



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

**TRANSFORMATION AND CONTINUITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY FROM THE END OF THE COLD WAR TO PRESENT**

Hazal CAN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2022

TRANSFORMATION AND CONTINUITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE
END OF THE COLD WAR TO PRESENT

Hazal CAN

Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2022

KABUL VE ONAY

Hazal CAN tarafından hazırlanan "Transformation and Continuity in German Foreign Policy from the End of The Cold War To Present" başlıklı bu çalışma, [Savunma Sınavı Tarihi] tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından [Tezin Türü] olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Prof. Dr.M. Nail ALKAN (Başkan)

Doç. Dr. Murat ÖNSOY (Danışman)

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kadri Kaan RENDA (Üye)

Yukarıdaki imzaların adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylım.

Prof.Dr. Uğur ÖMÜRGÖNÜLŞEN

Enstitü Müdürü

YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI

Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin/raporumun tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarım bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır.

Tezin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinlerin yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan **“Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge”** kapsamında tezim aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır.

- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren 2 yıl ertelenmiştir. ⁽¹⁾
- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ... ay ertelenmiştir. ⁽²⁾
- Tezimle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. ⁽³⁾

...../...../.....

Hazal CAN

¹“Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge”

- (1) Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü teze ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez **danışmanın**ın önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulu** iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir.
- (2) Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internetten paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez **danışmanın**ın önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulunun** gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir.

ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandıđım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadıđımı, yararlandıđım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, **Do. Dr. Murat NSOY** danıřmanlıđında tarafımdan retildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

Hazal CAN

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Finding and choosing words that will express my gratitude to everyone who supported me during the writing process of this thesis is not so easy. In the first place, I would like to thank my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Önsoy for his endless support, kindness and patience. His guidance helped me complete my Master's degree. In fact, I am lucky to have met and studied with him. Honestly, I could not have imagined having a better advisor for my Master's study.

In addition to my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Nail Alkan and Dr. Kadri Kaan Renda for their constructive criticism, questions and encouragement.

My sincere thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Yaşar Aydın from Hafen City University Hamburg for accepting to have an interview with me on the thesis subject to widen my perspective.

Furthermore, I would like to express my endless gratitude to my beloved friends Çiğdem Deniz, Zeynep Çoruh and Oliver Zühlke for being with me throughout my hardest time. Without their support, I would have struggled a lot.

Of course, the most special thanks go to my parents Rukiye Can and Halil Ibrahim Can for supporting me and providing every single opportunity I have needed throughout my life. I hope I have become the daughter of whom they will always be proud. They mean everything to me.

Last but not least, despite sounding odd to some, I would like to thank myself for coping with all the hardships I encountered during the writing process of my thesis. Finally, the light at the end of the tunnel has been seen. I will put an end to my academic journey with this thesis; however, it will always guide me along the way up to my career steps.

ABSTRACT

Can, Hazel. *Transformation and Continuity in German Foreign Policy From the End of the Cold War To Present*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2022.

According to the Constructivist IR theory, the most basic factors affecting a state's behaviour are ideas, perceptions and interests. However, at this point, by a constructivist structure, interests are associated with ideas rather than material power, and interests in question are shaped within the scope of socially constructed ideas and perceptions. Hence, ideas, perceptions and interests may change in accordance with the present situation. At the same time, the Constructivist IR theory discusses roles and identities guided by ideas and perceptions. On this basis, this thesis argues whether Germany grounds on continuity in its foreign policy based on a "civilian power" concept starting from the end of the Cold War and reunification until today. In this context, the change/transformation and continuity of the guiding foreign policy principles which Germany constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War are also questioned. In the meantime, it is discussed whether or not Germany has diverged from being a "civilian power" by breaking the taboo of the restraint on military power, which is one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy within the frame of the out-of-area missions it has joined so far with a sense of international responsibility.

Keywords

German Foreign policy, reunification, civilian power, Constructivist IR theory, out-of-area missions, continuity, transformation.

ÖZET

CAN, Hazal. *Soğuk Savaş'ın Bitiminden Günümüze Alman Dış Politikasında Dönüşüm ve Süreklilik*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2022.

İnşacı Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisine göre bir devletin davranışını etkileyen en temel etmenler fikirler, algılar ve çıkarlardır. Ancak, bu noktada, inşacı yapı itibarıyla çıkarlar maddi güçten ziyade fikirlerle ilişkilidir ve söz konusu çıkarlar sosyal olarak inşa edilen fikirler ve algılar çerçevesinde şekillenir. Dolayısıyla fikirler, algılar ve çıkarlar da içinde bulunulan duruma göre değişiklik gösterebilmektedir. İnşacı Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi aynı zamanda fikirler ve algılar tarafından yönetilen rolleri ve kimlikleri de konu alır. Buna bağlı olarak, bu tezde Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimini ve Almanya'nın yeniden birleşmesini izleyen dönemden günümüze, dış politika ekseninde Almanya'nın "sivil güç" kavramına dayalı dış siyasetinde devamlılığı esas alıp almadığı tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Almanya'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitimiyle inşa ettiği temel dış politika prensiplerinin günümüzdeki devamlılığı ve değişimi/dönüşümü de konu edilmektedir. Aynı zamanda, Soğuk Savaş sonrası "uluslararası sorumlulukları gereği" katıldığı "alan dışı görevlerle" Almanya'nın dış politikasının mihenk taşlarından olan askeri güç kullanmaya yönelik kısıtlamayı kırarak "sivil güç" olmaktan çıkıp çıkmadığı tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Alman dış politikası, yeniden birleşme, sivil güç, inşacılık, alan dışı operasyonlar, devamlılık, dönüşüm.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KABUL VE ONAY	i
YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI	ii
ETİK BEYAN	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
ÖZET.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY.....	15
1.1.CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....	15
1.2.METHODOLOGY.....	18
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AS A “CIVILIAN POWER”	20
2.1. INTRODUCTION.....	20
2.2. A SYNOPSIS OF WEST GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR ERA.....	25
2.3. KONRAD ADENAUER PERIOD (1949-1963).....	30
2.4. LUDWIG ERHARD PERIOD (1963-1966).....	35
2.5. KURT GEORG KIESINGER PERIOD (1966-1969).....	37
2.6. WILLY BRANDT PERIOD (1969-1974).....	39
2.7. HELMUT SCHMIDT PERIOD (1974-1982).....	42
2.8. HELMUT KOHL PERIOD (1982-1998).....	44
2.9. CONCLUSION.....	47
CHAPTER 3: THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR.....	49
3.1.INTRODUCTION.....	49

3.2. GERMANY’S ROLE IN OUT-OF-AREA-MISSIONS: FROM RESTRAINT TO RESPONSIBILITY.....	54
3.2.1. Kosovo War (1998-1999).....	59
3.2.2. The Bundeswehr in Afghanistan (2001-2021).....	65
3.2.3. Germany’s Engagement in Mali.....	69
3.2.4. Germany’s Fight against the Islamic State.....	70
3.3.CONCLUSION.....	72
CHAPTER 4: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE: STILL A “CIVILIAN POWER” OR BECOMING A HEGEMON?.....	76
4.1. INTRODUCTION.....	76
4.2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF 1CONTEMPORARY GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.....	77
4.2.1. European Integration and Deeper Cooperation.....	78
4.2.2. Transatlantic Alliance.....	80
4.2.3. Commitment to Peace and Security.....	82
4.2.4. Promotion of Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights.....	83
4.2.5. Multilateralism.....	84
4.3. CHANGING PARAMETRES AND CHALLENGES TO GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.....	86
4.4. A CHALLENGING PARTNERSHIP: GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.....	88
4.4.1. The Ukrainian Crisis and Germany’s Role in Crisis Management...92	
4.4.2. A U-Turn for Germany: the Russo-Ukrainian War.....	95
CONCLUSION.....	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	102
APPENDIX 1. ORİJİNALLİK RAPORU.....	114
APPENDIX 2. ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYET FORMU.....	116

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS	Airborne Warning & Control System
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
CSCE	The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EURATOM	The European Atomic Energy Community
EUTM Mali	The European Union Training Mission Mali
FRG	The Federal Republic of Germany
FDP	Free Democratic Party
IFOR	The Implementation Force
IR	International Relations
ISAF	The International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen
KFOR	The Kosovo Force
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali

NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RAF	The Red Army Fraction
SPD	The Social Democratic Party of Germany
TEU	The Treaty on the European Union
UK	The United Kingdom
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
US	The United States

INTRODUCTION

The “civilian power” concept points out a theoretical concept in foreign policy analysis that supports the civilisation of international politics in all spheres. The concept has started to be articulated in order to define the civilian styles of exerting influence for some political actors such as the European Union, Germany and Japan since the Cold War. In this context, ideal-type civilian powers are those that actively support the ‘civilising’ of international relations (Harnisch, 2001, p.37). Accordingly, states which embrace a “civilian power” identity promote values such as the rule of law, anti-militarism, democracy, multilateralism and they struggle to ‘create international arenas for cooperation in order to exercise power’ (Tewes, 2002, p.22).

On this basis, the word civilian generally implies non-military elements and it grounds on cultural, diplomatic and economic policy tools, and to define a “civilian power”, we can talk about four fundamentals, among them are ‘means, ends, use of persuasion along with civilian control over foreign and defence policy making’ (Smith, 2005, p.64). Being a “civilian power” is also about exerting influence (Tewes, 2002, p.11). Therefore, it could be assumed that the aim of a state pursuing “civilian power” values is to provide contribution to the civilisation of the international society by guaranteeing the rule of law, which is a cornerstone for international peace and security, political stability, wealth and a legitimate authority.

One point in relation to civilian powers is that they struggle to ‘transfer the processes and institutions that have civilised politics and society domestically to the international level’ (Tewes, 2001, p.10). Hence, internalising the requirements of being a “civilian power” is of utmost importance in conducting and implementing relevant policies at the international level. However, it must also be noted that the concept has gone through a considerable change over time and though the “civilian power” concept was initially affiliated with the ‘almost’ completely ‘non-military conduct of foreign policy’ in accordance with the term “civilian” as mentioned before, today it is argued whether military

actions for the purpose of humanitarian interventions along with peace-keeping and peace-building operations could be evaluated within the frame of the “civilian power” concept (Tewes, 2002, p.10).

However, we should also make a distinction between being a “civilian power” and exercising “civilian power”; being a “civilian power” includes the means or policy instruments that a state facilitates; the ends which the state pursues, the manner those instruments are utilised as well as the process through which foreign policy is conducted, whereas exercising “civilian power implies policy instruments that a political actor benefits from with the aim of exerting influence (Smith, 2005, p.65). Moreover, policy instruments are supposed to be separable from policy objectives, and both policy instruments as well as policy objectives for civilian powers should hinge on collective or cooperative security and democratic values as suggested by Henning Tewes (2002, p.11). It is also a fact that instead of acting unilaterally to neutralise threats, stop wars and help build peace in areas where it is necessary, civilian powers usually back up the system of collective security, which is an arrangement of states to prevent or stop wars based on the idea that an aggressor against any member of the international society is seen as a threat to international peace and security. Yet, civilian powers have a reserved approach towards the use of military force, but this does not mean that they prefer to be pacifists or aloof in their foreign policy attitudes.

As to policy instruments including military means, however, there is an uncertainty on how much of their use should be accepted within the “civilian power” concept. In this regard; the fine line between civilian and military power is allegedly critical (Smith, 2005, p.64). On the one hand, the term “civilian power” points out a perception, according to which a state power is described within economic orientations, and in this sense, similar to a trading state whose foreign policy is featured by certain national economic interests (Tewes, 2002, p.10). On the other hand, peacekeeping forces are regarded as a “civilian power” foreign policy means (Smith, 2005, p.64). Based on this, in the thesis, in general, it is dealt with whether Germany should be still perceived as a “civilian

power” after the Cold War, and the German military operations from the onset of the 1990s should be evaluated within the outline of the “civilian power” concept. The main point of view given in the thesis is that Germany as a coherent political actor has so far conducted its out-of-area operations blending civilian and military aids, and it has generally avoided from being involved in high-risk combat conditions on the basis of ideational reasons. It is for this reason that it could be asserted that the “civilian power” concept in German foreign policy bears a constructivist grip as it puts an emphasis on the norms and values affecting ‘how German foreign policy makers define their interests’ (Tewes, 2002, p.18)

Already speaking of the similarity between a “civilian power” and a trading state, additionally, it should also be mentioned that a “civilian power” differs from a trading state in that the former has more than merely economic orientations and motivations. In contrast with trading states, civilian powers do not only pursue an economic performance, but they also seek ways to civilise, domesticate and influence international affairs by exerting force with international law and norms. Therefore, regarding Germany as a trading state would downgrade its civilian characteristic, which is more significant in its conduct of foreign policy.

However, apart from the stress on democratic values, the “civilian power” concept today agrees with the liberal thinking in justifying *laissez-faire*, the concept which highlights the benefits of free trade and the non-intervention principle (Tewes, 2002, p.13). Both the “civilian power” concept and the *laissez-faire* doctrine mention the benefits that free markets have in common. Besides, any other notion stemming from the liberal thinking is the stress on more commercial relations and less conflict despite the fact that liberalism sometimes favours the idea of a ‘just war’ (Tewes, 2002, p.15).

Another point regarding civilian powers is the emphasis on the notion of rights, which is related to one of the universally recognised values, that is, the recognition and promotion of human rights. Germany pays special attention to human rights and it is clearly indicated in the German Basic Law. In this sense, the non-military conduct of foreign policy, which is an integral and indispensable

part of the “civilian power” concept, might be also considered to be linked to the defence of human rights. Nevertheless, in German foreign policy it is also observed that one of the aims of military operations is to serve for the protection of human rights although this seems contradictory. However, Germany constrains its use of force constitutionally since the state power should be controlled and limited through the rule of law (Tewes, 2002, p.13). In fact, the mentality here is that German foreign policy should contribute a great deal to peace if it is responsible for a civil society.

The term “civilian power”, furthermore, also deals with topics such as economics, migration, organised crime, and environmental issues which could be categorised under soft power headlines. Germany, which is claimed to be a “civilian power”, displays a good example in this regard. For example, Germany’s initiatives on environmental issues aim to address and highlight the environmental problems both at local and international levels along with their effects on economics. The country’s “*Energiewende*” or energy transition policy aims to increase the use of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power in addition to biomass energy while phasing out the nuclear power for the sake of the environment. It is an attitude which Germany keeps emphasising both within the country and in the European Union. On this basis, the country has a shaping role in foreign policy that reaches beyond its borders.

Apart from the concept of “civilian power”, foreign policy culture and role theory should be referred together as well because being a “civilian power” reveals a state’s foreign policy culture and its role in international politics and they are complementary to each other. In order to understand and analyse the change and continuity in German foreign policy after the end of the Cold war, the agents affecting its foreign policy culture and role should be traced back to 1945 when Germany’s contemporary norms and values were constructed. Once a state encounters a new contingency, existing state identities and the emergence of a specific foreign policy may change and formulate a new pathway for the state to define its interests. For Germany, the destruction of the Second World War

brought about the necessity to rethink its state identity and role and thus behaviour. The combination of the two led to a new foreign policy culture.

It should be noted that foreign policy culture is a wide spectrum by means of which all aspects of the state behaviour can be seen as suggested by Tewes (2002, p.29). Today, German interests specified by German policy makers are considerably based on the cultural-institutional setting through which German foreign policy is conducted. In this case, foreign policy culture can be interpreted as:

“a subset of a larger political culture, as a collective model of nation-state identity, embodied in custom or law, that affects how members of a given foreign policy elite conceive of the aims of foreign policy, and what significance they ascribe to military force, multilateralism, and societal interests for the conduct of foreign policy” (Tewes, 2002, p.24).

Based on the definition above, foreign policy culture can be said to be related to the material structures of state organisation such as customs and laws, and they are produced by those in power, which suggests that foreign policy culture is ‘contested, negotiated, and legitimated’ (Tewes, 2002, p.25). In Germany’s case, however, the production, negotiation and legitimisation of foreign policy are constructed through norms. Hence, the change and continuity debate in German foreign policy, which is the essence of this thesis, cannot be discussed through changes in governments and their political orientations since German foreign policy is based on continuity in general, and the changes are related to the external political conditions rather than governments. Political culture is also assumed to be the most favourable means to analyse the state behaviour in the long term since the concept of political culture displays a stable pattern, and it is not open to changes so easily.

In addition to one characteristic of political culture mentioned above, one can count four generic ways to understand how culture influences behaviour: first of all, culture helps us to identify the primary goals of the collectivity (Duffield, 1999, p.771). At this stage, collectivity refers to a body of state and state behaviour, which can be, meanwhile, defined as ‘patterned or recurring decisions and actions by governments’ (Holsti, 1970, p.233). Moreover, culture

sets the basis for identity, norms, values and interests for the state. Therefore, political culture is one of the major forces for the state identity and state interests. Secondly, political culture identifies perceptions generated by external factors, and at the same time it is responsible for how these perceptions are interpreted; thirdly, based on the interests culture forms, it shapes the formation and identification of the behaviours; and lastly, culture impacts the assessment of feasible options and choices (Duffield, 1999, pp.771-772). In this context, it can be interpreted that political culture has a huge impact on possible options a state can choose in a certain condition. Along with economic interests, geopolitical potentials, domestic political considerations and perceptions caused by political culture are responsible for recurring conflict among allied nations, and one stance is the disagreement between Germany and the USA over Iraq in 2002, which many thought would cause 'a total loss of credibility and a long-term rift' between the two, was the reflection of the German political culture, and ever since, the German-American alliance has been considerably diminished (Kalberg, 2003, p.1).

As for the German political culture in the aftermath of the Cold War, it can be suggested that as a result of a commonly shared set of beliefs and values, a steady foreign policy culture has emerged. Undoubtedly, deplorable historical experiences and the collective memory have played the biggest role in the formation of its foreign policy preferences. As mentioned before, though there was an expectation of change towards German foreign policy after the reunification, the unified Germany proved many wrong. Instead of exercising military power for assertive reasons, Germany has opted for taking advantage of economic, political, and diplomatic instruments as well as arms control, and peaceful settlement of disputes (Duffield, 1999, p.780). On the other hand, multilateralism has continued to be an important commonly shared norm in German foreign policy culture because German leaders thought that unilateralism would result in diplomatic isolation, insecurity and conflict. At the same time, both international cooperation and integration have been highly praised even at the expense of national prerogatives (Duffield, 1999, p.781). It is for this reason that Germany's general stance in international affairs could be

easily claimed to still pursue the characteristics of a “civilian power”. However, although the expected change has yet to come in its full terms, as a result of the compelling political conditions such as the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War in February 2022, Germany seems to go through a change in terms of its military capability due to security reasons by breaking down a taboo in its foreign policy.

On this basis, the second chapter portrays the post-war chancellors and their periods until unification in order to understand the emergence of Germany’s “civilian power” approach in its foreign policy. It starts with Konrad Adenauer and ends with Helmut Kohl. In the third chapter, however, some of the military operations of the German armed forces joined after reunification under the motivation of the culture of responsibility are discussed to answer if they could mean a deviation from the “civilian power” approach. Among them are Cambodia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Mali, and the war against terrorism in Syria and Iraq with a reference to ISIS. In the light of the previous two chapters, the fourth chapter argues change and continuity in relation to the guiding principles of German foreign policy along with the challenges. In this regard, the German-Russian relations are expressed as a big challenge. In the final stage, what is intended to conclude is that German foreign policy is bound to change due to the changing political conjuncture.

Research Question

The end of the Cold War and reunification pinpointed a crucial shift in the foreign policy context of the Federal Republic of Germany. Together with unification, Germany has become the most important actor in Europe, and undoubtedly, the guiding principles of its foreign policy have often been challenged. While Germany was itself the focal point in check during the Cold War years, it became a power influencing and controlling regional politics in the aftermath. Although the context of German foreign policy has shown a clear change, the driving forces behind it have remained the same. The unified Germany, just like the Bonn Republic, stressed a foreign policy favouring

deepening and widening integration of Europe, commitment to the transatlantic partnership, restraint on the use of force, multilateralism, rule of law and promotion of democracy and human rights. The key concern was why Germany did not act assertively in its foreign policy behaviour and pursue a more independent foreign policy though it became a more powerful international actor at the end of the Cold War. In this sense, Germany followed an unpredictable pattern for many. This was unpredictable because the unified Germany was expected to embrace military power in the harsh conditions of the post-Cold War years.

The relationship between Germany's external and domestic agents has been influential in the conduct of its foreign policy (Brummer & Oppermann, 2016, p.2). Starting from the end of the Cold War, German policy makers have confronted gradually growing and changing expectations regarding Germany's role in foreign policy. On the one hand, Germany was expected to claim more responsibilities on a global scale, and on the other hand, it failed to fulfil these expectations due to increasing domestic concerns. Trying to find balance between these two contradicting sides has also created a challenging situation for German policy-makers. Additionally, external demands have brought along deviations from the traditional foreign policy role conceptions. Taking into account all of these, German foreign policy has become incalculable.

However, German policy-makers, the citizens and the country's allies favour the policies pursuing a "civilian power" role conception on the international stage. Important features of this foreign policy role conception have become indispensable parts of Germany's political agenda based on norms. These norms have aimed to civilise global politics by means of international law. Thanks to its traditionally established foreign policy culture, which had imposed a restraint on military power since the Post-War period, Germany also succeeded in gaining the trust of its Western allies following the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the "civilian power" role conception is successful at explaining the relationship between Germany's own perception of its role on the global

stage and external role demands based on which Germany has pursued a foreign policy different from that of great powers (Kirste & Maull, 1996).

Additionally, as mentioned before, together with unification, external expectations and demands regarding German foreign policy role have greatly changed due to the changing political atmosphere. Germany's allies have had demands for Germany's active participation in the military area, and they have asked for Germany to behave like a 'normal international actor' (Brummer & Oppermann, 2016, p.2). In this sense, the question one will ask in the first place should be what would be the 'normal' for Germany? Actually, a 'normal' behaviour for German foreign policy would be to assume more international responsibility in line with its values, and less restricted by its Holocaust-based memory when it comes to cope with international issues (Brummer & Oppermann, 2016, p.2). Based on the external demands, it could be asserted that Germany seems to have agreed upon playing a more active role in international affairs in the aftermath of the Cold War. Yet, the more active Germany gets the more its partners expect.

It is a bare fact that German foreign policy has evolved from a pacifist one to a leading one, especially in recent years. Germany has first made great strides in the military area by breaking a taboo in its foreign policy. The biggest step in this sense came with the Kosovo War in 1999 and it was followed by the war in Afghanistan and the operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria within the frame of its fight against terrorism. In fact, together with these military engagements, Germany's foreign policy role as a "civilian power" has been called into question. Apart from the use of force, Germany has taken over a leading role in crisis management such as in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Playing a constructive role between Russia and Ukraine, Germany proved its ability to assume a mediating leadership role in its periphery. Nevertheless, the Russian aggression which revealed itself in February 2022 is beyond what Germany can tolerate. Even if it is simply an assumption for the time being, Germany's strong comeback in the military area will be a consequence of Russia's invasion of

Ukraine. It is for this reason that Germany's "civilian power" role concept, which shaped its foreign policy during the Cold War years, is obviously now in limbo.

In the light of all the facts above, this thesis looks for an answer to whether Germany should be still regarded as a "civilian power" which shows continuity in its long-held foreign policy and the military engagements it has contributed to so far ought to be defined as deviations from its role conception as a "civilian power".

Literature Review

Reunification was the beginning of a new age in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and various opinions have been suggested regarding its civilian character in relation to the use of force. For Hanns W. Maull (2000), West German foreign policy shaped into a "civilian power" that put an emphasis on multilateralism, the Western integration, and restraint on the use of force in its foreign affairs based on norms that continued to persist after unification. According to Eckart von Klaeden (2009), German foreign policy has been substantially defined by continuity since 1990.

Oktay Hekimler (2020) suggests that Germany's identity determined its foreign policy throughout the Cold War years and it behaved in accordance with a "civilian power" identity; however, together with reunification, Germany became an important economic and political actor and it felt the obligation to be militarily active apart from the fact that it made efforts to better its bilateral relations with Russia. With all these, it is also added that Germany created some doubts regarding its "civilian power" concept among its allies and this raised questions about whether Germany would remain committed to its traditional foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War period (Hekimler, 2020, p.1). On the other hand, Maull (1990) argued that after reunification many would fear the return of the German revanchism and that the unified Germany would pursue revisionist policies just like Japan; but, these concerns have not reflected the reality. And in fact, these assumptions were mostly evoked by realist and liberal schools of

thinking and these theories failed to explain the future of German foreign policy after unification as they did not take norms into consideration. However, although the Cold War and the threats it posed ended, the post-Cold War period brought along new challenges, primarily with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As a result of the ethno-nationalist conflicts which broke out in Europe, Germany changed its attitude towards security policy, and accepted the need for German engagements in military operations in the areas outside of NATO (Maull, 2000, p.56). For *the Economist* magazine, Germany 'came out of its post-war shell' together with the Kosovo War (1999, July 8). Based on this, Maull (2001) contends that Kosovo represented an 'important departure' in the post-Cold War foreign policy of Germany. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that Germany also took over a huge responsibility by helping the neighbouring countries of Kosovo deal with refugees in large numbers and sought after a 'diplomatic solution' to the conflict (Maull, 2001, p.109). In his article "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy", Sebastian Harnisch (2001) also interprets the German participation in the Kosovo War as a breaking point in a 'long-held tradition' in German security policy. In the meantime, Nina Philippi (2001) delves into the criteria for a German engagement in NATO-led out-of-area missions in the scope of a "civilian power" concept. Six conditions that ought to be considered before the use of force are mentioned: (1) the legality of the operation, (2) prior use of non-military means, (3) the proportionality of the use of force and a clear military and political aim, (4) a multilateral scope of the military operation, (5) conditions when the use of force is needed, and (6) a justifiable risk for the participating soldiers (Philippi, 2001, pp.57-60). Another set of criteria for a military engagement in relation to Germany is also described: (1) the consent of the German parliament, (2) the German state interests, (3) the readiness of well-equipped and trained soldiers and the availability of fiscal means, (4) the results of German history, and (5) support from the German public (Philippi, 2001, pp.60-62). Besides this, Sebastian Harnisch (2001) argues that the shift in Germany's foreign policy trajectory was based on three reasons. These included the changes in the international power system, the extent of international intertwinement under the

frame of organisations such as the EU, NATO and OSCE, and lastly the stability of German foreign policy culture based on socially constructed norms (Harnisch, 2001, p.36).

On the other hand, Henning Tewes (2002) deals with Germany's "civilian power" concept from a NATO and EU security policy perspective in his book *Germany, Civilian Power, and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union*. It is contended that after reunification, the fate of Europe's international politics was dependent upon how the unified Germany would pursue its foreign policy and whether the institutions such as the EU and NATO who bore responsibility for wealth and security during the Cold War period, would keep doing the same in the post-Cold War period (Tewes, 2002, p.1). In the meantime, Tewes (2002) delves into the values and interests which moulded German politics within the scope of NATO and the European Union, and he concludes that Germany shows an overall continuity by integrating these values after unification.

In addition, Niklas Helwig (2016) asserts that Germany's solution to the challenges it has faced in foreign policy has substantially showed continuity as well. In Helwig's *Europe's New Political Engine*, it is argued that after reunification, Germany started to play a leading role in crisis management and its new role as a leader in the EU has served as a balancing act between its "civilian power" identity and the external demands and expectations from its partners based on its role as a leader in the EU (Helwig, 2016, p.211). Helwig (2016) also argues that Germany displays gradual assertiveness whereas remaining committed to its "civilian power" principles guiding its foreign policy. It is also discussed that although Germany's military presence is observed more often, the use of force is still seen as the last resort, and other traditional foreign policy principles such as the commitment to the transatlantic partnership, and Western integration within the frame of the EU are still driving German foreign policy (Helwig, p.2016, p.211).

Von Klaeden (2009) also adds that other issues in foreign and security policy such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

have also threatened German security in addition to the disruption in energy supplies and raw materials, which is highly probable to interrupt international trade, thus, German prosperity. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is seen as the most important pillar of international non-proliferation policy and Germany supports the strengthening of the Treaty due to increasing risks (Von Klaeden, 2009, p.45). Furthermore, in resolving issues, thanks to Germany, the European Union is an important actor through which solutions to challenges are found (Von Klaeden, 2009, p.40). In fact, for Eckart Von Klaeden (2009) therefore, European integration constitutes the most crucial part of German foreign policy because Germany's membership poses an important element in the country's relations with third countries. For Helwig (2016), a positive posture towards European integration is also favoured by Mainstream German political parties.

What is more, according to Kirch (2016) Berlin's economic and political power has helped Germany have a leadership position in the EU, and especially in the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014, the country's economic and political strength was tested. However, together with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as Andreas Umland (2022) suggests, it is high time that Germany left its foreign policy 'la-la land.' As suggested by Sarah Marsh and Sabine Siebold (2022), Putin's aggression pushes Germany to assume a leadership role as a global power.

To sum up, in the introduction, a well-defined research question, the concept of "civilian power" and a detailed literature review were given.

In the first chapter, however, a theoretical framework within the definitions of the constructivist IR theory and a process-tracing method will be mentioned.

In the second chapter of the thesis, the chancellors period of West Germany will be given within the frame of "civilian power" until reunification. And the process paving way to unification will be dealt.

In the third chapter, Germany's out-of-area missions and its military role in conflicts will be highlighted and whether it could be perceived as a "civilian power" after unification will be discussed.

In the last chapter, Germany's foreign policy direction and its role in international politics will be explained by mentioning the pillars of German foreign policy. In this regard, Germany's relations with Russia are of utmost importance. The Russo-Ukrainian war seems to change Germany's foreign policy identity as a "civilian power".

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Constructivism as an IR theory is defined by a stress on the significance of normative and material structures together with the role of identity in the conduct of political actions and the constitutive relationship between agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.188). Constructivism's appearance in the International Relations discipline is generally affiliated with the end of the Cold War as a consequence of the fact that the two mainstream theories, realism and liberalism failed to explain it. To put it another way, the end of the Cold War eroded expository claims of neo-realists and neo-liberals since neither was capable of anticipating and conceiving this systemic change, which was about to reshape the world politics (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.195). In fact, it can be claimed that this failure is related to some of the basic assumptions of these two theories such as the presumption that states are self-interested actors that yearn for power, and the uneven power distribution among states which explains the balance of power (Theys, 2018, p.1). The gist of constructivism is human awareness or consciousness and its influence in international politics (Jackson&Sorensen, 2013, p.209). Many theories in the IR discipline tend to focus on material power. Furthermore, realism and liberalism chiefly pay their attention to the state rather than the agency of the individual (Theys, 2018, p.1). Constructivism argues that the most significant part of international relations is social other than being material. As Nicholas Onuf (1989) puts it, the social world is of our making. Thus, international relations are shaped through the actions of actors who have power. According to constructivists, the social reality is subjective, and both the social and political worlds are not outside of human consciousness (Jackson&Sorensen, 2013, p.209).

In one stance, for constructivists, the world is socially constructed just as what we know about the world is socially constructed and this is referred to as 'the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge' as explained by Sarina Theys (2018, p.1). Alexander Wendt (1995) gives a famous instance which shows the social construction of reality by explaining that 500 British nuclear weapons pose less threat to the US whereas five nuclear weapons that belong to North Korea imply a bigger threat. These presumptions are related to the ideational structure instead of the material structure. At this point, nuclear weapons refer to the material structure while the meaning given to them implies the ideational structure. In this regard, the UK and North Korea are not qualified the same way. Furthermore, according to constructivism, agency and structure are correlatively combined, which means they influence one another. On this basis, actors in world politics are the agencies whereas the international system is the structure. The international system, however, includes thought and ideas and in case they change, the reality of international relations also goes through a change (Jackson&Sorensen, 2013, p.209). In fact, this change can be explained by a famous phrase that is often pronounced in the IR discipline. As Alexander Wendt (1992) suggested, "anarchy is what states make of it." What is intended to be implied here is that anarchy does not inherently exist in the international system; on the contrary, it is constructed by the nation states in the international system.

Another tenet of constructivism is identities and interests. In constructivism, it is suggested that states could be defined by more than one identity and identities imply the way states define themselves. Based on this, state identities also define their interests. Constructivism also suggests that the position international actors place themselves in relation to their identities and their behaviour towards each other runs international politics (Banchoff, 1998, p.4). According to constructivists, states have to act in line with their identities; otherwise, their identity and the legitimacy of their policies would be questioned. For instance, Germany has a traditional foreign policy culture which was constructed in the post-war period, and this political culture imposes a restraint on the use of force. This traditional foreign policy culture also implies

Germany's state identity as a "civilian power". In this context, in spite of being an important actor with its giant economy, Germany has remained committed to its "civilian power" identity since reunification and has not become a military power. For constructivists, especially collective identity should endure over time (Banchoff, 1998, p.16). In other words, collective identity is rather steady and, therefore, it is not open to swift changes; therefore, the German national identity is remarkably stable, which indicates why the German identity and foreign policy are expressed by continuity other than change (Hampton&Peifer, 2007, p.371). At the same time, with the demise of the Iron Curtain, for Germany, the European Union constituted the most significant institutional structure, and this reinforced Germany's europeanised identity. From another perspective, as the boundaries of identity can change over time based on the political conjuncture of the period, we can explain the shifts in the understanding of the "civilian power" concept in German foreign policy and how the changes are legitimised in the public eye.

Moreover, constructivism contends that social action is firmly grounded in social norms. Social norms refer to 'appropriate behaviour of actors within a given identity' (Katzenstein, 1996). States are expected to behave according to the norms that are related to their given identity. For example, Germany as a 'civilian' power is expected to pursue a non-militarist and non-aggressive foreign policy within multilateral settings. In this regard, constructivism is quite successful at comprehending and interpreting the unified Germany's continuing multilateralism based on its identity and shared values (Baumann, 2002, p.1). At the same time, it can be claimed that the persistence of the EU norms such as sovereignty and multilateralism, despite a remarkable structural change in world politics after the Cold War, also paved the way for continuity in Germany's foreign policy as its identity is aligned with that of Europe (Banchoff, 1998, p.11).

In order to understand German foreign policy after the Cold War, actors and their interests in German foreign policy should be investigated as well. Besides this, norms also define change and continuity in German foreign policy

behaviour, and they may vary based on issues and situations. On this basis, for constructivists, German foreign policy behaviour is likely to change in case norms related to a particular subject undergo a change. To illustrate, although it is early, it is predicted that German foreign policy will enter into a new era, and one of its core tenets, the restraint on the use of force will be bound to change due to the changing norms in conjunction with the Russian occupation of Ukraine in 2022.

However, prior to the presumption above, it should be also noted that some norms have already displayed change in relation to Germany's engagement in NATO-led out-of-area operations. On the other hand, a devotion to deeper European integration in the aftermath of the Cold War is assumed to be the reflection of the continuing institutional norms (Banchoff, 1998, p.9). In fact, Germany's europeanised identity, which continued after the Cold War, constructed a specific perception of interests such as the promotion of widening integration based on economy and politics. All in all, constructivism gives a rational account of general continuity in German foreign policy by blending state identity, norms and values. Yet, in case of any structural change in world politics, German identity, thus state behaviour, might transform or undergo a substantial shift.

1.2. METHODOLOGY

In an inquiry, research methodology refers to particular processes and techniques used in order to classify, analyse and categorise information on a chosen subject. Methodology also helps the reader assess the research's credibility and validity.

In order to give an answer to the research questions described in the Research Question section, the thesis is built on the methodology of process-tracing. Hence, the "civilian power" role concept is given as an ideal type for German foreign policy identity. In the thesis, first of all, the roots of Germany's "civilian power" role concept are described starting from the post-war period so that a

comparison can be made in relation to the current role conception so as to show continuity and change. In this context, the post-war period pinpoints the start. Additionally, foreign policy behaviour is also discussed to show if the “civilian power” role concept is regarded as a factor affecting Germany’s foreign policy preferences.

By referring to secondary sources, this thesis discusses that “civilian power” role concept still has a huge impact on the conduct of German foreign policy as this role also defines the guiding principles of German foreign policy, which are also given. On the other hand, change in the foreign policy preferences of Germany is argued within some of the out-of-area missions the German armed forces have joined. However, in the very beginning, in fact, it is agreed that Germany is still a “civilian power”; therefore, though Germany has transformed in the military area, these military engagements are not accepted as a deviation from its civilian role concept in this thesis. However, the thesis had to be finished in open-ended way as German foreign policy is assumed to change together with its identity and thus behaviour based on the recent changes that have been threatening security across the globe due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. It is for this reason that analysts assume that Germany is likely to rise as a global power claiming even a greater responsibility in its politics in the near future. However, time will tell if Germany’s understanding of power and responsibility will have a resemblance to those of the United States and its exceptionalism.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AS A “CIVILIAN POWER”

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter argues German foreign policy and its civilian character within a historical background, starting from the end of the Second World War. The argument revolves around the Federal Republic of Germany or, in other words, West Germany as modern-day Germany inherited the legacy of the FRG in the wake of the reunification. The chronological order in the chapter covers an insight into West Germany's Cold-War foreign policy and the chancellorships of the figures that were in charge until the reunification along with important developments that can be articulated within the context of a “civilian power” approach.

German foreign policy has been at the centre of European and international politics and Germany has long had the ability to impact the development of Europe due to its geopolitical location. Especially throughout the twentieth century, Germany was the main subject matter since the country was responsible for both world wars, during which the balance of the power system in Europe was threatened. The end of the Second World War brought about long-lasting international systemic changes on a large-scale and, along with border changes, the world survived a bipolar order. The war had destructive effects, especially on Germany, resulting in the partition of the country into two; the West part being controlled by the western Allied powers and the East part being controlled by the Soviet Union.

Because of its aggressive and militaristic political culture, Germany was seen and regarded as an unreliable political actor. In order to change its bad reputation; the country has struggled to take the shape of a “civilian power”, purging itself from its militaristic ambitions. Particularly, since the end of the

Second World War, Germany has been 'widely perceived as a free-rider that hides behind its history to promote its economic interests' (Leonard & Hackenbroich, 2022, para.4). Because the German political elites have decisively supported 'the pursuit of peace, the maintenance of norms and rules, and the need for diplomacy' it has 'no history of using power politics in a progressive way' since the end of the Second World War (Leonard & Hackenbroich, 2022, para.5).

In the aftermath of World War II, the entire world was curious about what kind of a "*Sonderweg*" the FRG would follow up. Nevertheless, it is also suggested that "the way in which Germany responded to its environment has differed considerably in different periods" (Harnisch & Maull, 2001, p.1). During the Cold War era, both the FRG and the GDR struggled for their existence on the international arena, and they were the embodiments of the bipolar world, representing the two opposing ideologies. Therefore, their political orientations varied greatly from one another. While West German foreign policy was characterised by 'cooperation with its Western allies within the transatlantic framework of NATO and the regional integration in Europe' (Harnisch & Maull, 2001, p.1), the GDR existed as part of the Eastern Bloc. However, as the main focus of this chapter is West Germany, all the discussions will revolve around it, and by virtue of the previous line, I would like to draw brief attention to the "*Westbindung*" or the "*Westintegration*", which could be interpreted as the German integration into the Western bloc through cooperation under the auspices of the transatlantic framework of NATO along with the regional integration within Europe. This laid the foundations of the German "civilian power" identity and the democratisation of Western Germany. During this transformation, there were two instrumental factors, one being the Basic Law in the form of "*Grundrechte*" or basic rights, which provided the West German civil society with a constitutional basis, and the other one being the development of the Social Market Economy (Tewes, 2002, p.38). The Basic Law could be claimed to have been an instructive guideline for decision making on top of the fact that it functioned as a 'normative framework of West German politics', and it

became an indispensable part of West German political culture (Tewes, 2002, p.38).

On the one hand, the Social Market Economy allowed those who were weak to take part in the marketplace, and, on the other hand, it was considered as a path to accustom Germans to a civil society embedded in a market economy. Since the Social Market Economy was functional in explaining the relationship between the society and the state in Germany, it meant much more than an ordinary economic enterprise, and “creating a civil society by unleashing the forces of capitalism was a key achievement of post-war West German governance” (Tewes, 2002, p.39). Furthermore, the specific relation between capitalism and the Federal Republic led the state to embrace a character of a trading state. However, viewing West Germany as a trading state would downgrade its foreign policy to a mere ‘economistic cost-benefit analysis’ (Tewes,2002, p.39).

In fact, the “*Westbindung*” had brought West Germany not only economic benefits but also other gains such as democratic norms and values, which constitute the bases for Germany’s “civilian power” identity. The transition to a liberal democratic polity was the outcome of a rationalised national identity based on a “civilian power” approach and a modern capitalist economy; and furthermore, institutional, cultural, and international variables also contributed to Germany’s transformation (Brady & Wiliarty, 2002, p.1). The linkage between the national identity, culture and foreign policy are highly important. The German national identity before 1945 was related to ‘territory, blood and the quest for the national grandeur’ as Germans referred to themselves as a “*Kulturnation*” other than a “*Staatsnation*” and this revealed a failure in acquiring a “civilian power” foreign policy attitude since the German state had not settled civilianised politics at home (Tewes, 2002, p.37). For a state to become a “civilian power”, its society must liberate itself from the state and become civil in the first place, which will be followed by the production and construction of “civilian power” policies.

The real journey to acquiring and building up its “civilian power” identity started after 1945 for Germany. However, it is also possible to refer to the elements or exercise of a “civilian power” to some extent regarding German foreign policy before 1945 although it was not pronounced and declared as the aim by the political elites of the period. For instance, it could be suggested that the Berlin-Baghdad railway line project, which was a commercial enterprise funded by Deutsche Bank for the German interests can be given as an example as it had been claimed to serve for the stabilisation of the Middle East, bearing a so-called feeling of responsibility (Tewes, 2002, p.35). Along with the fact that it carried a ‘missionary sense of nationalism’, the project served for the economic interests of Prussia as part of its quest for power and survival in a hostile political environment (Tewes, 2002, p.35).

On the other hand, the Weimar Republic could be assumed to have had a foreign policy approach which was the closest Germans came to pursue the policies of a “civilian power” in that the Weimar Republic fulfilled one of its most noteworthy foreign policy achievements together with the Treaty of Locarno signed in 1925 and the accession to the League of Nations in 1926 (Tewes, 2002, p.35). The admittance to the League of Nations could especially be compared to the achievement both German states had when they were admitted to the United Nations in 1973. This can be too interpreted as the embracement of multilateralism.

Nonetheless, the signature of the Treaty of Rapallo back in 1922 between the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union was a consensus that had already revealed Germans’ revisionist ambitions and quest for power. On the one hand, it would not be incorrect to claim that the relation between the German state and the society was the reason behind the failure of the exercise of German “civilian power” prior to 1945 as both influenced the perception of the German national identity based on national aspirations unlike Germany’s europeanised identity constructed and consolidated throughout the Cold War. In the meantime, it would have been a mistake to expect the Weimar Republic to internalise and portray “civilian power” features for a long term, taking into

account the entire, social and economic burden caused by the Treaty of Versailles.

On the other hand, it is also possible to observe that there were some acts inimical to the 'culture of contrition' in the 1980s. One example is the Bitburg controversy, which took place in 1985, when Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan paid an impromptu visit to a military cemetery to commemorate the end of the Second World War, which also included the graves of some Waffen-S.S.members (Langenbacher, 2014, p.56). Apart from the fact that this visit had created a short-term tension between Germany and its transatlantic ally, it was also seen as an act that could pose a risk of 'reawakening the memories and the passions of the time' (Skelton,1985, para.13). Moreover, the reunification was also followed by some other eruptions of memory, one of which was moving the capital from Bonn back to Berlin (Langenbacher, 2014, p.56). However, these eruptions of memory did not mean that Germany was transforming into what it used to be in its dark past. Today, the collective memory of Germans based on the Holocaust-centred past is still quite vivid thanks to the education system in the country, which accentuates the Nazi atrocities. According to the constructivist perspective, collective memory is rather steady and, therefore, it is not open to swift changes; moreover, national identity is remarkably stable, which indicates why the link between identity and policy is expressed by continuity other than change (Hampton & Peifer, 2007, p.371). Based on this, it is likely to refer to continuity in Germany's conduct of foreign policy at least for the foreseeable future. The Constructivist grip poses that political culture and memory establish identity and policy. However, in Germany's case, both its political culture and "civilian power" role identity are the products of the Holocaust-centred memory.

On the other hand, there is a different dimension regarding political identity which a myriad of constructivist studies highlights. Accordingly, the boundaries of identity can change over time based on the political conjuncture of the period, through which we can explain the shifts in German foreign policy and how the changes are legitimised in the public eye. Although the reunification has

resulted in the creation of a new nation state, it has apparently not been capable of constructing a new people out of the Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany, and the peoples of both the republics still differ from each other in terms of attitude and values as well as 'divergent interpretations of the historical legacies' (Brady&Wiliarty, 2002, p.4). In spite of the fact that the political identity of West Germany predominates over the unified Germany, since the reunification policymakers and citizens have been trying hard to tackle this difference. Both political elites and citizens give importance to the equality and solidarity between east and west Germans as well as their common status today as citizens of the unified Germany (Brady&Wiliarty, 2002, p.4). It is obvious that in the post-war period, West Germany sustained a foreign policy which was not akin to that of any European state. The normative aspects of post-war German foreign policy built the basis for constructive approaches, and eventually led to the reunification in 1990.

2.2. A SYNOPSIS OF WEST GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR ERA

West Germany was, indeed, the progeny of the Cold War, and the survival of this 'infant' state amid threat was entirely at the mercy of the Allied forces. The foreign policy aims manifested by Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic in the first years of West Germany were based on security, prosperity, sovereignty, and equality which could have been achieved only through the Western integration (Tewes, 2002, p.40). Hence, a total integration into the West constituted the foremost pillar of West Germany's foreign policy. The inclusion of the Federal Republic to the Western system in real terms happened after it had joined the ECSC, the EEC, the EDC and NATO (Tewes, 2002, p.40). Apart from the emphasis on the Western integration, multilateral action contrary to unilateral acts or 'national independent action' was a priority in consolidating foreign policy, and it was backed up by a policy of responsibility (Harnisch & Maull, 2001, Introduction, p.1). Meanwhile, the "culture or policy of responsibility" in German foreign policy refers to a political culture that 'sought

to compensate for Germany's history through a distinct set of principles within its constitution as a basis for Germany's post-war foreign policy: a ban on wars of aggression, a strong commitment to human rights along with regional integration and a liberal asylum policy' (Harnisch & Maull, 2001, Introduction, pp.1-2).

In order to understand the power and position of the Federal Republic of Germany in the international political arena, the foreign policy it pursued during the Cold war must be examined. The FRG's foreign policy was mainly part of a constructivist narrative, and aimed to lead to the civilianisation of international affairs. It can be posited that the peculiar constellation of democratisation in a divided nation in the shadows of the Nazi past as well as the strong and intense presence of the culture and political norms and values imposed by the Western world, pushed the FRG into a path that is completely different from its rival GDR (Müller, 2003, p.3). It is for this reason that we should take external constraints and pressure into consideration since they also played a key role in the formation of the German foreign policy in the post-war era. In parallel to the conjunction of the time and the traces its past had left, Germany devised a foreign policy which paved the way for a pacifist tradition to some extent, disabling the country to use hard power tools such as military force. In the post-war period, West German foreign policy evolved into the 'mould of a "civilian power"', pursuing a policy of promoting multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration, and tried to abstain from the use of force by means of national and international norms (Maull, 2000, p.56). Followed by the end of the Second World War, the FRG prepared a civilian constitution based upon human dignity, human rights, and cooperation in order to promote worldwide peace 'as an equal partner in a united Europe' ("Basic Law of the FRG", 1949, p.1). As it is understood from the phrase taken from the Preamble of the Basic Law, the German identity was considered equal to the European identity. This could be interpreted as the first step to construct a European identity rather than a national German identity, which is a notion Germany still advocates at the present time. In addition to this, according to the Article 1 in the Basic Law of 1949, human dignity is 'inviolable', and all state authority is responsible for

respecting and protecting it ("Basic Law of the FRG", p.1). The reflection of the feeling of guilt derived from the dark past of Germany during which human dignity had been tarnished was noticeably given in the post-war constitution. As set out in the *Grundgesetz's* Article 65, the determination of the policy guidelines are specified in the charge of the Federal Chancellors, and they are responsible for determining the general guidelines of policy ("Basic Law of the FRG", p.14), which is also known as "*Richtlinienkompetenz*". Additionally, the chancellor has the power to select the members of the Cabinet, which is the main body in the general decision making of policies (Harnisch, 2013, p.78).

On the other hand, the German government is responsible for the application of the country's foreign policy. The parliamentary system in Germany is grounded in an electoral system that requires a proportional representation; thus, coalition governments come into power on a regular basis (Harnisch, 2013, p.78). It can be assumed that such an electoral system with such a pluralist government structure imposing limits on the chancellor is due to the havoc caused by the one-man rule in Third Reich. However, the government is not a homogenous political actor in spite of "*Kollegialitätsprinzip*" and *Richtlinien*; therefore, it harbours its own disagreements within itself (Büyükbay, 2017, p.24). Again, according to the Article 65 of the Basic Law, each Federal Minister has the right and capability to conduct the affairs of their department independently within their own responsibility, which is referred to as "*Ressortprinzip*".

One of the most important constraints the FRG encountered regarding its foreign policy was undoubtedly the feeling of guilt towards the Jewish people and its psychological burden, which is still vivid in German foreign policy. The German dictatorship, war and the holocaust had overshadowed West Germany's role since it was founded (Banchoff, 1996, p.36). It is, therefore, argued that this situation led to a "*Machtvergessenheit*" (forgetfulness of power) in the Cold War period as opposed to "*Machtbesessenheit*" (obsession with power), which had reflected itself in the third Reich. It can be defended that "war and tyranny can easily be construed as external forces that simply befell the German nation" (Kattago, 1998, p.86). The national guilt, which the Second

World War had left on the shoulders of Germans made them choose a pathway in the direction of a "*Friedenspolitik*" (policy of peace). It was a concept uttered in the Basic Law's preamble to serve for world peace and repeated declarations by leaders that German foreign policy was a peace policy (Crossley-Frolick, 2013, p.44). Apart from the "*Friedenspolitik*", the "*Westbindung*" played a crucial role in sustaining a foreign policy, integrated with the West. The German integration into the West was of utmost importance in order to regain sovereignty lost in the war, to provide security against the threat imposed by the USSR and to reshape the German image (Önsoy & Koç, 2019, p.83). At the same time, this integration into the West was the only way out for such a state as Germany, which was militarily weak. Germany's policy towards the West was the consequence of its weak status as a penetrated state, and it did not have full sovereignty along with the fact that it had to accept foreign troops deployed by the Allied powers (Harnisch, 2012, p.77).

Another important advancement in German foreign policy at that time was the progress of the relations between France and Germany as two perennial enemies. This development was important in that it was based on the civilian power politics. Though it was assumed that Germany would grow into a power pursuing power politics in case it had the capability, it never departed from being a "civilian power", and remained committed to its Western and transatlantic ties, showing no tendency towards power politics and unilateralism in its foreign policy. In fact, the foreign policy aims of the Federal Republic of Germany significantly remained constant, and they were modified based upon the changes both in international and domestic politics; hence, the main ingredients of its foreign policy were defined by persistence and continuity (Hanrieder, 1989, p.312).

Another aspect regarding the foreign policy of the FRG is that there was a diversity of views among the political leaders in respect to the ways to follow up. Whereas some leaders were in favour of maintaining policies in respect to Gaullism, others promoted Transatlanticism. On the one hand, German leaders supporting Gaullism promoted a free Europe from the US hegemony, and on

the other hand, those who favoured Transatlanticism were of the opinion that there was a dire need for cooperation between Europe and the USA, assuming that the bilateral relations between Europe and the USA were of utmost importance, especially in terms of security. In one instance, Konrad Adenauer was known for his support for Gaullism, Ludwig Erhard and the then-Minister of foreign affairs, Gerhard Schröder advocated Transatlanticism. In relation to the aforementioned point about the inhomogeneous structure of the German governmental structure, the Cabinet also entailed ministers who defended the belief in Transatlanticism when Adenauer was in office, and this situation restrained him from pursuing his goals emanating from Gaullism (Önsoy&Koç, 2019, p.85).

Without a doubt, one of the most important advancements in German foreign policy during the Cold War was the introduction of the “*Ostpolitik*” (East policy) in Willy Brandt’s era. As the name suggests, this new policy aimed at opening a new page in foreign policy and promoting the diplomatic relationships with the Eastern Bloc countries. In this regard, this doctrine opposes the “*Westpolitik*” (West policy) pursued by Konrad Adenauer. However, it is of crucial importance that it was an appropriate act towards being a “civilian power” in that it embarks on the embrace of different political ideologies, and it was a peaceful move in conjunction with the ideas suggested in the German Basic Law of 1949.

The “*Ostpolitik*” can also be seen as a step towards the normalisation of the relations between the FRG and GDR. It also reflected Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition’s particular policies, because it differed significantly from the previous governments’ attitude towards the East (Ash, 1993, p.36). In the previous administrations, the notion of “*Alleinvertretung*” had been adopted, and accordingly, the FRG was regarded as the sole agent of the Germans. This led to the neglect of the GDR. This process, which started with Willy Brandt, eventually resulted in the reunification of Germany under the umbrella of “*Zwei plus Vier Vertrag*” (Two Plus Four Agreements) in Kohl’s administration. In the following chapters, the chancellors of the Cold War period will be separately discussed with a reference to the “civilian power” approach.

2.3. KONRAD ADENAUER PERIOD (1949-1963)

Germans found themselves in a political puzzle after 1945, and it had long-term national and international results. The country was divided by a 'historical discontinuity' (Mathiopoulos, 1985, p.677), and its then recent past led to the division of the German state, leaving a blurry future for Germans. The German question between 'denial and acceptance of history' was compensated by Konrad Adenauer's decision to integrate the FRG into the West, adopting a new democratic identity (Mathiopoulos, 1985, p.677). Konrad Adenauer was the first chancellor of West Germany, therefore he was also known as "*Gründungskanzler*" (founding chancellor). He had also served as the first minister of foreign affairs between 1951 and 1955. In addition to this, he was among the founders of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany.

Konrad Adenauer was seeking to achieve a place in history as one of the most prominent leaders of the mid-twentieth century, and he was the most important influence in the 'organisation and processes of the post-war German public life' (Freund, 1963, pp.458-459). He knew that the only way for the unification of the FRG and the GDR was based on the *Westpolitik*, which was also a way out of the Nazi past for many Germans. Konrad Adenauer was also aware that integration, particularly with neighbouring states, was the only solution for West Germany to get rid of the external constraints on both its domestic and foreign affairs (Dinan, 2005, p.23). Adenauer's accomplishments in creating and sustaining a West German state is quite important, since he achieved them in a dangerous environment where the struggle between East and West was bitter (Freund, 1963, p.461). Starting from Adenauer's administration, the foreign policy of the FRG put an emphasis on multilateralism and integration into the West so as to gain influence.

Forming cooperative institutional arrangements and taking advantage of soft power elements to pursue interests without being aggressive were the best strategies for Germans so that they could win confidence of the Allies, and they also realised that they could earn respect and policy success only if Germany

integrated itself into the West and promoted common values (Erb, 2003, p.2). Thanks to Adenauer's intense efforts, West Germany's first step to sovereignty was taken with the Petersberg Agreement of 1949, which was signed between West Germany and the Allied High Commission. "The fourteen years of the German Federal Republic were dominated by the solid and stolid figure of Konrad Adenauer. More than anyone else, the Rhenish statesman helped his country regain the international trust and respect it had lost during the Hitler years" (Gatzke, 1980, p.179).

The Allied Powers were also confused about what the new Germany would look like. On the one hand, France asked for Germany to be 'demilitarised, decentralised and deindustrialised' as the French had suffered from German militarism and expansionism more than any of the other Allied Powers (Dinan, 2005, p.20). However, this meant total destruction for Germany. On the other hand, it was again France, which came to the realisation that Germany had to be restored to stability, security and strength in Europe. Actually, in the very beginning, the idea of the European integration was fuelled by the United States, and to boost the weakened European economy, it introduced the Marshall Plan, which provided aid to Western Europe, with the aim of rebuilding the war-torn regions, modernising European industry, and of course, preventing the spread of communism. It was also initially manifested by the US that Western European states should gather under the frame of an organisation for further cooperation. This aspiration eventually paved the way for the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948. However, the organisation could not go beyond the point of being a stage for the Western European nations to argue about the share of the Marshall aid (Dinan, 2005, pp.57-58).

On the other hand, in an attempt to form a strong integration within Europe, the Franco-German social and economic cooperation under the administrations of de Gaulle and Adenauer played a crucial role, which later prompted the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 as part of the Schuman Plan, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Through this

initiative, six Western European countries, West Germany, France, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy started a process of integration in Europe. As it is argued, after all “integration among discrete political units is a historical fact in Europe” (Haas, 1961, p.366). Although the establishment of the ECSC was for the purpose of organising the coal and steel industries, and it served for economic interests, it also contributed to peace in Western Europe, creating cooperation and regional integration among the ‘inner six’. Furthermore, the creation of the ECSC presumably had the most benefits on West Germany, since it provided it with the opportunity to be influential in the post-war policies of Western Europe. Instead of being totally dismissed and isolated, becoming a part of a supranational organisation such as the ECSC by giving the authority did not constitute a problem for the FRG as it already had limited sovereignty; on the contrary, it could be claimed to have helped Germans integrate into the West. The FRG under the administration of Adenauer aggrandised its power within the West by collaborating in Western alliances, and the Chancellor’s strong leadership led to the ‘build-up of a reservoir of bargaining power’ (Freund, 1963, p.464).

After the six members of the ECSC realised the success of the cooperation under the organisation, they decided to go one step further. Particularly, the already increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union upon the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, and other nations that had adopted communism (Erb, 2003, p.23). To illustrate, the invasion of South Korea in 1950 by North Korea, which was a communist nation, brought about the Korean War, and in essence, it was a proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union. This war triggered a fear among Western European countries that their turn would come as well and their countries might be invaded by the Soviet Union. All these developments paved the way for a further integration in Western Europe with the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC). Presumably, the main idea was to generate a European military force in which German forces could also contribute, and this could be perceived as a substitute for NATO.

On the other hand, the idea of the rearmament of Germany might be considered as an action against pursuing “civilian power” politics, when all the political circumstances are taken into consideration it is understood that it was a necessary step in accordance with the conjuncture. Therefore, it could be supported and defended that the thought of the German rearmament was to preserve the regional peace and stability on the edge.

Nevertheless, Western European states, notably France, feared that a threat might be posed due to the rearmament of Germany, as there was still a sceptical approach towards Germany’s rearmament. However, the Korean War and other approaching communist threats made a change unavoidable. The five members of the “Inner Six” were against Germany’s disarmament, and they were not in favour of any leadership taken over by the FRG from a military point of view. In this regard, Adenauer, who claimed an equal treatment towards Germany in all areas, asked “If shared sovereignty was good enough for German industry, why was it not also acceptable for German rearmament?” (Dinan, 2005, p.28). Although Germany was accepted as an equal member of the EDC as a result of Adenauer’s strong efforts, the EDC remained unratified due to the rejection of France based on a potential British membership. But still, the acceptance of the FRG into the EDC was an important step towards gaining full sovereignty. Adenauer also thought that West Germany’s participation in the EDC would pave the way for the reunification of two German states, as the Soviet Union would be willing to talk when they were unable to expand their territories (Large, 1996, p.152).

The EDC failure must have been perceived as a subversion by the United States; therefore, it sought for different ways to unite Western Europe in which Germany would be an equal member, but of course without antagonising France. The Nazi atrocities were still alive in the minds of European nations, especially in the memory of France. However, in 1954, a way was found to strengthen the German ties with the West without antagonisation, and this way led to West Germany’s entrance into NATO as the fifteenth member, with some prohibitions such as the production of atomic, biological and chemical materials

(Kaplan, 1961, p.621). This development meant extended integration into the West for Adenauer and his country, and now West Germany was one step closer to its equal status among other Western European states. Eventually, in May 1955, the FRG became a full member of NATO, and in November of the same year, West Germany rearmed and created the *Bundeswehr* (the German army) with 400,000 soldiers, being the largest army in Europe after the Soviet Red Army (Erb, 2003, pp.29-32). By joining NATO, Adenauer thought that the FRG could provide the West enough strength to force the Soviet Union to the 'peace table', and then this would lead to a reconsideration of Germany's divided status (Kaplan, 1961, p.623). In fact, this shows us that the FRG under the Adenauer administration was ardently seeking ways to unify with the GDR through multilateralism and diplomacy. However, the FRG was not alone in conducting its foreign policy. West German foreign policy was also dictated by the relation between the US and the USSR.

The FRG's political focus drew a strict line under the Hallstein Doctrine, which was in effect from 1955 till 1970. According to this principle, "a nation's status with the FRG was automatically defined as either good, bad or nonexistent" to quote Margarita Mathiopoulos (1985, p.677). Throughout this period, the idea that the FRG was the only representative of Germans predominated, and the Federal Republic declared that it would cut off diplomatic ties with any state that would recognise East Germany. Furthermore, it was perceived as an unfriendly act by the FRG when a state established diplomatic relations with the GDR. However, this doctrine luckily was abandoned in the 1970 as it was understood that it could not be sustained. In fact, such a hostile attitude towards the GDR posed an obstacle in the reunification of the two German states, and it was a behaviour contradicting the policies of a country that claimed to pursue peace in the world and stability in its region.

After more than a decade, Adenauer's career was approaching its end. Especially starting from the 1960s, Konrad Adenauer and his party CDU had been going through certain hardships. The *Spiegel* affair in 1962 flared up anti-Adenauer attitude and was followed by spontaneous outbreaks of protests of

press and political parties against Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and the Bonn government in general (Anthon, 1963, p.194). The scandal broke out after an article analysing the German army in NATO was published, and the internment of some magazine staff escalated the vehemence of the situation. This scandal did not cost Adenauer and Strauss an arm and a leg, but their office. It was received as an intervention against freedom of press by the public and this led to the vote loss for CDU/CSU. When Konrad Adenauer retired in 1963, “he held the post of chancellor for over fourteen years, the longest span of political leadership in Germany since Bismarck, and one which inevitably suggested comparison with the architect and chief statesman of the “Second Reich” states Robert Spencer (1964, p.459). Adenauer had played such an important role in the transformation of German foreign policy that his name became identical to the German Chancellorship. Just as Bismarck’s resignation was followed by a ‘period of bitter domestic strife’, so Adenauer’s resignation left some problems behind (Spencer, 1964, p.459).

2.4. LUDWIG ERHARD PERIOD (1963-1966)

Upon Adenauer’s resignation in 1963, Ludwig Erhard took over the chancellorship in West Germany. He was rather experienced and qualified, since he had served as the Minister of Economic Affairs under Adenauer’s administration from 1949 till 1963 and as the vice-Chancellor from 1957 to 1963. “Ludwig Erhard was expected to bring a more conciliatory governing style with room for dialogue; he aspired to the role of a ‘people’s chancellor’ who would not allow himself to be co-opted by powerful interest groups or political parties” (Hennecke, n.d., para.10). As a result, he was in direct contact with the public. However, his chancellorship went through several hardships. First of all, some incomplete business from the Adenauer period regarding domestic policy; secondly, estrangement and conflicts within the CDU/CSU; thirdly, the SPD’s transformation into a coalition partner; fourthly, the disagreements on the direction of foreign policy between the “Gaullists” and “Atlanticists” like Erhard himself were among the chief problems of Erhard’s era (Hennecke, n.d.,

para.11). It can be easily argued that with the leadership of both the CDU and the CSU in opposition to him, Erhard's parliamentary position was much weaker than that of Adenauer's (Spencer,1964, p.461). His foreign and defence policies followed a pattern that promoted close relations with the US, and like most German leaders, Erhard wanted to find a solution to the divided status of his country. Undoubtedly, the existence of NATO and the US on German soil was highly important for Germany's security, and Erhard was well aware of this fact. Just like his predecessor, Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard also embraced European cooperation for the economic interests of his country.

In regard to economic interests, Erhard's name was associated with the introduction of the Deutschmark, which replaced the Reichsmark in 1948 as the currency of West Germany ("Ludwig Erhard", 2018, para.2). What's more, Ludwig Erhard is also known as the father of the social market economy, and during his time as the Minister of Economic Affairs, the FRG enjoyed a stable period of economic growth. Erhard is considered to be the architecture behind Germany's becoming an "economic miracle". He advocated the motto 'prosperity for all' and this became first a hope and then a reality for Germans who suffered from the dark Nazi regime ("Ludwig Erhard", 2018, para.5). During his era, Erhard paid special attention to the relations with the United States and Israel ("Ludwig Erhard", 2018, para.6). Even verbalising a relationship between the FRG and Israel was an important indicator in terms of the transformation the foreign policy of West Germany had gone through. It could be even claimed that the special emphasis on the Israel-West Germany relationship was important proof of the civilianisation of German foreign policy. Throughout Erhard's period, West Germany gradually opened up to Eastern Europe by building up trade missions in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland ("Ludwig Erhard", 2018, para.6). While Erhard had served as the Minister of Economic Affairs for fourteen years, he sat at the chancellery seat for only three years. Because of the disputes over economic and fiscal policy issues, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition came to an end in 1966 ("Ludwig Erhard", 2018, para.7) Although he had a legendary reputation, Erhard never considered himself to be a miracle man and he always underlined that his country's rapid growth was thanks to a

sound economic policy along with the adaptation to a free economic system (Reichel, 2002, p.427).

2.5. KURT GEORG KIESINGER PERIOD (1966-1969)

Kurt Georg Kiesinger came to power after he had been elected Federal Chancellor in 1966. Kiesinger is regarded as a figure in the transition period from the Adenauer era to the social-liberal coalition, and as the head of a grand coalition, he envisaged a temporary alliance between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (Gassert, n.d., para.1). During Germany's first Grand Coalition under the Kiesinger Era, the government had to deal with an economic crisis as the economy was no longer on track as it used to be. The state was drowning in debts, and unemployment was on the rise; therefore, at that time, the state rewarded business contracts to prevent businesses from bankruptcy and to avoid unemployment ("Kurt Georg Kiesinger", 2018, para.2).

Similar to the Erhard era, the Grand Coalition under Kiesinger administration also tried to further relations with Eastern Europe. Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt looked for the ways to improve ties with the East (Banchoff, 1999, p.61). In one instance, the FRG established diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania at that time. To indicate, he approved the exchange of ambassadors with Romania although it held full diplomatic ties with East Germany (Banchoff, 1999, p.77). It was, after all, Kiesinger who also suggested a soft interpretation and application of the Hallstein Doctrine, and during the negotiations for the Grand Coalition in November 1966, he tried to explain the need for talks based on an eight-point programme offered by the SPD, and it carried the intention of normalising with the GDR (Sergio, 2015, pp.418-419). However, compared to Adenauer and Erhard, "Kiesinger espoused the goal of reunification more forcefully" according to Thomas Banchoff (1999, p.75). He took concrete steps towards the aim of national unity. For example, Kiesinger began corresponding with the then Minister-President of the German Democratic Republic, Willi Stoph ("Kurt Georg Kiesinger", 2018, para.4). Based upon the developments above, the Kiesinger era could be

characterised as a period of *détente* in terms of West German foreign policy. In this period both Kiesinger and Brandt regarded European *détente* as a way leading to national unity; however, Kiesinger was of the opinion that West Germany was the sole representative of the German people in international affairs just like his predecessors Adenauer and Erhard (Banchoff, 1999, pp.76-77). Still, for Kiesinger, reunification was beyond being a mere constitutional obligation. During the *détente* in Europe, Kiesinger also supported the renunciation of force accords with Moscow and its allies; but he always portrayed a cautious attitude towards the Soviet Union as suggested by Banchoff (1999, p.75).

Throughout the first Grand Coalition government under the Kiesinger Era, the emergency legislation issue was highly important in that it kept the public quite busy. Though the FRG was partly responsible for its own destiny starting from 1955, the Allied Powers (the US, the UK and France) claimed certain rights and they were able to protect their armed forces located in West Germany's territories ("Kurt Georg Kiesinger", 2018, para.5). Nonetheless, the West German government wanted to pass legislation including any emergency situation so that these rights could be used by the German authorities once they had the ability to protect those armed forces themselves. Upon this legislation, especially students stood up against this regulation as they did not want the West German state to gain that much power shortly after the war ("Kurt Georg Kiesinger", 2018, para.6). This indicates that although the state pursued power politics from time to time, the people of the FRG did not want their country to diverge from a civilian approach, providing an auto control, and they were asking for more freedoms. Those who protested against the emergency legislation are also known as 'the 68 generation', referring to the year of 1968 when the social upheaval started. After the elections held in 1969, the SPD wanted to form the new government with the FDP, rather than the CDU, which resulted in the end of the reign of the CDU after twenty years, and Kiesinger was succeeded by Willy Brandt.

2.6. WILLY BRANDT PERIOD (1969-1974)

The first ideological divergence from Adenauer's "*Westpolitik*" occurred when Willy Brandt, the first social democratic Chancellor took office as in 1969. Starting from Brandt's era, establishing strong relations with the Eastern Bloc and especially East Germany became a focal point. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in fact specified a pivotal shift in West German foreign policy, and it was regarded as an equivalent of Adenauer's reconciliation with the West (Ash, 1993, p.33). The main goal set by the "*Ostpolitik*" was to provide an appropriate circumstance for the unification of Germany. It can also be argued that this policy opened up a new page regarding the relations with the states of the Iron Curtain, and West Germany was closer to purging itself from self-limiting chains (Özer&Karadağ, 2017, p.134).

The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 must have showed Brandt, who was then the mayor of West Berlin the need for establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR as well as the Soviet Union for the realisation of the unification. In fact, the historical origin of "*Ostpolitik*" can be traced back to the early 1950s; but a major development took place when the FRG and the Soviet Union set up ties and it was a huge step towards West Germany's détente with Eastern Europe (Chopra, 1972, p.227). Willy Brandt's "*Ostpolitik*" differed from other policies on the grounds that it brought about a deviation thanks to its orientation towards the East, and it entailed several bilateral agreements with the Iron Curtain states such as the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. What was different here was that Brandt's predecessors were not so keen on improving strong and genuine bilateral ties with the East due to West Germany's commitment to multilateralism and Western integration. Before Brandt, the Bonn government's "*Deutschlandpolitik*" was based upon the idea that the unification of Germany could happen only through a 'policy of strength' which would be based on Western integration and the Hallstein Doctrine (Juneau, 2013, p.279). Nonetheless, for Willy Brandt, it was necessary to accept the presence of the GDR.

As for the brain behind this novel policy, it was Egon Bahr, who was Willy Brandt's chief foreign policy advisor. Bahr thought that the only way that would lead to the German unification was to cooperate with the Kremlin; and in order to start a relationship of mutual confidence with Moscow, the FRG was compelled to accept the status quo in Europe as well as the division of Germany (Juneau, 2013, p.279). Bahr defined his strategy under the motto of "*Wandel durch Annäherung*" (change through rapprochement). In the meantime, Willy Brandt believed that thanks to détente, the transformation of the Soviet system might be achieved eventually by means of an external factor, and hence, there could be a "*Wandel durch Annäherung*" (Niedhart, 2016, p.34). However, "*Ostpolitik*" was just part of the international détente and its main goal was the maintenance of peace and stability across Europe; therefore, for the creators of "*Ostpolitik*", this new conservative but at the same time dynamic policy whose main aim was to transform the European status quo, did not bring about a fundamental change (Juneau, 2013, p.279). It can be articulated that "*Ostpolitik* combined continuity with innovation" (Hanrieder, 1989, p.326).

Brandt's "*Ostpolitik*" forced West Germany to lead a foreign policy full of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the GDR. To illustrate, it constituted a vital step towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation that resulted in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which was the zenith in détente; and furthermore, for the West, "*Ostpolitik*" was also crucial in that the FRG was so keen on cooperating and acting together with its allies in a policy towards the East (Hanrieder, 1989, p.326). Regarding this issue, the Chancellor was of the opinion that "his *Ostpolitik* was a constituent part of the West's policy towards the East, denying any charge that the FRG was 'going it alone' with its Eastern policy" (Juneau, 2011, p.285). At this point, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* could be assumed to be a policy through which West Germany focused its attention on strengthening diplomacy on the continent, and sustaining stability for the region by approaching the East, and in fact reconciling the West with the East. Willy Brandt was aware of the fact that any German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe would be influential on Moscow, Eastern communist countries and East

Berlin, and the main focus was directed at Moscow, since it played a key role for reunification (Sommer, 1968, p.60). In some way, the "*Ostpolitik*" managed to deal with the sharp dilemma of the FRG's security policies on its territorial unity in the 1950's and the 1960's towards Eastern states, especially the GDR. The détente processes of the 1970s brought most benefits to the Germans, and West Germany gained its global prestige along with its diplomatic leverage (Hanrieder, 1989, p.328). Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was a golden opportunity for the Federal Republic of Germany to find solutions with its eastern neighbours.

Willy Brandt maintained a foreign policy which yielded in the rapprochement in the relations with the Eastern Bloc. Accordingly, the New Eastern policy of the FRG also resulted in the treaties with the neighbours in the East and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and this constituted an additional framework for German foreign policy in the 1970's (Banchoff, 1999, p.15). The treaties such as the Moscow (1970), the Warsaw (1970), and the bilateral treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany between 1970 and 1972 paved the way for other institutional bases for the "*Ostpolitik*". Among these treaties and agreements were the Quadripartite Agreement signed in 1971, the Transit Agreement and the Basic Treaty signed in 1972 with the GDR, and the Treaty of Prague signed in 1973 with Czechoslovakia. With the Treaty of Warsaw, the FRG renounced its claims regarding the Polish Border, and the Oder-Neisse Line was recognised as the border between the two. In return, Poland agreed to allow ethnic Germans still in Poland to leave for the FRG (Solsten, 1999, p.108).

Additionally, in the negotiations with the Soviet Union, both the FRG and the GDR had already accepted the Oder-Neisse border. The signing of the Basic Treaty (*Grundvertrag*) in 1972 by the FRG and the GDR, on the other hand, posed a breakthrough in the relationship between the two German states in that it opened a new and a decisive chapter, and the process of establishing diplomatic ties between the FRG and GDR, which had already been fuelled by the Transit Agreement in May 1972 made a smooth start (Blacksell & Brown, 1983, p.260). By means of these diplomatic initiatives, the FRG displayed an

attitude emphasising civilian means in its foreign policy. The Bonn government maintained a sincere, decisive, and clear-sighted policy of détente with Eastern Europe under the Brandt administration (Sommer, 1968, p.59). Not only was Willy Brandt important but also his decisions affected the conduct of both world and European politics, and he contributed to the de-escalation of the tension between the Blocs and the development of cultural and commercial relations; thus he helped overcome the adverse impacts of the Cold War. Brandt had not invented the norms and codes of the notion of co-existence; however, he was the one who grounded this notion with ethical and pragmatic values (Aydın, "Willy Brandt ve Almanya'nın Doğu Açılımı", 2020, para.1).

2.7. HELMUT SCHMIDT PERIOD (1974-1982)

Born in 1918 in Hamburg, Helmut Schmidt served as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974 till 1982. He was regarded as one of the most 'respected German politicians of all times' ("Helmut Schmidt", 2021, para.1). Just like Ludwig Erhard, he had already been active in politics; thus, he was quite experienced when he became the Chancellor. Between 1967 and 1969, Schmidt led the SPD faction, and then he took over the Ministry of Defence, and in 1972, he became the Finance Minister under Willy Brandt's administration. After Brandt's resignation, the Bundestag elected him the Chancellor. He was the Chancellor during the turbulent times, as he had to cope with several hardships from economic crises to the acts of terrorism committed by the Red Army Faction (RAF) ("Helmut Schmidt", 2018, para.1).

In 1973, when the oil prices skyrocketed due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the West came to the realisation that they were dependent on oil, since sharply rising oil prices curbed the post-war economic growth. Though the FRG managed the crises better than many other countries, the unemployment figures were on the rise in the mid-1970s ("Helmut Schmidt", 2018, para.2). It can also be assumed that the FRG gained its fame as Europe's economic powerhouse since it proved that the country could deal with the crises even when it was at its worst (Elliott, 2015, para.4). In fact, Chancellor Schmidt was

of the opinion that solutions to fiscal issues could be found only through cooperation. Unfortunately, he was not the Chancellor of the period when the “*Wirtschaftswunder*” (economic wonder) was experienced. Similar to many other countries, the FRG also went through lower economic growth, higher inflation, and eventually higher unemployment. “The world-wide recession brought economic matters to the foreground” as stated by Hanrieder (1989, p.329).

Apart from the economic turmoil, the Schmidt government had to deal with a series of conflicts with the United States due to fiscal and monetary issues. The world monetary crises, which flared up in the early 1970s caused the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary regime and also ‘sharpened American attacks on the exclusionary trade practices of the European Community’ (Hanrieder, 1989, p.328). The 1970s brought about a sharp change in sustaining both global and regional balance of power. In fact, “the 1970s placed a heavy strain on the historic transatlantic security compact and the economic, political, and psychological foundations that had sustained it in the post-war decades” (Hanrieder, 1989, p.328). Although the FRG was successful at managing the oil crises, this spoilt the relationship of West Germany with the United States and the EC. In one instance, West Germany showed resistance against American suggestions for a political and economic ‘axis’ between Bonn and Washington by refusing a pioneering role for the German economy and complaining about the American monetary policies (Hanrieder, 1989, p.329). The Schmidt government also stood up against the EC even in a tougher manner and attempted to urge the member states to take up responsibility regarding fiscal issues. Thanks to Schmidt’s efforts towards being a ‘good European’ and his good ties with the French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, France and West Germany founded the European Monetary System (Hanrieder, 1989, p.329). It can be assumed that this was a huge step towards enhancing the unity within Europe without any external urge. This could also be perceived as West Germany’s decisive attitude towards generating and promoting a strong European identity.

In addition to the global economic turmoil, the world witnessed some other political escalations throughout the 1970s. One of them, which was also of particular concern to West Germany was the NATO Dual Track Decision. The story started when the Soviet Union unilaterally decided to deploy SS20 medium-range nuclear missiles that were stationed against Europe. Upon this, NATO agreed on the NATO Dual-Track decision, which allowed medium-range missiles to be deployed, particularly in West Germany in case negotiations with the Soviet Union failed. This tension also paved the way for a widespread peace movement towards disarmament. The Dual-Track decision was against the civilian identity perception which had been adopted subsequent to the Second World War. Upon the failure of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, NATO inevitably decided to deploy its missiles. The year was 1987 when the US and the Soviet Union agreed upon the disarmament of nuclear weapons. However; in West Germany, the domestic debates on the Dual-Track Decision had already led to a crisis within the SPD/FDP Coalition, which had different perspectives on policies towards economic issues, and this eventually cost Schmidt his office in 1982. All in all, Schmidt's period was one full of turmoil. His chancellorship was characterised by worsening stagflation, radical domestic terrorism, domestic protests against nuclear power plants, disputes within the SPD/FDP Coalition, and disagreements within the North Atlantic alliance over the neutron bomb as well as another oil-price shock in 1979 and the collapse of the *détente* (Cary, 2019, p.151).

2.8. HELMUT KOHL PERIOD (1982-1998)

After the coalition of the SPD/FDP, a new coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP emerged in 1982. When Helmut Kohl took office within a coalition with Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1982, he succeeded his namesake, Helmut Schmidt through 'the first successful constructive vote of non-confidence in the *Bundestag*' and he gained a solid victory in the federal elections held in 1983 (Goldman, 1983, p.5). He is referred to as the "Chancellor of the Unity" by many since the FRG and GDR reunified when he was in office ("Helmut Kohl", 2018.,

para.1). Kohl served as the Chancellor throughout the 'watershed period between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new multipolar world order' (Schlevogt, 2002, p.8). For Helmut Kohl, it can be assumed that his main aim was to create a Europeanised German identity. Like his predecessors, he also stressed the necessity of the Western integration, but particularly the European integration, and Kohl also sustained the policy of *détente* towards the Eastern states. During the first years of his government, tax reforms were put into effect so that the prosperity could flourish among the people in West Germany, which also resulted in the reduction in the national debt ("Helmut Kohl", 2018, para.4). Undoubtedly, it was a firm step toward the economic recovery in the country. Besides the pursuit of policies towards economic development, the Kohl government was also seeking to better the social conditions by introducing reforms on long-term nursing care. However, his policies followed a trend supporting NATO's Dual-Track Decision, which had created problems in Schmidt's time. On the other hand, Kohl paid special attention to the relations with France, and in this regard, he embraced a pattern similar to Adenauer's politics.

Followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th November 1989, Helmut Kohl thought that it was a golden opportunity to restore the German unity. "Kohl took literally the injunction in the West German constitution to restore the country's unity" as stated by Simon Tisdall (2017, para.6). Thereupon, he introduced a 'ten point plan' and he urged for a quick reunification. He was successful at convincing European leaders by promoting the thought that German unity and European unification were 'two sides of the same coin' ("The Chancellor who reunited Germany", 2013, para.6). Thus, Kohl implied that he was of the opinion that the German identity and the European identity were the same, and in a potential reunification, a unified Germany would also be integrated into the West. In this sense, the 'ten point plan' was important in that it had an influence over the idea of Pan-Europeanism (Önsoy&Koç, 2019, p.114).

As part of this plan, the first step was to build a closer cooperation between the two German states in all spheres, which would be directly beneficial for the

people of both sides, and this included specifically economic, scientific-technological, and cultural cooperation; secondly, this cooperation would be followed by the emergence of a confederation that would lead to the foundation of a federation to be in the same line with the East-West détente and European integration (Helmut Kohl's Ten-Point Plan for German Unity, November 28, 1989). On the other hand, in addition to the FRG-GDR rapprochement, throughout the 1980s, the world politics went through a rapidly changing phase, and especially starting from the late 1980s, the Iron Curtain states experienced both an economic and a political transformation (Önsoy&Koç, 2019, pp.114-115).

In the summer of 1990, Helmut Kohl succeeded in persuading Mikhail Gorbachev to assure that the reunified Germany could decide which alliance it would belong to ("The Chancellor who reunited Germany", 2013, para.7). In fact, with this move, it was intended to make it quite clear that a unified Germany would be independent in decision-making processes of its foreign policy by signalling that it could be part of the West rather than the Eastern Bloc. However, it could be assumed that Kohl was also trying to keep the relations both with the West and the East in balance. Though the neighbouring countries had reservations towards a unified Germany subsequent to three destructive and at the same time expansionist wars (1870-71, 1914-1918, 1939-1945), they found different way to address the German question (Harnisch, 2013, p.73).

Once the Berlin Wall fell, the policies towards the reunification of the two German states were pursued within the scope of the Four plus Two Talks. Apart from the fact that West Germany had more chances for the sovereign and unified Germany thanks to the benefits its West integration had provided, because the West German political system had remained almost unchanged, and due to strong constitutional constraints along with a powerful and consensual foreign policy culture, it was easy for the FGR to ingest the five East German states during the reunification process (Harnisch, 2013, p.73). With the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, the

united Germany achieved its full sovereignty both in its domestic and international relations, which was also related to the right to freely decide on alliances ("The Two plus Four Treaty in UNESCO's Memory of the World Register", n.d., para.4).

2.9. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I aimed to cover West German foreign policy starting from the end of the Second World War until 1990, the year when the two German states unified. The chapter delved into the Federal Republic of Germany's integration into the West and its post-war settlement. West Germany had transformed into a potential balancer between the East and the West, growing into an economic power (Hanrieder, 1989, p.311). The Cold War West German foreign policy was mainly dominated by a sense of guilt due to the atrocities of the Second World War, the Western integration, transatlantic alliance, a strict commitment to multilateralism, a civilian identity along with a Eurocentric character. It is clearly observed that historical memory played a key role in constructing a German foreign policy identity in the Cold War. If we need to summarise German foreign policy during that time, it could be asserted the country's foreign policy was mainly haunted by its post-war guilt, and therefore, West Germany conscientiously developed its foreign policy, within the context of a "civilian power" identity. Since the collective memory was quite vivid at that time, it was one of the indispensable factors in making policies. Moreover, the memory discourse in Germany is still likely to be related to generational settings and political circumstances (Fullard, 2010, p.72). The darkness of the Nazi regime had caused the FRG to develop and partly to lead a pacifist tradition in its foreign policy.

On the other hand, a major change in West Germany's foreign policy happened when Brandt's "*Ostpolitik*" was adopted with the aim of having better relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries along with the GDR, which had been ignored until that time. This chapter portrays a country which was struggling for its legitimacy in the first place and then which was looking for

ways that would lead to the reunification with its other half. West German political elites were aware that a strong economy would be a key to the reunification; it is for this reason that they were decisive in creating an economic miracle out of a world-war wreck.

Throughout the Cold-War period, political, strategic and economic conditions changed, along with the restraints and opportunities which West Germany had to deal with (Hanrieder, 1989, p.312). In the first years of the post-war period, Germans were torn between the two blocs, and haunted by the feeling of guilt and lack of sovereignty. The priority at that time was the survival of the state.

However, in the later periods, as West Germany started to re-gain its self-confidence, it realised that it could play a global role in the world politics, and after assuring its legitimacy, it was obvious that the reunification would eventually come. During the Cold War years, especially the FRG was the buffer zone between the Western and Eastern bloc, and it had to sustain a balanced policy. Although it had conflicts and disagreements with its Western allies, the FRG always maintained a pro-Western attitude. Eventually, when the two German states unified, Germany's legitimacy was also completed.

As a consequence of the reunification some social challenges such as globalisation, multiculturalism, regional integration as a united state brought about several fundamental changes in the institutions, norms and policies (Brady&Wiliarty, 2002, p.3). Therefore, the reunification of Germany raised questions and reservations in minds as regards to what kind of a power Germany would grow into. Would Germany pursue power politics or would it keep being a "civilian power"? In the next chapters these questions will be answered in relation to the traits Germany had adopted since the post-war period and its attitude towards the use of force within the scope of military actions.

CHAPTER 3

THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the German foreign policy attitude towards the use of force in the aftermath of the reunification, which also coincided with the end of the Cold War. Although it was expected by many that a unified Germany would pursue a reconciled policy as for the use of force; on the contrary, it initially portrayed a timid attitude. Germany always looked for a constitutional basis and a multilateral setting for its military involvements. It can be suggested that the *Bundeswehr's* military engagements are the reflections of the universalisation of the culture of responsibility Germany has developed out of its historic guilt. The chapter also outlines some of the military operations Germany has participated in, starting from the Kosovo War, which is accepted as a 'watershed' in the country's attitude towards the use of force in that it was the first combat mission German soldiers took part in since the Second World War.

The end of the Cold War brought along ambiguity and thus, many challenges to world politics. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought a dilemma to light regarding international politics along with conflicts. International politics was torn between 'implementing human rights' through the use of force if needed and 'respecting states' sovereignty (Friedrich, 2000, p.4). The reunification of Germany, on the other hand, coincided with the tragic events of the 1990s. This period marked a breakthrough in many ways, and the reunification raised questions regarding a unified Germany's role in international politics. It should also be noted that the unification augmented the spectre of German hegemony in post-Cold War Europe (Sperling, 2001, p.389).

There were plenty of predictions and assumptions on what could happen after the Iron Curtain had fallen down and the Cold War had come to an end, from

the dissolution of NATO to the disintegration of the European Union. The assumption and fear that a unified Germany would become an assertive and aggressive state to pursue power politics were common as well. The reunification of the two Germanies was so sudden that it did not leave any room for the political self-understanding of the Germans (Von Bredow, 1992, p.289). Moreover, it was a phenomenon for which German policy makers were not prepared either. However, when it comes to German foreign policy after the reunification, “continuity dominates change” (Harnisch, 2001, p.35). Instead of dominating EU politics and ‘playing its full constructive role in the centre of Europe’ as suggested by Eckart Arnold (1991, p.453), Germans have been in the pursuit of civilising international politics.

Yet, the reunification in 1990 sparked several debates about German power, and potential policies a unified Germany would adopt. In Germany, there was also scepticism about the future orientation of foreign policy after the reunification. Whether Germany’s role concept based on a “civilian power” approach would persist was an object of curiosity. However, at the end of the Cold War, German leaders ensured that a unified Germany would remain the same as the former one and preserve foreign policy traditions, values and calculability which the Federal Republic of Germany had successfully implemented before the reunification (Lantis, 2002, p.22). It can be contended that the German question evolved into a different form followed by the end of the Cold War. For many, the reformulation of the German question would be if Germany was willing to be a hegemon in Europe? Ever since, several expressions have been suggested to define Germany, such as the normal power, the reluctant hegemon, geo-economic power or a “civilian power”; however, it has never been affiliated with the hard power concept.

German foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War was considerably moulded by a set of ideas, particularly by a well-established political culture and a developed pro-European national identity (Baumann, 2002, p.5). In conjunction with the “*Westbindung*”, restraint on the use of force and commitment to multilateralism were among the main characteristics of German

foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. During the 1990s, Germany became an important actor and promoter of the enlargement of NATO and the EU as part of its identity. Besides this, it also supported some arrangements in arms control, non-proliferation as well as international criminal law. In this sense, it can be suggested that Germany resembled a “civilian power” by taking the initiative, influencing and civilising international politics with the help of strategies including the monopolisation of force within means of collective security along with the preference for peaceful resolution of disputes and strengthening the rule of law (Harnisch, 2001, p.35). Furthermore, the foreign policy role concept Germany had adopted since Adenauer ‘survived beyond unification’ as well (Maull, 2000, p.56).

However, though the constructivist literature also emphasises the continuity of German foreign policy, it underestimates some non-negligible changes, especially regarding the traits mentioned above. After the Cold War, new conditions were meant to bring along new necessities that would pave the way for the creation of new norms dissimilar to already existing ones. That is to say, subsequent to the East-West conflict, some institutions in Germany went through fundamental reconfigurations such as the armed forces (Von Bredow, 1992, p.289). Initially, the deeply-rooted traces of the Nazi past and the devastation its military force caused created both external and domestic reservations on the formation of the *Bundeswehr*. Moreover, even a slight change in the military area would mean a big change in Germany’s political culture for many. In addition, it can be held that since the end of the Cold War, the role of military power in German foreign and security policy has gone through a considerable change (Noetzel&Schreer, 2008, p.212). Yet, it is essential to mention that for Germans, the *Bundeswehr* functions as an institution established for nothing else but to provide and ensure domestic security and defence, and the defence of the German land has always been the priority for the German armed forces other than elsewhere (Klose, 2005, p.37).

On the other hand, in the 1990s, the world witnessed a period of subsequent conflicts and wars, which demanded active German participation in world

politics both politically and militarily. For many years, the German territories were used as battlefields, and this was especially true throughout the Cold War era, when German soil was used as the main arena for a potential Third World War (Klose, 2005, p.37). Although Germans were not so willing to have a military force, the circumstances of the Cold War period necessitated forming a German military force. In this respect, Germany joined NATO in 1955 and in 1956, it made an amendment to the Basic Law in order that the state could make a contribution to the integrated forces of NATO for the defence of Western Europe against a potential threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the use of force was preferred within a multilateral setting rather than a unilateral act. What is more, military power was considered to serve for territorial defence only; hence, it did not play an active role for long. It can be suggested that Germany is constitutionally devoted to world peace and the renunciation of aggression (Peters, 2018, p.246). Henceforth, the use of force has been restricted by the Basic Law. Accordingly, it is saliently given in Article 87a, Paragraph 1 that the Federation is allowed to establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence, and in Paragraph 2, it is given that on top of defence, the Armed Forces might be employed only to the extent permitted by the Basic Law. However, although the Basic Law had explicitly restricted the scope of the use of military force, Germans were unwilling to join collective security forces in general. Until the unification of Germany, the restrictions of the Basic Law had been used as excuses for the rejection of any military engagement. However, in 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court made a judgement allowing German military engagement within the auspices of NATO and UN peacekeeping missions by granting the *Bundestag* the right to decide on military operations abroad, and thus, the Constitutional Court allowed German participation in multilateral peace and security missions.

Meanwhile, the first out-of-area mission outside of NATO terrain was in Cambodia where German doctors were assigned to provide medical care for the UN peacekeeping forces ("The Bundeswehr as an Army on Operations," 2022). In this way, the first deployment of the *Bundeswehr* was justified through

humanitarian aid. However, over time, the existence of the German military forces abroad has been rationalised by adopting the idea that threats do not respect national borders, and therefore, the *Bundeswehr* is deployed worldwide ("The Bundeswehr as an Army on Operations," 2022). Apart from the deployment to Cambodia, the *Bundeswehr* forces participated in several other operations and among them were providing helicopter units to control UN sanctions in Iraq, supplying humanitarian aid to the Kurds in Iran and joining actions over Bosnia and the Adriatic Sea (Friedrich, 2000, p.5) In this sense, the first serious deployment of the German *Bundeswehr* was in 1996 to Bosnia as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). With this act, Germany 'crossed a historic divide' and this mission served as an important breaking point with the antimilitarist attitude of Germans (Cooper, 1997, p.99).

The main motivation for the legitimisation of political and military actions was mainly solving humanitarian crises. However, before the conflict in Bosnia, which took place between 1992 and 1995, the majority of Germans stood against the out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* as in the Gulf War. Hence, the *Bundeswehr* did not participate in the war; instead, Germany provided financial contributions. While the German public opposed the Gulf War, it was surprising that they did not protest against the deployment of their soldiers to Bosnia. It is also known that Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fisher (Alliance 90/ The Greens) had protested against the US, opposing the Gulf War. In fact, the anti-war sentiment against the Gulf War emanated from a strong drive against anti-Americanism, and what was harshly opposed was the 'militarism of the American leadership' (Cooper, 1997, p.102).

However, the situation was different in Bosnia and there values were more important than interests and human rights ushered out sovereignty. The West did not intervene in the region on account of economic motives and interests similar to the US interests in oil in the Gulf War. In particular, for Germany, the reason for a military engagement in Bosnia was connected to human rights violations. In the years following the war, Germany felt more pressure to play a more active role in finding solutions in the ethnic conflicts within the Balkans

(Kundnani, 2012, p.44). The Balkans on the other hand, were like a bomb ready to go off, and any unrest that would flare up in this region was likely to affect the entire continent. The ethnic conflicts in the Balkans still continued to terrorise the region towards the 2000s. Eventually the large-scale violence and turmoil the Yugoslavian wars created, caused Germany to adopt a new security attitude, and the challenges imposed by the conflicts in the Balkans led the Federal Republic to change its security policy and accept the necessity for potential German engagements in military interventions apart from the traditional NATO operations.

3.2. GERMANY'S ROLE IN OUT-OF-AREA-MISSIONS: FROM RESTRAINT TO RESPONSIBILITY

The Federal Republic's role in security and peace promotion (*Friedensförderung*) has propagated in the last three decades. After the unification and the outbreak of conflicts during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the potential future role of the *Bundeswehr* created a huge controversy in Germany, and it was instigated by the conflicts in various places of the world. The controversy was about whether Germany should remain committed to its self-imposed constraint against the use of force in military operations outside of NATO or it should claim a responsibility and play a more active role in this regard. Beforehand, Germany had displayed a rather hesitant attitude towards its role in civilian crisis management, and it opted for diplomatic and antimilitarist solutions for conflict prevention. In fact, Germany's hesitation to adopt a more active role in out-of-area missions was also supported for some good reasons. First of all, any tension or conflict coming from any Third World country throughout the Cold War could have spread across the two German states as they were the representatives of the two opposing blocs and their own alliances; that is, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Secondly, Germany could have turned into an arena for a nuclear war likely to break out between the East and the West. It is for this reason that the Western Alliance did not urge Germany to participate in any large-scale crisis outside of NATO's main frontier in Europe.

And thirdly, based on its history and culture of responsibility, Germany had adopted a very cautious attitude towards the use of force except for the reason of self-defence of its own soils. Both domestic constraints and external sensitivities set drawbacks regarding military action. The collective memory was still so alive that deploying German soldiers to any corner of the world could have evoked the nasty memories of the Nazi regime among Germany's neighbours.

The restrictions in Germany's military activity outside NATO were attributed to the Basic Law of 1949. The "*Grundgesetz*" of 1949 was grounded in a security policy with no West German military, and this was more or less because of the induced policies of the victorious Allies of the WW II rather than the self-awareness that West German policy makers should have (Lange, 2022, para.2). Accordingly, the use of force and the "*Bundeswehr*" was allowed only for the conditions under which there was a defensive purpose. Nonetheless, the spectrum of German foreign and security policy has transformed with the end of the Cold War, and this has invalidated common approaches to Germany's posture towards military operations. Starting from the early 1990s, due to the changing and newly emerging conditions in world politics, Germany was obliged to embrace some changes in its foreign policy and the role it had adopted since the post-war period.

Above all, Germany was not a divided country longer, which belonged to two opposing ideologies. Accordingly, securing its territory against another German army was off the table, but this did not mean that there was no need for an army. Moreover, now that the unified Germany had a bigger responsibility for providing and sustaining peace all over the world, referring to Germany's historical experience over and over again could not be accepted as an excuse for its exclusion from a common responsibility, and due to its past, Germany cannot be urged to adopt an 'observer status' in world politics (Kamp, 1993, p.165).

We should be able to distinguish two Germanies in this respect: Germany before 1945 and Germany after 1990. Especially; after the Second World War,

Germany had embraced a whole different state identity and foreign policy attitude that is respectful for human rights and promotes rule of law along with multilateral settings. The restraint on the use of force, with which Germany (West Germany at this point) had imbued itself since the post-war period, apparently persisted until the unification, and even afterwards. Germany gave a full consent to all liabilities emanating from the memberships of multinational organisations such as the United Nations, NATO, CSCE and so on. To illustrate, once Germany joined the UN in 1973, it did not claim any preconditions regarding the UN Charter, which also entailed a proviso as to participation in combat missions, and it was identified in the famous Article 51 of the Charter.

However, what Germany needed to be aware of was the fact that threats to its security could come from anywhere in the world and they were not restricted to its region only. It is for this reason that, after the reunification, as a country playing a key role not only in Europe but also in world politics, it had to accept the necessity for a change in the perception of the role of its military power because the unification encumbered Germany with new responsibilities towards both its neighbours and international community. Moreover, politically and economically stable world politics would be the most beneficiary for Germany in order to reconstruct the recently joined eastern part of its country. The willingness to take advantage of such a stability also suggested the Federal Republic's readiness for an active contribution to crisis prevention and crisis management (Kamp, 1993, p.165). But undoubtedly, the out-of-area missions had to be carried within a constitutional frame. While the *Bundestag* was the final decision-maker for military operations abroad, the Constitutional Court paved the way for German involvement in multilateral peace and security missions as well as collective defence efforts (Peters, 2018, pp.247-248). Starting from the first deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers in 1992, over 130 mandates for foreign missions have been promulgated and prolonged by the German parliament. There has been always a need for a parliamentary approval for foreign missions based on the related provisions for military deployments and among them are the Article 24(2), and Article 87a of the Basic

Law in addition to Article 26 on the prohibition of a war of aggression and Article 115a on the declaration of state of defence (Peters, 2018, pp.249-250).

For Germany, the use of force has become a prior action under certain circumstances to implement its values and norms such as defending human rights, democracy, freedom, maintaining peace building, and preventing humanitarian crises, and it has not been regarded as a tool for an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. In Somalia, for example, the *Bundeswehr* soldiers were deployed in 1993 under the UNOSOM II Operation with the aim of dealing with the rebels of the United Somali Congress responsible for the turmoil and humanitarian crisis in the country. Therefore, the use of force was a necessary act to bring stability and to reshape the political order in the region, but different from Cambodia, the operation in Somalia was not part of a humanitarian aid campaign, yet a military act. However, the fact that Germany has the power to act freely in the spheres of foreign policy such as with military options does not necessarily mean that Germany has to contribute to every single international operation for the promotion of peace because it also has freedom to decide on whether to deploy its soldiers or not (Kamp, 1993, p.165).

When we look at the operations of the *Bundeswehr* after the reunification, we see a variety in purposes. To start with, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the German armed forces sent helicopters in order to assist missions within the scope of Operation Safe Havens for Kurdish refugees fleeing from Iraq to Turkey and Iran due to Saddam Hussein's persecutions, and during that time, the German navy vessels participated in mine-clearing operations in the Gulf area while West Germany had refused to assign minesweepers back in 1988 on the grounds that the decision would be against the Constitution; secondly, in 1991, the German *Luftwaffe* (Air force) joined UNSCOM to control if Iraq abode by the policies regarding the use of the weapons of mass destruction. Thirdly, in 1992, German soldiers were deployed to Cambodia to send medical aid to the UN troops, and that year was quite a busy one for the *Bundeswehr*, since its mission also included the organisation of providing food and medical aid for Bosnia, along with a patrol duty over the Adriatic Sea for the observation of any

potential break of the UN sanctions on Serbia, and again in 1992, the German soldiers were sent to Kenya to provide food airlifts to Somalia. What is more, what could be claimed to be a breakthrough for Germany was the case in which the Federal Republic decided to send soldiers to join NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet to observe the violations against the 'no fly zone' over Bosnia despite a huge domestic controversy in the *Bundestag*.

Nevertheless, though these operations mentioned above were mainly based on the conviction that they provided humanitarian aid and contributed to the peace-building processes in the relevant areas, the German government was blamed for thwarting the Basic Law. This indicates that the Federal government and German people were not ready to reconcile their army since their collective memory as regards the past experience was still quite vivid. The probability that the *Bundeswehr* soldiers might participate in NATO's AWACS crew caused serious doubts and a sharp disagreement which soared beyond the German government and the opposition by including the governing coalition this time (Kamp, 1993, p.167). To indicate, while the CDU led by Helmut Kohl was in favour of the *Bundeswehr's* presence in the AWACS fleet, the FDP, which was then a coalition partner opposed the idea and suggested that the Constitution be revised so that the German soldiers could join a combat mission outside of Germany. As it can be inferred, the FDP had more hesitations regarding the legitimacy of the operation than the government. However, as for the SPD, another partner of the coalition, it had grown cynical against military operations since the very beginning. Interestingly, although both the FDP and the SPD had applied to the court so as to stop the government from allowing the *Bundeswehr* to join its first operation abroad ever since the end of the WWII, the Constitutional Court's verdict was in favour of the government, permitting German soldiers in the AWACS fleet. In general, military missions, especially the out-of-area missions, have been part of a controversy in German foreign policy.

Yet, these operations conducted by the *Bundeswehr* were also a 'controversial instrument of German crisis management' (Glatz, et al., 2018). What is more,

these operations have proven to be necessary to stop violence and crimes against humanity, and fighting against ever-lasting insecurities in troubled areas. Of course, the aims of such deployments have varied, but for Germany, the main goal has been to prevent history from repeating itself all over the world as a country and a nation who had already been responsible for the calamities of the Second World War and experienced its heavy burden. The evolution of the operations' scope can be claimed to be the results of the changes in war and violent conflict, international political and legal conditions as well as institutional frameworks for these missions (Glatz, et.al, 2018).

Moreover, Germany's military involvements in international operations also carry the traces of its culture of responsibility also including the obligations derived from international law, political commitments and alliances. Accordingly, the Kosovo conflict, which paved the way for NATO's intervention that took place in 1999, was a 'watershed' both for Germany and Europe in terms of the post-war political development (Friedrich, 2000, p.1)

3.2.1. Kosovo War (1998-1999)

The Kosovo War marked a turning point in Germany's post-war military actions in that it was the first combat war in which the *Bundeswehr* had participated in since the end of the Second World War and with no clear UN mandate, but the use of force in Kosovo started a process leading to the reconsideration of the military use in German foreign policy, which still has repercussions today. The KFOR (the Kosovo Force) was the most important engagement in Germany's military history after 1945 because of the number of troops (Peters, 2018, p.249). Subsequent to the Kosovo War, the deployments of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers across the world have showed us the dimension of the change in this context. Not before too long, those military operations abroad were out of the question.

However, the Kosovo War was not the first case for which German soldiers set foot in the Balkans. The *Bundeswehr* had already been part of NATO's IFOR

operation from 1995 through 1996, which granted Germany the opportunity to encounter a conflict resolution. In fact, during the IFOR operations, the *Bundeswehr* soldiers were there to assist the stabilisation efforts rather than the participation in the military action. However, the situation in Kosovo was utterly different. The German military presence in Kosovo served to halt the conflict and bring stability back to the region, and if possible to secure peace in Kosovo. As a country whose motto during the Cold War era was *Nie Wieder Krieg*, Germany was in Kosovo to protect ethnic Albanians against the enormities committed by the Yugoslavian state forces.

What was interesting is that the deployment of German soldiers to Kosovo was allowed by the Red-Green federal coalition government. However, the former had portrayed an attitude against the deployment of German soldiers abroad in previous missions, and the latter had 'never missed a single opportunity beforehand in order to criticise NATO (Friedrich, 2000, p.2). In another instance, during the Gulf War in 1988, while both Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer had showed up in the protests against the war along with the United States, due to the changing political conjuncture, they had to show their commitment to the Alliance after they had come to power. It is for this reason that the Kosovo War also presented a breakthrough for the left wing parties, which were then in power in Germany. In a sense, this indicates to us that Germany's commitment to its Western Allies was still persistent and hence, the Federal Republic was ready to fulfil the military obligations derived from this alliance. Regarding this issue, it can be proposed that Germany had exhibited continuity in one of its core foreign policy orientations since Konrad Adenauer by preserving its loyalty to the Alliance (Friedrich, 2000, p.2).

Likewise, the *Budeswehr's* presence in Operation Allied Forces (OAF) has also been defined as a 'watershed' or a 'defining moment' for German foreign policy and this operation could be the most important indicator of transition in Germany security and defence policy in the aftermath of the Cold War (Miskimmon, 2009, p.561). What should be noted is that the *Bundeswehr's* participation in OAF was the first time when Germany was engaged in

combative use of force since the Second World War, and different from the previous mission, it was launched without a UN Security Council Mandate. It can be suggested that the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers in 1999 indicated that a historic German unwillingness to take over the responsibility of crisis management alongside NATO had been tackled (Miskimmon, 2009,p.561).

The *Bundeswehr's* participation in Operation Allied Forces was specifically important since it signalled the onset of a more active military role in crisis management, and therefore, it could be claimed to be a zenith showing that there was a change in German foreign policy in the 1990s. The then Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder and the then Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer took advantage of the post-war history of Germany to justify the German involvement in the Kosovo War, advocating that the war was a good reason to take a greater responsibility in the international community in order to prevent similar atrocities to the ones experienced during the Second World War (Miskimmon, 2009, pp.562-563). It could also be asserted that this also pointed to the reconstruction of the German foreign policy attitude towards military actions abroad and marked the break of the culture of restraint regarding the use of military force. In any case, the main aim of the participation in the Kosovo War was for humanitarian reasons. The long-established '*Nie Wieder Krieg*' (Never Again War) policy was reframed as '*Nie Wieder Auschwitz*' (Never Again Auschwitz), and '*Nie Wieder Völkermord*' (Never Again Genocide) by Fischer as a call to mobilise the international community for the protection of human rights and in fact, although the participation in OAF was not a real transformation in a real sense, it could be perceived as an evolution of the existing ideas and principles so that they could be applied to any altered international context (Miskimmon, 2009, p.563).

On the other hand, the *Bundeswehr's* presence in Operation Allied Forces caused debates across the country regarding its future role in German foreign policy. Existing sensitivities which had resulted from the Third *Reich's* role in the Balkans during World War II and the German bombing of Belgrade in 1941 also

created fears and evoked memories of the Nazi Regime; however, the significance of being a reliable and committed NATO ally and the willingness to make up for the past mistakes led Germany to take part in the Kosovo War (Miskimmon, 2009, p.563). In one way, the Federal Republic was pursuing the goal of proving that the newly elected government would display continuity in foreign policy and there would be no axis shift in the role and main principles. Hence, it can be said that the Social Democratic-Green party government had shown commitment to foreign policy continuity, and it was the main focus of the Red-Green coalition government's agenda (Lantis, 2002, p.22). Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister of the Red-Green coalition, also proclaimed in an interview with the US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "the most important change in foreign policy of Germany is no change. So full continuity is, I think, very important" (Fischer, 1998, para.47).

Yet, though the German leaders promised that continuity would persist in Germany's foreign policy behaviour, that the world politics was going through a political transformation was a non-ignorable fact. In Germany's immediate surroundings, there was no threat exposed to its territory; but other problems including humanitarian crises had already emerged. Furthermore; the crisis in Kosovo had necessitated immediate action before it was too late. Because in the case of a failure to stop the destructive war in Kosovo, Europe's security would have been affected and there would have been much more serious consequences for the entire continent than assumed. It was feared that the crisis in Kosovo could have the potential to flare up into a broader war by involving Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece (Lantis, 2002, p.27). What motivated Germany to take part in the Kosovo war was primarily due to the sense of responsibility to defend human rights. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, peace-building efforts were again an issue as the order in the entire continent of Europe had been threatened because of the re-emergence of nationalism (Scharping, 2000, p.38). Besides, Germany had a sense of responsibility towards its NATO allies, and the government realised that their foreign policy options were rather restricted (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.21).

Additionally, the Kosovo crisis empowered the relations in the Alliance as it led to an active and close cooperation to bring stability to Europe. The Kosovo crisis also made a contribution to the creation of a new awareness among European Allies, leading them to be one voice and act jointly (Scharping, 2000, p.40). The Kosovo War also indicated that it was of utmost importance to create a dynamic European security and defence policy. Germany's participation in the Kosovo War was also a good opportunity to play a pivotal role in world politics.

However, the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers to Kosovo did not refer to a total change in the Federal Republic's approach towards the use of force. Starting from 1999, the world has witnessed the transformation of the *Bundeswehr* into a deployable force in international crisis management under multilateral operations, and the crisis in Kosovo urged Germany to develop a favourable attitude towards an autonomous pro EU military capability (Miskimmon, 2009, p.567).

On the other hand, Germany's external role is still restricted and, despite the participation in the Kosovo War, the country's general approach to the use of force regarding the following out-of-area operations remained uncertain mostly. It is because of the fact that Germany has felt pressurised in operations such as Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa, and Germany's key role and contribution in the Kosovo War has sunk into oblivion due to its continuing abstention from the use of military force. Sending German soldiers to Kosovo for combat provided an important hint on the country's post-Wall foreign and security policy, and the Kosovo War was not for defensive purposes, nor was the aim to protect Germany's security, instead, the military engagement was as part of a multilateral force in order to intervene on the soil of a sovereign state (Crawford, 2007, p.56). As mentioned before, the operation was also carried out due to humanitarian reasons with the aim of solving crises and preventing atrocities.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the intervention in Kosovo created a domestic reflection in Germany since the post-war German identity had been characterised by its multilateral orientation; thus, the war brought about

fundamental questions as to Germany's self-perception as a "civilian power" and the future role of the Federal Republic in reframing the post-Cold War order in Europe (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.19). For such a country as Germany, the state identity and national role conceptions are related to multilateral settings; therefore, foreign policy has a responsibility towards allies. Moreover, it was not possible for Germany to ignore the atrocities in Kosovo; otherwise, it would have dismissed its ethical and political responsibility towards human rights, and Kosovo would have become the new Bosnia. What is more, another point that worried Germany regarding the Kosovo crisis was about a potential wave of refugees because Serbian nationalism and expulsion posed a threat that would lead to mass migrations into Western Europe.

It can be argued that the Kosovo war also had important impacts on domestic politics in that it was the first "*Bewährungsprobe*" (test) for the Red-Green coalition government, whose political leaders belonged to the '68ers' generation, which had no direct involvement in the Second World War and its aftermath (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.24). The military participation in the Kosovo crisis helped Schröder to gain political fame as his leadership traits and his skill to take hard decisions in the time of crisis proved effective. In the meantime, though the German government defined its foreign policy as "*Friedenspolitik*" (peace policy), the atrocities in Kosovo caused this peace policy to be reconstructed in a way allowing air attacks.

Additionally, diplomatic attempts for the resolution of the crisis constituted a crucial domestic political purpose to display an active commitment to develop a solution to the Kosovo crisis (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.27). On the other hand, Germany's term presidency of the European Union laid a heavier burden on the country, increasing the importance of its role in finding a solution to the crisis to re-stabilise the region. Actually, in several aspects, the Kosovo War caused dilemmas in foreign policy behaviour with regard to Germany. Although it evoked questions regarding the function and efficacy of military force and marked a breakthrough in Germany's attitude towards military operations, it did

not establish long-term effects, and the Federal Republic's tentative position in the following operations remained stable.

3.2.2. The *Bundeswehr* in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

Just as the 9/11 attacks shocked the entire world, so too it raised public awareness of the global threats in Afghanistan. Since the post-war period, German policy makers and the public have put forward their history when it comes to the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers to the out-of-area mission, but there have been some stances from which Germany has been unable to escape. Though Germany announced that it was in solidarity with its transatlantic ally, becoming involved in a military operation against Afghanistan created a controversy among the Red-Green government. Though Schröder expressed 'unqualified solidarity with the US.', soon after he agreed upon a military support for the upcoming campaign in Afghanistan (Lombardi, 2008, p.588). When the *Bundestag* decided to deploy the *Bundeswehr* soldiers to Afghanistan in 2001, it was under the scope of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany was an important contributor of troops for the ISAF along with the fact that it function as the lead nation for the Regional Command-North (RC-N) (Gallenkamp, 2009, p.1). By force of the treaty obligations, Germany provided the mission with both fiscal and military contributions, and it was initially the third-largest contributor with more over 3,500 troops in NATO after the United States and Great Britain for the operation *Enduring Freedom*, and over time it became the second largest provider of troops with approximately 150,000 soldiers deployed until the total withdrawal in 2021. Nobody foresaw that the out-of-area mission in Afghanistan would be the longest and largest operation in modern German history.

On the one hand, defending itself in such an active combat contradicted Germany's non-interventionist history and identity, and this identity conflict was mirrored in a furious and ongoing discourse on foreign military engagements and the Federal Republic's identity as a responsible actor in world politics (Engelkamp&Offermann, 2012, p.235). On the other hand, with no imperial

history in Central Asia, it was believed that Germany would neutrally lead an international meeting which spearheaded the Bonn agreement or officially the Agreement on Provisional arrangements in Afghanistan for the reestablishment and the reconstruction of the Afghan governmental institutions (Lombardi, 2008, p.588).

In fact, starting from the very beginning, Germany was seriously involved in the security missions in Afghanistan. It should also be noted that the German participation in NATO's operations in Afghanistan was exclusively based on civil construction, police and military training (Bindenagel, 2010, p.98). To illustrate, soon after the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001, German soldiers started to patrol in the Afghan capital. Moreover, the Federal Republic decided to settle provincial reconstruction teams in the two northern cities of Afghanistan, Kunduz and Faizabad in 2003, and in 2006 a German general was appointed as the commander of the regional command north. In addition to all these, until 2007, the *Bundeswehr* was in charge of training the Afghan police. However, even though Germany actively contributed to the US-led NATO mission in Afghanistan, both the Schröder and Merkel governments could not escape from being criticised. Both German governments were attacked by the allies and were criticised on the grounds that they displayed a reluctant attitude towards the operation in Afghanistan and they refused to share the burden equally.

Besides this, the German governments in charge during the Afghan War had to cope with those who were either against the participation of the *Bundeswehr* forces in missions abroad or were not happy with the way in which the German soldiers were used as the public in Germany was concerned about the allied policies towards Afghanistan since legitimacy of the military force in order to combat the threat of terrorism was questionable (Lombardi, 2008, p.589). A large majority of German citizens as well as the leaders regarded Afghanistan as a failed state whose people were left impoverished and underdeveloped and were led to violence instead of considering the situation as a 'war on terror' (Lombardi, 2008, p.590). In fact, the main aim of the deployment of German

soldiers to Afghanistan was to rebuild the country rather than waging a bloody war. It is argued that Germany functioned in a peacebuilding, reconstruction and a stabilisation role in the Afghanistan conflict (Bindenagel, 2010, p.96). On the other hand, the former German Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, expressed in a speech in the *Bundestag* on 11 March 2004 that “Our security is defended also at the Hindukush, albeit not exclusively when threats to our country are forming there, as in the case of internationally organised terrorists.” (Ruttig, 2012, para.3). From this perspective, it is also understood that Germany viewed Afghanistan as a threat to its security even though there are tens of thousands of miles in between.

The Afghanistan conflict was portrayed as a ‘civilian development project than a war’ in the public eye, but subsequent to the Kunduz attack in September 2009, the perception changed, and it was obvious that Germany was at war, hereupon, the majority of German citizens asked for an immediate withdrawal (Bindenagel, 2010, pp.105-106). The war situation was unacceptable for Germans and their soldiers should not have engaged in a combat and died in another country. After the attack, violence in the RC-N area gradually increased and security conditions worsened even though the area was comparatively regarded as peaceful, secure and stable (Gallenkamp, 2009, p.1).

Increasing attacks on the *Bundeswehr* soldiers and casualties led German citizens to develop a general anti-war attitude. “Get out of Afghanistan!” had already been the slogan articulated by the Left party since the beginning of the ISAF operation (Fürstenau, 2021, para.2). If it is possible to mention a German strategy or a road map for Afghanistan, then it could be asserted that it was based upon constructing equilibrium between civilian and military acquisitions since the battle against the Taliban’s terror was justified in the hope of bringing hope for democracy and development into the wrecked country. However, after the German forces had encountered a number of suicide attacks between 2007 and 2008, and insurgent groups had detonated bombs on roads against the ISAF and Afghan forces, it was obvious that Germany was stuck in a conflict,

and due to the worsening security situations, there was a fierce debate in the parliament on whether the ISAF could be successful (Kaim, 2008, p.611).

As a result of the expansion of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Germany's defence and security policy 'reached a critical juncture' (Noetzel&Schreer, 2008, p.211). Over time, Germans have become more critical to military missions abroad, and this was partly because of the Afghan War as the allegedly civilian-oriented Afghanistan policy of the Berlin government did not live up to the expectations of people. It should be noted that Germany's initial unreluctance to back up the operation and to provide military resources reflected on the operational reality as the situation in Afghanistan increasingly became difficult (Kaim, 2008, p.616).

Even though the "*Neuorientierung*" (New Orientation) reform adopted in 2011 aimed to supply more military resources for international crisis management, Germany's strategic perspective had already started to shift as the *Bundeswehr* was reaching its limits (Schmitt, 2020, p.88). In a sense, the military involvement in Afghanistan indicated the limits and possibilities of Germany. It can also be claimed that because the military involvement in Afghanistan had reached the borderline of what Germany could handle and tolerate from the very beginning, in the later periods, the German policy-makers and the German public displayed an anti-war and anti-Bush attitude as in the Iraq War, which erupted in 2003. This indicates that the German public and politicians were strongly committed to the notions which still constitute the backbone of their norms and values.

In fact, the war in Afghanistan was already lost when it was understood that it could not be won through military means, but the victory could be possible only through civilian means. On the other hand, Germany's abstention from the UN Security Council vote on a resolution regarding NATO's involvement in Libya in 2011 also indicated that Germany had already started to adopt a culture of military constraint again as a result of the burden of the war in Afghanistan. Once for all, after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and the total withdrawal

of the German troops in 2021, Germany had to accept the mass chaos its Afghanistan policy had created.

3.2.3. Germany's Engagement in Mali

For the last several decades, the Sahel region has been a trouble spot for ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and underdevelopment. However, the stability of the region is crucial for the African continent. For its own security, Germany is also eager to help establish governmental structures and institutions in the region. As usual, within the scope of a multilateral setting for peace and security, the Federal Republic has been promoting the stability of the Sahel region with two military operations it has been contributing to with approximately 1,300 military personnel since 2013. To indicate, the UN peace keeping mission MINUSMA (The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) has been aiming for the execution of the peace process in Mali and the stabilisation of the country's central regions.

On the other hand, the EUTM Mali (European Union Training Mission) is a multinational military training mission commanded by Germany and it aims to train and advise the armed forces of the Republic of Mali in order that the country can protect its territorial integrity and cope with the threats coming from the terrorist groups such as ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) and JNIM, which is a branch of Al-Qaeda in Mali and the cusp for other terrorist formations such as al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front. Before the *Bundeswehr* withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, Mali had been the second biggest deployment area. Along with military contributions, in order to promote peace and stability, Germany has been utilising diplomatic means as part of its policy. As in Iraq and Syria, the Federal Republic also combats radical Islam in Mali. It can be suggested that the most efficient way to fight against terrorism and criminality in the region is to take control of the relevant areas and borders, providing the military and the police with better training and more equipment (Kolb, 2013, p.5).

However, above all, Germany observes its self-imposed obligation to claim more responsibility, which is derived from its culture of responsibility (Hanisch, 2015, p.1). Even if the territorial integrity of the country has been ensured to a large extent, security in the northern parts is still an important issue. As for the reasons behind the *Bundeswehr's* ongoing presence in Mali, it is possible to suggest a couple of interrelated considerations. In the first place, it can be said that the presence of the German military force in the area serves for security interests in the region. That the Sahel region has stability is also vital for Europe because instability and impoverishment in the region may have severe effects on Europe, thus, on Germany, and the impacts may manifest themselves and spread quite fast in the form of a refugee crisis (Hanisch, 2015, p.2). It is for this reason that, the main goal of the MINUSMA mission is to sustain stability in Mali. The presence of the *Bundeswehr* in the region also covers strategic factors. With the expansion of the MINUSMA mission, Germany has claimed more responsibility all over the world by contributing considerably, and this may raise the question whether Africa will be the next focus of the Federal Republic after Afghanistan (Hanisch, 2015, p.3).

It could also be asserted that apart from the fact that Germany is militarily present in Mali as part of a multilateral mandate, it makes its presence felt both economically and politically as well. Lastly, though when MINUSMA will be over is not known yet, at least for now, it is expected that the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers will come to an end at the end of May 2022. In the short term, we will see what kind of a path Germany will follow in Mali.

3.2.4. Germany's Fight against the Islamic State

The Iraqi War (2003-2011) and the civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 has left an authority gap in this region and this situation has caused fundamentalist groups to settle down in this area. Iraq and Syria have become a hub for these groups shedding fear and terror. Critical developments and instability in Iraq and Syria led Germany to reconsider its role in the region. The Federal Republic has been playing an active role in the fight against the so-called Islamic State

since 2015. Under normal circumstances, the deployment of the German armed forces is allowed and legitimised through the Basic Law, the relevant articles of the UN Charter and UN Security Council's resolutions within a multilateral settlement. On the other hand, the participation of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers in Syria against ISIS was based on the UN Security Council Resolution 2249 along with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This way, Germany supported its involvement in collective self-defence against the Islamic State with the aim of helping Iraq and France. However, Resolution 2249 does not allow for the use of force, whereas Article 51 clearly authorises the use of force in case of an armed attack, but it is confined to attacks that are imputable to another state (Terry, 2016, p.26). At this point, the problem arises as the so-called Islamic State is not a state actor. Germany's engagement in Syria and Iraq was justified through an overly broad interpretation of international law; on the other hand, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force is one of the means by which states violate international law in the fight against terrorism (Schüller, 2017, p.1). Moreover, the Berlin government also counted on other traditional justifications in the law of nations for the use of force such as Article 42(7) TEU (The Treaty on European Union), resolutions 2170 and 2199 of the UN Security Council (Peters, 2018, p.261).

Germany's military engagement in Syria involved the deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance aircraft and approximately 1,200 soldiers at the first stage, and it was assumed that Germany justified this military involvement in support of France based on the French invocation of the Article 42(7) TEU (Terry, 2016, pp.27-28). It should also be noted that the French assertiveness in the fight against ISIS was the outcome of the Paris Attacks, which took place in November 2015.

In addition to the deployment of soldiers and Tornado airplanes, the German contribution to the war against ISIS entailed a programme for training the Peshmerga in Northern Iraq on top of refuelling aircraft and a frigate. While providing military assistance against ISIS, the German government looked for legal justifications as mentioned before; however, it was not enough to convince

the opposition in the *Bundestag*. “Members and factions of the parliamentary opposition filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court against the deployment decisions in the context of OIR” (Peters, 2018, p.261). In fact, this was not a shocking act given that the Left and the Greens were the opposition parties of the Third Cabinet of Angela Merkel. In fact, it can be argued that the opposition was also right regarding their objection because the German engagement in the anti-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq violated the German constitutional Law.

Consequently, Germany’s ostensible legal justification for its participation in the Western-led operation against ISIS did not meet requirements and was against its values adopted in the post-war period. Therefore, it can be easily suggested that Germany’s military engagement in Syria was an outlaw. On the other hand, the ISIS activities in Iraq and attacks in France only met the requirement of being an armed attack as set out in Article 51 (Terry, 2016, p.56) However, because ISIS is not a state, the terror attacks conducted by it cannot be imputable to any other state.

Another issue regarding the operations in Syria and Iraq is that there is no UN resolution that allows for the use of force, which also makes the presence of the German armed forces in the region illegal as Germany usually looks for mandates. It could also be argued that Germany’s extended interpretation of the UN Charter within the context of its military involvement in Syria and Iraq led to more violence apart from the fact that it mitigated the long-established international law standards (Schüller, 2017, p.3).

3.3. CONCLUSION

After its reunification, Germany has transformed the understanding of the notion of territorial defence deriving from West Germany to a broader perspective. The understanding of security in Germany in the aftermath of unification was characterised by certain traits. In general, there has been a reserved attitude towards combat missions; however, when the issue is about the protection of

human rights, this has suggested a valid reason for German participation in out-of-area missions. For Germany, as set out in the first article of its Basic Law as well, human dignity cannot be violated, and protecting it all over the world has become a top priority.

As mentioned before, the end of the Cold War led to a variety of challenges and changes in the global security environment, which also urged Germany to reconsider its position towards the use of force and the role of its armed forces. Above all, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the German armed forces became an "*Armee ohne Feindbild*" or in other words, armed force without a concept of an enemy (Longhurst, 2014, p.55) Throughout the 1990s, Germany deployed its soldiers to different parts of the world from the Balkans to Africa on the grounds of varying reasons such as civilian crisis management, humanitarian aid, combat against terrorism, etc. by justifying the use of force under the perception of German culture of responsibility. Furthermore, it provided a basis for out-of-area missions by making an amendment to the Basic Law in 1994.

However, the Kosovo crisis was a turning point in German military history after 1945 since it was the first combat war the German armed forces joined after the post-war period. Followed by this, the Afghan War was important in that it was the first ground battle the *Bundeswehr* participated in after the Second World War. Furthermore, the presence of German military personnel in Mali can be explained through strategic factors along with the enhancement of peace processes and assurance of stability in the Sahel region. Moreover, different from the out-of-area missions mentioned above, Germany's participation in the combat missions against ISIS in Syria and Iraq at the request of France and Iraq has raised questions in minds as its military involvement in these countries has been claimed to be not legal and it was based on Germany's extended interpretation of some articles in the law of nations and relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. Yet, what Germany has observed in its engagement in out-of-area missions is that all these operations must be within a multilateral mandate. It is possible to conclude that Germany's attitude towards the use of

force has considerably evolved and today, it is one of the most important contributors to peacekeeping missions in the world. Germany's perspective on military contributions has showed us the extent of change in its strategic culture.

Nevertheless, defining this shift in the country's understanding of force should not be perceived as a deviation from Germany's "civilian power" role as none of these missions was carried out based on an act of aggression and assertiveness. Although the country has become more active in military operations, they do not constitute a priority in solving crises. Germany still promotes civilian methods such as diplomacy and rule of law in conflict resolution, and puts an emphasis on the restraint on use of force.

If we need to summarise German foreign policy since the reunification it could be asserted the country's foreign policy has been haunted by its post-war guilt, and therefore, Germany has conscientiously continued to pursue its foreign policy, within the context of a "civilian power" identity. The memory discourse in Germany is likely to be related to generational settings and political circumstances (Fullard, 2010, p.72). The darkness of the Nazi regime also caused Germany to develop and partly to lead a pacifist tradition in its foreign policy after the Cold War. Even for that reason, Germany has still been criticised for 'not playing a role on the world stage commensurate with its size as Europe's largest economy' (Marsh&Siebold, 2022, para.7).

It is still possible to redefine German political identity through a reinterpretation of the past (Müller, 2002, p.280). Therefore, in conjunction with the burden of the past, the collective memory deriving from the atrocities in the Second World War also played an important role in shaping the foreign policy, political culture and identity of Germany after the Cold-War. Because of 'the burden of the past' or in other words, 'the German catastrophe', the Federal Republic 'established a culture of contrition, shame, or guilt' (Langenbacher, 2014, p.55). Today, it could be easily claimed that Germany is still in 'the shadow of Hitler' (Langenbacher, 2014, p.55), and it is obsessed with its past based on a holocaust-centred memory. Indeed, a country like Germany whose military force was dramatically 'scaled down after the end of the Cold War' cannot be

expected to pursue power politics even after decades (Marsh&Siebold, 2022, para.15).

Behind the promotion of democracy, free market economy, multilateral settings, peace, and a “civilian power” approach, there is a strong feeling of guilt caused by the sorrows of the past and the collective memory, which has been passed down from generation to generation. In the shadow of its past, Germany still pursues a timid policy when it comes to military operations. The norms and values as well as limits shaped by the Second World War and the Holocaust-centred memory are still immensely influential in German foreign policy behaviour towards military operations.

CHAPTER 4

CONTINUITY OR CHANGE: STILL A “CIVILIAN POWER” OR BECOMING A HEGEMON?

4.1. INTRODUCTION

It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter that at the end of the Cold War, the reunification and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about uncertainties and new responsibilities for both Germany and the international community. Especially the 1990s were a transformational period for Germany and these years opened a new page for the ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy. On the one hand, the end of the east-west rivalry led to transformation within Germany itself, Europe and the entire world; on the other hand, German foreign policy has shown determination in the continuity of its traditional course (Maull, 2006, p.1). It is for this reason that Germany has committed itself to the European Union and supported the enlargement to a certain degree. Similarly, it has also promoted membership in NATO and has shown solidarity with its allies by taking part in the military operations of the organisation even though this contradicts Germany’s post-war identity as a “civilian power”. Taking into account all of these, it can be suggested that Germany has been strictly loyal to Western integration and its transatlantic relations.

However, international political parameters have been constantly changing, and they point at a reconsideration of Germany’s policies. Especially, commitment to military restraint, which is one of the traditional tenets of German foreign policy as given in the previous chapters, has been particularly challenged in recent times. In the light of political events and challenges, Germany has been pushed to play ‘a more active, more self-confident, and more engaged’ role in world politics (Sauerbrey, 2017, p.1). This role has also urged German policy-makers to realise that Germany’s new position has implied new responsibilities as well.

Even though Germany is reluctant to take the lead in crisis management within the European environment, as a country that enhances globalisation, it is expected to 'show more leadership and play the role of a "shaping power" (Helwig, 2016, p.11).

In the meantime, a shaping power refers to a state in world politics capable of solving problems and conflicts that concern the international community along with creating ideas and taking initiatives (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [SWP]&the German Marshall Fund of the United States [GMF], 2013, P.16). In this sense, Germany can be regarded as a shaping power, at least within the European Union. But, this does not mean that Germany is no longer a "civilian power". A "civilian power" can also be a shaping power based on the norms and values that make it civilian. Germany's 'normative agenda of civilising' world politics while pursuing a "civilian power" role also indicates that it wants to shape international affairs in this direction (Brummer&Oppermann, 2016, p.2). In fact, Germany has taken over the leadership in Europe with the shaping power role, which it has never claimed, and this reflected itself especially in the Ukraine crisis in 2014. In this context, German-Russian relations have importance in explaining the change and continuity debate in German foreign policy behaviour because Russia has long posed challenges and threats to the security and stability of Europe, and the latest conflict which erupted between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has become a global threat that will change the balance in world politics. It is for this reason that German-Russian relations as well as the Russo-Ukrainian war will be discussed within the context of the change and continuity debate in this chapter.

4.2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

History and the foreign policy norms that Germany has created, play a crucial role in explaining contemporary German foreign policy, and the traditional German foreign policy norms have emerged as a result of the atrocious events of the Nazi regime and the Second World War (Helwig, 2016, p.19). On the

other hand, German foreign policy has been moulded as part of its self-imposed identity as a “civilian power”.

A sovereign and united Europe, the transatlantic alliance, the enhancement of peace and security, commitment to multilateralism as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights are the core of German foreign policy (“Germany’s foreign and European policy principles”, 2019, para.1). Furthermore, German foreign policy and European policy cannot be regarded separately because Germany’s state identity is blended in a strong European identity. Likewise, Germany can play a crucial role in politics within a strong European Union; therefore, it should sustain close cooperation with the member states to shape the EU policies. Close and strong cooperation is also necessary to protect Europe’s borders, provide domestic security and enrich the economy. Particularly, the close cooperation between Germany and France is highly important for the maintenance of the European integration in all spheres. From this perspective, it can be suggested that Germany regards the EU as a single common state.

Apart from the principles mentioned above, there is one more characteristic that defines German foreign policy and its civilian identity: military restraint. However, this tenet will not be given in detail as the previous chapter has already covered this issue. But, it will be discussed as a changing principle as a consequence of the latest developments between Russia and Ukraine. In order to understand the core tenets of German foreign policy, they will be examined separately in the following sections.

4.2.1. European Integration and Deeper Cooperation

European integration has been a driving factor in German foreign policy since 1945. Nevertheless, initially, no state predicted the direction of Germany’s role in European integration (Patel, 2022, para.5). As a first step, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in which West Germany was included, was founded in parallel to the Schuman Plan. This was followed by the

establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was founded as a result of the Treaty of Rome to keep the use of nuclear energy under control and ensure that it would be used for peaceful purposes.

However, with the introduction of the Merger Treaty, European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community were unified under one single council and commission and they were renamed as the European Communities. With the Maastricht Treaty, which was put into effect in 1993, the European Communities changed into the European Union. On the other hand, being an effective member of these communities helped Germany foster its economic growth. In the meantime, the European Union and the Common Foreign Security Policy created by the Maastricht Treaty 'served the purpose of keeping a strong and united Germany in check' (Helwig, 2016, p.31).

In parallel to the developments mentioned above, it can be assumed that the unified Germany started to develop a stronger European approach in its foreign policy. Ever since, Germany has pursued a pro-integrationist attitude and embraced the enlargement of the union in general. Germany highlights its undoubtable commitment to a strong European policy on all occasions since it views Europe as the key to the assurance of stability in the region. Besides, the significant role Germany has played in shaping the institutional structure of the European Union could be claimed to be an indicator of its post-war "civilian power" identity (Frenkler, 2001, pp.26-27).

Since the 1990s, Germany has struggled to preserve and reinstall the basics of the European integration process in conjunction with its European policy. What is more, it has also pursued to achieve progress with integration 'by utilising the interests of its partners in Germany's economic power' (Frenkler, 2001, p.30). On the other hand, it can be asserted that some members have viewed the Union as a buffer zone against the power of the united Germany. This has turned into something useful for Germany to gather the European states under

a union. On top of this, Germany's willingness to pass some of its sovereign powers on to a supranational institution implies that it has no intention to dominate the Union.

On the one hand, from a "civilian power" context, the concurrence of economic and political integration helps establish a long-term stability, and thus, the widening of the European integration coheres with the ideals of a "civilian power" (Frenkler, 2001, p.30). On the other hand, from the German point of view, the European Union is the main constituent of a unified European political structure, and for peace to flourish across the continent, it is the most important factor. However, with the Brexit, the instrumentality of the EU has started to be questioned by other member states. But, despite the UK's abandonment of the Union, Germany is still committed to developing a good relationship with the UK 'in spirit of good partnership' ("Germany's foreign and European policy principles", 2019, para.4). What could be concluded, however, is that Germany is not willing to become a European hegemon; instead, it wants to act as a normal member state under equal conditions with other members (Freudlsperger & Jachtenfuchs, 2021, p.118).

4.2.2. Transatlantic Alliance

Besides a strong European integration, the transatlantic alliance constitutes one of the pillars of German foreign policy. Within this context, the US is Germany's most important ally, and their relations have been shaped as a result of historical experiences, common interests and values such as the rule of law, freedom and the promotion of democracy. Their strong ties go back to 1945 when the US decided to stay in Europe as a security and stability provider throughout the Cold War ("Transatlantic relations", 2022, para.2). Three decades after the end of the Cold War, and despite the annihilation of the Soviet threat, both sides still agree upon the need for a transatlantic partnership so as to 'maintain the kind of world they want' (Chrobog, 1998, p.79). The German-American relations can be defined as a 'partnership in leadership'. In fact, before the reunification, US President George H.W. Bush foresaw a

greater role for Western Germany in the international community (Brummer & Oppermann, 2016, p.3). It is obvious that since the unification, Germany has contributed a lot to maintain global peace although it initially displayed a timid attitude. However, the conditions urged Germany to take a serious and an active position in its bilateral relations with its allies. As in Afghanistan, Germany stood in solidarity with its transatlantic partner despite being reluctant.

On the other hand, there have been cases in which Germany and the US have been in conflict with each other. As in the Iraq War, the US realised that Germany could stand up against itself. In this regard, Germany also blamed the US for not adhering to the commonly shared values such as multilateralism and democracy. Likewise, in Libya under the influence of the Arab Spring, Germany opted for an inactive role rather than playing an active one in the military operations.

Later on, the Trump presidency also brought the German-American relations into a deadlock. Trump's distrust against the EU, NATO and Germany harmed their bilateral relations. Although some consider that this distrust was peculiar to the Trump administration, it is still full of uncertainties how the bilateral relations between Germany and the US will be shaped in the near future. Because Germany, who was once under the safe wings of the US, has now become a power capable of shaping international affairs alone, it does not have to be under the US guidance. In the middle of Europe, Germany has gained a geostrategic importance as it divides Western Europe from Eastern Europe (Aydın, 2017, para.8).

In the meantime, Germany's real political power had already manifested itself in the European debt crisis in 2009 with its ability of crisis management. It pursued a restrictive wage and fiscal policies and enforced the Eurozone states in debt to follow those (Cesaratto&Stirati, 2010, p.56). This indicated that Germany was becoming a leader in the European Union. Germany position of leadership within the EU, on the other hand, is likely to be a source of confrontation with the US in the near future given that it already created disturbances during the Trump era.

After the Trump administration had damaged the transatlantic relations, it is a fact that Germany welcomed the election of Joe Biden. At least, the belief that the German-US relationship will be based on a more 'flexible diplomacy' and mutual understanding of each other is quite common for now (Pifer, 2021, para.1). In the light of the latest events in Europe, a strong and closer cooperation between Germany and the US will be needed to ward off the Russian threat in Europe as well. This also means the mutual empowerment of NATO and other common institutions. The Russo-Ukrainian War may also open a new chapter for Germany and the US by sharing a leadership, and this may bring a fundamental shift in Germany's self-inflicted role as a "civilian power".

4.2.3. Commitment to Peace and Security

One of the primary goals of German foreign policy is undoubtedly to maintain peace and security across the globe. This obligation is deeply entrenched in the past of the country, and it is an outcome of the culture of responsibility Germany has developed. The promotion of peace and crisis prevention has increasingly become an indispensable part of German foreign policy since the 1990s. Together with its allies, Germany pursues a policy of working for a peaceful and multilateral world. Political institutions of which Germany is part of such as the EU, NATO, UN, OSCE etc. also cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the world.

Sustaining a peace policy, on the other hand, requires the promotion of diplomacy in settlement of disputes and conflicts as the first resort. However, Germany's policy guidelines also cover a security policy which can yield in the use of force as the last resort in order to maintain peace as in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. In addition, it is suggested that Germany's security policy is considered to be shaped by another tradition along with anti-militarism, which is multilateralism (Iso-Markku, 2016, p.51).

On top of crisis management; stabilisation, disarmament and arms control also underpin the spectrum of the German security policy. On the other hand, as a

result of the culture of responsibility, Germany has started to claim a more active role in crisis regions and in settlement of disputes as in the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014. Likewise, the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers to crisis regions is among Germany's peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. Even if Germany's efforts to advance peace and peaceful conflict resolution can be evaluated within its role as a "civilian power", military deployments could be regarded as a breakaway from its role.

Changing conditions and issues threatening world peace also urge the German role to go through a transformation. For now, it can be said that Germany's role as a "civilian power" is in a limbo. Though it has emerged as a 'political powerhouse' in the EU, both domestic and internal pressures force Germany to take decisions towards a more active security policy (Iso-Markku, 2016, p.51). Particularly, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine seems to cause fundamental changes in the area of security. Although Germany appears to be reluctant to undergo a strict change, a role change will be inevitable.

4.2.4. Promotion of Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights

Germany has promoted democracy, the rule of law and human rights ever since 1945. These traits are also complementary to peace and security worldwide. civilian powers, on the other hand, are expected to respect and strengthen democracy, international law and human rights. Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has always advocated the promotion of these traits. Particularly, the German Basic Law states that the general rules of international law also frame an integral part of the federal law (Meier, 2001, p.72). Similarly, the first article of the "*Grundgesetz*" also implies the importance of human rights.

Before the reunification, human rights had been used as rhetoric against the Soviet Union and the GDR as part of an ideological instrument in German foreign policy (Pfeil, 2001, p.88). However, together with the end of the Cold War and unification, promoting human rights has become a national objective in

Germany. On the other hand, protecting human rights has consistently gone hand in hand with the promotion of rule of law and democracy in German foreign policy. It should also be noted that Germany has been a party to all important human rights covenants and bears an active role in the UN human rights regime (Pfeil, 2001, p.91). As a result of this active role, Germany has been in full support of a large variety of human rights such as economic, social, cultural rights along with women's, children's and LGBT rights.

In general terms, it could be suggested that Germany's human rights policies show parallelism to its "civilian power" role concept. To indicate, a "civilian power" exerts itself for the democratisation of other states and supports effective economic structures as well as other liberal values such as a free market economy. What is more, civilian powers contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law in international affairs. Consolidating the rule of law also requires the protection of human rights pre-eminently.

Besides all these, both internal and external human rights policies of a "civilian power" should be credible and apply to all countries on the same level (Pfeil, 2001, p.100). As a country which has a shaping role in world politics, Germany should not shy away from contributing a lot more to democracy efforts. The position of the current German government towards democracy will also influence the future of democracy both in Germany and in the European Union (Leininger, 2021, p.1).

4.2.5. Multilateralism

When German foreign policy is called into question, it can be easily suggested that Germany's opt for multilateralism serves as one of the pillars of its foreign policy. However, unlike realist expectations, it is argued that Germany has been more strongly in favour of multilateral settings since the 1990s (Baumann, 2002, p.1). Just like other tenets of its foreign policy, German history, in particular, the dark years of the Nazi regime have been influential in Germany's preference for

multilateralism. It is for this reason that, Germany's focus on institutions such as the EU, NATO and OSCE is the consequence of its multilateral policy.

Similarly, Germany's attitude towards its security and defence policy has been predominantly shaped by its strict commitment to multilateralism. On the one hand, its firm attachment to multilateralism points at Germany's determination to stop itself from 'turning against its neighbours and partners' (Iso-Markku, 2016, p.53). On the other hand, even in its military engagements, Germany has looked for a multilateral mandate in an absolute manner. In fact, multilateralism has been used in order to legitimise its military involvements (Iso-Markku, 2016, p.57).

Apart from serving German material interests, multilateralism implies a normative basis as well (Hofhansel, 2001, p.1). In line with this, it can be argued that Germany's impact on international affairs regarding multilateralism has become an important factor in terms of its state behaviour. Multilateral German foreign policy refers to the conduct of foreign policy in a firm cooperation with other states usually within the context of an international setting (Baumann, 2002, p.3). In the meantime, German multilateralism could be evaluated together with German political culture, identity and role.

It can also be argued that Germany used multilateral integration as a tool for confidence-building in its relations with its neighbours that still had distrust against itself after the reunification (Baumann, 2002, p.4). To sum up, the German understanding of multilateralism can be divided into three categories. In the first place, multilateralism functions as an "internalised and culturally induced habit"; secondly, it is used as a 'strategy to secure influence' and thirdly, it is a tool for confidence-building (Baumann, 2002, p.20). Not only does multilateralism serve for German interests, it also constitutes one of the norms and values of the German "civilian power" approach. Today, with over 83 million citizens, Germany has the largest population in Europe apart from the fact that it ranks the fourth among the world's top largest economies. While Germany has the power to act unilaterally at least within Europe, German foreign policy still follows a strong orientation towards the "*Westbindung*" and a strong

transatlantic partnership. In this sense, multilateralism can be defined as an 'overarching principle' of German foreign policy (Mello, 2021, p.1).

4.3. CHANGING PARAMETRES AND CHALLENGES TO GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

German reunification paved the way for a new chapter in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic as well as in international affairs. As it has been already mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, the first years of the (West) German state policy were mainly characterised by the issue of the Western integration. The late 1960s and the early 1970s were defined by an Eastern policy, while the mid-1970s and the early 1980s were marked by disputes over the restoration of the German militaristic capabilities. In the wake of the reunification in 1990, Germany attained enough power to determine its priorities in foreign policy without any restraint imposed by the East-West rivalry.

Despite challenges, since 1990 the foreign policy of the united Germany has been considerably defined by continuity. However, this does not mean that no change has occurred. It could be suggested that German foreign policy has gone through some important changes such as the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers within NATO operations. On the one hand, it could be asserted that these military engagements grew out of the increasing responsibility towards humanity Germany has assumed rather than regarding this approach as a huge paradigm shift. It is for this reason, it could also be advocated that Germany's attitude towards military operations has undergone a transformation other than a change.

On the other hand, as in the entire world, Germany has to cope with some major problems as regards to foreign and security policy. Increasing terrorism, belligerent attitudes imposed by Russia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as climate change directly threaten the security of Germany and other states. Even though Germany struggles to remain as a "civilian power" in such a hostile environment, a drastic change as to its foreign policy

role seems unavoidable. Particularly, the war in Ukraine which broke out in February 2022 has already signalled the steps of a change in German foreign and security policy. With this war, food and energy supplies have been already disrupted and it will have consequences affecting international trade. On the other hand, the German-Russian relations can be claimed to be at a loose end, and Russia constitutes a big challenge on its own to German interests. For the time being, commitment to the European integration appears to be the most logical solution to ward off the threats. Also in an election speech in 2017, when Angela Merkel said: “We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands naturally in friendship with the United States of America, in friendship with Great Britain, as good neighbours with whoever, also with Russia and other countries”, it was a clear sign that Germany would more fiercely promote and take the lead in the European integration (Paravicini, 2017, para.4). These words are also important in that it indicates a change in the views of German policy-makers on Germany’s position both in the international sphere and within the European order.

A number of serious issues such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria and the refugee crisis have jeopardised the security of Europe. Apart from all these, the Trump administration’s scepticism about the transatlantic partnership with Germany and the EU along with the UK’s decision to leave the European Union laid a burden on Germany in particular. Additionally, Brexit implied a rejection to the European integration (Gaskarth & Oppermann, 2021, p.85). This is still an act which can cause a bandwagoning effect among other EU member states.

The problem here is how long Germany can hold onto its europeanised identity and sustain its integrationist policies? In fact, at this point, the Russo-Ukrainian war might have created an awareness of being ‘us’ among the European states, and this can offer Germany an opportunity for its European integration policies. However, in the first place, Germany has to define its priorities and responsibilities well. Today, although Germany is still promoting diplomatic

channels for the solution of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it has been also in a contradiction between its values and the reality.

Nevertheless, Germany is now aware of the fact that it has more responsibilities for the protection and the enhancement of peace and security, particularly in its own region. At the end of the day, the political turmoil created by Russia will transform Germany into either an actor more committed to its traditional norms and values or a state which puts high value on military capabilities rather than a civilian state behaviour. In this respect, Russia poses itself a challenge to Germany. It is for this reason that if a change is inevitable in German foreign policy, it will be due to the Russian aggression.

4.4. A CHALLENGING PARTNERSHIP: GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

On the European continent, the German-Russian relations draw attention even though nobody would have foreseen such a rapprochement (Spanger, 2012, p.33). Based on history, Germany and Russia share a special relationship. As Europe's two largest nations, it is not possible for Germans and Russians to disregard each other due to their pioneering roles on the continent (Götz, 2007, p.1). When we look at the historical background, we see that, on the one hand, Germans and Russians fought together and on the other hand, they turned their backs against each other as in the Second World War. However, during the Cold War years, Russia's support towards the reunification is incontrovertible as well. Therefore, while defining the German-Russian relations, it is possible to mention contradictory feelings such as fear, admiration, hatred and a romantic bond (Koenen, 2005, p.15).

Starting from the 1990s, together with the reunification, the relations between Germany and Russia advanced in a strategic direction. It could be suggested that Germany has been the bridge between Russia and the Western world. Added to this, Russia has been the biggest energy supplier and the main natural gas provider for Germany. Their strategic partnership yielded in the

Nord Stream I and II projects, which aimed at energy flow from Russia to Germany. Thus, Germany could have had the chance to become an energy hub within the EU if these projects had not been suspended due to the Russo-Ukrainian War. The relationship between Germany and Russia should be evaluated as an important determinant of European politics and security (Siddi, 2016, p.157).

Furthermore, Germany is one of Russia's important business partners apart from being a main supplier of investment goods (Götz, 2007, p.1). In addition to economic ties, Germany and Russia are linked to each other culturally. Along with Russians of German descent who have moved to Germany, peoples of both sides have had the chance to get to know each other thanks to tourism and educational activities (Götz, 2007, p.3). After English, the German language ranks the second in terms of the number of the learners ("Germany and the Russian Federation: Bilateral relations", 2022, para.5).

The German-Russian Forum and the Petersburg Dialogue brought a deeper perspective to the bilateral relations by widening the dialogue (Götz, 2007, p.3). Germany's culture of responsibility also reveals itself in the bilateral relations with Russia. The past plays an important role in this regard and Germany bears a responsibility for the Soviet victims of the Second World War ("Germany and the Russian Federation: Bilateral relations", 2022, para.6).

One of the reasons why the relations between Germany and Russia have been dynamic is that there is no ethnic, religious or unresolved border issues between the two (Götz, 2007, p.3). Nonetheless, what has put the German-Russian bilateral relations in jeopardy has been the Russian state behaviour since the 2000s. Russia has been trying to regain its super power of the Soviet times and for this cause, it has been threatening the security of Europe.

Although Russia is a critical business partner for Germany, its continuous violations of international law have been corresponded by Germany through sanctions. Germany's commitment to rule of law reveals itself here as well. Whereas Germany has been quite firm in its criticism of the Russian violations

of international law, their strategic partnership and cooperation have continued on a large scale (Helwig, 2016, p.23). However, it could be suggested that the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflicts provoked by Russia in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 have turned the German-Russian relations upside down.

In fact, the German government played a key role in the implementation of the sanctions on its strategic partner. It is for this reason that the German-Russian relations should be examined if we want to name a sharp change in German foreign policy. Additionally, Russia's annexation of Crimea also caused the questioning of one of the basics of the "*Ostpolitik*" or "*Neue Ostpolitik*", which is the pursuit of cooperation with Russia (Siddi, 2016, p.158). However, during political crises, Germany displays a more diplomatic attitude in general rather than cutting the ties. Today, in its relations with Russia, Germany pursues a "*Russlandpoliti*", which aims to keep Russia within the Western system.

Thanks to economic and political power, along with its good diplomatic ties with the Kremlin, Germany assumed a default leadership to find a solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (Kirch, 2016, p.74). From a Russian perspective, it could be assumed that Russia's aggressive attitude may be the consequence of the NATO and EU enlargement policy, which Germany fiercely supports. As the EU enlarges towards the east of Europe, this may evoke Russia's fear of containment. As for Ukraine, it serves as a buffer zone between Russia and the West; hence, the Western integration of Ukraine poses a huge threat against Russia's security. It is also outstanding that despite Russia's aggressive behaviour, Germany has always kept diplomatic channels open. The rationale behind this could be attributed to German economic interests which became a driving force in the bilateral relations of the two after Russia's economic comeback in the 2010s (Spanger, 2012, p.38). German business is the driving force behind Germany's policies towards Russia as asserted by Stephen Szabo (2015, p.47).

Another thing which should be noted regarding the German-Russian relations is that they are traditionally shaped by the federal chancellor; and therefore, when Angela Merkel came into power, many thought that the relations between the

two would not be so close and stable as they had been under the administrations of Schröder and Putin (Forsberg, 2016, p.137). The reason why Merkel's era would create a break in the bilateral relations emanated from the consideration that she would not sustain the friendly relations deriving from the "*Ostpolitik*". When we look at the bilateral relations between the two before the Merkel administration, it is possible to mention compatibility between Schröder and Putin. To indicate, Schröder was more moderate towards Russia. He tended to be more cooperative with the Kremlin regarding international issues such as the Iraq War, and usually avoided from shifting the blame on Russia for the defects in the rule of law and human rights (Forsberg, 2016, p.137). Some may approach this behaviour critically; however, it could be assumed that the reason for Schröder's moderate approach towards Russia might have been rooted in the thought of gaining and integrating Russia into Europe for the security of the region.

On the other hand, in contrast with Schröder, Merkel was more cautious about Russia, and she tended to be more attached to the values of the German states rooted in 1945. It is for this reason that she was more concerned about Russia's democratic development and human rights conditions (Rahr, 2007, p.145). However, similar to Schröder, she also maintained a trade and economic cooperation, but she was more careful about security policy; therefore, she was not much in favour of the idea of the NATO enlargement towards Ukraine and Georgia. (Forsberg, 2016, p.137).

Angela Merkel prioritised the German-US and the EU-US relations based on the common values such as democracy and freedom rather than the relations with the East (Rahr, 2007, p.143). However, during the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Merkel administration was rather willing to assume the role of a mediator between Russia and Ukraine for the sake of the security in Europe. Of course, she did not refrain from harshly criticising the strategic partner over the annexation of Crimea, thus, the violations of international law and human rights. The annexation of Crimea was irreversible, and it was obvious that Russia would carry the issue of Eastern Ukraine to a higher level in the pursuit of the

status it had during the Soviet Union (McMillan, 2016, p.9). If Russia had not waged war on Ukraine in 2022, it was probable that the Scholz government would establish stable and amiable ties with Russia as the Schröder administration, which was another SPD-led government, did. But now, Germany is on the verge of another historic divide, which may result in a sharp change in the foreign policy culture and role based on the “civilian power” approach. However, in order to make a proper inference on the future of Germany’s state behaviour, the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 should be discussed as well since it could be assumed as the prelude to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

4.4.1. The Ukrainian Crisis and Germany’s Role in Crisis Management

If we need to trace back the roots of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, we should go back to the Vilnius Summit in 2013 when the then pro-Russian Ukrainian government rejected to sign the Association Agreement, the negotiations of which had been already finalised in 2011 with the European Union (Fix, 2016, p.113). This refusal evoked the Euromaidan protests, which caused a political crisis in the country. Upon the Ukrainian government’s closer cooperation with Moscow, the protests spread across the country. These internal disturbances in Ukraine eventually got worse with the Russian interventions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and the declaration of independence by the de facto Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in the aftermath of an unofficial status referendum in 2014 deepened the crisis in Ukraine.

Although Germany opted for a reserved position by rejecting a mediation role in the first phases of the Ukrainian conflict, the crisis turned into a litmus test that revealed the strengths of German foreign policy, its diplomatic skills and economic power along with its weakness in military power (Speck, 2015; Fix, 2016). However, what is noteworthy regarding the Ukrainian crisis is that it was the first time that Germany had interfered with a major international crisis for the purpose of crisis management. The German leadership in this crisis can be explained for three reasons. First of all, the German power and influence had

already started to emerge starting from the 1990s; secondly, Germany was located in the centre of the EU, and had long been nested in the EU structures apart from the fact that it had the biggest economy and the most crowded population in Europe; and thirdly, Germany was the only country to take over the leadership position in the Union (Speck, 2015, para.3).

On the other hand, the main issue was how long Germany could mediate between Ukraine and Russia and disable any military conflict which was likely to endanger the security in Europe. For Germany, it was important to find equilibrium between the two sides. Eastern Europe and Russia pose high importance to German security and prosperity (Speck, 2015, para.7). As previously mentioned in this chapter before, Russia is the biggest energy supplier and a business partner for Germany. Yet, it should be kept in mind that Russia poses a huge threat to the security of Germany, thus, Europe. It is for this reason that Germany has supported the EU enlargement policies towards the Balkans and tried to improve economic ties with the eastern neighbours to surround itself and the borders of the European Union with allies.

Yet, Germany initially showed resistance against imposing sharp sanctions on Russia and mainly insisted on negotiating through various formats such as meetings and telephone diplomacy between Merkel and Putin as well as talks with the Ukrainian and Western leaders (Kundnani&Pond, 2015; Speck, 2015). Those dialogues and negotiations included the Weimar Triangle with Germany, France and Poland along with the Normandy format including Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France.

In the meantime, the dialogue and negotiation formats changed into a mediation effort in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflicts in the Donbas region (Fix, 2016, p.122). The first format was Geneva format between Russia, Ukraine as well as the US and the EU. During the talks, an agreement on disarmament and the withdrawal of the separatists supported by Russia from Donbas was reached. Besides, the Geneva talks were the only negotiation format in which Germany did not explicitly take part but conducted shuttle diplomacy (Fix, 2016, p.123). As for the Normandy format, it was

functional in that it instrumentalized the European leadership role. It should also be noted that the institutional power of the European Union paved the way for a German leadership role in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014; Germany put its trust on the OSCE rather than the EU in order to establish initial talks (Fix, 2016, p.125)

Moreover, it is possible to tell that there was a personal dimension to Germany's leadership role in that Merkel is from the GDR, which was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, and she could speak Russian (Speck, 2015, para.8). In that sense, Germany might have seemed to be a better alternative for Russia other than the UK or France.

As regards the German leadership role in the Ukrainian conflict, it could be claimed that there was a multilateral dimension as well. This could be likened to Germany's search for a multilateral mandate to justify its military engagements in the out-of-area missions it had joined. In its efforts to form a common Western attitude, Berlin conducted all crucial issues in conjunction with the US, and tried to gain trust in the EU for its approach (Speck, 2015, para.11).

However, when it came to imposing sanctions on Russia, Germany and the US displayed different attitudes. While Washington was in pursuit of punishing Moscow via sanctions, Berlin's list of sanctions was designed to be a deterrent against any future aggression (Kundnani&Pond, 2015, pp.173-174).

On the other hand, the sanctions served two purposes. Firstly, through sanctions, it was given that the Western world was one voice in its approach to the Russian aggression; and secondly, with the help of the sanctions, it was aimed to limit Russia's mobility on Ukraine by creating an economic fluctuation in Russia (Speck, 2015, para.22-23). But, seemingly, the sanctions imposed right after the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 did not work on Russia given that it waged a war on Ukraine in 2022.

Apart from the multilateral dimension mentioned above, there was also a non-militarist dimension to the crisis, which could be perceived as a continuum of German foreign policy. Through the crisis, Germany adopted a non-militarist attitude. It is for this reason that the military dimension of the West's attitude

towards the Ukrainian crisis was only based on a reorientation of NATO's collective defence principle (Speck, 2015, para.27). In a nutshell, regarding the military engagement, Germany was as usual committed to its culture of restraint and acted in accordance with its traditional foreign policy principles of a "civilian power" (Fix, 2016, p.128).

As a result, the European attitude towards the first leg of the Ukrainian crisis (the second one is the war in 2022) was mainly shaped by Germany; thus its norms and values. Hence, Europe's approach to the crisis can be defined as a 'German European one' (Fix, 2016, p.129). Germany's leadership role in the Ukrainian crisis also reflected its "civilian power" characteristic. Besides, Germany's leadership in the crisis indicated that Germany could claim a leadership position within the borders of Europe if it were legitimised through normative principles (Fix, 2016, p.129). During the conflict, Germany also sustained its anti-militarist approach, and this could be interpreted as the reflection of its "civilian power" role. The Ukrainian conflict was also important since it indicated that Germany was ready to assume a leadership position in any potential crisis and this was welcomed by other EU states and its transatlantic ally. Even though the crisis did not cause a change in the pillars of German foreign policy, it is difficult to say the same for the Russo-Ukrainian war. If a change is necessary, it will be followed by this war, and this time it looks difficult for Germany to remain a pacifist.

4.4.2. A U-Turn for Germany: the Russo-Ukrainian War

The war which Russia launched on Ukraine in February 2022 seems to have had fundamental effects on Germany. Putin's aggression has not only made Germany reconsider its energy policy but it has also caused Berlin to overhaul its diplomatic attitude towards Russia and reevaluate its military role in the world (Macgillis, 2022, para.1). Although Europe's economic giant, Germany was initially accused of having an overly cosy attitude with Russia and prioritising its economic interests, the crisis in the middle of Europe has paved the way for a transformation of German foreign policy ("A New Era: Germany Rewrites its

Defence, Foreign Policies", 2022). Upon Russia's aggression, the Scholz government, which came to power in December 2021, made a historic decision in terms of Germany's foreign policy by announcing that Germany would increase its military spending on military defence up to more than 2% of its economic output. This is a drastic change given that Germany's stance towards military force has been quite cautious and pacifist. What is more, Berlin has decided to suspend the Nord Stream 2 project and decided to send lethal weapons to Ukraine, which also marks a 'Zeitenwende' or a turning point in Germany's history. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused German politicians to come to the realisation that using trade and energy along with insistence on dialogue in order to build ties with Moscow have been nothing but a huge mistake (McGuinness, 2022, para.1-2).

This new era is likely to include weapons delivery, a drastic increase in military spending and a gradual cut in Russia's energy imports, which will speed up the *Energiewende* policy. Nils Schmid, who is the foreign affairs spokesperson for the SPD also asserted that this new era would be more about containment and deterrence along with defence against Russia (McGuinness, 2022, para.5).

Vladimir Putin's war may trigger a new Cold War era, in which Germany will actively take part this time; and therefore, this new era might change Germany's "civilian power" approach in the short term for the sake of the European security. With the new Ukrainian crisis, Germany has perhaps left behind a special and unique kind of restraint in foreign and security policy as Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock ("A New Era: Germany Rewrites its Defence, Foreign Policies", 2022). However, it could be asserted that these changes in German foreign policy will not change Germany's culture of responsibility; on the contrary they will strengthen it. This new era will also increase Germany's commitment to NATO and perhaps its transatlantic ally, the US as well. On the other hand, there is a chance that Germany may take the lead within Europe in a stricter manner and establish the EU as an alternative bloc in the current multipolar world order. What is certain is that Germany unavoidably is already

entrenched in some changes and it will not be able to remain a “civilian power” in the long run.

CONCLUSION

German foreign policy has been mainly defined by continuity for over 60 years, which implies credibility, predictability and responsibility of Germany (Flemes & Ebert, 2017, p.251). In fact, continuity has become a key feature of German foreign policy as Klaus Kinkel emphasised in his words “continuity, continuity and continuity.” (Schneider, 2012, p.5, as cited in Flemes & Ebert, 2017, p.251). Followed by the Second World War, the future of German foreign policy was one of the most important issues for regional peace in Europe. Starting from 1945, the German state principles have been based on multilateralism ingrained in the transatlantic alliance and Western integration, restraint on the use of military force, and a civilian approach of foreign policy with an emphasis on a europeanised identity. Throughout the first years of the Post-War period, the bilateral relations with France played a key role in the acceptance of West Germany within the Western society and European security. Besides this, the relationship between the two countries brought about a new dimension to the European integration as well. With its novel guiding principles, war-torn (West) Germany sought after a different chapter in its political history and wanted to claim its place in the international system as a sovereign state. The balanced politics which Germany pursued in the Cold War years helped secure the country’s position in the international community and gain trust.

Together with the reunification in 1990, however, many realist thinkers such as John Mearsheimer thought that Germany would start to pursue power politics by dismembering itself from NATO and the EU and it could even become a nuclear deterrent power (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.8). In contrast with the common realist and liberal beliefs, Germany sustained its “civilian power” approach in its foreign policy and remained committed to its core values although it has been criticised by its allies on the grounds of its firm position against the use of force. Even if Germany has avoided using force, it has become a key actor with its growing economy, and shaped politics at least within its region.

However, the changing politics and circumstances have brought along challenges to German foreign policy and they have necessitated a change. Germany has not just pursued norms to 're-enact and reproduce' its traditional "civilian power" role conception; on the contrary, German policy makers have questioned the efficacy and legitimacy of the key principles (Harnisch, 2001, p.44). There has been undoubtedly a change in the German role conception since 1990. For this reason, it is possible to mention a transformation of German foreign policy rather than naming a seismic shift. This is to say, German foreign policy has evolved within its own borders with new interpretations in line with the conjuncture and the spirit of the time. Germany has been a state that has firmly promoted the Western integration embedded in the transatlantic alliance, rule of law, human rights, and democracy since 1945. Another foreign policy principle that Germany has embraced has been its self-imposed restraint on military power. Although this was initially imposed by the victors of the Second World War, Germany has never complained about it and sustained this principle willingly.

In spite of the fact that the guiding principles of German foreign policy have been challenged especially after the end of the Cold War, Germany has succeeded in adjusting itself to the world order by preserving these principles. Yet, if we need to name a change or transformation German foreign policy has gone through since the end of the Cold War as mentioned before, it is definitely the self-imposed restraint on military power, which was derived from the dark past of German history. Though collective memory is still quite influential in the conduct of German foreign policy, a transformation in the area of its military has occurred based on Germany's culture of global responsibility.

Right after the reunification, Germany had to deal with several challenges including the burden of East Germany. The end of the Cold War also caused latent issues to come up worldwide resulting in conflicts threatening global peace and security. This environment paved the way for German military action. The 1990s were the years when German soldiers started to be deployed across the world due to several reasons. However, the deployment of German soldiers

was never for assertive purposes. Instead, the reason why the unified Germany sent its soldiers to various corners of the world has generally been on account of humanitarian reasons or this has been the justification of the military action within German foreign policy. But, Germany's military actions in NATO-led out-of-area missions have mostly been tried to be legitimised through multilateral mandates and constitutional decisions.

For many, the Kosovo War in 1999 was a watershed moment for Germany as it was the first combat war German soldiers had joined since 1945. It contradicted the German political elite along with the public and it caused a conflict between the guiding principles of the Post-War period and the German foreign policy role (Harnisch, 2001, p.52). The deployment of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers to Kosovo also raised critical questions as to Germany's "civilian power" role concept among its allies. This situation was seen as a 'deviation from the course expected by an ideal-type civilian power' (Harnisch, 2001, p.53). However, the definition of "civilian power" could be claimed to be open interpretation. When we look at the definition of a "civilian power", we see that it refers to a state that conducts its foreign policy and pursues its interests by means of political and economic tools and promotes multilateral cooperation, human rights and rule of law. Furthermore, for some, it is also acceptable that a "civilian power" can use military force under the frame of peace-keeping and peace-building efforts to protect human rights though it exposes a sharp contradiction with being civilian; but, it is still evaluated within this role concept. By joining the Kosovo War with no clear UN Security Council mandate, Germany broke a taboo regarding one of its key norms of its foreign policy identity as a "civilian power". Besides this, Germany acted in a similar way when it decided to assist its neighbouring country France in its fight against terrorism in Iraq and Syria based on a broad interpretation of international law (Schüller, 2017, p.1).

On the other hand, for Germany, the use of force has been a last resort in crisis or conflict management and it has showed a stance towards favouring diplomacy. At least, it has been so till the Russo-Ukrainian War, which erupted in February 2022. Although Germany even tolerated Russia in the first

Ukrainian crisis, which flared up in 2014 and did not diverge from a civilian stance, the latest development has been the final straw for Berlin. On this basis, it will be correct to assume that the real watershed moment for German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War may be triggered by the Russian aggression which threatens the security of Europe.

In fact, Putin might have inadvertently achieved what the Western allies of Germany have tried to do: to cause Germany to claim its role as a key global power together with an assertive foreign policy supported by a strong army in spite of its war guilt and Holocaust-based memory (Marsh&Siebold, 2022, para.1). Putin's aggression has caused a "*Zeitenwende*" or a turning point in German foreign policy by paving the way for Germany's reconsideration of its military role. It is also possible to claim that Germany has now become a normal power. Even though Germany has struggled to remain committed to its norms and values, changing political structures and challenges will eventually bring about mandatory changes and transformations for the country. If Russia keeps posing threats to the security of Europe, this change in German foreign policy role can happen faster than expected. However, Germany can also benefit from the current conflict by balancing the core tenets of its foreign policy and can turn its Europe into a value-oriented and interest-driven actor which will be influential in the global system (Flemes&Ebert, 2017, p.264).

As a result, this thesis has argued the impact of the "civilian power" role concept on German foreign policy behaviour and explored the relationship between its identity and social structure since the end of the Cold War. The findings indicate to us that foreign policy roles might show some diverging patterns open to interpretation in line with situations. Despite diverging mode of actions, it can be concluded that Germany, as a "civilian power", has shown continuity in its foreign policy since 1990. However, in spite of a pattern of continuum, the new era, which has started as a consequence of the Russian threat, is bound to cause changes in Germany's role in its foreign policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A New Era: Germany Rewrites its Defence, Foreign Policies. (27 February 2022). *France 24*. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220227-a-new-era-germany-rewrites-its-defence-foreign-policies>

Albright, K. (Host). (1998, November 3). Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and German Foreign Minister Joschka Press Remarks prior to their meeting. U.S Department of State. Retrieved from <https://19972001.state.gov/statements/1998/981103>

"Anonymous" (8 July 1999). Germany comes out of its post-war shell. *The Economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/europe/1999/07/08/germany-comes-out-of-its-post-war-shell>

Anthon, C. G. (1963). The End of the Adenauer Era. *Current History*, 44(260), 193–201. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45310903>

Arnold, E. (1991). German Foreign Policy and Unification. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 67(3), 453–471. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2621946>

Ash, T.G. (1993). *In Europe's Name*. New York, Random House.

Aydın, Y. (2017). Yeni Alman dış politikası: Ne ABD ile ne ABD'siz. *Star*, 08.07.2017. Retrieved from <https://www.star.com.tr/acik-gorus/yeni-alman-dis-politikasi-ne-abd-ile-ne-abdsiz-haber-1234787/>

Aydın, Y.(2020). Willy Brandt ve Almanya'nın Doğu Açılımı. *Perspektif*.

Banchoff, T. (1996). Historical Memory and German Foreign Policy: The Cases of Adenauer and Brandt. *German Politics & Society*, 14(2 (39)), 36–53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23736443>

Banchoff, T. (1998). Germany's European Policy: A Constructivist Perspective. *Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series*, 8 (1), pp.1-39.

Banchoff, T. (1999). *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*. Ann Arbor. The University of Michigan Press.

Brummer, K. & Oppermann, K. (2016). Germany's Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: "Becoming Normal?". *Oxford Handbooks Online*, pp.1-27.

The Basic Law of the FRG (23 May 1949). Cvce.eu. Retrieved from https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7fa618bb-604e-4980-b667-76bf0cd0dd9b/publishable_en.pdf.

Baumann, R. (2002). The Transformation of German Multilateralism: Changes in the Foreign Policy Discourse since Unification. *German Politics & Society*, 20(4 (65)), 1-26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23740512>

Bindenagel, J. D. (2010). Afghanistan: The German Factor. *PRISM*, 1(4), 95–112. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26469080>

Blacksell, M., & Brown, M. (1983). Ten years of Ostpolitik. *Geography*, 68(3), 260–262. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40570697>

Büyükbay, C. (2017). Almanya'nın AB İçerisindeki Liderlik Rolü: Uluslararası Krizler Bağlamında Dış Politikada Süreklilik ve Değişim. *Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 8(1), 19-38.

Brady, J. S., & Wiliarty, S. E. (2002). How Culture Matters: Culture and Social Change in the Federal Republic of Germany. *German Politics & Society*, 20(2 (63)), 1–13. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23740541>

Cary, N.D. (2019). Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement. *Central European History* 52(1), 148-171.

Cesaratto, S., & Stirati, A. (2010). Germany and the European and Global Crises. *International Journal of Political Economy*, 39(4), 56–86. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23032360>

Chopra, H. S. (1972). Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" and its impact on Franco-German relations. *India Quarterly*, 28(3), 227–235. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45070302>

Chrobog, J. (1998). Transatlantic Relations: A German Perspective. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 5(2), 79–87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590312>

Cooper, A. H. (1997). When Just Causes Conflict With Accepted Means: The German Peace Movement And Military Intervention in Bosnia. *German Politics & Society*, 15(3 (44)), 99–118. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23737424>

Crawford, B.(2007). *Power and German Foreign Policy Embedded Hegemony in Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Crossley-Frolick, K. A. (2013). Domestic Constraints, German Foreign Policy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. *German Politics & Society*, 31(3 (108)), 43–75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43917560>

Dinan, D. (2005). *Ever Close Union: an Introduction to European Integration*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Dinan, D. (2005). *Origins and Evolution of the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duffield, J. S. (1999). Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism. *International Organization*, 53(4), 765–803. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601309>

Engelkamp, S., & Offermann, P. (2012). It's a Family Affair: Germany as a Responsible Actor in Popular Culture Discourse. *International Studies Perspectives*, 13(3), 235–253. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44218711>

Elliott, L. (2015). How Helmut Schmidt Helped West Germany Thrive in Tough Times. *The Guardian*.

Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Fix, L. (2016). Leadership in the Ukrainian Conflict: A German Moment. In Helwig, N. (Ed.) *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. FIIA Report 44*, pp.109-129.

Flemes, D. & Ebert, H. (2017). Bound to Change: German Foreign Policy in the networked Order. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 2 (1), pp.251-269. Retrieved from <https://risingpowersproject.com/files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/vol2.1-flemes-ebert.pdf>

Forsberg, T. (2016). The domestic sources of German foreign policy towards Russia. In Helwig, N. (Ed.) *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. FIIA Report 44*, pp.135-152.

Frenkler, U. (2001). Germany at Maastricht: Power Politics or Civilian Power? In S.Harnisch & H.W. Maull (Eds.). *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (pp.26-48). Manchester University Press.

Freudlsperger, C.& Juchtenfuchs, M. (2021). A Member State Like Any Other? Germany and the European Integration of Core State Powers. *Journal of European Integration* 43(2), pp.117-135, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2021.1877695

Freund, G. (1963). Adenauer and the Future of Germany. *International Journal*, 18(4), 458–467. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40198929>

Friedrich, W.U. (2000). Kosovo and the evolution of German foreign policy in the Balkans. In W.U. Friedrich (Ed.). *The legacy of kosovo: German politics and policies in the Balkans* (pp.1-24). American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. *German Issues* 22, The John Hopkins University.

Fullard, K. (2010). Memory and Identity in Autobiographical Texts by Günter Grass and Dieter Wellershoff. *Rocky Mountain Review*, 64(1), 71–85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677056>

Fürstenau, M. (2021, August 21) Opinion: Germany has failed in Afghanistan. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-germany-has-failed-in-afghanistan/a-58936536>

Gallenkamp, M. (2009). Afghanistan: Understanding German Objectives and Strategies. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09071>

Gaskarth, J. & Oppermann, K. (2021). Clashing Traditions: German Foreign Policy in a New Era. *International Studies Perspectives* 22, pp.84-105.

Gatzke, H.W. (1980). *Germany and the United States, a "Special Relationship"*. Harvard University Press.

Germany's foreign and European policy principles. (2019) The Federal Foreign Office| Home Page. Retrieved from <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/policy-principles/229790#:~:text=A%20sovereign%20Europe%2C%20the%20transatlantic,principles%20of%20German%20foreign%20policy>

Germany and the Russian Federation: Bilateral relations. (2022). Federal Foreign Office. 25.02.2022. Retrieved from www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/

Glatz, R.N., Hansen, W., Kaim, M.& Vorrath, J. (Eds.). (2018). Missions in a Changing World. SWP Research Paper.

Goldman, G. (1983). The Challenge For Chancellor Kohl. *German Studies Newsletter*, 1, 5–9. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23733970>

Götz, R. (2007). Germany and Russia-Strategic Partners? *Geopolitical Affairs* 4,pp.1-12. Retrieved from <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/fachpublikationen/>

Haas, E.B. (1961). International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization*. 15(3). 366-392.

Hampton, M. N., & Peifer, D. C. (2007). Reordering German Identity: Memory Sites and Foreign Policy. *German Studies Review*, 30(2), 371–390. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27668292>

Hanisch, M. (2015). A new quality of engagement: Germany's extended military operation in northern Mali. Federal Academy for Security Policy. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22208>

Hanrieder, W. F. (1989). The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989. *German Studies Review*, 12(2), 311–332. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1430097>

Harnisch, S. & Maull, H.W. (2001). Introduction. In S.Harnisch & H.W. Maull (Eds.). *Germany as a Civilian Power ? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (pp.1-8). Manchester University Press.

Harnisch, S. (2001). Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy. *German Politics*, 10(1), pp.35-60, DOI: 10.1080/09644000412331307384

Harnisch, S. (2012). German Foreign Policy: Gulliver's Travails in the 21st Century. pp.71-93.

Helmut Kohl's Ten –Point Plan for German Unity. November 28, 1989. Retrieved from https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=223

Helmut Schmidt. The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany | Home page. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-en/chancellery/federal-chancellors-since-1949/helmut-schmidt>

Helmut Schmidt (2021). | DW | 18.07.2021. DW.COM. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/helmut-schmidt/t-17454265>.

Hekimler, O. (2020). Alman Dış Politikasında Güç Kavramı ve Sivil Güç Konseptinin Geleceği. *Namık Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksek Okulu Dergisi*, 21 (1), pp.1-11.

Helwig, N. (Ed.) (2016). Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. *FIIA Report 44*, pp.13-25.

Helwig, N. (2016). Conclusions: German change and the implications for the EU's foreign and security policy. In Helwig, N. (Ed.) *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy*. *FIIA Report 44*, pp.211-215.

Hennecke, H.,J. (n.d.). *Geschichte der CDU Ludwig Erhardt*. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from <https://kas.de>

Hofhansel, C. (2001). Germany, Multilateralism and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. *Center for European Studies Program for the Study of Germany and Europe*, pp.1-23. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/9296/1/Hofhansel.pdf>

Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

Hyde-Price, A. (2001). Germany and the Kosovo war: still a civilian power. *German Politics*. 10(1), pp.19-34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644000412331307374>

Iso-Markku, T. (2016). Germany and the EU's Security and Defence Policy: New Role, old challenges. In N.Helwig (Ed.) *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy*. *FIIA Report 44*, pp.49-66.

Jackson R. & Sorensen, G. (2013). *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Fifth Edition). Oxford University Press.

Juneau, J.F. (2011). The Limits of Linkage: The Nixon Administration and Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik", 1969–72. *The International History Review*, 33(2), 277–297. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23032805>

Kaim, M. (2008). Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO. *International Journal*, 63(3), 607–623. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204400>

Kalberg, S. (2003). The Influence of Political Culture upon Cross-Cultural Misperceptions and Foreign Policy: The United States and Germany. *German Politics & Society*, 21(3 (68)), 1–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23740526>

Kamp, K.-H. (1993). The German Bundeswehr in Out-of-Area Operations: To Engage or Not to Engage? *The World Today*, 49(8/9), 165–168. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396528>

Kaplan, L. S. (1961). NATO and Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partnership. *International Organization*, 15(4), 618–629. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705555>

Kattago, S. (1998). Representing German Victimhood and Guilt: The Neue Wache and Unified German Memory. *German Politics & Society*, 16(3 (48)), 86–104. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23737375>

Katzenstein, P.J. (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Klose, G. J. (2005). The Weight of History: Germany's Military and Domestic Security. *Connections*, 4(3), 37–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26323184>

Koenen, G. (2005) *Der Russland –Komplex*. C.H. Beck Verlag, München.

Kohl, H., & Schlevogt, K.-A. (2002). Supranational Visionary and Builder of Euroland: Former German Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl on the Euro's Significance for Germany and Its Neighbors. *The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005)*, 16(1), 8–12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4165805>

Kolb, A. (2013). Recommendations for German Foreign Policy Measures in Mali and the Sahel. In *Security and Development in the Sahel: Recommendations for German and European Foreign and Development Policies* (pp. 5–6). Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10090.5>

Kirch, A., L. (2016). Germany and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing stability and democracy in a ring of fire. In Helwig, N. (Ed.) *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy*. FIIA Report 44, pp.71-88.

Kirste, K., and H. W. Maull. 1996. Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie. *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (2): 283–312.

Kundnani, H. (2012). The Concept of “Normality” in German Foreign Policy since Unification. *German Politics & Society*, 30(2 [103]), 38–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23744455>

Kundnani, H., & Pond, E. (2015). Germany’s Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis: Caught Between East and West. *Foreign Affairs*, 94(2), 173–177. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483496>

Kurt Georg Kiesinger. The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany|Home page. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-en/chancellery/federal-chancellors-since-1949/kurt-georg-kiesinger>.

Lange, Felix (2022, April 5). A constitutional framework for Bundeswehr operations abroad based on international law. *Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional*. Retrieved from <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-constitutional-framework-for-bundeswehr-operations-abroad-based-on-international-law/>

Langenbacher, E. (2014). Does Collective Memory Still Influence German Foreign Policy? *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 20(2), 55–71. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590974>

Lantis, J. (2002). The moral imperative of force: The evolution of German strategic culture in Kosovo. *Comparative Strategy*, 21(1), pp.21-46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0149593023173508064>

Large, D.C.(1996). *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Leininger, J. (2021). Why Germany Should Promote Democracy Now More Than Ever. German Development Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/why-germany-should-promote-democracy-now-more-so-than-ever/>

Leonard, M., & Hackenbroich, J. (2022). *The birth of a geopolitical Germany*. ECFR. Retrieved from <https://ecfr.eu/article/the-birth-of-a-geopolitical-germany/>

Lombardi, B. (2008). All Politics Is Local: Germany, the Bundeswehr, and Afghanistan. *International Journal*, 63(3), 587–605. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204399>

Longhurst, K. (2004). *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003*. Manchester University Press.

Ludwig Erhard. The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany | Homepage. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-en/chancellery/federal-chancellors-since-1949/ludwig-erhard>.

Macgillis, A. (11 March 2022). How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Upended Germany. *Propublica*. Retrieved from <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-upended-germany>

McGuinness, D. (18 April 2022). Ukraine war: Germany's conundrum over its ties with Russia. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61118706>

Marsh, S., & Siebold, S. (2022). *Analysis: Putin forces Germany to step up to role as global power*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-forces-germany-step-up-role-global-power-2022-02-27/>.

Mathiopoulos, M. (1985). The American President Seen Through German Eyes: Continuity and Change from the Adenauer to the Kohl Era. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 15(4), 673–706. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550271>

MauI, H. W. (1990). Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. *Foreign Affairs*, 69(5), 91–106. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20044603>

MauI, H. W. (2000). Germany and the Use of Force: still a 'civilian power'? *Survival*. 42(2), 56-80, DOI:10.1093/survival/42.2.56

MauI, H. W. (2006). Introduction. In H.W. MauI (Ed.), *Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (pp.1-9). Palgrave Macmillan.

McMillan, S. (2016). Germany's relations with Russia: willing fools or trusted intermediaries? *New Zealand International Review*, 41(4), 6–9. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48551921>

Meier, O. (2001). A Civilian Power caught between the lines: Germany and nuclear non-proliferation. In S.Harnisch & H.W. MauI (Eds.). *Germany as a Civilian Power ? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (pp.1-8). Manchester University Press.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security*, 15(1), 5–56. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981>

Mello, P., A. (2021). German Foreign Policy, pp.1-23. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344362151_German_Foreign_Policy

Miskimmon, A. (2009). Falling into Line? Kosovo and the Course of German Foreign Policy. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 85(3), 561–573. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27695031>

Niedhart, G. (2016). Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 18(3), 14–59. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925604>

Noetzel, T., & Schreer, B. (2008). All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 84(2), 211–221. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25144762>

Onuf, N.G. (1989). *World of Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Routledge.

Önsoy, M. & Koç, Z. (2019). Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Federal Almanya Dış Politikası. In H. Bağcı, İ.Ermağan & B.Gümüş (Eds.) *Dünya Siyasetinde Almanya 1* (pp.79-122). Nobel.

Özer, B. & Karadağ, C.T. (2017). Willy Brandt'in "Ostpolitik"inin Alman Dış Politikasına Mirası. *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 52. 134-148.

Paravicini, G. (2017). Angela Merkel: Europe must take 'our fate' into own hands. *Politico*, 28 May 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/>

Patel, K.K, (2022). Foes into friends: Germany's Role in Post War European Integration. Retrieved from <https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/foes-into-friends-germanys-role-in-postwar-european-integration/>

Peters, A.(2018). Between military deployment and democracy: use of force under the German constitution. *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law*, 5(2), pp.246-294. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2018.1521066>

Pifer, S. (2021). Order from Chaos: Rebuilding US-German relations: Harder than it appears. Brookings. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/25/rebuilding-us-german-relations-harder-than-it-appears/>

Pfeil, F. (2001). Civilian Power and Human Rights: the case of Germany. In S.Harnisch & H.W. Maull (Eds.). *Germany as a Civilian Power ? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (pp.1-8). Manchester University Press.

Rahr, A. (2007). Germany and Russia: A special Relationship. *The Washington Quaterly*, 30 (2), p.137-145. Retrieved from www.tandfononline.com

Reichel, R. (2002). Germany's Post-War Growth: Economic Miracle or Reconstruction Boom? *Cato Journal* 21(3), pp.427-442. Retrieved from <https://www.cato.org/search?query=richard+reichel>

Reus-Smit, C.(2005). Constructivism. In S.Burchill, and et.al (Ed.) *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ruttig, T. (2012). Protecting Freedom at the Hindukush: Source of Famous Afghanistan Quote Dies. Afghanistan Analysts Network. Retrieved from <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/international-engagement/protecting-freedom-at-the-hindukush-source-of-famous-afghanistan-quote-dies/>

Sauerbrey, A. (2017). *Populism, History, and Identity in German Politics and Foreign Policy*. German Marshall Fund of the United States. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18874>

Scharping, R. (2000). Germany, Kosovo and the Alliance. In W.U. Friedrich (Ed.). *The legacy of Kosovo: German politics and policies in the Balkans* (pp.38-50)

Schüller, A. (2017). Position Paper: Unlimited use of armed drones in the fight against terrorism in Syria? European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. pp.1-9. Retrieved from: <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/publication/position-paper-unlimited-use-of-armed-drones-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-syria/>

Schmitt, G. J. (Ed.). (2020). Germany: a U-Turn on Defense. In *A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners* (3rd ed.). USAWCS Press.

Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. *Politique Européenne*, 17, 63–82. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45017750>

Sergio, M. L. (2015). “Détente” and its effects on Italian and German political systems (1963-1972). *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali*, 82(3 (327)), 411–430. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44397778>

Siddi, M. (2016). Germany’s evolving relationship with Russia: Towards a norm-based Ostpolitik? In Helwig, N. (Ed.) *Europe’s New Political Engine: Germany’s Role in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy*. FIIA Report 44, pp.155-168

Skelton, G. (1985). Reagan to Honor German War Dead on V-E Day Trip. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-04-19-mn-14900-story.html>

Solsten, E. (Ed.) (1996). *Germany: A Country Study*. Diane Publishing.

Sommer, T. (1968). Bonn’s New Ostpolitik. *Journal of International Affairs*, 22(1), 59–78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24356458>

Spanger, H.-J. (2012). German-Russian Relations: A Pan-European Mission as National Interest. *Studia Diplomatica*, 65(1), 33–44. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26531517>

Speck, U. (26 March 2015). German Power and the Ukraine Crisis. *Carnegie Europe*. Retrieved from

<https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/03/26/german-power-and-ukraine-conflict-pub-59501>

Spencer, R. (1964). Germany in the "Erhard Era." *International Journal*, 19(4), 458–473. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40199060>

Sperling, J. (2001). Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post-Cold War Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(2), 389–425. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593269>

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik & the German Marshall Fund of the United States. (2013). New Power New Responsibility Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere//GermanForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf

Szabo, S. F. (1990). *The Changing Politics of German Security*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Szabo, S. F. (2015). *Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geoeconomics*. Bloomsbury, London.

Szabo, S. F. (2017). Germany: From Civilian Power to a Geo-economic Shaping Power. *German Politics & Society*, 35(3), 38–54. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48561492>

Tewes, H. (2002). *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging Nato and the European Union. New Perspectives in German Studies*. Palgrave, Macmillan.

The Two plus Four Treaty in UNESCO's Memory of the World Register. Federal Foreign Office Political Archive (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://archiv.diplo.de>

The Bundeswehr as an Army on Operations. Website of the German Federal Armed Forces. (2022). Retrieved from <https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/about-bundeswehr/history/army-on-operations>

The Chancellor who reunited Germany. Website of the Federal Government | Home page. (2013). Retrieved from <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-chancellor-who-reunited-germany-413888>.

Theys, S.(2018). Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory, pp.1-4. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/72842>

Transatlantic relations. (2022).The Federal Foreign Office| Home Page. Retrieved from <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/usa>

Tisdall, S. (2017). Helmut Kohl: Leader Who United Europe as well as Germany. *The Guardian*.

Umland, A. (2022). It's time Germany abandons its foreign policy la-la land. *Politico*, 5 May 2022. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-germany-foreign-policy-turning-point-zeitenwende/>

Von Bredow, W. (1992). Conscription, conscientious objection, and civic service: the military institutions and political culture of Germany, 1945 to the present. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, 20(2), 289–303. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45294286>

Von Klaeden, E. (2009). German Foreign Policy: Parametres and Current Challenges. 20 Years after the Fall of Berlin Wall, pp.39-46. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=dbe754bb-3783-2cc6-6714-814ffe1246be&groupId=252038

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391–425. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858>

Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20(1), 71–81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217>



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 27/06/2022

Tez Başlığı : Soğuk Savaş'ın Bitiminden Günümüze Alman Dış Politikasında Dönüşüm ve Süreklilik

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 113 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 27/04/2022 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 9 'dur.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- Kaynakça hariç
- Alıntılar hariç
- Alıntılar dâhil
- 5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: Hazal CAN

Öğrenci No: N18130246

Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler

Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler -Tezli

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASTER'S THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Date: 27/06/2022

Thesis Title : Transformation and Continuity in German Foreign Policy from the End of the Cold War to Present

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 27/06/2022 for the total of 113 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 9 %.

Filtering options applied:

1. Approval and Declaration sections excluded
2. Bibliography/Works Cited excluded
3. Quotes excluded
4. Quotes included
5. Match size up to 5 words excluded

I declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname: Hazal CAN

Student No: N18130246

Department: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Program: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH THESIS

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 26/04/2022

Tez Başlığı: Soğuk Savaş'ın Bitiminden Günümüze Alman Dış Politikasında Dönüşüm ve Süreklilik

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, mülakat, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kurul/Komisyon'dan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: Hazal CAN

Öğrenci No: N18130246

Anabilim Dalı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

Programı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER-TEZLİ

Statüsü: Yüksek Lisans Doktora Bütünleşik Doktora

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)

Detaylı Bilgi: <http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr>

Telefon: 0-312-2976860

Faks: 0-3122992147

E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Date: 26/04/2022

Thesis Title: Transformation and Continuity in German Foreign Policy from the End of the Cold War to Present

My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname: Hazal CAN
Student No: N18130246
Department: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Program: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ITH THESIS
Status: MA Ph.D. Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)