



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences  
Department of International Relations

**EVOLUTION OF THE NOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY AND  
JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY UNDERSTANDING(S)**

Aysu İmran ERKOÇ

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2023



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The jury finds that Aysu İmran ERKOÇ has on the date of September 05, 2023 successfully passed the defense examination and approves her Master's Thesis titled "Evolution of the Notion of Human Security and Japanese Human Security Understanding(s)".

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Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandıđım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadıđımı, yararlandıđım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, **Prof. Dr. Mine Pınar GZEN ERCAN** danıřmanlıđında tarafımdan retildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

*Aysu İmran ERKO*

## ABSTRACT

ERKOÇ, Aysu İmran. *Evolution of the Notion of Human Security and Japanese Human Security Understanding(s)*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2023.

Since the publication of the Human Development Report in 1994, the concept of human security has been a topic of ongoing discussion in the international community. It has continued to evolve until the publication of the Special Human Development Report on Human Security in 2022, which was published in the post-COVID-19 period. In this study, the evolution of human security from the day the Human Development Report was published until the release of the 2022 Special Human Development Report on Human Security is analysed. The thesis begins by examining the evolution of the concept at the United Nations. Then, it focuses on Japan's understanding of human security, which is distinguished by initiatives related to the understanding of human security. The significance of human security for Japan and the factors that prompted its adoption of the notion are studied. While analysing Japan's endeavours in this field, the thesis critically examines how the identities attributed to Japan and the roles assigned to Japan by Japanese policymakers have influenced Japan's understanding of human security. This is done through analysing the rhetoric of the Diplomatic Bluebooks and speeches of Japanese policymakers from 1998 on, that is the year when Japan started to pursue this understanding as a policy until the revision of the Charter for Development Cooperation in 2023. Human security was at the beginning a rhetoric maintained at the level of the Prime Minister, but later became the rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Afterwards, while it was the rhetoric of Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which administered Official Development Assistance (ODA) until the COVID-19 pandemic, today the rhetoric of "human security in the new era", rhetoric produced by Prime Minister Kishida, predominates. The Japanese human security understanding can be described as a supporting element of its current approach to foreign policy, which has been made more visible through the concept of aid.

### Keywords

Human security, Japan, United Nations, United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), Official Development Assistance (ODA).

## ÖZET

ERKOÇ, Aysu İmran. *İnsani Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Japon İnsani Güvenlik Anlayış(lar)ı*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2023.

İnsani güvenlik kavramı, İnsani Gelişme Raporu'nun 1994'te yayınlanmasından bu yana uluslararası toplumda süregelen bir tartışma konusu olmuştur. Bu çalışmada, 1994 İnsani Gelişme Raporu'nun yayınlandığı günden COVID-19 pandemisi sonrasındaki dönemde yayımlanan 2022 İnsani Gelişme Özel Raporu'nun yayınlanmasına kadar insani güvenliğin gelişimi analiz edilmektedir. Öncelikle kavramın Birleşmiş Milletler'deki gelişimi incelenmekte, ardından insani güvenlik anlayışıyla ilgili girişimleriyle öne çıkan Japonya'nın insani güvenlik anlayışına odaklanılmaktadır. Bu tezde insani güvenliğin Japonya için önemi ve bu kavramı benimsemesine neden olan faktörler üzerinde durulmaktadır. Buna göre Japonya'nın bu alandaki çabaları analiz edilirken Japonya'ya atfedilen kimliklerin ve Japon politika yapıcılarının tarafından Japonya'ya biçilen rollerin Japonya'nın insani güvenlik anlayışını nasıl etkilediği eleştirel bir şekilde incelenmektedir. Bu inceleme Japonya'nın bu anlayışı bir politika olarak izlemeye başladığı 1998 yılından 2023 yılına kadar "Diplomatik Mavi Kitaplar" ve Japon politika yapıcılarının konuşmalarının söylem analizi ile yapılmaktadır. İnsani güvenlik başlangıçta başbakan düzeyinde sürdürülen bir söylemken, daha sonra Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın söylemi haline gelmiştir. Sonraki dönemde, COVID-19 pandemisine kadar Japonya Resmi Kalkınma Yardımını yöneten Japon Uluslararası İş Birliği Ajansı (*Japan International Cooperation Agency*, JICA)'nın söylemi iken bugün Başbakan Kishida'nın ortaya attığı "yeni çağda insani güvenlik" söylemi hakimdir. Japonya'nın insani güvenlik anlayışı, yardım kavramı aracılığıyla daha görünür hale gelen mevcut dış politika yaklaşımının destekleyici bir unsuru olarak tanımlanabilir.

### **Anahtar Sözcükler**

İnsani güvenlik, Japonya, Birleşmiş Milletler, Birleşmiş Milletler İnsani Güvenlik Vakıf Fonu, Japonya Resmi Kalkınma Yardımı.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CHS	Commission for Human Security
FHS	Friends of Human Security
FOIP	Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy
GHQ or GHQ SCAP	General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
HDR 1994	Human Development Report 1994
HSN	Human Security Network
HSU	Human Security Unit
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC	International Criminal Court
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDA Treaty	US-Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty
MSA	Mutual Security Act
MOFA of Japan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PKOs	Peacekeeping Operations
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDFs	Self Defence Forces
SDF Law	Self Defence Forces Law
Special HDR 2022	The 2022 Special Human Development Report on Human Security
TFHS	Trust Fund for Human Security

UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

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## INTRODUCTION

The year 2022 (令和 4 年/*Reiwa* 4)<sup>1</sup> is the year of the release of the 2022 Special Report entitled “New threats to human security in the Anthropocene: Demanding greater solidarity”, which, after a long time, identified current threats to human security. Since the term “human security” was first used by the international society in 1994, components and scope of the notion have been discussed and advocated by numerous actors. When we consider this latest summary, we comprehend that human security is defined as a supporting tool to achieve the “Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs), especially “Goal 16: peace, justice, and strong institutions” (UNTFHS, 2019).

The 2022 Special Human Development Report on Human Security (hereinafter referred to as Special HDR 2022) states that the concept of human security (人間の安全保障 /*ningen no anzen hoshō*), to which new elements have been added, has its roots in the Human Development Report 1994 (hereinafter referred to as HDR 1994) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In the first definition of human security made by the UNDP, threats to development are emphasised and two main components are defined: “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (UNDP, 1994).

Later on, in 2012 another component of human security, “the right to live in dignity” was officially introduced in General Assembly Resolution 290 (A/RES/66/290). This resolution redefined human security as an approach that “assists member states to identify and address challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people” (UNGA, 2012). It frames the official approach of the United Nations (UN) that will be discussed in the first chapter. Prior to this, to clarify the official language used by the UN between

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<sup>1</sup> It is the name of the current reign of Emperor Naruhito, which began on 1 May 2019. The term name *Reiwa* is officially translated as “beautiful harmony”, but there are also those who translate it as “comely peace”. The reign of Emperor Hirohito (1989-2019) is called *Heisei* (平成), which consists of the characters 平 (*Hei*, peace) and 成 (*Sei*, to become/transform). *Heisei* can be translated as “achieving peace” or “reaching peace”. Especially with the start of the modern era, the *Meiji* period (明治時代), each reign was named with one era name (*nengō*, 年号), in other words as *issei ichigen* (一世一元). The purpose of this naming is to transmit a philosophical and political message for each period. The origin of the tradition of naming periods can be found in the Chinese tradition. Even though the People’s Republic of China is not currently practicing this, several other countries such as Japan maintain this tradition.

1994-2012 (平成/Heisei 6-24), we need to look at the general discussions and opinions since the initial use of the term. In the years between 1994 and 2012, most ideas on development and well-being of the people were welcomed. Yet, both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and a majority of the UN Member States were not eager to expressly use the phrase “human security”, and instead they opted for “people-centred security”. Even after the adoption of Resolution 290, there have been ongoing academic and political discussions over the definition as well as the “added value” of the concept. States such as Japan, Canada, South Africa and Australia have been contributing to the political debates. Each of these countries presented an aspect of these discussions and has influenced the components of human security. In this regard, Japan is one of the prominent actors that have been following human security as a foreign policy objective since 1998 (平成 10 年/Heisei 10) and as a basic policy under the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter since 2003 (平成 15 年/Heisei 15). Therefore, the Japanese approach to human security is a contemporarily important topic that is worth discussing. Within the scope of this thesis, which places at its core the notion of human security, discussions will be based on the identity definitions of and on Japan such as “normal country (普通の国)” or “peace-loving nation (平和国家)” and the perception of the Japanese society regarding the notions of human and security.

While the HDR 1994 is commonly referred to as the document that introduced the phrase of human security, there is another document that was drafted twenty years earlier than the 1994 Report. This study is entitled “Human Security: Some Reflections” and was published in 1966 by a Canadian developmental psychologist named William Emet Blatz (Winestock, 2010, p. 71). Blatz is widely known for his contribution to the psychology literature with his theory of security, wherein he defines security as a state of consciousness that contains willingness to comply with the consequences of one’s own decisions (cited in Grapko, 2010, p. 55). Accordingly, he argues that there are two conditions of security: to feel satisfied during an action, i.e., independent security, and to be willing to accept any consequences, i.e., dependent security (Grapko, 2010, p. 56). While Blatz refers to the notion of security differently from that of the International



Relations terminology, he was the first scholar who directly attributed the notion of human security to the individual, specifically children.

The study of Baldwin (1997) would be beneficial for providing a better explanation of the concept of security. In fact, the number of studies in the field of security has increased visibly with the end of the Cold War and a significant amount of these studies has aimed to redefine security. It can be said that attempts to redefine security have led to a common view on security as a contested concept. In contrast to the common view, Baldwin (1997, pp. 8-12) denotes security as not a contested but a neglected concept, and consequently highlights the deficiency of the conceptual analysis. In classifications, the concept of security is generally divided into two as “traditional security” and “non-traditional security”. Such a classification mostly attributes to the referent object, which is just one of the facets of security. Hence, Baldwin (1997, pp. 12-17) suggests that we need to ask seven questions to remove ambiguities when examining a security policy: “security for whom” (referent object); “security for which values” (both moral and material); “how much security”; “from what threats”; “by what means”; “at what costs”; and “in what period”. The most notable part of this article arguably is its focus on the concept of security itself, in other words, its emphasis on the theoretical aspects rather than the practical ones. The questions asked in this article will guide the analyses of this thesis in comprehending the policies followed by the governments of Japan since 1998 (平成 /*Heisei* 10) related to human security and the rhetoric of Japan regarding this concept.

Another important work to understand the concept of security is by Emma Rothschild. She questions the acceptations related to the concept of security which is commonly referred to as the broadening and deepening of the security understanding after the 1990s (Rothschild, 1995, p. 57). According to Rothschild, the idea of security can be traced back to the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, and it was after the French Revolution that states became the referent object of security policies (Rothschild, 1995, p. 61). In this period, security turned into a goal to be achieved through diplomatic and military strategies.

Works related to the concept of security in the sense of state security also overlap with this period. However, the etymological roots of the word security, which is the Latin word “*securitas*” that is translated into English as “the tranquillity of spirit” hints that the

concept relies on the feeling of the individual, and earlier studies such as that of Cicero (106–43 BC) and Seneca (1 BC–65 AD) support such understanding (Rothschild, 1995, p. 61). In this sense, we can suggest that security is the inner condition of an individual instead of being a physical condition. Furthermore, Rothschild (1995, p. 62) posits that even after the French Revolution security was defined as a condition of an individual by some scholars (such as Tom Paine). Yet, this definition also underlines the collective good with the influence of the Enlightenment (Rothschild, 1995, p. 63). To sum up the main thoughts within the article, security is defined as an inner condition by primordial philosophers while after the French Revolution it obtained meanings that include both individual and common good as a product of liberal thinking. Over time, security has gained the meaning of security of states from external threats, and today, it is linked with international security (Rothschild, 1995).

While there is a mammoth literature on human security, there is still lack of discussion and its categorisations. The main reasons for this are that a great majority of the works focus on the practical or event-based aspects of human security, and that theoretical debates, specifically concerning the recent developments are missing in the literature. To understand this gap better, it would be helpful to review the main theoretical discussions, as well as criticisms, and to exemplify some of the specific topics.

It is possible to divide the theoretical discussions on human security into three groups. In the following paragraphs, the theoretical discussions will be introduced respectively: in a narrower sense, in broader/holistic terms, and the hybrid version consisting of both the broad and the narrow. Some scholars divide the theoretical discussion into two as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, however for the sake of clarity, this thesis will use the terms broad and narrow because the concepts of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” may confuse the reader when reading sections relevant to the HDR 1994. After explaining the main debates, some of the criticisms will be addressed and then, specific topics related to human security will be exemplified.

We may start explaining the narrow understanding by looking at the works of Lloyd Axworthy who is both a scholar and a Canadian political leader. Axworthy (2004) refers to human security as a “new scientific field” and also as a “policy lens”. He considers this

policy lens as a “core part of the international agenda” which is often portrayed as conflicting with national security (Axworthy, 2004, pp. 348-349). He claims that national security and human security have a mutual aim, that is to protect people. So, even though their approaches are different, they are the “two sides of the same coin” (Axworthy, 2004). He uses the word “scientists” for the individuals who need to bring these two sides together (Axworthy, 2004). In his earlier studies, as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada who served between 1994 and 2000, Axworthy (1997; 2001) explains the initiatives of Canada on human security. While aiming to show a lack of leadership for the success of human security, he presents proofs of Canadian leadership as a soft power such as “the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention” and the “Human Security Network” (Axworthy, 1997, pp. 187-188; 2001, p. 20).

On the other hand, Ramesh Thakur defines human security as a “political worldview”. He uses the definition of the University of United Nations as a faculty member of this university. This definition focuses on “the protection of people from critical” and “deadly threats”, whether it is “rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events”, regardless of “within or outside of states”; direct or structural (Thakur, 2004, p. 348). Another scholar, Krause mentions that the broader understanding is a “shopping list” and a synonym for the “bad things” because of the wide range of matters, and therefore the concept must be limited (Krause, 2004, p. 367). Other scholars define human security in narrower terms as follows: Alkire (2004) refers to it as “vital and feasible goals”, while Roberts (2006) bases it on mortality and death, and Hettne (2010) sees it just as economic.

Broader understanding is represented by several scholars from various perspectives. Ulvin (2004, p. 353), who focuses on social change, defines human security as a “field of intersection” that includes “humanitarianism, development, human rights, and conflict resolution”. Thomas (2004, p. 354) also looks at the function of human security, which is providing a language and a rationale for the majority of humanity besides the debates of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. Weinert (2011) builds his perspective on the English School approach, and for him, human security has both pluralist and solidarist features, thus there might be different actors and various areas.

According to Acharya (2004), human security is a “holistic paradigm” that enables “opportunities for creative synthesis and theoretical eclecticism” (p. 356). In one of his previous studies, Acharya (2001) criticises current difficulties in understanding human security of the period. In this study, he points at an east-west division on the debate of “freedom from fear” (west) and “freedom from want” (east), and personally claims to be a follower of the freedom from want side (Acharya, 2001, pp. 443-444).

On the other hand, Winslow and Erikson (2004) take human security as a dynamic concept. They aim to understand how human security definitions come from different social and cultural backgrounds, and offer implementation of qualitative anthropological research methods to define human security. In a similar vein, Mack (2004, p. 367) considers human security as the “signifier of shared political and moral values”, and hence argues that besides the analytical utility of the concept, focusing on features relevant to shared values is much more logical. In this sense, it is possible to say that human security needs to be contextualized in broad terms.

Some scholars propose a hybrid definition that contains both broad and narrow qualities. Owen (2004) uses a threshold definition. According to him, there is a “need for sacrifice on the part of both broad and narrow proponents” for taking the right action. Wibben (2008) claims that trying to fix the meaning of human security risks pandering and underlines the necessity of defining problems and responding accordingly to them.

Apart from the discussions mentioned above, there are scholars who associate human security with different concepts. Studies of the following scholars are some of the prominent examples. For instance, Leaning (2004) defines human security as “psychosocial well-being”; Chandler (2012) tackles R2P and human security from a critical perspective; and Bajpai (2004) introduces a Human Security Index (HSI) based on eleven threats which are taken as the indicators.

Besides the theoretical discussions over the components of human security, numerous topics are associated with the concept by scholars: Gender issues by Fox (2004), Hoogensen and Stuvøy (2006), Carpenter (2006); HIV/AIDS by Altman (2003) and Scanlan (2010); biopolitics and human security by De Larrinaga and Doucet (2008), Youseff (2008) as well as Azhiim and Nurcahyani (2018); drug trafficking by Behera

(2013); human trafficking by Blanton et. al. (2018) and Yousaf (2018); space and human security by Pal (1997) as well as Jasentuliyana and Karnik (1997); migration by Estrada-Tanck (2013), Njiru (2018), Purkayastha (2018), Seedat-Khan and Johnson (2018), and Nayak (2019).

Common criticisms regarding the concept are the lack of policy responses and the lack of workable or measurable definitions (Hampson, 2004; Grayson, 2004; King & Murray, 2001). Besides these criticisms, there are works questioning the very nature of human security as a concept. They advocate that the normative side of the notion is very attractive but in reality, it is a problem-solving concept and uncritical, in other words theoretically weak (Buzan, 2004; Macfarlane, 2004; Newman, 2004; 2010, p. 92). Furthermore, Chandler claims that human security is of no policymaking capacity and that human security frameworks are reinforcing rather than challenging power relations (Chandler, 2008a; 2008b, p. 463). Liotta (2004) questions human security from a distinct perspective. He claims that “a real debate” should be about which “forms of security” are appropriate and correct for international actors and which can be applied to “a global set of rules”, rather than rejecting human security altogether (Liotta, 2004, p. 363).

Hubert (2004, p. 351), who refers to human security as “an idea that works in practice”, underlines the existence of the rejection of the concepts that “worked at practice but not in theory” and interprets academic debates on human security accordingly. He also underlines the absence of an agreed definition and conceptualisation (Hubert, 2004). Similarly, Paris (2004) evaluates the silence of the academy and describes human security as an inscrutable notion. However, as in his previous article, this criticism is more positive than those of the others (Paris, 2001; 2004). Moreover Evans (2004), while referring to the concept’s Asian roots, notes that Asian countries are generally “not at the cutting edge of human security thinking or practice”, and challenges Asian political and intellectual leaders to put human security on the agenda in order to reconcile national and human security and to understand the complex linkages between development, governance and human security.

According to Suhrke (1999; 2004), academic interest is generated by the activities of the policy community. Following Suhrke’s claim, it is also possible to say that most ideas

related to the debates are also regulated by this community. Therefore, most of the scholarly works focus on rather recent and hot topics of the specific time period, such as HIV/AIDS and human trafficking, instead of in-depth discussions on the sub-concepts of human security such as “freedom to live in dignity” and “freedom from fear”.

In the light of this brief literature review, it can be observed that most studies in the literature focus on the apparent or practical sides of human security. Scholars who raised criticisms mainly focus on the “ambiguous” nature of the concept, yet most do not offer solutions to tackle this “ambiguity”.

Almost all scholars take the term human security for granted and do not question the use of the words “human” and “security” or how they are perceived by the international community. Yet, in the literature there generally seems to be an agreement on the referent object, i.e., the individual. Nevertheless, some scholars prefer to use the word “people” frequently. One of the possible reasons for this is that these scholars signify something different from just “human security” because signified concepts may differ according to situations and actors. Therefore, within the context of this thesis, the Japanese case will be examined based on the signified concepts of particular situations.

Some scholars mention an Asian, particularly a South Asian approach to “human security” which is different from that of the West. Scholars such as Acharya (2001) advocate that human security has “Asian roots”. This reference mainly relies on the studies of Mahbub-ul Haq who was the Special Adviser of the Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP, 1994, p. IV). However, there is hardly enough number of works to argue that there is an existing east-west debate. To dwell on the debate on human security approaches in Asia and Europe, there is a need for comprehensive analyses that illuminate the similarities and differences between the two continents’ approaches to human security. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by focusing on the human security approach adopted by Japan—an Asia-Pacific country. Hence, it aims to provide an example of the existing approaches, particularly within the context of Japan and contribute with a case relating to the east-west debate.

In the literature on Japanese human security understanding there are studies focusing on the human security policy of Prime Minister Obuchi (see, Edström 2003); discussing

domestic human rights and human security (see, Fujioka, 2003); comparing Canadian and Japanese understandings based on practice (see, Bosold and Werthes, 2005); dealing with the question of peacebuilding and Japan (see, Nasukawa, 2010); examining human security policies of Japan and ASEAN (see, Tan, 2010); comparing policy shifts of Japan, such as from peacekeeping to peace enforcement (see Hynek, 2012); considering natural disasters in Japan as a domestic human security threat through the triple disasters of 11 March 2011 (see, Sato, 2016 and Kersten, 2016); as well as those analysing Japan's human security discourse until 2020 (see, Tanke, 2022)

Kaoru Kurusu, who has published several works on Japan's understanding of human security, in one of her first studies on this subject that was published in 2005 characterises human security as a “composite norm (複合規範)”, and argues that in the long run, it may be a norm that states “should naturally take into account (当然配慮すべき規範)” (栗栖, 2005, pp. 88-89). Another study published in 2011 and translated into English by Rikki Kersten, focuses on developments from the publication of HDR 1994 (during the Murayama Government) to the mid-2000s when JICA adopted “human security norms”. This study posits that in Japan, the adoption of “human security norms” stems from the voluntary choices made by the policy elite rather than social pressure, diverging from “existing research on the acceptance of norms” (Kurusu & Kersten, 2011, pp. 131-132).

In a later work, Kurusu (2018) examines the role of Japan in the field of human security and concentrates on the norm diffusion process. The actions analysed throughout the study include the establishment of the “Commission on Human Security (CHS)” and the creation of the “Friends of Human Security”. The study concludes that Japan's human security initiatives have been a “learning process” for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that Japan has expanded its network with small and medium-sized powers to mainstream human security at the UN, which has led to increased recognition of human security, especially in the UNGA (Kurusu, 2018, p. 333). However, Japan is “relatively disadvantaged in terms of networking and manoeuvring” compared to countries with networks such as the EU Member States and G77 Members. For this reason, Kurusu characterises Japan's initiatives in the field of human security as “circumspect, conciliatory, and reserved” and argues that partly as a result, the “definitional content of

human security has lost clarity” (Kurusu, 2018, p. 334). Japan’s success as a norm entrepreneur has therefore been limited. Networking policy will continue to be a challenge for Japan as it takes the lead in a multilateral environment. Japan needs to do more to overcome its shortcomings.<sup>2</sup>

In another study of hers, Kurusu (2019) describes the characteristics of key stakeholders’ perceptions of human security in Japan, interviewing ten key individuals from government, academia, civil society and business. Based on these interviews, Kurusu (2019, p. 97) categorises human security risks in East Asia into four groups: “natural disasters and environmental risks, interstate relations, intrastate or regional conflicts, and social issues”. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the concept of human security is not “yet fully accepted in Japanese society” and that Japan could contribute more in the field of human security if it adopts “a stronger cross-sectoral/interdepartmental approach” (Kurusu, 2019, p. 107). In addition, Japan could do more with “a longer-term strategy based on human security principles” (compared to the norm of the “responsibility to protect”), especially in cases where the sovereignty of the recipient state is at stake, through cooperation with non-governmental organisations and international humanitarian organisations (Kurusu, 2019, p. 107).

Another study claims that human security is a “Japanese social science”.<sup>3</sup> The main reason behind this is the existence of the so-called Japanese academic-policy complex in the field of human security, i.e., the close relations between policymakers and scholars (Ikeda, 2009, pp. 197-198). In this study, the role of Japan is referred to as an “assembler” or “assembly line” of human security discourse (Ikeda, 2009, p. 199). He mentions human security as a discourse and talks about “Japanising” human security based on providing knowledge, and argues that human security is transforming into the form of peacebuilding (*heiwa kōchiku*, 平和構築) in the context of Japan (Ikeda, 2009, p. 206).

In most of these articles, the Japanese approach is addressed from a critical perspective. Some point out domestic structures, while some identify patterns in Japan-UN relations.

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<sup>2</sup> See Gilson and Purvis (2003) for another study focusing on the challenges for Japan to become a norm entrepreneur for human security.

<sup>3</sup> This notion is an analogy to “Stanley Hoffmann’s argument that International Relations is an American social science” (Ikeda, 2009, p. 197).



However, they neither discuss how Japan is perceiving human security, nor refer to the Japanese perceptions of the society and the individual. Diverging from the existing literature, this thesis argues that Japan's perception of the individual and the society cannot be equated to the Western perception. Accordingly, this thesis asks what Japan's human security understanding is.

To comprehend the Japanese human security understanding, the following sub-questions will be asked:

- What does Japan understand from “human security”?
- How does Japan perceive security and define “human”?
- Where the emphasis on human security is placed? Is it on the “human” or the “security”? Or, is it on the individual or the society?
- Which words are used with human security? Through which words human security objectives are defined?
- When did Japanese politicians start to follow the human security approach? Which events have affected their policies related to human security?
- Is there any correlation between the human security agendas of the UN and Japan?
- Is there any relation between rhetoric claimed to be followed by Japan such as proactive pacifism or peace-loving state and the human security approach of Japan?
- If there is a relation, what are the rhetoric produced by Japan for the sake of actualising the human security approach when compared to the previous rhetoric and identity definitions?

These questions point that Japanese human security understanding cannot be understood apart from the foreign policy of Japan, domestic conditions, and the international context. Cognizant of this fact, this thesis aims to cover the period between 1998 and 2022. The year 1998 is commemorated as the introduction of the concept of “human security (人間の安全保障)” by Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi, who took office the same year and served until 2000. As mentioned earlier, 2022 is the year when the UNDP's “Special Report on Human Security” was published.

From my point of view, instead of referring to the concept as ambiguous or vague, the components of human security need to be questioned in relation to each actor who is providing a specific definition because each of the signifiers and signifieds that are mentioned by these particular actors gives us the language in use. This thesis will analyse the language and the preferred rhetoric that was used in official documents and speeches on human security between 1998 and 2022.

The level of analysis of this thesis will be the state level, and to provide a clearer explanation, the focus will also be placed on the international level when necessary. Accordingly, to understand Japanese human security policies followed by the State, the discourse prevalent in the official statements and documents of institutions such as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (政府開発援助/*Seifu kaihatsu enjo*) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (独立行政法人国際協力機構/*Dokuritsu gyōsei houjin kokusai kyōryoku kikou*) will be examined.

Overall, this thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 aims to fill the gap resulting from the event-based explanation of the evolution of the concept, which focuses on discussions of human security in the international arena by different actors (e.g., the UN, Canada, the Commission on Human Security). Chapter 2 aims to explain domestic structural roots and the definitions on Japan's identity. The first section of Chapter 3 discusses the etymological and philosophical origins of the concept of human security and reflections of the Japanese understanding of this concept. The second section analyses the evolution of the Japanese human security understanding and rhetoric on Japanese society and its link to Japan's human security approach. Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the overall discussion and provides a general picture of the Japanese human security approach.

## CHAPTER 1

### UN-CENTRED EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY

The Human Development Report 1994 (人間開発報告書 1994) is the first document which uses the notion of “human security” under the roof of the UN and specifically the UNDP (国連開発計画). Addressing concerns about issues such as security, prosperity, or growth is a reality not only of contemporary times but also has been of early human societies or civilizations.

Even if these concerns were the reality of people, it was not possible to speak of a collective action that targets multiple issues at the same time. It is conceivable to say that reports of the commissions such as “the Brandt Commission-Independent Commission on International Development Issues” (“North-South: A Program for Survival” in 1980 and “Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery” in 1983) and the “Brundtland Commission-The World Commission on Environment and Development” (“Our Common Future” in 1987) are examples of the first efforts aiming to tackle concerns similar to Human Development Report 1994 (Centre for Global Negotiations, 2010; Overseas Development Institute, 1980; WCED, 1987). While using the notion of human security, Human Development Report 1994 does not oblige states to act in the way recommended in the report. This report is only recommendatory, but there is also the fact that most of its recommendations have started to be followed by many states over the time.

This chapter aims to explain the fundamental characteristics of human security as introduced by the UNDP Human Development Report and the positions of several different actors. In the first section, the 1994 Report will be analysed through the following aspects: the main purpose(s) of the document, the meaning of human security for the authors of the report, and the origin of the concept as it is pointed out in the Report.

### 1.1. UNDP AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP or the Programme) is mentioned as the global development network of the UN. When we look at the emergence of the UNDP, we can see a connection between the Marshall Plan, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Programme. The connection between these three is related to the current function of the Programme.

Historians who study organisational development of the UN system divide pursued policies interrelating with development into decades (Alarcón & Kawamura, 2017). Pre-existing organisations before the UNDP, payment systems and initiatives (e.g., Bretton Woods System) and experiences gained are modelled for newly emerging countries after decolonisation as of the 1960s in the UN system, especially by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA or the Assembly).

Period	Policy
1961-1970	the designation of the 1960s as the “Decade of Development” by the GA
1971-1980; 1981-1990; 1991-2000	UN Development Decades
2000-2015	the Millennium Development Goals
2015-2030	the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

**Table 1.** UN Development Agendas (1961-2030)

Before the UNDP, two separate organisations were already established: one for technical assistance, “the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance”; the other one is for development projects, “the United Nations Special Fund”. From the combination of these two organisations, the UNDP came into existence in January 1966<sup>4</sup> (Murphy, 2006, p. 5). Technical and monetary assistance for countries (specifically “less developed countries”) is one main function of the Programme. However, another function which considered as

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<sup>4</sup> The main purpose of this section is not to explain the full history of the Programme, but to present a summary in order to provide a clearer understanding of the functions and policies of the Programme that paved the way for a report such as HDR 1994.

“a revolutionary programme of advocacy” of UNDP is the Human Development Report(s) (hereinafter, HDR) (Murphy, 2006, p. 7).

Considering the first HDR published in 1990, the main objective of development is “to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives” (UNDP, 1990, p. 9). Human development itself is defined as “a process of enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP, 1990, p. 10). When we compare current policies being pursued, it is possible to say that there is no major difference between earlier descriptions and goals.

HDR 1990 has crucial importance to understand the “human security” approach of the UNDP and, with it, the UN's approach. This importance can be understood through features and focal points well-defined for human development by the UNDP. These features are the “formation of human capabilities” (e.g. health, knowledge and skills) and the “use of acquired capabilities” (e.g. leisure, productivity), and the focal point of development mentioned as people rather than the development of income and wealth however the balance of formation and use of capabilities is underlined more in this document (UNDP, 1990, pp. 10-11). HDR 1990 does not only define human development but also a well-known index for measuring human development, Human Development Index (HDI).

HDR 1994 is a report that discusses various concepts such as sustainable development, integration of peace agenda and integration agenda, the establishment of a UN development system (UNDP, 1994, p. iii). In this regard, chapter two of this report is of special importance, as it tackles with components of and needed policies for “human security”.

This report outlines “four essential characteristics of human security: universality; interdependence of its components; and easier insurance through early prevention; people-centredness” (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22-23). Besides these, HDR 1994 emphasises two aspects that are parallel to “two components of human security, freedom from fear and freedom from want” which will be explained in the following paragraphs. The first aspect is “safety from chronic threats” (e.g., hunger, disease, and repression) and the second is


“protection against sudden and hurtful disruptions” in daily life patterns (UNDP, 1994, p. 23).

This report underlines that “human security not be equated with human development” because human development is a broader concept which is a “process of widening the range of people’s choices”. In comparison, human security is about exercising these choices safely and freely (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). However, a link exists between “human security” and human development, this link is the position of human development as a critical ingredient of participatory development. According to UNDP, “human security” stresses that “people should be able to take care of themselves”: all people “should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living” (UNDP, 1994, p. 24). This statement shows us one of the main concerns of human security is the availability of this opportunity for all people. Therefore, as an “integrative concept,” human security acknowledges the “universalism of life claims and solidarity” among all people (UNDP, 1994, p. 24).

### **1.1.1. Origins of components of human security**

According to HDR 1994, there are “two major components of human security”: (1) “freedom from fear”, and (2) “freedom from want” which were recognized since the very beginning of the UN. Security understanding of the UN also gave equal weight to territories and people. When we look at the roots of the current human security understanding, HDR 1994 refers to the results of “the United Nations Conference on the International Organization in San Francisco” (i.e., “the San Francisco Conference”) that established the United Nations in 1945. The so-called “battle of peace” has two fronts: the security front (first component), and the economic and social front (second component). Accordingly, only “victory on both fronts” can assure a lasting peace (UNDP, 1994, p. 24). Moreover, some events that took place before and after the San Francisco Conference should be addressed to understand the two components. One of these is the “Four Freedoms Speech of Franklin Roosevelt in 1941”.

Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered this speech as the Annual Message<sup>5</sup> on 6 January 1941. The primary aims of this speech were to convince the American citizens of aids made to allied powers during World War II and to interfere in the war. However, the effects of this speech were more comprehensive than these aims, and also, this speech reflected the universality of the concepts introduced by the President. Roosevelt defines freedom as the supremacy of human rights everywhere and classifies four freedoms: “freedom of speech and expression”; “freedom of worship”; “freedom from want”; “freedom from fear” (FDR Library, 2009). In his speech, “two components of human security”, “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, were defined in an analogous manner in the HDR 1994. According to Roosevelt, “freedom from fear” is “a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour anywhere in the world” (FDR Library, 2009). The definition of “freedom from want” is “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world” (FDR Library, 2009).



**Figure 1.** Dimensions of Human Security according to the UNTFHS<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> “The Annual Message” was the official name of annual speeches delivered from 1790 to 1946 by the presidents of United States of America (USA) at the beginning of each year. The name of the annual speeches was officially changed to “State of the Union Address” in 1947 (State of the Union Address, n.d.).

<sup>6</sup> Adapted from Human Security: From Principles to Practice College by United Nations System Staff, n.d.

The HDR 1994 suggests the following conceptions for security: from “exclusive stress on territorial security to greater stress on people’s security”; “from security through armaments” to “security through sustainable development”. As summarised in Figure 1, the Report also defines threats to “human security” under seven dimensions as the following: “economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political” (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-25).

While the term of “human security” started to be well-known with the HDR 1994, the foremost aim of the Report was not only to introduce a concept by itself. This concept was introduced in the Report because of a summit to be held at the state level in 1995. “The World Summit for Social Development”, or with its full name, “Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development of 1995”, is defined as a “fresh opportunity” to shift from territorial security to “human security” for the next 50 years. As underlined earlier, HDRs can only provide advisory opinions for agenda-setting as there are no obligations arising from their policy suggestions. When we look at the considerations of the HDR 1994 for this summit, the challenge for the 21<sup>st</sup> century was “human security”. HDR 1994 advocates that the Summit should call for the contribution and solidarity of all people for global human security, request the adoption of policy measures for human security and provide the cooperation of all the states, in this sense an international framework also needs to be formed (UNDP, 1994, pp. 39-40). The following section aims to discuss significant points and language used in “the Report of World Summit for Social Development of 1995”.

### **1.1.2. Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development of 1995**

“World Summit for Social Development of 1995” is the first international conference where state representatives met with the agenda of “social development” and “human well-being for all” (UN, 1996, p. 2). Although the issues referenced in the document are the same as in HDR 1994, the word choices are different and the solution is left directly to the states, not to the international organizations. The necessity of respecting the sovereign rights of states is explicitly noted. What appears here may be that even if the value given to the individual is underlined, an understanding that would undermine the sovereignty of the state cannot be adopted. In this case, while human interests are pursued based on the state-individual relationship, the state is the primary actor when compared



to the other actors. Issues such as “human development” and “human security” are also seen in this report as requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It can overall be observed that while the use of the term human security in institutions and reports was avoided, the definition of human security put forth in HDR 1994 was adopted by the cooperating states at the conference. This is evidenced in the outcome document of the conference, namely “the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development”, by the use of the terms “people-centered” instead of “human-centered” and “social development” and “human well-being for all” instead of “humanitarian development”.

### **1.1.3. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997)**

The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (in short, “The Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty”) was negotiated and adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997. Signing continued until the Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999 (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, 2017). The so-called “Ottawa Process” began in 1996 following the Ottawa Conference held from 3-5 October in Canada and this led to the adoption and signing of the Convention (Overview and Convention Text, n.d.). This Convention is referred to as one of the starting points of people-centred policymaking. When we look at its original document, it is possible to say that the Convention targeted the civilians however from a narrower definition of “human security” or it just considered one component of the “human security” definition of the UNDP, “freedom from fear” (UN, 1999).

The background of the Convention can be traced back to the 1980s. As an anti-landmine movement, it overlaps with a coalition called “the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)” which was established by a group of non-governmental organisations in 1992 (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, 2017, p. 3). This coalition shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 with Jody Williams who is the founding coordinator of the ICBL for their support and contribution to the realisation of the Convention (The Norwegian Nobel Institute, n.d.). This shows the importance that is attributed to the Convention. Besides this coalition, several countries refer to themselves as the contributors to the implementation of the Convention, and Japan is also one of them, however, the leading role is assumed by Canada.

Two of the core reasons why Canada is acclaimed as a role model for the narrower understanding of human security are the roles played by Canada in the adoption of the Convention as well as “the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC).” A third reason is “the Human Security Network” (HSN), which is introduced in the following section. The policy agenda followed by the HSN embraces the understanding adopted by Canada and supports policies such as the establishment of the ICC and the enactment of “the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”.

#### **1.1.4. The Human Security Network (1999)**

The “Human Security Network” is a policy framework that emerged as part of a bilateral agreement between Canada and Norway in 1998 to coordinate and take action with dedication “to using a human security perspective to international problems” (Fuentes Julio & Brauch, 2009, p. 991). Although Canada is not a part of this framework today, the establishment of the HSN appeared after the consensus between Norway and Canada were documented in “the Lysøen Declaration” (Axworthy, Vollebæk, Kuhnle, & Peou, 2014, p. 145). The foremost aim was “to create a road map” and follow a path where all nations contribute to a more secure world and work towards “finding durable solutions to the security problems facing humanity”. Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, and Vollebæk, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, intended to support their foreign policy regarding human security and to promote an international system that favoured the protection of human rights over military and economic interests (Axworthy, Vollebæk, Kuhnle, & Peou, 2014, p. 144).

The Canada-led original agenda was perceived as integrating human security into the agenda of the Security Council during Canada’s two-year term membership (1999-2000) to the Council. This aim was pursued by Norway’s membership in the Security Council for a two-year term between 2000 and 2001 (Suhrke, 2014, p. 187). The HSN’s most significant gains are still referred to as “the Ottawa Treaty” banning anti-personnel mines; “the Rome Statute” (creating the ICC); the Security Council resolutions on “Children and Armed Conflict and Women, Peace and Security”; major developments on the Protection of Civilians; adoption of “the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” by UN member states in 2005. These gains overlap with the understanding of Canada, the narrower perspective that refers to “freedom from fear”.

The HSN consists of “twelve member-states: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer status), Switzerland and Thailand”. Suhrke underlines that most of the recent usage of the term human security by the Canadian Foreign Ministry on the Network’s official website<sup>7</sup> is in 2004 and, the term was not listed as a subject heading on the website as of 2013 (2014, p. 188). Chile made an announcement in the same year, in this announcement member states are also listed, but Canada is not mentioned as a member state (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2013). Another remarkable point of this announcement is the Network’s perception of human security, which is a broader understanding that emphasizes survival, livelihoods, and dignity of citizens, in parallel with the UN (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2013). One of the recent documents, a joint statement 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction expressed on behalf of the HSN by Austria also confirms this broader understanding.

To summarise the position of the HSN in terms of the development of the concept of human security, while the states under “the umbrella of the HSN” initially adopted a narrow understanding, the changes in the policies adopted by the Network over time have transformed it into a structure consisting of states with different perspectives. Hence, while the 12 member states have commonalities, almost each has a specific agenda directly related to human security (such as Thailand on HIV/AIDS, Mali on small arms and light weapons, and Austria on human rights education) (Fuentes Julio & Brauch, 2009, p. 996; Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, n.d.). Although it is difficult to obtain information about the Network, different insights are one of the reasons for its continued existence.

## **1.2. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY (2001)**

### **1.2.1. “We the Peoples” (2000)**

In 2000, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan introduced a comprehensive report, entitled “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, that offers a “21<sup>st</sup> Century Action Plan” and sets the agenda to be discussed at “the United Nations

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<sup>7</sup> It is not possible to reach documents related to the HSN via the official website of the Network, because its domain is currently expired.

Millennium Summit on 6-8 September 2000” (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000). Annan aimed to urge nations to share opportunities and to identify and act on the major challenges (Annan, 2000, p. 5). The significance of the Report for human security is related to the way the issues are discussed in the report, which is known as the action plan of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Report touches on the progress made since the establishment of the UN and the concepts of globalisation and governance. It expresses that there are challenges in three categories, namely, “freedom from want”, “freedom from fear”, and “leaving an environmentally sustainable future”, and concludes with suggestions on UN reform (Annan, 2000, p. 17).

Globalisation, which is one of the first topics of this report, leads to both opportunities (such as better living standards, technology diffusion and faster innovation, accelerated economic growth) and challenges (such as poverty, inequality, environmental problems, diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS) for states and peoples. These opportunities and challenges are at the centre of Kofi Annan’s recommendations in the report. Although it is a fact that more people live in better conditions with the global economy and the globalizing world, it is also a fact that many people still struggle with extreme poverty and the problems it causes. In the second chapter titled “freedom from want”, in which it is stated that it is a necessity to create first education and then job opportunities while fighting against extreme poverty, issues such as ensuring basic health care and vaccination for all, preventing diseases, building technology bridges, providing financial aid and assistance to states (e.g. African countries) are discussed (Annan, 2000, pp. 19-40).

Under the title of “the freedom from fear”, Kofi Annan mentions the changing nature of warfare from “inter-state” to “internal conflicts” and the need for a more “human-centred approach” to security and touches upon issues such as “conflict prevention, protecting civilians, post-conflict peacebuilding, and reducing arms” (Annan, 2000, pp. 43-53).

Kofi Annan states that in 1945, the founders of the UN could not have projected the need for another freedom, besides “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”, “the freedom of future generations to sustain their lives” (Annan, 2000, p. 55). To ensure this freedom, nations need to adopt and implement “the Kyoto Protocol”, and develop policies

to tackle the freshwater shortage, chemical pollution, and poor sanitation; to reserve forests, fisheries, and biodiversity (Annan, 2000, pp. 56-65).

### **1.2.2. United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000)**

According to Resolution 53/202 adopted by the UNGA on 17 December 1998, it is decided that the “fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly will be the “Millennium Assembly of the United Nations” and as a part of this session, a “Millennium Summit of the United Nations” will be held (UN General Assembly, 1999). Meeting for “the outcome document of the Millennium Summit of the United Nations” was held on 6-8 September 2000, and “The Millennium Declaration”, which covers a statement of “values, principles, and objectives of the agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> century” and sets “deadlines for collective actions” was adopted (UNGA, 2000b). This declaration does not use the same classifications as Kofi Annan’s “We the Peoples” Report, however it refers to freedom as one of the six fundamental values and focuses on the threats to survival and well-being (UNGA, 2000a).

### **1.2.3. Human Security Now (2003)**

The UN Millennium Summit has been a turning point for the establishment of an independent Commission for Human Security (CHS). As a Commission launched in January 2001 and began operations in June 2001, the Commission was set up in response to the call of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to attain “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” in September 2000. Annan highlights “human security” as a comprehensive notion that combines “the main agenda items of peace, security and development” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

The Commission intended to achieve three goals: “to promote public understanding”, “engagement and support for human security” and its “underlying imperatives”; “to develop the concept as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation”; and “to propose a concrete programme of action to address critical and pervasive threats” to the concept (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 153).

To this end, the Commission prepared a report called “Human Security Now.” The CHS claims that the report is testimony that we live in a world “more interdependent than ever

before” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 12). This report aims to respond to both old and new concerns people face such as terrorist attacks, ethnic violence, epidemics, and underlying reasons for concern at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. iv). The report states that the main focus of human security is “the protection and expansion of people's vital freedoms” and that these freedoms are rooted in “people's survival, livelihood and dignity”. In this sense, the definition of human security is dynamic, and it encompasses a lot “more than the absence of violent conflicts” and comprises “human rights, good governance, access to education and health care”, thus enabling every single person to have the opportunities and choices to realise their own potential (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

This report regards the building blocks of “human security and state/national security as freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment”. “Protecting a core of activities and abilities, developing the capabilities” of individuals and communities to make informed choices, and “acting on behalf of causes and interests” in many spheres of life are essential for human security therefore it is far more than survival (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

The report discusses differences between state security and human security based on focus, menaces, actors, and empowerment. The two forms of security are considered as mutually reinforcing and interdependent concepts. It is also stated that “state security cannot be achieved without human security” and vice versa, and that human security requires “strong and stable institutions”. Another point is that while state security is focused, human security is broad. To summarize the differences: there is a shift of focus from “external aggression” to protecting “people from a range of menaces”; such as “pollution, terrorism, massive population movements, infectious diseases and long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation besides protecting territorial boundaries”; involving a range of actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional and international organizations, and civil society apart from states; empowering people and societies (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6).

According to the CHS, human security is concerned with violent conflict (that is any form of violence), deprivation (especially educational deprivation), and both peace and

development are important and interconnected. Therefore, “the chain from poverty and deprivation to violent conflict” must be followed carefully (Commission on Human Security, 2003, pp. 6-7). Human security interacts with and is different from “other human-centred concepts such as human development and human rights”. The Report indicates that protection is the first key to human security while empowerment is the second and both are mutually reinforcing. Human security is considered as deliberately protective hence, to protect people, the development of “national and international norms, processes, and institutions”, which are “comprehensive and preventive”, are required (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 11). Empowerment is “the people’s ability to act on behalf of themselves and others”, thus, people build resilience to difficult conditions and their “potential as individuals” and as “communities” and can demand “respect for their dignity” when it is contravened (Commission on Human Security, 2003, pp. 10-11).

The report suggests a “human security framework” to deal with the “conditions” and “menaces” people face. This report also, underlines that within the UN system, responsibility for the diverse interdependent components of human security resides in distinct divisions of the UN and its related bodies therefore institutions, policies, and priorities are not in line with people’s expectations/aspirations for peace, human rights, democracy and social equality (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 130).

The CHS advocates that the target of human security must go beyond the issues addressed by the UN in “the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” and “the Millennium Declaration”. Therefore, the CHS suggests “the creation of a global initiative” that puts “human security” at the top of all agendas (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 131).

#### **1.2.4. UNTFHS and the UN Human Security Unit**

“The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (UNTFHS), which has undergone changes since its establishment in 1999, used to focus on financing projects in areas such as “health, education, agriculture and small-scale infrastructure development”, and these projects were generally conducted by different UN Agencies (UN OCHA, n.d.).

In line with the recommendations of the CHS Report, “the Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS)” was established and approved by the UN Secretary-General. The Board which still operates today, is mandated to make recommendations on how to better manage “the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS)” and to enhance the impact of its activities. This board held its first meeting in September 2004 (外務省, 2004, p. 184).

In 2004, the UN Secretary-General took over the administration of the UNTFHS from the “Office of the Controller” and transferred it to the “Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)”, and established “the Human Security Unit (HSU)” within this office (UN OCHA, n.d.). The HSU plays a role in integrating the “human security” approach into the activities of the UN system to translate it into tangible results by managing the “Human Security Trust Fund” (UNTFHS, n.d.).

### **1.3. UN DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN SECURITY**

#### **1.3.1. In Larger Freedom (2005)**

“In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” is a “follow-up document of the outcome document of the Millennium Summit” and the Report of the Secretary-General for the upcoming world summit to review the implementation of “the Millennium Declaration” (UNGA, 2005a). In this report, Kofi Annan repeats his previous statement that the UN should aim “to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace” (UNGA, 2005a, p. 5). This report states that nations and institutions should endeavour to progress the understanding of larger freedom by providing “freedom from want”, “freedom from fear”, and “freedom to live with dignity” (UNGA, 2005a, p. 55).

When compared to the previous report of the Secretary-General “We the Peoples”, the differences in the classification of the concept of freedom attract attention. Freedom from want, one of the three categories defined in this report, in Larger Freedom, also includes freedom to live in a sustainable environment, the third category of freedom in the “We the Peoples”. The concepts of the rule of law and democracy, which are mentioned under the headings of globalisation and the reform of the UN, and the notion of human rights, which is often mentioned under the heading of “freedom from want”, are discussed under



the new category of “freedom to live in dignity”. The reason behind this new category is member states’ emphasis on the “promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights” in the Millennium Declaration (UNGA, 2005a, p. 34).

### **1.3.2. World Summit Outcome Document (2005)**

The UNGA (2005b) adopted a resolution titled “2005 World Summit Outcome”, which introduced each state’s “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Paras. 138-139) and the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (Para. 97) and a Human Rights Council (Para. 157). Moreover, in Paragraph 143, the UN General Assembly (2005b) expressed, for the first time, a commitment as to the clarification of the conception of human security, which as follows:

We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly (p. 31).

Although an informal thematic debate was carried out to reflect the multidimensionality of human security under the roof of the UNGA in 2008 and states were to follow up on their commitment as to Paragraph 143, no official document emerged until 2010 (Department of Public Information, 2008).

### **1.3.3. Human Security: Report of Secretary-General**

The report presented by the Secretary-General aims to show developments and initiatives related to human security according to “the 2005 World Summit Outcome” (Para. 143), as well as the added value of and the main debates on the concept (e.g., the relationship between state sovereignty and human security). The report identifies the primary role as “to ensure the survival, livelihood and dignity of the citizens belong to governments”, and considers human security “an invaluable tool for assisting Governments in identifying critical and pervasive threats to the welfare of their people and the stability of their

sovereignty” (UNSG, 2010, p. 1). There is no shift from the focus which is “threats faced by people” and “root causes of insecurities” and “scope which depends on the threat” (e.g., pandemics/transnational) of the principle when we compare it to the previous documents (Paras. 25 and 27). The report also continues to underline the necessity of the development of an integrated network (Para. 30).

Three key components cover principles of “human security” and enable the exploration of the value added by the concept. The first component is that human security addresses existing and arising threats. Second, human security understanding demands security in a broadened sense which includes a dual policy framework, namely the “protection and empowerment of people as its basis and purpose” (Para 28). Third, this does not involve “the use of force against states’ sovereignty”, thus intends to combine the targets of the three freedoms (“freedom from fear”, “freedom from want” and “freedom to live in dignity”) with various strategies (Para. 19) (UNSG, 2010).


The report refers to governments as instruments of peace and stability, and advocates that the UN Charter stresses “sovereignty” and “livelihood” and “dignity of people” equally, and, in this sense, human security offers an analytical framework between governments and the people (Para. 21). In addition to this, “the broad understanding of human security” is considered at “the centre of the work of the UN” and does not bring additional layers to this work but complements it (Para. 70). Moreover, it indicates that when government institutions are “weak” or “under threat”, the human security understanding encourages addressing the main causes of the shortcomings and improve “the resilience of governments and people” (Para. 20).

Following the recommendation section of the report presented (Para. 72), the General Assembly gathered to discuss this report (A/64/701) and organized a panel discussion entitled “People-Centred Responses: The Added Value of Human Security” on 20-21 May 2010 (UNSG, 2010; UNGA, 2010).

Subsequent to the Secretary-General’s report (A/64/701) and discussions, in 2010, the UNGA adopted “the follow-up to Paragraph 143 of the World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/A64/291)” regarding human security, while indicating that ongoing attempts to define the concept of human security should continue. Then, on 10 September

2012, the UNGA adopted resolution A/RES/66/290. This resolution frames the concept of human security in line with “the 2010 Report of Secretary-General”. Thus, the UNGA acknowledges that human security is “an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing the pervasive and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their populations” (UNSG, 2010; 2012; UNGA, 2012).

In addition, the General Assembly requested a report from the Secretary-General on the results of the implementation of this resolution and the views of the states. As a result of this request, The Report of Secretary-General, A/66/763 was published in 2012. One of the noteworthy points in this report is that during the discussions, member states emphasised four policy areas where the human security approach could be applied. These are “climate change, post-conflict peacebuilding, global financial and economic crises and health” (UNSG, 2012).



**Figure 2.** Concept of Human Security According to UNTFHS<sup>8</sup>

On 10 September 2012, the General Assembly adopted A/RES/66/290, in which it acknowledged the four core principles (“people-centred”, “comprehensive”, “context-specific” and “prevention-oriented”), two key strategies (“protection” and “empowerment”) and three fundamental freedoms (“freedom from fear”, “freedom from

<sup>8</sup> Adapted from Human Security: From Principles to Practice College by United Nations System Staff, n.d.


want” and “freedom to live in dignity”) of “human security as an approach to assist States in identifying and addressing the challenges people face” (UNGA, 2012).

In 2013, “the Report of the Secretary-General (A/68/685)” was published based on the responses of Member States, various organisations, non-governmental organisations, and research institutions to a questionnaire on human security, i.e., the results obtained in areas where the human security approach is applied at the local, regional and international levels. The report requests the General Assembly to consider “the post-2015 development policy” and to encourage countries to provide “financial support to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (UNSG, 2013).

#### **1.4. 2022 SPECIAL REPORT ON HUMAN SECURITY**

According to UNDP, there has been a “sharp reversal in human development” with the COVID-19 pandemic, and insecurities have affected “6 out of 7 people” (UNDP, 2022). It is stated that we are facing a world full of “new interconnected challenges” arising from natural and social systems and that “global warming, natural disasters, and loss of biodiversity” will further increase due to “human pressures on the planet”, which may lead to “a new set of risks that humanity has not known so far” (UNDP, 2021, p. 1).

Not all of the risks are new, nor are they all caused by COVID-19, and the underlying drivers are structural. Against this backdrop of increasing structural challenges, the Human Development Report Office has recognised that human security has emerged “as a top priority for national and international policymaking” and that “a new generation of Human Security” is needed. The Human Development Report Office organised a symposium entitled “Virtual Symposium: A New Generation of Human Security” between 8 and 11 June 2021 “to inform the preparation of a Special Report” that will propose policy options and tools to respond to the risks facing societies around the world (UNDP, 2021, p. 1). Although the title of this symposium was not used verbatim, the Special Report published in 2022 proposes new components to the understanding of human security.



**Figure 3.** The three strategies of human security and their relationship with agency<sup>9</sup>

“The 2022 Special Report on Human Security” emphasises three points: “solidarity”, “agency” and “new threats to human security”. Starting from the last, the Report lists new generation threats such as “digital technology threats”, “inequalities”, “violent conflicts”, “health threats” interconnected “human security threats” and advocates for the expansion of “the human security framework” in the face of these threats. In addition, it is highlighted that human security should take into account the “interdependence between people and the planet” beyond securing individuals and their communities, and that a third strategy, “solidarity”, should be added to “protection” and “empowerment” strategies. Finally, “agency”, which the report defines as “the ability to hold values and make commitments, and to act accordingly when making one’s own choices or participating in collective decision-making, regardless of whether they enhance one’s well-being”, comes to the fore. Agency is characterised as the core of the proposed new framework for human security (UNDP, 2022).

Given the chronological outline based on official documents regarding the evolution of the concept of human security in the international arena provided in this chapter, and taking into account the discussions in the literature, it can be observed that the first attempts made by the international community were related to the “narrow understanding of human security”, i.e., the principle of “freedom from fear”. When we take into

<sup>9</sup> Adapted from 2022 Special Report on Human Security by UNDP, 2022.

consideration the current framework, it can be argued that this narrow understanding has become an applicable understanding with a clear scope in theory (as seen in reports prepared by organisations such as the UN and UNDP) as well as practice (such as in the practices of UNTFHS) and has acquired new components with the experiences gained from practices.

Based on the above analysis of the development of the UN-centred understanding of human security, this Chapter aimed to enhance the comprehension of Japan's contribution to the development of the notion during the turning points in the UN as to its understanding of human security. Such analysis will also serve as a background for the discussion in Chapter 3 as to the Japanese perspective of human security.

## CHAPTER 2

### JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

This chapter addresses the roots of Japan's pursuit of human security. To this end, the Constitution of Japan, the decisions taken by Japanese governments in domestic and foreign policy, the steps taken when external factors play an active role, and the roles played by the bodies established by Japanese governments will be studied.

Before discussing its conception of human security, Japan's previous security policies and the legal and political foundations of these policies should be briefly mentioned. For this reason, the article on defence forces in the Japanese constitution should be addressed first.

#### 2.1. POLITICAL ROOTS OF JAPAN'S HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

##### 2.1.1. The Post-War Constitution of 1947 and Article 9

The Japanese Constitution in force today, “the Constitution of Japan (日本国憲法)”, is a constitutional text that was promulgated on 3 October 1946 and entered into force on 3 May 1947. After World War II, Japan was on the defeated side, and it would not be wrong to say that the American-led GHQ<sup>10</sup> had a great influence on the writing of the constitution of the state, which was governed under the control of the GHQ between 1946 and 1952 (Formulation of the GHQ Draft and Response of the Japanese Government, n.d.).

“The Constitution of Japan” is referred to by many as “the Peace Constitution”. In the English version of “the preamble of the Constitution”, the statement “We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want” is included, in line with Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Four Freedoms Speech of 1941”.

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<sup>10</sup> GHQ, in its full name “The General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (連合国軍最高司令官総司令部, GHQ SCAP)”, was established on 2 October 1945 after Japan surrendered on 2 September 1945 and remained in existence until Japan signed a peace treaty on 28 April 1952 (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, n.d.; Military Agency Records RG 331, 2016).

Similarly, the original text includes the words “*kyōfu to ketsubō kara manukare* (恐怖と欠乏から免かれ)”, which expresses “the state of being free from fear and want”. However, the reason why it is called “the Peace Constitution” is not this statement but the existence of Article 9 which means the demilitarisation and disarmament of Japan (昭和二十一年憲法 日本国憲法, 2022; The Constitution of Japan, 2022).

The English and Japanese versions of Article 9 of the Chapter II of the Japanese Constitution, which read as follows, contain wording that may be interpreted differently from a legal perspective.

#### Chapter II Renunciation of War / 第二章 戦争の放棄

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
 / 第九条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段としては、永久にこれを放棄する。

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (The Constitution of Japan, 2022) / 前項の目的を達するため、陸海空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持しない。国の交戦権は、これを認めない (昭和二十一年憲法 日本国憲法, 2022).

In the English version of Article 9 of the Constitution, the wording used is that there is no recognition of the right of belligerence, while in the Japanese version it is a “renunciation of the use of military force as a method of settling international disputes”



(underlined part of the article). When we think in terms of the English version, not only “the waging of war” but also “the use of force as a state instrument” is waived. However, the existence of the “Self-defence Forces” (自衛隊, SDFs) shows that the original wording of this article is understood differently from the English version and is based on the “self-defence” principle of the UN Charter. In addition, as a UN member state, Japan also bases its “inherent right of self-defence” on Article 51 of the UN Charter under Chapter VII (Charter of United Nations, 1945).

The idea of renunciation of war was not an idea that was raised for the first time by the international society during the drafting of the Japanese Constitution. “The Kellogg-Briand Pact”, also known as “the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War”, of which Japan was one of the signatory states, is an important pact that deals with “the renunciation of war and the settlement of disputes without the use of weapons”, although it could not play a sufficiently effective role in this regard when it was signed in 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, n.d.). In addition, “the Atlantic Charter”, which was declared at “the Atlantic Conference” during World War II, talks about the prevention of war and the disarmament of states that threaten other nations or the establishment of a permanent general security system (Atlantic Charter, n.d.).

Article 9 is an article that many Japanese governments, including the current Kishida government, have endeavoured to revise but have not yet done so. Arguably, this article forms the basis of Japan’s human security understanding and its long-standing “peace-loving nation (平和国家)” discourse (Japan's Security Strategy, 2016).

The next section will focus on the National Reserve Force, the predecessor of the Self-Defence Forces, which were created based on the principle of “self-defence” in the UN Charter, despite the limitations of the Constitution.

### **2.1.2. The National Reserve Force**

Article 9 on Japan’s military power was not always interpreted in the same way by Japanese political leaders. For example, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, in his speech at the Plenary Session of the Imperial Diet on 26 June 1946, stated that Article 9 “not only abolished war”, but Paragraph 2 of the Article also “renounced the use of military

force, even in self-defence”. In this speech, Yoshida Shigeru stated that many wars were fought in the name of self-defence (e.g. the Manchurian War and World War II for the Empire of Japan), that it was not desirable for the Japanese to be seen as a warlike nation or for Japan to be seen as a threat to the world peace, and that Japan voluntarily relinquished its right to wage war for any reason. He also indicated that Japan was the first peace-loving state (平和愛好國) and that when an international organisation for peace (平和國際團體) was established, a state that attacked Japan would be the enemy of all peace-loving states. This is in line with the statements in both the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Atlantic Charter. These views expressed by Yoshida Shigeru are known as the Yoshida Doctrine (帝国議会会議録検索システム, 1946). So how did the Self-Defence Forces come to be established in Japan when Yoshida Shigeru opposed having a military force even for self-defence? The short answer is the outbreak of the Korean War.

On 8 July 1950, General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, stating that he authorised the establishment of a National Reserve Force of 75,000 people. The grounds for this were indicated as “illegal immigration” and “smuggling”. In the text, in which it is stated that the protection of the coastline is essential, the “increase of the national police force” and the establishment of “the police force in the rural areas” are also mentioned, and the reason why the National Reserve Force/国家警察予備隊 stands out more is that this armed force has later evolved into the Self-Defence Forces (Douglas MacArthur's Letter to Prime Minister, 1950).

If we look at the background of this incident, with the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the forces of the UN member states led by the United States (US) were sent to South Korea for assistance, and General MacArthur was appointed as the commander of these forces by President Truman. As the American troops stationed in Japan were shifted to Korea, Japan faced the danger of being left unprotected against the Soviets as it had no military forces.

Although the letter seems to give authorization for the establishment of such a force, there is no evidence that the Japanese officials had such a request. Following the letter sent in

June 1950, the National Police Reserve Order was issued by the cabinet on 10 August 1950 (National Diet Library, 2019). This was not a law passed by the Japanese Diet, but a cabinet order (政令) based on the Imperial Decree No. 542 “Concerning Orders Issued upon Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration” (Legislative Bureau House of Councillors, 2020).

### **2.1.3. The US-Japan Security Alliance**

During the American occupation of Japan, most US officials argued that Japan should be rearmed while George Kennan was among those who opposed it. The main reasons for this were a possible Soviet attack and a shortage of US military manpower (Sugita, 2016, p. 124). In terms of Japan’s own perspective on its rearmament, it is possible to give an example from the period of “the Peace Treaty” negotiations. From the 1950 to 1951 “the Peace Treaty negotiations” between Dulles and Yoshida and between the Japan-US delegations, it is understood that the US wanted Japan to rearm so that it would at least not be a “burden” on the US militarily, and that while Japan did not want to have an army, and if it were to have an army one day, it would be as late as possible (Hosoya C., 1981). Three reasons were given by the Japanese government for Japan's reluctance towards rearmament. The first reason was that although some nationalists wanted rearmament, the public was “abhorred” (嫌悪) of wars after the Pacific War. The second reason was that rearmament would burden Japan’s economy and make it difficult for the people to make a living. The last reason was that neighbouring countries might think that Japan was an aggressive country. It is noteworthy that while the state’s domestic security was to be provided by the state itself, the government prioritised economic power over military power (外務省, 1951, pp. 138-139).

As a follow-up to this understanding of the Japanese government, at the end of the negotiations, Japan signed a security treaty with the US on 8 September 1951, that is the same day as the signing of “the Peace Treaty”, called “the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan (日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の安全保障条約)”. The reasons given for this security agreement were that with the entry into force of “the Peace Treaty”, Japan would not have effective means to enforce its “natural right of self-

defence” since it had been demilitarised, as well as the persistence of “irresponsible militarism”. The legitimacy of this Treaty was based on both “the Peace Treaty” and “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence” as enshrined under “Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”, to which Japan was not yet a State Party (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008).

Consisting of five articles, the Peace Treaty was criticised in many respects, such as for containing asymmetrical provisions, being unconstitutional, Japan being a free-rider or, conversely, the US being a free-rider. For instance, it is argued that Article 1 contains asymmetrical provisions since it states that in addition to the presence of US military forces in Japan, the US can provide assistance to “suppress internal uprisings” and “disturbances upon the express request of the Japanese Government” (Sakurada, 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, in Article 4, the two Parties agreed that the treaty would “terminate when international peace and security in the area of Japan” had been maintained by the UN, its arrangements, or “alternative individual or collective security measures”. Yet even today there is no such arrangement.

#### 2.1.3.1. The Self-Defence Forces (SDFs)

It is possible to say that the Japanese army, which was disbanded by the occupation forces, was attempted to be rebuilt in three stages. These stages can be sorted as follows. In 1950, as mentioned before, with the outbreak of the Korean War, a relatively small-scale “National Reserve Force (国家警察予備隊)” was formed to ensure internal security. Then in 1952, after independence was regained, this force was revised and expanded as the “National Safety Forces (保安隊)”. Lastly in 1954, all these were transformed into the “Self-Defence Forces (自衛隊)” (National Archives of Japan, 1950; JGSDF, n.d.).

Enacted on 31 July 1952, after “the Peace Treaty” entered into force on 28 April of the same year, the “Security Agency Law (保安庁法)” stipulated that the forces attached to this agency would “maintain peace and order in our country and protect persons and property (わが国の平和と秩序を維持し、人名及び財産を保護する)” (National Archives of Japan, 1952). And just a few days before “the Peace Treaty” came into force,

on 26 April 1952, the “Marine Guard” (海上警備隊) was formed under the “Maritime Safety Agency (海上保安庁)”. On 1 August 1952, the “Security Agency (保安庁)” was founded. And after that, the “Maritime Safety Agency (海上保安庁)” was positioned below the “Security Agency” (保安庁). The “Marine Guard” was also reorganised as the “Security Force (警備隊)”. Concurrently, the “National Police Reserve” was also subordinated to the “Security Agency”. On 15 October 1952, the “National Police Reserve” was later restructured as the “National Security Force (保安隊)” (JGSDF, n.d.).

On 1 May 1954, “the Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty between Japan and the United States of America (日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互防衛援助協定)” entered into force, Article 8 of which is said to have led to the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces. At the same time, three other agreements entered into force. These were “the Agreement on the Purchase of Agricultural Products (農産物購入に関する協定)”, “the Agreement on Economic Measures (経済的措置に関する協定)”, and “the Agreement on Investment Guarantees (投資保証に関する協定)”. These are collectively referred to as “the MSA Agreements (MSA 協定)”. They are named as such because the basis for each agreement is “the US Mutual Security Act (MSA)” (石井, 2003; National Archives of Japan, 1954).

Under the “US Mutual Security Act”, countries receiving US aid were obliged to make efforts to defend themselves and the so-called free world, in other words to contain the Soviet Bloc. Article 8 of the “US-Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty (MDA Treaty/MDA 協定)” also stipulates that Japan is “obliged [... to take all] reasonable measures (合理的な措置)” to contribute to the development and maintenance of its own defence forces as well as the defence forces of “first world countries” and to strengthen its own defence capabilities. What is meant by reasonable measures here points to Article 9 of the MDA, which states that each country shall apply it to the extent permitted by its

own constitution, and in fact refers to Article 9 of “the Japanese Constitution” (Ministry of Defence, 1954; U.S. Embassy in Japan, 1954).

Since the beginning of its negotiations in 1953, the MDA Treaty has come to the fore with issues such as Japan’s rearmament and the amendment of the constitution (NHK, 1953). In July 1954, the SDFs was established by the adoption of two Defence Laws, “the Defence Agency Establishment Law (防衛庁設置法) No. 164”, which completely amended “the Security Agency Law” (Law No. 265 of 1952) and reorganised the Security Agency into the Self Defence Agency (防衛省), and the Self-Defence Forces Law (SDF Law, 自衛隊法) No. 165, which created the SDFs. With the addition of an air component, the SDFs became a tripartite self-defence force consisting of the “land forces (陸上自衛隊), sea forces (海上自衛隊) and air forces (航空自衛隊)”.

Since its enactment in 1954, as of 2019, the SDF Law has been amended 162 times, either directly or through other laws, and it is likely to continue to be amended as the current Kishida government has shown a willingness to amend Article 9 of the Constitution as well as “the SDF Law” (Musashi, 2019, p. 4).

The Hatoyama Cabinet, which came to power the year the law was passed, interpreted Article 9 as “not excluding the right to self-defence” and “the minimum necessary level of defence capability”, and the subsequent cabinets have continued to maintain this viewpoint (Research Commission on the Constitution House of Councillors, 2005, p. 38).

The SDF Law was amended several times after the establishment of the SDF, but the Kishi Cabinet, which came to power in 1957, adopted “the Basic Policy of National Defence (国防の基本方針)” for the first time in the same year together with “the National Defence Council”, and this remained the most comprehensive security strategy until 2013 (Japan Ministry of Defense, n.d.; Kitaoka, 2022).

#### 2.1.3.2. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960)

Regarding “the Japan-US Security Treaty” signed in 1951 immediately after “the Peace Treaty”, there was an ongoing debate in the Diet about its revision, arguing that it was

signed under conditions in which Japan had virtually no ability to defend itself and that its content was not suitable for Japan to maintain its autonomy (自主性) as an independent country. Accordingly, at a meeting between Prime Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower in June 1958, the Government of Japan established “the US-Japan Security Committee (日米安全保障委員会)”. In September 1958, as a result of the talks between Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Secretary of State Dulles in Washington, it was decided to negotiate the revision of the Treaty. In October 1958, Foreign Minister Fujiyama and US Ambassador to Japan McArthur began negotiations on the revision of the Treaty in Tokyo (Office of the Historian, 1958; 外務省, 1961; Office of Historian, n.d.). After a period of two years, the negotiations were completed on 19 January 1960 and the new treaty, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and The United States of America”, was signed (MOFA of Japan, 2021).

The new treaty is defensive in nature, in line with the “purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”. The treaty aims to preserve Japan’s peace and security as a complement to the “maintenance of the peacekeeping functions” of the UN (Articles 1 and 7) and clarifies the determination of the US and Japan to resist external armed aggression against the territory under their administration, making it an agreement of mutual and equal assistance (Articles 5 and 3). It also provides for the promotion of economic cooperation and the promotion of a general cooperative relationship not limited to the defence dimension (Article 2). Furthermore, there is a provision for holding consultations in the event of “a threat to Japan’s security or to the peace and security of the Far East” (Article 6) (外務省, 1961; MOFA of Japan, 2021).

#### 2.1.3.3. The Gulf War and UN peacekeeping operations 1992 onwards

The Gulf Crisis was a turning point for Japan. It was one of the actors that endeavoured to resolve the crisis peacefully, and when the invasion took place in 1991, it decided to impose economic sanctions against Iraq on its own initiative before the adoption of “the UN Security Council resolution on economic sanctions”. When there was a need for co-operation involving human resources as well as financial and material co-operation, Japan was unable to pass “the UN Peace Co-operation Bill”, which would have provided the

infrastructure for Japan to contribute in terms of human resources. Even though it provided large amounts of aid, Japan was criticised on the grounds that its cooperation was “too little, too late”, and that it did not involve cooperation using human resources but rather chequebook diplomacy (MOFA of Japan, 1991). In 1992, “the International Peace Cooperation Act” came into force, and Japanese Self-Defence Forces took part in nearly 30 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in accordance with its principles. Japan enacted “the Law on Special Measures for Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq” and “the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” after 9/11, and the enactment of the two special laws was due to the restriction of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Hoshino, 2007).

#### **2.1.4. Official Development Assistance (ODA)**

The history of the introduction of “the Official Development Assistance (ODA, 政府開発援助)” dates back to 1954, when Japan began to provide “technical assistance to Asian countries” through its involvement in “the Colombo Plan” and to 1958, when it made its first yen loan (ODA Loan) to India. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its perspectives on development assistance first in 1978 in the “Current State of Economic Cooperation, and Its Outlook: The North-South Problem and Development Assistance”, and then in 1980 in the “philosophies of Economic Cooperation: Why Official Development Assistance”? In 1991, i.e., the year the Cold War ended and the Gulf War began, the Ministry announced “4 ODA guidelines”. These guidelines deal with arms expenditure, arms production, arms trade and democratisation (MOFA of Japan, 1994; 外務省, 2022).

On 30 June 1992, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter)” was approved. The “ODA Charter” has as its basic philosophies “humanitarian concerns”, recognition of “interdependence between nations of the international community”, “environmental concerns” and support for “the self-help efforts” of recipient countries. The “ODA Charter” also contains 4 ODA guidelines (MOFA of Japan, 1994).

This assistance was provided between 1992 and 2003 without any changes to the Charter, and it was only in 2003 that the structure of the Charter was revised. Then, in 2015 the



structure of the Charter was changed resulting in both a new name, the “Development Cooperation Charter”, and modifications to its fundamental principles, one of which is human security (MOFA of Japan, 2015b).

## **2.2. DEFINITIONS ON JAPAN’S IDENTITY**

It is argued that the minimisation of the state’s defence expenditures due to the prioritisation of economic development stemming from the peace-loving state discourse underlined by Yoshida Shigeru, one of Japan’s prime ministers, led to reliance on the US for the security of the state, and that Japan eventually moved towards becoming a peaceful economic power rather than a great military power.

The Gulf War narrative is the event that serves as a kind of catalyst that strengthens the rhetoric of those who are against the discourse of a peace-loving country and those who produce discourse for its change. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, it is possible to say that the debates on Japan's identity or the identity it should adopt have increased.

Yoichi Funabashi argued that the fact that Japan is both an “economic giant” and a “military dwarf” is not an “unstable” and “temporary” phenomenon or an “escape”, but that the end of the Cold War is an opportunity for Japan to define its own power and role as a pacifist state that can become a global civilian power which actively participates in world peace but restrains itself militarily. In addition, he argued that Japan’s experience in the Gulf War should not change its strategy of acting as a “global civilian power”, and that it should increase its political power through economic power, not military power, and only in this way can it become a new power. Furthermore, Japan’s “one-dimensional economic strategy” should be replaced by a more “multifaceted”, “values-oriented policy”, including being a “model” for development; maintaining international peace; promoting human rights; and protecting the environment (Funabashi, 1991).

In 1994, at a time of growing international criticism of Japan’s inadequate response to the Gulf War, Ozawa Ichirō proposed the idea of Japan becoming a “normal country (普通の国)”, stating that this could only be achieved by revising Article 9 of the Constitution, thereby restoring the ability to “exercise the right of collective self-defence”, “sending

the SDF to participate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations”, and Japan “becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council” (Hagström, 2015).

Overall, based on the above analysis of the pivotal events, documents and Japanese identities that have been considered influential in Japan’s adoption of a human security approach and its “success” in this regard, it can be argued that Japan’s efforts to position itself positively in the international community following World War II as well as its perceived standing contributed to an increased credibility in its human security approach.

## CHAPTER 3

### JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

The Japanese equivalent of “human security”, “人間の安全保障”, means security of the human being. In Chinese, this concept is similarly translated as “人的安全” (*rén de ānquán*), which means security of human beings. The word human is not only a word that expresses humankind in Japanese, but also personality and character. Moreover, it is said that it originates from Buddhism and expresses the world in which people live (人の住む世界) (デジタル大辞泉, 2023).

Watsuji Tetsurō (和辻哲郎), one of the most important philosophers of Modern Japanese philosophy, who has been compared to philosophers such as Heidegger and Kant, attached special importance to the concept of *ningen* (人間). According to Watsuji, the word *ningen* originally meant society or the world, but over time it came to be associated with both society and the humans living in it. Today, it retains both meanings. When analysed in its own context by dividing it into *nin* and *gen*, the kanji<sup>11</sup> 人 (*hito/nin*) refers to “self” or “selves”, “other” or “others”, “people” in general and “society”. The kanji 間 (*aidagara/gen*) or “betweenness” does not eliminate these connotations when added to *hito/nin* to form the compound term *ningen* (人間). In analysing the meaning of *Aida*, Watsuji states that the word *ningen* (人間) was used to distinguish it from *chikushō/beast* (畜生), *gaki/preta* (餓鬼), and other realms of existence in the Buddhist theory of transmigration; to be human meant to be born in the *ningen* realm (人間界) apart from

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<sup>11</sup> Kanji (漢字) is one of the three writing systems used in Japanese. It originated in China and, unlike the other two writing systems, Hiragana (ひらがな) and Katakana (カタカナ), is based on meaning, not syllabic sounds.

the others. In this way, the word *ningen* acquired the meaning of “human being” as distinct from other living creatures (Eguchi, 2009).

The word *ningen* (人間) means (1) the category of human beings as a whole, (2) a nature or essence specific to human beings, and (3) an individualised human being. Watsuji stated that individual human beings necessarily belong to the *ningen* realm to be distinguished from other living creatures, and that the *ningen* realm cannot exist without its individual inhabitants. In other words, as long as individual *ningen* exist, the *ningen* realm exists, and as long as the realm exists, individuals will exist. To summarise, *ningen* refers to both individual human beings and the *ningen* realm, not just human beings or just society (Eguchi, 2009).

To elaborate on the concept of *aidagara* (間柄), that is the spatial and relational ties that people establish, such as individual/society, individual/family, individual/workplace, are also related to *aidagara* (間柄). What Watsuji prioritises in this betweenness (*aidagara*) is society rather than the individual (Carter & McCarthy, 2019).

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, security has two basic meanings. The first of these is “the state (状態) of being secure” and the second is “measures (手段) taken to ensure security” (Soanes & Stevenson, 2009). However, although the English word security carries these two meanings, a distinction is made between these meanings in Japanese and the condition of being secure is simply expressed as *Anzen* (安全) in Japanese. However, the second meaning of the word is covered by the word *Anzen Hoshō* (安全保障). *Anzen hoshō* means to “to guarantee security” (安全を保障する), which begs the question of which condition is secure and by what means (手段) it can be “guaranteed”.

Today, *anzen hoshō* (安全保障) is often preferred when referring to security in academic and political contexts, but it is difficult to say that both concepts (*anzen* and *anzen hoshō*)

were frequently used with their current meaning in Japanese before World War II. Yet, there is consensus that the origin of the word *anzen* (安全) is Chinese.

Mukaidono Masao cites Uchida Kakichi's *Anzen Daiichi* (安全第一, Safety First), stating that the word *anzen* originated in the "Classics on Filial Piety" (孝経), which is said to have been written by Confucius approximately 2500 years ago. According to Uchida, in the "Classics on Filial Piety" (孝経) there is an expression "上に安じ, 下に全うするは, 礼より善きはなし", which means the top should be dedicated to His Majesty, while the bottom should face all people and strive for the safety of the nation with all sincerity (cited in 向殿, 2017). When looking at the original Chinese text of the work, a sentence corresponding to the same kanjis could not be found, but a phrase that may have a close meaning may be "安上治民, 莫善于礼", translated by James Legge as "[f]or securing the repose of superiors and the good order of the people, there is nothing better than the rules of propriety" (Legge, n.d). One of the first instances of the concept of *anzen* in a Chinese text is "dào lǐ yì yì, ān quán wú huàn (道里夷易, 安全無患)" in the work titled *Jiaoshi Yilin* (焦氏易林) attributed to Jiao Gan (焦贛, n.d.).

The character an (安), the first kanji of the word *anzen*, is made up of 宀 and 女, which refers to a woman (女) inside a house (宀=家). It may have emerged as such, considering that being inside the house provides protection from both natural events and wild animals. The character zen (全) is the second kanji of the word *anzen*. There are different interpretations of the origin of the kanji zen (全). For example, there are those who say that it is made up of 入 and 工 and refers to a piece of work that is completely sealed and protected and contains the meaning of being completed, those who say that it is made up of 入 and 玉 and is related to obtaining the best treasure, "jade", those who say that it represents the king checking inside the castle that the people in his domain are living in

safety. This is the meaning of safety, and it can only be said to be safe when there is both a bottom-up perspective from below and a top-down perspective from above (向殿, 2017, p. 71; 辛島, 2011).

There are deep links between security and shrines in Japan. Japan is surrounded by the sea and there are shrines specialising in maritime security (海上安全) (e.g., Shikaumi Shrine, Furogu Shrine). Another example is visiting the shrines at the end of the year and at the beginning of the new year. Even those who do not believe in Shintoism make this visit, where *emas* (絵馬) are hung, including the votive pictures with the words “safety in the house” (家内安全). This is a wish for the whole family to be healthy this year, free from illness, accidents and dispersal. Safety, in this case, means protecting the health of one’s family, including oneself, and avoiding unexpected injuries or disasters, and it is the body and ultimately human life that must be protected. At many Shinto shrines, amulets (お守り) for traffic safety (交通安全) can be taken. It is believed that these amulets will prevent traffic accidents, injuries, and even death if injured. People responsible for human life, such as workers at nuclear power plants and railway operators in Japan, have *kamidanas* (神棚) where they work.

As discussed earlier in the literature review and preceding Chapter, references to Japanese identity and history are made when discussing Japan’s human security policy. These references can create the impression that Japan is more inclined towards human security than it actually is, and that Japanese foreign policy is more pacifist than it actually is. This may be due to how Japanese society is perceived, rather than Japanese foreign policy per se. Although there are many proposed descriptions of the “nature” of the Japanese society, three of the most prominent are mentioned here to provide a general framework. These are “*nihonjinron* (日本人論)”, “*kanjin shugi* (間人主義)” and “*amae* (甘え)”. While the term “*nihonjinron* (日本人論)” originally referred to the theories and discussions about Japan and the Japanese, critics of the term use “*nihonjinron*” as a general term for the discourse of “Japaneseness”. This concept attempts to capture the essential traits, personalities and attitudes that distinguish a people, namely the Japanese, from other

human beings. According to Dale (1986), a scholar critical of “*nihonjinron*”, there are three main assumptions of “*nihonjinron*”: the Japanese are culturally and socially homogeneous and virtually unchanged from prehistory to the present; they are radically different from all other nations; and that they exhibit a conceptual and methodological hostility to any mode of analysis that is perceived as coming from external, non-Japanese sources (cited in Ando, 2010, p. 34).

The first word of the concept “*kanjin shugi* (間人主義)”, which Hamaguchi proposed to describe the Japanese society, consists of the kanji “*aida* (間)” and “*hito* (人)”, as in the concept of “*ningen* (人間)” which forms the basis of Watsuji Tetsuro’s philosophy, but the kanji have been replaced. Such replacement of kanji has created a new concept, “*kanjin* (間人)”. Hamaguchi (1982) argues that the values that the Japanese have in relation to interpersonal relations as “the contextual (間人)” can be referred to as “contextualism (間人主義)”, whereas its opposite is “individualism (個人主義)”. The “*kanjin* (間人)” that Hamaguchi translates as “contextual” is literally “between-person”, and the orientations included in *kanjin-shugi* are “mutual dependence”, “mutual reliance”, and “regard of interpersonal relations as an end in itself” (Lebra, 1984, p. 463). He defines “*kanjin shugi* (間人主義)” as follows: “Japanese people are aware of themselves only in relationship with others and see this relationship as a part of themselves” (cited in Mabuchi, 1998, p. 188).

“*Amae* (甘え)”, a concept that Takeo Doi has been working on since the second half of the 1950s, is important for understanding human relationships among the Japanese. According to his definition, it is a phrase that has no exact equivalent in European languages and means “indulgent dependency”. It is a non-verbally transmitted emotion that describes what a baby feels when looking for its mother, but also when an adult has a similar feeling of emotional closeness to another person (Doi & Schwaber, 2016, p. 179). For example, the verb form of “*amae*”, “*amaeru*”, expresses the “promotion of security and cherishment sought through another person”, whereas English does not have a stand-alone expression but uses the gerund as “being loved” (Johnson, 1993, p. 99).

Doi's book "The Anatomy of Self: Individual versus Society" discusses the binary concepts of "*ura* (裏)/*omote* (表)", "*honne* (本音)/*tatemae*(建前)", "*uchi* (内)/*soto* (外)", and how the individual and society are understood in Japanese society. According to Doi, "*ura* (back, concealed)" and "*omote* (front, overt)", which are said to form the basis of "*amae*", are defined as two concepts in a symbiotic and mutually constitutive relationship in which one cannot exist without the other. It is said that "*ura*" realises "*omote*", but "*omote*" is also indispensable. Without the establishment of "*omote*", there can be no preservation of "*ura*". It is said that the average Japanese tries to live his or her life by minimising the contradictions between "*omote*" and "*ura*", and by avoiding to show his or her "*ura*" to others (Doi, 1986, pp. 151-154).

The highest ideal in Japanese society is "to be allowed to *amaeru*", and human relations are seen as a function of "*amae*". One expression of this ideal is to ensure the harmony (*wa*/和) of the people, and even when this is almost impossible, general principles are laid down as public "*omote*". This is the very form of "*tatemae* (public attitude, official stance)", a sign that protects the "*wa*" of the group. But this in no way prevents the individual from having "*honne* (real intention, private thoughts)" in the "*ura*" of "*tatemae*" (Doi, 1986, pp. 153-154).

The distinction between "*omote*" and "*ura*" corresponds to the binary concepts of "*uchi* (inside)" and "*soto* (outside)", which the Japanese use to distinguish types of human relationships based on "the degree of tolerance of *amae* behaviour" (Doi, 1986, p. 154). The Japanese only show "*omote*" when dealing with "*soto* (outside)" relationships of "*giri* (obligation, 義理)", but reveal "*ura*" in the intimate, unrequited relationships of "*uchi*". "*Uchi*" and "*soto*" refer to the "dual nature of human relationships", while "*ura*" and "*omote*" refer to the "dual nature of consciousness". From this perspective, "*soto*" is "*omote*" and "*uchi*" is "*ura*" (Doi, 1986, pp. 154-155).

Considering that numerous cultural and social elements which are now labelled as "Japanese style (日本風)" were generalised during the nation-building process that became systematic with the Meiji Restoration, and that this situation is related to nationalism, a critical look at these theories which have been put forward to define



Japanese society as a whole would be of benefit. The aim of the inclusion of these theories is that they are theories that both an outsider looking at Japan or the Japanese people and a Japanese politician might find meaningful and logical to define Japanese society.

### **3.1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY (1998-2023)**

In this section, the “human security policy” pursued by the Japanese governments will be analysed through “the Diplomatic Bluebook”<sup>12</sup> published annually by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing on the rhetoric produced through the events in the Bluebook. Prior to this, in what sense and when human security was used by Japanese policymakers when it was not yet mentioned in the Bluebook will be analysed.

The phrase *ningen no anzen hoshō* (人間の安全保障), regardless of its current context, was mentioned in the 106<sup>th</sup> Japanese Diet session on 5 August 1986, and in the context of the human security perspective in the 132<sup>nd</sup> Diet session on International Affairs on 15 February 1995. The context in which it is used in this session is the need to focus not only on military security but also on human security when assessing Japan’s “international responsibility for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific” in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (National Diet Library, 1986; National Diet Library, 1995).

In addition, on 25 April 1990, Yasuhiko Yuize (唯是康彦), an economist and academician specialising on agricultural economics, in his speech on the problems in rice production at the 118<sup>th</sup> Session of the Japanese Diet that can be associated with the food security perspective, stated that this problem is not only a problem of Japan, but also of all rice producing countries, and in this respect it is an issue of “humankind security” (人類の安全保障, *jinrui no anzen hoshō*) and protection of the ecosystem, and drew

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<sup>12</sup> These annual reports began to be published in 1957 under the title “Recent developments in our diplomacy (わが外交の近況)” and were renamed as “Diplomatic Bluebook (外交青書)” in 1987.

attention to such a security problem, while the UNDP report had not yet used such a concept (National Diet Library, 1990).

In 1997, the then Prime Minister Hashimoto, in his speech at “the UN Special Session on Environment and Development”, emphasised two points when talking about environmental problems. These two points were “our responsibility to future generations” and “global human security” in the official English translation of the speech (Ministry of the Environment Government of Japan, 1997). However, during his speech, Hashimoto used the expression “*jinrui no anzenhoshō* (人類の安全保障)”, which corresponds to the humankind security, unlike the expression “*ningen no anzenhoshō* (人間の安全保障)”, which is used in Japanese today for human security (環境省, 1997).

The term “*ningen no anzenhoshō* (人間の安全保)” for human security is commonly believed to have been first used at the prime ministerial level in Keizo Obuchi’s speech at the conference entitled “An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow – The Asian Crisis: Meeting the Challenges to Human Security (アジアの明日を創る知的対話 アジアの危機：ヒューマン・セキュリティへの脅威と対応)”<sup>13</sup>, which was held at Hotel Okura in Tokyo, but this is not the case. The former Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama referred to human security in his speech at the United Nations 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary meeting in 1995, explaining that it aligned with his “human-centred society (人にやさしい社会)”<sup>14</sup> administration policy (日本政治・国際関係データベース, 1995). Nevertheless, Obuchi’s 1998 speech rather than Murayama’s 1995 speech, is the widely acknowledged milestone in Japan’s adoption of human security. This is because Obuchi viewed human security as a way of thinking, rather than an idea that aligned with his own views. Therefore, the beginning of Japan’s pursuit of a human security policy is

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<sup>13</sup> It is worth noting that the term “*hyūman sekyuriti* (ヒューマン・セキュリティ)” was used in the Japanese title of the conference.

<sup>14</sup> In the English translation of the speech, “human-centred society” is used, but the equivalent of this expression is “people-friendly society”.

considered to be 2 December 1998, the date of Keizo Obuchi's "An Intellectual Dialogue on Creating Asia's Tomorrow" speech.

### 3.1.1. Keizō Obuchi Government (July 1998-March 2000)

Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi gave his own definition of human security" in his "An Intellectual Dialogue on Creating Asia's Tomorrow" speech stating that: "I understand this as the idea of taking a comprehensive view of all kinds of threats to human survival, livelihood and dignity and strengthening efforts against them" ("私はこれを、人間の生存、生活、尊厳を脅かすあらゆる種類の脅威を包括的に捉え、これらに対する取り組みを強化するという考え方であると理解しております。" (外務省, 1998a).

The term "dignity (尊厳)" mentioned in this speech was not a word used by the countries defending a "human security" perspective in those years, nor was it mentioned in the UNDP Report of 1994, but when the report of "the Commission on Human Security" is examined, "living in dignity" is included in the definition of "human security" as the third freedom. As for the place and the context, the speech was delivered in Tokyo and concerned the Asian Economic Crisis in order to justify that the aid provided to Asian countries was made from a human security perspective, especially by considering the economically disadvantaged groups (外務省, 1998a). In addition, it can be said that this meeting signalled that Japan would adopt "human security" as a policy.

Announced in 1957, the three principles of Japanese diplomacy (日本外交の三原則) are "United Nations centredness (国際連合中心)", "cooperation with liberal countries (自由主義諸国との協調)", and "commitment to Japan's position as a member of Asia (アジアの一員としての立場の堅持)" (外務省, 1958). Based on the facts that Japan's human security initiative was introduced at a conference with Asian countries titled "An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow—The Asian Crisis: Meeting the Challenges to Human Security", that it has supported the UN in establishing a trust fund

for human security, and that it has used the UN to construct its human security rhetoric, it would not be wrong to interpret that these three principles remain valid or that these principles guide the steps taken by Japan.

In his speech in Vietnam on 16 December 1998, Keizo Obuchi posed the question of what kind of Asia should the “21<sup>st</sup> century Asia” be and stated that he believed that Asia’s new century should be a “century of peace and prosperity based on human dignity (人間の尊厳に立脚した平和と繁栄の世紀)” (外務省, 1998b). Here again, the concept of “human dignity” comes to the fore.

In this speech, Obuchi also stated Japan’s readiness to “contribute 500 million yen” (approximately USD 4.2 million) for “the establishment of the Human Security Fund (人間の安全保障基金)” within the UN as a capital co-operation for the projects implemented by the organisations in the UN system in the field of “human security” (外務省, 1998b; MOFA of Japan, 1999; 外務省, 1999a).

As a result of such financial contribution from Japan, “the Trust Fund for Human Security (the TFHS)<sup>15</sup>” was established in March 1999. The projects funded by the Trust Fund in its first year (e.g. “the Human Dignity Initiative Project”, a poverty reduction project in Southeast Asia) focused primarily on the economic and social threats facing countries affected by the Asian economic crisis (外務省, 2000a; MOFA of Japan, 2000a). While the UN had not yet formally adopted the “human security” understanding, Japan, through a UN agency, pursued policies on “freedom to live in dignity” and “freedom from want”.

Obuchi’s speech titled “In Quest of Human Security (人間の安全保障を求めて)”, which he delivered at a symposium a year after his speech in Vietnam and remarked on promoting human dignity (人間の尊厳の推進)—that is one of the three themes of the symposium—is also of importance. Obuchi noted that in order to ensure “human

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<sup>15</sup> This is the present UNTFHS.

security”, in addition to conflict prevention (that is the first theme discussed) and sustainable development (that is the second theme discussed), there is need for a society that enables people to be respected as individuals, to realise their potential and to fulfil their social responsibilities, in other words, human dignity must be promoted (外務省, 1999b).

Overall, we see that during the Obuchi government, especially through the “Trust Fund for Human Security” (the TFHS), the concept of “human security” became a part of Japan’s foreign policy. In 1999, meetings were held with Nordic countries at the level of Prime Ministers and with the G8 countries at the level of Foreign Ministers. In addition, the symposium titled “Development: With a Special Focus on Human Security” held in Japan also addressed the “human security” of Africa (MOFA of Japan, 1999). In sum, Japan’s initiatives on “human security” have not been limited to Asia Pacific.

### **3.1.2. Mori Government (March 2000-March 2001)**

The Mori government, like the Obuchi government, continued to contribute to the TFHS. However, this subsequent government took a further step by advocating a deepening of the understanding of human security. In his speech at “the UN Millennium Summit”, Prime Minister Mori stated that human security is “one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy”. He also noted that Japan intends to deepen its understanding of human security by establishing an “International Commission on Human Security (人間の安全保障のための国際委員会)” with the participation of recognised experts (外務省, 2000b).

The Prime Minister raised the issue of human security at many international meetings, including “the Second Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting” in 2000 and “the African policy” speech in 2001. For example, at “the Second Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit”, as at the UN Millennium Summit, he highlighted infectious diseases, drugs and transnational organised crime as problems that threaten people’s survival, livelihood and dignity. In his “Africa and Japan in the New Century” speech, he raised similar issues stating that “the success or failure” of cooperation to ensure “human security in Africa”

would be a test of Japan's diplomatic strength or weakness (MOFA of Japan, 2000b; MOFA of Japan, 2001b). In the same speech, he maintained the perspective of valuing each and every human being (人間一人ひとりを大切にする). He reiterated this at the UN Millennium Summit, and regarded the development of human resources as important for human security policy in the medium and long term (外務省, 2001).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs also spoke about “human security” at “the Kyushu-Okinawa summit” on 21-23 July 2000, and hosted “the International Symposium on Human Security (人間の安全保障国際シンポジウム)” on 28 July. The two keynote speakers at this symposium were Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, who would later co-chair “the Commission on Human Security” proposed by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori at “the UN Millennium Summit” (MOFA of Japan, 2001a).

### **3.1.3. Koizumi Government (March 2001-September 2006)**

It is possible to divide the human security policy pursued during the Koizumi Junichirō era into two parts: before and after 29 August 2003, which is the date when the revision of the “ODA Charter” was approved.

During the Koizumi government, the CHS, which was an initiative of former Prime Minister Mori, started its meetings. The first meeting of the Committee was held in New York in June 2001 and the second meeting was held in Tokyo in December 2001. The Commission finalised the report in February 2003 after five meetings (外務省, 2002a).

The report was presented first to Prime Minister Koizumi and then to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (MOFA of Japan, 2003a).

Following 9/11 attacks, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a symposium in Tokyo in December (the day before the CHS meeting) on the theme of “Human Security and Terrorism”. In his speech there, Prime Minister Koizumi, in addition to talking about “terrorism and Japan's initiatives for the reconstruction of Afghanistan”, underlined the concept of “human security” by saying that the threat of “terrorism” itself, as well as other threats to individuals, must be dealt with (外務省, 2001).

According to the 2002 Bluebook, for the Koizumi government, “human security” was still “one of the main perspectives of Japanese foreign policy (日本外交の重要な視点の一つ)” and Japan was demonstrating international leadership in promoting “human security” through active intellectual (through the CHS) and financial contributions (through the TFHS), but it was not “one of the pillars of foreign policy” as it was for the previous government (MOFA of Japan, 2002; 外務省, 2002a).

In January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi delivered a speech entitled “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia a Sincere and Open Partnership” in Singapore, the last stop of his visit to Asian countries, in which he announced his own initiative to strengthen cooperation with Asian countries and proposed the “creation of a community” in which Japan “acts together and advances together (共に歩み共に進むコミュニティ)” with other East Asian countries. By East Asian countries, Prime Minister Koizumi refers to “the core members (中心的メンバー)” of this community, namely his own country Japan, the countries surrounding the Japanese islands (China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) and ASEAN. One prominent point in this speech is the emphasis on “deepening cooperation with China and the Republic of Korea (日本と中国、韓国との協力の深化)”, while another is the absence of a reference to “human security” (外務省, 2002b).

In the Bluebook 2003 report, Japan argues that the concept of human security should be transformed into concrete actions in line with the ideas set out in the report of the CHS. It highlights the TFHS established by Japan within the UN<sup>16</sup> and the assistance provided to Afghanistan and Sierra Leone through the fund. In addition, the use of ODA instruments is mentioned for the first time (MOFA of Japan, 2003a; 外務省, 2003).

In the Bluebook 2004, Japan underlines the implementation of “human security” as an idea that “complements the traditional concept of security” in accordance with the CHS Report, and states that the declarations of international meetings (e.g. “the 10<sup>th</sup> Tokyo

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<sup>16</sup> There is no information on the establishment of the fund on the UNTFHS page, but it is repeatedly stated in Japanese reports that this institution was established by Japan.

International Conference on African Development”) and bilateral negotiations (e.g. “Japan-Poland Summit Meeting”) in which Japan has participated include statements on putting the CHS report into practice (MOFA of Japan, 2004).

The shift in Japan’s “human security” perspective was signalled in Prime Minister Koizumi’s general policy speech. In this speech that was delivered on 31 January 2003, Koizumi mentioned human security only in one instance, when he used the phrase “focusing on the area of human security (人間の安全保障分野に重点化する)” in the section on steps to be taken to improve the effectiveness of ODA (衆議院, 2003). This rhetoric was put into practice with “the revision of the ODA Charter”. As a result of this revision, “human security” became “one of the principles of development assistance policy” under the Basic Principles of ODA Charter<sup>17</sup> rather than one of the main perspectives of Japanese foreign policy (MOFA of Japan, 2003b). In line with this revision, “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects”, which existed before this revision, was redesignated as “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (KUSANONE, 草の根・人間の安全保障無償資金協力)” and began to focus more on human security issues (外務省, 2004).

While both the 2005 and 2006 Bluebooks mention the concept of human security and the CHS report, it can be inferred that the emphasis on the “ODA Charter” and “the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (KUSANONE)” has increased (MOFA of Japan, 2005; MOFA of Japan, 2006; 外務省, 2005; 外務省, 2006).

#### **3.1.4. Abe, Fukuda and Asō Governments (September 2006-September 2009)**

In the Bluebook 2007, human security is mentioned in only two places: One in the section on development assistance and the other in the section explaining the diplomatic doctrine “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” announced by Foreign Minister Taro Aso on 30 November 2006, stating that the doctrine will contribute to the realisation of Japan’s

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<sup>17</sup> The “ODA Charter” outlines five basic policies: “supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, the perspective of “human security”, assurance of fairness, utilization of Japan’s experience and expertise, partnership and collaboration with the international community”.



human security policy. In order to create this “Arc”, it was aimed to “strengthen relations with NATO, Australia and India”, but Abe’s resignation and his replacement by Fukuda resulted in a change in foreign policy perspective (MOFA of Japan, 2007; Hosoya Y., 2011).

In 2006, the system for planning and implementation of international co-operation in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to change. The Ministry began to manage issues related to international cooperation, such as concrete policy formulation, policy planning and coordination of ODA, through the establishment of “the International Cooperation Planning Headquarters (国際協力企画立案本部)” directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, in August of the same year, “the International Cooperation Bureau” was formed by unifying “the Economic Cooperation Bureau” with the divisions of “the Global Issues Department” concerned with international organisations and multilateral development. It is stated that these changes were made in order for Japan to utilise its ODA more strategically and effectively. It is stated that these revisions were made in order to “ensure a more strategic and effective use of ODA” (MOFA of Japan, 2006; 外務省, 2006).

When we look at the implementing organisations, three main institutions stand out. These are “the Japan Bank for International Cooperation”, which manages Yen loans, “the Japan International Cooperation Agency”, which is responsible for technical cooperation, and “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan”, which provides grant aid. In other words, there was a different system for each type of aid. In the planned system intended to be established in 2006, it is envisaged that all these aids will be managed by JICA<sup>18</sup> (国際協力機構), that is, by a single agency (JICA, n.d.). The “new JICA” (新 JICA) was established in October 2008 as a centralised agency to implement aid schemes (MOFA of Japan, 2009)

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<sup>18</sup> JICA was formally established as a special public institution on 1 August 1974 and transformed into an independent administrative agency on 1 October 2003 (JICA, 2008).

In 2007, the Directorate-General established for the first time a set of five “Priority Policy and Regional Priority Issues for International Cooperation (国際協力重点方針・地域別重点課題)”. Human security is included in this policy set as the fifth item with the phrase “ensuring human security (人間の安全保障の確立)” (MOFA of Japan, 2008; 外務省, 2008). In 2008, these priorities remained unchanged and the policy of “ensuring human security” was included in the outcome texts of international meetings such as “the Yokohama Declaration on African development” (MOFA of Japan, 2009). 2008 is the midway year towards achieving the MDGs by 2015. In this regard, Japan made an early commitment under the “principle of human security” to focus on “health, water and sanitation, and education” as key areas of the MDGs (外務省, 2009).

### **3.1.5. Hatoyama, Kan and Noda Governments (September 2009-December 2012)**

In 2009, Hatoyama Yukio delivered a speech to the 64<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly, expressing his determination that Japan will once again act as a “bridge (架け橋)”. He based this determination on the concept of “*yu-ai* (友愛<sup>19</sup>)”, which was a perspective adopted by his grandfather who was also a former prime minister, and the concept of being a “bridge between the East and the West” as put forward by Mamoru Shigemitsu, the then foreign minister. In his speech, he outlined five challenges that Japan plans to take on in fulfilling this bridging role. These are the (1) “global economic crisis”, (2) “climate change”, (3) “nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”, (4) “peacebuilding, development and poverty”, and (5) “East Asian community building”. Among them, he associated the fourth challenge with human security, arguing that national security and human security are increasingly intertwined, advocating a “shared security” through the

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<sup>19</sup> In his speech, Hatoyama Yukio defines “*yu-ai* (友愛)” as a “way of thinking that respects one’s own freedom and individual dignity” while at the same time “respecting the freedom and individual dignity of others” (総理官邸, 2009).

“yu-ai” principle (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2009; MOFA of Japan, 2010; 総理官邸, 2009; 外務省, 2010).

In working towards achieving the MDGs, Japan advanced its efforts based on the concept of human security through various initiatives (e.g. “the Muskoka Initiative”, “Kan Commitment”), with a particular focus on health and education (MOFA of Japan, 2011; 外務省, 2011). Furthermore, there was the emphasis that threats to human security were diversifying and intensifying, and that policies to be pursued after 2015 should be discussed (MOFA of Japan, 2012; 外務省, 2012a). The Bluebook 2013 includes these points but differs from the 2012 report in that it emphasises human security as a guiding principle in strengthening international cooperation (MOFA of Japan, 2013; 外務省, 2013).

### **3.1.6. Abe Government (December 2012-September 2020)**

On 26 September 2013, Prime Minister Abe delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly in which he stressed that Japan will be a country that will carry the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace (積極的平和主義)”<sup>20</sup> in the new era and emphasised international cooperation to bring peace and prosperity to the world. He said that his country had decided to participate more actively in UN collective security measures, including peacekeeping operations, and argued that the principle of “human security” would become ever more important.

The word “proactive” was also prominent in Bluebook 2013, but even looking at the Bluebook 2014 report, it can be said that Japan clearly adopted the “Proactive Contribution to Peace (積極的平和主義)” discourse in 2013 (MOFA of Japan, 2014; 外務省, 2014). The constituent blocks of this discourse are that it has become difficult for a “single country to defend its peace and security on its own” and that Japan's “active contribution to peace and security” has become a necessity. Japan has put this rhetoric

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<sup>20</sup> This concept should be translated as “proactive pacifism”. However, Japan prefers to use the term “Proactive Contribution to Peace” in English texts.

into practice with two important documents, Japan's first “National Security Strategy” and the new version of “the National Defence Programme Guidelines”, which will set the basic course of Japan's “diplomatic and defence policy” with the cabinet decision taken on 17 December 2013 (The Government of Japan, 2014).

According to Bluebook 2014, in addition to the need for the international community to work together keeping in mind the human security perspective, Japan announced its “Global Health Diplomacy Strategy (国際保健外交戦略)” in May 2013. This strategy concerning the field of health was also related to the MDGs, and stated that it is taking initiatives to provide “Universal Health Coverage (UHC, ユニバーサル・ヘルス・カバレッジ)” to enable people with access to basic health services without excessive financial burden, as well as making efforts to reduce disaster risk based on its own experience, namely the “Great East Japan Earthquake” (MOFA of Japan, 2014). In addition, at the 68<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly side event entitled “Post-2015: Health and Development (ポスト 2015 年:保健と開発)”, chaired by Foreign Minister Kishida, Prime Minister Abe emphasised the importance of “mainstreaming UHC in the post-2015 development agenda” (外務省, 2014). The Bluebook 2015 differs from the 2014 Report as it includes three “vitamins”—namely “inclusiveness”, “sustainability” and “resilience”—as vital elements for development that promote human security, as proposed by Foreign Minister Kishida in May 2014 (MOFA of Japan, 2015a; 外務省, 2015). Since 2015, Japan has begun to stress that the 2030 Agenda builds on philosophies such as “people-centredness” and “leaving no one behind”, and that human security is at the core of these philosophies (MOFA of Japan, 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022; 外務省, 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022).

In addition to the emphasis on the 2030 Agenda in Bluebook 2016, Japan as a country that considers health as an indispensable issue and has achieved the highest life expectancy, is an actor that is expected to play a proactive role in the field of health (MOFA of Japan, 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019). In Bluebook 2020, it is seen that Japan has managed to be a pioneer in the field of health, which is an important element of human

security, and has implemented “Universal Health Coverage” (UHC) and pursued policies such as “Basic Design for Peace and Health” (MOFA of Japan, 2020).

In addition, in February 2015, with the initiative of Foreign Minister Kishida, both the name and the basic policies of the “ODA Charter”, in which ensuring human security is the basic principle, were changed. In the Charter, which is now called the “Development Cooperation Charter”, the former principle of human security is currently included as the second of the three basic policies as “promoting human security” (MOFA of Japan, 2016a; 2015b).

In 2018, the rhetoric of human security as one of the diplomatic pillars from 2014 onwards was replaced first by the phrase “...one of its diplomatic pillars, and has positioned it as a guiding principle that lies at the roots of Japan's development cooperation in the Development Cooperation Charter...”, and then by the phrase “human security as a guiding principle that lies at the roots of Japan's development cooperation in the Development Cooperation Charter” in the following year's report (MOFA of Japan, 2019; MOFA of Japan, 2020)

In February 2019, the Government of Japan, together with the UNDP, the UN Human Security Unit and relevant countries, hosted the High-Level Event entitled “Human Security in its 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary” at the UN Headquarters in New York, highlighting that the human security approach is becoming increasingly important in the SDG era (MOFA of Japan, 2020).

### **3.1.7. Suga Government (September 2020-October 2021)**

In Bluebook 2021, it is stated that the spread of COVID-19 is a “human security crisis” and it is of great importance to take actions based on the concept of “human security” in order to overcome this crisis (MOFA of Japan, 2021).

In September 2020, Prime Minister Suga stated in the General Debate of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly that Japan will make greater efforts to realise the SDGs and tackle global challenges through the “human security concept of the new era (新たな時

代の人間の安全保障)” while responding to “various challenges”, and proposed to “gather the world's wisdom and deepen discussions” (MOFA of Japan, 2020)

Furthermore, in line with Suga’s statement about deepening the discussions, in June 2021, the first online meeting of the “Group of Friends of Human Security”, attended by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, was held with the participation of 63 countries and agreed that it was timely and appropriate to revitalise the concept of “human security”, given its relevance to addressing global challenges, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and agreed to continue the meetings (Permanent Mission of Japan to UN, 2020). As of April 2023, the number of meetings has reached five and the topics covered in these five meetings include “key elements of human security”, “cross-cutting challenges to human security” (Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, 2021; 2022). The “Friends of Human Security Group” was originally an “informal, open-ended forum” created in 2006, which until the end of 2009 was a platform for UN Member States and relevant international organisations to discuss the concept of human security. This platform restarted its meetings in June 2021 with the aim of revitalising the debate on the concept of “human security” (MOFA of Japan, 2016b).

### **3.1.8. Kishida Government (October 2021-December 2022)**

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' initial government budget proposal for fiscal year 2022, Japan has set five priorities, the second of which is to promote “human security and demonstrate leadership in addressing global issues” (MOFA of Japan, 2022). In FY2023, “human security” was included as one of the five priorities, but this time in third place, as promoting “human security” and strengthening efforts to address global challenges (外務省, 2023).

Prime Minister Kishida has made clear his determination to work with the UN to promote initiatives based on the principle of “human security in the new era”. In this context, the global challenges that Japan is attempting to address include achieving the SDGs through capacity building support and co-operating with developing countries based on the principle of human security.

In the “Charter for Development Cooperation” revised on 9 June 2023, which is planned to be revised by the first half of 2023 in order to further expand and accelerate efforts to achieve the SDGs through the strategic and effective use of ODA as one of the most important diplomatic tools in “the new era of human security”, Japan continues to position human security as “a guiding principle that underlies all of its development cooperation (我が国のあらゆる開発協力に通底する指導理念)”, and emphasises “investment in people (人への投資)” to realise human security in the new era (MOFA of Japan, 2023; 外務省, 2023a; 外務省, 2023c). Furthermore, the Charter includes the strategy of “solidarity (連帯)”, which is stated to be added to the strategies of “protection (保護)” and “empowerment (能力強化)”, and “agency (主体性)”, which is referred to as the new framework for human security in Special HDR 2022 (MOFA of Japan, 2023a; 外務省, 2023c).

Prime Minister Kishida gave a speech at the UNGA on 19 September 2023. When examining this speech in the realm of human security, the significant focus on human dignity (人間の尊厳) throughout the speech becomes prominent. In his speech, Kishida emphasised the challenges faced by the international community. He argued that creating a “common language (共通の言葉)” based on human dignity could help address these crises, and that prioritising human life and dignity was necessary. Kishida called on the international community to take responsibility and focus on “human-centred international cooperation (人間中心の国際協力).” He also highlighted two key points related to these issues. These points aim to collaborate towards achieving a tranquil and steadfast international community where the concept of human dignity is honoured, and to maintain equilibrium between the progression of digitalisation and human dignity. Throughout his speech, various topics were linked to human dignity. The following points can be considered key.

- The UN Charter committed to safeguarding human dignity through its writing.

- Maintenance of the rule of law and the right to live in peace is essential in strengthening and protecting human dignity.
- Japan holds a leading role in the protection of human dignity.
- Private financing should be made available to develop economies that promote protection of human dignity (Kishida, 2023).

“Investment in people (人への投資)” was referred to in this speech. However, the “Charter for Development Cooperation” refers to “investment in people” to achieve human security in the new era. In contrast, Kishida outlined “investment in people” as crucial to achieving both “quality growth (質の高い成長)” and “sustainable growth (持続可能な成長)”. He described it as a “key (鍵)” to addressing inequality and achieving the SDGs. Additionally, he stated that “investment in people” is his “political credo (政治信条)” (Kishida, 2023).

## 3.2. ANALYSING JAPANESE HUMAN SECURITY


Through significant moments, the previous section reviewed the changes in the Japanese interpretation of human security across different government. This section scrutinises human security’s representation in the Japanese National Diet, in Diplomatic Bluebooks, and speeches by Japanese policymakers at the UNGA.

### 3.2.1. Human security in the Minutes of the Diet

As noted previously, in the minutes of the Japanese National Diet, the phrase “*ningen no anzenhoshō* (人間の安全保障)” was first mentioned outside the context of human security in the 106<sup>th</sup> Japanese Diet session on 5 August 1986 and in the context of a human security perspective in the 132<sup>nd</sup> Diet session on International Affairs on 15 February 1995 (National Diet Library, 1986; National Diet Library, 1995).



It was also mentioned that the concept of “humankind security (人類の安全保障, *jinrui no anzen hoshō*)” was emphasised in a speech that could be associated with food security at the 118<sup>th</sup> session of the Japanese Diet on 25 April 1990 (National Diet Library, 1990). Furthermore, “*hyūman sekyuriti* (ヒューマン・セキユリテイ)” is also used in the Japanese National Diet to refer to human security. This expression was brought into Japanese from English. It is therefore necessary to look at each of these three expressions of human security.



**Figure 4.** The frequency with which human security is mentioned in the Japanese National Diet


Figure 4 shows the number of days on which human security was debated in the Japanese Diet each year from 1986 to the first half of 2023.<sup>21</sup> “*Ningen no anzenhoshō*”, shown in red in the figure, did not appear in the Diet records after 1986 until 1995, that is when it reached its first peak. The number of days debated, which declined for a while, has been in an upward trend since 1998, although it declined in some of the years after 1998 until 2008, peaking at 60 days in 2008. After this date, it is not possible to speak of a clear upward or downward trend in the number of the days the concept was on the agenda, but

<sup>21</sup> This figure is based on Sarah Tanke’s work published in 2022, but her publication does not include “*jinrui no anzen hoshō*” and the time period chosen is not the same (Tanke, 2022).

it can be observed that there was a decrease between 2008 and 2011, an increase until 2015 and then a decrease again. After 1999, the number of days on which human security was on the agenda did not fall below 20 days. To compare this situation with the other two equivalents of human security, “*jinrui no anzenhoshō*” peaked in 1998 with 5 days a year, and “*hyūman sekyuriti*” reached its peak in 2001 with 14 days a year. Neither of these terms has shown an upward trend since then. This indicates that “*ningen no anzenhoshō*” is the conceptual equivalent of human security adopted by Japanese policymakers.

### 3.2.2. Human security in Diplomatic Bluebooks

Since 1998, the year in which human security was introduced in Japan, there has not been a single year in which human security was not mentioned in the Bluebooks. Since 1999, when the 1998 report was published, the concept has been less prominent from time to time (e.g., 2003, 2009, 2012) but with peaks in 2005 and 2014 (see Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Human security in Diplomatic Bluebooks, 1999-2023<sup>22</sup>

The first peak occurred in 2000, followed by a downward trend in the number of times the concept was mentioned in the report until 2003, after which there was an increase in the number of times human security was used, which began to decline with a peak in

<sup>22</sup> The years indicated in the figure are the years the Bluebook was published.

2005. There was a downward trend until 2010, after which there was an increase. After 2012, it increased again and in 2014 it started to decrease again. After 2018, the number of occurrences of human security in the report started to increase. The fact that human security has been included in the report of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs every year since 1998 proves that it has been adopted as an integral part of Japanese foreign policy. Japan's focus on human security has fluctuated over time, this variation can be interpreted by examining the contexts in which human security is linked to Japanese foreign policy.

Periods	English version of the Bluebook	Japanese version of the Bluebook
1998(?)-1999	a key perspective in developing Japan's foreign policy	外交を展開していく上での重要な視点
2000	one of the key perspectives of Japanese diplomacy	日本外交の柱の一 (2000) (one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy)
2001	a key perspective in the development of Japan's foreign policy	日本外交を展開していく上での中心的な視点の一つ
2002	one of the key perspectives of its foreign policy	外交の重要な視点の一つ
2003-2005	Advancing/promoting diplomacy with an emphasis on the perspective of human security	「人間の安全保障」の視点を重視しつつ外交を推進している 「人間の安全保障」の視点を重視して外交を推進している
2006-2008	ODA Charter principle ensuring human security	ODA 大綱の人間の安全保障の視点を重視する 人間の安全保障の確立を重点とする
2009-2012	human security as a guiding principle	人間の安全保障を指導理念とする
2013	a key challenge for Japan's diplomacy	人間の安全保障を指導理念として重視している
2014(?)-2017	human security as one of its diplomatic pillars	人間の安全保障を外交の柱の1つ
2018	human security as one of its diplomatic pillars + a guiding principle that lies at the roots of Japan's development cooperation	日本の開発協力の根本にある指導理念

2019-2023	a guiding principle that lies at the roots of Japan's development cooperation	日本の開発協力の根本にある指導理念
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**Table 2.** The context wherein the term human security is placed in the Diplomatic Bluebook (外交青書)

As summarised in Table 2, Japanese policymakers have not consistently placed human security in the same position. Nevertheless, while Japanese foreign policy may undergo occasional policy changes, there are certain principles that remain constant. It would be accurate to state that these principles have had an impact on human security within the context of Japan.

If we take a closer look at the Diplomatic Bluebooks and consider which words are repeated most frequently under the headings related to human security, it will become clearer how Japan perceives this concept. For this analysis, the Japanese versions of the Bluebooks were analysed with User Local's AI Text mining (ユーザーローカル AI テキストマイニング) tool.

Rank	Word 1	Word 2	Co-occurrences
1	これら (these)	問題 (issue)	8
2	アジア (Asia)	経済危機 (economic crisis)	8
3	アジア (Asia)	対応 (response)	7
4	アジア (Asia)	小渕 ( <i>Obuchi</i> )	7
5	人間の安全保障 (human security)	取組 (initiative)	6
6	アジア (Asia)	健康 (health)	6
7	人間の安全保障 (human security)	考え方 (way of thinking)	5
8	人間の安全保障 (human security)	行う (to do)	5
9	取組 (initiative)	問題 (issue)	5
10	問題 (issue)	国際社会 (international community)	5

**Table 3.** Prominent word pairs under the Human Security heading in the 1999 Bluebook

The two most repeated words under the Human Security heading of Bluebook 1999 are “human security” (8 times) and “Asia” (8 times), followed by “issue” (7 times) and “initiative” (5 times). However, when we look at the number of co-occurrences of the words, it is understood that the emphasis on “Asia” is dominant, and an attempt is made

to define what human security is. The two most prominent concepts in Bluebook 1999, “human security” and “Asia” are mentioned together 6 times in Bluebook 2000, but the emphasis on “assistance” and “project” in line with the human security has replaced the effort to define the concept of human security. In 2000, “human security” and “United Nations” were mentioned together 7 times, and the focus was on the concept of human security itself, with no emphasis on “Asia”. In 2001, on the other hand, the “international community (国際社会)” and “threats (脅威)” were mentioned together 7 times, and in general, under this heading, the emphasis on “threats” rather than “initiatives” stands out. In Bluebook 2003, the words “community(コミュニテイ)–building(造り)” and “UN (国連)–fund (基金)” were the most often cooccurred words with 4 times. When Bluebook 2004 is analysed, it is seen that “commission” (9 times) is often mentioned together with human security, and that the notions of “cooperation” (7 times) and “fund” (7 times) cooccured with human security more frequently than other concepts.

Rank	Word 1	Word 2	Number of co-occurrence
1	人間の安全保障 (human security)	委員会 (commission)	9
2		協力 (cooperation)	7
3		資金 (fund)	7
4		無償 (free of charge)	6
5		考え方 (way of thinking)	6
6		草の根 (grassroots)	6
7		人間の安全保障 (human security)	5
8		視点 (perspective)	5
9		重視(emphasis)	5
10		推進(promotion)	4

**Table 4.** Prominent word pairs under the headings related to Human Security in the Bluebook 2004

This situation is similar in Bluebook 2005. The word “commission” is used 17 times, and the word “fund” is used 7 times along with the word “human security”. In Bluebook 2006, this decreased to 8 times for “commission” and 5 times for “fund”. In 2004, “commission” was the most frequently used in the context of human security, while in 2005, “commission” and “Japan (日本)” were used in same sentence with human security 8

times. In 2006, the concepts most frequently cooccurred with human security were the United Nations (6 times) and 理念 (*rinen*), meaning principle/ideal. In 2007, the notion of “assistance” was more prominent than “human security”. The concept of “assistance” cooccurred with “Japan (日本)” 20 times, “human security (人間の安全保障)” 19 times and “US Dollar (米ドル)” 19 times respectively. Since there is no human security sub-heading in Bluebook 2009, the heading “Promoting international cooperation (国際協力の推進)” was analysed. In this heading, “assistance” is more prominent than the concept of “human security”. The word “assistance” was mentioned 23 times with “US Dollar”, 17 times with “implementation (実施)” and 14 times with “Japan”. When we look at the words with which the concept of human security appears together mostly, “issue (問題)”, “assistance (支援)”, important point (重点)”, “developing countries (開発途上国)”, each four times.

In Bluebook 2010, there are words that are more often used in co-occurrence with other words than human security, for example “assistance” and “Japan” 28 times, ODA and “Japan” 20 times, “implementation” and “assistance” 19 times. Human security is most commonly used with the words “Japan” (9 times) and “cooperation” (8 times). In Bluebook 2011, “assistance” was the most frequently used word in co-occurrence with another word. For example, it was used 21 times with the word “education (教育)” and 17 times with the word “field (分野)”. Apart from “assistance”, another word that draws attention is “education”, which is not mentioned so often in previous reports. On the other hand, human security was used 15 times with Japan and 13 times with “assistance”. In the Bluebook 2012, human security is briefly covered under the heading of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). If we look at the words with which human security is co-occurred in this part of the report, these are “Japan” (10 times), “MDGs” (4 times), “realisation (実現)” (4 times), “assistance” (4 times).

In Bluebook 2013, Human Security is covered under both the MDGs and ODA titles. The most frequently used word pair is “assistance (支援)”–“Japan (日本)” with 38 times. Human security is used 13 times with the word “Japan”, 7 times with “strengthening (強化)” and 6 times with “assistance”. When the text is analysed in general, it is seen that “assistance” is the most frequently used word together with another word. In Bluebook 2014, word pairs co-occurring with the word “assistance” are also prominent, but the word pair mentioned together even more than that is “ODA–Japan” (29 times). Among the words with which human security is most often mentioned together are “Japan” (14 times), “UN” (10 times) and “assistance” (8 times). In Bluebook 2015, the most frequently occurring word pair was again “assistance”–“Japan” (33 times), while the words most frequently combined with human security were “Japan” (12 times), “assistance” (9 times) and “cooperation” (7 times).

Word Pair	Bluebook year				
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
	co-occurrence				
協力-開発 (cooperation–development)	46	14	36	42	48
協力-日本 (cooperation–Japan)	39	24	41	45	41
支援-日本 (assistance–Japan)	26	28	24	39	41
日本-開発 (Japan–development)	23	12	21	27	26
人間の安全保障-日本 (human security–Japan)	17	9	9	13	7

**Table 5.** Prominent word pairs under the headings related to Human Security in the Bluebook, 2016-2020

In Bluebook 2016, human security is covered under the headings of ODA and SDGs. The pair “assistance”–“Japan” frequently co-occurred with 26 times, but the prominent concept was “cooperation (協力)”. The words with which it occurs most frequently are “development (開発)” (46 times), “Japan” (39 times), and “fund (資金)” (22 times). Human security was used together with “cooperation” (8 times) and “assistance” (8 times) and most frequently with “Japan” (17 times); this pattern continued in the 2017 report with 9 times; in Bluebook 2018 with 9 times; in Bluebook 2019 with 13 times. In Bluebook 2017, the two most repeated words “cooperation” (28 times) and “assistance” (24 times) occurred in the same sentence with Japan.

Word Pair	Bluebook year					
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
	co-occurrence					
協力-開発 (cooperation-development)	36	42	48	47	16	13
協力-日本 (cooperation-Japan)	41	45	41	53	24	11
SDGs-推進 (SDGs-promotion)	37	38	51	24	19	17
SDGs-日本(SDGs-Japan)	24	25	26	17	11	7

**Table 6.** Prominent word pairs under the headings related to Human Security in the Bluebook, 2018-2023

In the 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 reports, “cooperation” and “SDGs” are prominent. For example, “cooperation”–“Japan” (e.g., 53 times in 2021), “cooperation”–“development” (e.g., 48 times in 2020), “SDGs”–“promotion” (e.g., 51 times in 2020), “SDGs”–“Japan” (24 times in 2018, 25 times in 2019, 26 times in 2020) co-occur. Although in numerous other Bluebooks, “human security” and “UN” are frequently co-occurring, in 2020, the “UN” was the word most frequently used in combination with “human security” with 12 occurrences.

The 2022 Bluebook’s sections related to human security again emphasise notions other than human security. Among these notions, in addition to “assistance” (e.g. “assistance”–“Japan”, 29 times) and “cooperation” (e.g. “cooperation”–“Japan”, 24 times), which are also prominent in previous reports, the word “nutrition”—e.g. “summit”–“nutrition” (サミット-栄養) 26 times, and “improvement”–“nutrition” (改善-栄養) 25 times—stands out. As can be seen in Table 7, there has been a decrease in the number of occurrences of some of the concepts that came together more frequently in previous reports. This shows that Japan is focusing more on issues related to “nutrition” under the headings related to human security in 2021. In Bluebook 2023, the frequency of co-occurrence of concepts with “assistance” is noticeable. For example, “assistance”–“Japan” occurred in the same sentence 22 times, “strengthening”–“assistance” 18 times, “implementation”–“assistance” 16 times. Not very different from the other years, in both the 2022 (8 times) and 2023 (10 times) reports, human security is most frequently used together with “Japan”.



Rank	Word 1	Word 2	Number of co-occurrence
1	人間の安全保障 (human security)	日本 (Japan)	222
2		国連 (UN)	142
3		支援 (assistance)	129
4		協力 (cooperation)	112
5		課題 (task)	95
6		基金 (fund)	89
7		取組 (initiative)	84
8		設置 (establishment)	80
9		考え方 (way of thinking)	70
10		理念 (principle)	68

**Table 7.** Words that most often appeared together with human security in the Bluebooks, 1999-2023

When the Bluebooks are analysed together, the word “Japan” is used most often together with human security, followed by the word the “UN”. On this basis, it can be said that the actor that Japan emphasises in its human security narrative is “Japan” itself before the UN. Human security was mentioned together with aid-related terms such as “assistance”, “cooperation” and “fund”. It is understood that Japan sometimes characterises human security as an “initiative,” sometimes as a “way of thinking”, and sometimes as a “principle”.

### 3.2.3. Analysing human security in Japan’s addresses at the UNGA

The Japanese government has frequently taken part in the General Debates at the UNGA, usually at the level of the Prime Minister. In cases where the Japanese Prime Minister was unable to attend, the Foreign Ministers would participate instead (see Table 8). The speeches held during the General Debates are highly significant, as they provide a platform for each country to elucidate their priorities to the international community.

Under this heading, this thesis will examine the position of human security in addresses delivered since 1994, when discussion of the concept began in the international community. For this analysis, the Japanese versions of the addresses were analysed with User Local’s AI Text mining (ユーザーローカル AI テキストマイニング) tool. In this analysis, the study published by Sarah Tanke in 2022 is used as a reference, but neither

the tool used, the time period chosen nor the language of the speeches used as a source are the same.

Session (Year)	Speaker
48 <sup>th</sup> (1994)	Yōhei Kōno (FM)
49 <sup>th</sup> (1995)	
51 <sup>st</sup> (1996)	Ryūtarō Hashimoto (PM)
52 <sup>nd</sup> (1997)	Keizō Obuchi (FM)
53 <sup>rd</sup> (1998)	Keizō Obuchi (PM)
54 <sup>th</sup> (1999)	Masahiko Kōmura (FM)
55 <sup>th</sup> (2000)	Yōhei Kōno (FM)
56 <sup>th</sup> (2001)	Kiichi Miyazawa (PM)
57 <sup>th</sup> (2002)	Junichirō Koizumi (PM)
58 <sup>th</sup> (2003)	Yoriko Kawaguchi (FM)
59 <sup>th</sup> (2004)	Junichirō Koizumi (PM)
60 <sup>th</sup> (2005)	Nobutaka Machimura (FM)
61 <sup>st</sup> (2006)	Kenzō Ōshima (Permanent Representative to the UN)
62 <sup>nd</sup> (2007)	Masahiko Kōmura (FM)
63 <sup>rd</sup> (2008)	Tarō Asō (PM)
64 <sup>th</sup> (2009)	Yukio Hatoyama (PM)
65 <sup>th</sup> (2010)	Naoto Kan (PM)
66 <sup>th</sup> (2011)	Yoshihiko Noda (PM)
67 <sup>th</sup> (2012)	
68 <sup>th</sup> (2013)	Shinzō Abe (PM)
69 <sup>th</sup> (2014)	
70 <sup>th</sup> (2015)	
71 <sup>st</sup> (2016)	
72 <sup>nd</sup> (2017)	
73 <sup>rd</sup> (2018)	
74 <sup>th</sup> (2019)	
75 <sup>th</sup> (2020)	
Special Session on COVID-19	Yoshihide Suga (PM)
76 <sup>th</sup> (2021)	
77 <sup>th</sup> (2022)	Kishida Fumio (PM)
78 <sup>th</sup> (2023)	

**Table 8.** List of Japanese policymakers who addressed the UNGA General Debates, 1994-2023

The analysis centred on the frequent use of “human security (*ningen no anzenhoshō*)”, “security (*anzen and anzenhoshō*)”, and “human (*ningen*)” in speeches. The pairs of words were scrutinised for repeated occurrences. Notably, “*ningen*” was not frequently associated with any other word. As a consequence, evaluations are made on security and human security.



**Figure 6.** Human security in Japanese policymakers' addresses at the UNGA General Debate, 1994-2023

Prior to the 1999 speech, there was no mention of human security in any of the speeches. Upon analysing Figure 6, it becomes clear that the concept was most frequently mentioned in speeches given in 2000 and 2022. However, despite reaching its peak in 2000, it was absent from speeches given in 2001 and 2002. Similarly, the concept of human security, which was mentioned in every speech until 2016 after the 2003 speech, was not mentioned at all in the speeches between 2016 and 2019. Excluding this three-year period, it is evident that Japan continued to prioritize the concept in its UN agenda following the publication of the CHS “Human Security Now” report in 2003, as can be observed from the evaluation of this as seen in Figure 6.

The term “security” is used in two different ways in these speeches as “anzen (安全)” and “anzenhoshō (安全保障)”. This word is most often linked to “peace (平和)”, with 41 instances for “anzen” and 11 instances for “anzenhoshō”. Furthermore, Table 9 illustrates Japan’s perspective on security as a concept that requires “maintenance (維持)” (13 occurrences). In terms of security, the actors referenced are primarily international, and specifically the Security Council (14 occurrences), the UN (13 occurrences), or the international community (12 occurrences) rather than Japan itself (12 occurrences of “our country (我が国)” and 9 occurrences of “Japan (日本)”).

Rank	Word pair	Number of co-occurrence
1	安全-平和 (security–peace)	41
2	国際-安全 (international–security)	25
3	安保理-安全 (security council–security)	14
4	国連-安全 (UN–security)	13
5	安全-維持 (security–maintenance)	13
6	国際社会-安全 (international community–security)	12
7	安全-我が国 (security–our country)	11
8	安全-役割 (security–role)	9
9	安全-日本 (security–Japan)	9
10	安全-実現 (security–implementation)	8

**Table 9.** Security (*anzen*) in Japanese policymakers’ addresses at the UNGA General Debates, 1994-2023

Upon analysing all speeches collectively, it is noteworthy that Japan is the most frequently cited actor in relation to human security, with mention of both “our country” and “Japan”. This trend is consistent with the findings from the Bluebooks. Japan is described or associated with human security as an “initiative” in 13 instances, a “principle” in 11 instances, and a “way of thinking” in 7 instances, mirroring the language used in the Bluebooks.

Rank	Word 1	Word 2	Occurrence
1	人間の安全保障 (human security)	我が国 (our country)	14
2		取組 (initiatives)	13
3		新た (new)	12
4		理念 (principle)	11
5		重要 (important)	9
6		達成 (achievement)	8
7		時代 (era)	8
8		考え方 (way of thinking)	7
9		強化 (strengthening)	7
10		日本 (Japan)	7

**Table 10.** Words that most often appeared together with human security in Japanese policymakers’ addresses at the UNGA General Debates, 1994-2023

As seen in Table 10, the descriptions of human security in the speeches are predominantly positive in nature with frequent use of terms such as “new (新た)” (12 occurrences), “achievement” (達成) (8 occurrences) and “strengthening (強化)” (7 occurrences). Negative evaluations are not prominent in the speeches. Only 1999 and 2022 are notable years in the context of human security where the term “new (新た)” holds significance. In 1999, the concept of human security was first mentioned by a Japanese policymaker during a UNGA speech. Meanwhile, the year 2022 stands out because of Prime Minister Kishida’s emphasis on a new era in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.

### **3.3. EVALUATION OF THE POLICIES PURSUED**

It is important to note that Japan’s sole consistent policy on human security originated from the establishment of the TFHS, “on Japan’s initiative” and the Japanese governments have donated a total of about 50 billion yen to the Fund up to fiscal year 2022 (外務省, 2023a; 外務省, 2023b). So, given Japan’s perspective on human security, may we conclude that it is identical to aid? The answer is both yes and no.

In policy documents and speeches, security is frequently paired with peace, whereas human security is commonly linked to aid and assistance. Furthermore, in speeches delivered at the UNGA in particular, security is addressed in terms of actors in the international community, and human security is mentioned together with Japan. From this perspective, Japan aims to establish itself as a player within the global community that offers assistance while embracing the human security approach. Accordingly, the answer to this question is yes. A few examples to support this are given below.

Even the 1997 speech of the then Prime Minister Hashimoto—one of the first to mention the concept of human security, specifically “humankind security” before it became Japanese government’s policy—places a strong emphasis on “ODA and their role in promoting sustainable development” in developing countries (環境省, 1997). As noted above, Prime Minister Obuchi then defined human security. He even mentioned the connection between “human security” and a “life in dignity”. Despite such rhetoric, the first institution to be established was a trust fund. After 2006, it is possible to say that

human security is directly associated with Japan's ODA, although it is often considered one of the principles of Japanese foreign policy.

With the 2015 revision of the ODA Charter, which was renamed as the Development Cooperation Charter, human security has become a full-fledged ODA policy. JICA is the ODA policy-making body. It would not be wrong to say: JICA is the organisation that has taken over Obuchi's legacy. In addition, the fact that Sadako Ogata, who was involved in the creation of the "Human Security Now" report, which was central to the UN's institutionalisation of "human security", became the head of the JICA in 2003, helped to ensure that the human security rhetoric was effectively continued by a Japanese agency until she left her post in 2012 (外務省, 2012b; Kyodo News, 2019). Perhaps thanks to the perspective and policies of Ogata, who had served in many different positions at the UN (e.g. UN High Commissioner for Refugees), human security remained a part of Japan's foreign policy despite the changes of prime ministers.

Akihiko Tanaka and Shinichi Kitaoka, who succeeded Ogata as JICA President, also contributed to JICA's human security policy and continued to meet with officials from many countries. In addition, JICA began offering academic education programmes (e.g. "JICA Development Studies Program" and "JICA Chair") on human development and human security with Japanese universities. JICA also continues to contribute to the literature through a research institute named after Sadako Ogata. In addition, it publishes annual reports on human security. It is noteworthy that Akihiko Tanaka, who was serving his second term as JICA president, emphasised "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific" ("自由で開かれたインド太平洋", FOIP) initiative, which was also highly valued by Prime Minister Kishida, and that most of his meetings were with countries in what the Japanese government defines as the Indo-Pacific region (Tanaka, 2022). However, it is difficult to envisage that current Prime Minister Kishida's human security policy in the new era can go beyond an instrumentalised human security rhetoric, given the increase in Japan's defence expenditure and the policy documents on defence.

Returning to the question of whether human security is identical to aid, when we look at Japan's understanding of human security, using the Japanese understanding of human security as a synonym only for the concept of aid may mean ignoring other ways of

characterising human security. The possibility that the answer to this question is no will be explored below.

It is possible to consider Japan's current human security policy as a supporting element of the FOIP initiative was mentioned above. This policy was made part of the Japanese foreign policy by Shinzo Abe in 2016, and this initiative was aimed at "the economic development and stability" of countries in the region. Today, the emphasis on India in the Indo-Pacific region is prominent (MOFA of Japan, 2023b).

A fundamental reason for considering human security policy as a supporting element is that in "the Development Cooperation Charter" that was revised on 9 June 2023, Japan continues to position human security as "a guiding principle that underlies all of its development cooperation (我が国のあらゆる開発協力に通底する指導理念)" and emphasises "investment in people (人への投資)" to realise human security in the new era, has been revised to facilitate ODA, as highlighted in the FOIP initiative (MOFA of Japan, 2023a; 外務省, 2023c).

We may assess Japan's human security approach by analogy with the "*amae*" theory, which was explained at the beginning of this Chapter as one of the theories put forward to explain Japanese society. Doi's "*amae*" theory and related binary concepts are not theories or concepts produced to make sense of international relations or political science, but it can be said that Japanese politicians/policymakers produce rhetoric by looking through similar lenses or by reflecting that they are looking through these lenses.

When discussing security in their UNGA addresses, Japanese policymakers commonly refer to the international community as the "actor" as it represents the "*soto* (outside)". Additionally, they often allude to the UN Charter as a representation of the current international "*omote* (front)" rules. The evidence that Japan most frequently associates security with the concept of peace in the UNGA lends weight to this argument. To achieve "*wa* (harmony)" within the international community and satisfy the "*amae* ideal", states with a voice within the international community hold "*giri* (responsibilities)". These responsibilities, particularly in Japan's case, as stated by Japanese officials, involve

adhering to the UN Charter and international law, as well as providing aid for the development of other nations. “*Ura* (back)”, on the other hand, can be interpreted as Japan’s endeavour to attain enough military capabilities to defend itself against the threats around it and Japan’s ever-increasing military budget. Thus, the human security perspective and peace-loving country identity characterise Japan in “*tatemae*”, or official stance, while in “*honne*”, or real intention, Japan appears as an actor engaged in development assistance and economic cooperation with Asian and African countries. Hence, it can be deduced that the Japanese human security understanding, at least today, is a supporting element of its foreign policies, which are more visible through the concept of aid.



## CONCLUSION

This thesis questioned the reasons for Japan's adoption and maintenance of a human security perspective. Japan is a country that has not abandoned its initiatives on human security, and they have been in the background as parts of a supplementary policy from time to time.

When human security was first announced by Japan, the concept had its own section in the Bluebook, but over the years it has been included in sub-headings (but never under the UN heading) under Japan's "International Cooperation or Response to Global Issues", where ODA section is included. If an analogy is to be drawn, it can be said that Japan's ODA and the TFHS can be likened, and similarly, the HSU and JICA are similar in terms of function.

Japanese prime ministers have a tradition of announcing their policies either immediately upon their arrival or, if the policy pursued by their predecessor has been accepted, after it has been settled especially on the New Year's Eve. If the policy is aimed for the international scale, it is generally announced at the UN. If it is regional, a visit to the targeted location is planned and the ground is prepared for the announcement of the policy. In this vein, human security was Prime Minister Obuchi's policy, but since the institution that could implement the policy had been established and accepted by the international community, it would not be wrong to say that the policy of human security was inherited by the subsequent prime minister because of Obuchi's untimely death. If we look at the Koizumi government, it can be inferred from Koizumi's speeches that he wanted to reduce human security to the level of bureaucracy or development aid and made efforts to implement his own policies.

The human security rhetoric produced by Japan appears to be an instrumentalised rhetoric that legitimises its own aid policy rather than a hegemonic rhetoric, that is, a rhetoric that dominates other countries and pushes states to follow a human security policy. Accordingly, while human security was initially the rhetoric of the Prime Ministry, it then became the rhetoric of the foreign ministry. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, it was the rhetoric of JICA, which administered ODA. Today, with Kishida's rhetoric, there is a

rhetoric of “human security of the new era”. Prime Minister Kishida stated that he will implement “human security in the new era” with the influence of the UNDP Human Security Report published in 2022. At the same time, Japan has included human security among the three basic policies it will follow while sitting in the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member.

The Japanese narrative to date has been that the Constitution restricts them, but it is worth questioning whether Japan is using the constitutional policy of keeping military power at the level of defence power to strengthen itself economically. Does Article 9 of the Constitution create a disadvantage for Japan, or will it create a burden both in terms of its image in the international arena and the responsibilities it will have to assume when it has a military? This is a question that is difficult to answer until we experience it, but it is one that must be asked in future studies.

The concept of human security itself has been criticised for being vague and lacking clear boundaries, with actors addressing only threats to existence, though not today. While the debate on the issues that threaten human security has relatively increased in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has not been much discussion on the principles and strategies of human security until the UNDP “Special Report on Human Security” was published. However, as mentioned earlier, the same concepts gain and lose meaning when translated from one language to another. For example, determining the meaning of dignity in freedom to live in dignity in relation to the threats we face today is not as easy as making this freedom part of human security.

Considering the steps taken since the second Abe government, it is possible to conclude that Japan is accelerating its steps towards becoming a “normal” state, but this does not mean that it will become a militarised state. Arguably, Japan is no longer an economic or political giant and a military dwarf, but a tightrope walker that balances both.

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## APPENDIX 1 ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

	<p><b>HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY</b>  <b>GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES</b>  <b>ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS</b></p>
<p><b>HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY</b>  <b>GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES</b>  <b>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Date: 04/10/2023</p> <p>Thesis Title: Evolution of the Notion of Human Security and Japanese Human Security Understanding(s)</p> <p>My thesis work related to the title above:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.</li> <li>2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).</li> <li>3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.</li> <li>4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).</li> </ol> <p>I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.</p> <p>I respectfully submit this for approval.</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;">Date and Signature</div> <p><b>Name Surname:</b> Aysu İmran ERKOÇ</p> <p><b>Student No:</b> N18132172</p> <p><b>Department:</b> International Relations</p> <p><b>Program:</b> International Relations</p> <p><b>Status:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MA    <input type="checkbox"/> Ph.D.    <input type="checkbox"/> Combined MA/ Ph.D.</p>	
<p><b><u>ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL</u></b></p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">APPROVED.</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">_____  Prof. Dr. Mine Pınar GÖZEN ERCAN</p>	



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Date: 04/10/2023

Thesis Title: Evolution of the Notion of Human Security and Japanese Human Security Understanding(s)

My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
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3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
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I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

**Name Surname:** Aysu İmran ERKOÇ  
**Student No:** N18132172  
**Department:** International Relations  
**Program:** International Relations  
**Status:**  MA  Ph.D.  Combined MA/ Ph.D.

**ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL**

APPROVED.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Mine Pınar GÖZEN ERCAN

## APPENDIX 2 ORIGINALITY REPORT



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 04/10/2023

Tez Başlığı: İnsani Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Japon İnsani Güvenlik Anlayış(lar)ı

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 81 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 04/10/2023 tarihinde tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı %7'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1-  Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- 2-  Kaynakça hariç
- 3-  Alıntılar hariç
- 4-  Alıntılar dâhil
- 5-  5 kelimededen daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

**Adı Soyadı:** Aysu İmran Erkoç

**Öğrenci No:** N18132172

**Anabilim Dalı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler

**Programı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler

**DANIŞMAN ONAYI**

UYGUNDUR.

Prof. Dr. Mine Pınar GÖZEN ERCAN



**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**  
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**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**  
**ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞINA**

Tarih: 04/10/2023

Tez Başlığı: İnsani Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi ve Japon İnsani Güvenlik Anlayış(lar)ı

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**Programı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler

**DANIŞMAN ONAYI**

UYGUNDUR.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Mine Pınar GÖZEN ERCAN