



Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN ANATOLIA
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
(1919-1924)**

Yusuf DİNÇEL

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2024

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

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05/06/2024

Yusuf DİNÇEL

I “*Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge*”

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ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandıđım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadıđımı, yararlandıđım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, **Prof. Dr. Yonca İLDEŐ** danıřmanlıđında tarafımdan retildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

Yusuf DİNEL

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Yonca İLDEŞ, who never withheld her help during my long Ph.D. education. During the dissertation process, I was able to overcome problems thanks to her support whenever I needed.

I would like to thank my thesis committee members Assoc. Prof. Anar SOMUNCUOĞLU, Assoc. Prof. Gökhan ERDEM, Prof. Dr. Ferudun ATA. I would also like to express my gratitude to Assist. Prof. Ahmet TETİK for sharing his valuable opinions with me during the thesis process.

I am grateful to my family for their support throughout my Ph.D. process. Last but not least, this thesis would probably not have been completed without the sacrifices made by my wife Meryem, so I would like to express my eternal gratitude to her.

ABSTRACT

DİNÇEL, Yusuf. *Analysis of Greece's Activities in Western Anatolia within the Scope of Strategic Intelligence (1919-1924)*, Ph.D.Thesis, Ankara, 2024.

This thesis aims to analyze the activities of Greece during the occupation of Anatolia from the perspective of strategic intelligence. The real motivation behind the military and political moves of the Greek authorities in Anatolia was attempted to be revealed and Greek massacres against the Turks were analyzed in detail. Whether Greek politicians acted according to the elements of strategic intelligence was examined.

This thesis also analyzes developments before, during and after the occupation in the light of Ottoman, Greek, British, American and League of Nations archival documents, many of which are being used for the first time. It is emphasized how the events, which have not been uncovered until today or which have never been revealed before, were handled in intelligence reports. Most of the archival documents have not been used in other studies and offer new perspectives for researchers. Thanks to the archival documents, the course of Turkish-Greek relations during and after the occupation, the perspectives of Greek politicians towards Anatolia and the course of the relationship between politicians and intelligence officers have been tried to be revealed in an unbiased manner. The struggles of the intelligence organizations of the Allied states to be effective in Anatolia and similarly the role of Greek intelligence during the occupation of Anatolia are included. At the end of the war, Greece, which did not act within the framework of strategic intelligence and failed, what kind of a policy followed in the Lausanne Peace Negotiations and whether it applied the elements of strategic intelligence or not, is once again discussed in the light of archival documents. After the occupation, the developments in the population exchange process between Turks and Greeks were based on the archive documents of the League of Nations.

Keywords: Greek Occupation, Hellenism, Intelligence, Strategic Intelligence, Population Exchange.

ÖZET

DİNÇEL, Yusuf. *Stratejik İstihbarat Kapsamında Yunanistan'ın Batı Anadolu'daki Faaliyetlerinin Analizi (1919-1924)*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2024.

Bu çalışmada, Yunanistan'ın Anadolu işgali sırasındaki faaliyetlerinin, stratejik istihbarat açısından incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Yunan yetkililerin, Anadolu'daki askerî ve politik hamlelerinin arkasındaki gerçek motivasyonun ne olduğu ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmış ve Yunanistan'ın Türklere karşı katliamları, ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Yunan siyasetçilerin, stratejik istihbaratın unsurlarına göre hareket edip etmedikleri incelenmiştir.

Bu tezde ayrıca işgal öncesinde, sırasında ve sonrasında yaşanan gelişmeler birçoğu ilk kez kullanılan Osmanlı, Yunan, İngiliz, Amerikan ve Milletler Cemiyeti arşiv belgeleri ışığında analiz edilmiştir. Bugüne kadar aydınlatılmayan veya daha önce hiç ortaya çıkarılmamış olan olayların, istihbarat raporlarında ne şekilde ele alındığı vurgulanmıştır. Arşiv belgelerinin çoğu, daha önce başka çalışmalarda kullanılmamış olup, araştırmacılar için yeni bakış açıları sunmaktadır. Arşiv belgeleri sayesinde, işgal sırasında ve sonrasında Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin ne şekilde cereyan ettiği, Yunan siyasetçilerin, Anadolu'ya yönelik bakış açıları ve politikacı ile istihbaratçı arasındaki ilişkinin seyri tarafsız bir biçimde ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Müttefik Devletlerin istihbarat teşkilatlarının Anadolu'da etkin olma mücadelelerine ve benzer şekilde Yunan istihbaratının, Anadolu'daki işgal sırasındaki rolüne yer verilmiştir. Savaş sona erdiğinde, stratejik istihbarat çerçevesinde hareket etmeyen ve başarısızlığa uğrayan Yunanistan'ın, Lozan Barış Görüşmelerinde nasıl bir politika takip ettiği ve stratejik istihbaratın unsurlarını uygulayıp uygulamadığı, bir kez daha arşiv belgeleri ışığında ele alınmıştır. İşgal sonrasında, Türkler ile Rumlar arasında gerçekleşen mübadele sürecindeki gelişmeler, özellikle Milletler Cemiyeti arşiv belgelerine dayandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Yunan İşgali, Hellenizm, İstihbarat, Stratejik İstihbarat, Mübadele.

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INTRODUCTION

Intelligence is one of the most important elements that states need to maintain their existence without collapsing. In every period of history, statesmen have been able to maintain the state thanks to the information obtained through intelligence. However, countries that have failed in the field of intelligence have faced great catastrophes throughout history. Intelligence is one of the most influential factors in the decision-making mechanism of the state, both historically and in terms of modern understanding. The head of state, acting on the information provided by the intelligence services, wants to be sure of the results of his political decisions. This is why, especially in times of war, the relationship between politicians and intelligence officers becomes more important.

Strategic intelligence is a type of intelligence that states need in times of war and peace to ensure that the national security of a nation is not threatened. The understanding of strategic intelligence, as defined by the intelligence community, shows its true success when it guides the senior officials of the state. Strategic intelligence aims at long-term planning in an environment where a state's threat priorities are identified. The success of strategic intelligence is directly proportional to the information obtained through tactical and operational intelligence. Especially in times of war, the information gathered by tactical and operational intelligence in the field is of great importance. Therefore, the greatest benefit of strategic intelligence is the gains it provides in wartime, based on the plan drawn up in peacetime. When a state moves away from the strategic intelligence doctrine and turns to political activities, it brings with it various problems.

This thesis analyzes the developments before, during and after the Greek invasion of Anatolia from the perspective of strategic intelligence. It tries to identify the factors of strategic intelligence and the parameters that determine the framework of the relationship between politicians and intelligence. In addition, it is examined whether Greece acted according to the strategic intelligence approach in its relations with Turkey between 1919 and 1924. In this thesis, did Greek statesmen act on strategic intelligence before or during the war? What is the relationship between the Megali Idea and Greek foreign policy? What are the similarities and differences between the policies of the Allied powers and

those of Greece? After the war, during the Lausanne peace negotiations, did the Greek authorities adopt the understanding of strategic intelligence in diplomatic terms, particularly in the negotiations on population exchange? answers to these questions are sought. Furthermore, it is the basic assumption of the thesis that during the occupation of Western Anatolia, Greece acted with the understanding of the Megali Idea and did not adopt the strategic intelligence approach in general. This pre-war political understanding by Greek politicians led Greece to a catastrophe at the end of the war. The war that took place between Turkey and Greece between 1919 and 1922 can be analyzed from a historical perspective as well as from political and economic aspects. In this context, the evaluation of the war from an intelligence point of view helps to reveal the relations between the two countries from a different perspective. The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the developments during and after the war by examining the intelligence reports written during this time. This period, which covers the collapse of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in its place, greatly influenced the development of Greek domestic and foreign policy. The relationship between the Allies and Greece is another important theme of the thesis. In this context, it will be shown how the Allied powers directed Greek domestic and foreign policy.

In the thesis, qualitative methods are used and the events that took place against the background of historical developments are brought to light through archival documents. In this context, documents from the Ottoman, British, Greek, American and League of Nations archives are used in many parts of the thesis. In the Ottoman archives, the correspondence of the Ministry of Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezareti*) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Nezareti*) are used. While the correspondence of the Turkish side regarding internal security after the Greek occupation was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, the correspondence with the representatives of the Allied states or the International Red Cross was kept under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the way the Turkish side dealt with the developments is analyzed in the light of both internal and external factors. In the British archive (*The National Archive*) in the thesis, *the Admiralty (ADM)* documents, which mainly contain the intelligence correspondence of the British naval forces, detail the military aspect of the Greek occupation and give striking information about the massacres carried out by Greek officers. *The Cabinet Office (CAB)*

documents show how British politicians dealt with the Greek invasion and the discussions between them. *The Foreign Office (FO)* documents contain diplomatic correspondence about the Greek invasion in British foreign policy. In addition, the intelligence analysis reports produced by the Allied intelligence services on the Greek army are quite remarkable. Thus, whether Greece acted in accordance with strategic intelligence is revealed by these documents. Finally, the intelligence reports prepared by *the War Office (WO)* clearly address the strategic mistakes made by the Greeks during the war. Looking at all the intelligence reports in the National Archives used in this thesis, it is clear that Greek intelligence failed to adequately analyze the Turkish side during the invasion of Anatolia. The archive records entitled “*British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers*” deal with the activities of the Allied powers during the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. In addition to military assessments, the political and economic aspects of the invasion are also highlighted. “*The Cadbury Research Library: The Papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain*” collection at the University of Birmingham contains mainly assessments of Greek domestic politics before the war. In these archival documents, Venizelos, who is recognized as an important figure in Greek politics, is approached from the perspective of biographical intelligence. Among the components of strategic intelligence, biographical intelligence has an important place. It can be used to identify the tendencies, habits and opinions of politicians. Another important archive, *the House of Commons Hansard Archives*, reveals the debates among British politicians about the Greek advance in Anatolia. The thesis also devotes a great deal of space to the Greek archives. In this context, the political developments prior to the Greek invasion of Anatolia are first discussed by analyzing the archival documents in the “*Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive*”. Then, during the invasion, Greece’s progress in Western Anatolia is analyzed through the use of tactical and operational intelligence. It is noted that Venizelos held diplomatic meetings with the leaders of the Allied powers. This archive contains the correspondence between Greek officials. The reasons and consequences of the strategic mistakes made during the occupation are underlined. Greek military and political officials continued their advance in Anatolia in pursuit of the Megali Idea. The military, political and economic aspects of the occupation are revealed through these archival documents. In addition, the archive of *the General Archives of Greece* is used and the military aspects of the Greek occupation are detailed. In this context, the

diary of a soldier who served in Anatolia during the Greek occupation was utilized. In this way, the tactical and operational intelligence understanding of the Greek troops during the occupation was identified.

Another important archive series used in the thesis is "*The United States National Archives*". The American archive documents include the military and diplomatic activities of the Greeks and the Turkish side during the occupation. Intelligence reports prepared by American officials objectively evaluated the Greek invasion of Anatolia. The clearest conclusion that can be drawn from the documents is that Greece lacked the ability to govern either in its own country or in another country through occupation. Moreover, the propaganda-based allegations against the Turks by Greek intelligence officials, which were used intensively, were refuted by the intelligence reports in the American archive documents. Thus, the claims that Christians were persecuted by the Turks before and during the occupation of Anatolia were proven to be false. The reports of US intelligence officers serving in Anatolia show that American decision-makers analyzed events in a realistic manner in order to make the right decision about Anatolia. This is one of the most important conditions for the success of strategic intelligence. A transparent and trust-based relationship between the decision-maker and the intelligence officer leads to confident steps in foreign policy. The massacres committed by Greek soldiers against Muslims during the occupation of Anatolia are reflected in American intelligence reports. In this report, it was often emphasized that the massacre of the Muslim population in Anatolia by the Greeks without any strategy would have disastrous consequences for them. After the war, the activities of the American aid organizations in Anatolia are included and the destruction of the Greek army in Anatolia was revealed. The reports signed by Admiral Bristol dealt with the Greek occupation and the resistance organization of the Turkish side in detail.

Finally, the documents of "*The League of Nations Archives*" are utilized in the thesis. In the archive documents of the League of Nations, the activities of Greece during the occupation are included, but the population exchange negotiations after the war are mainly highlighted. In this framework, after the end of the war, attention was drawn to the problem of Rum refugees. However, it was revealed that the League of Nations was

not sufficiently interested in the situation of Turkish refugees during this period, as it was determined that the majority of the documents were about Rum refugees. There was little mention of the difficulties experienced by Turkish refugees. After the war, the Greek authorities' policy towards refugees was highlighted, and their failure to resettle refugees from Anatolia was clearly reflected in the archival documents. There is also criticism of the League of Nations officials. Thanks to these archival documents, the events that took place during the Turkish-Rum population exchange can be analyzed more clearly. Through diplomacy and propaganda, the political moves of the Greek side during the negotiations are remarkable. In response to the good intentions of the Turkish side, the Greek side chose the path of gaining interests. More importantly, the League of Nations, which assumed the role of mediator, did not hesitate to openly support Greece instead of adopting a neutral policy. The correspondence of Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations, with the League's member states and the exchange of letters with League officials clearly demonstrate this claim. The archives show that American aid agencies stepped in when the League of Nations was inadequate in dealing with refugees. However, the US government argued that the Greek authorities should develop a more effective refugee policy.

In this thesis, five different archives are used to show how historical developments took place in an unbiased way. It was found that there are similar interpretations of the same event in different archives. The analysis of the Greek invasion of Anatolia is better understood thanks to the documents from five different archival sources. In this way, it has been possible to examine in depth the events that have not yet been elucidated. The focus was not only on military and political events, but also on the impact of diplomacy and economic factors. In this context, the basic elements of strategic intelligence are discussed. The use of archival documents from four different countries as well as the archival documents of the League of Nations, an international organization, in this thesis provides a multidimensional approach to Turkish-Greek relations.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter, entitled "*Conceptual Framework of Strategic Intelligence*", provides general information on intelligence and strategic intelligence theory, and the second chapter, entitled "*The Understanding of Hellenism in*

Greece's Foreign Policy”, emphasizes the concept of the Megali Idea. The impact of these two concepts on Greek rulers is analyzed. In the third section, entitled “*Greece's Occupation of Western Anatolia in the Context of Strategic Intelligence*”, the Greek occupation of Anatolia between 1919 and 1922 is evaluated within the framework of strategic intelligence analysis. The final section, entitled “*Strategic Intelligence Analysis of Greece's Foreign Policy After the War: The Lausanne Peace Negotiation&The Turkish-Rum Population Exchange*”, examines how diplomatic activity, one of the most important elements of strategic intelligence, was carried out during the post-war population exchange negotiations.

The first chapter begins by defining intelligence and the importance of intelligence to states. It is emphasized that with the right intelligence information, the right foreign policy moves can be made. Intelligence is an indispensable element for states and the benefits of accurate intelligence, especially in times of conflict, are undeniable. However, as important as the significance of accurate intelligence is, the question of whether the decision-maker will act on the intelligence information is another noteworthy issue. In this context, the relationship between the intelligence officer and the decision maker is elaborated. If the leader ignores the intelligence reports and acts according to his own point of view, it indicates that the state will face disasters. The intelligence reports prepared before the Greek invasion of Anatolia showed the difficulties that the Greek army would face in Anatolia, but Venizelos ignored the intelligence reports by adopting the idea of Megali Idea. Therefore, the reports that intelligence officers present to decision-makers should be carefully analyzed. Another important issue, the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, is illustrated by examples.

The second chapter discusses the concepts of Hellenism and the Megali Idea, which motivated the Greek invasion of Anatolia, and their impact on foreign policy. The third chapter focuses on Greece's military, political and diplomatic activities during the occupation of Anatolia in the light of archival documents. It examines what happened in İzmir, an important city for both the Turkish and Greek sides, during the occupation. According to Greek archival documents, the massacres committed by the Greek army

against the Muslims had to be brought under control. This systematic policy of the Greek army against the Muslim population cannot be explained by strategic intelligence.

In the last chapter, the migration of Rums and Armenians who helped Greek troops in the occupation of Anatolia to Greece and the arrival of Muslims in Greece to Anatolia are discussed within the scope of strategic intelligence. Some of the the archival documents of the League of Nations, including the negotiations between Nansen, who was assigned by the League of Nations during the Turkish-Rum population exchange, and Hamid Bey, representing the Turkish side, regarding the resettlement of the refugees, have been used. This chapter mainly uses the archives of the League of Nations. The Greek administration did its utmost to prevent the refugees from entering the country. Greece, which had been defeated in the war, was in a very bad economic situation and was therefore very reluctant to provide for the needs of the refugees. During the negotiations on the population exchange, Greece tried to be effective diplomatically. Moreover, with the financial support of the Allied powers, it was able to escape responsibility for the refugee problem. The Greek administration engaged in propaganda activities on the refugee issue by mobilizing religious authority. This section highlights the role of the League of Nations during the exchange treaty.

In this thesis, for the first time, the Greek invasion of Anatolia is analyzed within the framework of strategic intelligence. Thus, the perspectives of Greek military and political officials before the invasion are revealed and the activities during the invasion are evaluated in terms of strategic intelligence. Looking at the activities of the Greek army in Anatolia, it was determined that it utilized tactical and operational intelligence elements. It was also found that the Turkish resistance acted according to a planned and strategic intelligence approach. However, since the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia is the main topic of the thesis, the details of the Turkish resistance are not examined and only the remarkable aspects of the archival documents are analyzed. British, American and League of Nations archival documents have been used in the thesis in order to avoid making assessments only from the Turkish or Greek perspective. Within this framework, the thesis is based on transparency and much new information about the Greek occupation has been obtained from various archives. In addition, with regard to the Turkish-Greek

war and the ensuing population exchange negotiations, it was found that there was much overlap between the secondary sources and the archival documents.

Moreover, most of the theses on the concept of strategic intelligence in Turkey are linked to current events. In this context, the Turkish foreign policy approach to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus problem has been analyzed within the framework of strategic intelligence. There are also theses that emphasize the importance of strategic intelligence in the fight against terrorism. Approaching historical developments, such as the wars that states have experienced in their past, within the framework of strategic intelligence is a method that is not very common either in theses published in Turkey or in foreign literature. In the foreign literature, there is only one article that examines the Second World War from the perspective of strategic intelligence theory. In conclusion, the method of analyzing historical developments within the framework of the concept of strategic intelligence is not very common in the literature. This thesis aims to investigate Turkish-Greek relations from a different perspective. The Turkish-Greek war and the subsequent diplomatic developments are examined through a strategic intelligence approach.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

In this section, how the concept of strategic intelligence is handled in intelligence literature and what it means will be analyzed. Before delving into the concept of strategic intelligence, it is necessary to define what intelligence is and is not. The historical origins of intelligence go back to ancient times. To understand the basic notion of intelligence, the periods from the establishment of states to their collapse can be examined. During this period, one can come across many periods of ups and downs in a state. By adopting an intelligence perspective, the activities of states in the historical cycle can be scrutinized. For this reason, with the help of intelligence analysis, it is important to research the political and military activities of states in order to uncover different aspects of historical events.

Although the concept of strategic intelligence is relatively new in intelligence literature, in practice, it is a *sine qua non* for the survival of states. Since the emergence of states, the concept of strategic intelligence has maintained its importance. In this chapter, different views on the nature of intelligence will be presented, the importance of it for decision-makers will be emphasized, and the importance of strategic intelligence will be discussed. It will be revealed how strategic intelligence is an essential factor for decision-makers, especially in times of danger. It will be analyzed that strategic intelligence does not only cover the period of war but is mainly wide-ranging planning in times of peace. Differences/similarities between strategic intelligence, tactical and operational intelligence will be exposed. The role of intelligence in wartime will be examined.

1.1. INTELLIGENCE AND ITS COMPONENTS

First of all, intelligence has been an element that states give importance in times of peace and war. Each state needs intelligence for the protection of its national security. They prioritize national security, and in this context, intelligence plays a major role. The definition of intelligence has been considered in different ways in the literature. Beside the definition of intelligence, one of the most critical issues in intelligence literature is the

relationship between intelligence agencies and decision-makers. Another issue that has attracted attention both historically and currently is the extent of the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy.

1.1.1. Definition of Intelligence

There are different definitions of the concept of intelligence in the literature. If the word intelligence is considered etymologically, it is known that the word is of Arabic origin and is used as the plural of the word “*istihbar*”. The meaning of the word “intelligence” is “newly learnt information, sensations, information collection, news gathering” (Seren, 2017, p. 223). In accordance with another definition, intelligence is the name given to the activity of an intelligence agency operating within a state to obtain information about a foreign target and to present this information to the use of decision-makers. This information, which is frequently classified, is critical for predicting the target country’s actions and for classifying the target country as a friend or foe (Westerfield, 2001, p. 15143). As can be seen from this definition, the acquisition of classified information is an indispensable activity for an intelligence service.

According to the definition on the official website of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Turkish equivalent of the word “*istihbarat*” is “news gathering”. However, in intelligence literature, the concept of news refers to unprocessed/unvalued information. Therefore, intelligence differs from normal information. The concept of intelligence emphasizes more comprehensive and in-depth knowledge (National Intelligence Organization (MIT), n.d.). While intelligence agencies do not deny the importance of information, they do not confine their intelligence activities to information alone (Warner, 2002, p. 17).

Intelligence is closely related to the process of obtaining information. The questions of who requests the information, through which sources the information will be obtained, and how the incoming information will be handled and utilized are the main issues of intelligence (Clark, 2007, p. 1). While fulfilling all these stages, the reason component should not be ignored. “Intelligence” also means *reason* in English. In the process of

obtaining and analyzing intelligence information, the mind factor should not be overlooked. The intelligence information obtained will be useless unless it is processed through a logic filter. (Keleştemur, 2015, p. 29). Moreover, in intelligence organizations, the type of information known as *raw information* is very common. Since the influx of news and data through various sources is intense, the relevant intelligence officers are expected to evaluate/assess them. Evaluations based solely on raw data will be insufficient and may even lead to mistaken conclusions. That is why the difference between intelligence and information should be well understood. Information is a phenomenon that can be known regardless of how it is obtained. On the other hand, intelligence acts to meet the needs of decision-makers and applies the processes of collecting, processing and narrowing down the information to make it fit for purpose. All intelligence can be categorised as information, but not all information is intelligence (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 1).

It is a well-known fact that through intelligence, states collect, process and utilize information when necessary. State administration is an area where knowing is of central importance (Herman, 1996, p. 1). It must be remembered that intelligence is only one of the functions of the state. However, compared to other functions of it, intelligence is distinguished by two features. First of all, almost all events that take place in the world of intelligence are classified. Each state seeks access to classified information held by the target country. The race for access to clandestine materials is a common phenomenon among intelligence organizations. Due to this aspect of it, most researchers think that they cannot conduct research on intelligence because they think that they will not have enough information. Researchers feel that if they conduct research on this topic, they will reach limited results. Even if intelligence is a secret activity by its very nature, which it should be, research on this subject and the development of intelligence literature do not constitute a situation that eliminates secrecy. The second characteristic is that the inherent secrecy of intelligence is a source of bewilderment for ordinary citizens, especially in the more prosperous countries. In these countries, there are those who see it as a means of interfering with the right to privacy. This raises the question of balancing the dichotomy between freedom and security (Mizrahi, 2016, p. 40). Related to this issue, the inherent secrecy of intelligence is frequently discussed in this literature, claiming that it poses an

ethical dilemma. But, it should be borne in mind that intelligence relies on secrecy to adequately understand the source of significant threats. (Bellaby, 2022, p. 7). So, the most important role of intelligence is to gain an advantage over the target country and reduce the threat level (Hendel, 2006, p. 42). From that perspective, in order to ensure the national security of the state, the intelligence mechanism resorts to various means. What is important here is that the intelligence agency does not act outside the scope of its purpose. The decision-maker's request for intelligence information on matters that do not concern national security is regarded as an interference in private life by the intelligence organization, which operates in secrecy. Apart from that, if there is a situation that poses a threat to national security, the fact that the intelligence organization follows the understanding of the protection of the right to privacy may cause a security weakness.

Another critical issue is that each state's intelligence needs differ from one another. While one state may have high expectations of intelligence, another may have low ones. In that case, what determines the limits and adequacy of intelligence? The answer to this question varies depending on the threat perception of the countries. A state may increase its intelligence needs in accordance with its foreign policy objectives and national interests. In this context, leaders also have great duties. Another important question is how leaders will use the intelligence information obtained (Johnson, 2003, p. 657). It is very important that those responsible for the establishment of national security make use of a think tank in the light of their needs and demands. Besides intelligence information, civil organizations' analysis/interpretation will enable decision-makers to take a more rational path. The mission of intelligence will not only be to inform the decision-maker. Moreover, the decision-maker will be more informed in this way (Marrin, 2004, p. 663). While assessing the intelligence gathered, leaders can make connections with previous events. Leaders who act in line with national interests can make more successful political decisions thanks to the information obtained from intelligence.

From another point of view, intelligence can be divided into two parts: physical and verbal intelligence. In the past, intelligence was gathered on the battlefield by ordinary soldiers determining the strength and capability of the enemy country. Nevertheless, thanks to the technological developments after the Industrial Revolution, it has been observed that

different tools have been utilized to collect intelligence in the war zone. With the advent of the airship, the balloon and the aeroplane, it became possible to access more than the physical intelligence available to mounted troops or soldiers on the battlefield. After the widespread use of verbal intelligence, the use of physical intelligence by armies has decreased. The most important bases of verbal intelligence are written and oral sources. Many documents, such as correspondence between units within the army, debates in parliament and public reports reveal the military, economic and social aspects of a country. It can be underlined that verbal intelligence provides more information about the target than physical intelligence. As it is mentioned above, until the First World War, armies were able to get information about each other with the help of physical intelligence. However, during the First World War, the movement of the enemy force could be determined more quickly by means such as wireless radios and trench radios. Tactical and intelligence information could be obtained by infiltrating the enemy's radio communications at the front lines using these vehicles (Kahn, 2002, pp. 7-9). When intelligence information is obtained, it must be processed. As a result, a thorough understanding of the intelligence process is required.

The intelligence process can be better understood if the stages that make up the "*intelligence cycle*" are known. In order to create it, a request or advice must first be received from the decision-maker. After the requirements conveyed to the intelligence by the state mechanism are put forward, the intelligence cycle starts to turn. The intelligence cycle has seven steps. Firstly, planning is made regarding the requirements. Subsequently, existing information on the matter is collected. The data obtained are categorized. After data processing, the analysis phase is in progress. Then, a report is drafted on the matter and finally distributed to decision-makers (Prunckun, 2010, pp. 4-5). The process of analysis is a cognitive activity and one of the most important stages of intelligence information (Heuer, 1999, p. 173). The intelligence cycle determines what the day-to-day activities of the intelligence agencies will be (Goldman, 2006, p. 80). One of the main tasks of intelligence agencies is to provide reports to decision-makers based on alternative information and sources (Goodman, 2003, p. 67). These stages are used by intelligence organizations to generate intelligence information. Action is taken upon request from the decision-maker. Unless these stages are followed- and the analysis stage in particular is a

critical threshold- erroneous or incomplete conclusions may be reached. Staff working in intelligence agencies must have the intellectual capacity to analyze cases. The pressure exerted by the decision-maker on the intelligence organization to act quickly may result in failure. That's why, the demands of the decision-maker are fulfilled by respecting the steps of the intelligence cycle.

When planning a military or civilian operation, intelligence endeavours to reduce the information gap or risk margin. The term "reducing the margin of risk" refers to the effort to ensure security (Gill, 2010, p. 45). But, another important issue emerges in this regard; there is a more serious issue than the intelligence information obtained about the enemy forces, and that is the need for the state to have sufficient data on its own operations and plans. Lacking this competence, the state cannot analyze the information about its enemy correctly. In this context, the main purpose of intelligence is to optimize an activity to be undertaken against the target country in line with the interests of the state (Handel, 1990, p. 1). At this point, intelligence tries to ensure that decision-makers manage risk and uncertainty situations properly by minimizing the possibility of failure or controlling negative effects. In this respect, it appears to have a practical aspect. Yet, while providing these contributions, it puts itself into a risky game. As Sun Tzu mentioned that the intelligence mechanism should support the decision-maker in a sensitive manner, considering threats from the enemy. A mistake made by intelligence in risky situations will be costly (Warner, 2008, p. 24). Intelligence has its own unique aspects and it is an area of high responsibility and cost. While performing intelligence activities, human life may be put at risk. This is why, extreme caution must be exercised (Ben-Israel, 1989, p. 663).

It is vital for intelligence to develop an early warning system against threats to the national security of the state and to support decision-makers in a timely manner with strategic foresight (Sullivan, 2007, p. 17). Decision-makers' expectations from the intelligence apparatus should be based on these objectives. Intelligence comes first as the leader's mainstay against external attacks on the national security of the state. If it is prepared as an early warning system, risk and threat assessments can be made in a timely way, and thus issues that may undermine national security can be eliminated.

1.1.2. The Relationship Between the Decision-Maker and the Intelligence Organization

In the intelligence world, reducing uncertainty means revealing the secrets that hostile forces are trying to keep, enabling the government to eliminate activities that are against the country and to carry out actions that are in the country's interest. This perspective is not wrong, but it is incomplete. Theoretically, intelligence provides a realistic picture of threats and opportunities by facilitating the work of decision-makers through information/news obtained from the right sources, without distorting the facts, after a process of analyses based on the *filter of reason*. In theory, these should be the most important tasks of intelligence organizations. Yet, theory and reality/practice on the ground are not always the same (Fingar, 2011, p. 50). The decision-maker's desire to respond quickly to problems puts pressure on the intelligence organization. At this point, the intelligence organization may concentrate on activities that it thinks will bring success in a short time and on solutions that are disconnected from reality. The reflex of intelligence agencies to move away from rational methods and to act only in line with the demands of the decision-maker will lead to failures.

As mentioned above, conflict/disagreement between decision-makers and intelligence officers is not uncommon due to differences in perspective. For psychological and political reasons, politicians are forced to exaggerate their political power in domestic politics during critical periods and this puts pressure on the intelligence community. The intelligence community regards this approach of leaders as irresponsible. There is also a tendency for leaders to view intelligence agencies as discouraged and unreliable. At times, leaders' desire to maintain their own power contradicts the intelligence community's perspective and they focus on trust and political support, whereas intelligence organizations do not see themselves as responsible for providing these two elements. In its reports to the decision-maker, intelligence highlights difficulties and drawbacks. Sometimes the decision-maker may not want to face the facts (Jervis, 2010, pp. 186-204). When a politician fails, the focus is on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the information provided. The politician argues that he/she made the right decision in the light of the information given to him/her. If the correct intelligence information had been

given, we would have made the right decision and we would not have faced failure, he/she makes statements targeting the intelligence organization. However, rather than simply targeting the information provided by the intelligence services, the question of the arguments and justifications on the basis of which political decisions are legitimized should be raised here (Heazle, 2010, p. 308). Within this framework, after the 9/11 attacks, the relationship between decision-makers and the intelligence community has come under renewed discussion. Claims were made that US intelligence had failed in terms of both tactical and strategic intelligence, and the decisions of politicians were questioned less. The understanding that intelligence information is the main factor affecting the decisions of politicians has been effective at this point (Marrin, 2011, p. 182).

The difference in perspective between the analyst and the leader, in a practical situation, is as described above. There is a great difference between the risk taken by the analyst and the risk taken by the leader. The leader has to make political decisions under pressure. The analyst works under pressure, but the leader has more responsibility for failure (Kissinger, 1994, p. 27). Intelligence analysts strive to shed light on all aspects of a problem, but there will undoubtedly be areas where they fall short. In uncertain situations, the analyst tries to help the decision-maker by making predictions by considering the data (Friedman&Zeckhauser, 2012, p. 825). For this reason, decision-makers need to be clear in determining foreign policy objectives and interests. If clear goals are not set before the intelligence agencies, intelligence officers will be confused and will engage in unnecessary efforts (Fidan, 1999, p. 33). In this manner, good communication between the analyst staff and those in the state administration is of great importance for overcoming problems. Nevertheless, formality between the two groups needs to be maintained. Administrators should not use analysts to support their own policies. Analysts' comments and assessments should not fall into the trap of "*politicization*" (Marrin, 2004, p. 667). The greatest frustration for an intelligence analyst is when intelligence analyses and reports are ignored and policy decisions are made by the decision-maker. Roger Hilsman, in his 1953 assessment, noted that in such cases intelligence analysts are both angry and bewildered (Marrin, 2017, pp. 725-726). Analysts prefer to see that their assessments are taken into account by the decision-maker.

Sometimes they may feel abused or unappreciated by the politician. The decision-maker may also claim to have been misled by intelligence. These mutual tensions become more intense when there is a failure (Steinberg, 2008, p. 82). In the words of Sherman Kent, the most important thing for intelligence to do in order to avoid falling into the trap of politicization is to stay away from politics after providing reports to the decision-maker. On the contrary, Roger Hilsman argues that there should be no distance between politics and the intelligence community (Hulnick, 2006, p. 968). The concept of politicisation is one of the most important problems in the relationship between intelligence and politics. The manipulation of intelligence by politicians can threaten national security. The politicization of intelligence carries the risk of ignoring new information obtained through sources or acting in accordance with the interests of the decision-maker. As a result of this relationship between the intelligence agency and the politician, both sides are likely to develop suspicion and prejudice towards each other (Rovner, 2011, p. 5).

The contentious relationship between politics and intelligence can be clearly seen in historical events. Japan's attack on the US at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is an important case in terms of revealing the role of intelligence officers working under pressure and stress in the failure. At that time, the US intelligence had a great deal of information about Japan's objectives against the US. The failure of the US, which had so much information, at Pearl Harbor may seem like a contradiction. In the investigation after the event, some facts were uncovered. The Washington administration knew that the Japanese were going to attack. Nevertheless, the reports prepared by the US intelligence organization were not coherent. The intelligence officers who prepared the fragmented reports presented to the decision-maker were unable to produce a solid analysis from the mass of information in a limited time. If the information about Japan's attack had been analyzed taking into account all possibilities and risks, the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been predicted and necessary measures could have been taken. Another point of view is that intelligence agencies should only present the reality on the ground to decision-makers and they should not recommend policy. General William J. Donovan (1883-1959) argued that intelligence agencies should be centralized and independent because those who direct intelligence operations can distort the facts. Donovan also

argued for a centralized, non-biased, non-policy-advising intelligence organization (Hilsman, 1952, p. 2).

Another critical aspect of the relation between policymakers and analysts is that the intelligence is expected to be practical and service-orientated and to play a facilitating role in decision-making by political and military leaders (Kovacs, 1997, p. 145). Donovan's judgements on the establishment of intelligence agencies represent a conception that is both remarkable and strictly limited. Intelligence agencies are institutions that act in line with the goals and interests of the country and operate with the aim of establishing security. An intelligence agency should not be buried in ideological obsessions. However, it should develop a broad perspective for the decision-maker, which includes different possibilities. Advisory opinions may also be offered. In light of these considerations, Donovan's statement may be considered excessive. Advice may be given to guide those involved in the administration of the state, but it should not be directive in nature.

Within this framework, in the world of intelligence, the understanding of uncovering the truth as it is and conveying it to decision-makers gains importance. Intelligence organizations have to provide accurate information to decision-makers on national security. "*And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free*", which has become the motto of the CIA, reveals the importance of the truth for intelligence organizations. Founded on 18 September 1947, the CIA acted in line with the analytical intelligence approach and this principle for the first twenty years. During this period, the model of a close relationship between decision-makers and intelligence officers was opposed in order not to jeopardize the impartiality of intelligence. However, later events such as the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal showed that the policy of balance between the intelligence organization and the decision maker was abandoned and the principle of neutrality was violated (Bar-Joseph, 2013, p. 348).

It should be noted that events, especially during the war, provide important clues for intelligence analysis. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor is closely related to the concepts of "strategic surprise" and "surprise attack". Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack on the US.

The concept of surprise is intricate in nature. Surprise attacks catch the victim unprepared and prevent an adequate response. It occurs in three important situations. Firstly, it indicates a process that is not in the assumptions of the target of the attack. Secondly, it points out that the early warning system is disabled at the time of the attack. Thirdly, it occurs in an environment where threats are not sufficiently analyzed (Chorev, 1996, pp. 2-3). Prior to the surprise attack, Japan successfully conducted deception operations. Firstly, Japan gave the impression that its military forces were training in Kyushu. The main force in the Japanese army set up a false formation, using the means of communication, to make it believe that such training was taking place. Fake military operation plans were sent to Japanese commanders. In December 1941, the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that a large Japanese ship was sailing for California and Panama to evacuate Japanese citizens. Thus, it was tried to give the impression that Japan was not in an aggressive attitude. Before the attack, the Japanese press also reported on the revitalization of diplomatic relations between the US and Japan (Bruce&Bennett, 2008, p. 124).

Japan's attack on the US at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War is considered a strategic surprise for the US. If we consider the activities of the US at that time, it is seen that the US army deciphered the "Code Purple" containing Japan's diplomatic correspondence thanks to signal intelligence. Nevertheless, the lack of coordination between the intelligence agencies and the military was widespread. There was a race between agencies to hide information. There was an invisible cold war between these institutions. They were prejudiced against each other. While the US military perceived a threat from Japan in terms of sabotage attacks, other agencies considered such an attack to be a remote possibility. The US administration underestimated Japan's military capacity (Tverton, 2001, p. 72). This defeat caused the US to turn inward and began a process of analyzing its mistakes (Rose, 2001, p. 57).

As indicated above, deception operations are used extensively by intelligence agencies. They are used not only in times of war but also in times of peace. The Pearl Harbor attack is referred to as a "strategic surprise" in intelligence literature. In order to avoid surprise attacks, states should be informed by their intelligence units in a timely manner. As seen

in the investigation file of the Pearl Harbor attack, although there were many indications of an attack, the US intelligence failed because it was not able to present a holistic picture (Marrin, 2004, pp. 656-663). One of the primary functions of intelligence is to evaluate information obtained from sources within its own internal mechanism in order to take action against new developments and problems along with alerting decision-makers as soon as possible. (Betts, 1980, p. 20). On the other hand, in practice, the intelligence community may be reluctant to recognize the flaws in leaders' policies and to warn or criticize them. The intelligence agencies are preoccupied with establishing all the information and possibilities relevant to the case. As seen in the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is a danger that intelligence can get lost in the mass of information. In this case, long-term intelligence production and analysis are out of the question (Wasserman, 1960, pp. 163-164). The power of the state that carries out a surprise attack increases significantly, but the idea that every surprise attack will lead to victory is highly misleading. If the assumptions underlying the basic policies of the surprise-attacked state are invalidated, the surprise attack has achieved its main objective (Hastedt, 2003, p. 50). With the surprise attack, Japan demonstrated its high military power capability, but it made some misjudgements. The outcome of the Pearl Harbor attack was a political disaster for Japan (Wirtz, 2017, p. 16). At first glance, Japan appeared to have succeeded with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, it lost that war when the US later dropped atomic bombs on Japan, and its effects were not forgotten for a long time. Therefore, the results of the surprise attack should be evaluated by taking into account its long-term effects.

It must be remembered that espionage is often utilized in the conduct of deception operations and strategic surprise events. To avoid confusion regarding concepts, it is essential to understand their meaning. There are variations between intelligence practices in the 19th and 20th centuries and those employed today. For some researchers, the concept of intelligence is misperceived. The interchangeable use of espionage and critical analysis leads to misinterpretations. These two concepts differ from each other. When it comes to espionage or spies, most people think of the works of Ian Fleming and Tom Clancy¹. But a common definition of espionage can be made as follows; it is the activity

¹ Many novels about espionage have been written by Ian Fleming and Tom Clancy.

of a state to collect information about the target country in a secret manner. Common espionage activities include intercepting secret documents and monitoring military movements (Pun, 2017, pp. 357-358). Intelligence operations conducted through spies take place after the recruitment and training of foreign agents (Hulnick, 2004, p. 167). In the world of espionage, there is danger and uncertainty. In such an environment, spies engage in collecting information/data. The analysis process in the world of intelligence involves collecting, analyzing and interpreting data, identifying future developments, threats, risks and opportunities. According to this perspective, events are approached from a broad perspective (McDowell, 2009, p. 5).

It must be noted that the intelligence process is based on an extremely complex and broad field of work. Intelligence organizations use people as their sources. In this respect, espionage is one of the most popular methods of intelligence organizations. However, intelligence agencies do not provide reports to decision-makers based solely on human intelligence (HUMINT). This is relates to intelligence obtained as a result of contacts with people. When used effectively, HUMINT provides information about the target country and its plans in the short and long term (Kavsıracı, 2020, pp. 709-712). If the information obtained through espionage is presented to the decision-maker without being subjected to the analysis process in the intelligence agency, failure is inevitable. Analysis units in intelligence agencies produce intelligence by evaluating information received through human intelligence-based sources. Raw information obtained only from narrow sources does not constitute intelligence. In other words, spies are sometimes a poor guide to events. David Kahn states that spies are unreliable actors in wars and gives the following example: After the D-Day Normandy landings by the Allied forces during the Second World War, Germany analyzed the reports of 173 spies and found that only %8 of them were accurate (Codevilla, 1992, p. 10). It must be underlined that obtaining the correct intelligence is, as the example shows, invaluable and analyzing the facts on the ground and forecasting the future is of vital importance not only for politicians but also for diplomatic and military units (Thielmann, 2005, p. 1). Intelligence agencies carry out psychological operations as well as analyses. They seek to gain the upper hand on the battlefield by deceiving enemy actors. But, the analysts should approach the process from a broad perspective, combining military action with intelligence (Gentry, 2019, p. 836).

It should not be mistaken that only one stream of thought is dominant within the intelligence discipline. At this point, it is known that there are various definitions of intelligence. According to Sherman Kent, who has made significant contributions to the intelligence literature, intelligence is a physical organization. Intelligence officers working in such an organization need to know the history of the target countries in order to be able to follow their present. They should make predictions about these countries in the future. Information about target countries should be useful for decision-makers. Complete and timely information is of great importance for decision-makers. Intelligence officers capable of making analyses should be brought together and work as a team (Kent, 2003, p. 51). As noted above, in Kent's view, common sense should be exercised in the face of administrative problems in intelligence organizations. (Ginsburg, 1950, p. 90).

An intelligence assessment based solely on historical and current statistical data may be insufficient in presenting different possibilities in terms of how the enemy will behave. Hence, analytical thinking methods should be developed in intelligence organizations. In such a situation, it is necessary to put forward all possibilities. Thanks to the war planning prepared through simulations, more realistic data will be obtained. Thus, a great deal of experience will be gained before entering the real war atmosphere (Krizan, 1999, p. 16).

1.1.3. Intelligence and Diplomacy

Intelligence does not only cover military matters or periods of war. Essentially, intelligence requires gathering information about target countries in times of peace. In this way, it can be said that another important tool used by intelligence is diplomacy. From a general perspective, diplomacy is the name given to the entire process of negotiation and dialogue between states. Diplomacy maintains its importance as an auxiliary or alternative policy factor in times when military power or war is on the agenda. Thus, it becomes an effective factor both in times of peace and war. Before the establishment of the modern state, secret services were assigned to manage relations between countries. In doing so, they undertook many tasks such as diplomacy, covert operations and intelligence collection. After the modern intelligence bureaucracy was built, the practice of secret services performing all these tasks simultaneously was

abandoned and their mission responsibilities were reorganized. Nonetheless, it is a well-known fact that intelligence officers in intelligence agencies conduct “*secret diplomacy*” behind closed doors with their counterparts in target countries. The involvement of British intelligence in the peace talks with Northern Ireland, the meetings of the Mossad and other Israeli intelligence services with groups in the region, and the CIA’s relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization show that secret diplomacy is not only between states but also between states and non-state actors. The most important feature of covert diplomacy is that it can be easily denied by the parties. So, intelligence services play an important role in establishing channels of dialogue and reconciliation in both the national and international arenas. In undertaking this role, the intelligence services have to obtain the approval of the political will (Scott, 2004, pp. 330-331).

It must be pointed out that intelligence agencies are emerging as an influential force in negotiations with both intergovernmental and non-state actors, and are seen to reinforce diplomacy or to be an instrument of foreign policy. Although intelligence includes subjects such as conflict, war, military operations, and so on, where diplomacy does not provide much specialization, intelligence and diplomacy are two important fields that complement each other. In the process of foreign policy formulation, issues with national security content concern intelligence rather than diplomacy and information collection is essential in both fields. Although, intelligence and diplomacy differ from each other in terms of information collection methods, in a foreign country, diplomacy and intelligence activities, rather than being seen as contradictory issues, are elements that increase the mobility of a state abroad (Herman, 1998, pp. 13-18).

The intelligence organization not only facilitates the decision-maker through the intelligence information it obtains, but it can also activate the “intelligence diplomacy” channel in order to solve the problems that the state administration has with the target country/group. It is well known that diplomacy is mainly carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in times of weak relations between two countries, intelligence agencies may step in. With the approval of the decision-maker, intelligence agencies can initiate contact with the other country’s intelligence services. The main objective of this

course of action is to prevent a complete breakdown of the channels of dialogue between the two countries.

Intelligence is an area of national security, and it is a large and multidisciplinary organization. It is mainly applied against foreign countries, but the way to establish security within the country is parallel to the strength of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence. The intelligence mechanism is both complex and costly due to the different elements it involves. It is of vital importance for intelligence officers to be open to the world and to be able to follow developments in a timely manner in order to make the correct assessment of the intelligence obtained. It should not be forgotten that those who work in the analysis department are engaged in work of crucial value to the intelligence services.

1.2. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE APPROACH

Although strategic intelligence is relatively new in intelligence literature and its importance is increasing day by day, it is an important perspective used by states in the historical process. States should be prepared for all kinds of positive/negative scenarios in times of war or peace. Therefore, the principles of strategic intelligence come to the fore. The concept of strategic intelligence is closely related to strategy. And, for a better understanding of strategic intelligence in intelligence literature, the meaning of tactical and operational intelligence should be analyzed separately. Because strategic intelligence comes to a better point with the intelligence information provided by tactical and operational intelligence. If only operational or tactical intelligence information is used, long-term intelligence activities cannot be undertaken.

1.2.1. What is Strategy?

Before explaining strategic intelligence, the concept of strategy should be mentioned. It must be noted that strategy has many different meanings and first of all, it should be examined etymologically. If we consider the etymology of the concept of strategy, the term “*strategia*” used in ancient Greek appears in the foreground. This is related to the

concepts of “*streategike episteme*” (knowledge of the general) and “*strategon sophia*” (wisdom of the general) (Echevarria, 2017, p. 3). In this regard, a general form of knowledge is mentioned within the concept of strategy, and it is emphasized that it is not enough just to know, it is necessary to think deeply about knowledge. Admiral Wylie explains that strategy is not a scientific concept and it requires a high level of intellectual endeavour. While determining it, a rational, high level of judgement, objective and inclusive attitude should be adopted (Jablonsky, 2006, p. 115).

There is no common definition on the concept of strategy agreed upon by all authors. There are some generalizations in the literature on this subject. According to a common definition of it, strategy is the art of drawing a road map about the resources and methods to be used to determine the goals and to ensure the balance between these goals and the available means. It is necessary to follow a realistic path between means and ends. It often comes into play to find solutions when the parties are in conflict with each other, or in an environment where conflicts of interest, not of fact, exist. For this reason, It has a broader scale than planning (Freedman, 2013, p. xi).

As claimed by another definition, strategy is the art of using all means representing the armed forces or national power during war or peace to ensure national security (Zabecki, 2006, p. xxiv). Carl von Clausewitz, H. Von Moltke, B.H. Liddell Hart and André Beaufre have discussed the concept of strategy by establishing a relationship between military power and the objectives of war (Baylis&Wirtz, 2016, p. 4). At this point, its meaning on military power and political issues will be discussed. While it shows how to conduct a war in the field, it also provides a road map to achieve a political goal. Strategy, in the words of Carl von Clausewitz, is not only applied on the battlefield, but also includes the elements that enable the use of explicit or implicit threats, as well as the instruments of war and propaganda, to achieve political goals. In state administration, it is utilized in the management of all elements related to power and is a road map created to achieve a purpose. In the opinion of André Beaufre, the dueling aspect of the concept of strategy is illustrated by the fact that in a dispute between two parties, they try to solve the problems by putting forward their will. It refers to a process and has a dynamic structure and is

another name for being able to adapt to changing and developing situations in the world (Osinga, 2007, p. 9).

Strategy is not only associated with war. It can be used in times of war as well as peace. In strategy, the aim is to establish control over the other side (Gray, 2013, p. 13) and the proverb “*Si vis pacem, para bellum*”, which was widely used during the reign of the Roman Empire, is closely related to strategy. This proverb translates as if you want peace to prevail, be prepared for war (Luttwak, 2001, p. 1). In order to achieve this, a strategy must be acted upon in peacetime. From another point of view, it is considered to be an art rather than being seen on the same level as a scientific understanding. There is no specific formula for achieving strategic success. Each situation is recognized as unique and it is necessary to develop different strategies for each case (Lonsdale, 2007, p. 5). It is also possible that a pre-war strategy becomes meaningless during the war. War itself already represents uncertainty (Murray&Grimsley, 1994, p. 1). Even the existence of an inadequate strategic approach during a war is better than fighting a war with no strategy at all. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley recognize that strategy is a process and in an environment of uncertainty, it is essential in order to keep pace with what is happening. As claimed by Robert Osgood, strategy is the general name of planning for the use of armed force, including diplomatic, economic and psychological power factors, to support foreign policy explicitly or implicitly. Lawrence Freedman underlines that it includes verbal expressions as well as actions. It has both a physical and psychological component and it involves bargaining and persuasion methods along with threats and pressure (Baylis&Wirtz, 2016, p. 4).

In general, it can be said that strategy is related to both the organization and external factors. In order to change the environment, the organization part uses strategy. Strategic decisions to be taken within the organization will affect the general welfare. The other important point is the implementation of analytical thinking. For a state to ignore the concept of strategy when managing a war or creating defence plans is like making moves on a chessboard without a king. Wars that are tried to be managed without a strategic mind are doomed to fail. In such a situation, going to war is tantamount to foolishness. Soldiers and decision-makers may argue about which move is strategically best during a

war. In such an environment, those who claim that strategizing is unnecessary will be the main actors of destruction (Osinga, 2007, p. 10). It is the subject itself who will carry out the analytical aspect of the strategy. The subject who determines the strategy (military commander, decision-maker) should not be ignored (Yükselen, 2018, p. 4).

Strategy is important in terms of determining the aims and objectives of the state. Another important question is what the priorities will be among the determined objectives. Strategy comes into play when resources are limited and decisions on how to distribute them are in question. In a process where there is more than one opportunity, the strategic approach again becomes the main topic of conversation in terms of which one will yield the best results (Heuser, 2016, p. 18). It is important for a military leader to be well-trained and to adopt a strategic approach. It is an undeniable fact that in the military profession, one must act with more responsibility and be more meticulous than in other professions. The necessity of strategic and analytical thinking cannot be denied in the military profession, which is the guarantee of the security of thousands of citizens and the sole protector of national security (Brodie, 1949, p. 488).

In order to better analyze the strategy literature, it is necessary to include the views of the chaos theory. It represents the understanding that nothing can be fully known. Proponents of this concept believe that no strategic prediction can be true. Those with this point of view reject the act of forecasting altogether. There are also those who consider strategy as an illusion. According to the supporters of this view, when planning, it is not practical to determine which strategy is more accurate. The people doing the planning try to make comparisons with previous examples. In line with this approach, it is not possible to draw a logical conclusion (Betts, 2000, pp. 8-20). The views of both those who advocate chaos theory and those who regard strategy as an illusion are extreme. At the time of planning, it is not possible for an understanding that has no strategy to survive. Once a military or political strategy has been determined, the problems along the way can be dealt with more easily.

It should be noted that the concepts of war planning and strategy are different from each other. All technical works carried out by the military authorities within the framework of

a determined strategy are considered as war planning. War planning by military authorities cannot be considered within the scope of strategy and it is a technical practice. On the other hand, strategy is an assessment made from a broader perspective (Gray, 1981, p. 25). Each state takes military and political decisions before going to war with another state. These high-level decisions constitute a strategy and the war planning in a narrower field is not considered within the scope of strategy.

Most scholars of strategy argue that the more dynamic the situation, the more a leader should act with foresight and make long-term decisions. This theory does not always correspond to the reality on the ground. In a dynamic process, it is possible to encounter “surprise” events at any time. In such an environment, leaders’ foresight will become more fragile (Freedman, 2013, p. 571). When formulating a strategy, one should not lose touch with reality. Statesmen should also seek the views of their advisers when formulating a strategy. In a situation such as war, which is characterized by uncertainties, many unexpected events may occur. Therefore, any assessment made by ignoring the realities will result in a negative outcome.

During the war, the political will that produces the strategy is responsible for how the military means are to be managed. Depending on the political objectives and available military resources, the time required for the implementation of the strategy may vary. The three most important elements in determining the strategy are the target, the path to be followed and the available means. Strategy formulators should act with these considerations in mind (Gray, 2016, p. 65). But, it should be noted that the perception that an organization with a strategic thinking understanding will always produce a strategic approach does not correspond to reality (Global Intelligence Alliance, 2004, p. 4). It should not be forgotten that an organization that sets out without adopting a strategic approach is unlikely to be successful. Strategic analysis should be carried out in order not to face undesirable or unexpected events (Treverton&Ghez, 2012, p. 12).

It is essential to highlight that the uncertainties encountered in strategy formulation will also bring contradictions. In such an environment, the responsibility of the decision-maker will increase. That’s why, it is necessary to be prudent in strategy formulation.

Being able to act as a bridge between contradictions will be one of the main tasks of strategy. Achieving great goals brings with it great responsibilities. John Lewis Gaddis comments that strategy is an endeavour to utilize unlimited aspirations within the scope of limited means. Thus, the harmony between objectives and means is emphasized (Ataç, 2019, p. 4).

It is clear how important determining a strategy for a state. Having a strategic approach is an essential characteristic of the intelligence community. Rather than drowning in masses of information, the intelligence organization has to provide long-term reports to the decision-makers. For this reason, it is very difficult for an intelligence organization that does not adopt a strategic approach and gets lost in reports that do not have a long life span to help decision-makers.

1.2.2. Tactical Intelligence

Within intelligence organizations, as mentioned above, there are three different types of intelligence according to their functions: tactical, operational, and strategic. Unless the differences between these intelligence types are understood, it is very difficult to clearly reveal the network of relationships between events. Firstly, the differences/similarities between these types of intelligence will be discussed. In this way, the concept of strategic intelligence will be more clearly understood.

Tactical intelligence occurs in an emergency situation and refers to intelligence information that contributes directly to the achievement of the objective, and it is time-limited and focused on short-term aims (Prunckun, 2010, p. 6). It is the type of intelligence required to conduct operations at the tactical level (Keithly, 2010, p. 57). Generally, it is utilized in order to produce quick solutions in times of crisis, and it is functional in tracking the intelligence target and obtaining information about the target (Goldman, 2006, p. 130). It is of vital importance that the information obtained through tactical intelligence is communicated to decision-makers in a timely manner if it is the information that the decision-maker directly needs to know (Akbulut, 2020, pp. 26-27). Tactical intelligence information and analysis obtained for military leaders remain within

the military organization. In other words, military commanders are not obliged to share technical information, such as the number and strength of enemy elements in the capture of a target, with the decision maker. Tactical intelligence information should be shared with the decision-maker if it is of a type that would benefit operational or strategic intelligence information (Russell, 2007, p. 5).

So, it can be stated that tactical intelligence is used to determine the capacity and intentions of the enemy, and the military leaders benefit from the information provided by tactical intelligence during the formulation of war plans and during the war. Determining the enemy's mobility is an important stage (Thomas, 2008, p. 144). Tactical intelligence, which provides important information about the enemy, makes a military difference in the field when applied effectively (Haigler, 2012, p. 51). In order for tactical intelligence to have a high capacity, planning and financing needs must be provided before entering into a hot conflict (Kindsvater, 2006, p. 59).

Since tactical intelligence is emphasized in times of emergency, the reports are transmitted verbally to military commanders. Written reports are less preferred. It is an auxiliary element in ongoing operations, and it is delivered by the analyst to the head of the operation in a fast and practical manner (McDowell, 2009, pp. 21-23). It can be obtained by interrogating the enemy and analyzing captured documents (Easter, 2001, p. 84). The essence of it is based on data and observation. The information and documents obtained are analyzed and evaluated (Shapira, 2020, p. 287). Taking military action on the basis of uncertain information gathered through tactical intelligence is prone to failure (Heazle, 2010, p. 292). Tactical intelligence information must be clearly defined. Acting in uncertainty will lead to unfavourable scenarios.

The importance of tactical intelligence is better understood on the battlefield. The military moves of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East during the First World War can be given as an example. In November 1915, the Ottoman Empire began to concentrate its military efforts on the Tigris coast. Bulgaria's entry into the war strengthened the Ottoman Empire's position in Europe. Britain's intelligence units in the Middle East thought that the Ottoman Empire would turn towards the Middle East. With the intelligence

information obtained in line with tactical intelligence, Britain was acting on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would send 60.000 troops to this geography. As a result, in December 1915, British and Ottoman forces came face to face in the Kut region of Iraq (Popplewell, 1990, pp. 160-161). Acting according to the intelligence information obtained in November, Britain did not expect to face such a siege in December. At the end of the war, Britain lost the war because it made mistaken judgements about intelligence information. Tactical intelligence is useful in acquiring instant information, and in this manner, Britain was too late to act on the intelligence information it had gathered.

If another example is considered, there are those who interpret the US invasion of Iraq as having succeeded tactically, but when the post-invasion developments are analyzed, it is considered as a strategically unsuccessful invasion attempt. In the opinion of these analysts, the decision to oust Saddam Hussein was correct. But, Iran took advantage of the power vacuum in Iraq after the operation. Then, the rise of DAESH corresponds to the same period. Beside, after the invasion of Iraq, the power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran intensified. After the US decided to withdraw from Iraq, DAESH filled the power vacuum. Even if the US administration thinks that it has made the right move at the tactical level, when viewed from a strategic approach in the long term, it is seen that it has carried out a failed operation. Although tactical intelligence is of vital importance during instant and emergency situations, if a strategic approach is not adopted in the long term, it results in failure. This is where the importance of strategic intelligence comes into play (Treverton, 2022, pp. 281-282).

In general, intelligence is used as an effective instrument both during war and in peacetime, and it is useful in the conduct of diplomacy too. Beside that, Tactical intelligence provides reassuring information in the implementation of foreign policy decisions, and it also has a practical aspect in implementing the decisions taken in the field. During the Lausanne Peace Talks, all telegraphic correspondence of the Turkish delegation was deciphered. This situation strengthened Britain's hand in the negotiations during the Lausanne Conference, which took place between 1922-23 (Herman, 1996, p. 153). The role of intelligence is so crucial that in an environment where diplomatic

negotiations take place, it is necessary to access confidential information in order to understand the real opinions of the other side. It is possible to make effective decisions by accessing information that the other side should not know.

During war, the number of the opposing force is one of the most important issues that tactical intelligence emphasizes on target elements. The number of weapons possessed by the enemy forces is also an essential issue. It is necessary to determine whether the target element is at the division, brigade or regiment level. Tactical intelligence seeks to determine the locations of enemy forces and to reveal the organizational structure of the target forces. Thus, the military organization of the other side can be understood. Determining the material and equipment used is of great importance in terms of tactical intelligence information. Knowing the elements that are evaluated within the doctrine of tactical operations such as defence, offence or special operations is important during the war. Knowledge of combat capability and special information compiled about enemy forces will provide an advantage in the course of the war (Şenel&Şenel, 1970, pp. 23-24).

One of the crucial aspects of the tactical intelligence is related to counter-terrorism or the suppression of insurgencies (Seren, 2017, p. 272). In order to combat terrorism at the tactical level, it is necessary to implement policies to suppress the ability of terrorists to organize (Sims, 2007, p. 40). Tactical intelligence support is of great importance in the fight against terrorism. In the prevention of terrorist acts, tactical intelligence information must be acquired and utilized in a timely manner.

1.2.3. Operational Intelligence

Operational intelligence is conducted against a specific target or activity and provides information in support of the operation (Prunckun, 2010, p. 7). It is the name given to the type of intelligence necessary for the planning and execution of all kinds of national security operations (Goldman, 2006, p. 105). The scale of operational intelligence is larger than tactical intelligence. Beside, it focuses on the military capacity and capabilities of the enemy. It also tries to predict what moves the target may make. When operational intelligence is utilized during the fight against terrorism or the suppression of insurgency,

it focuses more on political, social and economic factors than tactical intelligence. The most important feature of operational intelligence is that it acts as a bridge between tactical and strategic intelligence. Once strategic objectives have been determined, operational intelligence has an important function in providing the needs determined to achieve these objectives (Seren, 2017, p. 273).

Operational intelligence, which includes tactical moves, comes to the forefront to analyze the battlefield in order to plan and execute major operations. The collection and analysis elements of operational intelligence facilitate commanders' work in the field. While tactical intelligence support facilitates operations, strategic moves by the commander can change the course of the war (Tyler, 2014, pp. 20-27). Activities planned and performed at national and regional levels are considered within the scope of operational intelligence (Haigler, 2012, p. 51). From another perspective it must be pointed out that operational intelligence is mostly utilized by combatant commanders (Thomas, 2008, p. 144). At this point, commanders use elements of it to achieve strategic goals (Keithly, 2010, p. 57). Michael Handel defines operational intelligence as "intelligence in wars and military operations". It is needed for a commander to harmonize the tactical intelligence success achieved towards a certain target with strategic intelligence (Tyler, 2014, p. 15).

At the time of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had established a complex intelligence network in various parts of Europe. Agents and informants were working in the intelligence system. The information obtained by the agents was transmitted to the British government. Thanks to the agents in the field, the armies of the enemy forces were penetrated and their modus operandi was identified. Agents and informants operating in the neighbouring countries of France gathered valuable information revealing France's military intentions and the situation of the French people. Thus, Britain had an idea about France's military, political and social situation. The military matters that reached the British government were shared with the Ministry of War. Thus, Britain benefited from both operational and strategic intelligence. During the Peninsular War, which took place between 1808 and 1814, Britain attempted to bring both types of intelligence together and aimed to maximize the yield. In this war, Wellington, who was in charge of the British army, preferred not to see strategic

intelligence and operational intelligence as two separate types of intelligence and endeavoured to make them compatible with each other. By utilizing operational intelligence, Wellington tried to learn the operational style of the French army present in the Peninsula. In addition to high-quality information such as strategic intelligence, the British government had operational intelligence on French military operations (Davies, 2006, pp. 202-203).

Britain was not content with obtaining military information on the battlefield. Due to the extensive intelligence network established across Europe, not only military information but also political and social intelligence information was accessed. Although the information provided by operational intelligence remains important, the process can be evaluated in a multidimensional way thanks to the information gathered by strategic intelligence. Therefore, It is seen that tactical and operational intelligence is more frequently brought to the agenda in short-term or emergency situations and they seek to neutralize the identified targets urgently.

When analyzing the position of the German army in the Second World War, it reveals the importance of operational intelligence capability. In 1942, Germany was moving towards a defensive military strategy, while the Allied forces were in a better position to apply operational intelligence. Senior commanders in the German army were well-trained in tactical moves (Handel, 1990, p. 23). The German army's operational intelligence capability was lacking. Therefore, the Germans concentrated on tactical moves.

Tactical and operational intelligence urgently eliminate specific risks and threats (McDowell, 2009, p. 54). In some cases, tactical and operational intelligence may be inadequate to understand the enemy's real strategy (Adams, 2015, p. 52). Operational and tactical intelligence knowledge comes to the fore as an assistant to those working in operational units in intelligence organizations and military structures (Karaağaç, 2017, p. 44). But, strategic intelligence differs from these two types of intelligence in some aspects. It includes information collection, counterintelligence and covert operations (Johnson, 1990, p. 215).

1.2.4. Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence seeks to estimate the power capacity, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the targets. It does not limit itself to knowing the conditions in a particular region of a target country or to gathering information only on military matters. It seeks to understand the amount, capacity and objectives of national elements in a country. Strategic intelligence production does not begin with the outbreak of war, nor does it end with the establishment of peace. The importance of it continues in peacetime as well as in wartime. In order to determine the capacity and weaknesses of a country, it is not sufficient to gather information only about its armed forces. A country's economic situation, socio-cultural structure, domestic and foreign policy, transportation, communications, industry, the existence of opposition groups within the country, the relations between these groups and the points of divergence are the main issues that fall within the scope of strategic intelligence. If the information on these issues is analyzed in detail, it will be inevitable to establish national security in a strong manner (Şenel&Şenel, 1970, pp. 17-19). Strategic intelligence comprises *deep analyzes* rather than a simple assessment of military and political events (Berkowitz&Goodman, 1989, p. 6). In this context, the components of strategic intelligence include biographical, sociological, economic, political, geographical, transportation, communication and technical intelligence (Goldman, 2006, p. 127). One of the most prominent components of strategic intelligence is political intelligence. It may cover the decision of whether to go to war or not, as well as issues such as the mode of operation in war and when the war will end. Political orientation is the determining factor in a country's foreign policy (Şenel&Şenel, 1970, pp. 39-46). And, political intelligence has an impact on military and foreign policy issues. Stephen R. Bowers highlights that the purposes of intelligence are political. Economic, social or technological problems have political aspects. That's why, political intelligence has the opportunity to closely follow many issues in social life (Seren, 2017, p. 278). Consequently, it should be noted that strategic intelligence has a life-saving feature for decision-makers in times of peace and war. The other important aspect that should be noted that in times of war, strategic intelligence can be highly utilized with the support of tactical and operational intelligence. The importance of strategic intelligence,

which enables a country to be mapped in every aspect, becomes more prominent in critical times.

Strategic intelligence is expected to produce information that can be used by decision-makers. The information required is so vast that tens of thousands of people must perform this task in wartime to ensure success. From this point of view, it should be noted that intelligence is a task that should be performed by capable intelligence officers rather than individual efforts. As it is a difficult and demanding profession, the possibility of making mistakes is high. Strategic intelligence is the information necessary for conducting a country's foreign relations in times of war or peace. Walter Lippman analyzes this situation as follows; foreign policy functions as a protective shield in a country. In this respect, strategic intelligence information undertakes the task of guiding foreign policy, which is a protective shield and it should be applied at the right time and in the right place (Kent, 2003, p. x). The detail-oriented aspect of strategic intelligence is vital for the survival of states.

Strategic intelligence has a broader scope and organizational structure than tactical and operational intelligence and has been used by states for thousands of years (Westerfield, 2001, p. 15143). The utilization of strategic intelligence on the battlefield or in the event of armed conflict has been a cornerstone of international relations for thousands of years. According to military historian John Keegan, political and military leaders such as the Duke of Marlborough and George Washington have attached great importance to strategic intelligence, and since ancient times, military leaders have sought to determine the strengths and weaknesses, intentions and tendencies of enemy forces. The history of strategic intelligence goes back even further. In the Bible and the Old Testament, Moses is reported to have sent scouts to the Promised Land to gather intelligence. Although the concept of strategic intelligence has a long history, it was Sherman Kent who introduced the concept of strategic intelligence to the academic literature. Kent tried to reveal the value of intelligence and the challenges faced in the intelligence world. As stated by Sherman Kent, strategic intelligence is the information needed by high-ranking military and civilian officials to ensure homeland security. Adda Bozeman points out that strategic intelligence guides tactical-level moves in foreign policy matters to address specific

events and provides a stable roadmap for the *realization of long-term political objectives*. Loch Johnson and James Wirtz note that strategic intelligence contributes greatly to the implementation of defence and foreign policy objectives by senior officials. It provides a warning mechanism when national security is under threat. It is an element that decision-makers benefit from in determining the long-term interests of the country. For Berkowitz and Goodman, it is necessary to put the “big picture” in front of decision-makers so as to achieve future long-term goals (Russell, 2007, pp. 4-5; Scott, 2010, p.138) and again Berkowitz and Goodman point out that, in contrast to operational intelligence, strategic intelligence is in contact with different fields such as economics, politics, and technology and is directed towards a comprehensive goal (Shulsky&Schmitt, 2002, p. 177).

Sherman Kent, while discussing the concept of strategic intelligence, asserts that events should be handled with scientific methods, as in social sciences. According to Kent, the gathering of strategic intelligence information takes place in seven stages. Firstly, a problem that will attract the attention of intelligence officers must be identified. In the second stage, the direction from which this problem will be analyzed is determined. The importance of the problem for the country is tried to be identified; how the problem will benefit politicians during the decision-making process is analyzed. In the third stage, data on the problem are collected. If there is an information gap in the existing data, new information is obtained. In the fourth stage, the collected data are critically analyzed. In the fifth stage, the process of making sense of the data begins and the hypothesis comes into play here. In the sixth stage, the process of verifiability or falsifiability of hypotheses is discussed. Finally, it is decided which hypothesis is more correct/true than the others (Kent, 2003, p. 143).

It must be pointed out that the stages of strategic intelligence must be known in order to analyze the case. Sherman Kent states that an event in the intelligence organization should be evaluated by considering these stages. By following a scientific method, intelligence officers share the intelligence information obtained with the decision-maker. It should not be forgotten that each situation should be assessed within its own conditions. Strategic intelligence is the process of combining and analyzing different available information (Şenel&Şenel, 1970, p. 173). If the strategic analysis approach, which includes political,

economic and military interpretation and embraces an integrative approach, is not followed in state administration, the success rate of the decisions to be taken regarding the use of force will decrease. A good strategic intelligence understanding positively affects other instruments of national power. Insufficient strategic intelligence, on the other hand, reduces the effectiveness of the means of power and renders them dysfunctional (Russell, 2007, p. 9).

The US Department of Defence (Pentagon) considers the concept of strategic intelligence as follows; it is the intelligence required for the formulation of a strategic policy at the national level, as well as for the establishment of military operations. What is essentially meant by the concept of strategy here is not only acting within the framework of a plan but also the mind that directs the plan. When an operation is to be undertaken against a foreign country, deep insights into strategic intelligence are needed. Before undertaking an intelligence activity against a foreign country, it is necessary to determine what are the friendly and hostile elements, opportunities and obstacles in that country. If these elements are not identified, strategic intelligence reports will be nothing but a mass of information. In this case, the concept of strategy is no more than an intangible theory (Heidenrich, 2007, p. 16). When civilian administrators want to achieve political aims, they need to control military means, and strategic intelligence becomes an additional element (Russell, 2002, p. 193). Through it, leaders can calculate national/international opportunities and potential risks (Johnson, 2007, p. 1). It, unlike current intelligence, adopts the principle of being forward-looking. It seeks to provide rational facts about the risks and opportunities that decision-makers may face. It should be able to make insightful predictions based on changes over time (George, 2020, p. 117).

Strategic intelligence is considered a high level of intelligence. It provides a comprehensive analysis of a target or activity. It evaluates possible future situations and identifies potential threats. If there is a risk and security vulnerability, it provides warnings. It contributes to planning and policy formulation and assists in how to allocate existing resources (Prunckun, 2010, pp. 6-7). This is where the paradox of strategic intelligence begins.

In order to be able to realistically demonstrate strategic intelligence, it is necessary to bring together many factors. States allocate large budgets for this process. Decision-makers do not always prefer to act on the basis of the long-term predictions of strategic intelligence. Decision-makers may act on ideological grounds, or they may formulate an opinion based on their dialogues with other leaders (Johnson, 2003, p. 654). The acceptance of strategic intelligence by policymakers has often been an element of tension between policy and intelligence. Decision-makers tend to see intelligence as auxiliary information. But intelligence is also functional in controlling the ambitions of politicians (Hutchings, 2018, p. 27) and serves to restrain the desires of politics.

The role of strategic intelligence in historical events and how it has been assessed should be brought to attention. During the 1922 Chanak Crisis², it is worth looking at how strategic intelligence was utilized. First, Britain had organised an attack on France's naval codes in order to decipher France's secret correspondence. Therefore, Britain deciphered France's diplomatic correspondence ciphers thanks to signal intelligence. The intercepted telegrams revealed that France pursued a hypocritical policy during the Chanak crisis and tried to manipulate the British press in order to replace Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon with a pro-French minister. Lord Curzon, who was informed about the developments, expressed this as "*the worst situation I have ever experienced in my political life*". After this incident, Curzon refused to meet with the French Ambassador. This reveals the importance of strategic intelligence for the decision-makers in Britain in the case of France (Jackson&Maiolo, 2006, p. 436).

As demonstrated in the British-French relations in 1922 (Chanak Crisis), cheating/deception method was used to shed light on the strategic intelligence process. (Ransom, 1974, p. 134). Strategic intelligence is an important aspect affecting the relations between countries and the information obtained through strategic intelligence

² Chanak Crisis: After the liberation of İzmir by the Turkish army on 9 September of 1922, the issue of the Straits came to the agenda and Britain wanted to increase its influence over the Straits. While Britain was making defence preparations against the Turkish army, it also sought the support of France and Italy against the Turkish army. However, when Britain's efforts failed, it activated diplomatic channels and met with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish War of Independence. Between 10-30 September 1922, Britain faced the possibility of entering into a hot conflict. Britain referred to this period as the Chanak crisis (Çağlayan, 2017, p. 19).

has carried the diplomatic relations between the two countries to a different dimension. On the one side, Britain closely followed the policies of France in the interwar period and on the other side, France's moves to change the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Britain demonstrated its long-term goals towards Britain.

It should be noted that strategic intelligence is the most difficult and essential type of intelligence to be obtained through covert or other means to understand the political and military intentions of target countries. It differs from technical or low-level military intelligence in that it is highly prone to making mistakes. At the beginning of the Second World War, the course of the war changed as a result of the misinterpretation of strategic intelligence. From the intelligence perspective, It is claimed that in 1939, Britain, France and Germany were seriously mistaken in their understanding of military and economic power in the face of the Polish crisis. The main basis of this misperception, which led to the outbreak of the war, was the assessments made by the strategic intelligence of each state. Britain and France thought that Hitler would be prevented from entering the war thanks to the determined stance of the West. Hitler was using intelligence information that Poland would be captured without a major war in Europe. The idea that the Soviet Union would not make a move that would disturb the balance of power was supported by both blocs. At the outbreak of the Second World War, it became clear that these assessments were based on wrong perceptions. At that time, the vast majority of strategic intelligence was obtained through diplomatic channels. The collection and evaluation of intelligence was a routine task for embassy staff. In the summer of 1939, the military attachés of Britain, Poland, Sweden, France and the US came together to assess the situation. On the contrary, in the Soviet Union, the situation was different. According to the observations of US diplomat George Kennan, it was very difficult for any embassy employee in Moscow to carry out diplomatic activities. For this reason, the pillar of strategic intelligence was open-source intelligence. The reports were the result of detailed press research. At that time, in general, the main problem in the dissemination and evaluation of strategic intelligence was due to low organizational capacity and political reasons. There were many different organizations collecting intelligence, but there was no cooperation between them. In this manner, it ought to be stressed that for strategic intelligence to be successful, there needs to be a high level of coordination between

organizations because strategic intelligence information is shared with the decision-maker (Overy, 1998, pp. 451-454). As a result, the importance of strategic intelligence became more apparent during the Second World War and it can be pointed out that in the post-war period, many states, especially the US, have focused on strategic intelligence (Thielmann, 2005, p. 2).

It is important to note that Argentina's military intervention in the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1985 is an important incident in terms of showing how strategic intelligence is dealt with. This intervention, which was a surprise attack on Argentina, can be considered as a successful military operation at first glance. The factors of secrecy and speed, which Clausewitz mentions as the *sine qua non* for a successful surprise attack, manifested themselves in this intervention. Argentina misled British intelligence by using coded broadcasts. As a result of the clash between Argentine naval forces and the British in South Georgia, Argentina landed on the island on 2 April. Argentine forces completed the operation with few casualties. In the Falklands War, Britain retaliated against Argentina's operation by using land, sea and air power elements. Within a month, the control of the island was back in the hands of Britain. So, why did this Argentine operation fail? Argentina, by setting a political goal for itself in the international arena, wanted to take the Falkland Islands from Britain. At that time, a military administration was ruling in Argentina. The main purpose of the military government was to consolidate its position within the country. Hence, the government in Argentina was centred on a domestic political move rather than an international goal. Argentine President General Galtieri desired to eliminate the opposition groups in domestic politics and to prevent the bad economic situation in the country. Fearing a public backlash, he wanted to draw attention to a matter of national security. Thus, it aimed to mobilize national spirit throughout the country in a struggle against an external enemy. Rather than acting according to the realities of the international conflict, the military junta pursued a policy dictated by domestic politics. Argentina did not anticipate that Britain would carry out a reprisal operation against the islands in a short time. But, Britain called the United Nations Security Council for an emergency meeting and demanded the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the island. Subsequently, some European countries suspended their trade with Argentina. The military administration could not foresee that the US would support

Britain. On the one side, there was a misperception in the Argentine administration that the US would either remain neutral or prevent Britain's retaliation and on the other side, the most important reason behind Britain's failure to anticipate the surprise attack was its underestimation of the determination of the people in South America. Consequently, Britain failed to adequately analyze the reality on the ground (Andarcia, 1985, pp. 1-12).

From another perspective, Argentina's intervention in the Falkland Islands can be considered successful in terms of operational intelligence, but it should be considered as a failed military operation in terms of strategic intelligence. While carrying out this intervention, Argentina did not act according to long-term planning and failed to analyze future international reactions correctly. The sole success of the military operation does not guarantee that the action will be permanent. On the other hand, Britain's strategic intelligence assessments are far from the reality on the ground too. Britain did not think that Argentina would launch a surprise attack. It is seen that Britain's intelligence analyses were inadequate, but that it subsequently reconsolidated its power in the Falkland Islands thanks to its political moves in the international arena. It is essential to highlight that strategic intelligence consists of long-term and comprehensive assessments and military victories achieved by using tactical or operational intelligence components will be successful as long as they are guided by strategic intelligence.

When detailed reports on foreign countries are requested by decision-makers, the concept of strategic intelligence becomes the main topic of conversation (Heidenrich, 2007, p. 16). Reports are disseminated not only to decision-makers but also to other organizations in need (Haigler, 2012, p. 51). According to Richard Betts, despite the interest in the use of strategic intelligence by decision-makers or the increase in the budget and resources allocated to intelligence, strategic intelligence is not fully exploited (Barnea, 2020, p. 2). It is expected to develop a warning system against surprise attacks (Hudođlu, 2023, p. 4). Attacks that are prevented on the basis of intelligence information are, of course, significant, but if attacks cannot be thwarted and occur, the quality of the intelligence begins to be questioned. At this point, strategic intelligence does not become a priority in the event of a conflict or attack. A road map should be drawn by making the necessary analyses before the conflict.

It is important to point out that in strategic intelligence, three components, namely visionary management, strategic foresight and intelligence, stand out and the decisions taken should be able to keep pace with change. In visionary management, the issue of combating the crises encountered comes to the fore. Strategic foresight is a necessary factor when determining policies (Kuosa, 2014, pp. 15-19). In this regard, strategic intelligence is a field that examines a wide range of political, military, diplomatic, economic and social issues that come into play when situations such as war, peace and instability arise as it tries to make predictions about the target country and in case of failure in this process, surprise attacks are encountered. Within this perspective, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the 9/11 attacks can be given as examples of surprise attacks (Lim, 2016, p. 619).

This is where the key role of strategic intelligence becomes effective and the higher the intelligence capacity in terms of early warning and prediction, the more successful strategic intelligence will be (Walsh&Harrison, 2021, p. 663). Providing early warning of the enemy's military actions is one of the traditional roles of strategic intelligence, based on tactical intelligence. Lanir characterizes this role as "situational", while Knorr considers it "technical". Determining the military capability of the enemy is more of a concern for tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence seeks to analyze the target country's decision-maker's view of events and to determine the enemy's operational style (Shapira, 2020, p. 284). As can be seen, strategic intelligence gains more importance before a conflict or attack. If the means and capabilities of the target country are known, the steps to be taken will yield more successful results (Liotti, 2010, p. 100).

Even though some leaders are wise, their countries confront military disasters because their power capacities are weak or insufficient. Weak power capacities are the primary problem of these states. Leaders of states with high power capacities are likely to face military disasters if they make wrong judgements. For great powers, the importance of information and judgement capacity is more prominent when making strategic decisions. Therefore, defence policy decisions depend on the analysis and evaluation of information obtained by strategic intelligence. In cases of intelligence failure, most of the mistakes are made by decision-makers. Intelligence collectors and analysts are less likely to make

mistakes in terms of their impact on the results. Political and psychological, rather than organizational, causes of intelligence failure are more important (Betts, 2008, p. 87).

In order to have a greater influence on a politician's decision-making process, an intelligence agency puts forward analyses based on strategic intelligence. However, when the decision maker is under pressure, he/she needs operational and tactical intelligence information rather than strategic intelligence. Because operational and tactical intelligence information is essential for emergency situations. The pinpoint tactical and operational intelligence information provided by the intelligence organization will be positively welcomed by the decision-maker. Hence, thanks to the trust established between the intelligence organization and the politician, information at the strategic intelligence level will be taken into consideration by the decision-maker (Palacios, 2018, p. 197). Politicians may sometimes need short-term solutions to the problems they face. At this point, when the intelligence services offer various solutions, the politician's ability to act is enhanced and a harmonious cooperation between the intelligence services and the politician is established.

In general, as a supporting element, intelligence has an impact on the strategic outcome of wars. For this reason, it is rarely praised or heavily criticized. During the Second World War, decision-makers in Germany and military leaders in Japan paid little attention to strategic intelligence. The heavy defeat of Germany against the Soviet Union and the surrender of Japan as a result of the atomic bomb dropped by the US show that neither country acted strategically. As it is stated before, intelligence-backed surprise attacks, such as Pearl Harbor, may be successful for a short time, but have no long-term consequences. (Gentry, 2019, p. 844).

It must be noted that Germany failed in the intelligence wars of the Second World War. It made the wrong choices at many of the strategic turning points during the war. It underestimated the Soviet Union and was too courageous in its invasion of North Africa. It thought the Normandy landings were a deception operation. However, these mistakes were not only due to the weak nature of German intelligence but also to the success of the Allied powers in tactical intelligence. Kahn claims that the primary factor that caused

Germany to lose touch with the reality on the ground was its underestimation of its rivals and its perception of itself as superior to other states. At the beginning of the Second World War, the Germans rapidly achieved military successes. These successes led to the misconception that the Germans could never be defeated. Kahn points to Germany's aggressive behaviour as another reason. At the beginning of the war, Germany was in a tactical offensive position. On the other side, Britain, among the Allied powers, preferred to take a strategically defensive position. During this period, Britain realized the importance of intelligence and conducted its activities in that direction. When the Allied powers went on the offensive, they achieved military successes thanks to the investment in intelligence. In Germany, the unquestionable trust in the leader creates an environment contrary to "objective" and "rational" intelligence activities. It is believed that Hitler made the best decisions. Therefore, the leader's decisions, even if they are wrong, are not questioned. The same is true for the Soviet Union. Stalin chose not to listen to intelligence information about a surprise attack by Germany. This resulted in intelligence officers not submitting intelligence reports to the leaders, including possible dangers or failed operations. As a result, failure was inevitable (Handel, 2006, pp. 376-377). Both leaders regarded their own thought patterns as the dominant view and disregarded the advice of military, political and intelligence advisers (Handel, 2003, p. 26).

Leaders who do not want to hear the insights of strategic intelligence face failure. Not only in wartime but also in peacetime, the intelligence information obtained about the target country should be shared with the decision-makers. The further away from an objective and rational environment, the more difficult it becomes to understand the reality of war. Britain's emphasis on intelligence from the beginning of the war was a factor that changed the course of the war. Successes achieved through tactical or operational intelligence should not lead leaders to complacency. In a situation where strategic intelligence is neglected, the chances of success diminish.

It is known that modern intelligence analysis did not exist until the Second World War. Before this war, it was seen that US did not have adequate military and intelligence preparations, whether it entered the war or not. Although other great powers had a central intelligence organization based on collecting and analyzing intelligence, the US did not.

During the Second World War, the US realized that its intelligence was lacking. It lacked a structure to collect and analyze intelligence. It embarked on some activities to overcome the deficiencies. For these reasons, President Franklin Roosevelt first invited his friend General Donovan from the law Office and authorized by Roosevelt, Donovan was sent overseas on a visit to determine what the US should do in terms of intelligence. Donovan, who travelled to Britain in July 1940, tried to determine whether the British could resist Germany and found that Germany was weak in the face of fifth-column activities. At the end of 1940, Donovan organized a three-month Mediterranean tour. During this trip, he became more aware of the importance of social, political and military conditions and concluded that regular strategic intelligence information was indispensable during the war. He recognized that the political and psychological effects of war would be significant. On Donovan's advice, it was decided to set up a team of talented people in Washington, specializing in language and research techniques (Hedley, 2008, pp. 19-20). Before the war, the US foresaw the destructiveness of the war and tried to make up for its shortcomings. In this context, activities in which expertise is prioritized have been undertaken.

It must be stressed that there is an important link between war and intelligence. Philosophers working on war have indicated that it is wiser to break alliances without fighting and that it is important to keep allies together in the time of conflict. Thus, it has been pointed out that going to war alone is a very risky situation. In order to manage this whole network of relations, intelligence must be used. When two armies face each other, both sides try to trap each other. For this reason, the result of a war fought without having accurate intelligence about the enemy is a heavy defeat. Spies are employed to determine the enemy's capacity and understanding of warfare (Sawyer, 2013, p. 33). When a state goes to war and follows a wise strategy, it does not mistreat prisoners and does not devastate cities. The state relies on the power of intelligence and follows the strategies put forward by intelligence as a method in war. A strategically minded leader knows that the benefits of intelligence are greater than the benefits of brute force (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 15). In this framework, it has been revealed how a state will determine a road map around the predictions of strategic intelligence during a war. In war, a state that controls

its aggression will be in an advantageous position if it acts on the strategies put forward by intelligence.

It must be once more underlined that intelligence is one of the most important factors affecting the mobility of a fighting army. The army commander or politician directs the intelligence. Being superior in numbers in war does not mean that the war will be won. Acting with fear of the number of the enemy indicates that intelligence weakness has occurred (Tzu, 2009, pp. 34-55). Sun Tzu argues that the role of intelligence should not be forgotten when determining war strategy. He notes that intelligence is a fundamental element during warfare. According to John Keegan, intelligence is considered as an important supporting tool during the war. He believes that intelligence is insufficient to influence the tactical and strategic dimensions of war. Even though analysts such as J. Keegan believe that intelligence is not sufficient for tactical and strategic aspects, they also claim that intelligence is necessary for the conduct of a successful operation (Gentry, 2019, p. 833). When the military history of the West is analyzed, it is found that intelligence was of little importance during wars. From Caesar onwards, commanders endeavoured to gather information about the enemy force, but their main concern was the terrain and the condition of the troops. The Victorian historian Edward Creasy asserted that intelligence was a decisive factor only during the war Rome won against Carthage in 207 BC. In other wars that took place in world history, he emphasized the effectiveness of power and determination factors. However, when armies started to use railways in the 19th century, they needed centralized planning. In this way, the understanding of collecting intelligence for specific targets began to develop. The First World War clearly demonstrated the impact of intelligence on military victories. In time, Intelligence is becoming increasingly important to nations. During the Second World War, states tried to obtain intelligence information mainly by breaking each other's military codes. With the deciphering of Germany's "enigma" cipher machine, the Allied powers achieved significant successes on the battlefield (Kahn, 2006, pp. 125-132).

Nizamü'l-Mülk emphasized the importance of intelligence in the Seljuk period. It is underlined that a state must have an intelligence organization. The existence of an intelligence organization is essential not only during war but also in times of peace as a

guarantee of security within the country. In order to prevent an incident that threatens the security within the country, the intelligence organization must gather news through spies. The information obtained should be shared with the ruler because the decision-maker needs to make timely decisions according to the course of the situation (Nizamü'l- Mülk, 2009, p. xxi).

As can clearly be observed, among those who study the nature of war, there are different views on the role of intelligence in warfare. Regardless of its scale and function, the presence of intelligence during war is always of great importance. So as to reduce the level of uncertainty that may be encountered during war, or in order to make predictions about the effects of war, intelligence activity is an important tool (Arena&Wolford, 2012, p. 351).

It must be pointed out that Clausewitz, who has important studies on war, claims that war is not an end, but should be considered as a means (Bernstein, 1994, p. 57). He cares little about how the enemy perceives the war and defends mainly the consolidation of his own troop situation, with less reliance on intelligence information. He does not completely dismiss intelligence but, taking into account the factors of uncertainty and risk, suggests that the deficiencies of one's own troops should be addressed rather than the military preparations of the enemy. While Sun Tzu states that intelligence deception operations are absolutely necessary for success in war, Clausewitz does not comment on this issue. According to him, the intelligence obtained during the war may be incorrect or contradictory. Sun Tzu does not focus on developments in this respect and thinks that political and military advances before the war will change the course of the war. For this reason, Sun Tzu emphasizes the role of intelligence more than him, whereas Clausewitz is only concerned with operational and tactical issues regarding the role of intelligence in war. Therefore, he does not evaluate the concept of intelligence in as broad and comprehensive a framework as Sun Tzu. The role of intelligence during wartime has come to be measured by the availability of reliable information. The important role of intelligence in warfare was mainly seen during the First World War because intelligence was now being considered with an organizational approach during this period (Handel, 2001, pp. 122- 166).

In the historical process, the importance of the relationship between intelligence and warfare has become more clearly understood. As the nature of warfare has changed, the effectiveness of intelligence has increased. Regardless of the period, the importance of intelligence information during war cannot be denied. The fact that some authors ignore the role of intelligence in warfare should be considered within the framework of the conditions of the period. It is known that the influence of intelligence in the areas of war and diplomacy is increasing as time passes. In order for commanders to make decisions during the war, they must have at least tactical and operational intelligence information. Strategic intelligence is essential for long-term success.

As a result, it should not be forgotten that intelligence is an essential factor for states. Also, it should be pointed out once again that the intelligence is among the core pillars of states. Information obtained by intelligence is needed for the establishment of national security. Then, the relationship between intelligence agencies and politicians is noteworthy. If the decision-maker acts in the light of the information from intelligence, he/she follows a successful policy. Intelligence and diplomacy are two complementary fields. In cases where diplomacy is insufficient, intelligence plays an important role. In this context, it is seen that intelligence diplomacy has been effective recently. The importance of strategic intelligence for the intelligence world should be well understood. It enables states to achieve the best results in difficult times. Therefore, politicians should not ignore it. It is essential that decision-makers adopt a long-term political approach rather than short-term opportunities. In the long term, the decision-maker who acts according to the data of intelligence utilizes strategic intelligence. Especially before going to war, the analyses put forward by strategic intelligence should be carefully considered. In addition, the importance of operational and tactical intelligence should not be ignored.

The relationship between strategic intelligence and warfare needs to be clearly established. As it is known, war is one of the important turning points for the destiny of a state. Before entering a war, the state acts by taking into consideration all power elements. The purpose of the war should be well understood by both the decision-maker and the intelligence organization. The decision-maker and the intelligence organization, acting in line with the objectives and in cooperation, play important roles in the success

of the war. The position of intelligence during the war emerges in the implementation phase of the information obtained as a result of strategic intelligence. States must act within the framework of vital assessments based on the facts on the ground before the war. The existence of strategic intelligence comes into play at this stage. In the face of unfavourable situations to be encountered during the war, states should develop different methods with the support of intelligence.

CHAPTER 2

THE UNDERSTANDING OF HELLENISM IN GREECE'S FOREIGN POLICY

In this chapter, Greece's understanding of Hellenism will be mentioned and the concept of the Megali Idea will be highlighted. From a historical perspective, it will be examined whether Greece has been faithful to these concepts while determining its foreign policy, and its activities in line with the idea of the Megali Idea. The most important determinants of Greek foreign policy during the First World War were the political moves of King Constantine and Eleftherios Venizelos³, although the fact that both leaders had different foreign policy approaches points to the turbulent political process in Greece during this period. The effects of the developments before and during the war on Greece's foreign policy will be discussed in this chapter.

While Greece's foreign policy is examined, the effects of the internal developments before and during the war on Greece's foreign policy will also be discussed simultaneously in this chapter. Greece's position at the Paris Peace Conference and what demands it had from the Allied states before invading Anatolia will be determined. Venizelos' claims at the Paris Peace Conference will be evaluated in detail. In addition, the relations that Venizelos established with the leaders of the Allied powers and the activities that he carried out for the realization of the occupation of Anatolia. Finally, the activities of both Greek forces and Greeks (*Rums*)⁴ living in Anatolia before the invasion of İzmir will be analyzed.

2.1. HELLENISM AND THE MEGALI IDEA

Before explaining the concept of Hellenism, it is necessary to know what the term Helen corresponds to, and accordingly, in the literature, it is used as the equivalent of the notion

³ Eleftherios Venizelos, who was born in Crete, studied law in Athens and was involved in the organization of Greek gangs during the Cretan rebellion (Vardağlı, 2017, p. 104).

⁴ The Ottoman State used the word Rum to characterize the Greek-speaking population of Anatolia. Therefore, in the following sections of thesis, those living in Anatolia will be referred to as Rum. For more detailed information, see (Özbaran, 2004).

of “Greek”. But, in the Greek language, the word Greek is not used at all, and the word *Hellen* (*Ellinas*) is preferred as an alternative. According to a Greek, Greek-speaking Orthodox people who reside both inside and outside Greece are called *Hellen*. In the same way, the word *Rum* is not used in Greece to describe the Greek people. The Greek philosopher Isocrates (436-338 BC) stated that the name Hellen was not used in a racial sense, but as a word for intellect. The word Greek is derived from the word *Ionia* and it is the ancient name for Western Anatolia or the eastern Aegean coast (Erdem, 2009, pp. 1-2; Türker, 2013, p. 98). The word Rum was used by the Seljuk and Ottoman states as a geographical term to refer to the inhabitants of Anatolia. The Ottoman State used the word Rum to refer to the Greek-speaking Christian subjects living in Anatolia (Avcı, 2008, p. 225). In the Greek dictionary, the term “*Hellenism*” refers to all Greeks living in the world, or Greek national expressions. It is also used to describe Greek culture (Kılıçoğlu Cihangir, 2019, p. 11). On the other hand, *philhellenism* emphasizes the political aspect of Hellenism. Under this concept, the territory of Greece is opposed to being ruled by the Ottoman State. Besides, Hellenism highlights the admiration for the cultural and intellectual richness of Ancient Greece (Van Steen, 2010, p. 5).

Moreover, looking at the political processes that Greece has gone through since its foundation, the political aspect of Hellenism has been underlined rather than its cultural meaning. In connection with Hellenism, the notion of the Megali Idea comes to the fore. In this respect, it is one of the elements on which Greece has built its foreign policy. As a result, Hellenism and the Megali Idea are concepts used together and can be shown as the main reasons for the changes in Anatolian geography in the first half of the 20th century.

2.1.1. Developments in the Process Leading to Independence Within the Framework of Hellenism

In order to understand Greece’s understanding of Hellenism, it is first necessary to look at the Greek revolt of 1821 and the events that preceded it. It can be underlined that under the influence of the Enlightenment in Europe, many archaeologists and scientists flocked to Greece in the 18th and 19th centuries. During these excursions, many artefacts from

the Ancient Greek period have been unearthed (Demirhan, 2012, p. 43). At this point, Greece's claim to be the heir of both Ancient Greece and Rome gave it a special position in the eyes of Europe. Thanks to the archaeologists and scientists who came to the region from Europe, an attempt was made to give the people of Greece a consciousness specific to Ancient Greece. These efforts of the West have an important place in terms of creating the motivation for the Greek revolt between 1821-1833. After this period, research on Ancient Greece increased and the heroes of this era began to be brought to the forefront in the education system (Dakin, 1972, p. 2). This is why, westerners regarded the existence of this epoch as a miracle in the history of the world. (Puaux, 1920, p. 9).

It should be noted that neither the Greek clergy nor the Orthodox Greek peasants had embraced nationalist ideas before the 1750s. Nevertheless, the Western Enlightenment intensely influenced the secularization of the Rums. The French Revolution of 1789, as well as the occupation of the Ionian Islands by France between 1797-1799 and 1807-1814, led to the spread of Western ideas to the Balkan geography (Roudometof, 1998, pp. 21-28). It must be noted that attempts by Western Europe to create an identity for the Greeks led to the Greek Revolt of 1821, led by Alexander Ipsilantis. Britain openly supported the Greeks and the British Levant Company was engaged in intensive trade activities with the Greeks. Thus, it was aimed that with the establishment of an independent Greek state, commercial relations would increase and British goods would be comfortably transferred to the east. In addition, religious fanatical groups in British society at the time argued that the Greeks should be supported against the Turks (Demirhan, 2012, pp. 44-45). After a while, the revolts, first in Wallachia and Moldavia, and then in the Morea, evolved into an international problem and with the intervention of the Great powers, solutions were found to the disadvantage of the Ottoman State. According to M. Mazower, if the Western powers had not supported the nationalist movements in the Balkans, the results of the revolts would have been limited (Çelik, 2019, p. 9). The fact that the revolts had economic as well as political objectives cannot be denied, as it is seen that economic actors in Britain supported the Greek revolt.

It should not be forgotten that the Greeks were supported by both Britain and Russia. In this context, Russia founded the *Filiki Eteria* Society in Odessa in 1814 to establish a

Greek state by revolting Greeks and other Christian elements against the Ottoman State in the Balkans. With the efforts of this society, the revolt spread rapidly in the Morea (*Peloponnese*) peninsula, Thessalonica, Thessaly, and the Aegean islands (Aydın, 2018, p. 304). However, apart from Filiki Eteria, the activities of the *Elinoglosson Ksanadoxion*, founded in Paris in 1809 by Kalimahi and Grigorio Zaliki, are noteworthy. Ostensibly concerned with education, the association was in fact fighting for the independence of Greece. The money raised to provide scholarships for Greek students studying in Paris was used as arms and ammunition during the Greek uprising (Erman, 2019, pp. 48-49). During the uprising, more than 20.000 Muslim Turks -men, women, and children- were massacred by the Greeks. Defenceless Muslims, who were forced to leave their homes, were slaughtered by Greek gangs on the way as they tried to migrate to other regions (Clair, 2008, p. 1). As claimed by Salahi Sonyel, more than 50.000 people had lost their lives during the Greek uprising until 1822. Britain, France, and Russia were supporting the Greek rebels with money, arms, and fighters. Also, the intelligence organizations of these countries provided the Greeks with tactical and intelligence information (Sonyel, 1998, pp. 115-120). It can be said that religious, economic and political parameters were among the main reasons for France's support for Greece (Kayıran&Metintaş, 2018, p. 40). Besides, Russia supported the rebellion of groups including Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian rebels in the Balkans. It was known that the Ottoman State would suppress the rebellions, but Russian troops would intervene in Balkan geography. When the Ottoman State decided to appoint a governor or intervene in the Balkans, it had to get Russia's approval (Turan, 1999, pp. 270-271). It can be claimed that in the Greek uprising, the intervention of Western states, either directly or indirectly, was visible. Both commercial and politically motivated aid effectively spread the rebellion. Greek gangs systematically attempted massacres to reduce the Muslim population. This is where the importance of intelligence comes into play. The Greeks, acting on intelligence information provided by Western states, carried out activities aimed at changing the demographic structure of the region.

It is important to note that although Greeks did not constitute a majority of the total population of the region, they longed for a multinational state. Alternatively, the desire to create a limited nation-state in areas where Greeks were concentrated became prominent.

Finally, the idea of creating Greek principalities, each with its own autonomous administration, came to the fore. These three pillars of pre-revolutionary planning were by no means aimed at full independence. It is essential to highlight that when the Rums' secession from the Ottoman State was on the agenda, it was unthinkable not to have foreign support. This situation carried the risk of coming under the control of a foreign state. Therefore, before the revolt, there was no unity in the political objectives of the Greeks and there were deep contradictions between the plans put forward (Diamandouros, 1976, pp. 25-27).

During and after the Greeks' rebellion attempt, many aid activities were carried out in their favour in European capitals and various committees were set up. There was an apparent sympathy for the Greeks throughout the European countries. In this regard, the *London Greek Committee* was established in 1823 and the *Paris Greek Committee* in 1825. In defence of the Greek "cause", Lord Byron, Europe's most important romantic poet, used expressions in his poems that supported the Greek revolt. Greek admiration in Europe at the time was intense, and the discourse that Turks were "barbaric" was adopted, ignoring the massacres committed by Greeks against Turks during the revolt. At the root of Greek admiration in European capitals and even in the US was the belief that the Greeks were the descendants of Ancient Greece, the cradle of European civilization. In Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem *Hellas*, it is stated that "*We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our art have their roots in Greece*" (Heraclides&Dialla, 2015, p. 110). It can be realized that the concept of Hellenism was intensively kept on the agenda by the European states during this period. The main purpose of emphasizing Hellenism in the social and cultural spheres was to give political legitimacy to the Greek revolt. The fact that the massacres committed by the Greeks against the Turks were ignored by the European states is also a result of this.

It should be noted that the evaluation of the motivation behind the material and moral support of the Western states to the Greeks only as a longing for Ancient Greece may lead to wrong analyzes on the issue. From historical perspective, each great power had its own political interests. Britain, Russia, and France had political conflicts at the time and wanted to get Greece, which was in a strategic position, on their side in order to maintain

power in the Mediterranean. These countries have tried to create parties close to them in order to intervene in the internal politics of Greece (Kurt, 2018, p. 107-108). On the other hand, the cultural and political development of Greek society accelerated in the early years of the 19th century due to the relatively favourable economic conditions (Kitromilides, 1990, p. 5). It can be easily said that, Greece remained under the influence of Western states in both foreign and domestic policy.

Another important issue is that after the establishment of the independent state of Greece in 1830, Hellenism began to move in a direction where two centres were important, rather than being ruled from a single centre. While only İstanbul was at the forefront before, Athens, which was moving in a different political and ideological path, became a new centre. The Orthodox elites residing in İstanbul until the 1870s were extremely sceptical about newborn Greece's political ambitions. It must be recognized that the powers and status of the Orthodox in İstanbul were determined by the laws of the Ottoman State (Konortas, 2013, p. 222). The Orthodox elites perceived Athens as a threat to their position as the new centre and adopted this attitude. In the second half of the 19th century, educated Rums in İstanbul launched a struggle to standardize the Greek dialects spoken in the Black Sea and Cappadocia. In this way, a new ideological perspective was tried to be developed with reference to the Greek state (Georgelin, 2006, p. 31).

It is a well-known fact that the wind of nationalism that was blowing in the West also affected the Rums and Western intellectuals supported the Rum people in their revolt against the Ottoman State (Zacharia, 2008, p. 12). Patriarch Gregory V was Patriarch three times. During his first term (1797-1798), pamphlets written by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and printed in İstanbul condemned the revolutions in Europe. Patriarch Gregory V, who served as Patriarch for the second time between 1806-1808, was dismissed because of his support for the Serbian rebellions. During his third term as Patriarch between 1818-1821, the Greek revolt broke out (Karabiçak, 2023, pp. 85-86). As a result, Patriarch Gregory V was hanged by the Ottoman State for his involvement in the 1821 revolt (Erdal, 2004, p. 34). Some Greek intellectuals argued that Greece should expand gradually. They believed that an "Eastern Empire" should be established, including the minorities within the Ottoman State, and that Hellenism would spread in

this way. As a result, the Ottoman States' power would be on the wane and control of the minorities would be more difficult (Alexandris, 1992, pp. 37-38). The Patriarchate did not believe that the rebellion would establish an independent Greek state and considered a rebellion supported by the West as an undesirable development (Millas, 1999, p. 143). At this point, the Patriarchate, which has authority in İstanbul, was extremely worried about the latest circumstances and faced another center of power in Athens. For this reason, the Patriarchate preferred to side with the Ottoman State in the face of advances.

It should be known that the Orthodox Rums in the Ottoman State were free to practise their faith and were autonomous in their internal affairs (Georgelin, 2005, p. 20). Moreover, the Rum Orthodox community enjoyed the most favourable administrative and judicial status. The Rum Patriarchate enjoyed more privileges than the other communities. More importantly, the Rums held state offices and were influential in the bureaucracy (Ortaylı, 2009). The Ottoman State was attentive to the preservation of this welfare environment provided to the Orthodox Rums. Yet, as the relations between the Rums and the Western states developed, the existing order began to deteriorate. The inadequacy of the activities of the Ottoman State to prevent the relations between the Rums and the Western states will be clearly observed in the following years. The Rums, who were free to practice their faith within the Ottoman State, would begin to demand more. Consequently, unrest would grow and the Western states would a greater influence in the region.

It must be pointed out that the Greeks declared their independence on 24 April 1830, after attempting to rebel (Güvenbaş, 2020, p. 123). Subsequently, France, Britain and Russia accepted the independence of Greece and informed the Ottoman State that Greece should be recognized. Thus, it had to recognize Greece. (Demirözü, 2005, p. 297). In addition, during the war, which lasted intermittently for about ten years, the Greek elite was endeavouring to build a nation (Clogg, 1992, p. 47). At the time of independence, the Greeks were aware of the diplomatic, political, economic and military support of Britain and Russia. By the time of the revolt, Greece had absorbed only 25 per cent of the Rums in Anatolia and the Balkans. This situation increased the conflict and rivalry between the Ottoman State and Greece. She believed that a complete national reunification would take

place in the event of the complete collapse of the Ottoman State (Sotirović, 2018). Greek politicians did not believe that they could succeed just by gaining independence. Therefore, they considered the Ottoman State to be their biggest obstacle and stressed the need to go further to build a great Greece.

It must be noted that the Greek Orthodox Church declared its independence in 1833 without informing the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of İstanbul. After this event, relations between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate were completely broken until 1850. Greece sought to strengthen the power of the Greek Orthodox Church in Athens as the new centre of Hellenism. In this context, the University of Athens was founded in 1837 to further strengthen Greek national identity. The main purpose of the establishment of the university was to spread Greek culture to the Rums living in the Ottoman State. Besides, Rum students residing outside Greece were offered scholarships and opportunities to complete their education (Ntokme, 2010, pp. 408-410). As noted above, although Greek nationalism was attempted to rise in Athens, for the Rums within the Ottoman State, the nationalist discourses rising from Athens were not accepted unquestioningly. After declaring its independence, Greece faced an economic crisis. As a result, many Rums did not buy into the nationalist rhetoric in Athens and preferred to remain within the Ottoman State, which was in a better economic position. It should be underlined that from the second half of the 19th century onwards, there was a labour migration to the Ottoman State due to the economic crisis in Greece (Sjöberg, 2017, p. 28). After Greece gained its independence, it was observed that it needed more aid from the European states. The nationalist discourses of Greece, which was experiencing economic difficulties, were insufficient in the first phase.

2.1.2. The Megali Idea and Greece

After Greece gained its independence, she became a follower of an ideal called the “Megali Idea”. Accordingly, it concentrated on activities aimed at reviving the Byzantine-Greek Empire, with its centre in İstanbul. The Megali Idea coincides with the imperialist policies of the Greeks from 1798 onwards. In the words of the Greek historian Panayatis Pipinelis, during this period Greek politicians endeavoured to unite all Greeks and to

make Greece a national state. In this context, many in Greece were devoted to the goal of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire (Sofuoğlu, 1994, p. 211).

It is a well-known fact that in Greece, the idea of the Megali Idea was first expressed in 1844 in the parliamentary speech by Prime Minister Kolettis (Çulha, 2019, p. 158). In this speech, he stated that Greece did not only consist of the Kingdom of Greece, but that those who resided in Ioannina, Thessaloniki, Serres, Edirne, İstanbul, Trabzon, Crete or Samos were also Greeks. From this perspective, Hellenism had two great centres and Athens was the capital of the kingdom. İstanbul, on the other hand, was mentioned as the great capital and was represented as the hope and dream of the Greeks. The desire of Greece to be positioned in such a wide geographical area was manifested in 1864 with the title "*King of the Hellenes*" for King George I, rather than King of Greece. The Megali Idea is not a concept that is handled only with emotional fervour. On the contrary, it appears as an effective factor in the creation of the national consciousness of the Greeks. Therefore, the idea of recapturing İstanbul for Christendom shows the main goal at this point (Smith, 1998, pp. 2-3).

It is necessary to note that this declaration of Kolettis had the potential to bring the Greeks living in different regions under the wind of nationalism since the mid-19th century. Despite the establishment of an independent Greek State, the need to "save" the Rums living under the Ottoman State, who were referred to as "unsaved", was also brought to the agenda. This point of view signalled that Greece would be at war with the Ottoman State in the years to come (Gülsevin Tamer, 2020, p. 224). In this manner, the support of revolutionary movements within the borders of the Ottoman State and the development of diplomatic means were determined as the priority political moves by Greece in order to realize the Megali Idea (Zafeiridis, 2020, p. 31). Thus, the racial hatred instilled in the Greeks by Western intellectuals led to a desire for territorial expansion at the expense of the Turks (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 154). Within this framework, the goal that Greece set for itself as the Megali Idea encompassed a vast geography. The Greeks, united around this ideal, tried to seize the Anatolian geography in the following years. From the point of view of strategic intelligence, the goals of the Megali Idea are not realistic. The Turks have been living in the designated geography for centuries. Therefore, the goal of

conquering this region is an unrealistic approach. It should not be forgotten that strategic intelligence sets goals that can be achieved.

After the establishment of the Greek state, steps were taken to realize the Megali Idea. In 1894, the “*Ethniki Eteria*” Society was created in Athens by 14 Greek officers. The main aim of this society was to achieve the realization of the Megali Idea. In addition, the “*Epitropy*” Society, founded in the same year, advocated the autonomous administration of Crete and it later declared that Crete should be annexed to Greece. Also, Greek organizations such as the Greek Press Society (*Rum Matbuat Cemiyeti*), the Greek Thrace Society (*Rum Trakya Cemiyeti*), and the Greek Society for the Defence of the Nation (*Rum Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) were established by Greece (Sarı, 2017, pp. 445-446).

Another critical issue is that members of the *Ethniki Eteria* Society took to the mountains and rebelled in Macedonia. In this way, it was aimed for foreign states to intervene in the region (Doğtekin, 2022, p. 5). From this point of view, Greece aimed not only to expand its territory, but also to unite with Rums living outside Greece under the ideal of the Megali Idea through the societies and educational institutions it established. Thus, it could more easily occupy the lands of the Ottoman State (Erdem, 2014, p. 99). The Rums living in Ottoman lands were exposed to the propaganda of Greece. During this period, the Greek side focused not only on political and military aspects, but also aimed to unite the Greeks under a single roof through education.

Greece’s pursuit of the Megali Idea was being closely watched by the Western powers, and its behaviour in this direction could change the balance in the region. It could have had a disruptive effect on the policies of other states in Europe by siding with one of the great powers and seeking to realize this dream. Therefore, Britain, France, and Russia did not leave Greece alone, but used it when necessary according to their own policies. However, Western states did not intervene in Greece’s policy of violence against the Muslim population by acting in accordance with the Megali Idea (‘Arşiv Belgelerine Göre’, 1996, pp. XIX-XX). Each state approached Greece in parallel with its national interests. As a result, the above-mentioned countries had a great influence on Greece’s domestic and foreign policy.

On the one hand, Greece was trying to make itself politically strong, and on the other hand, it was trying to develop cultural ties with Rums outside the country. It should not be forgotten that the most important issue for her was the capture of İstanbul (Finefrock, 1980, p. 1049). Moreover, it is known that among the goals of the Megali Idea are; obtaining the full independence of Greece, capturing Western Thrace, Thessaloniki, Dodecanese Islands and Crete, including Western Anatolia within the borders of Greece, establishing the Pontic Greek Government, annexing Cyprus to Greek territory, taking Gökçeada and Bozcaada (Kalelioğlu, 2008, pp. 108-109). In addition to these regions, Thessaly, Epirus, the Ionian Islands and Macedonia are also among the Megali Idea targets (Gülsevin Tamer, 2020, p. 225). The studies of the Greek historians Spyridon Zampelios and Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos gave ideological support to the above-mentioned irredentist policy of Greece. These historians recognized Greece as the continuation of the Byzantine Empire (Kamouzis, 2014, p. 228). They reconsidered the myths, symbols and traditions of Ancient Greece and sought to demonstrate the significance of the concepts of that period for the Modern Greek State (Kamouzis, 2013, p. 21). At this point, Greece has entered the process of proving the existence of the Megali Idea and has tried to prove, through historians, that this ideal is real.

As indicated above, Greece endeavoured to establish Hellenic imperialism in the Near East. The idea propagated by Greek historians that Greece is the continuation of the Byzantine Empire is far from reality and has nothing to do with the Byzantine Empire in terms of race or history. The aim of Greek historians is to create a common Hellenic identity for Greeks through the Megali Idea. Hence, an attempt was made to create a national consciousness among the Greek people. Acting with such an understanding, the main goal of the Greeks was to “*civilize and Hellenize the East*”. According to the historian Pashalis M. Kitromilidis, the real purpose of the Megali Idea was to create political equality between Greeks living in Greece and Rums living abroad, although the real aim was to expand the borders of Greece. The only method to achieve this was the establishment and spread of national education (Erdem, 2013, pp. 64-65). By adopting a nationalist discourse, the elites in Greece emphasized that the Greek presence would not remain solely within the borders of the Greek State (Mania, 2020, p. 5).

After gaining independence, Greece acted in accordance with the objectives of strengthening the authority of the state, modernizing public institutions and, as mentioned earlier, establishing the Great State of Greece with all Greeks under one roof (Veremis, 2004, p. 53). The Greek State has tried to realize the Megali Idea step by step. In the context of strategic intelligence, it can be seen that Greece made long-term plans to achieve the Megali Idea. The next goal of Greece, which gained its independence in 1830 through the use of tactical and operational intelligence, was to unite Greeks around the ideal of the Megali Idea through propaganda. Recognizing that education is the most important element in the creation of national consciousness, Greek politicians have carried out their activities in this direction. However, it should not be forgotten that Greece's Megali Idea claims do not have a solid historical and geographical basis.

It should be noted that Greece sought to expand its territory. In this respect, Britain ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864 and Greece annexed Thessaly and Arta in 1881. These gains were small steps for Greece on the road to the Megali Idea (Dalezidou, 2002, p. 48) In addition, Greece's foreign policy focused mainly on Crete. It should be remembered that Muslims lived in Crete as well as Rums. The Ottoman State had carried out reforms on the island in order to protect the Rums of Crete from Greek provocations and to prevent the ambitions of European states in the region. They interfered in the internal affairs of the Ottoman State in Crete in order to gain political and commercial supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. It is well known that Crete had become a place of constant uprisings and rebellions. The revolts, which were brought under control during this period, took place again in 1897. Greece did its best to spread the rebellion in Crete. In this context, the Greek military started an invasion attempt in the island and committed massacres against Muslims in Crete. In 15 Muslim villages in Estiye, out of a total of 2500 people, only 28 were able to save their lives and many Muslim villages were burned and destroyed by the Rums. European states tried to persuade Greece through diplomatic means in the face of the atrocities committed by the Rums. But when these efforts failed, the Ottoman army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Rums in Crete and Greece demanded an armistice (Adıyeke, 2017, pp. 1111-1114). It is seen that Greece tried to increase its military effectiveness and no serious attempt was made by the European states against the systematic massacre of Muslims by the Rums.

It is clearly recognized that the goals of the Megali Idea have a serious place in Greece's foreign policy (Alexandris, 1982, pp. 137-138). In addition, Crete plays an important role for Greece due to its strategic position in the country. For this reason, during the war, Greece ignored the ceasefire calls of the European states and increased the level of violence. Crete was also significant for them because of its strategic location and commercial aspect.

It is important to point out that after the intervention of the Great powers, Crete was given an autonomous administration under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State. It was decided that Greece would pay a war indemnity of 4 million Turkish liras to the Ottoman State. The Great powers set up an international financial committee for both the payment of war reparations by Greece and the repayment of loans granted to it (Dalezidou, 2002, p. 48). Greece's heavy defeat at the hands of the Ottoman State in 1897 was an important turning point, as it showed that Greece's military capacity was not sufficient to realize the Megali idea. Therefore, it can be said that there is a great contradiction between its current military power and the goals of the Megali Idea. After this defeat, Greece fell into a severe economic crisis and approximately one sixth of its population emigrated (Özgören, 2022, p. 354). Although Greece tried to implement long-term projects under Megali Idea, it was not successful. The war of 1897 clearly showed that the Megali idea was not realistic. It is understood that Greece did not act within the framework of strategic intelligence. In order to manage the war, economic capacity must be as strong as military competence.

2.2. ACTIVITIES OF GREECE PRIOR TO THE OCCUPATION OF ANATOLIA

Before the invasion of Anatolia, Greece undertook intensive domestic and foreign policy activities to minimize the negative events that might occur during the invasion. During this period, Greek foreign policy went through a traumatic period due to the conflicts between Venizelos and King Constantine. The question of whether Greece would take part in the First World War on the side of the Allies or whether it would pursue a policy of neutrality is the main focus of this section. The diplomatic activities of Venizelos, who represented Greece at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, were remarkable. Venizelos'

aim at the Paris Peace Conference was to convince the Entente states to invade Anatolia. This process, which covers the period before the occupation of Anatolia, can be considered as the preparatory phase in terms of Greece's strategic intelligence.

Venizelos, who wanted to pursue an active foreign policy during and after the First World War, never gave up his ambitions in Anatolia. In this context, the behaviour of the Rum population and the Greek forces in Anatolia and the the question of how Anatolia was tried to be prepared for the occupation before the invasion should be clarified.

2.2.1. The Venizelos-King Constantine Struggle and Greek Foreign Policy

It should be noted that Greece's defeat in 1897 raised the possibility of regaining the lost territories among the Balkan nations. Moreover, the opposition of the great powers to the territorial arrangements in the Balkans caused political mobilizations in the region. During this period, Greek domestic politics were in turmoil, and this complex order in Greece continued until the Gudi Military Coup⁵ of 15 August 1909. After the military coup, it was decided to reform many areas in Greece. In this manner, the military committee advocated the preparation of a new constitution and invited Venizelos to the government after the coup in order to revise the Constituent Assembly. He got along well with both the military committee and King Georgios, founded his own party and became the Prime Minister of Greece on 6 October 1910 (Güvenbaş, 2020, pp. 126-127). The Venizelos government was sworn in and the ministers were experienced politicians. Afterwards, the government began to work on legislation (Erdem, 2009, p. 65).

It must be stressed that when Venizelos came to power, he began to act in accordance with the aims of the Megali Idea. First of all, the Greek army and navy were also in a very weak position. For this reason, Venizelos asked Britain and France for assistance and he

⁵ The officers in the Greek army were very angry about Greece's defeat by the Ottoman State in 1897 and were in favour of revenge. So, the officers were in opposition to the politicians. In such an environment, young officers began to organise. The military alliance that was formed stated that the army should be redesigned and the land and naval forces should be reformed. After the military memorandum prepared by the officers was sent to the Greek press, soldiers gathered in the Gudi region, east of Athens, on 15 August 1909. The Greek government offered no serious resistance and a military coup took place in Greece (Moiras, 2006, pp. 63-80).

also accelerated diplomatic negotiations to form an alliance against the Ottoman State in the Balkans. With the Greek defeat of 1897, Venizelos realized that Greece could not win a battle against the Ottoman State on its own and tried to develop a more planned foreign policy within the framework of the Megali Idea. While the Greek army was strengthening thanks to the aid received from Britain and France, the Battle of Tripoli, which took place between the Ottoman State and Italy in September 1911, was an opportunity for him. In October 1912, before the end of the Battle of Tripoli, he succeeded in forming a Balkan Alliance consisting of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro (Yellice, 2018, pp. 505-506). Greece had become ready for the Balkan Wars and had learnt that it was necessary to cooperate against the Ottoman State.

It is worth noting that during the war Greece was brutal towards the Muslim population, as it was in Crete. In this regard, the American missionary priest P.B. Kennedy came to the US consulate in Gorice, Albania, in February 1913 and stated that Greek troops had burned the villages around Gorice and committed massacres. Greece used irregular troops as well as its regular army. In this context, Colonel von Anderten, a German officer, indicated that Greek soldiers and notorious members of the secret society (*komitadjis*)⁶ carried out atrocities and broke into Turkish houses and stole valuables. During this period, robbery, looting and attacks on Muslim women became commonplace. In many places, Albanians took to the mountains to defend themselves against the Greeks and Serbs (The United States National Archives, 867.00/498).

As a result of the Balkan War, the Treaty of London was signed between the Ottoman State and the Balkan states on 30 May 1913. The Ottoman State lost all its territories west of the Midye-Enez border. However, the Balkan states could not agree on new borders and the Second Balkan War took place when Greece, Serbia and Romania declared war on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the Ottoman State took advantage of the conflict between the

⁶ Komita is the name given to the top level where decisions are made and policies are formulated. Komitadji are those in the ruling class who plan the activities of the gangs. Gangs are those who carry out the plans set by the komita. The main characteristic of the komitas is that although they appear to be associations set up for humanitarian purposes, they act in the name of nationalist interests. The gangs made up of Christians took the lead in carrying out attacks against Turks. The Komitas tried to create the impression that the Ottoman State could not govern the region and to ensure the intervention of Western states by carrying out actions that disrupted public order in the Balkans (Çanlı, 2017, p. 2826).

Balkan states and managed to retake Edirne from the Bulgarians on 23 July 1913. During the Balkan Wars, the Rums living in the Ottoman territories volunteered to join the Greek Army. During the most intense period of the Balkan Wars, according to the the League of Nations archives the number of Rums coming from Anatolia was around 60.000. Also, about 3000 Rums from the town of Urla were enlisted in the Greek army (The League of Nations Archives, S394/59/1). At the close of the Balkan Wars, Greece doubled its territory, including Crete (Çetin, 2010, p. 151). Indeed, while Greece had 63.000 km² of land before the Balkan Wars, it had 120.000 km² at the end of the Balkan Wars (Yalçın, 2017, p. 38). With the victory of Greece in successive wars, Constantine, who was the new King of Greece at that time, began to be shown as the leader who would realize the Megali Idea (Kinley, 2016, p. vii).

In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Greece continued to committed massacres against the Turks living in the new settlements it had acquired. For this reason, Turks started to migrate to Ottoman lands in large masses. The Ottoman State settled the incoming Turks in Thrace and the cities on the coast of Western Anatolia. In these regions, there were Rums who had previously rebelled against the Ottoman State and carried out activities in favour of Greece during the Balkan Wars, and those on both sides were exchanged between the Ottoman State and Greece (Sofuoğlu, 1994, p. 214). As a result of the Balkan Wars, the demographic structure of the Balkan geography changed significantly. Approximately 2.300.000 to 2.500.000 Rums, Bulgarians and Turks were forced to leave the Balkans (Yıldırım, 2012, p. 83). In such an atmosphere, Take Jonesco, the Romanian Minister of Interior, paid a visit to İstanbul in 1914 and met with Talat Pasha. He informed Talat Pasha that he could mediate the population exchange between Turkey and Greece and this offer was accepted. It should not be forgotten that Venizelos was in favour of the migration of Turks from the Aegean Sea towards the interior of Anatolia. Afterwards, negotiations had begun between Galip Kemalî Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, representing the Turkish side, and Prime Minister Venizelos, representing the Greek side, while migrations from both sides continued. A delegation led by Muhtar Bey also travelled to İzmir to examine the legal aspects of the issue. A draft exchange agreement was drawn up in 1914. In this context, after the Balkan Wars, there was an intensive migration movement across Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace, the Dardanelles and the Aydın

region. The migration movement, which covered such a large area, placed a heavy burden on the economies of both countries. Because of this, both the Ottoman State administration and the Greek Government approved the establishment of a “*joint commission*” to regulate the population exchange. According to the draft treaty, the Rums living in Western Thrace, around the Dardanelles and in Aydın, and Muslims living in Epirus and Macedonia were to be exchange. The transfer of the immigrants to the ports and their embarkation on ships were to take place under the auspices of the Ottoman and Greek Governments. It was agreed that both governments would warn each other if migrants in Greece or Turkey were preparing to leave their territory en masse. The material value of the buildings abandoned by the migrants would be determined by joint sub-committees, which would carry out the necessary inspections and controls. It was stated that the laws and regulations of the Ottoman State would apply in both Turkey and Greece in the case of disputes regarding the establishment of property rights and real estate in general. In this context, the book of Imperial Register (*kuyûd-ı hâkânî*)⁷ available in the Ottoman State was to be used as a criterion. Venizelos made an appointment with Talaat Pasha, who was in Switzerland, to sign the agreement in accordance with the principles determined. When Venizelos left Athens for Italy, the First World War broke out and he cancelled his trip, declaring that he wanted to wait for the outcome of the war. As a result, the draft treaty never came into force and was never signed by either the Greek or the Turkish side (The League of Nations Archives, R1671/41/19720/19720).

At the outbreak of the First World War, Greece, like Italy, was initially a proponent of neutrality (Çolakoğlu, 2022, p. 113). There were two different views in Greece. Venizelos declared that Greece could not remain neutral in a war in which the Ottoman State was involved. He also believed that the war would be won by the Allied powers and that it was right to join the war on the side of the Allies in order to realise the Megali Idea. For this reason, he argued that Greece should take a risk and join the war. King Constantine, on the other hand, was against a hasty decision to enter the war (Yellice, 2016, pp. 210-211). Venizelos and King Constantine were influential in the foreign policy of Greece

⁷ It is the name given to the registers that were created for military, administrative and financial purposes in the Ottoman State, and had a function in determining population, land use and revenues (Çınar, 2015, p. 146).

during the war. Accordingly, as it was stated, Venizelos believed that the Entente states would win the war and that Greece should be part of this bloc. From this perspective, On 18 August 1914, Greece offered its support to the Allied powers against the Ottoman State. Winston Churchill, the British Minister of the Navy, welcomed the idea of Greece joining the Allied powers. Although the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, supported the idea, he refrained from making a hasty decision because of Russia's position. On the other hand, the French politician Henri de Marguerie predicted that the Entente powers would never put pressure on Greece in their own political interests. At this time, the Ottoman State had not yet entered the war, and Britain argued that in the event of an offensive against the Ottoman State, a treaty should be concluded between British and Greek troops. King Constantine and Admiral Kerr, the Chief of the British Naval Mission in Greece, argued that the war should only be entered into if the Ottoman State attacked Greece. Venizelos did not favour this idea and wanted to resign. Later, although he remained in office, he started to have disagreements with King Constantine (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-001; Howard, 1931, p. 148).

According to the Venizelos archive documents of the Benaki Museum, the correspondence between the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the political director Dimitrios Sicilianos, dated 8 August 1915, was dominated by the view that İzmir should be given to the Rums in accordance with the Megali idea. It was pointed out that the Italians did not claim any rights over İzmir and that France, Britain or Italy had no ambitions over Western Anatolia since the partition of the Ottoman State had been discussed (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-003). At this point, Greece avoids confronting the realities on the ground. As will be explained later, there were deep differences of opinion between Italy and Greece over Western Anatolia. But, Greece declared that it would not relinquish İzmir under any circumstances. Greece's political interests in Western Anatolia coincided with Italy's ambitions. Greek politicians argued that the region should be completely given to them.

After the Ottoman State entered the war on 30 October 1914, Venizelos argued that Greece could not pursue a policy of neutrality. According to him, Greece had to side with Britain in order to realize the Megali idea. On the other hand, King Constantine believed

that the victor of the First World War would be Germany. However, he did not want Greece, which had just emerged from the Balkan Wars, to be involved in a large-scale war. In addition, King Constantine, who was married to the sister of the German King Kaiser William II, refrained from siding with the Entente states (Çolakoğlu, 2022, pp. 113-114). Venizelos declared that remaining neutral in the war was the most dangerous attitude. He stated that if Greece entered the war, Bulgaria and Romania should also enter the war. If Germany won the war, he believed that the Ottoman State would attack Greece. In short, Venizelos was in favour of an expansionist policy against the Ottoman State. On the other hand, King Constantine believed that the Allies would not support Greece enough to eliminate the Turks (Demirhan, 2008, pp. 70-72).

Kaiser William II endeavoured to persuade Constantine to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. King Constantine, on the contrary, conveyed to the German King that a neutral stance in the Balkans would be in Greece's interests (Cassimatis, 1988, pp. 17-18). When the disagreement between Venizelos and Constantine became apparent, Venizelos met with Admiral Koundouriotis and exchanged ideas on whether to pursue a different policy by breaking with the King. The Admiral encouraged Venizelos to revolt and they shared the view that the King's pro-German policy was a betrayal of Greece (Gibbons, 1920, p. 281).

It is noted that there was a discord between the two leaders regarding the goals of the Megali Idea. While Venizelos saw the First World War as an opportunity and planned to inflict a heavy defeat on the Ottoman State by siding with the Entente powers, Constantine was more cautious and strived to remain neutral and believed that Greece should adopt a non-aligned stance in the Balkans. In the process of producing and implementing strategic intelligence, differences of opinion between leaders emerged as a major challenge. Venizelos tried to realize the Megali idea by relying on the help of Western states. King Constantine, despite the support of Germany, believed that a neutral stance during the war would benefit Greece. If decision-makers start to act according to their ideologies, detached from the reality on the ground, they may take wrong decisions. Therefore, the intelligence provided should not be disconnected from the reality on the ground. Looking at the events mentioned above, Venizelos forced Greece to adopt a foreign policy method

within the framework of the Megali Idea understanding rather than strategic intelligence predictions.

It must be pointed out that in his declaration of 29 January 1915, King Constantine appointed Ioannis Metaxas as Chief of the Greek General Staff, thinking that he would keep Venizelos in check (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 0173-0002-0022). At this point, Constantine was afraid of being harmed by a slight change in the domestic balance of power. The views of Ioannis Metaxas on Greek foreign policy will be given later on, but what he did to keep Greece out of Venizelos' hands is quite remarkable.

On 15 February 1915, after the decision to land in the Dardanelles, the Allied powers began negotiations with Greece. Sir Francis Elliot, the British Ambassador to Greece, stated in his meeting with Venizelos that Britain wanted to utilize Greece's naval and land power. In the memorandum he sent to Constantine, Venizelos explained that if Greece participated in the Dardanelles Operation, it would gain great advantages, Anatolia would be given to Greece as promised by the Entente states, Britain would give Cyprus to Greece and, most importantly, it would have the opportunity to enter İstanbul on the side of the Entente states. Consequently, Venizelos convinced King Constantine. However, Ioannis Metaxas objected to the decision of war and presented a detailed report to Constantine. According to Metaxas, Russia was still a major player in the region. In such an environment, Greece would not be able to have a say in İstanbul. A Greek military operation against the Dardanelles or Anatolia would make it difficult to defend the Macedonian territories. In addition, Greece does not have the power to manage the Anatolian territories promised to Greece by the Entente powers. After reading the report, Constantine changed his mind and decided not to take part in the Dardanelles campaign.⁸ Upon this decision, Venizelos resigned as Prime Minister on 21 February 1915. In the

⁸ Unable to convince Greece, the British and French navies launched the Dardanelles operation on 19 February 1915. In Greek domestic politics, King Constantine's non-participation in the Dardanelles operation was criticized by pro-Venizelos newspapers. These newspapers argued that Greeks should be at the Dardanelles to liberate İstanbul from the Turks and realize the Megali idea. King Constantine was accused of being pro-German and of not having the courage to fulfil the Megali Idea. Pro-King newspapers, on the other hand, said that the Megali Idea was a dangerous policy and that Greece should act cautiously (Yellice, 2016, pp. 224-225).

elections held in Greece, Venizelos won again and he was given the task of forming the government (Özsüer, 2015, pp. 38-40). On the other hand, French government considered that the non-participation of Greece in the Dardanelles campaign was a mistake (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 011-17).

Within this framework, Metaxas also included in his report information about the Turkish-Greek war and the scenarios that might arise during the war. According to him, even if the Greek army occupied an important port city such as İzmir, this situation would not be devastating for Turkey. He argued that if the Greek army organized a military operation towards the interior of Anatolia, the occupation of the ports on the western coasts by Greece would not cause enough damage to Turkey. The western coasts are regions where the Europeans and Rums were more active in trade than the Turks. In order for the Greek army to invade Turkey definitively, it must destroy the main Turkish forces in Anatolia or Thrace. Besides, if Greece enters into such a battle, it must have secured its naval superiority (Erdem, 2009, p. 97). In Metaxas' view, if Greece organized an operation towards the interior of Anatolia, the Turks would have the chance to attack. In this case, the Greek army would adopt a defensive position. Therefore, the Turkish side would allow the Greek army to fight on a wide front and wait to deal a decisive blow to the Rums. This situation can be compared to Napoleon's attempt to invade Russia in 1812. When Napoleon first crossed the Russian border, he had an army of 500.000 men. By the time the French reached Moscow, however, the army was down to 80.000. The rest of the army had been left behind to protect the transport lines. In such a situation, the retreat was disastrous (Pallis, 1997, p. 32).

Metaxas' report is noteworthy because it highlights the importance of accurate and timely intelligence analysis for decision-makers. Venizelos' attempt to mislead King Constantine by distancing himself from the reality on the ground indicates that he acted in accordance with personal interests or ideological concerns. Metaxas' behaviour, which did not ignore the realities of foreign policy, demonstrates once again the importance of strategic intelligence. By adopting the idea of a long-term foreign policy approach instead of short-term unrealistic goals, he has endeavoured to ensure that decision-makers make the accurate assessments, but he has not been sufficiently effective.

While these developments were taking place in Greece's domestic politics, Rums serving in the Ottoman State were trying to carry out intelligence activities for Greek government. In February 1915, a Greek naval attaché and his assistant working in İstanbul were beaten by an Ottoman official on suspicion of espionage. After the incident, documents containing information about the Ottoman fleet were found on their person (The United States National Archives, 767.68/21-22). Greece prepared for future developments by conducting intelligence activities in the territory of the Ottoman State. In the context of strategic intelligence, it is seen that Greece tried to gather information about the naval power of the Ottoman State through *human intelligence*. Also, obtaining intelligence information abroad under the guise of a diplomat or military attaché is one of the most common methods used by states. Greece, which was to fight in Anatolia in the coming years in line with the Megali Idea, was involved in intelligence activities at an early stage.

It should be noted that Britain was concerned about Greece's strategic position, and correspondence between the British Foreign Office and military officials was intense regarding Greece's position in the war. In the report sent from Greece to the British military official Alfred Milner on 27 April 1915, it was emphasized that Venizelos was an important politician in Greece for the Entente states and that he could take great risks. It also stated that a military force consisting of Britain, France and Greece should be created and that this force would be able to defeat Turkey (The Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham: The Papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain, AC 13/3/67-86). In this context, it is clear that the ultimate aim of Venizelos and the Entente states was to occupy Anatolian territories. In addition, the Entente states declared that they would support Greece's territorial claims in the province of Aydın as long as Greece's foreign policy was compatible with their own (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 011-33).

Although the Allies stated that Greece would not be pressured to enter the war, they promised to provide military aid to Greece if it became involved in the war. A note sent by Venizelos to the Greek embassies in Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Nish, Sofia and Bucharest in September 1915 announced that France and Britain could provide military assistance to Greece if needed (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-

218). Attempts by the Entente powers to draw Greece into the war at all costs centred on promises of military aid. The letter of 8 September 1915 from Théophile Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, to the Greek Foreign Ministry, stated that Greece would be supported in every possible way. He also pointed out that the Entente countries had come to the Balkans as traditional friends of Greece (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-257).

It should be kept in mind that Bulgaria played an important role in Greece's foreign policy during this period. In a telegram sent by Georgios Passarov, the Bulgarian Ambassador in Athens, to the Bulgarian Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov on 15 October 1915, Metaxas' views on Bulgaria were included. According to Metaxas, Greece wanted Bulgaria's friendship and to avoid war. It was stressed that Greece was looking for new friends and that Bulgaria and Greece complemented each other. When Bulgaria's strong army and Greece's naval power come together, the doors of a great cooperation will be opened. It was pointed out that the hostility between the Bulgarians and the Greeks should remain in the past and thus the divisions would be reduced. By eliminating the mistrust between the two states, friendship could be established (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 025-136-175). As a result, Greek government believed that it was a better policy to cooperate with Bulgaria during the war. According to Metaxas, Greece needed friendly relations with its neighbours.

It is essential to highlight that a letter sent by the Allied ambassadors in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 1915 stressed that the Allies should be granted the right to use the port of Thessaloniki and the roads and railways connected to it in return for the aid to be given to Greece. It was also mentioned that any damage done to the region by the Allies during the war through the use of Greek territory would be compensated after the war (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 025-184-186). The issue of putting military pressure on Greece was brought to the agenda by the Entente states during this period. According to the report prepared by the British General Staff on 1 November 1915, against the possibility of Greece launching an attack against the Central Powers, there was an Allied force consisting of two French divisions and one British division, with a total of 43.000 soldiers from the Vardar Valley to Thessaloniki.

It was stated that two French and two British divisions were on their way from France to Thessaloniki and that the last division force would depart from Marseille on 4 December 1915, thus the total number of Allied troops in Macedonia was estimated to be around 150.000. The report also emphasized that the entrance to the gulf of Thessaloniki was protected by fishnets and safe from submarine attack, and stated that the total strength of the Greek land army was 200.000. At this point, it was noted that military pressure should be brought to bear to ensure Greece's cooperation with the Entente powers. However, the Allied states did not have sufficient military equipment to take such a position. Therefore, it was thought that pressure could be brought to bear through the naval power of the Entente states. In other words, the possibility that such pressure would completely alienate Greece from the Allied states was not overlooked (The Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham: The Papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain, AC 19/5/1-11).

At this point, the Entente states, particularly Britain, adopted a strategic intelligence approach to Greece. Britain tried to act by considering all possible options. During the First World War, the fact that Greece was not involved in the war put the Entente states in a difficult position. King Constantine's attitude of neutrality led the Entente states to look for other options. As mentioned above, Britain wanted to utilize Thessaloniki, the strategic gulf of Greece.

In this report, which is highly classified, the ambitions of the Entente powers towards Greece can be clearly seen. Because of its strategic position, Greece was under intense pressure to enter the war on the side of the Entente powers. As a result, there was almost a division in Greece due to the different foreign policy approaches of Venizelos and King Constantine. In October 1915, with Bulgaria's involvement in the First World War, Britain and France sent their troops to Thessaloniki. Venizelos did not react to this situation and King Constantine dismissed him in response to Venizelos' lack of reaction. During this period, Venizelos began to meet more frequently with the representatives of the Entente states. In this context, on 18 December 1915, in a meeting with the French Ambassador, he made some suggestions on how Greece could participate in the war. Then, Venizelos declared that the Government of King Constantine would only back

down if there was starvation in Greece. He believed that an embargo on important grains, such as wheat, would topple the King. By September 1916, Venizelos was organizing in Thessaloniki and needed the support of the Entente states. During this time, he established a provisional government in Thessaloniki and continued his activities there. Thus, between 1916 and 1917, a two-headed government emerged in Greece, one in Athens and one in Thessaloniki. (Eser, 2019, pp. 195-196; Yıldırım, 2017, pp. 314-315). Consequently, Venizelos divided Greece in two and organized the *National Defence Army* in Thessaloniki under the protection of the Allied powers (Smith, 1998, p. 188). The telegram sent by Bulgarian Ambassador Georgios Passarov to Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov in 1916 stated that Venizelos was trying to return to power with the support of Britain and France. However, it was highlighted that these attempts aroused hatred in the hearts of the Greek people (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 025-136-180).

During this period, the course of relations between the Entente states and Greece, the operations carried out by the Allied powers against the Ottoman State, the aim to act in cooperation with Greece is reflected in Greek archival documents. If these two actors acted together, the Ottoman State would be dealt a final blow. It would obtain Western Anatolia in return for the military sacrifices it would make. It was stated that this treaty between the Entente powers and Greece should remain secret (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-357). The position and importance of Greece during the war for the Entente powers was very clear and especially Britain wanted to cooperate with Greece in order to eliminate the Ottoman State.

In the report of 6 August 1916 sent by Jean Marie Guillemin, the French Ambassador in Athens, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was mentioned that the names of King Constantine and Venizelos came to the fore in Greek politics, the first was supported by the Germans, and the second was protected by us (the Entente states). It was also stated that Greece was in a diplomatic war and that a victory for Venizelos in the next elections would be tantamount to a victory for the Allies and his defeat would be recognized as a defeat for the Entente states. In his report, Guillemin stressed that this view was not his personal opinion, but that it was the common view of all (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios

Venizelos Archive, 013-016). Meanwhile, the capture of Kavala by the German-Bulgarian alliance in August 1916 increased reactions against King Constantine (Konstantinakou, 2020, p. 1173).

Within this framework, Britain and France reacted against King Constantine's policy of neutrality and declared that he was the only obstacle to Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 025-136-173). Thus, the Great powers intervened in Greek domestic politics in accordance with their own interests. As mentioned above, King Constantine's moves in Greek foreign policy were contrary to the interests of the Entente states. Therefore, Venizelos became an important figure in Greek politics for them.

It is essential to highlight that in correspondence between the British Ambassador to Greece, Sir Francis Elliot, and Venizelos, dated 4 October 1916, it was announced that the British Government could not officially recognize the provisional government in Thessaloniki at this stage. In addition, Venizelos informed Sir Francis Elliot that the movement he had initiated was not anti-Royalist. Therefore, he declared that he could intervene through the British Consulate General in Thessaloniki in all matters relating to Thessaloniki. The Allies declared a loan of ten million drachmas to the Athens and Ionian banks, indicating that Venizelos could use this money to continue his activities (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 013-097). Venizelos tried to pretend that he was not against the King in order to gain Britain's support. The financial aid given to him by the Entente states increased his power against the King. In this way, the Entente states avoided direct confrontation with King Constantine.

On the other hand, King Constantine was of the opinion that it was not right to further relations with the Entente states unless there was a promise to preserve the territorial integrity of Greece. He stated that the Entente powers should give Greece a definite territorial guarantee, whether in times of war or peace. The question was whether the Entente states would respect the territorial integrity of Greece until peace was secured. According to King Constantine, Greece was jealous because it had won these territories by war. If the guarantees demanded by Greece were granted by the Entente states, there

would be no obstacle for Greece to enter the war on the side of the Entente states (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 012-358). King Constantine, acting as a wise statesman, realized that the main aim of the Entente states was not to ensure the territorial integrity of Greece. Therefore, by adopting a strategic attitude, he stated that Greece could be involved in the war if its demands were met. Thus, he adopted a policy of not completely breaking off relations with the Entente states.

It must be acknowledged that Britain and France did not hesitate to give Venizelos the support he needed. They were united in taking the necessary measures for the formation and arming of pro-Venizelos Greek volunteer units in areas where King Constantine was strong. In the areas where Venizelos was strong, it was decided that the Allied states would provide financial support to carry out administrative services and continue the functioning of the government without interruption (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 013-104). Furthermore, in a telegram sent to Venizelos by the French Ambassador Jean Marie Guillemin on 27 October 1916, it was stated that the officers who supported Venizelos were imprisoned in Athens and Thessaly would be released and that they could go to Thessaloniki freely if they wished. It was stressed that France considered the Venizelist movement to be patriotic and would continue to support it (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 013-107).

During the First World War, Britain and France increased the pressure on Greece. As the Entente states wanted Greece to enter the war on their side, they directly supported Venizelos and they imposed a grain embargo on southern Greece. This was an attempt to humiliate King Constantine in the eyes of the Greek people. In order for Venizelos to gain more supporters, an attempt was made to put Constantine's administration in a critical position. France was the architect of the embargo policy, which put the king in a difficult situation in Greece. Britain, on the contrary, tried to support Venizelos through propaganda and Britain argued that the liberal press should be strengthened in order to increase the popularity of Venizelos in public opinion. Greek society was experiencing a period of "*national division*" between the supporters of Venizelos and those of Constantine. One part was a firm supporter of the Megali idea, while the other argued for neutrality during the war. Venizelos claimed that King Constantine was leading the

country to disaster and campaigned against him. But, the King did not change his neutral stance. In November 1916, Venizelos, with the support of the Entente states, carried out military activities in Macedonia. Greece's policy of neutrality was thus dealt a blow. The Allies believed that harsh measures should be taken against King Constantine (Kinley, 2016, pp. 42-47).

It must be pointed out that British and French troops landed in Piraeus and Athens in December 1916 to increase pressure on the areas controlled by King Constantine. While the Allies continued to support Venizelos in terms of military equipment and supplies, they were forced to withdraw due to the defence of the King's supporters. In the face of these developments, the Entente states decided to recognize the provisional government of Venizelos and they also demanded compensation from the Government of King Constantine. Thus, the Allied powers wanted to take revenge on him (Clogg, 1992, pp. 91-92).

Moreover, the internal conflicts in Greece had a high financial and political cost. In 1916, Greece had a budget deficit of 500 million drachmas. In order to prevent the disintegration of the Greek army, the Greek authorities told the Entente powers that the shortage of equipment and ammunition should be remedied (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-283). Greece, under the leadership of the Entente powers, faced a great economic crisis. Venizelos, who wanted to enter the First World War, had to meet the minimum military and economic conditions. The aid of the Entente states to her would not be delayed.

In addition to these developments, Italy landed troops in the south of Epirus in April 1917 and the Italian flag began to fly in the occupied villages (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-007). After the political and military developments, Venizelos conveyed to the Entente states in April 1917 that there was no other option but to overthrow the Government of King Constantine (Smith, 2006, p. 156). In this context, 1917 was an important year both for Greece and for the course of the First World War. In Russia, the tsarist regime collapsed in February 1917. Thus, the Tsarist regime, which had given all kinds of support to King Constantine until this time, was abolished. With

the entry of the US into the First World War in April 1917, a change of government took place in France and the Alexandre Ribot Government, which had a harsh stance in favour of the removal of King Constantine from power, took office. In this environment, with the support of Britain and France, Venizelos overthrew the Government of King Constantine and returned to Athens. He handed over the throne to his son Alexandros on 12 June 1917 and the embargoes imposed on Greece by the Entente powers were lifted (Özsüer, 2015, p. 65; Yellice, 2018, p. 507). Following the abdication of King Constantine, the Greek Ambassador in Rome, Lambros Koromilas, sent a telegram to Venizelos, wishing that the new period would bring peace to Greece (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-027). For Italy, developments in Greece were of great importance. The two countries' foreign policies influenced each other. Therefore, Italy closely followed the domestic political processes in Greece that would have an impact on its foreign policy.

Following the developments, Venizelos formed a new government in Athens (Bozkurt, 2010, p. 134). Greece had left behind another important threshold on the road to the Megali Idea, and Venizelos remained faithful to the concept of "*Greater Greece*". (Jensen, 1979, p. 553). On 30 June 1917, Greece entered the war on the side of the Entente states and declared war against the Central Powers. (Bostancı, 2021, p. 155). Thus, Venizelos achieved all of his political ambitions. He regained power and deposed King Constantine, with whom he had political differences. The most important development was the entry of Greece into the First World War on the side of the Entente powers (Yıldırım, 2020, p. 512). In the light of the above incidents, Venizelos attracted the arrows of hatred. On 10 July 1917, a letter sent to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed that two Greeks who had arrived in Greece from Switzerland might attempt to assassinate Venizelos (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-238).

It must be remembered Greece was keen to build up its military at this time and in a telegram sent to Venizelos in November 1917, Ioannis Gennadios, the Greek Consul General in London, stated that he was in talks with Mr. Rothschild regarding the loan needed to purchase the warship *Rio Janeiro* (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-256). Greece, which was not in a good economic situation, resorted to

foreign loans in order to strengthen itself militarily. Greece tried to stay close to the Entente, both financially and politically. From the point of view of strategic intelligence, it can be said that Greece was preparing for a major war and trying to overcome its deficiencies as much as possible. In addition, there was a schism in the Greek army during this period. A letter sent to Venizelos by the Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Politis in November 1917 contained updated information about the Greek army. According to this, most of the non-commissioned officers in the regiments in Athens were against the Venizelos administration. Also, 240 foreigners who opposed the current government were expelled from Athens. This measure had a harsh effect on the opponents of Venizelos. Those who were in high military positions did not have the merit to manage the events. It was alleged that the royalists in Athens were in contact with circles in Switzerland with the help of Italian consular officials (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 014-259). From this it can be concluded that the two Greeks who tried to assassinate Venizelos were acting under the direction of Italy.

It can be seen that Venizelos could not fully establish security in Greece. In order to secure his power, he tried to intimidate the royalists in the country. The efforts to remove the agents of foreign states in Greece from the country are remarkable. The most dangerous situation at the moment was the presence of anti-Venizelos soldiers in the army. Using the power of the secret services, Venizelos fought against any organization that could be hostile to him. The ongoing activities of the royalists inside the country and their connections outside threatened Venizelos' political career.

The foreign policy which was constructed in the Megali Idea framework became more evident after the abdication of King Constantine. The King adopted a policy of neutrality and acting on the basis of reports submitted to him. These reports prepared by military officials were important because they were comprehensive and forward-looking. On the other hand, Venizelos acted contrary to the understanding of strategic intelligence, acted within the framework of the Megali Idea and took the side of the Entente states by bringing Greece into the First World War. A foreign policy approach that is detached from reality and based solely on ideology is likely to fail in the short or long term. This is where the importance of strategic intelligence comes into play. Accordingly, Greece

has formed its foreign policy perspective by not making long-term assessments and by being caught up in ideological obsessions. Moreover, the concept of the Megali Idea has become so dominant that it has led to divisions in Greek domestic politics.

Meanwhile, Venizelos, who had seized power in Greece, was waiting for financial aid from the Entente states. In this context, in February 1918, the US, Britain and France decided to provide financial aid to the Greek army, including naval expenses (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 015-05). The Greek army, which received the full support of the Entente states, played an effective role in the attacks against the Central Powers. At the end of the war, Greece sided with the victorious states (Ediz, 2015, pp. 21-22). In this context, Venizelos met with the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George on 15 October 1918. He explained that if Western Anatolia was to be under Turkish rule, the Rums living there should be protected by an international authority. Lloyd George was well aware that they needed the support of Greece in their occupation of Anatolia. For this reason he handled Greece's demands carefully (Özgören, 2022, p. 358). It is clear that the victory of the Entente states strengthened Greece's desire for the Megali Idea. At a time when the Central Powers were suffering successive defeats on various fronts, the Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottoman State and the Entente States on 30 October 1918 (Türkmen, 2016, p. 19).

It must be pointed out that the end of the war was a positive development for the British public opinion. While Britain was quite satisfied with the signing of the armistice agreement with the Ottoman State, Greece was dissatisfied with the developments. Greece wanted to be included in the Mudros negotiations, but this request was rejected by Britain. In Greece's view, the terms of the armistice were not harsh, so she engaged in intensive diplomacy after the war (Ediz, 2015, p. 29). Moreover, in October and November 1918, Venizelos also visited European countries, held diplomatic meetings and concentrated on propaganda activities. He went to Britain, where he met with statesmen, journalists and Hellenophiles and tried to shape Greek foreign policy through propaganda. By emphasizing Greece's contribution to the end of the war, he sought to win the support of European public opinion (Smith, 1998, p. 62).

On the other hand, after the Mudros Armistice, the Entente countries tried to take control of strategic points in Anatolia. Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, who was assigned to the region by the Entente states, went to İzmir on 6 November 1918. Dixon tried to control the demonstrations organized by the Rums in İzmir, but his efforts were in vain. On 21 November 1918, the Greek official who arrived in İzmir called on the Rums to remain calm before the conference to be held in Paris. Venizelos' aim was to make İzmir safe and to show the Entente powers that Greece could rule the region (Ediz, 2015, pp. 31-32).

It was precisely during this period that the status of İstanbul began to be discussed. The attention of Bolshevik Russia was also focused on this region. Venizelos did not suddenly reveal his ambitions for the Megali Idea when the question of the status of İstanbul came up. During this period, he pursued a cautious policy and considered the capture of İstanbul by Greece as an early political move. He believed that Greece's successes in Western Anatolia and Thrace would make it easier to capture İstanbul. Venizelos considered that in this way the Megali Idea would be realized and Greater Greece would be established. (Gülsevin Tamer, 2020, pp. 265-266).

In December 1918, the memorandum issued by Venizelos regarding Greece's demands was reached to the staff of the British Political Intelligence Department in Paris. According to this memorandum, Greece demanded Northern Epirus, Thrace, Gökçeada, Bozcaada, Meis Island and the area around İzmir. According to the Political Intelligence Department, Greece's occupation of a region like İzmir, which contained a large Turkish population, would weaken itself. The intelligence reports indicated that there would be a great resistance against the Greek occupation in Aydın Province (Daleziou, 2002, pp. 74-75).

Venizelos acted in accordance with the Megali idea for achieve goal. He was trying to influence the states of Europe through propaganda. Strategic intelligence does not only come to the fore in times of war. As stated here, he was attempting to gain an important position in the eyes of the Allied powers through diplomacy and propaganda. Venizelos' stance of not taking İstanbul immediately is noteworthy in terms of the strategic

intelligence recommendation for long-term planning. By not making early moves, Greece was trying to avoid a confrontation with Bolshevik Russia. However, Britain and France wanted to gain a military advantage by confronting Greece with Bolshevik Russia (Yellice, 2016, pp. 216-217).

It can be said that propaganda should not be seen as a new initiative for Greece. Comments emphasizing Hellenism were frequently made in Greek foreign missions. The Greek embassies in Europe organized campaigns for the public opinion of the Allied powers, highlighting the importance of Greece. Greek press offices and non-governmental organizations were also active in this process and intensely engaged in Greek propaganda. Venizelos allocated large budgets for propaganda campaigns, especially in Britain and France. In this context, conferences were organized for Greece's Megali Idea and large sums of money were collected through aid campaigns (Karagiannis, 1981, pp. 73-74).

At this point, a criticism that appeared in a Turkish newspaper, *Tanin*, is of great importance. Greece's foreign policy in 1918 was openly criticized in the *Tanin* newspaper on 3 and 16 July 1918. According to the newspaper, Venizelos was the most important figure in determining Greece's foreign policy and he made many mistakes in this direction. Venizelos' policy towards King Constantine was equated with treason. It was said that the Rums in Turkey were living comfortably, but Venizelos sought to mislead them. It was also emphasized that Venizelos, acting under the leadership of Western states, would bring nothing but disaster to Greece (Tetik&Diñcel, 2022, pp. 20-21).

At the heart of the fragmented structure of Greece's foreign policy is the question of whether the ideal of the Megali Idea will be implemented or not. Besides, the unique weight of Western states in Greece's foreign policy is another important issue. According to the strategic intelligence assessment, decision-makers should not change their minds quickly when defining a country's foreign policy. In addition, a country's foreign policy should be unified. Different attitudes in foreign policy understanding weaken the state's ability to act. This paves the way for foreign states to intervene in both domestic and

foreign policy. Greece is a case in point. Moreover, the negative effects of the ideological perspective in foreign policy will become apparent in the coming years.

2.2.2. Greece at the Paris Peace Conference

In order to end the First World War through diplomacy, a peace conference was held in Paris on 18 January 1919, attended by approximately thirty-two countries. At this conference, peace treaties were signed between the victors and the losers of the war (Pitsoulis, 2019, p. 460). Fifteen days after the Paris Peace Conference started, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos travelled to Paris to convey the demands of the Greeks. During the negotiations, he tried to influence the representatives of the Entente states in favor of Greece, and by bringing up the right to self-determination by adopting Wilson's principles, he claimed that the entire region should be given to Greece, citing the number of Rums living in Western Anatolia, especially İzmir (Uslu, 2012, pp. 362-363).

In this respect, at the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos gave some statistical information on the population of Rums. He claimed that there were 1.694.000 Rums in Anatolia, 102.000 in the Dodecanese, 4.300.000 in Greece, 731.000 in Thrace and İstanbul, 151.000 in Northern Epirus and Albania, 43.000 in Bulgaria before the Balkan wars, 235.000 in Cyprus, 1.000.000 in Egypt, 150.000 throughout the African continent, 450.000 in North and South America and 400.000 in southern Russia, making a total of 8.256.000 Greeks in the world. According to him, although 55% of the Hellenic nation lived within the borders of the Greek Kingdom, 45% were scattered in different countries. He also stated that İstanbul should be given to Greece and the Straits should be under international guarantee, claiming that the Rums were the real owners of İstanbul (Venizelos, 1919, pp. 1-19).

It should be noted that Venizelos claimed most of the territory on both sides of the Strait, including İstanbul. According to him, the vast majority of the inhabitants in this region were the Rums. (Smith, 2018, pp. 53-54). Again, he claimed that the Rums in Western Anatolia outnumbered the Turks (Uzun, 2004, p. 39). To prove this claim, Greek government brought thousands of Rums from the islands to Western Anatolia and settled

them. Even though the Ottoman State tried to prevent Rum migration, there was an intense Rum migration to cities such as İzmir and Manisa (Mutlu, 2012, p. 270). In this regard, with the financial help of Venizelos, the Patriarchate started a propaganda campaign. The Patriarchate wrote petitions to the representatives of the Entente states, stating that the Rums were being victimized in Anatolia. It concentrated on propaganda activities for the return of the Rums who had previously migrated from Anatolia to İzmir and Thrace (Tekir, 2019, p. 31). Greece took steps to change the population balance in Western Anatolia. Venizelos engaged in activities that would not be sustainable in the long run in order to justify the demands he made on the Western states at the Paris Peace Conference. In this context, it can be seen that Venizelos tried to influence the Entente states by including unrealistic figures in the scope of the Megali Idea. But just contrary, strategic intelligence is produced and used on the basis of facts on the ground. If intelligence is not based on reality, the possibility of states making mistakes increases.

It is essential to highlight that these claims of Greece were not addressed in detail by the major states participating in the conference, and even the population figures given by Greece were not subjected to investigation (Lybyer, 1922, p. 457). Greece argued that Western Anatolia should be given to it for geographical and historical as well as ethnic reasons (Sweeney, 2020, p. 226). But, Greece's claim to the region was out of the question. These allegations were accepted as real data by the victors of the war. By ignoring the real population statistics, an attempt was made to formulate a policy according to the interests of Greece and the victors of the war. The desire of Britain and France to act away from the reality on the ground would lead to the Greek advance into Anatolia and eventually to the heavy defeat of the Rums against Turkey. Therefore, it can be said that Britain and France, just like Greece, did not act according to strategic intelligence in this respect.

The statistics presented by Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference are quite exaggerated. According to the 1905 census in İzmir Province, the total population of İzmir was 210.973 of which 100.356 were Muslims and 73.636 the Rums (Özkan, 2015, p. 121). In 1914, the population statistics of İzmit Sanjak show that the number of Muslims was 226.859 and the number of Rums was 40.048 according to the records of the General Directorate

of Population Administration of the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Osmanlı Dâhiliye Nezareti Nüfus İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü*) (Karpas, 1985, p. 188). Also, Mustafa İhsan Bey, Director of Statistics of Aydın Province, published a census in 1917 and it showed that the number of Turks living in the province was 1.291.962, the number of Rums 233.914 and the number of Armenians 21.914 (Tekir, 2019, p. 36).

According to US archival documents, the number of Turks living in İzmir is around 1.5 million. The Turkish population makes up 83% of the total population (The United States National Archives, 103-1/191020/474). Greece used false statistics to convince its Allies. It can be seen that the understanding of strategic intelligence to act on accurate information and evaluation was not implemented here.

It must be pointed out Greece's allegations and demands contradicted previous treaties. Venizelos' statements were incompatible with the Treaty of London, which ceded the Dodecanese and Rhodes to Italy. The Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne ceded a significant part of Anatolian territory, including İzmir, to Italy. However, in terms of territorial claims, Greece was the dominant power in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. In this perspective, Britain was the main supporter of Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference. British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who was a supporter of Greece, was behind the granting of so many privileges to Greece and he never withheld his support for Greece. In order for Venizelos to remain in power, he had to keep his promises to the Greek people, and his departure from power was contrary to Britain's interests in the region (Helmreich, 1974, pp. 41-45). In Lloyd George's view, the capture of İzmir by Greece, a friendly country, meant the protection of Britain from Russia and pan-Islamism (Larew, 1973, p. 257).

It is a well-known fact that Venizelos' territorial claims overlapped with Britain's foreign policy ambitions and Britain wanted to expand its influence in the Middle East. For this reason, İstanbul had to be cleansed of Turks first. In order to protect and strengthen British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece had to establish dominance in the region. Therefore, Greece was allowed to land troops in İzmir (Dockrill&Fisher, 2001, p. 5). When the Adalar Denizi (*Aegean Sea*), the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

were considered as a whole, the role assigned to Greece by Britain was of great importance. Britain and France were aware of Italy's interest in the Mediterranean region and in order to break Italy's influence, they supported Greece. In this context, Greece was promised the province of Aydın (Turan, 1991, p. 695). In this way, Britain looked favourably on the Greek plan to invade Anatolia. In other words, a basis of consensus had been established between Britain and Greece. Winston Churchill later explained this situation as follows: At a time when peace was to be made with Turkey, preparations were actually being made for war with Turkey. Once the great alliances were secured, the war would be fought by proxy, and this position was extremely dangerous for the proxy elements (Pitsoulis, 2019, p. 460).

Despite Britain's explicit support for Greece, reports from the British Foreign Office and General Staff opposed Greece's claims to Western Thrace. Britain raised no voice against the cession of Eastern Thrace to Greece (Özkan, 2015, pp. 121-122). In addition to British Prime Minister Lloyd George's support for Greece, the British bureaucracy tried to act more cautiously. The intelligence units of the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff sought to make assessments that were detached from political considerations. One of the biggest obstacles for intelligence organizations is the willingness of the decision-maker to act on the basis of their own assessments.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Greece declared that it had fought with 10 divisions on the Macedonian front in the First World War and that the Entente states had been successful on this front. In return, Greece's demands for Anatolia were to be met (Güvenbaş, 2020, p. 130). Venizelos claimed that the Thrace, İstanbul and Marmara regions should be given to Greece in return for the sacrifices it had made during the First World War. However, the Paris Peace Council, set up in Paris by the great powers of the time, stated that these regions should be under the control of an international administration rather than being given to Greece (Turan, 1996, p. 742). During the conference, Venizelos tried by all means to influence the Western statesmen. He was in a hurry to get the Greek army to intervene on the Anatolian coast. Meanwhile, the Italians were extremely disturbed by his claims over Anatolia (Verax, 1929, pp. 616-617).

On the other hand, Greece confronted the Italians on the international stage and asked for the support of the Western countries, especially the US. On 21 January 1919, a Greek military official named Spyros Spyromilios sent a letter to US President W. Wilson from Himara in northern Epirus, stating that they wanted to get rid of the Italian oppression against the Greeks in Himara. He also noted that they received support from Britain and France and requested the US to help them (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-06). Thus, after the Paris Peace Conference, Greece, in line with the Megali Idea, claimed rights in the Himara region such as İzmir and demanded that this region be taken from Italy and given to itself.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos stated in a letter sent to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1919 that he had negotiated with the Allied powers and that the Allied proposal was that İzmir would be left to the Greeks, provided that İstanbul remained under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State and the protection of the Sultan. Venizelos emphasized that he objected to this decision and that he had held secret negotiations with Britain (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-09). Venizelos argued that İzmir should be given to Greece unconditionally. It is seen that there were conflicts of opinion between the Entente states and Greece, and they were trying to act more discreetly. As a result, it was decided to cede the territory to Greece.

It is also worth mentioning the financial dimension of the dialogue between Greece and the Entente states. In this context, Venizelos asked the British government for financial assistance. In a letter from John Maynard Keynes to Venizelos dated 31 March 1919, it was reported that an additional sum of 150 million drachmas had been requested due to the late demobilization of the Greek army, but that this could not be met (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-27). When Venizelos saw that his demand was not being met, he wrote a letter to J.M. Keynes on 26 April 1919. Accordingly, it was stated that Greece needed a budget of 450 million drachmas for military expenditures and 150 million drachmas would be made as a prepayment. It was also pointed out that the demobilization of the Greek army was related to the developments in the Near East and that the 150 million drachmas promised to be paid by the Allied powers was not a sufficient amount and that this situation should be reconsidered (Benaki Museum,

Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-31). It is clear that Greece was in a difficult economic situation before invading Anatolia and was in need of Britain's assistance. The emphasis of strategic intelligence on the adequacy of pre-war economic resources is of great importance at this point. It can be said that Greece has a great deficit in this respect and that it is trying to achieve its goal of the Megali Idea under these conditions.

2.2.3. Activities of Greece before the Occupation of İzmir

It is important to note that Greece had made some preparations in the region before occupying İzmir. Riots by the Rums in Western Anatolia against the Muslim population had begun before the invasion. Hundreds of examples can be found in the correspondence of the *İdare-i Umumiye-i Dâhiliye Müdüriyeti*. In a telegram sent from the *İdare-i Umumiye-i Dâhiliye Müdüriyeti* to the Aydın Province on 11 January 1919, it was reported that Greek gangs had appeared in Çeşme and Urla and that they had slaughtered the local inhabitants as well as seizing the belongings of the Muslim population. The telegram also stressed the importance of the necessary investigations by the province (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 95/93). In this context, in the report prepared by Hatkinson, the British intelligence officer in Western Anatolia, on 12 January 1919, it was stated that it would be a great mistake to give İzmir or Anatolia to the Greeks (Turan, 1999, p. 18). These events put Greece in a difficult position to negotiate with the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference and then she wanted to carry out the invasion gradually. However, the systematic attacks by the Rums in Western Anatolia against the Muslim population would increase as the invasion approached. Greece, on the one hand, tried to act with restraint and, on the other hand, ignored the attacks of the Rums in Anatolia, which were in line with the aims of the Megali Idea. Later, when the number of crimes committed by the Rums increased, Greece sent authorized persons to the region and sought to give the impression that it was trying to control events as it is mentioned later.

After the Armistice of Mudros, French troops arrived in Eastern Thrace and on 14 November 1918, the Uzunköprü-Sirkeci railway was taken under French control. In January 1919, French soldiers handed over control of the Trakya railway to Greek

soldiers. The number of Greek soldiers in the region increased day by day and Venizelos tried to have more say in the region by making unfounded allegations, such as the fact that the Rum population in the province of Edirne and Çatalca was higher than the Turkish population (Törel, 2012, p. 240). Strategically important points are handed over to Greek soldiers and there was close cooperation between the French and the Greeks in the Thrace region. (The United States National Archives, 103-1/175020/96).

In this period, the Greek subversion activities in the Thrace region continued without slowing down. In the report sent by the Governorate of Edirne (*Edirne Valiliği*) to the Ministry of Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezareti*) on 3 March 1919, the activities of Greek troops in the region were detailed and the measures taken by the Ottoman State were stated. According to this report, Greek soldiers attacked the Muslim population in Lüleburgaz and three policemen and a commissar from the Central Province were sent to investigate the case. The commissar and the policemen were familiar with the Rum customs and language. They were instructed on how to deal with the Rum population. As a result of the incidents, the existing gendarmerie in Lüleburgaz was reinforced and its number increased to one hundred. The matter was brought to the attention of the British official in charge of the Greek soldiers in the region and it was stated that the Greek soldiers should stop their outbursts. The British official expressed his support for an end to the aggressive behaviour of the Greeks. The Greek Prime Minister Venizelos expressed his satisfaction with the presence of Greek troops in Lüleburgaz. His remarks were greeted with enthusiasm by the Christian population of the region, who took off their fezzes and started wearing hats. The Rums in Lüleburgaz clearly took a stance against the government and continued their excesses. It was emphasized that as long as the Greek soldiers remained in the region, the Rums would continue their exorbitances. Faced with this situation, the local authorities declared that it would be difficult to take action due to financial constraints and lack of staff (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye 5. Şube Müdüriyeti, 27/55). Venizelos' statements can be seen as an example of the implementation of strategic intelligence through propaganda. The aim was to shake the security of the region by stirring up the Rums and gaining more power for the Greek troops. After the Mudros Armistice, the Ottoman State found it very difficult

to maintain control in the region. Taking advantage of this, he made his demands regarding Lüleburgaz and its surroundings to the Entente states.

As the negotiations continued, Britain and France supported the Greek invasion of Anatolia. The US, however, did not think it right to dismember the Ottoman State in this way and declared that the new Turkish state to be established should be supported by the Great powers. The US opposed the *fait accompli* capture of İzmir by the Italians. For this reason, it was more logical for the US that Greece, acting under Allied control, would land troops in İzmir. The Italians were very uncomfortable with the developments and the demands of Greece were detrimental to Italian foreign policy interests. Fearing that Greece would increase its control in the Mediterranean, Italy landed troops in the Antalya region south of İzmir in March 1919 without any authorization from the Allied powers. As a result of intermittent Italian military occupations of the Antalya and Marmaris regions to “*maintain order*”, by May 1919 permanent Italian troops were stationed in both Marmaris and Antalya. Italy was on the verge of occupying the Anatolian territories to which it claimed it was entitled. Venizelos complained to the Allied powers at the Paris Peace Conference about Italy’s financial support to the Turkish press and its incitement of the Turks in the region to resistance against the possible Greek occupation of İzmir (Solomonidis, 1984, pp. 39-42). Meanwhile, the Greek authorities opposed Italy’s anti-Greek propaganda in and around İzmir. The British Foreign Office warned Venizelos to be wary of Italy’s moves. He was aware that Greece needed the support of the Allies in order to achieve its Megali Idea ambitions (Busch, 1976, p.89).

At that time, according to British military intelligence, the Italians were trying to invade the Marmaris, Bodrum, Söke and Kuşadası regions. Accordingly, 250 armed Italian soldiers were stationed in Söke, 100 in Ephesus and 500 in Kuşadası (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509). Italy’s landing of military forces in Anatolia was weakly protested by the other states attending in the Paris Peace Conference (Hind, 1978, p. 40). Greece’s interest in the provinces of İzmir and Aydın was well known to the Italians. Italy’s military landings in Anatolia were due to the fact that it had anticipated the decisions that would be taken against it (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/60671). In the face of Greek-

Italian rivalry, the US assumed that Greece would control İzmir (The United States National Archives, 103-1/15212/258).

In a report prepared by the Directorate of Police (*Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*) on 23 March 1919, it was stated that pessimism had emerged among the Rums and therefore internal turmoil increased, and that Greece had sent an official to the Paris Peace Conference. The Greek official who attended the conference met with the representatives of the other states. In the opinion of the representatives of the Allied powers, it is not possible for Greece to annex İstanbul because the Rums are still a minority compared to the Turks. In the context of the preparations for the revolution to be made by the Rums in İstanbul, it was announced that police stations and official places would be occupied, that a general would come from Athens to coordinate and that activities would continue on the transport of ammunition to İstanbul. (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti, 49/9). In the documents of the US archives, in the evaluation report written by the US official Bristol on 12 March 1919, it was noted that the uprisings of the Turks against the Rums could take place in İstanbul and Anatolia, but they would not take place on a serious scale. (The United States National Archives, 103-1/15212/258).

As can be seen, according to the Ottoman archives, Greece was concentrating on plans for a revolution in Anatolia. In a highly confidential letter dated 29 March 1919 by the *Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti*, it was indicated that the Rums had revolutionary aims and that measures should be taken to prevent them from obtaining arms and ammunition. It was also expressed that the Rums were preparing to organize a revolution and occupy official places in order to show their power and might, and that it should be investigated whether a Greek general would come to lead the revolution. It was stated that the activities of the Rums were being monitored day and night by the Directorate of Police (*Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*) (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti, 49/9). The intelligence units of the Ottoman State carefully monitored the activities of the Rums. The Rums needed military equipment for their revolutionary plans.

In a follow-up letter sent by the Directorate of Police (*Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*) to the Ministry of Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezareti*) on 31 March 1919, it was mentioned that General Paraskevopoulos, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, had arrived in İstanbul on 30 March 1919, that he had been enthusiastically welcomed by the Rum population and that the General had visited the Fener Patriarchate on the same day. On 2 April 1919, the Directorate of Police (*Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*) wrote that the riots of the Rum population were organized and encouraged by Greek officials, that the arrival of the General in İstanbul clearly demonstrated this situation and that the Entente states should take action in this regard (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti, 49/9).

Within this framework, the Rums' plans for a revolution in İstanbul were a very serious matter. When it became clear at the Paris Peace Conference that İstanbul could not be occupied, Greece resorted to other means. The fact that General Paraskevopoulos came from Athens to lead the revolution from one point shows that the Rums acted without thinking about the consequences. Greece believed that with the capture of İstanbul it would make significant progress towards its goal of the Megali Idea. This is why, Greece insisted on occupying İstanbul, which the Entente powers considered impossible. It can be seen that the security forces in the Ottoman State were extremely successful in gaining access to intelligence information. The Allied powers did not support these activities of Greece sufficiently. Britain was extremely concerned that Greece was acting outside its control. The Allies considered İstanbul or the Straits too important to leave to Greece. During the occupation of Anatolia, the Allied powers did not look favourably on the Greek idea of taking İstanbul. The initiatives of the Ottoman State before the Entente states put pressure on Greece.

While these developments were taking place in İstanbul, W. Wilson, the head of the US delegation to the conference, believed the claim that the Rums in İzmir were under threat from the Turks and approved the occupation of İzmir by Greece. On the other hand, US officials attending the conference argued that the occupation of İzmir by Greece would have economic drawbacks (Çınar, 2019, p. 245). American officials were aware that İzmir was an economic gateway to Anatolia and opposed the separation of İzmir from Anatolia

and its control by another state (Karabulut, 2016, p. 5). Decision-makers had to weigh up different political factors. In this respect, US officials at the Paris Peace Conference considered that Wilson's decision to invade İzmir was wrong. Before a serious undertaking such as an invasion, every possible contingency should be examined in detail, and the intelligence gathered should be analyzed in depth.

It is essential to highlight that in the letter sent by *Dâhiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti* to the Provinces of Edirne, Aydın and Trabzon, and the *Mutasarrıfs* of İzmit, İçel and Bolu on 7 April 1919, it was reported by the Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nezareti*) that weapons were being shipped to various 179 coasts of Anatolia via Greek torpedoes and ships, and that banditry was rampant after the Greek Red Cross delegations left the regions they had visited, and it was stated that the issue should be investigated to the finest detail (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 98/73). Consequently, in a letter dated 19 April 1919, *Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti* ordered an investigation into the activities of the Greek Red Cross delegation in Anatolian villages outside the scope of their duties (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus, 51/41).

In a telegram sent by Venizelos to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 May 1919, he ordered that the necessary preparations be made at the port of Thessaloniki for the first division to leave for İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-36). Before the invasion of İzmir, Greece tried to complete its military preparations in Anatolia. Its military arrangements for the Anatolian coast can be evaluated within the framework of operational intelligence. Greece, through the Red Cross, tried to create internal unrest in Anatolia and focused on using the intelligence it would obtain during the war. Greece's covert activity through the Red Cross can be seen as an attempt to minimize the problems it might face during the war.

So, it can be stated that Greece's insistence on İzmir caused it to act more actively in the region. Mavroudis, the official sent to İzmir by Greece, acted in order to control the excesses committed by the Rums in the region. Thus, Greece tried to avoid any kind of activity that could be to its detriment. In order for Greece to have strong arguments at the

Paris Peace Conference, tranquillity had to be restored in İzmir (Ediz, 2011, p. 26). The Greek authorities considered that it was necessary to influence the press in order to prevent unrest in the region. In this context, the owners of Turkish and Rum newspapers published in İzmir were brought together. In this meeting, it was stated that Turkish and Rum journalists should work as a team and that offensive expressions should not be included in the articles written. Greek officials sought to create the impression through propaganda that the Turks in İzmir were also demanding Greek rule (Sekili, 2019, pp. 21-22). The Greek censorship made it impossible for the Turkish press in İzmir to react against the occupation. In this context, Turkish newspapers sometimes appeared completely empty (Arıkan, 1988, p. 155).

Another detail that should be mentioned from the point of view of Greece at the Paris peace conference is related to the Pontic Rums. In this context, Venizelos' desire for Anatolia meant that the demands of the Pontic Rums attending the conference were ignored. He also developed close relations with the Armenians at the conference and he stated that an Armenian state should be established to include the eastern Black Sea region. Bogos Nubar Pasha, the head of the Armenian delegation, hoped that the Rums would get the land they demanded as soon as possible. In general, it can be stated that Armenian-Greek friendship was often emphasized at the Paris Peace Conference (Özgören, 2022, pp. 368-369). Although Venizelos did not seem to defend the rights of Pontic Greeks during the conference, he later started to work on Trabzon (Uslu, 2012, p. 366). It is noteworthy that Venizelos was sure that he would invade Anatolia. Therefore, he wanted to facilitate the invasion of Anatolia by gaining allies in the region. Increasing the number of allies in a region before it is occupied leads to positive effects during the war. According to the logic of strategic intelligence, it is necessary to analyze the reality on the ground in order to minimize the possible negative effects during the war.

At the Paris Peace Conference, before the occupation of Anatolia began, Venizelos stated in an interview with the Times newspaper that there should be a population exchange so that the Greeks in Anatolia would not remain under Turkish rule. Greece refused to accept the Turkish population in the territories it expected to acquire (Güzel, 2014, p. 138). Before invading Anatolia, Greece made preparations to break the influence of the Turks

in the region. By claiming that the Rums were oppressed in Anatolia, Greece tried to destroy the possible resistance power in the region. Thanks to such interviews given to the press, propaganda was made.

It must be pointed out that Venizelos, backed by major powers such as Britain, France and the US, came close to realizing the ideal of the Megali Idea with his desire to occupy İzmir. In this manner, Britain had first offered Greece the opportunity to land troops in İzmir in 1915. Since then, Venizelos had the idea of fulfilling this plan in his mind and, step by step, he came very close to achieving it. He relied on the promises of Britain and France. According to him, the idea of İstanbul and Armenia under a possible US mandate could be a deterrent for the Turks (Daleziou, 2002, p. 85). From the British point of view, Greece was only a military proxy in field. It is generally accepted that British foreign policy during this period was characterized by the use of proxies without direct involvement in the war.

Britain, France and the US were not very keen on landing their forces in İzmir. However, Lloyd George declared on 6 May 1919 that Venizelos should land two or three divisions of Greek troops on the shores of İzmir to protect the Rum citizens. France and the US responded positively to this British proposal. In a telegram sent by Euthymios Kanellopoulos, the Greek Commissioner in İstanbul, to Venizelos on 9 May 1919, it was reported that the battleship Lemnos was on its way to İzmir. On 13 May 1919, a Greek fleet sailed off the coast of İzmir surrounded by British warships. The atrocities committed by the Greek troops against the Muslim population on their arrival in İzmir marked the beginning of a tragedy for the forces supporting Venizelos. Following these developments, reports to the Paris Peace Conference raised questions about Greece's role in the war. According to a bureaucrat named Sir Sydney Armitage Armitage-Smith, who was in charge of financial affairs in the British government, the consequences of approving any territorial arrangement by the Greeks against the Turks would be severe. Bureaucrats in the British delegation opposed Britain's participation in the landing at İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-42; Goldstein, 1989, p. 352). But, in a telegram sent to Venizelos on 9 May 1919 by Emmanuel Repoulis, the Greek

Minister of the Interior, it was announced that the first division of 12.000 men was on its way (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 017-43).

It is important to underline once more that Greece was in economic difficulties before the invasion of Anatolia. In order to minimize the possible economic damage caused by the war, Greece asked the Entente powers for support. A letter sent by John Maynard Keynes to Venizelos on 10 May 1919 clearly shows that Greece was in an economic depression, as stated before. The letter stated that a new credit agreement could be concluded with Greece, providing for a loan of 50 million drachmas from the Britain and 50 million drachmas from France. It was noted that Britain was in financial difficulties and would not be able to provide sufficient assistance due to general restrictions on foreign borrowing (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-15). Greece was in great need of financial aid from the Entente states in order to financially manage the occupation of Anatolia. However, Britain stated that it was economically unable to provide an economic budget on the scale requested by Greece. It can be seen that Greece was in foreign debt as a result of the war and it is understood that economic planning before the war was not done properly. One of the most important elements of strategic intelligence is economic intelligence, as it is underlined before. Greece needed to be economically strong before the war in order to make its military and political moves during the war. Although Greece was not economically prepared for war, it tried to invade Anatolia.

From another perspective, the bureaucrats of the great powers criticized their leaders' insistence on Greece. The bureaucrats, who believed that action should be taken according to the intelligence information obtained, were against political leaders acting on personal motives. From this point of view, after a while the intelligence officers in the intelligence agencies started to prepare reports in accordance with the wishes of political leaders. This leads to the politicization of intelligence and increases the likelihood of unexpected events in a major event such as going to war. It is seen that Greece acted within the framework of the idea of Megali Idea and convinced the Western states to go to war within the framework of this ideal. If Greece's claims had been handled in the light of intelligence information, the Western states might have followed a more moderate path.

As a result, Greece, acting within the framework of Hellenism and the ideal of the Megali Idea, aimed to occupy Anatolia. It believed that it could occupy Anatolia with the support of Western states, disregarding the notions of strategic intelligence. Therefore, one of the main preparations Greece made before the war was to convince the Western powers to invade. At the Paris Peace Conference, it was clearly seen that Venizelos' claims did not reflect reality. Greece, which survived this process within the framework of the diplomatic relations developed by Venizelos, tried to fulfill its military and economic war preparations thanks to the support provided by Great powers. However, it should not be forgotten that the Greek army did not implement the elements of strategic intelligence for a real success. Greece thought that it could overcome the problems by using only its propaganda power. But, the reality on the ground was different and it was inevitable that Greece would be defeated during the invasion. In the reports they prepared before the invasion, Greek military officials mentioned the drawbacks of acting only according to the Megali Idea and warned of the negative situations that would arise during the occupation. While King Constantine pointed out the dangers of acting according to the principle of the Megali Idea, Venizelos insisted that Greece would gain a lot after the occupation of Anatolia. It was at this point that the role assigned to Greece by the Allied powers became important. It is true that Britain allowed Greece to invade Anatolia, but not for the purpose of a greater Greece or the realization of the Megali Idea. As will be seen later, Britain was supporting Greece in order to be effective in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

CHAPTER 3

GREECE'S OCCUPATION OF WESTERN ANATOLIA IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

This chapter analyzes the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia (1919-1922) from the perspective of strategic intelligence. It will assess whether Greece adhered to the principles emphasized by strategic intelligence during the occupation process. As mentioned in the first chapter, the existence of intelligence information is an essential element for one state to wage war against another state. Strategic intelligence analysis can change the course of a war. In cases where the necessary intelligence information is not provided, a negative outcome of the war will be inevitable.

The main motivations behind this occupation will be analyzed. In this manner, the landing of Greek troops in İzmir and their subsequent activities will be underlined. Then, Greece's military practices in Western Anatolia during the war and the massacres it carried out in the region will be examined in detail. The reports of the local/international observers who visited Western Anatolia will be mentioned and the reports obtained from archival documents will be of primary importance while revealing the extent of the massacres of Greece in Western Anatolia.

3.1. OCCUPATION OF İZMİR AND FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS

It is important to note that Venizelos argued that the most important stage in the realization of the Megali Idea was the occupation of İzmir. Therefore, the capture of İzmir was of great importance for him. Venizelos was dreaming of occupying the whole of Anatolia and that is why he demanded the support of the Entente countries during the invasion of İzmir. The reports prepared by Greek military officials before the invasion of Anatolia stated that the operation would be difficult and that the chances of success were low. However, decision-makers did not act on strategic intelligence because they were trapped by ideological considerations. Venizelos, relying on the support of the Entente states, believed that he would destroy the Turkish identity in Anatolia. He demanded that

the Greek authorities make an intense effort to ensure that the occupation of İzmir would be smooth and quick. Thus, he would attract the attention of the Entente powers.

3.1.1. Occupation of İzmir and Its Surroundings by Greek Forces

Despite the objections of the bureaucrats of the Allied states, Greece occupied İzmir on 15 May 1919. The entry of the Greeks into İzmir took place in an extremely disorganized environment. The Rums living in İzmir looted houses and Muslims were killed in clashes (Jensen, 1979, p. 554). Meanwhile, Greek troops carried out various provocations and massacres against the Muslim population (Dakin, 1972, p. 224). Greek soldiers were first welcomed to İzmir by the Chrysostomos Metropolitan of İzmir. He had in previous years abused his religious position and carried out activities in favour of Greece. For example, Chrysostomos, who was serving in Drama in 1906 and visited Jerusalem for Easter, travelled to Athens on his way back without permission from the Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman State contacted the Patriarchate and demanded the dismissal of him. However, the Patriarchate chose to protect him. During the investigation conducted by the Ottoman authorities, it was revealed that Chrysostomos had helped the Greek gangs and supplied them with weapons (Atalay, 2009, p. 33). Greek soldiers were first welcomed to İzmir by the Greek bishop Chrysostomos. The Turks in the city had no weapons to defend themselves and the Greeks killed around 700-800 Turks on the first day of the occupation (McCarthy, 2014, pp. 280-283). In his speech on the first day, Chrysostomos declared that they would not leave İzmir under any circumstances, and if they did, they would destroy everything and leave the city (Tansel, 1973, p. 208).

The attitude of the Rums, and especially the Rum clergy, towards the Muslims was very disturbing (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). Greece advised the Rums and Rum clergy to engage in subversive propaganda to prevent resistance in the region. Accordingly, they exaggerated the occupation of İzmir and propagandized that the only way for the Turks to survive was to hang the Greek flag on their houses (Su, 1982, p. 309). According to the accounts of a member of the British navy ship S/S Brescia, on the first day of the occupation, Greek soldiers and the Rums entered houses and beat Turks severely (McCarthy, 2014, p. 281). The Rums of İzmir watched as their Turkish

neighbours were massacred by Greek soldiers. The Rums killed policemen and gendarmes they had captured in remote areas. Moreover, fifteen days after the occupation of İzmir, many bodies were recovered from the sea. Near Seydiköy, where Muslims were massacred, it was observed that the bodies were not buried (Yalazan, 1994, p. 9). American archival documents indicate that the Greeks looted Turkish homes and arrested a large number of people (The United States National Archives, 103-1/18018/435).

In accordance with the instructions given to the Greek soldiers occupying İzmir, they should not approach the Turkish barracks. However, the Greek soldiers disobeyed this order and attacked the barracks and the government house and arrested about 300 Turks. Many of those arrested were massacred by Greek soldiers and the Rums. In accordance with the British official Mr. James Morgan, 300 Turks were killed on the first day of the occupation, while by the statement of Venizelos, 78 Turks were murdered out of a total of 163 (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509). According to the League of Nations Archive, 2 Greek soldiers were killed and 6 were wounded, while 20 Greeks drowned and 60 were wounded. It is stated that 300-400 Turks were massacred by Greek soldiers and the Rums (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). The Rums marched alongside the Greek soldiers, chanting *Zito Venizelos* (Long live Venizelos) and carrying a large Greek flag ('Greek Atrocities in the Vilayet of Smyrna', 1919, p. 18). Meanwhile, the Greek soldiers encountered resistance from a group of Turks led by Hasan Tahsin. The Rums who were helping the Greek soldiers opened fire on the Turkish officers from the balconies of their houses (Erdem, 2023, p. 531). 6 Turkish soldiers were martyred in this attack ('İzmir, Ayvalık ve Aydın Havalisinin Yunanlılar Tarafından İşgali', 1919, p. 5). Besides, many Turks were massacred by Greek soldiers for not saying *Zito Venizelos* and for not taking off their fez. British Admiral Calthorpe gave a stern warning to the officers who carried out the massacres. Colonel Zafiriou also demanded that the Rums in İzmir stop their crimes against the Turks (Jaeschke, 1968, p. 573). In the report sent by the İzmir Gendarmerie Command to the Gendarmerie General Command, it was indicated that the number of Muslims massacred in İzmir and the surrounding villages exceeded 2000. However, those who could not be found were recognized as missing and therefore the number of dead is not clearly known (Yalazan, 1994, p. 10).

During the Greek invasion of İzmir, the military and political authorities were far from applying strategic intelligence methods. The massacres committed by the Greeks can be explained by the lack of discipline in the army and the desire to realise the Megali Idea as soon as possible. The developments will increase the resistance of the Turkish side. It is revealed that Greek intelligence was unable to analyze the military and political developments in Anatolia adequately.

While Greece's intensive activities in Western Anatolia continued, British Admiral Calthorpe, who returned to İstanbul from İzmir, reported that the situation in İzmir was disastrous and that the Greeks were mismanaging the region. Greek troops would first establish control outside the city and then enter İzmir. The Greek troops would then take control of the barracks and government buildings. Admiral Calthorpe had told the Turks that the barracks should be surrendered and the Turks followed these instructions. However, this plan was not implemented by the Greek troops and the invasion started from the coastline. Greek soldiers fired indiscriminately at Turkish barracks. There is no evidence that the first shots were fired from Turkish barracks, as the Greeks claim. The surrendering Turkish soldiers were forced to march towards the coast, insulted by the Rums, during which some Turkish soldiers were killed and the survivors taken on board a ship. Ahmet İzzet Bey, the governor of İzmir, was arrested and his house was robbed by Greek soldiers. Admiral Calthorpe stated in his report that Greek soldiers raped Turkish women during the occupation and that Greek troops treated Jews in a similar way during the occupation of Thrace. According to Admiral Calthorpe, the general opinion of those who know the Greeks is that no territory in Anatolia or Thrace should be given to Greece (The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19). Furthermore, a British Admiral who was in charge of the landing in İzmir stated that the Ottoman officials should be reinstated as he foresaw that Greece would not be able to govern İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-60). From the first day of the occupation, the British military authorities did not consider that Greece would be able to run the administration smoothly in the region. They believed that it would be better for the local authorities of the Ottoman State to be returned to office, as they were sufficiently familiar with the dynamics in the region.

After the occupation of İzmir, the *İzmir Redd-i İlhak Cemiyeti* organized a rally on the night of 15 May, which was attended by a large number of people. The Greek occupation was protested and leaflets were published (Turan, 1996, p. 752). In addition, protests against the Greek occupation were organized in the settlements of Bayramiç, Seydişehir, Babaeski, Gördes, Burdur, Ezine and Ödemiş in Western Anatolia. It can even be stated that some Rum and Armenian Ottoman citizens also protested against the massacres committed by Greek soldiers during the occupation (Türkmen, 2016, pp. 31-32). In addition, civil society organizations in Anatolia continued to send petitions to the official institutions of the Allied states to demonstrate the injustice of the occupation of İzmir. The petition sent by the Alaşehir Turkish Women's Association (*Alaşehir Türk Kadınları Cemiyeti*) to the US Senate on 30 May 1919, it was stated that they protested the massacres committed by Greek soldiers in İzmir and that the resistance of Turkish women would continue. It was also stressed that the responsibility for any further developments lay with the Allies (The United States National Archives, 103-1/14330/662). The people of Anatolia did not act in a coordinated manner against the Greek occupations and protests were not organized by the government. According to the reports of American officials, the Greek massacres in İzmir were not surprising to those familiar with Greek methods and ideas (The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19).

It should be noted that initially, the Turks remained in a defensive position against the massacres committed by the Greeks in and around İzmir. *"The Turks were ready to sacrifice their lives to prevent the loss of İzmir. It can only come under foreign control after the death of all the Turks living there"*. This statement was reflected in a report signed by Bristol on 17 May 1919 (The United States National Archives, 103-1/20017/429). In the view of Ahmed Rıza, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, the ceding of İzmir, an important point of access to the eastern Mediterranean, to Greece by the Allied powers would lead to the economic devastation of the Turks and the process of building a new Macedonia in Anatolia would begin. In such an environment, security and order can never be established (The United States National Archives, 103-1/22020/481).

Greece's plan of action in Anatolia was far from being planned and co-ordinated. Driven by the dream of the Megali Idea, the Greek army fought for the political and economic destruction of the Turks. This point of view is contrary to strategic intelligence, as the Greek authorities chose to exterminate the Turks in order to ensure that Anatolia would be ruled by them.

It is important to note that Greece's Anatolian adventure continued under the control of the Western states. However, there were differences of opinion among the Allied powers against the occupation. The views of the US on İzmir indicate that the war would be protracted. The approval of the occupation of İzmir by the Western states was no coincidence. Strategically, İzmir had to be under the control of the Allied states in order to be strong in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Greece's military capacity was to be a source of disappointment for the Allied powers in the future.

It is a well-known fact that Greece was aware that it had to get out of the chaos in İzmir as soon as possible. The massacres of Turks by Greeks in the towns and villages of İzmir continued. The British representative in İzmir issued an order to the Greek authorities to restore order in the area. In response, Colonel Zafiriou declared martial law in İzmir (Solomonidis, 1984, p. 64). It is noticed that the Greek army had difficulties in maintaining order in İzmir. Besides, Venizelos appointed a Greek politician, Aristidis Steryiadis⁹, as the administrator of İzmir immediately after the occupation (Georgelin, 2005, p. 201). In the letter Colonel Zafiriou sent to Venizelos on 21 May 1919, it was noted that measures should be taken to restore order in the region. Moreover, the Greek military administrators believed that the resistance organizations of the Turks had emerged as a result of Italian provocation (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-109). At the same time, Nikolaos Mavroudis, a Greek official, sent a letter to Venizelos about the situation in İzmir, stating that reinforcements and ammunition should be provided for the military operations to be carried out in the Aydın region, and emphasizing that the Italian influence on the Turks was strong (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-110). Greece wanted to extend the occupation to all

⁹ On 21 May 1919, Aristidis Steryiadis, who landed in İzmir with the title of High Commissioner of İzmir, was the head of the Greek administration established in Macedonia (Çakmak, 2017, p. 354).

of Western Anatolia. However, the resistance of the Turks increased. In this context, the letter sent by Colonel Zafiriou to Venizelos on 23 May 1919 reported that the Turks would resist an attack on Aydın and that it was necessary to be prepared for this (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-125). The Greek authorities believed that Italy was the source of the resistance movements in Anatolia. Because there was a disagreement between Italy and Greece about Anatolia. Italy had previously claimed that Anatolia would be given to it. However, as will be seen in the later years of the war, the developments in Anatolia can be evaluated within the framework of the Turkish people's opposition to the Greek occupation and the launch of the Turkish National Struggle.

It should not be forgotten that Greece's harsh policy towards the Muslim population was reported by local administrators to the relevant security units of the Ottoman State. The Governor of Aydın sent a letter to the Ministry of Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezareti*) on 24 May 1919, stating that some Greek Red Cross workers in Ayvalık had opened fire on the police detachment and that some Rums had tried to smuggle three hundred sheep to the island of Lesbos, killing a Muslim (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, *Dâhiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti Asayiş*, 9/44). The Greek Red Cross has ceased to carry out covert activities and has been daring enough to openly engage in armed clashes with the security forces. The Rums in Western Anatolia who are involved in disturbing public order are acting under the control of Greece. At this point it must be kept in mind that strategic intelligence suggests that there should be a high level of liaison with local elements before an area is occupied. In order to overcome the difficulties it would face on the ground, Greece tried to improve its relations with the local Rums in order to facilitate itself during the occupation.

Meanwhile, it is also worth noting whether there was dialogue and consensus between the Entente states and the Greek government during the invasion. On 19 May 1919, according to a telegram sent by Mr. Balfour to the region, the occupation of the Aydın region required the approval of the Commander of the Allied Fleet in İzmir. Mr. James Morgan, British Admiral Calthorpe's representative in İzmir, stated that Nazilli had been occupied by Greek troops without permission and that no disturbance in the region could legitimize this occupation. Besides, Greece did not consider the occupation of Anatolia

to be temporary. When the Greek troops landed in İzmir, British Admiral Calthorpe, who issued the note, announced that 15.000 troops had landed by 22 May 1919. Greek troops followed the railway line and moved eastwards. On 3 June 1919, the regions of Alaşehir and Nazilli were occupied. Urla and Çeşme to the west of İzmir were occupied by small Greek detachments, and within ten days Greek soldiers also captured the Menemen and Bergama regions. Britain was in favour of a controlled occupation (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509). During this period, the Turkish people sent petitions to the Allied authorities explaining the injustice of the occupations. For example, the petition prepared by the Turkish Women's Delegation of İstanbul (*İstanbul Türk Kadınları Heyeti*) on 22 May 1919 highlighted Wilson's 12 principles and stated that the occupation of İzmir by the Greeks should end (The United States National Archives, 103-1/09422/502).

The Italian newspaper "*Messagero*" reported on 23 May 1919 that the Rums were carrying out mass arrests and massacres in İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-126). The Turkish government issued a statement saying that the occupation of Aydın was arbitrary. It was stated that the majority of Aydın was Muslim and the occupation was unacceptable (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-100). Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal went to Samsun on 19 May 1919 as an army inspector to investigate the unrest in and around Samsun officially during this period (Akandere, 2002, p. 251). While all these developments were taking place, Mustafa Kemal's main aim was to create a central resistance force among the Turks (Anzerlioğlu, 2009, p. 260). At this point it is necessary to mention about the military power of the Turkish army. The requirement that the number of Turkish army under the control of the Entente powers should be less than 20.000 meant that resistance to the occupations was not very strong (Toynbee, 2007, p. 273). According to Mustafa Kemal, every nation had the right to live. Since the Ottoman State was defeated in the Great War, he fought against the imperialist powers who wanted to deprive the Turkish people of their right to exist (Şimşir, 1982, p. 272). Therefore, Mustafa Kemal was mainly in favour of a centralized management of the resistance groups against the occupations. Mustafa Kemal believed that he had to fight against both the occupation of Anatolia and the government in İstanbul. The Allied powers, on the other hand, wanted to sign a heavy treaty with the weak government in

İstanbul, but the preparations for resistance in Anatolia frightened them. He took advantage of the disagreements between the Allied states and developed a dialogue with the US, Italy and France. He also had relations with the Soviet regime (Gönlübol&Kürkçüoğlu, 1985, p. 455).

It is a well-known fact that Venizelos took firm steps towards İzmir and he gave instructions to General Paraskevopoulos so that Greece would have a stronger position in İzmir. He ordered an infantry regiment and two artillery units to be transferred to İzmir as a matter of urgency (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-102). Greece also had plans for the establishment of a special police force in İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-119) and it was rapidly increasing its military fortifications and police force in order to take control of Western Anatolia. Venizelos believed that harsh military measures were necessary to avoid any resistance in Western Anatolia.

Another important issue is that on 25 May 1919, the Greek Patriarchate presented a letter of thanks to the representatives of France, Great Britain and the US for the occupation of İzmir by Greece (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-151). During the Greek occupation, it is observed that the Patriarchate acted actively. In this period, the Patriarchate forgot its religious status and engaged in political activities. The Patriarchate supported Chrysostomos in hiding the arms and ammunition smuggled into İzmir through the Greek Red Cross. Churches also became political centres where religious values were disregarded (Bostancı, 2021, p. 160).

It should be noted that in his letter to US President Woodrow Wilson on 26 May 1919, Crown Prince Abdülmecid stated that Anatolia was threatened from four sides, that peace could be restored in the Ottoman State thanks to the 12 principles that had been published, and that the US should make the necessary efforts in this regard. Abdülmecid stressed that he firmly believed that Wilson's 12 principles could be implemented in the East and that peace could be achieved in the region (The United States National Archives, 103-1/10526/537). Meanwhile, as the Greeks advanced in their occupation of Anatolia, massacres and looting of Turks increased. This situation strengthened the feeling among

the Turks to fight against the occupation (The United States National Archives, 103-1/19128/576).

Within this framework, Venizelos found himself in a difficult position with the Allies because of recent developments. The activities of the Greek troops in and around İzmir were being closely monitored by the Allies. In this context, the letter sent by Venizelos to George Clemenceau on 29 May 1919 made no mention of the massacres committed by Greek soldiers. According to Venizelos, the Turks were responsible for the clashes. It was stressed that the Greek government would not let the confidence of the Allied powers in vain (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 021-01). At this point, it is clear that Venizelos, using diplomatic means, was in constant contact with the leaders of the Allied powers and tried to give the impression that there was calm in the region by ignoring the massacres.

With the occupation, Britain was opposed to any initiative that would harm its commercial privileges in İzmir. James Morgan's talks with the British Foreign Office and British officials in İstanbul were dominated by the idea of protecting British commercial interests in İzmir. In the view of British citizens in İzmir, the activities of Greek soldiers were damaging Britain's prestige. During this period, petitions were sent to the British Foreign Office by British citizens in the region. Accordingly, the concern that the British had a commercial dominance in İzmir and that the Greek administration would not allow this to continue was frequently emphasized in the petitions (Dalezidou, 2002, pp. 97-98).

As a matter of fact the main concern of Britain and the other Allied powers was the possibility of Italian influence in the region. Therefore, they did not object to the control of İzmir and its surroundings by the Greeks. However, Venizelos, within the framework of the Megali Idea, desired to establish the Great Hellenic Empire by acting with the aim of acquiring more territory. For this reason, the Allied powers began to be disturbed by Greece's demands. Lloyd George did not raise his voice against this situation because of Britain's strategic interests in Anatolia. Besides, by gaining control of the Turkish Straits, Britain intended to consolidate its power both in Iran, India and the Arab countries (Larew, 1973, p. 257). Thus, Britain wanted to strengthen its strategic position by

controlling the Turkish Straits. While it had to keep Greece under control, it was also trying to convince the other Allies of Greece's importance in the region.

In time, Greece advanced by expanding its zones of occupation. On 31 May 1919, the settlements of Manisa, Tire, Aydın and Ayvalık were occupied (Tekir&Ural, 2017, p. 130). The areas of Ödemiş and Nazilli were occupied on 1-3 June 1919 (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). With the occupation, the number of immigrants from the region increased. For example, the number of immigrants in Çine reached 25.000 (Çapa, 1994, p. 379). During this period, intense clashes took place between the Greeks and Turks in the Ayvalık region. Therefore, the Greek side requested an armistice from the Turkish side (The United States National Archives, 103-1/09511/733) the clashes between the Turks and the Greeks continued. Later, the Greek advance into the interior of Anatolia continued unabated and the Turkish resistance in Ödemiş came to an end (The United States National Archives, 103-1/15411/1). These invasions meant the rapid loss of Turkish territory. In response to the Greek invasions, the Turkish National Forces (*Kuvâ-yı Milliye*) troops resisted and fierce clashes took place (Sofuoğlu, 2002, p. 137). According to British and Greek intelligence reports, Turkish resistance was highly effective. In June 1919, the Turkish National Struggle began under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Daleziou, 2002, p. 105). Greek troops moved deeper into Anatolian territory to cut Turkish supply lines. With the aim of suppressing the ongoing Turkish resistance, Greece expanded its area of operations. In this way, Greece began to move beyond the territories it had been promised at the Paris Peace Conference. On the Turkish side, resistance grew (Karagiannis, 1981, p. 230).

It should not be forgotten that at the Paris Peace Conference it was agreed that Greece could only occupy settlements such as İzmir and Ayvalı. Greek troops were not allowed to occupy anywhere in Anatolia without the permission of the Allied representatives, British Admiral Calthorpe, French Admiral Sagot du Vauroux and Maurice Swynfen Fitzmaurice, who commanded the British Aegean Fleet. However, as mentioned above, Greek troops occupied Aydın, Manisa and other regions. Greece justified these invasions on the grounds that its security was threatened. However, it was later determined that the Greek intelligence reports were not correct. According to another point of view, the Greek

military delegation misinterpreted what the British official, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, had said. In addition, Turkish officials in the occupied territories were exiled and the courts became unable to function (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). Greece insisted that the occupation of Manisa was carried out in accordance with British intelligence reports (Özgiray, 1993, p. 152). It is not realistic for the Allied powers to give the impression of opposing the occupation. Meanwhile, Greece is expanding the occupation in line with its Megali Idea objectives.

It is important to note that Venizelos was in constant contact with the military authorities in İzmir in order to be in control of every stage of the occupation. In a telegram sent by Venizelos to Major General Konstantinos Nieder on 10 June 1919, it was stressed that reinforcements would be sent to the region and that the Greeks should not be pessimistic about the large numbers of Turkish troops. Venizelos also stated that the evacuation of Nazilli would demoralize the Greek army (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 019-106). But the Allies put pressure on the Greeks to evacuate Nazilli. At this point, it is important to see whether the steps taken by Venizelos to achieve the goal of the Megali Idea coincide with the realities on the ground. In addition, in a letter sent on 11 June 1919 by Euthymios Kanellopoulos, the Greek Commissioner in İstanbul, to Nikolaos Politis, the Greek Foreign Minister, it was mentioned that a man called Mustafa Kemal had rebelled against the Turkish government and called on the Turkish people to rise up against the foreign occupiers. According to E. Kanellopoulos, the situation was becoming quite serious (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 019-114). Furthermore, On 15 June 1919, Colonel Zafiriou sent a telegram to Venizelos stating that there was resistance to the Greek occupation in Denizli and that the Turkish authorities were organizing this resistance movement (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 019-144). Meanwhile, the Greeks occupied Dikili on 23 June 1919 and burned 10 villages on the way, including 1095 houses. As a result of these attacks, the number of Turks left homeless and gathered in Soma was around 70.000 (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509).

After the Greek occupation of Aydın, Greek soldiers evacuated Nazilli and moved to Aydın between 20 and 25 June 1919 with the intervention of Britain (British Library:

India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509). During the retreat they massacred the prisoners with them (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). Venizelos as the decision-making actor declared that the Greek General Staff should be consulted before the recruitment of the Rums in Aydın (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-205). In this perspective, it is known that 9.850 Rum citizens in Aydın are in military service and approximately 2.000 more men will be conscripted (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 019-121). Britain believed that Greece would act in a controlled manner during the occupation of Anatolia. However, the Greek soldiers refused to obey the orders given. Although Britain took Greece at its word before the war on how it should behave during the occupation, it never thought of acting with caution during the war. If it should be evaluated from the perspective of strategic intelligence, it is important to operate within the framework of fixed plans. However, as can be seen, Greece's military moves were carried out in accordance with the ideal of the Megali Idea rather than the plans drawn up by strategic intelligence.

It should be emphasized that Greece carried out mass killings against Turks during the occupation of İzmir. The property of the Muslim people was confiscated by the Greeks (Dinçel, 2023, p. 1207). In İzmir, Greek soldiers broke into the houses of Dr Galip Bey, retired Major Tahsin Bey, retired Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi and Ahmet Efendi of Banque Agricole and stole 5.000 Turkish liras. The jewellery of Galip Bey's wife and daughters were also seized ('Greek Atrocities in the Vilayet of Smyrna', 1919, p. 15). The Greeks did not refrain from burning and destroying the holy places of Muslims. More than 50 mosques were burnt down by the Greeks in İzmir. Yunus Emre Tekke in Sarı Köy and Karaca Ahmed Tekke in Ahi Şeyh Köy were also destroyed (Kosifoğlu, 2004, p. 236).

Meanwhile, the Rums took advantage of the turmoil and looted the houses of the Turks. The students of the American Girls' College reported that all the houses belonging to Turks in the neighbourhood were broken into and valuables were stolen. All of these unfortunate incidents cannot be explained by the nationalist feelings of the Rums or the undisciplined behaviour of the Greek army. Turks were massacred due to the hypocrisy of the Allied states who preferred to remain silent in the face of the Greek occupation of İzmir. The Greeks, who claimed that they had come to İzmir to establish peace, were the

main cause of the deterioration of security and public order in the region. However, at the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos and the leaders of the Allied states declared that the Greeks would be free from 15 May 1919 (Smith, 1998, pp. 90-91). It is observed that the Greeks did not act in a systematic manner during the occupation. The Allied powers preferred only to warn the Greek authorities against the massacres.

Another important issue is that during the Greek occupation, the number of Turks who managed to escape the massacres and emigrated was around 15.000 (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 019-124). After the clashes in Aydın, the survivors migrated to Nazilli, Çine, Yenipazar and Denizli. In addition, migrations started from the areas where the Rums were densely populated towards the Greek occupation zones. This was an attempt to show that the Rum population was high. Turks living in Manisa, Menemen, Akhisar, Bergama, Edremit and Burhaniye settlements were forced to migrate to Balıkesir and they were travelling under poor conditions (Pancar, 2009, p. 58). According to the information reflected in the American archives, with the Greek occupation, around 100.000 villagers in Western Anatolia were forced to leave their homes and Turks fled to the mountains to escape the Greek massacre (The United States National Archives, 103-1/18014/41) and some of them were armed (Ertürk, 2023, p. 100). According to District Governor Kadri Bey, who served on the International Commission of Inquiry, the number of Turks who migrated to the interior, including Bergama and Aydın, as part of the occupation of İzmir was over 120.000. Another appeal to the Supreme Council estimated the number of those fleeing the massacres of the Greeks at around 300.000 (Berber, 1997, p. 235). Although there is no clear statistical data, it is clear that at least Turks migrated to the interior, which clearly demonstrates that the Greek occupation caused an internal migration.

According to the military reports prepared by American officials on 29 June 1919, Greece continued to increase its activities in İzmir during this period. In this context, there were 35.000 Greek soldiers in the Sanjak of İzmir. Greece had started to occupy regions outside its jurisdiction on the grounds that they posed a threat to its security. However, there was not enough evidence to prove the Greeks' justifications. In the view of the British Intelligence Service, Greece did not act as a *reliable actor* in the field and did not meet

expectations. In accordance with the intelligence reports, the Turks were organized in and around İzmir and there was insufficiently substantiated information that the Italians were acting together with the Turks in a conspiracy against Greece (The United States National Archives, 103-1/4177/19). It can be said that clearly British intelligence was dissatisfied with the way Greece was handling the war, and the British recognized that Greece was not acting in accordance with the doctrines of strategic intelligence.

It is important to note that the Greeks were forced to leave Aydın on 30 June 1919 due to the positive effect of the increase in the participation of the Kuvâ-yı Milliye troops (Pancar, 2010, p. IV). When the Greeks left Aydın, they burned down the Turkish quarters. The French gendarmes in the region estimated that between 1.200 and 1.500 Turks lost their lives in the attacks by the Greek troops. Two-thirds of Aydın, which initially had a population of between 30.000 and 35.000 was found to have been burnt. The Allied representatives in İzmir ordered the Greek military authorities not to attempt to reoccupy Aydın, as the Allies had already excluded it from the list of territories to be occupied at the Paris Peace Conference. According to the records of the League of Nations, on 2 July 1919, Venizelos sent a telegram to Aristidis Steryiadis stating that it was important to reoccupy Aydın at all costs and that Rear Admiral Fitzmaurice's orders should be ignored (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696).

Thus, on the 4th of July 1919, Greece occupied Aydın once again (Pancar, 2010, p. IV). As a result of the occupation of Aydın, 55 villages were destroyed and the peasants' property was plundered by the Greek soldiers. As a result, 60.000 Turkish villagers were forced to leave their homes and the total material loss in Aydın is estimated at around £8.000.000 (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). The Greeks destroyed the city of Aydın. In addition, the Allied powers were slow to react to the developments and sent a commission of inquiry to Aydın after the occupation (Toynbee, 2007, pp. 273-274). At the Paris Peace Conference, the Allied powers decided in July 1919 that a border between the Greeks and the Turks should be established. General Sir George Milne was appointed to carry out this task and he sent an order to the Greek authorities that the Greek occupations were not to continue (Turan, 1991, p. 568).

During this period, the Greek Patriarchate took on the task of organizing Greek groups. The Patriarchate also directed the *Mavri Mira* organization, which carried out gang activities and rallies in Anatolia. Greek flags were hoisted on Greek churches in İstanbul and propaganda activities were carried out by printing slanderous pamphlets about the so-called cruel behaviour of the Turks towards the Greeks. The Patriarchate, which under Ottoman law was supposed to have only religious powers, was involved in political activities. The greatest proof of the Patriarchate's involvement in politics was its decision to unite with Greece. In this way, the Patriarchate showed that it had a strong influence on the Rums. In this context, Dorotheos Mammelis, the Metropolitan of Bursa, who attended the Paris Peace Conference, acted as the representative not only of the Rums but of all Christians living in Anatolia and claimed that all the Rums in Anatolia wanted to be annexed to Greece. However, it was stated at the conference that this request could not be realized (Gökçen, 2018, pp. 52-57).

Consequently, neither in İstanbul nor in İzmir did anyone except the Greeks know where the occupation would end. Moreover, there was no clear information about the clashes between Greeks and Turks because of the Greek censorship of the press. All news against Greece was suppressed and only favourable news about the Greek occupation was available in the press (The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19). The Greeks continued their attacks on Turkish newspapers at every opportunity. In this context, during the occupation, Greek soldiers raided the printing house of *Köylü* newspaper in İzmir and killed two children working there (Ural, 2000, p. 307).

It is clear that Venizelos acted against the orders of the Allies and aimed to pursue the goals of the Megali Idea. The occupation of Western Anatolia is indispensable for the realization of the Megali Idea. However, ideological actions have no place in strategic intelligence and failure is inevitable. On the contrary, the ruthless behaviour of the Greek soldiers strengthened the resolve of the Turkish resistance forces, and the operational intelligence capabilities of the Turks against the Greeks improved. In addition, Greece accelerated its propaganda activities through the press and banned any news that could be against it. Greece did not argue that only military success in the field would be beneficial

and believed that it would try to break the Turks' resistance with strategic moves. However, the Greeks would observe that false news would cause harm after a while.

3.1.2. The Attitude of the Allies to the Occupation of Western Anatolia

Although the approaches of the Entente powers to the Greek occupation have been mentioned above, a more detailed analysis is important for the integrity of the subject. It must be pointed out that Venizelos sent a letter to British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour on 2 July 1919 to show how Greece had handled the occupation of İzmir at a time when he was losing prestige in the international public opinion. Accordingly, Venizelos acknowledged the existence of incidents such as the killing of captured Turks during the occupation of İzmir by the Greek army. While stating that those who are negligent will be punished before the law, he also underlines that a comprehensive investigation should be carried out to uncover the truth. According to him, the fact that the investigation in the region was carried out by the Allied states participating in the Paris Peace Conference meant a conflict of interests and this situation would make the impartiality of the investigation questionable. Moreover, Venizelos considered the allegation that the Greek authorities had taken inadequate measures to be unrealistic (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 021-02). Venizelos, taking advantage of the conflicts of interest between the Allied powers, opposed the disclosure of what had happened in İzmir and favoured an investigation by the Greek authorities. As will be seen below, Greece was helpless in the face of the accusations made against it. The method of persuading the Allies through propaganda proved inadequate, and once again Greece ignored the principle of strategic intelligence that the information obtained must be true.

The massacres perpetrated by Greece in Anatolia provoked a strong reaction from international public opinion. The questions/debates in the British Parliament are an important example of this. In the British Parliament, Brigadier Herbert Conyers Surtees asked the Foreign Secretary whether he was aware of the massacres committed by Greece against large numbers of unarmed civilians in İzmir. The Foreign Secretary's reply was that many people had died during the landing in İzmir and that those responsible would not go unpunished (House of Commons Hansard Archives, HC Deb, 04 June 1919, Vol.

116, cc1996-7). In the telegram sent by Venizelos to Major General Konstantinos Nieder on 5 July 1919, it was emphasized that the massacres committed by Greek soldiers in İzmir and Aydın had been put on the agenda of the British Parliament and that Greece's reputation had been damaged and that commanders should therefore ensure discipline (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 020-26). In this regard, in a parliamentary debate in July 1919, Lieutenant Colonel Aubrey Herbert asked the Foreign Secretary whether Turkish prisoners had been killed in front of Allied warships during the invasion of İzmir. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cecil Harmsworth, replied that, according to official documents, a large number of Turkish soldiers had been killed by the Greeks (House of Commons Hansard Archives, HC Deb, 26 June 1919, Vol. 117, cc303-4). A. Herbert claimed that the Allies had adopted a wrong policy by the Greek occupation of İzmir and thus British interests in Turkey had suffered (Kürkçüoğlu, 1978, p. 141). The massacres committed by Greece in Anatolia put it in a difficult position in international public opinion and from the strategic intelligence approach, it is important that diplomacy and propaganda activities are carried out simultaneously during the conduct of a military operation. If it is evaluated from the perspectives of strategic intelligence it can be said that Greece ignored these issues because of its Megali Idea objectives.

With this framework, Greece had to face the reaction of the Allied powers due to the aggressive behaviour of the Greek soldiers, especially in the first days of the occupation. In a letter from Venizelos to Ronald Montagu Burrows, Principal of King's College, dated 9 July 1919, he noted that after the killing of captured Turkish soldiers, they were judged and punished by the Greek military court. Venizelos announced that Colonel Mazarakis had been appointed to investigate at Mr Balfour's suggestion, and that he would be working with a British official. But he insisted that the events had been exaggerated and that the Greek army had respected the rules of war (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 021-03). The article entitled "*The Greeks in İzmir*" in the Manchester Guardian newspaper, published in the Britain on the same subject, included the massacres committed by Greek soldiers in İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 021-04). Venizelos could not impose censorship on newspapers published in the Allied states as he could in Anatolia. Although Venizelos tried to defend the Greek army under

pressure, the massacres committed by Greek soldiers in Anatolia became known to the whole world.

The negative consequences of the occupation of Anatolia for the Greeks were reflected in American archival documents. Accordingly, it was predicted that internal unrest in Anatolia would increase. From the point of view of American officials, the occupation of İzmir, where the majority of the population was Muslim, by the Greeks was not right. Provocative attacks on Turkish troops and civilians during the occupation were unacceptable (The United States National Archives, 103-1/1812/19). In the report prepared by Admiral W.S. Benson of the US Navy on 23 July 1919, it was emphasized that Venizelos' desire to occupy new places was important in terms of how he approached events. Benson observed the deepening of the occupation in İzmir, noting that İzmir was a calm place in terms of economy and security before it was occupied by Greece, but with the occupation, exports in İzmir have stopped and food products have not entered İzmir. He also stated that the railway in İzmir was not working and that the villages were in ruins. The report noted that it was impossible to find food on a train journey from İzmir to Aydın and that thousands of Turks had left their homes and fled to the mountains because of the intense fighting and the advance of Greek troops (The United States National Archives, 103-1/4555/19). The Greek occupation brought the economic life of İzmir to an end. The Allied powers were deeply disturbed that İzmir had become an insecure place, and the economic weakness of İzmir led to criticism of Greece.

The massacres of Greek soldiers in Anatolia increased to such an extent that Sultan Vahdettin sent a telegram to the British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe in July 1919, saying that Aydın was being destroyed and that the people of Anatolia could not be controlled unless the activities of the Greeks were stopped. The Sultan believed that only Britain could put an end to the Greek occupation. Meanwhile, Damat Ferit Pasha's cabinet resigned from the government on 20 July 1919, but formed a new cabinet the following day. Although he tried to persuade Mustafa Kemal to leave Anatolia and return to İstanbul, he was unsuccessful (Sonyel, 2011, pp. 177-181).

After the all tragic events, it was decided by the Allied powers to establish an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on 22 July 1919 to investigate the activities of Greece in and around İzmir. A General to be assigned by General Milne of the British Army and a General to be appointed by French General Franchet d'Espèrey were to serve on the commission. In addition, Italy designated General Dall'Olio, while the US announced that a name would be determined after the negotiations in Washington (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 021-197). As a result, this commission was set up under the leadership of the American High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol, to investigate the events in İzmir between 15 May and 20 July 1919, and included the French General Gedrges Hippolyte Bunoust, the British General Robert Hugh Hare and the Italian General Dall'Olio (Turan, 1991, p. 700).

In addition, Colonel Alexandros Mazarakis was assigned to İzmir by order of the Greek Prime Minister to investigate the violence against Turkish soldiers and civilians on the first day of the Greek occupation. In his report, Mazarakis underlined that Turkish soldiers, unarmed Turkish citizens and prisoners were subjected to violence, especially on the first and second days of the occupation. The report stresses that there has been no specific investigation into the events by the military authorities in İzmir. He underlined that the military intervention in İzmir was a mistake from the beginning. According to the report, it was obvious that the Rums living in İzmir would increase their outbursts and commit violence against the Turks when they saw the Greek army. However, the Greek government took no action in this regard (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-44).

The Greek Colonel's report clearly shows that innocent civilians were killed during the occupation of İzmir. It is obvious that the Rums in İzmir were involved in violent incidents by committing excesses. The landing of the Greeks in İzmir did not take place as the Allies had hoped. It is apparent that the local conditions were not subjected to a good intelligence analysis by the Greeks. The occupation was carried out by Greece without the elements of strategic intelligence being fully implemented.

While Greece was following the developments regarding the commission of inquiry in Anatolia, it was also trying to keep its rivalry with Italy in balance. In this context, on 29 July 1919, the Italian Foreign Minister Tomaso Tittoni and Venizelos met in Paris and signed the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. Under this agreement, Italy accepted Greece's territorial claims in Northern Epirus. The Dodecanese Islands, except Rhodes, were given to Greece. The Italians knew that Greece was supported by Britain and preferred to make a deal with her (Dinçel, 2023, pp. 1201-1202; Tağmat, 2023, p. 31). The question of İzmir was evaluated within the framework of this treaty and Tittoni suggested to Venizelos that the spheres of influence of both countries in İzmir could be determined (Erdem, 2009, p. 206). In this context, the delimitation of the line between Turks, Greeks and Italians in the Sanjak of İzmir was discussed in the League of Nations on 14 October 1919. According to Italy, Greece should withdraw from the Sanjak of İzmir and the Menderes River should be occupied by the Allied powers and Greece (The League of Nations Archives, 11/1696/1696). Venizelos was not in favour of this plan. From the point of view of strategic intelligence, Greek foreign policy during the occupation of Anatolia was designed to minimize various threats. Greece did not want to confront Italy in Anatolia. Italy, knowing the support behind Greece, had the aim of maintaining its current position. The fact that the occupying power pursued an active foreign policy during the occupation of a country is one of the approaches of strategic intelligence. In this way, the legitimacy of the occupation is defended in international public opinion.

Meanwhile, at the suggestion of the head of the delegation, Admiral Bristol, a Turkish delegate was included in the commission of inquiry in August 1919 (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 022-127). In this context, the aforementioned Lieutenant Colonel Kadri took his place in the delegation from the Turkish side (Turan, 1991, p. 700). The Commission made enquiries in and around İzmir and tried to establish the facts (The League of Nations Archives, S394/59/1). Before the arrival of the Commission of Inquiry, the Greek authorities had visited some Turkish villages and obtained written documents from the Turkish villagers stating that no attack had been made against them. Thus, they were trying to cover up the massacres and lootings they had committed in the region. Venizelos protested that Colonel Mazarakis did not have voting rights in the commission. On 27 September 1919, the members of the Inter-Allied Commission of

Inquiry left İzmir for a meeting in İstanbul after their investigations in the region (Turan, 1991, pp. 701-707; Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 023-163). According to the report, the Greek occupation of İzmir had the appearance of a *crusader movement*. The Greek commander-in-chief is responsible for the events that took place in İzmir on 15 and 16 May 1919. The highest Greek official in İzmir was held responsible for the massacres committed by Greece in the region. It was also planned that Greek troops would withdraw from the occupied territories and be replaced by Allied troops (Kemaly, 1921, pp. 61-65). The report also states that since the beginning of the Armistice of Mudros, the Christians in Aydın have been in good condition and have not been under any security threat. Thus, Venizelos' efforts to justify the occupation at the Paris Peace Conference on the grounds that Christians in Western Anatolia were not safe proved to be deceptive. It was insistently emphasized that the situation in the region deteriorated with the occupation of İzmir by Greek army. It was also expressed that the economic life of İzmir had come to the point of end and that this situation would continue as long as the Greeks remained in the region (Sağlam, 1971, p. 8). In addition, the activities of the Greeks during the landing were condemned in the report (Housepian, 1983, p. 140). But it must be necessary to underline that while the Commission was carrying out its investigations, the Greeks continued to attack Turkish villages throughout August. In this framework, they attacked five Turkish villages north-east of Manisa and massacred their inhabitants (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/89509).

While these developments were taking place, the Turkish National Struggle continued to increase its effectiveness in the eyes of the Turkish public. The Allies followed these developments closely. At the congress held in Sivas from 4 to 11 September under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish National Struggle, it was declared that the territory of the Ottoman State was an indivisible whole and that Greek or Armenian states could not be established. The Turkish National Struggle will fight against the Allies as well as against the Armenians and Greeks, and this is the proof that the Turkish army will reorganize itself (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1026). Turkey's national revival under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal took a stand against both Greece and the Entente powers (Korsun, 2021, p. 23). According to the archive of

the League of Nations, Mustafa Kemal organized the resistance, both politically and with arms, and made it clear that he would not allow Turkish territory to be dismembered. This armed force was made up of newly demobilized soldiers and officers, as well as groups of volunteers from the local population. In 1919, these groups numbered around 30.000. In contrast, the Greek army, under the command of General Nider, had five divisions (80.000 soldiers) and was better equipped and armed than the Turks. In addition, the Greek troops were heavily supported by the British Army's "Q" Branch, which provided logistical support (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696). Greece was militarily backed by Britain and was prepared, knowing that it would be involved in an all-out struggle. On the Turkish side, the Turkish National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal, although outnumbered by the Greeks, was in an important position as a resistance force. Although Greece was strong in tactical and operational intelligence, it was weak in strategic intelligence because of the Greek massacres in and around İzmir. Although the international community supports Greece, the developments leave it in a difficult situation.

It should not be forgotten that while Venizelos was struggling with the accusations against him following the landing in İzmir, he continued his activities in accordance with his goals within the framework of Megali Idea and he draw a map that include the region of Thrace and he thought that Thrace was as important as western Anatolia for the realization of the Megali Idea. On 24 September 1919, an article entitled "*The Claims of Greece to Thrace*" appeared in The Westminster Newspaper, describing Greece's interest in Thrace and its activities. The British politician Sir Arthur Crosfield, whose views are included in the article, recognized that Muslims were the majority in Thrace. The article argued that it was wrong to give the administration of Thrace to the Greeks, considering the Greek administration of the Balkans, Crete and İzmir. Sir Arthur Crosfield claims that the Greeks were not cruel. However, when security and welfare factors are taken into account, it should be recognized that the Greeks are a minority in Thrace and it was not right for them to rule over the Muslims in the majority. The article also states that in 1878 there were 100.000 Muslims in Thessaly, but today there are almost no Muslims left in the region, and in 1897 there were about 90.000 Muslims in Crete, but today there are 30.000 Muslims, and it is questionable whether Sir Arthur Crosfield was aware of these

facts. The Carnegie International Report explained that during the Balkan wars, hundreds of thousands of Muslims were massacred in Macedonia and as a result, 1.5 million Muslims were settled in İzmir in the territory of the Ottoman State. Finally, it was pointed out that the murders committed by the Greeks against the Muslims during the occupation of İzmir caused a reaction in the international community (The League of Nations Archives, S397/62/2). Greece carried out the same massacres in İzmir as in the Balkans. According to the archival documents of the League of Nations, it is clear that after the wars in which Greece was involved, the Muslim population in the occupied areas was systematically exterminated. In order to be effective and take control in the Balkans, just as in Western Anatolia, Britain, with the help of its intelligence service, used Greece as a proxy instead of fighting directly.

As the Turkish National Struggle strengthened, the Greek side avoided investigations against itself. In this context, Venizelos objected to the report that was to be prepared, claiming that the names of the witnesses involved in the investigation were confidential. In a letter sent to George Clemenceau on 23 October 1919, Venizelos argued that the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry was biased and that the Greek government protested against it. It was also stressed that the results of the inquiry would not be accepted by Greece (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 023-204).

However, the report continued to be the subject of discussion between Greece and the Allied powers. On 8 November 1919, Venizelos told the Allied states at the League of Nations that the report should remain confidential and that a new commission of inquiry should be appointed. He stressed that the Greek representative on the commission had been removed from the process, leaving no one to answer the charges against Greece (The League of Nations Archives, 11/1958/1696). In view of Venizelos' objections, the Allies decided not to publish the report (Dakin, 1972, p. 224) and contented themselves with issuing a warning to Venizelos. A letter was sent to Venizelos reminding him that the occupation of İzmir was temporary (Turan, 1991, p. 720). Venizelos responded to this warning from the Allies with a protest (The League of Nations Archives, 11/2076/1696). Meanwhile, the Turkish National Struggle was gaining strength and British officers, in a

same way, were propagating that the occupation would not be permanent in order to eliminate this resistance (Sofuoğlu, 2002, p. 140).

While Greece was criticized for the massacres in Anatolia, as reflected in the House of Commons Hansard Archives, the Anatolian policy was also criticized in Britain. It is necessary to note that Brigadier General Surtees continued to criticize Greece's Anatolian policy. In a session of the British Parliament on 17 November 1919, Brigadier General Surtees underlined that Muslim Turks were suffering from the massacres and atrocities of the Greeks and insisted that Greek troops should be evacuated from Anatolia (House of Commons Hansard Archives, HC Deb, 17 November 1919, Vol. 121, cc681-772).

After all, the Allies tried to increase the pressure on Greece. The people of İzmir sent petitions to the League of Nations complaining about Greece's criminal and civil jurisdiction, customs administration and censorship (The League of Nations Archives, 11/2167/1696). Turkish newspapers reported that the Turkish people were angry with the Greek soldiers and that the Greek army should leave the region. Fires broke out every night in İzmir and Greek soldiers brutalized the population (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 024-53).

At such a time, when reactions to the incidents were growing, a different approach came from the Patriarchate, as can be seen from the archival documents of the League of Nations. In his context, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the Armenian Patriarchate, the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate and the Armenian Protestant leader sent a letter to the representatives of the Allied states at the Paris Peace Conference on 19 November 1919. It was pointed out that the Christians in Anatolia were in a difficult situation and they asked for support from the Allied states. In this context, it was stressed that the occupation of Anatolia should be accelerated (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1001). The Rum and Armenian elements, who accompanied Greek soldiers in Anatolia and committed massacres against the Muslim population, believed that the Allied powers should intervene at a time when the Turkish National Struggle was gaining momentum. As it was underlined before, Greece aimed to inflict heavy casualties on the Turks by using local elements.

Although the Greek atrocities were criticized with a common attitude, it should not be overlooked that there was disagreement among the Allies. British Prime Minister Lloyd George declared in a speech that it was no longer possible to subject Greeks, Armenians or Arabs to Turkish rule in Anatolia (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1047). US officials stressed that Armenians and Greeks could neither form a self-government nor govern the Turks. Accordingly, the allocation of land in Turkish territory to these minority groups would cause major problems (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1063). In addition to the traditional crisis of confidence between Britain and France, there were differences of opinion over Turkey. France was in favour of Turkey's integrity and argued for a strict financial policy. Britain, on the other hand, favoured the expulsion of Turks from İstanbul and the rule of Greek and Armenian groups (Hind, 1978, pp. 47-48). In the weekly intelligence report prepared by the senior US Naval Officer in November 1919, it was pointed out that the mismanagement of the Greek army in Aydin province was continuing and that General Milne's orders were not being followed. It was also stated that the only way to restore security and peace in the region was to remove the Greeks from the region (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1047). Although the Allied powers gave the appearance of acting jointly on Anatolia, they were in competition among themselves.

It is important to point out that a document dated 24 November 1919 in the US archives describes the course of relations between the Allies and the conditions under which they tried to manage the process. During this period, one of the most important issues discussed among British intelligence officers was that the Turkish National Struggle Movement was developing closer relations with France. The Turks had a secret plan to spoil relations between Britain and France. It is known that a French embassy official told a Turkish spy that relations between Britain and France were bad. The political, intelligence and military system set up by the Allies in the Middle East is so vast and disorganized that problems between the Allies are normal. In the case of the Britain, British Military Intelligence in Turkey was constantly put in a difficult position by contradictory attitudes. According to the American archive, there was a disagreement between British intelligence officers in the field and management in İstanbul. British intelligence officers complained bitterly to those in İstanbul that they were unaware of

changes in the field and did not make decisions on the basis of reports submitted to them. It was emphasized at this point that the administrators made decisions based on their own world view. The duty of a colonel working in the British Intelligence Centre in İstanbul was to examine all incoming reports and to mark with a red pen those points he considered important. However, the insignificant intelligence information obtained as a result of the scrutiny of this colonel, who had no direct knowledge of the importance of the reports he was reading, was sent to higher levels. The resulting political move would therefore be far removed from current realities. The testimony of an intelligence officer on field duty attached to British Military Intelligence is an example of this situation. There was a large ammunition dump in Kütahya. At the beginning of the Turkish National Struggle, a British intelligence officer, who knew that the Turks wanted to seize the ammunition, suggested that the ammunition be transferred to İzmit. However, this suggestion was not taken into consideration. As the fighting intensified, the British General ordered the withdrawal of ammunition and the train carrying British troops was blown up as it reached the bridge. As a result, Britain's losses were great (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1073).

Looking at the above example, it can be seen that the relationship between the intelligence officer and the decision-maker is fragile, especially in times of war, and therefore wrong conclusions can be reached. It is well known that Britain's strategic intelligence is not at an adequate level and that it has problems in the analysis phase of intelligence. Should the decision-maker not act according to the intelligence reports, it may lead to the consequences that will change the course of the war. The comments and assessments of intelligence officers working in the field should be carefully scrutinized to reduce the possibility of error. The intelligence officer who stated that the ammunition should be sent from Kütahya to İzmit fulfils the requirements of tactical and operational intelligence; however, this intelligence was not used by the decision-making mechanism and there was a failure of strategic intelligence.

Meanwhile, the Greek occupation of Anatolia and the resistance of the Turks were closely followed by the world press. In this context, M. René Puaux, the foreign correspondent of the newspaper "Temps", who wanted to investigate the Greek activities in Anatolia,

gave his impressions as one of the first journalists to go to İzmir after the armistice. René Puaux shared his observations with his readers in an article entitled “*Greeks in Asia Minor*” in the Manchester Guardian on 4 December 1919. He argued that the resistance movement formed in Anatolia to resist the Greek occupation, led by Mustafa Kemal, should not panic the Allies and that the Turks were bluffing. He also pointed out that the Greek soldiers had no problems with ammunition, but the Turks did not have enough ammunition to fight a major war. Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal’s views on the Turkish National Struggle were published in the Manchester Guardian on 6 December 1919. According to him, the Turkish nation would never accept to live in captivity or be disintegrated, and the struggle would continue by mobilizing all material and moral resources (The League of Nations Archives, S394/59/1). The Turkish army resisted the Greek occupation and challenged the policies of the Allied powers. The resistance movement of the Turks was not seen as a source of concern by the Western States at the first stage. Along with the acceptance of Greece’s military and political superiority, it was taken for granted that the Turks would be defeated.

In the meantime, General Milne’s efforts to determine the Turkish-Greek border were finalized at the Paris Peace Conference in December 1919. Accordingly, the area defined by the *Milne Line* was set at a depth of 15 kilometres, beyond the settlements of Kuşadası, Aydın, Ödemiş, Turgutlu, Manisa and Bergama. It was also decided that the Turkish resistance forces would retreat 3 kilometres behind the line. This line, which left a part of Anatolia in the hands of the enemy, was intended to prevent the resistance forces (Turan, 1991, pp. 569-579). According to General Milne, there was a serious battle between the Turkish and Greek forces. The Turks were acting with the utmost determination to stop the Greek advance. Milne also expressed the view that the line controlled by the Greeks was not secure. Venizelos argued that the areas to be evacuated by the Greeks should be taken over by Entente troops (‘Türk İstiklâl Harbi 2. Cilt: Batı Cephesi’, 1965, p. 120). As is well known, the Allies favoured a gradual occupation of Greece. The Milne Line, although seemingly an attempt to resist the Greek occupation, was actually intended to break the motivation of the Turks to resist.

It must be stressed that one of Greece's Megali Idea goals was to capture İstanbul. However, the Allied plans were not realized within the scope of the Megali Idea. In December 1919, the Allied powers discussed the future of İstanbul. The British Edwin Samuel Montagu, who was serving as India's Foreign Secretary, stated that he was opposed to the idea of removing the Sultan from İstanbul, which Britain had adopted. During the negotiations, it was argued that İstanbul should be captured and must be under the control of France, Britain and Italy. It was emphasized that the Turks should no longer be in Europe and that it was appropriate to carry out this process in a way that would cause the least reaction from India and other Muslim countries. In a letter sent by Eric Drummond, a member of the League of Nations, to the British statesman Lord Corzon on 16 December 1919, it was pointed out that the idea of giving İstanbul the status of a *free city* had been put forward, but that this would cause many problems. Instead, the idea was stressed that İstanbul could have the status of an "*international zone*" under the protection of the League of Nations. Since India and Iran were members of the League of Nations in addition to Britain, France and Italy, and because Muslims should also be represented, the formation of a five-member commission was brought to the agenda (The League of Nations Archives, 11/2432/2432). The willingness of the Allied powers to include India and Iran in the Commission was a strategic decision. İstanbul was vital not only to Greece but to the Allies as a whole. In addition to the occupation of Western Anatolia, there was a widespread belief that İstanbul had to be retained in order to ensure control over the straits.

On the one hand, Greece planned to extend the occupation through diplomacy, on the other hand, it aimed to completely end the resistance of the Turkish people by continuing the massacres in the region through the Rum gangs. The Turkish peasants who attempted to engage in animal husbandry were subjected to the violence of the Rum gangs, and as a result there was limited economic activity in the region. Three villagers, Nusret, Hasan and Nicoli, were attacked by Rum gangs on 26 December 1919 on their way to Bornova. As a result of the attack, Hasan and Nusret's noses and ears were cut off, but Nicoli was not harmed because he was the Rum. Meanwhile, the property of Muslims in and around Ödemiş continued to be looted and the Rums moved to Çeşme, forcibly displacing Bosniak refugees and beginning to settle in the region. Greece, which supposedly sent a

Greek official to each village to ensure justice, carried out all kinds of unlawful practices. During this period, Muslims could not move from one village to another for fear of death. To sum up, the Greek administration had three main objectives; extermination of Muslims, confiscation of their property and preventing them from engaging in any economic activity. The murders committed by the Greek soldiers went unpunished due to the ostensible investigations carried out by the Greek government. Muslim youths in the regions of Tire, Bayındır and Ödemiş were forcibly deported by the Greeks. The unjust behaviour of the Greeks was reported by the Turks to the High Commissioners of the Allied powers (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/3). In these areas vacated by Muslims, deserting Greeks, as well as those living in Greece, were settled with the promise of land and farms (Orhonlu, 1973, p. 489). The above three objectives of Greece are indicators that Greek foreign policy is built in accordance with the Megali idea. In order to establish sovereignty in Western Anatolia, Greece forced Muslims to migrate by implementing a systematic migration policy. It is seen that Greek soldiers aim to establish control in the region by cooperating with the Rums.

3.1.3. Greek Occupation Forces Advance in Western Anatolia: 1920

As mentioned above, while Western Anatolia and İstanbul were part of Greece's plan in the context of the Megali Idea, there were differences of opinion among the Allied powers regarding İstanbul and the course of the Greek occupation in general. The fact that there were differences of opinion among the decision-makers in Britain, which was perhaps the most important quarterback in the occupation of Anatolia, is reflected in the documents of the National Archives of the United Kingdom. In this context, it is worth noting that the Greek occupation of Anatolia and the future of İstanbul remained among the most controversial issues among British politicians. In his speech to the British Cabinet on 6 January 1920, Field Marshal Sir Henry Hughes Wilson, the Chief of the Britain General Staff, expressed the view that control of İstanbul and its surroundings should be left entirely to the soldiers of the Allied powers, stressing that these regions could not be controlled by relying on non-Turkish groups. He also recognized that they were unable to establish a border between the Allied powers and the forces led by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. He stated that the cost to the Allied powers of maintaining 30.000 troops around

İstanbul would be enormous and that this burden would be shared between Britain, France and Italy, with local troops consisting of Greek soldiers. During the discussions in the cabinet, it was announced that the Allied powers should take complete control of Anatolia and that the Turkish people should be under mandate rule. It was pointed out that the Sultan was under the control of the Allies and did not have enough power to prevent the Turkish National Struggle in Western Anatolia (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CAB/23/20/2-6).

The Allies argued that if they could not take control of the straits, their occupation of Anatolia would be hampered. Although British Prime Minister Lloyd George supported this idea, he was in favour of giving İzmir to the Greeks. However, the War Office and the India Office did not think it was right that the capital İstanbul should be cleansed of Turks in the first stage and they believed that İzmir should not be given to Greece. Both organizations emphasized that the idea of expelling Turks from Anatolia was dangerous because there was intelligence information that a separatist group called *Sinn Fein* had emerged in India and that a similar situation to the Turkish National Struggle in Anatolia could occur in India (Dalezou, 2002, pp. 112-113).

It should be noted that the Greek soldiers continued their massacres in Anatolia without slowing down. On 5 January 1920, a gang of 20 Greek soldiers and the Rums tortured and killed Hafız Süleyman and Mehmet, who lived in the Karakuyu settlement of Torbalı, and stole their valuables. Similarly, on 9 January 1920, the inhabitants of Demirci and Yoğurtçular villages in Torbalı were slaughtered by Greek gangs. The Greek occupation made it impossible for the inhabitants of Bayındır, Tire, Aydın, Menemen, Bergama, Foça, Dikili, Urla, Çeşme and Seferihisar to cultivate their land. The consequences of this situation became clearer at harvest time. In Çandarlı, 33 innocent Turks were sentenced to death as a result of false testimony given by the Rums. In addition to the activities of the Rum gangs, Greece also tried to create national forces in İzmir. In this context, young men from the occupied areas were enlisted in the army (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/3). Through systematic massacres and looting, Greece attempted to make Anatolia uninhabitable for the Turks. It is observed that Greece implemented a policy of extermination. The Greek troops, who tried to destroy Western Anatolia, led to

an increase in the participation in the Turkish National Struggle. The people of the region, who had no right to life, would join the armed struggle to end the occupation as soon as possible.

The atrocities committed by Greece in Western Anatolia were closely followed by the international press. For example, in an article entitled “*To relieve the distress in İzmir*”, published in the Morning Post newspaper on 12 January 1920, Ameer Ali, the president of the British Red Cross Society, stated that the Muslims, especially in the Aydın region, were in great distress and that the infant mortality rate was high due to famine. It was stressed that the Greeks had deliberately destroyed villages and left at least 100.000 people homeless. It was expressed that the needs in Aydın should be tackled as soon as possible and that hundreds of people were dying every week because of poverty (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 026-13). From the point of view of strategic intelligence, it should have been preferable to adopt a gradual occupation model for the retention of the occupied territories. However, the Greek authorities believed that they could take over Anatolia in a short time with a *fait accompli* method.

It is important to note that in a letter sent to Venizelos in January 1920, the High Commissioner of İzmir, Aristidis Steryiadis, stated that there were around 1.000 Turks living in Aydın and that the Turks in the region were very satisfied with their lives and that he did not discriminate between Muslims and Christians. However, he said that living conditions in Aydın have become difficult and the economy is extremely unstable due to the civil unrest of the past five years. He claimed that some 25.000-30.000 Muslims who had been forced to migrate from Aydın and the surrounding area had travelled south of Menderes, but that they had refused to return to Aydın. Steryiadis stressed that he had no information about the conditions under which the Turkish refugees were living and that he could not provide them with any assistance. On 12 January 1920, Steryiadis announced in the Morning Post that the statements made by the President of the British Red Cross Society against Greece were false. He explained that he had given every facility to the Reverend R. Frew, the clergyman who had come to Aydın to make an investigation on behalf of the British Red Cross Society, and that he hoped he would be able to refute the

allegations in the Morning Post (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 026-51).

Greece's ruthless policy in Western Anatolia was aimed at reducing the Turkish population. In his letter, Steryiadis indicated the number of Turks in Aydın and the destruction they had caused in the region. Steryiadis' impression that there was no obstacle to the return of the Turks who had to migrate has nothing to do with reality. Greece wanted to create a situation in favour of the Rums by changing the population structure in Western Anatolia. In addition, the statements made against Greece in international public opinion put the Greek authorities in a difficult situation.

It is necessary to note that the situation that Steryiadis described for Western Anatolia was incompatible with reality. On 22 January 1920, Greek soldiers from the Bornova detachment opened fire on the inhabitants of the village of Beşyol. The Greeks raided the house of the village mukhtar, Mehmet Efendi, stole money and valuables and, before leaving the village, announced that the inhabitants would no longer be able to live in peace in their homes (The United States National Archives, 767.68/25). Muslims living in the Dardanelles region were attacked by Greek soldiers. On 25 January 1920, a man called Yelkenci İsmail was beaten unconscious by a Greek gendarme as he returned from a funeral. The reason for the beating was that he was wearing a cap bearing the name of the Prophet Muhammed. Furthermore, the Greek soldier did not refrain from insulting the Prophet (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2706/16).

It is noteworthy that in the report prepared on 5 February 1920 by a Lieutenant-Colonel working in the British General Staff Intelligence Department, by examining the regions where the Turkish-Greek war took place, it was stated that there were differences between the regions held by the Kuvâ-yı Milliye and the regions reflected in the reports prepared by the Britain General Staff. From the beginning of the occupation of İzmir, Turks of high status and considerable wealth had joined the Kuvâ-yı Milliye and were thus very useful in meeting the expenses of the troops. Voluntary participation in the Turkish National Struggle was widespread, and the necessary military equipment was provided by Turkish refugees who had been forced to migrate from the Greek-occupied territories. The Greek

atrocities after the occupation of İzmir united the refugees against the Greeks. In addition, the refugees included a large number of Rums who were Ottoman citizens. In the region, it was decided that every man between the ages of 20 and 45 would do military service, and a comprehensive registration system was introduced. Turkish peasants, in addition to their daily chores, were expected to report immediately to their posts in case of emergency. Communication with Turkish headquarters was by telephone, and local headquarters were manned by both mounted troops and infantry. According to the British archive, most of the rifles used by the Turkish troops dated from 1910 and were worn out. The activity and endurance of the Turkish forces was at a good level and their physical aspect was strong. The horses of the Turkish soldiers, despite their weak appearance, were capable of carrying heavy loads for 12-13 hours on mountain roads. Mounted infantry were very important for the Kuvây-ı Milliye troops, both because of their speed and their good marksmanship. The food supply of the Kuvây-ı milliye was in good condition and the bread was more nutritious than the black bread eaten by the peasants. The dress of the Turkish soldiers varied from region to region and the necessary arrangements were made at the local level. Among the Turks, the reaction against the Greek occupation was quite high and the idea of resisting the occupation was a common decision of the people. The Turks, with their limited ammunition, inadequate military equipment and inability to produce through arms factories when their ammunition ran out, were expected to wage a protracted guerrilla war, blowing up railways and bridges, cutting communications and ambushing and capturing small Greek units. The British Lieutenant-Colonel also noted that the Greeks were unfamiliar with Anatolia, while Turkish troops knew every mountain road and pass. The Turks could easily send infantry and mounted troops into Greek positions without being detected by low-flying aircraft. Anatolia was a very difficult geography for the Greeks, both because of the difficulty of flying between the mountains and because of the mostly forested terrain. In addition, the valleys were deep and rocky, making it easier for the Turks to attack and protecting them when they retreated. All these conditions made the Anatolian campaign an expensive and exhausting war for Greece (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/16/26/14-15). Beside that, the fact that the Turkish side did not have sufficient ammunition and was not prepared for a comprehensive operation in terms of military organization was among the main findings of British intelligence (Stavridis, 2008, p. 138). Throughout 1920, the

Greek army faced both regular and irregular Turkish troops. Greek troops needed additional intelligence to fully assess the capabilities of the Turks (Erickson, 2021, p. 80).

As it is underlined above, the British intelligence officer analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the Greek and Turkish sides. It is seen that the Turks were successful in terms of tactical and operational intelligence, using the guerrilla method. The Greek government attempted to invade Anatolia without paying due attention to geographical intelligence, one of the most important elements of strategic intelligence. Despite the shortcomings and inadequacies of the Turkish troops, there was a strong belief that they could succeed because of their familiarity with the region. Although the Allied powers provided tactical and strategic support, there was scepticism that the Greek troops would be able to wage a successful struggle. It is clear from the British intelligence report that Greece did not conduct its invasion of Anatolia by taking into account the elements of strategic intelligence.

While Greece continued its occupation of Anatolia, the Allied powers came together at the London Conference on 12 February 1920. Greece's demands for Anatolia were reconsidered (Dinçel, 2023, p. 1213). In his meeting with the leaders of the Allied states on 16 February 1920, Venizelos once again explained Greece's ambitions in Anatolia. During the meeting, in which the future of İzmir was discussed, Venizelos was asked by the Allied representatives whether the rights of the Turks would be protected as there were many Muslims in Edirne. Venizelos promised that the rights of the Turks in Edirne would be guaranteed and claimed that there were 30.000 Turks and 28.000 Greeks living in Edirne. Lloyd George asked Venizelos the source of these statistics. Venizelos replied that these statistics were obtained thanks to the population data of the Greek Patriarchate. Venizelos claimed that there were 590.000 Greeks, 350.000 Turks, 90.000 Armenians, Jews and other non-Muslim groups in the Sanjak of İzmir and that a total of 1.030.000 people lived in İzmir. Venizelos emphasized that only one third of the population was Muslim and that the Greeks remained in the majority, and that Turks outnumbered Greeks especially in the regions of Ödemiş, Tire and Bayındır, while Greeks predominated over Turks in the remaining occupied regions. Lloyd George asked Venizelos whether he was afraid of the Turkish resistance groups fighting against Greece, despite the plan to give

Western Anatolia to the Greeks permanently. Venizelos responded that the Greek army had been able to withstand these attacks for the past eight months and the attacks would stop if a peace treaty was signed with the Turkish side. Venizelos also accepted with satisfaction the proposal to make the port of İzmir a *free port* and suggested that a representative of the League of Nations could be appointed in the port (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 026-86-87). According to the League of Nations Archive, Ayvalı is the main settlement in Western Anatolia, where the Greek population is concentrated. In the interior, the Greek population is low and Turks are the majority in the country (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12236/1696).

The population of İzmir, based on American archival documents, was previously reported to be 83 per cent of the total population (The United States National Archives, 103-1/191020/474). After the occupation, according to American statistics, there were 375.000 Greeks, 325.000 Turks, 40.000 Jews and 18.000 Armenians in the Sanjak of İzmir (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 026-91). The different figures given for the population of İzmir are closely related to the massacres of Muslims by the Greeks and the situation of those who fled the massacres and migrated to the interior. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Turks fleeing from the attacks had to leave their homes (McCarthy, 2014, p. 279). Venizelos tried to show that Greeks were the majority in the region. Lloyd George was sceptical about the figures given by him. The Greek side feared Turkish resistance and did not want the war to drag on.

The fact that Venizelos based the above statistics on the Greek Patriarchate can be explained by Greece's desire for the Megali Idea. Together with the progression of the war, the number of those within the Greek army who questioned the Megali Idea increased. As the Greek troops moved towards the interior of Anatolia, it was seen that the Rum population was sparse and criticism of the aim and scope of the war intensified. Dimitris Ambelas, an artillery captain during the war, noted that the Rum population in the interior of Anatolia was very low. According to him, the historical temples and ruins of ancient Greek civilization were very weak arguments to convince the Greek population to continue the war (Benlisoy, 2019, p. 18). Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1920, the

Patriarchate organized the transfer of Rums from Bursa, Ankara, Gallipoli and İzmit to İzmir through the metropolitans (Atalay, 2009, p. 41).

While Venizelos was trying to build a case for the occupation of Anatolia, the British bureaucracy was continuing to monitor developments. In this context, the War Office report of 15 March 1920 stated that the Turks were tired of war, but the Turkish people were opposed to giving up their lands to Greece or Armenia and would fight to the end. It was also emphasized that if Greek troops, consisting of six divisions, were to seize the railway line between Konya and Eskişehir, such an operation would not yield results in the long term. It was pointed out that Greece would not be able to control the region for a long time and that the withdrawal of the Greeks from the region would affect the prestige of the Allied powers (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/16/26/1-7). Britain deployed a small number of troops in Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1280). Two Indian regiments of 1.000 men each were stationed in these areas (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1237). From a military point of view, Britain dictated how Greece should act in the war. The British bureaucracy foresees disastrous consequences if Greece tries to move beyond its military capacity.

As the Greek occupation progressed, the Allied powers declared on 16 March 1920 that they were temporarily occupying İstanbul and that the authority of the Sultanate would continue, but that the situation could change depending on the increase in unrest (Yavuz, 1992, p. 980). Under the occupation, prominent Turkish officials were imprisoned (Jensen, 1979, p. 554). In response, the Grand Vizier Salih Pasha sent a letter to the High Commissioners of France, Italy and Britain. According to the letter, there had been no disturbances in the country that could threaten the security of the Allied powers. The main reason for the current situation in Western Anatolia was the unjust occupation of the province of Aydın by Greek troops and the Rums and the massacres they committed against the Muslim population (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1258). On the other side, the Allied powers tried to legitimize the occupation of İstanbul by referring to the resistance of the Kuvâ-yı Milliye troops after the Greek occupation.

After the occupation of İstanbul, the Greeks stepped up their attacks in Anatolia. Greek troops attacked Ödemiş again in March 1920, bombing and massacring women and children living in the Gölcük plateau. The Greek government tried new methods to exterminate the Muslims (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/1). However, this new method of the Greeks cannot be considered as tactically and strategically appropriate. As already mentioned above, as the Greeks increased the level of violence, the participation of the Turks in the National Struggle increased (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/16/26/4). During this period, the villages of Bozdağ and Gölcük in Aydın were captured by the Greeks. About 2.000 Muslims left their belongings behind and settled in the Salihli region, but conditions there were extremely miserable. The inhabitants of the neighbouring villages fearfully awaited the Greeks' attacks (The United States National Archives, 767.68/24). From the point of view of strategic intelligence, it is clear that Greece has once again made the wrong moves in the region. While the Greek government was trying to remove the Turks from Anatolia, the strength of the Turkish National Struggle was increasing with each passing day. The British announced that Mustafa Kemal had ordered the army to be mobilized and that he had formed a military force of 150.000 men (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1176). During a period of intense clashes between Greek and Turkish troops, Mustafa Kemal opened the Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 23 April 1920 to liberate the homeland from enemy occupation (Mutlu, 2021, pp. 84-85). After the opening of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal sent a letter to the Soviet leader Lenin on 26 April 1920. According to the letter, Mustafa Kemal advocated cooperation against the Allied powers. The reply of the Soviet administration was given on 2 June 1920 by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin. Although the Soviet administration did not comment on the alliance, it did state that it favoured the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with the Ankara government (Gönlübol&Kürkçüoğlu, 1985, pp. 455-456).

It must be pointed out that the Allied powers organized the San Remo Conference in April 1920 to evaluate the developments in the Near East. Field Marshal Foch, Chairman of the Committee of Military and Naval Experts, said that if Turkey resisted, at least 27 divisions would be needed. He also emphasized that the Turks were arming themselves in the interior and that this situation would create problems for the Allies. Moreover, at this

conference, the Allies prepared the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres to be signed later. The Turkish Straits would be under the control of Italy, Britain and France (Daleziou, 2002, pp. 126-127; Larew, 1973, p. 258). It was noted at the conference that Allied troops had attempted to infiltrate the interior but had encountered resistance (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 027-07). According to the intelligence report prepared by the American intelligence officer in April 1920, it was pointed out that the Kuvâ-yı Milliye troops stopped the advance of the British forces and the telegraph communication from Bursa to Konya was cut. If European troops tried to invade Anatolia, they would have to face both regular and irregular Turkish troops, and in such a situation the methods of guerrilla warfare would be used (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1206). British troops were building military fortifications on the northern shore of the Gulf of İzmit and had withdrawn from Adapazarı and deployed in the Derince area (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1209).

Moreover, on 12 May 1920, Greece declared the terms of the peace treaty with Turkey as follows: the existence of Greece would continue up to the Black Sea region and Thrace would remain within Greek borders (Güvenbaş, 2020, p. 137). The Supreme Council also stressed that the İstanbul government must prevent Mustafa Kemal's activities and that the occupation of İstanbul would continue if the terms of the peace treaty were not accepted (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 027-08-09). The Allies put pressure on the İstanbul government to keep Mustafa Kemal under control.

With this framework, Britain was alarmed by the Turkish moves and British troops were wary of being attacked by the Turks. On 15 June 1919, near the Gulf of İzmit, the British were suddenly ambushed by them and the British military authorities declared that strong reinforcements were needed to keep the area under their control (Daleziou, 2002, p. 130). Following these developments, the Allied powers allowed the Greek army to occupy the railways up to the Bandırma area on 19 June 1920, on the grounds that the straits should be free (Güvenbaş, 2020, p. 137). In this context, the British, French and Greek governments agreed that France would control the European shore of the Sea of Marmara and Britain would control the Asian part, and that the Greek army would move from İzmir to the Sea of Marmara (The United States National Archives, 767.68/31). From the outset

of the occupation, the War Office was opposed to British troops being forced to go into the region because of the possibility of Greek failure. But, in June 1920, the British government requested Greek forces for reinforcements to maintain control of the area close to the straits. The Greek advance was authorized to protect Allied troops in İstanbul and the straits from attack by Turkish troops (Daleziou, 2002, pp. 150-151). Greece had 6 divisions in İzmir and 3 divisions in the Maritza region. British officials asked Venizelos whether the Greek troops in İzmir had the strength to advance to Bandırma. He replied that he could not answer this question and that he should consult the Greek military authorities. Meanwhile, Turkish troops were attacking British forces in the Gulf of İzmit. If Britain lost this area, the Turks would be able to bombard the surroundings of İstanbul day and night. Moreover, the British authorities foresaw that the situation would get worse if the Dardanelles were taken by the Turks. The outcome of all these developments was closely linked to what Mustafa Kemal decided to do (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CAB/23/21/305-307).

According to the American archive, in his statement of 19 July 1920, Mustafa Kemal, the President of the Grand National Assembly, summed up the events in Anatolia in a realistic way. Accordingly, those who claim that the armistice was broken when the Turks attacked the British in İzmit did not comment on the fact that the Allies broke the armistice when the Greeks landed troops in İzmir. After the armistice, a significant part of Anatolian territory was occupied by the Greeks. The honour of the Caliph and the Sultan is being destroyed and the sacred values of the nation are being publicly humiliated. The claims of British government officials that the Rums were in the majority in and around İzmir and that these areas should be under Greek mandate are not true. Mustafa Kemal pointed out that the Rums were more numerous in small settlements such as Ayvalık, while the Turks were concentrated in other places. For example, in İzmir, the Turks outnumbered the Rums. Officials of the International Commission of Inquiry in İzmir found that the Turkish population was higher in areas occupied by Greeks. The occupation of Anatolia, in collaboration with Britain and Greece, led to anarchy in the country. Mustafa Kemal stressed that the Turkish nation would start a holy war against the Greeks (The United States National Archives, 767.68/64). Mustafa Kemal declared that the Turkish National Struggle will continue until the last Greek soldier leaves the country. With the statements

of the international commission, the figures given by Venizelos concerning the Rum population in Anatolia have proved to be false.

Meanwhile, the Greek occupation had reached Balıkesir. Greek troops occupied Balıkesir on 30 June 1920. The Greek General Paraskevopoulos admitted that he faced great resistance in the south of Balıkesir (Sunay, 2021, p. 6). A strong British fleet landed on the shores of Mudanya and Gemlik on 10 July 1920 and landing forces attempted to take control of the area. The Turks resisted with heavy artillery fire, but the British took the area. Finally, Bursa was occupied as part of a Greek-British collaboration (The United States National Archives, 767.68/39). While all these developments were taking place, in July 1920, at the request of the British, Greek troops marched from İzmir to Bandırma and joined the other Greek forces landing there. Moreover, the Greeks were accompanied by British officers (The United States National Archives, 767.68/36). As it was mentioned above, Britain was using Greek troops in Anatolia as a proxy for Allied interests. The fact that the occupation of Anatolia was beginning to serve British interests worried the Greek authorities. Although the Greeks attacked and occupied Balıkesir, Bandırma and Bursa, they were unable to eliminate the Turkish army. The June offensive led to the resumption of hostilities between the Turks and the Greeks (Erdem, 2009, p. 233).

According to American intelligence reports, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the National Struggle, announced that he would never sign a treaty until Anatolia was evacuated by the Greeks. In general, it is underlined that the Greeks' landing of troops in İzmir and the occupation of Aydın province led to the emergence of the Turkish National Struggle. According to the American intelligence report, there could be two reasons why the Turks did not show sufficient resistance to the Greeks' advance: either the Turks would not engage in a conflict with the Greeks or they would deliberately retreat and drag the Greek troops into a protracted conflict. Thus, the Greeks would be faced with guerrilla warfare. Britain allowed Greece to fight in Anatolia, but the cost of the war was a major problem. Greece's war expenditures were increasing and its budget was running a deficit (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1335). The strategic moves of the Turks indicated that a war of attrition would break out. Greece's attempts to fulfil Britain's

wishes on the one hand and to carry out the occupation of Anatolia on the other hand were increasing the problems.

While some of the Greek troops advanced towards Bursa, others headed towards the east of İzmir. The main aim of the Greeks moving to Alaşehir was to occupy Uşak. Therefore, the Turkish side tried to transport troops and ammunition to Uşak. However, on 27 August 1920, the Greek troops launched an attack from Alaşehir towards Uşak. When the Turkish troops could not resist, they had to retreat to Banaz (Tutsak, 1995, pp. 299-302). Meanwhile, the Allies tried to spread the news that Mustafa Kemal had been wounded and that Bekir Sami Bey, the former representative to Moscow, had been assassinated in Tokat. The Greek side, on the other hand, was at odds with Britain. Britain argued that the Greeks were not in a position to launch another offensive and that this situation was demotivating the Greek authorities. General Pangolos travelled to İstanbul to meet with British officials to resolve the problems. The Greeks believed that they were fighting on behalf of Britain and that they could not hold the territory they occupied (The United States National Archives, 767.68/55). Therefore, in order to hamper the Turkish National Struggle, the Allied powers resorted to propaganda, one of the most important elements of intelligence. The recent developments caused disappointment for the Greek authorities because in the eyes of Britain, Greece did not have the power to continue the occupation of Anatolia and the Greeks realized that they were being used by Britain during the occupation of Anatolia.

It should be noted that Greek General Paraskevopoulos was cautious about the recent victories against the Turks because he believed that the captured territories could not be defended after the recent offensives. According to him, the Turkish National Struggle had to be destroyed first. With the capture of strategic points such as Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar, it was necessary to move towards Ankara and Konya. While these developments were taking place on the military front, steps were being taken on the diplomatic front that would affect the course of the war. In this regard, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed between the Allied powers and the Ottoman State on 10 August 1920. Mustafa Kemal declared that the Sèvres would never be accepted and stated that the Turkish people should be united for new battles (Solomonidis, 1984, pp. 91-92). With the

Treaty of Sèvres, Eastern Thrace, Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) were given to Greece. In addition, the Aegean Islands, which had been under the administration of Greece since 1913, were now recognized to be under Greek sovereignty. In addition, the regions of İzmir, Edremit and Kuşadası were to be given to Greece (Gülsevin Tamer, 2020, pp. 278-279). Greek sovereignty over Edirne and Western Thrace recognized (Brown, 1924, p. 113). As for the Straits, the Allied powers were to have a say and it was decided that they should be under the supervision of an international commission (Smith, 1998, p. 128).

Although Greece made diplomatic gains, its relations with its ally Britain were at an impasse. The methods used by Greece to suppress the Turkish resistance were criticized by British politicians. Britain considered that the consequences of the low morale of Greek soldiers in Anatolia and their cowardly behaviour would be severe. It was noted that Greece did not try to establish diplomatic relations with the Turks and consistently favoured offensive action (The United States National Archives, 767.68/59). As in the intelligence report mentioned above, Greece wanted to spread the occupation over a wide area in a short time. Greek troops extended the occupation of Uşak by 20 kilometres, killing 700 Turks and taking many prisoners (The United States National Archives, 767.68/60).

In Western Anatolia, fierce clashes between Greek soldiers and Turks continued without slowing down. In the intelligence report sent from the Greek Military Headquarters to the High Commissioner of İzmir on 22 September 1920, it was mentioned that there were clashes between the Kuvâ-yı Milliye forces and the Rums and that some Rums had fled from Denizli (The General Archives of Greece, GRGSA-CSA 2). Besides, Gemlik, occupied by the British in July 1920, came under Greek control. Greek soldiers entered the houses of the villages on the pretext of searching for weapons, and the Turks were treated arbitrarily by the Greek forces. The villagers, who were badly beaten, demanded justice (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/7). In terms of tactical and operational intelligence, Britain tried to act with a minimum of casualties. In this respect, strategic points in Anatolia were first occupied by British troops and then the region was handed over to Greek troops. However, the Greek troops did not act under British control.

In an observation report written by the British High Commission's intelligence officer on 25 September 1920, it was highlighted that the Greek soldiers were trying to form small units of Rums and were attacking the Turks. Therefore, the Greeks used the clashes as an excuse to carry out large-scale operations against the Turks. It was stated that the Greek military authorities had already used this tactic in Macedonia (The United States National Archives, 767.68/62).

Another tactic used by the Greeks was to arrest civilians and execute them at the Greek headquarters. According to the report prepared by the Beykoz police station on 22 September 1920, Deli Ömer oğlu Ali, who lived in Beykoz, was arrested by Greek soldiers while crossing the Bosphorus and executed in the Greek headquarters. According to the report of the Gebze District Governorate dated 29 October 1920, Hüseyin oğlu İbrahim, who owned a small restaurant at the Gebze railway station, was wounded by a sergeant of the Greek army (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2706/12). The arbitrary behaviour of the Greek troops brought the Greek authorities and the Allies into conflict. Britain was very uncomfortable with the Greek army acting beyond its control. Moreover, the October 1920 report of the Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul, which assessed the developments in Anatolia, pointed out that the Rums were deliberately provoked against the Turks by the Greek government. During the occupation of Anatolia, the Allies tried in every way to use the Armenians and Rums against the Turks for their own interests. The occupation of Anatolia was based on the desire of the Allied powers and Greece to realize their imperialist and commercial aims (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1361). Another important detail reflected in the League of Nations Archives, the Greeks were aware that Anatolia had valuable minerals and very fertile land, and argued that lines of communication should be improved and trade developed (The League of Nations Archives, 10/12733/10945).

It is essential to highlight that the intelligence report, which was based on the observations of the American aid officer and sent to the American Embassy in İstanbul on 20 October 1920, contained detailed information about the Greek occupation in Anatolia and the course of the Turkish National Struggle. Accordingly, it was noted that Mustafa Kemal was suffering from kidney disease and had to rest due to his poor health. The Greek

advance caused deep fear among the Turkish peasants. In addition, hatred of the British among the Turkish population was at its height. According to the informant, a Turkish women's battalion was being organized in Eskişehir. The British intelligence officer was informed that under the current circumstances, if the Turks decided to attack, the Greek army would be forced to withdraw from the occupied areas (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1355). The Turkish side was preparing for a protracted conflict. The statement that Mustafa Kemal was ill indicates that this information could have been used for propaganda purposes, as the Allied powers were using every means to wear down the Turkish National Struggle.

While these events were unfolding in Anatolia, new developments were taking place in Greek domestic politics. In October 1920, King Alexander was bitten by a monkey, the wound later became infected and the King died (Erdem, 2009, p. 269). Upon the King's death, the possibility of King Constantine, who had been deposed in 1917, being restored to the throne was raised (Dalezou, 2002, p. 157). A referendum was held in Greece on 14 November 1920 (Erdem, 2009, p. 284) and Prime Minister Venizelos lost the elections. Thus, in November 1920, King Constantine regained power (Meyers, 1984, p. 27). The opponents of Venizelos were harshly critical of his domestic and foreign policies. The Royalists stressed that they were in favour of a "*small Greece*" and admitted that Anatolia was a heavy burden for Greece. The Royalists predicted that the territories acquired by Greece through occupation would not be permanent and would be attacked. It was said that the Greeks were exhausted by the long wars (Smith, 1998, p. 153).

Britain, France and Italy opposed the King's re-entry into Greek politics (Clogg, 1992, pp. 95-97). On 30 November 1920, the French politician Leygues offered different proposals for the new political order in Greece. The Allies could not recognize the Greek King, but this would not be an effective sanction, or diplomatic relations with Greece could be cut off and conducted at the level of chargé d'affaires, but this would not be an effective method of punishment. If such a method were adopted, Greece could develop close relations with Germany. Also, economic sanctions could be imposed on Greece. In this context, the loan agreements to be given to Venizelos would be cancelled and the Greek economy would enter an unusual process. Thus, the Greek drachma would be

devalued and the Greeks would not receive loans from abroad (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/C.P. 2193). Greece's economic situation deteriorated as the war progressed. In order to assess the condition of the Greek economy, it is possible to analyze the debt situation by year. In September 1912, the total debt of the Greek state was 1 billion drachmas, while in December 1920, the total debt of Greece had risen to 4 billion drachmas. As the figures show, Greece's debt increased fourfold in 8 years. Moreover, Greece's foreign debt was monitored by the International Financial Commission, which consisted of British, French, Italian and Russian delegates (The League of Nations Archives, 10/12733/10945).

It must be acknowledged that the Greeks had great faith in British politicians. However, by the end of 1920, the British attitude towards Greece had changed. King Constantine, who had opposed the policies of Britain and France in the past, realized that he had to continue the occupation of Anatolia. With King Constantine back on the throne, the Greeks would focus their attacks directly on Ankara (Hatipoğlu, 1983, p. 86). The Greek occupation of Anatolia would then enter a new phase. The approach of the Allied states to impose sanctions on Greece or to ignore it politically would put the Greeks in a difficult situation in the future.

Despite the shift in Greek domestic politics, the developments in Anatolia reveal that nothing has changed. In a letter sent to the US High Commissioner on 16 November 1920 by the mayor of Bandırma, Servet Bey, the merchant Rasim Bey, İsmail Hakkı and Kâmil Efendi, it was underlined that Greek troops had caused great destruction in the occupied areas and had systematically massacred the Muslim population. Turks going to the market to shop were stopped by Greek soldiers and forcibly abducted. Emboldened by these incidents, Greeks and Armenians began attacking Muslims in the streets with axes and knives. During the occupation it was forbidden to keep weapons in the houses. On the pretext of searching for weapons for the second time, Greek soldiers entered the houses of Muslims and looted their property (The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/8). In addition, the decree signed by Mustafa Kemal, the President of the Grand National Assembly, on 17 November 1920 announced the decision of the Ministry of Finance to give 5.000 liras to the needy people whose houses, vineyards or property had

been destroyed by the Greeks in the Yenişehir district of Bursa (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-18-1-1/1- 19- 16).

It must be pointed out that in the letter sent to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry on 4 December 1920 regarding the activities of the Greek troops in Anatolia after the fall of Venizelos, it was reported that the Greek occupying forces had behaved harshly towards the Muslim population in the Biga district and that a Greek detachment of 100 men had been sent to the region, along with two mountain guns and heavy weapons (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dâhiliye Nezareti İdare-i Umumiye, 20/14). On the other hand, after the elections in Greece, voices of opposition to the new government were raised on the front line. On 22 December 1920, an official of the US consulate had a meeting with Aristidis Steryiadis, the High Commissioner of İzmir, a close friend of Venizelos. Accordingly, Steryiadis did not believe that he would work in harmony with the new government, but he continued his activities as part of his duty. According to him, the Greek people were exhausted by the wars, as they had been under arms for many years. He argued that the best thing the Allies could do for Greece was to prevent the return of the King. The Allied forces had already removed King Constantine from the throne, so it was not an understandable policy for the King to regain power. The main reason why France did not oppose the new government was that it was trying to improve its relations with the Turks because of its Muslim colonies and had therefore lost interest in Greece. Steryiadis stated that if the Greek drachma continued to fall, the Greek government would not be able to continue military operations in Anatolia or Thrace (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1374). Between 1919 and 1920, Greek foreign policy was designed with the aim of expanding the occupation of Anatolia.

3.1.4. Occupation of Western Anatolia by Greek Forces, Massacres and Defeats: 1921

It must be pointed out that in 1921, the Greek army was organized in line with the directives of the new government (Erdem, 2009, p. 300). The Greek army launched an offensive operation against the Turkish army on 6 January 1921. With the resistance of the Turkish army at İnönü in Eskişehir, the Greeks were forced to retreat. This success

caused great joy on the Turkish side and the Greek General Papoulas asked Athens for more troops for the next offensive (Jensen, 1979, p. 558). The Greek army burned and damaged Turkish villages as they retreated (Korkmaz, 2022, p. 39). The Greeks made a political move with this attack on Eskişehir, but failed to have the desired effect (The United States National Archives, 767.68/68). The Turkish side was inadequate compared to the Greeks in terms of numbers and equipment, but the Turks had a higher spiritual and moral superiority (Smith, 1998, p. 183). Desertions in the Greek army began to increase. In this context, Greek soldiers in Thrace broke their military oath and escaped from the army. On 1 February 1921, the commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment reported that the Greek soldiers in Thrace were not sufficiently trained, did not act in accordance with the Megali idea and were not sufficiently aware of their responsibilities. It was stated that national feeling within the army had diminished because of the deserters. These individuals and their families were informed that the punishment would be severe and that they would be arrested wherever they were caught. It was also stressed that they would be given light punishment if they returned to the army (The General Archives of Greece, GRGSA-CSA PRI077).

On the other hand, despite the victory of the war, the situation of the Turkish people deteriorated with each passing day. In a letter sent to the League of Nations on 14 February 1921 on behalf of the Turkish and Muslim Women's Associations in İstanbul and signed by Refika Edhem, Feyziye Fahreddin, Azize Ferruh, Safiye Hüseyin, Selam Rıza and Sadiye Halil, it was noted that more than 500.000 women, children and old people in İstanbul were suffering from hunger. In addition to Russian refugees, it was pointed out that Muslims had been forced to migrate because of Greek terrorism and that people in İstanbul were struggling with the cost of living. It was highlighted that people were unable to cope with hunger and that mothers were also unable to breastfeed their children. Mosques and public buildings have become shelters for those affected by the disaster. Although local aid organizations and associations are making efforts, they are failing to provide the slightest benefit (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/118).

Following the 1st İnönü victory of the Turkish side, the London Conference was held in London on 21 February 1921, chaired by Lloyd George and attended by delegates from

Athens, İstanbul and Ankara (Jensen, 1979, p. 558). Lloyd George advised the Greek delegation to develop a conciliatory dialogue with the Turks and to revise the Treaty of Sèvres (Solomonidis, 1984, p. 97). The reason for the change in the hostile attitude of the Lloyd George government towards the Turks, which continued until today, was the pressure put on the government by some British members of parliament (Şimşir, 1985, p. 347). The Allies tried to persuade the Ankara government to sign the treaty, in particular by making arrangements regarding the articles on İzmir and Thrace. However, the Greek government declared that it would not withdraw from the Treaty of Sèvres and that the Turkish side should accept the treaty in its original form. The Ankara government attended the London Conference not to discuss the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres, but to explain the scope and aims of the Turkish National Struggle. During the conference, the governments of Ankara and İstanbul made statements in support of each other and showed a common national stance (Sonyel, 1971, p. 13; Sofuoğlu&Yıldırım, 2015, pp. 366-376). On the Greek side, both the Royalists and Venizelos supporters, as well as the Greek newspapers, called for war against Turkey rather than a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres (The United States National Archives, 767.68/69). In this context, on 22 March 1921, King Constantine called for mobilization in order not to lose the lands in Anatolia and declared that at least 50.000 Greek soldiers should be gathered. The financial part of the mobilization decision was solved by taking out two loans from the National Bank of Greece, one for 50 million and the other for 75 million drachmas (The United States National Archives, 767.68/70). But all these developments did nothing to boost the morale of the Greek soldiers in Anatolia (Hibben, 1923, p. 547).

Although the London Conference was organized within the framework of the above-mentioned objectives, according to the Turkish National Struggle, it took place in the following way: Britain gave Greece time to regain its strength and made a political move by creating an environment to express the views of Italy and France, which were in favour of making an agreement with the Ankara government. Greece's rejection of the idea of an inquiry into the question of İzmir and Thrace was in fact the work of the British bureaucracy. The British never abandoned their policy of destroying the Turkish nationalists, who were the soul of the pan-Islamic movement and were seen as the greatest obstacle to British hegemony in the Muslim world. It is very difficult for the Turks to

reach an agreement with the Western powers who continue to act with their imperialist aims (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/112-114).

It is important to note that on 10 March 1921, Nüzhet Bey, who was working as a secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Rome as an spy for the US, gave some information about the latest situation of the Turkish army. He was a graduate of Robert College and spoke fluent English. He took part in the battle of Çanakkale and worked for 2 years in the intelligence department. He then worked for a short time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nüzhet Bey, who took part in the Turkish National Struggle, said that Mustafa Kemal tried to reorganize the Turkish army in the last three months. Those who were involved in gang activities were asked to join the National Army. However, it is known that the Circassian Ethem crossed over to the Greek side with 2.300 people (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1395). It must be underlined that the US used Turkish citizens as agents in order to get information about the course of the Turkish National Struggle. Especially in times of war, it should not be forgotten that the agents acted under the control of two different states at the same time.

According to the new plan of Colonel Sarigiannis in March 1921, the Greek 3rd Corps was to launch a sudden attack against the Turks from the Bursa side and be supported by the 1st Corps in the direction of Kütahya. Greek troops numbered 42.000 while Turkish troops numbered 33.000 (Gülsevin Tamer, 2020, p. 306). Although the Greeks were outnumbered, the motivation of the army was poor. Lord Curzon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom, sent a secret letter to Lord Hardinge, the British Ambassador to France, on 23 March 1921, stating that the clashes between the Turks and the Greeks would intensify again, that the Greeks would make an offensive movement, but that this would be a wrong policy in view of the reinforcements made by Mustafa Kemal. It was stressed that the offensive would start today and that Mustafa Kemal would prolong the fighting and wear down the Greeks with guerrilla tactics (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/C 6247/2740/18). The Greek army attacked again on 23 March 1921 and advanced on the Bursa and Uşak route. In the face of Turkish resistance, the Greeks were forced to retreat (Jensen, 1979, p. 558). While the situation on the front was like this, there were serious changes in British policy

towards Greece. From the aftermath of the elections in Greece until March 1921, Britain stopped openly supporting the Greeks. Instead, it adopted a “*wait and see*” policy, considering it in its own interest to act according to the results of the Greek offensive (Dalezidou, 2002, pp. 199-200). However, Britain’s ostensible policy of neutrality did not mean that it ceased its material and moral support for Greece and the British continued to support her secretly (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/113). It can be clearly underlined that Britain no longer believed that the Greeks could achieve a decisive success in Anatolia and the new Greek government’s demand for an offensive caused divisions in the army. Thus, the division would worsen the general situation.

It is true that there was resistance in the Greek army to the decision to mobilize, and the Greek government was not satisfied with the army, which had suffered two successive defeats at the hands of the Turkish army. In Athens, those who had previously been exempted from military service were called to the front as a result of the mobilization decision, which caused intense reactions (The United States National Archives, 767.68/73). Furthermore, after heavy fighting, the Greek troops, unable to capture Eskişehir, retreated towards Bursa. It was reported that more than 5.000 people lost their lives and were injured on the Greek side (The United States National Archives, 767.68/74). When the disintegration and disobedience of orders in the Greek army is evaluated by the strategic intelligence, it can be seen that there must be no deep disagreement between the decision-maker and the soldier or the intelligence officer. Although the Greek government has declared mobilisation, there are many people in the army who react to it.

As the withdrawal of Greek troops accelerated, Greek repression of the Muslims in and around İzmir increased. On 16 April 1921, “*Turkey*”, a newspaper published by the Permanent Bureau of the Turkish Congress in Lausanne, reported that some Greek troops leaving the Basmahane railway station had shot at and destroyed the minaret of the Çorakkapı Mosque. Such actions had become a tradition for the Greek troops. İzmir took on the appearance of a battlefield. In addition to the Greek soldiers, the Rums were constantly using weapons against the Muslim population. On the steamer to Göztepe, three Turkish women had their veils torn off and were attacked by Greeks. Because of the

frequency of such incidents in İzmir, Turks are afraid to go out of their homes (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1427). A letter sent by a group of Turkish citizens to the League of Nations on 22 April 1921 pointed out that the protests of the Turks were immediately suppressed by the Greek army and that the occupying forces were acting arbitrarily due to the encouragement of the Allies or the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. For its failure to take measures, the League of Nations bears the responsibility for all the unlawful activities of the Greek troops (The League of Nations Archives, 11/12274/1696). A remarkable detail in the context of what happened in the city is the following: a committee formed in İzmir under the leadership of the Greek Bishop Chrysostomos distributed weapons in the villages of Tomazo, Papas and Tebade, where the Greeks were in the majority. During the meeting of the Greek delegation at the governor's residence in Menemen, the Rums removed the Ottoman coat of arms from the entrance gate and threw it away. Muslims in İzmir were constantly harassed. Those who had decorated their shops for the Regaib Kandil were arrested by Greek forces (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2707/43). Greece is trying by all means to force the Muslims in İzmir to migrate. The Greek administration, which aims to change the population structure of İzmir so that Greeks become the majority, humiliates the values associated with Turk and Muslim.

During this period, the activities of the Rum Patriarchate were remarkable. In this context, on 13 April 1921, the Patriarchate received financial aid from the Rums living in the US and 1 million francs were sent. On 8 June 1921, the Vice-Patriarch Nikola issued a statement of thanks for this help from the American Rums. The Patriarchate also supplied the Greek soldiers in the Çatalca region. During this period, Greek officials used Rum women for espionage. Some Rum women in İstanbul were disguised as Muslims and sent to İzmit. Greeks who knew Turkish also carried out espionage activities by pretending to be Muslims (Toker, 2006, pp. 217-218). Greece is trying to carry out intelligence activities through the Patriarchate, which is supposed to have a religious mission. Strategic intelligence never denies the importance of human intelligence. At this point, it can be said that Greek intelligence has increased its activities in Anatolia.

Moreover, Greek massacres continued in the Marmara region too. In April 1921, the already small gendarmerie force in Erdek was disarmed by the Greek administration and replaced by a Greek militia under the Orthodox bishopric. The militia entered Muslim homes and arrested all men, regardless of age. Muslims were also forced to imitate animals and those who were ill were beaten. A 70-year-old man, Memiş, was targeted and arbitrarily killed by the Greek troops during a shooting exercise. In the Edremit and Erdek areas, the situation of the Muslims became unbearable (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/13). According to the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 23 April 1921, it was indicated that some of the Muslims in Gemlik, where there was deep misery, were evacuated and the possibility of sending them to İstanbul was being investigated (The League of Nations Archives, MIS.15.2/270). The Gemlik evacuation operation shows that Greece aimed to destroy the Turkish element in the region. Besides, the situation of Turkish prisoners of war in Greece was also desperate. The Ottoman Red Crescent kept a close watch on this problem (The League of Nations Archives, MIS.15.2/277). Greece would use Turkish prisoners of war as a bargaining chip against any unfavourable conditions it would face in Anatolia.

In addition to these developments, in the letter sent by the Vice-President of the Ottoman Red Crescent to the International Committee of the Red Cross on 22 April 1921, it was expressed that the Muslim people and administrators living in Orhangazi were deported to Gemlik by the Greeks on 16 April 1921. The deportees were not allowed to take their belongings with them and were subjected to Greek persecution on the way. Whatever was left in Orhangazi was looted by Greek soldiers. The Muslim population, who were not allowed to go to İstanbul, faced starvation. Finally, the letter stressed that the inhuman actions of the Greeks should be prevented (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-55-5/3).

It is essential to highlight that Britain began to realize that its Anatolian policy, which it had tried to implement through the Greeks, had failed. Threatening to withdraw from İstanbul, Britain tended to hand over the straits and the city to Greek control. This idea, however, would not be accepted by France and Italy. After the defeat of the Greeks against the Turks in the Second İnönü War, the Greeks threatened İstanbul through Thrace

and the British forces planned to retreat if the Greeks advanced. Britain believed that if İstanbul was surrendered, the Turks would seek its help. There was also a great deal of resentment against Britain in Anatolia (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1406). In May 1921, Greece declared that the southern part of the Sea of Marmara was blockaded and that it would seize any ship that violated this decision. The US expressed that it would not recognize such a decision. The Greek government stated that it had taken such a decision on the grounds that smuggling was being carried out by foreign ships. Nevertheless, in addition to the US, the authorities in the Britain, France and Italy also underlined that such actions were unacceptable. For this reason, under pressure, Greece cancelled the blockade order and the Allies denounced Greece's action as unwise (The United States National Archives, 767.68112/1-2). After the Second İnönü defeat in Anatolia, the Greek government, as it had done before, took steps that were not welcomed by the Allies.

If Greece's activities are evaluated in terms of strategic intelligence, the invasion of Anatolia by Greece, which acted with ideological concerns and ignored strategic intelligence to realize the Megali Idea, was unpredictable and Greece was unable to develop the solid diplomatic relations with the Allies that it had previously established.

It should be noted that the massacres committed by Greece in the Marmara region had increased to such an extent that it was decided to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the massacres of the Greek occupation forces, which were out of control and increasingly violent (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/18). In a letter from the British High Commissioner to the Senior Naval Officer in İstanbul dated 7 May 1921, the *Bryony* was ordered to stand by in İzmit Bay and other areas while investigations were carried out (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/201). With the joint decision of the Allied powers, on 12 May 1921, British General Franks, French Colonel Vico, Italian Colonel Rolletto and Monsieur Gehri of the International Committee of the Red Cross were assigned to investigate the regions of Gemlik, Yalova and Orhangazi. The delegation visited the coastal areas and photographed villages and mosques bombed and destroyed by the Greeks, and also encountered Greek soldiers stealing belongings from abandoned houses. A second delegation carried out inspections

in the regions of Beykoz, Paşabahçe, Şile, Gebze, Kandıra and İzmit ('Atrocités Grecques en Turquie', 1921, pp. 4-5). In Beykoz, 18 Turks were sentenced to prison by the Greeks and detained for 10 days. They were only given water and food on condition that they paid money to the Greeks. In the end, most of these prisoners were massacred by the Greek forces (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/307). As a result of the investigations, the delegations witnessed that the Muslim villages they visited were burnt by the Greeks. The population of the villages was not clearly known due to the Greek massacres and migrations. In the villages of Karacaali in Gemlik and Kapaklı in Armutlu, women and old people were killed by bullets to the head. During the attacks, many villagers lost their lives and Turkish women were raped (The League of Nations Archives, DR 589, I 6). The members of the Commission of Inquiry also found ten bodies, including one woman, on Karacaali beach. They stressed that the necessary measures should be taken urgently to prevent a recurrence of the incidents in the region (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/220).

At this point, the testimony of Monsieur Gehri is very important. Gehri describes the situation he encountered in Gemlik as follows: the Turkish refugees here had come from the burnt town of Pazarköyü. They complained that their belongings had been stolen on the way by civilian Armenians and Greeks. In addition, Mrs Hatice, who had lost her chin due to a bomb thrown by Armenian gangs into the village, described her experiences with fear (Oran Arslan, 2003, pp. 307-308). Investigations in Kandıra revealed that Muslim women had been bayoneted to death by Greek soldiers. Women in the villages of Karakiraz and Karasakal were attacked by the Greeks ('Atrocités Grecques en Turquie', 1921, p. 211).

Greek soldiers carried out similar massacres in Şile in May 1921. According to the reports submitted to the General Command of the Gendarmerie of the Ottoman State, the Greek soldiers and the Rums acted together to organize attacks on Turkish villages. The soldiers looted the villages and harassed the wives of those who refused to hand over their valuables. The Greeks completely destroyed the archives of official buildings (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2707/44). In his testimony, Dimitri oğlu Yorgi, who was detained after the Greek attacks on the village of Koca

Mustafa in Şile, emphasized that many Rums were enrolled as soldiers in the Greek army. The recruitment of these people was realized with the encouragement of the Patriarchate. Those who were sent to the Greek Consulate through the Patriarchate received a monthly salary of 30 liras (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2707/56).

It must be pointed out that all the places where Greece committed massacres in the Marmara region are called Samanlıdağ. It consists of the settlements of İzmit, Karamürsel, Yalova, Gemlik and Pazarköy. In his report, Monsieur Gehri gave some striking details. According to him, 3/5 of the Muslim population lost their lives during the Greek occupation of the Marmara region. Only 2-3 people survived in the villages of Karamürsel. The settlement of Çınarcık, which the soldiers did not burn down, was occupied by the Rums. According to Monsieur Gehri, the main aim of the Greek soldiers' activities in the Marmara region during the last two months was the *systematic destruction of the Muslim population*. The burnt villages and massacres witnessed by the Commission of Inquiry leave no doubt as to what the Greeks were doing in this region. Irregular armed civilian gangs and the regular Greek army committed crimes against the Muslim population. There is no evidence that these crimes were prevented or punished by the Greek military command. While the Greek gangs should have been disarmed and disbanded, they were supported by Greek troops. General Leonardopoulos, the commander of the 10th Division of the Greek army, authorized his division in Çemlik to commit massacres against the Muslim civilian population (The League of Nations Archives, 11/13569/12255). It is noted that the Greek military authorities did not take sufficient measures and failed to maintain discipline among the soldiers under their command. The fact that the Turkish authorities made every effort is reflected in the commission's report and it was stated that there were no complaints from the Rums against the Turks in the region (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/265-266).

According to a report prepared by British military intelligence in May 1921, some 60-70 Rum civilians came to Hereke from Darıca, near Gebze, under the protection of British Indian soldiers. While the Rums entered the houses in the area, the Indian soldiers stood guard. They broke down the doors of the houses and took away valuables. Captain Necip,

who served as an engineer in the navy, said that an Albanian interpreter employed by the British in Gebze woke him up from his bed and that he was beaten by the Rums. The commission reported that the Rums had tried to burn Turkish houses with paraffin, but that the Turks had prevented them from doing so. The villagers stressed that there were at least two Greek officers directing the armed Rums (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/333-335).

Apart from Ottoman and British documents, American archival documents provide important details about what happened in the region. In this context, many Turkish villages were destroyed and villagers lost their lives as a result of Greek attacks. In addition to the approximately 3.000 Turks made homeless, villagers from the Gemlik and Yalova regions took refuge in İstanbul. Thus, the already overcrowded population of İstanbul increased even more due to immigration. The reports given by the British General Franks to the US authorities contain photographs of the Greek atrocities and the testimonies of the villagers. Accordingly, the burning of villages in the Marmara region and the killing of Turkish villagers coincided with the passage of the Greek detachment through this region (The United States National Archives, 767.68116/20). A letter from General Franks to the British High Commissioner in May 1921 described the situation of the few surviving villagers as miserable (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/232). The inhabitants of Eserköy and Bozalfat, near Agva, reported that regular Greek troops had been advancing on their villages for the past nine months. In parallel with the previously mentioned incidents, the Greeks attacked Turkish women in the villages and looted the houses. Greek soldiers under the command of Katsaros terrorized the area, burning villages in Şile. Many villagers were beaten and some were hanged by their feet (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/273-277). In May 1921, on the road from Bursa Yenişehir to Gemlik, 15 Turkish villages were burnt down during the retreat of the Greek General Tirkopis. The Rum and Armenian gangs were protected by the Greek army and encouraged to attack. Those who tried to resist the gangs in the villages were brutally killed (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2707/41).

When the Greek government failed to achieve the desired results from its military interventions in the interior of Anatolia, it continued to organize attacks against Turkish civilian villages in the Marmara region. The settlement of Elmalık, near the village of Küçükkumla in Gemlik, was besieged by Greek troops armed with machine guns on 11 May 1921 and 1.100 people, including men, women and children, were massacred. The inhabitants of Haydarlı village, including pregnant women, fled the Greek persecution and walked for kilometres to reach a safe place (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2707/53). According to the members of the Inquiry Commission, the residents of the village of Küçükkumla who survived the massacre should be moved to a safe area (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/221). The International Committee of the Red Cross sent a boat with only 500-600 people to evacuate the area on 18 May 1921, but 3.800 Turks had to be removed (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/194). This situation shows the extent of the destruction caused by Greece in the Marmara region.

When the Greek government could not defeat the Turkish army by war, it started massacres against the Turkish population in order to force the Turks to migrate. When the reports are carefully analyzed, it is emphasized that the attacks were carried out by the Rums and that Greek officers were personally involved in the massacres (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/216). It is clear from the reports that the Greek military and Rums were acting together.

Meanwhile, the relationship between Britain and the Turkish National Struggle was going through a challenging period due to the developments. Mustafa Sagir, who was of Indian origin and was used by the British as a spy to get information about the Turkish National Struggle, had published a newspaper in Ankara to avoid attracting attention and had tried to create a basis of friendship between Britain and Turkey. Sagir pointed out that the British were very disturbed by the Turkish National Struggle. He explained that there was a section in the British Foreign Office dealing with the "*Eastern Question*", but that this department was against putting pressure on the Turks. This division stressed that the policy of forcing a Turkish colonel to salute a British major would lead to rebellion. In conclusion, he was a spy trained by the British to overthrow the government of Mustafa

Kemal. Mustafa Sagir, who was under the control of British Colonel Nelson, was followed by the Turkish National Struggle after a while and a search of his house revealed that he was a spy. Sagir had obtained information about Mustafa Kemal's habits, character and the speed of his car (The United States National Archives, 867.00/1429). The British followed the Turkish National Struggle very carefully. Through human intelligence, which is one of the most important elements of strategic intelligence, the British monitored the course of the Turkish National Struggle in order to formulate new policies according to the developments. The above-mentioned report clearly shows that there were differences of opinion between the British bureaucracy and politicians.

It is necessary point out that the Allied powers were aware that the conflict between the Greeks and the Turks would have serious consequences. In a declaration issued on 19 May 1921, Britain, France and Italy declared that İstanbul and its environs, as well as the settlements around the Gulf of İzmit and the entire Gallipoli peninsula, were under Allied control. Although the Turkish-Greek struggle in Anatolia continued, the Allies announced that they would adopt a policy of neutrality. No new troops would be recruited or units formed in any of the occupied territories. In addition, the declaration stressed that Turkish citizens could go to places outside the occupied territories and the Rums could go to Greece (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2510/5). The Allies decided to act cautiously as a result of Greece's uncontrolled behaviour in Anatolia. Meanwhile, the situation of the Turkish refugees displaced by the Greek attacks was made clear in a letter sent by E.A. Frick, delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to Georges Burnier, a member of the same committee, on 1 June 1921. Accordingly, it was noted that the milk needs of 600 children among the Turkish refugees should be provided (The League of Nations Archives, MIS.15.2/319).

It is essential to highlight that Greece was persistently preparing for a new offensive in Anatolia. The Greeks believed they needed to organize an offensive against the Turks to prove their strength on the battlefield (Daleziou, 2002, p. 203). Under pressure from the Allied powers, King Constantine was forced to continue the war in Anatolia. In this context, in order to raise the morale of the army, King Constantine set sail for İzmir on the Greek battleship Lemnos on 11 June 1921. Before leaving Athens, the King issued a

statement to the Greek people: *“As the leader of an army that has fought for Hellenism for centuries, I must say that victory will be for the Greeks. Just as our ancestors fought for freedom, equality and justice, so today we fight for these values. With a glorious civilizational past, we are aware of our heavy responsibilities today. I believe in the Hellenic idea and I am heading for the land where the supreme will of my nation has called me”* (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/54-56). From the King’s words, it can be said that Greece continued to fight in Anatolia with the concept of the Megali Idea. King Constantine preferred to make such a speech in order to restore the morale of the Greek people and army after the heavy defeats. Furthermore, when King Constantine arrived in İzmir on 12 June 1921, he made the following speech to the Greek army: *“I am proud of you for fighting with determination in the war for the liberation of the Greek nation. You are fighting for the Hellenic idea, which is the birth of civilization. With the strength that comes from your courage, you will succeed in the war”* (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/58). Constantine’s arrival in İzmir was not greeted with joy by the people. One British, one French and two Italian officials left the port of İzmir early to avoid greeting the King (The United States National Archives, 767.68/111). At this point in the Turkish-Greek war, as mentioned before, the Allies continued to act cautiously in their relations with Greece.

As Greece prepared for war, the Allies tried to establish a channel of dialogue between Greece and Turkey. In the event of a positive response from Greece, the government in Ankara would be contacted; in the event of a negative response, the Greeks would be left to fend for themselves. France, on the other hand, considered Greece’s military situation insufficient for a new war (The United States National Archives, 767.68/108-109). In a meeting held on 18 June 1921, the Allies decided that Eastern Thrace would be demilitarized up to the Çatalca line and that İzmir would be administered by a mixed gendarmerie of European officers and a Christian governor with an autonomous administration under Turkish sovereignty (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/10). The information contained in the letter from the British Ambassador in Athens is also noteworthy. In the letter sent by Lord Granville, the British Ambassador in Athens, to the British Foreign Office on 23 June 1921, it was mentioned that the possibility of a Greek attack might be a bluff and that the Greeks could not be

trusted too much. It was pointed out that the Greeks had committed massacres against the Muslims in and around Yalova and that they were very incompetent to administer a region. It was also stated that Britain's attempt to end the conflicts would not be accepted by the Turkish people as a means of prestige and that the view of the British in Greece would definitely change in a negative way (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/64-65).

In the face of the views of the British ambassador, the common position of the Greek newspapers in June 1921, as well as the Venizelists and the Royalists, was that the possibility of Greece giving up Anatolia under the guise of peace negotiations would never be accepted (The United States National Archives, 767.68/116). In Greece, only the Socialist newspaper called for an end to the Anatolian adventure (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/61). On the other hand, French intelligence was of the opinion that the Greek army was worn out and that the struggle in Anatolia should come to an end. However, Greek politicians, in their longing for the Megali Idea, were contuning to follow focus a policy away from the realities of the war. In this framework, Greek Prime Minister M. Gounaris declared the reasons for the resumption of Greek operations in Anatolia with a memorandum published in June 1921. After the attack in March, it became clear that the Greek army was now fighting a regular army with heavy weapons. It was therefore necessary to strengthen the Greek army. In this context, the Greek National Assembly approved a budget of 625.000.000 drachmas for the needs of the army. Because of its geographical position, Greece is a bulwark for the security of Europe against threats from Asia. The Greek government is aware that this policy does not contradict the new international conjuncture. Greek domination of Anatolia would also be compatible with Britain's interests. For the security of the Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece will duly fulfil its duties and make every sacrifice in the coming war (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/91-100). Moreover, Greek military officials stressed that any delay in carrying out the operations would be to Greece's detriment (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6519/161).

Following the developments, Venizelos revealed Greece's pre-war situation in an interview he gave to the "*Times*" newspaper in London on 8 July 1921. In his opinion, with the restoration of King Constantine, the Allies declared their neutrality and withdrew their financial support. The security of İstanbul and the Straits was now under threat. The Turkish side no longer cared about Britain, France or Greece, and Greek public opinion could no longer tolerate new wars. Greece had been struggling since 1912 and the army had been striving for the security of Europe, but Europe had ignored Greek demands (The United States National Archives, 767.68/145). Venizelos predicted that Greek operations in Anatolia would be unsuccessful. The Greeks believed they could not win the war without Britain's help and therefore demanded Allies' support at all costs. On the other hand, towards the end of July, Greek troops began to evacuate İzmit. This was part of Greece's plan in preparation for an offensive operation against the Turkish forces. During their withdrawal from Adapazarı and its surroundings, the Greeks brought Armenian and Rum refugees with them and burnt and destroyed Turkish villages together. In the course of their retreat, they encountered Turkish forces and low-intensity clashes took place between them. It is necessary to mention once again the Greek atrocities, before leaving İzmit, the Greek army organized the arming of the Christian population and delayed the evacuation for several days. According to American archive documents, the Rums and Armenians killed 500 people in the Muslim neighbourhood. The bodies of the dead showed signs of torture and were found with their hands tied behind their backs (The United States National Archives, 767.68/139). The Greek General Staff did not achieve the desired success in this region. The Rums living in the region did not refrain from persecuting their Muslim neighbours as a result of the provocations of the Greek army (Özel, 2005, p. 218).

In the report prepared by Georges Burnier for the İzmit region on 20 July 1920, it was stated, when the Greek troops were preparing to massacre 3.500 Turks in the courtyard of the French Catholic Institute during the retreat of the Greek troops, this attempt was prevented by the intervention of the officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Karamürsel, out of about 1.000 houses, only one was still in use. As a result of the destruction, there is no bread in the area as there are no bakeries left. The situation in

and around İzmit is critical and urgent assistance is needed (The League of Nations Archives, MIS.15.5/270).

It should be noted that the Battles of Kütahya-Eskişehir, which took place between the Greek army and the Turkish army on 10-25 July 1921, led to intense clashes (Öngel, 2022, p. 140). The Greek army was outnumbered and on 18 July 1921 the Turkish army was forced to retreat east of Eskişehir (Tilgar, 2008, p. 165). Greek aeroplanes bombed railway lines as Turkish troops tried to join forces. The 7th and 10th Greek divisions, which had left Bursa, entered Eskişehir (The United States National Archives, 767.68/127). On 21 July 1921, on the advice of the Turkish General Staff, the Turkish troops attempted a counterattack, but failed. The Turks lost control of the railway from Geyve to Afyonkarahisar and the government considered evacuating Ankara, the centre of the Turkish National Struggle, and moving it to Kayseri (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, WO 106/1438/3-4). The Turkish army retreated east of the Sakarya River on 25 July 1919 to avoid losing more troops (Çaykırın, 2022, p. 81). The Greeks captured 3 locomotives, a large number of railway wagons and weapons from the Turks. Brigadier General X. Stratigos, in his report of 25 July 1921, expressed that the Nationalists had been decisively defeated and that the rest would be destroyed (The United States National Archives, 767.68/150). The success of Greece in the war caused the İstanbul government to adopt a harsher attitude towards the Turkish National Struggle. Thus, a group close to Damat Ferit planned to stage a coup d'état in İstanbul and arrest Grand Vizier Tefvik Pasha and Foreign Minister İzzet Pasha, who sympathized with the National Struggle. As a result, a new pro-Allied administration would be established under the leadership of Damat Ferit Pasha (Sonyel, 2001, p. 697). Greece achieved this victory thanks to Britain's support, and British sympathy among the Greek people grew once again (Ediz, 2015, p. 271). At this point, the Greek army made good use of tactical and operational intelligence and targeted the railway, cutting the Turkish supply line. The Greek side also gained the upper hand thanks to aerial bombardment.

With the decision of 10 August 1921, the Allies declared that they would continue their policy of neutrality in the war between the Turks and the Greeks. It was agreed that the Allied governments would not intervene in the war in the form of troops, arms or material

support. The Allies declared that the Straits were an international problem that could not be solved by Greece. The British Prime Minister, however, declared that the policy of neutrality had gone too far, that the freedom of trade of private companies on both sides should not be impeded in any way, and suggested that if mediation between the Turks and Greeks became necessary, preliminary enquiries should be made so as not to be caught unprepared. Britain tried to find out informally what plans both sides had in mind. The French Prime Minister Monsieur Briand did not believe that Greece would be victorious in Anatolia. For this reason, he stressed the need to wait and not to make any hasty decisions regarding the Greeks (The Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham: The Papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain, AC 23/3/4-6). The relations between France and the Ankara Government became closer during this period. From January 1920 onwards, French soldiers suffered heavy losses against the Turkish resistance forces in Cilicia, Antep, Urfa and Maraş regions. Due to the increasing military expenditures, France faced economic difficulties. Moreover, due to the failure of the Greek offensive in Anatolia, the relationship between France and the Ankara government led to the establishment of channels of dialogue rather than confrontation (Yavuz, 1992, p. 280). The statement made by Italian Foreign Minister della Torretta on 31 July 1921 gives some clues about Italy's relations with the Ankara government. Torretta stated that the Eastern Mediterranean was of great importance for Italy and that Italy had tried to conclude a treaty with the Ankara government in favour of economic interests, but without success (Çelebi, 1998, p. 182).

During this period, there was a great deal of correspondence in the British bureaucracy regarding the developments in Anatolia. The letter sent by Raymond De Candolle, the commander of the British army, to Lord Granville in August 1921 contains remarkable information about Greece. According to him, Greece's limited resources prevented it from establishing a self-sufficient state in Anatolia. Agriculture in Anatolia was more likely to develop under Turkish rule. A policy that removes Greece from Anatolia and keeps the Turks under control will be more sustainable. The Allies will have to find joint solutions satisfactory to both the Greeks and the Turks. It will not be easy to persuade Greece to evacuate Anatolia (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/759/661-20-21).

However, Greece did not intend to evacuate Anatolia. In fact, it was trying various methods to create more chaos in Anatolia. It is important to note that with a tactic used in the Balkan Wars, Greece released the local deserters of the besieged region, causing a deterioration of public order in the region. Besides, for Greece, the new goal was the occupation of Ankara. (The United States National Archives, 767.68/134). In this framework, the Greek army would take control of the depots and supply bases. The Greeks based all their plans on the defeat of the Turkish army at Sakarya (İlgar, 1971, p. 34). Meanwhile, the Ankara government continued its search for an alliance before the battle of Sakarya. In this context, it was aware of the need to develop good relations with France and Italy in the west and with Russia and the Muslims in the east (Demirci, 2010, p. 25). According to British archive documents, Greece made its preparations and started to advance towards Ankara on 14 August 1921. On August 23, the main units of the Greek army went on the offensive, but they failed to succeed against the Turkish troops. The Greek offensive was halted, but both the Greek and Turkish sides were exhausted from the fighting. However, both armies continued to fight. On the evening of September 12-13, Greek troops were forced to evacuate the area around the Sakarya River and retreated towards Eskişehir. The Greeks realized that Ankara could not be captured easily (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, WO 106/1438/8; Ediz, 2015, pp. 276-278).

During the retreat, the Greek troops blew up all bridges and doorways from 8 kilometres east of Sakarya to Eskişehir and destroyed the Afyonkarahisar railway. They also burned and damaged all the areas they had evacuated. With the defeat at Sakarya, the morale of the Greek army reached the point of exhaustion. Some of the army's top commanders were replaced. The Greek General Papoulas was declared the "*scapegoat*" for the defeat. Reports from Anatolia revealed discontent among sergeants and privates. Besides, the prospect of a harsh winter in the Eskişehir region frightened the Greek army. The British military official stated that it would be very difficult for Greek troops to hold Eskişehir during the winter. The Greek General Staff predicted that the centre of activity would shift to Afyonkarahisar and that the Turks might use the Konya railway for future operations. The factors that contributed to Greece's defeat can be listed as follows: the

High Command's overconfidence in the army, the Greek Intelligence Service¹⁰'s lack of sufficient information about the Turks' course of action, the fact that the operational plan for the Battle of Sakarya was quite complex and the Greeks could not fully master the process, inadequate means of transport and faulty supply arrangements. It is clear that the Greek army will not succeed against the Turkish army. It would make small gains at first, but in the long run it would not be able to achieve a decisive victory in Anatolia. For this reason, the British General Staff advised the Greeks to negotiate with the Turks (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, WO 106/1438/14-23). The defeat of the Greek army caused the Rums living in Western Anatolia to worry. At this stage, the Rums in Konya and its surroundings who knew how to use weapons were transferred to İzmir by the metropolitans (Atalay, 2001, p. 176). To sum up, Greece failed in Anatolia as a result of miscalculations by Greek politicians, soldiers and intelligence officers. The inadequacies of the Greek authorities in terms of tactical and operational intelligence, as well as strategic intelligence, made their operations in Anatolia inconclusive. For tactical and operational intelligence to be successful, military officers in particular need to analyze the military capabilities and tactical moves of enemy forces. The detached perspective of Megali Idea had a great impact on this failure. According to strategic intelligence, ideologically motivated decision-makers can make mistakes in war.

It is essential to highlight that the activities of the Greeks in the Sakarya region were described by a Greek pilot captured by the Turks. He stressed that many villages west of Sakarya and along the Seydiköy line were burnt down and that this was the result of orders from the army commanders. The pilot's statements prove that the Greeks have been carrying out a policy of annihilation against the Turks for many years. All that remains in the Greek-controlled areas of Anatolia are the destroyed houses of the peasants who were forced to flee in the face of Greek terror ('Atrocités Grecques en Asie-Mineure', 1922, pp. 3-8).

It is important to note that Lord Granville remarked on 19 September 1921 that the Greek government would have to make a great diplomatic effort. However, the Greek Prime

¹⁰ In the archive document, the term Greek Intelligence Service is used, but it is presumed that this is the intelligence department within the army.

Minister, M. Gounaris, when asked by the British on 21 September 1921 whether the Greeks would take the first step towards negotiations with Mustafa Kemal, replied “no” and did not mention the question of mediation in any way. The Turkish side, on the other hand, declared that it would sign a peace treaty that would guarantee the freedom and independence of the Turkish nation within its own borders (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/E 7570/143/44). Then, the Greek government continued its massacres in Thrace. According to archival documents of the League of Nations, the Greek atrocities in Kırklareli were clearly revealed in the report prepared by Galib Bahlia on behalf of the Turkish Thrace Committee. A significant proportion of the men living in the villages of Kırklareli lost their lives as a result of the Greek massacre. Those who managed to survive found the solution of fleeing to the forests or taking refuge in Bulgaria. The villages of Akardere and Karabayır were occupied by Greek soldiers and although there were no survivors among the men of the villages, the bodies of the remaining women bore the marks of violence. The prisons were full of Muslims imprisoned for no reason and many died because of the poor conditions (The League of Nations Archives, 41/18483/18054).

When the Greek army’s policy of capturing Ankara failed, and refused to negotiate the Greek government was heavily criticized. In a report prepared by the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office on 26 September 1921, it was pointed out that all those who had not taken action against the Greek government during the operation were beginning to pursue an active policy. In Greece, as a result of the anger against King Constantine, it was learned that the National Defence Committee was preparing a revolutionary conspiracy. For this reason, the Greek military mission in İstanbul declared that it would take harsh measures against the leaders of the committee (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6532/154-159). Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish National Struggle, did not think it was right to initiate peace negotiations immediately after victory. He announced that the nationalist army should impose its own conditions on the Greeks and the Allies. Accordingly, he declared that the Greek troops in Thrace and İzmir should withdraw and the Allies should leave İstanbul and Anatolia. In the telegram sent by Bekir Sami Bey to Ankara on 4 October 1921, it was noted that the new target of the Turkish National Struggle must be İzmir and that for the time being, no

difficult process should be started in order to avoid any problems regarding the Straits (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6532/155-156).

After the victory at Sakarya, the warm relations that had begun between France and the Ankara government reached the level of signing a treaty. In this context, the Treaty of Ankara was signed between Turkey and France on 21 October 1921. According to the treaty, the conflicts between the French and the Turks were to end. The French would withdraw from southern Turkey. The Ankara government moved the troops on the southern front to Western Anatolia. The alliance between Britain and France thus suffered a serious blow (Budak, 2008, pp. 112-113).

It should be noted that Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office, met Venizelos on 13 October 1921. Venizelos argued that Greek operations in Anatolia were unnecessary and that King Constantine preferred to attack the Turks in order to preserve his throne. Venizelos thought that if the Turkish side began to develop close relations with any of the Allied powers, this would be a great danger to Greece. He predicted that the Greeks would not be able to find a lasting solution unless there was a definite agreement between Britain and France over Greece. Besides, the French Prime Minister, Monsieur Briand, was not in favour of King Constantine ascending the throne (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6532/184). France predicted that Greece would fail. Venizelos argued that Greece should adopt a strategic attitude and convince the French first. By increasing its diplomatic activity, one of the most important elements of strategic intelligence after the war, Greece was acting to put the Turkish government in a difficult situation.

It must be pointed out that in his speech to the Greek National Assembly on 18 October 1921, Greek Prime Minister Gounaris emphasized that both the advance and retreat decisions of the Greek army were taken by consensus of senior military officers, not by the government. The Treaty of Sèvres promised Greece 16.000 square kilometres of territory, but Greece now has an area of around 100.000 square kilometres. Gounaris stated that it was very important to organize in the occupied territories and that Greece should increase its efficiency and reduce its expenditure. He also said that Greece had

entered the war in cooperation with the Allied powers and that it was therefore important to establish closer contact with them (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6532/145-147). In this context, Prime Minister M. Gounaris, Greek Foreign Minister M. Baltazzis and Greek financial experts travelled to France, England and Italy at the end of October. While the Allies continued their persuasive efforts to mediate between Mustafa Kemal and Greece, the Greek government was also seeking financial support. (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6533/4).

As far as the Greek situation in Anatolia was concerned, Lord Hardinge's letter to Lord Curzon of 21 October 1921 pointed out that the Greek government had offered to establish a Greek civil administration in the occupied areas of Anatolia, but had made no demands regarding the peace treaty with Turkey. Monsieur Briand, for his part, spoke harshly to the Greeks and criticized their wrong attitude. He stressed that the plan to set up a civil administration in the occupied territories was tantamount to annexation and would arouse the anger of the Turks. It was also clear that this proposal would not be accepted by the Allies. He emphasized the need for Greece to reach an agreement with Turkey, either directly or through the Allies, and that this was vital not only for Greece but for the whole of Europe. He recognized that French public opinion had a strong hatred for the King and he did not agree with Venizelos' assertion that the first step towards peace for the Allies was the abdication of King Constantine (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6533/33-35).

Meanwhile, the Greeks continued to wreak havoc in Anatolia. In a letter sent by Lord Granville, the British Ambassador in Athens, to the British High Commissioner on 22 October 1921, it was pointed out that the Greeks should not damage the buildings around the Anatolian railway during their withdrawal. The importance of negotiating with the Greek government to prevent destruction was stressed, as this area would be important to British interests in the future (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/786/8404-7984-21). Greece was in a difficult situation in Anatolia and was looking for a way out. The Rums of Anatolia founded the *Hellenic Anatolian Defence Organization* in October 1921. Through this organization, the Greek government was

able to mobilize the Rums in the region and take steps towards the establishment of an autonomous state in Western Anatolia (Erdem, 2014, p. 101).

It is necessary to note that Greek troops in Eastern Thrace continued their massacres in the region in October 1921, while Greek public opinion debated the implications of the defeat. Persecuted by the systematic attacks of the Greek authorities and the crimes committed by the gangs, the Muslims were unable to protect themselves. Greek soldiers, who came to the village of Sofulu on the pretext of searching for weapons, rounded up the people and tortured some children by nailing their arms to the wall. The Muslim population left their property and migrated to İstanbul to save their lives. The Greek government brought a great number of Greek refugees from Rhodes to the region in an attempt to show that there was a larger Greek population in Thrace, as in the occupied regions of Anatolia. When Greek soldiers had to withdraw from the villages, high-ranking Greek generals, such as King Constantine's prince brother Andrea, gave orders to burn the villages. It is not difficult to imagine the excesses of the soldiers who received such orders (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/6533/95-100). According to archive documents of the League of Nations, the Greeks forced those among the Muslim population who insisted on not migrating to sign documents expressing their satisfaction with the Greek regime. Moreover, when Turks who wished to leave Thrace applied for passport, similar documents were prepared by the Greek authorities, stating that they were insignificant documents for obtaining travel permits. In this way, the Athens administration would later use the declarations obtained by force and deception to justify the continuation of the Hellenic regime in Thrace (The League of Nations Archives, 11/17956/12255). During the negotiations to be held in the future, Greece has been migrating the Rums to the region in order to show that the Rum population in Thrace is higher. Having failed in the military struggle, Greece is trying to change the demographic structure of the region in order to achieve diplomatic success.

It is important to note that in an interview with the Afghan ambassador in December 1921, it was said that the Greek army would disintegrate within a few months and that the Greek dream of occupying İstanbul would be futile because İstanbul could not be fully occupied even during the war years. The Greek invasion adventure would have serious

consequences. The people of Afghanistan attach importance to cities like İstanbul, Ankara, Tehran and Kabul because of Islam. Since İstanbul is a centre for all Muslims, any danger here will affect all Muslims (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı, 59/31). Everyone recognized that the Greek occupation could not continue. However, the Greeks refused to negotiate. They tried to protect the areas they occupied with the support of the Allies. Having completely lost the confidence of the Allied powers, Greece moved away from acting within the framework of strategic intelligence in Anatolia. The fact that France developed close relations with the Ankara government signalled that Greece could not continue the war. Then, the Greek army was spending its last days in Anatolia. The Turkish side, thanks to both military and diplomatic successes, was in a strong position against the Greeks.

3.1.5. The Bitter End of the Greek Occupation in Western Anatolia: 1922

As mentioned above, the fact that the continuation of the Greek presence in Anatolia required the support of the Allied states, particularly Britain, was reaffirmed by the statements of the Greek Patriarch in January 1922. Greece's military stalemate in Anatolia led to diplomatic crises. In this context, in January 1922, the Greek Patriarch Metaxakis made it clear to the Greek public that King Constantine would have to abdicate in order for Britain to help Greece. Thus, the Greek soldiers learned that the help they were expecting from Britain was no longer forthcoming (Hibben, 1923, p. 549). In his statement of 23 January 1922, General Papoulas underlined the need for the British to provide reinforcements in terms of men, money and material. He stated that if these demands were not granted, the evacuation of Anatolia would be inevitable. In the light of this information, M. Gounaris wrote a letter to Lord Curzon in which he threatened that Greece was making a final appeal for help and that if the request was not met, the process of evacuation would begin and Britain would have to take care of itself in its relations with the Turkish National Struggle (Smith, 1998, p. 251). Greece is unable to use diplomacy effectively against the Allies. The failure of the army has led Greek politicians to adopt a threatening tone. In the understanding of strategic intelligence, it should not be forgotten that success can be achieved if diplomacy is used effectively, even in the most desperate moments but Greek decision-makers did not achieve this.

Meanwhile, in France, the government changed in January 1922 and Raymond Poincaré, who was more anti-Greek than Monsieur Briand, became Prime Minister of France (Larew, 1973, p. 267). In the discussions about the future of Anatolia between the Allies, it was pointed out that there would be resistance if a forceful attitude was adopted towards the Turks in Thrace and İzmir, in accordance with the interests of the Greeks (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/124). At a meeting of the Supreme Council in Cannes in January, Lord Curzon suggested that İzmir could be given autonomous status under the protection of the League of Nations and that minor territorial adjustments could be made in Thrace. Italy and France seemed to welcome this proposal, but Poincaré was unwilling to help Greece (Howard, 1931, p. 265). From the beginning there have been differences of opinion between the Allies over Greece, but this will increase towards the end.

While the Allies were making plans for İzmir and Thrace, the Greek army was stepping up its activities in Thrace. Georges Burnier, in his report of 26 January 1922, stated that the leaders of the Muslim population of Eastern and Western Thrace had met in Edirne in anticipation of a large-scale Greek occupation of the region. The Turkish Committee of Thrace was also present at this meeting to defend the interests of the country. The Turkish committee first tried to implement in Thrace the armed resistance that had been successful in Anatolia. However, this attempt failed due to lack of equipment and financial impossibilities. Later, the committee gave up the armed struggle and tried to liberate Thrace through diplomacy. The executive committee of the committee included Şevket Bey, deputy of Çanakkale, Hayrettin Bey, deputy of Çatalca, Faik and Şeref Bey, deputies of Ankara, Kasım Efendi, one of the notables of the region, and Galip Bahlia, the extraordinary delegate. According to the Committee, Thrace was a Muslim region, Edirne was the oldest Turkish city in Europe, and the overwhelming majority of the population was Turkish. Moreover, the Rums and Christians do not represent even one third of the region. As in the occupied areas of Anatolia, the Greek civil and military authorities are trying to colonize the region (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/514).

It is important to point out information on the population of Thrace, obtained by Georges Burnier through the Turkish Committee of Thrace, was sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross on 10 February 1922. According to this, the total population of Eastern Thrace in 1919 was 635.500 of whom 431.540 were Turks, 165.000 Rums, 20.200 Jews, 16.000 Armenians and 2.000 Bulgarians. Thus, 67.5% of the population was Muslim. The total population of Western Thrace was 260.000 consisting of 160.000 Turks, 67.000 Rums, 2.600 Bulgarians, 2.500 Jews and 1.600 Armenians. Interviews with Muslims who had to migrate from Thrace to İstanbul revealed that the Greek regime used all possible means to force Muslims to leave. Greeks from southern Russia and the Caucasus were settled in the villages abandoned by the Muslims, but Rums from Anatolia were not brought to this region (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/520). G. Burnier stated that donations could be collected for 60.000 refugees in İstanbul and that this money could be used to provide clothing and food aid (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/532). In addition, the Ankara Government was to support the aid campaign (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/533). To emphasize once again that the main aim of Greek demographic policy was to outnumber the Greeks. Thus, when the peace treaty was signed after the war, it wanted to have a say over the region.

In order to solve the problems in the Near East, the Allies met in March 1922 and took decisions known as the "*Paris Proposals*". The Allies decided that neither the Greek nor the Turkish side would be forced to impose certain conditions. In return for the sacrifices made by Greece for the Allies during the war, economic aid was to be provided. Necessary measures would be taken to prevent the resumption of armed conflict between the Turks and the Europeans. But in order for all these conditions to be met, an armistice had to be signed between Turkey and Greece (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/459-460). The Greeks believed that concessions had been made to the Turks and there was a strong reaction against the Allies in Greek public opinion. Venizelos was also criticized for embarking on the Anatolian adventure without adequate assurances from the Allies (The United States National Archives, 767.68/171). The Allies knew that in the event of another war between the Turkish side and Greece, the Greek army would be completely disbanded and it is also a big failure for them.

It should be noted that at a meeting of the British Cabinet in March 1922, W.S. Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that Greece was morally exhausted and bankrupt. İzmir, which had been in dire straits for three years, was about to be handed over to the Turks. Lord Curzon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom, pointed out that the Allies had encouraged the Greeks to occupy İzmir at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and that it was therefore impossible to leave them to their fate (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CAB/23/29/301-305).

As rumours spread in Anatolia about the evacuation of Greece, it was learnt that a group of Greek officers were planning to form a new army and liberate the region with the help of the Rums in Anatolia. In such a situation, it was foreseen that the conflicts in Anatolia would intensify. An American official raised this issue in a meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister, who confirmed that such an attempt was being made, but added that the Greek government would not support such a move because of the risks involved and therefore did not believe it would succeed (The United States National Archives, 767.68/194). The Greeks still believed that they could realize the Megali idea. Although the Greek government officially declared that it would not support such a movement, it implicitly supported these initiatives on the grounds that they would boost the morale of the people.

It is worth noting that the Greek people were angry with both the Allies and the Greek government over the events in Anatolia. In this context, in a letter sent on 16 March 1922 to the Allies, the Greek Army, the Anatolian Defence Organization and the Greek Parliament by the officials of the *Panellenic Union of Wounded and Disabled Veterans of the Wars of 1912-1922*, founded by Greek veterans, it was stated that they evaluated the negotiations in Paris and protested against the idea of giving Anatolia to the Turks. It was also pointed out that the political divisions among the Greek people should disappear and unity should be sought. They demanded that the Greek army should not withdraw from Anatolia and, if necessary, the Greek race must be buried in Anatolian soil along with its dreams. It was emphasized that they themselves were ready to shed their blood in the same way (The United States National Archives, 767.68/196). The yearning for the Megali Idea among Greek politicians was also present among the Greek people. As the

situation of the Greek army in Anatolia deteriorated, the desire for unity increased. The Greek intelligence tried to propagandize through non-governmental organizations, as the example of the Panellenic Union shows.

It is noteworthy that in April 1922, the Allies proposed sending an observer commissioner to the region until the League of Nations had drawn up an evacuation plan for İzmir (The League of Nations Archives, RCP/314). Despite this proposal, the Allies believed that Greece would reject the decision to evacuate İzmir (The United States National Archives, 767.68/180) and were in negotiations with both sides to conclude an armistice between the Turks and the Greeks. Details of the truce were also sent to both İstanbul and Ankara. The Greeks accepted the terms of the armistice with modifications, but did not reply to the Allies on the question of a peace conference. The Turks, on the other hand, agreed in principle to the ceasefire but demanded that the Greek army leave Anatolia immediately. But, the Turkish request was not accepted by the Allies and Greece (The United States National Archives, 767.68/181). The British military authorities believed that the evacuation of the Greeks would be completed within 4-5 months. It was also decided that each of the Allied powers would have its warships docked in the port during the evacuation. According to General Harrington, if the evacuation did not go smoothly, there would be about 100.000 refugees in İzmir (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/1771/24). Furthermore, the Turkish side stressed that the Greeks, who controlled a strategic location such as the Eskişehir-Afyonkarahisar railway, should leave the region within 15 days (British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/136).

It must be stressed that in April 1922, the Allied powers formulated an evacuation plan, which included measures to ensure that there would be no disruption to the departure of the Greeks from Anatolia and the resettlement of the Turks. Accordingly, both sides were to be asked to guarantee that Turkish and Greek troops would not resume hostilities. In order to prevent damage to the property and lives of Greeks and Turks, both armies should refrain from extortion and looting. An organization to be established by the Allied powers, in consultation with the Greek and Turkish Commands, was to remedy the shortcomings of the plan (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2506/A520).

According to the intelligence report drawn up by the British authorities on 14 April 1922, the British Navy should not become too involved in the evacuation of Greek troops from Anatolia and should only play a supervisory role (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2506/881/878). On the other side, in Anatolia, political rivalry between Venizelos supporters and royalists gave way to cooperation after the Allied evacuation plan. Both groups argued that there should be no withdrawal from Anatolia (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2506/2489/3) and in a common sense, all parts whether Royalist or Venizelist tried by all means to delay the Turkish request for evacuation. The Greek government, citing the Christian population in Anatolia, declared in May 1922 that the evacuation decision could not be implemented without a special arrangement for the Rums. In this context, Greek officials stressed that a special regime should be established under the supervision of the Allied powers. Accordingly, the establishment of a gendarmerie organization commanded by officers of neutral countries and the implementation of a mixed judicial system were demanded. Greek military officials claimed that about 35.000 the Rums were serving in the Greek army in the occupied territories (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 028-59).

Meanwhile, the Hellenic Anatolian Defence Organization continued to organize itself intensively in the interior of Anatolia through its militias. Tasks such as protecting towns and railways were carried out by them (Erdem, 2014, p. 112). On the other side, to strengthen its army, the Greek government conscripted nearly 12.000 Greeks near Çorlu in May 1922 and gave them armed training (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları, 223/158). The situation of the Greek army in Anatolia was deteriorating with each passing day. Britain was anxious that the Greeks should maintain their current position. However, Greece believed that it could not stay in Anatolia for a long time, as it needed financial support and the soldiers wanted to return home (The United States National Archives, 767.68/216). But, the Greek government was aware that the money it had received in the way of compulsory loans would be exhausted within 5-6 months and foresaw that the process could not be managed in this manner indefinitely. The internal strife among the Allies manifested itself in the Greek issue. Britain, giving the impression that it was struggling to help the Greeks, cited French opposition as the

main obstacle. The British were thus shirking their responsibilities. In addition, as a result of all these developments, Greek domestic politics were influenced by developments in Anatolia. The Greek public blamed M. Gounaris for the failure of the operations in Anatolia during the last year (The United States National Archives, 767.68/212). The Greek economy was not in a position to afford the war expenses. At this point once again, it is seen that Greece could not manage its economy successfully before the war. The importance of economic intelligence, especially in times of war, should not be overlooked.

It is noted that the developments in the occupation of Anatolia were followed by Muslims in India. The *Khilafat Bulletin*, a newspaper published in Bombay, gave extensive coverage to the occupation of Anatolia in its issue of 2 June 1922 under the title "*Greek Atrocities on Turks*". Accordingly, General Townshend stated in his speech in the British House of Commons that the allegation that the Turks committed the crime of massacre against the Rums was a lie. He was a commander who had been captured by the Turks after the fall of Kut, but he did not refrain from telling the truth, as required of a statesman. The Greeks visited the Turkish villages they had burned to see if there were any valuables left. Moreover, the accounts of the Turks who were left to die and those who were rescued as wounded during the retreat of the Greek troops are quite remarkable. In an interview conducted in Polatlı Hospital with Ali oğlu Hasan Efendi, who was captured by the Greeks during the clashes, he said that he was brought before a Greek captain and asked questions about Mustafa Kemal, but he did not answer because he had never seen him. He also mentioned that the Greek soldiers took him to the edge of a ditch where the bodies of Turkish soldiers were piled up (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2383/6). Considering the incidents mentioned above in the Ottoman archive document, the systematic massacre of the Greeks continued. Using prisoners to get information from the other side is a common intelligence technique in wartime. The Greeks wanted to follow Mustafa Kemal's every move.

Greece was also going through a difficult period diplomatically. The report prepared by Annie I. Allen and Florence I. Billings of the American Relief Mission, which has the status of a private organization but has a relationship with the US Government, after their

impressions in Anatolia was sent by the Ottoman authorities to the representatives of the Allied powers on 5 July 1922. According to the report, the Turkish side wanted to show the mission officials the destruction caused by the Greek army during its retreat. A woman from the village of Oğlakçı in Sivrihisar said that among the Greeks there were some who spoke Turkish well and that they had taken all their belongings. In the village, the roofs were completely burnt and the stone walls had collapsed. The long black line in the fields showed that the wheat had been burnt. In the village of Mülk, which has a total of 100 houses, 95 houses were found burnt. The Mukhtar of village said that it was an organized action, because when the villagers told the soldiers not to burn our houses, they said they had orders and continued to burn them. The mosque in the village was also bombed and completely destroyed (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım, 2383/6; Rhodes, 1989, p. 611). Moreover, at the time, Greek army planes were dropping propaganda leaflets in areas where Turks lived (Yurtsever, 2008, p. 97). Another task for the volunteers who came to investigate the devastation in Anatolia was to explore ways in which the US and Turkish sides could develop a relationship (Şimşir, 1977, p. 296). Greece's destruction in Anatolia was confirmed by relief organizations. As reports like these were published, Greece's propaganda activities were disrupted and Greece felt under pressure in international public opinion.

It should be noted that the Greek government, which was in a deadlock both at home and on the international stage, wanted to make a strategic move by invading İstanbul as a last resort. On 26 July 1922, it was declared by the Allied powers that General Harrington, with the forces under his command, would resist the attempts of the Greek troops stationed on the Çatalca border to seize the region. The British authorities did not believe that the Greeks were capable of carrying out this attempt. The Greek government's main aim was to boost the morale of its troops (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/1771/263-266). The British High Commissioner, Sir Horace Rumbold, believed that the Greek threat to İstanbul was only a half-truth (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/1771/292-293). But, about 20-30 thousand Greek troops were stationed in the Lüleburgaz region. The Greek general claimed that his troops would advance towards İstanbul. Following the military developments, General Harrington made an official statement on 29 July 1922, declaring that any violation of İstanbul and

its borders would be suppressed by the Allied troops (The United States National Archives, 767.68/235). This move by Greece caused Mustafa Kemal to bring forward the offensive operation (Jensen, 1979, p. 562). Moreover, the ability of the Greek army to hold Anatolia had become questionable. For this reason, the Greek rulers declared the establishment of the Ionian State on 30 July 1922, with İzmir as its capital and an area of 18 thousand kilometres. However, this state lasted only 5 weeks and the Greeks were expelled from Anatolia (Müderrisoğlu, 1993, p. 569).

Greece's decision to occupy İstanbul was firmly rejected by the Allies. The concentration of Greek troops both in Anatolia and in the Çatalca region showed that Greece had made a strategic mistake. Lloyd George explained that King Constantine had moved two divisions from Anatolia to Thrace as part of the idea of advancing on İstanbul and that this move was the reason for the failure (The United States National Archives, 767.68/303). As a result, transferring Greek troops to Thrace reduced Greek troop strength in Anatolia (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CAB/23/31/2). On the other side, while the Turkish army was preparing for the offensive, Lloyd George, unable to provide financial support to Greece, made an anti-Turkish speech in Parliament on 4 August 1922, which was welcomed by the Greek public (Ediz, 2011, p. 304). Meanwhile, the Greek army had reinforced its troops in Lüleburgaz with 10.000 more soldiers. The commander of the Greek troops in Anatolia, General Hadjianestis, issued a statement declaring that they would win a glorious victory in İstanbul in order to raise the morale of the army (The United States National Archives, 767.68/248). The Allied declaration that İstanbul should remain neutral did not reflect reality, as the Greek navy had used İstanbul as a base for part of its offensive against the Turks. However, by Allied decision, the Turks were prohibited from any intervention through İstanbul (The United States National Archives, 767.68/260).

It should be noted that the stalemate in İstanbul and Anatolia changed when Mustafa Kemal ordered the offensive on 26 August 1922. On the first day of the offensive, the Greek front could not be broken, but the Turkish troops made progress (Erdem, 2009, pp. 455-463). Greece's main strategic mistake was the choice of İzmir as its military headquarters. İzmir was 400 kilometres from Eskişehir and 300 kilometres from Afyon

(Timoleonos Ambelas, 2001, p. 12). On 27 August, the Turkish army cut the railway line from Afyon to İzmir (Belen, 1986, p. 62). As a result, the situation for the Greeks deteriorated very quickly. General Tricoupis thought that he could go on the defensive by withdrawing his troops to Uşak. However, the Turkish army spoiled this plan of the Greeks and the Greek troops, who had to retreat from Afyon, were divided. In addition, a group of 20.000 men was defeated at Dumlupınar on 30 August 1922. Night of 31 August, the Greeks retreated towards Uşak and surrendered to the Turkish army the following day (Jensen, 1979, pp. 562-563). Thus, the Greeks' hopes of establishing a Greek Kingdom in Anatolia were dashed (Volkan&Itzkowitz, 2002, p. 133). Strategic mistakes in the Greek army became chronic and failure was inevitable. With the intelligence cycle failing at both operational and tactical levels, the Greek army had no choice but to retreat.

It should be kept in mind that in Bayındır, Greek civil and military officials were ordered to pack their archives, as it was thought that the Turks would attack. As a result of the clashes around Ödemiş, the Greek population of the region was transferred to İzmir. When the Greeks left Ödemiş, the telegraph line was cut. As the Turks approached the area, the Greek soldiers retreated and set fire to Ödemiş. Tire and Bayındır were evacuated and the Greeks received intelligence information that 4.000 Turkish soldiers were approaching Bayındır. Greek soldiers and the Rums plundered Bayındır. The Turkish army, consisting of infantry, artillery and cavalry units, opened fire continuously and drove the Greeks back (The General Archives of Greece, 'Personal diary of the life and action of Nikolaos Liolios'). The Turkish offensive was successful. In order not to leave any information and documents about their activities in Anatolia, the Greeks collected their archives and left the region.

After the defeat of Greece, the soldiers of the Greek gendarmerie in Bergama concentrated on the main towns and abandoned the villages. On 4 September 1922, the Greek troops banned the Muslim population of Soma from going out after 5.30 pm and threatened those who disobeyed with execution. The Greeks in the area gathered in the courtyard of the church from 6 pm to 5.30 am. All the men, including children aged 12-15, were armed by Greek soldiers. All the carts of the Greeks leaving Soma were confiscated by the soldiers to transport their ammunition and personal belongings to the

station. Although the Mufti, the Mayor and prominent Muslims said that the safety of the Greeks would be guaranteed and that there was no need for them to leave, the Greeks unanimously decided that everyone would leave the area and that no one would oppose them. Of the 1900 families in Soma, only 5 remained, the others went to Mytilene via Kınık-Poyracık and Dikili. Everyone except the commander of the Greek gendarmerie and 50 soldiers left Soma. Then, explosions were heard and a fire broke out in the government house and the hospital. While Muslims in the area hid, some Greek soldiers used petrol to spread the fire. Due to the strong wind, the fire spread to the Muslim neighbourhood and men, women and children had to leave their homes (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7950/172-173). As clearly stated above, Greek soldiers caused damage to the neighbourhood as they left. Greek families wanted to leave Soma as soon as possible because of the crimes they had committed against their Muslim neighbours during the occupation.

It is essential to highlight that the morale of the Greek soldiers was very low. On 5 September 1922, the Greek army left Uşak and Kütahya and set fire to the area. The Greek 3rd Army was in Eskişehir and when it left, it set fires everywhere so that nothing was left unharmed. In a telegram to the State Department on 5 September 1922, the US Consul in İzmir underlined that the atmosphere in İzmir was too bad to recover and that the Greek troops were trying to leave the area. The Greek army also threatened the Muslims to burn down İzmir (The United States National Archives, 767.68/274). According to American reports, on 6 September 1922, two British warships and six destroyers, three French cruisers and two battleships, one Italian cruiser and one battleship were in the harbour of İzmir. In addition, a Greek division was also on standby. Greek officers boasted that they would not leave without burning İzmir. The American, British, French and Italian delegates sent a note to the Greek Minister of War, Theotokis, asking for an assurance that İzmir would not be burnt and plundered. However, the minister said that he could not give any assurance. Furthermore, Greek soldiers arriving in İzmir sold their weapons to the Rums (The United States National Archives, 767.68/624). According to an American archive document, İzmir was vandalized during the three years of occupation, as well as during the departure of the Greeks.

At this point, in a meeting between Dr. Alexander Machlachlan, the president of the International College of İzmir, which operates as an American college in İzmir, and Mason Mitchell, the US Consul in Malta, on 21 September 1922, the activities of the Greeks during their withdrawal from İzmir were mentioned. On 9 September 1922, Turkish troops began to enter İzmir and there was a great stampede. The American Consul General, Dr Horton, was present in the square. The Turkish cavalry troops advanced slowly in four columns, but near the Palace Hotel bombs were thrown and shots were fired at the Turks. The Turkish soldiers did not react and continued their march in silence. On the same day, refugees appeared at the gates of the College, but when Sergeant Crocker's men searched them, they found a large number of weapons and ammunition. On 10 September 1922, the Sunday sacrament was being celebrated in the college church when suddenly gunfire and artillery was heard. Greek troops, unaware that the Turks had taken control of İzmir, were approaching İzmir from the south. 4,000 of the Greek soldiers who clashed with the Turkish army were captured (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7902/4-6).

It is essential to highlight that the report of Rear Admiral Mark. L. Bristol's report on the events in İzmir, written on 25 September 1922, is quite remarkable. According to this report, once İzmir was under Turkish control, there was no evidence that the Turkish army had caused or permitted the disturbances. It was impossible for the Turks to control the fire in İzmir with the fire-fighting equipment available. If the wind had been blowing from the west, the fires would have caused little damage and could have been brought under control immediately. It is difficult to believe the claim that the Turkish administration deliberately burned Christian neighbourhoods because they could not predict which way the wind would blow. It is very likely that the Christians burned their own houses before evacuating because the Greeks who had evacuated the interior of Anatolia had set fire to them. Moreover, the Greek troops openly declared that they would set fire to İzmir. The claim that the Turkish side would burn an important city like İzmir, which it had just captured and considered to be the most valuable prize of the war, is unrealistic. It is known that after the occupation of İzmir by the Greeks, an Armenian general named Tourkom organized Armenian bandits and gangs in and around İzmir. Besides, Captain Arthur Japy Hepburn, who served as Chief of Staff of the American

Naval Detachment, noted in his report that from the Turkish point of view, it was the Armenians and the Rums who started the fire in İzmir. In fact, it was emphasized that the Greek army had planned the fire but could not realize it because of the early evacuation of İzmir. The report also argues that it was Armenians who threw bombs at the entrance of the Turkish troops in İzmir (The United States National Archives, 767.68/624). Similarly, the report prepared by Paul Grescovich, the chief of the İzmir Fire Department, claimed that it was the Rums and Armenians, not Turks, who set fire to İzmir (Gauin, 2017, p. 42). Various reports and documents show that the İzmir fire, which was planned by the Greek army, was started by the Rum and Armenian groups. By claiming that the Turks started the fire, Greece tried to put the Turks, the victors of the war, in a difficult situation internationally through propaganda. However, the foreign missions in İzmir clearly showed how the events took place.

Meanwhile, these developments alarmed Britain. In a telegram sent by the British High Commissioner to the Allied High Commissioners on 8 September 1922, it was pointed out that Britain's Near East policy had not changed with the victory of the Nationalists and that Britain was prepared to send a large force to fight the Turks if the security of the Straits was threatened (The United States National Archives, 767.68/306). On 18 September 1922, the Greek army left Anatolia. In a note sent to the Turkish side, the Allies announced that İstanbul and the Straits region should not be attacked because of the policy of neutrality. Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, declared that he would not recognize a neutral zone and that he would not stop his troops until Thrace was liberated (Yaman, 1996, p. 191).

At the cabinet meeting on 15 September 1922, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, criticized the previous suggestion of the War Office that effectiveness should be increased only in Gallipoli, rather than establishing dominance in both Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. However, the Allies had entered into such a process that the security of İstanbul and the Straits had become the most important issue. Moreover, if İstanbul was given to the Turks, the Allies would not be able to maintain their position vis-à-vis Turkey (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CAB/23/31/24-36).

The Turkish Army was strong and disciplined and the defeat of Greece in Anatolia was a severe blow to British prestige. The Turks' next move could be a diplomatic or even military attempt in the area of İstanbul and the Straits, which worried Britain (The United States National Archives, 767.68/314). In an interview with Daily Telegraph correspondent John Clayton on 27 September 1922, Mustafa Kemal declared that the defeated Greeks in Anatolia were trying to create unrest in Thrace and that they should be stopped. Britain was trying to put Turkey in a difficult situation with the remaining soldiers of the Greek army. It also tried to have the sole say in the Dardanelles and İstanbul straits (Şimşir, 2012, p. 40). On 23 September 1922, the Turkish army entered the south of the Dardanelles, which Britain had declared a neutral zone. On 29 September 1922, the British Cabinet decided that if the Turkish troops did not withdraw from the region, it would launch a land, sea and air operation against the Turks and this raised the possibility of a conflict between Britain and Turkey. Turkish troops advanced towards the Dardanelles and Mustafa Kemal accepted the Allied invitation to a conference in Mudanya (Çulfalı, 1999, pp. 811-812).

Within this framework, in the correspondence, Mustafa Kemal demanded that both Turkish and British troops return to their positions, while the British government argued that the neutral zones should be evacuated by the Turks and that Turkish troops should not enter Thrace until the peace treaty had been signed (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7898/12-13). A telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British High Commissioner, Sir H. Rumbold, dated 2 October 1922, underlined that the British Foreign Office was pleased that the talks in Mudanya had taken place without delay and that the sole purpose of the meeting was to guarantee the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace and that, in return, the Ankara government undertook not to send troops into neutral areas and not to cross the Straits (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7898/29). Finally, on 11 October 1922, the Mudanya armistice was signed. The Greeks, under Allied supervision, were to evacuate Eastern Thrace within fifteen days and Turkish authority was to be re-established in the region. Until the peace treaty was signed, 8.000 Turkish gendarmes would be stationed in Thrace. İstanbul and the Straits would be placed under Turkish administration. In addition, the Turkish

army would wait in a determined line until a peace conference was organized (The United States National Archives, 767.68119/14; Kocaş, 1952, p. 1612).

As a result, Greece did not adopt a comprehensive strategic intelligence approach during its occupation of Western Anatolia. The Greek brutality during the occupation shows that Greek statesmen acted only in line with the Megali Idea. It was clearly reflected in the intelligence reports of different countries that Western Anatolia could not be ruled by the Greeks and that they could not lay claim to the Anatolian geography. Meanwhile, the progress of the Turkish National Struggle can be explained by consistent military and political moves. However, as Greek politicians did not make long-term plans, small successes were a source of morale for them and they believed that they would change the course of the war. In addition, the success of the Turkish side in the National Struggle, despite having fewer troops and equipment, was due to good tactical and operational intelligence analysis. Not only did Greece fail on the battlefield, but in its diplomatic activities it was satisfied with short-term gains and experienced problems in its relations with the Allies. A state that decides to go to war should assess the eight elements (biographical, sociological, economic, political, geographical, transportation, communication and technical) of strategic intelligence together and be able to act quickly according to developments. In this context, the country's intelligence service has a duty to know and analyze developments in a timely manner. While Greece was not successful in the occupation of Anatolia in the eight aspects mentioned above, the Turkish side achieved great success in this respect.

CHAPTER 4
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE WAR: THE LAUSANNE PEACE
NEGOTIATION&THE TURKISH-RUM POPULATION
EXCHANGE

This chapter focuses on the post-war population exchange between Turkey and Greece. During the Greek evacuation of Anatolia, the question of how to evacuate the Rum population led to important negotiations between the Allied powers, the League of Nations, and the Greek and Turkish sides. Similarly, the migration of Turks in Greece to Anatolia was an important issue between the two countries. While strategic intelligence makes important contributions to states on the battlefield, it is also useful in the field of diplomacy. Strategic intelligence can be used efficiently through diplomatic channels. For this reason, the main question of this chapter will be whether Greece used diplomacy effectively during the Lausanne negotiations, especially on the issue of population exchange.

In this context, the negotiations of the Turkish and Greek delegations through the League of Nations regarding the population exchange will be analyzed. Then, how the issue of the population exchange was evaluated by the parties at the Lausanne Conference will be discussed. Finally, the developments after the population exchange will be highlighted. In this framework, the conditions under which the immigrants travelling to Greece were accepted and the refugee policy of the Greek state will be examined. Then, the effects of the Greek occupation of Anatolia will be revealed through the issue of the population exchange.

4.1. THE TURKISH-RUM POPULATION EXCHANGE

The term “population exchange” refers to the exchange of Rums in Turkey and Turks in Greece, which was finally decided at the Lausanne Conference but which had already taken place in practice (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2014, p. 11). In the process of the Greek

government's attempt to occupy Anatolia in the context of Megali Idea, its policy on the Rums in Anatolia caused considerable damage to the Turkish government. Moreover, the political aspect of the Rums, who acted in accordance with the Greek idea of the Megali Idea, was very advanced. During the occupation of Anatolia, the Rums contributed a lot to the Greek army. The murders committed by a Rum living in the same village against his Muslim neighbour had a negative impact on relations between the two communities. Considering the crucial role played by the Rums during the occupation, at the end of the Turkish National Struggle, the view came to the fore that the Rums, who had supported the Greek occupation and participated in many massacres during this process, should leave Anatolia. The Greek side decided that the Turks in Greece should move to Turkey. Thus, by the time of the Lausanne Conference, the two countries had agreed to change their populations in a joint decision.

4.1.1. Developments before the Turkish-Rum Population Exchange

After the end of the Turkish National Struggle, the migration of the Rums in the cities of Western Anatolia and the Marmara region to Greece by land, sea or railway began. Especially in the coastal cities such as İzmir and İstanbul, masses of immigrants were visible (Ari, 2000, p. 7). In a letter sent to the League of Nations on 11 September 1922, the Greek Patriarch Meletios stated that about 200.000 Rums had been forced to leave Anatolia after the disintegration of the Greek army, that the refugees had migrated to Thrace and the Islands, and that there was an urgent need for shelter (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23548/23548). On 18 September 1922, Norwegian citizen Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations, requested permission from the League of Nations authorities to provide assistance to Armenian and Rum refugees from İzmir and Bursa. The League of Nations announced that there would be no obstacle to aid for Armenian and Rum refugees and that 100.000 swiss francs had been allocated to this end (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23560/23548). The Greek cleric's appeal for help is quite remarkable. Instead of going through official channels to the League of Nations, the Greek government asked for support through a religious figure who could be seen as an element of soft power. It should not be forgotten, however, that during the war Greek clerics had distributed weapons to the Anatolian Rums, from whom

they were now asking for assistance. Thus, Greece tried to be effective in the international arena via propaganda.

It is important to note that in September 1922, the British High Commissioner, Sir H. Rumbold, asked Admiral Bristol, through the American Relief Organization, to carry out relief work in İzmir. Bristol was unable to comply with this request, but stated that the Allies and Greece were not taking adequate measures for the refugees and were shirking their responsibilities. The Near East Relief and the American Red Cross allocated a total of \$50,000 to the refugees. However, the US claimed that the refugee situation was a serious problem that went beyond the aid agencies' donations. As a result, the US wanted to assist in the evacuation of the refugees, but argued that the main responsibility lay with the Allied powers (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/804/E 9500/27/44). In addition, in September 1922, the plan for the transfer of the Rums and Armenians to Britain's colonial possessions was put on the British political agenda. It was thought that the increasing number of refugees in Europe would create a risk of epidemic. It was therefore decided that the issue should be discussed with the British representatives in Geneva (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7898/87). The refugee crisis had become a major problem for the Allies. The Turkish government was aware that the Christian community had more opportunities to solve this problem. Moreover, international relief was being given to Christians rather than Turkish refugees. The Ankara government appealed to Muslim countries through newspapers in September 1922 and requested assistance for the population exchange to be carried out. In this appeal, the Christian community's assistance to the Armenians and Rums was highlighted, as well as the aid activities of the League of Nations, the American Red Cross and Near East Relief (The League of Nations Archives, 48/31414/23548).

The Allies made every effort to ensure diplomatic success for Greece on the refugee issue. The Turkish side realized that it had to concentrate on propaganda, one of the important elements of strategic intelligence, and tried to increase the visibility of Muslim refugees in the international arena.

Another important issue is that in the report prepared in Thessaloniki on 16 September 1922 by E.H. Jarvis, who was in charge of the *Imperial War Graves Commission* operating under the British government, it was pointed out that so far 1.500 refugees had arrived in Thessaloniki from İzmir, and that the refugees were taken to an area consisting of old huts that had been used as a hospital by the British army during the war, and that the huts, which had no windows, were not hygienic because they had previously been used by Russian refugees. In addition, when winter comes, the refugees will be in a difficult situation because of the rains. Two more shiploads of refugees are expected to arrive today, increasing the need for shelter by around 8.000. Although there are Greek official and civil committees dealing with the refugees, they are at odds with each other. The refugees were in desperate need of blankets and clothing. If money was raised for the refugees by the British Red Cross or other relief organizations, flour was also stockpiled (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7898/195-196). The problem of shelter and food for the refugees arriving in Greece could not be solved by the Greek government. At this point, it must be underlined that according to strategic intelligence, all possible developments, positive or negative, should be taken into account and acted upon. However, it has become clear that Greece has not made any plans for the post-war period, that is, from the beginning to the end of the population exchange process. The refugee crisis has a negative impact on Greece both economically and socially.

It should be noted that the Greek Patriarch Meletios wrote another letter to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on 22 September 1922. He pointed out that hundreds of thousands of refugees were still waiting on the coast of İzmir and that passport procedures were taking a long time. Therefore, he stressed that urgent measures should be taken as soon as possible (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23605/23548). Besides, in Nansen's letter to Mustafa Kemal of 25 September 1922, it was mentioned that the Iranian delegation to the League of Nations had requested that representatives be sent to the region, particularly to assist the refugees in İzmir, and that they would be under his control, would be in the region only for humanitarian aid and would have no political purpose. Through Hamid Bey, Vice President of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, it was reported that Nansen's representatives, M.M. Burnier, Hachsius and Ceunod, had been authorized to go to Anatolia (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23733/23548).

The Turkish government responded cautiously to requests for aid, given the possibility of Greek intelligence gathering through aid agencies during the war and it worked in coordination with the League of Nations to evacuate the refugees.

The situation of the refugees in Anatolia was discussed at a meeting of the League of Nations on 25 September 1922. During the meeting, Lord Balfour argued that the refugees should first be removed from İzmir and sent safely to Greece. He also promised that the British government would provide £50,000 for the refugees. Moreover, Iran, as the only Muslim state in the League, had the opportunity to convey the events to other Muslim states by adopting a more active policy. According to Balfour, concrete steps should be taken rather than engaging in theoretical discussions about the refugees in Anatolia. On behalf of the French delegation, M. Hanotaux called for the refugee crisis in Anatolia to be solved by supporting Nansen's work. In his speech, Nansen said that the refugees in İzmir should first be taken to a Greek island. He also stressed the importance of flour stocks in the places where the refugees would go (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23788/23788). Britain wanted Iran, as a Muslim country, to take the lead in the initiatives to be taken for the refugees in the Near East.

It is important to note that regarding the refugees, in a letter to Lord Balfour on 26 September 1922, British Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey wrote that the refugee problem should be handled carefully and that the Allied and American representatives had asked Mustafa Kemal for more time to evacuate the refugees in İzmir. It was also announced that 25 ships were ready in İstanbul to transport the refugees. The Greek press, on the other hand, accused the Allies of treason because the promises made to the Christians of Anatolia had not been kept (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7895/60). At the same time, the number of refugees in Athens was smaller than in Anatolia, but there was a danger of epidemics (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7895/76).

Meanwhile, R.W. Urquhart, Acting Consul in İzmir on behalf of the Great Britain, announced that the evacuation of Rum refugees from İzmir Port under the supervision of British and American warships was continuing as of 26 September 1922. In the meeting

held by the Allied and American officials, the decision to postpone the evacuation date to 15 October 1922 was notified to the Turkish side and Nureddin Pasha accepted this proposal. It was also underlined that 180.000 people had been evacuated so far and that negotiations with Mustafa Kemal had to be concluded peacefully in order for British refugees to return to İzmir from Athens and Mytilene (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7949/66-67). The evacuation process of the Rums was going on smoothly. It is seen that the Turkish side endeavoured to finalize the evacuations quickly by not obstructing them.

Within this framework, the situation of the Rum refugees on their way to Athens was appalling. The British Ambassador in Athens, F.O. Lindley, sent a telegram to the British High Commissioner, Sir H. Rumbold, on 27 September 1922, it was stressed that it was impossible for Greece to deal with the refugee problem by itself and that it was important to determine what measures the Greek authorities should take through a strong international aid organization (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7895/77). The report prepared by M.P. Baker, a League of Nations official, on refugees in Anatolia and Greece in September 1922 is noteworthy. In İstanbul, the number of Armenian and Rum refugees from İzmir and Bursa totalled 120.000. If the Russian Refugee Organization led by Colonel Procter is supported, the refugees will be assisted. Most of the refugees in Greece came from Anatolia within the last 2-3 weeks. The Greek government found it extremely difficult to provide them with adequate shelter. Funds are being raised for the refugees and the National Bank of Greece announced that it would give 1 million drachmas to meet their basic needs, but it was only able to pay out 5.000 pounds. It was pointed out that aid collected abroad could be transferred to the Greek government. It was also stressed that Nansen should put the refugees in İzmir on the agenda of the League of Nations and that it would be useful to negotiate with Mustafa Kemal. It was stated that both the Greek government and Britain should provide financial support for the evacuation of the Rums in İzmir. In this regard, it was emphasized that the refugee problem in İzmir could be brought to the attention of the world through the Near East Relief, Lord Mayor's Fund and Colonel Procter's Committee. The aid to be provided would be organized by Colonel Procter in İstanbul, Colonel Corfe in Athens and the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland (The League of Nations

Archives, 48/23750/23548). It was not possible for the Greek government to follow a plan for dealing with refugees. Therefore, international assistance was requested. It can be seen that Greece was in a very difficult economic situation. In order to solve the refugee problem, the Greeks acted mainly through international aid organizations and the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, Greece's defeat in Anatolia and the refugee problem deeply affected Greek domestic politics. In this context, Colonel Gonatas seized power on 26 September 1922 and while the incumbent Greek ministers were arrested, the King was left untouched (Akgün, 1993, p. 15). In addition, the Greek government sent a letter to Venizelos on 27 September 1922 and it asked Venizelos to take part in the diplomatic negotiations after the war. He accepted the offer and took office as the diplomatic representative of Greece (Yıldırım, 2006, p. 46). Thus, the Greek government tried to act effectively on the refugee issue by calling Venizelos, who had diplomatic and political experience, back into service.

In British politics, aid to refugees has been a controversial issue. A letter from Sir Arthur Stanley, President of the British Red Cross, to Sir Maurice Hankey, dated 30 September 1922, stated that Lord Balfour would give £50.000 to the League of Nations to be spent on refugees in Anatolia. However, according to Stanley, it was extremely wrong to give this money to Nansen and his colleagues, as previous experience had shown Nansen to be incompetent in handling money. The aid to be given by the British Red Cross would enhance Britain's prestige. But if the money is under Nansen's control, it will never be known that Britain organized the aid (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7898/190). During this period, British politicians talked about the benefits of emphasizing humanitarian activities related to refugees and the importance of staying away from political discourse (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7895/138-140). Furthermore, Britain only paid £19.208 of the £50.000 that was to be raised for the refugees, abandoning the offer when other countries failed to contribute. Although the British government claimed that it could not afford to pay this sum, it was spending heavily in the Mesopotamian region. Thus, on the pretext of liberating and protecting Christians, Britain and its allies incited them against Turkey (The League of

Nations Archives, 48/23995/23788). As a result, faced with a major failure in return for its support of Greece during the war, Britain has tried to make political moves to maintain its prestige after the war. In terms of diplomacy, Britain acted by using the elements of strategic intelligence. By giving the impression that it has launched a humanitarian aid campaign, it was trying to regain its lost reputation on the international stage.

It is important to note that Nansen, in his position as High Commissioner for Refugees, left Geneva for İstanbul on 30 September 1922 in order to examine the refugee issue between Turkey and Greece on the spot. He also appointed Lionel Fielden as his representative in Athens in October 1922 to assist Colonel Corfe in order to follow the refugee situation in Greece more closely. L. Fielden would not receive a salary and would work on a voluntary basis. On 11 October 1922, Nansen met the High Commissioners of the Allied powers in İstanbul and was assured of their support. Subsequently, he met with other foreign relief organizations and exchanged information on the latest situation of the refugees (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24229/23548; Psomiades, 2009, p. 295). Philip Baker, a member of the League of Nations, stated in a letter to Dr Rachjman on 11 October 1922 that he expected Britain to help Greece unconditionally because of the British government's concern for the refugees in Anatolia. In addition, Britain felt guilty about what the Rums were going through. In this context, Baker stated that he believed Britain would provide sufficient aid to vaccinate the refugees and to sanitize the camps (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25232/24010). However, Britain did not provide the promised relief. The financial support given by Britain to the Greeks during the war turned into a mere tokenism after the war.

In addition, Venizelos wrote a letter to Nansen on 13 October 1922. Accordingly, he expressed that Nansen had taken on an important task and that he had to make great efforts to ensure that hundreds of thousands of refugees could go to a safe place. He stressed that the number of refugees who had to leave their homes and seek refuge in Greece was 1 million. It is not possible for the Greek state, which has been at war for decades, to solve the problems related to refugees on its own. He underlined that the support of the states is necessary for the successful solution of this issue. The Turkish side demanded that the conference should decide on the exchange between the Turkish and Greek populations.

For this reason, Venizelos argued that the Rum population should be evacuated from Anatolia before any treaty is signed during the conference. Venizelos claimed that 350.000 Turks were living in Greece and that after their transfer to Anatolia, the Rums from Anatolia would be settled in the homes of Turks in Greece. This would ease the problem of housing the Rums (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/E/2278/10524/44). As a result, Greek migration to Greece continued. Within two and a half weeks, the number of Rum refugees in Mytilene migrating to Greece fell from 130.000 to 30.000 and most of the refugees were women and children. This situation made relief efforts difficult (The United States National Archives, 867.4016/724). Another remarkable detail is that the number of Armenians who left Anatolia for Greece was around 50.000 (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24190/23548). It should not be forgotten that during the occupation, Armenians participated in massacres as much as the Rums. They supported the Greek army tried to change the demographic structure of Western Anatolia. The Armenians and Rums, who had been brought to İzmir and other coastal cities by the Greek army from the interior of Anatolia, openly collaborated with the Greeks during the occupation. In order to prevent these people from rejoining the Greek army and increasing its strength, men between the ages of 18 and 45 were placed in garrisons and taken as prisoners of war. The prisoners in İzmir were ordered to clear the ruins of the fire. Those sent to the interior took part in reconstruction work in the areas burned by the Greek army (The United States National Archives, 767.68114/10). Venizelos threatened that if the prisoners of war were not released, he would conscript Muslim men in Greece as part of the mobilization in retaliation (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24375/24375). The main reason why the Turkish government recognized the male refugees in Anatolia as prisoners of war was that they had served in the service of the Greek army during the occupation. Hence, the Ankara government had to take measures in order to ensure its internal security. More detailed information on the prisoners will be given below.

Apart from the Orthodox Patriarch's appeal to the League of Nations, a remarkable appeal came from Pope Pius XI. On 9 October 1922, Nansen asked Pope Pius XI, the spiritual leader of the Catholic world, for help concerning the refugees in Anatolia. It was suggested that, with winter approaching, Catholic relief organizations could collect aid

for the refugees in Anatolia and that it was important to provide clothing and blankets, especially through Catholic women. Cardinal Gasparri stated on 21 October 1922 that all necessary measures would be taken for the refugees and that the Vatican would send a representative to the region (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24179/23949). So it is so obvious that Rum and Armenian refugees, the League of Nations carried out an intensive propaganda campaign in international public opinion.

It should be noted that in his letter to the League of Nations on 16 October 1922, Nansen indicated that Venizelos had encouraged himself to resolve the issue of the Turkish-Rum population exchange in Anatolia, Thrace and Macedonia. In addition, the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan in İstanbul recommended that negotiations on the Turkish-Greek population exchange should begin without delay. According to Nansen, as winter was approaching, it was important to resettle the refugees as soon as possible. Moreover, the matter of the exchange of prisoners of war and civilian prisoners between Turkey and Greece should be addressed. He stated that he would do his best to ensure the return of the captive citizens of the two countries to their daily lives (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/C.729-M.441). In this context, the Ottoman Red Crescent Society repeatedly contacted the Greek Red Cross about the poor conditions of Turkish prisoners in Greece. However, the Greek side did not consider the demands of the Turks. For example, Turkish prisoners on the island of Leucade have not been paid for several months. Moreover, the Greek authorities remained indifferent to the question of transferring the prisoners in the former Phalères, Larissa, Kato-Liossa and Suda to a healthier environment. On the other hand, the Greek generals and officers captured in Anatolia were paid their salaries on time and were provided with clothing. The Ankara government informed the Greek Red Cross that Greek prisoners in Anatolia would be treated similarly if the Greek side did not change its attitude towards Turkish prisoners (Türkiye Hilâl-i Ahmer Mecmû'ası, No. 15, p. 522). It is noted that Greece used the prisoner issue against the Turks for political gain. Greece tried to avenge the loss of the war by mistreating Turkish prisoners. It is known that the Greek Red Cross gathered intelligence during the war and was skilful in the smuggling of weapons into Anatolia. It can be said that Greece benefited from the Greek Red Cross at both tactical and operational intelligence levels during the war.

Within this framework, in his letter to Colonel Corfe on 13 October 1922, Nansen stated that when he met Mustafa Kemal, he would express that he was doing his best to help the Turks and thus show that he was acting impartially towards both sides. The letter also stressed that the Turks had a very important complaint that they had not been given the list of Turkish prisoners held by the Greek government or the Greek Red Cross. On the other hand, the Turks handed over the list of captured Greek prisoners to the Greek side within a few weeks. They stated that they had protested to Greece through the International Red Cross, but that they had not obtained any results. Therefore, Nansen believed that taking the list from the Greeks without delay would make an impression on the minds of the Turks, especially on Hamid Bey (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24292/14293). The League of Nations endeavours to play the role of mediator between Turkey and Greece on the refugee issue. However, Nansen personally realizes that he does not have such an influence on the Turkish side and tries to focus on the demands of the Turkish side.

It should be noted that in his report dated 16 October 1922, M. Gilchrist, who was in charge of the League of Nations, wrote that the Ankara government was sceptical about the activities of the League of Nations and that the Turks thought that the League only acted in favour of the Rums and Armenians and did not take any action regarding Turkish refugees. Gilchrist argued that fewer refugees would come to Turkey than to Greece, but that the League of Nations should carefully consider the resettlement of refugees in Turkey and that it would be logical to establish an organization for this purpose. This may have been unacceptable to Greece, but according to Major Johnson, given the Turkish distrust of the League, the move was not only humanitarian but also politically important. He also underlined that Turkey might soon apply for membership of the League of Nations and that it was therefore important to give a good impression (The League of Nations Archives, 48/31414/23548). At the point of solving the problem, Charalambos Simopoulos, the Greek High Commissioner in İstanbul, sent a letter to Venizelos on 16 October 1922 after his meeting with Nansen. Accordingly, Nansen expressed the Allied demand for the establishment of a Turkish-Greek commission for the exchange of prisoners and detainees (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 029-85).

After Greece's decision to evacuate Eastern Thrace, there was also a refugee problem in the region. According to the information given in October 1922 by Antoniadis, the Thrace Deputy appointed by the Greek government, the number of refugees migrating from Anatolia was 148,000. It was pointed out that in order to evacuate Eastern Thrace, it was necessary to act in accordance with a plan, otherwise there could be internal disturbances (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7902/68). In the letter sent by Venizelos to Lord Curzon on 13 October 1922, it was mentioned that it was impossible to evacuate Eastern Thrace in a short time and that the Greek nation, which had made all kinds of sacrifices during the war, was being left alone (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 029-162). Besides, Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, expressed that the Greek government's request to the League for an extension of the evacuation period would not be beneficial (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 030-12).

Another important issue is that in a letter to Sir Charles Harrington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Istanbul, dated 15 October 1922, Nansen stated that he had met with Hamid Bey and had received reports that many villages in Eastern Thrace had been burned by the Greek army. Hamid Bey underlined that a settlement called Fenerköy had been burnt down and that similar situations had occurred in villages in Edirne and Kırklareli. He also said it was worrying that the Rums were committing massacres before evacuating the region. Nansen expressed that such incidents frightened him because he had the support of the Allied Commissioners, but stressed that these developments were a major obstacle to peace. He therefore argued that the Allied powers should intervene to stop the ongoing activities of the Greeks. Nansen stated that he would demand the entry of Allied troops into Eastern Thrace and that the Greek government would be informed that such a move was inevitable. He discussed the matter with the Acting High Commissioner of Greece, who claimed that the destruction had been caused by attacks on Greek outposts by Turkish gangs in the past. Nansen, however, gave more credence to Hamid Bey's explanation (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24321/24321). Venizelos was consulted on this issue, but it is understood that he did not propose any plan or take any action (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/7902/79). The plan that Nansen really wanted to implement was to settle the Anatolian Rums in the

empty lands in Macedonia and Eastern Thrace. It was noted that the League of Nations could help the Greeks in this regard (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24375/24375). Nansen's plan had political rather than humanitarian motives. Thus, Greece would be able to change the demographic structure of the regions mentioned. This policy, pursued by the Greek government during the war, was put forward by the League of Nations, which acted as mediator after the war.

Meanwhile, Nansen met with Hamid Bey on 15 October 1922. Hamid Bey pointed out that the Greeks had forced hundreds of thousands of Turks to migrate from İzmir in 1921 and demanded the return of these people. Nansen also stated that the Rum refugees from Anatolia had moved to Eastern Thrace and that the Rums from Russia had settled in the houses of Turks and that he was interested in their evacuation. He also declared that he would take an initiative with the British government for the return of 20.000 Turkish refugees who had migrated to Bulgaria. In response to Nansen's question about prisoners of war, Hamid Bey said that the Ankara government recognized male refugees of military age as prisoners of war and that they would not be released until a peace treaty was signed (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24323/23548).

Besides, on 19 October 1922 Nansen sent L. Fielden to Edirne. Nansen highlighted that Fielden should be involved in the process in case the Greek authorities could not solve the traffic that would be caused by the frequent crossing of the Maritza River by refugees. In addition, Major Strober stated that the weapons of the refugees attempting to cross the Maritza should be taken away by the Greek authorities, otherwise they would cause unrest in Greece (The League of Nations Archives, 48/23843/23548). It was foreseen that refugees from Anatolia to Greece could pose a security threat. During the occupation of Anatolia, the Rums, who had been armed by the Greek army, did not give up their weapons after the war.

In addition, the Rum migration to Greece continued and the letter on the demographic impact of the ongoing migration in Greece is noteworthy. This letter written by F.O. Lindley to Lord Curzon on 19 October 1922 mentioned that in the near future refugees would constitute 18% of the total population of Greece and that the number of refugees

in Thessaloniki, Canea, Piraeus and Volos was increasing every day. Last week the number of refugees in Piraeus was 35.000 (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24921/24921). A report by the British Consulate General in Thessaloniki, dated 20 October 1922, noted that refugees had been arriving in Thessaloniki since 8 September, and it was officially estimated that 62.000 refugees had arrived in Thessaloniki so far, but no exact figure could be given. The Greeks were very poorly prepared to meet the needs of the refugees. There were three main refugee camps in Thessaloniki, Kalamaria, Lember and Harmanköy, and the authorities only distributed food at noon and in the evening. Refugees living in buildings outside the camps received only bread (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/804/77). In addition, 6.000 Greek refugees in Kavala were assisted by a committee of tobacco merchants. Due to the drought, water was scarce and there was not enough even for drinking (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24077/24077). It is necessary to note that in a letter to American aid agencies dated 18 October 1922, Venizelos stressed once again that the Greek government was unable to provide for the necessities of the refugees and that there was an urgent need for relief funds and expert organizers to deal with the refugees (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 030-22).

It should be noted that in October 1922 Nansen continued to collect funds for the refugees. Nansen succeeded in raising a total of £31.000 for the refugees in Greece and gave about £5.000 to the Greek government. With the support of the Bulgarian government, he bought 1.000 tonnes of flour and planned to distribute it in Greece through the American Red Cross. In addition, the İstanbul office of the League of Nations was trying to establish a hospital and camp for 10.000 refugees in Western Thrace at a cost of about £18.900. Efforts are being made to establish agricultural production in the camps. The Belgian government provided 2.000 tents and blankets for the refugees and the Polish government provided 30 tents. At this time Nansen organized the transfer of 80.000 Rum refugees to Greece and 10.000 Turkish refugees to Anatolia (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24610/23788).

While the situation of the Greeks migrating from Anatolia was like this, it is worth underscoring the Muslims of Canea had recently experienced unfavourable developments

due to population mobility. Therefore, on 19 October 1922, the Muslims of the region wrote a letter to the British representative in Athens. According to the letter, armed Rums committed acts of violence against the Muslims in Canea. As a result of the attacks, two people died and a woman was injured. The Muslims were forced to leave the city, leaving behind all their property and possessions, and were left in economic hardship. Refugees from Anatolia joined the settled Rums and attacked the Muslims. As confirmed by the Rums of Canea, when the Rum refugees first arrived they were accommodated by the Muslims in schools, mosques, farms and other buildings. However, the Muslims were not treated fairly by the Greek authorities (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/804/2). In the letter of 23 October 1922 from the British Vice Consul to F.O. Lindley about the situation in Canea, it was stated that the petition describing the situation of the Muslims in Canea was true and not exaggerated. It was known that armed Rums were threatening the Muslims in the villages of Canea. It was mentioned that the Turks were engaged in farming but had been forced to leave their villages. It was expressed that the Rums, who had escaped from the İzzettin fortress and the prisons in Canea, had brutally attacked the Muslims. According to the Vice-Consul, as the situation of the Muslims in Crete was likely to worsen in the future, their mass deportation could be considered (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/804/75). The refugees who left Anatolia caused unrest in the regions to which they went. Although the Muslims in Canea helped the refugees, the Rums tried to revenge the departure from Anatolia by attacking the Muslims. The British official's suggestion that the Muslims in Crete should leave en masse was intended to legitimize the attacks of the Rums.

The Greek High Commissioner in İstanbul, Charalambos Simopoulos, sent a letter to Nansen on 27 October 1922, requesting that attempts be made to persuade the Ankara government to sign a treaty between the two governments for the exchange of prisoners and refugees in Thrace, the Islands, Macedonia and Anatolia. The letter indicated that the Greek government had given Nansen full authorization in this regard (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24318/24318). Greece demanded the population exchange treaty with Turkey as soon as possible. Therefore, it wanted the process to be accelerated through the League of Nations. Nansen wanted to discuss the refugee issue face to face with Mustafa Kemal. In this context, Nansen, who returned from Athens on 24 October

1922, asked the French High Commissioner for a meeting with Mustafa Kemal. However, since Mustafa Kemal was constantly on the move, he could not give Nansen a definite date for the meeting. He was not satisfied with this answer. Hamid Bey, on the other hand, said that the population exchange would take place during the peace treaty negotiation. On 25 October 1922, Nansen had an interview with General Refet Pasha, who had been appointed Governor of Thrace. In the meeting, regarding the population exchange, which was the most important issue in Turkish-Greek relations at that time, Nansen explained that the population exchange treaty should be signed before the peace treaty. Moreover, in order for the Rum refugees from Anatolia and Thrace to be settled in Greece, the Turks in Greece had to return to Turkey. Therefore, the refugee problem was closely related to both sides (The League of Nations Archives, Special Circular 224).

In October 1922, Mustafa Kemal informed Nansen that the issue of population exchange had been accepted in principle by the government in Ankara and that he should discuss the matter with the Turkish authorities (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 032-02). In the letter sent by E. Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office, to Venizelos on 25 October 1922 regarding the refugees in Eastern Thrace, it was claimed that a small amount of grain stock would be left to the Turks during the Greek withdrawal. A French officer argued for a delay in the evacuation order, both for grain and military equipment, but the French General Charpy stated that the evacuation would take place. It was also revealed that the Greek army's grain stocks in Eastern Thrace had been purchased by a private syndicate in Athens. In addition, Nansen was making every effort to purchase the supplies that remained in stock after the evacuation. General Charpy explained that the Rums could take all their private property with them, including cattle and grain, but stressed that the property of the Turks would not be touched. The Allies also promised to pay the Rums for their crops in Eastern Thrace (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 030-96).

While the parties agreed to sign a population exchange treaty to solve the refugee problem, epidemics broke out among the refugees. In this context, Colonel Gauthier, who was in charge of the League of Nations, sent a letter to Dr Rachjman from İstanbul on 28 October 1922, stating that he had met with Turkish, Rum and foreign officials working

with Nansen to obtain accurate information about the Rum, Armenian and Turkish refugees, and that he had met with Hamid Bey. He noted that Hamid Bey received him hospitably, but that his general attitude towards the League of Nations was sceptical. The Turkish side was very capable of providing for the needs of the Turkish refugees both in İstanbul and in Anatolia. In contrast, the Greek High Commissioner expressed that the refugees in Greece were living in very difficult conditions. There were reportedly a few cases of typhus and plague in İstanbul, but no outbreak of cholera. The Near East Relief had representatives in İzmir, the Islands, Thrace, Macedonia and Athens. The US government had pledged a substantial amount of money to the American Red Cross, but had not yet delivered it. The situation in the Maritza region was deteriorating and the roads were full of refugees. As there was no port in Dedeağaç, food aid arrived by train via Lüleburgaz. Many of the refugees were sick and some were dying. It was expected that the refugees would cause serious epidemics, first among the local population and then throughout the Mediterranean. This could lead to the possible spread of diseases such as cholera and plague to Western European countries (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24577/24010). Both the Greek and Turkish sides demand a solution to the refugee problem, because the process raises different problems. Both the Allies and the League of Nations must assume their responsibilities. While the Turkish side is more sensitive to refugee issues and has tried to take all possible measures, the Greek side is looking for external support to overcome the crisis.

Meanwhile, the Allies and the League of Nations continued to provide aid to refugees in Greece. In this regard, Sir. H. Rumbold sent a letter to F.O. Lindley on 30 October 1922, pointing out that approximately 250.000 vaccines were stored in Warsaw and that it was necessary to determine the cities in Greece where the vaccines would be distributed, and in this context the cities of Thessaloniki and Athens were suggested (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/804/228). Erik Colban, Director of the Minorities Department of the League of Nations, sent a letter to the Secretary General of the League, Eric Drummond, on 31 October 1922, arguing that the Turkish government was in favour of a Turkish-Rum population exchange, except for Western Thrace, and that Hamid Bey was only conducting negotiations based on the directives given by the Ankara Government. He also stressed that the compulsory exchange of population

between Turkey and Greece should include the Rums in İstanbul. The official of the League of Nations, M. de Roover, criticized the compulsory exchange. Therefore, Hamid Bey sent a telegram to his government and asked whether voluntary exchange would take place. On the other hand, Nansen sent a telegram to the Greek government asking whether a mandatory population exchange involving İstanbul would be accepted or not. In this context, Nansen was in favour of continuing the negotiations, but Hamid Bey was reluctant, stating that the current discussions would be meaningless if the two governments had different views on the issue of forced or voluntary immigration (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24318/24318). The population exchange between the two countries was definitely decided to take place, but the two sides and League of Nations representatives had different views on the scope of the exchange and these differences would create great problems in near future too.

Nansen believed that a population exchange treaty should be signed immediately between Turkey and Greece and that diplomatic negotiations should continue. On 31 October 1922, Nansen sent a letter to the Greek Foreign Minister, Nikolaos Politis, with a very urgent code. The letter stated that Hamit Bey had been authorized by the Ankara government to sign a treaty for the compulsory exchange of all Rums living in Turkey, including the Rums in İstanbul, and Muslims in Greece. It was also underlined that the Greek government accepted the forced migration, including İstanbul. According to Nansen, it would be advantageous for the Greek government to accept the forced migration of the Rums in İstanbul if no other conclusion could be reached on the issue of population exchange, because it would be very difficult for the Turkish government to pay for the property that would be left behind if the Rums in İstanbul migrated. Therefore, the Greek government should accept compulsory migration if necessary. Hamid Bey also mentioned that if the two governments agreed on the principles, experts should meet to discuss the details (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24318/24318). Forgetting his role as a mediator between Turkey and Greece, Nansen undertook the task of shaping Greek foreign policy. During the negotiations on the exchange of population, Nansen is seen to have acted in a way that benefited Greece. By conducting its diplomatic activities through Nansen, Greece sought to increase its influence within the framework of strategic intelligence.

4.1.2. The Population Exchange at the Lausanne Conference

On 27 October 1922, the Allied powers offered peace talks to Greece and Turkey. However, this offer was made to both the government in Ankara and the government in İstanbul. This initiative of the Allies created a negative atmosphere in the eyes of the Ankara government (Kılıçoğlu Cihangir, 2013, p. 140). The decision to invite both governments to the conference is the greatest proof that the Allied powers still recognize the İstanbul government. There was a possibility that the İstanbul government might make some concessions during the conference, which could have hampered the diplomatic moves of the Turkish side. The İstanbul government accepted the invitation with pleasure and stated that there would be no separation between the Grand National Assembly and the İstanbul government. However, the Ankara government informed the Allies that the participation of the İstanbul government in the conference would not be accepted. Therefore, the Allies invited only the Ankara government to the conference. In order to radically resolve this dual structure, the Ankara government abolished the Sultanate on 1 November 1922 (Ertan, 2013, pp. 68-69). It should be noted that on 1 November 1922 Nansen learned that Hamid Bey would be attending the Lausanne Conference. In this situation, Nansen wondered whether the negotiations on refugees would continue, and in his last meeting with Hamid Bey, the plan to include the Rums of İstanbul in the compulsory migration between Turkey and Greece was put on the agenda. However, the Greek government informed Nansen that it would not accept this plan. He said that it should not be forgotten that the population exchange had not only a human dimension but also a financial one. He reiterated that if the Rum population left İstanbul, the Turkish side would have to make payments to compensate for the losses and stressed that the issue should be resolved through negotiations (The League of Nations Archives, C.736/M.447). Looking at the historical developments, the Turkish side was trying to increase the number of Rums to be exchanged in order to prevent the interventions of the Western states through the Rums (Anzerlioğlu, 2009, p. 320). It became clear that the population exchange could not be concluded through negotiations and that a treaty would be signed during the Lausanne Peace Conference. The Greek side argued that the population exchange should take place before the peace conference. The intensive

diplomatic efforts of the League of Nations also served this purpose, but the Turkish side was more successful in carrying out the process under its own control.

It is important to note that the League of Nations established a relief committee in Athens in November 1922 to coordinate the distribution of aid to Greece. The committee was to be headed by a European, but no suitable candidate could be found. It would be in dialogue with other relief organizations (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24439/23548) and it was thus set up to centralize the decisions taken as a result of the aid negotiations between the Allies, the Greek government and the League of Nations. The aim was to act in a planned manner. The committee in Athens began to organize aid for the refugees. In this regard, 500 tons of flour were distributed to refugees on the islands of Samos and Chios. In addition, the Near East Relief Mission sent 250 tons of flour to Mytilene, increasing the amount of aid. Until that time, the League of Nations official in İstanbul planned to use 6 British ships to evacuate the remaining refugees. In addition, an estimated 250.000 Rums and 100.000 Armenians had left Anatolia by 6 November 1922 (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24915/23548). The Allies put pressure on the Ankara government regarding the refugees. In his report of 8 November 1922, Admiral Mark L. Bristol stated that the Turkish government hoped to complete the population exchange during the peace conference. The Allies prepared a note of protest to the Ankara government. It emphasized that since the Turkish-Rum population exchange could not be resolved before the peace conference, it should be discussed in detail during the conference (The United States National Archives, 867.4016/779). The Turkish side was opposed to Greece's *fait accompli* solution to the refugee problem. The Greeks, on the other hand, wanted to solve the problem as soon as possible and accept a small number of refugees.

It must be pointed out that some of Nansen's activities were criticized by Greece. In a letter sent to Venizelos in November 1922, Elim Pavlovich Demidov, the last ambassador of the Russian Empire in Athens, said that Nansen was trying to bring a spy to Athens disguised as a member of the Russian Red Cross and that this spy would carry out communist propaganda in Athens. Demidov also accused Nansen of naivety. It was said that the spy would be interested in Russian refugees in Athens. It is a widely used method

of intelligence services to get information from the enemy country through refugees. If the needs of the refugees could not be provided for in the approaching winter, the discontent among them would threaten the internal security of the country (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 031-04). Greece's security was threatened by the refugee crisis. A state that operates its foreign policy with a strategic intelligence mindset can obtain accurate information about the target country through the spies it places among the refugees. In this way, human intelligence can be successfully conducted in regions where chaos reigns in the aftermath of war.

The negotiations at the Lausanne Peace Conference began on 20 November 1922. The issues of minorities and the Turkish-Rum exchange were discussed in the "Commission on Territorial and Military Questions". Moreover, while the second commission dealt with foreigners and minorities regime, the third commission concentrated on economic issues. The first commission was chaired by the British politician Lord Curzon, while the second commission was headed by the Italian Garroni. Finally, the third commission was presided over by the French representative Barrere. In the Commissions, the Turkish and Greek sides confronted each other on border, humanitarian and economic issues. In this framework, topics such as the border of Eastern Thrace, the status of the North Aegean Islands, the compensation demanded by Turkey, population exchange and the patriarchate problem were on the agenda (Kılıçoğlu Cihangir, 2013, pp. 142-143). The population exchange caused disputes between the Turkish and Greek sides. Important issues were discussed regarding the determination of the borders of Western and Eastern Thrace and who would have minority status (Kayam, 1993, p. 585). Lord Curzon requested all delegations and their assistants to keep confidential the details of the progress of the work, especially the official meetings and negotiations (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 032-68). In his speech during the conference, Venizelos stated that it was not possible for Turks to claim rights in Western Thrace and opposed the organization of a plebiscite in the region (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 032-92). Meanwhile, in November 1922, the Greek government began to keep records of refugees arriving in Greece. This method was first put into practice in Mytilene and Chios. The instructions given to Colonel Corfe by the League of Nations specified that refugees

should be treated in three categories: women, men under 26 and over 32, and men between 20 and 32 (The League of Nations Archives, 42/24614/24614).

It is worth noting that numerous reports were written on the situation of refugees in Greece. In the report of 21 November 1922 by A.A. Pallis, who dealt with the refugees in Macedonia and Thrace, it was pointed out that about 800.000 Rum refugees had reached the shores of Greece as a result of the defeat of the Greek army in the war in Anatolia, and with the departure of those in the Black Sea, Antalya and Mersin from Anatolia, the Greek government would have to deal with almost one million refugees. Considering that the current population of Greece is 5 million, a sudden increase of a fifth of the population would cause various problems. The situation of the refugees from Thrace was relatively better. The Greek government had to provide them with houses, land, seeds and money to enable them to grow their first harvest. However, Greece was in a very bad financial situation because its main source of income, İzmir and Eastern Thrace, had been lost. The increase in taxes was intended to pay off the debt, which had reached 1.500.000.000 drachmas. Agricultural activity on the arable land of the Islands could not meet the needs of the existing population. Some of the refugees worked as temporary agricultural labourers, harvesting olives and grapes. In addition, some of the best tobacco in the world is produced in the villages around Struma, which is today within the borders of Bulgaria, and Philip, which is within the borders of Kavala. Attempts were made to settle in this area, mainly by the Rums from the Black Sea towns of Samsun and Bafra, who were already involved in tobacco farming. However, the region's proximity to the Bulgarian frontier meant that border security could not be fully guaranteed. Lord Robert Cecil, Colonel Aubrey Herbert and Count E. Gleichen, who were influential in British politics, issued a declaration in November 1922, stating that Greece had been given money by Great Britain, France and the US to ensure the balance of credit during the war, but that aid to Greece had been cut off because of the return of King Constantine to power in November 1920. At that time it was decided to lend Greece 5.000.000.000 pounds, 566.000.000.000 francs and 33.000.000.000 dollars. In this context, if the promise of the loan was passed on to the League of Nations to be used for the refugees in Greece, it would go a long way towards solving the refugee problem (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 032-71).

After the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia, the Greek government faced many problems, both economic and political. An attempt was made to settle the refugees arriving in Greece in such a way that they could carry out agricultural activities in the regions from which they came. Due to the sudden influx of refugees into Greece, it has been very difficult to resettle them. Nearly a thousand villages were established in the north of Greece. New neighbourhoods as well as towns were established. The long-standing tensions in Greek domestic politics between Venizelos and the Royalists led to political instability. The refugees, on the other hand, were angry with the Royalists because they were seen as responsible for the population exchange. For this reason, most of the refugees supported Venizelos (Arslaner, 2017, pp. 28-32). The Rums from Anatolia also took part in the uprisings against the Gounaris government in Greece. In September 1922, pro-Venizelos officers attempted to stage a revolution on the islands of Chios and Mytilene. This attempted rebellion spread to Athens and Thessaloniki. The rebel soldiers who tried to take over Athens were defeated by government troops. However, King Constantine handed over the throne to his son. Coup attempts continued in Greece until the end of 1923. Besides, because of the famine in Greece, shops were being looted. Due to the severe psychological trauma caused by the defeat, the Greeks persecuted the refugees from Anatolia. As part of the ongoing policy of repression in Greece, the property of Muslims was confiscated through a 75 per cent war tax (Ari, 1991, pp. 16-18).

The situation in Greece, as mentioned above, in his report of 25 November 1922 on the population exchange, Nansen pointed out that the population exchange should start as soon as possible because the Turks who would leave Greece would be able to start their agricultural activities in Eastern Thrace in February or March. He also claimed that the solution of the refugee problem would be easier with the migration of Muslims from Greece. He stressed that İstanbul should be excluded from any kind of exchange initiative. However, he admitted that he did not have a plan on how to prevent the immigration of the Rums in İstanbul. He also insisted on the release of war criminals convicted by the Turks. He expressed his belief that if the Turks released the Rum prisoners, the 3.800 Turkish civilians held by the Greek government would also be released (Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 031-99). Nansen's main concern was the situation of the

Rum refugees. He thought that the Muslims in Greece would migrate and make room for the incoming Rums. For this reason, he advocated the population exchange to be carried out as soon as possible. The League of Nations seems to have been biased. The fact that the issue of the release of the Rums, who had participated in massacres of Turks during the war, was kept on the agenda without any mention of the poor living conditions of the Turkish prisoners in Greece, undermined Nansen's role as mediator. Meanwhile, the situation of the Turks who had not yet been able to migrate from Canea to Anatolia was very serious. The Turkish Red Crescent (*Hilâl-i Ahmer*) helped these people and had planned to give them 1.000 liras, but gave them 2.000 liras because they were facing starvation (Ari, 1991, p. 32).

It is necessary to note that the cities of Greece were full of refugees and the measures taken were insufficient. In Thessaloniki, there were not only refugees from Anatolia. In addition, refugees from the Balkan Wars and those fleeing from the Bolsheviks were living in Thessaloniki. The refugees from Thrace, İzmir and northern Anatolia, as well as Bursa, Mudanya and İzmit, can be divided into three groups (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25154/24077). The refugees had a negative impact on the Greek economy and the government's foreign debt increased. In addition, there were ongoing debates in Greek domestic politics over the refugees. While the royalists did not want the refugees in Greece, the communists endeavoured to use the refugees as an element of political interest. During the occupation of Anatolia, the Greek communists took an oppositional stance against the government and argued for a move away from the imperialist policies of the European states. The worsening economic situation and the fall in the value of the drachma created an opportunity for the communists. In this context, Greek Foreign Minister Nicholas Politis warned Venizelos on 22 November 1922 that the increasing number of refugees would lead to social divisions. While negotiations between the parties over the refugees continued, six high-ranking Greeks were sentenced to death on 28 November 1922 for their role in the occupation of Anatolia (Yıldırım, 2006, pp. 51-52).

Meanwhile, Nansen continued to appeal for help from Christian countries. In a letter sent to the King of Spain on 27 November 1922, he pointed out that the Rums who had to migrate from Anatolia to Greece were in need of shelter and food, and that the Greek

government was incapable of dealing with the refugees. It was therefore the duty of other Christian nations to help the Greek people. Nansen also asked Spain to organize a relief movement for Christian refugees in distress (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24936/23788). According to a report by League of Nations officials on 29 November 1922, although no epidemics had been reported among the refugees in Athens, there was a risk of epidemics with the imminent arrival of refugees from Anatolia. The American Red Cross built hospitals with a capacity of 5.000 beds. Even in peacetime, preparations were being made on a large scale in Greece, where the health system was inadequate. Nansen announced that he would organize a vaccination campaign against smallpox, typhoid, cholera, dysentery and plague, diseases that were likely to spread among the refugees (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24/2010/24/2010). In addition, in November 1922, the League of Nations planned to provide loans to the Greek government for the resettlement of refugees in vacant areas in Macedonia and Western Thrace (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24937/23548). The League of Nations' plans for Thrace are more political than humanitarian. Moreover, the Greek government has failed to distribute aid to the refugees.

While the general situation in Greece is like this, on 1 December 1922, Lord Curzon invited Nansen to join the commission negotiating the population exchange between Turkey and Greece. Nansen explained that he had been working intensively on the refugee question for the previous two months and that the refugee problem had to be solved once and for all in order to ensure security and economic stability in the Near East. He stressed that he had been invited by the Allied powers to İstanbul for the start of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek governments and that he supported the population exchange before the signing of the peace treaty. He said that he did not believe that the population exchange between Turks and Rums would lead to entirely positive results and that the citizens of the two countries would face great difficulties. Nansen drew attention to the fact that both Rums and Turks stayed away from productive activities, especially economic ones, and that this could have bad consequences. He explained that Turks migrating from Greece could engage in agricultural production on land in Anatolia, while the Rums migrating from Turkey could cultivate on land in Greece. According to Nansen, the political and psychological aspects of the incidents

would be better addressed with the realization of the population exchange (The League of Nations Archives, 48/24318/24318). As can be seen, Nansen prioritized the agricultural production factor for the immediate signing of the population exchange treaty between Turkey and Greece. The threat of refugees creating a security issue was seen by both the League of Nations and the Allied powers as a problem that needed to be solved once and for all.

At the beginning of December 1922, Italian representative M. Montagna, the chairman of the sub-committee in which the negotiations on population exchange were held, stressed that a draft treaty should be prepared without delay. In his speech, Colonel Tevfik Bey, representing Turkey, stated that there were three important issues to be resolved, namely civilian prisoners, prisoners of war and population exchange, and that each issue should be dealt with separately. The civilian prisoners were a source of great anger in the eyes of the Turkish people against the Greeks. The prisoners were taken into custody without any distinction between men and women, and it is known that there were even young girls among the prisoners. Therefore, the first thing to be done is to ensure that the prisoners are returned to Turkey. It is also necessary to clarify how the prisoners were treated. According to Tevfik Bey, there is no basis in international law to justify the detention of civilians. Therefore, the only aim of the Greeks was to destroy the intellectual class. During the Mudanya negotiations, the Allied powers warned the Greeks to solve this problem. On behalf of Greece, M. Caclamanos claimed that the civilian prisoners were spies. He claimed that these people would go to Turkey with the general amnesty to be issued at the end of the peace treaty. He stated that 125.000 people held as prisoners of war in Turkey should be released. In return, he underlined that 3.800 civilian prisoners in Greece would be liberated. Colonel Tevfik Bey insisted that the concepts of civilian prisoners and prisoners of war were different, adding that there were no civilian prisoners in Turkey and that prisoners of war would be exchanged. He also pointed out that the Rums of military age who were imprisoned in Turkey were serving in the Greek army and that there was a possibility that they could rejoin the army. If Greece had shown goodwill by repatriating its prisoners of war and civilian prisoners, Turkey could have sent the Rums to Greece before the peace treaty was signed. Nansen explained that after the signing of the agreement, the civilian prisoners could be repatriated first and then the

prisoners of war could be exchanged. He also emphasized that the Rum prisoners of war in Turkey had been forcibly conscripted into the Greek army during the war (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25256/24318). It is clear that it is not realistic for the Greeks to accuse all 3.800 civilian prisoners of espionage. Greece believes it can achieve diplomatic success by violating the international laws of war. The Greek government wanted to put the Turkish side in a difficult situation by using the terms civilian prisoners and prisoners of war together. In this respect, the Allied powers believed that Greece was making a diplomatic move based on false arguments.

It is worth noting that L. Fielden, a member of the League of Nations who was trying to organize relief activities in Athens, indicated in a letter sent to the League's headquarters on 2 December 1922 that the League of Nations should adopt an active policy method and that no concrete steps had been taken to combat against the epidemic and the resettlement of refugees (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25568/24010). In a letter sent to the British Embassy in Athens on 5 December 1922, Captain E.A. Nottingham Palmer, who was serving on behalf of the US in Mondros, pointed out that there were 11.000 refugees in Lemnos and that the rate of refugees in the Kastro settlement in Sifnos and the surrounding villages had reached 75%. The Rums, who were in a very bad situation, came with Turkish money. Although there are local committees formed by Greek merchants, the population is indifferent to recent events and motivated only by self-preservation. The American Red Cross has delivered 50 tons of flour to the region's governor. However, if relief were to be organized, an American Red Cross official should be sent to the region as the Greek authorities were unlikely to be able to manage the aid (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/806/763).

The second session of the population exchange negotiations in the sub-commission took place on 4 December 1922. Colonel Tevfik Bey claimed that the number of Turkish civilian prisoners held by the Greeks could be higher, contradicting the figures given by M. Caclamanos. Greece had held these prisoners because it considered them a threat to its security, but now that the Greek army had left Anatolia, there was no longer a security threat to Greece. Mr Caclamanos stated that Greece was prepared to release all civilian prisoners if a general agreement on prisoners was reached in the sub-commission. Mr. de

Lacroix, representing France, asked Mr. Caclamanos about the estimated number of prisoners of war in Anatolia. He replied that there were about 30.000 to 35.000 officers and soldiers in Anatolia. Colonel Tevfik Bey insisted that precise figures had to be given. It was reported that the civilian hostages would be repatriated and that this operation would be organized by the International Red Cross Committee. It was also agreed that Greece would send all prisoners of war to İzmir and Turkey would send an equal number of prisoners of war, officers and soldiers to Greece. It was agreed that the remaining Rum prisoners would be sent after the signing of the peace treaty. The Turkish delegates stated that the Rum men of military age in Turkey could be considered within the scope of the general population exchange treaty. After intense discussions between the Turkish and Greek sides on this issue, it was decided to send them to Greece as part of a general population exchange, with the guarantee that they would not be employed for military purposes (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25256/24318). As the Turkish side knew that the prisoners of war in its hands were serving in the Greek army, it emphasized that these people would be sent to Greece under a general treaty. Since the figures given by the Greek delegation were not clear, the Turkish side diplomatically put Greece in a difficult situation.

Meanwhile, on 21 December 1922, developments took place regarding the Rum prisoners in Anatolia and the Turkish prisoners in Greece. According to this, İsmet Pasha, the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Government, declared that Turkey welcomed the request of an international committee to visit the military camps in Turkey. It was also stated that it would be appropriate for the international committee to visit the prisoner camps in Greece (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı, 234/53).

In the ongoing negotiations on the population exchange between the two countries, Caclamanos claimed that the Turkish side had resolved this issue with the departure of a large Rum population from the country. Dr Nihad Reşad Bey stated that this claim was not true and that the Rums had left Turkey voluntarily. Şükrü Bey argued that a general population exchange between Turkey and Greece should be compulsory and stressed that Western Thrace should be excluded from the exchange. Caclamanos, on the other hand,

stated that if Western Thrace was to be excluded, it would be fair not to include İstanbul in the population exchange as proposed by Lord Curzon. He also stated that the Rums in İstanbul were part of İstanbul and had a significant impact on its economic life. It was pointed out that the urban Rums of İstanbul would not be able to integrate if they were sent to Greece. Şükrü Bey objected to the exclusion of İstanbul from the population exchange, taking into account the possibility of the Rums continuing their political activities in İstanbul. On 5 December 1922, Şükrü Bey expressed in the third meeting that the Greek government was trying to separate the Rums by dividing them into those in Anatolia and those in İstanbul. In response to the Greek government's demand that the Rums of İstanbul should not be sent to Greece because there was not enough space, Şükrü Bey replied that the Rums of İstanbul could be exchanged first. Similarly, Turkey has problems finding space for Turks returning from Greece. Noting that the number of Rums in İstanbul varies between 200.000 and 210.000, he pointed out that the number of Muslims in Greece, with the exception of Western Thrace, is the same. M. Montagna, on the other hand, argued that the refugees should be given shelter, but Tefvik and Şükrü Beys pointed out that this was not possible because the Greek army had burnt villages and towns in Anatolia (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25256/24318). As the Greek authorities were unable to evacuate Muslim refugees from Greece, Muslims from Thessaloniki, Canea, Kandiye and Crete were brought to the shores of İzmir, İstanbul, Samsun and Trabzon by ships from Turkey (Arı, 1990, p. 638).

As the Turkish side had just emerged from the war, it had to consider all possible factors that could pose a threat to its internal security. Considering the activities of the Rums in İstanbul during the war, this argument seems to be justified. Moreover, the Greek side's claim that the Rums in İstanbul could not be integrated into Greece cannot be explained with concrete data. In this way, Greece wants to suppress the Turkish side, especially by using moral factors. The problem of the settlement of the refugees puts not only the Greek side but also the Turkish side in a difficult situation.

At the fourth meeting of the sub-commission for the population exchange on 7 December 1922, Tefvik Bey said that there were 230.000 Rums and 50.000 Orthodox Turks living in Anatolia, while there were 500.000 Turks in Greece, excluding Western Thrace. He

gave this statistical information in order to show the difficulties to be experienced in meeting the needs of the Turks coming to Anatolia. During the occupation, the Greek army burnt 1.418 villages and 98.564 houses, a total of 27 settlements. In this framework, considering that the Muslims in Turkey do not have houses, it will not be easy to create settlements for those coming from Greece. The Turkish side was in favour of forced migration but demanded to wait until April to build new settlements. Tevfik Bey objected to Caclamanos' claim that there were no Rums left in Turkey, saying that the Rums had been trying to exterminate the Turkish population for 30 years and asked where the Turks in Crete, Thessaly and Morea were now. He added that 450.000 Turks had been forced to migrate to Anatolia during the Balkan wars. Furthermore, the British representative Ryan asked Tevfik Bey whether 50.000 Orthodox Turks would remain in Turkey, to which he replied that they would. Caclamanos denied that there had been a mass exodus of Turks after the Balkan wars and stressed that the Muslim population in Greece, including Western Thrace, was currently 450.000. The Greek delegation also claimed that the Rum population in Anatolia was 300.000. In İstanbul, the number of Rums was claimed to be more than 300.000 (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25256/24318). The Turkish side tries to put pressure on Greece by explaining historical developments. The destruction caused by the Greek army in Anatolia is shown in the context of statistical data.

In summary, the Turkish and Greek sides in the sub-committee agreed that the refugee problem was beyond the economic and political capacity of both countries. The Greek government resorted to all means to avoid accepting more refugees into the country. The Turkish side, on the other hand, defended the need to act in a balanced and fair manner. Greece was in a difficult diplomatic situation, especially with regard to the prisoners of war, since it was known that it had been displacing Turks for years and it did not know how to deal with the problem, because it was the first time that such a large influx of refugees had reached its country. Despite the support of the Allied powers and the League of Nations, the Greek government itself invited representatives of non-governmental organizations to Greece. Thus, as the American intelligence officer pointed out, Greece's capacity to administer a territory is very weak.

It should be noted that in the report on refugees sent to the League of Nations in December 1922 by Phocion Négris, president of the Hellenic League, it was indicated that the total number of refugees arriving in Greece from Anatolia and Thrace was 835.851. It was also pointed out that the majority of the refugees were women and children. It was underlined that women were giving birth in the camps without medical assistance (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25975/23548). It can be seen that the League of Nations failed to take effective action in the refugee camps. An important detail worth mentioning is the presence of Nestorian Christians alongside the Rums and Armenians. In this context, the Greek government put pressure on the British government to allow the 320 Nestorians on St George Island near Piraeus to return to Iraq. Greece did not want these refugees because of the risk of epidemics. However, the British government eventually settled the Nestorian refugees in a monastery on the Poros Island. In this context, the aid organization "*Save the Children*" objected to the use of the money that would be spent for Rum and Armenian refugees from Anatolia for Nestorians. According to the observations of C.H. Bentinck, a British diplomat stationed in Athens, in December 1922 there were 131.000 refugees in Athens and Piraeus, 20.000 in Volos, 11.600 in Patras, 130.000 in and around Thessaloniki and 13.000 in Corfu (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/806/E 404/4/44). As reflected in archival documents, there are different views on the number of refugees in Greece. Also, the transfer of Nestorians to the Greek islands shows that Britain was insufficient in dealing with the refugee crisis. As Greece was in close cooperation with Britain both during and after the war, developments in British foreign policy affected Greece.

Although the number of refugees varied, correspondence was ongoing regarding the assistance to be provided in the face of the difficulties they faced. In a letter sent by Philip Baker to the British politician Lord Salisbury on 8 December 1922, it was claimed that Greece should be given a loan for reconstruction and that the total loan of £50.000 promised by Britain and the aid to refugees were insufficient. It was stressed that the propaganda activities of the League of Nations and the contribution of experts were much more important than money. Baker also stated that the rebuilding efforts would enhance the prestige of the Greek government (The League of Nations Archives, C319/7/366).

In his speech at the Lausanne Conference on 14 December 1922, Venizelos declared that he was not in favour of a compulsory population exchange between Turkey and Greece, but that he accepted it because 650.000 Rums in Anatolia and 300.000 Rums in Western Thrace were refugees. The Rums did not want to leave their ancestral lands and appealed to the Greek government. Venizelos insisted on the abandonment of the compulsory population exchange, arguing that some 250.000 Rums in Anatolia should not be forced to migrate. Those Rums who had to migrate to Greece would be allowed to return if they wished. Similarly, the return of the Rums to Eastern Thrace was not to be prevented by the Turks. The Rums of İstanbul would be allowed to reside in that city without any restrictions. Furthermore, the Greek government would not use coercive measures to force the Turks in Greece to leave. İsmet Pasha was surprized by Venizelos' speeches (Meray, 2001, pp. 226-229). However, the most important reason for Greece's insistence on the İstanbul Rums was to be able to continue its activities within the framework of the Megali Idea in the future thanks to the presence of Rums in the Anatolian lands (Kalelioğlu, 2009, p. 102). Venizelos' participation in diplomatic talks was not without reason. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, it is known how the Greek politician persuaded the Allies to invade Anatolia. In this context, in order to convince the Turks at the Lausanne Conference, the Greek side put pressure on the Turkish side by creating the impression of mutual concessions, rather than acting with a tough foreign policy approach.

It is important to note that Herbert Watson, who was working in Athens on behalf of the *Save the Children Fund* and had just returned from Athens, stated in his report prepared on 18 December 1922 that the Greek government had given Nansen 1 million drachmas to buy corn, but that the corn never arrived in Greece and that everyone was complaining about Nansen. Beside, the plan to buy grain or corn from Eastern Thrace failed. The Greek government distributed food to the refugees through rationing. Moreover, the working system of the committee set up in Athens was relatively better. There were major differences between the Armenian and Rum camps in Athens. The Armenians were more active in the camps than the Rums and formed a 5-member committee for the administration of the camp. They also opened shops and built huts. Moreover, in general, the male population was larger among the refugees from Anatolia. According to Watson,

Armenian and Rum refugees would eventually return to Anatolia. A large number of refugees could be settled on the Greek islands. The plan to drain the Maritza and Struma valleys would reduce malaria and make the region suitable for settlement (The League of Nations Archives, 48/25508/23548). Reports on refugees generally note the higher numbers of women and children, but Watson's report highlights the predominance of male refugees.

During the peace negotiations, one of the most important issues, apart from the Turkish-Greek population exchange, was the status of the Patriarchate. At the meeting on 4 January 1923, the Turkish side stressed that Rum Patriarch Meletios should not remain in office, citing his political activities during the war. If this demand was not met, Turkey declared that it would deport the Rums in İstanbul. The British, however, strongly opposed this idea, arguing that the Patriarchate should not leave Turkey. For reasons of its own prestige, Britain opposed the separation of the Greek Patriarchate from Turkey (Clark, 2006, pp. 96-97). The Turkish side emphasized that the Patriarchate had assumed a political role, especially during the war, by ceasing to deal with religious affairs, which was its *raison d'être*. Thus, the Turkish Government demanded that an organisation acting against its internal security should leave the country. However, the Allied powers opposed this idea (Anzerlioğlu, 2009, pp. 325-326). The report of the discussions in the sub-commission was published on 9 January 1923. The Turks made the presence of the Rums in İstanbul conditional on the departure of the Greek Patriarchate. Lord Curzon proposed that the Patriarchate should remain in İstanbul provided that it did not engage in administrative and political activities. No clear agreement was reached on population exchange. As a result, İsmet Pasha accepted Lord Curzon's proposal and did not insist on his objection. Besides, the Allied demands for the establishment of Armenian and Assyrian-Chaldean states in Anatolia were firmly rejected. (Howard, 1931, p. 304). So, the efforts of the European states to grant autonomy to the Nestorians were unsuccessful (Bayburt, 2010, p. 12). It should be noted that the instructions received by the Turkish delegation stated that the exchange had to be resolved and that the establishment of an Armenian homeland was totally rejected.

It should be noted that there were reactions from the refugees to the Lausanne negotiations. The report of the British diplomat Bentinck, dated 22 January 1922, mentioned that Rums, Armenians and Circassians took part in demonstrations in Athens to protest against the population exchange (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/9060/123). In a letter sent to the British Embassy in Athens on 23 January 1923 by a committee of Rum refugees in the Cyclades, from where refugees from Anatolia and Thrace arrived in Greece, it was argued that if the negotiations on population exchange at the Lausanne Conference were considered, the Rums would remain refugees permanently and their ancestral lands would be lost. No agreement can prevent the return of the Rums and Armenians to Anatolia. Greece, which is a “*small country*” in terms of area, has difficulties in dealing with a large number of refugees. For this reason, the population exchange decision, which aimed to remove the refugees from their ancestral lands, was protested and called for reconsideration by the Great powers (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/243/133/L 2). By the end of January 1923, although negotiations continued, no clear consensus had been reached between the Turkish side and the Great powers. A draft treaty was proposed by Lord Curzon at the end of January, but France and Turkey rejected it (Clark, 2006, p. 106).

It should not be forgotten that the population exchange negotiations were met with reaction among Christians. In this context, a letter sent by Metropolitan Kyrillos of the Dardanelles to the British Embassy in Athens on 27 January 1923 claimed that he had been sent to a remote part of Greece in winter and that he had been wronged. It was underlined that the news from the Lausanne Conference was not favourable for the Christians and that the negotiations were protested. For the Rums and Armenians, the hope of return had reached the point of exhaustion (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/296/133/L2). The Rums of Canea protested against the population exchange negotiations between Greece and Turkey. They hoped to one day return to their ancestral lands. The governments of Britain, France, the US, Italy and Belgium were asked to reconsider the population exchange negotiations in Lausanne (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/251/133/L2). The developments during the Lausanne conference were closely followed by the Rums. They declared that they would protest against any decision taken against them at the end of the negotiations. They also

criticized the Greek government. According to them, any agreement with Turkey on population exchange would be proof that their sacrifices during the war had not been taken into account.

4.1.3. The Turkish-Rum Population Exchange Agreement and Subsequent Developments

With the resolution of the problem of the position of the Patriarchate in Turkey, the obstacles to the signing of a population exchange treaty between Turkey and Greece were removed. In this framework, the “*Turkish-Rum Population Exchange Agreement*” was signed between İsmet Pasha and Venizelos on 30 January 1923 before the signing peace treaty (Alexandris, 1992, p. 95). According to the first article of the agreement, from 1 May 1923 there would be a compulsory exchange of population between the Rum Orthodox in Turkey and the Muslims in Greece. Furthermore, no one could return to Turkey or Greece without the permission of the Turkish and Greek governments. According to the second article, the Rums in İstanbul and the Muslims in Western Thrace were to be exempted from the population exchange subject to the first article. Accordingly, the Rums in the settlements mentioned in the law of 1912 before 30 October 1918 were accepted as the Rums of İstanbul. Similarly, Muslims east of the border line established by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 were recognized as Muslims of Western Thrace. The third article stated that the Rum men imprisoned in Turkey would first be sent to Greece. The fifth article stressed that the property rights of Rums in Turkey and Muslims in Greece would be protected. The eighth article stated that refugees could take their movable property with them without any tax burden (The League of Nations Archives, 40/31022/28180). The eleventh article decided to establish a mixed commission to oversee the population exchange. The mixed commission would have four members from the Greek and Turkish sides (Kayam, 1993, p. 593). The other three members would be citizens of states that had not participated in the First World War (The League of Nations Archives, 41/27358/27358). Although Nansen demanded that the Rums from Anatolia who settled in the villages around İstanbul should be accepted as İstanbul Rums and subjected to the population exchange, this proposal was not accepted by the Turkish side (Erdal, 2006, p. 63).

There were reactions against the Turkish-Rum Population Exchange Agreement on both the Greek and Turkish sides. Petitions prepared by the Central Committee of Rums of İstanbul were sent to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The petitions focused on how Hellenism could survive in İstanbul in the future and the disadvantages of the population exchange. However, both civil society organizations and individuals clearly understood that there was no going back from the population exchange. Similarly, Muslims in Greece opposed the implementation of the population exchange. For example, Muslims in the Florina region asked the Greek authorities for permission to remain in Greece. However, they were eventually subjected to the population exchange (Yıldırım, 2006, pp. 106-108).

It is important to note that *Politia*, an anti-Venizelos newspaper published in Greece, published articles against the population exchange agreement signed between Turkey and Greece. It stressed that the decisions taken in Lausanne were unfortunate not only for the Rums but also for humanity. A British doctor working in the refugee camps stated that it was very difficult to persuade the Rums to work and that all the refugees wanted to return to Anatolia and had no intention of settling in Greece. They also explained that they found it more comfortable to continue their lives in huts in Anatolia than to live in Greece (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/238/133/L2). The Rums faced the consequences of their support for the Greek army's occupation of Anatolia and they were looking for ways to return to Anatolia.

Meanwhile, both the Rums and the Muslims objected to the decision of compulsory population exchange. On 6 February 1923, in a letter written by the Acting Consul General in Thessaloniki, Muslims living in Polygiro, Langada, Siatista and Iannitsa opposed the population exchange agreement (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/384/133/L2). In addition, 8.000 Rums and Armenians living in the regions of Cephalonia and Ithaca organized meetings and wrote protest leaflets against the Turkish-Rum population exchange agreed at the Lausanne Conference. They claimed that if the population exchange went ahead, it would significantly affect the lives of the Rums and Armenians living in Turkey. It was also stressed that refugees who had to migrate to Greece should return to Turkey (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/869/316/133/L2). After the signing of the population exchange

agreement, both Muslims and Rums were aware that they would have to leave their homes and start living in a different country from their homeland.

It is necessary to note that in his report of 11 February 1923, Colonel Haskell, who had been appointed by the American Red Cross to deal with all refugees not only in Greece but also in Europe, stated that he had entered Greece from the port of Piraeus and had worked for ten days to set up the administration of the American Red Cross. He stressed that the needs of health, shelter, clothing and food had to be provided first in Greece, but added that the shelters would be built by the Greeks. It was noted that after the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia, more than 1 million refugees migrated to Greece and the majority of the refugees were women and children, the claim that Muslims had persecuted Christian women in Anatolia was completely fabricated (The League of Nations Archives, 48/26891/23548). The Greek government concentrated on propaganda during the population exchange negotiations. Both during and after the war, it sought to gain diplomatic advantage by propagating the idea that Christians were being oppressed by Muslims.

When we look at what happened after the signing of the Treaty, we see that the calls for help for Greece in the resettlement of refugees continue. In fact, the issue is not only about refugee resettlement, but also about preventing the collapse of the Greek economy. It is necessary to note that the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees argued for an immediate loan to the Greek government to meet the needs and resettle the refugees. The Greeks were exhausted from years of war and it seemed impossible for them to cope with the refugee problem without help. Aid was needed not only to enable Greece to cope with the refugees, but also to prevent a complete collapse of the Greek economy. The migration of Rum and Armenian refugees from Anatolia to Greece also posed a problem for European countries, as it was estimated that 100.000 Armenians and 250.000 Rums were trying to seek asylum in Europe. In the context of these developments, on 22 February 1923 the Greek government requested a loan of £10 million from the League of Nations (The League of Nations Archives, 48/30845/23548).

It should be noted that in a letter to the Italian ambassador to the US, Gelasio Caetani, on 31 March 1923, US Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes pointed out that Rum refugees were placing a considerable burden on relief agencies and that the US was assisting the refugees through the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief Mission. Some 868.000 refugees have been resettled by American aid agencies in Greece and the islands of the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the food needs of 500.000 refugees are being met by the American Red Cross. However, it should be recognized that the food and shelter conditions in the refugee camps cannot be maintained indefinitely. Therefore, refugees must adapt to the economic life of the region in which they are resettled. In this context, the American Red Cross will cease its activities in Greece and the Greek authorities will have to make preparations for the refugees. Finding temporary solutions to the refugee problem would be a waste of time. According to American Red Cross also announced that its relief activities in Greece would end on 30 June 1923. An agreement was to be reached on the situation of the Armenians who had taken refuge in Greece (The League of Nations Archives, 48/28073/23548). The American administration, realizing that the relief activities were not part of a long-term plan, declared that the aid would not continue. Despite the activities of the Allies, the League of Nations and other aid organizations, Greece was unable to fulfil the necessary arrangements regarding the refugees. All the developments shows that the Greek administration had no strategy after the war.

Another important issue is that the Turkish side was disturbed by the activities of the Greeks in Western Thrace. In this context, the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Western Thrace wrote a letter to the Allied Commissariats in İstanbul on 24 April 1923. According to this letter, the Greek government continued its barbaric and cruel policies. The food needs of the Rum families living in Turkish houses are the responsibility of the Turkish landlords, who have to work all day in the fields. The Greek authorities confiscate the grain in the storehouses of the Turks and try to force them out of their homes without any reason. The Committee, which was unable to obtain information from the region due to its limited resources, demanded that the Allied powers take note of what was happening. In addition, Greek gangs, acting with the support of Circassians, massacred 10 Turks in the Drama region (The League of Nations Archives, 11/28378/28378). It is

observed that Greece did not act within the framework of strategic intelligence even after the war. As the Greeks acted within the scope of the Megali idea during the war, they continued to act in a similar manner after the war.

Despite the signing of the population exchange agreement, as of 9 May 1923, a large number of Turkish prisoners were still being held in Greece, many of whom were starving. The Turkish side insisted that Muslim women who had been taken to Greece during the war should be returned to Turkey as soon as possible (The League of Nations Archives, MIS-66A/265). By June 1923, there was no positive development in the situation in Greece. The annual report of the American National Red Cross, published on 30 June 1923, showed that the number of refugees in Greece reached 1.150.000 (The League of Nations Archives, 48/35000/23548). While the Greek government preferred to solve the problems of refugees in the international arena, it continued to avoid fulfilling the requirements of the convention. Although the League of Nations officials in Athens could not give an exact figure for the refugee population, they indicated that on 24 August 1923 there were at least 800.000 refugees living in Greece. Of this population, more than a third were dependent on government assistance for their survival. In order to prevent the refugees from starving to death, the Greek government had promised to give 2 drachmas per day, but for the time being it gives each refugee an allowance of 1 drachma. However, this aid was only given to women over 60 years of age and children under 12. In addition, some 40.000 Rum refugee peasant families in Macedonia and Thrace have been resettled in houses in Muslim villages. In the last few months 7.000 plows were distributed to farmers and 25.000 mules were given to Rum refugees after the demobilization of the Greek army. The Greek Government expropriated private property in the regions of Acarnania, Aetolia, Epirus and the Morea. It also confiscated six private properties covering an area of 121.000 square metres. The Governors of Epirus and Crete were granted loans for the settlement of refugees and to enable them to engage in agricultural activities (The League of Nations Archives, 48/30828/23548). There are different opinions about the refugee population in Greece. The Greek government was seen as inadequate to cope with the needs of the refugees. Besides, the US government opposed loans to the Greek government, arguing that it would weaken Greek efforts and that aid would do more harm than good (The League of Nations Archives,

48/29451/29451). Considering the political and economic turmoil in Greece, it has not been easy for the large number of refugees to integrate with the Greeks, and major problems have occurred (Hirschon, 2000, p. 37). Thus, the problems caused by mass migration in Greece would continue for decades (Clogg, 1992, p. 128). Greece failed in the field of diplomacy, where strategic intelligence can be used effectively. Unable to obtain economic support from the Great powers, the Greek authorities resorted to illegal practices. It is well known that economic intelligence is one of the most important aspects of strategic intelligence. In this context, it can be seen that Greece is going through a difficult economic period and does not have a long-term refugee policy after the war.

During that time, while Greece could not achieve to cope with the refugees, the Turkish side was working on a plan to settle 400.000 refugees in Turkey as part of the population exchange before winter (The United States National Archives, 767.68115/7). In addition, Colonel Treloare, who served as High Commissioner for Refugees, indicated in his report of 7 September 1923 that another 150.000 Rums from Anatolia would migrate to Greece and that nearly 1 million refugees had already settled in the northern regions of Greece. Moreover, the vast majority of the 350.000 Muslims in Greece were farmers. They therefore did not want to leave their land as part of the population exchange. Besides, half of the Rum refugees from Anatolia were engaged in agriculture, while the other half were tradesmen or industrial workers. While 200.000 Rum refugees were able to provide for their own needs, the rest tried to continue their lives without these opportunities (The League of Nations Archives, 41/30924/27358). Once again, a League of Nations report shows that the Greek government was unable to use international aid for refugees efficiently. As a result, the refugee problem became a heavy burden for Greece. The Turkish authorities began to make preparations for the settlement of the refugees coming to Anatolia.

Following in the footsteps of the American Red Cross, the Near East Relief had also suspended its aid to the refugees. The organization, which had last provided food for 50.000 refugees in İstanbul and the Black Sea until 15 September 1923, indicated that the Greek government should now take responsibility. In return for the continuation of the activities of the Near East Relief in Trabzon and Samsun, the Greek government agreed

to provide for the food needs of the refugees and announced that the remaining refugees would be transferred to Greece as soon as possible. H.C. Jaquith, who was in charge of the Near East Relief in Athens and İstanbul, offered his assistance to both governments in carrying out the operation of sending 8.000 Rums to Greece in exchange for the return of 8.000 Muslims to Turkey. The Turkish side asked the American relief organization for help in evacuating Muslims from the island of Mytilene to Ayvalık. Between 12 and 19 October 1923, the evacuation of 7.024 Muslims with 1.820 livestock to Turkey was carried out smoothly (The United States National Archives, 767.68115/15).

It is important to note that Tevfik Rüştü, a member of the mixed commission, declared that the population exchange officially began on 10 November 1923. In this context, preparations were made for the official exchange of refugees from Greece to Turkey. Muslim refugees were required to register their property in Greece in order to determine how much property they would own when they arrived in Turkey (Arı, 2000, p. 71). However, the arrival of Muslims from Greece in Turkey under the population exchange agreement brought with it problems. According to American archival documents, the Greek government, with the intention of destroying all sources of livelihood of the Muslim population and confiscating their property, wanted to send the Muslims to Turkey by force in November 1923. Greek gendarmes, in cooperation with the Rums, pressured Muslims in Greece to leave their homes and looted their property. Muslims fled to the ports to save their lives. The city of Thessaloniki was full of Turkish refugees from Macedonia. In Crete, harsh measures were taken against the Muslims and Doxiades, the Greek minister in charge of refugees, was the one who personally ordered the Muslim religious authorities to evacuate the houses of the Turks. The governor of Crete, Mr Mazarakis, settled Rums in the houses vacated by the Muslims. Moreover, Muslims who tried to return to their homes were massacred by the Rums. According to the decision number 7613 of the Greek Council of Ministers, the Muslims were subjected to a forced population exchange and had to hand over their private property to the Greeks. The right to rent the property left behind by the Muslims was taken away from them. As clearly reflected in the American documents, the Greek government carried out all kinds of unlawful practices to invalidate the population exchange agreement signed in Lausanne (The United States National Archives, 767.68115/16). The Greek government has

violated the terms of the population exchange agreement and Greece's policy towards Muslim refugees proves that its brutal behaviour during the war has continued.

Furthermore, in December 1923, the governorate of Thessaloniki tried to prevent Turks from Macedonia to enter the city. The Greek official in the mixed commission proposed the idea of sending Muslims in boats to Turkey. But the Turkish government did not welcome this proposal and declared that it would send boats to the region (The United States National Archives, 767.68115/21). In order to get rid of the economic burden caused by the refugees, the Greek side tried to send the Muslims as soon as possible. However, the Greek authorities did not stop acting in an unplanned manner.

The evaluation report of the Refugee Settlement Commission of 25 February 1924 states that the commission met in Thessaloniki on 1 November 1923 and evaluated the activities of the Greek government in Macedonia. Macedonia was seen as an area where refugees could be settled because it had fertile agricultural land. The Commission was responsible for the settlement of 1 million Armenians and Rums who came to Greece from Anatolia. Although the number of refugees arriving in Greece decreased, there were still some arrivals (The League of Nations Archives, C.91.M.30).

According to the report published by the US High Commissioner in İstanbul on 11 March 1924, the exchange of prisoners between Turkey and Greece took place under the supervision of an international commission. The Turkish side was represented by Muzaffer Bey and the Greek side by Kottakis. The other members were Swedish and Swiss officials. The Commission continued its work in Athens, İzmir and İstanbul. Following the meetings, it was agreed that 4.300 hostages and civilian prisoners in Greece would be returned to Turkey. In addition, 340 officers and 9.700 soldiers would be exchanged. Moreover, the exchange of Turkish and Greek populations still continued with difficulties. According to the figures provided by the officials of the International Red Cross, the number of Muslims who migrated from Greece to Turkey on 1 February 1924 were 52.917. Of these, 36.000 came from Thessaloniki, 10.000 from Crete and 6.000 from Kavala and Drama (The United States National Archives, 767.68115/28).

Although the population exchange agreement was signed, it was very difficult to put into practice.

Although the situation of the prisoners was clarified after the signing of the agreement, the situation of the refugees was not clarified and no improvement was observed. According to the League of Nations report of April 1924, refugees near Thessaloniki were still living in tents and malaria was widespread among refugees who had to wait long hours at the ports. The 295.000 refugees who had been settled in small villages through the efforts of the Refugee Settlement Commission and the Greek government were in need of food, medical care and clothing (The League of Nations Archives, 48/36591/23548). The report of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of 10 June 1924 stressed that, according to the Armenian Archbishop who had just arrived from Athens, the Greek government would soon be sending 4.000 Armenian refugees from Thrace to the Morea. All these refugees have migrated from Anatolia and 90 per cent of them have a profession. It would be an extremely wrong policy to settle Armenians in a region where there are only Rums, because Armenians do not speak Greek. In Thrace, where the majority of the population was Turkish, the common language was Turkish. Moreover, since the soil of the Morea peninsula is not suitable for agriculture and the number of industrial enterprises is small, it is extremely difficult for Armenian refugees to find work in this region. The Armenian Archbishop stated that permission from the Russian government was needed for the refugees to migrate to the Caucasus and asked the Greek government to postpone the migration policy until the permits were obtained. The Archbishop was also to meet with the Soviet representative in Greece to find out whether the necessary permits could be obtained. In July 1924, the Greek government decided to expel the Armenians from Greece. The League of Nations did not take the necessary steps to dissuade Greece from this decision. The Armenians were taken to the coastal towns of Macedonia. The Greek government declared that the Armenians living in the lands and shelters allocated for Rum refugees would leave Greece with the latest decision. The Armenians, who were unemployed and could not speak Greek, were against staying in Greece. The Greek government indicated that the evacuation of Armenians in the country would be completed within a year. The Greek administration announced that it could not bear the burden of Armenian refugees, as it was dealing with the problem of

too many Rum refugees. Moreover, the Armenian leaders' policy of not allowing Armenians in Greece to live with Rums, thus keeping Armenian nationalism alive, caused concern among the Greeks (The League of Nations Archives, 48/36901/25899). In the eyes of the Greek government, Armenian and Rum refugees, who migrated from Anatolia at the same time, did not have equal rights. The fact that the Armenians did not speak Greek was recognized as the main problem. The League of Nations discriminated between Armenians and Rums. In its long-term planning, the Greek government decided to expel the Armenians from Greece, considering them a threat to its internal security.

Meanwhile, migration from Greece to Anatolia continued by midsummer 1924. In a letter sent by the British Consul General in İzmir to the British Mission in İstanbul on 29 August 1924, it was reported that during the spring and summer months, some 37.000 Muslims from Greece arrived in İzmir with 8.000 animals. It is also known that refugees went to Ayvalı, Çeşme, Kuşadası and Bodrum by boat. Refugees who settled in the interior contributed to agricultural production by growing tobacco and olives. As three-quarters of the cities such as Manisa and Aydın were destroyed by the Greek army, there were no houses for the refugees to settle in. It takes at least a year to build houses. People in habitable villages refused to accept refugees, citing overcrowding (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 286/898/88). As a result of the Greek occupation, 70 per cent of the settlements in Marmara, the Black Sea and Western Anatolia were burnt down and rendered uninhabitable. Manisa and its surroundings were among the places where a significant part of the refugees from Greece settled. The refugees wrote petitions to the Manisa Governorate because they did not have a place to live (Öz&Berber, 2010, pp. 471-474). The main problem for the Turkish side was where to settle the refugees arriving in Anatolia. The effects of the destruction caused by Greece during the war continued after the war.

All in all, the Turkish-Rum population exchange led both countries to make critical decisions in terms of strategic intelligence. The Turkish side used diplomatic channels quite successfully until the population exchange agreement was signed. While the Greek side tried to use diplomacy effectively during the negotiations, it did not refrain from practices concerning the future of the refugees. The Greek authorities were extremely

unsuccessful in settlement of the refugees in Greece. The Greeks, always in need of financial support from the great powers, depended on the support of aid organizations to distribute and manage the aid that came in. The Turkish side was more effective in the resettlement of refugees in Anatolia. As can be seen from the League of Nations' archival documents, Greece's activities with regard to refugees were emphasized, and the difficulties faced by Muslim refugees were not taken into account. In this context, it can be said that the League of Nations adopted a biased attitude.

CONCLUSION

This thesis attempts to show how important it is for a state to act within the framework of strategic intelligence before becoming involved in a conflict environment. It has been determined what the Megali Idea goal of Greece before the invasion of Anatolia and its diplomatic activities for this reason mean in terms of strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence offers the possibility of analyzing historical developments with a broad perspective, apart from examining only military and political elements. It has been shown that Greece's invasion of Anatolia was realized within the framework of the Megali Idea goal and that it did not act according to the elements of strategic intelligence.

In the first chapter of the thesis, the issues related to the concept of strategic intelligence in foreign literature are given. The importance of strategic intelligence for states is underlined. It is also stressed that the importance of information obtained by intelligence agencies in the past was the same as the importance of intelligence for states today. It is noted that in every period of history, decision makers have needed intelligence organizations. Before explaining the theory of strategic intelligence, the concept of strategy was highlighted. In times of war, it is very important for military officials to act according to a strategy. In order to understand strategic intelligence, the concepts of tactical and operational intelligence are included in this chapter. Tactical intelligence is defined as action taken against short-term or immediate threats. Operational intelligence fights against targets with greater capacity than tactical intelligence. On the other hand, strategic intelligence does not focus solely on military and political issues as tactical and operational intelligence do. It also analyzes economic, social, geographical, transport and communications issues. The views of Sherman Kent, who introduced the concept of strategic intelligence to the contemporary academic world, are included in this chapter. Before a country decides to go to war against another country, the target country's capabilities in the above areas should be clearly identified.

The second chapter discusses how Greek statesmen viewed the concepts of Hellenism and Megali Idea and how Greek foreign policy was shaped around these concepts. In this framework, the relations between the Ottoman State and the Orthodox Rums were

emphasized by referring to historical developments. After Greece gained independence from the Ottoman State, the activities carried out for the sake of the Megali Idea were detailed. Before the invasion of Anatolia, developments in Greek domestic politics were analyzed. The debates on whether Greece should be involved in the First World War were highlighted, as were the internal conflicts between Venizelos and King Constantine in Greek domestic politics. The intervention of the Allied powers in Greek domestic politics is also underlined. The Greek archival documents used in this chapter provide a clear picture of Greece's political crises. The control of Greek foreign policy by the Allied powers began before the First World War and continued until the end of the occupation of Anatolia. The consequences of this situation were grave for the Greek people. Venizelos tried to convince the Allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to invade Anatolia. In this process, Venizelos, who was influential in Greek foreign policy, tried to show the number of Rums in Anatolia as a justification for invading Anatolia. On the other hand, Greece, which acted with the aim of invading Anatolia, was not economically prepared for a war. This situation is clearly demonstrated by Greek archival documents. It is seen that Greek officials were constantly looking for loans. Furthermore, this chapter reveals the subversive activities of the Rums in Anatolia before the occupation of İzmir through Ottoman, American and Greek archives. It is examined whether Greece acted in accordance with the elements of strategic intelligence before the war. Finally, the motivation behind the Greek invasion and the factors that influenced Greek foreign policy are discussed.

In the third chapter, the developments during the Greek occupation of Anatolia especially the massacres committed by the Greek army in Anatolia are analyzed. The massacres committed by Greece showed that Greece had embarked on the occupation before the war without any planning and with the help of the Allied powers. The Allied powers condemned the murders committed by the Greek army against the civilian population, but did not prevent it. In the face of the incidents, the resistance organization established by the Turks was included and it was shown that the Turkish side acted according to the strategic intelligence. The main aim of the Greek troops was to destroy the Turkish resistance and to settle in the region. Meanwhile, the Greek army had the support of the local Rums. The Rums stood by and watched as their neighbours, the Turks, were

massacred. The Greek troops benefited from the local Rums in terms of intelligence. The Greek administration also imposed censorship on newspapers in order to make the occupation permanent. In this way, it tried to be effective in the region through propaganda, one of the most important elements of strategic intelligence. Greece, which gave the impression that it would act under the command of the Allied powers before the occupation, acted in line with the goals of Megali Idea during the occupation. The Allied powers were extremely disturbed by the activities of the Greek army. Western public opinion began to speak out against the Greeks. For example, the British parliament criticized Greece's activities in Anatolia. In the reports prepared by both Greek and Allied officials, it was underlined that the occupation of İzmir was mismanaged and that the mistakes made would increase the Turkish resistance. It turned out that the intelligence gathered by the Greek administration before the invasion was inadequate. According to strategic intelligence, before occupying an area, all possible positive or negative possibilities related to the region should be analyzed. As can be seen, the Greek intelligence organization failed in this respect. Venizelos had informed the military authorities in the region that the occupation should not be interrupted in any way. However, as a result of the growing reactions against the Greek occupation, an international commission of inquiry was sent to the region. This situation shows that the Allied powers did not trust the Greek authorities. In response to the growing reactions, the Greek administration stepped up its diplomatic activities with the Allied powers. Later, the situation of the Greek occupation in 1920 came to the fore. The report prepared by British intelligence was included and the military situation of the Turkish and Greek troops was presented. It was concluded that the Greek occupation would fail in the long run. The Greek army, which was not acting in accordance with the orders of the Allied powers, tried to continue the occupation in order to realize the Megali Idea. British intelligence stressed that the Turks would inflict heavy losses on the Greek army by using guerrilla tactics. Moreover, as the Greek army moved deeper into Anatolia, it became clear that the Rum population was not as large as claimed, and this led to the Megali Idea being questioned within the army. In November 1920, Venizelos lost the elections and King Constantine seized power. Meanwhile, the Greek army was facing increasing resistance in Anatolia and the Greek economy was unable to cope with the war. By 1921 it was clear that the Greek army, despite being outnumbered, had not been successful in

the face of Turkish resistance. The massacres of Muslims by the Greek army were revealed through archival documents. The Greek army found itself in a very difficult situation in 1922. The hopes of the Allied powers for Greece were exhausted. In the intelligence reports, the main reason for Greece's military failure was the inability of the intelligence units to obtain accurate information. It can be seen that the Greek intelligence did not make the necessary preparations before invading Anatolia. While retreating from Anatolia, the Greek army tried to make Anatolia uninhabitable by burning Turkish villages. The Greek invasion of Anatolia was a disappointment for the Allies. The main reason for the failure of the Greek invasion, despite the support of the Great powers, was that the Greek army did not have sufficient intelligence. Greek intelligence did not have the necessary intelligence about the invasion of Anatolia and the resistance movement that would emerge before the war. This led to a heavy defeat in Anatolia. The resistance movement in Anatolia acted according to the arguments of strategic intelligence. On the other hand, the Greeks did everything to destroy the Turkish and Muslim identity in Anatolia. In the final chapter, Greece's post-war foreign policy is examined. Greece, having lost the war, sought the support of the League of Nations in order to gain diplomatic advantages. In the population exchange negotiations, it emphasized the importance of intelligence diplomacy.

In this dissertation, the developments regarding the war and diplomacy between Turkey and Greece were not only analyzed through secondary sources. In the dissertation, five different archival sources, namely Ottoman, British, American, Greek and League of Nations, were used, and issues that had not previously been uncovered in the literature were presented from an intelligence perspective. For example, the strategic failures of Greek intelligence during the invasion of Anatolia were addressed through archival documents. Thanks to the Greek archival documents, the mistakes made by the Greeks during the landing in İzmir were expressed by their own officials. In all the above-mentioned archival documents, it was stated that Greece committed massacres against Muslims during the occupation of Anatolia. The Greek archives stated that civilians were massacred as a result of the undisciplined actions of Greek soldiers.

Thanks to the archival documents of the League of Nations, the attitude of the Allied powers and the League of Nations towards the refugees has been revealed. It was found that the League of Nations had a pro-Greek attitude and was not sufficiently concerned with the problems of the Muslim refugees. When the archival documents of the League of Nations are analyzed, it is seen that the majority of the documents are related to Rum refugees. Besides, the documents show that there were differences of opinion between Greek civil administrators and military officials. They also show that the Allied powers disagreed with the Greek authorities and assessed the events from different perspectives. American archival documents state that Rums and Armenians acted together and committed massacres against Muslims.

Greek foreign policy, both before and after the occupation of Anatolia, was shaped entirely in accordance with the goals of the Megali Idea and Hellenism. It has been shown that Greek decision-makers did not act in line with the principles of strategic intelligence. Greek military officials informed the decision-makers about the mistakes made during the occupation of Anatolia, but no action was taken. It is necessary to have adequate knowledge of the political, economic, social, geographical, transportation, communication, biographical and technical issues that are important for strategic intelligence before entering into combat conditions. In other words, Greece attempted the invasion without the necessary intelligence on Turkish military operations. Economically, it is important to make adequate preparations before the war. However, the Greek side made efforts to obtain loans from the Allied powers during the war. It is also important to underline that Greek soldiers did not expect the Turkish public to react with resistance to the invasion. It was pointed out that the Allied powers were trying to gather information about Mustafa Kemal and the Kuvâ-yı Milliye through their spies in Anatolia. Through biographical intelligence, they tried to understand what Mustafa Kemal's next step would be. Towards the end of the Greek occupation, the Greek troops had to cut the lines of communication when they left the occupied territories. In addition, during the occupation, communication between Greek military officials broke down in areas where Turkish resistance was intense. It can be seen that transportation and communication intelligence was very important during the war. After the occupation, the policies followed by both sides during the Lausanne Peace Negotiations and the Turkish-Rum population exchange

were revealed, and especially it was analyzed whether the Greek side complied with the strategic intelligence.

In conclusion, this thesis has revealed the critical mistakes made by Greece during the occupation of Anatolia in terms of strategic intelligence. It has been established that Greek statesmen were ideologically obsessed and did not have a realistic perspective. It is inevitable that a state that embarks on an invasion or armed conflict without analyzing strategic intelligence will face disaster. The publication of unbiased reports before the war is of great importance. The Greek administrators, acting with ideological concerns, ignored the negative situations that would be encountered during the invasion. In this context, Metaxas' pre-war report on the invasion of Anatolia is very important. On the other hand, the military, political and diplomatic preparation of the Turkish side influenced the outcome of the war. It can be said that the Turkish side acted in a planned manner within the framework of strategic intelligence elements.

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
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
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF AFGHANISTAN¹¹

HR.IM.00059.00031.001

¹¹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı, 59/31.

**APPENDIX 2: LETTER FROM THE TURKISH WOMEN'S DELEGATION OF
İSTANBUL TO THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES¹²**



¹² The United States National Archives, 103-1/09422/502.

**APPENDIX 3: THE FIRST PAGE OF THE İZMİR REPORT,
WRITTEN BY THE GREEK COLONEL ALEXANDROS
MAZARAKIS¹³**

REPORT ON THE SMYRNA EVENTS
OF MAY 15th and 16th, BY
COLONEL MAZARAKIS.

When I arrived in Smyrna in compliance with an order of the Prime Minister for the purpose of conducting a special enquiry concerning the reported disorderly and violent acts committed to the detriment of Turkish soldiers or unarmed citizens and prisoners on the first day of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, more especially on those incidents which were denounced in the English Parliament or reported to the British Government through the latter's agents in the above-named city, I found that similar enquiries had already started by order of the Prime Minister or of the Officer Commanding the Army of occupation.

To hasten matters, I thought I had better make use of the information already secured, complementing it in some respects and carrying on at the same time, a more extensive enquiry for the purpose of finding a more positive source of information from all the Smyrna authorities, Greek, Turkish or Allied.


I hereby summarize the result of these enquiries, which are treated in greater detail, but in the same spirit, in the legal dossier, submitted to the Military Justice, at the same time as this document, for the punishment of the culprits.

I would like first of all to mention the following two indisputable facts.

I) It is doubtless that Turkish soldiers and unarmed citizens


¹³ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive, 018-44.

**APPENDIX 4: REPORT ON THRACE BY GEORGES BURNIER,
MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS¹⁴**



¹⁴ The League of Nations Archives, MIS-15-5/520.

**APPENDIX 5: IN A LETTER FROM GENERAL FRANKS TO THE
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER DATED 20 MAY 1921¹⁵**



¹⁵ The National Archives of the United Kingdom, ADM 137/2502/220.

APPENDIX 6: ORIGINALITY REPORT

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No:	FRM-DR-21
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub:	04.01.2023
	FRM-DR-21 Doktora Tezi Orijinallik Raporu <i>PhD Thesis Dissertation Originality Report</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No:	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev. Date:	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA	
Tarih: 05/06/2024	
Tez Başlığı: Stratejik İstihbarat Kapsamında Yunanistan'ın Batı Anadolu'daki Faaliyetlerinin Analizi (1919-1924)	
Yukarıda başlığı verilen tezin a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 309 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 05/06/2024 tarihinde şahsim/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı % 3 'tür.	
Uygulanan filtrelemeler:	
1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç	
2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kaynakça hariç	
3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alıntılar hariç	
4. <input type="checkbox"/> Alıntılar dâhil	
5. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç	
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tezin herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumlarda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.	
Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.	
Yusuf DİNÇEL	

Öğrenci Bilgileri	Ad-Soyad	Yusuf DİNÇEL	
	Öğrenci No	N20149263	
	Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	Uluslararası İlişkiler	
	Programı	Uluslararası İlişkiler	
	Statüsü	Doktora <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lisans Derecesi ile (Bütünleşik) Dr <input type="checkbox"/>

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Prof. Dr. Yonca İLDEŞ

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-DR-21
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		Revizyon Tarihi Rev. Date	25.01.2024

TO HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Date: 05/06/2024

Thesis Title (In English): Analysis of Greece's Activities in Western Anatolia within the Scope of Strategic Intelligence (1919-1924)

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 05/06/2024 for the total of 309 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled above, the similarity index of my thesis is 3 %.

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I respectfully submit this for approval.

Yusuf DİNÇEL

Student Information	Name-Surname	Yusuf DİNÇEL	
	Student Number	N20149263	
	Department	Uluslararası İlişkiler	
	Programme	Uluslararası İlişkiler	
	Status	PhD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Combined MA/MSc-PhD <input type="checkbox"/>

SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL

APPROVED
Prof. Dr. Yonca İLDEŞ

APPENDIX 7: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-DR-12
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	FRM-DR-12 Doktora Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu <i>Ethics Board Form for PhD Thesis</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev.Date	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA

Tarih: 05/08/2024

Tez Başlığı: Stratejik İstihbarat Kapsamında Yunanistan'ın Batı Anadolu'daki Faaliyetlerinin Analizi (1919-1924)

Yukarıda başlığı verilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır.
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

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	HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ	Doküman Kodu Form No.	FRM-DR-12
		Yayın Tarihi Date of Pub.	22.11.2023
	FRM-DR-12 Doktora Tezi Etik Kurul Muafiyeti Formu <i>Ethics Board Form for PhD Thesis</i>	Revizyon No Rev. No.	02
		Revizyon Tarihi Rev.Date	25.01.2024

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Date: 05/06/2024

Thesis Title (In English): Analysis of Greece's Activities in Western Anatolia within the Scope of Strategic Intelligence (1918-1924)

My thesis work with the title given above:

- Does not perform experimentation on people or animals.
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I respectfully submit this for approval.

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SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL

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