Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

AN APPRAISAL OF CHANGING TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1971 FROM A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE

Ahmet Berat GÖR

Master's Thesis

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ÖZET

GÖR Ahmet Berat**,** *Neo-klasik realist perspektif açısından 1960-1971 yılları arasında değişen Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkilerinin değerlendirilmesi,* Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2022

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye kendisine Sovyetler Birliği'ni kendisine tehdit olarak algılıyordu. Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkileri 1960-1971 yılları arasında değişmiştir. Bu değişim ile Türk Dış Politikası'nda çok yönlü dış politika dönemi başlamıştır. Türkiye'nin dış politikada çok yönlülüğe geçişine hem uluslararası sistemin hem de iç faktörlerin etkisi olmuştur. Uluslararası sistemde yumuşama döneminin başlangıcı ve Türkiye'nin sistemde yalnız bırakılması Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkilerinin gelişmesini sağlamıştır. Ayrıca 1960-1971 yılları arasındaki Türk siyasi liderlerin bakış açısı da Türkiye-Sovyetler ilişkilerini etkileyen bir başka unsurdur. Yani Türkiye-Sovyetler ilişkilerini açıklamak için sadece sistemik veya sadece yerel faktörlere odaklanmak yeterli olmayacaktır. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma ele aldığı dönemdeki Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği ilişkilerini bütüncül şekilde ele alabilmek için neoklasik realizmden yararlanmıştır. Neoklasik realizme göre devletlerin dış politikalarını etkileyen en önemli unsur uluslararası sistemdir. Ve uluslararası sistem analizde bağımsız değişken olarak ele alınır. Bu ara değişkenler ise devletlerin iç faktörleridir. 1960'larda Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinde yaşanan değişim bu çalışmanın bağımlı değişkenini oluşturmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, 1960'larda Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin iç faktörlerden süzülen sistemik uyaranlar sonucunda dostane ilişkiler kurduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu bağlamda bu tezde öncelikle uluslararası sistemde yaşanan olaylar ve bunların sistemin karakteristiğine etkisi ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra askeri cunta yönetimi, koalisyonlar dönemi ve son olarak Demirel hükümeti olarak dönemlere ayrılarak iç faktörlerin dış politikaya nasıl etki ettiği ortaya koyulmuştur.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Neoklasik realizm, ara değişkenler, Türk Dış Politikası, SSCB, çok yönlü dış politika

ABSTRACT

GÖR Ahmet Berat**,** *An Appraisal of changing Turkish-Soviet relations between 1960 and 1971 from a Neoclassical realist perspective,* Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2022

After the Second World War, Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to itself. Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union changed between the years 1960-1971. With this change, a multi-dimensional foreign policy period began in Turkish Foreign Policy. Both the international system and domestic factors had an impact on Turkey's transition to multilateralism in foreign policy. The beginning of the softening period in the international system and the isolation of Turkey in the system led to the development of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, the perspective of Turkish political leaders between the years 1960-1971 is another factor that affects Turkey-Soviet relations. In other words, it will not be sufficient to focus only on systemic or only local factors to explain Turkey-Soviet relations. In this context, this study has benefited from neoclassical realism in order to deal with the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in a holistic way. According to neoclassical realism, the most important factor affecting the foreign policies of states is the international system. And the international system is treated as an independent variable in the analysis. International systemic stimuli are shaped by intervening variables. The change in Turkish-Soviet relations during the 1960s is the dependent variable of this study. Thus, this thesis argues that as a result of systemic stimuli filtered through domestic factors Turkey and the Soviet Union had formed friendly relations in the 1960s. In this context, in this thesis, first of all, the events in the international system and their effects on the characteristics of the system are discussed. Later, it was divided into periods as the military junta administration, the coalition's period and finally the Demirel government, and it was revealed how domestic factors affected foreign policy.

Key Words

Neoclassical realism, intervening variable, Turkish Foreign Policy, USSR, multi-dimensional foreign policy

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO: Central Treaty Organization

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

DoD: Department of Defence

DP: Democratic Party

FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States

JP: Justice Party

NAM: Non-Aligned Movement

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NP: Nation Party

NTP: New Turkey Party

NUC: National Unity Committee

RPP: Republican People's Party

RVNP: Republican Villagers Nation Party

TFP: Turkish Foreign Policy

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WPT: Workers' Party of Turkey

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Turkey has established good relations with Western states since its foundation. The foundations of these good relations were the adoption of the Western-style economic model and the change in the political regime. As a newly established state in accordance with the status quoist approach adopted in the period of Atatürk, it was aimed to avoid international conflicts and to carry out the economic, political and cultural reforms needed by the state.

In the bipolar international system that emerged after the Second World War, Turkey positioned itself within the Western Bloc. Thus, Turkey was acting both in line with the values it had adopted since its establishment and also in line with the interests of the country. Turkey did not abandon the capitalist economic model it had adopted with the Izmir Economic Congress in 1923 and wanted to benefit from the aid of the Western Bloc states and especially the United States of America (USA) in order to maximize its interests. During the Cold War, Turkey positioned itself against socialism and aimed to protect both its own interests and those of the Western Bloc. The leading factor that pushed Turkey into this situation was its northern neighbor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Turkey wanted to get under the security umbrella of the Western Bloc due to the security threat it faced in the north after the Second World War. For this reason, Turkey made an effort for NATO membership and eventually became a NATO member state in 1952. Thus, it gained assurance of the US against the Soviet Union in both security and politics.

Security was not the only problem Turkey faced after the war. At the same time, Turkey needed to find a solution for the economic problems it was experiencing. For this reason, Turkey had entered into close relations with especially the leader of the Western Bloc; the USA.

Turkey had an important place in the "containment policy" adopted by the USA against the Soviet Union. Turkey used this situation in the early years of the Cold War to obtain more Western aid. The USA continued its aid to Turkey due to its geopolitical and military importance. Thus, Turkey tried to implement economic development programs with the aid and loans it received. However, these programs did not prevent Turkey from being dependent on foreign aid or loans. During the 1950s, Turkey tried to transform the aid it received from abroad into investment. The rise and fall of Adnan Menderes, the prime minister of the time, took place in parallel with the success rate of these investments. While the loans taken in the early periods provided important investments especially in the field of agriculture, the heavy price of the unplanned economy was paid with high inflation in the following years. In 1960, an important break occurred in Turkish political life.

Due to the economic and politic reasons, the army intervened in politics on May 27, 1960. After the coup, firstly the National Unity Committee, then the Coalitions Governments and finally the Demirel Government were formed between 1960 and 1971. During these governments, a transformation took place in Turkish Foreign Policy. In this period, a multilateral foreign policy was pursued by different Turkish governments. The basis of multilateral foreign policy was the development of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1971. The subject of this thesis is how and why relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union had changed. Since classical realism and neorealism cannot answer the question of how, the theory that can explain this period is believed to be neoclassical realism. So this thesis analyzes the changing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union from the perspective of neoclassical realism.

Theoretical Background

According to classical realism, the behavior of the state in the international system can be explained by focusing on power-seeking human nature. Classical realism acknowledges the anarchic nature of international system which means that everyone is at war with all in the system. More importantly, classical realism claims that human nature desires power and for this reason, power is the main goal for states. Neorealism, which emerged as a critique of classical realists, also accepts that the international system is anarchic. But unlike classical realists, it does not focus on human nature. Neorealism argues that states desire to increase power due to systemic factors. In the anarchic international system, states use power as a tool to ensure their security. According to neorealism, the structure of the international system and the distribution of power within the system are the primary elements that should be addressed to explain the behavior of states. The power distribution within the system determines the polarity. Neorealism tries to reach scientific results that can be verified through collecting measurable data and information to explainstate behaviour. For this reason, it claims that states behave the same in the same international system. Neorealism is insufficient because it cannot explain the different behavior of states within the same international system. Since the positivist approach of neorealism cannot explain why states behave differently within the same system, neoclassical realism, which includes intermediary elements in the analysis, is used in this thesis to account for the change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s.

Similar to neorealism, neoclassical realism recognizes that the international system is anarchic and it is the most important element in the analysis of state behaviors in international politics. Neoclassical realism considers the structure of the international system as an independent variable while explaining the foreign policies of the states. In order to explain why and how states behave differently in the same system, neoclassical realism includes the domestic variables in the analysis, too. These domestic variables are considered

intermediary variables, namely leader images, strategic culture, state-society relationship and domestic institutions and they are believed to affect foreign policy by shaping the systemic stimuli.

In this thesis, the most important factor in the change of Turkey-Soviet Union relations is the international system itself, which is the independent variable. The characteristic of the international system changed due to the transformation in the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union. The events affecting USA-USSR relations were the Berlin Crisis, the U-2 Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Non-Aligned Movement. So the change in the characteristic of the system is the main reason for the change in Turkey-Soviet Union relations.

The reason for the change in relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union cannot only be understood by examining the change in the international system. It will be incomplete to explain the change in relations by considering only systemic factors. For this reason, other factors that neoclassical realists treat as intervening variables should be taken into account. Among these intervening variables, the perception of the leader is the one that affected Turkey-Soviet relations the most. Between 1960 and 1971, Turkey experienced the military government first, and then the period of coalitions in which İnönü was the prime minister, and finally the premiership of Demirel. The way these leaders perceive threats or opportunities from the international system had been decisive for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Another intervening variable affecting Turkey-Soviet Union relations is strategic culture. Especially with the 1961 Constitution, issues that were not spoken in Turkey began to be discussed. In the environment of freedoms provided by the new constitution and due to the events in Turkish foreign policy, a change began to take place in the strategic culture of the society, in terms of worldview and common expectations in the most general sense. This situation affected Turkish-Soviet relations directly or indirectly by shaping the perceptions of the leaders.

The third intervening variable affecting Turkish-Soviet relations is domestic institutions. After the 1960 coup, the influence of the military on politics continued for many years. For a while, the administration of the country by members of the military meant that foreign policy was administered by members of the military themselves. Although a civilian government was established as a result of the elections held in 1961, the influence of the military continued. Alongside the military, the foreign ministry as a local institution was instrumental in foreign policy making as an important intervening variable. The influence of the institution in foreign policy came to the fore especially during the period when Çağlayangil served as the foreign minister.

The last intervening variable that affects foreign policy is the state-society relationship. It is the interaction between the institutions of the state and the groups in the society between the years 1960-1971. In this period, Turkish foreign policy was influenced by certain segments of the society. In the early 1960s, the influence of intellectuals on the state's policies and the influence of economic interest groups on Demirel's policies during his period show the effect of state-society relations on foreign policy.

The Aim and Research Question

The aim of this thesis is to examine Turkey-Soviet Union relations in a holistic way, taking into account both the effects of the international system and domestic factors. Neoclassical realism is used to provide a holistic perspective and to fully understand the reasons for the changing Turkish-Soviet relations. According to neoclassical realism systemic stimuli (independent variable) shapes by domestic factors (intervening variable). The foreign policy (dependent variable) occurs. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to show the combined/joint impact of the international system and internal factors in the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

The main research question of this thesis is "How domestic factors and the features of the international system affected Turkish-Soviet relations between 1960 and 1971?" Classical realism and neorealism both ask the why question in order to explain states' behavior. This thesis provides a new perspective to analyze state behavior between the 1960 and1971 by asking how question from the neoclassical realist perspective. Thus, initially, the historical background of the détente period, which officially began in 1969, is explained. Although the détente period started in the late 1960s, its origins date back to the beginning of the decade. Therefore, in this thesis, the beginning of the 1960s is called the pre-détente period.

In this thesis, along with the main research question, some secondary questions have been answered. The first secondary question is "Which events in the international system caused changes in the characteristic of the system?" With this question, the change in the characteristics of the international system, which neoclassical realism consider as an independent variable, is discussed. Another question is "How did domestic factors become more influential onTurkish foreign policy?". It explains the changing Turkey-Soviet Union relations by considering the leader image, strategic culture, state-society relationship, and local institutions as intervening variables in line with theoretical arguments of neoclassical realism. Therefore, this secondary question is important for understanding the changing relations between 1960 and 1971. The third secondary question is "How change in Turkey-US relations affected Turkey-USSR relations?" This question tries to explain how the dynamics within the poles have changed, hence how it enabled Turkey to establish better relations with the Soviet Union

The Hypotheses

The first hypothesis of this thesis is that the change in the international system between the years of 1960-1971 was the most important factor in the development of Turkey-Soviet Union relations. In other words, thanks to the

change in the characteristics of the system, Turkey was able to improve its relations with the Soviets. When the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union changed, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the characteristics of the system had also changed.

The second hypothesis of this thesis is domestic factors, especially the leader images, had an important role in developing relations. Many governments were established in the Republic of Turkey between the 1960 and 1971, and the perceptions of the leaders of these governments were different. In addition, the state-society relationship and the common expectations of the society differed in this period. These reasons had caused Turkish foreign policy to change within the bipolar system.

The third hypothesis of this thesis is that there were improvements in Turkey-Soviet relations due to the deteriorating relations between Turkey and the US during the 1960's.The Cyprus issue had not only created a divergence between Turkey and the US but also made Turkey isolated and lonely on the stage of international politics.

Scope, Importance, Methodology and Literature Review

The scope of this thesis was limited to the years 1960-1971. The first date chosen is the first intervention of the military in politics of the Turkish political life; meanwhile the second date is when the civilian power changed with a second military intervention 11 years later.[1] Furthermore, apart from the historical scope of the thesis, not all of the events that took place during this period both in the international environment and in Turkish foreign policy were discussed. In this context, only the important events that caused a change in the international system and the facts that caused breaks in the Turkish foreign policy are included in the scope of this thesis.

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[1] These military interventions are completely different from each other

The importance of this thesis is that it explains the reasons for the change in Turkey-Soviet Union relations between the years of 1960-1971 with a holistic approach, taking into account both the changing structure of the international system and domestic factors. This period is important as the change in Turkey-Soviet Union relations provides the transition to multilateralism in Turkish foreign policy. In addition, this period is when Turkey, as an independent state, pursued the most autonomous foreign policy in line with its own interests during the Cold War period. For this reason, this thesis may be important in order to understand the events in the past, present and the future of Turkish foreign policy in a proper context. Furthermore, while explaining the change in Turkish-Soviet relations, the perceptions of the leaders are tried to be revealed clearly by looking into newspapers, parliamentary minutes and the records of the foreign ministries. In this sense, the fact that archive scanning has been done in addition to the existing sources in the literature emphasizes the importance of this thesis.

In terms of methodology, qualitative research was conducted in this thesis. Documentary analysis and archival research used as a research method. The information obtained consists of primary and secondary sources. Among the primary sources, newspapers, parliamentary minutes, foreign ministry minutes, American archive documents were used as a result of long-term researches and scans. In the secondary sources, books, e-books, book chapters, articles, theses and websites were used. And newspapers used in this thesis were selected from the best-selling newspapers of the period. Headlines were used from newspapers in this thesis.

In the literature review, the tradition of realist theory (Carr, 1946; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Hobbes, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2003; Donnely, 2013; Gözen, 2019; Balcı & Kardaş, 2020) and neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998; Finel, 2001; Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, 2009; Devlen & Özdamar, 2009; Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016; Firoozabadi &Ashkezari, 2016; Yeşilyurt, 2017; Kiraz, 2018; Ertoy, 2018) arediscussed. The sources in the literature analyze

the developments both in the international system and in Turkey between the years 1960-1971 (Öztürk, 1968 ; Aziz, 1969 ; Erkanlı, 1972 ; Ahmad&Ahmad, 1976 ; Ahmad, 1977; İnce&Olson 1977 ; Hale, 1980 ; Gevgilili, 1987 ; Yetkin, 1995; Uçarol, 1995; Gönlübol&Kürkçüoğlu, 1996; Fırat, 1999; Aydemir, 2000 ; ; Zürcher, 2000 ; Tellal, 2000 ; Sander, 2013 ; Armaoğlu, 2015 ; Oran, 2015 ; Atılgan, Saraçoğlu, Uslu, 2015 ; Kaynar, 2017) are discussed from a neoclassical realist perspective. In addition, the two best-selling newspapers in Turkey (Milliyet, Cumhuriyet), the minutes of the Turkish Parliament (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), the journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Belleten), the records of the Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS) and the CIA reports (CIA reading room) were examined.

Chapter Outline

In the first part of this thesis, the theoretical background is explained. In this context, firstly, the common values of the realist theory tradition are mentioned. Then, the basic assumptions of classical realism and the ideas of leading classical realist writers are included. After classical realism, neorealism is explained and different perspectives are included in realist theory. After discussing the shortcomings of neorealism, the necessity of neoclassical realism, which is another theory in line with the tradition of realist theory, is mentioned. Later, neoclassical realism is discussed in detail. The definition and properties of the independent variable are explained according to the neoclassical realist theory tradition. Then, the intervening variables that shape the independent variable are included. The neoclassical realist theory is to be explained by considering the intervening variables such as the perception of the leader, strategic culture, state-society relationship, and domestic institutions.

In the second part of the thesis, the international system, which is the independent variable, is discussed. While dealing with the international system, the facts that changed the system are mentioned and the effects of these facts on the system are evaluated. In this context, first the Berlin Crisis, then the U-2

Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis and finally the Non-Aligned Movement were discussed. While dealing with all these facts, relations between the USA and the USSR, which are the leaders of two camps in the bipolar system, were examined. Also, it is to be explained how the foundations of the Détente period were laid.

In the third part of the thesis, the effects of the intervening variables on foreign policy is to be explained by considering the local dynamics. In this context, the years between 1960 and 1971 are divided into periods. This periodical distinction was made according to the duration of governments in Turkey. In this context, the process leading up to May 27th, 1960 is explained first. Later, the National Unity Committee is explained and the 1961 elections are discussed. As a result of the elections, there was a period of coalition governments that would last for an election term in Turkey, and finally the Demirel government is discussed. A periodical foreign policy narrative is built by considering the events in domestic politics, events in foreign policy and bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in each government period.

Finally, the conclusion part deals with the final point reached by the study. Thus, it is discussed whether the thesis achieves its purpose or not. In the thesis, it is evaluated whether arguments of neoclassical realism have been applied to the case of Turkish-Soviet relations during the 1960s.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. TRADITION OF REALIST THEORY

As the peaceful order established after the First World War began to deteriorate in the 1930s, criticisms of idealism emerged in international relations. In this context, realism-idealism debate, which is among the major discussions in the literature of international relations, had begun. Although it is known that the foundations of the realist theory were laid after the criticism of the E. H. Carr's "Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations" (1939) and H. Morgenthau's "Politics Among The Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace" (1948) books against idealism, the foundations of the theory are based on earlier times (Eralp, 2019, p.70). The Greek historian Thucydides (460 BC- 395 BC) and his work "Peloponnesian Wars", Niccolo Machievelli (1469-1527) who is an Italian historian and diplomat, and his work "Prince", English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and his work "Leviathan" are among the early pioneers of realism (Balcı, 2020, p. 120). However, many names like John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Gideon Rose have discussed realism from different perspectives.

While as a theory of international relations, realism has three different approaches, there are common values that all approaches accepted. Classical realism, structural realism (neorealism) and neoclassical realism all three types share the common values of the tradition of realist theory. Realists consider the sovereign state as the main actor of international relations. Both classical realism, which prioritizes human nature, and structural realism, which emphasizes the importance of the system, and neoclassical realism, which focuses on the importance of the domestic factors of states and international system, both accept that the nature of international relations is struggle-conflict and the international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no sovereign power in the international system (Gözen, 2019, p. 167). In an anarchic

international system, the goals of states are to survive and in order to achieve this goal the main way they use is maximizing their power (Gözen, 2019, p. 169-170).

Despite the shared commonalities, arguments about change and transformation in realism occurred in parallel with the developments in the periods when they emerged. When the international system began to change in the 1930s the foundations of classical realism were laid, which tried to explain international politics through human nature. The emergence and impact of structural realism, which puts the influence of the system at the forefront is observed during the Cold War period after the Second World War. But, structural realism has come under serious criticism due to its inability to explain the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and how and why the bipolar system ended. Because the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred neither due to a change in the capacity nor of material power, nor due to reasons arising from the structure, which are the foundations on which structural realists are based (Dyson, 2009, p. 12). The internal elements of the state, which had been ignored until this period by structural realists, at this point were taken seriously by neoclassical realists and the change and transformation in the international system were tried to be explained.

1.2. CLASSICAL REALISM

Classical realism, which includes the reflection of human nature on international politics, dates back much earlier than E.H.Carr. Known as one of the pioneers of the realist school, Thucydides' work entitled The Peloponnesian Wars is among the classical sources of both international relations and realism (Yurdusev, 2019, p. 33). In this work, Thucydides approaches the growing power of the Athenians as the cause of the war and its consequences (Gözen, 2019, p. 172). In this context, Thucydides lays the foundations of realism by revealing how power relations affect international politics.

Another name from which classical realism takes its foundations is Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli, having served in the city-state of Florence, collected his advice to the Medici family in the book of The Prince. Machiavelli develops a nonfiction political theory, and according to him, what exists, not what ought to be, should be studied and explained (Ağaoğulları, 2014, p. 324). At this point, the study of what exists, which is one of the main features of realist theories, can also be seen in Machiavelli. The method of administration is also made clear in the book of The Prince, and the emphasis on the importance of military power is evident here. The Italian historian, who says that rule can be achieved by law and military force, reveals a hierarchical structure between these two: "Where armies are not good, there are no good laws." (Machiavelli, 2008, p. 57). Also, according to Machiavelli, the only purpose of the Prince (leader) is war and the art of war (Machiavelli, 2008). Therefore, Machiavelli keeps the concepts of power and security adopted by classical realism above all else. For this reason, he is considered among the pioneers of classical realism.

Another name is Hobbes, who has a very important place in classical realism with his emphasis on human nature. Hobbes makes three assumptions about the state of nature. The first assumption is men are equal, and second, they interact in anarchy (in the sense of the absence of both rules and administrators) (Donnely, 2013, p. 56). The last one is, according to Hobbes, the nature in which there is no sovereign power. In his case, everyone is in a state of war against everyone, because the three main characteristics found in human nature are the cause of contention. The first one is competition, then insecurity, and finally glory (Hobbes, 1998, p. 83). Hobbes sees international relations as a "state of nature" and says that the state of nature is practically a state of war (Yurdusev, 2019, p. 44). The way the state continues to exist is through absolute sovereignty (Ağaoğulları, 2019, p. 446). In other words, human nature's desire to be strong and sovereign also reflects interstate relations. This situation gives an idea of Hobbes' thoughts on the structure of the international system. There is no sovereign power over states that have

absolute sovereignty in the international system so in this sense; it considers the international system is anarchic.

E.H. Carr's book "Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations", published in 1939, is considered one of the cornerstones of realist tradition. Carr make serious criticisms of idealism with this work and proposed the idea for the agenda that international relations should be looked at what exists, not what should be (Evans, 1975, p. 79). Carr said that military power could not be separated from politics and gave examples of how military power could affect the success of states in international politics (Carr, 1946, p. 105-106). Talking about military power as well as economic power and power over opinion, Carr kept military power one step ahead of all others (Carr, 1946, p. 95-132). Carr (1946, p. 22-94), who directed serious criticism to idealism in the second part of his book, succeeded in turning the focus of international relations from idealism to realism (Balcı, 2020, p. 130). Although E.H Carr and earlier thinkers have contributed to realism, a holistic narrative of realism has not been made. However, the study of realism as a whole check is of great importance to the theory, and Morgenthau realized this holistic narrative in his book "Politics among the Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace" published in 1948. Morgenthau's principles, which he describes as "the six principles of politics", reflect his perspective on international politics (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 3-11). The first principle of Morgenthau is politics is governed by the objective law that is derived from human nature. The second one is that politics is all about power The third principle examines the term of interest and argues that the core of politics is interests and the most important interests is being powerful and seeking more power. The fourth and fifth principles warn about the possibility of disruptive consequences of extremely moral state behaviors. The last principle handles differences between international politics and international law and economy (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 34-38; Cristol, 2009, p. 238-241). The most important of these principles is that he saw international politics as a struggle for power and emphasized that states aim for power to achieve all their goals (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13). So power for

states is the ultimate goal. At this point, how power is defined plays a critical role. Morgenthau said that "when we speak of power we mean man's control over the minds and action of other men" (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13). In addition, Morgenthau claimed that the political forces of states can be achieved by strong armament (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 14).

The idea that states resort to power to survive is seen in almost all classical realist writers. In this context, the most prominent concept in classical realism is power. But the fact that a state increases its power with security concerns has different consequences in the international system. The concept of "security dilemma", which is included in classical realism, emerged at that point. This condition has been called "Hobbesian Fear" by Herbert Butterfield. According to Butterfield, if you were locked in the same room with someone who was your enemy in the past and a gun in your hand, it makes sense for both sides to throw their guns out. But since you can never be sure of the intention of the opposite side, the mind prevents you from doing so (Butterfield, 1950, p. 89-90). In the same way, states cannot refuse to increase their power in order to survive because they cannot be sure of the intentions of the opposite side. In the international system, states always feel a threat and want to increase their power. This situation enters an unlimited cycle, and states constantly pursue power. States that increase their power now pose a threat to others. Other states feel less secure and see themselves as more powerless by comparison, so they want to increase their power, too (Herz, 1950, p. 157). This situation is known as security dilemma.

In the international system where the security dilemma arises, states can try to survive by using the "balancing" strategy. It is called balancing that states form alliances in the face of an actor who becomes a threat, having more material power than other states in the international system. In the final situation, the "balance of power" dominates the international system. But the atmosphere of

anarchy does not disappear, because the formation of a balance of power does not create a hierarchical structure in the international system.

1.3. STRUCTURAL REALISM (NEOREALISM)

The basic assumption of structural realism is that the most important element in international relations is the international system itself. According to Waltz, because human nature is affected by environmental factors, a pure definition cannot be made and cannot be a valid source of data (Waltz, 1959, p. 166). Therefore, in structural realism (neorealism), human nature ceases to be a source of international politics and is replaced by the anarchic international system. In this context, according to structural realism, the international system is sufficient to explain inter-state relations. Kenneth N. Waltz, founding father of this theory, notes that states make foreign policy only within the boundaries of the system and are only influenced by the international system in the process of foreign policy formation (Waltz, 1979, p. 74). In other words, the behavior of states is influenced by the international system's structural factors. These factors specify the state's foreign policy limitations.

In neorealism, states are considered as actors who make up foreign policy, but it is not possible for these actors to change and transform the system. Waltz accepted the states as equal in terms of sovereignty, but accepted the existence of the difference between the Soviet Union and Costa Rica (Waltz, 1979: 96). Neorealist, who tries to explain the reason for differences between states, focuses on the distribution of relative power abilities as the only reason for differences between states (Waltz, 1979, p. 125,132). Waltz explains what power capability is as follows: "Their rank depends on how score all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence." (Waltz, 1979, p. 131).

Although there are differences between states due to their power capabilities, the international anarchic system does not generate chaos. An element that

ensures order in the anarchic international system is the balance of power (Gözen, 2019, p. 182). Balance of power politics is formed by the effort of states aiming for minimal survival and maximum world domination to use appropriate means for their purposes (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). According to Waltz this effort is divided into two parts: internal efforts include increasing economic and military power and developing strategies, while external efforts include efforts to strengthen the alliance or weaken the enemy alliance (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). States avoid chaos in the international anarchic environment by establishing a balance of power in this way.

One issue that causes different views within neorealist theory is the view of power. Is power an instrument for states or a goal for each state? The answer of this question has caused the emergence of two different groups in neorealist theory. According to Waltz, power is an instrument that states use to ensure their security. In this context, the goal of states is not to maximize their power, but to maintain their position in the international system (Gözen, 2019, p. 182). Neorealist writers in this view have been called "defensive realists".

Another answer to the question of how much power states want in the international system is given by John J. Mearshemier. According to him the goal of states is to maximize power. In other words, power is not an instrument for states, but a goal in itself, and this situation has been called "offensive realism" in neorealism (Balcı, 2020, p. 138). The answer to the question of why states want to maximize their power and why they are "offensive" has revealed an important concept that exists in realism: Security Dilemma. According to security dilemma, since the intentions of other states cannot be fully understood, the security measure taken by one state can be perceived as a threat by other states. In this case, states that perceive the threat also seek to increase their power to ensure their security. But similarly, this situation is perceived as a threat by other states. Thus, states enter the race for power, turning into a spiral with no end (Donnely, 2013, p. 63). At this point, states constantly try to maximize their power for their security by perceiving threats

from other states. This situation indicates that the state is "offensive". Waltz, who is a representative of defensive realism, and Mearsheimer, who is a representative of offensive realism, have a common view of the stability of the international system, even if they have different ideas about how states see power. In the international system, each actor has different power capabilities. According to Mearshimer, the most important goal of the Great Powers, who are more capable of power, is to become hegemon in their region (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 138). But this situation is almost impossible (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 41). Following this assessment, Mearsheimer suggested that the most stable international system is the bipolar system (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 338). On the other hand, according to Waltz, in bipolar system because the parties are clearly obvious, it is more obvious from whom the danger is directed to whom and therefore, possibility of war is less in a bipolar system (Waltz, 1979, p. 170). In this context, both authors agree that the bipolar system is more stable than the multipolar systems. If states cannot make changes to the international system, the question of how to make changes to the system is one of the main questions that will be posed to neorealist as a structuralist theory. According to Waltz, changes in the international system can only occur with changes in the distribution of power capabilities of states (Waltz, 1979, p. 98). After the collapse of the Soviet Union the change of power distribution and the transition from bipolar system to multipolar systems supports Waltz's argument.

Neorealist system-based explanation of change in the international system demonstrates the inadequacy of the analysis. As sub-unit elements the image of the leader, domestic institutions, strategic culture and the relationship between state and society are some of the explanations that are ignored. As a matter of fact, neorealism, which explains the only condition for changing the international system as the distribution of power capacities, has been incomplete in explaining the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Instead of focusing on the causes of the end of bipolar system, neorealism focuses on the results. In addition, neorealism which claims that the system is determinative in the behavior of states has not been able to explain how states create different

foreign policies within the same system. For this reason, internal elements of the state, which were lacking in neorealism, are also included in the analysis by writers such as Talieferro, Ripsman, Lobell, and Rose. But while including the domestic factors to the systemic factors, neoclassic realism does not reject the main argument of realist theories. In this sense, the expression "Black Box" is used for the state because the internal elements of the state are not included in the analysis within realist theory. "Black Box" opened, as Bernard Finel (2001, p. 212) notes but with the inclusion of internal elements. In addition to some of the arguments of classical realism and neorealism, a new analysis emerged by adding "intervening variables" (Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, 2009). Thus, a third perspective was formed in realism, which occupies a large place in the literature of international relations, and was called "neoclassical realism".

1.4. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Structural realism, which explains on the basis of the nature of international system, has been incomplete in explaining why states behave differently within the same international system or the reason for the changes occurring in the international system. A theoretical gap has emerged due to neorealism's inability to explain changes in the system and the different behavior of states. This gap can only be filled by including unit level elements in the new theory. The concept of neoclassical realism was first used by Gideon Rose in 1998 in his article "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" (Rose, 1998). When describing neoclassical realism Rose gave reference to both classical realism and neorealism. While classical realism ignores systemic elements by focusing on unit level analysis, neorealist does not include internal elements of the state in the analysis by making a system-based explanation (Firoozabadi & Ashkezari, 2016, p. 95). According to Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, neoclassical realism shares the same view on state and internal society with classical realism. However, it begins the analysis with the basic assumptions of neorealism about the structure of the international system (Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, 2009, p. 19). Rose explains it as such: foreign policy of states first determines the international system and the material power capacity of the state

so it is realist, but the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is not direct and it is more complex than structural realism claims, because systemic stimuli must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why it is called neoclassical (Rose, 1998, p. 146). In other words, neoclassical realism has not broken away from the realist tradition, but has brought a new approach to the literature of realism.

According to neoclassical realism, states struggle for material power and security due to scarce resources in the world and the uncertainty felt by the anarchic international system meaning the absence of a higher authority (Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, 2009, p. 4). In this sense, it can be said that they share the same ideas as structural realists. Uncertainty in the anarchic international system leads to a power struggle between states, because the only way for states to survive depends on their power. They also accept that opportunities and threats from the system, are of primary importance in the foreign policy of states (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 19). The international system initiates the process of foreign policy formation by sending stimuli to evaluate and shape intervening variables. With another expression, when trying to explain state behavior in neoclassical realism, the explanation begins from the system (Ertoy, 2019, p. 11).

While neoclassical realists do not deny the importance of the system, if the pressures of the system are not included in the analysis, it will be no different from domestic policy, which analyzes only by focusing on domestic factors. So for this reason, it emphasizes that the international system is important (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 96). But neoclassical realism argues that, unlike structural realism, the foreign policies of states are not created directly by the system. According to them, warnings from the international system expose foreign policy by shaping intervening variables.

Figure 1. Foreign policy formation process in neoclassical realism

Systemic Stimuli	➡	Intervening variables	➡	Foreign Policy

Neoclassical realism reveals the limitations of structural realism in four points. These criticisms reveal the necessity of neoclassical realism in a general sense, and also in a special sense, why subunit elements should be included in foreign policy analysis. The first limitation of structural realism is perception and misperception. Leaders can misunderstand warnings from the international system, which can result in a wrong foreign policy behavior. Second, the international system is not always clear in terms of threats and opportunities. Threats and opportunities that are not clear may not be clearly understood by foreign policy makers. Third, leaders can make irrational decisions even if they understand the threats and opportunities clearly. The last limitation of structural realism is related to the mobilization of state resources. In order for states to respond to systemic orders to be effective, they must be able to conveniently mobilize state resources, but in any case, this may not happen (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 20-24). These four limitations showed the inadequacy of structural realism, demonstrating the need to take into account the six unit elements in the behavior of states. Criticisms of the limitations of neorealism form the basis of neoclassical realism. In neoclassical realism, independent variables (systemic stimulators) influence dependent variables (foreign policy) with the help of intervening variables (e.g. decision-maker's perception and local dynamics) (Kiraz, 2018, p. 417). Intermediate variables that transforms

foreign policy by evaluating the independent variable has been divided into four groups: the leader's perception and assessment of opportunities and threats from the international system, the relations between state and society, strategic culture and internal institutions (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 58).

1.4.1. Neoclassical Realism and The International System

According to neoclassical realism, other elements in the international system along not being ignored, main actors are states (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 35). States as actors of the international system, the material power of the state determines the position of that state in the international system (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 56). The definition of material power includes the size of the Army, defense expenses, military researches and developments, the size of population and the surface area of state's territory, gross domestic product, and natural resources (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 44).

In addition, at the beginning of the main arguments of neoclassical realism, the formation of foreign policies of states begins primarily with stimuli from the anarchic international system. According to how these stimuli from the system are perceived by intervening variables, foreign policy is created. In other words, neoclassical realists depend on the assumption that the structure of the international system is anarchic and accept the effect of anarchy on state behavior, but they also argue that stimuli from the anarchic international system are not the only factors in the formation of foreign policy. The international system does not dictate a single policy to states, and states do not automatically respond to each pressure. According to neoclassical realism, the system is expected to provide states with threats and opportunities, creating policies based on the internal elements of states and how they perceive these threats and opportunities (Folker, 1997, p. 17). In this sense, neoclassical realism differs from neorealist in its view of the system. Although the independent variable is accepted as international system the role of intervening variables in the formation of the dependent variable (foreign policy) is important.

In this context, the leader is the one who will evaluate what opportunities and threats the anarchic international system poses to the state (Wiecławski, 2017, p. 202).

Neoclassical realists approach to the international system has been divided in two points (Yeşilyurt, 2017, p. 121). The first of these is the clarity of warnings coming to the state. The degree of warnings that the international system sends to the state has an important place in the leader's understanding of these warnings and the foreign policy that he/she will create. In determining the degree of clearness, three issues are paid attention. The first is the degree to which threats and opportunities are noticeable. States do not act without receiving any signals in their favor or against them. Because states do not want to reduce or lose the gains they will gain due to a wrong foreign policy that they will create by taking action without seeing a signal from the international system. On the other hand, states do not want to declare a state as an open threat without receiving a signal from the international system. The second issue in measuring the degree of cleanliness of warnings sent by the international system is whether the system provides information about timing. Because of a foreign policy that will be implemented at the wrong time, states can be seen as offensive in the international system. In this case, it may be punished by other states. The third and final factor affecting the degree of clearness is related to whether alternative policies are demonstrated themselves. If alternative policies offer states - especially leaders-options in the process of creating a foreign policy, the most appropriate foreign policy can be followed (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 45). If there is high clearness on these three issues, the international system will increase its determinant on foreign policy (Yeşilyurt, 2017, p. 121).

Neoclassical realists, who argue that the system is uncertain due to the problem of clarity in the international system, defend that there can be no rational foreign policy output if there is no clear information about threats and opportunities (Dyson, 2009, p. 12-13). The second point at which neoclassical realists differ

from Waltz in terms of the system is the strategic environment. A strategic environment is a concept that explains the urgency and amount of threats and opportunities from the international system. According to Ripsman, Lobell, and Taliaferro, the greater urgency and amount of threats and opportunities, the strategic environment of the state is more restrictive. On the other hand, the lower the urgency and amount the strategic environment of states is more tolerant (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 52). States have the opportunity to choose from foreign policy options in the permissive international system. In this way, foreign policy output is formed, in which intervening variables are also effective, without having to implement a foreign policy imposed by the international system (Firoozabadi &Ashkezari, 2016, p. 95-96). It is generally accepted that the international system has low clarity and that states have a tolerant strategic environment. In addition, clarity and strategic environment shape which of the intervening variables will be more effective. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Degree of Systemic Clarity

		Degree of Systemic Clarity (High to Low)	
		High Clarity	Low Clarity
Nature of Strategic Environment (Restrictive to Permissive)	Restrictive Environment	Leader images and Strategic culture	Leader images and Strategic culture
	Permissive Environment	Strategic culture, Domestic institutions, and State-society relations	Indeterminate—all four clusters could be relevant.

Source: Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 95

Intermediate variables that are more effective in a restrictive strategic environment, regardless of whether decisiveness is high or low it is how leaders

perceive threats and opportunities and strategic culture. On the other hand, more intervening variables are able to be active in the tolerant strategic environment. For example, in a high clarity state-society relations, internal institutions and strategic culture can be enabled. In a low-clarity and tolerant strategic environment, it seems that all intervening variables can be effective. Considering that the international system is generally low-clarity and tolerant, the effectiveness of all intervening variables may be involved.

According to neoclassical realists, the international system is not fixed, and states can bring about changes in the international system in some ways. "Structural modifiers" are called the elements that make changes to the international system. Structural modifiers cover geography, distribution of technological elements within the international system, and all military technologies. The Soviet Union and the United States are good examples of as "structural modifiers" that transformed the system during the Cold War (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 40-41).

As a result, neoclassical realism accepts the main actors in the international system as states, but argues that warnings from the system are the starting point of the foreign policy of states. But according to neoclassical realism, the foreign policies of states, as structuralism realism argues, do not occur by automatically responding to warnings from the system. In this context, neoclassical realism defends that the warnings of the international system become foreign policy by passing through the filter of intervening variables.

1.4.2. Intervening Variables

The most important point that distinguishes neoclassical realism from other realist theories as the theory of international relations is the inclusion of intervening variables in the analysis. Against classical realism ignoring the international system and analyzing it through the state, structuralism realism focusing only on systemic elements, neoclassical realism has included unit and subunit elements as intervening variables in the analysis. Rose, one of the early

authors of neoclassical realism, claims that in order to make accurate analysis, it is necessary to look at how systemic elements are shaped by intervening variables at the unit level (Rose, 1998, p. 152). Thus, two-variable (dependent and independent variables) analysis in the realist literature has included intervening values as a third variable (Ertoy, 2018, p. 30). Until this period, the internal elements of the state, defined as the "black box", have been excluded from the analysis, the black box is opened, and the realist tradition has become a more useful theory that can analyze accurately (Finel, 2001, p. 227).

Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell approach these intervening variables in four titles. The first one is that political leaders perceive threats and opportunities from the international stimuli which is consist of international system, the second one is strategic culture, the third one is the relationship between the state and society, and the last is domestic institutions (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 58). In spite of their similarities, neoclassical realism and foreign policy analysis have difference. The main difference between neoclassical realism and foreign policy analysis is the answer to the question "what are the independent and dependent variables?". According to neoclassical realism international system is superior to domestic variables while analyzing the state's foreign policy. But on the other hand, foreign policy analysis privileges the unit-level variables in foreign policy decision-making (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 172). Thus neoclassical realism evaluates the domestic level variables as an intervening variable, while foreign policy analysis evaluates them as independent variables. Each intervening variable has a different effect on foreign policy formation processes. But in order to correctly evaluate the threats and opportunities from the international system and achieve the most rational foreign policy output, these intervening variables must be evaluated as a whole (Ertoy, 2018, p. 17). In addition, the same intervening variables in each state do not have the same effect. In other words, different intervening variables can come to the prominence in different states. For example, while more effective in foreign policy formation of internal institutions, strategic culture or state-society relations in more democratic

countries, in more totalitarian regimes, the perception of a leader can be found as the most effective of all intervening variables. The reason for this is that in democratic countries, leaders are concerned about re-election, and the institutions are important elements that make up the states in democratic countries (Kiraz, 2018, p. 436). Another element in which the effects of intervening variables change is the clarity of the international system and the strategic environment. These elements can also determine which intervening variable will be more effective (See Figure 2). But in general, intervening variables are considered as a whole and affect foreign policy formation processes at different points.

Figure 3. Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy

Source: Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 59

According to Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, foreign policy formation processes begin with systemic stimuli. How stimulants are perceived from the system affects the decision-making process. From the intervening variables that neoclassical realism has brought to realist literature, the image of the leader and strategic cultures are intervening variables that influence how stimuli from the international system are perceived. After systemic stimulants are evaluated with the influence of the leader's image and strategic culture, the decision-making process begins in foreign policy. After the decision-making process, the process of implementing decisions begins. The intervening variables that are effective in both the decision-making process and the policy implementation process are strategic culture, state-community relations and internal institutions.

Thus, each intervening variable affects foreign policy formation processes at different points, forming foreign policies and becoming international outputs. In addition, each state contains elements that reflect its own character. For example, thanks to strategic culture, it has been revealed how societies with different characteristic structures reflect their own characters in foreign policy.

1.4.2.1. Leader Images

The most active people in the decision-making mechanisms of states are considered as the leaders of states. The adjectives of these leaders differ according to the way the state is governed. For example, in a country governed by a presidential government, the leader of the state can be the president, while the leader of the state governed by a parliamentary system can be the prime minister. The whole of beliefs and values of leaders, who are the most active people in decision-making mechanisms, constitute the leader images, which is the first of the intervening variables. Leader perception is of great importance to understand why states in the same situation react differently to stimuli from the international system (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 123). Even, according to Rose, leader images is the most important among intervening variables (Rose, 1998, p. 147). Because the people who have the most information and authority are the leaders (Dyson, 2009, p. 16). This situation ensures that leaders are the most effective person in decision-making processes. But each individual has a different belief, perception, prejudice or ideology. This situation also applies to leaders. Leaders' perspectives on life can be completely different from each other, and this is one of the important elements that affect the foreign policy of states. Because the leader appears as the primary subject in all kinds of decision-making processes and the personality of the leader shapes this decision-making process (Kiraz, 2018, p. 28).

Profiles of leaders have a critical role in foreign policy formation processes (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 62). Because leaders who perceive stimuli from the international system and direct them to the decision-making

process. Neoclassical realists do not reject the influence of material power capacity in foreign policy. But they note that not only material power shapes foreign policy, but also how leaders perceive this material power is important in foreign policy (Ertoy, 2019, p. 18). In this context, foreign policy preferences made by leaders are not important according to material power or the abundance of resources, but how relative power is perceived by leaders is much more influential (Rose, 1998, p. 147). In other words, the leaders' perspective serves as a filter for stimulants from the international system. Rose conceptualized this as "transmission belt" (1998).

As a result of leaders misperceiving the distribution of material power, they may be on the wrong side of a war or it may overreact to view a threat that is important to the state considered as overly important (Christensen, 1997, p. 68). As Kiraz (2018, p. 432) quoted from Wohlforth (1993), the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States drew different foreign policies in the Cold War era because they perceived the capabilities of their own states and rival states differently. Before the Second World War, some states perceived Germany's rising power as a threat, while some states did not perceive it as a threat and sided with Nazi Germany (Ertoy, 2019, p. 19). This has been linked to the leaders' view of a rising Germany, and states had developed foreign policy in line with the leaders' perception. In this context, the perception of leaders has a great influence on foreign policy formation or foreign policy selection.

The way states govern changes how effective leaders can be in foreign policy. In totalitarian regimes, leaders' decisions can arise as direct foreign policy, while in democratic regimes, leaders are also influenced by other intervening variables. Even if the most important intervening variable is the perception of the leader in perceiving threats and opportunities from the international system, other intervening variables can be effective in shaping the perception of the leader.

Figure 4. Leader Images

Source: Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar, 2009, p. 144.

According to Ripsman, Lobell, and Taliaferro, some leaders based on their characteristic features, are more tend to risk, while others avoid risk (2016, p. 63). In this context, the effects of states on international politics are differentiating. Authors who have studied leaders such as Otto von Bismarck, Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein have used these leaders to emphasize the importance of personal characteristics to their foreign policy output (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 63). Because the opportunities and threats presented by the international system are evaluated by the leaders themselves, leaders who take more risks come to the fore. In order to take advantage of opportunities and eliminate threats, sometimes leaders may need to take risks. This situation reveals the leader's personal characteristics and the importance of his perception of how he evaluates threats and opportunities from the international system.

1.4.2.2. Strategic Culture

It is accepted by neoclassical realists that the main element determining the foreign policy of states is the anarchic structure of the international system and the relative distribution of power. But the relative power and system are insufficient to explain the different behavior of states within the same system. In this context, neoclassical realists try to explain the different behavior of states by adding intervening variables as a third variable to two-variable analyses

(dependent and independent variable). The second variable is strategic culture. Strategic culture in its broadest sense covers all the ideology that exists in the state and the culture and all beliefs that are spread in society (Yeşilyurt, 2017, p. 121). In other words, it refers to the expectations of the entire society within the country and the general style of understanding of society, including leaders. This situation also includes moral rules or restrictions that have taken place within the state. The use of military force, moral restraint intended non-use of weapons of mass destruction or ıssues such as humanitarian intervention are also the components of strategic culture (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 67). For example, in terms of the use of nuclear weapons, the strategic culture of the United States places a certain restriction, while in a country ruled by a totalitarian regime; there may not be the same restriction. In this context, how much decision makers are influenced by ideological limitations affects foreign policy output. Strategic culture does not just impose limitations. In other words, strategic culture can give leaders more opportunities. In nationalist societies, for example, the leader is less restrained on national security issues. In nationalist societies, leaders can come to the fore. So the" dominant ideology" is an important part of the Strategic Culture and can shape the movements of the state in the international system (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 69). But strategic culture can mislead the leader. For example, while the state is more rational to be in an offensive position a leader can follow a defence policy with strategic cultural pressure. Or while the defense strategy is in favor of the state the leader with the influence of strategic culture can damage the interests of the state by creating an offensive foreign policy (Ertoy, 2019, p. 32). In this context, the strategic culture that may affect the foreign policy outcomes of states should be analysed specifically with extra consideration for each state.

Strategic Culture has a decisive and guiding effect on many issues, from the capacity of actions in the foreign policies that states will follow to the expectations of society. Strategic Culture, which can influence who the state will be in peace or war with, also affects the permanence of peace (Ripsman, 2009,

p. 117). In addition, strategic culture has historically been passed down from generation to generation. Concepts such as peace, friend, ally, enemy, conflict that settle in the mind of society are etched into the mind of society and help it to have an idea of another state. Another example of the importance of Strategic Culture is that while the United States does not react negatively to the nuclear program of its neighbour, Canada, it has shown great reactions to Iran's nuclear program. This is because it does not perceive Canada, which feels closer to it as a strategic culture, as a threat, while Iran, which is very different as a strategic culture, is considered a threat to the United States (Ertoy, 2019, p. 19). As a result, Strategic Culture is by covers the beliefs, expectations, ideology of society, it is an important intervening variable that shapes the state's foreign policy. Strategic Culture in the sense that it affects the leader, who is an important factor in the foreign policy formation process, is also effective in foreign policy. Strategic culture can give leaders more opportunities in the foreign policy formation process or restrict leaders. In this context, neoclassical realists tried to explain the behaviour of states in the international arena by including strategic culture among the internal elements that influence the foreign policy of states.

1.4.2.3. State – Society Relationship

Neoclassical realists have included the state-society relationship in the intervening variables, arguing that the internal dynamics of states should also be taken into account in the foreign policy formation process. State-Society relationship approaches the relationship between the central institutions of the state and their ethnic, economic and social groups (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 70-71). Decision makers want the policies followed by closer relations with social or economic groups that have an important place in society to be accepted by the majority of society. For this reason, states turn their face to domestic policy in some foreign policy behaviours and try to create foreign policy output that will meet the expectations of groups representing a wide segment of society. The important point here is that the state creates foreign policy output under what social or economic group influence and degree of this

influence (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 71). In other words, leaders are trying to get the support of a wide segment of society by interacting with social, economic and ethnic groups, while these groups try to be active in the foreign policies of the state. According to Rose, Christensen defined national political power as follows: "the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation's human and material resources behind security policy initiatives." (Rose, 1998, p. 163). In this context, as it is important how the leader perceives rather than what the stimulants from the international system are, and how much the leader can mobilize national resources in the state-society relationship shows the political power of the country.

Society has been included in neoclassical realism analyses as an intervening variable, both influenced and influencing by foreign policy decisions (Kiraz, 2018, p. 32). Which group will be more dominant in society is of great importance in shaping foreign policy. For example, in a society where military groups are more dominant, foreign policy outputs can be expected to be more militaristic, or in a society where economic groups are more dominant, foreign policy outputs are expected to be created so that the economy does not suffer. In some cases, states may have to create foreign policy by making concessions to these interest groups (Schweller, 2004, p. 164-165). The degree to which it can influence foreign policy decisions is related to the leader's administrative ability and the dominance of groups within society. How autonomous foreign policy makers are in the state-society relationship is proportional to how influenced they are by society in creating foreign policy outcomes (Ripsman, 2009, p. 180). So, leaders do not have complete freedom to use national resources. The transformation of these resources depends on the state-society relations (Rose, 1998, p. 5). Another parameter that is effective in converting these resources is the form of government of the state and the political conditions of the state. Because leaders in democratic countries are in accountability position, they have little autonomy in converting resources. But in more totalitarian regimes, resources can be easily converted. There is also a view that there may be some dominant groups within the state, and that these

dominant groups refuses that it has shaped foreign policy. According to Ripsman, the state's foreign policies are not aimed at a specific group that makes it to meet expectations that cover the whole society. According to Ripsman, the state's foreign policies are not aimed at a specific group that makes it to meet expectations that cover the whole society (Ripsman, 2009, p. 180). On the other hand, according to authors such as Schweller (2004), Taliaferro & Lobell (2016), certain groups can be active in the foreign policy of the state.

The alignment of these groups with the state imposes freedom or limitations on foreign policy makers. Harmony between elites (or groups) in society gives freedom to the leader in foreign policy (Schweller, 2004, p. 159-171). If there is harmony between elites and foreign policy makers, foreign policy is satisfactory both in terms of domestic policy and in terms of international policy (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 71).

1.4.2.4. Domestic Institutions

The last intervening variable is domestic institutions. According to neoclassical realist authors, domestic institutions include legal institutions, procedures and bureaucracy (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 76). The legal institutions of the state can influence foreign policy output. For example, in a state where the military bureaucracy is strong, foreign policy is created at the request of this bureaucracy in case of a coup (Kiraz, 2018, p. 33).

Internal institutions differ according to the way countries are governed. For this reason, domestic institutions are more effective in foreign policy formation in countries whose management style is democratic. Institutions in democratic countries have a check and balance effect on the leader who is a foreign policy maker (Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro, 2016, p. 76). Making laws in countries governed by democracy, influence of Parliament on foreign policy makers taking into account the impact. It is clear that domestic institutions are an important intervening variable. For example, in the United States, when a

foreign policy conflict (especially on military issues) occurs between Congress and the President, the President may have to pursue a foreign policy at the request of Congress (Dueck, 2009, p. 161). In other words, domestic institutions can have a restrictive effect on foreign policy for leaders. Institutions, on the other hand, can use this situation to increase their reputation in society. Domestic institutions want to take a more important position in society by wanting to have more influence in the foreign policy process (Ripsman, 2009, p. 180). But it may not always be true that leaders in undemocratic administrations have more influence in foreign policy. For example, Khrushchev's autonomy in foreign policy construction may be less than that of a democratic country in foreign policy construction (Ripsman, 2009, p. 190). In this context, although the management style is important from the point of view of domestic institutions and from the point of view of influence on foreign policy, the point to note is the autonomy of the manager in foreign policy making.

As a result, domestic institutions have different effects in the foreign policy making processes of states. The influence of each domestic institution is different from the other, and sometimes there is competition between institutions. In this sense, domestic institutions that stand out in the states may be different. At the same time, the impact of domestic institutions on foreign policy cannot be ignored.

1.4.3. Criticism of Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism has been criticized in three different dimensions. The first of these is that neoclassical realism aims to fill the gaps in neorealism. According to Rathbun "neoclassical realism is the logical outgrowth of neorealism." (Rathbun, 2008, p. 297). Moreover, according to Rathbun, neoclassical realism continues to exist in the field of foreign policy that neorealism needs (Rathbun, 2008, p. 295). According to the criticisms made in this context, neoclassical realism could not go beyond filling the gaps of neorealism. So, neoclassical realism itself was seen as a foreign policy analysis derived from neorealism rather than a theory of international relations. But

Ripsman responded to this criticism by stating that neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy and neorealism is a theory of international politics (Ripsman, 2009, p. 191).

The second criticism of neoclassical realism is that the theory is reductionist. Neoclassical realism has been criticized as reductionist because it adds sub-state elements as intervening variables to the analysis (Kiraz, 2018, p. 38). However, while neoclassical realism gives the greatest importance to the international system in analysis, it also considers the intervening variables as the element that shapes the foreign policy implementation. In other words, it does not exhibit a reductionist approach.

The final criticism of neoclassical realism is that neoclassical realism is still in its developmental stage (Kiraz, 2018, p. 39). But neoclassical realism has shown that it has already completed its developmental process by developing three types. Theoretically, the theory is not fully completed. However, the criticism levelled at the theory is that it is not a theory because it has not completed its development. But both the theoretical foundations and the power of explanation and interpretation in practice are proof that it is an international relations theory.

In this context neoclassical realism criticized because of its differences from classical realism, neorealism and foreign policy analysis.

Figure 5. Differences of realist tradition theories

	Basic arguments	View of domestic politics	View of international politics	Factors to influence on state's foreign policy
Classical Realism	-Human nature -State's relation as zerosum game -Power as ultimate goal	Very important for state's foreign policy	Less relevant to state's foreign policy	-State's foreign policy is driven by domestic politics. -Anarchy is caused by human nature.
Neorealism	-International system shapes state's foreign policy. -Power is not the ultimate goal but means for security.	Less relevant to state's foreign policy	Very important for state's foreign policy	-Foreign policy is driven by state's interaction in the international system. -Anarchy exists due to the absence of world government.
Neoclassical Realism	-Pure unit-level is not enough. -Pure concentration of systemic pressure is inaccurate. -Relative power as chief independent variable	Important for state's foreign policy	Important for state's foreign policy	-State's foreign policy is driven by both domestic politics and international structure. -Cooperation is possible, given the relative gains.
Foreign Policy Analysis	-Domestic factors is the most important factor for state's foreign policy analysis	Very important for state's foreign policy	Less relevant to state's foreign policy	-State's foreign policy is driven by domestic politics

Source: Sophal, 2016, p.43

1.4.4. Conclusion

According to neoclassic realism, the most important factor shaping the foreign policies of states is the structure of the international system. System determines the limits of states foreign policy possibilities by sending stimuli to the states according to the system structure. Foreign policy is formed by shaping the stimuli sent by the system by intervening variables, which are sub-state elements. As a result, the main argument of neoclassical realism is the systemic stimuli that derive from the international system's structure specify the limitation of states, and domestic level variables which are neoclassical realism call intervening variables shape the stimuli.

The nature of the systemic environment changed from the restrictive international system to permissive between 1960 and 1971. So the dialogue between the different poles became possible. While the states were tied to one pole, the lack of relations with the other pole prevented them from forming foreign policy in line with their interests, except for the great powers. The bipolar

structure of the international system between 1960 and 1971 became the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy. The events affecting the structure of the bipolar international system were experienced among the polar leaders due to the structure of the system. Changes in the system made it possible to develop Turkish-Soviet relations. In this context, due to the change in the structure of the international system, the stimuli sent by the system to Turkey and the Soviet Union changed. In this context, some events between the two poles between 1960 and 1971 transformed the structure of the international system from restrictive to permissive. Because they transformed the system, these phenomena also indirectly affected Turkish-Soviet relations. In this thesis, the cases discussed between the two poles were chosen because of their effects on the system.

CHAPTER 2

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS

The main research question of the thesis "How domestic factors and the features of the international system affected Turkish-Soviet relations between 1960 and 1971?" focuses on both domestic factors and characteristic of international system. So the independent variable (features of international system) is one of the important factor to answer the research question of this thesis. In this context, one of the hypothesis of this thesis is changes in the characteristics of international system (independent variable) most effective and important factor for changing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

The structure and nature of the international system is the primary and most important element shaping the foreign policies of states. Neoclassical realism, like structural realism, has placed the importance of the system at the highest level. However, according to neoclassical realism, the system is not the only element that constitutes the foreign policy of the states. The international system draws certain limits to the states in their foreign policies. Within these borders, states shape their foreign policies with intervening variables. Intervening variables, which are the internal elements of states, differ from state to state, and therefore there are states that follow different foreign policies within the same international system. In other words, foreign policy is formed as a result of the stimuli sent by the international system to the states and the perception of these stimuli by the intervening variables. For this reason, the first step in the formation of foreign policy is the stimuli coming from the international system. The nature of these stimuli is affected by the structure of the system and the events occurring within the international system.

After World War II, a bipolar system appeared in the international system, and states shaped their foreign policy closer to the bloc in this bipolar system. In the bipolar international system, the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc were separated, and the United States and the USSR took over the leadership of

these blocs, while Europe ceased to be the center of power (Oran, 2015, p. 480-485). Although between 1945 and 1960 was a period that did not directly conflict between the blocs but included different armed conflicts, détente which officially started in 1969 began to be effective in the international system from the 1960s onwards. (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 483). Détente means "an improvement in the relationship between two or more countries which have been unfriendly towards each other in the past" (Oxford Dictionary). In International Relations, détente is defined as the period when the danger of war decreases with a mutual "duel of words" and the economic, political, cultural and technological agreements increase (Sander, 2013, p. 445). Since this détente between the Soviet Union and the USA changed the structure of the international system, the stimuli sent by the system to the states also changed, and changes occurred in the foreign policy of the states with the effect of intervening variables.

Some events and some elements between the two superpowers forced the states to reconcile. The most important reason for the pre-détente in the years between 1960 and 1971 was the conflicts and crises seen in both blocs (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 483). The reason for the disagreements and crises between the blocs can be summarized under two titles. The first of these was the conflicts and crises that arose due to nationalism, and the second was the conflicts and crises that arose due to the demand for autonomy. Nationalism and autonomy among the blocs were both the result and the cause of the détente. While the problem experienced due to nationalism in the Eastern Bloc was between China and the Soviet Union, the Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece in the Western Bloc became the cause of the Western Bloc crisis. The crisis in autonomy was De Gaulle's desire to include France among the great powers in the Western Bloc and the "Prague Spring" in Czechoslovakia in the Eastern Bloc (Fırat, 1996, p. 8-9)[2].

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[2] The Cyprus problem was discussed under the title of Turkey's Domestic Policy and Its Impact on Foreign Policy in the 1961-1965 Coalitions Period. Soviet Union-China relations and Prague Spring issues are discussed in the relevant sub-title under the title of Soviet Union Domestic Policy and Its Impact on

In addition to the problems experienced within the bloc, some events that brought the leaders of the bloc face to face made détente necessary or accelerated it. The nuclear power possessed by both blocs created the "balance of terror" and forced the states to détente (Öcal, 2017, p. 166). The U-2 incident, which was the spy plane crisis between the Soviet Union and the USA, the Cuban Missile Crisis that would almost cause a nuclear war, the Non-Aligned Movement that created an alternative in the bipolar system, the Berlin Crisis, which was the diplomatic crisis, were among the inter-bloc crises that were among the reasons for the détente.

2.1. BERLIN CRISIS

Berlin has been a city that has caused great tensions and disagreements between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc since the beginning of the cold war. After the Second World War, it could not be decided what the future of the defeated Nazi Germany would be, and this became the biggest problem among the states (Barker, 1963, p. 59-60). First of all, Germany's border problem with Poland had to be solved. In this context, the borders of Germany were determined as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. It was decided to cleanse Germany from the Nazis, to occupy it by four states (England, France, USA, USSR), and to establish a Central Control Commission. Finally, it was decided to establish democracy in Germany (Uçarol, 1995, p. 621-629). Berlin, on the other hand, was kept in a special position and although it remained in East Germany (Soviet occupation zone), it was decided to be divided into two and occupied by both Western and Eastern states.

Ten years after the first crisis in Berlin, the second crisis emerged. Although it had been a long time since the end of the war, the situation in Germany and Berlin was uncertain. Also, the Soviet Union claimed that West Germany was taking up arms, and the leader of the East German Communist Party claimed

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Foreign Policy. Although these issues have affected the international system, they are not discussed in this section as they are mostly related to the foreign policies of the relevant states.

hostile moves from West Berlin. In his speech with the US envoy, Khrushchev said that the soldiers in West Berlin are unnecessary and they are not needed unless countries engage in armed conflict. He then offered two free countries and said, "I don't want to do anything detrimental to the other three countries. (...) if anyone had anything else to suggest I would be very happy to consider it" (FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII, p. 149-150). For this reason, on November 27, 1958, the Soviet Union sent a note to three states and announced that they would evacuate West Berlin within 6 months, otherwise the Soviet Union would transfer all its rights in East Germany to the East German Communist Party (Sander, 2013, p. 313). In this case, the Western states would have to recognize the East German Federation.

The reason why Khrushchev wanted to expel the Western states from Berlin, especially on this date, was that he thought that the economic and military balances had changed in his favour thanks to the missile (Sputnik) sent by the Soviet Union into space. According to the CIA report, the Soviet Union wanted to consolidate communism in Eastern Europe by using the crisis in Berlin and to damage the image of the allies in Western Europe (CIA, 1958, p. 3-4).

Khrushchev and Eisenhower met at Camp David on September 25-26. In the joint statement made after this meeting, it was said that the negotiations would be resolved through peaceful methods and negotiation and that the problems regarding Berlin were overcome. Also, Khrushchev said that "question of West Berlin, even the all-German question, was only a part of the whole picture, albeit an important part. The principal problem is disarmament" (FRUS, 1958-1960, IX, p. 36-40). This discourse of Khrushchev was a sign of softening. However, when the U-2 crisis and then the Bay of Pigs took place, the negotiations were interrupted and only on June 3-4, 1961, the meeting took place in Vienna. In this meeting, Khrushchev said that if the Berlin issue was not resolved within 6 months by making peace with East Germany, the Soviets would sign a separate peace with this state until December (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 540). In this political conjuncture, when there was a rapid migration from East Berlin to West Berlin,

the Berlin Wall was built on 13 August 1961, separating East and West Berlin. In October 1962, the Soviets declared that the four-state arrangement was no longer valid (Sander, 2013, p. 317).

As a result, the basis of the emergence of the Berlin crisis is the Soviet Union's achievement of technological developments that would change the balance of power in the international system in its favor. Thanks to the Soviet Union's launch of the Sputnik satellite into space, it surpassed the United States in terms of nuclear weapons. Because the Soviet Union, which was able to send missiles into space, had the opportunity to hit the USA by attaching nuclear warheads to these missiles. Thus, the balance of power shifted in favour of the Soviet Union. When this situation is evaluated from the neoclassical realist perspective, the reason why the leader of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, brought Berlin to the agenda can be understood. The Soviet leader had the perception that he could use his military superiority in the international system in the political arena. Because the existing balance of power in the international system had changed and an advantage had been gained. For this reason, the issue of Berlin was brought to the agenda just after the Sputnik missile was fired, and it was thought that gains would be made in favour of the Soviet Union. However, as can be understood from the US archival documents, according to both US leader Eisenhower and US institutions, concessions from Berlin would be a great loss of prestige. Kennedy, who became president after Eisenhower, did not show any different attitude from the former president. On the contrary, Berlin demands were rejected, more harshly than Eisenhower. In fact, the famous statement of the US leader Kennedy, "Next winter will be very cold" is proof that he will not take a step back on the issue of Berlin. For this reason, the demands of the Soviet Union Khrushchev were not accepted. Domestic institutions and leader images, which are intervening variables included in the analysis of neoclassical realism, seem to be effective in foreign policy analysis. CIA, one of the domestic institutions, has been influential in the foreign policy output with the reports it sent to Eisenhower. Finally, the Berlin crisis took place, the demands of the Soviet Union were not accepted, hard

lines were drawn between the poles in the international system. However, the Berlin Crisis cannot be said to be the only factor causing tension in the system. Successive events in the system or occurring in the same time period caused the system to become more rigid. The Berlin crisis had an impact on the international system as a diplomatic crisis.

2.2. U-2 CRISIS

It was a worrying situation for the USA when the USSR launched its first satellite into space in October 1957. This meant that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States militarily and strategically. Because the satellite sent into space was proof that a long-range missile had been built to launch this satellite. For this reason, the United States has become a clear target. The USA, which thought that it would be defenceless in case of a surprise attack, thought that following all the movements of the USSR was the only thing that would ensure its security for now (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 541-542). For this purpose, on July 4, 1956, the United States made its first flight over the Soviet Union with a new spy plane called the U-2. The importance of the U-2 aircraft, as it was an aircraft capable of photographing by flying very high, could not be detected by radars and therefore could not be shot down. Until May 1, 1960, these planes continued to collect information by flying over the USSR (Gaddis, 2005, p. 73).

The U-2 plane, which was used by Garry Powers, photographing the military camps and nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union, departing from Turkey and going first to Pakistan and then to the USSR was shot down (Wright, 1960, p. 836). The United States of America, in a statement on this issue, said that one of the two meteorology planes belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which took off from Adana on May 1, disappeared near Lake Van (Wright, 1960, p. 837). But the plane and the pilot had been captured by the Soviet Union. But according to President Eisenhower, the Soviet Union did not have the technology to shoot down an airplane flying above 70,000 feet. Therefore, according to the President, the plane was deactivated when it

descended and the pilot could not destroy the plane and commit suicide (FRUS, 1958-1960/X, p. 530).

This was the issue that worried the United States the most. Because this plane and pilot had performed many spy flights before, and obtaining this information by the Soviets was an intelligence deficit for the United States. In his statement on May 5, Khrushchev stated that the hostile spy movements against the Soviet Union were carried out to undermine the Summit Conference and that the states that allowed these planes to take off from the bases were also responsible (Sander, 2013, p. 314). In the document he sent to Washington, the American ambassador working in Moscow recommended that they lost a great image in the Soviet public and that such espionage activities would be ended by telling the truth to the Soviet Union (FRUS, 1958-1960/X, p. 515). Arriving at their climax meeting in Paris on May 16, 1960, Khrushchev asked Eisenhower to denounce U-2 espionage in front of the whole world. When Kennedy refused to do this, Khrushchev left the meeting, and the Summit Conference, which was expected to be the beginning of a pre-détente between the two countries, ended before it started (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 173-174). When President Eisenhower learned that the U-2 pilot had been captured and questioned alive by the Soviet Union, he admitted that the flights were for espionage purposes. In his speech on May 25, 1960, he said that flights would be banned, but the flights continued (Erhan, 2015, p. 573).

As a result, the U-2 plane crisis before the Summit Conference, which could be the beginning of the détente, increased the tension between the two countries. It also severely cut off communication between the two countries. This political tension was also reflected in the international system, and the relationship between states subject to different blocs got worse. The United States had lost credibility in the international system and in the eyes of Soviet society. Although this situation did not cause a significant change in the strategic culture of the Soviet Union, the tension between the USA and the USSR did not decrease until the bilateral relations that would develop after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

2.3. CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Cuba, which is right next to the United States, had created policies in line with the request of the United States for many years due to the dictator leader Batista. However, with the movement he started in 1953, Fidel Castro ended this dictatorship by capturing Havana on January 8, 1959 and establishing his first government on February 16, 1959 (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 546). It was a matter of debate whether the USA could influence Fidel Castro for its own interests. However, in the US archives, it has been shown that communism spread rapidly in Cuba with the reforms made by Fidel Castro for economic and social life (FRUS, 1958-1960/VI, p. 459-460). Communism was on the rise in Cuba, as detected by the United States, and this was an important opportunity for the Soviet Union to get closer to Cuba. Cuba, which was recognized by the Soviet Union on January 10, 1959, declared that it was a socialist country in April.

In February 1960, a treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Cuba for the sale of sugar, which was vital to the Cuban economy. In addition, thanks to the oil trade with the Soviet Union and the technicians and economists from the USSR, Cuba did not submit to the pressure of the USA (Tellal, 2000, p. 161).

It was very clear that the Castro government did not want to be a puppet of the US government like Batista, and relations with the USSR were developing rapidly. A socialist state had emerged next to the USA, and this was not a situation that could be accepted by the USA. For this reason, work on the US side started immediately. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which had established contacts in the region at the beginning of March 1960, started to provide military training to Cuban citizens who wanted to intervene in Cuba on the island of Florida (De Quesada, 2009, p. 7-8). It was stated by the US defence ministry that the trained Cubans were nearly impossible to stand against Castro's military power. Because Cuba, whose relations with the USA deteriorated and improved its relations with the USSR, had obtained a large

amount of weapons from the Soviet Union until the end of the 1960s. According to the Ministry of Defence, military intervention in Cuba could be successful either with the US army alone or with the joint intervention of the US army and trained Cubans (Jones, 2008, p. 43). In other words, it was reported by the Department of Defence that an attack by Cubans trained in Florida alone would not be successful. But the US did not want to involve its own military in this intervention. According to the Eisenhower administration, "no overt action could be taken to replace the Cuban regime" within the framework of international law (De Quesada, 2009, p. 9).

In addition, the intervention of the USA with its own military would justify the intervention of the Soviet Union in Cuba or any other part of the world. Therefore, the intervention had to be carried out by trained Cuban troops. Relations with Cuba became tougher after Eisenhower left the presidency and Kennedy came to the presidency. According to McNamara, who served as the defense minister in the Kennedy government, President Kennedy was insistent that the United States could not allow the continued existence of the Castro government in Cuba (Jones, 2008, p. 44). In early January 1961, Fidel Castro called the US Embassy "nest of spies" and demanded reductions in its staff. After this event, the USA broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and began to look for other ways to overthrow Castro (Freedman, 2000, p. 127). After the diplomatic channel was closed, on April 17, 1961, the USA attempted the "Bay of Pigs" landing with the troops brought from Cuba and trained, but it was a great failure.

After the Bay of Pigs failure, Cuba rapidly developed relations with the Soviet Union. Cuba demanded air defence from the USSR, and on April 12, the Soviet Presidium agreed to send a lot of equipment to Cuba for air defence and coast defence (Freedman, 2000, p. 162). In this context, the Soviet Union began secretly deploying medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. The USA, on the other hand, was following every event that took place in Cuba by making flights over Cuba. However, the missiles installed under the thermal canvas by Soviet

technicians could not be followed by flights. But the Soviet authorities, who were negligent because the weather was too hot, were filmed by U-2 planes. On the morning of October 16, 1962, after the photographing mission of the U-2 planes, it was understood that the Soviets had placed a nuclear warhead in Cuba and the crisis officially began (Kennedy, 1968, p. 23).

The nuclear warheads of these missiles were brought to Cuba from the Soviet Union. According to Özcan and Ataç (2021), citing from the archival sources of the United States, cabinet members made different suggestions in the face of this crisis (Özcan&Ataç, 2021, p. 527-528)[3]:

• According to Foreign Minister Dean Rusk, either a quick coup should have been made or the OAS procedure should have been activated and even Castro should have been warned through the UN representative.
• According to Secretary of Defence McNamara, either an air strike should have been carried out on a specific area in Cuba or a large airstrike should have been carried out, destroying not only the missile sites but also the munitions and aircraft in Cuba.
• According to the Chief of the General Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Cuba should be blockade and the Soviets should be cut off from the island.

The proposal to blockade Cuba was criticized for fear that it would legitimize the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin. In addition, the missiles were now deployed in Cuba. Demanding the removal of these missiles would legitimize the USSR's demand for US missiles around it (Kennedy, 1968, p. 35). However, since the blockade was the most appropriate in this crisis, the United States took the decision to blockade on October 22-23 and blockaded Cuba against Soviet ships carrying nuclear warheads (Freedman, 2000, p. 196). According to Khrushchev, who offered an agreement by sending a letter to Kennedy on October 27, the USSR would remove all of its missiles from Cuba and the USA

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[3] For more archival studies on the Cuban Crisis, see: Özcan & Ataç, The 1962 Cuban Crisis: A Reading from the American Archives, Journal of Security Strategy, 2021, 17(39):521-562

would respect Cuba's independence and would not interfere in its internal affairs. Likewise, the USA would remove the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey and the Soviet Union would respect Turkey's territorial integrity and sovereignty and would not interfere in its internal affairs (Sander, 2013, p. 325-326).

Kennedy did not want to show this agreement in the press, but both countries complied with the requirements of the agreement. The US claimed that the Polaris submarine was a better defense mechanism as the reason for removing the Jupiter missiles (FRUS 1961-1963, VI, p. 189). Thus, a major crisis that would lead to nuclear war between the two countries was overcome. In addition, the "Red Line" established between the two countries made it possible to make direct phone calls in case of emergency. This showed that the problems could be solved through dialogue between the two countries, and after a major nuclear threat, relations softened. The effects of this softening were felt in Europe and Turkey within the Western Bloc.

The impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the international system was felt for the next two decades. First of all, it has been understood that both countries cannot afford to risk a nuclear war in the international system. This showed the importance of diplomacy in the relations between the two states even when the tension between the poles was at its highest. Secondly, the USA's acting in such a nuclear crisis without consulting its NATO allies was criticized by the member states (Sander, 2013, p. 327). The crisis in Cuba brought the tension to the highest level, but then it accelerated the process of détente and mutual dialogue. In other words, Cuban Missile Crisis started the pre-détente period. In addition, after the Cuban missile crisis, the USA's dismantling of Jupiter missiles and the USSR's removal of missiles from Cuba helped to reduce tension among the bloc leaders. But this caused certain problems among the allies. The credibility of the USA, which dismantled the Jupiter missiles, in the eyes of Turkish politicians and the public, decreased. This credibility began to be questioned by France as well, and it started the process that led to De Gaulle's departure from the NATO's army. The Cuban Crisis created problems for the

Soviet Union in terms of relations with China. The Chinese administration accused the USSR of betraying the revolution. The USSR, on the other hand, described the Chinese government as adventurous. This situation increased the tension and disunity between the two countries. This is how divisions emerged within the Eastern Bloc. In other words, the Cuban missile crisis led to divisions within both blocs.

Neoclassical realism claims that systemic stimuli are the most important factor shaping the foreign policy of states. In other words, the structure of the system and the foreign policy possibilities offered by the system to the states are the primary but not the only factors in the foreign policy of a state. In this context, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis marked the beginning of an important transformation in the system. Despite the existence of a bipolar system after the missile crisis, the period of pre-détente had begun. This softening changed the foreign policy options that states could pursue. That is, the systemic stimuli that will be shaped by the intervening variables had changed due to the change in the structure of the international system. In this context, serious changes occurred in the perceptions of the leaders. While the foreign policies of other states were perceived as a threat before softening, the transformation in the international system also eliminated the perceived threats.

The argument of this thesis is the improvement in Turkey-Soviet Union relations, which is an example of exactly this situation. During the Cold War period, the Republic of Turkey built its foreign policy on the Soviet threat, so it had a place in the Western Bloc with both military and economic aid and support from the West. However, the changes in both Turkish and Soviet domestic policies and the change in the structure of the international system in the 1960s directly affected Turkish-Soviet relations. The Cuban missile crisis, on the other hand, was considered the beginning of significant systemic changes, but it also caused a change in Turkey's perspective on the USA which was the leader of Western Bloc. In addition to this, De Gaulle in France intended to establish his own nuclear power. But the US did not want another

state to own a nuclear power within NATO. De Gaulle brought his nationalist ideas to the fore more when the international system changed in the 1960s (Erhan, 2015, p. 691). Ultimately, De Gaulle left the NATO's army in 1966, as the international system provided "space" for De Gaulle to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy. In other words, the Cuban missile crisis was both the peak of tension and the beginning of a pre-détente period. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis is an important touchstone, as the stimuli sent by the international system change and therefore affect the foreign policy choices of the states.

2.4. NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT

The Western Bloc / Eastern Bloc divergence arose in the bipolar international system that emerged after the Second World War. As a result of these divisions, organizations to ensure military, economic and political assistance were established within the bloc under the leadership of the United States and the USSR. In the bipolar system, countries aimed to obtain the maximum level of economic, military or political support by pursuing foreign policy in the interests of the leaders of the bloc to which they belonged. However, apart from this bipolar system, a group of countries called "Third World" or "Non-Aligned" emerged (Sönmezoğlu, 2009, p. 3). According to Mathur, "The term non-alignment was coined by independent India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in a speech on 28 April 1954 in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Mathur, 2016, p. 13). The main mission of the Non-Aligned Movement was to solve the problems that they could not overcome alone by acting together without being included in any bloc (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 564-565). The Non-Aligned Movement was necessary for weak states to bargain collectively against powerful states (Pretorius, 2008, p. 3). This movement was certainly not of a passive status. The main purpose of the Non-Aligned Movement was to support the decolonization process that had begun around the world and to ensure that the member states of this movement did not become an element that increased tension during the Cold War (Mathur, 2016, p. 13). For this purpose, Bandung Conference was held on 18-24 April 1955 with the initiatives of Egypt and India (Uçarol, 1995, p. 679-680). Turkey was also invited to the Bandung

Conference. But Turkey was against this movement because it thought that Moscow would benefit most from the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, in order to act as the spokesperson of the West and to show its loyalty to the Western Bloc, Turkey has irreversibly broken its relations with the Non-Aligned Movement (Fırat, 2015, p. 731). Turkish foreign policy in this period was based on the increasing polarization during the Cold War. Turkey, emphasizing its strategic importance, wanted to ensure the continuation of political, economic and military aid. For this reason, the Non-Aligned Movement, which would reduce the polarization between the poles or be an alternative to the countries, could threaten Turkish interests.

The Non-Aligned gained significant momentum thanks to the increase in African countries that gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The fact that 1960 is the African year is due to the number of countries that gained independence in Africa (Sander, 2013, p. 405). Since these countries got rid of the colony, they were both distant from the blocs and wanted to benefit from the opportunities of both blocs. But when faced with powerful states, these newly liberated small states didn't stand a chance. For this reason, they needed the support of the Non-Aligned movement. Or, the "Third World" Non-Aligned Movement supported the states that wanted to be independent by using the right of "self-determination" despite being in the colonies of big states. The basic principle on which this support is based was the principle of peaceful coexistence (Oran, 2015, p. 660). So the Non-Aligned movement relied on the United Nations to avoid any conflict. Because they believed that the UN was an organization that could prevent conflict and the arms race (Singham & Hune, 1986, p. 16). However, due to the low representation of Asian and African countries in the United Nations Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement demanded reform in the structure of the Council. Thus, it would be able to contribute more to peace and security in the international system (Mathur, 2016, p. 13).

The Non-Aligned Movement had an important place in the development of Turkey-Soviet Union relations, which is the subject of this thesis. The Soviet Union, which wanted to establish good relations with the Non-Aligned Movement, provided great assistance to these countries. These aids, which the Non-Aligned Movement, located outside of two blocs, received from the Soviets, attracted the attention of Turkey. In this context, it came to the fore whether the development of relations with the Soviet Union is the best example for Turkey (Tellal, 2000, p. 191).

As a result, the Non-Aligned Movement, which started with the 1955 Bandung Conference and held three summit meetings in the 1960s, was a movement that could change the structure of the international system. Especially in Africa, it was expected that the states that got rid of the colonies gained their independence and that they would be taken into the sphere of influence by the USA and the USSR. However, the Non-Aligned Movement had become an important alternative for the states that had created the "Third World" in the bipolar international system and did not belong to any pole. Thus, the states within the blocs used the Non-Aligned Movement to maximize their interests at their own poles. Some states thought they could protect their interests in the Non-Aligned Movement. For this reason, the bloc leader, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, entered a period of softening in the international system and wanted to prevent the states in their own bloc from joining the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Non-Aligned Movement has changed the systemic stimuli that neoclassical realism deals with in the sense of being an alternative to states. Because after this movement, the options offered by the system in the foreign policy of the states increased. The increase in these options was one of the elements that made a softening between the blocs necessary. In other words, the "Third World" became an important element that brought about a change in the structure of the bipolar system.

2.5. CYPRUS ISSUE AND TURKEY'S LONELINESS

The United States opposed Turkey's decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1964.[4] The letter sent by US President Johnson to Turkey caused a tension in relations between the two countries. In President Johnson's letter, NATO would not side with Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey intervened on the island. This situation had reduced the credibility of NATO, which Turkey used to see as a military guarantee. Thus, despite Turkey positioned itself in the Western Bloc, Turkey was left alone in the international system by the US, the leader of the bloc. This event caused a differentiation in Turkey's assessment of the characteristics of the international system. Until this period, Turkish foreign policy was parallel to the US foreign policy. The relations between the two countries shaped the attitudes of the states in the events that took place in the international system. Turkey did not make foreign policy choices contrary to the foreign policy of the USA in the events that took place in the system. However, the USA ignored Turkey's interests in the Cyprus issue, which Turkey perceived as very sensitive by both the society and foreign policy makers.

After the Cyprus issue, Turkey understood that it needed to protect its own interests in the international system although it was alone in the system. Since the Cyprus issue could not be resolved in 1964, Turkey's need for Americanpower to support itself in the international system diminished. Being isolated in the bipolar international system, Turkey found the political support it sought from the Soviet Union, the leader of the other pole. The Soviet Union's support of Turkey in the Cyprus issue was in line with its own interests. As Greece, which the military junta took over in 1967, developed its relations with the USA very quickly, Turkey became very important for Soviet interests in the Mediterranean. Turkey's loneliness in the international system and Soviet interests created the conjuncture that would ensure good relations between the two countries. In this context, after the Cyprus issue, Turkey wanted to eliminate

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[4] The Cyprus Incident has been explained in detail under the heading Foreign Policy of the Coalition Governments Period (page 81).

its loneliness in the international system by developing economic and technical relations with the Soviet Union.

Turkey-Soviet Union relations improved as a result of Turkey being left alone in the case of Cyprusby the USA. This situation started a period in which Turkey would follow a multi-faceted foreign policy. After the Cyprus issue, Turkey prioritized its own interests in the international system. This situation was prioritized by Turkish foreign policy makers. The interests of the country were supported in foreign policy not only by the current governments but also by the opposition parties. For example, speaking on behalf of the Republican People's Party in the 1968 budget negotiations, Nihat Erim said, "The development of Turkish-Soviet relations has become a national policy because it was adopted by the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party. And Republican People's Party support the government about Soviet policies." (MMTD, 20.02.1968, p. 443-444). So the deterioration of Turkey-USA relations caused Turkey's loneliness in the international system. And this loneliness gave rise to the changes relations between the Turkey and USSR.

2.6. CONCLUSION

According to neoclassical realism, the international system is not the only but the most important factor in determining the foreign policies of states. Because the structure of the system is the source of the stimuli to be sent to the states. These stimuli are perceived and shaped by the perceptions of state leaders, strategic culture, domestic institutions, and state-society relations, which are intervening variables, and foreign policy outputs are created. In this context, the change in the stimuli sent by the system causes a change in the foreign policies of the states.

The structure of the international system, on the other hand, could have changed with the crises or agreements between the USSR and the USA within the bipolar system during the Cold War years. Tensions escalated between the two poles from the beginning of the Cold War until the death of Stalin. However,

Khrushchev, who assumed the leadership of the USSR with the death of Stalin, wanted to abandon Stalin's harsh policies by putting forward the policy of "peaceful coexistence". But it also had to protect the interests of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. For this reason, détente gradually occurred in the international system until the beginning of the 1970s. With the Sputnik missile sent into space in 1957, the Berlin Crisis came to the fore between the Soviet Union and the USA, who wanted to influence the international system and change the system in accordance with their own interests. As a diplomatic crisis, the Berlin Crisis increased the tension in the international system. Thus, the separation between the blocs within the system was expected to become more evident. The Berlin Crisis, which was thought not to lead to an armed conflict, the U-2 plane crisis that coincided with the same time period, and Kennedy's failure to apologize, suspended the negotiations. Since another crisis in the international system increased the tension, the warnings sent by the international system to the states were perceived by the leaders as the need to increase security. Security in the bipolar international system was ensured by establishing closer relations with the bloc leader countries or by showing the opposing bloc leader thattheir intentions were not hostile. For example, after Turkey's U-2 crisis, Turkey felt the need to explain that it was not responsible for the plane that was shot down. Because Turkey saw itself in danger due to U-2 plane which was shot down in USSR territory. Turkey explained that it was not a part of this crisis because the plane was took off from Turkey to Pakistan and then to the territory of USSR.

Another and important crisis in the international system is the Cuban Missile Crisis. With the confrontation of the two superpowers in Cuba, the possibility of nuclear war emerged. The international system, which was tense with the Berlin and U-2 events, peaked in tension. When it comes to armed conflict or nuclear conflict, both superpowers agreed to change the system again. For this reason, Cuba can be considered from different aspects, as it was the event that both brought the international system to the most tensed point and started the softening in the 1960s. The hotline created after the Cuban missile crisis was

the smallest proof of the softening in the international system. Thus, diplomacy between the two states became the first option. The inability of the two superpowers to risk conflict in the international system, and then the start of diplomatic and détente negotiations, created a difference in the perception of the leaders of the actors within the system. States now had the opportunity to pursue a more "relatively autonomous" foreign policy.

Another consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was insecurity within the bloc. The resolution of the Cuban Crisis by the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union created distrust of the bloc leaders by some states. Because the states that was the negotiable subjects of the agreement between the USA and the USSR was Turkey, which is a member of NATO and a member of the Western Bloc, and Cuba, which adopted socialism and established close relations with the Soviets. For this reason, the USA and the countries allied with the USSR realized that they could be the subject of an agreement between the two countries and that this agreement could put their own security at risk. Thus, states started to follow a foreign policy separate from the bloc leaders to protect their own interests more.

Except for the Berlin, U-2 and Cuban Crises, the Non-Aligned Movement had a significant impact on the international system. Thanks to the Non-Aligned Movement, states saw that foreign policy could be followed outside of a certain pole. This situation created an alternative for the states within a certain bloc and enabled them to follow more autonomous policies. The decisions taken as a result of the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s made it clear that they would support the freedom wars against colonialism. This situation enabled many new states to gain their freedom in Asia and Africa. In other words, new actors joined the international system. The most important change that the Non-Aligned Movement made in the international system was the change in the structure of the United Nations. Emphasizing the representation problem in the structure of the UN, with the participation of new actors in the system, the Non-Aligned Movement insisted on the reform demand and this

reform was finally realized. The African countries and the Non-Aligned Movement showed a large amount of surplus in the UN and had an important place in the system with the reform that would ensure more representation of these states. This situation sets an important example for the democratization of the UN, which has an important place in the international system, as well as the changes it can make in the system for other states without being included in a bloc. This situation encouraged the states that demanded some autonomy within the blocs. For example, the policies that would result in France leaving the army of NATO after France wanted to see itself among the great powers, or the demands for autonomy in Prague were realized thanks to the changes made by the Non-Aligned Movement in the international system. If the Non-Aligned Movement and other crises did not cause a change or détente in the system, the control of the bloc leaders within the blocs could have been tougher or tighter. For this reason, the stimuli sent by the system to the states would prevent the states from pursuing more autonomous foreign policies, and there would be no problems within the bloc.

Changes in Turkish foreign policy and the effects of intervening variables will be discussed in the following chapters. With the differentiation of these intervening variables and the change of stimuli coming from the international system, a change occurred in Turkish Foreign Policy. This change also caused a change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. As a result of the changing foreign policy of both countries, Turkish-Soviet relations developed between 1960 and 1971.

CHAPTER 3

INTERVENING VARIABLES AND FOREIGN POLICY

According to neoclassical realism, international systemic stimuli are shaped by intervening variables. These intervening variables consist of domestic factors. In order to answer one of the sub-question of this thesis which is "How did domestic factors become more influential on Turkey's foreign policy?" it is necessary to examine governments between 1960 and 1971. In this context this thesis argues that domestic factors, especially the leader images, had an important role in developing relations between Turkey and the USSR. So this thesis argues that leader images and perception of the leader are more important thanother domestic factors. For this reason, in order to explain how domestic factors affected Turkish foreign policy this thesis focuses on strategic culture, domestic institutions, state-society relations and especially leader images. Besides, all of these intervening variables provide a holistic explanation for changing Turkish-Soviet relations.

3.1. PROCESS TO 27 MAY

3.1.1. Domestic Policy

When discussing the 27 May period, first of all, 27 May should be defined. The military's overthrow of the government by interfering with politics on May 27, 1961 is faced with two different definitions in the literature; revolution and coup. Both concepts are available for May 27. The reason why May 27 is described as a revolution is that after the Democratic Party's transition to an authoritarian management style, the military bureaucracy ended this authoritarian rule and reallocated freedoms. Despite this legitimation, it does not show any similarity with the concept of revolution in the Western tradition and the leftist tradition. Because May 27 is a military intervention carried out without social support (Saç, 2017, p. 78). In addition, since the concept of revolution is generally associated with regime change, 27 May cannot be equated with the French Revolution in this context. In addition, the execution of the civilian government,

which was overthrown after the coup and came to power with democracy, is against democracy. In this sense, May 27 is a military coup. Despite this, this intervention, which was carried out without social support, should not be perceived as a simple change of power. Because the reforms made after the coup and the Constitution added a revolutionary character to May 27. At this point, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's statement of May 27 would be appropriate: "The May 27 Coup is the overthrow of a government and the coup's rapid return to revolution" (Aydemir, 2000, p. 313-314). In other words, May 27 started as a military coup at the beginning, but with its subsequent actions, it gained a revolutionary dimension. So May 27 is seen as the two sides of the coin; one side is the military coup and the other side is the revolution dimension. In this context, neither a military coup nor a revolution could be labeled on May 27 in this study. In addition, although it is accepted that the reforms after 27 May and the constitution created by university professors add a revolutionary character to it, it will be called a military coup in the sense that it does not resemble revolutions like the French Revolution.

The May 27 military coup took place under the influence of external factors as well as internal factors. If we refer to one of these external factors, the coup carried out in Iraq on July 14, 1958 appeared as an encouraging factor for the planners of May 27 (Saç, 2017, p. 78-79). At this point, how the officers who carried out the 27 May 1960 coup perceived the stimuli coming from the international system became an important factor in the coup.

The internal elements that make up the coup come to the forefront more than the external elements. Economic reasons caused serious uneasiness and discussions within the country. At the beginning of these, in 1958, just before the May 27 coup, devaluation was carried out in order to ensure the continuation of the loans we received from the West, and 1 American dollar was increased from 280 kurus (Turkish currency) to 900 kurus. In this case, the external value of the Turkish lira, which had been held constant for eleven years, was changed and depreciated by 230%. However, instead of calling this

change a devaluation, the DP aimed not to cause public reaction by calling it a "premium system" (Evsile, 2018, p. 71-72). During this period, political tension was increasing between the Democratic Party and the Republican People's Party. The leaders of both parties were making accusations against each other, creating a tenser atmosphere in relations. In 1960, the government accused the opposition of provoking the coup, while the opposition accused the government of autocracy (Tunçay, 2002, p. 186).

Which groups approved this intervention after the coup is important to explain the internal dynamics in the Adnan Menderes period. The military junta will most happily welcomed by the large student masses and intellectuals in Ankara and Istanbul (Zürcher, 2000, p. 351-352). Another meaning of the support of May 27 by intellectuals and students is that the groups that are not satisfied with the Democratic Party government are the same. In other words, young officers of the army, students and intellectuals were not satisfied with the Democratic Party government. Therefore, May 27 actually emerged as the reaction of certain groups. The leading cause of reaction is the Democratic Party's going to dictatorship. Secondly, the unplanned policy followed in the country causes social-economic-cultural destruction (Oran, 2015, p. 666). When the process leading up to May 27 and what happened right after the coup are analyzed, it is clearly seen that the interests of the Democratic Party were in conflict with the interests of the army and intellectuals. However, the leader of the Democratic Party, Adnan Menderes, adopted harsher policies instead of coming to terms with these groups whose interests conflicted.

At this point, it is important to look at it from a neoclassical realist perspective. According to neoclassical realism, interest groups of which the leader associates with is considered a determining factor in foreign policy. This situation differs according to the perception, ideology, point of view of the leader and foreign policy is determined accordingly. In this context, Adnan Menderes pursued policies as a representative of rural areas, such as farmers, rather than intellectuals, army, and bureaucracy. The fact that Menderes came from a

family and culture that owned large agricultural lands had an impact on this situation. The fact that Menderes followed a policy aimed at protecting the interests of people living in rural areas rather than the intelligentsia and the army is an important factor in the process leading up to May 27.

As a result, the adventure of the Democratic Party and its leader Adnan Menderes, who came to power with the transition to multi-party life, started with economic successes and evolved into an economic depression. The social repercussions of this economic depression took place. Stuck in both domestic and foreign policy, Menderes tried to solve the problems by turning to a more authoritarian regime. However, this situation did not bring stability to the country, on the contrary, it exacerbated the problems. These problems resulted in the intervention of the military on May 27, 1960, and a new era began in Turkish political life.

3.1.2. Foreign Policy

Due to the domestic policies described earlier in 1960, necessary attention was not paid to foreign policy. The most important event experienced in foreign policy in this period was the crisis related to the U-2 spy plane departing from the American bases established in Adana during the DP period (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 173). This situation caused a great tension in the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Because the Soviets made statements targeting Turkey directly and stated that Turkey could be hit with guided missiles. The statement from the Turkish government came on 8 May. According to Armaoğlu cited in Erhan's article Turkey had not allowed any US aircraft to observe on Soviet territory, such an aircraft had not crossed the Turkish border and entered the Soviet border, and the Soviet government's statements confirm this, Turkey was only responsible for its own aircraft outside its airspace (Erhan, 2015, p. 574).

The U-2 crisis did not become a long-term issue that occupied Turkish-Soviet relations. However, less than three weeks after Turkey was openly threatened by the Soviet Union, a military coup took place in Turkey. This situation enabled

a new page to be opened in Turkish-Soviet relations. In 1960, since the administration of civil politics continued until 27 May, in this short period of time, while domestic politics were major events, foreign policy remained in the background.

3.2. The National Unity Committee Period

3.2.1. Domestic Policy

On May 27, 1960, a military coup was carried out by officers of the Armed Forces. Alparslan Türkeş's statement from Ankara radio in the morning showed the policy to be followed by the NUC:

> Honourable fellow countrymen! Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, in view of the recent sad incidents, and in order to avert fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen, ... (and will hold) just and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration... (They will hand) over the administration to whichever party wins the elections. The initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort to any aggressive act against individuals, nor will it allow others to do so. All fellow-countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the laws...
> We appeal to our allies, our neighbors and the world: our aim is to fully comply with the United Nations constitution and human rights principles. We are faithful to all our alliances and commitments. We are faithful to all our alliances and

commitments. We believe in and are committed to NATO and
CENTO. (Ahmad, 1992, p. 160-161)

This text, read on the Ankara radio on the morning of May 27, actually shows the NUC's view on both domestic and foreign policy. It is stated at the beginning of the text that the military intervention was carried out to save democracy and to prevent fratricide. In other words, according to the perception of those who carried out the May 27 coup, democracy in Turkey had become in need of salvation. The point to be noted here is that those who carried out the May 27 coup described themselves as neutral and above the party. The importance of this statement lies in the fact that they clearly stated that they were not a coup under the control of İsmet İnönü and that they were above the party politics. For this reason, 1960, 1971, 1980 were the years when there was direct or indirect military intervention in the civilian administration as the products of the mentality that the army was superior to the civilian administration (Yetkin, 1995, p. 79-80). As it can be understood from the first declaration of the May 27 coup, it was mentioned that the country's government would be handed over to the civilian administration as soon as possible, and the will of the nation would be respected. In the last part of the paper, signals are given about how international policies would be. The first of these is respect for the UN principle of human rights. The meaning of this statement is that a dictatorship would not be established and will not depart from the requirements of democracy. The second is the answer to the most curious questions in terms of relations with the West. Turkey would not break its ties with NATO and CENTO. This path to be followed in foreign policy was approved in the speech of Cemal Gürsel in which he announced the MBK program, stating that "the program will be adhered to on the first day" (Öztürk, 1968, p. 469). The underlying meaning of this statement is that Turkey was still on the side of the Western Bloc and there is no situation that requires the USA to oppose this coup for various reasons (Erhan, 2015, p. 681).

The NUC, which took over the administration, announced the new administration by announcing the ministers with the communique number 27 of the National Unity Committee in the Official Gazette on May 30. Cemal Gürsel appointed himself as the head of state, prime minister and minister of national defense, and Selim Sarper as the foreign minister (Official Gazette, 1960, p. 1440).

Starting on January 6, 1961, the work on the Constitution was completed on May 27, 1961, exactly one year after the coup. On July 9, 1961, the Constitution was put to the public vote as a product of both the intellectuals and the NUC. In the popular vote, 83% of the people participated in the voting. 60.4% of the participants voted yes, while 39.6% voted no (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976, p. 234). According to NUC, the Constitution, which was formed by a team that saved the country, would be accepted by the people with great enthusiasm (Özdemir, 2002, p. 204). Academicians, high officials and soldiers were influential in the preparation process of the 1961 Constitution. In other words, since the bureaucracy had the greatest influence in the creation of this constitution, the interests of the bureaucracy were mostly protected (Atılgan, 2015, p. 567). This situation also affected foreign policy because, as neoclassical realism explains, active groups in the country affect foreign policy output as an intervening variable. In this sense, the constitution adopted in 1961 was designed to increase the efficiency of the bureaucracy. As a matter of fact, newly established institutions created areas where bureaucracy could be more effective.

The Constitution adopted in 1961 brought with it the institutions of the democratic regime as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court, which can reject the articles it deems unconstitutional, was established. Thus, the party that won the majority in the parliament would not be able to amend the articles as it wished. Secondly, it was the granting of full autonomy to judicial institutions, universities, and communication organizations that made the 1961 Constitution a progressive one (Zürcher, 2000, p. 356).

Thus, universities, press, etc. institutions that were under pressure before May 1960 gained autonomy in a way that would not be affected by the oppressive administration. In addition, the National Security Council, which was established after the 1961 Constitution, legitimized the role of the army in politics (Uzgel, 2003, p. 181). With the new constitution, attempts were made to prevent political parties from evolving into authoritarian rule in Turkey. With the new institutions of democracy, a balance-brake system was created to prevent the establishment of an authoritarian regime. In addition, individual rights and freedoms were emphasized and more free areas were created for institutions such as universities. As a result, the 1961 Constitution, as a progressive constitution, has become a major element that protects the republic and democracy by granting wide rights to the citizens and institutions of the Republic of Turkey.

3.2.2. Foreign Policy

After evaluating the domestic policies experienced in the period of the National Unity Committee and their effects on foreign policy, it is necessary to talk about the basic principles of foreign policy in order to make the period more understandable. The NUC avoided the elements that would create a revolutionary character in foreign policy, and Atatürk's principle of "peace at home, peace in the world" was based on both neighbors and blocs in foreign policy (Ince & Olson, 1977, p. 274). However, this does not mean that there are no differences in foreign policy. According to what Kuruloğlu reported from the Balkans, the pro-western policies of the Menderes government damaged Turkey's reputation in Asia and Africa, and in return, no gains could be made from the west (Kuruloğlu, 2017, p. 193-194). In addition, according to Melek Fırat (1996, p. 28), three basic principles of the National Unity Committee came to the forefront in foreign policy; first, relations with the West would remain the same, but the principle of equality and sovereignty would be fundamental; secondly, relations with the Soviets would be tried to be developed on the basis of friendship and neighborliness and thirdly relations with non-aligned countries would be developed.

The division experienced as radicals and moderates within the May 27 movement also caused a division about foreign policy. On the one hand, there were those who wanted to continue the traditional foreign policy, on the other hand, there were those who sympathized with the non-aligned states (Fırat, 1996, p. 23). While explaining the government program, Cemal Gürsel stated that he would stick to the foreign policy principles in the declaration read by Alparslan Türkeş on the morning of 27 May. These foreign policy principles were to adhere to NATO and CENTO. However, the following words in the government program of Cemal Gürsel show the signs of a change in Turkish foreign policy: "Turkey does not harbor feelings of hostility towards anyone. We will shake hands with whomever extends their hands.(...) We sincerely want to advance our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual respect within the framework of good neighborliness" (Öztürk: 1968, p. 470-472). In addition, Orhan Erkanlı in his memoirs stated that in the meetings held before 27 May, the existing agreements on foreign policy would be adhered to, but a more independent policy would be followed (Erkanlı, 1972, p. 15). To call this independence diversification of foreign policy would be a very early diagnosis in this period. But the fact is that Turkey is pointing to a gradual transition to a "realpolitik" perspective.

In previous governments, government programs were announced that peace and order was in NATO (Öztürk, 1968, p. 470). However, Cemal Gürsel's government program was different from other government programs, and Turkey's security problem was not emphasized by referring to the Cold War and the socialist bloc. In other words, it is understood that Turkish foreign policy aims to prioritize the interests of the country (Fırat, 1996, p. 26).

After the May 27 government seized power, Khrushchev sent a letter to Turkey. In the letter, Khrushchev said that he wanted to improve relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, but some problems needed to be resolved. In addition, according to Khrushchev, he criticized Turkey's defense expenditures,

saying that Turkey could develop more easily if it did not spend on armament expenses. Gürsel, on the other hand, gave an example from the non-aligned states that took up arms in this situation and said that this situation was not an obstacle to developing relations and that the commitments would be adhered to. (Cumhuriyet, 01.09.1960). He stated that Gürsel would not leave the Western alliance, but that Turkey being in the Western alliance does not prevent it from developing relations with the Soviet Union.

A second proof that the NUC administration wants to develop good relations with the Soviets is the ambassador appointed to the Soviet Union. Right after the May 27 coup, Fahri Korutürk was announced as the foreign minister. After the coup, an offer was made to Sarper, who was experienced in foreign affairs and had a certain image, and Sarper accepted this offer, Selim Sarper was appointed as the foreign minister instead of Korutürk. Fahri Korutürk was sent to the Soviet Union as an ambassador. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sarper met with Khrushchev in New York in October 1960 (Milliyet, 05.10.1960). In this meeting, one of the most important developments in Turkey-Soviet Union relations was the proposal of the USSR to move its army hundreds of kilometers away from the Turkish borders. In return, he demanded Turkey to retreat a few kilometers and joint control. Turkey rejected this offer (Tellal, 2015, p. 774). The appointment of a person thought to be foreign minister as ambassador to the Soviet Union was a positive step in Turkey-Soviet Union relations. It is clear that this appointment is a direct message to the Soviet Union. Turkey showed that it attached great importance to its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union's request to withdraw its soldiers hundreds of kilometers as a sign of joint control and goodwill at the borders with a NATO member country shows the importance that the Soviets gave to Turkey. In other words, in this period, both Turkey and the USSR approached relations with a positive perspective. Although this situation did not affect relations in the short term, in the long term it would be an important milestone in Turkish-Soviet relations for the period between 1960 and 1971.

Relations that developed between the two countries under the rule of the National Unity Committee were not limited to this. On April 27, 1961, a contract was signed to provide direct rail transportation between the two countries (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976, p. 232). The creation of this transportation network is a sign of good relations for the future beyond a physical rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

As a result, the army, which overthrew the government on May 27, 1961, ruled the country under the name of the National Unity Committee. The domestic policies realized in this period aimed to bring law, democracy, science and freedom back in the country. In this context, innovations in domestic politics turned the May 27 coup into a revolution. During this period, events that can be criticized in domestic politics also took place. The executions of Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan may be at the forefront of these criticisms. In addition, liquidation from universities is among the mistakes of the National Unity Committee. However, the NUC started a new era in the country with the new libertarian and progressive Constitution in which it formed the "power". In addition to the important changes that can be considered as a revolution in domestic policy, major changes in foreign policy had not been made. In the statement read on the first day of the coup, commitment to NATO and CENTO was declared. Later, Cemal Gürsel talked about his loyalty to the Western alliance. However, innovations were also made in relations with the Soviet Union. Although there was no sharp improvement in relations with the Soviets, the foundations of good relations were laid in this period. The perception of the leader, which neoclassical realists consider as an intervening variable, has a great impact on these events in domestic and foreign policy. The fact that Cemal Gürsel's character was more moderate and progressive and the elimination of names like Alparslan Türkeş, known as the radicals in the coup team, shaped Turkish domestic and foreign policy. His moderate character played an important role in not making sharp turns in foreign policy and not rejecting the Soviet Union, which wanted to establish good relations. Since the idea of protecting the values of the Republic in the army was seen in Cemal

Gürsel, the changes approved by Gürsel after the coup were also suitable for these values. With the newly made Constitution, the establishment of the institutions that democracy needs, the authoritarian regime was prevented and the necessary preparations were made for the transfer to the civilian administration. If Cemal Gürsel had been in place of Madanoğlu or Türkeş, Turkey could have caused more radical turns or a more traditional foreign policy. In this context, the perception, character and ideology of Cemal Gürsel played an important role in shaping the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey after the revolution and in the next decade.

3.3. COALITION GOVERNMENTS PERIOD

3.3.1. Domestic Policy

The Republic of Turkey went through a political period between 1961 and 1965, when parties formed a government with coalitions. First of all, a coalition government was formed for the first time in Turkish political life. The fact that such a situation did not exist before was difficult for the stability of the government due to inexperience. The establishment of more than one government and the collapse of these coalitions and the necessity of new ones are the result of this inexperience. Another innovation in Turkish political life is related to the election system. Since then, the electoral system has been differentiated, and a new, more democratic and representative electoral system has been implemented.

Before the 1961 elections and the election results are discussed, the change in the 1961 election system should be mentioned. Until 1960, the electoral system in Turkey was based on the plurality system. According to this system, the party with the most votes in a province had the full capacity of the deputies that belonged to that province. For example, in the 1957 elections, Konya had a capacity of 21 deputies and the votes of four parties in the election results were as follows: Republican People's Party 40.9, Democrat Party 44.3, Nation Party 10.5, Freedom Party 4.4 percent. In this election, the Democratic Party captured

all 21 deputies (Hale, 1980: 402). The plurality system seriously stabilized power, but it was not a democratic electoral system. Because, as in the example, although the RPP had very close votes with the DP, it could not get any parliamentarians. The military administration, which took power on May 27, 1960, changed the electoral system and parliamentary structure. Turkey had a bicameral legislature, consisting of Chamber of Deputies and a senate (Hale, 1980, p. 403). The electoral system, on the other hand, was transformed from the plurality system to the proportional representation system (Sayarı, 1978, p. 44). Thus, a more democratic electoral system was adopted and small parties were ensured to have a presence in the parliament. Although this situation caused instability, the most democratic and representative elections in Turkish political life were held on October 15, 1961. While the proportional representation system was valid in the parliament, the majority system was valid in the Senate.

With the elections held on October 15, 1961, the NUC, which came with a military coup, handed over the power to the civilian administration. In the 15 October elections, the RPP had a firm belief that it would come to power alone. However, the election results did not turn out as RPP wanted. The RPP received 36.7%, the Democratic Party founded eight months ago 34.8%, the RVNP 14% and the NTP 13.7%. In the Senate, the AP captured 71 of the 150 senators with 35.5%, while the RPP obtained 36 senator seats despite 37.1% of the votes (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 222).

The fact that the elections were held and Turkey entered the period of coalitions did not mean that the army had withdrawn from politics. In this period, although the army was not the main actor, it was an element that had an impact on politics. This situation will show a tendency to decrease first and then to peak again between 1965 and 1971.

On the first day of the opening of the parliament, the expectation of the army from politics was the election of Cemal Gürsel as President. With the pressure

of the army and the support of retired general Ragıp Gümüşpala, the JP leader, Cemal Gürsel was elected President by receiving 434 out of 607 votes (Milliyet, 27.10.1961). Thus, the demand of the army was fulfilled and a reliable person was elected as the President.

After the presidential election was completed, a government had to be formed. This task was given to İsmet İnönü by Cemal Gürsel. The negotiations of the Republican People's Party for the coalition continued until November 18, and it was finally agreed in a coalition with the Justice Party. According to this agreement, the Justice Party would take 11 seats from the cabinet, including the interior ministry (Cumhuriyet, 18.11.1961). Looking at this period, the difficulties that the government to be established had to overcome were as follows (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 240-241):

• It will be the first time in Turkish political life to try a coalition government and this inexperience was causing concern for the government.

• State apparatuses and juntas, which had a tradition of intervening in power since May 27, 1960, wanted to preserve the power they had gained.

• Democrat Party members who were sentenced as a result of the Yassıada trials were waiting for political amnesty.

• The Turkish economy started to experience stagnation after 27 May. In order to overcome this stagnation, internal and external resources had to be created and new loans had to be obtained.

The program of the first coalition government, in which İsmet İnönü was prime minister, was announced by the prime minister who made a speech in the parliament on 27 November 1961. Within the scope of this thesis, only the foreign policy part of this government program will be discussed. In his speech, İnönü again stated that the principle to be taken as a basis in foreign policy is "peace at home, peace in the world". In addition, the prime minister stated that he would follow a foreign policy based on NATO and CENTO. İnönü stated that he wanted to develop relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual respect (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD), 27.11.1961, p. 123).

The first coalition government jointly established by RPP and JP lasted until 1 June 1962, then after two weeks of depression, the second coalition government period, this time between RPP-New Turkey Party (NTP)-Republican Villagers Nation Party (RVNP), started. But this coalition could not overcome the depressions either. Then, the RPP remained in power between 25 December 1963 and 13 February 1965 with the support of independent deputies and the NTP from outside. Finally, JP-NTP-RVNP-Nation Party (NP) coalition was established under the chairmanship of Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, and the last coalition government before JP came to power alone (Özdemir, 2002, p. 210-211). When the programs of the parties were examined after May 27, they were not different from each other in foreign policy. The fact that almost all parties had the same foreign policy discourse, as if a common foreign policy had been prepared, showed that Turkish foreign policy would be shaped mostly by stimuli from the international system during this period. As a matter of fact, this was the case, and there were differences only in the foreign policy program of the Ürgüplü period. The reason for this difference was the Cuban crisis in 1962 and the Cyprus problem in 1964 (Fırat, 1996, p. 64-67). In other words, in this period, the foreign policy program and objectives had a non-partisan character. Although the period of 1961-1965 is known as a period of instability in Turkish political life, the only reason for the instability is not the disintegration of coalitions and the establishment of a new government. Another factor that caused instability in this period was the soldiers in the army who attempted to "save the homeland" and attempted a coup.

As soon as İsmet İnönü formed the government, he made it clear that he would not allow those in the army who wanted to intervene in the government. İnönü said in his speech that "democracy will not be abandoned (...) if they cross the border, they will find the state forces against them" and stated clearly that he was against military intervention (Cumhuriyet, 18.01.1962). The direct addressee of these warnings was Talat Aydemir. Colonel Talat Aydemir said at the meeting organized by the Chief of General Staff on January 19, 1962 that

he believed "a second revolution will happen in Turkey one hundred percent" (Aydemir, 2020, p. 85). On the night of February 22, 1962, a military coup attempt was carried out under the leadership of Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gürcan. After this attempt, no criminal action was taken while 20 senior officers were retired (Milliyet, 25.02.1962). Fethi Gürcan and Talat Aydemir could not seize power, but managed to overthrow it. After February 22, the mobility within the army under the leadership of Gürcan and Aydemir did not end. This time they attempted a military intervention on May 21. Unlike February 22, this time there was an armed conflict and there were people who lost their lives in the army. This coup attempt by Aydemir and Gürcan also failed and at the end of the trial process that started on 7 June, Gürcan on 26 June 1964 and Talat Aydemir on 5 July 1964 were executed (Öztan & Ataman Çelik, 2017, p. 174-176).

İnönü displayed a resistant policy against Talat Aydemir's coup attempts and thus the 3rd İnönü government survived this situation before it collapsed. However, this government was overthrown in the February 1965 budget talks. Süleyman Demirel, who would take an important place in Turkish political life as the sole power in the upcoming elections, was appointed as the deputy prime minister of the new government (Özdemir, 2002, p. 215). This government remained in office until the October 1965 elections, and in the October elections, JP got rid of the coalition and came to power alone.

Talat Aydemir's coup attempts affected the foreign policy of the state. Since the army had the potential to make a coup at any time, the army put pressure on the leader. In this sense, the leader refrained from making radical decisions in foreign and domestic policy that would draw the reaction of the army.

In the coalitions formed in this period, İnönü always assumed the duty of prime minister as the first actor. The first of the two reasons for this situation is that the army put pressure on İnönü to become the prime minister. The second reason is that events such as the coup attempts on February 22 and May 21 and the

Cyprus crisis pushed the "National Chief" to the prime ministership (Fırat, 1996, p. 62). In this case, it is necessary to look at how İsmet İnönü perceived the stimuli coming from the international system as the perception of the leader during the coalitions period. However, it would be wrong to analyze only the perception of the leader among the intermediate variables that neoclassical realism brought to the literature. Because in the period of coalitions, it is possible for one or more parties to be partners in power, and the influence of the army, which is a certain group within the country, is obvious. The reason why this period is called the period of "military democracy" is the effect of the army on politics. The influence of the army in both domestic and foreign policy continues even though elections were held and a parliament elected by the will of the people was established. Talat Aydemir's coup attempts are the state of this effect turning into an intervention.

3.3.2. Foreign Policy

Some events that took place in the international system mentioned in the first part of this thesis had shaped Turkish Foreign Policy in the period of coalitions. In this section, the changes in the system will not be mentioned, but the direct effects of the events in the system on Turkish Foreign Policy will be discussed. Two important events during the coalition period formed the most important breaking moments of Turkish Foreign Policy. The first of these is undoubtedly the agreement made over the Jupiter missiles in Turkey after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because of this agreement, Turkey understood that the United States would endanger the security of its allies for its own interests. Thus, Turkey felt the need to switch to a multi-faceted foreign policy period in Turkish Foreign Policy. The second important break was the Cyprus Problem and the Johnson Letter sent by US President Johnson. Since this date, Turkey-Soviet relations had changed significantly and Turkey had displayed a realpolitik attitude in foreign policy. Some events that took place in the international system mentioned in the first part of this thesis had shaped Turkish Foreign Policy in the period of coalitions.

3.3.2.1. Cuban Missiles Crisis and Dismantling Jupiter Missiles

The USA, which had military superiority over the Soviet Union in the bipolar system, experienced a development that would lose this superiority towards the end of the 1950s. On October 4, 1957, Sputnik I -the world's first artificial earth satellite- was sent to space by the Soviet Union, and a month later Sputnik II entered space orbit (Peoples, 2008, p. 59). These satellites demonstrated that the USSR had gained the ability to conduct intercontinental missile strikes. The United States mainland thus became a target for the first time. In this case, the United States had to regain its first-strike superiority over the Soviets. Also, deterrence on the Soviet Union was among the primary strategies for the USA (Bernstein, 1980:99). That's why President Eisenhower demanded to place Jupiter Missiles in NATO member countries in order to have a deterrent effect on the USSR and regain its first-strike superiority (Erhan, 2015, p. 572). Turkey accepted this request with the "Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey" signed on March 5, 1959 with the USA, and accepted that the two countries would follow common policies for the cooperation in the fields of security and defense and for the peace of the international system. Based on this legal basis, Turkey agreed with the USA on the establishment of 15 Jupiter missiles on October 28, 1959 (Criss, 1997, p. 99). Turkey was taking a big risk in approving the installation of missiles on Turkish soil. Because it could not be expected to establish good relations with a state that allowed the security of the Soviet Union to be threatened (İzmir, 2017, p. 179). As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union started to put pressure on Turkey as of May 1, 1960. In the note sent, Turkey was asked for an explanation and it was said that if Turkey would be a part of NATO's aggressive policies, such as having nuclear missiles installed in the country, the Soviet Union would protect its Southern border (Criss, 1997: 107). Despite this note of the Soviet Union, Turkey considered this situation not as a crisis in relations with the Soviet Union, but as an opportunity to get closer to the USA and to come under the nuclear umbrella of the USA (Tellal, 2000, p. 141; Bernstein, 1980, p. 98-99). Thus, during the May 27 government period, Jupiter missiles began to be placed in Turkey. The

installation of the missiles was completed in 1962 due to both the placement of the missiles and the technical personnel training process (Atılgan, 2015, p. 646).

After the Cuban missile crisis, the agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA covered the Jupiter missiles, which had just been completed. In Khrushchev's message to Kennedy on October 27, 1962;

> I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive.(...) United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.(...) Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey.(...) The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs. (FRUS 1961-1963, XI, p. 258,259)

Kennedy initially opposed Khrushchev's proposal. Because, according to Kennedy, while the missiles in Cuba were for offensive purposes, the missiles in Turkey were for defensive purposes (Erhan, 2015, p. 682). How Turkey would approach the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles was important to Kennedy. In the message from Ambassador Hare, he stated that dismantling the missiles would create major problems in Turkey-US relations, and that one should be very careful not to harm these relations (FRUS 1961-1963, XI, p. 180). The United States knew that the only way out of the Cuban Crisis was to negotiate as the Soviets proposed, but the United States had to consider its reputation. In addition, there were opinions that missiles in Turkey were outdated and that

they should be dismantled even if there was no crisis, but it should not have appeared in this agreement (Garthoff, 1989, p. 71). Kennedy replied that he accepted Khrushchev's offer and said that if the missiles in Cuba were lifted, the blockadeblockade would be lifted, but Turkey did not mention the issue of the offer in this letter and preferred to make this bargain in secret (FRUS 1961-1963, VI, p. 182). Thus, it was carried out informally with secret letters between the two leaders (Dobbs, 2008, p. 233-234).

It was written in the Turkish press and society that the USA did not make Turkey a bargaining chip, and that despite Khrushchev's offers, Kennedy did not include the missiles in Turkey in the aforementioned bargain, following a lithe policy (Cumhuriyet, 29.11. 1962). In the Turkish press and politics, the idea that the USA could include Turkey in the bargain was rejected outright. Because Turkey showed its loyalty as the first country to support the decisions taken by the USA during the Cuban Crisis. When the USA decided to blockade Cuba, Turkey was the first state to stop its ships going to Cuba (Ince & Olson, 1977, p. 279). Finnletter, who reported that the Turkish authorities did not want to leave the Jupiter missiles with the feeling of owning them, stated that the Jupiters should be removed by establishing Polaris missiles in Turkey and establishing the Mediterranean command in which Turkish soldiers would be in the navy (FRUS 1961-1963, XI, p. 181). Turkish officials stated that they were against the dismantling of Jupiter missiles, which was a NATO guarantee in the eyes of the society. With the pressure of the USA, it was accepted to replace Jupiters with F104 aircraft and Polaris nuclear submarines (Fırat, 1996, p. 80). Ultimately, the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles took place not with the agreement with Khrushchev, but with the promise of more advanced technology. On January 22, 1963, it was written in the press that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be replaced with the more advanced Polaris (Milliyet, 22.01.1963).

The dismantling of the Jupiter missiles after the Cuban Missile Crisis was an important event in Turkish Foreign Policy, which created an atmosphere of

insecurity in the relations between the USA and Turkey. After this crisis, the view that the United States was Turkey's staunch ally disappeared, and the anti-US sentiment in society gained momentum. In addition, it was started to talk about how Turkey's unilateral foreign policy threatens its interests and the requirements of the transition to versatility in Turkish Foreign Policy (Erhan, 2015, p. 684). This situation laid the foundations for Turkey to establish a foreign policy in the following years in a way that would protect its own interests first.

When evaluated in terms of neoclassical realism, the Cuban Crisis and the removal of Jupiters caused significant changes in strategic culture. Confidence in the US had decreased in society, and Turkey had begun to be thought of as a tool for US interests, not an ally. The changing strategic culture had put great pressure on state leaders. Leaders became more careful in their relations with the United States, and changes occurred in the traditional Turkish Foreign Policy. There had been a difference in the perception of the leader due to the pressure on the leaders of the change in the strategic culture. Another factor that ensures that the change in the perception of the leader is reflected in foreign policy practices is the period of softening in the international system. With the softening in the international system, the leaders had more options in foreign policy. Thus, the leaders in Turkish political life had a conjuncture that could improve relations with the Soviet Union due to both the changing system and the changing strategic culture. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles became the first milestone to affect relations with the Soviets.

3.3.2.2. Cyprus Issue and Johnson Letter

The disputes in Cyprus in the 1950s were temporarily resolved with the prohibition of the parties' claims on the island (enosis), their union with Greece, and the division between Turkey and Greece in the Zurich-London Agreements (February 19, 1959) (Canar, 2018, p. 225). During the Zurich Conference meetings held on 5-11 February 1959, the two sides (Turkey and Greece)

agreed on the basic principles of the international status of Cyprus and the Constitution of Cyprus.

To create the state institutions of independent Cyprus, on 13 December 1959, Archbishop Makarios, the leader of Greek Cypriots was elected as the President and Turkish leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected as the Vice President. (Fırat, 2015, p. 719). On August 16, 1960, the preliminary agreements made in February 1959 were made a final treaty, and the Nicosia Treaty as a whole was named and the Republic of Cyprus was established. (Soysal, 1997, p. 271).

The first of the problems experienced in the Republic of Cyprus was about taxation. According to the decision of both community councils, it was necessary to collect taxes, but because the Turkish parliament could not take a decision, it became impossible to collect taxes. For this reason, Makarios decided to keep the old tax law and collect taxes from all incomes. However, Denktaş stated that this situation is unconstitutional and called on the Turks not to pay taxes (Fırat, 2015, p. 720). The second point of disagreement was about the command of the army. Turkish Cypriots claimed that the commander of the Turkish unit to be established in the army should also be Turkish, otherwise discipline would not be possible due to differences in culture, language and religion. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, claimed that each unit should have a Greek Turkish commander, so that unity in the army could be achieved. The third point of dispute was the unification of municipalities under the control of the Turkish side, on the grounds that it was a burden on the budget. Although the Turkish Community Council opposed this situation, the Greek ministers decided to unify the municipalities.

Although the Turkish side ignored this, tensions rose in the society (Fırat, 2015, p. 720). On 30 November 1963, Makarios proposed constitutional amendments in Cyprus by Dr. Fazıl Küçük and three guarantors gave it to the state (Soysal, 1997, p. 286). This demand for change forms the basis of the problems in

Cyprus. According to Makarios, the President and the vice-president should not have veto power, separate municipalities should be abolished, and the distribution within the administrative administration and the army should be done according to the population ratio (Uçarol, 1995, p. 751). When these constitutional amendments were rejected by Turkey on 6 December, Makarios continued to increase the tension in the society. As a result, on 21 December 1963, when the Greek Cypriot police stopped the car of the Turkish Cypriots and wanted to search, a clash broke out with the Turkish Cypriots and 2 Turkish youths died and 1 Greek policeman was injured (Cumhuriyet, 22.12.1963). After this event was the beginning of a series of violence known as "Bloody Christmas", it was decided to conduct low warning flights over the island at the security summit held on 24 December (Milliyet, 25.12.1963).

Due to İnönü's personality and ideology, he approached these attacks calmly and tried to appease the parties. When the events continued between the parties in Cyprus, at the conference convened in London with the initiative of the United Kingdom, it was proposed to prevent conflicts by placing a 10,000-man NATO force in Cyprus. However, President Makarios did not accept this and Cyprus was considered as the Cuba of the Mediterranean during this period. Then, upon the request of Makarios, the UN Peacekeeping Force was placed on the island on March 14 (Özcan, 2017, p. 232). But peacekeepers could not prevent conflicts. At the Assembly meeting held on March 16, 1964, the government was authorized for military intervention in Cyprus with 485 votes out of 489 (MMTD, 16.03.1964). Makarios announced in April that he had terminated the Treaty of Alliance, one of the most fundamental treaties of Cyprus (Cumhuriyet, 05.04.1964). He also announced that Cyprus would be heavily armed and a compulsory military service system would be introduced. Thereupon, the National Security Council decided to intervene in Cyprus on 6 June. (Özcan, 2017, p. 233). Thereupon, Prime Minister İnönü began to think that intervention was necessary. However, according to İnönü's perception, such an operation could not have taken place without the consent of the USA. For this reason, he informed the US Ambassador Hare about the situation. In

the message sent by Ambassador Hare to the USA, İnönü stated that he was waiting for US opinion and that he could not cancel the movement after this stage (FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 107). After the telegram sent by Ambassador Hare, US President Johnson sent a letter to İnönü, causing an important break in Turkish Foreign Policy.

Before evaluating the Johnson Letter, it is necessary to explain the Turkish domestic policy of the period and İnönü's perception. According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy outputs are shaped by intervening variables. In the previous sections, some foreign policy outcomes, which are influenced by the perception of the leader and strategic culture, were discussed. İnönü's decision to intervene in the 1964 Cyprus issue and the need to report this situation to the United States, as well as the international system, the influence of both international institutions, domestic institutions and strategic culture are seen. First of all, how İsmet İnönü perceived the intervention in Cyprus can be evaluated as the reason for the Johnson Letter and Turkish Foreign Policy that followed. According to İnönü, the USA could not afford a conflict on the southeast flank of NATO. For this reason, he thought that the USA would put pressure on Greece and Makarios in case of an intervention in Cyprus (Özcan, 2017, p. 233). Considering İnönü's personality, the opinion that he actually did not want an intervention outweighs. Secondly, as an internal institution, there were two coup attempts by Talat Aydemir from the Turkish Armed Forces. Therefore, there was no unity in the army and negotiations were being held with the parties that would form a coalition in the government. In other words, internal institutions were in a position not to allow this intervention. Thirdly, contrary to these situations, there was great pressure on the government in favor of intervention in the society (Fırat, 2015, p. 726). Considering the situation of the army and politics in addition to İnönü's own thinking, it is concluded that there would be no intervention in Cyprus in foreign policy. However, İnönü's decision to make such a decision in foreign policy was due to the influence of strategic culture. The idea that Turkish Cypriots were killed and wanted to be expelled from Cyprus in the Turkish society was putting great

pressure on the government. This situation had a great influence on İnönü's decision.

Following the letter sent by US President Johnson to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, the transition to a multi-faceted foreign policy in Turkish Foreign Policy accelerated. This letter was published in Hürriyet Newspaper two years later (Hürriyet, 13.01.1966). Despite this, June 5, 1964 was the basis of Turkey's developing relations, especially with the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the letter contains harsh warnings to the Turkish government. The beginning of the letter is the first and simplest version of the USA's disapproval of this situation. Turkey's dependence on the USA in foreign policy is clearly seen in this section. The President stated as a warning that Turkey should consult the United States before making a foreign policy decision. The second reason in the letter that Turkey should not intervene in Cyprus is the Treaty of Guarantee (FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 108).

It was stated that the intervention in Cyprus based on the Treaty of Guarantee was prohibited by the treaty itself, and the legal basis of the intervention was ignored. In other words, it is clear that the legal ground on which Turkey can defend its intervention in the international arena will not be accepted by the United States. In the continuation of the letter, the problems to be experienced in NATO, of which Turkey is a member, and Turkey's responsibilities before the UN were included (FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 108).

The biggest problem that the USA would experience in this period was the conflict between the states within NATO. A situation that would lead to a hot conflict between NATO states was unacceptable. For this reason, the US president, who warned that Turkey's military intervention could turn into a conflict with Greece, stated that he did not want this situation at all. In addition, President Johnson implicitly asked Turkey to leave the solution of the problem to the UN, stating that there is already a UN peacekeeping force in the region

and their recent achievements. One of the most important parts of the letter appeared in this section. It was stated that after Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, it might face the intervention of the USSR, and in this case, the USA and NATO would not be able to help. This contrasted with NATO's understanding of common security. The military ammunition that Turkey received in 1947 emerged as an obstacle to the intervention in Cyprus (FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 109).

Reminding that the weapons with which Turkey will intervene were given by the USA based on the 1947 treaty, President Johnson stated that these weapons cannot be used in military intervention. In other words, the Turkish army was deprived of its weapons. In this case, the biggest problem faced by Turkey in its foreign policy was that the approval of the USA was required when any armed intervention is to be made. In other words, it would not be possible to fight any threat without the consent of the USA. This was a major weakness in national security of Turkey

In addition to being a major break in Turkish Foreign Policy, the Johnson Letter was an event that would affect Turkish-American relations for many years. Even İnönü, who attached importance to relations with the USA and wanted to keep relations well, showed his reaction against the Johnson Letter (Ergüç, 2017, p. 265). In his reply, İnönü stated that they have been in consultation with the USA since the beginning of the Cyprus problem. İnönü also said that Turkey did not act against the Treaty of Guarantee and that both guarantor states were informed about the events in Cyprus and the intervention. İnönü expressed his deep concerns that NATO would not be able to help Turkey in the event of the Soviet Union's attack on Turkey. According to İnönü, in this case, NATO needed to be treated. In other words, İnönü made it clear that NATO's credibility was shaken. İnönü stated that Turkey is a loyal member of the United Nations and supports the UN morally and materially even in the most difficult times (Cumhuriyet, 14.01.1966: 7).

After this correspondence between the two leaders, Johnson invited İnönü to USA. İnönü welcomed this invitation and agreed to go to the USA. After 50 minutes meeting with Johnson, İnönü accepted to meet with the Greek leader (Cumhuriyet, 23.06.1964). Although the negotiations held here could not come to a conclusion, Turkey showed that it is a supporter of peace. When İnönü returned to the country he explained the meetings in the USA and the events that took place in the Cyprus crisis to the deputies upon the request of the parliament. İnönü, in this parliamentary speech, said that Turkey had a positive approach to the Acheson plan and that he would accept the control of a base in Cyprus, whose borders would be determined through negotiations, and the island of Meis (MMTD, 03.09.1964, p. 274-275). After giving more information about the plan, İnönü stated that Greece did not respond positively to this plan. As İnönü stated in the parliament, after Greece rejected the plan, Turkey put forward the absolute and final *'taksim'* in Geneva (MMTD, 03.09.1964, p. 276). At the end of İnönü's speech in the parliament, he expressed his deep belief that the USA wanted to solve the problem.

The first issue that came up among the results of this letter was the perspective of Turkish leaders and the public towards NATO. The possibility of NATO not defending Turkey in the face of the Soviet attack raised the question of how much security NATO provides (Erhan, 2015, p. 689). In addition, in the Johnson Letter, the only enemy Turkey could face was the Soviet Union. It had been understood that if a Western Bloc state threatened Turkey's security, NATO provisions could not be applied and even Turkey would not be allowed to ensure its own security (Gönlübol & Kürkçüoğlu, 1996, p. 496). Until this period, it had maintained a Western-based foreign policy (Bilgin, 2009, p. 103-123). However, the "Cyprus Crisis" forced Turkish leaders to question strict pro-American policies in foreign policy and to understand the necessity of establishing closer relations with other world states in the changing international system (Aydın, 2000, p. 119). With Johnson's letter, the period when US policies were accepted unconditionally and Turkish foreign policy was

integrated is over. In this context, the USA's Vietnam policy was opposed in the UN General Assembly in September 1965 (Erhan, 2015, p. 690).

According to Armaoğlu, just as the Truman Doctrine is a positive turning point in Turkey-US relations, the Johnson Letter reversed the positive period initiated by the Truman Doctrine (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 700). With the Cyprus incident, Turkey's loneliness in the international arena had emerged and foreign policy had become a subject of public debate. Another effect of the letter sent by Johnson on June 5, 1964 on Turkish foreign policy was the problem arising from the purchase of most of the army's weapons from the USA. For this reason, Turkey tried to ensure its security by diversifying its suppliers of military equipment (Erhan, 2015, p. 690).

3.3.2.3. Relations with the Soviet Union

This period was the period when relations with the Soviet Union returned to normal in terms of its basic features. There was a trust problem between the two countries from the past and this situation had to be overcome. In this context, while the leaders of both countries wished for better relations, Turkey allowed the Russian population living in Eastern Anatolia to migrate to the Soviet Union in order to improve their relations. Between October 23, 1961 and January 15, 1962, 2235 people living in Eastern Anatolia were allowed to immigrate to the USSR (Tellal, 2000, p. 205). In addition, another factor that could be the beginning of good relations was that Khrushchev wished that relations with Turkey would return to the Atatürk era on the 25th anniversary of Atatürk's death on November 10, 1963 (Cumhuriyet, 10.11.1963).

At the beginning of the Coalitions Period, Turkey's relationship with the USSR was shaped by the Soviet ambassador Nikita Rijov, who never broke his old friendship with İsmet İnönü. Visiting İnönü on January 1, 1962, the Ambassador offered a loan of 500 million dollars to Turkey on behalf of the USSR. In return for this loan, he wanted to restrict NATO's movement on Turkish soil (Fırat, 1996, p. 75). However, İnönü, in his reply on January 9, said that Turkey was

dependent on another system and that it was not possible to change the foreign policy (Ahmad, 1977: 243). In this case, the precondition for the development of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union was that Turkey's NATO membership was non-negotiable. These conditions were only achieved after the Cuban Missile Crisis and relations began to improve.

The crisis in Cuba changed Turkey's relations with both the USA and the USSR. Relations with the USSR improved while relations with the USA deteriorated. In the statement given by the Soviet Union leader Khrushchev on 12 December 1962, he said that he wanted to live in friendship with Turkey. He said that the development of bilateral relations would benefit both countries and wished that the relations would return to the time of Lenin-Atatürk (Gençalp, 2014, p. 319). This showed that both countries were trying to improve their relations. Turkey was wary of the USA due to the policy followed after Cuba, but needed great power for its national interests. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was making long-term investments by taking advantage of the softening in the structure of the international system, improving its relations with Turkey, which has been closely tied to the Western Bloc for many years.

Another factor affecting relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union was the abandonment of NATO's principle of mass response and the transition to the principle of flexible response. The meaning of the transition to the principle of flexible response for Turkey would be that in the armed intervention to be experienced with the Soviet Union, since Turkey is geographically closer to the USSR, it could be exposed to more destruction. For this reason, it was important for Turkey to improve its relations with the USSR in terms of security.

Another reason for the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the USA and the development of its relations with the Soviets is that the USA began to buy chrome from the USSR instead of Turkey, after the USSR reduced the price of chrome (Erhan, 2015, p. 699). In line with its own interests, the USA started

trade with the USSR without considering the economic situation of its ally Turkey.

After the Cuban Crisis, the first step in Turkish-Soviet relations was the visit of the parliamentary delegation, led by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, between 29 May and 14 June (Soysal, 1997, p. 283). During this trip, the news in the press made reference to relations during the period of Atatürk-Lenin and it was written that the Soviets had no demand from Turkey and offered economic aid (Bilge, 1996, p. 421).

After this visit, on 5 August 1964, Soviet Union's Ambassador Rijov and Foreign Minister Erkin met. After this meeting, it was decided to sign an economic and cultural cooperation agreement between the two countries. The visit of the Soviet Parliament delegation to Turkey wasarranged. In addition, investments that can be made were also discussed. Thus, the foundations of good relations wereestablished (Milliyet, 05.08.1964).

After the Cuban Crisis, the Cyprus problem emerged and the Soviet Union aimed to get maximum benefit from this problem. The goal of the Soviets and the Russian Empire to reach the warm seas throughout history was shaped by the Cyprus policies in the Mediterranean at this time. In this context, the Soviets had two aims in Cyprus. The first was to gain a base in the region by supporting Makarios, who followed a non-aligned policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and could oppose NATO, and the second was to improve relations with Greece and Turkey by taking advantage of the crack in NATO (Aziz, 1969, p. 169). After this visit, Krushev sent a message to Turkey on 9 August 1964 on the Cyprus events. In this message, "The Soviet Government has learned about the military operation undertaken by the Government of the Republic of Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus. (...) The Soviet Government invites the Government of the Republic of Turkey to cease its military operation against the Republic of Cyprus." (Belleten, October 1964 (2), p. 31). The Soviet Union claimed that Turkey's stance on the Cyprus issue was not in line with international law.

İnönü, on the other hand, explained the situation in Cyprus in a longer and more detailed way than Khrushchev on 13 August and said that Turkish intervention was in question because the events in Cyprus did not comply with international law. (Belleten, October 1964 (2), p. 35-39).

The second visit to the Soviet Union took place between 30 October and 6 November 1964 with the visit of Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin. This was the first visit in 25 years at the level of foreign ministers. The importance of this visit showed the most important state-level relations in the changing relations (Ahmad, 1976, p. 281). The visit was of great importance for Turkish Foreign Policy. First of all, it is understood from the Foreign Affairs statement that the meeting with the USSR took place because the preconditions for this visit were met. "As it was accepted by the USSR that Turkey's membership in NATO does not constitute an obstacle to the development of relations, Turkey will be pleased with the development of relations through cultural and economic agreements (Belleten, October-December 1964 (3), p. 16). In other words, the biggest obstacle to the initiation and development of relations was the dissatisfaction of the USSR with Turkey's membership in NATO. During this visit, the Soviet Union was informed in detail about Cyprus. In fact, Turkey first received the support it sought in the Cyprus issue during the negotiations that lasted between 30 October and 6 November. As a result of these negotiations, it was accepted by the Soviet Union that enosis could not take place in Cyprus (Milliyet, 06.11.1964, p.7). In the joint statement made after the talks, it was stated that 'the two sides expressed their support for finding peaceful ways to live in peace on the basis of respecting the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and recognizing the existence of two national communities on the island' (Belleten, October-December 1964 (3), p.6). Thus, the possibility of enosis being supported by the Soviet Union disappeared.

By the end of 1964, as the international system had changed for the USSR, it was time to improve relations with Turkey, a member of the Western bloc. The visit coincided with the period when the effects of the Cyprus crisis were

experienced. Due to the crisis, Turkey postponed the meeting for two weeks but did not cancel it. Also in the Soviet Union, Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev. However, despite the change of leadership in the USSR and the crisis in Turkey, the meeting was not cancelled. This shows the determination of both states. In addition, Turkey was left alone in the Cyprus problem and the support of the Soviet Union was of great importance. For this reason, Feridun Cemal Erkin's visit to the USSR was of vital importance for Cyprus and Turkish Foreign Policy (Tellal, 2015, p. 775). With this visit, Turkey found a country that would relieve the loneliness of the Cyprus problem. In the joint statement published, it was stated that the Turkish government gave detailed information to the USSR about the Cyprus issue. However, it was declared that both sides would respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and that the legal rights of both national communities would be recognized (Belleten, October-December 1964 (3), p. 19). With this joint declaration, the USSR accepted that it would respect the territorial integrity, independence and both communities of the island and rejected the enosis claim of Greece. In other words, Turkey made a bloc leader in the international system accept its view on the Cyprus problem to a large extent. This situation put an end to both the loneliness of Turkish Foreign Policy and its one-way foreign policy.

An important step between Turkey and the Soviet Union was the abolition of visa fees. This treaty, which was made on 24 December 1964 through the exchange of notes, entered into force on 15 January 1965 (Belleten, October-December 1964 (3), p. 20). The removal of visa fees between a Western bloc country and an Eastern bloc leader means that people's travel between the two countries is supported/approved. This shows that the periods when the Cold War was felt most clearly were left behind. Because while the Berlin wall was being built to better show the separation of the Eastern and Western Bloc, by the end of 1964, visa fees were abolished between the two countries and travel was encouraged.

Another important development in relations was the arrival of a Soviet delegation to Turkey under the chairmanship of Podgorny between 4 and13 January 1965. With this visit, meetings were held to improve relations between the two countries, and the Cyprus issue came to the fore in these meetings. On the Cyprus issue, the two countries ratified their previous commitments (Belleten, October-December 1964 (3), p. 20). In other words, the Soviet Union once again reiterated that it did not support the claims of Greece on the Cyprus issue.

Another reciprocal visit was the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromiko to Turkey in response to Cemal Erkin's visit in November. With this visit, visits at the level of foreign ministers became a commonplace. In addition, the loans given by the Soviet Union to Turkey for investment were increased (Ahmad 1977, p. 290). Gromiko, on the other hand, said in an interview at the airport that this visit would be beneficial in order to solve the old problems in relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Belleten, May 1965 (8), p. 50). Prime Minister Ürgüplü made the last visit in the coalition government between 8-17 August 1965. According to the decision taken during this visit, it was decided that the Soviet Union would build industrial facilities in Turkey with a loan of 150-180 million dollars (Soysal, 1997, p. 296-297).

As a result, due to the events in the international system during the Coalition Period, Turkey started to follow a foreign policy different from the common foreign policy it pursued with the USA. In this context, relations with the Soviet Union, which had been broken, started to be restored in this period. During this period, the positive developments with the USSR bore fruit when the Justice Party formed a new government, and Turkey found significant investments and international support from the Soviet Union. In this period, Turkey experienced the first phase of the transition to a multi-faceted foreign policy. The most important country providing versatility was the Soviet Union. In this context, "normalization" was seen in the USSR-Turkey relations, which had been broken

since World War II. This normalization had been replaced by "cooperation" between1965 and 1971.

When the normalization and cooperation of these relations are considered from the neoclassical realist point of view, both the change in the structure of the international system and the perception of the leader and strategic culture come to the fore. With the change in the international system, the Soviet Union had the opportunity to follow policies that would improve relations with Turkey, and it became possible for Turkey to respond positively to these policies. In other words, the most important element in the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, which changed between 1960 and 1971, was the international system. In addition, the perception of the leader, who perceives the stimuli coming from the international system and transforms them into foreign policy, has also been effective in the change of these relations. Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy affected the entire Soviet foreign policy, as well as relations with Turkey. In addition, the foreign policies pursued by the USA deeply affected public opinion in Turkey. Due to the opposition to the USA, which started to emerge in the public, Turkish leaders were not prevented from developing relations with the Soviet Union or were forced to develop these relations. The period of coalitions had become a period of normalization in Turkey-Soviet Union relations.

3.4. JUSTICE PARTY PERIOD

After Ragıp Gümüşpala passed away on 6 June 1964 (Cumhuriyet, 06.06.1964), Saadettin Bilgiç, a very popular figure in the party, assumed the temporary chairmanship. But the 1965 elections were approaching, and the JP had to elect a new president with the general congress. Until the congress to be held on November 29, 1964, two important candidates came to the fore: Saadettin Bilgiç and Süleyman Demirel. Saadettin Bilgiç and the people he represented were aiming to settle accounts with the members of the army on May 27 and were making propaganda in this direction (Demirel, 2017, p. 529). However, Demirel won the presidency of the Justice Party because he focused

on national-spiritual values, the country's problems, and the solution of society's problems, not taking revenge for the DP from the army (Demirel, 2017, p. 529).

RPP and İnönü accepted the majority system in the 14 May elections in order not to overpower the DP in the 1950 elections. With a similar thought, he wanted to switch to the national balance system in 1965 in order to keep the JP as small as possible (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 324). The 'national remainder' electoral system, which provided for more strictly proportional representation was accepted in February 1965 (Hale, 1980, p. 406) Thus, the Workers' Party of Turkey entered the parliament in the 1965 elections. The national remainder electoral system, which provided the widest representation in the political life of Turkey, ensured that the 10 October 1965 elections were the most democratic. In the election held on October 10, the Justice Party received 52.9% of the votes, ending the Coalition Period and came to power alone. RPP achieved a lower rate than the 1961 elections with 28.7% of the votes (Soysal, 1997, p. 297). The government was formed on October 27, 1965, and Süleyman Demirel was appointed as the prime minister and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil as the foreign minister (Öztürk, 1968, p. 609). The average age of the newly established government was 47 and half of the ministers were lawyers (Cumhuriyet, 28.10.1965). In this context, Demirel was promising that he would work to ensure justice and prosperity in the country with his young and dynamic staff.

3.4.1. Domestic Policy

The main goal of the Demirel government in the economic field was to complete the transition to an industrial society, for which Menderes had prepared the infrastructure but could not come to a conclusion. At the same time, it was necessary to break the pressure of the army on politics. For this reason, the Demirel government had to cooperate with both business people and the military and develop a policy to protect the interests of these two groups. He was of the opinion that the planned economy model should be adopted in order to realize the economic development of Turkey. Demirel abandoned the "Plan, not rice" discourse of the Menderes period and became a party to the planned

economic development (Fırat, 1996, p. 132). In this context, when the effect of economic development is considered, the effect of the state-society relationship, which is another intermediate variable of neoclassical realism, on foreign policy will be seen. After 1961, especially between 1965 and 1971, the relations between Demirel, the army, and the bourgeoisie determined the domestic and foreign policy to be formed in line with the interests of which class. Whichever group the Justice Party represents, a policy towards the interests of this group has been followed consistently in foreign policy. Demirel, who gave importance to the bourgeoisie and foreign capital, promised that all kinds of assistance would be provided to the private sector and foreign capital would be supported (Ahmad, 1977, p. 238). While Demirel received the support of the bourgeoisie, he also drew the reaction of the Anatolian tradesmen. Because Anatolian tradesmen could not develop due to the privileges they gave to large capital owners (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 405). However, from Demirel's point of view, the economic well-being of the state was the basis of politics. For this reason, Demirel followed policies that would try to protect the country's economic interests at the maximum level during his time in power.

As a person, Demirel was a person who stayed away from conflict and sharp politics, so he followed "moderate politics" between 1965 and 1971. In the process of the President's change, his moderate politics showed itself again. On March 27, 1966, it was determined that Cemal Gürsel could not continue his Presidency with the report given by 37 doctors due to his health problem (Cumhuriyet, 27.3.1966). Cevdet Sunay was the person who will take the seat vacated by Cemal Gürsel. It was Demirel who proposed or had to recommend Cevdet Sunay as the President. Demirel tried to give assurance to the army by offering Sunay as the President (Özcan, 2017, p. 237). The newly elected President Cevdet Sunay was a representative of the military's influence on politics during his tenure as a former chief of staff. In other words, Demirel tried to do politics under the pressure of the army to intervene and there were cases where he had to make decisions in line with the interests of the army. As neoclassical realism claims that institutions can affect foreign policy, Demirel

was also influenced by the Turkish Armed Forces, which could be considered the most important institution in Turkey at that time.

Demirel's attitude towards class struggles in the country was clear. Demirel said that "we will not allow class fights" about ideological fights within the country (Cumhuriyet, 30.05.1965). One day after Demirel made this statement, the term party chairman and prime minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü made a statement that "the private sector has fallen behind in investment" and explained this situation with a right-left conflict (Cumhuriyet, 31.05.1965). In other words, Demirel's wish not to allow class struggle could have had the purpose of reassuring the private sector. Here again, it is clear that Demirel saw the economy as the primary factor in both domestic and foreign policy. In addition to this statement by Demirel, the Armed Forces' distribution of "Fight Against Communism" brochures was in the nature of a war declared against the leftist ideology in the country (Atılgan, 2015, p. 609). However, as discussed in the foreign policy section, a distinction was made between Moscow and Communism in foreign policy. In this context, the fact that Erel Tellal's opposition to communists had become a state tradition for the mid-1950s is also seen in the mid-1960s. But there is a distinction between anti-communist and anti-Soviet (Tellal, 2000, p. 60). The distinction made between communism and the Soviets is essentially a distinction made by Atatürk. "It is necessary to separate the two issues. One is to be a Bolshevik and the other is to ally with Bolshevik Russia." (Borak, 1997, p. 89). From the very first years of the republic, a distinction was made between the USSR and its ideology. Although the USSR and communism were identified with the Cold War, there was a different perception in Turkey's domestic policy. This distinction was also valid for the Demirel period. While Demirel was developing his relations with the Soviets, he did not have a positive approach to communism in the country. While opposition to communism continued within the country, anti-Soviet sentiment began to decline. This situation started with Menderes' planning of a Soviet visit, and when 27 May prevented the visit, the opposition to the USSR decreased within the country until the second half of the 1960s (Tellal, 2000, p. 115). Demirel's distinction between the Soviet Union and

communism was clearly revealed in his speech on 16 November 1966. Demirel said, "The Left is against everything. (...) Turkey has great advantages in its relations with the states with which it has established friendships in Turkey's foreign policy. (referring to the Soviets). In the enterprise system, the institution of reasonable and legitimate profit must be recognized (Milliyet, 16.11.1966, p.7). Demirel also said "the Justice Party takes the private enterprises into consideration in its program" (Cumhuriyet 16.11.1966). On the same day, Demirel said, "Turkey is not the place for the henchmen of Marx and Lenin" (Milliyet, 16.11.1966, p.7). Although Demirel wanted to improve relations with the Soviets economically and culturally, he did not allow communist movements within the country.

In general, in the 1960s, especially during the Demirel government, the issues that were feared to be put in Turkey for many years gained new meanings and began to be discussed by the society (Gevgilili, 1987, p. 257-258). Demirel did not take a harsh stance while struggling with leftist movements in the country. He fought against leftist organizations in line with his personality. For example, when Demirel was asked if he would do something about the marches held in the country, he said "the roads are not eroded" (Milliyet, 09.11.1968). Thus, Demirel's "moderate policy" prevented conflicts within the country.

In addition, Demirel did not address the student and worker movements that took place in 1968 and followed a policy of normalizing these movements. He said, "What used to be seen as rebellion is now a social issue", reflecting that the mobility experienced is a community issue and can be resolved (Milliyet, 14.06.1968). In the process leading up to 1971, Demirel's ignorance of the problems and therefore the inability to solve the problems was an important factor.

On July 15, 1968, the American 6th Fleet was exposed to demonstrations. The US flag was hoisted at half-mast. Ink spilled on the US soldier and the windows of US vehicles were broken. These events progressed until the US soldier was

thrown into the sea (Atılgan, 2015, p. 617). The reaction against the USA increased in the country. In particular, Komer, who was appointed as the US Ambassador in 1968, was known as the "Butcher of Vietnam" and there was a public reaction from the moment he was appointed. The event that most clearly showed the society's point of view towards the USA took place in 1969 at Middle East Technical University. The vehicle of the US ambassador was burned at the university financed by the USA (Atılgan, 2015, p. 618). The opposition to the USA, which started with the Johnson Letter, increased with the increase in the effectiveness of leftist organizations in the country. Demirel had to consider the demands of the society in Turkey's relations with the United States. Public's common opinion and expectation has become one of the most important factors shaping foreign policy in this context.

In 1971, the pressure of the army on politics was felt. When Gen. Emin Alpkaya made a statement instead of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel after the National Security Council meeting on January 22, 1971, it was understood that the army had put the government in the background (Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, 23.01.1971). During 1971, those who belonged to the leftist organization or those with this ideology were killed with bombings, and they were trying to retaliate against it. The state, on the other hand, did not or could not take any measures against this situation. The AP could not make financial reforms in the country, and could not prevent the anarchic situation in the country (Zürcher, 2000, p. 373). For this reason, Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur gave a memorandum to President Sunay in order to end the chaos in the country and asked him to seize the situation (Atılgan, 2015, p. 642). The force commanders made preparations for a military coup, but when no force could be found to initiate the coup, the government was overthrown with Demirel's resignation on 12 March 1971 against the memorandum. With Demirel's resignation, İsmet İnönü initially strongly opposed the military's involvement in politics, but later, when he learned that Nihat Erim would be appointed as the head of the government, he announced that he would support the new government. In the

face of İnönü's attitude, Ecevit, who was the general secretary of the party, resigned from his position (Zürcher, 2000, p. 373).

3.4.2. Foreign Policy

In the foreign policy program of the Justice Party, Demirel stated in his government program that he attached importance to the development of relations with the Soviet Union. He also said that the development of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union would be in line with the interests of both countries (MMTD, 03.11.1965, p.94). In other words, Demirel gave the signals of the change to be experienced in Turkish Foreign Policy in his speech in the government program. Demirel stated that the international system has changed and the Western bloc is now far from reality. In addition, he specifically stated that being included in a bloc would not prevent relations with another bloc or with non-aligned groups, thus paving the way for the development of relations with the Soviet Union (Öztürk, 1968, p. 660-661). Since how leaders perceive the changes in their characteristics in the international system is important in the foreign policy process, how Demirel and Çağlayangil understood the system affected foreign policy. In this context, the development of the relations between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc in the international system and the signs of the softening period were also detected by the government. In his speech to the parliament in 1966, Çağlayangil said that ideology no longer separates states, especially in economic matters (MMTD, 17.06.1966, p. 93-94). In other words, at the beginning of 1965, the Justice Party realized that the stimuli coming from the system changed due to the change in the features of the international system. Evaluating the international system after the 1965 elections, Demirel said, "It has been understood from the international developments that have taken place in recent years that the concept of the exclusionary bloc, regardless of its distinctive feature, does not fit the world realities" (Özcan, 2017, p. 236).

What changed was not only the international system, but also the Turkish leader. In this context, as both the stimuli from the international system and the

perception of the leader changed, the differentiation in foreign policy began significantly. This is the reason why the Soviet Union was not perceived as a threat. In other words, Turkish Foreign Policy had been reshaped thanks to the developments in the world and in Turkey. The negativities experienced in the relations with the USA caused Turkey to enter into new pursuits in foreign policy. After World War II, there was the Soviet Union, where relations were at zero level (Tellal, 2000, p. 194). However, the Soviet Union was not the only country with which Turkey developed relations in its multifaceted foreign policy. At the same time, Turkey chose to develop its bilateral relations with European countries. In this context, in order to create an alternative to the USA, it signed a protocol with the European Economic Community on July 23, 1970 (Atilgan, 2015, p. 633).

Before making a foreign policy evaluation between 1965 and 1971, it is necessary to talk about Turkish foreign policy traditions. Because the change experienced in this period does not claim to be a change in the fundamentals of foreign policy. Rather, it is a change experienced despite a traditional foreign policy. Turkey has been in an effort to westernize itself since the foundation of the Republic and claims to be Western. Turkish political history had progressed along the lines of approaching the West, and this had become traditional. The period when Western-based foreign policies were most evident was II. This was the period when NATO and Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) memberships were achieved after World War II. Since this date, Turkish Foreign Policy had used economic aid and credits it received against the threat of the Soviet Union in order to protect the interests of the West in the Middle East (Cem, 2009, p. 371-372). But in the 1960s, the transition to versatility in foreign policy began. The foreign policy tradition that started to change, especially with the Johnson Letter, differed significantly during the Demirel's government. The foreign minister of the period, Çağlayangil, in his speech in the Assembly, emphasized that the main principle of Turkish foreign policy was the interests of the country, with the following words: "There are no eternal enmities or eternal friendships in the international world; eternal national interests" (MMTD, 19.02.1966, p. 564).

Çağlayangil said that the difference of the Soviet ideology did not prevent its development and that good relations could be developed with both the USA and the USSR (MMTD, 19.02.1966, p. 587). In this context, a different approach in Turkish Foreign Policy came from the Workers' Party of Turkey. In his speeches in the parliament and in his party program, TİP demanded full equality in international relations in foreign policy principles, and an end to imperialism and colonialism (Fırat, 1996, p. 71).

According to Demirel, there were two reasons for the deterioration of Turkey-US relations during the Justice Party period. First of all, there was a much closer relationship between Turkey and the USA than at the level of states. So much so that the letters signed by the two captains were considered as agreements. According to Demirel, the United States did not like the fact that all these agreements were gathered in a single agreement and that bilateral relations were moved to a more formal and state level. In addition, Demirel, who stated that the departure of U-2 planes from Turkey did not bring any benefit to Turkey, claimed that the USA was very uncomfortable with the ban on these flights (Yetkin, 1995, p. 110-111). In addition to this, Demirel, who commented on the role of the USA in the process leading up to 12 March, wanted to establish factories such as an iron-steel factory that would process heavy industry mines, as Turkey sold its heavy industry mines without processing. For this reason, when asked whether to provide financing for these factories in the meeting with the USA, he was responded negatively, while when this question was asked to the Soviet Union, a positive answer was received and work on these projects started with the Soviet Union (Yetkin, 1995, p. 112-113). In the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the USA and the development of relations with the Soviet Union, local variables as well as the international system were effective in the changes in foreign policy, which is the argument of this thesis. Leader perception has been an important mediating variable in the decline of relations. Because Demirel's characteristic structure and his experience in the private sector in his professional career, he preferred to follow a policy based on the economic concerns.

There were many agreements between the USA and Turkey. The fact that these agreements covered every subject and every detail was an issue that was disturbed by the Demirel government. For this reason, on January 6, 1966, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil said, "We are in the process of reviewing bilateral agreements with the United States" (Belleten January 1966, (16), p. 44). In this context, Turkey brought the bilateral agreements together into a single agreement. On July 3, 1969, the Joint Defense and Cooperation Agreement, which replaced the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the USA, was signed (Ahmad, 1976, p. 370). This situation negatively affected relations as it was not a desired situation by the USA.

Foreign policy decisions of Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Çağlayangil were realized in line with certain targets. The first of these was economic development. Demirel's government, which sees economic development as the first and main goal, evaluated everything from the perspective of the passion for economic growth. In other words, according to Demirel's perception, all factors and policies are shaped according to whether they affect economic growth. For this reason, all kinds of credits to be obtained by opening up and changing relations were used in the maximum way. Secondly, Demirel government avoided all kinds of conflicts in foreign policy in order not to destabilize and to make a linear progress (Cem, 2009, p. 374-375).

The Justice Party, which held the power between 1965 and 1970, followed a foreign policy by prioritizing the interests of the class and groups it represented. Due to Demirel's personal characteristics, which have been mentioned before, his main goal was the desire to grow rapidly at all costs, and protecting the interests of the developing bourgeoisie was the main factor affecting foreign policy. Minor changes in foreign policy were required to obtain the long-term loans sought, and these were made. But even these were seen as a revolution in traditional Turkish Foreign Policy (Cem, 1977, p. 16-17). Although the interests of certain classes and groups in Turkey were taken into account,

important steps had been taken in industrialization and development initiatives. Although the USA and western countries did not approve of these steps, the Soviet Union warmly welcomed them and industrialization steps were taken (Yetkin, 1995, p. 142). Due to both these economic reasons and diplomatic reasons, Turkey-Soviet Union relations have developed.

3.4.3. The Cyprus Problem (1967)

By 1967, confusion arose in the internal politics of Greece. Konstantin Kolias, who became the prime minister with the military coup that took place in Greece on this date, announced that he would bring a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue (Belleten April 1967, (31), p. 35). However, in the government program of the junta administration, the aim of "to ensure enosis through peaceful negotiations, taking into account the rights of the Cypriot minority" was announced (Belleten April 1967, (31), p. 36). In other words, the aim of the new military junta was to ensure enosis. Kolias' goal was to cover up the problems he experienced in domestic politics with a foreign policy victory over Cyprus (Ahmad, 1977, p. 414). It was clear that Kolias would present a proposal to Demirel for these peaceful ways, so the two leaders met on September 9-10, 1967 (Belleten September 1967, (36), p. 16-17). Kolias' proposal was to leave the Dhekelia base to Turkey and realize the enosis. However, in his answer, Demirel stated that the Turkish government would not accept enosis under any circumstances, that the two communities on the island could not come under the domination of each other, that the balance in Lausanne could not be disrupted, and that the treaties could not be broken unilaterally (Fırat, 2015, p. 736). When the two sides could not come to an agreement, the talks ended by expressing their hopes for the coming years with a joint statement (Belleten September 1967, (36), p. 40-41).

After the Greek junta announced its desire for enosis in the government program and could not get what it wanted from Demirel-Kolias talks, it took action in line with this request in November 1967. The Cyprus crisis emerged (Ahmad, 1977, p. 414). On November 15, 1967, Greek citizens raided the

regions where Turkish citizens were abundant (Belleten, November 1967, (38), p. 21). Thereupon, the parliament convened on 16-17 November and gave the government permission to use military weapons (MMTD, 17.11.1967, p. 4-5). On 17 November, the foreign ministry sent a note to Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey decided to intervene immediately and Turkish jets started flying over Cyprus on 18 November 1967 (Cumhuriyet, 19.11.1967). After the parliament gave Demirel the permission to use armed force, Demirel demanded a military intervention. But the army did not have the military equipment to make a successful landing at that time. For this reason, when Demirel's request could not be met, Demirel wanted to solve the problem through diplomatic means (Fırat, 2015, p. 737). Since both states could not find a solution and NATO measures could not be implemented, US President Johnson sent a special representative for the Cyprus issue. Cyrus Vance, former US secretary of defense, sent as special envoy (Belleten, November 1967 (38), p. 35). The points that were agreed upon at the end of Vance's negotiations are as follows (Fırat, 2015, p. 737):

• Both sides will respect the independence of Cyprus and confirm their duty towards this country.
• The armed forces on the island will be withdrawn within a month and a half, except for the treaties, and this process will be done under the supervision of the UN Peacekeeping Force.
• Turkey will lift the war or intervention measures it has taken to the island
• Compensation will be paid to those killed and injured during the conflict and illegal weapons will be confiscated.
• Grivas will be prohibited from returning to the island and both countries will gradually disband their national troops.

While Cyrus Vance was making this offer, anti-American movements in Turkey had become very strong. For this reason, Vance had to leave Ankara and was subjected to widespread protests at the airport (Ahmad, 1977, p. 415). The policy of the Soviet Union on Cyprus was to continue the policy it had previously

accepted. In his speech to the parliament at the beginning of 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil clearly stated that he accepted that the Soviets were against enosis and that there were two communities living on the island. However, according to Çağlayangil, the Soviets wanted a small or large state not to interfere with the island (MMTD, 20.02.1968, p. 493). However, thanks to Turkey's intense efforts in the international arena, it was decided to take back the Turkish and Greek troops in Cyprus with the UN decision (Soysal, 1997, p. 312). In this case, the enosis demand of Greece was badly damaged. With this withdrawal, it provided equal rights and freedom of movement for Turkish Cypriots, thereby reducing the pressure on the Turks in the region.

As a result, the government had to take a decision to intervene in the 1967 Cyprus problem with the pressure of the Turkish public opinion (Ahmad, 1977, p. 414). In other words, the event in which the effect of shared public opinion and expectation on foreign policy was most evident was the decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1967. Both the Turkish public and Dr. The pressure of the Turkish Cypriots, through Küçük, affected the decision to intervene in foreign policy (Cumhuriyet, 18.11.1967). The 1967 conflict became a tool for the rapprochement of the Soviet Union and Turkey. The Soviet Union once again understood that it needed to get closer with Turkey in line with its aims in the Mediterranean.

3.4.4. Relations with the Soviet Union

During this period, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union focused on economic interests (loans) and getting rid of the US-dependent one-way policy in the international system. Because, according to Demirel, the Western bloc countries and especially the USA did not want Turkey to advance in the field of industry. The development of relations with the USSR provided the necessary loans for growth, support and stability from a great state on Cyprus (Özcan, 2017, p. 237). Demirel stated the following in his interview (Yetkin, 1995, p. 112-113).

We had some projects in 1967. We were having a lot of trouble using mineral resources. We used to export ore and import metal. For example, we would give 5 tons of ore and buy 1 ton of metal. It was a robbery. I was thinking of establishing factories that process ore. We wanted to build an iron and steel factory, an aluminum, zinc, lead (...) factory. (...) This was also true for oil. We were selling crude oil and buying processed oil, so we wanted to establish a refinery. (...) We asked the Westerners to finance them, and they said they wouldn't. We asked the Soviets, they said they would. We negotiated with the Soviets and started their construction. The West was disturbed by this. The American ambassador in 1967 visited me and said, 'Are you changing axis'. (...) They were very disturbed by the fact that we had improved our relations with the Soviets.

As Demirel explained, the investments desired to be made in Turkey lie on the basis of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. In this context, the decline of the USA-Turkey relations, which constitutes the main argument of this thesis, had a positive effect on the USSR-Turkey relations. The US's lack of support for Turkish investments forced Turkey to seek a new economic cooperation. This cooperation was provided by the Soviet Union. The USSR not only allowed Turkey to improve its economic situation, but also increased its political autonomy against the West, with very low interest and long-term industrial loans (Oran, 2015, p. 676). Besides, it was stated in the speech of Foreign Minister Çağlayangil during the 1966 budget negotiations that no concessions would be made in foreign policy in return for the development of these economic relations and the economic and financial aid received from the Soviet Union. According to Çağlayangil,"Just as we will not allow our Western friends to demand foreign policy concessions from us due to the economic and financial aid they have provided, we will equally certainly oppose such demands from the states with which we have re-entered good neighborly relations" (MMTD, 19.02.1966, p. 584).

On December 21, 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Kosigin arrived in Turkey. This visit of Kosigin was important in the context of a Soviet Union Prime Minister's visit to the country for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Kosigin's first statement in Turkey was that we want to live in peace and friendship (Belleten, December 1966 (27), p. 84). Kosigin also stated that he would like to further develop Turkish-Soviet relations in possible fields (Cumhuriyet, 21.12.1966). This visit was also covered in the press of the Soviet Union. Pravda newspaper expressed the purpose of the Soviet Prime Minister's visit to Turkey as follows:

> "Turkey is making great efforts to develop its economy. The Turkish business community shows great interest in Soviet industrial equipment. Turkey needs loans to raise the welfare level of its people." (Milliyet, 21.12.1966, p.7)

It has been stated that Turkey has established economic relations with the Soviet Union for Turkey's own interests about economy. In the joint statement, it was stated that both countries were satisfied with the visit and bilateral relations and demanded the development of economic and commercial relations (Belleten December 1966, p. 104).

First of all, the facilities that could be built by sending a technical team from Turkey to the Soviet Union were discussed. According to the report of the returning technical team, the iron and steel plant in Turkey would be completed as soon as possible. In addition, projects for establishing glass factories and vodka facilities in Turkey were completed (Belleten June 1966, (21), p. 55-56). By 1967, factories began to be opened with Soviet loans and technical assistance. At the aluminum factory opened in Seydişehir, both Demirel and the USSR Ambassador expressed their satisfaction with the improvement of relations between the two countries (Belleten, August 1967, (35), p. 11). In addition, with the support of the USSR, an oil refinery in İzmir was opened on

August 17 with Soviet financing (Belleten, August 1967, (35), p. 19). During this period, most of the investments made in Turkey were made with the help of Soviet loans and the Soviet technical team. In this context, investments in Turkey had become the most important element of relations between the two countries.

When the military junta came to power in Greece, the first thing they did was to establish close relations with the United States. Because of these relations, the Soviet Union began to perceive Greece as a threat. Greece, which could be used by the Soviets in their policy of landing in the Mediterranean, was no longer compatible with the policies of the USSR. For this reason, the Soviet Union wanted to be active in the Mediterranean through the last possibility it had by strengthening its relations with Turkey (Armaoğlu, 2013, p. 706). Demirel visited the USSR on 19-29 September 1967, in response to Prime Minister Kosigin's visit to Turkey (Soysal, 1997, p. 311). In this visit, as a result of the negotiations on Cyprus, it was stated that the rights of both sides should be protected and enosis was rejected (Belleten September 1967, (36), p. 19). According to Demirel, who met with Kosigin about the bad relations between Turkey and the USSR and Turkey's being a member of the Western Bloc, Kosigin said, "It is Stalin's job. We have now changed our policy. We follow new policies and do not approve of the old one." (Yetkin, 1995, p. 110). In this context, the bad relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were shown as Stalin's fault, as in the 20th Congress of the CPSU. And since the "obstacle" in front of the development of Turkey-USSR relations had been removed, relations between Turkey and its northern neighbor began to develop. Another important visit between the Soviet Union and Turkey was made by Cevdet Sunay on 12-21 November 1968. With this visit, a head of state visited Moscow for the first time.

The changing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were also approved and supported by other parties in the parliament. One of the parties that approved the development of relations with the Soviet Union in order to

protect Turkey's interests in the changing international system was the RPP. Nihat Erim's speech on behalf of the RPP in the Parliament on February 17, 1967 which was after Kosigin visit was an example of this. "*The fact that Mr. Prime Minister Demirel was able to meet with Mr. Kosigin in an atmosphere of mutual trust has been an important success for the country and worthy of congratulations for the Prime Minister.*" (MMTD, 17.02.1967, p. 330). Another example was the Nation Party. On behalf of the Nation Party, Mesut Ozansoy said that *"In our opinion, these developments (changing Turkey-Soviet Union relations) have been very beneficial for our country."* (MMTD, 19.02.1966, p. 583). Supporting the development of relations with the Soviet Union in economic and cultural fields by the parliamentary parties facilitated the Democratic Party's foreign policy to develop relations. For this reason, internal dynamics did not become an element of pressure in the relations with the Soviets.

It is possible to evaluate the relations between Turkey and the USSR, which developed during Demirel's period, around both treaties and visits. In this context, the previously described relationships can be listed as follows (Gönlübol & Kürkçüoğlu, 1996, p. 549-550):
• 19 April 1968- Istanbul-Moscow non-stop sleeper train service agreement
• May 7, 1968- Third Iron and Steel Industry preliminary project agreement
• 19 June 1968- Signing of the Arpacay Dam protocol
• June 23, 1968- Arrival of a committee of Soviet experts to Turkey
• 8-12 July 1968- Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil's visit to the USSR
• October 10, 1969- Signing of an agreement on the Iskenderun Iron-Steel industry
• 10-21 November 1969- President Cevdet Sunay's visit to the USSR
• 16-23 May 1970- The visit of Vladimir M. Vinogradov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Turkey.

Turkey's developing relations with the Soviet Union did not have a military dimension. These relations developed only in the economic, technical and

cultural fields. In this context, Turkey did not leave NATO and the Western Bloc during these years. On the contrary, it remained loyal to its NATO alliance while improving its economic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1967, one of the years when the best economic relations with the Soviet Union were experienced, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Çağlayangil, said in his speech in the parliament that the Justice Party was affiliated with NATO and the Western Bloc. He added that he was not against having NATO bases in the country, which would carry out all kinds of defense actions that would not drag Turkey into war, harm its interests and sovereignty, and would not endanger its security (MMTD, 06.01.1967, p. 125). Military relations with the United States were not like before the Johnson Letter. But in the military field, Turkey still maintained a partnership with the United States. In line with this partnership, Turkey agreed to buy 10 warships from the USA in 1967 (Milliyet, 09.10.1966). In addition, Turkey did not cut its relations with the USA in the economic field. According to Demirel, Turkey's most important goal was the completion of investments. In order to ensure these developments, Turkey needed foreign capital support. In this direction, he did not hesitate to improve his relations with the Soviet Union. However, he did not ignore that the economic aids of the USA would be an accelerating factor for investments. The Republic of Turkey demanded the release of 1.9 billion liras blocked by the USA at the Central Bank of Turkish Republic. With the USA accepting this offer, Demirel accelerated the investments in the country by receiving economic support from both the USA and the USSR (Milliyet, 16.11.1966).

As a result, when this change in Turkish foreign policy is evaluated from the perspective of neoclassical realism through the elements described above, it can be said that the perception of the leader and the economic and political groups in the country shape the foreign policy. Demirel's desire for economic development and industrialization is the first factor that shaped Turkish foreign policy. The fact that the loans required for industrialization and development plans could not be provided by the USA and the Soviet Union took advantage of this situation and offered its economic support to Turkey contributed to the

development of Turkey-USSR relations. Secondly, the influence and pressure of the Turkish bourgeoisie on Demirel is too important. Demirel developed close relations with the bourgeoisie in the country in between 1965 and 1971, when he was in power alone, and was determined to protect the interests of this group. As a result of this determination, all possible loans and investment promises were taken from the Soviet Union without breaking relations with the USA and the West, and bilateral relations were developed.

CONCLUSION

The subject of this thesis is the examination of improving Turkey-Soviet Union relations between 1960 and 1971 from a neoclassical realist perspective. Positioning itself within the Western Bloc after the Second World War, Turkey switched to a multilateral foreign policy in this period. There are several reasons for this break in Turkish foreign policy. The aim of the thesis is to understand and explain these reasons in a holistic way. For this purpose, neoclassical realism, one of the international relations theories, was used. The reason for choosing the neoclassical realist theory is that it is thought that the change in the foreign policy of this period can only be explained by considering the international system and domestic factors together. In this context, how the independent variables are shaped by the intervening variables (which is the argument of neoclassical realist theory) and how foreign policy practices, (which are the dependent variables) emerge have been discussed.

The main research question in this thesis "How domestic factors and the features of the international system affected the Turkish-Soviet relations between 1960 and 1971?" has been answered. While trying to answer this question, first of all, the theoretical background was created. In this context, first classical realism, then neorealism, and finally neoclassical realism, which is the theoretical basis of this thesis, were discussed. The importance of neoclassical realism for this thesis is that it offers a holistic perspective as it deals with both domestic elements and the structure of the international system. The perspective of neoclassical realism on the international system, which is the independent variable, has been evaluated.

The events that took place between the leaders of the blocs or outside the blocs within the international system caused a change in the structure of the system. These events, which directly affected the system between 1960 and 1971, brought about a softening in the structure of the system. These changes in the system had a direct impact on the foreign policies of the states. As neoclassical

realism claims, systemic stimuli take their place as the primary factor in shaping foreign policy. Foreign policies can also change with the effect of intervening variables in the changing international system. In this context, the change in the structure of the system was the most important factor in Turkey's changing relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey had prioritized the interests of the country in an international system that had entered a period of détente. Because the characteristic of system has changed and this changes provide permissive international environment for state. The change in Turkish foreign policy was not only caused by events at the system level.

Then, by dealing with the intervening variables, it has been revealed how the stimuli coming from the international system were shaped. Thus, the foreign policies of the states, which are their dependent variables, were formed. In the second part, the international system between 1960 and 1971 was evaluated. One of the arguments of this thesis is that decreasing tension between two superpowers after the Cuban Crisis paved the way for the détente period in the international system which affected Turkey-Soviet relations in the 1960s. In this context, the events affecting the system between 1960 and 1971 have been discussed. In the third chapter, domestic dynamics and their effects on foreign policy have been explored. Thus, it has showed that how the intervening variables shaped the stimuli coming from the international system in the example of Turkey. In this context, the question of "How and under which conditions the Turkey-Soviet Union relations developed in the 1960s?" has been explained.

The first hypothesis of this thesis is that the most fundamental factor in the improvement of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union is the transformation that had begun to take place in the international system after the Cuban crisis. This situation was handled from a neoclassical realist perspective and it was explained that the system had become permissive after the changes in the system. Thanks to this change in the characteristics of the system, Turkey was able to respond positively to the Soviet Union's request to improve relations. In

other words, the change in the system made it possible for Turkey to respond positively to the Soviet Union.

Another hypothesis of this thesis is that domestic factors are also effective in the development of Turkey-Soviet relations. In particular, the perception of the leader is the intervening variable that has the greatest impact on foreign policy, which is the dependent variable. In this context, the perception of Turkish leaders between 1960 and 1971 and domestic factors affected this perception were tried to be explained in this thesis. In order to show the effect of the perception of Turkish leaders on foreign policy, government changes have been used to divide the periods. In other words, by trying to evaluate each leader and each government in their own period, it has been tried to show more clearly how the change of leaders affected the foreign policy output.

The last argument discussed in this thesis is that the deterioration of Turkey-US relations had an important place in the development of Turkey-Soviet relations, as it affected the perception of the leader and the opinion of the public. Events affecting Turkey-US relations had left Turkey alone in the international arena. In addition, the US's pursuit of policies against Turkey's interests had led to the questioning of the most reliable ally. In this thesis, the events between the two countries and their results have been examined, too. Thus, the reasons for Turkey's isolation in the international arena have been revealed. As a result, Turkey's problems with its ally, the USA, were handled as a factor that led to the improvement of relations with the USSR.

The scope of this thesis is limited to Turkish-Soviet relations. Because the importance of the 1960s is that Turkey had adopted a multilateral foreign policy. The meaning of multilateral policy is that relations with the Soviet Union were improved as well as the Western Bloc. In this thesis, it is not claimed that Turkey broke away from the Western Bloc and approached the Eastern Bloc. It is claimed that Turkey developed its relations with the Soviet Union in this period due to economic, military and political reasons. Turkey was still a NATO

member state. In this context, economic, cultural, and technical relations developed with the Soviet Union rather than a military one. According to one of the arguments of this thesis, the development of relations with the Soviet Union was due to the fact that NATO member countries were left alone in the international system in matters such as Cyprus. In other words, Turkey has not abandoned NATO's duties and responsibilities.

In this thesis, the speeches of the leaders were examined in detail in order to be able to discuss the perception of the leaders more clearly. Leader's perception is the most important intervening variable because leaders are the most effective factor in the perception of systemic stimuli and decision-making processes. In this context, the statements after the visits and the documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are important in terms of the sources of this thesis. In addition, the news in the two best-selling newspapers at that time were used to show both the perception of Turkish leaders and how the relations developed. In addition, American archival documents were used both to understand the events that took place in the international system and to explain the changing nature of Turkey-US relations. These archival documents were obtained as a result of intense efforts and contributed to the thesis as primary sources. In addition to primary sources, books, e-books, articles and theses were used as secondary sources.

The creation of a multilateral foreign policy shows that Turkey had changed its foreign policy tradition in line with its interests. Security comes first among these interests. It emerged that there was a serious security problem when Turkey realized with the Johnson Letter that the military equipment, which came with the aid from the USA, could not be used without the permission of the United States. In addition, the fact that the USA declared that it would not protect Turkey against any Soviet attack brought Turkey's security problem to light. For this reason, Turkey aimed to ensure its security by improving its relations with the Soviet Union, which it used to perceive as a threat.

Another factor that causes Turkey to make a transition to multilateralism is international politics. Unable to find the support it sought for national issues such as the Cyprus Problem in the international arena, Turkey realized that it needed to change its foreign policy tradition. The absence of a great power support to Turkey in the international arena would have caused the loss of its rights in Cyprus. For this reason, Turkey improved its relations with the Soviet Union, the great power in the bipolar international system, and prevented the Soviet Union from being a threat.

Another factor affecting the transition to a multilateral foreign policy is the economy. In this period, Turkey was making investments in its economy with foreign aid and loans. These loans and aids were provided by the USA. In this context, the fact that the USA did not want the loans that were given to Turkey to be used in heavy industry forced Turkey to find loans from elsewhere. In this context, especially during Demirel's period, joint projects and industrial investments were made with the Soviet Union.

As a result, Turkey had the opportunity to establish a foreign policy in a more permissive environment due to the changes in the characteristics of the international system between the years of 1960-1971. In addition, the perceptions of Turkish leaders in are important variables in the country's foreign policy. For example, Demirel gave priority to economic development in his policies. He perceived the USA's attitude towards Turkey regarding loans as "They do not want Turkey to develop". For this reason, he chose a foreign policy aimed at improving the relations with the Soviet Union in order to realize the economic development he aimed for. In this context, leaders directly affect the dependent variables, which are foreign policy outputs. The aim of this thesis is to show exactly why and how Turkey-Soviet relations had changed by showing the effect of both the system and the intervening variables on the foreign policy formation process in military, political and economic issues.

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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 08/04/2022

Tez Başlığı: Neo-Klasik Realist Perspektif Açısından 1960-1971 Yılları Arasında Değişen Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

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Tarih:08/04/2022

Tez Başlığı : Neo-Klasik Realist Perspektif Açısından 1960-1971 Yılları Arasında Değişen Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

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