Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO! AN ANALYSIS OF THE EU'S FAILED DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS IN SERBIA

Simge PELİT

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2022

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ABSTRACT

PELİT, Simge. *It Takes Two to Tango! An Analysis of the EU's Failed Democracy Promotion Efforts in Serbia*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2022.

This thesis aims to provide a sufficient explanation for the failure of democracy promotion efforts in Serbia. Through employing process-tracing method and constructivist theory, the goal is to identify the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Since the overthrow of Milosevic regime in the country, the European Union (EU) has gradually intensified the relation between the Union and Serbia. Attributed to its normative power, the EU started the double processes of democracy promotion and Europeanization of Serbia to shape the country in accordance with its norms, values and principles. Democracy is perceived as both a means and an end by the EU. However, regarding the current status of democracy in Serbia, these efforts seem to failed dramatically. As a result of the analysis, this thesis came to the conclusion that the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia derive from Serbia-related internal and the EU-related external reasons, therefore holding both responsible.

Keywords

Democracy promotion, Serbia, European Union, constructivism, process-tracing

ÖZET

PELİT, Simge. *Tango İki Kişi ile Yapılır! AB'nin Sırbistan'daki Başarısız Demokrasi Teşviki Çabalarının Bir Analizi*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2022.

Bu tez, Sırbistan'daki başarısız demokrasi teşviki çabaları için yeterli bir açıklama sağlamayı amaç edinmiştir. Süreç izleme metodunu ve inşacılık teorisini uygulayarak hedef, Sırbistan'daki demokrasi teşviki başarısızlığı arkasında yatan sebepleri belirlemektir. Avrupa Birliği (AB), Milosevic rejimi devrildiğinden beri, Birlik ve Sırbistan arasındaki ilişkiyi giderek yoğunlaştırmıştır. Normative gücüne istinaden, AB Sırbistan'ı kendi normlarına, değerlerine ve prensiplerine göre şekillendirmek için ikili demokrasi teşviki ve Avrupalılaştırma süreçlerini başlatmıştır. AB, demokrasiyi hem araç hem amaç olarak algılamaktaydı. Bununla birlikte Sırbistan'daki şu anki demokrasi seviyesi göz önüne alındığında bu çabaların dramatik bir şekilde başarısız olduğu görülmektedir. Analizler sonucunda, bu tez Sırbistan'daki demokrasi teşviki başarısızlığının Sırbistan bağlantılı iç ve AB bağlantılı dış sebeplerden kaynaklandığı sonucuna ulaşmakta, bu yüzden ikisini de sorumlu tutmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Demokrasi teşviki, Sırbistan, Avrupa Birliği, inşacılık, süreç izleme

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AVNOJ	Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
BMZ	Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization
CEE or CEECs	Central and Eastern Europe or Central Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS	Democratic Party
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EIDHR	European Initiatives on Democracy and Human Rights
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
FPI	Pablo Iglesias Foundation
GTZ	German Development Cooperation
IBM	Integrated Management of Border/Boundary Crossing Points
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organizations
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

ISPA	Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
K-FOR	Kosovo Force
LGBTQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer
MEDA	Mediterranean Development Assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
NPAA	National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis
OBNOVA	European Commission's Reconstructing Programme
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction
RBA	Republican Broadcasting Agency
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
RECOM	Coalition for Reconciliation Commission
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SAPARD	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SEECP	South-East European Cooperation Process
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNS	Serbian Progressive Party
SP	Stability Pact
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS	Serbian Radical Party
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USA or US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy
WB	World Bank
WB6	Western Balkan Six (Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro)
WBs	Western Balkans
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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INTRODUCTION

From ancient times to the present day, the understanding of the term 'democracy' had varied significantly. The contested nature of democracy (Gallie, 1956) led to numerous discussions about the appropriate form. Needless to say, democracy as far as everyone knows took a long time to emerge. It was in the 20th century that nations started to see democracy as the normal form of governance. However, the connotations attributed to the concept of democracy still diversified greatly (Huntington, 1991a, pp.5-6). With the end of the Cold War, there emerged a much more monolithic understanding of democracy based on Western liberal standards. People started to put more emphasis on human rights and rule of law. The toleration for authoritarian governance was mostly over (Magen & McFaul, 2009, pp. 5–6). The Western values began to globalise. After a short period, a consensus for a specific model of democracy appeared to be agreed upon.

Liberal democracy understanding with free and fair elections, broad protection of rights and freedoms, inclusive civil society and independent and accountable institutions are embraced predominantly. This brought about the increase in transition to liberal democracy (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011, p. 8). From that moment on, democracy is seen pre-eminently as an acceptable form of governance. Due to the attractiveness of liberal values, the potential reach of democracy extended. The biggest appeal of liberal democracy is that a nation does not need to be fit for democracy, in contrast, it needs to become fit through democracy (Sen, 1999, p.4). Regardless of how different their histories, cultures or traditions are, people chose democracy owing to the fact that it enriches their lives. People's involvement in governance give them opportunities to learn through the practice of democracy and shape their society. Thus, the universality of democracy created a global appeal and contributed to the growth of transition to liberal democracy in the world.

The acceptance of democracy as a universal value (Sen, 1999) culminated in the increase in democracy promotion activities. Particularly, after the end of the Cold War, victorious Western countries decided to export their understanding of liberal democracy to non-democratic societies (Schmitter & Brouwer 1999; Huber 2015;

Önsoy & Baba 2018; Magen & McFaul 2009; Beichelt 2012; Lloyd 2010; Pevehouse 2005). With the leading of the United States of America (USA), Western states intensified the use of democracy promotion rhetoric and developed policies to boost human rights and democracy in the world. Western states acknowledged liberal democracy as an international norm and initiated the promotion of democracy in every step they take. On account of its universal appeal, Western states saw democracy as an opportunity for the transformation of people of every ethnic and religious group. A world with fewer autocrats and more democrats certainly serves the interests of Western states. Not just Western states but the whole world benefits from the few numbers of autocrats and their authoritarian regimes. Hence, boosted by the end of the Cold War, waves of democratization were experienced and promoters used the opportunity to transfer their sense of democracy and to shape the targeted state in accordance with their views (Huntington, 1991b).

Among democracy promoters, the European Union (EU) managed to draw attention. Even though the EU shares the view of liberal democracy with the West, the Union becomes prominent with motive and models behind its promotion activities. In the aftermath of the events between 1989-1991, including the revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the transition to liberal democracy rose significantly and the efforts for democracy promotion by the EU magnified (Kubicek, 2004, p. 1). On the basis of its normative power (Manners, 2002, 2006, 2009), the EU began to use its power of attraction and became a leading actor in democracy promotion. In order to maintain peace in the European continent, the EU saw democracy as a prerequisite for peace and stability in Europe. For this reason, the Union incorporated democratic norms, values and principles into every fiber of its being (Manners, 2009, p.2) and demanded compliance from its member states and the actors who are willing to have a relation with the EU. Democracy is seen as a 'standard' or 'normal' by the EU and following the end of the Cold War, it started promoting democracy to former socialist states in the European continent. In a way, the EU's job was easy since those states had already set their eyes on the Union. After preparing the Union and strengthening its capabilities, the EU offered cooperation at many levels, with

the ultimate prospect of membership to the EU (Freyburg et al., 2015, p.14). The promise of membership was the most efficient tool and encouraged states to undertake necessary reforms. One by one, former socialist states fell under the spell of the EU. Enlargement policy assisted the EU both to transform former socialist republics and to shape the post-Cold War order which contributed to preserving a peaceful environment in the European continent (Smith, 2011, p.300).

However, the EU failed to pass the first test on its foreign policy when it failed to deal with the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s occurred in the Balkan Peninsula, which is the backyard of the EU (Elbasani, 2008, p.295). The failure of the Union caused huge damage to its image at the international level. Their first reaction was to keep the troubles away from the Union (Smith, 2000, p.817). However, shortly after, the possibility of the spread of the crises made European countries very anxious and they set off planning to end wars. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was inevitable, so the EU assumed responsibility for assisting in the post-conflict environment to transform regional countries. It introduced many approaches to incorporate the Balkan countries into the Union and as anticipated, the membership perspective was the one that chosen by the Western Balkan countries (Elbasani 2008; Türkeş & Gökgöz 2006; Jano 2008). In addition to the process of Europeanization, to achieve complete transformation, the EU initiated democracy promotion as well (Barbulescu and Troncota, 2013, p.72).

The acceptance and consolidation of democracy would help regional countries to get rid of their old habits and also to settle their issues. The Western Balkan countries were eager to be a part of these offered processes. Some of them immediately launched their integration processes like North Macedonia, while others were a bit late to join. Serbia was one of the latecomers. With the overthrow of Milosevic, the country entered into the process of transformation starting from mid-2000s (Djordjevic, 2008, p.88). Serbs were overwhelmingly determined that their goal is to become a democratic modern European country. Therefore, the EU made advances towards Serbia and kicked off integration and democratization processes. By employing its leverage and through using the tool

of conditionality, the EU has urged Belgrade to adopt democratic norms and practices. However, more than two decades later, Serbia seems far away from achieving its goal. The current status of democracy in the country demonstrates that under a so-called democratic regime, Serbia continues its old practices. Today, Serbia is put in the group of countries labelled as illiberal democracy (V-Dem), flawed democracy (EIU) or hybrid regime (Freedom House). Thus, it is largely assumed that democracy promotion activities failed in the country.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Fed up with the remnant of the old regime, liberal forces in Serbian society initiated a transformation process in 2000 by overthrowing the Milosevic regime. Serbs, who were enthusiastic to start over, decided on their priorities and began working on them. Becoming a democratic modern European state was at the top of the list. On this account, Serbs broke the ice with the West and made a rapprochement. On the basis of normative power, the European Union was also optimistic about developing relations with Serbia-which is a critical county for the stability in the Balkan peninsula- and about diffusing its norms, values and principles to ensure the irreversibility of the transformation of Serbia. Soon after, Serbia was included in the processes of Europeanization and democratization. In order to complete the transformation of Serbia, the EU prescribed the achievement of both processes. Coupled with the willingness of Serbian society, the promise of membership by the EU gave Serbia adequate incentives to carry out essential reforms. By virtue of its leverage towards the aspirant countries, the EU chose to use several tools such as conditionality, assistance and monitoring to ensure the acceptance and consolidation of democracy. Simultaneously with the membership process, the EU promoted liberal democracy in Serbia. However, after more than two decades of democracy promotion in Serbia, the current status of democracy indicates that these efforts are failed dramatically.

This thesis is an attempt to find out "Why democracy promotion in Serbia failed?". Following a deductive path, the aim of the thesis is to unravel the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. With reference to constructivist theory, two main actors in democracy promotion, the EU and Serbia, and their beliefs,

interactions, behaviours and practices will be examined to identify reasons behind the failure. The first point of departure is to assess the democratic history of Serbia to clarify the influence of Serbia on its own democratization process and in the second point, the EU's democracy promotion activities in Serbia will be analysed to diagnose the effect of the EU on the current status of democracy in Serbia. In the third point, by reviewing the previous analyses, the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion will be identified. At the end of the evaluation, the argument that is reached is "The failure of democracy promotion in Serbia stems from Serbia-related internal and the EU-related external reasons, thus both the EU and Serbia are responsible for current status of democracy in the country."

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is widely acknowledged that democracy promotion has arisen along with democracy itself. Ancient Athens, British and French empires were counted as historical democracy promoters (Huber, 2015, p.7). Nevertheless, the type of democracy that this thesis focused on emerged much later time. In the 20th century, the contemporary meaning of democracy entered into the stage of world politics and after a certain period of time, a consensus over the meaning of democracy was reached. Democracy is accepted as a universal norm and its promotion is recognized as a world value (McFaul, 2004). Therefore, contemporary democracy promoters got on the stage and particularly after the end of the Cold War, the studies on democracy and democracy promotion intensified. The literature review is conducted in three categories: democracy promotion, democracy promotion activities of the EU, and democracy promotion in Serbia.

The research on democracy promotion, in the first place, clarify that it has two centres: international relations and transition studies. In the first field, the focus is on the actors and their foreign policies and in the other field, the focus is on the character and dynamics of the domestic political regime (Beichelt, 2012, p.2). Another important thing that would be noticed during the review process is that the promotion of democracy can be performed both locally and externally. The locally-driven process of democracy promotion concentrates on the domestic

democracy promoters and their activities, while the externally-driven process of democracy promotion concentrates on external actors and their influence on the target state. There are numerous studies on the promotion and protection of democracy (Burnell 2007, 2008; Kurki 2010; Hubson & Kurki 2012; Carothers 2004, 2006; Ethier 2010; Jahn 2012; Wolff & Wurm 2011; Magen et al. 2008; Wetzel & Jan 2011; Beichelt 2012; Schmitter & Brouwer 1999; Whitehead 1996, 2012; Schraedar 2003).

The literature on democracy promotion provides various standpoints about the meaning attributed to the concept. Huber (2015) and Magen & Morlino (2008) define democracy promotion as a foreign policy practice, which an external actor affects the environment and the behaviours of the people within the targeted state. They continue by exampling the institutionalized foreign policy practices of both Americans and Europeans (Magen et al., 2009, p.2). Schmitter & Brouwer (1999) argued that before the 1970s, democracy promotion had been used as a weapon in foreign policy but now it turned out to be a set of activities carried out by foreign actors intended to politically liberalize recipient countries. Following their sentiments, Grimm & Leininger (2012) and Beichelt (2012) outlined democracy promotion as the activities of non-domestic actors that seek to support democratization and to help domestic actors to learn playing in accordance with the democratic rules. Likewise, Hubson & Kurki (2012) emphasized that democracy promotion is a process "by which an external actor intervenes to install or assist in the institution of democratic government in a target state" (p.3). It has several strategies from peaceful to forceful methods (Hubson and Kurki, 2012, p.3). Ethier (2003) agreed that democracy promotion is initiated by external actors whether governments or international organizations through using various strategies to achieve democratic transition or consolidation in a targeted state (p.99). In consequence, it is clear that democracy promotion is seen as a practice of foreign policy conducted by an external actor towards a targeted state to assist the transition to democracy or consolidation of democracy.

With the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on human rights, the rule of law and democracy skyrocketed. Besides the USA, European countries and many

international and non-governmental organizations joined in the activities for universalising these norms and values. Naturally, democracy promotion activities increased as well. These actors embraced the understanding of liberal democracy and its promotion of it, yet their motive and model behind those activities fluctuated. The motivations (Wolff & Wurm 2011; Kotzian et al. 2011; Huber 2015; Grimm & Leininger 2012) and models (Whitehead 2001; Kubicek 2003; Magen et al. 2008; Magen & McFaul 2009; Huber 2015) behind democracy promotion also became the subjects of study. The strategies adopted by the promoter play a major role in the success of the promotion, thus, the motive and the model were chosen for the targeted state should be done regarding the status and the needs of the targeted state.

With reference to these notions, the European Union became an influential and leading democracy promoter in the world. On the basis of its normative power, the EU presented itself as an anchor of democracy and started to diffuse its norms and standards to others. Liberal democracy, human rights, rule of law, freedom etc. are the core values of the Union and they are seen as 'standard' or 'normal', so, from the EU's point of view, others should adopt these standards just as well. A little while later, the EU embedded these standards in every fiber of its being. Besides engraving these norms, values and principles into the EU, in order to shape the comprehension of 'normal' in international relations, the Union put its principles into established treaties, conventions or agreements.

In the post-Cold War era, the EU began to apply this strategy to diffuse its principles, norms and values. With the demise of the Soviet threat, the European continent entered into a transformation period and the EU offered itself as a supporter. The former socialist republics in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe aimed to transition to democracy. This was an opportunity for the EU and it introduced several programmes and policies to help and promote democracy. Thus, it can be said that the democracy promotion activities of the EU rose rapidly. The rise of democracy promotion activities of the EU automatically increased the number of studies (Youngs 2004; Kubicek 2003; Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005a; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Morlino & Sadurski 2010; Huber

2015) in book-length, in articles and in working papers (Özkurt 2017; Simmons 2011; Börzel & Risse 2004; Youngs 2001, 2008, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011; Seeberg 2009; Grimm 2019; Kurki 2011; Pace 2009, 2010; Kotzian et al. 2011; Lloyd 2010; Wetzel & Jan 2012; Theuns 2017). In these studies, the EU's democracy promotion was analysed thoroughly from the rise of interest for promotion to the models the Union uses.

Grimm (2019), for instance, discussed the relationship the EU builds as a donor with the recipient country and stressed the asymmetrical power of the EU. The promoter or donor has the full power, while the recipient has no leverage. She argued that a dynamic relationship is better for democracy promotion. Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) explored three models of democracy promotion- linkage, leverage and governance- that employed by the EU and they considered the tangible outcomes of the promotion activities. Kotzian et al. (2011) also studied the choice of instruments for democracy promotion by the EU and tried to determine the factors for the choice of a particular instrument. Youngs (2009), who is known for his works in this field, examined the EU's strategy in supporting democratic norms in third countries. He asserted that the EU preferred to use its networks rather than the use of hierarchical power. As democracy promotion activities of the EU increase, the analysis of the promotion efforts of the EU increase in the same way.

In the 1990s, when Yugoslav wars hit the European continent, the EU's failure to deal with the crisis damaged its position in the international arena severely. Its normative identity and actorness started to be questioned. Therefore, to rectify this, the EU targeted the Balkan countries and assumed a role of a leader for the transformation of the countries. Taking into account previous accomplishments, the EU offered a membership perspective towards the Balkans. The aspirant Balkan states must be EU-like to be a part of the Union. This means a massive transformation process for the Balkan states. Additionally, the EU began democracy promotion efforts to ensure political transformation and the consolidation of democracy in the regional countries. By the same token, these efforts of the EU in the Balkans were investigated (Dandashly & Noutcheva 2021;

Dimitrova & Pridham 2004; Pridham 2002, 2005; Pridham & Gallagher 2000; Pridham & Vanhanen 1994; Fagan 2011; Groβ & Grimm 2014; Grimm & Mathis 2018; Haukenes & Freyberg-Inan 2013; Vachudova 2006).

Dandashly & Noutcheva (2021) studied the normative rivalry between the EU and other regional actors in the European neighbourhood. The societies in the European neighbourhood and their acceptance, modification or rejection of norms were explored to point out norm contestation. Today, although there is a widely acknowledged consensus over democracy as a norm, still the domestic settings have an influence on norm diffusion. Dimitrova & Pridham (2007) drew attention to the democratization processes in Central and Eastern European states (CEE). With the inclusion of these former communist states into the accession process towards the EU, a unique promotion model for democracy was emerged, which is the democracy promotion through integration. Dimitrova and Pridham (2007) examined the tools and approaches employed by the EU to strengthen democratic institutions in CEE. Groβ & Grimm (2014), in their work, investigated the interaction between external and domestic actors in democracy promotion. Admitting that democracy promotion persists to be an asymmetric relationship between the donor and receiver, still, domestic actors have various instruments to deal with the demands for reforms. To illustrate, they put forward the EU's democracy promotion in Croatia and the role of domestic actors in meeting the demands for reforms. Haukenes & Freyberg-Inan (2013), in a similar manner, evaluated the democracy promotion activities of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe but criticized the Commission's one-size-fits-all democratic model in the region. They emphasized that democracy is a primary export norm of the Union but the promotion of a specific model of democracy consistently is not a good idea for the future member states. As can be seen, when the promotion of democracy in a particular region, in this case, the Balkans, is talked about, domestic context begins to come to the surface. Each society has distinctive features and when it comes to norm diffusion, they come into play. The EU as a promoter must consider the domestic context to determine its strategy, and the targeted society must consider its own condition to accept and adopt the promoted norm.

After many experiences, another country in which the EU started its democracy promotion activities was Serbia. The EU's democracy promotion activities started when the Milosevic regime in the country was overthrown in 2000. The new government and the Serbian citizens wanted a clean slate and they chose the path towards the Union. Serbia, like other Western Balkan countries, was offered a membership perspective and soon it involved in approaches the EU introduced such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Similarly, Serbia has been subjected to double processes namely Europeanization and democratization. In addition to the membership process, Serbia was & is exposed to democracy promotion activities of the EU. The increased pressure was thought to facilitate the transition to democracy. The EU's efforts of democracy promotion in Serbia were tackled by many scholars (Wichmann 2007; Milenkovic & Milenkovic 2013; Djordjevic 2008; Dudley 2020; Minic 2007; Bobic 2016; Kovacevic 2018; Stojarova 2020; Halaboku 2018).

Wichmann (2007) assessed the strategy of the EU in the democratization process of Serbia and discussed the effect of the Europeanization process over the democratization process with reference to societal participation and promotion of civil society. Dudley (2020) explored the success of the promotion of democracy through conditionality in Central and Eastern European countries. By tracing political developments and progress in the EU membership process of Serbia, she pointed out that the EU weakens its own ability by approving partial compliance by candidate states. Minic (2007) preferred to approach the Serbian path towards the Euro-Atlantic integration positively by saying that the Serbian case was one of the most difficult cases of the last two decades but it is a major stabilizing factor in the region. She concludes by highlighting the importance of intensified dialogue between parties. Djordjevic (2008) interrogated the limits of the EU in positive transformation at the domestic level of Serbia. The EU's strategy on Serbia in relation to the processes of Europeanization and democratization was simply tested in this work.

Serbia's democratization activities contain the domestic political developments and the acceptance of democracy by society and elites. In accordance with the

statement above, the evaluation of domestic conditions is also important for the acceptance and consolidation of democracy. Thus, numerous studies concentrated on the history of Serbia to point out the obstacles for the state to get rid of to achieve the transition to democracy. Generally, the literature starts from the Yugoslav period and stress the period of Milosevic for the current status of democracy (Miller 1997; Edmunds 2007, 2009; Bieber 2003; Kostovicova 2006; Spoerri 2015; Presnall 2009; Ramet & Hassenstab 2019; Subotic 2017; Di Lellio 2009). Some studies directly concentrate on the issues that need to be solved to achieve political transformation, including party politics, state-building problems, economic and social problems etc. (Hebda 2020; Milacic 2017; Castaldo 2020a, 2020b; Zakosek 2008; Ramet & Pavlakovic 2006; Listhaug et al. 2011).

Hebda (2020) highlighted the complex issues of Serbia regarding political transformation which occurred as a result of political, economic and social modifications. However, Hebda (2020) especially urged on the power of the Serbian Progressive Party and its negative effects on the quality of democracy. Castaldo (2020), by using a combination of qualitative and quantitative research, claimed that Serbia is a competitive authoritarian state and Vucic had a particular role in the impediment of transition to democracy. Zakosek (2008) explored the link between state-building and democratization of Serbia and argued that the nationalistic mobilization for state-building prevented democratization in Serbia. Edmunds (2009) studied the resistance to democratization in Serbia and found out that illiberal actors and networks have continued their existence within the new system, adapted to new conditions and undermined the consolidation of liberal democracy in Serbia.

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive view of the Serbian case to the relevant literature. Instead of looking from a single point of view like focusing on economy, culture or ideology to explain the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia, by embracing a more comprehensive view, the thesis has tried to reveal the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion from the perspectives of both Serbia and the EU.

On the grounds of the given context, this thesis is an attempt to find out the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Employing a deductive reasoning and a constructivist understanding, the desire is firstly to figure out the main determinants in the case and then to pursue the connections which led to the failure. By tracing the processes Serbia went through, the reasons behind the failure will be exposed.

In the introduction, research question, the goal of the thesis, and literature review were given.

In the first chapter, theoretical background of the thesis, including constructivist theory of International Relations and process-tracing as a method, will be laid down.

In the second chapter, the conceptual framework of the thesis will be explained. The contested nature of democracy, the consensus over liberal democracy, democracy promotion activities, motives and models for those activities and many other relevant issues will be clarified. Moreover, democracy promoters, specifically the EU will be put under the scrutiny as a major promoter of democracy. Simply, the basis for this study would be given in this chapter.

In the third chapter, the democratic history of Serbia will be analysed to understand the current status of democracy in the country. By following the proto-democratic practices of the Serbs throughout history, key steps towards the acceptance of liberal democracy will be unravelled, therefore it will illustrate how far the Serbs have come. The discovery of routinised authoritarian practices by the consecutive Serbian governance could show their own impediment to the failure of democratization in the country.

In the fourth chapter, the European Union's involvement in Serbia and its impact on the level of democracy will be investigated. With the EU's entrance into the Balkans after the bloody wars of Yugoslav dissolution, the EU launched the promotion of liberal democracy apart from enlargement strategy to achieve transformation of the Western Balkan countries. In this chapter, the EU's

democracy promotion activities in Serbia and the progress of Serbian democracy will be displayed.

In the fifth chapter, the objective is to identify the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Keeping the results of previous chapters in mind, through tracing the processes that Serbia experienced, two determinants in the failure of democracy promotion were identified. Based on these determinants, which are the EU and Serbia, Serbia-related internal and the EU-related external reasons were explored. This chapter will analyse the reasons for pursuing the connections which led to the failure of democracy promotion.

In the last chapter, this thesis concludes that the democracy promotion efforts in Serbia failed due to the Serbia-related internal and EU-related external reasons. In spite of the willingness of Serbian society and the activities of the EU to promote democracy in the country, the efforts are failed. On the basis of this, the conclusion gives the summary of the findings and held both the EU and Serbia responsible for the current status of democracy in the country.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

"Constructivist turn in IR" occurred when IR scholars failed to predict or explain the end of the Cold War (Checkel, 1998). The traditional theories of IR such as realism or liberalism neglected the impact and explanatory power of ideas, norms and values. Constructivism is an approach to IR that "challenged the rationalism and positivism of neo-realism and neo-liberalism while simultaneously pushing critical theorists away from metatheoretical critique to the empirical analysis of world politics" (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.217). Constructivists have shared the material assumptions of traditional IR theories while emphasizing the social dimensions of international relations and the probability of change (Fierke, 2016, p.162). In other words, constructivism rose as an alternative to the dominant theories in IR by challenging their positions and concentrating on the role of ideas, identities, and norms proposing a new approach to explain world politics (Ba & Hoffmann, 2003, p.15).

The term 'constructivism' was coined by Nicholas Onuf in the field of IR in his *World of Our Making* and IR constructivist family tree started to take roots (Peltonen, 2017, p.3). At first, he made it clear that constructivism is not a theory because it does not offer a general explanation for what people do or how the world changes (Onuf, 1998, p.58). Then, Onuf reconstructed IR through the exploration of rules and proposed that the starting point is the deed. He argued that with deeds people and societies construct each other (Onuf, 1989, p.36). The basis of constructivism is that human beings are social beings and social relations construct people into the sort of being that they are. For Onuf, people make society, and society makes people so it is a two-way process. Between people and society, rules as a third element were introduced to link the other two elements. Thus, social rules keep the process going. A rule is considered as a statement that informs people what we should do or who the active participants in society (Onuf, 1998, p.59). For constructivists, participants are called agents

and rules give agents choices. By making choices, agents collectively change the institutional features of the context they operate (Onuf, 1998, pp.60-61).

Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), in his *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, demonstrated how rules and norms constitute practices that at the same time enable meaning by operating as guidance devices (pp.7-14). For Kratochwil, things have no meaning in themselves, rather the meaning of things is constructed within their context. Because of that, one should pay attention to communication or language in meaning construction. With his work, Kratochwil stressed the importance of reasoning. For him, rules and norms could provide the basis for answers or solutions but they must be accompanied by a way of reasoning (Peltonen, 2017, p.4). Both Onuf and Kratochwil challenged the assumptions of IR theories without promising a grand theory for the field. For them, the world is not simply out there. The social world is continuously constructed through our deeds, rules, perceptions and norms. Likewise, the material world is not given. People act in the world through language and deeds and give meaning to things (Peltonen, 2017, p.5).

Later, with the article of *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* (1992) and the book of *Social Theory of International Relations* (1999), Alexander Wendt consolidated constructivism by building bridges and proposed a constructivist theory of IR. Wendt proposed a via media constructivism that is located between positivism and post-positivism (Arkan, 2014, p.24). He supported that positivist epistemology is compatible with constructivism (Fierke, 2016, p.168). The idea was that the acceptance of the significance of human social life on international politics does not require the rejection of science (Arkan, 2014, p.24). Moreover, he specifically focused on ontology to explain how the international system works and how it is structured (Wendt, 2010, p.370). In his famous article, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* (1992), he elaborated on this issue and investigated the relationship between the agent and structure. According to Wendt (1999), anarchy "is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic" (p.249). It attains logic as a function of the structure only when agents are put inside them (Wendt, 1999, p.249). Additionally, Wendt (1992) chose to explain the issue with an example of

two space aliens named Alter and Ego who met for the first time. Through a number of gestures, the two aliens tried to determine who is a friend or an enemy. Alter and Ego developed a social relationship and it is discovered that their choices in the relationship depend on the response of the other (Wendt, 1992, pp.404-405). At this point, Wendt put forward the mutual constitution of agent and structure. Simply, an agent influences its environment, as well as influenced by it (Jung, 2019, p.2).

In a few words, constructivism emerged as an alternative approach to the study of IR in the post-Cold War era, particularly with works of the fathers of IR constructivism such as Onuf, Kratochwil, and Wendt and stressed the importance of the social world along with the material world. Specifically, after the studies of Wendt, many points of disagreement occurred in the constructivist camp. For that reason, the variants of constructivism, conventional and critical variants, appeared in accordance with the adherence to rationalist and reflectivist principles (Hopf, 1998, p.181). However, in this thesis, instead of explaining this issue further, the general assumptions of constructivism in IR will be given.

In general terms, Ruggie (1998) described that "Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life" (p.856). It is identified by "an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures" (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.217). Constructivist IR theory concentrates on the role of ideas, knowledge, norms, values, and arguments in world politics, underlining the role of intersubjective understandings on social life (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p.392). The constructivist theory has three fundamental tenets: an epistemological claim that supports social construction of knowledge; an ontological claim that advocates social construction of reality; lastly, a reflective claim that stresses the mutual constitution of reality and knowledge (Jung, 2019, p.2). Constructivism asserts the following: (a) human interaction is shaped first and foremost by ideational factors, not material ones; (b) intersubjective beliefs as shared collective knowledge are the most important ideational factors; (c) these intersubjective

beliefs construct the interests and identities of actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, pp.392-393).

On the basis of ontological propositions of constructivists, ideational structures that are as significant as material structures can shape the behaviour of actors. Shared or intersubjective ideas, beliefs and values have structural characteristics, and they can exercise a powerful influence on behaviour. Constructivists examining how ideational structures condition the identities of actors is vital since identities inform interests and actions (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 224). Wendt (1992) highlighted that "Identities are the basis of interests" (p.398). Therefore, in order to understand the interest formation, the focus should be on the identities of the actors. Also, explaining how actors constructed their interests help to comprehend various international phenomena (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.225). It has been asserted that normative and ideational structures are shaping the identities and interests of the actors through communication, imagination and constraint, which affect the consideration of the actors in both practical and ethical terms (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp.225-226).

Constructivists treat actors as social and advocate that the identities of social actors are constituted by ideas, norms and values of the social environment in which they act (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.226). The subjects of international politics have different identities that are shaped by social, political, cultural and material conditions (Fierke, 2016, p.165). Reus-Smit (2013) addressed that the states' social identities are constituted by normative and ideational structures, and those structures of international society are thought the product of state practices (p.227). The subjects are evolving as they interact with each other and their environment (Fierke, 2016, p.165). Through reciprocal interaction, people create enduring social structures in respect of which they define their identities and interests (Wendt, 1992, p.406). Thus, agents and structures are mutually constituted because ideational and normative structures may condition the actors' interests and identities, but those would not exist if the actors did not believe them (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.225).

Figure 1: The reciprocal interaction of the actors and context (Source: Ba & Hoffmann, 2003, p.22)

After laying down the general assumptions of constructivism, the next thing to do is to explain the importance of norm and the activities of norm diffusion in connection with democracy promotion. Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) defined norm as a "collective expectation for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity" (p.3). As a result of the actions and beliefs of the actors, social norms were produced as aspects of social structure and in turn norms shaped the behaviour and perception of the constituting actors (Hoffmann, 2010, pp.2-3). In some situations, norms have constitutive effects like defining the identity of an actor, while in others they have a regulative effect like prescribing a behaviour (Katzenstein, 1996, p.3).

It is argued that norms may shape actors and their actions, but these norms merely exist because of the routinized practices of agents. Practices are notified by and embed ideas, beliefs and values. When they are executed, they become concrete phenomena actors do (Reus-Smit, 2013, p.239). Another important thing to state here is that since practices embed norms, values and beliefs, the logic of human behaviour could be understood by examining the bases of their action. March and Olsen (1998) put forwards two logic of actions: logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness. In the logic of consequences, the actions of the actors are driven by expected consequences and prior preferences. By evaluating their objectives, preferences, and interests in circumstances, the

actors make a rational choice. Their choices are explained by determining consequential reasons for them (March and Olsen, 1998, pp.949-950). On the other hand, in the logic of appropriateness, the actions of the actors are driven by senses of identity and rule-based. The behaviour of the actor is associated with his identity. The actor is expected to act in compliance with the obligations of its identity or role to a particular situation (March and Olsen, 1998, p.951).

The studies of norms by constructivists generally focus on: (i) normative behaviour- how a norm affects the behaviour within a community; (ii) socialization- how a norm diffuses and is internalized by actors outside that community; (iii) normative emergence- how an idea reaches the status of shared or intersubjective in a community (Hoffmann, 2010, p.3). This thesis put the emphasis on socialization. Checkel (2005) defined socialization "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (p.804). The outcome of socialization is sustained compliance predicated on the internalization of these norms. Checkel argued that by adopting community rules, socialization implies that the targeted actor switch from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005, p.804). He also described three mechanism of socialization: strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. Strategic calculation derives from rationalist social theory and actors are seen as rational as they calculate and seek to maximize on given interests, changing their behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the international community (Checkel,2005, pp.808-809). Role-playing stems from organization theory and cognitive psychology and actors are viewed as boundedly rational. Organizational environments triggers roles and actors adopt particular roles because they are appropriate in that certain setting (Checkel, 2005, p.810). Normative suasion has roots in constructivism and actors offer their arguments and try to persuade each other that their interests and preferences are open for redefinition (Checkel, 2005, p.812). In short, through socialization process, actors are internalized. Norms are constitutive for the actor's identity and they become linked to the duties and obligations that define the actor's identity (Sending, 2002, p.456).

In the post-Cold War era, it has been already mentioned that democracy promotion has been conceptualized in the context of international diffusion of liberal norms, rule of law, human rights, and good governance (Chandler, 2013, p.215). As a result, the study of democratic norms and diffusion of them entered into the IR with the constructivist understanding that the identities and interests of the states were strongly influenced through intersubjective engagement at the international level. As the world became more globalized, states started to adopt the standards of behaviour, which were democratic liberal norms (Chandler, 2013, pp.215-216). Risse-Kappen (1995) emphasized that liberal democracies are identified by the rule of law, checks and balances, participatory rule of citizens, and political culture and political system that embed norms, rules and procedures. These characteristics are lacking in authoritarian regimes (Risse-Kappen, 1995, pp.499-500). Hence, the fundamental idea behind democracy promotion after the Cold War arose based on these characteristics. Following the assessment of Katzenstein, it is recognized that democratic liberal norms have both constitutive and regulative effects, in this regard, democracy promoters initiated their activities for norm diffusion to shape the perception and behaviours of the actors. Democratic norms that have been internalized by actors affect the identity and interactions of the actors in domestic and international spheres (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p.500). In other words, with the help of constructivism, it is understood that democracy promoters aimed at diffusing democratic norms and the understanding of liberal democracy to shape the targeted country and to regulate the international system in accordance with their desires.

On the basis of the information given above, in the post-Cold War era, there was an expectation for the EU to act appropriately. By virtue of its normative power, the EU was expected to behave in harmony with its identity and to help the transformation of the European countries in the continent. From the point of view of international actors, the EU had the power of influence that could bring change in Europe. Consequently, the EU's normative power reflected in its practices and it took an active role in Europe. Less number of authoritarian regimes and a greater number of democratic regimes in Europe will facilitate the realization of the goal of the EU in the continent, which is the constitution of EU-like states. The

concept of Europeanization, at that point, began to be emphasized. Anastasakis (2005, p.78) interpreted Europeanization as both a method and the substance of the European project. In the literature of Europeanization, the most used definition was presented by Claudio M. Radaelli. He defined Europeanization as "processes of construction, diffusion and the institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms…" (Radaelli, 2000, p.4). Helen Wallace (2000) simply preferred to call this process 'EU-ization' which implies the changes driven by the EU for membership, while Tanja Börzel (1999) emphasizes that Europeanization is like "the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policy". No matter how Europeanization is defined, the main point is that it aims at large-scale changes where it is applied. The EU wanted to create an EU-friendly environment after the Cold War era and Europeanization is the key for such transformation.

Socialization, in the context of the EU, basically serves as a mechanism of Europeanization (Checkel, 2005, p.804). As Olsen (2002) stated "Europeanization as export of European models is interpreted as a process of diffusion" (p.925). To diffuse the EU's standards, norms, values and principles and to make sure they are internalized by the targeted state, socialization was often used by the Union. Hence, one could state that the EU utilizes socialization in an effort to further policy and normative transfer.

In the post-Cold War era, the EU attempted to diffuse its norms using socialization as a mechanism of Europeanization to realize processes of changes in the European continent. By means of reciprocal interactions on many levels, the EU aimed at shaping former socialist republics in Europe to regulate the continent through the diffusion of liberal democratic norms. Therefore, compliant with its standards, the EU started to promote liberal democracy and democratic practices in every step it takes.

In the same manner, after the Balkan wars, the EU developed many approaches to the regional countries to achieve full transformation of the countries and to integrate them into the Union. Serbia, after overthrowing the Milosevic

government, chose to follow the path towards the EU and aimed at becoming a part of the Union. By all means, to accomplish that Serbia needs to fulfil certain conditions. First and foremost, for the EU, the acceptance and consolidation of liberal democracy in Serbia should be achieved. Simultaneously with Europeanization, the EU began its democracy promotion activities in Serbia. Derived from its normative power, the EU was aware of the fact that to diffuse democratic norms to Serbia, the barriers in the country should be overcome. Considering the domestic context in Serbia, in order to overcome barriers, the EU has been trying to shape Serbia in terms of identity, interests, culture, and practices. Through internalization of the EU's norms, rules and principles and with the constitutive and regulative effects of them, the EU intended to achieve full transformation of Serbia.

Since 2000, Serbia and the EU have developed a relationship that integrated with many areas. Due to this integrated relationship, they can easily influence each other. Through employing a constructivist understanding, the effect of this relationship on democracy in Serbia will be questioned. In this thesis, the application of constructivism will reveal how well the EU's efforts have worked on Serbia and how well the country has internalized the norms. Furthermore, by analysing the road to the current level of democracy in Serbia, the behaviours of elites, and shared ideas and beliefs of Serbs, Serbia's own role in the current situation will be highlighted.

1.2. PROCESS-TRACING AS A METHOD

In an inquiry, the goal is to find an answer to the research question. The researcher creates a design and selects a method to implement the plan. The selection of the research method is a crucial step because it brings a specific way of data collection, analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2014, p.31). Creswell (2014) identified three research approaches: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. The very basic distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is formulated in respect of using words (qualitative) than numbers (quantitative). On the other hand, the mixed method is an approach to combine both qualitative and quantitative data (Creswell, 2014, p.32). In this thesis, a qualitative research

method is chosen to find an answer to the previously mentioned research question, which is to analyse the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. In this case, the chosen method should satisfy the requirements of the determination of causal mechanisms and constitutive relations between the parties (Lupovici, 2009, p.197). The social practices of the involved actors need to be seen from the necessary angles to analyse better. Lupovici (2009) emphasized that "Relying solely on either positivist or discursive methods does not provide the constructivist scholar with a suitable framework" (p.197). Thus, a method that bridge the material and ideational worlds should be applied to the case. On this account, process tracing as a qualitative method of analysis will be used to determine the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia.

Process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis in social science generally defined by its objective to trace causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.1). The method of process tracing involves the attempt of determining the intervening or causal mechanisms between independent variables and the dependent variable (George & Bennet, 2005, pp.206-207). Beach (2016) described the core of process tracing is that "tracing causal mechanisms that link causes (X) with their effects (Y)" (p.463). The ambition to trace causal mechanisms relies on two understanding: (a) to make better evidence-based inferences about a causal relationship, (b) to give a stronger understanding of how a cause produces an outcome (Beach, 2016, p.463).

Figure 2: The place of causality between variables (Source: Author's own collection)

There are three types of process tracing: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining the outcome. The first one is theory-testing process-tracing which decides a theory from the existing literature and tests it to demonstrate that each hypothesized causal mechanism is present and functions in the case. The second one is theory-building process-tracing which pursue building a general

explanation from the evidence, which infer that a more general causal mechanism exists from the information of a specific case. The last one is explaining-outcome process-tracing which attempt to provide a sufficient explanation of an outcome in a particular historical case. Different from the others, the aim is not to test or build a more general theory but to deliver an adequate explanation of the outcome of the case that the desire is more case-centric than theory-oriented (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.3). Explaining outcome process-tracing tries to craft an adequate explanation for a specific outcome and to do that, explaining outcome process-tracing has two paths to build the best possible explanation of an outcome: deductive and inductive paths (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.19).

In this thesis, through following a deductive path, explaining-outcome process-tracing will be used to unravel the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. This type of process tracing seeks to find out the causes of a specific outcome in a single case. This research starts with the recognition of the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Then, the factors (X) that link the outcome (Y) attempted to be found. In the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia, the first determinant was Serbia in view of the fact that the targeted country's willingness and capabilities are the prior determinants in the case. The country's dedication and its willingness to accept democracy are of paramount importance in the case of democracy promotion. The other determinant that links with the outcome is the EU. As a democracy promoter in Serbia, it is the EU who is responsible for the failure of democracy promotion after Serbia. After the establishment of X and Y, it has come to the point to open the black box to reveal causal mechanisms between X and Y.

The point of departure was first to examine the democratic history of Serbia to figure out how the current state of democracy has been reached. The proto-democratic practices of the Serbs were investigated to assess the constitutive steps towards the current state of democracy. The idea was to study the routinised practices of Serbs throughout history to understand the role of Serbs in the current situation. Secondly, the EU's democracy promotion efforts in Serbia were analysed to estimate the EU's influence on the current state of democracy

in Serbia. By linking Europeanization with democratization and through employing conditionality, monitoring and financial assistance, the EU aimed at transforming Serbia by means of diffusing its norms, values and practices. The goal was simply to understand the influence of the EU on the progress of Serbian democracy. In the last part, by virtue of reviewing these processes that Serbia went through, the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia were sought to determine. Pursuing the logic of deduction, it was discovered that behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia, there were Serbia-related internal and EU-related external reasons.

Figure 3: The causal mechanisms between X and Y (Source: Author's own collection)

In sum, this thesis is an attempt to find out the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. The study employed explaining-outcome process-tracing method to provide a sufficient explanation for the outcome for the Serbian case. In addition, with the contribution of constructivist theory, a considerable explanation for the practices and interactions of the actors put forward to comprehend the behaviours of the actors over time and to understand how the outcome has been reached. Furthermore, during the research, both primary (EU reports) and secondary (literature on democracy promotion, EU enlargement strategy and Serbian history) sources were used. Furthermore, country-specific V-Dem data is used to stress the state of democracy in Serbia. Nonetheless, this study has the limitation of the language barrier. Since the Serbian language is not known, the sources written in Serbian could not be examined.

CHAPTER 2 – DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

It could be said with certainty that democracy is one of the most controversial topics of all times. It is a popular term used by almost everyone, yet there is no common definition agreed upon. From ancient times to the present day, the meaning put into that word has brought forth many intellectual discussions and, on this basis, led to several incidents. As a result, various understandings of democracy rose to the surface. Since 20th century, there has been a common insight about the contested nature of the concept of democracy (Gallie,1956). This insight accepts the possibility of many different models of democracy, none of which can be proved correct or incorrect (Kurki, 2010, p.369). Recognizing that, today there seems to be a consensus for a particular model of democracy. With the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy understanding started to be embraced immensely. The world has witnessed a large number of transitions to democracy. Democracy promoters, who had acknowledged liberal democracy, wanted to amplify momentum and started to develop approaches to promote democracy in other states or societies. Shortly thereafter, it was begun to be discussed that democracy has emerged as "the world's new universal religion" (Corcoran, 1983) or as a "universal value" (Sen, 1999). It really is fascinating to see that regardless of history, experience, economic development or cultural elements, states, societies and people has come to an agreement about democracy and accepted it as the most legitimate form of government.

This chapter will concentrate on reviewing the journey of democracy and its promotion efforts which will give the basis for this thesis. There are four sub-sections. The attention firstly will be given to the history of the concept of democracy. The origins of the concept, alterations of the perceptions about democracy and the connotations attributed to the term will be examined. Then, contemporary definitions of democracy, the major highlights of the debate about the meaning of democracy, and the preferred definition of it which will be used in this thesis will be addressed. In the third section, democracy promotion activities, the promoters, their motives, and models will be studied in details. In the final section, the European Union as an actor who rigorously committed to the promotion of democracy will be demonstrated. The EU's understanding of

democracy, the framing of its own description of democracy within the Union, the main motivation behind its democracy promotion activities, and the distinctive models it uses will be unravelled.

2.1. HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY

The origin of democracy comes from the Greek words *demos kratos* which signifies people rule. While the root meaning of the word pretty much remained the same, *demos* went through changes. Ancient Athens, for instance, did not include women, slaves or immigrants to "the people" (Jent, 1967, p.242). Thus, *demos* from Ancient Athens differs from "the people" today. Likewise, the quality of *kratos* and the forms of implementation changed concerning historical and socio-economic formations (Uslu, 2014, p.137). The classical model of democracy which based on the form of direct democracy developed in the most powerful *polis* or city-state Athens during the fourth and fifth centuries BC (Heywood, 2013, p. 93). A large number of citizens was active in politics and major decisions were made by an assembly called *Ecclesia*. Moreover, there was a Council which consisted of 500 citizens, acted as the executive body of the Athenian democracy (Heywood, 2013, p. 95). When, the lowest class of Athens, Thetes demanded equal rights in their city, democratic ideas started to sail throughout the Aegean (Huber, 2015, pp.7-8). Nevertheless, it should be reflected on the fact that nearly half of Athens' population comprised of slaves, who had no citizenship rights (Tilly, 2007, p.26). That said, although Ancient Athens had some democratic qualities, the understanding was far away from the contemporary one. Later on, the journey of democracy continued in the Roman Republic, in which could be seen the appearance of a constitution. Rome combined democracy with aristocracy and gradually descended into the oligarchy (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011, p.5). At Rome, the constitution and the institutions of the state were democratic, but in their spirit and working, they linked to the principle of the aristocracy (Hattersley, 1930, p.54). Truth be told, the Romans cared little for the form of government, but their legacies, especially Roman law, have been influential in shaping the democratic movement of ancient and modern

times (Hattersley, 1930, p.75). When the Republic fell, democratic practices halted for nearly a thousand years (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011, p.5-6).

In Hattersley (1930)'s view, modern democracy rests on the recognition of the rights of the individual and the recognition can be traced to the medieval era. In the early medieval period, there were no territorial units, so when the needs of society wanted to be realized, unity and association appeared as a natural development (Hattersley, 1930, p.77). Parliaments and other forms of organizations emerged and people gained channels to verbalize their needs and demands. In a similar manner, the Magna Carta, which was a document that legalised the share of authority between the king and Great Council in England, was signed in 1215 (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011, p.6). With that, the development of democracy picked up again. The issues of representation, constitutional checks on the power of the monarchy, opposition to the crown and so on were expressed not through parliaments but through resistance and rebellion (Hattersley, 1930, pp.92-93). In the 16th century, the monarchy was considered a divine institution, and constitutional assemblies and other checks on power were dependent on the king's pleasure (Hattersley, 1930, p.106). However, it was also in this period that the authority of the king and the Church started to be questioned. The Renaissance and the Reformation, which were the periods of learning and revelation, led to the rise of ideas from which the modern democratic movement has descended. For a long time, democracy had a negative connotation (Huber, 2015, p. 9) but this began to change during the time that philosophers and intellectuals dove into inquiring about the ideal form of government.

The concept of democracy started to re-appear in the 17th century with the writings by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau who were the intellectuals of the Age of Enlightenment. "Who should hold the power & how to rule" were among the questions that these intellectuals eager to find answers to. Hobbes believed that the people among themselves create a supreme power, but once it was made, the people should have no further control over the government (Jent, 1967, p. 243). After that, the sovereign makes sure to maintain

the peace and security of society. Therefore, according to Hobbes' views, democracy could only function at first. Locke, and then Rousseau, disagreed with Hobbes and wrote about majority determination. He advocated that people were born free and equal, had a right to private property and consent to government. Hence, Locke underpinned that society should be based on these principles (Jahn, 2012, p. 695). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the 18th century, highlighted that popular sovereignty would always endure (Jent, 1967, p. 244). For Rousseau, as time passed, modern civilisation lost original freedom, happiness, equality and liberty. Through social contact, the state would assure those rights and the general will of the people (Laskar, 2013, p.5). The ideas that came out of these writings shaped the perceptions of many people and paved the way for the revolutions that occurred in America and France. Even though the American Revolution did not directly pioneer the French Revolution, it did encourage the idea of the possibility of change (Huber, 2015, p. 9). In the 18th century, there was a growing antagonism towards the political and social system of the ancient regime, hereby people chose to put a fight for democratic principles such as equality and liberty (Hattersley, 1930, p. 141). French Revolution became the symbol of that fight. Democracy has evolved through many phases, and after ups and downs, it deeply ingrained in many parts of the world (Jent, 1967, p. 244).

Afterwards, connotations constructed upon democracy has persisted to diversify. Nevertheless, there could be come across to a similar interpretation as in today. As a starting point, Abraham Lincoln, who was the president of the United States of America, in his Gettysburg Address considered democracy as "government of the people, by the people and for the people" (Heywood, 2013, pp. 89–90). In the 19th century, an influential philosopher, John Stuart Mill took on radical behaviour concerning the form of government and criticized liberals who settled for the establishment of constitutional monarchy. In his *Considerations on Representative Government*, he strongly defended voting rights for adults including women while putting education as a precondition for it (Uslu, 2014, p.146). Yet, it would not be wrong to say that the political thoughts of Immanuel Kant exceedingly influenced the contemporary democracy promoters and their sense of democracy. At first glance, Kant's view on democracy would come as a

surprise. He equated democracy with despotism because it establishes an executive power to make all decisions which contradict the general will. He advocated that executive power is not the whole people therefore people do not make all decisions (Simpson, 2019, p.116). However, if one digs enough, it is easily seen that Kant uses democracy in a pre-modern sense. His description indicates despotic sovereignty that is incompatible with representative government and the separation of powers (Hanisch, 2016, p.64). Kant's argument evokes the modern liberal democracy which requires representative institutions, the protection of people's rights, and the separation of legislative and executive powers (Gaubatz, 1996, p. 137). Further, in his *Perpetual Peace*, he grasped the international state of nature and underlined the need to overcome the natural condition by creating a league of liberal nations. Kant emphasized liberal republicanism or constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan sense of responsibility (Pangle, 2009, pp. 28–30). Influenced by Kant, several years later, Michael Doyle presented democratic peace theory which implies that democratic states do not fight with each other (Simpson, 2019, p.109).

As it is seen, the ideal form of government has always been questioned. Eventually, intellectuals argued that democracy may be the remedy to their problems. This realization, however, came in the 20th century. Huntington, who is a renowned researcher in the transition field, studied the rise of democracy. He portrayed democratic transitions as waves which refers to a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes within a specific period (Huntington, 1991a, p.15). He identified three waves of democratization. The first one started in the 1820s with the extending of suffrage and lasted until 1926 (Huntington, 1991b, p.12). World War I, which occurred mainly because of the political and national unrest, resulted in the end of monarchical government and the establishment of democratic institutions in Europe. Victorious allied powers lent a great impulse to democracy (Hattersley, 1930, p.208). Nevertheless, the rise of fascism marked the beginning of the first reverse wave that reduced the number of democratic states in the world (Huntington, 1991b, p.12). The impetus was interrupted with the rise of the totalitarian dictatorship in Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan and in the other parts of the world. The defeat of fascism in World War II

triggered a second wave of democratization but followed by a second reverse wave between 1960-1975 (Huntington, 1991b, p.12). The third wave of democratization is activated in the mid-1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain. In the late 1970s, the democratic wave picked up steam in Latin America and some of the East Asian countries. It gained even greater strength when the wave engulfed the communist world (Huntington, 1991a, pp. 21–24). With the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, democracy experienced a resurrection. It has continued to flourish not just in the former states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but also in the Middle Eastern and Asian states (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011, p. 8). Yet, unfortunately, many of the states could not sustain their transition to democracy and went through a process of regression from democracy (Levitsky & Way 2010; Ottaway 2003; Zakaria 2007; Carothers 2002; Bermeo 2016; Walder & Lust 2018). In short, since the 20th century democracy has recognized as an appealing system, even though certain states failed to complete their transitions or to sustain them.

Next generations of democracy promoters are affected and shaped by all these ideas and incidents mentioned above. Today's understanding of democracy and practice of democracy promotion are far from ancient times. The term "democracy" was exposed to heavy criticisms and formations. Philosophers, scholars, theorists so on has proceeded their work on the concept. Although the meaning attributed to *demos* & *kratos* still varies in theories and practices, the system of liberal democracy is mostly accepted by the international community now. In addition to the journey the concept has experienced throughout history, to analyse better, contemporary perceptions of the definition of democracy should be examined briefly.

2.2. DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES

In this day and age, all modern democratic theories start the job firstly declaring that there are two forms of democracy, direct and indirect. Athenian democracy was the example of direct democracy, where the whole citizens came together and govern themselves. However, with the rise of the nation-state, this was no longer possible. In order to meet the need there emerged what is called indirect

democracy, in which the people indirectly govern themselves through representatives (Mulgan, 1968, p. 3). After agreeing upon this, they return to the central question once again, the actual meaning of democracy. Gallie (1956) discussed that the concept of democracy is extremely contested (p.184). The reason for this is the attempt of those who seek more than just the definition. They tend to present an argument behind the definition (Lundström, 2004, p. 1). That's why there are numerous definitions of democracy.

Thus far, it is stated that the concept of democracy dates back to ancient times. Yet, its modern usage comes from the revolutionary upheavals in Western society at the end of the 18th century. In the 20th century, debates over the meaning of democracy gave birth to three general approaches like democracy as a source of authority for government, purposes served by government and procedures for consisting government (Huntington, 1991a, pp. 5–6). In this section, I present the two most-discussed perceptions of democracy. The first one is Joseph Schumpeter's minimalist model in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* and the second one is Robert Dahl's pluralist model in *A Preface to Democratic Theory*.

Schumpeter (2003) started his formulation by problematising the 18th century classical understanding of democracy. He criticised the elements of the common good and the will of the people in the definition of democracy. He simply argued that there is no such thing as determining common good and will. These elements might mean different things to different people (Schumpeter, 2003, pp. 250–251). Then, he developed a revisionist or realist democratic theory. He searched for the real quality of democratic governance and found out that in democratic societies, the governance was not in the hands of the people or the majority. Chosen or appointed people were actually in the governance and politics were shaped with respect to their interests (Uslu, 2014, p.147). Therefore, he said that democracy is a method for societies to elect their representatives, and participation rises as an essential part of democracy (Abrão Baloi, 2019, p.79). In short, his minimalist model sees democracy as a method for arriving at decisions by elites who compete for the people's vote that decides who is going to form the

government and hold the power. He qualifies democracy with elections in which citizens have the right to elect and be elected.

In contrast to Schumpeter, Robert Dahl took a more comprehensive attitude in the formulation of democracy. According to his perspective, democracy is a polyarchy that one should both maximize the degree of integration and the level of institutionalisation. His intent was to move democracy away from the understanding of an elitist model by giving participants a leading role in the decision-making process. Therefore, to achieve this, society must be founded on democratic institutions (Abrão Baloi, 2019, p.79). Dahl calls for a polyarchal democracy that constitutes six institutions: elected officials; free and fair elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship (Tilly, 2007, p. 10). These institutions are essential for the development of polyarchal democracy which requires the responsiveness of the rulers to the citizens (Abrão Baloi, 2019, pp.79-80). If one becomes successful in establishing that system, then democracy would provide opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and inclusion of adults (Dahl, 1998, p. 38). In short, with polyarchy, Dahl proposed an inclusive political system with wide opportunities. He transcended Schumpeter's electoral democracy and highlighted the importance of democratic institutions.

The purpose of explaining these two distinctive models is that in the modern age, the different remarks of democracy usually come from these understandings. Some insist on a minimalist standard like Schumpeter, while others -especially contemporary applications- measure democracy by Dahl's polyarchy (Diamond, 2002, p.21). At first, the concept of democracy is approached from one dimension and then it began to be addressed from multi-dimensions. Simply, it is no longer just about elections or institutional criteria. The need for a broader understanding of democracy is agreed predominantly. Today's democracy promotion inclines to be a liberal model of democracy. Liberal democratic thought is developed with the contributions raging from John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Joseph

Schumpeter to Robert Dahl (Huber, 2015, p. 24). In this thesis, I preferred to use a comprehensive conception of democracy by Larry Diamond. Democracy is basically the capacity to change the government through free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1947, p.269). Liberalism, on the other hand, is a complementary factor to democracy. According to Fareed Zakaria (1997), liberalism is the tradition to guard individuals against whatever the source of coercion (pp.25-26). Hereby, liberalism brings checks and balances and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Diamond adopted the term liberal democracy that refers to:

> extensive protections for individual and group freedoms, inclusive pluralism in civil society as well as party politics, civilian control over the military, institutions to hold officeholders accountable, and thus a strong rule of law secured through an independent, impartial judiciary. (Diamond & Plattner, 2015, p.xvi)

Still, it bears repeating that the understanding of democracy varies from person to person (Downs 1957; Huntington 1991; Schmitter & Karl 1991; Przeworski 1991; Karatnycky 1999; Diamond 1999; Tilly 2007; Sodaro 2008). The benefit of this occasion is that its vagueness keeps the door open for future studies. In the next section, in spite of having different perceptions of democracy, recent democracy promotion practices will be discussed.

2.3. EFFORTS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Just as democracy, the literature on democracy promotion reveals that there are many characterizations. Huber (2015), by mixing definitions of other scholars, describes democracy promotion as a type of foreign policy that is the "sum of official activities conducted by an independent actor that is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it" (p.22). Therefore, for her, democracy promotion is those activities that aim at encouraging "the transition to, consolidation of, or improvement of democracy" in receiver states (Huber, 2015, p. 23). Schmitter & Brouwer (1999) call it the activities adopted, upheld and applied by foreign actors designed to provide political liberalization in recipient countries (p.12). Based on these descriptions, democracy promotion can be characterized as a set of

activities of external actors who intentionally try to come through authoritarian power and to establish a democratic system (Beichelt, 2012, p. 3).

Huber (2015) states that democracy promotion is considered to enter into history alongside democracy itself (p.7). Although democracy promotion activities have been around for a while, it has new to be accepted as a universal value by the international community. McFaul (2004) expressed that democracy is an international norm right now and it is stronger than ever. People of every ethnic group, every religion and every region of the world regard democracy as an ideal system of government. Even though the violation of the norm occurs from time to time, it does not prove that it does not have near-universal appeal. For this very reason, the promotion of democracy is embraced by many and it has become an international norm (McFaul, 2004, p.148). A normative consensus over democracy emerged between Europeans and Americans. The triumph of democracy as an ideal system and the absence of alternative modes of government form the basis of this consensus. Not long ago, the European continent itself was divided between authoritarian and democratic regimes and Americans were willing to support the authoritarian regimes who had anti-Soviet tendencies. The end of the Cold War eliminated the toleration for authoritarian practices worldwide and allowed for the expansion of democratic governments (Magen & McFaul, 2009, pp. 5–6). In this section, notable democracy promoters, their motivations behind their efforts, and the models they use to promote democracy will be analysed.

2.3.1. Democracy Promoters

First thing first, it should be acknowledged that democracy as a norm could be promoted both internationally and domestically. In this section, the light will be shed on the external democracy promoters. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) divided democracy promotion activities into two groups: before the 1970s and after 1974 (pp.4-5). Based on this division, it would not be wrong to say that the USA was the top democracy promoter before the 1970s. It is seen as the first-generation contemporary democracy promoter (Huber, 2015, p. 11). The origin of the US commitment to democracy promotion is traced back to the Wilson

principles (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, p. 18). Woodrow Wilson was the person who thought to protect American democracy by creating a world that is safe for democracy. Hence, he laid down the objectives, meanings and tools for democracy promotion. He supported the League of Nations to create a peaceful international environment but the League turned out to be unsuccessful. After World War II, the US became more concerned with the stability of its allies. America found itself as the promoter of the liberal democratic world order (Huber, 2015, pp. 11–12). During the Cold War, the US adopted democracy as the major criterion for like-mindedness. John F. Kennedy declared that democracy promotion was one of the objectives of US foreign policy (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, p. 18). Jimmy Carter reinforced the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department, Ronald Reagan founded the National Endowment of Democracy (NED), and Bill Clinton created United States Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Democracy and Governance program. However, the democracy promotion efforts of the US started to backfire as a result of the Iraq War in 2003. After September 11, justification of the Iraq War with democracy rhetoric damaged its democracy agenda tremendously (Huber, 2015, p. 13).

After 1974, a new wave of democratization started and many countries launched their transition from autocracy towards liberal democracy (Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999, p. 5). The second generation of democracy promoters emerged at the same time (Huber, 2015, p. 14). After some time, the collapse of the ideological counterweight to liberal democracy at the end of the 1990s facilitated the activities of international actors such as states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (Magen & McFaul, 2009, p. 6). Particularly the USA, European countries and the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Beichelt, 2012, p. 3) and the World Bank emerged as the second generation of democracy promoters. Therefore, one may argue that after 1974 there appeared to be more diverse democracy promoters.

Specifically, since the end of the Cold War, many European countries began democracy and human rights initiatives through party foundations. These new foundations followed Germany's lead who had experience in the area. Germany's party foundations or *Stiftungen* were followed as an example and many government-funded nongovernmental organizations established (Lloyd, 2010, p. 548). European governments have already been contributors to development assistance, and in recent years they increased their focus and funding to democracy and human rights programmes. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), for example, started its activities to reduce poverty but then shifted to human rights and democracy projects. Germany's German Development Corporation (GTZ) and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) made human rights and democracy as their key pillar. Besides, German institutions such as Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert and Heinrich Boll are party foundations that play significant roles in democracy promotion. Moreover, Great Britain's the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), Spain's the Pablo Iglesias Foundation (FPI), Austria's Dr Karl Renner Institute are other European institutions that interested in democracy promotion activities (Lloyd, 2010, pp. 551–557). Furthermore, the European Union developed its genuine understanding of democracy promotion. After the end of the Cold War, the EU institutionalized its democracy promotion efforts through agreements and protocols. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and later the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 confirmed the commitment to democracy promotion efforts (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, pp.18-19). The EU founded the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and geographic programmes like MEDA and the Cotonou (Magen & McFaul, 2009, p. 18). Shortly afterwards, the EU and its members became the largest foreign aid donor in the world (Lloyd, 2010, p. 558).

Other important democracy promoters are international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN). Pevehouse (2005) argued that membership to those organizations can serve to ensure domestic elites that their interests will be protected in a democracy if they adopt policies they value like protection of property rights or

commitment to free trade. Membership to the IOs may help to legitimize transitional regimes and make them complete their transition to democracy. Also, by using positive and negative incentives, domestic groups could be forced to make reforms (Pevehouse, 2005, p.3). Even though conditionality-based democracy promotion has often been linked to the EU today, its origin came from the World Bank and its development policy (Beichelt, 2012, p. 7). Briefly stated, the IOs could foster democracy promotion activities just as good as other kinds of promoters.

2.3.2. Motives Behind Democracy Promotion

Democracy as a norm embedded in democracy promotion and it is promoted both vertically and horizontally. Whereas vertical promotion means the diffusion and consolidation of democracy internationally by external actors, horizontal promotion means the introduction of the norm at home by domestic elites (Silander, 2005, p. 91). The underlying motive or motives of initiating this activity are just as important as the activity. Önsoy and Baba (2018) addressed the monolithic understanding of democracy and the oversimple justification of democracy promotion as a post-conflict panacea. They argued that during the Cold War period, democracy promotion was used to deal with the ideological conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union and in the post-Cold War era, democracy became a necessary condition for sustainable peace and security in the world. Thereof, democracy promotion efforts increased rapidly in any post-conflict society (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, p.17).

Kotzian et al. (2011), diversely, presented two fundamental motivations behind democracy promotion. The first motivation is normative and it is based on an internal-external analogy. The external promoter would rather be surrounded by states that have the same political system organized by the same principles and same values the external promoter accepted (Kotzian et al., 2011, p.996). To illustrate, after the end of the Cold War, the EU attempted to attract newly independent former socialist republics in its backyard and aimed at diffusing the democratic ideals to them. The second motivation is rationalism and its logic came from the idea that being surrounded by democracies has certain

advantages. The first advantage based on the democratic peace thesis which advocates that democracies do not attack one another, thus increase safety. The second advantage is that democracies cooperate and directly boost welfare and the economy. Lastly, it is thought that democracies do not have a spillover effect that avoids problems such as terrorism (Kotzian et al., 2011, p. 996).

Sharing some similar grounds with Kotzian et al. (2011), Huber (2015) discussed democracy promotion in the context of security interest and identity dynamics. In the context of security interest, she advocated that democracy reduces threats and nurture a stable environment. In fact, democracies are security seekers. When other states are converted to democracy, then transparency and other values will facilitate the emergence of a reliable environment and there will be no threat to societal order. In the context of identity dynamics, she defended that a democratic role identity is essential for democracy promotion. Through promoting democracy, external promoter continuously points out what and who a democracy is. Therefore, it is certainly essential to have a democratic identity because, at the same time, the promoter projects its image (Huber, 2015, pp. 35-37). Here, the consistency between the rhetoric and the self-image emerges as a vital element in democracy promotion.

Grimm and Leininger (2012), in their work, identified two kinds of motivations in democracy promotion and claimed that these motivations sometimes were in a clash. They determined intrinsic and extrinsic objectives. Intrinsic objectives refer to different elements of democracy promotion such as inclusion, free and fair elections, ownership etc. For instance, the goal of institution-building may clash with the goal of empowerment. Likewise, the goal of supporting the election of a certain political figure might conflict with the goal of creating an inclusive government. Extrinsic objectives refer to the clash when the motivation of democracy promotion interrupts with other motivations such as peace-building, state-building, regime stability etc. (Grimm & Leininger, 2012, pp.397-398). The highlight here is that the promoter might have multiple motivations pursuing democracy promotion and in some cases, they result in conflict.

As stated many times, democracy and the motivations behind its promotion are very subjective topics. There are a lot of different understandings of democracy, and similarly the motivations to promote it varies among promoters. Each promoter takes on a specific definition of democracy and acknowledges particular motivation for its promotion. In the next section, a variety of methods used in democracy promotion by external promoters will be examined.

2.3.3. Methods of Democracy Promotion

There is a widespread discussion about the methods the external promoters use. One of the prominent to systematically analyses the methods of democracy promotion was Laurence Whitehead. In his *International Dimension of Democratization*, he developed three methods: contagion, control and consent (Whitehead, 2001, pp.5-16). Later, Paul Kubicek (2003) in his *The European Union and Democratization* used very similar categorization and employed four methods: control, contagion, convergence and conditionality. A resembling terminology is put forward by Magen, McFaul and Risse. They offered four logic of influences for external actors to promote democratic change in targeted states, namely control, material incentives, normative suasion and capacity-building. Control includes the temporary suspension of the state's sovereignty and the seizure of its institutions by the external actor which endeavours to transform the targeted state's domestic structures. This logic of influence was exercised in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of WWII and the colonies of imperial powers. In the post- WWII environment, different modes of control emerged including interim administrations of the EU, the UN and NATO (Magen & McFaul, 2009, pp.11-12).

Material incentives are used by international actors to manipulate threats and promise to change the cost-benefit calculations of the target state in an effort to motivate democratic reforms. Material incentives can be divided into categories of positive and negative incentives. Negative material incentives are non-violent but still punitive. Political, economic and diplomatic sanctions are negative material incentives that intend to weaken the domestic authoritarian regime in the targeted state. Positive material incentives, which include recognition of new

states and government and contractual agreements with security, trade and aid benefits, aim to push nondemocratic states towards liberal economic, political and legal reform. Differently from control, the logic of material incentives is exercised where domestic actors maintain a degree of autonomous political will. Material incentives based on rational bargaining logic, where domestic actors calculate the cost-benefit of the bargain. The size and speed of rewards, the credibility of conditionality, and the size and distribution of domestic compliance cost are important for the potency of incentives (Magen & McFaul, 2009, pp.12-14).

Normative suasion, contrary to material incentives, assumes that domestic actors would choose to undertake reforms because of its appropriateness. According to this logic, democratic development is not reducible to the cost-benefit analysis to maximize predetermined interests. Those interests emerged as a result of social structures and interactions. Therefore, external actors can help speeding up the internalization of democratic norms, policies and institutions in the targeted state. Like in the case of material incentives, normative suasion has positive and negative forms. Actors generally use "name and shame" to pressure the targeted state into compliance with democratic practices. The last logic of influence is capacity-building. The basic understanding behind this logic is that if the targeted state is expected to comply with democracy, then its institutional and financial capacity needed to be addressed. Hence, domestic actors should be empowered through information, financial and technical assistance (Magen & McFaul, 2009, pp. 14–15).

Similar to Magen & McFaul (2009)'s categorization, Huber (2015), in her *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy*, offered three types of actions to promote democracy. The first one is coercive democracy promotion that promotes democracy by force through military intervention. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the UN Security Council authorized intervention in Libya in 2011 are the possible examples (Huber, 2015, pp.24-25). The second one is utilitarian democracy promotion that either pursues to wield the incentives through positive and negative conditionality or democracy assistance. Positive conditionality is

designed to intensify the economic and political resources of a regime that are willing to improve. Negative conditionality refers to the limitation or cancellation of military or economic aid to those countries that are unwilling to reform. Conditionality works only when the targeted state inclines to involve in the promotion process. Yet democracy assistance is more diverse than that; it does not only have to work with targeted government but also it can support grass-roots organizations as well (Huber, 2015, p. 26). The third and last one is identitive democracy promotion. This type of action attempts to convince the targeted state to accept promoted values or to change the behaviour in compliance with those values through speech acts. Speech acts are not just expressions but they also emphasize going into action. Concerning democracy promotion, speech acts can name and shame violations or lack of progress, and demand progress in democratic reforms (Huber, 2015, p. 27).

Another important thing here is the centre of attention in democracy promotion. External promoters' decision to focus on the state or society affect the practice of democracy promotion hugely. The strategies of the promoter differ depending on whether the promoter adopts top-down – focusing state institutions like national and local government, legislatures, judiciaries, militaries, police forces etc.- or bottom-up approach – focusing on society like public opinion, free media, minority groups, youth and cultural institutions etc.- (Magen & McFaul, 2009, p. 15). In addition, there is a difference between the "direct" and "indirect" involvement of democracy promoter. Direct involvement means the external promoter engages directly with the targeted subject whether state or society, having full control of its democracy promotion activities. Whereas indirect involvement means that the external promoter authorizes and endorses the targeted subject but usually through institutions which the promoter exerts its influence indirectly upon it (Magen & McFaul, 2009, p.16).

To make a long story short, it could be stated that for democracy promoters there are three primary factors to consider for their democracy promotion efforts: the motivation behind their policies, the methods they use, and the local context of the targeted state. In general, the critique of democracy promotion comes from

these three factors (Chandler 2000; Carothers 2006; Gills, Rocamora & Wilson 1993; Robinson 1996; Schaffer 1998; Sadiki 2004; Huber 2013; Schlumberger 2006; Cox, Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2002). The critics usually question the real motivation of democracy promotion and try to understand why the promoter chooses a particular country and what is the aim of the promoter in there. On the other hand, some focuses on the methods the promoters use whether it is suitable for the targeted state. This automatically brings the status of the targeted state to the table. The local context of the targeted state is vital for the success of democracy promotion because it helps the promoter to decide its strategy towards the state. For illustrative purposes, the United States of America was criticised heavily for its intervention of Iraq by using democracy promotion as a camouflage a hidden motive (McFaul, 2004, p.147). Both the motivation and the method the US preferred to use became the topics of judgement and further, in the coming years, affected the credibility of democracy promotion activities of the US. In the next section, moving from the general to the specific, the EU as a democracy promoter will be assessed.

2.4.   THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A DEMOCRACY PROMOTER

The environment that occurred in the aftermath of the changes of 1989-1991 contributed to the efforts of democracy promotion. Since the end of the Cold War, numerous actors take an active interest in promoting democracy across the globe. In order to tempt transition from non-democratic regimes to democratic regime or consolidation of democracy, many direct and indirect policies have been developed by external democracy promoters (Kubicek, 2004, p. 1). Among the second generation of contemporary democracy promoters, the EU rose as a significant actor with a wide range of tools in its toolbox. At first, the literature concentrated on the EU's approach to identifying similarities and differences with the USA (Börzel and Risse 2009; Lloyd 2010; Önsoy and Baba 2018; Youngs 2002; Magen et al. 2009). The desire is understandable to compare the second generation of democracy promoter with the first generation. Önsoy and Baba (2018) stated that there are major similarities and also clear differences between the US and the EU. Whereas the liberal democratic approach to democracy

promotion and security rationale is similar, the biggest difference between them is about their interests and expectations from democracy promotion. The EU's efforts of democracy promotion distinguish itself from the US and in the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU arose as an agent of democracy (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, pp.19-20).

Then, the focus shifted to the motives and interests behind the EU's efforts of democracy promotion. The discussion concerning its motives led to whether the EU should be named as "civilian power" (Duchêne, 1973), "a realist power" (Hyde-Price, 2006), "post-modern power" (Cooper, 2003), "soft power" (Nye, 1990; Smith, 2014), "normative power" (Manners, 2002,2006,2009), "normative empire" (Del Sarto, 2016), "transformative power" (Grabbe, 2006), "ethical power" (Aggestam, 2008), or "hegemon" (Haukkala, 2008). According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), power is an attribution of an actor that can be used to shape the actions of others (p.45). That brought the discussion about the power of the EU and its role in the international system. Therefore, what kind of power the EU is as a democracy promoter has been the subject of some studies. The EU became an influential and leading actor in democracy promotion. Its liberal democracy understanding embedded in its foreign policy. Its prominent motives and methods made the EU an attractive promoter. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate these matters. In this section, the evolution of the EU's democracy understanding and its promotion activities will be examined. Then, the normative power quality of the Union will be highlighted as the main motivation behind its democracy promotion efforts. Lastly, the models the EU uses for democracy promotion activities will be explained.

2.4.1. Framing Democracy within the Union

One of the raison d'etre of the EU was to preserve peace in the continent, and soon, it is agreed that democracy is the prerequisite for peace and stability not just in the European continent but in the whole world. Since the 1950s, the EU has frequently expressed that it is founded on certain principles. It has diffused democratic norms and requested the implementation of those norms by its members (Özkurt, 2017, p. 3). Yet, there was not any criteria or any tools to

promote democracy during that time. The change came when Mediterranean countries Greece, Spain and Portugal declared their ambitions to integrate into the EU (European Community back then) in the 1970s. They were former dictatorial countries and this situation raised the issue of democracy. The integration of Mediterranean countries projected the evolution of the political dimension of the Union. After that, the EU turned out to be a "school for democracy" (Democratic Progress Institute, 2016, pp. 12-14). Before the end of the Cold War, democracy continued to be an internal principle. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism as well as the reunification of Germany forced the EU to adapt itself to these international developments. The EU already had established principles, the one thing it needed was mechanisms to pursue the promotion of its principles. With the Maastricht Treaty or TEU in 1992, the formulation of the common foreign policy of the EU declared and policy-making structures underpinning EU foreign policy strengthened (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, p.5). Moreover, the mechanism of conditionality put into force which provided a motivation for member states to pursue integration policies as well as democratisation activities (Özkurt, 2017, p. 4). Thereafter, democracy promotion became the indivisible part of the EU's foreign policy and the diffusion of liberal democracy in Diamond's sense as its objective. Lisbon Treaty of 2007, in Chapter 1 Art10A (1), states that the EU's action on the international level shall be guided by the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, equality, solidarity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Further, in Chapter 1 Art 10A (2), it is emphasized that the Union shall pursue policies and actions to consolidate and support democracy, rule of law and the principles of international law (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). With reference to this, one could say that the Union takes democracy promotion on as a duty. From this point onwards, the EU intensified the promotion activities of liberal democracy as a foreign policy goal.

In the post-Cold War era, the EU did not hesitate to involve the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights into its policies and agreements with external actors. However, the EU's approach differs considerably across regions

and countries. It generally would rather a positive approach by means of providing assistance, using diplomacy and conditionality (Simmons, 2011, p. 130). With an effort to diffuse its norms, values and principles, the EU quickly introduced several programmes. It started with the Development Policy at the end of the 1980s between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group (ACP) countries. The Lomé agreements were signed to grant preferential trade deals and financial assistance. At first, it mainly concerned about economic issues and not much worried about the EU's principles. As time passed, the policy changed significantly and conditionality was strengthened with the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000, which replaced the Lomé agreements (Börzel & Risse, 2004, pp. 1–6).

Democracy promotion later integrated into the accession perspective and became a huge part of the Enlargement Policy. The accession criteria were announced at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 and introduced economic, political and legal (the *acquis*) criteria for anyone who wants to be a member of the Union. Democracy and other principles incorporated into these criteria by the EU (Democratic Progress Institute, 2016, pp. 15–16). Especially after the collapse of communism, the EU put forward these conditions to support the transition of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and signed the Europe Agreements. Moreover, to help accession process, the EU introduced many assistance programmes such as the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction). Given the success of the transformation of the CEE countries, the enlargement perspective extended to South-Eastern Europe and more programmes such as CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization) was provided (Börzel & Risse, 2004, pp.7-11). Conditionality is the mechanism of the EU, known as carrot and stick, which was used effectively in enlargement policy to urge aspirant and candidate states to comply with the democratic standards of the EU (Simmons, 2011, p. 133).

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is another policy of the EU aimed at "achieving political and economic stability in its immediate neighbourhood" (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p.11). It can be perceived as the enlargement policy minus

membership perspective. The objective of the ENP was to advanced security in the EU's neighbourhood (Simmons, 2011, p. 132). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful eastern enlargement, the EU faced new security challenges in Eastern Europe, the Southern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Thus, the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in those countries became the goal of the EU to turn them into friendlier partners. Similar to other policies, the EU funded its goals through assistance programmes such as MEDA (Mediterranean Development Assistance) and TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p.12).

All these policies and programmes are not managed by "a ministry for democracy promotion in the EU". Its efforts encompass EU competences (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p.15) and are conducted by less hierarchical regulation. The Lisbon Treaty took a concrete step in interlinking institutions and providing a guideline for a unitary framework for democracy promotion activities. Because, besides the EU's activities, member states carry out their own democratisation activities without the EU's involvement. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty supplied a user's manual. At the EU level, the bodies in charge of arranging democracy promotion efforts are the European Council and the European Commission. General Directorate in the Commission manages democracy promotion activities for external relations and the Council directs activities within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Önsoy & Baba, 2018, p. 21). In addition, with limited competences, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide and heavily criticized violations (Börzel & Risse, 2004, pp.18-19).

2.4.2. The EU's Motive for Democracy Promotion

It can be observed that the EU's understanding of democracy and democracy promotion has passed through changes. Since its foundation, the Union has seen democracy as one of its core values and as time went by, it incorporated democracy into every fiber of its being. By keeping up with the international developments, the EU has advanced toward becoming an international actor

anchoring democracy. The power of the EU and its role in the international arena became major topics in its democracy promotion efforts. Hence, the EU started to illuminate where its power comes from and how it manages to affect other countries. As a normative power, the EU justified its democracy promotion efforts with the desire of diffusing its own understanding of liberal democracy and shaping the perception of others. Normative power EU has evolved simultaneously with the Union itself and came out as the main motive behind its democracy promotion efforts.

The EU as a non-traditional entity was created in a traditional world. This situation reflected both the neglect and an underestimation of the EU's role in international relations. A traditional state-centric view dominated the world back then, which led to the verdict that the EU is not an actor (Bretherton & Vogler, 2005, p. 11). Today's system inaugurated in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia that based on the concept of a sovereign territorial state. Since the EU is *sui generis*, neither a state nor an international organization, for a long time, its role in the international system or actorness has become a topic of discussion. Christopher Hill (1993)'s well-known argument, "capability-expectations gap" came out of the concerns about the EU's actorness. Caparaso (1996) argued that if one wants to grasp what the EU is doing, it must move beyond the traditional order towards the post-modern stage. Heretofore, there can be no doubt that the EU is a unique actor, and its actorness is still under construction (Bretherton & Vogler, 2005, p. 22).

Drawing on these perceptions, the EU's actorness is tried to be explained in reference to the notions of opportunity, presence and capability. Opportunity refers to the factors in the external environment which affect the actions of the actor. Presence denotes the influence of the EU by its existence. Capability signifies the availability of the EU's instrument (Bretherton & Vogler, 2005, p. 22). These notions helped the EU to define its agency and power in international politics. By way of defining its agency and power, Manners (2002) suggested a "normative power" concept for the EU. Normative Power EU differentiates itself from other concepts and it is predicated on three factors. The first factor is the EU's presence in the world. Its presence was affected by "the historical context,

hybrid polity and legal constitution" (Manners, 2002, p.241). Regarding the historical context, the EU was created after the horrible World War II. The war was the product of the most wicked type of nationalism which led to genocide. That's why, the founding fathers of the Union committed to maintaining peace, and they created the Union's institutions and policies accordingly (Manners, 2002, p.240). The power of ideas continued to exert an impact on the evolution of the EU in the post-Cold War era. Those ideas also made the EU aware of other forms of influence and power. From that point onwards, the EU started to be concern about more than economic policies and to rely on more than material forms of power (Manners, 2009, p.2).

Concerning the hybrid polity, by transcending Westphalian norms, the EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance (Manners, 2002, p.240). The EU attracted attention because of its new form and actor quality. This new form also showed its unmatched quality in its constitution. Its constitution is elite-driven and treaty-based, which upholds the principles such as democracy and rule of law (Manners, 2002, p.241). The combination of the historical context, its post-modern form and constitution led to the emergence of the EU's unique presence in international politics which manifest ideational power. Thus, Manners proposed to "think the ideational impact of the EU's international identity/ role as representing normative power" (Manners, 2002, p.238).

Normative power EU is about "power over opinion" (Carr, 1962, p.108). The EU's capability to verbalize its principles, ideals, values and norms and "to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners, 2002, p.239) are the second factor of its normative power. Being able to shape 'what is normal' is a clear demonstration of the EU's normative power. According to Manners, the EU has five core norms: democracy, human rights, peace, liberty, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms which embedded in every cell the EU has. The EU is wise enough to choose its principles from previously established treaties, conventions or agreements like the UN Charter. It makes the legitimacy and the justification of the principles easier (Manners, 2009, pp.2-3).

The third factor of its normative power is norm diffusion. Over the past 50 years, the normative basis of the EU has been developed. Although since its foundation the Union has made clear the centrality of its values verbally, only a little while ago, the EU set out its principles on its foundational treaties (Manners, 2002, p.242). In Art. 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), it is stated that "The Union is founded on the values of *respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights*, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities" (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Art. 3 (5) of the TEU, its passion to promote its norms expressed: "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall *uphold and promote its values* and interests" (emphasis added). Later, with the amendment of the Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 49 underlined once more that "Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union". Apparently, the importance of democracy has grown as the time went by. It infiltrated into every cell of the Union, which turned it into major democracy promoter in the world.

EUROPEAN UNION	
Interest in democracy promotion	Yes, increase gradually through the 1970s
Type of democracy	Liberal democracy
Motivation	Normative
Tools	Conditionality, assistance, monitoring
Mechanisms	Both bottom-up & top-down
Influence	Both direct & indirect
Models	Linkage, leverage and governance

Table 1: The EU's Democracy Promotion Card (Author's own collection, inspired by Freyburg et. al (2015) and Dimitrova and Pridham (2007))

The EU is meticulous to integrate its norms and values into pretty much all of its relations including trade, enlargement and development policies (Manners, 2009, p.2). Manners (2002) said that "The reinforcement and expansion of the norms identified here allow the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts" (p.244). Therefore, now, the EU is more than an economic giant. It is a post-modern entity, which has normative objectives to achieve. Here, it is necessary to specify that normative power EU could pursue its interests like security and stability whilst promoting its norms. Börzel and Risse (2009) warned

not to fall into 'norm vs. interest trap'. They advocated that it is impossible to think interests outside norms (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p.7). Actors could engage in democracy promotion activities that driven by normative motives and also could want to fulfil their foreign policy goals. Tocci (2008) clarifies this by saying that "to be normative, foreign policy must pursue normative goals through normative means" (p.8). In other words, as long as the EU follows its normative objectives through normative means, it will remain as a normative power. Normative power EU explicitly refers to the constitutive norms of the Western community and express its willingness to promote and protect liberal democracy. The EU intend to diffuse its norms in non-coercive and normative ways. Simply put, the EU's normative power is the motivation behind its democracy promotion activities abroad. Its democracy promotion efforts associate with its normative power and role perception. The identity and the role the EU constructed for itself are in line with the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998) of its actions. The bottom line is that where you sit determines where you stand.

2.4.3. Models of EU Democracy Promotion

The EU's normative power as well as the expectations about its international role oriented to the rise of the activities of democracy promotion abroad. The promotion of democracy generally attributes to the EU's enlargement policy. Nonetheless, as has been noted above, the EU made the promotion of democracy part of other policy fields too. For this reason, the EU brought forward several instruments and models. European Commission (2001) underlined that:

> to promote human rights and democratisation objectives in external relations, the EU draws on a wide range of instruments… These tools should be used in a coherent manner, to achieve synergy and consistency and to ensure maximum effective use of resources to promote sustainable development and respect for human rights and democratisation worldwide. (p.6)

Among many methods of democracy promotion, in this thesis, Freyburg et al. (2015)'s categorization is thought to be more appropriate for the EU's external democracy promotion activities. The models could be understood as the mixture of aforementioned methods such as material incentives and normative suasion

but in a more distinctive way. The motivation for the norm diffusion by the EU penetrated into these models and democracy promotion activities of the Union are distinguished into three models: leverage, linkage and governance. The first two models originate from the traditional approaches of democratisation (Levitsky & Way, 2010), while the last model is a current extension (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 4).

	Linkage	*Leverage*	*Governance*
Target	Society	Polity	Sector
Outcome	Democratic culture	Democratic institutions	Democratic governance
Channel	Transnational	Intergovernmental	Transgovernmental
Instrument	Socialization	Conditionality	Learning/Socialization
Case	Supporting the transition of Latin American countries in the 1980s	Supporting the transition of the CEE and the WB countries	Supporting the ENP countries such as Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine

Table 2: Models of EU's Democracy Promotion (taken by Freyburg et al. (2015, p.14) with author's addition)

The linkage model targets the level of society and attempts to operate activities for the occurrence of democratic culture. Socio-economic conditions of a society containing economic growth, education, values and civil society are considered as a precondition for democratisation. The role of external democracy promoter is to help societal actors to involve in the socialization process and embrace democratic norms. Through transnational channel that include both direct activities like giving support to the democratic opposition in the target state and indirect activities like pointing out societal conditions for democracy, the external actor aims to empower society to achieve democratisation from below (Freyburg et al., 2015, pp. 14–15). In the linkage model, the EU may contribute to the development of societal conditions first by promoting the economic development of the target state and second by the support for education in the target society (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 16). The purpose here is simply to improve the conditions of society to facilitate the settlement of democratic norms and culture. However, to achieve this, the target state should not isolate itself from the outside. This model could be successful only if there is an openness to a certain degree (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 17).

The leverage model targets directly the polity and highlight the role of political processes and the power holders in the government. It intends to reform the polity and founds essential institutions to ensure vertical and horizontal accountability and other democratic norms. The external democracy promoter uses conditionality effectively to persuade domestic elites to do reforms (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 13). This model concentrates on domestic actors because it argues that structural factors do not determine transition but are shaped by the domestic actors' interests and strategies (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 17). Democracy "[is not] a delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil" (Shin, 1994, p.141). Due to this, domestic elites emerge as crucial players in the transition period. In the leverage model, conditionality appears to show elites the carrots and sticks of the situation. In a bargaining process, an external promoter uses information, promises and threats to accomplish its goal. Generally, the external promoter has asymmetrical power in the bargain (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 17). The EU exercises strict conditionality in its relations with the aspirant and candidate states. The EU sets out the conditions for those countries and expects them to fulfil in order them to receive rewards from the Union like financial assistance or association agreements. There are few matters the EU to bear in mind. The availability of the tangible (material and political) and intangible (social or symbolic) rewards (Schimmelfennig, 2005), the size and credibility of tangible rewards, the strength and determinacy of the conditions and the cost of adoption for the target state (Freyburg et al., 2015, pp. 18–20). These matters may affect the leverage of the EU in its democracy promotion efforts.

The governance model differs from linkage and leverage models and targets sectors like internal security or environmental policy. It is a narrow approach comparing with others. Through the transgovernmental channel, the objective is to succeed in transferring procedural principles (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 14). This model is based on the influence of democratic norms embodied in sectors. The concept of democracy is seen as a guide for administrative rules and practices. The goal is to promote principles such as accountability, transparency and participation (Freyburg et al., 2015, pp. 20–21). The EU prefers using the governance model with non-member and non-candidate states to create

horizontal transgovernmental networks. For instance, the EU uses this model with the ENP countries to transfer principles of accountability, transparency and participation which in return for amplifying cooperation in areas such as immigration or the environment (Freyburg et al., 2015, p. 21).

Freyburg et. al (2015), in the end, called attention to the complementary nature of these three models. They stated that linkage, leverage and governance models are not mutually exclusive but actually they are mutually helpful (Freyburg et al., 2015, p.23). Democracy promotion efforts could not be successful without accepting democratic principles, societal participation or the active involvement of the domestic elites in the process. Therefore, in order to acquire the desired outcome, one should consider the status of these aspects and then should apply the appropriate model to the target state or society.

Last but not least, as mentioned earlier, democracy promoters are often criticised because of their practices. The motives, the methods and the local context of the targeted state are the starting point of the critics' argument. The EU is one of the top democracy promoters whose efforts are constantly criticised. Its motivation and agenda for democracy promotion (Theuns 2017; Powel 2009; Seeberg 2009; Houkenes & Freyburg-Inan 2013; Pace 2010; Orbie & Wetzel 2012; Wetzel, Orbie &Bossuyt 2018), the methods it prefers to use (Fagan 2011; Lane 2010; Youngs 2001; Youngs 2009; Casier 2011) and its concern for the local context of the targeted state (Völkel 2014) have been the subjects of the many critiques. Especially regarding its democracy promotion efforts in the Western Balkans, the EU is criticised for having a security-stability-democratization dilemma (Kovačević 2018; Stahl 2013; Grimm & Mathis 2017; Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac 2020; Richter 2012; Pridham 2008). In order to reach the goal of this thesis, the critiques of the EU's democracy promotion activities should be taken into account. Although this thesis will not discuss it in details, in the upcoming chapters the effectiveness of the EU's democracy promotion efforts will include certain criticisms.

This chapter has shown that the concept of democracy and the promotion activities underwent many alterations. In the course of time, the definitions of the

term and the promoters has varied. Once it managed to be freed from its negative connotations, democracy was started to be viewed as a universal value. Contemporary promoters, specifically after the 1970s, acknowledged democracy as their core principle and reflected this standpoint into their policies. The EU is among the contemporary democracy promoters, who endorse liberal democracy and pursue policies to promote it. On the grounds of its normative power, the EU embedded its norms, values and principles into its institutions, policies and agreements. In line with the identity it constructed for itself, the appropriate behaviour is to diffuse its norms by following normative means through normative ways. For normative power EU, consistency and coherency are crucial. The Union needed to reflect its identity and role perception into its practices. Thus, gradually after the 1970s, the EU started to be more vocal about its interest in democracy promotion. In due course, it became a prominent democracy promoter in the world. In virtue of its distinctive models, the EU aims at diffusing its own understanding of liberal democracy to other states. By adopting a positive approach, the Union uses tools such as assistance, diplomacy and conditionality to promote liberal democracy in targeted states. In the next chapter, democratic history of Serbia will be examined to demonstrate the key steps towards the acceptance and adoption of liberal democracy to understand the current status of democracy in the country.

CHAPTER 3- DEMOCRATIC HISTORY OF SERBIA

In the course of time, the acceptance of democracy and the promotion of it have intensified. Promoters have expressed the appropriateness of democracy as a system, which caused the boost of transition to democracy especially after the end of the Cold War (see Huntington 1991 or Fukuyama 1992). In the second chapter, the desire for a transition to democracy and promotion efforts were illuminated. Regardless of any difference, various societies made their voices heard about their eagerness for democratic transition. Nevertheless, when the success or failure of transition is started to analyse, one of the first things to do is to point the finger at differences. Each society has distinctive culture, traditions, experiences and history that impact every step they take. Keeping that in mind, it could be observed that in some societies democracy flourish, while in others it does not (Shapiro,2003, p.x). At that point, certain factors, which are determined and studied by theorists, scholars, and practitioners manifest themselves for the assessment of the adoption and consolidation of democracy. The commonly analysed factors include culture (Almond & Verba 1963), ideology (Lipset 1993; Katz 1997; Ruboko 1991), economy (Olukoshi 1998; Przeworski & Limongi 1997) and external forces (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1999; Bratton & van de Walle 1997). Through examining the relationships between democracy and these factors, one can acquire the condition of democracy in a particular society (Makulilo, 2017, p.50). Hence, democracy will not take root immediately after its introduction to a new society. Its acceptance and consolidation are determined primarily by the society's capabilities (Hasegawa, 2018, p.1).

That said, in this chapter, the intent is to present the democratic history of Serbia to better understand the current status of democracy in the country. However, the chosen approach to present the democratic history of Serbia is distinct. Instead of examining above mentioned factors, the focus is on proto-democratic practices that refer to the features that appear democratic in the period before the acceptance of the contemporary understanding of democracy. Refusing the single model of democracy - known as the Western type of democracy- (see Youngs 2015), in the case of Serbia, the concept of proto-democracy would be more appropriate to provide constitutive steps that eventually led to modern

democracy in the country. Since practices embed beliefs, ideas and values, the exploration of the practices of the Serbs throughout history would present the logic of their behaviour, which help us to comprehend how the current status of democracy is reached. The presentation of contemporary liberal democracy to Serbia was not long ago and for that matter, premodern democratic practices should be put under the scope. Kohli (1993) highlighted that the development of appropriate institutions is crucial so that democratic norms and practices take hold in society (p.671). Furthermore, according to Bentzen et al. (2017), there is quite an evidence that the development of modern democracy in Europe was facilitated by proto-democratic institutions of medieval Europe (p.4). Following this, to understand the state of democracy in Serbia, the link from premodern democratic practices to modern democracy should be explored. Put it another way, footsteps towards liberal democracy such as routinized practices, institutions and political traditions of Serbia throughout history should be analysed. Refraining from making anachronistic mistakes, the goal is to reveal the political practices such as laws, assemblies, and constitutions and traditions considering these practices and traditions are inherited by the modern Serbian state. The exploration of the practices and traditions of the Serbs could also illustrate the role of the Serbs on their own democratization process.

This chapter is divided into three sub-sections: the birth and the rise of Serbs, the epoch of Yugoslavia, and the post-Milosevic period. Each section while narrating the history at that time, concentrates on proto-democratic practices. Firstly, while the premodern democratic practices during that period will be uncovering, the Serbs' settlement in the peninsula, the establishment of their own kingdom, their conditions after the occupation of the Ottoman Empire and the road to independence will be explained as well. Secondly, the birth and the death of Yugoslavia, the actions of Slobodan Milosevic, the wars of independence and the influence of these incidents on democratic practices will be argued. Lastly, in the post-Milosevic period, the efforts for establishing modern democracy, the attempts of reconstructing the country and restoring their image at the international level, meanwhile dealing with old legacies will be reviewed.

3.1. THE BIRTH AND THE RISE OF SERBS

The ancestors of today's Balkan people arrived in the peninsula in the 6th and 7th centuries (Cox, 2002, p.19). South Slavs, namely Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, crossed the Danube River and occupied a large part of the Balkan Peninsula. They were tribal societies scattered all over the peninsula and had no centralized organization. Yet, Barbara Jelavich (2016) claimed that they laid the foundation of their Middle Age kingdoms during that time (p.14). From the beginning of Serbian medieval statehood, Serbs found themselves between the Byzantine Empire and the West, whose influence manifested on Serbia in many ways (Stojkovski, 2020, p.168). Despite being irregular, Serbs were effective in guerrilla warfare (Temperley, 1919, p.11) and fought with Byzantine Empire and Turkic people like Avars (Cox, 2002, p.19). After the 9th century, Serbs fell under the rule of Bulgarians and then Byzantine (Cox, 2002, p.20). Starting from the second half of the 9th century, they converted to Orthodox Christianity, which naturally extended the influence of Byzantine (Temperley, 1919, p.26). When the Byzantine took away the independence of Bulgarians, Serbs acquired a better place. In due course, they managed to found two states in the territories of Raska and Zeta (Jelavich, 2016, p.19).

The political history of Serbs actually starts with prince Stefan Nemanja. He became the first ruler of Raska and gave his name to the dynasty, which was called the Nemanjic dynasty (Jelavich, 2016, p.19). His sons, Stefan and Sava, continued his reign and got international recognition and founded the self-governing Orthodox Church. Sava -known as Saint Sava- became the archbishop of the Church and later wrote a code of church law called *Krmcija (or Nomocanon)*, which was based on a Byzantine model (Cox, 2002, p.21). One can assume that right from the beginning, the Byzantine Empire had affected the lives of Serbs in areas including religion, culture and social life. Nonetheless, Sarkic (1992) argues that one of the biggest contributions of the Byzantine was its constitutional ideology that introduced hierarchical order and monarchical power (p.148). This influence could be seen during the reign of Stefan Dusan.

Serbs got the highest stage of medieval power and reputation in the reign of Stefan Dusan, who became the ruler in 1331 and stayed in power until his death in 1355 (Jelavich, 2016, p.20). During that period, the political situation in the Balkans was very complex. The Byzantine Empire was in constant decline so Serbian authorities took advantage of this situation for expansion (Nesovic, 2020, p.117). Dusan conquered many of his neighbours and extended the lands from Sava and Danube Rivers to the Adriatic and Aegean Sea (Cox, 2002, p.21). Furthermore, he expanded the legacy of St. Sava by upgrading the status of the Church in Pec (İpek). He made the leader of the Church a patriarch instead of an archbishop and put the Serbian Church on equal terms with the other churches such as the Church in Constantinople (after 1453 became Istanbul).

Another achievement of Dusan was his law code, which exhibits the type of his administrative character as trying to fight against anarchy and corruption to govern efficiently and justly by putting harsh punishments (Cox, 2002, p.23). Dusan's Code is seen as the most important legal document of medieval Serbia. The aim was to bring the kingdom a legal order and to make Serbia a modern European state (Golijan & Stankovic, 2015, p.31). "Dusan promulgated a codification to encourage the transition from the Serbian tribal monarchy to a new legal system." (Angelini, 2012, p.78). Along with some Serbian customary law, the Code of Dusan was based on Byzantine law (Angelini, 2012, p.85). The Code is composed of 201 chapters: the first part is comprised of 135 chapters, and the second one is of 66 chapters (Angelini, 2012, p.86). It contains provisions about the criminal law, the Church and civil laws (Nesovic, 2020, p.118) but mainly it is criminal law with different forms of punishment. Dusan's Code is simply an imperial constitutional act (Golijan & Stankovic, 2015, p.33). Even today's basic principle for democracies, which is the rule of law, could be found in Dusan's Code in articles 139, 171 and 172 (Sarkic,1992, p.153).

All these practices were actually a result of the Byzantine influence. Serbian kings wanted to become Emperors themselves. This desire was realised when Dusan proclaimed himself as the Tsar and autocrat of the Serbs and the Greeks in 1346. His Code followed the Byzantine Emperors and legislators Justinian I, Basil I and

Leo VI (Sarkic, 1992, p.151). However, this impressive kingdom came apart when Dusan died at the age of 46. Serbs wanted to become more powerful than the Byzantine Empire. Although at some point they fulfilled their desire, they could not escape their downfall. Kemal Karpat (2015) stated that after Dusan, the state of the Serbs had crumbled in a night for the reason that they had no national, ethnic or political essence (p.27). After his death, his son Stefan Uros came into power but he could not control authority in his lands because of internal schemes and external pressure. With his death in 1371, the Nemanjic dynasty came to an end (Jelavic, 2016, p.20). In brief, when the Serbian medieval period observed, regarding proto-democratic practices, the church law called *Krmcija (or Nomocanon)* and *Dusan's Code* caught the attention*.*

Afterwards, a prince named Lazar Hrebeljanovic was accepted as the next Serbian leader because his wife Milica was a Nemanjic. He tried to restore the status of the state by uniting Slav princes but failed greatly and Serbian lands fell into the hands of the Ottoman Empire (Cox, 2002, p.24). Lazar managed to achieve an alliance with Bosnians, Bulgarians and other Balkan leaders against the Ottoman Empire in 1389 in the Field of Blackbirds (or Battle of Kosovo) but resulted in a huge defeat for Serbs that in the aftermath became a legend to shape every aspect of the life of Serbs ahead (Günal, 2021, p.184). The battle was only one of the many confrontations they had, however, the meaning of the battle for the Serbs was dissimilar comparing with others. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 ended the medieval empire under Dusan and became the symbol of the loss of freedom and the beginning of the enslavement of Serbs (Cox, 2002, p.30). Their leader Lazar died in the field, who transforms into a hero in the eyes of his people. The defeat was expected due to the lack of essence for unity among Serbs (Karpat, 2015, p.28) but in the end, the great sacrifice of their leader turned out to be a wished essence for them.

With the Battle of Kosovo, more than 400 years of Ottoman rule over Serbs had begun. There are diverse interpretations about the impact of Ottoman rule on Serbs. In general, Serbs describe the Ottoman rule as a dark period in which their progress was prevented. Their claim was that when Europe lived through

Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, they missed these important developments owing to the Ottoman rule. Bideleux and Jeffries (2006) said that liberalism, the rule of law and the development of independent states were delayed due to the Ottoman period which caused violence in the future (p.3). On the other hand, there are experts that have opposite opinions such as Stavrianos, who comprehended that the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire helped the Balkan people to create a scapegoat considering their failures of administration, institutions and history but in fact, the Ottoman rule contributed to the preservation of Balkan nationality (Stavrianos, 1958, pp.31-32).

In an attempt to find out the influence of Ottoman rule over Serbs, the social structure and organization of the empire should be examined. Ottoman Empire had two types of organization. The first one is related to religion and the other is about the place of people in the community. Ottomans who described their empire based on two fundamental factors expressly, Islam and military, had both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects and had ruled the empire in accordance with the sharia law (Miljkovic, 2019, p.75). Muslims had the superior position, yet non-Muslims were granted the freedom of living however they like in return for a tax. Concerning the hierarchy of the empire, the top place belonged to the sultan, who was believed to have absolute authority from God and the possessor of everything. After the Sultan, members of military and administrative service had the highest place in the Ottoman Empire. At the lowest place, there were ordinary people called *reaya* which comprised the majority of society (Jelavich, 2016, p.44).

What needs to be emphasized for the impact of Ottoman rule over the Serbs as well as the whole Balkan people is that the systems of *millet* and *devşirme*. *Millet* system was created to organize a society that contains a diverse population. It is a system based on religion. In the empire, all religious groups were organized into *millets*. These organizations had significant legal and financial functions (Cox, 2002, p.33). The biggest millet in the Ottoman Empire was Orthodox millet including Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Wallachians and Montenegrins. They were given status after the conquest of

Istanbul in 1453 by Sultan II. Mehmet (Sancaktar, 2011, pp.37-38). Ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul (Fener Rum Patrikhanesi) was the head of all Orthodox Churches and of the Orthodox *millet* (Stavrianos, 1958, p.104). Under the Ottoman rule, Balkan Christians developed a strong Orthodox identity because they continued to live like they used to but with *the millet* system they benefited from the protection of the empire (Karpat, 2015, p.56). Serbs, like other Balkan communities, benefited from the millet system and in spite of ups and downs, Serbs managed to gather around their Church and through their religious identity they achieved to develop a sense of ethnic identity during the Ottoman rule, which paved the way for their independence movement (Karpat, 2015, p.56). The other important system for the Balkan people was *the devşirme* system. It was some kind of recruitment practice for non-Muslim children. Ottoman administration identified young men who are suitable for the system and collected them to be raised in Turkish and Muslim culture and to be educated well enough to work for the empire (Sancaktar, 2011, p.36). Although this system was subjected to heavy criticism, it should be noted that the chosen people after the end of their recruitment enjoyed a privileged life and they grew up to be powerful officials, even grand viziers (Cox, 2002, p.34). The Grand Vizier Sokolovic (Sokullu Mehmet Paşa) was the biggest evidence for this.

As a part of a non-Muslim group, Serbs were subjected to these systems. Most Serbs were peasants so they were a part of *reaya* and drew advantage from the *tımar* system. Serbs gained from the local administrative system, which provided a more advanced system of organization for the Serbian community. Moreover, with the benefit of the aforementioned systems, a Serbian elite group emerged particularly after the 18th century (Miljkovic, 2019, p.80) that guided the Serbs to unite and produce an identity. Hence, the Ottoman rule over the Serbs was actually not a dark period, in contrast, the Ottoman rule and its systems helped the Serbs to take few steps forward. They moved from the medieval form of organization, assembled under the Church, obtained a Serbian elite group and most importantly found the long-desired essence for their unity. Indeed, the impact of the Ottoman rule and its systems are crucial because if there is no union then there are no steps towards democratic practices because the Serbian

nation-state is an Eastern-style nation based on ethnicity and they used ethnicity to foment national awareness (Jovanović, 2014, p.87). Considering this, Ottoman rule provided the Serbs with a platform to gather around which eventually led to the development of national identity. These activities ignited the struggle for national liberation in the 19th century and at the end, the political scene witnessed democratic practices.

It must be noted that during that period, besides the acquirements of Ottoman rule, there were three other factors that affected the dynamics of Balkan politics, which directly influenced the independence movements and indirectly impinged on the democratic practices of Balkan people. The factors were the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the national awakening of the ethnic communities in the empire and the increasing interests and rivalries of the great powers (Stavrianos, 1958, p.215). In consequence of the decline of the empire, the imperial structure began giving the alarm in every sector and as being mostly peasant, Balkan communities were badly influenced. The degeneration of the empire accompanied by military and administration deterioration; the rise of *chiftlik* system (replacing *tımar*), which worsened the lives of peasants; the growth of commerce and industry; and the increase in the communication with the European countries, which led to the increase in foreign ideologies, (Stavrianos, 1958, p.222) were affected Balkan people adversely.

To make the situation more difficult, great powers specifically Russia threw gas on the fire in the Balkans. Russia was one of the great powers that took advantage of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It conquered the vast territories across the Danube River and along the shore of the Black Sea by the end of the 18th century (Stavrianos, 1958, p.226) but did not want to halt its advance. Under the Ottoman rule, Balkan communities gathered around the Orthodox Church, which dominated education, written literature and intellectual life in general, so the leadership of the Church was unchallenged. Hereby, Russia embarked on using the Church to penetrate into the region. At the Vienna Congress in 1815, the emperor of Russia declared himself as the natural protector of the Orthodox people under Ottoman rule and stated that by his religion he was obliged to help

the oppressed Serbian people (Stavrianos, 1958, p.228). These kinds of thoughts led to the emergence of the policy of Pan-Slavism, which was the ambition of uniting all the Slav people under the leadership of Russia (Jelavich, 2016, p.383).

Influenced by all of the aforementioned factors, Serbs took up arms against the Ottoman Empire. In the late 18th century, Sultan III. Selim, who wanted to restore the order in the Balkans, allowed Serbs to run their own affairs and maintain an armed militia in return for cooperation with the governor in Belgrade (Cox, 2002, pp.39-40). Yet, when III. Selim was distracted by the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte, rebellious Serbs assassinated the governor of Belgrade. As a response, new rulers killed as many Serbian leaders as they could to prevent the uprising they sensed was coming (Cox, 2002, p.40). Still, the first insurrection in the Ottoman Empire was proclaimed by the Serbs under Karadjordje Petrovic, known as Kara George (Temperley, 1919, p.174). Kara George, who was chosen by the local leaders (*knezes*), unseated the rulers and sent a delegation to Russia asking for help to realize the goal of independence for the Serbs. The Russian Tsar I. Alexander made a peace with Napoleon so the aid to the Serbs evaporated but with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Serbs gained autonomy (Cox, 2002, pp.40-41). Consequently, by exploiting all the factors, the Serbs finally got autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and started the construction of their political scene.

After gaining autonomy, Serbs needed to establish a working political system but endeavours were beset by difficulties. Dragnich (1975) categorised the political efforts of Serbs into five periods. The first period covers the early times of the 19th century, which was the period of strong one-man rule even though there were efforts to limit the powers of the ruler. The second period covers between 1838-59, which was characterized by an oligarchic government. The third period covers the decade of 1858-68, which was a return to one-man rule. The fourth period covers 35 years, which was the period of struggle for democratic political institutions. Despite serious problems like an uneven playing field, democratic practices that are similar to today's practices emerged during the fourth period.

Lastly, the fifth period, which was the period of constitutional parliamentary rule was interrupted by the World War I (Dragnich, 1975, p.347).

The first efforts were undertaken by Kara George. This was the first period and for a brief time Kara George was forced to share the power but closer to the end, his power was absolute (Dragnich, 1975, p.347). Kara George used his position to take important steps towards modernization such as opening elementary schools (Cox, 2002, p.41). However, he was criticized for being opposed to the foundation of a centralized Serbian state, hence Milos Obrenovic, with the support of the people, became the new leader of Serbs (Karpat, 2015, p.45) and the second period began. Realizing that the independence was not in view soon, Milos by using his diplomatic skills sought to achieve his aims through an agreement with the Ottoman governor and, in the end, his tactics paid off and he acquired more judicial and administrative power (Dragnich, 1975, pp.347-348). After some time, Milos developed unlimited power in the country. He put the National Office under his control and by means of placing his own people, he abolished the remnants of local self-government from the Ottoman times (Cirkovic, 2004, p.190).

Later, with the victory of Russians against the Ottomans and the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829, Serbs were granted full autonomy (Karpat, 2015, p.45). Thus, Milos achieved: the recognition as the hereditary prince of Serbia by the Ottomans, doubling the lands of the nation, establishing order in the society and preventing the rise of the aristocracy (Dragnich, 1975, p.349). In spite of his achievements, Milos's arbitrariness met with strong opposition called *Ustavobranitelji*, which means the Defenders of the Constitution, and with the help of the Sultan, they managed to limit Milos's power (Cox, 2002, p.42). The opposition accomplished to get a constitution that divided the power between the prince and a Council with seventeen members. Even though they still heavily rely on the monarch, the Defenders of the Constitution were able to set up significant institutions like the Supreme Court in 1846 (Cirkovic, 2004, p.212). Displeased with these developments, Milos was forced to abdicate and the prince Alexander Karadjordje was brought to the throne by the Council (Dragnich, 1975, p.349).

During the oligarchic rule, efforts of modernization of the Serbian nation in the fields of education, agriculture, trade and military were initiated. Over time, educated people showed signs of dissatisfaction with the regime and demanded an institution that would represent and defend the rights of people. There was the Serbian Skupstina (Assembly) but it was only gathered once during the oligarchic rule (Dragnich, 1975, p.351). In 1858, Alexander was removed and ageing Milos was voted back to power. When he died of natural causes, his son Mihailo Obrenovic ascended the throne (Cox, 2002, p.44) and the second one-man rule started. Mihailo had major aims in his mind like uniting the Balkan people in a war against the Ottomans, enhancing legality and improving the welfare of the country (Dragnich, 1975, p.352). To achieve these goals, he decided on the Enlightened Despotism, which was widespread in Europe in the late 18th century (Cox, 2002, p.44). He was induced that all authority must be concentrated in the hands of the ruler because Serbs were not ready for the representative government (Dragnich, 1975, p.352). The Council was transformed and simply turn into his cabinet and the Skupstina became an advisory body (Cox, 2002, p.44). His biggest achievement was the creation of a national army (Dragnich, 1975, p.353). His popularity lessened with his tumultuous personal life and in 1868 he was assassinated. He had no children, that's why the power transferred to his nephew Milan Obrenovic (Cox, 2002, p.47).

The following period until the end of the Obrenovic dynasty in 1903 was witnessed the struggle for the establishment of democratic political institutions. Considerable progress was made towards a constitutional parliamentary system. The representatives in the Skupstina increased steadily (Dragnich, 1975, p.355). There were political parties like Radical, Liberal and Progressive parties, which echoed the need for reforms. The Radical Party, led by Nikola Pasic, had a hybrid ideology including ideas of socialism and anarchism. The Radicals perceived themselves as the protectors of average Serbs, so they used peasant populism (Cox, 2002, p.52). The Liberal Party, led by Jovan Ristic, followed a nationalist foreign policy and were pro-Russian (Cox, 2002, p.51). The Progressive Party were similar to the Liberals sharing the beliefs of industrialization, modernization, parliamentary power and civil rights, but they were less tied to Russia (Cox, 2002,

p.52). The struggle among these political parties was a sign of democracy. As an indication, the Liberal Party initiated a process that produced the constitution of 1869, authorizing legislative power to the Skupstina. Even though the constitution was far from the desired democratic understanding, it contained ministerial responsibility (Dragnich, 1975, p.355).

In the late 18th century, the ideas of liberalism expanded to Serbian surroundings and prompted struggles against autocratic rule and for constitutional and representative political life (Cirkovic, 2004, p.207). These ideas fostered nationalism and encouraged the struggle for national liberty (Cirkovic, 2004, p.208). Nourished with liberal ideas, Serbia attacked the Ottoman Empire to realize 'Greater Serbia' and faced a huge defeat. Despite that when Russians came to help, they signed the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Serbs got full independence (Karpat, 2015, p.47). Shortly after, Milan declared Serbia a kingdom in 1882 (Cox, 2002, p.54). Towards the end of the century, the Radical Party gained more power, which was disliked for Milan because he would rather govern with the Progressive Party. Milan's response to this development was abdication. Before his abdication, he adopted a democratic constitution that guaranteed political liberties and parliamentary supremacy (Dragnich, 1975, p.356). This decision was not the outcome of his support for democracy, on the contrary, he believed that this move would create chaos in the country (Cox, 2002, p.54). Nonetheless, when Milan's son, Alexander Obrenovic, began his reign at the age of thirteen, he performed the role of the constitutional monarch (Dragnich, 1975, p.356). His reign was known for his manipulation of the political system. Alexander played off politicians and parties against one another and fiddle with the constitution at will. The reputation of the royal family sank lower when his father Milan meddled in political and military issues and when Alexander chose to marry an unpopular woman (Cox, 2002, p.54). The period of the Obrenovices ended with the coup of 1903 by a revolutionary government and Peter Karadjordjevic was brought to the throne (Batakovic, 2017, p.126).

King I. Peter was unlike the Obrenovices, he issued his unwavering commitment to liberal and democratic principles instead of absolutist leanings (Batakovic,

2017, p.126). He preferred the country's reliance on Russia and sought to avoid the clientelist position of Serbia against Austria-Hungary that Obrenovic put before which decreased independent action of the country (Batakovic, 2017, p.127). In short, he moved away from Vienna and got closer to St. Petersburg. He was pro-Russian, had received education in France and had translated the famous work of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* into Serbian (Cox, 2002, pp.55-56). He was patriotic and nationalist and committed to liberal governance. He made some modifications to the constitution of 1888, known as the constitution of 1903 (Dragnich, 1975, p.359). The new unicameral parliamentary system was a significant change, which enhanced the role of the Assembly, limited the role of the monarch and introduced universal male suffrage (Batakovic, 2017, p.127).

According to the constitution of 1903, Serbia was a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. The king and the National Assembly with the State Council as consultative body exercised legislative power on an equal footing. The consent of the Assembly was required for every law but the king had the right to sanction laws (Batakovic, 2017, p.127). Most of the political parties had faded from the view, yet the Radicals were still kicking around. The Radicals were divided into two parties: the Independent Radical Party and the People's Radical Party (led by Pasic) and dominated the political scene in Serbia between 1903-1914 (Batakovic, 2017, p.128). The Liberals, in 1905, established a party under the name of the National Party, while the Progressive Party was renewed in 1906 (Batakovic, 2017, p.129). Despite common grounds such as parliamentary democracy, representative government, local self-government and the unification of Serbian lands, these parties had different political objectives. The Independent Radicals was the only one supporting the spirit of the Yugoslav community and criticized the People's Radical Party for abandoning the original principles of radicalism and being inclined to corruption. The National Party accused the Radicals of betraying the national cause for party interests. The Progressive Party, on the other hand, favoured an evolutionary process to the parliamentary system (Batakovic, 2017, p.130).

During the period of King I. Peter, there was a substantial growth of culture and political liberties. There were several dozen political and cultural newspapers in Serbia such as *Politika*, *Samouprava* and *Odjek*. With the liberal law of 1904, the freedom of the press was provided (Batakovic, 2017, p.130). Moreover, Serbian politics had witnessed election battles at that time. Between 1903-1914 five general elections were held. By virtue of the constitution of 1903, the king had the power to dissolve the assembly and order an election within two months (Batakovic, 2017, p.132). Many coalition governments formed and unformed. According to Batakovic (2017) "Obstructionism was one of the main features of parliamentary life in Serbia between 1903-1914" (p.138). Serbian fragile democracy was challenged by a series of political and economic crises like the Tariff War of 1906 with Austria-Hungary, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 (Batakovic, 2017, p.140).

Especially starting with the Russian sponsored Balkan Wars, the wars that occurred in the 20th century generated an obstacle for the development of democracy in the Balkan peninsula. A Balkan League involving Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece was created in the early 20th century and this alliance waged war against the Ottoman Empire. They had an easy victory and made important territorial gains. Yet, the Second Balkan War occurred simply over the spoils of the first war (Cox, 2002, p.57). In the end, Serbia doubled its territory and reoccupied Kosovo with the Treaties of Bucharest and Istanbul (Günal, 2021, p.188). Unhappy about this news, soon after, the distrust and animosity between Serbia and Austria-Hungary reached a peak. The heir to the throne of the Habsburg Empire, Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated by a Bosnian Serb nationalist named Gavrilo Princip during the Archduke's visit to Sarajevo in 1914, which sparked World War I or the Great War (Cox, 2002, p.63). Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia and quickly Serbia joined the war alongside the Allies led by France, Britain and Russia. Surprisingly, the Serbian army resisted and fought well against the Austrian aggression and against the forces of the Central Powers. In spite of heavy casualties, Serbia got out of the war with acquisitions (Günal, 2021, p.188). For Serbs, the time of wars demanded action and sacrifice instead of words and political wisdom (Cirkovic, 2004, p.246),

therefore one can say that until the end of World War I, there was no significant development concerning democracy.

This section demonstrated the early history of Serbs up to World War I. After the formation of the medieval kingdom in the 8th century, Serbs experienced some kind of primitive organization in their society, and with the influence of the Byzantine, they had experienced premodern democratic practices such as the Code of Dusan. Later, under Ottoman rule, in opposition to common belief, they managed to organize at an advanced level and maintain their identity. In fact, they attained the long-desired essence for unity which is a must for their own nation-state. After gaining autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, the Serbs started the construction of their political scene and experienced different periods varies from one-man to oligarchic rule. Particularly during that time, the Serbs initiated to limit the power of the ruler, establish democratic institutions like Skuptina and the Supreme Court and found political parties with different agendas.

In the 19th century, following their independence from the Ottoman Empire, Serbs became more involved in democratic practices and had constitutional and parliamentary systems. Even though their practices were far from the proper contemporary application, still they held competitive elections and political parties struggled for achieving their objectives. It could be observed that there were important developments in the political and cultural lives of the Serbs. This being said, in the 20th century, the occurrences of wars disrupted the progress towards democracy. In other words, particularly after the 18th century, the Serbs experienced premodern democratic practices, yet it is important to point out that democratic principles and institutions were bent at will of the ruler. In the next section, the era of Yugoslavia will be examined.

3.2. THE EPOCH OF YUGOSLAVIA

The status of Serbs and their political journey during the era of Yugoslavia are undoubtedly crucial for the purpose of perceiving today's conditions. Serbs had two experiences of Yugoslavia: one is after the end of World War I (WWI) and the other one is after the end of World War II (WWII). With the end of the Great War, the secret plans of the Allies, which was about the sharing of the south Slav

lands, were exposed (Günal, 2021, p.188). Balkan communities, who were battle-damaged, were shocked by the news. The impact of this revelation was a positive step towards a united front. The role of the government of Serbs and the Yugoslav Committee, which consisted of notable South Slav migrants and politicians, was noteworthy. By late 1915, Serbia was occupied and controlled by the enemy, and the population suffered from the cruelty of the victors' administration (Cirkovic, 2004, p.249). Under the rule of the regent Prince Aleksander and the Prime Minister Nikola Pasic, Serbs constituted an exile government in Corfu (Jelavich, 2017, p.153). Thus, one might remark that the government in exile could not include the people in the decision-making process and took vital decisions with a handful of people.

Despite being extremely powerless, the Serbs wanted to advance on the way to the national unification of all the Serbs which was stated in the Nis Declaration in 1914 (Cirkovic, 2004, p.249). Jelavich (2017) underlined that though Serbs mentioned the desire to cooperate or even unite the South Slavs, actually they did not necessarily need a Yugoslav state (p.153). In contrast, some distinguished Croat and Slovene migrants, who were anti-Habsburg, founded the Yugoslav Committee to conduct a campaign for the unification of South Slavs (Jelavich, 2017, p.154). Anyhow, when the map of Europe was redrawn in the aftermath of the war, South Slavs started to see their similarities as more significant than their differences and came together to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, shortly after, renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which means the land of the South Slavs (Cox, 2002, p.67-68). It was created by uniting the territories of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Macedonia, the Kingdom of Montenegro and the provinces of Croats, Slovenes and Serbs from the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire (Nenadovic, 2012, p.17). The Corfu Declaration of 1917 issued that the new Kingdom would be "a democratic and parliamentary monarchy under Karadjordjevic dynasty, with equality of names, languages, alphabets, religion..." (Cirkovic, 2004, p.250). Several old political parties and some new parties took part in the renewed political life. On November 28, 1920, elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, and later on, the unification and adoption of the constitution passed with procedural manoeuvring

that aimed at benefiting particular political parties rather than consensus and stability (Cirkovic, 2004, pp.255-256). The monarch had the leading role and the government depended on him. The Assembly became a place for national recriminations and confrontations. The political climate quickly went downhill. Within a decade, there were 24 different cabinets that testify to the instability in the country (Cirkovic, 2004, p.257).

Up to this point, the first experience of Yugoslavia emerged after the end of WWI against an external threat. South Slavs were united under the same roof in the leadership of Serbs (Günal, 2021, p.188). Yet, once the external threat disappeared, the constituents started putting their interests first. The position of the Serbs had changed substantially. They went from an oppressed minority to the ruling nation. (Cirkovic, 2004, p.259). Around the 1920s, some national groups within the Kingdom began complaining about the dominant position of the Serbs and the disregard of the rights of the non-Serbs since the constitution they used was a version of the Serbian constitution of 1903 (Nenadovic, 2012, p.18).

In the interwar period, Serbs with more than 40 percent of the population held the majority in the Kingdom. Following Serbs, Croats with 20 percent and Slovenes with nearly 9 percent were the most crowded ethnic communities (Cox, 2002, p.74). It should be stated that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was home to other ethnic communities such as Bosnians, Macedonians, Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Roma people etc. As the statistics represented, Serbs were the biggest group in the country and acted as it was their own. Tension arose when other ethnic groups especially Croats (Croatian populist Peasant Party) expressed their dissatisfaction and the desire for autonomy (Günal,2021, p.188). King Aleksander found the solution in suspending the constitution and introducing dictatorship in 1929 (Jelavich, 2017, p.212). During that time, authoritarian rule was common in Europe due to the economic depression and political unrest (Cox, 2002, p.76). Aleksander, in 1931, presented a new constitution to cover his dictatorship. The bicameral parliament, voice vote and a new party, by the name of the Yugoslav National Party, were introduced (Jelavich, 2017, p.212). Heretofore, the constitutional monarchy in Serbia between 1903-1914 was the product of the

Serbian liberals from the 19th century onwards, and their liberal tradition demonstrated considerable viability such as political pluralism during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1918-1941 (Vujačić, 2002, p.211). However, the dictatorship of Aleksander and authoritarian government spoiled the democratic practices and shortly the situation got worse.

Caused by these developments, some nationalist movements appeared. In the early 1930s, Croatians led by Ante Pavelic founded the Ustasha movement, which was an extremist organization that promoted the foundation of independent Croatia (Nenadovic, 2012, p.20). Pavelic had to flee from Yugoslavia not to be arrested and with the support of Mussolini, he masterminded the movement from Italy (Jelavich, 2017, p.213). Building upon a similar perception like Machiavellianism that focuses only on the ends and does not refrain to use any means to achieve the goal, the Ustasha movement conducted terrorist acts to be successful. They assassinated King Aleksander, who was ethnically a Serb, and the country started to slide into fascism (Günal, 2021, p.188). Aleksander's successor was his oldest son II. Peter but he was not yet eighteen so it was determined that his regent Prince Paul should direct the ship. That's why Yugoslavia would not have a functioning king until II. Peter assumed his throne in 1941 (Cox, 2002, p.77). The timing was awful because alarm bells were ringing for quite some time signalling the coming of another world war. Nazi Germany launched terrible and destructive attacks that took place in Africa, Asia and Europe (Nenadovic, 2012, p.21). The next place was the Soviet Union and Hitler was concerned about the Balkans. To guarantee that the Balkans would not be a problem for his operation towards the Soviets, Hitler put pressure on Yugoslavia to follow a pact to maintain its neutrality. Afterwards, the government in Belgrade which acted on behalf of II. Peter was overthrown, thereof Hitler attacked Belgrade (Nenadovic, 2012, pp.21-22).

Yugoslavia was gone and annexed by neighbouring states. When there are no state and no constitution, there appears an anarchic environment, and like Ustasha, other resistance movements emerged in the country. Chetniks, led by Draza Mihailovic, was a movement that advocated the resurrection of the pre-war

Kingdom. Mihailovic's plan was to create a homogeneous Serbia. Therefore, he identified the Chetnik movement as a part of the Yugoslav Army and tried to establish contact with the Yugoslav government in exile to get recognition. Soon, the government recognized both the movement and Mihailovic as its military commander (Jareb, 2011, p.156). Chetnik movement remained exclusively Serbian oriented and inimical to other Yugoslav ethnic and religious groups (Jareb, 2011, p.157). German attack put the existence of Chetnik forces in jeopardy. Their policy of waiting and inactivity allowed the communists to catch on (Jared, 2011, p.158). On the other hand, with the help of Hitler and Mussolini, Pavelic managed to found an independent state of Croatia (Nenadovic, 2012, p.23). Against the activities of the Axis (Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan), the Allies (Britain, France and Soviet Russia) launched to support guerrilla operations in the Balkans.

At the beginning, they supported the Chetnik movement but after a while, they chose to support the Partisans, which was a multinational communist organization (Cox, 2002, p.81). Partisans were the most important resistance movement with its leader Josip Broz Tito, who organize military units to liberate occupied territories (Jelavich, 2017, p.282). The movement differed from the others with its structure and ideology based on national liberation and communist revolution (Nenadovic, 2012, p.24). It reached out to all nationalities and crushed other movements. Thanks to the support from the Allies, the liberation of Yugoslavia was begun by the Partisans. In 1942, Tito gathered the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). The intent of this meeting was to give the struggle a political legitimacy (Jelavich, 2017, p.285). At last, the Partisans, alongside Soviet Red Army liberated the country from invaders and the second experience of Yugoslavia started. In brief, during the interwar period, the Serbs had experienced democratic practices to a certain extent. At the start, the political climate was moderate, which had a relatively working Assembly and a constitution, but then, the situation deteriorated instantly and for a time the anarchic environment was present, in which the resistance movements ran wild in the country.

In the aftermath of World War II, the country became close to the Soviet Union and took samples from its socialist system. In 1946, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was officially declared and a new constitution was announced (Govorchin, 1948, p.315). The founding father of the country and the president Tito and his ideological comrade Edvard Kardelj advocated Marxist-Leninist ideology and followed the policy of democratic centralism and the formula of national in form and socialist in content (Guzina, 2000, p.21). According to Article 1 of the new constitution, the new Yugoslavia is a federal state, in the republican form and presented equal rights to the community of people, including the right of self-determination (Bertsch, 1977, p.89). By establishing a federal system and providing autonomy, ethnic groups within the country were tried to be satisfied. Yugoslavia was made up of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Each republic has its own government. Additionally, there were two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo (Govorchin, 1948, p.315).

Given their ideology, preserving the system demanded reconciliation along ethnic lines with the leading role of the party. Though each nation was granted a separate federal unit, except Bosnia-Herzegovina, a highly centralized one-party (the League of Communists or the Communist Party) structure with apparatus like police was carefully arranged to counterbalance (Guzina, 2000, p.23). The Titoist strategy was to build a delicate balance between centralism and federalism, or unity and diversity (Bertsch, 1977, p.90). This delicate balance was tried to be maintained through constitutions, namely the 1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974 constitutions. The Constitution of 1946 emphasized centralism and Yugoslav statehood, the Constitution of 1953 marked the beginning of the Yugoslav way to socialism, the Constitution of 1963 compromised the idea of socialist unity of Yugoslavia and the nationalism of the constituent nations, and the Constitution of 1974 stressed the concept of self-management and decentralization (Lapenna, 1972, pp.214-215). These efforts were indeed democratic practices to preserve the unique balance even though their adequacy might be contestable. It should be noted that Serbs were unhappy with these constitutional arrangements though the very reason was to satisfy the constituent

nations. Their perception was that their degree of political control was not proportional to the sacrifices they made (Critchley, 1993, p.441).

Pribichevich (1945) stated that Yugoslavia is neither a democracy nor a totalitarian country, oscillates somewhere between the two. Yugoslavia is a state with democratic institutions such as parliament, free press and free competition of parties (Pribichevich, 1945, p.448). Yet, there was an absence of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. Legislative power and administrative authority vested in the National Assembly that consisted of the Federal House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities. The first branch was directly elected by all the citizens, while the second branch was elected separately by the republics. Both houses were equal and had equal rights. The Cabinet was appointed and dissolved by the National Assembly (Govorchin, 1948, p.315). Each republic has its own national assembly, cabinet and presidium. The judicial system encompassed the Supreme Court of Yugoslavia (the highest judicial organ), the supreme courts of the republics and autonomous provinces, country and military courts (Govorchin, 1948, p.316).

The first decade of the new state felt the strong impact of Stalin. Yugoslavia was recognized as a part of the communist world. Indeed, Yugoslavia was a member of the Cominform, which was an organization of communist states under the direction of the Soviets (Jelavich, 2017, p.343). However, when Tito assumed a more independent stand, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and was subjected to economic boycott from communist states (Günal, 2021, p.190). Oral Sander (2018) claimed that the main reason for the split between Tito and Stalin was the struggle for power (p.85). Tito refused to be another satellite state of the Soviet Union, so chose to adopt a third way, a bridge between the liberal West and the communist East. Later on, the de-Stalinization process launched and pan-Yugoslav supranational socialist patriotism tried to be engraved (Guzina, 2000, p.23). As can be seen in the Constitution of 1953, the limitation of state intervention in the areas of the economy, social services, culture and education and decentralisation were highlighted (Lapenna, 1972, p.214), which could be interpreted as the West's influence on Yugoslavia. By the early 1960s,

Yugoslavism, which was the promotion of solidarity and brotherhood among South Slavs, began to fade (Bertsch, 1977, pp.89-90). Guzina (2000) asserted that Yugoslavism did not last because it was perceived as a threat to the nations' identities (p.24). The efforts for decentralization, de-etatization, depoliticization and democratization were launched in contrast to centralization (Bertsch, 1977, p.90). With the amendments to the constitution, the republics gained more power. The constitution of 1974 gave republics and two provinces complete political jurisdiction within their territories (Bertsch, 1977, p.92). The delicate balance that tried to be preserved between nationalism and socialism seemed to be losing, and the national form started to gain the upper hand against socialism (Guzina, 2000, p.24). The aim of the 1974 constitution was to solve the problem of nationalism and the threat to communism. While decentralization would appease the demands for democratization, a reformed self-management system would sustain the growth (Guzina, 2000, p.25). In theory, the idea seemed problem-solving, yet, in practice, it proved disastrous and ended in disintegration. The new constitution could not achieve maintaining the leading role of the party while empowering the republics.

Another issue was raised after a while. The situation of Yugoslavia after Tito began to be discussed. Who will be the next successor was among the questions that were asked during that time (Shub,1972). Tito rejected succession strategy and decided on a collective Presidency model allowing the participation of constituents (Bertsch, 1977, p.95). The Presidency was created to be the highest executive body that composed of the representatives from each republic and autonomous province (Shub, 1972). This new system waited until Tito's death to be active. With the death of Tito, the glue of the state disappeared. The 1974 constitution already gave republics the opportunity to form and maintain the essence of their nations. They preferred to use these opportunities to further essentialize the ethnic characteristics of their identities at the expense of civic ones (Guzina, 2000, p.27). In the post-Tito period, there was an increased expression of ethnic identity to revisit the grievances of that time, past hatreds and growing perception of economic and social problems in an ethnic context (Critchley, 1993, p.440). Yugoslavia was perceived as a forced community.

Especially after the multiparty elections in 1990, the crisis between republics worsened considering mostly totalitarian and nationalist politicians were elected (Simic, 1992, p.59). Particularly, the activities of two individuals, Slobodan Milosevic and Franco Tudjman provoked nationalism and ancient hatred (Radeljic, 2010, p.116). They were self-centred politicians and did not interested in finding solutions to the country's problems.

Pretty soon, circumstances deteriorated even further. When Milosevic came to power and took back the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina, authoritarianism and extremist ethnic nationalism were intensified in the country (Moodie, 1995, p.103). Milosevic appealed to Serbian nationalism, suppressed other ethnic groups and promote Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia (Moodie, 1995, p.104). While Yugoslavia started falling into an internal crisis, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc caused the alteration of the international environment of Yugoslavia (Simic, 1992, p.59). There were lots of newly born states, and their behaviours were encouraging and inspiring. Therefore, both internal and external factors affected the future of Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1990s, constituents felt like secession was the only choice they have. The conflict erupted following the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia and the Yugoslav army was quick to respond (Moodie, 1995, p.105). Having no Serb minority helped Slovenia to get its freedom easily, but Croatia was not so lucky. Furthermore, the violence spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which did not want to stay under Serbia's control (Günal, 2021, pp.191-192). The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina turned out to be a hell hole. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided along ethnic lines: Croats, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslim) and Serbs, and full-scale civil war began (Moodie, 1995, p.107). At last, external intervention came to stop the bloody Yugoslav wars. Western states, headed by the USA, intervened through NATO and forced the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. Dayton legitimized the partition of Yugoslavia and allowing Milosevic and Tudjman to act as guarantors of peace in the peninsula (Gallagher, 2005, p.3).

Accepting the situation, Milosevic continued down the road with Montenegro and founded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 (Günal, 2021, p.191). The

new state had two constituent republics. Kosovo and Vojvodina were the provinces of Serbia. The 1992 Yugoslav constitution specified the new structure, which was a three-tiered system including the federal government in Belgrade, the governments of each constituent and regional administrations in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Each constituent had a unicameral parliamentary system, while the state had bicameral parliament (Miller, 1997, p.147). However, this new state was doomed to failure too because marginalization, suppression, intolerance and aggressive Serb nationalism persisted. The 'peace' was disrupted with the occurrence of conflicts in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians chose to pursue armed struggle towards independence. To conceal his failures, Milosevic used his last chance to defend sacred Kosovo. In 1999, NATO intervened Kosovo and bombed the sites of Serbs. Eventually, Milosevic accepted the conditions and NATO established a mission (KFOR) to maintain peace in the region (Günal, 2021, pp.193-194).

Fallen flat on his face once again, Milosevic knew that his time to be up. At the international level, it could be expressed that he was the only representative of the ancient regime in 2000 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989. Former socialist states initiated their transformation and determined new goals such as being a member of the EU. Serbia was not one of the countries in this category, yet, specifically after the Kosovo War, both externally and internally, people started showing their displeasure of Milosevic's rule. At the domestic level, Serbs criticized the situation that Milosevic got them into. He made use of Serbian nationalism to come to power and gained popularity using the dream of creating 'Greater Serbia'. He was getting into wars imprudently and often. He created a hybrid regime containing the characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism (Nikolayenko, 2012, 142). He defeated his opponents in elections in 1987 and established a new political course that favour populist methods (Zakosek, 2008, p.593). Further, he adjusted the monopoly of control over state and social ownership and created etatist capitalism, in which certain elites exploited private ownership and wealth, while everyone else in the country suffered from poverty (Stojanovic, 2001, pp.25-26).

Bieber (2017) argued that whereas in the first half of the 1990s the regime preferred a nationalist-populist attitude, in the latter half of the decade they assumed a Sultanist stance drawing on patronage and control of the state to retain power (p.40). In short, Milosevic combined many factors such as the dream of Greater Serbia, the use of communist institutions (federal presidency, the JNA etc.) and elites that benefited from the system he created to preserve his seat. Nonetheless, changing the rules of the game, fragmenting political opposition and controlling the media could not save Milosevic anymore (Nikolayenko, 2012, p.142). The strike came from an unexpected place. The growing dissatisfaction created a civil society movement Otpor (Resistance) in Serbia (Stojanovic, 2001, p28). The search for an alternative to Milosevic brought people together and unified political opposition against him. The tipping point was when he tried to intervene in the results of the 2000 elections. He was overthrown by means of democracy.

Thus far, it is shown that the second experience of Yugoslavia paid attention to the past mistakes and to avoid the occurrence of these mistakes, a delicate system was set. Yet, Tito's death and following downfall signalised the fragility of the system and its dependence on one person. Tito made an effort not to be influenced by the waves of democratization in the world. After the end of WWII, during the second wave of democratization, he established a federal-state close to Soviet-style communism. Later, during the third wave, despite being affected by the West, he tried to keep their third-way approach. Yugoslav road to socialism with Western influence managed to remain standing for a time but not dealing with ancient hatreds and suppressed ethnic nationalism among other reasons brought an end to Yugoslavia. Serbs like other constituents of Yugoslavia had enjoyed the unique structure of the country. Nevertheless, when the right time came, they did not hesitate to criticize the system intensely and claimed to be the suppressed and battered nation in Yugoslavia. They had used their overwhelming population and significant roles in state affairs to become dominant in the country, which ultimately demolished the country. The wars in the Balkans hindered the transition from communism to constitutional democracy (Besirevic, 2014, p.957). After the end of the Cold War and the Yugoslav wars, charmed by

the trend of the transition to democracy, a façade of democracy was established in the Republic of Serbia and former practices such as patrimonialism and clientelism were continued. In the end, as a reaction to Milosevic's actions, opposition emerged in the political arena as well as in the society and took Milosevic down.

In short, this section described the experiences of Yugoslavia. Both experiences started with the ambition of unity in the Balkan peninsula but ended in disintegration. Serbs, from the beginning, desired a dominant position and did not want to share power with others. The first experience of Yugoslavia was a constitutional monarchy with some degree of democratic practices. The ruling dynasty was Serb and other ethnic groups were not as effective as the Serbs. Towards the end of the 1930s, authoritarian rule was in effect and this situation caused the emergence of the resistance movements in the country. At some point, after the German occupation, the Yugoslav state ceased to exist and an anarchic environment occurred. Subsequently, Tito salvaged the situation and the second experience of Yugoslavia started. The new Yugoslavia was a socialist federal state that consisted of many nations. It had a delicate balance to avoid the supremacy of a certain nation. Over time, the demands of the constituents were tried to meet. For instance, decentralization was introduced to appease the demands for democratization in the country. However, ethnic nationalism could not be overcome. Especially after the death of Tito, populist leaders provoked and manipulated the people, which led the country to bloody wars.

In the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, each constituent established its own state. The Republic of Serbia was declared, and Milosevic created a hybrid regime that contains characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism. The old habits like clientelism, patrimonialism, suppression, controlling media, seizing state institutions, electoral fraud etc. were persisted. Even though there were certain features of democracy, it was only for show. Eventually, dissatisfaction regarding the situation of the country escalated, and the people who once supported Milosevic began searching for an alternative. When the last piece of the ancien regime, Milosevic, was overthrown, a new period began for the Serbs. In the next

section, the post-Milosevic period and the establishment of democracy in the contemporary sense will be explored.

3.3. THE POST-MILOSEVIC PERIOD

It is usually portrayed that the collapse of the Milosevic regime was achieved through a revolution. It enabled the political transition from communism to democracy. Although it should be acknowledged that the overthrown of Milosevic was a democratic breakthrough, Serbia did not accomplish the establishment and consolidation of democracy in one night. Actually, today it is still discussed that Serbia has not completed its democratic transition and continue being a hybrid or illiberal regime (see Freedom House or V-Dem reports). In the post-Milosevic period, Serbia got into transformation in many areas. However, the transformation phase was long and had ups and downs. The legacies of the communist period endured and political elites did not bother using them to consolidate their positions. The defeat of Milosevic was not only thanks to the mass protests. The core pillars of his regime like the army, the police and the tycoons who got rich during the time of Milosevic switched sides and led to the fall of his regime (Bieber, 2020, p.22). 18 opposition parties united under the name of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and ended the corruption-ridden 13-year-old regime of Milosevic (Krnjevic-Miskovic, 2001, p.96).

A new government was formed and Zoran Djindjic was the new prime minister of Serbia and Vojislav Kostunica became the elected president of Yugoslavia. President Kostunica declared his vision of the future with the words " a state without rivers of blood for borders, a good, efficient, democratic, European state, one that is free inside and free abroad, that is independent, with a normal economy, industry, banking system, social and health care and media" (as cited in Krnjevic-Miskovic, 2001, pp.96-97). The vision was promising but real transformation could not obtain if past practices such as clientelism and state capture continued. The core pillars of the Milosevic regime were used by the new government. Both Djindjic and Kostunica had their own supporters in the Yugoslav security sector: the military had a close relationship with Kostunica and the police had with Djindjic (Edmunds, 2008, p.34). Even though they shared the

aspiration of reforms for the country, Djindjic and Kostunica constantly fought with each other and used their supporters to gain an upper hand against the other (Pribicevic, 2004, p.107). The continuation of the use of the military, organized crime, the lack of media independence so on created a huge obstacle in front of the country's democratization (Subotic, 2017, p.167). The expectation was high, but the new government was poorly equipped to cope with it. The overthrown of the Milosevic and the formation of the new government was seen as the turning point for Serbia but the same practices continued. Even though democratic institutions were established, they did not function properly.

Apart from the domestic situation, after the Yugoslav wars, there was an international expectation from Serbia to make a peace with the past, to pay its dues and start the reconciliation process. The biggest anticipation was the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was a court established to examine the crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars. The new government was assumed to arrest and deliver the criminals, specifically the delivery of Milosevic (Subotic, 2017, p.170). This expectation brought out the differences between Kostunica and Djindjic more clearly. Their disagreement was predicated on the Serbian identity: Djindjic was a pro-European and pragmatist, while Kostunica was a democratic nationalist (Krnjevic-Miskovic, 2001, pp. 97-98). To appease the international community, Djindjic was ready to arrest and deliver Milosevic to the ICTY, whereas Kostunica was opposed to the idea (Subotic, 2017, pp.168-169).

In the post-Milosevic period, incumbents had lots of tasks to handle. In addition to dealing with the past legacies, the new Republic had to complete the state-building process, find its soul and restore its image in the world. Serbia determined a pro-EU stance, though its foreign policy sometimes showed inconsistencies (Mladenov, 2014, p.154). In order to approach Europe, incumbents had to be successful in the establishment of democracy and application of particular reforms. Since the 2000s, Serbia has been dominated by populist parties that support the EU membership as well as democracy but actually pursue policies to undermine the consolidation of liberal democracy

(Bieber, 2017, p.44). In that environment, the fragility of the coalition appeared to be a problem. The coalition was made of many political parties but the two largest parties DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia-Kostunica's party) and DS (Democratic Party-Djindjic's party) could manage innovation if they agree on. Concerning a new constitution, which would replace Milosevic's constitution of 1990, whereas Kostunica's DSS advocated an increase in centralization and define Serbia as a national state rather than a civic one, Djindjic's DS insisted on decentralization, returning the autonomy to Vojvodina and reinforcement of liberal democratic values in a civic state. Moreover, when the issue of cooperation with the Hague emerged, Kostunica began openly supporting Milosevic's nationalist views and the hope for a new constitution vanished (ICG, 2006, p.2). The lack of the willingness of newly empowered democratic opposition and the continuity with the old regime posed a threat to democratization (Mladenov, 2014, p.155). Thus, not long after the overthrown of Milosevic, the domestic scene witnessed a political standoff.

Djindjic prevailed against Kostunica by arresting and transferring Milosevic to the Hague, albeit the price. Djindjic was assassinated in 2003 by a member of the Red Berets, which was a paramilitary unit (Subotic, 2017, p.170). People at large perceived that the operation was arranged to stop the investigations and extraditions to the ICTY. Whatever it was, one thing was sure that the assassination was another blow to the democratic transition of the country and it made moderate reformists take a step back. It proved that the remnants of the Milosevic regime still persist and many paramilitary units that engaged in terrorist acts attached to political parties (Batt, 2005, p.57). After Djindjic's death, the DOS collapsed and Kostunica managed to form a government with other small parties such as G17+ (Egeresi, 2020, p.146). He tried to show the resolute defence of law and order, and partially cleared out criminal networks (Batt, 2005, p.57). However, being reluctant to deliver, Kostunica used the situation and decided the voluntary surrender of indictees to the Hague (Batt, 2005, p.58). While Djindjic was trying to demonstrate the good faith of Serbia and the desire for a new beginning by handing over war criminals, Kostunica was hesitant and this position could not help but notice by the international community.

In the aftermath, Boris Tadic, who became the new leader of the DS, was elected as the new president in 2004 and the governing coalition was made up of the DSS and other small parties like the support Milosevic's party SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) (Subotic, 2017, p.170). Prime minister Kostunica was put under pressure about two issues: cooperation with The Hague and the status of Kosovo (Pond, 2006, p.220). Even with his nationalist view and on occasion anti-EU rhetoric, Kostunica was seen as a trusted partner especially by the EU (Mladenov & Stahl, 2015, p.125). Externally, the incumbents were subjected to pressure to cooperate and make necessary reforms and internally, they also faced with pressure particularly coming from the Serbian Orthodox Church to fight against external force, object the Hague and not to sell out Kosovo for membership in the EU (Pond, 2006, p.230). Meanwhile, the loose federation of Serbia and Montenegro was coming to an end. In spite of all the efforts, in 2006, Montenegro declared its independence from the federation (Mladenov, 2014, p.155). This divorce was not so hard comparing the previous one. Further, it could be considered that the velvet divorce directed Serbia to get rid of Milosevic's constitution of 1990.

The new constitution was approved by the parliament and as a result of the national referendum entered into force in 2006 (Dallara & Marceta, 2010, p.126). The international community, including the Council of Europe, the EU and the US, welcomed the constitution of 2006, which was motivated by their desire to promote democracy in Serbia (ICG, 2006, p.11). The new constitution has provisions regarding human and minority rights, the establishment of an Ombudsman, the abolishment of owned property in the socialist sense and the simplification of constitutional procedures (Dallara & Marceta, 2010, p.126). Serbia adopted a parliamentary system relying on the separation of powers between the branches of the legislative, executive and judiciary. With the new constitution, the president assumes a symbolic role but it does not forbid the president's membership in a political party. The unicameral parliamentary system has continued and the 5% threshold has remained (Egeresi, 2020, p.147). In addition to good points, there are, of course, bad ones too. The biggest concern was Serbia's behaviour towards Kosovo, which was recognized as a constituent

part of Serbia (ICG, 2006, p.14). Also, political influence over the judiciary, the limitation on territorial decentralization and the ambiguous relations between domestic and international law are among the bad points of the new constitution (Dallara & Marceta, 2010, p.126). Moreover, ICG (2006)'s report emphasized that whilst the constitution of 1990 defined Serbia as a civic state, the new constitution described it as "a state of the Serbian people and all citizens who live in it…" that opposed the European standard of basing statehood on *demos* rather than *ethnos* (p.13). In a few words, the long-awaited constitution was finally introduced for strengthening democracy and the new structure of Serbia but still failed to solve the most concerning issues such as ethnic nationalism and the Kosovo problem.

The election in 2007 showed the alteration of the political scene in Serbia. Although SRS (Serbian Radical Party), an extreme right-wing and anti-European party, won most of the votes, the DS, DSS and G17+ managed to form a coalition government with Tadic as president and Kostunica as prime minister (Subotic, 2017, p.170). Pro-EU politicians started to lose public support and right-wing parties, by using populism, appealed to the masses and increased their stand. The division in the country became evident after Tadic won the presidential election in 2008 by a narrow margin (Mladenov & Stahl, 2015, p.126). The endorsement of the EU could not be enough when the matters like cooperation with the ICTY and the solution of the Kosovo problem were seen as identity issues by the Serbian community. At about the same time, the UN-administered province of Kosovo decided to declare its independence from Serbia. Serbia immediately refused to recognize the action and applied international bodies to deal with the problem (Mladenov, 2014, p.155). These developments continued to hamper the democratization process in Serbia and diverted its attention. In 2012, estimated concern came true and pro-EU Tadic lost the election to Tomislav Nikolic of SNS (Serbian Progressive Party), which emerged after the split of the SRS in 2008 (Subotic, 2017, p.171). The SNS formed a coalition government with the SPS and seized the power. Tomislav Nikolic was elected as president, Ivica Dacic from the SPS became prime minister and Alexander Vucic from the SNS deputy prime minister (Egeresi, 2020, p.147). The purge of

reformists in the political scene of Serbia was completed when the SNS solidified its power in 2014 by winning a plurality of votes (Subotic, 2017, p.171).

Ever since the SNS has been able to maintain its power and hold the majority in the parliament. In 2017, Vucic became the president of Serbia and introduced a de facto semi-presidential system that enables him to hold the power in his own hands (Egeresi, 2020, p.147). Although Vucic likes to portray himself as a moderate leader, who initiates to meet halfway to solve problems like Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue for Kosovo problem, he is criticized immensely because of his authoritarian practices such as the constant state of crisis, weak institutions, strongmen in charge, nationalism, re-establishing a loyal media and so on (Bieber, 2020, pp.89-129). Even so, the international community, particularly the EU, chose to turn a blind eye to these practices due to the usefulness of Vucic. Vucic pursues a pragmatic foreign policy which evaluates his choices in accordance with the objectives, interests and preferences and then makes the most rational choice that works for him the best. He explicitly declared his support for EU integration, while maintaining strong ties with Russia (Bieber, 2020, p.45). The EU has welcomed his standpoint and alluded to Vucic as their "favourite autocrat" (Eror, 2018).

Lately, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the executive branches took extraordinary powers, which strengthened the authoritarian shift in the country. The authorities introduced a 'state of exception' without the approval of the legislative body in Serbia. They justified their decision in reference to Article 200 of the constitution, which lay down the condition that the president of the state, the president of the parliament and the prime minister can decide on the implementation of a state of emergency in the case of the inability to convene the parliament (Tzifakis, 2020, p.199). The state of emergency created a very favourable environment for authoritarian practices and further inclined democratic regression. What is more, in order to take advantage of the pandemic, national elections took place and Vucic won more than 60% of the votes, which enabled him to make constitutional amendments on his own (Günal, 2021, p.205).

The controversial issue here is that in 2021 Serbia looks increasingly like the one in the 1990s. Many scholars argue that Serbia is a competitive authoritarian (Castaldo, 2020a) or semi-authoritarian (Radeljic, 2018) country. Castaldo (2020a) expressed that since Vucic's coming to power, Serbia started to demonstrate serious signs of democratic backsliding (p.1). Based on the definition of Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime that contains characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism. In such a regime, democratic institutions exist but the authorities view them as a means of retaining power. The opposition parties are present so competition is also at play. Yet, the playing field is skewed in favour of incumbents, thus it is unfair (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p.5). Incumbents politicize state institutions such as the judiciary and exploit resources to hinder their opponents' capacity. Moreover, they control media to limit the opposition's access to voters, therefore weakening their political campaigns (Castaldo, 2020a, p.9).

In a similar vein, Radeljic (2018) chose to identify Serbia under Vucic with the notion of semi-authoritarianism. Semi-authoritarianism is a system that fuses the rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of democratic institutions and respect for a narrow sphere of freedoms with illiberal or authoritarian traits. They tend to maintain the democratic appearance, allow little competition for power and leave enough space for civil society to form and function to some extent (Ottoway, 2003, p.3). The names attributed to the current regime in Serbia may differ but the common ground of all of them is that the liberal democracy understanding is still yet to engrave. Since 2012, the SNS has used its electoral strength to change the system. Vucic has dominated all state institutions, exploited resources, used the pillars of the old regime and established an authoritarian regime. In a disguise of democracy, he continues his authoritarian practices, while proceeding on the way to the EU.

This chapter has explained the democratic history of Serbia from the first appearance in the stage of history to the present day. Through highlighting the proto-democratic practices of the Serbs that shows the constitutive steps towards the current status of democracy in Serbia, one may evaluate the significance of

these routinised practices and how they take hold in society. Since the medieval period, the Serbs had initiated to produce certain regulations to facilitate their lives and they did not hesitate to adapt the current trends of their time. Nonetheless, it is clear that they did not overcome their tendency to patrimonialism and obstructionism. Regardless of the time, the leader always wanted to fuse all the power in his own hands and found a pretext to create an obstacle for democratization. Still, almost in every period, acts akin to modern democratic practices could be encountered.

At first, following their arrival and settlement in the Balkan Peninsula, Serbs struggled to become organized. They remained irregular until the Nemanjic dynasty managed to form a primitive organization. Although they did not achieve to have a national, ethnic or political essence for themselves, proto-democratic practices such as *Nomocanon* and Code of Dusan can be found during the times of medieval Serbia, which helped them to regulate their lives by setting some rules. Serbs, afterwards, got their essence and organization when least expected. Ottoman rule, which Serbs usually described as the dark period, enabled them to organize, unite and produce an identity. During that time, they succeeded in gathering around the Orthodox Church that gave them an opportunity to develop a religious identity. Later, with the degeneration of the empire, they obtained autonomy and started to construct democratic institutions such as Skupstina. Obrenovic and Karadjordje families contested over the rule of Serbia, hence, generated an active political scene. Although the ruler had controlled everything, there were several political parties with different agendas and ideologies that created a competitive playing field. When Serbs finally got their independence, they had experienced in the constitution, political parties, assembly and elections.

Despite encountering democratic practices like having a constitution, political parties, assembly etc., Serb rulers tend to congregate all the powers in their hands. They always had an excuse for such behaviour like the unavailableness of Serbs. Patrimonialism was occasionally met with a reaction like the Defenders of the Constitution in the 19th century but usually, it endured. This tendency could be seen in the medieval period, during the period of the experiences of

Yugoslavia and in today's Serbia. In the first experience of Yugoslavia, Serbs were the ruling nation and they experienced constitutional and parliamentary systems. Despite fluctuating between oligarchic and one-man rules, the first Yugoslav experience indicated some democratic practices. At the time of the second experience of Yugoslavia, the communist party, particularly Tito, was responsible for everything and held the power. He wanted to create a balanced system between the constituent nations and to meet the demands for democratization, yet, it was impossible to satisfy everyone, especially the Serbs. After Tito's death, Milosevic wanted to hold the reins of power, at the same time working for Serbian domination in the country. These tendencies led the country to bloody wars. In the end, each republic founded its own state, but old habits die hard. In the post-Milosevic era, even though the Republic of Serbia aimed at establishing a democratic and modern state, they have not completed their transition yet.

Old legacies and practices persist in a façade of democracy. In rhetoric, incumbents voice their commitments to democracy and reforms, but in reality, they avoid the consolidation of liberal democracy. Lately, Alexander Vucic created an illiberal (or hybrid) regime, in which he constantly uses populism and nationalism to appeal to the Serbian society. He uses EU rhetoric and democratic appearance to charm the EU and the international community, while continuing authoritarian practices. Put it briefly, although democratic practices are encountered in every period, democracy is not allowed to take roots in Serbia. Its consolidation has not been allowed for one reason or another. In the pre-modern times, the ruler allowed democratic practices to a certain extent and held the reins of power. In modern times, patrimonialism persisted with a democratic cover. Old practices seem not to be abandoned, hence liberal traditions and democracy could not penetrate into Serbia. In the next chapter, the EU's democracy promotion efforts for the establishment and consolidation of democracy in Serbia will be discussed.

CHAPTER 4- EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN SERBIA

As already stated, the birth of the European idea was to prevent war and to preserve peace in the European continent. For more than fifty years, the European Union has managed to maintain peace, stability, prosperity and security. To be able to accomplish such a task is not easy. Since the beginning, the Union has adopted a meticulous approach to be aware of the developments around the world so that the EU would be ready for any kind of challenge. Even though the continent did not go through any major conflict after the foundation, the Union aimed at preserving the area of peace and stability. For this objective, the process of European integration was put forward which indicates the integration of the European states on many economic, political and societal levels (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012, p.6). The idea was that interdependence among states would help to sustain the area of peace. When it is understood that the strength comes from unity, the EU created various policies to include other nations into its club. The enlargement of the Union emerged as a vital process both for the sake of the organization and the European continent. In its 2003 enlargement strategy report, European Commission (2003, p.3) stressed that:

> …the coming enlargement is more than another extension of the EU: it represents the application on a continental scale of a European model of peaceful and voluntary integration among free peoples. In fact, it is the realisation of a dream of the founders of European integration: the reunification of the European continent, divided in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Indeed, it is argued that the widening of membership prospects and deepening of integration would have an impact on the power of the organization. After the incidents occurred in the 1990s in the Balkan Peninsula, the EU decided to extend its club to include the Balkan countries into the organization to maintain peace and stability throughout the whole continent. With the offer of membership, the EU started the transformation of the Balkan countries in various fields. In this chapter, the objective is to find out the EU's democracy promotion activities in Serbia. Hence, first, the EU's entrance to the Balkans, second, the framework of democracy promotion efforts of the EU towards the Western Balkans (WBs)-

which directly demonstrates the democracy promotion agenda for Serbia- and then, more specifically its democracy promotion efforts in Serbia will be assessed thoroughly.

4.1.   EU'S ENTRANCE INTO THE BALKANS

Predominantly, enlargement policy is accepted as a form of foreign policy of the EU to assess the aspirant states that want to join the club (Sjursen & Smith, 2004, p.126). It is a process that the EU uses to spread its values, norms and understandings to the other states. In Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's view (2002), enlargement policy is the process of institutionalisation of organizational rules and norms which transforms the actions and interactions of actors (p.503). It gives the EU the enormous power of setting the rules of the game and shaping the actors involved in the process. Moreover, the policy intertwined the domestic and international spheres (Sjursen & Smith, p.127), therefore, the EU is not only influential in shaping the involved actors but also influential in their international stands.

This became handy, particularly in the post-Cold War era. After the demise of the Soviet threat, former socialist states set eyes on the EU (then the European Community) and the EU chose its enlargement policy to spread democracy, prosperity and security to former socialist states of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Smith, 2011, p.300). It could be said that this was the start of the 'widening vs. deepening' debate. When the heat of the debate flared up, European Commission made it clear that "widening must not be at the expense of deepening" (European Commission, 1992, p.10). However, the focus of the debate was not whether to enlarge, but how and when (Smith, 2011, p.302). External and internal factors had to be convenient for enlargement.

To propose such a perspective, the organization had to be prepared. It must consider its capabilities and the external situation. For starters, it tackled the deepening issue with Maastricht Treaty (Smith, 2011, p.302) and later, in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council meeting, the Union set worriers' mind at ease by introducing membership conditions. Earlier, the Treaty of Rome, Art. 237

stated that being a 'European state' was enough to apply for a membership. Now, with the Copenhagen criteria, aspirant states have to fulfil economic and political requirements and to approve the *acquis communautaire*. A little while later, in 1999, Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 5&49) strengthened these conditions by adding respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law, and at the Helsinki European Council the EU stated the good neighbourliness as an added condition to the list (Smith, 2011, p.306). Consequently, the EU dealt with the concerns and embarked on meeting the expectations of former socialist states. Smith (2011, p. 312) argued that given its rhetorical and treaty-based commitments, the EU had little choice to enlarge to the democratizing former socialist states. Building upon its normative power, the Union had to act appropriately, thus the initiatives to diffuse of its norms, values and principles increased with the end of the collapse of the Iron Curtain.

Following these developments, the countries who expressed their desire to be a part of the organization began their course of Europeanization. Undeniably, the EU hit two birds with one stone with its enlargement policy. While transforming the former socialist states into more EU-like states, the EU also shaped the post-Cold War European order. The promise of membership encouraged states to undertake political and economic reforms and to integrate with EU members, which in return contributed to the stable and peaceful environment in the continent (Smith,2011, p.300). Especially after the incorporation of ten new members in 2004, the EU seemed more eager to use its power of attraction to ensure stability and prosperity across Europe. 'Return to Europe' motivated the CEECs to adhere to the conditions laid down by the EU and, in the end, they adapted liberal democratic norms and values (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p.520). The success of this round of enlargement had an overwhelming impact on the organization. The EU has accomplished to configure and reconfigure the post-communist states after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989 through its enlargement and integration policies (Fagan, 2010, p.18). From that point onwards, enlargement policy is often believed to be the most successful foreign policy of the Union. It contributed to the transition to

democracy, respect for human rights, minority rights, conflict resolution, security and stability in Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p.918).

The achievements of the EU received a blow when the Union did not want to engage in the disturbance in the Balkan Peninsula. Before getting into details, it is necessary to clarify which states belong to the Balkan region and what was the EU's approach towards those states. The Balkans is a geopolitical term containing many political units that compose the Balkan Peninsula. South-East Europe (SEE), for instance, is a political unit comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Western Balkans is another political unit involving all former republics of Yugoslavia and Albania (Elbasani, 2008, p.293). This political term is started to use at the beginning of early 2000s and usually refers to the countries in the Balkan peninsula who are not a member of the EU. Therefore, there are two different groupings in the region. At the very beginning of the 1990s, the Balkan region witnessed (a) the transition of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania to democracy, including free elections, market liberalisation and the improvement of civil society (b) the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Kavalski, 2003, p.198). The EU, considering these developments, provided two distinct dynamics because when Bulgaria and Romania launched their processes of economic and political change, the Western Balkan countries were still struggling in a series of ethnic conflicts and succession wars. The EU saw Bulgaria and Romania as suitable countries who could follow the path of the Central European States and pursue their Europeanization processes. However, the former republics of Yugoslavia and Albania were subjected to a more different approach that kept them away from the Union. Yet, Fagan (2010, p.19) emphasized that the EU cannot be blamed entirely for the differentiation of its approach towards the region. The dissimilar socialist period, the Yugoslav crisis, different political culture and legacies have configured the countries. In a word, the EU approved the differentiation of its attitude towards the Balkan Peninsula.

However, soon, their approach towards the Western Balkan countries turned out to be inadequate. The Yugoslav crisis during the 1990s and the possibility of the

spread of the crisis made European countries very anxious. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which was located in southeast Europe, started crumbling when its legendary leader Joseph Broz Tito died in 1980. Yugoslav crisis exacerbated with raised tensions and encouraged hatred among nationalist forces in the country and eventually resulted in bloodshed (Radeljić, 2010, p.115). The Yugoslav Wars "shocked civilized West" (Lucarelli, 2000, p.1) and wanted to stay away from the trouble-making part of the continent. The Balkan Peninsula has always been identified with negative connotations such as fragmentation (see Todorova 2003). This perception could be seen in the approach of the EU during the 1990s. Although the EU committed itself to the transformation of former socialist states of CEE and to enlarge to include those countries into the Union, this approach was not offered to the countries in the Western Balkans.

At the outset of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the EU implemented *terra incognita* approach to keep the turbulence at arm's length (Smith, 2000, p.817). The Union favoured in acting in the fields of crisis management and humanitarian aid (Jano, 2008, p.143), and put diplomatic pressure to manage the crisis remotely. However, this approach failed horribly. At the international level, the EU was perceived as the main actor who able to lead the international action towards the crisis in the Balkans (Elbasani, 2008, p.295). In contrast, the EU could not be able to halt the violence in its backyard and as a result, this situation damaged the reputation of the EU and its actorness at the international level. If an actor tries to prove its actorness, power and capabilities at the international level, then it should be able to handle any kind of challenge in its neighbourhood. In addition to the failure of foreign policy, the EU's normative power identity took a hit as well. Unfortunately, the EU became aware of its blunder only towards the end of the conflict. The escalation of succession wars and especially the long Bosnian War stained the European Common Foreign Policy hugely (Elbasani, 2008, p.295). That's why the EU kicked off finding an exit strategy and a clear approach towards the region. The spirit of the "Hour of Europe" had been found unfortunately close to the end of the Wars. Subsequently, the Union involved in the post-conflict environment and assumed the responsibility for the future of the region.

After the end of the Bosnian War and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the EU appeared to consider "the Balkans as a more part of Europe rather than a region far from its doors" (Jano, 2008, p.144). In the post-conflict era, the EU focused on how to transform the chaotic and unpredictable region into a stable and peaceful part of Europe. In 1996, the EU launched the Royamount Process that aimed to boost regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations (Elbasani, 2008, p.295). In the words of Türkeş and Gökgöz (2006, pp.674-675), the Royamount Process was a sample of preventive diplomacy for the EU to stabilize the region in the post-Dayton context.

A year later, the Union took firm action and further specified the terms of its new approach, Regional Approach, involving all countries in which the EU did not sign any association agreements. This approach created a new group of countries (the WB countries) comprising the states of former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) and Albania (Elbasani, 2008, pp. 295-296). The conditions like respect for human rights, minority rights, the rule of law, democratic principles, regional cooperation and market economy reforms set forth so that bilateral relations among the WB countries could build (Türkeş & Gökgöz, 2006, p.675). Under the Regional Approach, the conditionality applied in the WBs was unlike the cases of the EU had before. The biggest difference was that there was no prospect for rapid membership. If the countries meet the conditions, then they would be received rewards such as trade concessions or financial assistance (Türkeş & Gökgöz, 2006, p.676). The approach reinforced the conditionality to foster the EU relations with the WBs offering financial assistance, unilateral trade preferences and cooperation agreements (Elbasani, 2008, p.296). Shortly, the EU acknowledged that the Regional Approach would not encounter a positive reaction from the region mainly because of the lack of long-term strategy and a membership perspective, particularly at a time when most of the Western Balkan states prioritized integration into the Union (Jano, 2008, p.145).

The occurrence and the escalation of the Kosovo War of 1999 demonstrated that the EU's approach was not sufficient to deal with the challenges in the WBs. It pushed the European policy-makers to update their approach and move beyond

crisis management understanding (Elbasani, 2008, p.297). The EU, whether wanted it or not, was in need of a stronger and more comprehensive approach because once again its credibility was at stake (Türkeş & Gökgöz, 2006, p.676). After the NATO intervention in 1999, the EU and its policy-makers began to discuss the range of offers they could give to the WBs. At a special meeting in Cologne in 1999, they introduced the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which aimed at coordinating the efforts of the EU members in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and introducing membership perspective for the Western Balkan Six (WB6) including Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro (Jano, 2008, p.145). The Stability Pact (SP) is regarded as a political commitment of the EU and the start of the project of Europeanization of the WB6. In 2000, at the Feira European Council meeting, the EU confirmed that the WB countries are the potential candidates for EU membership and later, in 2003 at the Thessaloniki European Council meeting, the EU reaffirmed its commitment towards the region (Jano, 2008, p.146) by saying the future of the WB countries lies within the EU (European Council, 2003, p.2). The EU has willingly accepted the challenge coming from the WBs and expressed that "For new democracies, Europe is a powerful symbol, signifying their fundamental values and aspirations." (European Commission, 2003, p.4).

In a nutshell, the EU's involvement in the WBs and the acceptance of the region as a part of Europe had their roots in the chaotic and unpleasant events of the 1990s. International community with the EU and the USA leading intervened the Balkan wars, first in Bosnia in 1995 and later in Kosovo in 1999 (Serwer, 20119, p.14). At that period, the Balkans was a priority for the American foreign policy and their goal was to stabilize the region in a way of self-sustaining that does not require an external intervention (Woehrel, 2005, p.1). Around the same time, it was argued that America had secondary interests instead of vital or strategic ones (Serwer,2019, p.17). On top of this, when the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA happened, the priority of the foreign policy shifted and the Western Balkans have receded from the minds of Americans (Woehrel, 2005, p.1). Briefly, the USA was out (not entirely) and the EU was in. Even though it took a long time for the EU to recognize its sense of responsibility in the WBs, eventually the EU

widened its integration policy to include the WB6 and initiate the Europeanization processes of those countries. Owing to its normative power, which again has developed simultaneously with the Union itself, the EU attempted to diffuse its core principles to the WB6. In addition to the process of Europeanization, the EU promoted the consolidation of democracy in the WB6. One might tell that the EU has begun to show its grandeur in the WBs since the early 2000s, even though it has faced with difficulties every once in a while. The above-mentioned period was necessary to be explained because democracy promotion efforts in the WBs came after these developments. As a part of the transformation of the WB6, the EU has tried to shape the perceptions of those countries in many fields. Thus, in the political field, the EU initiated to encourage the WB6 to recognize its core norms and values, and to accept its own understanding of liberal democracy. In the following section, the framework of democracy promotion efforts of the EU in the region will be unfolded.

4.2. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The genuine desire of the EU in the Western Balkans is to shape regional countries in many fields for the golden carrot of membership. The region is ridden with leftovers from ethnic conflict and succession wars. To preserve peace and security across Europe, the problems left from the Yugoslav crisis need to be solved and reconciliation among regional countries must be ensured. Hence, when the WB countries expressed their eagerness to become a part of the Union, the EU decided that the best solution for all these problems was to offer a membership perspective and to start the Europeanization processes of the WB6, which means the transformation of the WB6 not just in the structural but also in a cognitive sense. Using socialization as a mechanism of Europeanization, the EU aimed to transfer its rules, norms, principles to the WB6 and to achieve full transformation of the regional countries. Along with the deficient state capacity, clientelist networks and unsettled borders, the WB6 need to handle ethnic tensions and learn to show tolerance to one another. Admittedly, the process of Europeanization would be loaded and long for the WB6. Nonetheless, in this

section, the intent is not to explore the Europeanization of the WB6 from several angles, but to find out the efforts set forward by the EU to bring political change and to establish liberal democracy.

After having miserably failed to prevent the wars in Yugoslavia and the events that happened as a consequence of wars, the EU played its last card and presented membership perspective to war-torn countries of the WBs. The region posed a massive challenge to the EU because of the political and economic problems at hand. Moreover, the credibility of the EU's foreign policy depends on the democratization and revitalization of the WB6 (Vachudova, 2005b, p.68). So as to succeed, the EU paid attention to the region and poured greater sources to bring positive changes. With the start of the Europeanization process, reformist and moderate politicians were empowered to introduce domestic change in many areas (Börzel, 2011, p.7). During that period, the democratization process came into the picture inherently to confront problems such as building political consensus and dealing with ethnic harmony. Barbulescu and Troncota (2013, p.72) emphasized that there is no Europeanization without democratization in the WBs. According to their views, if Europeanization is defined as the export of democratic rule, then it includes a process of accepting EU legislation by virtue of already existing democratic practices (Barbulescu and Troncota, 2013, p.72). Therefore, it is clear that the Europeanization and democratization of the WB6 are connected (Börzel, 2011, p.7). In other words, normative power EU has involved in the post-conflict environment of the Balkans in the stage of the transition to democracy, using enlargement as its best foreign policy to convince local actors in democracy building for a future EU accession (Barbulescu and Troncota, 2013, p.65). Next, the democracy promotion efforts of the EU in the WBs will be studied.

4.2.1. Promoting Political Change in the WBs

As a unique organization, the EU tries to learn from its mistakes to perfect its crafts. Along the way, the events that emerged have changed the organization and made the EU blossom significantly. Likewise, the events in the Balkans during the 1990s have changed the EU as much as the EU is now trying to

change and transform the WB6 (Belloni, 2009, p.317). The widespread belief on the extension of membership prospect to the WBs stems from disillusionment with the failures at the time of the Yugoslav Wars (Belloni, 2009, p.314). At the start, the EU identified its approach towards the region as a conflict prevention strategy, yet, quickly realized that the WBs needed a long-term strategy providing multi-ethnic coexistence and democracy (Belloni, 2009, pp.313-314). Attributed to its normative power, the EU accepted its responsibility towards the region and committed itself to ensure the transformation of the WB6 in accordance with the standards it set.

In order to accomplish the transformation of war-torn countries, the EU must ensure the transition to democracy. The establishment of democracy and the implementation of democratic reforms would contribute to all levels of society and make sure the irreversibility of the peace in the region as well as in the continent. For this reason, according to Balfour and Stratulat (2011, p.vii), democracy is perceived as an end, which displays the values and norms the EU recognized as the essence of the organization, but also as a means to an end to manage the predicament of the WBs. The EU saw democracy as the only solution for the WBs to consolidate their states and societies. The design of democracy is to empower ordinary citizens to have their voices count and to govern themselves based on mutually agreed preferences (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011, p.5). By this means, with the embracement of democracy and democratic norms, the WB6 would be able to settle their issues more easily. At the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the enlargement process was regarded to be the best anchor to endorse the political and democratic transformation of the WBs (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011, p.1). Consequently, since the early 2000s, the EU has been intensively involved in democracy promotion in the region (Richter, 2012, p.508).

The character of the EU made enlargement policy so successful in promoting democracy (Vachudova, 2005b, p.69). The benefits of joining the Union motived the aspirant countries to meet the requirements. Vachudova (2005b, p.69) highlights that the political will to satisfy the requirements set by the EU demonstrates the effectiveness of conditionality during the pre-accession

process. The political will of the aspirant countries combining with the EU's leverage towards them culminated in successful enlargement. In this matter, the asymmetric interdependence, enforcement and meritocracy are the factors that created the EU's active leverage towards the aspirant countries (Vachudova, 2005b, p.69). Thereby, on the grounds of its normative power, the EU chose to use its leverage towards the WB6 to promote democracy through various tools such as conditionality, assistance and monitoring. The tool of conditionality is more of an application of carrots and sticks method to pressure the targeted state or society in direction of compliance with the terms the EU presented (Djordjevic, 2008, p.83).

The main tool of the EU in promoting democracy is political conditionality. Pridham (2007, p.446) said that the EU has exploited its leverage over the candidate and potential candidate states to meet its democratic standards by imposing conditionality in return for accession prospect. At this point, it is obligatory to make a distinction between political and the *acquis*-related conditionality. The former is about the commonly accepted norms, values, practices and political standards, while the latter is more technical and refers to laws, resolutions, agreements, judicial decisions and declarations of the EU (Anastasakis, 2008, p.367). Both are at play in the region at the same time. As the main tool of the EU's democracy promotion, "Political conditionality is associated with the democratization of post-authoritarian countries aspiring and/or negotiating to become members of the EU, and is seen to have a positive impact on democratic transition and consolidation of their political systems" (Anastasakis, 2008, p.366). The use of political conditionality is usually perceived as a necessary evil to put pressure on local incumbents to comply with the criteria (Anastasakis, 2008, p.365). The non-negotiable political criteria include: pluralist democracy, respect for human and minority rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression, separation of powers, civil society, fight against corruption and good neighbourly relations (Anastasakis, 2008, p.367). Over the course of journey, the EU has developed other tools like financial assistance and monitoring for the potential EU members to assist their reform processes. With the combination of its tools, motivation and leverage, the EU conceived an efficient democracy

promotion practice in the WBs. That said, the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the WBs via political conditionality led to some modification in its enlargement policy (Pridham, 2008, p.57). EU conditionality in the WBs -in addition to the Copenhagen criteria and the agreements that signed with each Balkan country after the Yugoslav Wars such as the Dayton, Ohrid and Belgrade Agreements-contains the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the Stability Pact (SP) that later replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008 (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011, p.7). Briefly, the EU through these approaches set additional criteria for the WB6 to achieve irreversible transformation and to ensure the establishment and consolidation of democracy.

As noted above, by the early 2000s, the EU accepted its role as a leading actor in the WBs and the region became its laboratory of post-conflict reconstruction (Barbulescu & Troncota, 2013, p.64). The Kosovo War of 1999 sent a clear message to the Union about the magnitude of the Balkans, so the Stability Pact was introduced simultaneously with the approval of Resolution 1244 (Türkeş & Gökgöz, 2006, p.677). It was officially launched at an international summit in 1999 in Sarajevo and received the support of many countries and major international organizations (Elbasani 2008, p.297). The SP was the brainchild of the Regional Approach towards the region and seen as the first attempt to Europeanize the Balkans (Kavalski, 2003, p.202). The pact aimed at advancing peace, democracy, economic prosperity and stability throughout the region. The cornerstone of the SP was regional cooperation. It called on countries firstly cooperate among themselves and then with the international actors (Elbasani, 2008, p.297). With its broad scope, the SP hoped to facilitate several processes that would make the European political, social and economic dynamics part of the logic of the Balkans (Kavalski, 2003, p.203). Even though the SP stressed shared values, regional ownership and partnership, there occurred some doubts about the nature of the pact. It was argued that the pact was an international intervention to succeed in particular goals of intervening states (Elbasani, 2008, p.298). In spite of these arguments, the pact showed a sign of commitment and support towards the region and soon it was overtaken by the SAP.

To make it clear, the pact is complementary to the SAP and accession process (Türkeş & Gökgöz, 2006, p.679). The SAP represents the comprehensive approach of the European Commission and presented it to the WB6. It is a formulation of the principle of conditionality and the bilateral contractual relations between the EU and each Balkan country. The SAP draws upon the experiences of previous enlargement processes to accomplish the transformation through the promotion of democratic, economic and institutional reforms (Kavalski, 2003, p.203). For the purpose of completing transformation of the WB countries successfully, the SAP also underlined the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia particularly for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (Pippan, 2004, p.225). Hence, the SAP builds upon the Regional Approach but surpassed it with its comprehensive scope, resources, conditions and most importantly the promised reward.

The process consists of three phases: first, a preparatory phase that would set the framework of the needed reforms to prepare the countries for the signing of the agreement; the second phase of actual negotiation about the adoption of the agreement; the third phase about the implementation of the agreement that discusses the potential candidate status (Schenker, 2008, p.2). With regard to the SAP, the speed on the road to the EU would depend on the merits of each country individually (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012, p.26). The process comprises of six areas: (a) economic and trade relations with and within the region, (b) development and partial redirection of existing economic and financial assistance, (c) increased assistance for democratization, civil society, education and institution-building, (d) cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs, (e) development of political dialogue also at the regional level and, (f) negotiation of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) (European Commission, 1999). Here, the SAA could be grasped the same as European Agreements that signed with the CEECs (Durovic & Jacimovic, 2014, p.14). The signing of the agreement simply means that the country has chosen to become a member of the Union. Through the process, the EU monitors the progress and judges the country and if the country meets the conditions, then it signs an SAA with that country.

Stabilization and Association Agreements	Year signed
Albania	2006
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2008
North Macedonia	2001
Kosovo	2015
Montenegro	2007
Serbia	2008

Table 3: The EU's Agreements with the WB6 (Author's own collection)

At the Zagreb Summit of 2000, the EU said that accession of the WB6 based on the Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria and the SAA should be regarded as the first step towards the accession to the EU (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012, p.32). Later, at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, although the membership perspective of the WB countries confirmed, the limited capacity of the regional countries was under the spotlight. Because of the inability of the administrations and the possibility of incompatibility with the reform agenda, the EU identified short-, medium-, and long-term priorities (Schenker, 2008, p.13). The road to EU membership was affirmed to be long. Türkeş and Gökgöz (2006) interpreted the outcome of the Thessaloniki Summit and said that the EU "did not go beyond confirming the status quo -neither total exclusion nor rapid integration-" (p.683), thus failed to meet the expectations of the WB countries.

The strengths and weaknesses of these approaches might be controversial, still, there is one solid outcome that the EU approved the belonging of the WB countries to the Union. This position echoed time and time again. The transformation process of the WB6 is long, so the organization must assure these countries' place in the Union and lead them to adopt regional ownership. The countries in the region have many problems and the remedy for them starts with cooperation. Bechev (2006, p.34) underlined that although the SP put together in a hasty manner, which aimed at post-conflict reconstruction in the WBs, the stress of regional cooperation as its core objective was an important move. When the time has come to change the scope of the cooperation to highlight long-term sustainability and to support the region's path towards the organization, in its 2006 Final Report of the Senior Review Group on the Stability Pact the EU

declared the constitution of a Regional Cooperation Council (Delevic, 2007, p.20).

After two years of the transition from the SP, the RCC became fully operational, supporting and initiating regional cooperation under the guidance of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) (Regional Cooperation Council, 2010, p.1). In addition to its five plus one priorities, namely economic and social development, infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, building human capital and parliamentary cooperation, the RCC also supports giving political guidance and working to enhance the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the SEE countries (Rotta, 2008, p.66). Regional cooperation is viewed as a strategy and an opportunity for the Balkan countries to restructure themselves in many areas (Monastiriotis, 2008, p.4), so as to achieve not just incorporation to the EU but also stability and security in the region. Concerning the political area, regional cooperation is crucial for reconciliation, overcoming extreme nationalism, promoting mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, tolerance, political dialogue and good political relations (European Commission, 2005a, p.4).

Although the encouragement for the transformation and the political change of the EU was embraced by the WB6, the large-scale transformation is not costless. To support those countries to carry on their reform processes, since the 1990s, the Union has introduced many financial assistance programmes ranging from humanitarian aid during the crises to reconstruction in the post-conflict period. Before proceeding any further, it should be reminded that democracy promotion could be exerted through direct and indirect approaches. The direct approach to democracy promotion, which focused on the impact on political institutions and processes such as elections and legislatures, and the support for political actors, is exerted through democracy assistance (Grimm & Mathis, 2018, p.166). Whereas, the indirect approach to democracy promotion, which prioritized the improvement of the conditions of environment for democratization like peace, stability and socio-economic development, is exerted via development assistance (Grimm & Mathis, 2018, p.166). Since the start of the dissolution of Yugoslavia,

the WB countries have received various assistance through both direct and indirect approaches.

First, the countries of the WBs received humanitarian assistance and disaster relief via European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and later they benefited from the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE). The original goal of the PHARE was to ease the reconstruction of candidate states to adopt *acquis communautaire* but also provided aid in various areas such as humanitarian assistance (Grimm & Mathis, 2015, p.920). To benefit from the PHARE and OBNOVA, the country's commitment to democratic reforms, recognition of human and minority rights and compliance to the peace agreement were considered as the prior factor (Pippan, 2004, p.224). For the early period of the 2000s, the WB countries received financial assistance through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programme, replacing OBNOVA and PHARE (Anastasakis & Bechev, 2003, p.7). "The CARDS strategies will be part of a coherent international community response to help the region meet its *substantial development* and *SAP challenges*" (emphasis added) (European Commission, 2006a, p.8). Therefore, it is clear that during that time the SAP was recognized as the main approach towards the region and the CARDS was the financial assistance programme for it to help the countries to accomplish their reforms. The WB6 received financial assistance through these programmes, but regarding democracy promotion, they needed more. After the establishment of a stable and secure environment, the foundation of democratic institutions, the empowerment of political actors as well as the creation of favourable conditions for democracy such as a fair playing field are necessary steps for democracy promotion (Grimm & Mathis, 2015, p.918). This is exceptionally hard in post-conflict societies, so democracy assistance is a must for the WB6.

Seeing the situation, the EU introduced the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) displacing the previous five programmes – PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, the Turkey programme, and CARDS to meet the pre-accession needs with a single framework (European Commission, 2009, p.7). IPA provides

assistance in many forms to candidate countries and potential candidates to strengthen their democratic institutions, the rule of law, to promote fundamental freedoms, human and minority rights, social inclusion, to empower civil society, education etc. (European Commission, 2009, p.6). It is simply designed to help countries in many areas. IPA has five components: capacity-building, cross border cooperation, regional development, human resources development and rural development (European Commission, 2009a, p.8). IPA II represents the continuation of the programme. Though the general philosophy remains, the new generation underscored compatibility with the fundamental first approach and focused on good governance and socio-economic objectives (Miscevic & Mrak, 2017, pp.200-201). Additionally, the EU initiated the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programme. The goals of the EIDHR are defined to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, so the programme supports the receiving countries particularly in these areas (Blomberg, 2012, p.20). Deducing therefrom, one might state that today the IPA and the EIDHR are the main financial assistance of the EU in its democracy promotion efforts.

Programme	Full Name	Years	Total Amount (€)	Purpose
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office	Since 1994	7,1 billion (2014-2020)	Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies	1989-2006	Approx. 10,9 billion	Reconstruction, pre-accession assistance
OBNOVA	European Commission's Reconstructing Programme	1996-2000	400 million	Reconstruction
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development to the Western Balkans	2000-2006	5 billion	Regional cooperation, stabilization, economic reforms
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance	I-2007-2013	I-11,526 million II-11.698 million	Pre-Accession assistance, political, economic, institutional reforms

		II-2014-2020		
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights	Since 2007	Approx. 11,2 billion	Promotion of democracy and human rights

Table 4: EU's Financial Assistance Programme to the WBs (Author's own collections, Source: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en)

In sum, with the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and particularly after the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, the EU embraced its responsibility towards the WBs and committed itself for the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. In order to achieve the transformation of the WB countries, the Union presented the membership perspective. Through the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria and the additional conditions that laid down with SAP and the RCC which are complementary to the accession criteria, the EU aimed at shaping the WB6 into would-be members. By means of facilitating the process, the EU put forward several financial assistance programmes noted above. In substance, the EU connected its democracy promotion efforts in the region with the enlargement policy and employed conditionality rigorously. While both political and *acquis*-related conditionality are used to transform the WB6, the focus is on the changes in the political area and the embracement of democracy. This section explained the framework of the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the WBs. The next section will concentrate only on the democracy promotion efforts of the EU in Serbia.

4.3. THE EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS IN SERBIA

In the aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars, one cannot deny the importance of Serbia in the Balkan Peninsula. International community, especially the European Union, saw this fact to prevent chaos and horror and to preserve peace, security, and stability in the region as well as in the whole continent. Rather than ad hoc and reactive responses, they needed to have a forward-looking approach. Their first initiative was to provide the successors of Yugoslavia as far as peaceful departure, while keeping Serbia in check to avoid any disorder. In the early 1990s, the US and its allies including the EU agreed a kind of foreign intervention in the form of democracy assistance to the republics of Yugoslavia to help them

in training, material resources to political parties, independent media and civil society organizations (Spoerri, 2015, p.3). They designed democracy aid to bolstering political parties and electoral processes so that to promote peace and democracy in the region. In the same way, aid to Serbia rested on a single objective during that period which was regime change. At first, between 1990-96, in Serbia, there was absence of aid and further Serbia was subjected to international sanctions. People did not want to get involve in Serbia, on the contrary, "most people in Washington wanted to build a wall around Serbia and let them rot…" (as cited in Spoerri, 2015, p.48). This approach was interpreted as the international community's intention to help Milosevic stay in power. Without external support, his opponents were outspent by the regime (Spoerri, 2015, p.54). Whatever was the reason behind the absence of aid towards Serbia, the approach altered over the 2000s. Some time later, they realized that the defeat of Slobodan Milosevic was a must in pursuance of the successful transformation of Serbia to modern democratic state, which in return would solve a lot of the problems at hand. Thereby, international community started to support politicians which were opposed Milosevic and were moderate towards the outside world. Spoerri (2015) stated that Serbia represented a new direction for democracy assistance which the goal was not democracy but the replacement of the head of state (p.6). In the end, with the October 2000 incident, Milosevic was overthrown.

However, soon, they realized that the problems such as nationalist sentiments, war criminals, sovereignty issues etc. remained exactly as they were and were not going away all of a sudden. Moreover, these issues were interlinked with the issues of other countries in the region, so if a disturbance occurs in Serbia, then it would likely to spread into other countries as well. That's why, international community cannot ignore Serbia and must ensure the transformation of the country. This was extremely hard for the international community because Serbs had developed a distrust against the West, specifically after the NATO intervention to Kosovo, and were sceptical of their offerings. Knowing this, international community with the EU leading -because of the shift in US' focus- refrained from intervening internal affairs of Serbia directly, meanwhile indirectly encouraging them to make reforms. Although democracy aid may at times have

helped Serbia, in the post-Milosevic era, aid has often been ineffective in promoting democratization. More was needed and the EU finally stepped up in Serbia.

The democratic changes started to take place in Serbia after 2000. In the post-Milosevic era, Serbian politicians prepared an agenda to collaborate with European countries and pursued the path to the EU membership (Bobic, 2016, p.79). The orientation towards the Union came as no surprise because during that time all the successors of the SFRY focused on getting EU membership. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, EU membership is not easy and requires adoption of certain matters. In simple terms, Serbia needs to become a modern, democratic, EU-like state. However, in the early 2000s, the legal and constitutional structure of Serbia (back then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later Union of Serbia and Montenegro) were not organized to meet the needs of any modern and democratic state (ICG, 2001, p. xiv). In fact, many structures and people that belong to old regime persisted to be a part of the state. For instance, Milosevic's wife was a member of the Parliament until 2003 (Vejvoda, 2004, p.38). Although, the fall of Milosevic brought political rehabilitation (Kostovicova, 2004, p.23), the weight of the past, institutional weaknesses, territorial disputes, the arrest of war criminals and their extraction to The Hague, nationalistic sentiments, intolerance so on restrained the transition to democracy. Pavlovic (2020, p.20) stated that "Rather than building strong democratic institutions that would prevent electoral manipulation, media control, public office abuse, and various sorts of extraction, the post-Milosevic political elite did a poor job, thus leaving democratic institutional design unfinished." Even with the support of the EU, the democratic path of the Serbia was non-linear (Bieber, 2018a, p.31). In this section, the concentration will be on the establishment and consolidation of democracy in Serbia and the impact of the EU's democracy promotion efforts as well as membership perspective on its progress.

4.3.1. Serbia's EU Path

As one of the countries among the WB6, Serbia was involved in the membership perspective offered at Thessaloniki Summit and in approaches such as the SAP,

the RCC, and all the financial assistance programmes demonstrated in the previous section. Like other WB countries, Serbia was & is exposed to double processes notably Europeanization and democratization, hereby faced many conditions prescribed by the EU. Besides Copenhagen Criteria and the requirements set particularly towards the WBs, Serbia had & has its own issues to handle before EU membership. Serbia's path towards the EU has bounded with its democratization process, respecting human and minority rights, compliance with the ICTY and solution of Kosovo issue (Fagan, 2010, p.115). Overcoming these issues would help Serbia in its process of transformation and on its way to the Union.

Bazic (2019) divided the relationship between Serbia and the EU into two stages: The first stage starts with the Yugoslav Wars in 1991 and lasted until the end of Milosevic's regime in 2000 and the second stage begins with the establishment of pro-EU government in the aftermath of the overthrown of Milosevic and proceeds until now (pp.306-307). In the first stage, Serbia was subjected to international isolation after its attitude towards the Yugoslav Wars and Kosovo crisis. A new opportunity for rapprochement between the EU and Serbia occurred when the EU announced the Stability Pact, yet its acceptance to the Pact came after ousting Milosevic in 2000 (Djordjevic, 2008, p.88). In the first stage, Serbia was not able to tackle requirements set by the EU seriously because its political system was not mature enough to meet the terms of democratization (Djordjevic, 2008, p.89). Milosevic had used the socialist heritage to limit pluralism, enforce a nationalistic and authoritarian environment, party control over state resources (Bieber,2020, p.19) that resulted in state weakness and capture, weak opposition and control over media which prevented the progress towards democracy. With the fall of Milosevic, the EU invited new president Kostunica to the Feira EU Council, where Serbia gained the status of potential candidate (Djordjevic, 2008, p.89) and through EU membership perspective EU started to use its leverage to make political changes in Serbia.

In the second stage, with the new political elites that were pro-EU, Serbia started to get close to the EU, which they thought was necessary for the stabilization and

consolidation of the country (Bazic, 2019, p.307). Since 2000, Serbia began its process under the SAP. In 2004, the European Council established European Partnership for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro to employ conditionality in order to strengthen the democratization process, yet it was failed due to the status redefinition of the common state (Djordjevic, 2008, pp. 89-90). A twin-track approach presented to both Serbia and Montenegro after their union became unfunctional and both assessed in a feasibility study as ready to negotiate their SAA in 2005 (Bobic, 2016, p.79). However, negotiation on a SAA called off as Serbia did not cooperate with the ICTY until the deadlock overcome in 2007 (Djordjevic, 2008, p.90). Despite overcoming the deadlock regarding the full cooperation with the ICTY, another issue emerged soon after. The announcement of Kosovo's independence in 2008 and the readiness of the Western countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo interrupted the accession process (Bazic, 2019, pp.308-309). Even though the EU signed the SAA with Serbia on 29 April 2008, it placed another condition for Serbia-normalization of relations with Kosovo (Bazic, 2019, p.309). So far, one can state that Serbian stateness and statehood, and the cooperation with the ICTY halted the democratization process in the country and blocked the progress on the way to the EU (Djordjevic, 2008, p.90). The resolution of these sensitive issues would accelerate the speed towards the Union but Serbs were reluctant to approach them because they strongly linked with Serbian identity and culture.

In 2011, European Commission demanded Serbia to meet certain tasks affiliated with judicial reforms, improvement in the regional cooperation, the continuation of economic reforms, the completion of cooperation with the ICTY so on, so that candidate status could be given to Serbia (Bazic, 2019, p.309). Serbia succeed in the cooperation of the extraction of war criminals to The Hague, regardless of the heavy reaction in the country, and consequently, it was granted as a candidate country in 2012 and the negotiation process for accession started in 2014. Around the same time a new Serbian government headed by Alexander Vucic (then Prime Minister, now President) took the office and declared EU integration as one of the government's priorities (Burazer, 2020, p.2). This stance and the signing of Brussels Agreement in 2013 welcomed by the EU which

provided Vucic a potential for manoeuvring at home vis-à-vis the Union (Radeljic, 2018, p.71). As has been pointed out repeatedly, cooperation with the ICTY and normalization with Kosovo were emphasized as main obstacles in front of Serbia's democratization and its future towards the EU but recent developments seemed to satisfy the Union because they failed to reinvigorate of reforms especially in areas of democracy and rule of law (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2020, p.11).

In the absence of strong political institutions and accountable officeholders to consolidate checks and balances in the country, the elected ruler, in this case Vucic, could further erode the existing balances and justify his actions through the support he receives from the EU (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2020, p.12). Despite authoritarian tendencies of Vucic, he has rewarded with improvements in Serbia's accession process and called as "anchor of stability" in the region which used to intensify his grip on power (Castaldo, 2020b, p.15). The EU has intentionally avoided adopting a firmer stance against illiberal policies of Serbia because they expect Vucic's government to serve the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of the EU in Serbia and in the whole region (Radeljic, 2018, p.72). By way of illustration, in the 2015 migration crisis, Serbia played an important role in handling refugee crisis and directed the flow of refugees from Syria to contribute regional stability (Gafuri &Muftuler-Bac, 2020, p.12). In short, even with democratic backsliding, Serbia has continued to receive support from the EU. So far, Belgrade has opened 18 chapters and provisionally closed 2 chapters. The slow pace of reforms and the lack of progress in state of democracy appeared to be no killjoy neither for the EU nor for Serbia as long as status quo remained the same in Serbia-which benefits Vucic - as well as in the continent -which benefits the EU-.

Year	Event
2000	FRY joined the SAP at EU Summit in Biarritz
2003	EU membership promise at Thessaloniki Summit
2004	Twin-Track approach to Serbia & Montenegro
2005	Negotiations on the SAA started
2006	Negotiations on the SAA called off due to insufficient cooperation with the ICTY
2007	SAA negotiations restarted after Serbia's cooperation with The Hague
2008	SAA signed

2009	Visa liberalization & Serbia applied for EU membership
2010	The Interim Trade Agreement that signed between Serbia and the EU came into force
2011	European Commission's opinion about Serbia regarding its candidacy status
2012	Serbia became a candidate country
2013	SAA entered into force & Council approved the Commission's recommendation to open negotiations with Serbia
2014	First Intergovernmental Conference between the EU and Serbia
2015	Chapters 32 "Financial control" and 35 "other issues- Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo" are opened.
2016	Chapters 23 "Judiciary and fundamental rights", 24 "Justice, freedom and security", 5 "Public procurement" and 25 "Science and Research" are opened. Chapter 25 provisionally closed.
2017	Chapters 20 "Enterprise and industrial policy", 26 "Education and culture", 7 "Intellectual property law", 29 "Customs Union", 6 "Company law" and 30 "External relations" are opened. Chapter 26 provisionally closed.
2018	Chapters 13 "Fisheries", 33 "Financial and budgetary provisions", 17 "Economic and monetary policy" and 18 "Statistics" are opened.
2019	Chapters 9 "Financial services" and 4 "Free movement of capital" are opened.
2020	Commission proposes Economic & Investment Plan to support the WBs
2021	Opening of cluster 4 on Green agenda and sustainable connectivity

Table 5: Serbia's EU Path (Author's own collections, Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/serbia_en)

Bazic (2019) advocated that "Serbia's European path have been achieved with significant compromises and ultimatums, which was frustrating for the ruling elites, and which has fuelled the anti-European mood and opposition to Serbia's accession to the EU in the political public." (p.315). Serbs were unenthusiastic for particular demand of the EU like Kosovo issue and the cooperation with the ICTY that they thought could lead further weakening of the country. The cost of EU membership and democratization caused second thoughts every once in a while, hence resulted in non-linear democratization. However, although the EU's demands and conditions often perceived as ultimatums, they are essential for Serbia if the country really wants to make peace with the past, reconciliate with its neighbours and transforms its country. Moreover, the EU has tried to ease the weight on the shoulders of Serbia by offering financial assistance not only for the structural areas but also for the transformation of society's social perception to embrace modernity and democracy. According to the Delegation of the European Union in the Republic of Serbia (2020), since 2001, Serbia has received 3,000,000,000 € from the EU funds via CARDS (2001-2006), IPA I (2007-2013) and IPA II (2014-2020). To dig in a little, through IPA II, Serbia received

assistance mainly in categories of democracy and rule of law & competitiveness and growth which also highlight the point this chapter made earlier that the EU had linked Europeanization and democratization processes.

Serbia	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total €
Democracy and Rule of Law	**80,4**	**143,3**	**106,7**	**109**	**96,5**	**78,6**	**78,1**	**692,6**
Democracy and Governance	52,9	115,7	60,3	36,8	67,8	78,6	34,4	446,4
Rule of Law and fundamental rights	27,5	27,6	46,4	72,2	28,7	0	43,8	246,2
Competitiveness and Growth	**98,6**	**79,8**	**96,1**	**103,2**	**159,4**	**150,8**	**158,8**	**846,8**
Environment, climate change and energy	74,7	0	0	78,2	65,1	103,8	0	321,8
Transport	0	64,8	0	0	0	0	0	64,8
Competitiveness, innovation, agriculture and rural development	5	15	68,7	25	70,8	47	105	336,5
Education, employment and social policies	19	0	27,4	0	23,5	0	53,8	123,7
Total €	**179**	**223,1**	**202,8**	**212,2**	**255,9**	**229,4**	**236,9**	**1539,1**

Table 6: Sectoral Distribution of IPA II in Serbia (Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/serbia_en)

In short, like any other WB countries, Serbia has undergone democracy promotion efforts by the EU through political conditionality, monitoring and assistance. With the overthrowing of Milosevic in 2000, the relationship between the EU and Serbia started to develop. Specifically, after the promise of membership, the EU included Serbia in its several approaches such as the SAP and the RCC to transform the country into a modern democratic state via using rigorous conditionality. Certain sensitive topics namely cooperation with The Hague and Kosovo sometimes interrupted the progress, yet it should be remarked that Serbia has made some progress both in Europeanization and democratization processes. The EU preferred monitoring Serbia closely while providing financial assistance like IPA to facilitate implementing reforms. In the next section, the progress of democracy in Serbia will be discussed.

4.3.2. The Progress of Democracy in Serbia

Drawing on its normative power, the EU tends to underscore what is "normal" for its understanding and promote its normals or standards in every way possible. This could be seen in its enlargement and democracy promotion policies. In enlargement policy, the Union put forward its standards and demanded full compliance. Likewise, in democracy promotion, the EU has wielded considerable normative power as a promoter of its own liberal democracy understanding. In the first chapter, it is stated that this thesis will use the definition of liberal democracy by Larry Diamond, which stresses the protection of freedoms, pluralism in party politics and civil society, civilian control over the security forces, having an independent judiciary and accountable officeholders (Diamond & Plattner, 2015, p.xvi). The EU prefers to advocate this type of understanding and embed its perception into its policies. Following this, if the EU wants to see a democratic Serbia that becomes a beacon of progress in the Balkan peninsula instead of an aggressive regime that could threaten stability and security, then it should continue to encourage the democratization process and reforms (Edmunds, 2009, p.129). Because of this logic, Serbia has been the target of the above-mentioned democracy promotion efforts. Since its decision to seek EU membership, Serbia has been imposed upon conditionality and pre-accession requirements aimed at meeting EU standards in many areas from a market economy to democratic governance (Edmunds, 2009, p.129). In this section, the progress of Serbia embracing liberal democracy will be revealed with the help of the EU's country reports and V-Dem Institute's data that show the status of components of democracy and civilian rights throughout the years.

The EU has urged Belgrade to adopt democratic principles, norms and values in order to complete its transition and consolidation of democracy in the country. Satisfying this request was not easy, thus the EU prepared an agenda for democracy promotion in Serbia. The agenda comprises far-reaching conditions such as the Copenhagen political criteria-which are the stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights- regional cooperation, respecting international obligations and cooperation with the ICTY.

The progress of Serbia in meeting these conditions will be discussed in three categories: the first one is democracy and rule of law, the second one is human rights and protection of minority rights and the third one is regional issues and international obligations.

The first category is democracy and the rule of law, which contains the constitution, parliament, government, public administration and civilian control over security forces. Serbia suffered from weak administrative and implementation capacities, therefore structural improvement in these areas are crucial in the embodiment of democracy. In the early 2000s, Serbia endured structural weaknesses and coordination difficulties especially in areas where competencies are shared between the State Union and the republics (European Commission, 2005b, p.8). When Serbia and Montenegro decided to divorce peacefully, the political situation of Serbia experienced further progress. A new constitution entered into force in 2006 that contained detailed provisions like human and minority rights, civilian control over security forces and a constitutional basis to the Ombudsman (European Commission, 2006b, p.6). The opinion on the new constitution, Venice Commission (2007) said that "In general many aspects of this Constitution meet European standards…however, there are some provisions that still fall well below those standards…" (p.3). There were still some concerning areas such as political influence to appoint judges and prosecutors, the impact of political parties over parliament and the scope of territorial decentralization (European Commission, 2006b, p.6). In 2008, a package of laws adopted to give Vojvodina a new status in line with constitutional requirements (European Commission, 2008a, p.6) but the Kosovo issue was still sensitive and understood as a part of Serbia (Venice Commission, 2007, p.3). After the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the political arena affected adversely by the rise of nationalistic feelings and this situation affected the activities of parliament and government (European Commission, 2008b, p.48). Public administrations were vulnerable to political interference. The functioning of the parliament improved but still needed more reforms. The sharp political divisions impacted parliamentary activities. Law on Political Parties, Law on the National

Assembly so on has adopted but the attitude must be continued to be in line with European standards (European Commission, 2010a, p.48).

Resembling other areas, on the judiciary, there has been some progress but still, the judiciary has persisted to be intervened and to be undermined its independence (European Commission, 2005b, p.23). The Constitutional Court resumed its duties (European Commission, 2008b, p.49) and new bodies like the High Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council were established (European Commission, 2009b, p.55) but further efforts needed to be made and the independence and efficiency of judiciary needed to be ensured to meet European standards. In the area of public administration, coordination and planning were strengthened (European Commission, 2014, p.22), though transparency and accountability were still an issue. A newly created Ministry for European Integration has kept providing guidance to coordination structures for European integration and to the alignment of domestic legislation with the National Plan for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA) (European Commission, 2018, p.9).

Moreover, Belgrade showed strong political impetus to fight against corruption. The Anti-Corruption Agency began its work in 2010 but still has to improve its role in certain areas such as public procurement, privatisation and the protection of whistle-blowers (European Commission, 2010a, p.48). In short, Serbia continues to fulfil political conditions set by the EU, yet slowly. It needs to pay attention to particular areas such as the rule of law. Deep political polarisation has been experiencing in the country. While elections were conducted efficiently, the dominance of the ruling party was a concern (European Commission, 2020, p.8). Those who hold political power wants to solidify their position through the voting process and to do that they use public resources, electoral fraud, electoral register and corruption (Kmezic,2020, p.187). As you can see on the below figure, Serbia's transition to democracy has not been steady. Even though some steps were taken, these initiatives were not consolidated and resulted in failure. Since the overthrowing of Milosevic, elites in both politics and business have seized the control of state institutions -which is called state capture- and have jeopardized

public interest and transition (Pesic, 2007, p.4). Dysfunctional institutions, unfinished reforms, state capture, corruption, the desire for power maximization etc. produced the current situation. Thus, to accomplish irreversible democratic transformation, firstly Serbia needs to commit itself to the democratization process, and then it must continue the reform process, strengthen democratic institutions, ensure free and fair elections, consolidate the rule of law and fight against corruption.


Figure 4: Status of democracy components of Serbia (Source: V-Dem Institute 2020)

The second category is human rights and the protection of minority rights, which contains civil and political rights, access to justice, the prison system, freedom of expression, media, civil society, freedom of religion and economic and social rights. When Serbia joined the Council of Europe, the authorities pointed out certain areas requiring further efforts like adopting the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Commission, 2005c, p.17). Ministry for Human and Minority Rights replaced the former government human rights agency in 2008 (European Commission, 2008a, p.14). It has been promoting respect for human and minority rights and tolerance and has used occasions such as the International Roma Day and the International Day of

Tolerance to raise awareness among the population (European Commission, 2009c, p.13). Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has continued to deal with the violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Commission, 2010b, p.12).

With respect to minorities, Serbia is a multi-ethnic state that has notable regions with the majority of minority groups, namely Vojvodina, Kosovo and Sandzak. In order to create a stable and peaceful environment, tolerance against one another and respect for human and minority rights should be established. For the displaced persons and refugees, the Re-admission Agreement between Serbia and the EU entered into force in 2008 (European Commission, 2008a, p.20). The Law on Minority National Councils was adopted in 2009 to regulate competencies of national minority councils (European Commission, 2009c, pp.17-18). Although there have been some improvements in minority rights, discrimination is still seen towards minorities particularly to the Roma population (European Commission, 2010b, p.17). Furthermore, for the protection of the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+), there are insufficient support and pride parades are usually the target of violence (European Commission, 2013, p.11).

As regard to access to justice, a new Serbian Criminal Code entered into force and efforts had been made to implement the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture (European Commission, 2006b, p.12). Post-2000 alterations sought to codify criminal law and adopt European standards (Tripkovic, 2016, p.373). In terms of sentences; the death penalty was abolished in 2002, imprisonment and fine remained, and community service and driving license revocation added (Tripkovic, 2016, pp.373-374). In the area of the prison system, the conditions have been improving but still, there are problems such as overcrowding in prisons (European Commission, 2009b, p.14). Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution, however, incidents including death threats, hate speech and attacks especially against journalist have continued (European Commission, 2010b, p.13). Even President Vucic (then Prime

Minister) called the independent Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) "liars" (Balkan Insight, 2015). Concerning media, the Media Strategy adopted in 2011 and the Republican Broadcasting Agency (RBA) has trying to improve the transparency but the violence has decreased only slightly (European Commission, 2012, p.14). It is highly argued that media freedoms saw rapid decline specifically after Vucic came into power. According to the survey of BIRN and Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 8 out of 15 Serbian media outlets were under the control of individuals known for their affiliation with politicians in power (as cited in Stojarova, 2019, pp.8-9). Hence, it can be deduced that most of the media is under the control of the government and the others are under political pressure, censorship or threat.

Concerning civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were both a part of the democratic struggle (October incident in 2000) and a forerunner in European Integration (Bobic, 2016, p.81). In Serbia, the lack of involvement in the decision and policy-making processes by civil society stems from the flaws in the institutional and legal framework and the influence of political power holders (Bobic, 2013, p.82). Nonetheless, some progress has been made in improving cooperation between the government and civil society organizations (European Commission, 2015, p.7). Prime Minister launched regular meetings with representatives of leading civil society organizations (European Commission, 2015, p.8). The Office for Cooperation with Civil Society continued with initiatives to further enhance the legal, financial and institutional framework for the development of civil society (European Commission, 2016, p.8). In short, Serbia managed to adopt the legislative and institutional framework for upholding human and minority rights but consistent and efficient implementation still require further assurance to strengthen human rights institutions and to step up measures to protect the rights of people facing discrimination or hate-motivated crimes (European Commission, 2020, p.30). Besides, media, civil society and liberties must be liberated and further advanced in Serbia to be in line with European standards. As shown below, Serbia needs to go a long way.

Figure 5: Status of Civilian Rights of Serbia (Source: V-Dem Institute 2020)

The third category is regional issues and international obligations, which contains regional cooperation, respecting the peace agreements such as Dayton, cooperation with the ICTY and normalization with Kosovo. Firstly, as a United Nations Member State and a signatory of the Dayton/Paris Agreements as well as a country under the SAP process, Serbia has an obligation to cooperate and follow these demands (European Commission, 2005c, p.22). Except for the full cooperation with the ICTY, Belgrade had no major problems in compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreements (European Commission, 2006b, p.15). Serbian authorities were reluctant to locate, arrest and deliver fugitives. Whereas, domestic war crimes trials had worked efficiently (European Commission, 2006b, p.16). However, after a while, Serbia has made satisfactory progress and delivered the most wanted fugitives including Stojan Zupljanin, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic (Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012, p.1176). Respecting regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, Serbia has persisted to participate in regional initiatives like the South-East Europe Cooperation Process. Also, it preserved to support the Coalition for Reconciliation Commission (RECOM) (European Commission, 2015, p.20). The

remaining issue here is the Kosovo problem. The EU does not demand the recognition of Kosovo as a condition of membership (Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012, p.1158), yet, it does demand the normalization of relations and cooperation. After the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the situation got tenser. As a matter of fact, Serbia recalled serving ambassadors from countries recognized Kosovo's independence (European Commission, 2008a, p.22). Then, the Serbian government asked for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but the decision was a disappointment for Serbia (Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012, pp.1172-1175).

Some progress has been made when Serbia participated in a dialogue with Kosovo in 2011 and parties agreed on regional cooperation, representation of Kosovo and integrated management of border/boundary crossing points (IBM), freedom of movement, customs stamps and mutual acceptance of diplomas (European Commission, 2012, p.19). The EU-facilitated dialogue with the High Representative upgraded to a high-level political process and resulted in 'First Agreement' comprises elements namely the establishment of an Association/Community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo, single police force and integration of all judicial authorities within Kosovo (European Commission, 2013, p.5). After that, the high-level dialogue resumed and key agreements were finalized on 25 August 2015 (European Commission, 2015, p.22). In spite of these agreements, their implementation has been slow. Sometimes the normalization process was interrupted by incidents like the decision of the Kosovo government to impose customs tariffs on imported goods from Serbia (European Commission, 2019, p.53). Even one could say that the process between Kosovo and Serbia stopped because of the decision of customs tariffs. In 2020, Miroslav Lajcak was appointed as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue to take forward the normalization talks, but still, no achievement has been made (European Commission, 2020, p.66). In short, in this category, except Kosovo issue, huge progress has been made. Serbia continues to engage in regional cooperation initiatives and to prove itself to its neighbours -could be seen during the COVID-19 crisis- that they could build a peaceful and stable environment together.

This chapter has shown the efforts of democracy promotion by the EU in Serbia. On the basis of its normative power and one of the raison d'etre of the organization, in the mid-1990s, the Union decided to involve in the Balkan peninsula and then embarked on various approaches. By diffusing its norms, values and principles, the EU aimed at transforming the regional countries and shaped them in accordance with its ideals. After acknowledging the Balkans as a part of Europe, the EU declared that the future of the WB countries is within the organization, thereby proposed EU membership perspective. Europeanization and democratization processes are vital in the transformation of the regional countries and in the resolution of the problems at hand. For the WBs, the two cannot be separated, thus, Europeanization and democratization processes were linked and have continued simultaneously since then. Once the objective was settled on, several approaches such as the SAP and the RCC, and financial programmes such as IPA and EIDHR were introduced for democracy promotion by the EU. Through its political conditionality, monitoring and financial assistance, the EU has been using its leverage to promote democracy in Serbia particularly after 2000. Serbia's democratization has started with the ousting of Milosevic and in the aftermath, thanks to these approaches, democracy began to be embraced. In spite of obstacles like Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY, some progress has been made in the process of democratization. However, it is demonstrated that the transition to democracy in Serbia is non-linear and certain components of democracy are deteriorating day by day. The EU launched democracy promotion efforts in the country and presented many approaches, yet one could say that unfortunately these efforts are failed. The next chapter will investigate the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion efforts in Serbia.

CHAPTER V- FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN SERBIA

In the previous chapters, it is addressed that transition to democracy and its consolidation will not take hold immediately in a society. Its acceptance, promotion, and consolidation are linked to particular determinants. Here, the fundamental determinant is society's willingness. In the case of Serbia, in the post-1990s environment, the country overwhelmingly decided to transform itself to become a modern democratic European state. As chapter 3 revealed, there were already some practices that constituted the steps towards modern democracy in Serbia. Therefore, it could be assumed that Serbia had the willingness and capabilities to achieve democratic transition and its consolidation. Another significant determinant in this context is the EU's democracy promotion activities in Serbia. At the start, it is emphasized that democracy can be promoted both internally and externally. In addition to the internal promotion activities, the EU is the external promoter of democracy in Serbia, which has explained in chapter 4. Hence, the EU's activities emerged as another vital determinant. On the grounds of its normative power, specifically after the Yugoslav wars, the EU developed various policies towards the WB countries in order to attract and incorporate them into the Union. By using its leverage such as conditionality and assistance, the EU aimed at transforming the regional countries. The carrot of EU membership charmed regional countries to follow the path of the EU and undertake several reforms. As a normative power, the EU introduced its standards & norms and expected total commitment to them. Liberal democracy is among the golden rules which aspirant countries have to adopt. For the EU, democracy is not just a standard to adopt, rather it is seen as a remedy for all the problems of Serbia. Consequently, since early 2000, the EU has been promoting democracy through numerous channels and hoped to see a consolidated democracy in Serbia.

However, the findings of this thesis emphasize that the democracy promotion in Serbia is failed due to two main factors which are also the above-stated determinants in this case. Just as their encouragement affected the acceptance of democracy, their mistakes can also hinder the consolidation of democracy. The

EU and Serbia themselves can throw a spanner in the works. Therefore, through tracing the processes Serbia experienced, it is identified that the first main factor is derived from internal factors of Serbia and the second main factor is stemmed from EU-related external factors. Simply put, both internal and external factors caused the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia and the goal of this chapter is to analyse the factors that led to this outcome. This chapter is divided into two sub-sections. First, three internal factors, namely old legacies, political culture and stabilitocracy, and their influence on the consolidation of democracy in Serbia will be discussed. Second, three EU-related external factors such as the EU's approach towards the WBs, its attitude during the period of crises and the impact of opportunistic players in the region, and their effect on democracy in Serbia will be analysed.

5.1.   INTERNAL FACTORS

The primary condition for a change to happen is the will for a change. Serbian society started to demand change when Milosevic and his governance became unbearable. Even his inner circle at some point shifted side and joined the opposition (de Krnjević-Mišković,2001). During that time, the 1989 revolutions and the Yugoslav wars affected Serbian people and they gravitated the movement of people power. Thousands of people appeared in the streets to protest and defend their rights against the government (Di Lellio, 2009, p.373). At the end, the will of the people became reality on October 5, 2000. The last remnant of ancien regime in Europe ceased its existence. After that, the construction of the new state has begun. Based on the will and the demands of the majority of Serbian people, the expected path would be reframing Serbia as a European state which culturally, politically and institutionally a part of the democratic West. In fact, in theory, the new Serbian state decided to follow the path towards the European Union and to become a modern European country. Yet, in practice, there were apparent problems that certain people refrained from solving. Ignoring those problems directly challenged the modern democratic European narrative in mind. Anna Di Lellio (2009) emphasized that "Serbia's mobilization was incompatible with democratization and European Integration"

(p.374). The old practices endured in the new state. The legacies of the past morphed into nationalist and populist authoritarianism and persisted with a façade of democracy.

In this section, the desire is to display the internal factors which created obstacles for the consolidation of democracy in Serbia. These factors mostly came from the epoch of Yugoslavia but some of them emanated from the times of middle age, hence, there would be lots of references to chapter 3. All these factors are inherited by the modern Serbian state which caused the current status of democracy. This thesis identifies three internal factors. The first one is old legacies which contain patrimonial tendency, ethnic nationalism and state capture. The second internal factor is the weak democratic culture of Serbia. Political culture occurs with the accumulation of values and knowledge that forms the substance of political processes. Thus, political culture has a constitutive force and can impact the course of democratization. The third internal factor is stabilitocracy. Stabilitocracy is a new term which is used to describe the autocrats who are backed by the EU. This thesis accepts Aleksander Vucic as one, who provides external stability for the EU but continues his authoritarian practices internally which prevent the establishment of real democracy in Serbia. All in all, the cumulative impact of all these internal factors slowed down the democratization process in the country and complicated the prospects for consolidation.

The first internal factor that heavily damaged the consolidation of democracy in Serbia is old legacies. According to Merriam-Webster, legacy means "something transmitted by or received from an ancestor or predecessor or from the past". In this situation, old legacies imply the baggage Serbs have been carrying since their emergence at the stage of history. These can be seen as a burden because they prevented Serbs to progress in many fields including politics. The first baggage which Serbs need to get rid of is the patrimonial tendency. Patrimonialism is:

> the highly personalized exercise of power; the lack of a clear distinction
> separating the state from the ruler's household and the official from the
> private; the discretionary, unrestrained, and unmediated exercise of

power; the personal subservience of officials to the ruler; the use of tradition as its major principle of legitimation; and, more generally, the tendency to regard the state as a source of provisioning for the ruler (Diamandouros & Larrabee, 2000, p.30).

When one looks at the political history of Serbia, it can be easily seen that this tendency of holding all the authority and power in one hand is apparent. During the times of middle age, in the Kingdom of Serbia, despite the existence of certain codes and courts, all the power and authority was rested on the ruler. Then, in the times of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan was the supreme leader and no one could say anything against his authority. As a matter of fact, this type is recognized as the extreme variant of patrimonialism called Sultanism. The most important difference between patrimonialism and Sultanism is the latter's inclination to break with tradition which frees the ruler from any type of restraint (Diamandouros & Larrabee, 2000, p.30). And after gaining their independence in 1878, Serbs followed a similar approach. They established a constitutional monarchy but implemented Enlightened Despotism. The ruler concentrated all the power in his hands claiming Serbs were not ready for the representative government (Dragnich, 1975, p.352). Later, in the 19th century, liberalism spread all around the world and likewise, Serbs were affected by it as well. Although they experienced a growth in cultural and political liberties, still the king had the power. All the institutions could be dissolved with a word of the king (Batakovic, 2017, p.132).

In the 20th century, wars prevented the acceptance and embodiments of democracy for the reason that times of crises require great sacrifices. Thus, there was no time to talk about democracy or the separation of powers. The preservation of the state had the utmost importance and other things were irrelevant. Afterwards, during the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, there was a union of South Slavs, and Serbs were one of the constituents. The Kingdom was a parliamentary monarchy and the monarch had the leading role (Cirkovic, 2004, pp.250-257). Some time later, these institutions were closed and authoritarian rule and dictatorship prevailed in the Kingdom. Priorly, there were some institutions albeit for show but now the King had the absolute authority. Thereafter, during the times of the second experience of Yugoslavia, there was

a new system. The new Yugoslav state was a federal socialist state of many ethnic groups. It was made up of six republics and two autonomous provinces, and each had its own systems (Guzina, 2000, p.23). However, the founder of the state, Tito had always the last word in every decision. No matter what adjustments were made, this was the manner until his death.

Following the death of Tito, Milosevic attempted to realize his yearning for a dominant position in Yugoslavia. He attempted to seize all the power in his hands and tightened the control over regime elites (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p.44). When Yugoslavia started to dissolve, he continued his regime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p.40). This patrimonial rule finally received a blow in 2000 and the regime was taken down by the people in Belgrade (Vladisavljevic, 2016, p.48). Nevertheless, in the post-Milosevic period, patrimonial tendency did not vanish. Even though democracy is accepted and certain institutions were established, the desire for patrimonial rule still exists. Today, the governance of Aleksander Vucic in Serbia is an obvious demonstration. His semi-presidential system allows him to hold the power and control all the institutions in the country (Egeresi, 2020, p.147). As a result, it is an undeniable fact that patrimonial rule has been an irresistible attraction of Serbian rulers. The leader, regardless of the time period, always wanted to concentrate all the power in his hands and enjoyed his personal rule. Presumably, this baggage is generated by a weak civil society. The same society that knocked down Milosevic regime is actually capable of eradicating this baggage but it seems that there are other things to make sure the weakness of civil society.

Another legacy received from the past and perhaps Serbia's heaviest baggage is ethnic nationalism. It must be born in the mind that nationalism was the primary reason which directed Serbs, like other nations, to the independence movement. National sentiments brought people together to achieve building their own nation-state. Therefore, in the simplest form, nationalism refers to emotions, sentiments or beliefs (Gagnon, 1994, p.131). Here, the term ethnic nationalism is preferred to nationalism because it is the baggage that causing disorder from time to time and lag Serbia behind. V. P. Gagnon (1994) described ethnic nationalism as a

rhetoric used by political actors to justify and explain policies in relation to the interest of the nation (p.131). The entry of nationalism to the multi-ethnic Balkans indeed caused reactions but as a matter of fact, manipulation of ethnic nationalism stirred up the region and led to disasters. The Balkans was a fertile ground for the politics of ethnicity, specifically during the epoch of Yugoslavia. The nomenklatura, who were the elites that controlled the state and society, mobilized ethnic nationalism to retain their political power. In places where tangible nationalist grievances were present, elites manipulate ethnic politics by appealing patriotic symbols, quarrels with neighbours or scapegoating minorities (Gallagher, 2000, p.84). This quickly became a habit in the Balkans. In Serbia, from the 1990s onward, ethnic nationalism is used by ruling elites in the structure of domestic politics and economic power (Gagnon, 1994, p.132). Particularly in the post-Milosevic era, elites did not hesitate to appeal to ethnic nationalism to sabotage the transition to democracy and its consolidation. It became their tool to maintain their status in the state. Unreformed ex-socialists defied the winds of democratic change, perpetuated the newly established state and carried on with their old habits (Gallagher, 2000, p.85).

In the newly established Serbian state, elites succeeded in adapting this tool to the new era. For instance, Aleksander Vucic and his party SNS managed to downplay their roots to extreme nationalism and created a pragmatic approach. Vucic himself made gestures to correct his image as a nationalist like visiting the Srebrenica commemorations in 2015. His attendance received an angry reception and Vucic was attacked at the cemetery. Serbs called the attack an "assassination attempt" (VOA News, 2015) and once again they used the situation to get the upper hand. At the same time, when it is necessary, he or his party appealed the old tool like giving space to the war criminals in the party (the former Yugoslav Army officer Veselin Sljivancanin) (Bieber, 2020, pp.123-124). Lately, Serbian tabloids, which are pro-government newspapers like *Kurir* and *Informer*, called Ratko Mladic 'hero' after the final verdict of the UN war crimes tribunal. Vucic did not address the decision directly but stated that "neither Serbia nor the Serbian people have been convicted of anything" (BIRN, 2021). The elites in Serbia specialized in using ethnic nationalism when applicable. Regardless of

domestic or foreign policy, even though it is minimized, ethnic nationalism is still very much used when the opportunity arises. Moreover, the exploitation of the Kosovo problem is another tactic of the new Serbian elite. Since 2008, Serbia has been using the Kosovo problem to legitimize their actions or policies. They extend uncertainty among citizens to incite ethnic nationalism and portray themselves as the provider of stability and the protector of their nation-state to consolidate their power in the state (Bieber, 2020, p.92). It is clear that manipulation of ethnic nationalism is still used in Serbia in accordance with the interest of political elites. In addition to the creation of a state of crisis, the use of ethnic nationalism also prevents the rise of tolerance in society which affects the consolidation of civil society. Citizens fell back on ethnic identity and failed to reach a collective sense in society. Thus, this situation creates a productive environment for elites to sabotage the development of democracy. Ethnic nationalism was/is manipulated in order to reinforce the longstanding practices and to preserve and strengthen the seats of elites. Unless Serbia stops appealing it, democracy is unlikely to consolidate.

The last legacy that needs to be addressed is state capture. State capture is not unique for Serbia. It is a widespread phenomenon across the world. Yet, recently, the EU drew attention to the subject which has reached an alarming level. The term was firstly used by the European Commission in its annual report on North Macedonia in 2016 to depict how the state institutions in accession countries could not work properly and were being undermined constantly (European Commission, 2016, p.4). Then, as a result of many analyses, the destructive effect of state capture has been put forward. Lemstra (2020) defined state capture as "systemic political corruption in which politicians exploit their control over a country's decision-making processes to their own advantage." (p.1). Fazekas and Toth (2016) further highlights that state capture illustrates the use of state resources for illegal purposes by a group of elites in control of the state (p.322). It is basically a process in which particular actors infiltrate into state institutions with the help of clientelist networks and use these institutions to hide their corrupt activities (Lemstra, 2020, p.2).

The elements of state capture are weak institutions, links with organized crime and corruption at all levels of state (European Commission, 2018). The weakness of state structures enables political actors to penetrate into state effortlessly with the help of informal networks and exploit the resources to benefit their supporters. The absence of functioning state institutions, strong opposition and civil society ease the deployment of this system. Another vital element is clientelism that refers to the reciprocity of exchanges for the sake of mutual benefits between a patron and a client (Radeljić & Đorđević, 2020, pp.2-3). This informality is used frequently to bypass formal and legal mechanisms (Bieber, 2020, p.111). Without the mechanisms of checks and balances and the merit system of recruitment, patrons posit their clients in public administration, thereby gaining political influence over bodies. In addition to these elements, corruption deteriorates the situation further. Corruption, which means the misuse of public office for private gain (Sotiropoulos, 2019, p.8), shows traces of the times of socialism and because of the geographical position of the Western Balkans remains as the one of the biggest issues of the regional countries (Sotiropoulos, 2019, p.14). Political elites, once in power, create a base among businessmen who are involved in corrupt actions and reap from it (Sotiropoulos, 2019, p.21). The pro-government business elites generally control private mass media like TV stations or newspapers (Sotiropoulos, 2019, p.22). In Serbia, Pink and Happy TV stations are known to be key allies of Vucic (Bieber, 2020, p.127). Thus, when these elements combine, state capture becomes a systemic abuse of state resources (Lemstra, 2020, p.2).

In Serbia, this system continues to strengthen. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Milosevic's criminal economy was captured and personalized by actors such as Miroslav Miskovic and Stanko Subotic that led to a decrease in living standards, high unemployment and a terrible social situation. Then, the complex transition period after 2000 coupled with the previous problems oriented to the capture of the state and the economy by a small group (Džihić & Segert, 2012, p.245). In time, a shadow economy with its political connection developed and consolidated in Serbia (Sörensen, 2006, p.317). Clientelist networks have played a key role, which undermined independent institutions and continued their loyal exchanges.

The biggest sponsor of this system is that the state maintains its position as the most important employer in Serbia (Keil, 2018, p.10).

In countries like Serbia with a high unemployment rate and uncertainty in the job sector, the most secure employment is in the public sector (Bieber, 2020, p.111). And usually employment in the public sector is linked to party affiliation (Keil, 2018, p.10). Although the roots of state capture in Serbia go back to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the period of Milosevic, current president Vucic and his party managed to take it to another level (Lemstra, 2020, p.3). More than 20 percent of the population are members of Serbian political parties and by 2015, the SNS claimed to have more than a half-million members (Bieber, 2020, p.113). They politicized public administration by employing individuals who are loyal to the ruling party. Placing their supporters facilitated control over the administration and the governance of the state at various levels (Lemstra, 2020, p.3). In post-Milosevic Serbia, new political elites did not hesitate to use the existing weakness to their advantage. State capture, which is a systemic abuse, was created to protect and enhance the position of political elites and particular tycoons. For that reason, state capture emerges as the fundamental challenge to the democratic processes. It weakens state institutions, distorts the control over the public administration and empowers informal networks. Overall, it deals a major blow to democracy and its consolidation.

Consequently, old legacies of Serbia, including patrimonialism, ethnic nationalism and state capture emerge as heavy baggage that needs to be get rid of in order to consolidate democracy in Serbia. The enduring patrimonial tendency, weak institutions, the dominance of the executive over other bodies and the strongman in charge exacerbate the democratic situation in the country. Further, the use of ethnic nationalism to justify corrupt actions and the preservation of state capture severely curtail democratic practices. These internal practices need to be dealt with instantly to construct a more favourable environment for democracy to flourish.

The second internal factor that necessary to tackle is the weak democratic culture of Serbia. "Political culture… refers to a set of political values, beliefs, attitudes,

and behaviours that are characteristic of a particular political community." (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.108). The concept was first coined by J. G. Harder in his work *Reflection on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* at the end of the 18th century, but the popularity of the term came in the mid-20th century, specifically with the works of Gabriel Almond (Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009, p.13). It quickly became the central concept of social sciences and along with Almond, Sydney Verba, Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel and many more contributed to the rise of political culture (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109). Almond and Verba (1963) in their *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* described political culture as "political orientations- attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." (p.13). Their argument was that the dynamic between political culture and political structure is key to political stability and political change (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109). Since the political culture arises from the political aspect of the culture of a society (Devine, 1972, p.15), the pattern of behaviours and preferences of the members of society orients the political system. In this sense, political culture turns into a crucial notion for the stability and functioning of a democratic system (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.108).

Almond and Verba (1963) identified three types of political culture: parochial, subject and participant cultures (p.17). In parochial cultures, individuals are apolitical (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109). In these societies, individuals think in line with familism and their political orientations are related to their social and religious orientations. They had little expectation for a political change (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.18). In subject cultures, individuals are aware of politics but they are mostly passive and respective of their political authority (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109). This type exemplified by centralized authoritarian societies. In participant cultures, individuals tend to be oriented to both the political and administrative processes (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.19). The members of the society have an active role (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109). Participant cultures are in conformity with democratic political structures. After explaining these types, Almond and Verba (1963) stressed civic culture that is composed of the mix of parochial, subject and participant cultures (p.20). They stated that the most convenient form of political

culture for democracy is a mix of subject and participant cultures where individuals respect the authority and abide by the law (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.109).

There are also other explanations of variation in political culture. Socioeconomic explanation, for instance, tries to explain variation in values, behaviours and orientations in compliance with modernization theory or human development theory (see Inglehart's analyses) (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.110). Another explanation is made by cultural/historical variables. As an illustration, some researchers discuss religious traditions and institutions affect constraints and opportunities for democratization process. A number of researchers found out that Christian Orthodox tradition shows non-democratic potentials (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, pp.111-112). The last explanation that will be highlighted is institutional and elite-centred explanations. Institutional approach originates in the idea of institutional learning through the process of socialization. Citizens embrace the values and norms that the institutions' embody. In consequence, the functioning of democratic institutions increases citizens' democratic orientation. Also, since institutions are determined by the choices of elites, the elites' behaviour and choices emerge as a determinant (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, pp.112-113). They can contribute to political cultural change.

For the evaluation of Serbia's political culture, instead of choosing one of the above-mentioned explanations, a holistic approach will be opted. Based on Almond & Verba's explanation, Serbian society has a dominant subject culture. From the beginning, the Serbs have been aware of the politics. Although sometimes they oriented the political processes, they tend to remain obedient and respectful for the authority. Considering their political history, they had lived under centralized and authoritarian states, in which they learned to stay silent and be passive. In reference to socioeconomic explanation, industrialization and modernization under socialism produced growing differences in economy and social interests among predominantly peasant and rural Balkan societies. The increasing heterogeneity generated underground political cultures and two tendencies, the nationalist and the reformist, emerged, which ultimately brought

an end to the political system. In these circumstances, political reform including democratization was disrupted by ideological commitments (Bianchini, 2000, p.71). The end of socialism brought a nationalist political culture. Homogeneity has been imposed as a value and has been encouraged by myths and symbols to strengthen the loyalty of individuals, therefore hindering democratization (Bianchini, 2000, p.73).

In accordance with the cultural/historical explanation, it could be said that religious traditions are massive part of the political culture of the Serbs. The Orthodox Christianity and the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church play an important role in the creation of Serbian political culture. According to Ristic (2007), the philosophy of the Serbian Orthodox Church does not endorse liberal values and in favour of collectivism. They believe an organic unity among state, church and the nation (pp. 191-192). To prove the point, the cancellation of the pride parade in the capital Belgrade for years and the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be considered. Serbian Orthodox Church simply thinks that "homosexuality is a Western threat to the traditional values of national and religious identity." (Igrutinovic et al., 2015, p.205). The head of the Church labelled the event as a "parade of shame" (BBC, 2011). As can be seen, the Church plays a predominant role in Serbia by appealing identity and solidarity values and recasts political culture (Bianchini, 2000, pp.71-72). Citizens who respect the Church embody these values. In accordance with the elite-centred explanation, elites who are in the heads of the leading institutions -like state institutions or the Church- or have links to those institutions can orient the citizens and determine the variant of the political culture in the country. When one looks at the Serbian history, it can be seen that the state has always been ruled and directed by a number of elites. Likewise, these elites have effects on the formation of political culture due to their practices.

All things considered, Serbia has a non-democratic political culture, which contains attitudes such as authoritarianism, traditionalism, state paternalism and social distrust (Kirbis & Flere, 2017, p.114). In a less developed and less modern Serbia, passive citizens could not escape the influence of the Orthodox Church

and the elites, and they embodied the imposed values. The essential political values that needed for a strong political culture such as cultural and political tolerance or political trust could not blossom in such an environment. Thereupon, a weak civil society and unfunctional state institutions came to existence, which hindered democratization in Serbia. The weak democratic culture, which consists of values, behaviours and preferences from the past to the present, is one of the major reasons why democracy has not consolidated in Serbia.

The last internal factor that is required to mention is stabilitocracy. The term was first introduced by Srđa Pavlović to outline the status of Montenegro, which was presented by consistent undemocratic practices and external support of the West (Pavlović, 2016, p.1). As stated by Pavlović (2016), the president of Montenegro, Milo Dukanovic has built a stabilitocracy in the country, in which he can do what he wants while getting support from the West (p.1). A similar term "stabilocracy" was used by Antoinette Primatarova and Johanna Deimel to describe the situation in Albania, which is a country "oscillates between democracy and autocratic tendencies." (Primatarova & Deimel, 2012). Following them, Florian Bieber (2018b) amplified the term by describing "a government that claims to secure stability, pretend to espouse EU integration and rely on informal, clientelist structures, control of the media, and the regular production of crises to undermine democracy and rule of law." (p.176). In this matter, Bieber's broad definition will be used to illustrate the situation in Serbia. The Western Balkan countries, in general, are weak democracies with autocratically minded leaders. Even though they govern their countries through informal networks and have patterns of authoritarianism, by providing external stability in the region, they get the support of the EU (Kmezic & Bieber, 2017, p.95). The rise of geopolitics and the threat of ethnic conflict led the EU to tolerate this occurrence (Kmezic & Bieber, 2017, pp.95-96).

After the demise of Yugoslavia, one by one the former Yugoslav republics embarked on the path towards democracy and their recognition as candidates for EU membership at the 2000 Zagreb Summit made sure they follow this path (Kmezic & Bieber, 2017, p.5). With the incentive of EU membership, the

expectation was that they would move out of the political grey zone (Carothers, 2002, p.9) and would complete their democratic transition. However, authoritarian leaders of the WBs found out a clever way to continue their practices. They formally accept the demands for democratization and allow the existence of opposition and elections to a certain extent, but they use other ways to manipulate the system and continue their illiberal practices (Bursac & Vucicevic, 2021, p.188). Since the early 1990s, most of the WB countries have experienced a variety of hybrid regimes that fall in the scope between democracy and authoritarianism. The regimes that emerged in the region had two common characteristics: institutional weakness and authoritarian political actors who benefited from these weaknesses. The support for democratization, both in terms of normative and financial, came from the West, especially from the EU and their lack of pressure for a strong democratic rule has facilitated the emergence of these regimes that grounding their external legitimacy on providing stability instead of democracy (Bieber, 2018c, p.338).

Stabilitocracies appeared in the region, which adapted the difficulty of preserving the support from the West while ensuring authoritarian control domestically (Bieber, 2018c, p.340). Stabilitocracies exercise control informally and take control of the state institutions and the media to have complete authority domestically. Further, by reflecting themselves as reformers and saviours from any forms of crises in the WBs, they managed to get an endorsement from the West. If the earlier vision of EU integration come to mind, stabilitocracies in the region could be seen as a step back because they stress geopolitical considerations over liberal democracy. Stabilitocracies offer stability towards the Union whether it be solving external challenges or pacifying regional issues (Bieber, 2018b, p.179). However, the main source of instability in the region, as a matter of fact, is stabilitocracies themselves. Bieber (2018b) stated that "stabilitocracies cause instability, and the only stability they provide is in the (kept) promises made towards external actors." (p.179).

Despite the roots of stabilitocracy in Serbia go back to the 1990s, Vucic deserves applause for his contribution. Since 2012, he has gradually gathered power in his

hands. He knew that the EU wanted the WB countries to remain stable and conflict-free, so he portrayed himself as "an anchor of stability in the region" (a description of former Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurtz) and enjoyed illiberal practices internally (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2020, p.6). Serbia, which has a key role in regional stability, is seen as an indispensable partner by the EU and the EU rhetoric coming from Serbia intensified the bond between them. Vucic became "Europe's favourite autocrat" (Eror, 2018). The EU turned a blind eye to illiberal practices and the erosion of balances in Serbia and began appreciating Serbian leader's efforts in handling crises. Two examples would help comprehending the relation between the EU and Serbia. The first one is related to the Kosovo issue. Serbia's relations with Kosovo and maintaining the Brussels Dialogue are crucial for maintaining stability in the region (Emini & Stakic, 2018, p.7). Vucic represents himself as a moderate and pro-European leader who is open to talks to solve the dispute in peaceful means. Yet, this impression did not stop him to exploit the Kosovo issue now and then. Serbia, in 2017, launched a new train service from Belgrade to Mitrovica decorated with stickers and the slogan of 'Kosovo is Serbia' in different languages. Kosovar politicians expressed their opposition to the train and eventually Vucic stopped the train before the border with Kosovo. Both sides accused the other of the occurrence of the crisis (BIRN,2017). The crisis did not only appeal to the nationalist side of the electorate in Serbia but it also managed to impress the EU by de-escalating the crisis of their own making (Bieber, 2020, p.96). Vucic attempted to show his good intention with the words "[we] stopped the train to show that we wanted peace. We sent train, not a tank" (BBC, 2017).

The second example is Serbia's role in the migration crisis of 2015. During that time, the flow of refugees from Syria caused a disorder in Europe and the EU did not know how to deal with it. There were many refugee routes reaching to the EU borders and with Hungary's blockade, Serbia came to the rescue and directed the flow of refugees to use another route (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2020, p.12). Thus, both the train incident and migration crisis strengthened the image of Vucic and boosted his role as a stabiliser in the region. He became a key player in the eyes of the EU, who protect peace and stability in the region. Lately, with the

burning issues in the WBs and the crisis in Ukraine, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron approached Vucic to talk about the position of Serbia and to ensure peace and security in the continent in case of any disturbance (Telegraf, 2022). This conveys a clear message that as long as Vucic provides external stability, the EU will continue to ignore illiberal practices in the country. Political elites in Serbia benefit from this situation and fortify stabilitocracy in the country. They divert the attention of the EU from democratization or political reforms to this kind of regional stability issue. The EU, which is deceived from the lip service of Serbian elites, is actually undermining its own democracy promotion.

In summary, one needs to talk about their own mistakes before criticising the other. In this section, three factors, namely, old legacies, political culture and stabilitocracy were suggested as Serbia's faults in the failure of democracy promotion. The elites in the new state found new ways to continue their old practices and to exploit the new system. In return, these practices hindered democratization and democratic reforms in the country. After explaining the internal factor, in the next section, the EU-related external factors that affected the democracy promotion initiatives in Serbia will be investigated.

5.2.   EXTERNAL FACTORS

As already indicated, for a change to happen, there must be a will for a change in the society. If the demand really exists in the society, then the biggest step towards change has been taken. This demand can be further intensified with the participation of another factor. In the case of Serbia, after expressing their desire of a democratic European country, the Western powers started to support the country in their transition period and initiated assistance programmes to ease the domestic cost of reforms. The EU stood out amongst Western powers and approached Serbia with a much more comprehensive strategy. On the basis of its normative power, the EU decided to take the WB countries under its wing and began to imprint them in compliance with its standards. The acceptance and consolidation of democracy is among the standards and norms of the Union. Hence, the will of the society met with the pressure of the EU for the establishment of democracy in Serbia and intensified the emphasis for the

transition process. The EU, as an external promoter of democracy in Serbia, became one of the central determinants in the process.

In this section, the intention is to demonstrate the EU-related external factors which culminated in the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Since the factors are EU related, the time frame will be post-2000s. This thesis identifies three EU-related external factors. The first one is the EU's approach. There is an inconsistency between the theory and practice of the EU. Its approach towards the region as well as towards Serbia stems from its normative power, yet, when one analyses the practices and preferences of the EU, it can be seen that the EU in reality uses a pragmatic approach. Along with this, there is also a flaw in the theory part. In its democracy promotion activities, the EU should put more emphasis on social learning and make sure that reforms are not superficial. The irreversibility could be achieved through social learning so that the society embraces liberal democracy. The second factor is the period of crises. It is argued that during the period of crises, the attention of the EU shifted and the WBs fell in priority ranking. Since 2003, the EU has been dealing with several crises. Due to its pragmatic approach, the Union preferred to deal with emergencies, which affected the credibility of the EU in the eyes of the WB countries. The third factor is the emergence of opportunistic players and their activities in the WBs. Because of the gap created by the lack of attention of the EU, opportunistic players such as Russia, China and Turkey increased their activities in the region. They enjoyed the opportunity and tried to use it to take a hold in the region. All these EU-related external factors affected the democracy promotion activities of the EU and caused the current democratic status in Serbia.

The first EU-related external factor is the EU's approach towards Serbia. The Union does not have an exclusive approach to Serbia. Its approach proceeds from the enlargement perspective, which proposed to the whole Balkan peninsula after the Yugoslav wars. "The hour of Europe" has begun and since then the EU has main responsibility for the transformation of the regional countries, including Serbia. The conflicts of the 1990s and failure of the EU to prevent the catastrophes have shaped the foreign policy agenda of the EU (Flessenkemper,

2017, p.23). The discourse and action of the EU affected by these developments and resulted in more open armed and integrated approach. At that time, the EU was in the process of soul-searching. Through defining its standards, the EU opted for a normative power concept and reflected its principles, ideals, values and norms into every cell it has. On the basis of its normative power, the EU aimed at transferring five core norms explicitly, democracy, human rights, peace, liberty, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2009, p.2) to the WB countries through EU integration process.

Since the early 2000s, the EU has been using political conditionality to spread its democratic model and promoting democracy as the sole remedy for the problems that the WBs experienced (Stratulat, 2017, p.11). Stratulat (2017) expressed that the EU fell into a trap of seeing democracy as a silver bullet. At the same time, the EU allowed "the resilience of a failed status quo and sustained the fragility of the mechanisms of change and reform in the region." (p.11). In other words, based on its normative power, the EU focused on democracy promotion along with membership perspective but could not see the desired democratic standards in targeted countries. In this respect, it is argued that there are fundamental errors in EU's approach that lead to this outcome. In theoretical terms, the EU's approach and its basis can be understandable, yet, in practical terms, there are some inconsistencies. Therefore, as opposed to the core understanding of the approach, in reality, the EU actually uses a pragmatic approach.

The normative agenda of the EU intends for political transformation in Serbia. The Union calls for respect for rule of law, reforms in justice and home affairs, fight against organized crimes, good neighbourly relations and so on (Anastasakis, 2008, p.370). However, what is 'normal' or 'appropriate' for the EU is not always find in practices. Sometimes the EU chooses more practical and functional perspectives which contradicts with its normative agenda. It is a well-known fact that the countries in the WBs long-suffering from state weakness and clientelist informal networks. These structures are the reasons of the lack of the rule of law, the flourishing organized crime and corruption (Anastasakis, 2008, p.371). The natural thing to do is to fight against these structures to consolidate

liberal democracy. However, sometimes, specifically when there is a threat of instability and fear of its spillover, the EU considers its own interests first and follows a more pragmatic approach.

Previously explained, in such cases, the EU ignores the presence of these informal structures and supports the country to preserve the stability in the continent. The rigorous approach of the EU turns into a flexible approach in the times of need. Hence, instead of eliminating them, the EU strengthens the structures which undermine its approach. Occasionally, the EU disregards the bypass of some features of democratic system for the sake of a functionality. "EU conditionality can run counter to democratization" (Anastasakis, 2008, p.366) and the EU underlines the result instead of the procedure. In a democratic state, debate and discussion become a habit and every decision is the outcome of such processes. However, in Serbia, between 2016 and 2018, nearly 70 percent of laws and amendments were passed without public debate (Bieber, 2020, p.110) and no opposition were made as long as the reforms were made on paper. Considering the appropriate behaviour, the EU should have opposed such procedure and should not have applauded Serbia as a frontrunner. Undoubtedly, there is an inconsistency between 'what does EU say' and 'what actually it does'. Every once in a while, the EU does not refrain to implement a pragmatic approach that contradicts with its normative power. The fact that this happens infrequently does not mean that it does not harm its approach.

Another important thing regarding EU's approach is that its top-down nature. "The strong dose of technocratic thinking that underpins the EU's democracy promotion" (Stratulat, 2017, p.14) in fact creates a fragility. It is too depending on elites in targeted country. The reforms that needed for political transformation and the adoption of democracy comes from the pressure and imposition of the EU. It is true that there is a will for a change in Serbia, nonetheless, the number of pro-EU is short and the change is quite painful. It is EU's job to support the pro-EU Serbs, ease the pain, and facilitate the transition.

The EU's approach is very similar with Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier's external incentives model. It is simply a bargaining model, which involved actors exchange

information, promises or threats and in accordance with their interests they act to maximize their power and welfare. The EU, in this case, pays rewards -assistance or institutional ties- if the targeted government complies with the conditions it presented and withholds the rewards if it fails to comply (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). The realisation of reforms and rule adoption depend on the decision of targeted government. Democracy promotion by the EU has carried out through leverage which concentrates on domestic actors rather than society. The incumbents in targeted government are involved in the process, not public. The effectiveness of the rule transfer in this model is uncertain because the public is absent from the processes of transfer and adoption. In order for democracy to be well established, the people must be included in the process. They must learn to respect the procedure and act appropriately.

The embracement of liberal democracy can be only achieved if the people engage in the transition and consolidation phases. That's why the EU should put more emphasis on social learning model. According to this model, the actors are motivated by incorporated identity, values and norms. In the course of action, they question the appropriateness of the action in compliance with the embodied identity, values and norms. The rule adoption and the compliance with the EU conditions should not be imposed. Targeted government and its society willingly accept those conditions and accept the norms. They should be engaged in the process actively in order to learn and accept the discussed condition. Put differently, if democracy is aimed to be established in Serbia, then Serbian people should absorb everything about it so that they can truly accept and perform it. To do that, bottom-up approach should be improved. Strong civil society that embodied the liberal democracy and the appropriate type of behaviour simplifies the EU's job. In short, concerning EU's approach, both in theory and practice, it needs a major rethink. If the irreversibility of transformation is among the goals of the EU, then the society must be involved in the process and the EU must learn to act consistently in line with its identity.

The second EU-related external factor is the period of crises, which caused a shift in EU's priority list. At this point, what is understood from the definition of

crisis is crucial. It refers to "a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decision" (Rosenthal et al., 1989, p.10). The Union itself was the product of crises and turbulences. It was originally a defensive project and at a later time, this project evolved into a complex international actor (Castells et al., 2018, p.22). The events that took place affected the EU as well as everyone else. Jean Monnet (1978) highlighted that "Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises." The EU learned from these events, determined its flaws and shaped itself into a new international player. The EU acknowledged its responsibilities and offered EU membership perspectives to the WB countries to preserve peace and stability in whole Europe. The WBs became a priority for the Union and their transformations were monitored closely by the European Commission. However, it is claimed that since 2008 the EU has been dealing with several crisis whether on the European continent or not that generated a shift in priority and the WBs fell back from the EU's list of priority. The fall back influenced the pro-Europeans negatively and benefited the authoritarians in the WB countries, which deteriorated democratization.


Figure 6: Period of Crises (Source: Author's own collection)

The Euro crisis started the period of crises for the EU. Euro crisis was in substance a financial market crisis which turned into a fiscal crisis. (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p.1582). It questioned the euro as a currency and the ability of EU institutions to manage the crisis (Castells et al., 2018, p.26). The EU, which was seen as an economic giant, had been seriously shaken by this crisis. The geopolitical crises with Russia and with the Middle East caused the divergence of resources and the EU had to confront some international issues (Castells et al., 2018, p.27). In 2015, the migration flow reached across the Aegean Sea and spiralled out of control (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p.1578). EU institutions worked with member states to develop common border security policies but some member states have resisted and disagreed on asylum management (Riddervold et al., 2021, p.25). As in the Euro crisis, the member states attempted to share the burden but, in the end, they failed to develop a common interest in strengthening the Schengen regime (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p.1585). Because of their geography, the frontline member states like Greece and Italy, the transit countries like Hungary and Slovenia were affected by the migrant crisis hugely. One year later, one of the destination countries, Britain as a result of the referendum decided to leave the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p.1588). This was an unprecedented event and it gave rise to many assumptions such as the end of the European project. While this crisis is still around, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world. Once again, the capability of the EU was in question. At first, most Europeans expected their local and member state governments to protect them but later member states demanded that the EU regulate the health policy and rescue them (Greer et al., 2021, pp.747-748). Even though the EU faltered at the beginning of the corona crisis, it has relatively had good crisis management. The EU got used to operating in permanent crisis mode (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p.1578).

Traditionally, the EU believes that a stable environment is at the centre of its own interests (Müller, 2016, p.364). When aforesaid crises occurred and posed real threats to the Union's long-standing objectives of a zone of peace, stability and prosperity (Müller, 2016, p.359), the EU simply decided to reduce the costs of non-Europe to advance the effectiveness of its foreign policy (Müller, 2016,

p.370). Owing to the fact that some of the crises were within the borders of the Union, the EU ranked its priorities and chose to focus on the ones that need urgent attention. In contrast to the logic of appropriateness, the EU applied the logic of consequences and selected the best possible choice for itself. Over the course of the decade, the Union coped with uneven economic recovery, the rise of populist and Eurosceptic parties in its members and the erosion of democratic principles in some of its member states such as Hungary and Poland (Matthijs, 2020, p.1127). Thus, it is understandable that the EU wanted to solve the crises that threaten its fundamental values and norms, yet, the change of focus was perceived as the WBs were off on the EU agenda.

Realizing the situation, the EU tried to motivate the WBs that they were on an irreversible track to EU membership. In 2014, the Berlin Process was launched to re-engage with the WB countries (Bonomi, 2019, p.3) and in 2018, the European Commission presented a new strategy "A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans" to signal that the WBs are back in the EU spotlight (Bonomi, 2019, p.2). Although the significance of the EU for the Balkans is indisputable, the period of crises has dealt a blow to relations. Jean-Claude Juncker's "no further enlargement will take place over the next years" (European Commission, 2018, p.1) announcement was assumed that the WBs are stuck in the EU's waiting room, hence, they decided to take advantage of the situation. Since they were no longer in the spotlight, they thought that what they do within their borders will not matter to the Union as long as they do not draw too much attention. Indeed, the EU did not utter a word about the deterioration of the status of democracy in the WBs and even supported the autocrats like Vucic in Serbia. Briefly, the EU neglected the WBs and by extension Serbia during the period of crises, thereby undermining its approach towards the region. Its lack of attention and its absence nurtured the people that have a tendency to authoritarianism.

The last EU-related external factor is the occurrence of the opportunistic players in the WBs. When the EU's enlargement process started to lose momentum, other external players particularly Russia, Turkey and China decided to step up

their games (Nechev & Trauner, 2017, p.1). More than two decades after the violent conflicts in the Balkans and the efforts of the EU to transform regional countries, many analyses showed that the WB countries are losing ground on the rule of law, democratic accountability and media freedom. State capture, the growth of informal networks and erosion of independent media and checks and balances are the characteristics of this landscape (Bassauener, 2019, p.2). Authoritarian tendencies are rising in the region and the EU is in truth doing nothing to deal with them. Especially during the period of crises, taking advantage of the EU's preoccupation and its absence in the WBs, some actors sought ways to improve their relations with the regional countries. Those actors were called opportunistic players for the reason that they used the EU's state to take hold in the region.

Opportunistic players adopted the attitude of supporting the WB countries' integration to the EU (Nechev & Trauner, 2017, p.2) and brought economic and political leverage to develop strong relationships with governments in the region (Bassauener, 2019, p.2). Unlike the EU, they offered many investments and partnership projects with no special conditions or restrictions. Even though their carrots may be smaller than the Brussels, relatively having no sticks get the attention of the WBs. That's why, the WBs welcomed them with open arms and foreign direct investment in the region became more diverse (Kemp, 2021, p.197). The diversification of investment and of actors in the WBs is not a concern. There is no rule that the EU should always be the number one in the region but when these newly established ties began to deteriorate the countries status, then it becomes an issue. With this in mind, it is argued that the relations between Serbia and opportunistic players have affected the EU's approach towards the country and amplified the authoritarian tendencies. Opportunistic players did not mind the illiberal practices in Serbia, on the contrary, have a joint interest in weak democratic safeguards (Bassauener, 2019, p.2). In the absence of the EU, they competed to fill the gap created by the EU and to develop new ties with Serbia. Here, it is claimed that Serbia's relations with Russia, Turkey and China weaken the EU's approach towards Serbia, thus affecting democracy promotion activities in the country.

The first opportunistic player is Russia. Russia has a long history in the region and has cultural and religious connections with the Balkan communities (Bassauener, 2019, p.6). By exploiting the anti-West sentiments, Russia uses the Orthodox-Slavic brotherhood to intensify its relations and cooperate with local elites (Metodieva, 2019, p.3). Moscow does not have a comprehensive strategy to replace the EU's enlargement policy but it prefers to have strong relations on key sectors like energy, foreign policy, media and communication (Nechev & Trauner, 2017, p.2). Lacking a grand strategy does not stop Russia to exploit the weak spots and gaps (Bechev, 2021, p.188). In its power toolkit, it has media, energy, church, security cooperation, cultural organizations, NGOs and so forth (Metodieva, 2019, p.4). It has institutional ties such as defense and free trade agreements with Serbia, membership in the Peace Implementation Council monitoring the Dayton Accords (Bechev, 2021, p.191). Its economic footprint in Serbia is increasing specifically in the energy sector. Serbia became the hub of Russian influence in the region. Russian state-owned Gazprom, which bought the Serbian state oil company NIS in 2008 (Bassauener, 2019, p.8), dominates the markets in the region. In defense sector, Russia continues to endorse Serbia, which expressed its unwillingness to join NATO. In 2018, Russia donated six MiG-29 fighter jets and promised more deliveries to Serbia in the future (Metodieva, 2019, p.4). Its opposition to Kosovo's independence has served to maintain its leverage in Serbia (Bassauener, 2019, p.7). The recent addition to the power tool of Russia is disinformation. Serbian people have access to Russian news agency Sputnik, Russia Today and magazines such as Nedeljinik and R Magazin (European Parliament, 2017, p.13). The media is captured by politicians and the absence of fact-checking institutions create a fertile ground for disinformation (Metodieva, 2019, p.5). In short, Russia wisely located the spots to exploit and used its historical, cultural and religious ties to further utilize the opportunity. In addition to state-level relations, Russia managed to intensify pro-Russian and anti-West rhetoric through local actors. With the support of both government and local people, Russia guaranteed its influence in Serbia.

The second opportunistic player is Turkey. Turkey and Serbia had been on opposing sides for a long time. Particularly during the Bosnian war, "Serbian

butcher" was in daily use in Turkey. To Serbs, Ottoman rule was a dark period and this denunciation paved the way for Serbian nationalism (Aydıntaşbaş, 2019, p.2). Thus, when Turkey initiated its re-engagement with the Balkan peninsula, building a relationship with Serbia appeared to be a difficult one. The re-engagement began with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and extended under Ahmet Davutoğlu (first foreign minister, then prime minister) (Aydıntaşbaş, 2019, p.4). Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" and "zero problems with neighbours" initiatives aimed at positioning Turkey as a leader in the former Ottoman lands (Bassauener, 2019, p.11). Drawing on the imperial past, Turkey intended for a pragmatic approach. There are still political, cultural and social aspects of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. Also, there are Turkish minorities in nearly all Balkan states (Demirtaş, 2013, p.166). By using these connections, Turkey wanted to strengthen its relationship with the regional countries and wanted to develop relations in other fields. However, these initiatives -particularly Ottomanism- did not work in Serbia. In truth, there is no emotional connection to utilize. The relation between Turkey and Serbia have reached the highest point when they decided to be a rationalist. Although they did not share a border, they see each other as neighbours and accepted the objective of "strategic partnership" (MFA Turkey, 2011). In this partnership, economic interests come to the fore. In 2019, Serbia became Turkey's largest trading partner in the WBs. The Turkish state and private institutions are investing in the fields of banking, motorways and energy (Büyük & Öztürk, 2019, p.124). Turkey and Serbia signed Free Trade Agreement and Agreement on the Infrastructure Cooperation (MFA, 2011). In addition, Vucic's leadership and governance are quite similar to Erdoğan. Büyük and Öztürk (2019) expressed that "Serbia's strongman President Aleksander Vucic is another Erdoğan best man." (p.123). Vucic allows Erdoğan to play his game in the region, which is being the leader of Muslims (Büyük & Öztürk, 2019, p.124). They do not get in each other's way. Evidently, Turkey does not have a comprehensive strategy to replace the EU. It genuinely supports the Euro-Atlantic integration of the WBs. Despite the fact that its approach sometimes conflicts and creates certain questions, its sole desire is to extend and fortify its relations -mainly economic relations- with the regional countries. Yet, Erdogan's

influence in the WBs should not be undermined. His personal relations with Balkan autocrats and especially with Vucic might further damage democratic values and worsen the status of democracy.

The last opportunistic player is China. China is a newcomer to the WBs but its profile in the region has risen considerably. Nowadays, Serbia claims to be the best friend of China in Europe (Le Corre, 2018, p.29). The Chinese refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence and its veto on the UN Security Council are appreciated by Serbia and in return, Serbia has tried to align itself with China on the issues that need support (Bassauener, 2019, p.14). Today's level is attained with the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The economy is China's biggest tool. With the BRI, China planned to project both its economic and political power worldwide (Tonchev, 2017, p.1). Through '16+1' format, China wants to increase its presence in Central and Eastern Europe, which is a part of its global strategy (Tonchev, 2017, p.2). The WBs provide access to the markets in the EU's core but their infrastructure is way behind the EU (Bassauener, 2019, p.14). Therefore, Chinese projects and investments intend to play catch-up. China sees the regional countries as potential EU members (Le Corre, 2018, p.33), so it is in its interests to have a strong presence in the WBs. In terms of Chinese strategy, Serbia emerged as China's key partner in the Balkans. Mostly in the forms of loans, China has already invested higher than $1 billion to the sectors such as energy and infrastructure. The Sino-Serbian Friendship Bridge across the Danube river and a steel plant in Smederevo were some of the products of Chinese investments (Tonchev, 2017, p.2). Vucic personally promotes Chinese investments in Serbia. In 2016, when Chinese president Xi Jinping visited the country, he insisted that China would lift Serbia's economic growth, improve living standards and bring more jobs (Le Corre, 2018, p.31). Day by day Chinese physical presence is increasing in Belgrade. Huawei, Bank of China and Norinco have representative offices in Belgrade. The main reason for the promotion of Chinese investments by Serbia -and by many Balkan countries- is easy alignment with local political elites. The EU's funds are larger and cheaper than Chinese loans but they come with strings. That's why, political elites favour China (Le Corre, 2018, p.32). What is worrying here is that the economic influence of China

might bring political influence. The current agenda of China does not involve good governance and lacks the EU's standards and values such as the rule of law (Zweers et al., 2020, p.43). According to the paper of Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) (2018), external financing from authoritarian countries to the transition countries, where democracy is not completely embedded, can bolster undemocratic practices and corruption (pp.2-3). Since Serbia lacks transparency, accountability and functioning checks and balances, China's potential for political influence causes a concern.

In a nutshell, as regards to the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia, the EU has its own mistakes. In this section, three external factors, namely the EU's approach, the period of crises and the opportunistic players were suggested as the EU's faults in the matter. Those factors are all interconnected. The problems in the EU's approach led to the emergence of question marks over time. When the crises began to occur in the European continent, these question marks started to increase even more. The credibility of the EU and its offers were looked at with suspicion. In that environment, other players came to play which benefited the actors with authoritarian tendencies. While the credibility of the EU is being questioned, authoritarian actors, namely Vucic, consolidated their position in Serbia and made it impossible for democracy to develop and engrave.

This chapter was designed to demonstrate the factors that led to the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. The findings have shown that there are two main factors: internal and external factors. In this case, internal factors stemmed from Serbia and external factors came from the EU. In the beginning, it is discussed that the acceptance, promotion and consolidation of democracy are linked to particular determinants. The biggest determinant is society's willingness. In the case of Serbia, the society raised its voice and showed its willingness to democracy starting in 2000. At that point onwards, the lack of the progress of Serbian democracy caught the attention, which led to the discovery of obstacles for the development of democracy in Serbia. These are the internal factors stated earlier. Old legacies, explicitly patrimonial tendency, ethnic nationalism and state capture, weak democratic culture, and stabilitocracy slowed down the process of

democratization and hindered the consolidation of democracy in Serbia. These factors affected Serbia's capability and ability to nurture democracy. The EU became another determinant in this formula when the Union willingly announced its desire to transform the WBs and include those countries within the EU. The EU's democracy promotion efforts set out at the same time. Yet, over time, specific matters were noticed. The fundamental error and inconsistency in EU's approach, its attitude during the period of crises towards the WBs and naturally to Serbia, and the emergence of the opportunistic players in the WBs impede the EU's democracy promotion in Serbia. When all things are considered, both the EU and Serbia are to blame for the failure in democracy in Serbia. The political elites in Serbia used every situation to continue their traditional practices and took advantage of new conditions to create a beneficial environment for them. The occurrence of stabilitocracy in Serbia is an indication of how futile the EU and Serbia are. Serbia, which cannot give up its habits and cannot break with the old times, and the EU, which cannot act in line with its identity and cannot hold its promise, are both responsible for the outcome in Serbia.

CONCLUSION

Democracy promotion efforts in Serbia has been carried out since the early 2000s. Along with the domestic efforts, the EU as an external promoter have been trying to consolidate democracy in the country. However, it is found out that democracy promotion efforts in Serbia failed dramatically. The aim of this thesis is to discover the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. In this respect, the research employed process tracing method, which is a tool of qualitative analysis. The main objective of process-tracing is to determine causal mechanisms that influenced a change or group of changes. There are distinctive types of process tracing and in this thesis, explaining-outcome process-tracing is used to provide the best possible explanation for the outcome in Serbian case. By applying process tracing method, the goal of the thesis is to reveal the reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia.

Additionally, this thesis asserted that constructivism offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining the practices and behaviours of the actors. Democracy promotion activities of the EU were based on the diffusion of its norms, ideas, beliefs and principles to create a peaceful and EU-friendly neighbourhood in the post-Cold War era. On the grounds of its normative power, the appropriate behaviour for the EU was to transform the war-torn WB countries. Through using socialization as a mechanism, the EU started to transfer its policies, norms and principles to shape the regional countries. Serbia, after overthrowing Milosevic in 2000, chose to follow the path towards the Union and shortly after, Europeanization and democracy promotion processes started in the country. The desire was to trigger a set of processes of change in Serbia. The Union aimed at diffusing its liberal democratic norms to the country. By utilizing socialization, the EU's approaches further strengthened. Double processes are pursued to achieve full transformation of Serbia. In this regard, constructivist theory provides means to comprehend the behaviour of the actors over time to characterize key steps in the process of democracy promotion. By doing so, underlying reasons for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia could be identified.

Furthermore, this thesis, different from other analyses, offers a comprehensive view of the Serbian case. Instead of focusing on a single notion to explain the failure of democracy promotion in the country, the thesis examined the processes Serbia experienced, revealed the views and influences of both Serbia and the EU on the progress of democracy in the country, and then provided a sufficient explanation for the current outcome in Serbia.

In the introduction of the thesis, the research question and the goal of the study were given. With the acknowledgement of the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia, the main goal of finding the reasons behind the failure was set. Afterwards, a literature review was conducted in three categories: democracy promotion, democracy promotion of the EU, and democracy promotion in Serbia.

In the first chapter of the thesis, theory and methodology were explained. Constructivist theory was applied to comprehend the norm diffusion, practices, and the behaviours of the involved actors and explaining-outcome process-tracing method was used to provide a sufficient explanation for the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Through tracing the processes Serbia experienced, the desire was to determine the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia.

In the second chapter of the thesis, the conceptual framework regarding the concept of democracy and its promotion efforts were put forward. The understanding of democracy, the motive and the method of the promoter occupy an important position regarding their convenience for the targeted state. Starting from ancient times, the origin of democracy, its alterations and connotations attributed to the concept were set forth to emphasize the contested nature of democracy. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, to a large extent, a consensus was reached over the type and the meaning of democracy. The toleration for authoritarian practices across the globe was mostly over. Liberal democracy with a broader understanding of democracy including extensive protection of freedoms, inclusive civil society and independent institutions was agreed upon predominantly. Not long after, democracy promotion efforts grew very quickly and the number of promoters around the world went up.

Even though there is a wide acceptance of democracy as an international norm, there is a notable variation among the promoters regarding their motivation and method for democracy promotion. The EU as a democracy promoter managed to shine amongst others with its understanding, motive, and method. The EU becoming an influential and leading democracy promoter came with its actorness. The type of its power shaped its actorness and actions. The normative power of the EU situated the Union as an anchor of democracy and motivated the Union to diffuse its norms and standards. By virtue of its normative power, the EU started to verbalize and promote 'what is normal' in the world. As one of its core principles, liberal democracy was promoted by using conditionality, assistance and monitoring, directly and indirectly through various channels. In this chapter, the EU as an external promoter was put under the scope. The understanding of the EU's perspective on democracy and its promotion efforts are necessary for the construction of the framework for the study of democracy promotion in Serbia. As an external promoter of democracy in Serbia, the EU's perception and activities form an important part of the study.

In the third chapter of the thesis, the democratic history of Serbia was analysed to disclose the key steps towards the current status of democracy in the country. In order for democracy to be established in a country, the acceptance and adoption of democratic practices are worth its weight in gold. That's why, in this chapter, the proto-democratic practices of the Serbs were investigated to demonstrate the constitutive steps towards democracy in contemporary times. The routinised practices by the Serbs since the medieval period could facilitate highlighting the link from premodern democratic practices to modern democracy. Bearing in mind that the Western type of democracy and the expected phases did not occur in Serbia, the introduction and transition to liberal democracy in Serbia are obligatory to review. This being said, in this chapter it was discovered that before the EU's efforts of democracy promotion in Serbia, there were proto-democratic practices in the country.

The premodern practices of Serbs started when they achieved to be organized under Nemanjic dynasty. Despite being a primitive organization, they were able

to regulate their lives and set certain rules such as Code of Dusan. When they had lived under Ottoman rule, they still had some kind of autonomy and succeeded in uniting the people and constructing an identity. Furthermore, towards the 19th century, they began performing democratic practices such as writing a constitution, participating in an election or building democratic institutions like an assembly named Skupstina. Later, in the times of the first Yugoslav experience, in spite of being the ruling nation, Serbs underwent several different rules fluctuating between oligarchic and one-man rules. Under the rule of the monarch, Serbs had constitutional and parliamentary systems but always with specific restrictions. At the time of the second Yugoslav experience, Serbs, just like other constituent nations in the new state, were under the rule of the communist party and the leader Tito. Although there were some democratic features in Yugoslavia, Tito held the power and in the aftermath of his death, Milosevic sought to fill his place, which thereafter led the country into bloody wars.

Following the end of the Yugoslav wars, Serbs founded their own democratic modern state and liberal democracy was introduced to Serbian society. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy started and the liberal Serbian elites began cheering on democracy and reforms. When the current status of democracy is examined, it becomes clear that liberal democracy is not fully established and in fact, the old habits somehow continues with minor changes. The new system is a façade of democracy and old habits persist. At the end, when all things are considered, it has been observed that particular practices that derived from even medieval period continue to exist in modern times. Old legacies such as patrimonial tendency and authoritarian practices remained and prevented democracy to take roots in Serbia. Thus, reviewing the democratic history of Serbia evidently exhibit the Serbs' detrimental effect on the status of democracy in Serbia. The view of political practices of the Serbs throughout history helped identifying the internal reasons, which hindered the establishment and consolidation of democracy in Serbia.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, the aim was simply to assess the EU's influence on Serbia. In the aftermath of the bloody Yugoslav wars, the EU decided to enter

the region and to help the regional countries to transform themselves. The WB countries were eager to shape themselves and wanted to be a part of the West, thus it was easy to convince them to sit at the table. The EU, in spite of the debate of 'widening vs. deepening', was inclined to offer a new perspective for the WBs because its self-confidence had increased due to the success in CEECs. The EU was eager to use its power of attraction to assure stability and peace across the continent. The enlargement policy of the Union, which is seen as the most successful foreign policy of the EU, could achieve these objectives in the WBs. The formal commitment of the EU towards the WB countries was in 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit. The EU affirmed its membership perspective towards the region and extended a hand for the transformation.

In view of the fact that the region is full of problems including political issues, the EU decided to link the Europeanization and democratization processes. For the purpose of achieving the transformation of the WB countries, the Union was obliged to ensure the transition to democracy. Democracy was seen as both a means and an end towards the WB countries. Hereby, the review of the EU process of Serbia would also display the democratic progress of Serbia. By using political conditionality, the EU aimed at diffusing its norms, values, practices and political standards to Serbia. By employing its conditionality, monitoring and financial assistance, the EU has been promoting liberal democracy in Serbia since 2000. It was found out that when the EU reports were examined, it could not be denied that there had been some developments in Serbia involving the political arena. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that there has not been much progress in certain components of liberal democracy like rule of law and in reality, they are deteriorating day by day. Consequently, from this point of view, the EU's approach did not succeed in promoting democracy. Serbia deceived the EU with its democratic cloak. Even though some progress has been made in the process of democratization, old habits continue in the country with a few changes. The EU has not been effective enough for the acceptance and consolidation of democracy in Serbia. Hence, it becomes clear that the EU's democracy promotion efforts in Serbia failed.

In the fifth chapter of the thesis, the intention was to discover the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. In the case of Serbia, there identified two main determinants: Serbia and the EU. Serbia, which is the targeted state, was the most important determinant because its willingness is the key in the democratization process. Serbia's willingness and capabilities could lead to a change in the county. Serbia by acting like an internal democracy promoter could accelerate the transformation to democracy. Reviewing the democratic history of Serbia in chapter 3, Serbia went through particular democratic processes and carried out democratic practices but they have always faced an obstacle that prevented them from adopting and embracing democracy. Thereby, Serbia-related factors are the first reason for the failure of democracy promotion. Then, the EU as an external democracy promoter was essential to scrutinize. In the post-Milosevic period, building upon its normative power, the EU developed policies to incorporate Serbia into the Union. By using its leverage, the EU intended to diffuse its standards and norms to the country. The establishment and consolidation of liberal democracy in Serbia has been the golden desire of the EU. However, when the findings of chapter 4 are taken into account, the EU's democracy promotion efforts failed and today, it is generally claimed that the country has a façade of democracy. Therefore, EU-related factors are the second reason for the failure of democracy promotion.

If all these are considered, it can be said that the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia stemmed from Serbia-related internal reasons and the EU-related external reasons. Keeping the key findings of processes in mind -which were studied in chapters 3 and 4-, some factors were determined by using explaining-outcome process tracing. There identified three Serbia-related internal factors: old legacies, political culture and stabilitocracy. Old legacies, which are patrimonialism, ethnic nationalism and state capture, were described as heavy baggage of Serbia that need to be get rid of immediately to consolidate democracy in the country. They transmitted from the past and endured until today. Political culture is formed with the accumulation of values, beliefs, and behaviours and can orient the direction of the political aspect of society. After the evaluation, it was seen that weak democratic culture is another reason for the

failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. Stabilitocracy is another internal factor, which depicts the current situation of Serbia explicitly. It is a term to describe a government that provides external stability, give lip service to the EU and enjoy authoritarian practices at home. This new system is created by the Serbian elites thanks to the lack of interest of the EU, which weakened democracy in the country further.

Along with the Serbia-related internal factors, there identified three EU-related external factors: the EU's approach, its attitude during the period of crises and the impact of opportunistic players in the WBs. The inconsistency of the EU's approach towards the WBs and its pragmatic behaviour affected the credibility of the EU. Behaviours that contradict its normative power undermine both the actorness of the EU and the success of its policies. Likewise, the deviations in behaviour were reflected in the EU's democracy promotion efforts. Also, the EU's democracy promotion in Serbia became worse during the period of crises when its attention shifted and the WBs fell in the priority list of the EU. As a result of its pragmatic approach, the EU preferred to deal with emergencies and neglected the WB countries. Influenced by previously stated factors, opportunistic players such as Russia, Turkey and China began to increase their activities in the WBs. The EU's lack of attention and its absence in the region attempted to be filled by these players. In such an environment, these authoritarian actors are preferred over the EU by the WB countries, including Serbia. The preference affected the consolidation of democracy and as a matter of fact, intensified authoritarian practices in the WBs.

This study was designed to unravel the reasons behind the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia. By tracing the processes Serbia went through, it is come to the conclusion that both Serbia and the EU are to blame. Despite Serbia's overwhelming willingness to democracy after the demise of Milosevic, it was discovered that there were specific factors that prevent democracy to consolidate in Serbia. It was found out that in a democratic cloak, Serbian elites continue their old habits in new ways. The EU, on the other hand, seems to lose itself along the process. The credibility of its normative basis and its actorness has been severely

undermined by its recent practices. Simply put, the failure of democracy promotion in Serbia derives from Serbia-related internal and the EU-related external reasons. Thus, both the EU and Serbia are responsible for the current status of democracy in the country.

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HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORİJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 21/06/2022

Tez Başlığı : Tango İki Kişi ile Yapılır! AB'nin Sırbistan'daki Başarısız Demokrasi Teşviki Çabalarının Bir Analizi

………

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 161 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 27/04/2022 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 9 'tür.

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HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASTER'S THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT

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**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA**

Tarih: 21/06/2022

Tez Başlığı: Tango İki Kişi ile Yapılır! AB'nin Sırbistan'daki Başarısız Demokrasi Teşviki Çabalarının Bir Analizi

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Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı:	Simge Pelit
Öğrenci No:	N19134901
Anabilim Dalı:	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı:	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Statüsü:	☒ Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Doktora

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

(Unvan, Ad Soyad, İmza)

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Date: 21/06/2022

Thesis Title: It Takes Two to Tango! An Analysis of the EU's Failed Democracy Promotion Efforts in Serbia

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My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname:	Simge Pelit
Student No:	N19134901
Department:	International Relations
Program:	International Relations
Status:	☒ MA ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

(Title, Name Surname, Signature)