur and Timias battle with Orgoglio and Duessa’s seven headed beast, the beast is blinded by Arthur’s magically bright shield (I. viii. 20) and Orgoglio’s head is cut off by the knight (I.viii.24). Having subjugated his monstrous opponents, Arthur then proceeds to free Redcrosse from the dungeons. After searching for quite some time in this dark dreary place<sup>21</sup>, Redcrosse is found in a horrible state, his “feeble thighes, vnhabable to vphold / His pined corse,” the knight has become a “ruefull spectacle of death and ghastly drere” (I.viii.40). They go back and capture Duessa who is then disrobed but left unharmed to go free in accordance with Una’s orders. The witch’s true form is revealed as an old hag with various animal parts, and she escapes into the wildernesses (this is only momentary as she reappears in later Cantos) (I.viii.47-49).

Overall, Redcrosse’s captivity serves as a testimony of God’s power to save in contrast with human weakness and sinfulness. As Spenser’s poetic persona proclaims

Ay me, how many perils doe enfold  
The righteous man, to make him daily fall?  
Were not that heauenly grace doth him vphold,  
And stedfast truth acquite him out of all:  
Her loue is firme, her care continuall,  
So oft as he thorough his own foolish pride,  
Or weaknes is to sinfull bands made thrall:  
Els should this *Redcrosse* knight in bands haue dyde,  
For whose deliuerance she this Prince doth thether guyd. (I.viii.1)

---

<sup>21</sup> According to Kaske, Arthur’s rescue of Redcrosse from the dungeon “re-enacts the credal Harrowing of Hell” by Christ (“Bible” 88).

In this sense, the fall is not just a biblical event, but it is the everyday experience of postlapsarian “righteous” humans who continually battle through faith with the evil within. Spenser implies that this in-betweenness necessitates the continual receipt of God’s love/grace. Indeed, as Duessa is freed by Una’s orders, it is foreshadowed that the duplicity or in-betweenness she allegorically represents will continue to haunt the knights. Moreover, through the depiction of Duessa as a commixture of different animals, Spenser hints at the animality of in-betweenness once more, as he also did so with Errorr:

But at her rompe she growing had behind  
 A foxes taile, with dong all fowly dight;  
 And eke her feete most monstrous were in sight;  
 For one of them was like an Eagles claw,  
 With griping talaunts armd to greedy fight,  
 The other like a beares vneuen paw:  
 More vgly shape yet neuer living creature saw. (I.viii.48)

Una declares this sight as the “face of falshood” (I.viii.49). Arguably, Duessa is not just an external force which has engendered Redcrosse’s fall, but she is also a reflection of the double nature of Redcrosse in particular, and humankind in general, battling in-between “falsehood” and “truth,” as well as “animality” and “humanity.”

After this episode where he is reunited with truth, it takes quite some time for the knight to recover through various forms of religious and spiritual counsel. In the eleventh Canto of Book I, Redcrosse is finally ready to battle his main opponent, the Dragon. As the knight and Una approach the lady’s “natiue soyle,” she encourages Redcrosse, stating that this battle will him “euermore renomed make, / Aboue all knights on earth, that batteill vndertake” (I.xi.2). From a far, they see the tower where Una’s parents are imprisoned as well as the mountain like Dragon, the Dragon sees them too and begins to approach (I.xi.3-5). With that, Redcrosse sends Una away to safely hide and watch, and Spenser evokes his Muse in anticipation of this heroic episode (I.xi.5). The Dragon is described in detail; the “dreadfull Beast” is so huge in stature that as he flies, he casts a shadow like a mountain overcasts a valley (I.xi.8), his sharp scales are clattering about like a “plated cote of steele” (I.xi.9), his wings are “like two sayles” which move clouds with the air they beat (I.xi.10), his knotty tail has two stingers which “sharpest steele exceeden farr” (I.xi.11), same with his claws, his bloody gaping mouth is full of iron teeth and between

them, hangs pieces of his latest victims, he spews out smoke and sulphur, finally, his eyes which “burne with wrath” also spark flames and set his surroundings on fire (I.xi.14). This meticulous depiction of the Dragon as an impossibly large, exceedingly weaponised and utterly frightening creature can be read as an overt proclamation from the start that no human can defeat him without divine help.

Rightfully so, the Redcrosse knight almost “quake[s] for feare” of this tremendous opponent (I.xi.15). He first tries to attack with a spear, but the Dragon’s scales are impenetrable (I.xi.16). With his huge tail, the beast throws Redcrosse and his horse down to the ground, they both get up and the Dragon picks them up and flies until his grip is loosened and they are freed (I.xi.16-19). Redcrosse then manages to pierce the Dragon by aiming at the skin under his left wing (I.xi.20). The Dragon can no longer fly but he constrains Redcrosse’s horse with his tail, forcing the animal to throw off his rider and the knight is dismounted, then, the Dragon proceeds to set Redcrosse ablaze (I.xi.23-26). At this point, Redcrosse comes very close to being defeated, he is dismal, “Faynt, wearie, sore, emboyled, griued, brent / With heat, toyle, wounds, armes, smart, and inward fire,” hence, Spenser’s poetic persona proclaims that “Death better were, death did he oft desire, / But death will neuer come, when needes require” (I.xi.28). In accordance with the pattern hitherto observed, indicating his position as an elect Christian, when Redcrosse is in despair, he is to be rescued by God’s grace. Accordingly, he falls into the “*well of life*” by chance (I.xi.29). Now the sun starts to set, and Una prays to God all night (I.xi.32).

The morrow next, Redcrosse comes out of the waters fresh and healed as “this new-borne knight to battell new,” he is likened to an eagle which has cast its old plumes and grew new ones (I.xi.34). But the Dragon is not renewed, he still carries the wound from yesterday, and Redcrosse proceeds to give him a new one on the head (I.xi.35). This time, the Dragon strikes with his stinger, as it gets stuck on Redcrosse’s shield, the knight is able to sever the beast’s tail off (I.xi.39). Next, the Dragon snatches Redcrosse’s shield, and the knight cuts his claw but once again he must retreat because of the Dragon’s flames. “It chaunst (eternall God that chaunce did guide),” Redcrosse falls next to a tree, “Great God it planted in that blessed stedd / With his Almighty hand, and did it call / The

tree of life, the crime of our first fathers fall” (I.xi.45-46). From the tree of life, oozes out a stream of balm and it pools on the ground:

Life and long health that gracious ointment gaue,  
And deadly wounds could heale, and reare againe  
The sencelesse corse appointed for the graue.  
Into that same he fell: which did from death him saue. (I.xi.48)

With that, the second day of their battle also comes to an end through divine intervention, and the sun sets again while Redcrosse lays immobile in this pool of balm/ointment. Seeing her knight’s “second fall,” Una goes devoutly back to prayer (I.xi.50).

In the morning of the third and final day of the battle with the Dragon, Redcrosse rises again, fresh and “All healed of his hurts and woundes wide” (I.xi.52). The Dragon charges at him with open jaws and the knight stabs him right through the mouth, with that, the Dragon is killed, he collapses and “like an heaped mountaine lay” (I.xi.54). Joyous Una comes out of her hiding place to celebrate victorious Redcrosse, “Then God she prayisd, and thankt her faithfull knight, / That had atchieude so great a conquest by his might” (I.xi.55). These final lines summarise and demonstrate the general theme of the episode, that is, the descend of “the Dragon” and the ascend of “mankind” is possible only through God’s grace.

Traditionally, the Dragon episode is read in two interdependent ways, in accordance firstly with the legend of St. George, patron saint of England, and secondly with narratives of the fall. In the first association, the Redcrosse knight becomes St. George by defeating the Dragon as prophesised earlier in Canto X by a Hermit:

[...] for thee ordaind a blessed end:  
For thou emongst those Saints, whom thou doest see,  
Shalt be a Saint and thine owne nations frend  
And Patrone: thou Saint *George* shalt called bee,  
*Saint George* of mery England, the signe of victoree. (I.x.61)

In the second association, Una's royal parents represent Adam and Eve, the Dragon is the serpent, and their kingdom is Eden as suggested by the presence of the tree of life. Stenner merges the two associations in her reading of the episode and argues that

[t]he connections to the fall are clear, but owing to his national identity, Redcrosse's quest is epic as well as sacred: he must ontologically and racially purify the Eden that is Spenser's fantasised nation. The dragon is the enemy of the Christian faith, and an invading other antithetical to White Britishness. Simultaneously, it represents the monstrous bestiality that must be purged from the centred and rational self. ("Error's Repurcussions" 102)

Indeed, the Dragon can also be read as the final epitome of monstrous animality within the human which must be eradicated for Redcrosse to achieve ideal humanity. An accumulation of serpentine Error and giant Orgoglio, the Dragon too reflects the in-betweenness of the human knight and he is subdued through God's direction, as a result Redcrosse achieves sanctification, holiness and realises the "true state of humanness" proposed in *The Faerie Queene*. As Gless notes, "[a]lthough holiness results from cooperation of human will with divine grace, God alone remains entirely responsible for salvation" and "[e]fforts to achieve holiness simply render visible the otherwise secret inner operations of predestined grace" (506). Likewise, the Redcrosse knight proclaims that

His be the praise, that this atchieu'ment wrought,  
Who made my hand the organ of his might;  
More then goodwill to me attribute nought:  
For all I did, I did but as I ought. (II.i.33)

With that, in line with reformist thought, the Redcrosse knight attributes all agency to God. As Stenner further argues, "[s]ymbolic rejection through violent destruction is the task that Redcrosse must achieve when he vanquishes Spenser's composite creatures," hence, "allegorically banishing animal and racial alterity from hegemonic human ontology (though only temporarily, in the poem's looping psychological economy)" ("Error's Repurcussions" 102). It is true that the allegorical as well as religious implications of the Dragon are only "temporarily" banished in Book I since "composite" or in-between creatures will continue to push the limits and attack the boundaries of "the human" throughout *The Faerie Queene*.

In the ninth Canto of Book II, Guyon and Arthur arrive at the house of temperance, that is, the castle of a lady named Alma and it represents the human body (II.ix.1). To their surprise, the castle's gates are barred and when they request entrance, a watchman emerges and warns them, the castle has been under the siege of villains for seven years, many knights who have attempted rescue, have been slain by them (II.ix.12). All of a sudden, "A thousand villeins rownd about them swarmd / Out of the rockes and caues adioyning nye, / Vile caitiue wretches, ragged, rude, deformd" (II.ix.13). These are Alma's monstrous nonhuman besiegers some of which are then dispersed by the knights. They are likened to "a swarme of Gnats" and the knights slash "their idle shades; / For though they bodies seem, yet substaunce from them fades" (II.ix.15-16). These villains are later revealed to be the deadly sins, allegorically attacking and sieging "the human" as represented by Alma's castle. After hearing of their troubles, Alma lets the knights in to her castle and entertains them. She is described as a faire, virginal lady "full of grace and goodly modestee," clad in "lily white" attire (II.ix.18-19). Spenser's poetic persona proclaims that

Of all Gods workes, which doe this world adorne,  
 There is no one more faire and excellent,  
 Then is mans body both for powre and forme,  
 Whiles it is kept in sober gouernment;  
 But none then it, more fowle and indecent,  
 Distempred through misrule and passions bace:  
 It growes a Monster, and incontinent  
 Doth loose his dignity and natiue grace.  
 Behold, who list, both one and other in this place. (II.ix.1)

Here, the doubleness/in-betweenness of the human is openly presented, the body is either ascending to excellence through good governance or descending to monstrosity through intemperance, while the soul, represented by Alma, needs to keep constant government which proves to be a challenge or battle in the following stanzas, even while she is being counselled by reason.

After courtly entertainment, Alma accepts the knights' request to tour her castle and guides them through its various parts. Through a hall, they enter the kitchen which represents the stomach, they meet allegorical figures such as a "marshall" named Appetite



(II.ix.28), a cook named Concoction and the “kitchin clerke” named Digestion (II.ix.31). From there, they move on to a parlour representing the heart where “litle *Cupid* playd / His wanton sportes” (II.ix.34). Afterwards, “Vp to a stately Turret she them brought, / Ascending by ten steps of Alablaster wrought” (II.ix.44). Climbing up from the neck, they arrive at the head and the brain, “This parts great workemanship, and wondrous powre, / That all this other worldes worke doth excel” (II.ix.47). Here they meet “three honorable sages” who “counselled faire *Alma*, how to gouerne well” (II.ix.47-48). “The first of them could things to come foresee; / The next could of thinges present best aduize; / The third things past could keepe in memoree” (II.ix.49). They tour the chambers of each and in that of the third sage representing memory, Arthur finds a book entitled “*Briton moniments*” and Guyon finds one named “*Antiquitee of Faery lond*” in which the histories of their ancestors are told (II.ix.59-60).

According to Fudge, in *Alma*’s castle “Plato’s model of the human is given its finest outline in the early modern period” (*Brutal Reasoning* 86). This is because

[h]ere, Spenser has created a Platonic image of the human, with the journey from appetite to emotion to reason represented as a journey not from the organic to the inorganic but from belly to heart to brain. Whereas Aristotle [...] regarded the brain as having merely organic, sensitive capacities—the limitation of the animal—in this Platonic model the brain is the seat of reason. (Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning* 86-87)

As it has been discussed in the introduction chapter of this thesis, Aristotelian models of ensoulment regard the rational (inorganic) soul type and consequential ability to reason as a distinctive possession of humankind, lacking in animals which only possess the vegetative and sensitive (organic) soul types despite having brains. However, as Fudge suggests, in *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser does not follow this model exclusively.

In Canto XI, Guyon departs from *Alma*’s castle with the Palmer to pursue his main quest, but Arthur remains. Momentarily, the sieging villains dispatch their assault on the castle. Their numbers are “huge and infinite,” but their Captain Maleger arranges the villains in twelve troops, seven of which (representing the deadly sins) attack the castle gates (II.xi.5-6). The remaining five assault its “fiue great Bulwarkes” or fortification walls (II.xi.7). In order, these bulwarks represent the five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell

and feeling or touch. The shapes and properties of these troops are of various animals, some are a mish mash of different animal parts, in a sense, they are all composite “beastly” beings trying to permeate their way into the sequestered human. They physically attack the wall or boundary between “the human” and “the beast,” and allegorically, they are associated with the passions/temptations which affect the respective senses, driving humankind to sin and consequential degeneration to animality.

The first troop of “monstrous,” “misshapen wightes” have the features of animals with good eyesight like “Owles,” and “Lynces” and they taunt the bulwark of sight with temptations “by which the eyes may fault,” such as “Beautie, and money” (II.xi.8-9). The second troop are associated with harmful words a human might hear, they are shaped like “Snakes” and “wilde Bores” and they assault the bulwark of hearing through “Bad counsels, prayses, and false flatteries” (II.xi.10). The list goes on for many stanzas, the bulwark of taste is attacked by ostrich mouthed creatures representing “vnthrifitie waste, / Vaine feastes, and ydle superfluity” (II.xi.12). Finally, the fifth troop attacking the sense of touch is the “most horrible of hew” for they are like “Snailles” and “Vrchins,” “Armed with dartes of sensuall delight,” and “stinges of carnall lust” (II.xi.13). Altogether, these “beasts” try to annex the castle / the human with orders from their Captain Maleger. Seeing Alma’s desperation, Arthur pledges to save her and gets his armour ready. With the help of his squire Timias and horse Spumador<sup>22</sup>, Arthur begins to disperse the beastly troops, meanwhile, Maleger approaches, riding upon a tiger and followed by two old hags named Impotence and Impatience (II.xi.23).

His arrows are warded off by Arthur’s shield and the knight proceeds to chase Maleger (II.xi.24-25). With the help of Impotence and Impatience, Maleger is able to oppress Arthur momentarily as Timias swiftly comes to his aid, and Spenser attributes Arthur’s rescue from sure demise to “grace” (II.xi.30). Afterwards, “prickt with reprochful shame,” Arthur fiercely attacks and kills Maleger but the villain is revived upon hitting the ground as if nothing has happened, time after time, he dies in Arthur’s arms but once his corpse is laid down to earth, he comes back to life (II.xi.31-35). With that Arthur

---

<sup>22</sup> It is worth noting here that amongst these monstrous “beasts,” Spumador, a “true animal” who is neither anthropomorphic nor composite, creates a contrast by its virtuous representation.

comes to the realisation of “How th’Earth his [Maleger’s] mother was, and first him bore, / Shee eke so often, as his life decayd, / Did life with vsury to him restore,” therefore, to ensure he stays dead, Arthur should not “him committ to graue terrestriall” (II.xi.45). Hence, the knight kills Maleger once more but this time he throws his body into a lake (II.xi.46). At the end of the Canto, the victorious knight is also terribly wounded himself, Timias and his steed take him back to the castle to be healed with the help of Alma (II.xi.48-49).

Once more emphasising the overall association of sinfulness with earthliness in *The Faerie Queene*, like Orgoglio, the captain of the seven deadly sins is directly linked with the earth itself. Spenser does not refrain from demonstrating the fallibility of earthly humans at the cost of Arthur’s acclaim either, his epitome of heroism, humanity and virtue:

So greatest and most glorious thing on ground  
 May often need the helpe of weaker hand;  
 So feeble is mans state, and life vnsound,  
 That in assuraunce it may neuer stand,  
 Till it dissolued be from earthly band.  
 Prooffe be thou Prince, the prowest man alyue,  
 And noblest borne of all in *Britayne* land,  
 Yet thee fierce Fortune did so nearely driue,  
 That had not grace thee blest, thou shouldest not suruiue. (II. xi. 30)

With that, Alma’s rescue from her nonhuman besiegers as well as the allegorical rescue of “the human” from sin is actualised through grace. However, Spenser does indeed prove in the final Book that his human characters may never stand in assurance as yet another “beastly” opponent roams forever free.

The Blatant Beast is one of the most striking examples of “in-betweenness” in *The Faerie Queene* and he is first introduced in the final Canto of Book V. Described as a “monster” and “dreadfull feend of gods and men ydrad,” the beast is employed by two hags named Detraction and Envie to attack the knight of justice Artegall (V.xii.35-37). Later, in Book VI, Calidore, the knight of courtesy, is appointed by Gloriana to capture this beast which harms Faerie Land and its inhabitants physically through attacks as well as morally and

allegorically through blasphemy. As the name Blatant<sup>23</sup>, his “thousand tongues” and spiteful “barks” (VI.i.9) suggest, one of the allegorical associations of the beast is with harmful speech in general and rumour in particular. This is the central quest of Book VI and throughout the Cantos, Calidore struggles to achieve it as he is often diverted and does not fully comprehend his mission. At the end of Book VI, which is also the end of the completed portion of *The Faerie Queene*, the Blatant Beast evades Calidore once more and goes “into the world at liberty againe” (VI.xii.38). His escape suggests the everlasting presence of an evil threat.

In the beginning of the legend of courtesy, Calidore encounters Artegall and explains how he has been appointed a mission which perplexes him. This is because he does not know where to find or how to subdue the beast, he is “To tread an endlesse trace, withouten guyde, / Or good direction, how to enter in, / Or how to issue forth in waies vntryde” (VI.i.6). Artegall in turn, provides the troubled knight with much needed direction as he has just been attacked by the Blatant Beast recently. Then on, the evasive beast, just like Calidore, is seen/mentioned very sporadically in Cantos III, V, VI, IX and XII. In Canto III, while her knight Calepine and Calidore are conversing, lady Serene’s “wauering lust” and “wandring sight” lead her alone into fields, unsuspectingly, to make a garland (VI.iii.23). All of a sudden, she is snatched up by the Blatant Beast who carries her away in his “wide great mouth,” “to haue spoyled” (VI.iii.24-25). The knights pursue them and when Calidore overtakes the race, Blatant drops Serene off and Calidore continues to pursue the beast instead of tending to the wounded lady, “There left on ground, though in full euill plight, / Yet knowing that her Knight now neare did draw, / Staide not to succour her in that affright, / But follow’d fast the Monster in his flight” (VI.iii.26). While his dismissal of Serene is attributed to the knight’s persistence in following the beast this instance, it is also ironic because he will not be so persistent later. Such an act of indifference towards a wounded lady is not necessarily courteous, hinting at Calidore’s future ineptitude from the start. This begins the perilous journey of Calepine and Serene which the narrative follows, the beast and Calidore re-emerge much later in Canto IX.

---

<sup>23</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the word “Blatant” is “[a]pparently invented by Spenser, and used by him as an epithet of the thousand-tongued monster,” symbolising “calumny.”

However, in Canto V, it is revealed that Timias also had a recent encounter with the Blatant Beast, and he has been bitten. With Belphobe's restored favour, Timias also gains enemies, some of which are villains called Despetto, Decetto, Defetto (VI.v.13), spite, deceit, and detraction (Bond 215). They employ the beast to attack Timias and he is rescued momentarily by Arthur, however, his wounds, like that of Serene, grow rancid and infectious, "Of their late woundes, the which the *Blatant Beast* / Had giuen them, whose grieffe through suffraunce sore increast" (VI.v.39). Therefore, Serene and Timias are left to be cared by a Hermit in a Hermitage who "combines worldly wisdom with a genuine religiosity" (Bernard 360). The Hermit realises that the wounds given by the Blatant Beast cannot be cured surgically as "The inner parts now gan to putrify," therefore, they "rather needed to be disciplined / With holesome reede of sad sobriety, / To rule the stubborne rage of passion blinde" (VI.vi.5). His advised method to restore their health is as follows; "First learne your outward sences to refraine / From things, that stirre vp fraile affection; / Your eies, your eares, your tongue, your talk restraine," "For from those outward sences ill affected, / The seede of all this euill first doth spring" (VI.vi.7-8). As demonstrated in the episode of Alma, the five senses are constantly under the attack of temptations. Thus, the Hermit tells Serene and Timias:

Abstaine from pleasure, and restraine your will,  
 Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,  
 Vse scanted diet, and forbear your fill,  
 Shun secresie, and talke in open sight:  
 So shall you soone repaire your present euill plight. (VI.vi.14)

This is the only way to recover from the bite of the Blatant Beast according to the Hermit since "This hellish Dog, that hight the *Blatant Beast*" is a "commixtion" of two monsters from hell named Echidna and Typhaon (VI.vi.10-12). With his many tongues, the Blatant Beast "poures his poysnous gall forth to infest / The noblest wights with notable defame" and spoils their good names as well as their bodies with "reproch" and "shame" (VI.vi.12). By following the Hermit's method, Serene and Timias are healed, and they depart from the Hermitage (VI.vi.15). Arguably, like Error, Duessa and Alma's besiegers, the Blatant Beast too reflects the in-between human condition and the "monstrosity" of this doubleness, as such he is not just an external opponent, but he is

within Serene and Timias, and because of this, they need to discipline themselves through spiritual council.

In Canto IX, the narrative momentarily returns to where it left off, Calpine chasing the beast. The knight pursues the beast “first from court,” “to the citties,” “from the citties to the townes,” “from the townes into the countrie,” and “from the country back to priuate farmes,” demonstrating the beast’s all-inclusive, wide range of victims, as well as pointing critically first and foremost at the court (VI.ix.3). A pastoral village he arrives at proves to be Calidore’s main distraction as he completely abandons his quest here in pursuit of a beautiful damsel named Pastorella, and in awe of simple country life. It is as late as Canto XII when Calidore finally returns to his main quest of subduing the beast “Who all this while at will did range and raine, / Whilst none was him to stop, nor none him to restraine” (VI.xii.2). During his search Calidore finds that the beast has massacred his way through all “estates” of people and the turn “to the Clergy now was come at last” (VI.xii.23). The beast is found at a church within a monastery, “Regarding nought religion, nor their holy heast,” he has wreaked havoc within the chambers of the monks (VI.xii.24). Spenser also directs criticism at clergy by saying that the beast “searched all their cels and secrets neare; / In which what filth and ordure did appeare, / Were yrkesome to report” (VI.xii.24). Within the church, he has “robd,” “fouled, and blasphemy spoke,” “And th’Images for all their goodly hew, / Did cast to ground” (VI.xii.25).

Here the beast is cornered by Calidore and his gaping, biting mouth with iron teeth is described in detail, he has a thousand tongues of sundry kinds, each belonging to various animal species along with “mortall men:”

And therein were a thousand tongs empight,  
Of sundry kindes, and sundry quality,  
Some were of dogs, that barked day and night,  
And some of cats, that wrawling still did cry.  
And some of Beares, that groynd continually,  
And some of Tygres, that did seeme to gren,  
And snar at all, that euer passed by:  
But most of them were tongues of mortall men,  
Which spake reprochfully, not caring where nor when.

And them amongst were mingled here and there,  
The tongues of Serpents with three forked stings,

That spat out poyson and gore bloody gere  
 At all, that came within his rauenings,  
 And spake licentious words, and hatefull things  
 Of good and bad alike, of low and hie;  
 Ne Kesars spared he a whit, nor Kings,  
 But either blotted them with infamie,  
 Or bit them with his banefull teeth of injury. (VI.xii.27-28)

Indeed, the Blatant Beast is a thoroughly composite creature, he is an amalgamation of many animals which can be harmful, including mortal / earthly humans. For Stenner, “he possesses a troubling hybridity in which humanity is implicated” (“Sheep, Beasts, and Knights” 170). He is oppressed by Calidore’s shield and when the beast cannot eschew through physical force, he resorts to the use of his many tongues, attacking the knight with bitter words (VI.xii.33). Calidore subdues the beast with an iron muzzle, and “therein shut vp his blasphemous tong” (VI.xii.34). Having conquered his fierce opponent, Calidore showcases the Blatant Beast by walking him like a dog throughout Faerie Land on a chain, however, the knight’s victory is short lived as one day, “whether wicked fate so framed, / Or fault of men, he broke his yron chaine, / And got into the world at liberty againe” (VI.xii.38). Spenser’s poetic persona proclaims that “Thenceforth more mischiefe and more scath he wrought / To mortall men, then he had done before,” because the beast grew stronger and although some tried, none could ever subdue him, “So now he raungeth through the world againe, / And rageth sore in each degree and state” (VI.xii.39-40). Spenser suggests that the beast roams to this day, sparing no one, “Ne spareth he most learned wits to rate, / Ne spareth he the gentle Poets rime, / But rends without regard of person or of time” (VI.xii.40).

In terms of its ambiguity, evasiveness and overall incompleteness, Calidore’s quest is noticeably different from those of many other knights in *The Faerie Queene*, as well as other conclusive battles held between humans and nonhumans aforementioned in this chapter. Arguably, Calidore’s opponent is not necessarily a “beast” in the traditional sense of the human/animal divide either because he is extremely verbal, so much so that the Blatant Beast is an emblem of language itself, albeit, ill-used. In this instance, language, that which makes humans “truly human” for so many other thinkers, is what Spenser finds to be the biggest folly of humankind, configured as an everlasting beast. According to Moshenska and Ramachandran,

Calidore's quest for the Blatant Beast, typically understood as an allegory for court slander, is literally the pursuit of a monster whose allegorical body foregrounds eating and orality: the Beast's many mouths and many tongues suggest the amalgamation of a communal devouring. (134)

Indeed, the "monstrosity" of Blatant is orally fixated, both meanings of tongue, as an appendage of the mouth and as language, merge through his depiction, the same is also true of Spenser's usage of "rend," suggesting that Blatant's victims are torn to pieces physically as well as verbally. Within this perspective, Spenser indicates that slander, blasphemy and other forms of corrupt speech or verbal abuse are no better than physical devouring. Moreover, they are signs of the communal "beastliness" within humankind, thereby, their possession of language does not always distinguish humans from animals, on the contrary, it can have the opposite effect. Overall, as Mulryan states, a "culmination of intractable evil in *The Faerie Queene*," "[t]he Blatant Beast rages, and will rage to the end of time, as a demonic force at once external to man and internal to the innermost recesses of his being" (96-97).

To conclude, it has been established in this chapter that Spenser's virtuous knights are in a continuous state of battle with their inner fallibility, materiality and animality, often embodied as nonhuman, monstrous or "bestly" opponents. Such depictions reflect the poet's understanding of the in-between condition of postlapsarian humans, either ascending to salvation from their earthly bounds or descending through sin. Redcrosse and his nonhuman adversaries share more than what meets the eye and reveal the frailty of earthly humans as well as their constant need for divine guidance and grace to distinguish themselves. Through the siege of Alma's castle by deadly sins, the inner workings of the human are revealed both physically and allegorically. Finally, as the Blatant Beast escapes, it is suggested that humankind's "battle in-between" continues beyond *The Faerie Queene*.



## CONCLUSION

By comparatively studying *The Faerie Queene*'s animals/nonhumans and humans with the aim of discerning how Spenser constructs and portrays these categories as a representative of the pre-Cartesian period, this thesis has found that Spenser's pre-Cartesian attempt to privilege humankind falls short of a total realisation and absolute anthropocentrism unlike Cartesian discourses which advance few decades after him in the seventeenth century. This is because, while Spenser configures qualities (moral ideals and virtues) to elevate and distinguish humans from other earthly creatures such as animals, due to his ontological and theological understanding and political position, the poet's work indicates that fallen humans are incapable of adopting these qualities on their own. Only elect/predestined humans who are directed by "God's grace" to battle for salvation can distinguish themselves from "animality" and realise the "true state of humanness" ascribed by the poet as the culmination of virtue. The rest are situated equally to or sometimes lower than animals. Thereby, Spenser does not deny that humans have much in common with animals, on the contrary, he draws a metaphorical and moral mutability from human to "beast" and "beast" to human, blurring the lines between these two categories. In result, for characters in *The Faerie Queene*, while "humanity" is an elusive ideal to which only few chosen humans can ascend, "animality" is the reality shared by the rest of "living wights." Overall, *The Faerie Queene* not just subverts its poet's humanist intent of fashioning the ideal human through moralising allegory, but it also reflects the permeability of the human/animal divide in pre-Cartesian early modern discourses.

Scholars of early modern animal studies concur that together with René Descartes's work, the seventeenth century represents a period of notable change in which dualistic thinking is strengthened. Heightening anthropocentrism in western thought systems, Cartesian ideas establish a definitive binary opposition between humans and all other animals by reducing the latter to soulless machines/bodies, incapable of reason or cognition. In contrast, pre-Cartesian literary works often allow and instigate the study of animals and humans within a continuum. It has been found that this is also true of *The Faerie Queene* which charts a continuous spectrum from animality to idealised humanity in which both human and nonhuman actors ascend or descend in accordance with their moral conduct.

While Spenser reserves the special status of “ideal humanity” for elect human characters only, animals and humans meet at various other points within this scale or spectrum. Such depictions also reverse the hierarchy between humans and animals either by suggesting that animals can be “better” or that humans can be “worse.” However, anthropocentric methodologies tend to overlook this aspect in early modern texts (especially in allegories) by reading animal figures exclusively as metaphors for the human condition or by focusing only on their symbolic function, and even by disregarding them altogether. Hence, one objective of early modern animal studies is to overcome this tendency and call attention to animal figures as self-signifying nonhuman agents. In this sense, their ability to act as metaphors for “the human” results from our observation of, and likeness to animals instead of difference.

This perspective has been applied to Spenser’s various animal and animal-like figures in the first chapter of this thesis which investigates the poet’s conceptualisation of “humanity.” The epic’s benevolent animals such as the Lion of Book I, the equines, and Timias’s Dove from Book IV have been studied as they both reflect observable animal characteristics and inform the poet’s ascribed ideals of humanity by functioning as moral exemplars. Through their righteous depiction, Spenser also critiques his human characters who are prepositioned towards error, sin and degeneration because of the postlapsarian condition. Thereby, it has been found that in *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser configures faith and spirituality as the sole indicator by which humans can distinguish and “elevate” themselves from animals. The Satyrs of Book I and Book III have been regarded as the mid-point in the epic’s spectrum from animality to humanity due to their benevolence which is eclipsed by an inaptitude to comprehend “true” faith. The salvage man of Book VI has been established as an elect human character who both resembles the aforementioned nonhumans and verges upon “virtuous humanity.”

In contrast with “humanity,” in the second chapter, Spenser’s representation of “animality” has been studied through the poet’s consecutive depiction of sinful or degenerative human characters who do not comply with his moral ideals. Fradubio from Book I, Gryll from Book II, the salvage man (Lust) of Book IV, Souldan and Adicia from Book V, and the salvage nation of Book VI, have been analysed as examples of humans

who descend from their station, both physically and metaphorically, by metamorphosing into nonhumans or emblems of sin, in turn, revealing the poet's understanding of the unfixed human condition as well as his justification of various forms of "governance." This understanding has been explained through Spenser's relative anthropocentrism which excludes "unvirtuous" human characters from "humanity" by equating them with wild/savage or "harmful" animals. Spenser's hermeneutical association of certain animal species with the deadly sins has also been studied through the parade of Lucifera in Book I. It has been found that there is not much of a distinction between Spenser's hermeneutical use of certain animal figures and his depiction of "immoral" characters in *The Faerie Queene* because such humans are not just physically transformed into nonhuman figures, but they too are reduced to figurative signs, symbols or emblems of sins and vices.

An overview of humankind's "in-between" depiction in *The Faerie Queene* has been conducted in the third chapter by studying episodes where human knights of virtue battle hybridised nonhuman opponents. These engagements have been analysed as allegorical representations of humankind's continuous spiritual battle with its own materiality, and in this perspective, victory represents the realisation of a "true state of humanness" and separation from animals. The Redcrosse knight, Sir Guyon, Artegall, Calidore, Arthur and a selection of their various nonhuman opponents such as Error, Orgoglio, the Dragon (Book I), Maleger (Book II) and the Blatant Beast (Book VI) have been studied and it has been found that throughout *The Faerie Queene*, in accordance with reformist thought, Spenser emphasises that these battles can only be won through God's will rather than that of humans. Therefore, it has been established that Spenser's fallen human characters are not innately distinguished from or superior to animals since their stations are unfixed and conditional to God's grace.

Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to the field of early modern animal studies by providing a contemporary and extensive analysis of *The Faerie Queene* as a whole, with focus on Spenser's representation of "animality," "humanity," and human/animal divisions as a pre-Cartesian poet, since for the most part, animal related Spenser studies have considered the individual Books of *The Faerie Queene*, or its parts respectively and

the field of study itself is “incipient” (Stenner and Shinn 11). In terms of future possibilities for animal focused Spenser studies, nonhuman/animal agency can be regarded as an element present within the poet’s works which needs further consideration and re-evaluation as definitions of “agency” are ever expanding through developments in posthumanist, ecocritical as well as new materialist theories and literary criticisms in the twenty first century.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Source:

Spenser, Edmund. *The Faerie Queene*. edited by A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki Suzuki. Routledge, 2013. Print.

### Secondary Sources:

“Anthropomorphism, N.” *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, July 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/8752114299>.

“Blatant, Adj. & N., Etymology.” *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, March 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/9672883094>.

Andrew, Malcolm. “birds.” *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990.pp.93-94. Print.

Auksi, Peter. “Calvin, Calvinism.” *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990.128-129. Print.

Bernard, John D. “hermits.” *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 359-360. Print.

Blisset, William. “stanza, Spenserian.” *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 671-673. Print.

Boehrer, Bruce. “Response: Equal Rights for All Dirt.” *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 337–340, doi:10.7756/spst.030.020.337-40.

---. *Shakespeare Among the Animals: Nature and Society in the Drama of Early Modern England*. Palgrave, 2002. Print.

Bond, Ronald B. “Despetto,Decetto,Defetto.” *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 214-215. Print.

- Brooks-Davies, Douglas. "Lucifera." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 441–442. Print.
- . "The Faerie Queene, Book I." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 259-263. Print.
- . "Una." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, Edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990.pp.704-705. Print.
- Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. edited by Rhonda L. Blair et al., vol. 1, Oxford UP, 2005. Print.
- Caius, John, and Abraham Fleming. *Of Englishe Dogges, the Diversities, the Names, the Natures and the Properties. A Short Treatise Written in Latine and Newly Drawne into Englishe by Abraham Fleming*. *Archive.org*, <https://archive.org/details/ofenglishedogges00caiuuoft/>
- Calarco, Matthew. *Animal Studies: The Key Concepts*. Routledge, 2021. Print.
- Campana, Joseph. "Spenser's Inhumanity." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 277–299, doi:10.7756/spst.030.017.277-99.
- Cosman, Madeleine Pelner. "Spenser's Ark of Animals: Animal Imagery in the Faery Queen." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1963, pp. 85–107. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/449547>.
- Derrida, Jacques. *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. edited by Marie-Luise Mallet, Fordham University Press, 2008. Print.
- Descartes, René. *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*. translated by Donald Cress, 4th ed, Hackett Publishing, 1998. Print.
- Doerksen, Daniel W. "predestination." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990.pp. 556. Print.

- Evans, Maurice. "Palmer." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 526-527. Print.
- Freccero, Carla. "Human, Animal, and Metamorphic Becomings." *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature*, edited by Susan McHugh et.al., Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 155–166. Print.
- Fudge, Erica. "Early Modern: Flesh." *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Animals*. edited by Derek Ryan. Cambridge University Press, 2023, pp. 38–56. Pdf.
- . "What Can Beast Fables Do in Literary Animal Studies? Ben Jonson's *Volpone* and the Prehumanist Human." *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature*, edited by Susan McHugh et.al., Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 195–208. Print.
- . "You Are What You Eat." *History Today*, vol 67, no.2, 2017, pp. 41-46. <https://www.historytoday.com/miscellanies/rise-flesh-avoiders>.
- . *Brutal Reasoning*. Cornell University Press, 2006. Print.
- . *Perceiving Animals Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture*. Macmillan, 2000. Print.
- Garrard, Greg. *Ecocriticism*. Routledge, 2004. Print.
- Gless, Daryyl J. "nature and grace." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 505-507. Print.
- Gouwens, Kenneth. "What Posthumanism Isn't: On Humanism and Human Exceptionalism in the Renaissance." *Renaissance Posthumanism*, edited by Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano, Fordham University Press, 2016, pp. 37–63. Print.
- Greenblatt, Stephen, ed. *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*. 10th ed. Vol. B. NY: Norton, 2018. Print.
- Greenlaw, Edwin. "Spenser and Lucretius." *Studies in Philology*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1920, pp. 439–64. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4171781>.

- Hadfield, Andrew. *Edmund Spenser: A Life*. Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.
- Hankins, John E. "Caliban the Bestial Man." *PMLA*, vol. 62, no. 3, 1947, pp. 793–801. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/459312>.
- Hansen, Abby and Grissom, Margaret. "stones, precious." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 673-674. Print.
- Hardin, Richard F. "Adicia, Souldan" *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 7-8. Print.
- Hardison, O.B. Jr. "Humanism." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, Edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 379-381. Print.
- Harrison, Peter. "The Virtues of Animals in Seventeenth-Century Thought." *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 59, no. 3, 1998, pp. 463–84. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3653897>.
- Harrison, Thomas Perrin. "Divinity in Spenser's Garden of Adonis." *Studies in English*, no. 19, 1939, pp. 48–73. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20779509>.
- Heale, Elizabeth. *The Fairie Queene: A Reader's Guide*. 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.
- Hume, Anthea. "Duessa." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 229-230. Print.
- . *Edmund Spenser: Protestant Poet*. Cambridge UP, 1984. Print.
- Kaske, Carol V. "Bible." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 87-90. Print.
- Kennedy, William J. "Fradubio." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 318. Print.



- Klingelhöfer, Eric, Tracy Collins, Sheila Lane, Margaret McCarthy, Clare McCutcheon, Sarah McCutcheon, Jo Moran, and John Tierney. "Edmund Spenser at Kilcolman Castle: The Archaeological Evidence." *Post-Medieval Archaeology* vol 39, no 1, 2005, pp. 133–54, doi:10.1179/007943205X53381.
- Lecky, Katarzyna. "Irish Nonhumanness and English Inhumanity in *A Vewe of the Present State of Ireland*." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 133–150, doi:10.7756/spst.030.009.133-50.
- Loewenstein, Joseph. "Gryll's Hoggish Mind." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 22, 2007, pp. 243–256, doi:10.1086/spsv22p243.
- Lönngren, Ann-Sophie. "Metaphor, Metonymy, More-Than-Anthropocentric. The Animal That Therefore I Read (and Follow)." *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature*, edited by Susan McHugh et.al., Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 37–50. Print.
- Maclean, Hugh. "Orgoglio." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 518-519. Print.
- Markham, Gervase, *Markhams methode or epitome wherein is shewed his aprooued remedies for all diseases whatsoever incident to horses, oxen, kine, bulls, calues, sheep, lambs, goats, swine, dogs of all kind, conies, all sorts of poultrye, all water-foule, as geese, ducks, swans, and the like) pigeons, all singing birds, hawks of all kind; and other creatures seruice-able for the vse of man: deuided into twelue generall points or heads. By Gervase Markham. Gentleman., 1616, Oxford Text Archive, <https://ota.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repository/xmlui/handle/20.500.12024/A06957#> .*
- Marotti, Arthur F. "Animal Symbolism in the Faerie Queene: Tradition and the Poetic Context." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1965, pp. 69–86. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/449571>.

- Marston, Thomas E. "Of Englishe Dogges." *The Yale University Library Gazette*, vol. 51, no. 1, 1976, pp. 18–20. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40858609>.
- McHugh, Susan, et al., editors. *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Print.
- Melehy, Hassan. "Silencing the Animals: Montaigne, Descartes, and the Hyperbole of Reason." *Symplokē*, vol. 13, no. 1/2, 2005, pp. 263–82. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40550630>.
- Mirandola. *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. Edited by Francesco Borghesi, Michael Papio and Massimo Riva, Cambridge University Press, 2012. Print.
- Mohl, Ruth. "Spenser, Edmund." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 668-671. Print.
- Montaigne, Michel. *An Apology for Raymond Sebond*. Trans. by M.A. Screech, Penguin Books, 1987. Print.
- Moshenska, Joe, and Ayesha Ramachandran. "Faerieland's Cannibal Metaphysics: Spenser with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 37, 2023, pp. 119–144, doi:10.1086/723101.
- Mulryan, John. "Blatant Beast." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 97-98. Print.
- Oerlemans, Onno. *Poetry and Animals: Blurring the Boundaries with the Human*. Columbia University Press, 2018. Print.
- Oram, William A. "Human Limitation and Spenserian Laughter." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 35–56, doi:10.7756/spst.030.004.19-56.
- Plutarch. *Plutarch's Three Treatises on Animals: A Translation with Introductions and Commentary*. Trans. by Stephen T. Newmyer, Routledge, 2023. Print.

- Raber, Karen. *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Print.
- Ramachandran, Ayesha, and Melissa E. Sanchez. "Spenser and 'The Human' an Introduction." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. vii–xv, doi:10.7756/spst.030.001.vii-xv.
- Ramachandran, Ayesha. "Humanism and Its Discontents." *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 3–18, doi:10.7756/spst.030.002.3-18.
- Rao, Namratha. "'Good to Think [With]': Spenser's Animals Against Materiality." *Edmund Spenser and Animal Life*, edited by Rachel Stenner and Abigail Shinn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, pp. 183–202. Pdf.
- Reid, Lindsay Ann. "Unsoiled Soil and 'Fleshly Slime' Representations of Reproduction in Spenser's Legend of Chastity." *Ground-Work: English Renaissance Literature and Soil Science*, edited by Hillary Eklund, Duquesne University Press, 2017, pp. 79-101. Print.
- Sanchez, Melissa E. "Posthumanist Spenser?" *Spenser Studies*, vol. 30, 2015, pp. 19–31, doi:10.7756/spst.030.003.19-31.
- Schiesari, Juliana. "'Bitches and Queens': Pets and Perversion at the Court of France's Henri III." *Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures*, edited by Erica Fudge, University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 37–49. Print.
- Schneider, Debra Brown. "holiness." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 372-373. Print.
- Seber, Hande. "The Evil Queens of *The Faerie Queene*." *When Evil Met Magic: A Versatile Journey*, edited by Nadine Farghaly and Gabriella Madlo, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2013, pp. 137–158. Print.
- Spenser, Edmund. "An Hymne of Heavenly Love." *The Poetical Works of Edmund*

*Spenser*, edited by J.C. Smith and E. De Selincourt, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 593-596. Print.

---. *The Faerie Queene: Books Three and Four*, edited by Dorothy Stephens, Hackett Publishing, 2006. Print.

Stenner, Rachel, and Abigail Shinn. "Introduction: Edmund Spenser and Animal Studies." *Edmund Spenser and Animal Life*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, pp. 1–18. Pdf.

Stenner, Rachel. "Sheep, Beasts, and Knights: Fugitive Alterity in Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* Book VI, and *The Shepheardes Calender*." *The Palgrave Handbook of Animals and Literature*, edited by Susan McHugh et al., Palgrave, 2021, pp. 167-179. Print.

---. "Error's Repercussions: Dragons, Race, and Animality in *The Faerie Queene*." *Edmund Spenser and Animal Life*, edited by Rachel Stenner and Abigail Shinn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, pp. 93–114. Pdf.

Stirling, Brents. "The Philosophy of Spenser's 'Garden of Adonis.'" *PMLA*, vol. 49, no. 2, 1934, pp. 501–38. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/458173>.

Tuve, Rosemond. *Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books and Their Posterity*. Princeton University Press, 1966. Print.

Wall, John N. "Church of England." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 153-160. Print.

---. "Church of Rome." *The Spenser Encyclopedia*, edited by A.C. Hamilton, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 160-164. Print.

Wolfe, Cary. "Human, All Too Human: 'Animal Studies' and the Humanities." *PMLA*, vol. 124, no. 2, 2009, pp. 564–75. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25614299>.

## APPENDIX 1. ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORMS

	<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b>	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-09
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	<b>FRM-YL-09</b> <b>Yüksek Lisans Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu</b> <i>Ethics Board Form for Master's Thesis</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev. Date	25.01.2024

<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b> <b>İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA</b>	
Tarih: 13/06/2024	
Tez Başlığı (Türkçe): Edmund Spenser'in <i>The Faerie Queene</i> 'inde Kartezyen Düşünce Öncesi Hayvan ve İnsan Temsilleri	
Yukarıda başlığı verilen tez çalışmam:	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır.</li> <li>2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.</li> <li>3. Beden bütünlüğüne veya ruh sağlığına müdahale içermemektedir.</li> <li>4. Anket, ölçek (test), mülakat, odak grup çalışması, gözlem, deney, görüşme gibi teknikler kullanılarak katılımcılardan veri toplanmasını gerektiren nitel ya da nicel yaklaşımlarla yürütülen araştırma niteliğinde değildir.</li> <li>5. Diğer kişi ve kurumlardan temin edilen veri kullanımını (kitap, belge vs.) gerektirmektedir. Ancak bu kullanım, diğer kişi ve kurumların izin verdiği ölçüde Kişisel Bilgilerin Korunması Kanuna riayet edilerek gerçekleştirilecektir.</li> </ol>	
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.	
Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.	
Ayşe Ece Cavcav	

<b>Öğrenci Bilgileri</b>	<b>Ad-Soyad</b>	Ayşe Ece Cavcav
	<b>Öğrenci No</b>	N21134646
	<b>Enstitü Anabilim Dalı</b>	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı
	<b>Programı</b>	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

### DANIŞMAN ONAYI

Prof.Dr. Hande Seber

UYGUNDUR.

	<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b>	Doküman Kodu <i>Form No.</i>	FRM-YL-09
		Yayın Tarihi <i>Date of Pub.</i>	22.11.2023
	<b>FRM-YL-09</b> <b>Yüksek Lisans Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu</b> <i>Ethics Board Form for Master's Thesis</i>	Revizyon No <i>Rev. No.</i>	02
		Revizyon Tarihi <i>Rev. Date</i>	25.01.2024

<b>HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY</b> <b>GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES</b> <b>DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE</b>	
Date: 13/06/2024	
ThesisTitle (In English): Pre-Cartesian Representations of Animals and Humans in Edmund Spenser's <i>The Faerie Queene</i>	
My thesis work with the title given above:	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Does not perform experimentation on people or animals.</li> <li>2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).</li> <li>3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.</li> <li>4. Is not a research conducted with qualitative or quantitative approaches that require data collection from the participants by using techniques such as survey, scale (test), interview, focus group work, observation, experiment, interview.</li> <li>5. Requires the use of data (books, documents, etc.) obtained from other people and institutions. However, this use will be carried out in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Law to the extent permitted by other persons and institutions.</li> </ol>	
I hereby declare that I reviewed the Directives of Ethics Boards of Hacettepe University and in regard to these directives it is not necessary to obtain permission from any Ethics Board in order to carry out my thesis study; I accept all legal responsibilities that may arise in any infringement of the directives and that the information I have given above is correct.	
I respectfully submit this for approval.	
Ayşe Ece Cavcav	

<b>Student Information</b>	<b>Name-Surname</b>	Ayşe Ece Cavcav
	<b>Student Number</b>	N21134646
	<b>Department</b>	English Language and Literature
	<b>Programme</b>	English Language and Literature

**SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL**

Prof.Dr. Hande Seber

APPROVED

## APPENDIX 2. ORIGINALITY REPORT

	<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b>	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-15
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	04.12.2023
	<b>FRM-YL-15</b> <b>Yüksek Lisans Tezi Orijinallik Raporu</b> <i>Master's Thesis Dissertation Originality Report</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev.Date	25.01.2024

<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b> <b>İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA</b>	
Tarih: 13/06/2024	
Tez Başlığı: Edmund Spenser'in <i>The Faerie Queene</i> 'inde Kartezyen Düşünce Öncesi Hayvan ve İnsan Temsilleri	
Yukarıda başlığı verilen tezin a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 112 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 12/06/2024 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı % 5'dir.	
Uygulanan filtrelemeler*:	
1. <input type="checkbox"/> Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç	
2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kaynakça hariç	
3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alıntılar hariç	
4. <input type="checkbox"/> Alıntılar dâhil	
5. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç	
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tezin herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumlarda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.	
Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.	
Ayşe Ece Cavcav	

<b>Öğrenci Bilgileri</b>	Ad-Soyad	Ayşe Ece Cavcav
	Öğrenci No	N21134646
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı
	Programı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı

### **DANIŞMAN ONAYI**

UYGUNDUR.

Prof.Dr. Hande Seber

	<b>HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ</b> <b>SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ</b>	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-YL-15
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	04.12.2023
	<b>FRM-YL-15</b> <b>Yüksek Lisans Tezi Orijinallik Raporu</b> <i>Master's Thesis Dissertation Originality Report</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev.Date	25.01.2024

**TO HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE**

Date: 13/06/2024

Thesis Title (In English): Pre-Cartesian Representations of Animals and Humans in Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 12/06/2024 for the total of 112 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled above, the similarity index of my thesis is 5 %.

Filtering options applied\*\*:

1.  Approval and Declaration sections excluded
2.  References cited excluded
3.  Quotes excluded
4.  Quotes included
5.  Match size up to 5 words excluded

I hereby declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Kindly submitted for the necessary actions.

Ayşe Ece Cavcav

<b>Student Information</b>	<b>Name-Surname</b>	Ayşe Ece Cavcav
	<b>Student Number</b>	N21134646
	<b>Department</b>	English Language and Literature
	<b>Programme</b>	English Language and Literature

**SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL**

APPROVED

Prof. Dr. Hande Seber