



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Science
Department of International Relations

**ANALYSIS OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF
KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY**

Firat ÇAPAN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2015

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
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


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20/01/2015



Fırat ÇAPAN

DEDICATION

To My Beloved Fiancée,
YELİZ

ÖZET

ÇAPAN, Fırat, *Devlet İçi Çatışma Analizi, Türkiye'nin Kürt Meselesi Örneği*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara; 2015.

Bir devlet içi çatışma örneği olarak Kürt meselesi Türkiye'nin barışçıl bir çözüm bekleyen temel meselelerinden biridir..Bu çalışmada devlet içi çatışma ve savaşın nasıl tanımlandığı çözümünün neden zor olduğu, açıklandıktan sonra devlet içi çatışmaların nasıl sınıflandırıldığı ile bu çatışmaların temel sebeplerinin ne olduğu tartışılmıştır. Daha sonra Kürt meselesinin bugüne kadar geçirdiği evreler incelenmiş, Türkiye'deki Kürt meselesinin bir devlet içi çatışma örneği olarak nasıl tanımlanabileceği, ve devlet içi temel çatışma sebeplerinin Türkiye'deki Kürt meselesi açısından ne kadar açıklayıcı olduğu tartışılmıştır. Son olarakta devlet içi çatışmanın temel sebeplerinin Kürt meselesi açısından nasıl aşılabileceği ve kalıcı barışa nasıl ulaşılabileceği maddeler halinde açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Devlet İçi Çatışma ,Kürt Meselesi, Barış Süreci

ABSTRACT

ÇAPAN Fırat, *Analysis of Intra-State Conflicts, The Case of Kurdish Issue In Turkey*
Master Thesis, Ankara, 2015

As an intra-state conflict Turkey's Kurdish issue is one of the primary issues that necessitate to an immediate settlement. In the thesis, after the questions of "how Intra-state conflict and war are being defined and why their resolution is challenging" are being answered. Both the classifications and root causes of intrastate conflicts are explained. Then the evolution of Kurdish Issue is analyzed and Kurdish issue is evaluated within the context of Intra-state conflicts and the question of whether the root causes are explanatory for Kurdish issue or not is addressed. Lastly the ways to reverse the root causes of intra-state conflicts and to achieve an enduring peace is suggested in respect to Kurdish issue.

Key Words

Intra-State Conflict, Kurdish Issue, Peace Process

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INTRODUCTION

Except the example of Japan and Poland which are mostly termed as homogenous states, most of the world states today – and in the history as well, are multinational and multiethnic. The concept of “Nation State” which spread all over the globe after the French Revolution can barely deal with the problems of multi-ethnicity and domestic dissidents within the states. Most of the conflicts are intra-states and the war between and among the states is something rare, especially in the era of post-World War II. The collapse of Soviet Union boosts the trend of intra-state conflicts and resurgence of ethnic outbreak in most part of the world. The number of states in terms of the membership to the United Nations increased to 189 in 2000, which were 159 in 1990. The Intra-states of conflicts has variety of types such as ethnic, ideological, class or religious. Sometimes It is difficult to perfectly define the types of the conflict in question and further it might be some mix of all these. The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of bipolar world has decreased and loosed the attention on the class and ideological conflicts and most world politics focus is on ethnic and religious conflict now. In other words the post-Cold War era conflicts are generally identity-based. For that reason it is not a coincidence for some scholars to dub this era as the “age of identity” It is not just an invented or abstract term that postmodernism lent to us, but the conflict of identities is something real and experienced throughout the world like Kashmir, Srilanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel and Turkey. The important aspect of these conflicts are that they resist to resolution and they are intractable. Most of these conflicts last a long time and when violence emerges they happen to be bloody and leave behind a victimized population. Further they bear very high cost on populations, if not resolved.

One of the most important aspects of intra-state conflict is that in the pre conflict, during conflict, and post conflict era the conflicting or warring parties have to live together, if separatism is not the outcome. The dispute may be about a territory, gaining governmental power or economical resources. Whatever the dispute is about, the dynamics of intra-state conflict, the way to deal with it or resolution of it is different from that of interstate conflict. So the researcher or practitioner ought not to approach

with the same tools that are being used for inter-state conflict. To resolve cleavages between or among states is different from those waged between state and groups or between two groups. As stated above since it is anticipated that the groups will live together in the post conflict era, mostly the process is more fragile to carry a peace initiative in intra-state conflict and the resurgent of conflict is more likely in such kind of initiative. In addition to that the second factor that makes the intra-state conflict more intractable is the power asymmetry between conflicting and warring parties. States in general are reluctant and unwilling to make concession to an insurgent group. On the other hand, for a weak conflicting party with respectively low number of staff and cost, they gain large by inflicting a small attack on the state. When asymmetry gap is narrow, the likelihood of a solution is higher. In other words when power balance is obtained it leads to a more sustainable relations.

Turkey seeks to find a peaceful solution to its long decade and intractable problem Kurdish Issue. The former initiative of AK party government failed due to the lack of organized preparations, amateur peace processes, which had started in 2009 and end in 2011 after PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) members staged an ambush and killed 13 Turkish soldier in the Silvan province. In the meanwhile with the failure of initiative, the armed conflict escalated in to a very intense confrontation that account for more than 700 dead within fourteen months from 2011 to 2012 which is the highest death rate that unprecedented in 13 years. The detention of Kurdish activist with the conviction of being the member of illegal organization KCK (The Union of Communities in Kurdistan), The PKK raids, Turkish military operation to the bases of PKK and the widespread death fasts of Kurdish prisoners in 2013, led to a stalemate and similar developments dragged the conflict in to a stagnate condition for the parties. Later on prisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's called the prisoners to end the hunger strike and the followers listened to this call. Since then the situation deescalated and government launched a peace talks with Abdullah Öcalan that boosted hopes among public. The public expectation is that three decade old conflict which marked with bloody memories will end. During the time of writing this thesis, talks were going on with Abdullah Öcalan and in 21 March 2013 of Newroz celebration his letter was read by BDP parliamentary members to the mass that were gathering for the celebration, and in this letter he

addressed the PKK members and called to a fully withdrawal from armed struggle and urged the militants to retreat from Turkish borders and move to the Northern Iraq.

Considering all above mentioned, the thesis is an attempt to explain the Kurdish issue in the intra-state conflict theory and propose a way out to the issue. The research question of thesis is “can Kurdish issue and the root causes of the conflict be explained within the intra-state conflict theory framework and how can the root causes of the issue be transformed to attain an enduring peace?”

In the first chapter, the thesis seeks to clarify the dynamics of intra-state conflict, examines what sort of intra-state conflict are present, and studies what are the root causes of Intra-state conflicts. This part will constitute to a theoretical background for the next two chapters.

The research questions of first chapter are:

- What we mean by Intra-state conflicts and war and why they are in rise?
- What kinds of Intra-state conflicts exist and what are the main differences?
- What are the root causes of Intra-state conflict?

In the second chapter, first the Kurdish issue is being analyzed in terms of historical legacy and then the issue is analyzed in terms of intra-state conflict definition and the root causes of Kurdish issue is also being examined.

The research questions of second chapter are:

- How Kurdish issue evolved to the present time?
- What types of Intra-state conflict corresponds with Kurdish issue?
- Are root causes explained in the first chapter relevant and explanatory for Kurdish issue ?

The last chapter provides a roadmap for reversing the root causes of conflict with analysis of Kurdish issue in these respects.

The research question of last chapter is: What policies must be adopted to reverse the root causes and reach an enduring peace?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study based its arguments and draws the conclusions from the basic resources on Intra-state conflicts and war, peace processes and Kurdish issue, are being assessed from the perspective and lenses of those resources. The thesis methodology will follow the methodology that has been adopted by peace and conflict resolution studies. The first feature of this methodology is the normative approach to social conditions. It implies the value-laden characteristic of the peace studies in which peace is uncontested good and must be the main

objective and war and conflict is clearly refer to a bad situation.¹ Some scholars has been using the analogy between medical and peace studies and states that “Like medical scientists in respect of disease and physical suffering, peace researchers saw violence and war as an evil to be controlled or eliminated, and made an ethical commitment to that end”² With the same token the assumption that the paece studies is founded upon is that the existing social structure is not a fate or destiny and open to change by human action. The normative methodology leads to a proactive mode of action in research that make the studies useful for practioner in addition to theoretical contributions. The second aspect of peace stduies methodology is its interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary facet. As Attack maintains “Peace theory is still very much a compilation of theories and concepts derived from other disciplines, such as international relations, political science, sociology, philosophy and theology”³ When peace is matter any of method is justifiable to use. Thus in the thesis for instance the approach of “Realism” that relates to power, security dilemma, and overcoming the

¹ Attack Iain , *Peace Studies and Social Change*, Development Education In Action ,Issue 9, Autumn 2009 p 2.

² McSweeney, B ‘Introduction: Comments on Morality and Peace Research’ in McSweeney, B (ed.) *Moral Issues in International Affairs: Problems of European Integration*, Macmillan Press,London, (1998) p.1

³ Attack Iain , *Peace Studies and Social Change*, Development Education In Action , Issue 9, Autumn 2009 p 2

security dilemma was utilized. Likewise Marxism a theory that highly make references to structural factors or economical inequalities was touched upon in the thesis without directly naming it. In other words the means to achieve an end, which in the thesis is reaching an endurable peace in Kurdish issue, relating to normative methodology were employed throughout the thesis particularly in the third chapter.

CHAPTER 1

INTRASTATE CONFLICT AND WAR; DEFINITION AND ROOT CAUSES

Only dead have seen the end of war

Plato

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analysis the intra-state conflict, war, trends of wars, types of intra-state conflict and root causes of intra-state conflicts. Since most of the states are multiethnic, the existence of different groups within states and claims they propound, such as autonomy or independence has become a point of attention and caution for international and internal politics. Firstly the chapter attempts to clarify the definition of intra-state conflicts and war and explains why it is important for global politics. Trends in world politics, the “globalization” process and emergence and increasing importance of minorities in politics are other cases in point. To understand this phenomenon and trends the chapter delves in to the types of internal conflicts and the conditions that give rise to those internal troubles. Distinctive studies emphasis different classifications and this diversity stemmed from their focus point in the conflict. The chapter employs the classification of “identity/ethnic based”, and “ideological based /conflict over central government” as the focus of conceptualization, while referring to other classification as well such as, the Correlates of War project Classification to compare and clarify that different conceptualization. Correlates of War Project Classification are also providing the tool to distinguish Intra-state wars from the intra-state conflicts that have not reached to the degree of intra-state wars. On the other hand for operational classification to the Kurdish Issue, the identity/ethnic based, and ideological based distinction appeared to be

satisfactory, since the thesis is not a deep study of the theory of intra-state conflict and war. Moreover identity/ethnic based” –ideological based conflicts / classification is widely referred in seminal studies and texts of peace and conflict studies.

Later on, the chapter analyzes the causes and the condition in which internal conflict and war emerge. Those causes are classified in to four sections. First is the “structural factors” of intrastate conflict. Under the structural factors of intra-state conflicts, “weak state” security dilemma, ethnic geography has been analyzed. Second is the “political factors” in which exclusionary national institutions, discriminatory national ideologies, intergroup politics and elite politics were examined. As a third element, economic and social factors were analyzed. Lastly the “cultural/perceptual” factors was investigated which cover “cultural discrimination”, “group histories” and “perceptual factors”. Followings are the details of above mentioned.

1.2. THE DEFINITION OF INTRA-STATE WAR

Varranes states that “It is clear that vast majority of armed conflicts, which have plagued the world in the last two decades are within states rather than between states”⁴ Yet there are no consensus on the terms regarding internal conflicts. Civil war, Internal war, Intra-state war are some of terms that are sometimes being employed scholarly. Another challenge regarding the terms is that even with same concept sometimes scholars imply different meanings.⁵ For example Wallersteen uses civil wars for those kind of conflicts which are related to a conflict over governmental power rather than territorial issues.⁶ When it comes to territorial related conflicts, he prefers the term “State Formation Conflicts”. Yet some other studies use Intra-state conflict that encompasses all types of internal conflicts regardless of whether it is over seizing a territory or

⁴ DeVarenes, Fernande (2003), “Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Content and Approaches”, Darby, John and Roger MacGinty (ed.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.152-153.

⁵ Throughout the study intra-state conflict or Intra-state war were used interchangeably. With intra-state conflict, violent confrontations or tensions that have high potential of violent confrontation were meant where intra-state war implies the conflicts in which 1000 thousand conflict related deaths have been taken place yearly within the border of a state.

⁶ Wallersteen, Peter (2002), *Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System*, Sage, London.

governmental power. Thus a coup d'état or a religious confrontation is both being studied under the title of intrastate conflict. Brown prefers the terms of Internal conflict and he defines it:

By internal conflict, we mean violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origin can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state. Examples include violent power struggles involving civilian or military leaders; armed ethnic conflicts and secessionist campaigns; challenges by criminal organizations to state sovereignty; armed ideological struggles and revolutions⁷.

As seen in the definition, there are multiple types of domestic troubles and conflicts. In some cases when the state is weak, the groups fight among each other with their own tools, without any intervention of governmental powers. Unlike traditional wars in those conflicts civilians are direct subject of the war. Moreover, they are not only subject to wars, but at times also directly involve in the fights that borne out in Rwanda and Bosnia and elsewhere. There as on civilian become victim on those war stems from the fact that, mostly it is extremely difficult to distinguish civilians -that are the bases for groups to recruiting fighters- from the real members of rebellious group.

The criteria has been put for intra-state war by the "Project of Correlates of War" (COW) is as follows:

Intrastate wars are wars that are fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces (civil war), or at least two non-government forces (inter-communal war). While there are two types of intrastate wars, these data only describe civil wars. In order to be classified as a civil war, the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war⁸.

It can be inferred from the definition that 'civil war' is a subtype of intra-state war that the state is a primary party. When the state is not a party in the war according the project conceptualization the term of inter-communal war is preferred. The "Project"

⁷Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT, p.1.

⁸Sarkees Meredith Reid and Schafer Phil (2000), "The Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997" *Conflict Management And Peace Science*, Vol. 18, No 1, pp.123-144.

conceptualization “intra-state war” will be employed throughout the study and differences will be left to the section of the “types of intra-state war”.

1.3 TRENDS AND IMPORTANCE OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS

In traditional meaning war is a concept that defines a fight among two or more states. In modern time, the armed struggles mostly occur within state itself. Wayman and Singer define three types of wars. Those are “Inter-state”, “Intra-state” and “Extra-state” wars⁹. Here Intra-state wars imply a conflict within state and they used “civil wars” interchangeably with intra-state wars. Cold War era is respectively a peaceful period regarding to Inter-state wars. From 1953 Korean War to the end of Cold war, only a few inter-state wars have been taken place. “Inter-state wars are less than 25% of the total 196 wars since 1945 to 1996¹⁰. From 1998 till the present day 47 wars have occurred in which UN intervened, only three of them were inter-state wars (Chad-Libya, Iraq-Kuwait and Eritrea-Ethiopia).¹¹ On the other hand the internal problems of states during Cold war had become an area of proxy wars between two super powers. The Interstate conflicts were intervened by the US or Soviet Union in accordance to their perceived goals. Some examples are the intervention to the Guatemala in 1954, The Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 by the US and Hungary in 1956 Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Union¹². Thus it would not be wrong to assert that Intra-state wars are not a characteristic of post-Cold War era. There have been tensions inside states during Cold War as well. However they were suppressed by a greater conflict of “West” and “East”. In other words, those tensions were earthed up by ideological confrontation of the “Liberal World” and the Communist World.” The stability of order and maintenance of borders were enhanced

⁹Frank Whelon Wayman, J. David Singer (2003), Inter-State, Intra-State and Extra State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997, *International Studies Quarterly*, p. 49.

¹⁰ Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte (1999), “From Inter-State War to Warlordism: Changing Forms of Collective Violence in the International System” in Wiberg Hakan and P. Scherrer (ed.) *Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, Ashgate: Asgate, p.35.

¹¹ Yilmaz Muzaffer Ercan (2007), “Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era”, *International Journal On World Peace*, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.12.

¹² Wallensteen, Peter (2002), “Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System”, Sage, London.

by geopolitics of Cold War, rather than by the norms of 'international order'.¹³ On the other hand the Cold War period was also marked by decolonization struggles and national groups focused on the "imperial" enemy which suspended the internal cleavages to a later time. However with the end of decolonization process, demarcation of the borders by colonial rules, has not always corresponded to ethnic divisions of the countries. Indeed it is impossible to locate every ethnicity into a distinctive territory. As we mentioned before most of the nations are multiethnic and there are great varieties of minority problem and dozens of them are accounted for armed conflicts. Scherrer states that 'If we look underneath the structures of some 200 states there is an extraordinary multitude of perhaps 6500 up to 10.000 nations, nationalities, and people as ethnic entities of diverse size'¹⁴ That is to say end of the Cold War led to the unearthing of divisions within states that were undergrounded or surpassed by a greater ideological division of West and East. The Incidents in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and ultimate dissolution of it, the case of Rwanda and new states that have emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to an awakening about domestic, ethnic, religious division within states. The suppressed conflicts of the former period have surfaced in the new era. Today Intra-state wars claim more deaths than any other kind of wars. The main threat to peace comes from those kind of conflicts rather than from the war between major inter-state wars.¹⁵ The sufferings it creates are high and it claims mostly civil lives. In addition to deaths, displacement of population and crossing of the refugees across the borders - sometimes in huge numbers – brings about extra problems to be dealt with. In occasions their impacts spill over to the borders and give rise to international problems between neighboring states, when their security is becoming endangered. Even worse they might lead to regional conflicts between number of states when their interests are at stake. Thereby a domestic trouble may spark a conflict that will not stop inside the border and create international problems, which might threat international order.

¹³McGarry, John; O'Leary, Brendan (1993),"Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict", *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts*. London: Routledge,p.1.

¹⁴ Scherrer P. Christian (1999), "Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of Ethnicity and Mass Violence: Types Dynamics Characteristics and Trends" in Wiberg Hakan, Scherrer P. Christian(ed), *Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict, Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, Ashgate: Asgate, p.54.

¹⁵ Yilmaz Muzaffer Ercan(2007) "Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era", *International Journal On World Peace*, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.11.

Another aspect of Intra-states war is that it lasts longer than traditional types of wars that take place between states. The conflicts in Angola, Turkey, Philippines and Columbia are instances of intractable war that last more than 20 years.

But why inter-state wars do not last as long as do intra-state wars? And why do their numbers diminish?

If a war is between states, international actors are more prone to intervene in those types of conflicts since they pose a big threat to international order. As liberal tradition of thought argues that states are more dependent on each other, which makes a war more costly and more unlikely. If it happens, international actors are more or less reluctant to intervene to preclude repercussions on international order. "The norms of peaceful behaviour" that dominates the international interactions among states is another explanation propounded by liberals for the declining number of interstate wars. Realists on the other hand argue that the decline stems from the power relations and great powers seek to keep the status quo intact for the maintenance of order.¹⁶ These assumptions are not mutually exclusive and presumably all of them are valid to explain the decline of interstate wars.

Then what accounts for the longevity of intra-state wars and their increasing numbers? Firstly, the states are mostly reluctant to submit to any armed group and the power asymmetry between state and armed group makes it intractable. The states are also resistant to outside intervention in their own problems, which is embodied in international treaties as "non-intervention principle"¹⁷. The resolution through mediation and third party interventions are mostly considered by states as last options. Power asymmetry, nonintervention and reluctance of states to recognise another legitimate power within its territory account for the longevity of intra-state conflicts.

¹⁶ Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte (1999), "From Inter-State War to Warlordism: Changing Forms of Collective Violence in the International System" in Wiberg Hakan and P. Scherrer (ed.) *Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*.: Asgate p. 35.

¹⁷ Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.(UN Charter Article 2(7))
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

The process of globalization in which the nongovernmental organizations have emerged as powerful actors, and which have weakened state sovereignty over domestic issues also contributed to the rise in the number of Intra-states wars. Not only legal NGOs have gained importance, but also “illegal” or armed organization have broadly made the use of globalization process. The groups have gotten the chance to voice loudly their demands on international arenas and mobilise the mass toward their cause thanks to the developments in telecommunication industry. State hardly can control their borders. So the weakening of the state and the emerge of non-state groups as actors gave rise to new forms of interactions. However, this interaction are not always friendly.

Lastly principally Interstate conflicts are dealt with International Organization particularly via United Nations. The parties generally recognised members of these organizations, but the intra-state issues are principally left to the legitimate states, unless the state calls for the intervention from international organizations. When coming to Intra-state, wars indeed mostly one side is not a recognised member and is not eligible to appeal a supreme body. It is not to say that there are no rules for domestic problems and an anarchical situation prevails, but for states these internal issues are matters of expediency rather than principles and laws. That is why the problems like human rights violations and humanitarian intervention are subjects of deep discussion.

Intra-state conflicts and wars are the main issue of the stability of international order in recent decades and it seems that they will remain to be centre of concern in the coming decades. The methods to cope with these challenges will be the main issue of international politics.

1.4 THE TYPES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Not all intra-state conflicts are identical. There are great deals of differences among various types in terms of their motivational roots, geographical aspects, parties involved etc .For example Scherer define and categorizes a number of types such as; “Anti-Regime Wars or Political and Ideological Conflicts: State versus Insurrection”, “Ethno-nationalist Conflicts: State versus Nationalist Group,” “Decolonization wars or Foreign-State Occupation”, “Inter-ethnic Conflicts”. The classification done by “Correlates of War

Data Project” (COW), which was first introduced in 1972 and later updated in 1994 and 1997, is another very insightful classification in the sense that its generalization and scope is well designed. It defines intra-state wars that are between or among the groups within internationally recognized territory of a state and subdivide them in to two groups. One is “Civil War” that fought against the regime of state and any armed conflict that are involved. The other is “Inter-communal Wars”, which is a conflict between the non-state or non governmental groups within a state. For a conflict to be considered a civil war, it must involve a) military action internal to metropolis of state system member, b) active participation of national government, and c) effective participation of both sides and a total of at least 1000 battle deaths during each year of war.¹⁸

Intra—StateWars

Civil Wars

- 1) For Central Control

- 2) Over Local Issues

*B. Inter-Communal*¹⁹

Further COW (Correlates of War) Project grouped “Civil Wars” in to two categories according to the motives behind non-state actors. Whether the conflict is over local or regional affairs or it is over the control of central government is the base of classification. In conflict over the control of self-government the aim of insurgents is to overthrow existing regime and replace it with which they perceive more friendly and receptive to their interests whereas conflict over local issues is a struggle to modify a regime’s treatment of a particular region that populated by a minority group, and to replace the local regime with a more friendly one or ultimately to secede from the larger political

¹⁸ Scherrer P. Christian (1999), “Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of Ethnicity and Mass Violence: Types Dynamics Charecteristics and Trends” in Wiberg Hakan, Scherrer P. Christian(ed.), Ethnicity and Intra-state Conflict, Types, Causes and Peace Strategies, Ashgate,p.61.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.128.

unity in order to set up their own state²⁰. Although categorizations abound, as a last one to refer here is “Ideological intra-state conflicts and Ethnic/Identity Based Intra-state conflicts” division. Arguably Civil wars for “central control” and “over local issues”, classification of COW here are replaced by different names, while in reality it refers to the same. Thus the distinction of “Ideological/Conflict over central control and ethnic/identity based conflict” is broad enough and satisfactory to utilize for our aim. Details and discussion of all the types are beyond the scope and aim of the thesis, only this generally referred classification in academic resources classification will be highlighted in the next section

1.4.1 Ideological Intra-State Conflicts/Conflict Over Central Control

In the ideological intra-state conflict, the issue in question regards to the holding of government power and the main concern is the regime type and social political system. The conflicting parties mostly hold opposite ideology and their understanding of how the government and the regime type should be is incompatible. The opposition’s aim—regardless of whether it is an armed or a civil movement- is to replace the incumbent government and change the socio-political order. In this kind of conflicts, the territory is not an issue of concern and each party seek the support of all populace. The loyalties of individuals are not fixed; in contrast, it is substantially flexible. The opposing sides struggle and battle over the control of state rather than parcel out one part of it. The issues are mostly, if not always, about economic problems, political and social conditions, social order, regime type etc. So the parties seek to win the hearts and minds of population regardless of their ethnic affiliations. Thereby whole country is an area of struggle and the same populations are the subject of political mobilization and activities for both sides. Military success is not enough unless the political support is gained.²¹ The root of the conflict is competing ideologies of parties and their world view rather than their fixed ascriptions. Loyalties are more vulnerable to transformation over time in ideological conflicts. To clarify distinction it is appropriate to give example here.

²⁰ Ibid, p.129.

²¹ Kaufmann Chaim, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No 4 (Spring, 1996), p.139.

The conflict in Northern Ireland which is between Protestant Unionist and Catholic Republicans, can be considered as an ethnic conflict. While the conflict in Afghanistan between Taliban whose political goal is to establish an Afghanistan ruled by their understanding of Islamic principles and government, must be considered as an ideological conflict. In the former one the conflict is more related to the territorial issue. On the other hand in the later conflict the issues in question are control of governmental power and with which world view the country is going to be ruled.

1.4.2 Ethnic/Identity Based Conflicts

Not all ethnic differences lead to conflict. There are numerous examples of heterogeneous states that ethnic or religious groups live in harmony. Ethnicity itself is a contested term, but it is yet a very crucial concept in domestic and international politics. As Allison states: “ethnicity remains one of the most elusive and mysterious aspects of social structures, but also one of the most fundamental and important”²². Horowitz states that “Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security in a divided society, as well as a source of trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and protection against neglect of one’s own interest by strangers”²³. When ethnicity and identity becomes the source of conflict, it makes the conflict more intractable and resistant to resolution. This stems partly from the fact that the ethnic identities –even though not static- are more stable and strong than other affinities. Wolf Defines ethnic conflicts as:

...that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primarily fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues over which conflicts erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms- that is, one party to the conflict will claim that its distinct ethnic identity is the reason why its members can not realize their interest, why they don’t have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied. Thus ethnic conflict are a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict , its cause, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide²⁴.

²² Allison, Lincoln (2003) “Ethnicity” In I Mclean and A. McMillan (ed.), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2nd edn.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 178.

²³ Donald L. Horowitz (1994), “Democracy In Divided Societies” in Diamond Lary and Marc F. Plattner (ed.) *Nationalism Ethnic Conflict And Society*, John Hopkins University Press London,p. 49.

²⁴ Karl Cordell & Stefan Wolff (forthcoming), *Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses*.Cambridge: Polity.

The rigidity of affinity is the main difference with ideological conflicts. On occasion the conflict or war itself strengthens the loyalties to ethnic identities. The memory shaped by suffering and victimization psychology generated by the war memories awakens the ethnic consciousness. Unlike ideological conflicts, conflicting party in ethnic conflicts pursue to gain the hearts and minds of their own populations, rather than seeking support from rival group's constituents. Especially in times of tension and escalation, their bases for support are their own community. Efforts to collaborate with and gain the hearts and minds of other group's members, proven to fail since their identity are at the center of dispute.

To reiterate ethnicity is not fixed and subject to change as well like ideologies, but since it derives its base from blood, race, culture, common descent or religion, once the ethnic identity is formed it becomes quite resistant to change.²⁵ As Horowitz states "*ethnic group is not just a trade union*"²⁶ When identity asserted, proponents of that identity are in most part reluctant to compromise.²⁷

The ethnic group that perceives its conditions as unfair and underprivileged will tend to hold the idea that they have exposed to injustice by the system because of their identity. Whether it's real or a matter of perception, the group pursues political changes through different means, which are not always friendly, and calls for transition. This transition may range from the democracy to the recognition of cultural rights, to federalism or autonomy to demand for secession.

When the matter is identity, the legitimacy of the state and its laws, fall under question. State system is perceived to be unfavorable for the group. Thus the laws considered to be breakable by the "oppressed" ethnic or identity groups²⁸

Another aspect of ethnic conflict which differs from ideological based conflict is related to territoriality. Mostly if not always, the ethnic group attributes their identity to a particular

²⁵ Yılmaz Muzaffer Ercan(2007), "Intra-State Conflict in the Post-Cold Era", *International Journal On World Peace*, Vol.24, No 4 December, p.14.

²⁶ Donald Horowitz (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict: Group Comparison and the Sources of Conflict*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p.104.

²⁷ Weinstock, Daniel "Is Identity A Danger to Democracy", in Primoratz Igor, Pavkovic, Aleksander(ed.) *Identity, Self-Determination And Secession* Aghate Burlington 2006 p15

²⁸ Ibid, p.13.

territory that they reside. Thus, a claim for self-rule—ranges from strengthening the democratic governance to autonomy, to independence - arises within the group. The claims for the “home land” are perceived to be associated with commonness and identity of the group. Moreover the issue of territory may drive the claims to the extent that the minority group asks for self-determination. According to a study, by the 2006 there were 26 ongoing violent self-determination conflicts and more 55 ethnic groups that pursued this task through nonviolent means, additional 40 use both methods. In total there are 120 territorial concentrated ethnic groups globally that seek greater degree of independence from the host states.²⁹

1.4.2.1. Ethno Political Conflict

As it was earlier stated, to assert that any ethnic distinction leads to violence is incorrect. There are numbers of ethnic distinctions in most of states around the world, which have not revealed in violent forms at all. The relationship of Russian and Estonians in Estonia, or the relationships of different linguistic groups in Canada, Belgium and France are far from being an ethnic conflict. Instead of ethnic conflict it is more expedient to use the terms like “dispute, unease, or tension for such situations. In other situation the relationship could hardly be termed as tension, let alone conflict. The conflicting interests of different groups in Switzerland and their interaction proceed through and handled with democratic political institutions and set ups. The distinction of pure ethnicity and ethnicity as a political tool is thus insightful. As aforementioned, mere ethnicity it is not the chief source of aggression and violence. Ted R. Gurr points that ethno political conflicts emerges when groups define themselves using ethnic criteria make claim on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other political actors³⁰. Here the ethnicity is a motivational factor for mobilizing struggle against adversaries, rather than the central sources of conflict. As a case in point Gurr puts the

²⁹ Wolff Stefan (2011), “Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Merit and Perils of Territorial accommodations”, *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 9, p. 26.

³⁰ Gurr, Ted Robert, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), p.348.

Kurdish issue as an example of ethno political conflict and put it in the serious and emerging ethno political conflicts.³¹

After clarifying definition and types of Intra-state conflicts and wars we will focus on the causes of those conflicts on the next section.

1.5 THE ROOT CAUSES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS³²

Some studies that focus on the inter-group relation claim that most of domestic violence stems from ancient hatred of groups towards one another³³. The argument is that those bad relationships within a state border were suppressed by former authoritarian rulers and later or sooner they will be surfaced. Especially the violence in Balkans, is being given as an evidence for that argumentation. Is the “ancient hatred” an enough explanation? There are some instances that societies have experienced some sort of historical misdoings, whereas memories remained from those days do not always translated into violence. So It can be argued that ancient hatred is one of source of inter-state conflicts and other factors need to be included to the explanation. There are four main factors that triggers Intra-state violence. Those are Structural Factors, Political Factors, Economic/Social Factors, and Cultural/Perceptual Factors.³⁴ Next section highlights these factors.

1.5.1 Structural Factors

There are three structural factors relating to inter-state wars. These are “weak state”, “security dilemma”, and “ethnic geography”³⁵. Yet it must be keep in mind that these factors are not mutually exclusive and they have strong links with one another.

³¹ Gurr, Ted Robert, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), p.348

³² External factors were ignored due to those factors are difficult to determine and measure mainly because the states mostly prefer to hide their agenda towards other states, and to have impact on external factors is difficult as a venue of policy prescriptions.

³³ D. Kaplan Robert, *Balkan Ghost, A Journey Through History*, Picador, St. Martin’s Press, 2005.

³⁴ Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT p.13.

³⁵ *ibid*

1.5.1.1 Weak State

When the state institution fails to provide its main requirements and services, and thus loses its legitimacy in the face of society, makes it vulnerable to conflict. When state does not function properly or when it can not maintain stability and economic development or when the state institutions weakened by corruption, the power vacuum generated from these situation will push the groups to seek power for self sufficiency. Arbitrary drawn borders by external powers, incompetences in administrations, lack of control over borders or similar situations that state can not exert influence and lose legitimacy lead to a “Hobbesian kind of environment that will consequently brings about violence.”³⁶ To put it differently, lack of governmental institutions to provide legitimacy generate an environment conducive to violent. States are the sources of benefits, legitimacy and coercion that keep societies united. When those functions falter, and do not proceed properly, other forces that are beyond control and mostly violent come in to the scene to fill the power vacuum.

1.5.1.2 Security Dillema in Intra-State War

Security dillema as a structural factor is one of the most important elements of intra-state wars and it has been discussed broadly in studies about intra-state wars. The concept of security dilemma was first coined by John Herz in 1951 in his book *Political Realism and Political Idealism* and then British Historian referred to a similar situation in his book *History and Human Relation*, even he did not use the term security dilemma. For both scholars security dilemma is a situation of ‘tragedy’ in which two parties without any intend to do harm to one another, end up fighting with each other³⁷. In this line of thought the tragedy does not stem from something like “ancient hatreds” or elites who uses national cards. Rather it is about insecurity of groups toward each other and the uncertainty of the situation they are in. The uncertainty leads to parties to be susceptible of other party’s intention and thereby perceive opponent party as having the worst intention and will probably take action for putting this intention in to the practice in

³⁶Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT p.14.

³⁷ Roe Paul, “The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’”, *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No 2 (Mar., 1999), pp. 183-202.

a sooner time. To avoid this situation parties want to act earlier, which in turn increase fear and doubt in other party.

Indeed security dilemma is a concept that is employed mostly by realist school of international relations to clarify the nature of relation between states in the anarchical set up of international system. In other words, anarchical set up is a state where there are no sovereign powers prevailing and every state has to deal with its own security concern, without relying on others. The concept employed first to define the relation between states and the situations states find themselves in anarchical conditions. In the absence of a superior authority security becomes the fundamental concern of states. To be freed from this state of fear states seek power. The competition over and efforts to acquire power, provoke other parties fears and insecurities which then urge those parties to follow suit.

Power is a relative concept and it is difficult to measure the power. Because of this fact one party's defensive measures, may be perceived as aggressive by other party. Namely effort to increase security by one urges reaction by other, which consequently makes the original party more insecure. The security of one means insecurity of other. Even if the parties are aware of the consequences of their security seeking actions, the situation and anarchical structure compels them to act that way. The uncertainty of the intention and indistinguishable of defensive actions from those of offensive, lead parties to assume the worst case scenario.³⁸ Since all weapons have dual purpose, arms can be both deployed for defensive and offensive purposes. The security dilemma manifests itself very definite in arm races that a state increasing the arms leads other to act accordingly in order to maintain the same level of security, and that circumstance later again drives the first party in to a state of requirement to increase arms.

Although first figured to explain the interstate relations, later security dilemma started to be utilized for intrastate condition as well. Especially after the Cold War that number of groups find themselves in an anarchical-situation in which not any dominate group could prevail over others. Barry Posen for the first time applied security dilemma in to the intra-state context. Posen argued that security dilemma problem appears in ethnic conflicts,

³⁸ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival*, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993).

when the intrastate conditions becomes similar to anarchical international system. The absence of a powerful operating government urges groups to seek their own security. For intra-state conditions he states that “A group suddenly compelled to provide its own protection, must ask the following questions about any neighbouring group.: Is that a threat? How much of a threat? Will threat grow or diminish over time?”³⁹ Even though this groups still lack many of attributes of statehood given the condition of emergent anarchy, it is inevitable for some of them not to act the same way states act due to the need for self help. Thus they ends up with power more than needed.

According to Posen security dilemma intensify when two conditions hold. One is the identical aspect of defensive and offensive, military force which for a state makes it impossible to signal its defence intent. As Posen states “*Each group will have no choice but to assess other’s military potential in terms of its cohesion and its past military records*”⁴⁰ Further when the parties to conflict or war are in the same size in terms of power, we have to observe their motivation rather than the capacity. Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland are considered to be defensive states. But this label has given them in respect to the Soviet Union power capacity. Arguably against similarly sized states they would have been called offensive. For intrastate conflicts especially in the close settlements, a moderate arm capacity accompanied by a ground forces with strong group solidarty, namey a strong identity awareness will feed security dilemma and each party’s capacities will appear offensive.⁴¹ This partly stems from the group’s historical concious about other. While evaluating other’s offensive capacity of their identity they asks the question “How did the other groups behave the last time they were unconstrained and “ Is there a record of offensive military activity by the other? and since the historical reviews of people seldom take the direction of scholarly standarts, the groups tend to answer this questions as the other to appear dangerous. The oral history seldom subjected to critical scrutiny. Further in the lack of central authority, the local politics, in order to gain power will use emotionally charged histories in their speeches to mobilize masses. With the Posen words;

³⁹Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” *Survival*, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993), p. 29

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 30.

.. the military capability of groups will often be dependent on their cohesion, rather than their meagre military assets. This cohesion is a threat in its own right because it can provide the emotional power for infantry armies to take the offensive. A historical record of largescale armed clashes, much less wholesale mistreatment of unarmed civilians, however subjective, will further the tendency for group to see other groups as threats. They will all simultaneously 'arm'- militarily and ideologically-against each other⁴².

The second one that intensify security dilemma between groups is the effectiveness of offence over defence and this is conditioned by two variables. One is technology and the other is geography. Technology is a universal variable that effect the military potentials of all states while geography is circumstantial. Posen puts an exception to technology factor in respect to nuclear technology. If a group acquire nuclear power and if its opponent follow suit, 'groupness' will not effect the security dilemma, as much as it will in non-nuclear situations. Because national sentiment would not effect the ability of groups to launch a nuclear attack.

When it comes to geography, the anarchical state in domestic structure, creates superiorities for the offence over defence. The groups in order to avoid encirclement forced to adopt offensive strategies especially when they have the ability to dominate over some or all others. In response the others will likely follow suit, but the geography factor is circumstantial. Hostile groups may have opponent's groups population living in their lands respectively. Thus those population may serve as hostages. However mostly offence prevail over defence due to the motivation for creating homogeneous surroundings. Inflicting small amounts of offense creates great tactical advantages where the group interspersed in the same land. According to Kaufmann "the severity of ethnic security dilemma is greatest when demography is most inter-mixed weakest when community settlement are most separate"...⁴³ In densely intermixed settlements, determining the fronts is an impossible task and so effective defence of the front is impossible. The mindset of parties by virtue of ambiguity turn out to the understanding that "before enemy attacks and drive us out, it is better to do it first" On the other hand when the demographies are more homogenous and groups are separated, Kaufman

42 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival*, Vol.35, No 1 (Spring 1993)

43 Kaufmann Chaim, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" *International Security*, Vol. 20, No 4 (Spring, 1996) p.148.

claims that offensive and defensive mobilization measures are more distinguishable, which diminishes security dilemma. Defensive vulnerabilities rise and offensive opportunities emerge in the intermingled population settlements.⁴⁴

In addition to that, according to Posen, the behaviour of International Organization encourage offence as well. UN instead of maintaining an enduring peace first, for the most part intervene to stop the fighting and cease fires. Where a party is victorious and other has lost but agree the terms sanctioned due to the fear of the a worse situation. The UN thus favours victorious party and creates incentives for offensive military actions⁴⁵.

1.5.1.2.1 The Inter-Societal Security Dilemma⁴⁶

However unlike Posen, Kaufmann adopts a wider approach to security dilemma, not limiting it with the emphasis just on military security, and go beyond issues of territory in ethnic conflicts⁴⁷. In addition to that he differentiates between security dilemma for inter-state and intrastate level and criticises straightforward analogies. He states that: "... the neorealist concept of a security dilemma can not be mechanically applied to ethnic conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not enough to create security dilemma between communities which may have been at peace for decades. an ethnic security dilemma requires reciprocal fears of group extinction"⁴⁸.

In this sense he combines the security dilemma with the issue of identity. When identities are perceived as irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, one groups attempts to preserve identity leads to other fears of extinction or losing identity, which in turn creates ethnic security dilemma. Maintenance of states relies on its sovereignty while maintenance of society relies on its identity. Threaten identities tend to be preserved and strengthen in response to this threat.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 139.

⁴⁵ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival*, Vol.35, No 1 Spring, p. 34.

⁴⁶ Roe Paul, "The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'" *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No 2 Mar., 1999.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Kaufman, Stuart J, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No 2.

Some criticism has been done by constructivists on the concept of identity in the sense that identity is not something fixed but it is a product of a process and it changes over time. Thus they contended that identity can not be taken as granted with reference to security dilemma. Their critics emphasize on the culturalist notion of such conceptualization.⁴⁹ On the other hand those critics reflected by the proponents of such conceptualization that “the one hand identities are chosen and not given, yet once they are chosen they become absolute⁵⁰”.

For threaten societies, the response strengthens the existing identity. In order to preserve identity, military force utilized especially when identity strongly depends on territory. But the additional preserving methods adopted in Intersocietal confrontations. The most important one appears as ethnic nationalism.⁵¹ Especially when a group feels humiliation, and being ashamed, their identity begins to symbolise a huge umbrella that protects them against external threads. Even one will never meet with its most of members, he/she will feel a sameness with all the members of groups. And in the times of crisis this tendency of group members increases⁵². Practice such forbidding language, changing the names of places, displacement or deportation of the population, closing the education institutions and worship⁵³ may lead the groups to cling more on their identity and become more ethnic nationalist. As Weaver state “... It (nationalism) offers a particularly attractive mode in times of crisis and depression since the link to a glorious past...donates immediate relief, pride and shield against shame”⁵⁴. For dominating groups the other groups identity claims are perceived as a thread to their own identity. The question of who we are always implies the question of who we are not too. Thus for the preservation of identity the suppression of other’s identity justified which in turn feeds other groups’s fear of extinction and serve the group act accordingly, with more

⁴⁹ Roe Paul, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’” *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No 2 Mar., 1999, p. 192.

⁵⁰ Lindholm, Helena, (1993), Introduction: “A Conceptual Discussion” in Helena Lindholm, (ed.) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflicts in the 1990s*. Gothenburg: Nordnes, p.15.

⁵¹ The term Ethnic nationalism sometimes may refer to something primitive and irrational and noncivilised make it worse than state nationalism or civic nationalism. My usage of ethnic nationalism here is referring to neutral notion.

⁵² Vamik D. Volkan (2009), “Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis,” *International Forum of Psychoanalysis*, 18:4, pp 206-213.

⁵³ Roe Paul, “The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’” *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No 2 (Mar., 1999) p.192.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 195.

determination for the preservation of their identity. Nationalism of both side becomes a issue of security, as do arms and military capacity for interstate relations. Both groups, with the societal security dillema cling more to their identity against perceived fear in order to preserve it. It mostly occurs between a state that seeks to establish a common or homogenous identity and a minority ethnic or religious gruop that perceive this policy as a threat to their survival. Roe claims that "...while seeking to make its situation better, by supressing or assimilating those groups which challenge its legitimacy, instead the state comes to make it worse by taking measures which serve only to heighten opposition to regime"⁵⁵. This is also related to state weakness which we mentioned before. The inability to provide an broad identity brings about incompatibility between state and groups. Supression stems from the weakness which in turn make state more weak and vulnerable.

Why an ethnic groups demands, pose a threat to the existence of a state? Or why it's perceived as malign? For the states most sensitive issue is territorial integrity. Demands by an internal groups might be perceived as being secessionist. It is argued that accepting one demand, will be followed by other demans and consequently it will bring about the separation of the groups. In fact those actions of state to avoid this outcome themselves, may trigger the undesirable because those actions will most probably not be perceived as defensive actions by minority groups.

1.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography

When a state multi-ethnic that makes it more prone to violence. Only few states like Iceland or Japan are homogenous. It does not mean that all states that are multiethnic experience the same kinds of problems. Ethnic composition varies and fragmatation differs from state to state. Ellingsen explain three criteria of multiethnicity,⁵⁶

- The degree of fragmentation within a country

⁵⁵Roe Paul, "The Intra-state Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'" *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No 2 (Mar., 1999) p.197.

⁵⁶ Ellingsen Tanja(2000), "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War", *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo.

- a) The size of the largest linguistic, religious and ethnic group within a country
- b) The number of linguistic, religious and ethnic group
- The size of the largest minority group within a country
- Ethnic affinities to other countries

The more a society is fragmented, or if it is difficult to define the “people” of the state, the more domestic violence is likely. With the same token if power is centralized in the hands of one group and if the other groups are obstructed to hold power in governmental institutions the oppressed group will resort to violence as they don’t see any way out of situation but aggression. According to Ellingsen, societies in which the size of the dominant group is less than %80 of total population, has a greater propensity for domestic conflict, than societies in which the size of dominant group exceeds 80% of the total population,⁵⁷ but that is not enough to determine domestic violence. He also argues that conflict likelihood is higher with several groups than with few or many groups.⁵⁸ If the power is divided between several groups, it leads to competition among the groups, but when there are many groups or few groups, there will not be enough big group to provoke and initiate violence.

The size of largest minority group within a country is also an important determinant, as an indication for tendency to intra state violence. Again Ellingsen found that countries with a medium sized (5%-'20%) second largest group, have approximately twice as high risk of domestic conflict than countries with a small (less than 5) second largest ethnic, religious or linguistic group, but when the size of second largest group is more than 20% the incidence of violence is less frequent than the countries that has medium sized (5%-20%) second largest group. It seems that when the group is more than 20% the suppression of the group is more difficult and more costly comparing to other situations.

Ellingsen last argument relates to Intra-state conflicts is “ethnic affinities to other countries”. Many ethnic groups spread over different countries and borders. Sometimes a minority group in one state may be majority in another state. So the groups may have

⁵⁷Ellingsen Tanja (2000), “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew?Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War”, *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

their identification that is different from the identity of the state where they live. It generates suspicions and fear towards those groups in the eyes of respective states.

The weak state, security dilemma, and ethnic geography are three structural elements of intra-state wars. Political factors of intra-state conflict will be focused upon in the next section.

1.5.2 Political Factors

There are four political elements that affect a state's propensity to domestic violence. These are Discriminatory Political Institutions, Exclusionary National Ideologies, Inter-Group Politics, and Elite Politics.⁵⁹

1.5.2.1. Discriminatory Political Institutions

Discrimination refers to differences and gaps between economic and political rights of any particular group members compared to other groups⁶⁰. When a state system is authoritarian and closed to some groups in the sense of accessing to power, this generates resentment and frustration among those groups. If the institutions of government like judiciary, military or police, dominated by a particular group, namely if one group's access to governmental power is hampered by implicit or explicit obstacles, the conditions are proper to generate frustration. For instance, an election system that favours majority representation by adopting a very high election threshold, will indisputably create rage among minority groups. Such kind of political settings diminished the legitimacy of state in the eyes of discriminated group members. Thus those groups might resort to violence, if they can not articulate their frustration and anger through political channels⁶¹. Violence becomes a way of politics for not only to release anger, but also as a tool to achieve political ends. To put it differently, violence is conceived as a way of communicating the desperation, since the discriminated group does not see any way out. Not only an authoritarian system brings about discriminatory political settings, democracies

⁵⁹ Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT p.13.

⁶⁰ Ellingsen Tanja (2000), "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War" *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44 No 2, Apr, Sage, Oslo.

⁶¹ Gurr, Ted R. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1970.

also may face those kinds of challenges. The political settings in which hidden obstacles are existing for minority groups, to access political institutions even in democracies, such as restrictive election system as we mentioned earlier. In addition to that the individual rights that democracy maintains, might not satisfy the demands of a minority group and they may call for “group rights” and amendments laws accordingly. That is why the democratic system itself does not guarantee against intra state conflict. Democracy itself might lead to domestic troubles and destabilize the state. It has been argued that the democracies creates opportunity for groups to mobilize conflict. There are lines of thoughts regarding this idea. Some scholars assert that authoritarian regimes are more prone to domestic violence, whereas others claim that, since democracies are open and transparent, the tendency of violence is higher in democracies. Some others on the other hand argue that in between regimes are the most perilous in respect to domestic violence.⁶²

However, the authoritarian regime’s oppression of the dissent, does not necessarily create a peaceful society. In that situation the troubles suppressed only to be released as soon as authoritarian regime collapse. The demise of the Soviet Union provide a good evidence of that. Meanwhile democracies are less discriminatory but provide opportunities, while the authoritarian regimes are more discriminatory, but has harsh limitation on political activity. While studying some case, Ellingsen found evidences that “Domestic conflict is less likely in democracies than in autocracies or semidemocracies and domestic conflict is less likely in autocracies than in semidemocracies”⁶³. We can conclude that in time of transition and while democracies have not enhanced, it creates the situation in which the risk of violence is still high. Further the more unequal a society is, the more it will have potential for aggression. Conversely the fairer a regime is, it is less likely to break up in violence. This is vastly related to the regime type which was mentioned above.

⁶² Ibid, p.235.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 237.

1.5.2.2. Exclusionary National Ideologies⁶⁴

If the “people” that defined in the constitution of the state in question, according to an ethnic or religious origin and not or at least perceived not to encapsulate all the citizen, troubles may emerge about the identity of the state within ethnic groups. The citizenship that formed to include and incorporate most people while excluding some, will be seen by segregated population as offensive to their identity. The civic nationalism that adopted by most of Western states is supposed to encapsulate all groups and entails them with same rights regardless of their origin. However the civic nationalism itself is focusing on the individual equal rights rather than groups right though some multiculturalist civic nationalists accept limited cultural group rights as long as they are in line with and do not harm common identity. The civic nationalism adopt an integrative policy rather than the policy of assimilating the minorities, but it is still limited to individual rights mostly because the fear of seperative tendencies that may spread among minorities.⁶⁵ The definition of citizenship is the most controversial issue relating to political factors. A definition claimed to be civic by one group may be perceived exclusionary by the other group. Further every group may claim their version of definition is not discriminative and most encompassing one.

The founding ideology that a state is open is thus very crucial as a determinant of internal conflict. The more encompassing it is, the less risk of cleavages among groups.

1.5.2.3 Inter-Group Politics⁶⁶

Not all different groups in a state have negative interaction. The history of group relations, the power of their identity, their incompatible objective and the hatred amongs member of groups towards other group which may be derived from historical events and experiences have effects on internal conflict. “*The emergence of new groups and*

⁶⁴ Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT, pp.16-17.

⁶⁵ McGarry John (2001), “Northern Ireland, Civic Nationalism, and Good Friday Agreement” in McGarry John (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided: The Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement in Comperative Perspective*.

⁶⁶ Brown E. Michael (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge, MIT, p.18.

*changes in the inter-group balance of power can be particularly destabilizing”*⁶⁷

Moreover the change in economical situation may effect group dynamics and one group may start to blame a particular group for their diminishing standard of life. Namely a frustration emanates from economic crisis may be directed to a particular group, which then destabilize group relations.

1.5.2.4. Elite Politics

In the times of troubles or crisis, elites use the opportunity to gain power against their rivals. The above mentioned conditions turns to be opportunities to be utilized for leading figures to mobilize masses. Benjamin Reilly argues, there is increasing evidence from many regions of ‘elite initiated conflict’.⁶⁸ So according to this line of thought, elites provoke the peoples and drive the situation towards conflict in order to strengthen their positions. Moreover in severe competitive circumstances, to conduct more antagonistic actions becomes strategic for those elites to gain power. *“According to Bourdieu, it is political leaders who emphasize the differences, who have the power of imposing the vision of divisions that is the power of making visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit”*⁶⁹. Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia are good example for elite driven conflicts. They manipulated ethnicity and used it as a tool for their political end. In short in the conflict situations the elites are those, who make cleavages visible or even invent new cleavages that non-exist in reality to provoke masses.

Aleksa Djilas accounts for the war in Yugoslavia exemplify an insightful approach to the role of elites. He points:

The nationalist ambitions, fears and frustrations of Yugoslavia’s constituent groups. ... were not the inventions of nationalist intellectuals or political elites. However, the Yugoslav civil war would not have happened if elites...had not irresponsibly and deliberately manipulated nationalist sentiments with their propaganda and policies. The force of nationalist passions

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 18.

⁶⁸ Caspersen Nina, “Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict, Southeast European Politics” *Southeast European Politics*, November 2013, Vol. 4, London, p. 105.

⁶⁹ http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/26506/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/bba173d5-10ab-4577-8d49-60d8256e778d/en/PN04.02.pdf

whipped up by these opportunistic leaders not only made conflict inevitable, but it also made the war extremely brutal.⁷⁰

1.5.3. Economic/Social Factors⁷¹

The economic problems, income injustice, discriminatory set ups, gaps between groups, living conditions, unemployment high inflation are basic elements that exacerbate intra-state conflicts. Transition from one economic system to another may be destabilizing as well. Transition from welfare system to market-based system may leave some groups vulnerable that once had been under protection of the government supports in the form of social and economic benefits.

Second when the economic hardship is peculiar to or coincidence with a particular ethnic or religious group, it makes the situation graver and inextricable. The identity element of conflict compounds with economic hardship which might be perceived as deliberate discriminatory policy towards the group, and for group members it may signal a threat to their existence.

Third the discriminatory economic policy makes it difficult to make a distinction between class and identity. The line between two concepts becomes blurred due to which the group members face segregation from economic life on the base of their identity, which then determine their societal class. So most of ethnic conflict, if not all, have an class component and it is not surprising that for the most part ethnic insurgent groups pursue a leftist agenda.

The modernization of a society, unequal improvement, unsteady urbanization lead to emergence of some groups who take advantage of this improvement, while leave others disadvantaged. *“Even if a country’s overall economic picture is improving, growing inequities and gaps can aggravate intra-state tensions^{72”}.*

⁷⁰ Djilas, Aleksa (1995), “Fear Thy Neighbor,” in Charles Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, quoted in Oberschall Anthony (2007), *Conflict And Peace in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence*, Routledge, New York, p. 100.

⁷¹ Brown E. Michael (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT, p.18.

⁷² Brown E. Michael (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT, p. 20.

Developments of mass media, high education rates, bring about an awareness of political consciousness among masses, which in turn aggravate cleavages. If a society cannot respond the improving expectation among its members, be it social, cultural or economical, unmet demands will result in domestic resentment and frustration.

In the following figure James C. Davies depicted how revolution emerges when frustration arise out of unrealized expectations and needs. According to Davies a certain gap between expectation and actual realization of demands is tolerable and he assumes that expectations are always higher from what actually is accomplished.




Figure 1.1 Satisfaction Of Needs And Revolution (Davies)⁷³

⁷³ Wallensteen Peter (2002), *Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace and Global System*, Sage, London, p.41.

The lower line is actual performance and when the gap with the up line which is expected performance and which is increasing, is narrow, the society assumed to function well. But when gap expands to a degree that is intolerable, it is argued that a revolution is close to break out in society. This may happen when economy stops to grow after a considerable time of growing. We can apply the figure to the political issues as well. The democratization of the world, spreading of democratic principles and human rights led to an increasing expectation among the nations. The mass media and education and process of globalization fostered this trend. The places where the gap between real performance of the states regarding to enacting this principles and their societies expectation are narrow, the tendency to domestic violence will diminish. On the other hand when the expectation about this values increase profoundly and the political system and institutional capacity is insufficient to respond this expectation, the probability of rising trouble will be evidently high.

Since economic and social factors are in consideration, we will not go in details about political issues here. Davie's figure shows that the societies that function well to provide the needs has little tendency to revolutions. The industrialization process and modernization, has expanded the need of people while the resources has kept being scarce. So the domestic violence and in Davies terminology revolutions are easier to outbreak with modernization and industrialization. Social and economic change of modernization undermined old institution and orders, with replacing nothing instead. Nevertheless not all revolutions occur with aggression and violence. In lots of place this revolution breaks with nonviolent movements. In Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt, the old system replaced almost totally with nonviolent methods.

A state unable to respond the economic and social needs of some of its members consequently will have a deficit of legitimacy of its rule.

1.5.4 Cultural/ Perceptual Factors

There are two cultural and perceptual factors that identified in the internal conflict scholarly, first is cultural discrimination and the second is group histories and group perception of themselves and others.⁷⁴

1.5.4.1. Cultural Discrimination

Cultural discrimination refers to the policies of government, which aim to destroy a particular group's specific characteristic such as language, religion and assimilate them in to the majority group's identity. These policies may include bans over the usage of language in education, constraints on access to educational opportunities, displacement or replacement of population across the country to prevent a group to form a majority in a place and to melt the ethnic group in to the broader accepted identity, etc. As the third type of violence Johan Galtung conceptualize "cultural violence"⁷⁵ which refers to "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) - that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."⁷⁶ To Galtung "direct violence" and "structural violence" gain their legitimization from cultural violence, which then rendered acceptable in society.⁷⁷ Thus cultural violence provides ideological bases for cultural discrimination. The system of thought, the symbols, institutions, educational system breed cultural violence which then make cultural discriminatory practice easier to apply, legal, explicit, or implicit limitation on the improvement of a culture, language, religion or sect, preventing them transferring their culture to next generation, unequal treatment to the group members are all feed on internal trouble. Even in democratic system, implicit discriminatory practice may prevail because of cultural violence.

1.5.4.2 Group Histories and Group Perception of Themselves and Others

⁷⁴ Brown E. Michael (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge, MIT, p.21.

⁷⁵ Two others are Direct Violence and Structural Violence.

⁷⁶ Galtung Johan (1990), "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No 3, p. 291.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 292.

Throughout the history groups have had numerous interactions which are not always friendly. Painful and hurting histories of groups in most cases are being transferred to another generation. Thus, perceptions to one another are formed out of this history. Crimes committed either groups, against one another in a distant past rise grievances and leads to the conveying of perception and stereotypes in minds of people over decades. Each group tends to glorify itself and demonizes the other. The concept of "ancient hatreds" that is popularized by Robert Kaplan in an attempt to explain ethnic war in Yugoslavia emphasize how past is brought to recent times and led to atrocities. When groups are susceptible to and have distrustful perception of each other any provocation will confirm their perception and ignite the flame for conflict. "The slightest provocation on either side confirms deeply held beliefs and provides the justification for a retaliatory response"⁷⁸.

Some wrongdoings or killings can be justified on the ground of the self-image as to be "victim of the incidents" in the distant or near history, and "to redress injustice". In addition to that this misdoings or killings can be justified on the ground of a self-image that the group is the valiant subject of the history and carrying out those on that mission.

Myths and symbols are important parts of group's imagination of life. Myth is a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives event and action a particular meaning. The reality of the myths has not any importance. Regardless of being accurate, the myths relates to today. It guides today. A symbol is shorthand implying of a myth which is emotionally charged⁷⁹. In other words symbols are the language of myths. Peoples with this symbols can be easily transferred to a certain time in history and a very different incident or context can be perceived as resurrection of a certain past by the group members. The observations by Reuter's correspondent, Andrej Gustincic at the start of Bosnian war provide a good insight in to the use of myth and symbols in the wars.

Do you see that field" asks a Serbian woman, pointing to a sloping by the Dirina river. "The jihad (Moslem Holy War) was supposed to begin there. Foca was going to be the new Mecca. There were lists of Serbs who were marked down for death." The woman says, repeating a belief held by towns people and gunmen. "My two sons were down on the list

⁷⁸Brown E. Michea (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, MIT, p.23.

⁷⁹ Kaufman Stuart J, (2001), *The Symbolic Politics Of Ethnic War*, Cornell University Press, New York.

to be slaughtered by like pigs. I was listed under rape.” None of them have seen the list but this does not prevent anyone from believing in them unquestioningly.⁸⁰

In this chapter we tried to identify intrastate conflicts and wars, underlying causes, trends and types. The next chapter will go further and focus on the resolution of intrastate conflicts and wars, peace processes, strategies, principles and condition for stable settlements of those conflicts.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Kaufman Stuart J, *Modern Hatred The Symbolic Politics Of Ethnic War*, Cornell University Press Press, New York, 2001,p3.

CHAPTER 2

RECONSIDERING KURDISH ISSUE

ROOT CAUSES OF AN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Kurdish issue has been one of the chief fault lines of Turkish Republic since its very founding in 1923. Even though the root causes of the issue goes well back to last period of Ottoman Empire, the foundation of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 and developments since then extensively aggravated the problem. Transition from an empire -that ruled by dynasty and in which the source of legitimacy had been religion - to a nation state, in which the legitimacy has been derived from the nation itself, was presumably the main source that gave rise to the problem. Unlike the Empire, the new state did not tolerate any different identity claims, which fall outside its determined definition of nation within its territory.

In “Nation and Nationalism” Ernest Gellner points that “*nationalism is a primarily political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent* and he defines nationalism as”. *A theory of political legitimacy requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones*”.⁸¹ It would ‘not be wrong to say that the foundation of Turkey Republic was an effort to coincide the ethnic boundaries with the politic ones. The name of new state was Turkey and the population lives within Turkey territory’s was Turk. This principle was embodied in the first constitution was Turkey that was enacted in 1924. The article 88 of the first constitution of Turkish Republic reads as; “*The name Turk, as a political name, shall be understood to include all citizen of Turkish Republic, without distinction of or reference to race or religion*”⁸². As David Miller states “*it is valuable for the boundaries of political units (paradigmatically, states) to coincide with national boundaries.*”⁸³ Yet it is hardly to find any state boundaries in which people possess identical political or ethnic affiliations. The Turkish Republic partly achieved this

⁸¹Gellner (2006), Ernest *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell Publication, Oxford, p1.

⁸²<http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/1924constitution.pdf>

⁸³ Quoted in http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-000j-political-philosophy-global-justice-spring-2003/lecture-notes/Innational_selfdetermin1.pdf

task of homogenization for their non-Muslim residents by exchange of populations with Greeks that was one of the terms of Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The state's aim was to make Turkish identity as a cultural dominant identity of nation and assimilate other identities in to Turkishness. That ideology is termed Michael Hatcher as state-building nationalism a "nationalism that is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state"⁸⁴ However Kurds did not melt (or extensive part of Kurds) in to the Turkish identity that was prescribed in the constitution for various reason, some of which arguably are ethnic geography of Kurds, -that hinders pervasion of state- influence, lack of state resources and institution, and international binds of Kurds with their neighbor brethren among others. Moreover the assimilation efforts were rendered to be counter productive and have generated quite the opposite of what had been desired. It gave rise to a serious competitor and challenger to Turkish nationhood and nationalism. Kurdish nationalism which can be explained by Hatcher's conceptualization as peripheral nationalism that refers to "a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation in to an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government."⁸⁵

On the contrarily it will be an oversimplification to explain the complexity of the issue only with nationalism of both sides. Structural factors, political factors, economic and social factors, perceptual and cultural factors that referred in the first chapter are all their share as the factors for emergence in the conflict. In this chapter the thesis will attempt to analyze the historical background of the conflict, the definition of the problem as an intra-state conflict and root causes of the conflict under the factors that were cited above.

2.2 HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF THE CONFLICT

To understand the present it is a significant necessity to study the history. Although the historical events that the conflict emerge out of it, is extensively differ from the current conflict, we can track back to the history to see a consistent flow of events

⁸⁴ Hatcher, Michael (2000), *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, New York.

⁸⁵ Al Serhun, "Elite Discourse, Nationalism, and Moderation: A Dialectical Analysis of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalism", *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 14:1 94-112, 15 Jul, 2014.

developments that reaches to the present time. The flow of events substantially transformed the problem yet the core of issue has remained unchanged. The motives, ideology, and demands behind the conflict have undergone profound changes, but the center sources of conflict remain fixed, even in some sense they have gotten worse. As Hamit Bozarslan states “one can barely suggest a continuum between the Kurdish insurrection of 1920s and 1930s and the violence of 1970s, 1980s and 1990s”.⁸⁶ Nevertheless it is best to make clear that each period is strictly conditioned by previous ones. To illustrate continuity, the issue of autonomy is a case in point. The first wave of upheavals in Kurdish region were aimed to maintain the autonomous status of the region, which today is one of most voiced demand of Kurdish political actors. It is why next sections are devoted to brief overview of those periods.

2.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy

The main identity of Ottoman Empire which keep the Sultan's subjects together was Islam and the leader of Muslims nation was Caliphate which represented by Sultans of the Empire. Ottoman Empire was adopted “millet system” in which subjects of empire categorized according to their religion and the statute of minority had been given non-Muslims that granted - as Gunter writes- “..Virtual autonomy in cultural, religious and educational affairs.”⁸⁷ Although not considered as minority Kurds were enjoying an extensive autonomy in their homeland which had been granted by Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim in 1514, the date big part of Kurdish land was fell under the empire rule after Yavuz's victory against the Safavids in Çaldıran War. Kurds had declared their allegiances with Yavuz⁸⁸ and after war was ended an agreement signed between Sultan Selim signed an agreement with 23 Kurdish emirates that granted Kurds autonomy in their region. For a long period of time Kurdish lands were ruled by Kurdish Mirs (emirates) and the region remained autonomous in return to providing armed forces to

⁸⁶ Bozarslan Hamit (2000), “Why the Armes Struggle, Understanding The Violence In Kurdistan Of Turkey” in *The Kurdish Conflict In Turkey*, İbrahim Ferhad and Gürbey Gülistan(ed.), St. Martin's Press, New York.

⁸⁷ Gunter Michael M (1997), *The Kurds And Future of Turkey* St. Martin's Press NewYork, p.4.

⁸⁸ Heper Metin (2007), *The State and Kurds in Turkey;The Question of Assimilation*, PalgraveMcMillian, London.

the empire during the wars. Having noted that it is important to point that Kurds- and other ethnic groups have not had a self-consciousness about their separate ethnic identity⁸⁹. The main source of identity was religion and components of the empire divided on the ground their religious identity. Muslim component were superior comparing to non-Muslim component of empire though non-Muslim subject could retain their religious cultural and ethnic characteristics within the Empire. This situation continued until centralization policy adopted by Ottoman Sultan Mahmud the Second in the beginning of nineteenth century. Nationalism wave in the Europe after French Revolution entail the Empire to initiate some reforms. Some of those reforms were including centralization of the Empire, which were undermining Kurdish emirate privileges and their semi-independent statutes. Further the Tanzimat reforms (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber) that was introduced 1839 and which aimed to modernize the entire system of empire complicated the Kurds situation. Direct tax to increase empire income was one of the main drawbacks for local leaders and it was a direct interference of the state to their autonomous statute.⁹⁰ Moreover the Reforms had provision relating to non-Muslim subjects, which was bringing about equal statute to them with Muslim populace of empire. Once privileged member of the empire, the Muslim Kurds were discontent about losing their previous positions. To put it differently the transformation of power structure within empire brought about unfavorable consequences for Kurd's situation, which had been once profoundly favorable for them to retaining their autonomous existence. In 1847 Badr Khan Beg, a strong Kurdish noble revolt against the empire mainly for centralization policy of empire that wanted to be put in effect in the region. The revolt was crushed by heavily army deployment to the region by the empire. Later followed several other revolts by Kurdish notables, some of which are "Yezdan Şer" revolt in 1855 Sheikh Ubeydullah revolt in 1880 among others. Even though some scholars claim the contrary, those uprisings were far from carrying a Kurdish Nationalistic agenda, all were indicating tribal characteristic and the chief aim was to regain the autonomous statute and reversing centralization policies. It can be inferred that because those revolt couldn't gain all the Kurdish factions', support the tribal and religious order affiliation was prior to a national affiliation for Kurds in that times. In fact the revolts failings for the most

⁸⁹ Akyol, Mustafa (2006), *The Origin Of Turkey's Kurdish Question: An outcome of the breakdown Of the Ottoman Ancient Regime*, MA thesis submitted to Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Istanbul.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

part were due to these internal divisions. Religion was another motivation against modernizing reforms in those revolts. That is the reason behind Abdul Hamid II's motive to pursue an Islamist agenda for keeping the empire under control. He had understood that he could not keep the Christian subject and a number of Christian subjects such as Greeks and Serbs had already declared their independence from the empire. In 1891 he formed a Kurdish armed cavalry group called "*Hamid's Regiments*" (*Hamidiye Alayları*) presumably tasked to maintain order in the region, hinder Armenian nationalistic aspirations and various Kurdish revolts. To some scholars Hamidiye Regiments proved to be the significant in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism⁹¹. In 1908 the introduction of Constitutional monarchy by the Ittihad and Terakki Party (Committee for Unity and Progress Party) imposed on Abdul Hamid a time of liberty enjoyed by all subjects of Ottoman Empire. In that time first cultural, nationalist, Kurdish journals was published by Kurds. Later on Ittihat ve Terakki (Progress and Union) Party pursued a Pan-Turkist policy that had impacts on the Republic cadres as well. Nevertheless Kurds supported the Ottomans in World War I and subsequent "War of Independence" led by Mustafa Kemal. Apparently Muslim identity and anxiety on an Independent Armenia was the main motive behind this support⁹².

After the World War ended treaty of Sevres was imposed by allied powers to the government in Istanbul in 1920s that designed the new setup of Ottoman lands and the agreement stipulated in article 62 an autonomous Kurdish region with an independent Armenia (there were other provision as well relating to Formation of Arab States)⁹³. Though the agreement was never implemented for variety of reasons among which the chief ones were nonexistence of a powerful Kurdish leadership and internal division and differences among Kurds. For example Sharif Pasha's attendance in Paris Peace Conference and issuing a document jointly with Armenian representative Boghos Nubar in which formation of an independent Kurdistan and Armenia was requested received a harsh criticism and condemnation from tribal leaders of Kurds and they sent a telegram to high commissioner of French in Istanbul and stressed the brotherhood and unity of

⁹¹ Gunter M. Michael (2008), *The Kurds Ascending; The Evolving Solution To the Kurdish Problem In Iraq And Turkey*, Palgrave McMillian, New York.

⁹² Beşikçi İsmail, *Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk Ve Kürtler*, Available at <http://www.zazaki.net/yazi/mustafa-kemal,-ataturk-ve-kurtler-324.htm>

⁹³ Yıldız Kerim, *The Kurds In Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights*, Pluto Press, London, p.37.

Muslims. The conclusion of World War 1 brought about desperate outcome for Kurds that they found themselves divided by four states borders.

2.2.2 Legacy of the Republic

During struggles against foreign powers in different fronts that were known as “the war of independence” Mustafa Kemal, to secure Kurds allegiances had never indicated his nationalistic intention and secular vision that would be manifested later on the establishing of Turkish Republic. The initial phase of war and later the Kemalist cadres were referring to new state as “being homeland of Turks and Kurds”⁹⁴ Indeed Kurdish support was considerably crucial for bringing in victory, In an early time in 1919 Ataturk says that: “As long as there are fine people with honor and respect Turks and Kurds will continue to live together as brothers around the institution of the Khilafa, and an unshakeable iron tower will be raised against internal and external enemies”⁹⁵.

In another occasion he states that: “...there are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate them, but while we are busy to defend and protect, of course, the nation is not one element”.⁹⁶

Meanwhile in the first Grand National Assembly- that was founded in 1920 in Ankara, and declared to be real representative of the state against the Assembly in Istanbul which was under the control of Great Britain at that time, there were several representative of “Kurdistan” region. Moreover the Assembly in one of the 1922’s sessions had discussed on a resolution for establishing an autonomous Kurdish Region, but discussions were postponed to later time, never proved any result⁹⁷

What all this incidents reveals, is that in the midst of independence war, the society and ruling class were not ethnically biased towards Kurdish demands. However after the victory over foreign forces and the land secured from foreign penetration, Mustafa Kemal could then focus on internal design of the state. The multiethnic set up of the

⁹⁴ Ismet İnönü quoted in Gunter M. Micheal (1997), *The Kurds and Future Of Turkey*, St Martin’s Press, New York, p. 5.

⁹⁵ McDowall David (1997), *A Modern History Of Kurds*, I.B Tauris, New York, p. 187.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse_hur/1922de_kurtlere_soz_verildi_mi-1118147

empire was tried to replace by a single nation and identity. In 1923 Sultanate was abolished and Turkish Republic was declared and then in 1924 Caliphate was abolished, which was the turning point for the transformation of the identity from a religious one to a secular one. Likewise all opposition was eliminated and Mustafa Kemal took absolute control, so that he could implement the vision in his mind. This vision was a secular, western nation state that was intolerant to the traditional institutions and ethnic identities. Then a severe policy of Turkification was adopted which had remained in effect till the late 1980s. Ismet Inonu one of the closest person to Ataturk and his successor states that: "In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or 'le turquisme'"⁹⁸.

The new constitution of republic that was drafted in 1924 was an embodiment of state nationalism that blinded against any differences within the new state. The new state was aimed to form a system based on a centralism, secularism and nationalism.⁹⁹ The unity of language in education was enacted in 1924¹⁰⁰. Not surprisingly those policies seed the sow of new dissents and Kurdish revolts resurrected thereafter. In 1925 Sheikh Said, a leader of religious sect revolt against the republic on the grounds that after the abolition of caliphate he claims can be summarized roughly as that, Islam and its representational body caliphate was uniting Turks and Kurds under Islamic brotherhood motto", yet Turks and Kurds is meaningless. His motives have been in discussion, whether they were religious or Kurdish nationalistic, around academic circle till recent times. The majority of scholars stress both on Islamic and nationalistic motivation behind the uprising¹⁰¹. Whatever were the motives behind; the uprising was one of the greatest challenges to the main and foundational principle of the Republic. Despite gaining enormous support among the Kurds the government consequently crashed the revolt with well-equipped armed forces and hanged the organization's leaders.

⁹⁸Cited in Barkey Henry J., Fuller Graham E. (1998), *Turkey Kurdish Question*, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,Oxford.

⁹⁹ Post Jerold M. (2007), *The Mind Of Terrorist; Psychology of Terrorism from The IRA to Al-Qaeda*,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p 68

¹⁰⁰ Saatci, Mustafa (2002), "Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict" *Nations and Nationalism*,Vol. 8 (4), pp. 549-564.

¹⁰¹ Bruinessen Martin, Agha, Shaikh and State, *On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan*, Utrecht 1978

Later on the assimilation policy accelerated the usage of Kurdish language prohibited, and the Kurdish names of villages and towns were replaced by Turkish ones. Beside these nationalist arrangements, the new republic introduced secular adjustments as well in various areas such as on education, military, cultural and social life. In 1925 religious schools known as madrasas were closed together with religious fraternities that were one of the main institutions that Kurdish was employed and could survive and thought with Arabic. The past Islamic laws were replaced by western law and codes. In 1928 Latin alphabet was adopted in place of Arabic alphabet. In the same year Islam as being the “state religion” was eradicated from the constitutions. Put differently both assimilating and secularizing policy gave rise to discontent among Kurds. Because Kurds were not only different in terms of their ethnicity, they were also tending to be more pious than the rest of community¹⁰².

Meanwhile the academic and cultural studies were conducted to prove that Kurds were in fact Turks. Infamous phrase “Mountain Turks” were employed to force Kurds to prove that Kurds had forgotten their Turkish identity. The numerous studies had been done to prove that Kurdish language is not an authentic language but a mix of Turkish, and Persian.

In 1934 Settlement Law was adopted to resettle Kurdish population through western cities from eastern region to make it easier the Kurds assimilation to the Turkish society, the culture and language¹⁰³ and it aimed to decrease the density of Kurdish Population in any particular region. However, those efforts did not bear fruits for the reason that the state resources were not enough to carry such big population relocations. Further under article 5542 of the Law 8000 villages and towns were renamed with Turkish names¹⁰⁴

Following those widespread transformations several other rebellions broke across the Kurdish region. Again the state harshly suppressed those uprisings in which thousands of civilians were killed by government forces. Especially in 1938 in Dersim trouble according

¹⁰² See http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2006_09_KONDA_Toplumsal_Yapi.pdf (According to Survey The people living Southeast of Turkey define their identity more in terms of religion rather than nationality)

¹⁰³ Aslan Senem, “Citizen Speak Turkish. A Nation in the Making”, *Nationalism And Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 13:2, 2007, pp. 245-272.

¹⁰⁴ Nachmani Amicam (2003), *Turkey: Facing A New Millennium*, Manchester University Press, New York.

to official estimates 13 thousand people were killed majority of who were civilians (nonofficial estimates claims a far large numbers as many as 50 thousands)¹⁰⁵.

The trouble in Kurdish region lost its momentum after World War II¹⁰⁶ until 1980s. The transformation from single party system to multi-party system, and victory of Democrat Party against CHP (Republican People Party) brought about partial liberation to the Turkey. Beside Cold War urge the society to focus on internal stability against outside threats. As we implied earlier the Super Power's confrontation has given priority internal division and troubles which had had impacts on the course of Kurdish issue in Turkey as well. Nevertheless decolonization process which was backed by Soviet Union has given impetus to Kurdish activist as well and lead to a resurrection of Kurdish nationalism and till the 1980s Kurdish activist pursue their cultural and ethnic demands within left-wing groups and parties and the method were for the most part in a nonviolent forms.

2.2.3. Last Insurgency of Kurds, Emergence of PKK

During the 1960s, the demand of Kurds had been on cultural demands, and the political figures of Kurds were participating to the politics within Turkish leftist parties. During those times the demands were revolving around the cultural recognition of Kurds. In is significant to point that Kurds have taken part on right leaning parties as well. Whereas those Kurds were not revealing their Kurdishness except a few exceptions, indeed arguably they were not representing the Kurdish political demands.

In 1980 Turkish Army intervened to the politics life¹⁰⁷ and staged a coup d'état which banned all political activities and civil ruler, were replaced by army members all over the country. Infamous "Diyarbakır Prison" where Kurdish activist were kept as detainees and received cruel and insane torture, was one of the brutal practice of military ruling. Another practice of military ruling was the ban of Kurdish not only in state institution and

¹⁰⁵ Aygün, Hüseyin, *Dersim 1938 ve Zorunlu İskan*, Dipnot. İstanbul, 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Saatci, Mustafa, "Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict" *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8 (4) 2002, pp. 549-564.

¹⁰⁷ There were two other Coup D'états prior to 1980 one 1960, and an indirect one in 1971

public life, but also in social and private life. Those practices of the military ruling give a violent rise to the Kurdish political activity.

In 1978 at Lice, Abdulla Ocalan and several his friends founded The PKK(Kurdistan Workers Party) with the task of launching armed fight against the state and eventually realizing a separate state of Kurdistan. They issued a manifesto reads as:“a radical revolution was needed to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan where the peasantry and proletariat could enjoy true independence.” After the military coup PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan escaped to Lebanon and then Syria for safe heavens and consolidated PKK’s military capacity between 1980 and 1984 here. The organization was gradually gaining the hearts and mind of Kurds and could recruit fighters from peasantry and low class Kurds. PKK was both a tool of emancipation for young Kurds from the state’s and society’s oppression and an organization to achieve political objectives. In the initial phase, PKK fought with tribal and feudal structures within Kurdish society, as well as, other left wing Kurdish Parties. In 1984 in the provinces of Eruh and Şemdinli they launched their first strike to the Turkish army and the harsh confrontation between government and PKK has continued thereafter. The fight intensified in 1990s onwards and continued till the recent times. The conflict has claimed about 45 thousand life from both sides, as well as civilians. About four thousand villages were burned, and roughly one million people from eastern villages forced to move to western cities that worsen the suffering of the fight and economic cost is not to mention. Unidentified murders were common during the conflict, which was mostly carried by hidden and unofficial structures within the state to curb Kurdish activism. Most of these crimes have not been cleared yet.

After intensive fight of 1990s,so called low-intensive war, in 1999 Abdullah Öcalan declared a cease fire and called PKK members to withdraw the Turkish soils after his capture by Turkish government of the time. During some of this withdraws some estimates that about five hundred PKK members were killed by Turkish force’s ambushes. This ceasefire continued till 2004. As Turkey made efforts to access the European Union, in 2001 a number of constitutional amendments were passed in parliament, which lifted the ban on the Kurdish broadcasting. Later on some other amendments were enacted that pave the way to a more democratic and liberal Turkey.

Yet military high rank staffs were discontent and voicing concern related to unity of the state.¹⁰⁸ In 2002 AK Party election victory can be considered a breakthrough in the course of Kurdish Issue. Their implicit anti-Kemalist agenda though it takes long pave the way to the weakening of military power over the politics, which strengthen politician hands to take initiatives regarding the Kurdish issue and to adopt policies that fall outside the mere security scope of the issue. Nevertheless, the success of AK Party has been far from perfect. The course of conflict goes back and forth and hovers between escalation and de-escalation. For instance in 2012, according to International Crisis Group around 8 hundred people were killed in Kurdish issue related incidents¹⁰⁹ just after the so called “Kurdish Opening”(later the name of initiative converted to “democratic opening and national unity and brotherhood project) -that was initiated by government in 2009 to reach a resolution of issue via dialogue with the stakeholders of conflict - was proved to fail. During these initiatives the government held secret meeting with PKK leadership in Oslo. Yet reciprocal attacks from both side against one another and harsh discourse both representatives of government and Kurdish Movement, brought the process to a deadlock. The level tension in 2012 was almost equaled with the tension of 1990s in terms of life lost. Meanwhile a hunger strike by Kurdish prisoners was staged to draw attention the long time blockage of visits to İmralı Island where Abdullah Ocean has been kept. Ocalan calls for ending the hunger strike that were continuing for 60 days ended the strikes and let to de-escalation of tension and later in 21 march 2013 in Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır Ocalan’s addressed to the crowds in a letter and call for ultimate farewell to violence and withdrawals of PKK members from Turkish soils. PKK limitedly abide by those calls and only a small part of members has left the Turkey. Talks are proceeding between Kurdish political party, government intelligence and PKK’s leadership in Kandil with ups and downs. However those talks have yet to conclude with a peaceful outcome. In the next chapter the ongoing talks will be addressed, and details of course of events relating to talks left to next chapter.

¹⁰⁸ Yavuz Hakan M , “Five Stages Of Construction Of Kurdish Nationalism In Turkey” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7 (3), 2007, pp. 1-24.

¹⁰⁹ *Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement* International Crisis Group Europe Report N°219 – 11 September 2012 p5

2.3 DEFINING KURDISH ISSUE AS AN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Firstly the history of Kurdish issue reveals that, Kurdish identity has been at the core of the conflict. However, Mesut Yeğen states that:

Whenever the Kurdish question was mentioned in TSD,[Turkish State Discourse] it was mentioned as an issue of political reaction, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question. In TSD, the Kurdish resisters were not Kurds with an ethno-political cause, but simply Kurdish tribes, Kurdish bandits, Kurdish sheikhs - all the evils of Turkey's pre-modern past.¹¹⁰

But changing the names does not change the reality, through hard efforts Kurdish identity could not have eliminated. More it gained a more powerful attraction, which presumably would have been less fervent, if oppression had not enforced.

Secondly as the classification made by Correlates of War, Kurdish conflict fits to a “civil war” for some periods of conflict when the fight had been escalated and death toll exceeded the correlates of war threshold of 1 thousand for each year of conflict. The conflict never has been the inter-communal type, since Turkish and Kurdish communities has not got into direct fought with one another except some limited confrontations in western cities of Turkey. The conditions of COW, for civil wars as we cited in chapter one are:

- a) Military action internal to metropolis of state system member
- b) Active participation of national government, and
- c) Effective participation of both sides and a total of at least 1000 battle deaths during each year of war

“a” and “b” clearly correspond with Kurdish conflict, but the condition defined “c” is more problematic. Firstly there is a big controversy over the conflict related deaths and various counts are given from different resources. For example, according to a Human Rights Watch report, between 1984 and 1994 thirteen thousand people lost their life in the conflict.¹¹¹ Yearly average of which is one thousand three hundred deaths that exceeds

¹¹⁰ Yeğen Mesut; “The Kurdish Question In State The Turkish State Discourse”, *Journal Of Contemporary History* Sage Publication, London, Vol. 34(4), pp. 555-568.

¹¹¹ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/HELSINKI-16.htm>

the COW provision to name the conflict “civil war”. According to the report some half of those killings had taken place in last two years. Put it different the conflict between 1992 to 1994 war, far exceeded the threshold of COW yet, for the most part of the years after 1999 death toll has been below one thousand.¹¹² So it would not be wrong to name the conflict as civil war for the period before 2000. Thereby we can name Kurdish issue is a conflict, which at times rises to the degree of “civil war” and have the potential to reach that level anytime in the future if peace talks fail.

2.4 ETHNIC/IDENTITY- AND IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT

Despite the fact that PKK has adopted a far leftist and Marxist agenda, and in the initial time the main object of the organization had been founding a separate Marxist socialist Kurdistan, it is obvious that the primary motivation of recruits to PKK had been relating to their very identity of Kurdishness. Even though there has been Turkish and foreign fighters within the ranks of the party, it has remained very limited. To illustrate this very fact following is a quote from the cease-fire declaration of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan:

On the one hand, you say that the Kurds are as much owners of these lands as the Turks, that all their national and social rights will be recognized; on the other hand, even our name is denied. This is what led to the violence. We are surely the side that should be least responsible. We wanted our identity. We wanted our democracy. We wanted our culture. Can anybody live without culture? Can anybody live without democracy? What do you expect us to do after even our name has been denied?

As we referred the difference between ideological and identity based conflict, one of the characteristic of identity based conflict was the rigidity of affiliation. Even though Kurdish political parties have pursued a leftist and progressive agenda, their turn out in the elections is very limited among Turkish community. Despite achieving successes in recent national and local elections, national percentage of votes of Kurdish political parties does not undergo a massive change. Further support to Kurdish political parties

¹¹² For example from 2012 one of most intensive year of conflict in terms of death tolls, some eight hundred seventeen conflict related killings took place. See <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/222-turkeys-kurdish-impasse-the-view-from-diyarbakir.pdf>

in the western cities has remained very limited, except in some big cities where Kurds immigrated especially in 1990s. That is to say since the main support to Kurdish political parties came from the Kurdish community, the assumption we present earlier for identity/ethnic based conflict that is “though not fixed once formed, identity resists to change” is very relevant for Kurdish issue as well and in terms of territoriality which is another characteristic of identity/ethnic based conflict that differentiate them from ideological based conflict, Kurdish issue is intensively include a territorial aspect. Kurds for the most part densely populated in a particular region and their identity is highly related to that region. The demands for autonomy by Kurdish political representative are explicit indication of that fact. Territory is one of the basic issues in the conflict.

However the conflict might evolve to include some ideological conflict character as well. The Kurdish political parties efforts to gain hearts and minds of all Turkey, the statements that “they do not want a separate state anymore, and the ultimate goal is achieving democratic republic¹¹³ in which all communities coexist peacefully and respecting and hanging Turkish flag in Party meetings and congress display a tendency that conflict might evolve to ideological struggle over governmental structure of state. But still the dynamics of conflict are far from being in the form of an ideological conflict.

2.5 ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH CONFLICT;

2.5.1 Structural Factors;

2.5.1.1 Weak State;

The Weak state factor in the region has been one of the major components that breed the conflict in the mostly Kurdish populated areas. Kurdish region has remained relatively deficient in the sense of governmental service and related functions.

¹¹³http://www.hawarnews.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2238:oecalan-war-is-at-a-stage-to-end-through-democratic-negotiations&catid=1:news&Itemid=2

Firstly the centralization of state affairs has significant impact on the region. The region where Kurds are inhabited is far from center of state namely the capital and center of political activity.¹¹⁴ State institution has often malfunctioned due to geographical hardness of the region. Due to uneasiness to reach and access the geography of Kurdish populated region Kurdish community relatively deprived of state institution's service in all senses from economy to health services, to education to judiciary and so forth. Further that deficiency in state institution's function has been aggravated by ineligible and inadequate civil servant due to unwillingness of capable persons to work in an undeveloped region.¹¹⁵ Yet state in military sense has been very intact and deployed a huge number of army the region. Arguably state fills the gap of other services with suppressive existence in the region. Moreover the huge military expenditure to curb resistance has prevented adequate funding for other services as well. "State with muscle" can be used for Turkey for the most period of its history; however states are in charge of other functions in addition to security as well such as judiciary, education and health services as well.

Secondly the Kurdish region has borders with three other states (Iraq, Iran , And Syria) that obstruct the state to fully control the region. Especially those states that are cursed with chronic instabilities that made it difficult to hinder spillover effect and thorough paced control of the region.

It is difficult to contemplate that Kurds live in an anarchical like state, but the weakness of state broad areas escalate the prospects for violence. In other words the vacuum that has stemmed from the lack of intact and legitimate state has given rise of troubles and sporadic violence in the region.

¹¹⁴ Fuller Graham E, "The Fate Of The Kurds" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring, 1993 pp.108-121.

¹¹⁴ For Observation of a district governor in the region see *Çağdaş Tamer İdari ve Siyasi Anılar*, Cinius Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013.

2.5.1.2 Security Dilemma of Kurdish Issue

Turkish Republic has come out from the ashes of an Empire that was including a good deal of different ethnicities and nations. Most of these nations gained independence one by one as Empire had been weakened by nationalistic wave that French Revolution inspired in 1789 and afterwards. Three principle of French Revolution “liberty” “equality” and “fraternity” understood by mainly Christian communities as independence rather than civil rights.¹¹⁶ More, Ottoman Empire’s dramatic dissolution and losing great proportion of its lands, Turkish Republic perceive any nationalist claim as a sign of independence intention. The treaty of Sevre that envisage independence for remaining nationalities of Empire namely the Armenian Kurds and Arabs seems to provoke the fear of extra dissolution and lose of lands that was perceived as intolerable for late Ottoman bureaucrats and Kemalist cadres of early Republic era. Arguably the harsh treatment of Kurdish demands can be a result of those fears.

With the same token Kurds historical memories of treasons and broken promises made by the governments that began with the promise of Ataturk for cultural autonomy, has led to a disappointment and distrustfulness towards state institutions. The Governments during the course of insurgencies has not hesitated to punish no supportive parts of the Kurdish community. All those sufferings in the hands of state result in a great deal of insecurity and distrustfulness among the big part of Kurdish Community and their social and political leaders.

This entire historical legacy has aggravated present conflict, on the one hand it acts to preserve the state territorial integrity from one side perceived as threat to the maintaining national existence of other side; while on the other hand, the acts to maintain the cultural and national characteristic by one side has been perceived as threat to the integrity of state. As we mentioned, in the chapter one ambiguity of intentions and historical records of military actions further the acuteness of Security Dilemma.

¹¹⁶ Zürcher Eric J. (1993), *Turkey A Modern History*, I.B Taurus, New York, p. 26.

After PKK has emerged, the armed aspect of conflict drives both sides to harsher measures regarding to violence and arms gaining. It is said that about four hundred billion dollars has been the cost of conflict since 1983. The big share of which has been spent on arms. Yet more measures have been taken, the more parties have stuck to their identities against threats.

The anarchical state that is an important aspect of security dilemma, when the authority weakens groups seeks for their own security and make use of this power vacuum. The 1991 Gulf War creates an anarchical-like situation in the Kurdish region of Iraq and PKK made use of this opportunity; took root in the region, strengthen the organizational structure of the party and find safe heavens for future fight. It is not coincidence that the most severe fights occurred in the period between 1991-1995 between state security forces and PKK members.¹¹⁷ That was partly a consequence of anarchical like state of post-gulf war. In addition the indistinguishable offence capacity from defense is relevant in that situation as well. Presumably the Turkish Army's evacuation of villages was an attempt to diminish its vulnerability and was a realization of offences advantages over defense where the region was mostly populated by Kurds.

When we comes to the issue of identity and security dilemma, it seems that until recently states that Kurdish and Turkish identities as mutually exclusive. Whenever Kurdish demand for their identity recognition is referred, it follows by the claims that those demands are undermining state identity and pave the way to partition of state¹¹⁸

Lastly the intermixed nature of population of Turkey, which especially raised greatly after forced migration of villages in 1990 to western cities of Turkey, expose a high risk in a situation of intense conflict. Today nearly half of the Kurds live in the western cities of Turkey. According to Kaufmann " the severity of ethnic security dilemma is greatest when demography is most intermixed weakest when community settlement are most separate".¹¹⁹ Bearing in mind that the intensity of Security dilemma, future violence might be more intense, grave and bloody from the earlier ones. The only solution as

¹¹⁷ Kirişçi and Winrow estimates that between 1992-1995 some 16613 including both armed forces and civilians were killed in the conflict-related fights. Kirişçi Kemal and Windrow Gareth M. (1997), *The Kurdish Question And Turkey; An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, Southgate, London.

¹¹⁸ For an example see http://www.kongar.org/aydinlanma/2005/499_Alt_Kimlik-Ust_Kimlik.php

¹¹⁹ Kaufmann Chaim, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" *International Security*, Vol. 20, No 4 (Spring, 1996), p. 148.

Kauffman suggest will be the complete separation of groups to their enclaves. Kaufman states that “The more intense the violence, the more likely it is that separation, will be the only option”¹²⁰

2.5.1.3 Ethnic Geography of Kurds

Kurds are considered to be the world largest nation without state. They have split between Turkey, Iraq, Iran Syria and former Soviet Union¹²¹ According to some estimates Kurds population is about forty million half of which lives in Turkey. A survey has been done in 2011 revealed that there are some 14 million Kurds lives in Turkey. Whatever the precise numbers, Kurds in Turkey approximately account for 20 percent of the population. Kurds are major non-ethnic group has remained from the ashes of Ottoman Empire. Although there are other ethnic groups living in Turkey as well such as Arabs, Lazes and other groups their populations are relatively minor and they do not constitute majority in the any specific region of Turkey. The density of Kurdish community makes the issue more complex.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 159.

¹²¹ Pope, Nicole And Hugh (1997), *Turkey Unveiled; A History of Modern Turkey*, Overlook, New York p. 247.




Figure 3¹²². Ethnic Geography of Kurds

Let us now reconsider Ellingsen hypothesis here. His assumption were ;

- The degree of fragmentation within a country
 - a) The size of the largest linguistic, religious and ethnic group within a country
 - b) The number of linguistic, religious and ethnic group
- The size of the largest minority group within a country
- Ethnic affinities to other countries

¹²²Beriker Nimet Atiyas (1997), *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 28(4),, p. 440.

When we consider the fragmentation within the country the dominant group is too large namely close to 100% percent the violence is less likely. If dominant group is “large but not too large”¹²³ violence is more likely to broke. Ellingsen put the threshold of 80% percent for too large dominant group. For Turkey dominant group is less then 80 percent, since only Kurd approximately accounts for 20%¹²⁴ that make the Turkey more vulnerable to conflict in that sense. For the second asumption Ellingsen assert that conflict is higher with several groups than a few or many groups. The presence of many means that no one has enough dominant to mobilize conflict. It is highly explanatory for Turkey, after Turkey has eliminated its of non-muslim component with various methods and there remained few groups that increase the likelihood of conflict. Many groups mean that non of them large enough to pose threat to internal stability. When we look at later assumption of Ellingsen for assessing Turkey again the largest minority group is large enough to be able to mobilize violence. He assert that the more large the minority group, the more internal violence is likely. To put it differently, we can say that Kurds are neither enough large to impose their will on political system nor small enough to be completely ousted from exerting politics affect.

Lastly one of most relavant assumption of Ellingsen for Kurdish issue is that of Ethnic affinities to other countries. Kurds in Turkey have always had large identification with their brethen in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Especially the developments in Iraq have had great impacts on Turkey Kurds. The relative emancipation of Iraqi Kurds from Saddam regime in Iraq in 1991 has inspired Kurds in Turkey, so much so that large uprising in those years in close region of Turkey, such as in Cizre in Newroz celebrations which cost to of 90 people life. The Kurdish insurgency mostly got their strenght from this geographical traits of their region.

¹²³ Ellingsen Tanja (200?) “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity And Domestic Conflict During And After The Cold War”, *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No 2, (April), Sage Publications, Oslo, pp. 228-249.

¹²⁴ According to CIA World factbook 2008 estimates Kurds are account for 18 percent of total population. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> , Another survey that conducted by KONDA revealed that Kurds made up for 17.7 percent of entire poulation. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011_06_KONDA_Kitap_Basin_Bulteni.pdf There are some other estimates which claims the Kurds to form 25 percent of whole pupolation.Kreyenbroek,Philip&Allison Christine(ed) *Kurdish Culture and Identity* Zed Books 1996,p7 Condisering those It can be asserted that Kurds are made up between 15-25 percent of population, which can agruabbly be in rise in the next years due to higher fertility rate of Kurds comparing to Kurds.

As a last aspect of ethnic geography, it is important to point the fertility rate of communities. Research reveals that Kurd's fertility rate is higher than any other group in Turkey¹²⁵ The Kurdish population increase more highly which transforms ethnic balance between Turks and Kurds and might aggravate internal trouble in the future. We observed above from the Ellingsen assumption that the more populated largest minority group means more likely the violence to break.

2.5.2 Political Factors

2.5.2.1 Discriminatory Political Institutions

Prospect for conflict is low when overall political system is fair and each group represented in political and social institutions. Conversely when those institutions are closed to access for some specific groups where others are overrepresented, and their interest are served system, is likely to bring about frustration, resentment and consequently violence over time.¹²⁶

When we consider Kurdish issue in that sense, the Discriminatory Political Institutions are discernible as factors that has been fueling the conflict. From the beginning of 1990s when the first Kurdish political party with the name of HEP(Halkın Emek Partisi/People Labour Party) came to the scene to the 2009 successive Kurdish parties were closed by Constitutional court mostly on the ground of parties activities against the unity of the state. Throughout those years many of parliament members and activist of the parties were sent behind bars with the same charges. Out of six political parties so far 5 have been closed by Constitutional Court . In 2009 Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tuğluk(considered to be the moderate figures in party were banned to carry political activities within the rank of a party for five years. Another case in point regarding to discriminatory political institutions is election system that widely blocks small groups to access parliament since 1982 has limited The Kurds representation in the parliament. The election system that

¹²⁵Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2014), "2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey". Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK, Ankara, Turkey and <http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1232809-dogum-hizi-en-cok-guneydoguda-en-az-marmarada>

¹²⁶ Brown Michael E. (1997), "The Causes of Internal Conflict" in Michael Brown E and Others (ed.) *Nationalism And Ethnic Conflict*, MIT Press, p.7.

imposes a national ten percent threshold for political parties to access the parliament mainly become an obstruction for Kurds representation in the parliament. To overcome that challenge Kurdish parties go on to election with independent nominees that partly alleviate the obstacle, yet they have been still underrepresented in parliament comparing to their overall amount of votes.

Another example to illustrate the discriminatory policy is the existence and representation of Kurdish originated persons as city governors. As a centralized state city governors authorities over variety of affairs are broad. According to a study only 54 out of 488 city governors have borned in cities where Kurds constitute majority and among them some are not Kurd¹²⁷

It is important to point here that Kurds can rise to within the state ranks and political system, but until recently this could come true on the condition that those that rise do not manifest their Kurdish identity and accept Turkish identity¹²⁸

Broadcasting in Kurdish language in a state based TV, could be realized in 2004 and that broadcast was only limited to 45 minutes at that time. For the long period of time Kurdish culture and language could not be represented in any state institutions. The last education institution where the language of instruction was Kurdish closed in 1925.

There has been indeliberate discrimination practices as well. Being less educated, the problem of language, and the regions under development has worsened the prospects of Kurdish citizen to access to the political institutions.

Despite all, the reforms that have been done for EU, accession process by Turkey partly limited those discriminatory practice, but there are yet broad matters to be dealt with regarding to discriminatory political institutions.

¹²⁷ The origin of 134 governor couldn't have been identified Tezcür Güneş Murat "Türkiyede Silahlı Çatışmanın Med Cezirleri ve Zor Bir Barış" in Aktaş Murat (ed.) (2014), *Çatışma Çözümleri Ve Barış, İletişim* İstanbul, p.171.

¹²⁸ Barkey Henry J., Fuller Graham E. (1998), *Turkey Kurdish Question*, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Oxford p.12.

2.5.2.2 Exclusionary National Ideology

As we mention earlier Turkey was founded on the notion of single nationality. This single nationality excludes other identities and the state with its apparatus and resources at her disposal, made efforts to assimilate different identities to Turkishness. There are extensive controversies over the notion of “Turk” that whether it is civic that implies citizenship or ethnic that relates to blood. When we observe the practice of state there are dual face of this nationalism. In one aspect it is civic in nature that it allows the Kurds to raise in state institutions and in respect to enjoying all rights that state granted to its citizen. In another aspect it is ethnic in regards to forced assimilation of Kurds and repression of those who refuse to adopt this new identity.¹²⁹

The main ideology of Turkish republic has been laid down By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which embodied in six principles of so called “Kemalism” that have been added to the constitution in 1937. Those are secularism, republicanism, nationalism, stateism, populism and reformism. Nationalism principle has evidently been a homogenous and mono-ethnic in principle and when the matter regards to Kurds as Van Bruinessen register that;

... There are strong ideological impediments to the recognition of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture, and further concessions are almost unthinkable. The military and civilian elites (which include ‘assimilated Kurds’) are deeply committed to the Kemalist dogma that the people of Turkey are one homogeneous nation, and they perceive each denial of unity as a vital threat to the state.¹³⁰

When we look at citizenship and nationality relationship in Turkey, an ambiguity is evident. The constitution in force define this relationship in article 66 that; “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”¹³¹ It is evident that Turkishness defined in terms of citizenship and do not deny differentials, but impose a higher identity. However, when we observe Turkishness in history books that students studies in primary and high schools and question what it implies, we encounter a very

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.12.

¹³⁰ Cited in Heper Metin (2007), *The State and Kurds in Turkey; The Question of Assimilation*, Palgrave Mcmillian, London, p.3.

¹³¹ http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

ethnic notion of Turkishness in those books and none of history of different ethnicities is ever mentioned.¹³²

Mesut Yeğen implies this ambiguity points different levels of Turkishness. He states that;

..There are different degrees of Turkishness, being a subject of the Turkish Republic, being a Turkish subject, and being Turkish and, more importantly, that Turkish citizenship fails to overlap with or exhaust Turkishness in the full sense of the term. What is even more interesting is that there is a remarkable correlation between the different levels of state apparatus and different degrees of Turkishness. For instance, the institutions at the heart of the state (military) match themselves with being of Turkish race, while the institutions at the edge of the state (state dormitories) are content to match themselves with Turkish Republic citizenship.¹³³

Even though discourse of government officials have been emphasizing the civic nature of citizenship, as David Romano states “..In practice state-building (of Turkey) was along ethnic nationalist lines”¹³⁴ *which in turn fueled counter ethnic resistance of Kurds.*

Those characteristic of state ideology is not only something of the past. Those characteristics can be indicated in the current constitution in force as well. Article 42 of the Constitution reads as “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education”¹³⁵

No matter what had been implied with word Turkishness in the mindset of founding fathers of republic, what has been experienced and perceived by Kurds arguably was not an encompassing identity that considers their cultural and political rights.

2.5.2.3 Inter-Group Politics

It would not be wrong that, the inter-group politics between Kurds and the rest of population, is the most positive factors among other factors. There has been no inter-communal hatred and fight between Kurds and Turks. The cooperation of Turks and

¹³² For example, the history book at 11 grade starts with “State Understanding of Turks, Military and Turks, and so on which in fact refers to Ethnic Turks.

¹³³ Yeğen Mesut (2004), “Citizenship And Ethnicity in Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.40 No., p.57

¹³⁴ Romano David, *Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity*, Cambridge Press, New York, p.118.

¹³⁵ Constitution Of the Republic Of Turkey, http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

Kurds in the history is always referred among public and the conflict indeed has been a dispute and of Kurds and government. Even the far nationalist parties of Turkey have not resorted to a direct rhetoric of hatred and theorization against Kurds; neither do Kurdish parties against Turks.

However large Kurds immigration to western metropolis of Turkey led to direct encounters of Turkish and Kurdish grassroots and resulted in competition between them in social and economic life. Further intense fights of 1990s and PKK's heavy activities, pushed Turkish Public to identify Kurds with PKK.¹³⁶ Cenk Saraçoğlu in his study "Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society" points to rising anti Kurdish sentiments among the Turkish society particularly among middle class people, who have direct contact with Kurdish migrants in cities¹³⁷. At times Kurdish construction workers are being attacked by groups that motivated with nationalist sentiments. Thereby it can be argued that Intergroup politics In Kurdish issue in near future might deteriorated which had been constructive in the past due to less encounters.

2.5.2.4 Elites and Kurdish Issue

Elites are those who see the opportunities in time of social turmoil's mobilize masses towards political ends. When we consider the previous insurgency in the Kurdish Region powerful and charismatic leaders roles are evident. From Bedirxhan, to Ubeydullah to Sheikh Said, elites were very influential to initiate those insurgences. Elite's role can be an explanation why after 1940s till 1980s there has been relative calm in terms of rebellions in the region. That was partly a success of government to eliminate the Kurdish leadership either by executions or exiles. After subsequent insurgency after 1925, which continued till 1940s, Turkey dispersed all Kurdish notables and leaders regardless of taking into consideration whether if they had collaborated with insurgents or not. In other words, even non participant and non-supportive figures had faced punishment. For example a notable religious figure Said Nursi,-despite the fact that he

¹³⁶ Barkey Henry (1993), "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma" *Survival*, Vol. 35, s4, pp. 57-58.

¹³⁷ Saraçoğlu Cenk (2011), *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society*, I.B. Tauris, London.

had never collaborated with the rebellion - was sent to exile just after Seikh Said uprising had been crushed in 1925. However after 1960s number of Kurdish students studying at Universities in the western part of Turkey has increased. Those students at the same time politicized within Turkish leftist parties and began to develop national identification. That environment was partly brought by the constitution of 1960s that was favored social and individual rights. David Romano points that: "Education, particularly university education, exposed a new generation of both wealthy and talented poor Kurds to ideas of nationalism, socialism, and the struggle of other peoples against state tyranny."¹³⁸

From that leftist circle a new Kurdish leftist movement emerged and they point the grievances and sufferings of Kurds at the hands of state. They started to organize demonstrations and publish journals which were mostly expressing those grievances in a leftist-socialist jargon.

The leader of PKK Abdullah Ocalan was also a university student in the beginning of 1970s. The leadership of Kurdish resistance movement was shifting from tribal leaders or religious notables to a relatively lower class of students and intellectuals. The leadership of Ocalan and his character were indispensable part of PKK's success over other Kurdish groups. First unlike other Kurdish group he could made use of the state suppression to mobilize people and convince them to a violent campaign. In the course of struggle he consolidated his power and became God-Like figure among PKK supporters. It wouldn't be wrong to say that the Kurdish resistance could not mobilize such a massive support without Ocalan powerful leadership and his ability to translate the oppression of state into an immediate need to his personality. He state himself as: "In this revolution,I have felt the greatest amount of pain; all those faults of history, instead of being owned by others have fallen solely on my shoulders."I establish a thousand relationships every day and destroy a thousand political, organizational, emotional and ideological relationships No one is indispensable to me"¹³⁹.

¹³⁸Romano David *Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity*, Cambridge Press, New York, p.42.

¹³⁹Quoted in Post Jerold M. (2007) *The Mind Of Terrorist; Pschology of Terrorism from The IRA to Al-Qaeda*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Öcalan could depict himself as a hope for an impoverished and weakened people by oppression of state by virtue his powerful and undaunted character, although the conflict would still exist even without such an influential leadership. The Kurdish conflict from that sense has largely exacerbated and become violent by virtue of the influential elite figures.

2.5.3 Economic and Social Factors

Beside its identity characteristic, Kurdish issue is largely related to economic and social difficulties that the Kurdish region has been experiencing. Although state officials tend to stress mainly socio-economic dimension of the issue, in large part due to their unwillingness to acquiesce the issue's ethno politic dimension, still socioeconomic part of the problem is evident. To illustrate this reality, consideration of economic deterioration of the region, since the foundation of Republic is insightful. For instance according to polls in 1927, the main Kurdish city Diyarbakır after Istanbul and Bursa had had the third highest employment rates, in respect to industrial sector employment. Fifty years later in 1972 Diyarbakır fall 27 sequences in the same index. In 2000 Diyarbakır was in the 54th rank in that sense.¹⁴⁰ The example of Diyarbakır illustrates overall region's socioeconomic deterioration and the deterioration had been the result of centralization policy of the state that decreases the regional economic balance. The region currently is the least developed region in Turkey in terms of all socio-economic indications such us unemployment, average per capita annual income¹⁴¹ industrialization, education and health etc. 20 city of the region are the most poor cities of Turkey.¹⁴² This economic backwardness has been growing worse owing to low intense war. The evacuation of villages both deteriorate agriculture and husbandry and create a huge mass of internal migration that exacerbate unemployment and unplanned urbanization problems.

¹⁴⁰ http://www.kalkinmamerkezi.org/kalkinma_raporlari_goster.aspx?krq=4

¹⁴¹ Ergil Dođu (2007), *PKK; "Partiya Karkerê Kurdistan"* in Heiberg Marianne and Others (ed.), *Terror Insurgency And State; Ending Protracted Conflicts*, University Of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania,p.324.

¹⁴² http://www.kalkinmamerkezi.org/kalkinma_raporlari_goster.aspx?krq=4

When coinciding with ethnic lines socio-economic dimension of the issue as we mentioned in chapter one make the problem more acute. People generally tend to attribute their socio-economic backwardness to their identity which generates opportunity for leaders to utilize these sufferings for political goals. Class dimension was added to ethnic dimension of problem. That is partly explain why PKK adopted a socialist and Marxist agenda. Leadership of PKK was aware of socio-economic dimension of the problem.

Frequent promise of respective governments in Ankara to take action for the economic developments have been rarely materialized, which make the region population cynical.¹⁴³ What is interesting, is that according to a research during the AK Party ruling from 2002 to 2006, the region's destiny has worsened in a period that government officials have been praising their economical achievement¹⁴⁴. This is a warning sign in the sense of Davies figure that attempts to explain revolutions. If the gap between expected performance and actual performance rise to an intolerable extent, revolution (in our case violence) is likely to break out. To put it different the socio-economic factors that had extensive impact on the break out of the violence still highly valid in the Region of Kurds and among Kurds.

2.5.4 Cultural/ Perceptual Factors,

2.5.4.1 Cultural Discrimination of Kurds

In addition to state level, the discriminatory acts in public and cultural spheres have been evident regarding to Kurds. After the end of rebellions of 1930s Republic Foundation Kurds were treated as they have never existed and their history and language were tried to be made invisible from all spheres of life¹⁴⁵. For example in 1930 the minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt while speaking on real citizens stated that:

¹⁴³ Barkey, Henry J. (2009), *Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, p.59.

¹⁴⁴ <http://eski.bianet.org/static/dogu2.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ Romano David, *Kurdsih Nationalist Movement; Opprtunity, Mobilization, Identity*, Cambridge Press, New York, p. 15-60

“Turks are the only masters and owners of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.”¹⁴⁶

“Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face”¹⁴⁷ - was spelled by Cemal Gürsel the fourth president of Turkey when he visited the main Kurdish city Diyarbakır in 1960. Expressing the Kurdish identity was deemed to be crime and whoever has expressed faced charges. For example in 1980 public work minister of pre-coup period Şerafettin Elçi was served 27 months in prison because of an earlier interview as minister in a newspaper in which he uttered that he was a Kurd and there were Kurds¹⁴⁸. Even though in the same interview he had expressed his respect to the territorial integrity of the country he was convicted of being separatist. Indeed one of the main practices of cultural discrimination had been the prohibition of Kurdish in public and private life. In the former three constitution of Turkey (1921, 1924, 1960) there were not any prohibition of language but the Turkish was being defined as “official language of the state” in 1924 and 1960 constitutions (the Constitution of 1982 removed the “official” and specified the Turkish as “the Language of State”). But the usage of Turkish was broadly encouraged and Kurdish was prohibited by laws that were imposing prison sentences upon any Kurdish speaker in public life¹⁴⁹. But the constitution of 1982 outlawed any language rather than Turkish to be thought to Turkish citizen as their mother language¹⁵⁰. Kurdish names were also banned to be given to babies and cultural practices such as music in Kurdish were practicing underground because of the prohibition. Those practice continued till 1991 when Özal the 8th president of Turkey, abolished the law that had prohibited the usage, and broadcasting of Kurdish. However the restriction on Kurdish language, literature and culture had remained intact until the Turkey judicial reform packages were passed as EU Accession requirements¹⁵¹. The first Kurdish language

¹⁴⁶ Dragoş C. Mateescu (2006), "Kemalism in the Era of Totalitarianism: A Conceptual Analysis," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 234.

¹⁴⁷ Cited in <http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12616392/index.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=food-summit-land-pix-tv--1116-08.rmr-2009-11-16>

¹⁴⁹ Nisan Mordechai (2002), "Minorities in the Middle East" Mcfarland&Company Inc, London, p. 47.

¹⁵⁰ global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf ("No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved").

¹⁵¹ For detailed analysis of those reforms see <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/tsr.pdf>

course was opened in 2004 and state television TRT has begun to 45 minutes Kurdish broadcasting which mainly were on cultural matters of Kurds. In 2009 a full-fledged TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish was set up. In 2011 the right to defend in native language in courts was granted after the long time denial of demand By KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan/, Group of Communities in Kurdistan) members to defend themselves Kurdish in the courts¹⁵². The ban on prisoners to talk to Kurdish with their visitors in prisons was abolished as earlier as 2011. Despite all developments on eliminating the usage of Kurdish, education in native language is still a matter of massive controversies and although the assimilationist practice for the most part eliminated in laws and regulations, the assimilation of Kurdish children proceed due to invisible hindrances. Other practices such as banning the “Newroz” celebrations a festival that mostly celebrated in Middle East and some part of Asia and in some cities reveals that cultural discrimination though considerably has diminished is still ongoing regarding to Kurdish issue. Moreover the rights are being interpreted in the sense of “individual rights” rather than “group rights” which seems unsatisfactory regarding to for example for issues like education in mother language.

For the most period of the Republic Kurds have been faced with discriminatory and assimilationist policy that tried to rid the very existence of Kurds for the sake of the uniformity of the state, and consequently derogate the cultural and ethnic characteristic of Kurds which in turn aggravate the grievance sensed by Kurds and flame the violence.

2.5.4.2 Group Histories and Group Perception Regarding to Kurdish Issue

As we mentioned, earlier group relation of Turks and Kurds have been relatively well while state and Kurds relations have always remained problematic. The suppression and persecutions of Kurds at the hand of successive governments of the Republic, merited a memory of victimhood, and grievances. This memory is confirmed by recent incident as well. The killing 34 civilians in 2011 in Uludere province of Şırnak by Turkish air planes bombing confirmed deeply held perception of Kurds regarding to persecution

¹⁵²http://www.todayszaman.com/national_diyarbakir-court-allows-defense-in-kurdish-for-first-time-in-kck-trial_305662.html

and atrocities in history such as Dersim massacre, or Zilan plain operation that to one estimates 3000 noncombatant (of rebellion) men women and children were executed¹⁵³.

By the same token the demise of empire, losing of huge amount of lands and independence of number of minorities from empire, together with intense war of 1990s, killing of thousands of soldier and indoctrination of governmental institutions, brought about another narrative, which is generally among Turkish public towards any Kurdish political movement's demands. In some instance those perception manifested in any Kurdish demonstrations in the form of lynch attempts mostly being legitimized on the ground of preserving the unity of the country. As we mentioned earlier with the legacy of violence in 1990s, Turkish public tended to associate Kurds with PKK.

A research conducted in 2014, İzmir that hosted to relatively large Kurdish immigrants reveal a deteriorating group perceptions patterns of communities toward one another. According to the research "Turks viewed Kurds as rogue, whereas Kurds viewed Turks as barbarian"¹⁵⁴ the research revealed that the perceptions alter depending on the intensity of violence. To put it differently the conflict itself generates misperceptions which in turn increase the likelihood of conflict. Namely the equation transverses here and conflict itself gives rise to root causes. Another research made in 2011 by "Konda" revealed this deteriorating patterns of perceptions. For example, one of the finding of research was that 57.6 percent of population would not prefer to have a Kurdish spouse, 53.5 would not accept A Kurdish business partner and 47.4 percent do not look favorably on to have a Kurdish neighbor, while rations for Kurds toward Turks are 26.4, 24.8 and 22.1 respectively¹⁵⁵ This pattern seems to stem from the intense violent period of 1990s, which has worsen the perceptions of both communities especially the "Turks". The "ancient hatred"¹⁵⁶ that propounded by Robert Kaplan to explain the ethnic wars- particularly for war among ethnic groups living inside Yugoslavia that concluded

¹⁵³ McDowall, David (1996), "A Modern History Of Kurds, I. B. Tauris, New York, p.206.

¹⁵⁴ Bilali Rezarta and Others (2014), "Psychological asymmetry in minority-majority relations at different stages of ethnic conflict", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 43, pp. 253-264.

¹⁵⁵ Konda Biz KİMİZ'10 – Kürt Meselesinde Algı Ve Beklentiler Raporu file:///C:/Users/HP/Google%20Drive/akademik/tam/2011_06_KONDA_Kurt_Meselesinde_Algı_ve_Beklentiler.pdf

¹⁵⁶ Kaplan Robert, *Balkan Ghost; A Journey Through History*.

the complete dissolution of it- is not enough distant to be called ancient for Kurdish issue. Yet the “recent hatred” seems to have already been sprung due to the violence experienced in recent past.

Similarly the Kurdish songs that glorify the fight, and fighters, loaded with the feel of victimhood or Turkish series that favors militarism, and honor the war against PKK with intensive usage of symbols like national flag, and martyrdom and attribution to history etc. shape and renew the misperception that aggravate tension regarding to Kurdish issue and make it hard to resolution.

This chapter attempt to analyses historical legacy of Kurdish issue, the definition of Kurdish issue in terms of intra-state conflicts and war and examine the relevancy of root causes regarding to Kurdish issue. It is found that Kurdish issue is an ethnic/identity based conflict, which at times had escalated to civil war according to COW project. Further it seems that many of Root causes are highly relevant in the context of Kurdish issue, which is explanatory for the emergence of conflict and violence. In the next chapter the thesis will attempt to shed light on the prospect to reverse the root causes.

CHAPTER 3

PATH TO PEACE

REVERSING ROOT CAUSES OF KURDISH ISSUE

Making peace typically requires as much if not more courage and determination than does making war.

---David P Barash&Charles P Webel

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Every war must end. People cannot live under an infinite state of war. However ending a war is not an easy task. When referring to ending an intra-state conflict, it is far more complex and sophisticated than an ending interstate war. First there are two or more legitimate actor in interstate wars and both states are legally recognized and entitled to act as an independent agent. Yet for the intra-state conflicts or wars recognition is the main obstacle for ending the dispute. One actor is an independent internationally recognized entity namely the “state”. Other actor on the other hand has not any legal (not legitimate) bases in terms of both internal and external recognition and most likely labeled as terrorist or rebellious group. Thus to reach and sign an agreement with an internationally recognized agent, cannot be equated to signing an agreement with a rebellious non-state or non-official group. Once a state starts to initiate a process of talks with such a group, de-facto recognition and legitimacy is arguably will be attained by the group. This logic leads states to set off the talks with rebellious group through its intelligence agencies rather than direct governmental and political interaction with those groups. The Weberian monopoly of state on the use of force or violence has been contested and states will tend to avoid any direct interaction.

Second for the interstate wars once an agreement is signed parties and people draw to their borders and interactions between societies and peoples reduces considerably. International borders after demarcation (if any) limits encounters. However ending an intra-

state agreement prescribes the very system of domestic politics and post agreement phase is of paramount importance in which mode of interaction of groups expected to be regulated. Since the defeat in intrastate conflict might lead to the party's loss of existence at all the high stakes in the conflict makes the compromise in the most cases difficult.¹⁵⁷ Unlike the armies withdrawing to their borders, and substantial diminish of interaction between armies, antagonists and hostile parties has to live together even long after an agreement signed (on the condition that the agreement does not include any cessation and dividends of borders. The agreement will shape the mode of domestic interaction which formerly was the source and root cause of the conflict. In other words states are very sensitive about the monopoly on the use of violence and will not be eager to share it with another power and an intrastate agreement requires a substantial transformation of domestic settings.

Bearing in mind these two difficulties, ending an intra-state war is not an impossible task. In the light of successful examples, determined, committed and visionary political figures have the power to lead a society to a stable peace. The examples of Northern Ireland and South Africa among others, though they are not perfect, prove the very possibility of lasting peace. Having said that, achievements in those examples has not coincidentally attained. All are consequences of planned and principled actions.

Similarly AK Party the ruling party of Turkey since 2002 initiated "democratic opening" in 2009 to solve long decades Kurdish issue. In fact this initiative was one of most radical and courage policy since the foundation of the Republic. However the so called democratic opening was failed due to various reason and both side blame the other side's actions and intentions as the reason of failure. In the meanwhile with the failure of initiative, the armed conflicts escalated into a very intense confrontation that accounted for more than 700 dead within fourteen months from 2011 to 2012 which is the maximum death rate that unprecedented for 13 years. The detention of Kurdish activist with the conviction of being the member of illegal organization KCK (The union of Communities in Kurdistan), The PKK raids, Turkish military operation to the bases of PKK and the wide spread hunger strikes of Kurdish prisoners in 2013 leads to stalemate

¹⁵⁷ Licklider, Roy, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993", *American Political Science Review*, 89(3),pp. 681–690.

condition for the parties. Later on, prisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called the prisoners to end the hunger strike and the hunger strike ended following this call. Since then the situation deescalated and government launched peace talks with Abdullah Öcalan that boosted hopes among public. The public expectation is that three decade old conflict which marked with bloody memories will end. The talks are going on with Abdullah Öcalan and on 21 March 2013 of Nevroz celebration his letter was read by BDP parliamentary members to the mass that were gathering for the celebration, and in this letter he addressed the PKK members and called to a fully withdrawal from armed struggle and urged the militants to retreat from Turkish borders and move to the Northern Iraq. A small part of militant has withdrawn to Turkish soils. Yet great part of militant have remained in their bases and kept their potential for next fights. Negotiation with Öcalan continues with back and forth but a conclusion has yet to be reached.

This chapter seeks to explore the principles that have the potentials to reverse the root causes of Kurdish issue and be guidance for policymakers, peace workers and researcher that devoted their lives to an enduring peace for Kurdish issue. The thesis will just express these principles and condition.

3.2 ENDURING/STABLE PEACE

Peace is an elusive concept. It has barely a consensual general and theoretical definition. This definition problem leads scholars to attribute adjective to the peace such as Enduring/Stable Peace, so that they can limit the definition ambiguity. Enduring/Stable Peace indirectly implies that instable and short living peace exists as well. So an enduring/stable peace refers a situation after a negotiated agreement in which parties willingness to take up arms dramatically diminish, and personal and societal security and well-being are sustained, so much so that recurring of war is out of prospect for a long period of time. Enduring/stable peace requires both a cessation of violence and absence of motivation to pursue goals through violence. As for motivation it will disappear in case of security and well being of parties. To that end a well-designed peace agreement is of paramount importance in which the concerns of parties are well addressed. Keneth Boulding defines “stable peace” as “*a situation in which the*

*probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.*¹⁵⁸ Negative peace, conditional peace, precarious peace is some other concepts that refer to the lack of enduring/stable peace. Negative peace refers to the absence of armed violence, but not necessarily absence of other types of violence such as poverty, oppression, injustice etc.¹⁵⁹ Whereas precarious peace imply a *state of little more than a temporary absence of armed conflict* and lastly “conditional peace” imply to a peace maintained by general deterrence but the prospect for war reserved for crisis situation.¹⁶⁰ Enduring/Stable Peace is quite the opposite of these concepts. The reason why “positive peace” of Galtung was not employed is that it refers more to an ideational situation and more utopian to be attained whereas Enduring/Stable peace is more practical and operational observable and measurable. Thus an agreement that brings about an enduring/stable peace will deem to be a successful agreement. Even though some agreements end violence for a durable time, however, do not end prospects for violence for parties.

3.3. CONDITIONS TO REVERSE ROOT CAUSES

Understanding the conditions that lead to successful resolution of disputes and have the potential to reverse and transform the conflict to a constructive initiative is of paramount importance for policy makers. The condition that will reverse structural, political and cultural/perceptual factors are analyzed separately

3.3.1 Reversing the Structural Causes

3.3.1.1 Institutionalization

Negotiation and settlement do not only aim to stop the killing, but also they build or ideally they must build a frame in which the mode and rule of interaction are defined regarding to state and society or state and insurgent groups relations. Institutionalization relates to both rule of negotiation and structures incorporated in the

¹⁵⁸ Boulding, Kenneth E. (1978), *Stable Peace*, Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 13.

¹⁵⁹ https://www.transcend.org/files/Galtung_Book_unpub_Theories_of_Peace_-_A_Synthetic_Approach_to_Peace_Thinking_1967.pdf

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/stable-peace>

agreement for post- agreement set ups that will govern groups in the future¹⁶¹. Waterman notes; “civil wars often end in a deal and that deal is about political institutions”¹⁶² Institutions prescribe some behaviors and prohibit others. The essential function of institutions are to diminish uncertainty and increase the predictability in regards to actors behavior and rule of competition in the future, which then mitigate the security dilemma between parties. Institutional design provides the groups with the mean to pursue their goal other than violence. Institutionalization is the only cure for weak statehood that rise the chaos and anarchical state thought to be increase the propensity of violence

Institutional designs are about forming structure about the use of coercive force, the distribution of political power and the distribution of resources. ¹⁶³ And power sharing and power dividing institutions are the most utilized tools for intra-state wars. Power sharing and power dividing mechanism provide groups with power to have influence on governmental issues, the lack of which most probably has given rise to the escalation of tension. Further power sharing and power dividing institutions are the main guarantees for protection of the particularities of the groups. This is because power sharing and power dividing arrangements preclude the option for one party holding sufficient power to dominate others. Moreover these institutions give opposition group a sense of ownership to the system which previously they were trying to destabilize because they were considering the system working against their interest. In other words, power sharing and power dividing agreements lead to a balance of power between contending parties and prevent power concentration in the hand of single party¹⁶⁴. In addition, those structures and arrangements allow the groups identities to be accommodated in the general identity of the major group. Johan Galtung use the term “Feel At Home” to refer the situation where in the political system every citizen finds some part of his identity represented and demonstrated in the public and political sphere. He points the example of Switzerland where the bills

¹⁶¹ Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), *Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania,, p. 26.

¹⁶²Quoted in Hartzell A. Caroline, “Explaining The Stability of Negotiated Settlement to Intrastate Wars” *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 43, No 1 (Feb. 1999), p.6.

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), *Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, p. 25.

are issued in four languages. The members of four different language groups experience their identity represented in the public sphere. Thus they build an identity affiliation to the state and as their identity represented, they feel at home in the country¹⁶⁵

In the first chapter the role of weak state as a structural root cause of intra-state conflict was emphasized. Weak state manifests itself in the lack of institutions that provide good and services to the public. But additionally and even more they provide set ups in which system of state could function and demand of groups are met inside whether this demand are related to identity, governance, or elections. The opposite of weak state can be described well as “legitimate state” rather than powerful state since power might imply military power. Legitimacy attained by the institutions that provide the sense of belonging its citizen which than ease the tension that triggers the conflict. Especially when conflict is an identity conflict political institution are of paramount importance and negotiation mostly should focus on setting up institution that pave the ways to the accommodation of these identities. Anthony Oberschall writes that: “Conflict management consists of building overarching, shared identities and symbols, and providing political institutions that organize interest and divisions that cut across ethnic lines¹⁶⁶”

As to emphasize the significance of power sharing and power dividing Institutions Hartzell and Hoddie writes that:

Power-sharing and power-dividing institutions may also help enhance the credibility of former belligerents' commitment to peace to the extent that they compartmentalize or divide decision-making powers. Leaders will find breaking their promises very difficult if they are institutionally bound to obtain other actors' assent in order to change policies or make new decisions. By reducing the risk of arbitrary behavior by some set of actors, power-sharing and power-dividing institutions help enhance the negotiated settlement's credibility as a whole.¹⁶⁷

The dominance and oppressions against a group are generally maintained and prevailed over institutions. Pre-war institutions seem to be unable to prevent the

¹⁶⁵ Drawn from the class given by Galtund in Hacettepe Peace and Conflict studies Master Programme in 2013.

¹⁶⁶ Oberschall Anthony (2007), *Conflict And Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 12.

¹⁶⁷ Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), *Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, p. 27.

eruption war. Endurable peace therefore requires transformation of these institution or building of new ones that “...Do not contain the same failures that led to conflict in the first place”¹⁶⁸. Their main characteristic must be impartiality towards different groups so that those groups trust can be maintained and thus institutions can function effectively and the most effective institutions are those which are democratic. Beside those institutions a negotiation must take in to consideration of building institutions that deal with past wrongdoings, truth and reconciliation commissions- election monitoring, ceasefire observation etc. In other words institutions are not only the mechanism that builds the future, but also tools for coming to terms with the past.

One of the primary trigger that gave rise to Kurdish issue is inefficient institutions. Especially the centralization policy which traces back to Ottoman period result in weakening of traditional institutional set ups. What replaced were those that unaware of the needs and priority of the region. In the present situation, the best alternative seems to be enact the rules that devolution of some state power to regions and design some institutions that will made Kurds to “feel at home” rather than a feeling of alienation. In other wars the institutions must be more receptive to the needs and demands of Kurds where they live. The institutions that the identity can be maintained, or an arrangements on the security force that are more familiar and if need be more specifically recruited, will diminish fears and alienation of Kurds. The institution that allocate rights and limit the use of force¹⁶⁹ will create an environment of predictability. Further, legalization of ongoing peace process or a body that will observe the disarming and demobilization of ex-fighters and guarantees for those ex-fighters beyond doubt, will diminish security dilemma of parties. Likewise an election system that enables the small groups to have influence on governmental issues, is of utmost importance. Ten percent national threshold in Turkish election system is one of the main obstacles before Kurds to have voice and power in Parliament. The feel of weakness will trigger the security dilemma and only cure is to give each group power that is proportional to their population.

168 Wolf, Stefan (2007), *Ethnic Conflict; A Global Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New York, p.156.

169 Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie (2007), *Crafting PeacePower Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, The, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania,, p.27.

3.3.1.2 Timing

Timing is about doing what and when. In other words, it is about doing right thing at right time. Every peace initiative must have an attentively set timetable. Hasty actions might lead to undesired result and failures. With same token belated actions may damage the entire process. With the course of time, expectations and understandings of actors will change. Moreover the nature of conflict may also change. Any regulation aimed to ease the tension that would have an impact if imposed previously might not have any impact later or an immature and early initiative may trigger the old memories of conflict which then result in escalation of the conflict. While carrying out a peace initiative parties to conflict must consider the timing of each step delicately and act accordingly.

Furthermore, well organized in terms of timing and scheduled peace initiative will give a sense of predictability to parties and hinder distrust and insecurity towards process. A promised action taken in time will be a sign of loyalty to the process by the stakeholder to the conflict and enhance trustfulness among parties. However postponed action will foster suspects to the intention of the adversary. Distrust and possibility of being cheated by opponents which aggravated by uncertainties may well be tackled by timely actions. That is one of best ways to overcome “Security Dilemma” that was explained in the first chapter as a main source of intra-state conflict, among groups. Well timing initiatives on the other hand decrease ambiguity and uncertainties which then decrease, if not fully prevent, possible manipulations and provocations.

For ethnic conflict it is argued that the more opportunity for peace postponed the more it is likely to be difficult to attain peace. The timely actions that had been scheduled earlier will increases confidence that other side is committed to its promises.

3.3.1.2.1 Ripe Moment

The idea of “ripe moment” was developed by William Zartman. The concept focuses on the notion of “Mutually Hurting Stalemate”. It refers a situation, when both parties to the conflict cannot achieve an outright victory over their opponents, the situation evolves to

a deadlock and continue to fight more, achieve nothing but more pain, perhaps even a catastrophe for both sides.¹⁷⁰ No outright victory seems likely in near future for adversaries. As Peter Wallensteen observes *“Neither side is winning within the time framework it had expected nor with the resources it had at its disposal.”*¹⁷¹ This situation marks a “ripe moment” for peace, which parties seek a way-out and negotiation seems favorable and less costly than fighting. If a “mutually hurting stalemate” exists and if parties perceive a way out it is a “ripe moment” for peace. However “ripe moments” do not automatically lead to searches for the solution. The moments have to be searched and grasped by parties or by virtue of a mediator¹⁷², because “ripe moments” are not only objective occasions, but also they are related to parties perception of the existence of such moments. Here we consider parties as rational. Otherwise not all ripe moments will lead to initiation of peace processes. Further “ripe moments are not always discernible and reachable by parties’ rational calculations. Third parties or mediators are thus could be vital to made parties to grasp and realize “ripe moments”. They can encourage the perception of stalemate to the parties and show way outs.

Zartman points out that “Ripeness is the key to many successful cases of negotiation, opening the way for discussions that lead to an agreement in the Sinai (1974), Southwest Africa (1988), El Salvador (1988), Mozambique (1992), and many others”¹⁷³

Regarding to Kurdish issue it can be asserted that it is the most “ripe moment” to seize the opportunity for a peaceful solution in the history of the conflict. State and broadly Kurdish political movement seems to realize that there is no military solution to the conflict. Both leaders and public are in favor of a solution based on dialogue of sides. This opportunity must be utilized by both sides as we know the nature and dynamic of Kurdish are highly vulnerable to regional and international fluctuations. Further some scholars point to radicalization of Kurdish youth and pro-Kurdish party members stress the fact that they are the last generation that government can talk to” Actually the new

¹⁷⁰ Wallensteen, Peter (2002), “Understanding Conflict Resolution; War, Peace And Global System”, Sage Publications, London, p.46.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² I William Zartman (2001), The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments, Global Review of Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1:1, pp. 8-18.

¹⁷³ <http://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/> (09.11.2014)

generation had not had previous shared experiences with Turkish public.¹⁷⁴ They are more alienated than the previous generations. Thus timely action in Kurdish issue is a crucial component of peace and sign of commitment to other side.

As we referred to Davies figure regarding to breaking out of revolution, we can apply this principles to nonmaterial expectation as well. A period of development in terms of democratization and extending rights has generated high expectation which requires the continuation of reforms regarding to Kurdish issue. However, if actual performance diminish dramatically it might cause turmoil in the near future. Thereby the actions must be taken timely and reforms shouldn't fall behind the democratic trends in the world.

3.3.1.3 Security Guarantees

The absence of a high authority, or to say it differently, one parties distrust to existing bodies and refusing its supervision, worsen the insecurity.¹⁷⁵ The structure in which parties left to seek for self-preservation; defined by Jervis as ... “not evil but tragedy¹⁷⁶” the structure of the system that leads parties to pursue their survival by their own tools exacerbate insecurity for others that generate a vicious cycle which we defined earlier as “security dilemma”. In other words, even if parties share common goals and are not greedy for gaining power, the structure in which they function, drive them to compete with one another for power. Frequently this competition brings about violent confrontation; what Jervis defines as tragedy rather than evil.

It is apparent that if the conflict mainly stems from security concern of the involved parties, a negotiated agreement will be expected to involve some provision that should ameliorate this insecurity between parties. If the security concern of the groups is not addressed, it is unlikely to have a stable peace. Walter defines Security guarantees as “*implicit or explicit promises given by an outside power to protect*

¹⁷⁴Villelas Ana “Turkey and The Kurdish Question: Reflecting On Peace Building” Report by Escola de Cultura de Pau, Agencia Catalana de Cooperacio al Desenvolupament .June 2011

¹⁷⁵ Badran, Ramzi (2011), *A Peace Agreement Theory: Contracting For Sustainable Peace*, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Binghamton University, State University Of New York.

¹⁷⁶ Jervis Robert (1976), *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, p. 66.

*adversaries during the treaty implementation period*¹⁷⁷ Yet some researcher without referring the third party, put the emphasis on building the institutions which parties can preserve their security and existence. The most important ones are those which relates to state power, use of coercive force, political power and control over resources¹⁷⁸. The first regards to security over armed aggression, the second one regards to security for identity and the last one is security for wellbeing, all of which described in the first chapter as the source of intra-state conflict. A fair distribution of power on those dimensions is necessary to hinder any group to hold the ultimate power, and utilize it to dominate and oppress other groups.

Likewise security guarantees for ex-combatant are vital component of any negotiated agreement. A negotiation without envisioning a protection for armed units in post-war period, beyond doubt will prove to fail, because those units will be extremely dangerous for and spoil post war peace situation. Peace made with whom a fight has been done and lack of considerations for ex-fighter, will drive them to use their power to disrupt any peace agreement. Further, once they surrender and disarmed, they will have insurance from state and national army that this will not be used against them and they will not be attacked and annihilated. What will prevent a state to do this against insurgent militants? In peace agreement different provisions have been enacted for ex-fighters. Some of this agreement prescribes incorporating ex-fighter to national army. Other agreements provide opportunity to ex-fighter to become political figures of post war period.¹⁷⁹

When we consider the Kurdish issue it is vital to include security guarantees for ex fighters of PKK and also pro government village guards so that keeping arms by both renders useless. That guarantee might be in the form of providing immunity for “crimes” against the state, job, and like integrative services. Recruitment in national security force is other option to be considered. For the high rank militants other

¹⁷⁷ Walter, Barbara (1997), “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” *International Organization*, 51(3), pp. 335-364.

¹⁷⁸ Hartzell Caroline A., Hoddie Matthew (2007), *Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

¹⁷⁹ Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was a left wing rebel army during El Salvador’s 1980-92 civil war, after peace accord in 1992 FMLN became a political party and with its leader Salvador Sanchez Ceren a former guerilla won two consecutive elections.

alternatives such as to have a living abroad seems to be more appropriate. Whatever the forms of this integration might be, one thing is sure that if the existence of an ex fighter or group of them is in danger and not protected in a post conflict agreement, they will seek and attempt to spoil any peace initiatives.

The most critical situation is that of prisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Will he be kept in prison for all his life or not? Bearing in mind that he has a great influence on the some part of Kurds, an arrangement for his future must be considered for an enduring peace. Yet in relation to “timing” it must be in the future that any arrangement for Öcalan should not spark huge reaction on the Turkish public. The timing for this must be well thought.

3.3.2 Reversing the Political Root Causes

3.3.2.1 Identity Recognition

Recognition of the identity of other side is indispensable element of pre-negotiation and without it negotiation phase will not come to the scene. To recognize other side result in emergence of inter-locator with whom the issues can be negotiated. Recognition does not have to be in a formal state, but de-facto recognition is needed. In addition to that recognition of identity lead the parties to perceive the conflict in the eyes of their adversary since the negotiator parties supposed to response other sides demands, and most probably accept a set of them, if not all.

Further with the recognition of identity, a kind of legitimacy attributed to the adversary, which then result in to appreciate and assume some rights to other one of which include an essential right, right to exist. It is the identity of parties that is non-negotiable and its recognition during the negotiation is irreplaceable. As we referred earlier identities are not fixed but once they are formed they are resistant to change, hence is not a matter to be compromised on. Identities should deem to be predetermined and agreed on in pre-negotiation period. In the initial periods of interaction, recognition does not have to be in the formal manner yet de-facto acknowledgement of identity must be assigned to the adversary especially when the conflict is related to ethnicity. On the role of identity

recognition Vsevolod W. Isajiw states that: "Identity recognition provides integrity to the process of interethnic negotiation and in difficult cases of negotiation even one or a few actions which symbolically detract from identity recognition will have the effect of undermining the entire process."¹⁸⁰

The path to negotiation is not a mere settlement of the specific issues, but it also refers to the change of relationships; alterations on the mode of interaction, moderation of attitudes, norms, customs and law as well.¹⁸¹ The recognition of identity is the basic tenet of relation transformation, which eases the tension and paves the way for negotiation of specific issues. The recognition of identity expresses the willingness of each part to be accounted equal on the negotiation table. Power asymmetry tames by identity symmetry which can be attained by recognition of identities. Namely the parties are on equal footing in negotiation when identity recognition ensured. The refusal of identities however has damaging effect and mostly leads to escalation of tension among groups or among a group and state.

Isavij again considers that the main agent to perform the recognition of identity is the one that is public and possesses legitimate power. Recognition of identity by legitimate power send message to the other side that they are taken seriously as a negotiation counterpart. Some symbolic action like adopting multilingual educational system or TV broadcasting in minorities' language in state-funded media institutions imply an implicit recognition of identity of other party. Recognition means recognition of rights as well, because existence entails rights. The process might go in both ways; either to give some rights to identity groups that is an inexplicit acceptance or official acceptance; only after recognition whether implicitly or explicitly parties will accept to solve their differences via cooperative and joint action. If the core issue of problem is identity, recognition of it pave the way for common understanding and identifying the problem, which at times become a very serious issues of dispute that block the efforts to the settlement of the problem. If parties disagree on the definition and name of problem, the efforts are of no avail.

¹⁸⁰Vsevolod W. Isajiw (2000), "Approaches to ethnic conflict resolution: paradigms and Principles", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 24, pp. 105-124.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Brenda Reed singled out three elements that shows recognition is provided. These are;

- a) The party moves from self-absorption to attentiveness to others.
- b) The party becomes more open, more receptive, more responsive, and
- c) The party exercises and strengthens their capacity for responsiveness to others.¹⁸²

The three elements aim at transforming the relationship, which has disrupted during the course of conflict and it is a prior necessity before the need to negotiate specific issues. Recognition of identity is the basic feature of transforming the relationship so that parties can encounter and discuss other remaining issues.

In addition, recognition of identity entails the acceptance of legitimate goals of other side as well, which means they are entitled to be subject of talks later on. As a case in point for a long period of time Israel refused to acquiesce PLO as a legitimate representative of Palestine people and called his leader Arafat as terrorist. Thus they wouldn't meet him because they refused to meet a "terrorist" and did not take him in to consideration as negotiation counterparty. Rather they meet with other supposed PLO leaders which proved no outcome since they do not have real authority. The real power of PLO was at the hand of Arafat and he had not wished to give concession unless he would be recognized as a legitimate leader and allowed to come to negotiation table. Only after Israel begin to meet recognize PLO and its real leadership the efforts brought about 1993 Oslo accords. In Lebanon the constitution that recognize all ethnic and religious groups and entitle them with some power on their communities matters generated three decade long peace and stability to the country.

For the most part of the Republic, state policy had been to deny any recognition demands by Kurds for their identity. The main policy has been to define the issue a problem of backwardness, tribalism¹⁸³, etc. Further some attempts by politician to name the issue as Kurdish problem, were faced with severe reactions by army

¹⁸² Brenda Reed, "Empowerment & Recognition in Mediation," [available at:<http://www.mediate.com/BrendaReed/pg2.cfm>, 2004.]

¹⁸³ Yeğen Mesut; "The Kurdish Question In State The Turkish State Discourse", *Journal Of Contemporary History*, Sage Publication, London, Vol. 34(4), pp. 555-568

bureaucrats and after this reaction those attempts were relocated.¹⁸⁴ Only in 2005, President Erdoğan voiced the Kurdish reality and explicitly named it as Kurdish Question.¹⁸⁵ Although later he expressed his regret¹⁸⁶, arguably it can be said that the Kurdish de facto identity has been recognized. However, as we stressed above there must be receptiveness and responsiveness to the other which seems lacked in Kurdish issue. Governments still are hesitant and ambivalent to a fully recognition. Moreover what had done in respect to recognition does not have legal bases, which can potential to be revoked by subsequent governments.

3.3.2.2 Self-Rule

Along the same line in the institutional design of self-rule ought to be taken into consideration. Again Galtung eloquently states roughly “every nation wants to be ruled by their own kind, even if they are not kind”¹⁸⁷ Many other scholars have pointed out the importance of self-ruling arrangements such as autonomy and federalism. For example Stephan Saidman find that “federalism reduces the level of ethnic violence and Nancy Bermeo concludes that federal institutions promote successful accommodation in the case of ethnic conflict”¹⁸⁸ On the other hand other scholars argue that arrangement like territorial autonomy trigger secessionist tendencies rather than cures the national aspirations. As for that Galtung requests the alternative option of non-territorial autonomy which does not put the focus on territorial base, (regional autonomy) but rather on the identity itself. Yet still there are strong arguments regarding to territorial autonomy on the base that; territorial autonomy enable groups to determine their own affairs while at the same time

¹⁸⁴ In 1993 the Prime Minister Tansu Çiller attempted to remove some obstacles to express ethnic identity, but later she was persuaded by military high rank bureaucrat to abandon that policy. Heper Metin (2007), *The State and Kurds in Turkey The Question of Assimilation* Pgrave Mcmillian, London, p.139.

¹⁸⁵ Akyeşilmen, Nezir “Revisiting Kurdish Question In Turkey: A Hope For Solution” *The Journal of Social And Economic Research*, Selçuk Üniversitesi vol 25, 2013 p 89. Indeed a nonmilitary solution had been tried by Turgut Ozal. However those efforts came to an abrupt end when he died in 1993. Subsequent government efforts were hindered by the heavy hands of Turkish Military. Erdoğan is the first prime minister to have a policy venue free of military impact concerning to Kurdish issue.

¹⁸⁶ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-kurt-sorunu-diyerek-yanlis-yaptim,216461>

¹⁸⁷ Drawed from the class given by Galtung in Hacettepe Peace and Con poliflict studies Master Programme in 2013.

¹⁸⁸ Quoted in Wolf Stefan (2011), “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflict. The Merits and Perils of Territorial Accomodation”, *Political Studies Review*, 9(1,) p.28.

allows the majority to maintain territorial integrity and mitigate separatist tendencies.¹⁸⁹ In other words, autonomy allows both state to maintain the goal to secure territorial integrity, and minority groups to achieve their goal to decide and direct their own affairs.

In September 2014 referendum in Scotland over the independence and staying inside United Kingdom that resulted in favor of unity with UK, rather than independence had provide us with a strong and convincing proof that autonomy at times strengthen the unity of entity by accommodating different identities rather than assimilating or excluding them. The principles of “Feel At Home” and “to be ruled by its own kind” that propounded by Galtung provide a wise road map for negotiators to arrange institution that satisfy these needs. By this means for separatist wave might be eased.

It is best to make clear that, the election system of state either allows the ethnic groups to be represented in governmental bodies or to be excluded from those bodies. Thereby an agreement on election system should cover some amendments that pave the way for equal representation among groups. Self-rule thus does not limit to domestic level also can be expanded to national level as well. In other words the more equal representation in governmental power in national level, lead to more fair decision making on domestic level.

Lastly constitutional amendments to accommodate identity claims avert fragmentation of a state. Drafting a new constitution that cover major amendments ranging from language rights to election system, to decentralization on cultural and societal issues, that grant minorities with some rights, will provide minorities what they would expect to have, if they would have been separated, but without actual separation.

In the studies regarding to Kurdish issues, self-rule has been widely discussed.¹⁹⁰ Yet any arrangement of self-rule do not necessarily prescribe a secessionist outcome.

¹⁸⁹ Badran, Ramzi (2011), *A Peace Agreement Theory: Contracting For Sustainable Peace*, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Binghamton University, State University Of New York..

¹⁹⁰For examples see “*The Kurdish Question And Turkey; An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, Southgate, London, 1997.and Gürbey, Gülistan, “Peaceful Settlement Of Turkey Kurdish Conflict Through Aoutonomy?” ,in İbrahim Ferhad and Gürbey Gülistan(ed.) *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey:Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy St Martin’s Press, Newyork 2000, p57.*

Especially after the detention of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the PKK and its political wings have moderated their goals, and began to propose a democratic solution to Kurdish issue. Further they proposed a democratic autonomy that is not only regarding to Kurds, but the whole Turkey. For Turkey as well, the best solution seems to be a self-rule that is not mainly based on non-territorial options since the half of Kurdish population are already inhabited in Western cities. Particularly in an era that the neighbors Kurds are gaining extensive rights, Turkey needs to accommodate its own Kurds rising expectation. As a radical proposition would be to leave the Kurds to decide their own destination, which does not always necessarily lead to secession, but even more integration. The political system of Turkey need to be broaden to be able to accommodate the identity demand of Kurds so that the principle of “Feel at Home” propounded by Galtung can be attained. Another proposition regarding to self-rule principle in Kurdish issue is to bring elections and abolish the appointment system from Ankara city governor known as “Vali” who has great powers on city affairs, so that the duality of state and people on governmental issues be eliminated and people become the sole source of decision making mechanism.

3.3.2.3 Powerful Leadership

In the first chapter we define “elite politics” as source of internal conflict. The idea was that, it is elites are who trigger and drive the conflict for political and personal gains. In other words they exploit and making use of fault lines within society.

Endurable peace also requires good leadership that has the power to lead the societies towards peace. Powerful leaders have abilities to persuade their constituents, to start, proceed talks, and implement the possible agreement terms, convince their constituents to come to the terms with the past, and provide people the motivation and belief necessary for the process. Besides, powerful leaders can prevent possible splits within their party’s ranks, and maintain unity against possible spoilers. Thereby a charismatic leader has an extreme impact on achieving an enduring peace.

Nelson Mandela with his charismatic leadership has transformed a society that has plagued by bloodshed and painful past, to a visionary, peaceful, and tolerant society in which blacks and whites can coexist. His white counterpart De-Klerk equally contributed to this peaceful outcome. South Africa can be defined as a country that achieved peace with powerful leadership. Similarly Northern Ireland troubles also have taken the route towards a peaceful transformation, thanks to powerful leadership of both catholic and protestant parties. In 2005 the leader of pro-IRA party Sin Fein Garry Adams call to IRA for ultimate farewell to the arms and to use exclusively peaceful means was a decisive moment for the course of conflict. These examples illustrates that charismatic powerful leaders are those who have transformative impact on the masses that have deeply affected by the legacy of war. They can call on their people to suspend their hostilities and unite behind the peaceful transformation.

Secondly leaders by setting the stage for settlement run the risk of being accused of treason for talking to enemy, become vulnerable to the criticism and within their group ranks their authorities may be challenged by opponents¹⁹¹. Thereby powerful leadership may require taking those risks and putting a strong political will towards settlement. It also requires a vision for a common future for the people rather than calculations for next elections and “retaining office”. In other words powerful leadership means and necessitates risk taking for the sake of peace. Sometimes the risk may entail to acquiesce the defeat and the only person has authority to get the populace to swallow bitter pill is powerful leaders. Charles de Gaulle plays this role in 1961, when he recognize the independence of Algeria. Likewise did Marshal Petain in France and Carl Mannerheim in Finland have led their communities for similar occasion in 1940 and 1944 respectively?¹⁹² These examples obviously illustrate determination and courage of leaders during historical moments for peace is extremely significant to ward off dissents and opposition that are highly likely to emerge. The role of leaders as peacemaker has not been emphasized as much as their role as warmonger or villains in the scholarly studies. This partly stems from the fact that violence and war draw more attention than peace initiatives. To save lives,

¹⁹¹ Hartzell, Caroline A Hoddie (2007), “Crafting Peace: power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars The Pennsylvania State University Press.

¹⁹² Barash David P.,Webel,Charles P. (2014), *Peace And Conflict Studies* Sage California, p. 206.

has not as much news value, as to commit killings. Nevertheless the inspiration that a leader such Gandhi, Martin Luther K.J. or Mandela has given to their communities as well as to the world has clearly emphasized and proved the role of leaders in peace initiatives.

Ongoing peace process relating to Kurdish issue apparently could be viable thanks to powerful leaderships of both sides respectively. Influence of Erdogan on Turkish public is indisputably crucial for the maintenance of the talks and similarly the charisma of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan among PKK members and supporters have great impact on the sustainability of the process. Both have the power to lead the people that are on the opposite side of political life, towards cooperative actions aimed at bringing about enduring peace. As we mentioned before there will be some people or fraction that will not satisfy with the term of peace as is the case in Turkey as well. Especially in a country that political life is highly polarized like Turkey powerful leadership is a sine non qua of a peace solution. Otherwise the spoilers will be ready to break the hope and ruin the process. For Turkey the role of Erdogan and Öcalan should be reinforced, so that they can unite their supporters for the sake of peace. In addition to that they must give messages to other side's to gain their trust as happened in the case of South Africa. Powerful leadership sanctions the emergence of new elites to instigate future conflicts since they dominate the political area and prevent emergence of new leader. That is another elements of why the role of Erdogan for Turkish public and Ocalan for PKK is vital component of peace. Lastly both figures are over their sixties and they will want to be remembered as peacemaker of Turkey rather than to be recalled as figures of bloody past. Thereby their leadership on the issue must be more encouraged. Even though powerful leaders are not preferable for overall democratic system, it is vital for peace.

3.3.3. Reversing the Cultural and Perceptual Root Causes

3.3.3.1 Truth and Reconciliation

As a last but not least, element of enduring peace is truth and reconciliation. Group histories as we mentioned in the previous, might be the source of present conflicts.

Every war or conflict brings about extreme sufferings to the society in terms of losing lives, displacement of peoples, mass atrocities and war crimes, casualties etc. For a stable future, societies need to reconcile with their past. Cycle of violence mainly continue due to grievances, anger, frustration, and desire for vengeance that rooted in the pains of war. Societies without revealing the truth regarding to what happened in the past, and coming to the terms with that past, will transform those conflicts to the next generations.

That is why peace agreements generally followed by forming of a truth and reconciliation commissions, the task of which are to deal with past wrongdoings, encountering victims and perpetrators, heal the wounds, and creating an environment that forgiveness could take place between different factions of the society. Any refusal to exert this task will seed the saw of next war. Two or three groups alienated from one another cannot leave in a state of perpetual animosity within one unity forever. To put it differently societies which dealt with reconciliation task conceivably achieve the unity within the society whereas those who failed to carry out reconciliation proved to be highly divided societies. Reconciliation initiatives for the most part launched in intra-state conflicts, where even after war ends people continue to live in one entity together.

Lederach define reconciliation in four sequences. "Truth", "Mercy", "Justice" and "Peace"¹⁹³. Namely endurable peace is an outcome of those three elements. Again powerful leaders with robust institutional bodies can persuade society and carry those missions of revealing "Truths", "Mercy" "Justice" and "Peace."

The main problem of reconciliation regards to timing of launching truth and reconciliation initiatives. Most of studies reveal that building such commission either coincide with slightly after fight ends and term of peace determined or long after the fight ends. Whenever the reconciliation mission is being carried, it is obvious that while fighting proceed it is difficult and dangerous to launch such an initiative. That is because pains are fresh and victim and perpetrator are uncertain to define during the

¹⁹³ Lederach John Paul (1997), "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies Washington D:C. United States Institute of Peace Press..

fighting. Further such effort might trigger frustration and anger which fans flame of conflict.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was just initiated after fight ended. However Peace in Northern Ireland has never initiated such a mission except some minor efforts by some organization. It can be argued that because of reconciliation mission has not been completed Northern Ireland remained divided despite the fact that fight has ended.

Reconciliation paves the way to coexistence and harmony between former antagonists. Although reconciliation seems to be distinct process from negotiation indeed they are connected.¹⁹⁴ Reconciliation is a continuation of negotiation and it paves the way for peace that is an outcome of negotiation- to take roots among the former enemies. Thereby reconciliation is a long term task whereas negotiation is respectively a short term mission.

Institutions for the task of reconciliation sooner or later should be designed. To include terms for reconciliation in the agreement will facilitate and give a legal basis for such initiatives of reconciliation.

It has been extensively spelled in political and academics circles for a need to establish a truth and reconciliation commission for Kurdish issue. The memory of notorious Diyarbakır prison, disappearance, killings displacements throughout 1990s have generated sufferings, grievances and frustration, which still flaming the conflict. In addition to near past incidents, earlier wrongdoings such as Dersim (1938) should be addressed. Unaddressed wounds result in emergence of narratives oh history among people that is mostly hostile and tend show an insecure discourse towards state or the other group. Those attitudes reflected to behaviors or misbehaviors which then lead to misperceptions among people.

A research done by Police Academy in Turkey demonstrates that one of the motives of PKK members for joining the organization is as expressed by members

¹⁹⁴ Rossoux Valerie (2003), "Is Reconciliation Negotiable?", *International Negotiations*, Vol 18, pp. 471-493.

vengeance of a relative lost in the fight.¹⁹⁵ Reconciliation and feeling of justice and forgiveness evidently will curb the temptation to fight and for that to happen steps of truth, which refers what really happened, mercy, a feeling of empathy with other side, justice, coming to terms with the past, and peace that is enduring and stable should be taken in Kurdish issue, but all those steps entail an environment in which fight has stopped. While fight proceed it is impossible to carry out a reconciliation initiative, but peace without reconciliation will render vulnerable to re-ignition of violence and the goals of unity and harmony cannot be achieved where the society remain deeply divided.

3.3.3.2. Discourse

Many conflicts escalate or deescalate partly because of the party's representatives, leaders or proponents discourse against their adversary. Mostly rival parties use an insulting and humiliating language towards their opponents. Sometimes the derogatory rhetoric used by party reaches to the extent of dehumanization and demonization of the other. The rationale behind this usage is simply that, by attributing bad and evil traits to the adversary, unfair treatment, misdoing and injustice towards them are being legitimized. The aggressive behaviors towards the other are being provoked by this derogatory rhetoric. Putting the blame on the other, and avoiding responsibility and burden of the conflict obstruct reasonable and wisely actions by parties. Moreover presenting the world as either black or white areas - good and evil - the usage of humiliating language, functions to tighten the ranks inside the group by eliminating moderate and midway stances and turns the softs to the hardliners. Moreover by employing a particular language parties or leaders manipulate and deviate from the truth.

Likewise the discourse has effect to tame the conflict when being employed circumspectly. A language that favors peace, and deprecate aggression, will have a spillover effect both on supporters and opposite side.

¹⁹⁵ Özeren Süleyman and Others (2012), "Bireylerin Terör Örgütüne Katılmasına Etki Eden Faktörler Üzerine Bir Alan Çalışması: PKK/KCK Örneği" *International Journal of Security and Terrorism*, Cilt: 3 (2), pp..57-83.

In some occasion to keep silent is better than talking on the issue. Wise politicians are aware of their impact on their constituents and must act accordingly. Non-aggressive discourse will prepare the population to the peaceful future. Otherwise an agreement on paper without the consent of people will fail sooner or later. Non-aggressive discourse is an important component of consent. Further such a language will reinforce the trust of opponent's population towards the one who use that language as well.

In addition to well timing, discourse is also a vital element to diminish the security dilemma of the adversaries. Language partly if not wholly, reveals the parties intentions and when employed mildly, it gives a clear message to the opponent of one's willingness to reconcile and lessens the fears. Yet a demonizing and insulting rhetoric is a distinct indication of the parties' readiness to fight which in turn fuels the suspicions of either party. In the first chapter we referred to a Bourdieu's quote *that reads: "it is political leaders who emphasize the differences, who have the power of imposing the vision of divisions that is the power of making visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit"*¹⁹⁶. In fact actors do that by means of language. On the other hand they also have the power to emphasize affinities, and have the power of imposing the vision of unity that is the power of making visible and explicit social cohesion that are implicit. It is only a matter of how they employ the language and the kind of discourse they resort. For a stable peace to be achieved, a discourse that highlights cohesiveness, favors peace over violence and avoid demonizing and humiliating language, should be adopted not only by leader, but also by people who have direct or indirect relation to the conflict. When sides have suspicious perception toward one another, the worst meanings will be attached to what other says. Careless use of language thus might be quite destructive for perceptions. Parties during dialogue tend to test the other side either to validate or adjust its initial perception¹⁹⁷. Validation of negative perception becomes fact when the opponent's discourse is inattentive and demonizing. Meanwhile fears that drive the parties to misperceptions are validated and aggravated by the negative usage of language, whereas those misperceptions diminish with a positive, constructive and peaceful discourse. Simon observes that "Activity or inactivity, words or silence, all have

¹⁹⁶http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/26506/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/bba173d5-10ab-4577-8d49-60d8256e778d/en/PN04.02.pdf

¹⁹⁷ Nikolaev Alexander G. (2007), "International Negotiations: Theory Practice and The Connection with Domestic Politics", Lexington, Plymouth,, p. 24.

message value: they influence others and these others, in turn, cannot not respond to these communications and are thus themselves communicating”¹⁹⁸ Especially during the talks parties tend to be more sensitive in regards to attaching the meaning to the words and actions of other side. That is the reason why discourse has been put as a vital element for reversing cultural and perceptual factors.

Parties in Kurdish issue mainly employ a harsh discourse towards other side; especially in public statement, this harsh stance is more evident. Frequently parties blame other side¹⁹⁹ on the grounds of harboring ill will. This discourse effects grassroots perceptions as well. Occasionally the harsh rhetoric reaches to the extent of demonizing the other side, despite the fact that parties are in the process of talks. More importantly the discourses that legitimize and stress the need for continuation of armed struggle or counterterrorism policy, despite the fact that whether they are tactical or long term strategies, are not clear, the effect on the public perception is destructive, because public support is vital for a Kurdish peace. For that reason path to peace starts with a peaceful discourse of parties.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 24.

¹⁹⁹ <http://www.haberler.com/aydogan-akdogan-baris-dili-ni-kullanmali-6695013-haberi/>

²⁰⁰ Reversing economic and social factors were not touched open for those are beyond our field of study and require more technical elaboration.

CONCLUSION

Kurdish issue in Turkey has been evolving through different stages and at present it is in a phase of opportunity for resolution. The issue with its historical dynamics is a complicated matter with impacts on different dimension of political life of Turkey ranging from democracy, to culture to socioeconomic condition of people etc. Arguably a peaceful solution to the conflict will have enormous positive implication on different areas of life in Turkey. Moreover that implication without doubt will have impact on regional level as well.

As is the case in Kurdish issue most wars and conflicts occurs within state rather than between states. Especially post-Cold War era give a momentum to this situation. Most of conflicts were suppressed by greater confrontation of ideological poles. After the confrontation between USA and Soviet Union disappear the cleavages within the states have surfaced or gained momentum. Although Kurdish issue has its roots back to last period of Ottoman Empire, the most intensive widespread clashes happened through 1990s.

Intra-state conflict refers to conflict the source of which is mainly domestic and violence occurs within the border of state. However all Intra-state conflicts and wars are not in identical form. Their type extensively varies. They can be in the form of extensive armed conflict, between state and insurgent group, or intercommunal. It is possible to extend the list of types. Yet the classification of ethnic/identity based intra-state conflict and ideological based intra-state conflict, was explained due to this classification is satisfactory enough to cover main and specify main differences. Moreover the classification done by "Correlates of War"²⁰¹ to distinguish the types of war provides a helpful tool to determine whether a conflict has escalated to a civil war or not and if yes what type of war is it.

The primary difference between identity/ethnic based conflict and ideological based conflict is that in the former one allegiances to cause are more fixed and resistant to transformation and for the most part issue at stake touches to territorial issue, while in

²⁰¹ Sarkees Meredith Reid and Schafer Phil (2000), "The Correlates of War Data on War: an Uptade to 1997", *Conflict Management And Peace Science*, Vol. 18 No 1, pp.123-144.

the later one allegiances are more flexible and the issue in dispute is mostly over the type of governance and regime of state. As a subset of ethnic conflict ethno political conflicts refers to the conflicts, where motivational force emanate from ethnicity, while it is not always necessary and immediate reason for the conflict.

Regardless of the types of intra-state conflict there are four factors specified in the thesis that give rise to intra-state conflict. Those are structural factors, political factors, socioeconomic factors and cultural perceptual factors. There are three structural factors. The first weak state which refers to inability of state and state institutions to exert power, that result in a power vacuum and anarchical like situation, which then become the source of conflict. The second one is “security dilemma”, which is the outcome of vicious circle generated by parties or groups actions that provoke the other side’s fear and they feel forced to follow the suit and so forth. The last structural factor is ethnic geography. The distribution of an ethnic group over the country, the density of group or their size in the overall population of country, and kinships in neighbour country are all elements of ethnic geography, which determine the course of intra-state conflict. There are four political factors. The first is “discriminatory political institutions” that implies differences and gaps between economic and political rights of the any particular group members comparing to other groups in the political institutions, which raise grievances among discriminated groups. The second is exclusionary national ideologies that is regarding to narrow founding ideology of state that excludes some of elements or identities from its citizenship definition that invoke those excluded parts to mobilize conflict. The third political factor is intergroup relation which regards to group relation in the course of history or newly established relations. If those relations had been negative it effects present time and may seed conflict. The last political factor is elite politics, which explain the conflicts mainly as an elites driven phenomenon. To this line of thought, it is elites are who mobilise and encourage groups by exploiting the turmoil’s and grievances the mass experiencing: Namely it is argued that elites make explicit the fault lines to mobilize the conflict. Economic and social factors highlight the wellbeing of a group or society as a determinant of intra-state conflict. If ethnic lines overlap with economic deprivation the conflict become more intractable and complex. Further if a period of

development follows an enormous sharp, which is quite contrary to the expectations, this situation leads to a high vulnerability to conflict.

When we consider Kurdish issue from the lenses of above factors they seem quite relevant and explanatory for Kurdish issue. The root causes of Kurdish issue can be traced back to last period of Ottoman Empire. After the policy of centralization adopted by late Ottoman Sultans Kurdish nobles and Mirs (princes) had lost their autonomy in their region which paved the way to the subsequent rebellions throughout to the last year of Empire. The foundation of new Republic though was not against the rights of Kurds in initial years, later on brought about harsh sanctions in terms of Kurdish rights and identity. Building on the principle of nation states, Kurds found themselves excluded from the new identity of the state. Those exclusionary ideology and cultural discrimination policies that aimed at Turkification of all Muslim elements ignited the series of Kurdish rebellions that began from Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925, one of the most important and influential upheavals in Kurdish rebellions history. Nevertheless those rebellions had different motivational ground and Kurdish nationalism was only one motivational factor among others. Those rebellions were harshly crushed by governmental forces and the series of rebellions lost their momentum in 1940s. The years 1940 to 1960 passed with a quite silence in terms of Kurdish political mobility and till 1960 to 1980s the Kurdish political movement followed a policy aiming at cultural recognition and rights of Kurds within left wing and socialist Turkish parties. It is important to point that the silence year of Kurdish political activity was also the intense period of Cold War. The emergence of PKK has been a decisive moment in Kurdish political movement in terms of its effect and broadness. In effect the grave oppression exerted by 1980 military coup-d'etat gave a violent direction to Kurdish issue. Throughout 1990s in the immediate post Cold War era, an intense fight was waged between government's security forces and PKK. The fight went back and forth till 1999 when PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured by Turkey. Ocalan declared a cease fire just after his detention. Meanwhile during 2000s, Turkey efforts for EU accession paved the way for extensive reformation in constitution and laws which were mainly regards to democratization process of Turkey and specially touching to Kurdish issue. In 2004 PKK ended the cease fire, but in 2009 the government initiated a democratic

opening aimed at ending long decade Kurdish conflict. As the part of the “Opening” a state based TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish and Living Language Institute that would have departments on Kurdish language was established. The initiative ended for various reason and parties blame the other side as responsible for halting of the “opening” later the conflict escalated to a very high level in 2012 and a death fast was launched by PKK’s prisoners members. The demand of prisoner was the renewal of contact and visits with Ocalan and the right to defence in mother language in the courts. The government contact to Ocalan while the condition of the prisoner in fast became critical. Ocalan called the end to the fasts which was observed immediately by prisoners. In 21 March 2013 he made another call to PKK members to withdraw Turkish soil. Although some units of PKK began to withdraw, later the withdrawals were stopped. Talks among Ocalan, Turkish intelligence, government Kurdish party BDP and PKK leaderships are ongoing with back and forth.

Bearing in mind this historical legacy the root causes that we propounded seems highly relevant both in terms of historical context and current dynamics. When we consider structural factors weak state, security dilemma and ethnic geography is very explanatory for Kurdish conflict. The state institution remain very ineffective in Kurdish region, Security dilemma of both side has been exacerbated by a quasi-anarchical and war ridden environment of region and ethnic density of Kurds in the region and their relation with their neighbour brethren are all important element of Kurdish issue.

In terms of political factors the “discriminatory political institutions” such as the obstacle on the fair representation of Kurds in parliament, which made possible by ten percent election threshold or unintentionally exclusion of Kurds from institution because of ill education opportunities, exclusionary national ideology, which embodied in the task of establishing a homogenous identity within state and the principles of nation state that grants and favour only one dominant identity within the territory of state and “elite politics” figures like Abdullah Ocalan that are mobilizing masses on these grounds are revealing the root cause behind the conflict. “Intergroup Politics” seem to be favourable comparing to other factors. Turks and Kurds relation in history for the most part have been favourable. However, the rising encounters of Kurds and Turks in industrialized cities lead to competition and Intergroup politics gradually worsen.

When we consider socio-economic factors the Kurdish region has worsened extensively on this terms their situation ottoman era comparing to other region. Especially because ethnic lines overlap with socio economical backwardness the issue become more intractable.

Lastly when we consider cultural and perceptual factors, “cultural discrimination” policies of government had been based on assimilation and Turkification of Kurds, with non-acceptance and recognition of any cultural rights at all. Regarding to group histories and perception factors the situation tend to be negative. National symbols, memories of wars, indoctrination of nationalism have worsened the perception of Turks and Kurds towards each other.

Is there a way out from the impasses of root cause? Could those factors be reversed? The thesis proposed same policies to overcome those root causes. For structural factors, Institutionalization, security guarantees, well timing proposed as for reversing political factors identity recognition, powerful leadership and principle of self-rule are recommended whereas for cultural and perceptual factors to be overcome truth and reconciliation policy with wise discourse are suggested. When we consider Kurdish issue those policy recommendations seems to be ignored by policy makers and parties to conflict for an endurable peace.

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
I respectfully submit this for approval.


01.03.2015
Date and Signature

Name Surname: Firat GAPAN
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Department: International Relations
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ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.


Doc. Dr. Havva KER ARSLAN
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
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