Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Emmanuel BEKOLO EBOLO

Ph.D Thesis

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DEDICATION

To my wife Seraphine Mireille BEKOLO and our children:

- MOUNGOU BEKOLO Marguérie Shékina;
- EBOLO BEKOLO Barack Shalom;
- BILOA BEKOLO Godbless Ezéchias;
- and the upcoming one in a few weeks.
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Emmanuel BEKOLO EBOLO
ABSTRACT


This thesis presents a comparative assessment of the implementation of decentralization and local government reforms over the period 2004-2019 in two unitary countries influenced by the Napoleonic model of administrative system. The focus is on the degree of the government closeness to the people manifested in Turkey and Cameroon. Building on the line of comparison suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014) further continued with a far more comprehensive framework, seven main variables were assessed: the structure of local government; average size of local government; the weight of local authorities in the multi-level governance; the security of existence of local authorities; the empowerment of local governments in the political, administrative and fiscal dimensions. The study used both secondary data and primary data. The primary data were generated from semi-structured interviews conducted with thirty-three informants from twenty-seven municipalities in different cities of the two countries. The results have revealed a convergence in terms of the presence of sectoral drawbacks preventing the achievement of the highest possible closeness to people. These drawbacks are essentially the continued manifestation of administrative centralization through, among others, a low fiscal decentralization making local governments highly dependent on central government transfers, and a weak participation of citizens in the management of local affairs. However, in each of the variables comparatively assessed, there are also noticeable differences between the two countries putting Turkey in a better situation than Cameroon. Based on these findings, the study concludes with recommendations for the improvement of decentralization outcomes in either country.

Keywords:

Decentralization, Local Governments, Reform Implementation, Government Closeness to the People, Comparative Assessment, Cameroon, Turkey.
ÖZET (Turkish Abstract)


Anahtar Sözcükler

Adem-i Merkeziyet, Yerel Yönetimler, Reform Uygulanması, Karşılaştırmalı Değerlendirme, Kamerun, Turkey, Devletin Halka Yakınlığı.
RÉSUMÉ (French Abstract)


Cette thèse présente une évaluation comparative de la mise en œuvre des réformes de la décentralisation et des collectivités locales au cours de la période 2004-2019 dans deux États unitaires influencés par le modèle napoléonien de système administratif. L'accent est mis sur le degré de proximité du gouvernement avec le peuple atteint en Turquie et au Cameroun. Sur la base des critères de comparaison suggérés par Ivanychina et Shah (2014), qui ont été enrichis dans cette étude avec un cadre beaucoup plus complet, sept variables principales ont été évaluées: la structure du gouvernement local; la taille moyenne du gouvernement local; le poids des collectivités locales dans la gouvernance multi-niveaux; la sécurité de l'existence des autorités locales; l'autonomisation des gouvernements locaux dans les dimensions politique, administrative et fiscale. L'étude a utilisé à la fois des données secondaires et des données primaires. Les données primaires ont été obtenues suite à des entretiens semi-structurés menés avec trente-trois participants de vingt-sept municipalités dans différentes villes des deux pays. Les résultats ont révélé une convergence en termes de la présence d'inconvénients sectoriels empêchant d'atteindre la plus grande proximité possible avec les personnes. Ces inconvénients sont essentiellement la manifestation continue de la centralisation administrative à travers, entre autres, une faible décentralisation fiscale rendant les gouvernements locaux très dépendants des transferts du gouvernement central, et une faible participation des citoyens à la gestion des affaires locales. Cependant, dans chacune des variables évaluées de manière comparative, il existe également des différences notables entre les deux pays, ce qui place la Turquie dans une meilleure situation que le Cameroun. Sur la base de ces résultats, l'étude se termine par des recommandations pour l'amélioration des résultats de la décentralisation dans les deux pays.

Mots-clés:

Décentralisation, collectivités locales, mise en œuvre des réformes, proximité du gouvernement d’avec le peuple, évaluation comparative, Cameroun, Turquie.
ABBREVIATIONS

ADC: Animation and Development Committees
CAC: Centimes Additionnels Communaux
CG: Central Government
DEM: Directly Elected Mayor
ERP: Economic Recovery Program
EU: European Union
GG: General Government
ICT: Information and Communication Technologies
IEM: Indirectly Elected Mayor
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LA: Local Authority
LG: Local Government
NPA: New Public Administration
NPM: New Public Management
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SNG: SubNational Government
SNG-WOFI: World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment
SPA: Special Provincial Administration
UDRH: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
WB: World Bank
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE ISSUE

Highly inspired by the New Public Management doctrines, decentralization reforms that swept across the world within both developed and developing countries (Sadioglu and Dede, 2016), namely since the beginnings of the 1980s, have led a large number of governments to embark on the process of conveying powers, responsibilities and resources from central authorities to subnational tiers of government. Among the factors behind this revolution or shift in the public sector governance, there was citizens’ dissatisfaction with the public governance (OECD, 2019) under the previous era. In most of the countries worldwide, the period before the 1980s was essentially dominated by the welfare state stemming from the keynesian economic policies that have been effective since the 1930s in developed countries and have led governments to take a more active role in the administration of economic and social policies. That period also corresponded to the period of traditional public administration, or hierarchical public administration or again top-down approach of public administration in which most of all public policies applied in the whole country were decided and managed from the central government. The centralization of powers in the hands of bureaucrats during those times has led to insufficient performance in the provision of public services. There were also some discussions that since citizens better know their own needs than anyone else, they should be involved in the public decision-making process at least indirectly through their representatives as concerns matters of local interest (Görmez, 1997; Osborne and Gaebler, 1997; Kom, 2003; Güler, 2006; Öktem, 2014; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017).

One critical driver of the transformation of public governance framework is, on the one hand, to empower the elected representatives of local citizens so as to enable them to better serve with accountability the general public they represent, and on the other hand, to involve the general public in the process of local government decision-making. Against

---

1 Decentralization has entailed a big change in the paradigm of public governance through the move from a system where almost all the powers, responsibilities and resources were managed by and from the central government to a system where many of those powers, responsibilities and resources have been transferred to lower levels of government having a legal existence.
this backdrop, Turkey and Cameroon which are the focus of the present comparative study, introduced their own reform laws on decentralization and local governments since the 2000s. However, in this movement, each country has taken its own path under the influence of its geographical characteristics, historical legacies, political features, dominant culture and the prevailing socio-economic conditions (European Commission, 2016).

Many years after the adoption of these reforms, there are little comparative case studies assessing the extent to which the implementation of the reforms is delivering the targeted outcomes. The present research seeks to fill this gap, using empirical data and available official statistics for the comparison. Norton (1997) argued that local governments, through their nature, are closer to the frontiers of society and its social and environmental problems than regional and central government, and accordingly are well indicated for the identification of local needs and the appraisal of what action is needed. OECD puts that “How decentralization is designed and implemented has a major impact on its outcome. Decentralization may expand citizen participation by bringing government closer to citizens” (OECD, 2019:14). Have Cameroon and Turkey then succeeded to bring their respective government closer to their citizens? If yes, to what extent? If no, why not?

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study has one main research question and two sub-questions. The main research question is to what extent Turkey and Cameroon have moved government decision-making closer to their respective people over the period 2004-2019? The sub-research questions are : (i) to what extent are local authorities autonomous in either country; (ii) how can local governments be adequately empowered in either country to bring public decision-making closest to the citizens?

Since this work is a hypothesis-driven study and not hypothesis testing approach, the researcher main hypothesis is that the degree of government closeness to citizens

---

3 My Consulting Coach explains that “Taking an hypothesis driven approach to a problem means attempting to solve that problem by focussing on your best hypothesis as to the answer.”
manifested in either country depends on the way decentralization and local government reforms were designed and implemented. This main hypothesis has given room to the following three sub-hypotheses around which the study has been conducted:

**H1:** In either country, the government is closer or less close to its citizens, depending on the structure, the size, as well as the weight and the security of existence of local governments.

**H2:** The extent of the political, administrative and fiscal discretion manifested by local governments in either country influences the level of government closeness to their respective people. This sub-hypothesis has been the most significant in the study, because it has enabled to investigate the three interrelated and interconnected dimensions covered by decentralization.

**H3:** Since the first reform laws on decentralization and local governments were introduced in Turkey and Cameroon almost the same year, i.e. 2004, the differences between both countries in the level of government closeness to citizens might imply that the design and the implementation of those reforms have been comparatively subjected to obstacles or limitations.

To answer these research questions and hypotheses, this thesis presents a comparative evaluation of the level of government closeness or closest to citizens resulting from the design and the implementation of decentralization and local governments reforms in Cameroon and Turkey, two unitary countries that had been historically influenced by the Napoleonic model of administrative system. To further elaborate on this main purpose, four research aims were developed: (i) to critically review the literature exploring concepts related to the closeness of government to its people and common criteria for the measurement of that closeness; (ii) to investigate the level of government closeness to citizens achieved in the trajectories of the reform design in either country; (iii) to empirically investigate the degree of the government closeness to people in the real-life of each country; (iv) to understand the variance in the results between the two countries, and come out with suggestions to enhance positive outcomes.

Unit of analysis. The paper mostly built on the framework suggested by Ivanyana and Shah (2014)\(^4\) for the comparative measurement of the government closeness to its people. However, their line of comparison was further continued with a far more comprehensive framework allowing to use both secondary and primary data for the assessment. This framework posits local governments as the appropriate units for any assessment of the level of empowerment of local citizens in decision-making. As far as subnational governments are concerned, there is common sense of agreement that municipalities are the most extensively used all over the world. In effect, an OECD study of 2019\(^5\) encompassing 122 countries around the world has identified a total number of 637 900 subnational governments in those countries. Out of this number, 624 166 are municipal-entities, 11 965 are intermediate governments and 1769 are state and regional governments (OECD, 2019). As it will be shown in the next chapters, the same reality applies to both Turkey (Güll, Kamalak and Kiriş, 2016; Tan 2018) and Cameroon (Kom, 2013), where municipalities have the largest number of units among the existing subnational governments. Therefore, in this study the comparison mostly focuses on ‘municipalities’ as local government units of reference.

The objective of comparing Cameroon and Turkey was to help identify what might be learnt from one country that could usefully contribute to policy-thinking and making in the other country (Norton, 1997). Without any attempt or intention to question the autonomy and sovereignty of either state, this study proposes a look at every possible policy convergence. Bennett (1991) identified a fourfold framework of processes through which convergence might arise: “emulation where state officials copy actions taken elsewhere; elite networking, where convergence results from transnational policy communities; harmonization through international regimes; and penetration by external actors and interests”. Though the data and conclusions of this research should apply primarily to the two countries under review, the results may also serve as general

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\(^4\) In accordance with the ethical regulations of Hacettepe University, a permission was solicited and obtained from Ivanyana and Shah to utilize their framework as the basis for the comparison. This authorization is provided in annexe 6.

\(^5\) See “2019 Report World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment : Key Findings”.

background information on major aspects of the comparative assessment of the move of the government decision closer to the individuals.

1.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH

Many years after the initial adoption (in the cameroonian constitution of 1996 and the Turkish constitution of 1982) of decentralization policy, the assessment of their implementation is useful to find out whether this revolution has achieved or is achieving success in the transformation of their respective governments. While decentralization policy as such has attracted much research attention worldwide, the assessment of its outcomes in terms of the level of empowerment of local citizens’ representatives, has however, received little attention. Although Ivanyna and Shah (2014) suggested “worldwide indicators on localization and decentralization” in their study entitled “How Close Is Your Government to Its People?”, there is a scarcity of studies comparing in an extensive manner the degree of the closeness of government decision to the public. This thesis is intended to contribute to the filling of this gap by taking an important step in the direction of the comparative assessment of the empowerment of local authorities in the different fields of public decision-making so as to have a well-informed awareness on the impact of the reforms.

1.3.1 Why a Comparative Perspective for The Measurement of Government Closeness to the People?

As Norton (1997) pointed out, comparison often leads to a re-conception of national and local problems and new ideas on how they might be overcome. The transformation resulting from the implementation of decentralization points a necessity to analyze the outcomes of this policy (Jüttting, Corsi, Kauffmann, Mcdonnell, Osterrieder, Pinaud and Wegner, 2005). This certainly explains and justifies the need to investigate the level of government closeness to people from a comparative standpoint through theoretical discussions. As OECD puts it, “dysfunctional systems of decentralization are part of the

---

6 According to OECD, a system of decentralization can be said to be “dysfunctional” when there are failures due to the fact that reforms have not been properly designed and implemented, and when the multifaced dimension of the concept was not well understood. It further put that dysfunctional systems of decentralization are among the main causes of the crisis of democracies.
story behind the crisis that some democracies are facing; it is thus critical to find ways
to make systems of decentralization work more effectively” (OECD, 2019:11). One way
to make decentralization system to work more effectively is certainly the conduct of
comparative studies7. Even though the direct copying of institutions and practices applied
abroad is not recommended without a study as thorough as possible of their impacts in a
new environment, learning by comparison is essential at all levels. Fred Riggs argued that
“All subjects of Political Science and all scientific interpretations of public
administration need to be comparative”( Riggs, 2002).

1.3.2 Why the Selection of Turkey and Cameroon for the Comparison?

Although Turkey and Cameroon have many differences in terms of history, geography
features, politics, culture and economy, they also have in common some features that have
led the researcher to conduct the present comparative study. The selection of Turkey and
Cameroon was indeed guided by the following consideration: First consideration: the
two countries have, to some extent, similar historical background in terms of Napoleonic
tradition of their administrative system, even though the one of Turkey is longer and more
ancient, dating back from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century until the beginning of
the 1980s (Kapucu, & Palabıyık 2008; Keleş 2016; Öktem & Çiftçi 2016; Tan 2018;
Bakır & Ertan, 2019). Turkey therefore appears at the same time attractive and a seeded
candidate for the understanding of how a strongly centralized state for longtime has
moved to a decentralized one.

Historically and though for a shorter duration than Turkey, Cameroon is also an example
of a unitary and centralized state which also shifted to a decentralized unitary state
through a constitutional amendment of January 18, 1996. Since 1972, a Napoleonic model
of administrative system (Cobban, 1946) has been put in place in Cameroon. Local
governments then played a minor role while the unique center of decision-making was
located in the capital city8 and more specifically at the presidency of the Republic.
Inherited from France through the colonial or the mandated territory of League of Nations
period (1916-1945), the unitarian-centralized state was enforced in Cameroon until the
eve of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 (Ngongo, 1982; Meyomesse, 2008; Menkoue,

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7 i.e. the study of other systems than one’s own system.
8 The Capital of Cameroon is called ‘Yaoundé’.
2015), when the country adopted decentralization thereby devolving significant functions to local governments.

Furthermore, Cameroon and Turkey constitutionally adopted a decentralized form of the state. As a result, turkish and cameroonian public administrations are organized in terms of central management (which is also called general administration or central administration) and local management (also called local government or local administration). In addition to having together France as a role model of the administrative system, both countries their first reform laws related to decentralization and local government reforms in almost the same period (2003-2005), providing *ipso facto* an objective temporal basis for the comparison of their implementation.

**Second consideration:** both countries have experienced the influence of some similar factors for change. The so-called factors are external and internal. Within the first category of factors, the common influence of NPM doctrines and the role of international financial institutions (WB, IMF) can be cited. In effect, the local government policy was part of the decentralization program prescribed to governments by the WB and IMF as a part of the broader economic recovery program (ERP) considered as a panacea for the deplorable economic conditions of the borrowing countries. The local government policy could, therefore, be regarded as a developmental strategy for countries referring to those institutions.

Likewise, in the domestic sphere of the two countries, there was an increasing demand for change, because some influent grassroots associations were claiming the right to manage local affairs by their locally elected representatives⁹. In Turkey, Sözen (2012) recalls that:

> “the strong political commitment and leadership demonstrated with regard to the restructuring of public administration by the government set up by ‘AKP’¹⁰, which secured a landslide majority of seats in Turkish Grand National Assembly ... at the general elections of November 3, 2002 and 22 july 2007, played an important role in pursuing administrative reforms. Administrative reform has been one of the key priorities of AKP governments. Besides, the growing demands and expectations for better provision of public services raised by various segments of the society and mainly by the business world and non-governmental

⁹ Further explanations about the endogenous demand for change in Turkey and Cameroon are provided in Section 7.5 of chapter two of the thesis.

¹⁰ AKP means in English Justice and Development Party. It is the political party in power in Turkey since 2002.
organizations (NGOs), were also influential in making administrative reform happen”.

In Cameroon, bringing government decision closer to citizens or increasing citizens’ involvement in local affairs management has become more than a stake for the safety and unity of the country. The successful implementing of decentralization is more than ever regarded as a condition for peace and stability of Cameroon.

Third consideration: As a country with an impressive and unstoppable emerging economy which was not that much different to Cameroon some decades ago as regards economic level, Turkey seems to be a good candidate for the comparison with Cameroon. This comparison may allow to find out most successful example(s) of the bringing decision making closer to the citizens, so that national and local policy-makers in either country might draw inspiration from these examples and adapt their own needs. Such a perspective will provide evidence of beneficial opportunities for change, even though it is hard to exactly replicate other people or communities’experience. There are almost always constraints requiring the adaptation of imported ideas to national and local realities (Lidstrom, 1998). This comparative perspective can achieve this aim with the findings it offers.

1.3.3 Evolution of Some Socio-Economic Features of Turkey and Cameroon that Need to be Considered and Explained

The exploitation of some available data shows that socio-economic characteristics of each country were subjected to some evolutions that should not be meaningless in this study in so far as they can somehow be related to some missions, functions and practices assigned to local authorities\textsuperscript{11} as shown \textit{infra}. Thus, table 1 gives the evolution of GDP per capita in Cameroon and Turkey between 2004 (the year of the introduction of the main reform laws in the two countries) and 2017, as well as the resulting difference in GDP in each year. Table 2 presents the evolution of poverty headcount ration in the two countries.

\textsuperscript{11} We have employed the terms “..can somehow be related…to local authorities” in this sentence because to our knowledge, there is no study neither in the case of Turkey nor in the case of Cameroon showing that decentralization policy has had an impact on the evolution of the socio-economic situation of the concerned country. Future studies in this issue would be welcome to explain whether they can be related, taking account of the data available.
countries. Table 3 outlines the evolution of the Human Development Index (HDI) in the two countries between 2005 and 2017.

Table 1: Evolution of the GDP per Capita (in US $) in Cameroon and Turkey from 2004 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>Increase in GDP between the years 2004 and 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5220</td>
<td>9580</td>
<td>11880</td>
<td>11230</td>
<td>10930</td>
<td>5710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>8320</td>
<td>10490</td>
<td>9830</td>
<td>9300</td>
<td>5300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Data Base.

Table 2: Comparison of the ratio’s evolution of poverty headcount (in % of population) at national poverty lines in Cameroon and Turkey between 2007 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in %</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Comparison of HDI trends in Turkey and Cameroon from 2005 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUR</td>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>TUR</td>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>TUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP data base, Human Development Index Reports

* In 2017, Turkey is globally ranked 64 in terms of HDI

According to the United Nation Development Programme, the Human Development Index (HDI) was created to emphasize that the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country should be people and their capabilities. The HDI can also be used to question the choices of national policy, asking, for instance, how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes. These contrasts can stimulate debate about priorities of government policy.
1.4 METHODOLOGY

To better address the afore mentioned research questions and hypotheses, the study adopted a qualitative research approach that will be further explained in chapter three. This approach included firstly an exploitation of secondary or previously collected data accessible in documents such as books, journal articles, official documents, research works, newspapers, and on-line sources. These materials allowed the author of this research to try to figure out the level of government closest to citizens as a result of the reforms’ design. Secondly, extraction of primary data was made through a field research conducted under the form of semi-structured interviews with some informants in Turkey and Cameroon, selected randomly among mayors, municipal council members, municipal administrators from seventeen municipalities in three cities in Turkey and ten municipalities in the two main cities of Cameroon. The purpose of these interviews was to extract participants’ evaluation, interpretation and experiences with respect to the subject matter. The interview questions were organized around six main topics related to the three interconnected dimensions that decentralization covers as already mentioned above. These topics were: (i) allocation of powers, (ii) supervision of local authorities, (iii) democratic local governance, (iv) local finances, (v) local human resources, and (vi) practical recommendations to enhance outcomes.

1.5 STUDY COVERAGE AND CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

In dealing with the reforms in question, the study provides the clarification and the understanding of the following covered and related concepts:

1.5.1 Administrative Reform and Local Administration Reform

Public administration as a subject is very dynamic and not static. It keeps changing with changing times. Right now, what we are studying might not be the trend twenty years later. It might be something else. For example, in 1887 when Woodrow Wilson first gave the idea of starting a science of public administration, he was responding to his time. He
wanted to purify public administration from the clashes of politicians. In the late 1960s when Dwight Waldo launched a call for new public administration, he was keeping in view the turbulent times of those moments. In a similar manner, NPM considered as the second reinvention of public administration, was a product of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This movement gave rise to accelerated decentralization policies and local government reforms in an era dominated by what have been called “LPG”, i.e., Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization. Hence the concept of administrative reform. The ideas, techniques, processes surrounding administrative reform in general also apply to local administration reform given that the second is a derivative of the first.

Although the expression “administrative reform” is widely used in the literature related to public sector management, it has not a universally agreed definition. The concept has been defined differently by authors. Thus, according to Montgomery (1969), administrative reform is “a political process aiming at adjusting the relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in a society, or within the bureaucracy itself...Both the purposes of reforms and the evils addressed vary with their political circumstances”. For Caiden, administrative reform covers three properties which are interrelated. The first is “moral purpose”; it emphasizes the importance and necessity of improving the status quo by removing alleged faults. The second is “artificial transformation”; it points a total differentiation from the existing arrangements and the adopted policies. Finally, the third is “administrative resistance”, when opposition to the change is assumed (Caiden, 2017).

According to Owejaiye (1981), “administrative reform is generally used to describe activities which actually go far beyond its salient meaning. It is conceived as directed action. Administrative reform is defined here as those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices, structures and behaviors within it.” (Public management) reform has been defined by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017) as “Deliberate attempts to change the structures, processes, and/or cultures of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better.”

In the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Public Administration, Gow (2012) defines ‘administrative reform’ as “a conscious, well-considered change that is carried out in a public sector organization or system for the purpose of improving its structure, operation or the quality of its workforce”. He cited Caiden (1968) who wrote that “man should not
wait for changes to take place naturally but should seek to speed, by artificial means, improvements in the world order.” He further explains that administrative reform has a political dimension which is critical, because decision to change things needs to be finally taken by those who have the political power. The latters can be reluctant to pass the asked reform when they believe it might harm their interest or ideology. Administrative reforms may be instigated by periods of crisis or national trauma. They can also be grown from the work of a “research branch or one or more line units charged with delivering products or services”. Generally administrative reforms originate from outside the administration.

Based on what precedes, the following figure was drawn to present an incremental life cycle of decentralization applicable to all its aspects and outcomes:

![Incremental Life Cycle of Decentralization](image)

**Figure 1:** Incremental model of decentralization life cycle applicable to all its aspects and outcomes.

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13 For instance, the École libre des sciences politiques was established by the French government in the aftermath of its defeat during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Earlier before in Great Britain, namely in 1855, a set of reforms creating an upper tier of civil servants to be recruited on the basis of examinations was enacted in an atmosphere of recriminations over the poor performance of the country's armed forces during the Crimean War. In 1883 in the USA, the Civil Service Commission was established, and the system of civil service entrance examinations was introduced in reaction to the assassination of President Garfield by a rejected office-seeker.
1.5.2 Decentralization and Local Government Reforms

A newsletter published by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo on April 5, 2005 argues that although decentralization and local government reforms are sometimes confused and evoked as synonymous, they differ from one another on many points. For instance, "where local government reform is about enabling localized communities to better administer issues than to present municipal governments, decentralization is a transfer of central powers to lower levels of government". Decentralization also entails transfer of some powers and functions from central authorities to subnational authorities. Sadioglu and Dede (2016) write that the reform of local governments came to the agenda through downsizing, transformation, decentralization and deregulation of the welfare state.

The present study used both concepts in a complementary manner in so far as they all are applicable to the context of the two countries under review. Both countries are engaged in the process of decentralization and seek to establish a genuine local governance. In Turkey, reform initiatives concerning local administration stand at the heart of the government reform agenda whose objective is to strengthen quality of service delivery to citizen alongside with a greater responsiveness to the needs and expectations from disadvantaged groups (Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government, United Nations., & IASIA, 2007).

1.5.3 Relations between Central and Local Governments

Central-local relations are critical in the decentralization process. In effect, the allocation of powers and responsibilities between these two tiers of authorities is one of the essential factors influencing the success or not of the reforms. As Acar (2016) puts it, in the relations between the two-levels of government, there might be informal dynamics playing a more significant role than the formal powers and functions distributed between them. For this reason, analysis should be deeply undertaken on the interactions between different actors and the interplay of various factors across a range of both formal and informal issues.

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14 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Pajollari (2017) points out that: “Central-local relations have a considerable importance on their own because they make the decentralization process possible. In a country where the relations between the central and local authorities are well balanced, decentralization process moves forward in a more confident manner”. He further asserts that “when we give a look at the theoretical aspect of decentralization and the relations between central government and local authorities, we understand that the more they are developed, the better a country performs politically and economically”. The dynamics of central-local relations entail the taking into consideration of different issues such as: the administrative trusteeship on legal acts of local authorities; the protection of local authorities against the improper or excessive use by the central government of his supervision and control powers; the role of the central state representative at the local level; human resource; local finance.

Keleş (2016) indicates that relationships between the different levels of authorities is governed by the principle of the existence of sub-national authorities guaranted by the Constitution and law. The law should specify the powers, responsibilities and duties of local authorities as well as their relationships with higher tiers of government. The responsibilities of local authorities should be full in matters of interest to the local citizens, except where the law provides otherwise. Local governments should have complete and exclusive powers that must be respected by other authorities. They should be controled and supervised only in conformity with the procedures and conditions established by constitutional and legal provisions. The supervision of local authorities should respect their autonomy and should be limited to the verification ‘a posteriori’ of their acts and decisions. The suspension or dismissal of local authorities or councils should not be arbitrary and should depend on and carried out with due respect to the terms, conditions and procedures specified by the law.

For Saunders (1982), “Clearly, the problem of central-local relations will differ according to one’s perspective”. It therefore means that the problems of Turkey and Cameroon will not totally be the same. But they may have common characters. In the framework of central-local continuum, some authors have suggested potential areas of

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16 Well developed in terms of coordination and clarity in the share of powers, duties and responsibilities between the two categories of institutions.

17 Central-local continuum can be defined by referring to the fact that in many countries, different aspects are either delegated to local authorities or kept at the central level.
conflict that are part of the focus of our comparison. As far as Cameroon is concerned, Kofele-Kale (2011) evokes the following areas: (i) administrative relationships between the two tiers of authorities with consequences on local autonomy, (ii) division of powers in which tensions can be felt owing to the inadequate financial resources that should accompany the responsibilities transferred, (iii) role of the state’s representatives in local governance which is likely to create concern about the effectivity of political decentralization due to the submission to their prior approval of many important acts of local councils (such as municipal budget, personnel recruitment, loans, etc.) before they enter into force, (iv) the possible appointment of civil servants to carry out the tasks of elected representatives thereby hampering the principle of democratic local governance.

In a similar vein, Güney and Çelenk (2010) note in the Turkish case that “the share of powers and competences between the central and local levels has been to the advantage of the former, especially with the principle of administrative tutelage that governs the relations between the two levels” Thus, potential areas of difficulties in the Turkish central-local continuum are the following: (i) financial relationship where the patron-client relationship is likely to exist in which local finances largely depends on the centre, (ii) administrative tutelage.

1.5.4 Reform Objectives

With the adoption of decentralization reforms, it is expected that local authorities become empowered and therefore act on the behalf of their constituencies by creating wealth and jobs, effectively fighting inequality, and tackling other serious challenges of local development (Commission of the European Communities, 2000; African, 2016). If local authorities are effectively empowered, they can play a significant role and enable the achievement of the main objectives of decentralization reforms which are improved efficiency in service delivery, local democracy, local governance and local development. Those concepts are further and well detailed in the chapter three of the thesis.

An important external driving factor for the recent administrative reform in Turkey has been its aspiration for full membership of the EU, especially since Turkey was granted status as a candidate country at the Summit of the European Council held in Helsinki in December 1999 (Sözen, 2012).
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The present report is organized in six chapters. The first provided a backdrop for the study and the research problem. It highlighted that one main thrust of decentralization is bringing public decision closer to the individuals. So many years after the adoption of this ‘quiet’ revolution, assessments of its outcomes need to be carried out. The purpose of the study was explained, and the main research question and secondary questions were formulated.

The second chapter offers a literature review exploring the rationale for moving public decision closer to the individuals through decentralization. This closeness includes both spatial proximity and political proximity, even though a bigger emphasis is put on the second one. A framework is developed for the measurement of the closeness of government to the people. The chapter clarifies decentralization which is a multidimensional and complex concept that covers three interdependent and interconnected dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal.

The third describes the research methodology. It underlines that a comparative case study method was utilized and several qualitative sources of information were used to support the findings and conclusions. Secondary data were collected from library materials including on-line sources, official documents, government reports. Primary data were extracted from semistructured interviews held with some key informants in both Turkey and Cameroon. Chapter three also highlights techniques utilized for data analysis and addresses the question of validity and reliability.

The fourth offers a comparison of the level of empowerment of local authorities resulting from the design of decentralization and local government reforms in both countries. It builds on the examination of constitutional, legislative and regulatory provisions on decentralization and local government in either country. For certain aspects, data for the measurement and comparison are taken from some official sources.

Chapter five complements the comparative measurement of the government closeness to the people in the design of decentralization and local government reforms by an additional approach, which includes empirical evidence from a field research. It determines the real magnitude of decentralization from the viewpoint of interviewed practitioners in both
countries. Chapter five tries to properly capture the reality on the field by finding out the gap between informants’ expectations and the actual outcomes.

Finally, chapter six provides a summary of the study. It also suggests recommendations proposed by the experts interviewed in this study for improving decentralization outcomes. The study’s limitations are indicated. Likewise prospects for future research are proposed.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW: RATIONALE FOR THE BRINGING OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING CLOSER TO THE CITIZENS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a survey of academic works on government closeness to the people and presents a framework for the comparative assessment of that closeness across countries. In effect, there is neither a monocausal explanation for the moving of government closer to the people nor a common sense of agreement among authors about the criteria used to comparatively measure the level of this closeness. However, in order to carry out such comparative studies, it is important to have or define a set of terms and concepts to serve as a reasonable basis for the comparison. Because decentralization is a concept which is multidimensional and complex, embracing a wide range of aspects political - policy, functional, administrative, fiscal and more (Hutchcroft, 2001; Schneider, 2003; Montero and Samuels, 2004), conclusions reached by people about its extent can be different depending on the aspect(s) the authors examine or focus (Jaewon Yoo, 2018).

2.2 WHY THE MOVE OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE: ONE MAIN THRUST OF DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS

After the observation, in the late 1970s, of the failure of the Keynesian economic policies promoting the welfare state, public administration worldwide has experienced a fundamental reform advocating the roll-back of state, the end of the top-down approach in public administration, the market-based public administration, the development and implementation of bottom-up approach and decentralization. Rooted in “New Public Management” ideas, the concept of decentralization has been subjected to a lot of definitional distinctions given by both scholars and governments.
2.2.1 The Definition of Decentralization in the Literature

There is no single definition of decentralization in the literature - there are rather many in such a way that it is merely unfeasible to list here all definitions and their authors. However, it can be said that all these definitions are somehow close to each other, and for this reason we refer here to definitions that highlight the major components of the concept.

In their book titled “Introduction to Comparative Public Administration”, Kuhlman and Wollmann (2019) provide interesting contributions with respect to the concept of decentralization. They first define it as the devolution of responsibilities for policy/decision-making and of administrative functions from the (central or national) state administrative level to subnational levels. The recipient being what they call later a local government unit. Kuhlman and Wollmann (2019) then distinguished two types of decentralization: first, ‘political decentralization’ in which “political decision-making powers and responsibilities are transferred along with the respective administrative functions, in particular with regard to the specific tasks, while a direct intervention by the state administration in the form of supervisory control is ruled out”. Second, ‘administrative deconcentration’ which is “an essentially administrative concept and notion referring to the transfer of state functions, including budgetary and in some cases human resources, from central state institutions (ministries, authorities) to subnational and local (deconcentrated) state or semi-state administrative units”.

In a study titled “Different forms of decentralization and their impact on government performance: Micro-level evidence from 113 countries”, Goel, Ram, Mazhar and Nelson (2017) distinguishes four forms of decentralization that are administrative decentralization, federalism, fiscal decentralization, and aggregate decentralization. To them, we add political decentralization which refers to a form of governance mostly based on a semi-autonomous status recognized by constitutions to local units without national identity, but with semi autonomy. In the administrative decentralization, legislative and judicial powers are not gathered, because local administrations only have "executive" or “administrative” powers or functions. Administrative decentralization has two components: functional decentralization or decentralization by service in which the provision of certain public services is done by an independent organization (e.g.: universities, etc.), and the territorial decentralization in which it is possible to adequately meet the common and local needs of residents through organs designed by themselves.
and having some autonomy (e.g.: municipalities). Fiscal decentralization implies allocation of spending and revenue responsibilities to lower levels of government (the World Bank). Federalism is a highly developed form of decentralization, because local governments are autonomous in the different matters devolved to them. However, in this study, the dimensions of decentralization which are repeatedly used are political, administrative and fiscal.

Among the scholars, perhaps the most comprehensive definition of decentralization is given by Rondinelli, et. al. (1981) according to whom decentralization is “the transfer of responsibilities for planning, management, resource-raising and allocation from the central level of government to (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies; (b) subnational government units; (c) semi-autonomous public corporations or authorities; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs/PVOs.” This definition includes all the various types or faces of decentralization. However, in the framework of this thesis, the research attention is focused on decentralization towards the category of lower level of government called “local government”. According to Yoo (1994), decentralization was the solution to cure the breach caused by centralism and restoring democracy.

Boex and Yilmaz (2010) note that decentralization is gradually understood as the empowerment of individuals through the granting of powers and rights to their local representatives to perform various acts on behalf of them so as to improve the public service provision. They add that a broader check is desired in order to appraise whether decentralization policy is successfully empowering the citizens through decentralized entities. According to these authors, achieving effective local government empowerment requires the interrelated aspects or dimensions of decentralization to work hand-in-hand, i.e., fiscal, political and administrative.

2.2.2 Decentralization in the Institutional and Legal Environment of Cameroon and Turkey

The Constitution of Cameroon provides in its first article that the country is a “decentralized unitary state”. Thereafter, the law on general orientation of decentralization provides that this term refers to a “devolution by the state of special powers and appropriate resources to regional and local authorities to enable them to
In addition to those aims of decentralization mentioned both in the Constitution and laws, it appears today relevant to add that successful implementation of decentralization has become a prerequisite to mitigate separatist tendencies and to maintain peace and security in some developing countries including Cameroon. For instance, Antwi-Boasiako & Csanyi (2014) wrote that the overall reluctance to decentralize in Soudan had resulted to the incidence of civil wars and separatist tendencies in the country. This resulted in separating the South from the North and it might lead to more demands of separation by other marginalized regions in Darfur and the East.

In Turkey, the Constitution already proclaims that “the organization and functions of the public administration are based on the principles of centralization and decentralization”. Since 2004, Turkish government had launched decentralization reforms. These led to the enactment of several laws on the subject matter. They increased the autonomy and resources of local authorities and aimed at reorganizing the tasks’division and the relationships with central government authorities. Agence française de développement, Bayraktar, and Massicard (2011) assert that “these reforms represent substantial change, since there had previously been practically no intermediate level between the central government and the people, and the centres of decision-making in Ankara constituted serious bottlenecks that were regularly circumvented”. The programme of the 59th government of Turkey well develops its understanding of decentralization by clearly stating that:
“the fundamental principle will be local delivery of public services, taking into account both national priorities and local differences. Services that do not need to be provided by the central government will be transferred to local governments, along with their resources. Strong emphasis will be placed on democratization at the local level; central control over local elected bodies will be limited to control over legal matters” (TBMM, 2003).

2.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE ERA OF DECENTRALIZATION

Basically, decentralization implies empowering subnational authorities to ultimately empower the individuals (UN. ESCAP. Secretariat, 2006). Strengthening local authorities can lead to an increase of the performance in public service provision (Curristine, Lonti and Joumard, 2007), because they help to reduce the load shouldered by the state by avoiding “apoplexy” at the centre and paralysis at the extremities (Odilon Barrot et l’abbé de Lamennais, 1848). Local government was defined by Sills in the International Encyclopaedia (1972) as “a public entity which is a sub-unit of a state or of a region, charged with the responsibility of carrying out certain public policies in a relatively small territory”.

In the Constitution of Turkey, local governments are presented as “public corporate bodies established to meet the common local needs of their inhabitants, and whose principles of constitution and decision-making organs elected by the voters are determined by law”19. They are granted administrative and financial autonomy for carrying out their duties even though the levels of that autonomy is criticized as we will see later in this paper.

The Constitution of Cameroon does not openly use the term “local government”, but rather “local authorities” which is synonymous with the first one in so far as they are legal persons of public law, enjoying the autonomy mentioned above, for the management of local interests20 and freely administered by elected assemblies who deliberate as per

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19 See article 127 of the Turkish Constitution.
20 See article 55 of the Cameroonian Constitution.
the conditions set by the law. Powers are devolved to them in subject matters “necessary for their economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sport development”. Consequently, the two terms “local governments” and “local authorities” are then interchangeably used in this thesis.

The rapid urban development and industrialization of the society have paved the way for the formation and empowerment of local authorities. Idem for the increase of the rates of literacy which have been utilized as an excuse during a considerable amount of time to justifying the postponement of the setting up of local authorities in some underdeveloped countries. Apart from that, the impact of local government on the economic and social development is another reason elucidating the necessity of their existence (Maddick, 1963).

The powers exercised by these entities are not “original”, but rather stem from the sovereign state. Local government systems do not have the same structures and functions in all the countries. As already mentioned above, their design is influenced by historical, geographical, political, cultural, social, economic and administrative factors of every country.

In the world, four main systems of local government can be distinguished (Keleş, 2016). Their knowledge is very useful in so far as it may enable to answer the question of whether there exists a “best or most ideal” system likely to inspire countries who constantly want to improve their own system. The first system is influenced by the Napoleonic model and has the following characteristics: local authorities enjoy a constitutional backing for their existence and all of them have equal status in the constitution; there is the practice of tutelage over local authorities by the state representative; local authorities are technically supported by the various deconcentrated services of the state in the framework of public service delivery. The existence of local authorities in countries having this first system is more politically motivated than it is motivated by a real desire to enhance the quality of public service rendered to citizens (Hesse and Sharpe, 1991).

The second main system is influenced by the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Here, there is no constitutional recognition of the existence of local authorities which are rather created by the law. Local authorities are neither controlled nor supervised by the central government. In theory, the entities representing the state at the national or federal level do not intrude
on the performing of local services. Some countries applying this system are the UK, the USA, Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and Ireland.

The third category of local governments is constituted by countries of Northern and Central Europe. There are similarities with Anglo-Saxon system as concerns the relationships between local and central authorities. Local governments have general competence to deal with all matters of local interest, a constitutional status and a large autonomy.

The fourth and last system is composed of countries from the former socialist block created by Lenin and Stalin efforts. They have traces of communist regimes as follows: local authorities have no autonomy in the real sense; executive and legislative powers were nearly integrated in these nations encompassing countries of Central and Eastern Europe i.e.: Yugoslav Republic, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. However, this system is undergoing profound transformations since the 1990s to progressively align with decentralization policy and requirements.

From the explanations provided supra, it appears that the two countries under investigation, i.e. Cameroon and Turkey, can be classified the first category of local government.

2.4 THEORIES PROVIDING RATIONALE FOR DECENTRALIZATION POLICY AND THE CLOSENESS OF GOVERNMENT TO THE INDIVIDUALS

Many theories have provided rationale for decentralization and the need for empowering local citizens through their representatives. The ideal scenario for the occurrence of the solicited citizen participation is direct democracy. A study of Asatryan and al. (2015) shows that direct democracy activities are associated with more efficiency of the government than the inverse. However, direct democracy is difficult to implement largely due to the size of certain geographical areas and populations in various countries. Therefore, indirect or representative democracy is widely applied at different levels of government within countries. Stigler (1998) asserted that a representative government works better when it is closer to its people. The representative system allows elected assemblies to make decisions on the behalf of the general public. Therefore, the question
at stake is to know in which circumstances elected councils better represent the populations of their communities, and moreover, what mechanisms can enable voters to participate in decision-making outside the periodical voting of council members and mayors?

2.4.1 NPM Doctrines

After the New Public Administration (NPA) of the late 1960s, NPM is the second reinvention of public administration. It is a product of the early 1990s. The term “New Public Management” was used for the first time in 1991 by Christopher Hood. In 1992, Osborne and Gaebler also mentioned it in the book titled: “Reinventing Government”.

NPM can be interchangeably used with other names like “Managerialism” (Pollitt), “Entrepreneurial Government” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), and “Market-based Public Administration”.

Four main reasons have led to the emergence of NPM. First, that era was dominated by what have been called ‘LPG’21, and it was marked by the rise of neo-liberalism which meant roll-back of the state and downsizing of the government. Second, there were ‘Thatcherism in the United Kingdom (UK) marked by reforms privatizing almost all the public sector organizations, and ‘Reaganomics’ in the USA in the 1980s characterized by similar reforms than in the UK. Third, several drawbacks of traditional Public Administration have also contributed to the rise of NPM. These are, among others, emphasis on rules, principles and structures, red tape, bureaucratization, closed system not keeping in touch with society, wasteful expenditure, poor quality and higher prices of services delivered. Fourth, the lending conditionalities of the IMF and the WB) contained obligations for the recipients countries to embrace and apply an array of NPM principles.

With the help of international financial institutions cited above, NPM reforms have been implemented worldwide. NPM aims at three Es, i.e., Economy, Efficiency and Effectivity (Pollitt and Boukaert, 2017) in the delivery of public service. It expanded internationally and was opposed to the top-down and hierarchical character of the traditional public administration. Influenced by the New Right Philosophy, NPM advocates decentralization and the incorporation of the principles, techniques and practices of

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21 LPG means Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization.
private sector in the public sector management. Matei and Chesaru (2014) underline that NPM guided reforms are intended to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in the utilization of public resources. The concept of NPM emerged as a solution to the structural and managerial problems encountered in the public sector such as centralized bureaucracies, the size of government, inadequate mechanisms of accountability, waste and inefficiency in public resource utilization (Kalimullah, Alam et al. 2012).

Among the most important features of NPM related to decentralization policy, there is the focus on efficient public management which means that public organization, for instance, municipalities, should deliver to citizens goods and services of a high quality. There is also the goal that managers of public organizations should have the necessary freedom or autonomy to manage their resources in order to achieve services of great standards as well as an increased satisfaction of clients. Here, the people should be active citizens and not just passive recipients.

Moreover, the central government should have a limited role which will result in better governance through the retreat of the state, the privatization, contract management and decentralization. As Osborne and Gaebler put it: “Governments that are tall, sluggish, over-centralised...don’t work well”. For this reason, they further assert that: “We don’t need more governments, we need better government. To be more precise, we need better governance”. Governance has been defined by Sahni and Vayunandan (2010) as the “act of collectively solving our problems”.

According to Hope (2001), NPM reforms are expected to bring structural and institutional changes aimed at maximizing allocative and productive efficiencies held back by public agencies, namely the bureaucrats who are characterized by the selfish incentives of expanding their administrative spheres and budget while being unresponsive to citizens demands. NPM has then come to identify “a series of methods aimed at reforming the organization and processes of the public sector in order to provide quality services to citizens and make it more efficient and effective in the resource utilization and service delivery” (Promberger and Rauskala, 2003). To this end, the top-down model and pyramidal approach of traditional public administration should be changed into flattened structures and hierarchies. Thus, NPM favours decentralization by advocating the reduction of central agency controls. Within decentralization, the public manager is
suggested to obtain the best possible employees through proper planning, selection and training.

Many scholars have conducted empirical studies that have shown the importance of NPM in bringing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the general government and in local administration in particular, on the basis of the application of business management approaches. Among those studies, we can cite Zaharia (2012) who finds that the adoption of the ideas, techniques and practices of private sector has accelerated the transformation process of the classical and bureaucratic public administration of Romania and Switzerland into governments which are responsive to community needs. Concerning the Swiss case, his study reveals that over one-third (precisely 34.7%) of municipalities apply many elements of NPM ideas in such a way that 25.3% of municipalities have already implementated NPM inspired measures. Zaharia therefore concludes that the overcoming of poor performance and situations of the two countries’ local government required introducing NPM new ideas and concepts.

Similarly, in an exploratory study conducted on administrative reforms and performance of local public policies, Santos Curto and Dias (2014) explain the relationship between the reform of regulation and the municipal revenue collections in Portugal. Their research employed a grounded theory method and information on local administration structure and the level of partnership with the private sector. They found that when the participation of private sector organizations is increased in local public policies, it has a direct consequence in terms of less reliance on state budgets, for instance.

Likewise, Hammerschmid and Van de Walle (2011) discussed two constituents of NPM inspired reforms, namely, the “managerial creativity and innovativeness” on one side, and the “changes in the role of government and citizens”, on the other side. They concluded that while changes in the role of government and individuals have remained critical, many academic researchers focus on managerial innovation within the public sector.

These considerations and explanations on New Public Management well apply to both Turkey and Cameroon in so far as the two countries are also concerned with structural and managerial issues. The critical character of the prevailed problems together with the imposition of Brettonwoods institutions, forced the government of the two countries to adopt decentralization and local government reforms.
2.4.2 Public Choice Approach

Public Choice simply means more choice to the people in terms of public services. Essentially a critique of the bureaucratic model of administration, public choice theory or approach (PCT/PCA) was developed by a number of eminent scholars in different ways. PCT basically has to deal with the possibility of “institutional pluralism” in public service delivery. PCA is against the monopoly of government in the public service provision.

Vincent Ostrom, one of the key proponents of PCT puts that “democratic administration is more efficient than bureaucratic administration” i.e., hierarchical administration or top-down administration. He asserted that “perfection in bureaucracy will reduce the capability of larger administrative system to respond to the varied preferences among citizens for many different public services”. Vincent Ostrom clarified his position against excessive centralization and in favor of decentralization. PCT pleads for a range of diverse organizational arrangements for the delivery of diverse public services.

As one of the two defining pillars of NPM, PCT is also one of the theories advocating decentralization. It emerged together with the criticism against the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s. Its major promoters like Ostrom, Buchanan, Tullock, Niskanen, argued that the keynesian economic policies exausted state’s resources and accordingly government’s authority had to be dispersed towards other levels of government in order to share the administrative burden. More concretely, central government administrations should transfer powers and functions to lower tiers of government (Martinez Vazquez, 2011).

PCT is essentially a state-reducing doctrine which promotes market expansion on the ground that government decision-making is not based on individual citizen’s interests but rather on citizens collective interests. PCA is also against the theory of public interest, because they believe that the obvious result of public interest approach is the “state overload” which normally entails the need for the broadening of the public sphere. The consequences of the state overburden are: the machinery of government becomes

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22 Bureaucratic model of administration means a hierarchical administration, a top-down model which is mainly driven by rules and principles.
23 Institutional pluralism means plurality of institutions. There should be more institutions in the public service provision.
unavoidably large; no compulsion to innovate or raise the quality and reduce costs due to the absence of competition. Contrariwise, the government machinery becomes inefficient because of the increases of bureaucracy powers threatening democracy. Civil servants have no incentives to perform and citizens have no freedom of choice.

2.5 OVERVIEW OF SOME CONCEPTS RELATED TO GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING CLOSER TO PEOPLE

As we continue our research here, there is the need to review some basic concepts that cannot be avoided; these are local autonomy, local democracy, local governance and local development. Each one of these interrelated concepts is useful for a comprehensive study and understanding of decentralization and closeness of government to the people.

2.5.1 Local Autonomy

According to Clark (1984) and Gurr and King (1987), local autonomy is “the power of local governments to act upon their own objectives without any constraints from higher-level government”. Local autonomy is also the freedom of local authorities to operate in an independent manner with regard to the central government and to manage themselves without prior notice from other levels of government, while fulfilling their public local responsibilities and duties according to the management principles.

The argument behind local autonomy is to increase the responsibilities of local administrations towards the public grounded on local government taxation and their duty to serve the local people according to the demand. The foundation is based on the ideological approach which envisages the reduction of the role of the state and the work of institutions for individual benefits. This idea supports local autonomy by using the principle of subsidiarity (locality of service). Local autonomy is useful to local governments because it provides local government authority and flexibility to meet increasing local service demands, allows local governments to determine the structure and form of management that best suits their needs and circumstances, maintains local administrations mostly from central management conflicts and at the same time not addressing the local needs (Davey, 1971). Local autonomy is discussed by Pratchett (2004) around three distinct angles: “as freedom from central interference; as freedom
to effect particular outcomes, and as the reflection of local identity”. However, local authorities’ freedom can be inhibited or undermined according to the mood of the sovereign power.

Page puts that having some control over community decision-making is the meaning of “local”. This understanding of local authorities contrasts with the fact that the so-called authorities are basically subordinate institutions. Theoretically, the law lays down and can change the structures and powers of local governments (Page, 1991). Therefore, the concept of local autonomy is relative owing to the issue of sovereignty. Local autonomy entails the possibility of exercising a certain control over particular local policy issues. Tension is likely to always exist between central and local authorities in particular spheres (Keuffer, 2017). As a result, local autonomy is seriously challenged by an array of economic and political factors.

In the present study, local autonomy is not understood as absolute, but rather relative. What most call the researcher attention is to find out the extent to which the autonomy granted to local government by the constitution and laws is respected both in terms of functions and local finances. Every trait of local discretion – financial, policy and functional - is taken into consideration and the discretion level manifested by local governments, and by extension by the local people, is measured.

2.5.2 Local Democracy

Local democracy is habitually claimed to have the same meaning with local autonomy, because without enjoying a certain degree of discretion, communities will hardly experience democratic practices. In its two forms, i.e., participatory and representative, local democracy is indeed a key characteristic of a larger democratic polity. Inside local governments, elected representatives expand and exercise democratic competences, and are accordingly held accountable to and by citizens.

The responsiveness of the locally elected representatives is supplemented and disputed by broader chances for political participation offered to citizens by the local institutions of democracy. The local level is the venue where relationships linking representative democracy and extensive participation of citizens are most visibly manifested. The understanding and application of local autonomy is fundamentally influenced by the
consideration of local democracy which is a basic part of a larger participatory democracy with significant results (Pratchett, 2004).

Although a larger role is recognized to local democracy as mentioned above, it can be emphasized that local democracy is basically linked with local governments. It is the most “raison d’être” of local government (Wolman, 1996). Politics is practiced in local democracy institutions, meaning that these institutions are the ideal place for the competition of priorities and values and for a cooperative conflicts’ resolution. If preferences and values in competition are conveyed and conflicts solved, local democracy institutions must have a measure of authority and power to operate, that is, some degree of discretion.

Arnstein (1969) developed a “ladder of participation”. The ladder helps to understand what people want to express when they use the concepts of participation and non-participation. It is a matter of disagreeing that non-functioning models and behaviors are offered to the public under the "participation" criterion. This ladder contains two ineffectual situations that seem unable to provide actual participation in the first two steps but seem to agree. The first situation is a "therapy" situation and the second is a "manipulation". In fact, the real intention of these two steps is not to guarantee people’s participation in the planning and management phase, but to direct the owners to train participants and to treat their participation problems.

Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (1969) is the most famous expression of attendance in terms of how far it has been left to citizen to join the power. There is a sort of tokenism, i.e., when there are situations where the ladder can hear and hear the voices of the so-called "tokenism" at the third (informing) and the fourth (counseling) level. Here, what Arnstein tries to describe is the existence of dysfunctional participation models that allow politicians to politicize over the poor.

Participation can only be realized and limited within the possibilities that the power holders permit and offer. People have no power to change the status quo. With these models, disadvantaged groups or situations of the poor are sought to placate. The condition of settling is the fifth step of the ladder, and the final point of the tokenism situation. The poor or disadvantaged groups have the right to be proposals in the stage of
settling, but this proposal remains the sole authority of the ruling party on the consideration and the decision.

_Citizen Supervision / People's Power:_ In the upper three steps of the stairs there are stages that characterize the people's power. At these levels, people's influence in the policy making processes is increasing and the public is now in the way of power. The first stage of the process is the "partnership", which allows citizens to negotiate and participate in negotiations with the power holders. In the case of partnership, power can be redefined and distributed between the citizens and the power holders through negotiation. It accepts the establishment of common mechanisms (such as policy boards and planning committees) and the sharing of responsibility for resolving problems with people and power impunity. After the partnership phase, the top and last stages of the phase are "transferred authorities" and "citizen / people control".

Along with the poor and the disadvantaged, all the people have control of most of the administrative power and decision-making mechanisms. The government will share or transfer its powers with people. In the last stage, people have the power to control everything. The negotiations between the public and the public officials are concluded in the direction of their request, meeting the demands of the people. Because decision-making authority is present. There are no boards where this kind of power and decision-making authority is present. City Agency Policy Boards, for instance, established in the United States in 1960s as negotiator of city governments, are a typical example of what people have in their possession of real gentlemen.

### 2.5.3 Local Governance

Local governance deals with the promotion locally of good governance practices to attain a sustainable and equitable development (John and Sage, 2010). In theory, local governance refers to the manner authority and power are locally implemented. It builds on two premises: first, accountable and responsive local authorities performing on account of a political and local community; second, vigourous citizens, actors of private sector and organizations of civil society who contribute to the endeavour for development and provide a guardian responsibility with the ability to request rights, accountability and transparency (European Union, 2016).
For a good governance at the local level, it is required that an array of institutions engage the people in local public affairs (e.g.: planning and budgeting; participatory policymaking instruments), so that local authorities perform as facilitators of the service providers networks (e.g.: partnership of public-private sectors and civil society) and accountability is ensured to the people (UNDP). According to Capuno (2005), the quality of local governance depends on two parameters: (i) the central government political willingness to establish an enabling environment through legal and regulatory instruments allowing local authorities to draw optimum advantage of adequate autonomy in the exercise of power; (ii) the manner through which public policies are made and implemented by local authorities in reference to the processes of local policymaking and interactions with the people, the private sector and other public institutions using all together the resources available.

Building a “representative, participatory, democratic, responsible, accountable, transparent, efficient and effective local governance model which promotes the development of community, sensitive to democratic governance”(Sadioglu and Dede, 2016), is the main aim of decentralization and local government reforms.

2.5.4 Local Development

Local development refers to all the activities and initiatives undertaken by local authorities in view of achieving their development (Pike et al., 2012). It also means that the development process of a local unit is thought and implemented locally without frequent involvement of the central government. Local units are given the responsibility and the charge of ensuring their development. In this context, the central government contributes by ensuring all facilities and by avoiding to prevent those local units from achieving development. Local development decisions must not remain at central level and priorities should be set with consulting with the municipalities (Bryden, 2010). The access of people to basic public services such as health and basic education should be guaranteed. The contribution of local development to the achievement of national development objectives of should be recognized by the state who should mobilize additional resources and address problems of social cohesion to this end. National policy, more or less explicit, should be formally adopted for the promotion of local development.
The recognition of LA as development actors is another condition for a positive connection of decentralization reforms and development. The potential of local development can be fully tapped if local authorities are granted adequate autonomy and are accordingly accountable. If such power and space is not provided to local authorities by the central government, their chances to realize progress would be considerably reduced.

Local development is also expressed through the fight against inequality, jobs and wealth creation, and the tackling of other serious challenges to development (European Commission, 2016). In many countries, governments are utilizing decentralization tools for better targeting service provision, the improvement of the representation of the needy or indigent, and the reduction of poverty (Jütting et al., 2004).

For decentralization processes to generate pro-development outcomes, there is a need to strengthen the both sides of governance that are supply side (by the empowerment of local authorities) and demand side (by empowering citizens’ engagement and nurturing more fruitful relations of the state and the society).

2.6 FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMPARATIVE MEASUREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT CLOSENESS TO THE PEOPLE

Once the rationale for bringing government decision closer to the people is demonstrated as done above, the next question that can logically pop up in one’s mind is how to measure the government closeness to the people. In other words, are there sound indicators, criteria and framework(s) enabling the measurement of the so-called closeness? If yes, are there some criteria, indicators and frameworks more reliable than others? The least which can be said is that despite the lack of universally agreed methodology or framework for the measurement, there are some framework, ideas and indicators suggested by scholars that are useful for the assessment of the impact of the reforms, in terms of achieved level of government closeness to the people. Of course, this research does not present all the different contributions suggested by the extent literature on this aspect. Rather the research highlights those that seem more relevant for our comparison, and insights are drawn from them even though the study mostly draw from the framework suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014).
2.6.1 Page & Goldsmith’s Triple Measure of Access, Function and Discretion for the Assessment of Decentralization’s Level and Degree

In the framework suggested by Page and Goldsmith (1985, 1987), the terms ‘closeness of government to people’ was not explicitly used as such, but these authors rather employed the term ‘extent of centralization and decentralization’. Since there is a growing sense of common agreement that the main drive of decentralization is to bring public decision-making closer to the individuals as shown above, this research then considers as synonymous with government closeness to people, the framework of Page and Goldsmith for the assessment of the degree of decentralization.

Page & Goldsmith (1987) argued that one rationale for the existence of local government is to shape the way enabling that benefits of the modern state are provided to citizens. Their main concern was to classify the systems of local governments in Western Europe. The criterion they adopted for this classification was ‘central-local government relations’, since they argued that within a given polity the nature of intergovernmental relations was basically determined by changes in the tasks and functions discretionarily carried out by local authorities, and by the degree of influence and access LAs have in the policy discussions across the nation. On the basis of that array, these authors split the Western Europe local authorities system into two ensembles: countries of Southern and and countries of Northern Europe.

According to their findings, in countries of Northern Europe such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain, there was an extensive set of functions and high level of discretion for local governments with weaknesses at the national level on the part of local politicians. In Southern European states on the other hand, there was an influence at the national level on the part of local politicians who paradoxically were representing local constituencies with few responsibilities and little legal and financial discretion. Their frame has been used and cited by many scholars as a main line for the classification of countries in terms of the level of decentralization (Wollmann, 2000; John & Sage, 2010; Swianiewicz, 2014; Kersting and Vetter, 2003). Page and Goldsmith considered that access, functions and discretion of local governments are the major drivers to the amelioration of the life quality of a local constituency.
Later, decentralization was divided by Page (1991) into political and legal localism. To gauge political localism, Page used “access” whereas “discretion” and “functions” were employed to assess legal localism. Political localism refers to the influence entertained by local political elites on processes of decision-making at the national scale with respect to the matters affecting the interests of their locality. It also makes sure that the national level takes into account the local interests. However, in legal localism, decentralization is addressed in terms of the number of functions and the extent of discretion enjoyed by local authorities.

Yoo (2018) identifies some advantages and disadvantages of Page and Goldsmith’s typology. Concerning the advantages, he points out that in Page and Goldsmith’s framework, political localism is presented as a significant component of decentralization, and the formal and legal as well as the informal aspects of power are considered. He further asserts that the framework also eludes the “narrow legalism” under which comparative studies of intergovernmental relations have long been conducted on the subject matter of institutional and legal powers of local authorities (John, 2001). Regarding the disadvantages, Yao underlines that a very limited number of unitary countries (Denmark, Great Britain, France, Norway, Spain, Italy, and Sweden) were examined by Page and Goldsmith. Apart from that, their typology theorized two systems of local governments in Europe whereas in most other systems there are three to four types of local governments. In addition to the above, it is believed that the shift “from an era of government to an era of governance” is poorly reflected in the approach of Page and Goldsmith with respect to central and local authorities relations.

Taking account of both advantages of and criticisms against Page and Goldsmith’s approach, this study builds on Ivanyna and Shah framework which is more comprehensive and definitely constitutes an adjustment of Page and Goldsmith’s ideas.

2.6.2 Ivanyna and Shah’s Worldwide Indicators on Decentralization and Localization, and Additional Contribution Extracted from The Related Literature

As already discussed above, one of the declared aims of decentralization is to achieve greater closeness of decision making to the people so as to involve citizens in the public
governance. In a more comprehensive way than the framework suggested by Page and Goldsmith, Ivanyna and Shah (2014) conducted a study aimed at ranking countries on administrative, fiscal and political dimensions of decentralization. They defined a set of indicators of decentralization that has been widely cited and used, including by institutions such as the WB, OECD. Due to the scarcity of worldwide frameworks, they suggested one that would help to measure the distance existing between public decision and the people. Since their data set was compiled from a variety of sources in 182 countries\textsuperscript{24}, Ivanyna and Shah’s framework appears important, for comparative purposes, to measure the government closeness. It then constitutes a noteworthy contribution to the establishment of benchmarks for the comparative evaluation of the so-called closeness. The focus was the relative importance of local authorities, their status and the extent of their discretion with regard to the exercise of their responsibilities. The present study mostly draws from Ivanyna and Shah’ framework, because it provides criteria that can numerically be rated, while the additional contributions offer qualitative variables and therefore constituted a sort of check-list for the use of primary data generated from the field research.

According to Ivanyna and Shah (2014), a government is closer to its people if the following features are met: (i) it operates in “a small geographical area and population”, (ii) it possesses autonomy, (iii) there is no possibility for upper-tiers of government to terminate it without reason. Seen from this angle, this broad understanding from Ivanina and Shah of the closeness of a government to its people integrates the notions of political and legal localism of Page and Goldsmith discussed above. However, Ivanyna and Shah’s understanding goes further by including other important features related to the subject matter encompassing interrelated topics of local governments such as their structure, their size, their significance, and the security of their existence. The comparative assessment between Turkey and Cameroon in this study is conducted around these elements, among others.

\textsuperscript{24} The study itself precises that the most recent data used dated back on 2005.
2.6.2.1 The Link between Local Government Structure and the Closeness to the People

The administrative structure and the number of tiered levels of local governments differ across countries. Varying from 1 to 5, the number of administrative tiers also has an impact on the government closeness. Norton (1997) believes that a single tier has obvious attractions, because it enables each local authority, in theory at least, to work to a comprehensive and inclusive set of objectives and policies that takes account of the full range of local needs. It also enables, he pursues, an overall coordination of services to realize the greatest effectiveness and efficiency better than in a multi-tier structure. On the other hand, there are also arguments in favor of multi-tier systems. The most important argument among them is perhaps the need to keep the much possible functions in authorities both easily accessible to local inhabitants and having the greater ability to conduct large-scale investments, afford more specialized equipment and hire more specialized staff. According to Ylvisaker, the optimum number of tiered levels is three because “Two is an invitation to abiding conflict and stymie, or at the other extreme to subordination and acquiescence” (Ylvisaker, 1983).

2.6.2.2 The Bearing of Local Government or Municipal Size on the Closeness to Citizens

From the standpoint of average size in terms of area and population, local governments differ from one country to another and even within countries. Ivanyna and Shah (2014) argues that the size of local governments influences the chances of citizen participation in decision making. It is believed that the qualities of local government are determined by its size more than any other single factor (Marques, Kortt & Dollery, 2015). In some advanced democracies for example, the targets for the minimum size of the population were set in the 1960s for basic local authorities of 8, 10, 12 or 20 thousand inhabitants, justified by the numbers considered necessary to provide basic education and social facilities. In their study, Ivanyna and Shah (2014) find that the average number of inhabitants in local governments oscillates between about many thousand inhabitants (Switzerland, Equatorial Guinea, Austria, Czech Republic) to many hundred thousand inhabitants (Indonesia, DR Congo, Korea), with the average population of the country estimated at 101,000 inhabitants. Thus, while local government units in countries of North America and Europe strikingly have little population than those in the rest of the
globe, local authorities in the countries of East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are more than five times larger on average. Local governments in lower-income countries have a very large population.

Keleş (2016) also argues that the effectiveness of citizen participation cannot be achieved without taking into account the size of the unit of local government in terms of both population and territory. While larger local government units seem to be more effective suppliers of services, at the same time the expansion of democratic processes do not occur easily within their territorial boundaries. For this reason, having local communities with smaller size as possible was among the targets of the reform initiatives. Table 5 below presents the number of municipalities in some selected countries as well as average municipal size for each of them.

**Table 4: Number of Municipalities and Average Municipal Size in Some Selected Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Municipalities</th>
<th>Av. Municipal size</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35 357 communes*</td>
<td>1891 inhabitants**</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11 054 Gemeinden</td>
<td>7 450 inhabitants</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7 960 comuni</td>
<td>7 605 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>33 524 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>19 267 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>175 500 inhabitants***</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Around the Pacific</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>35 879****</td>
<td>9 086 inhabitants</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3959</td>
<td>9 272 inhabitants</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1741</td>
<td>72 790 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>224 742 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>33 253 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>113 519 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>47 Kaunti</td>
<td>1 057 444 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>121 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SNGWOFI 2019 and the author’s sketch.

* France has the second-highest number of municipalities in the world after the United States.
** France has the third-lowest average municipal size in the OECD.
*** The United Kingdom has the largest average municipal size in the OECD (with Ireland and Korea). All municipal level authorities have more than 20 000 inhabitants.
**** USA have the first highest number of municipalities in the world.
2.6.2.3 Average Area of Local Governments as an Element Enabling to Capture the Level of Closeness to Citizens

From the 182 countries concerned by the study of Ivanyna and Shah, local government average area varies from 0.01 TSK\textsuperscript{25} to 70 TSK, with Czech Republic and Libya respectively at both ends. Local government units in countries of Europe and South Asia are relatively much smaller in area at the same time as local governments in African and middle east countries have average areas of up to 14 times larger. Average area of local government units in higher income countries is generally smaller than in countries with lower-level income. The large tendency observed by the authors is that local governments in higher income countries tend to have smaller size on average (both in terms of area and population) than those in countries lower income levels.

2.6.2.4 The Weight of Local Authorities in the Multi-level Governance System

In the effort to appraise the closeness of government to the individuals, the assessment of the weight of local authorities is critical. Ivanyna and Shah (2014) gauge the weight of local authorities by considering the share of local governments expenditures in the consolidated expenditures of general government. The importance or the weight of local government then depends on the amount of their expenditures that should normally increase in parallel with the increase in their powers, duties, and responsibilities.

According to the study of Ivanyna and Shah, the share of local government spending in the general government expenditures differs from one country to another. In several countries, it is virtually zero percent (Guyana, Haiti, Mozambique, etc.). In Denmark, it reaches 59 percent. In the same sample, the share of local government expenditures in more than half (63 percent) of countries is less than 13 percent whereas it is higher than 30 percent in only 11 percent of the countries. Globally speaking, local authorities are important actors of the public sector only in North American, European, East and Asian countries. What needs to be kept in mind at this level is that, the much this share is higher, the much public decision is closer to the public.

\textsuperscript{25} TSK = Thousand Square Kilometers.
Besides local government share of general government expenditures, there is another variable that could serve to assess the weight of local authorities, i.e., the share of local government employment in the general government employment. The more the share of local government employment is higher in general government employment, the more public decision-making is closer to the citizens.

2.6.2.5 The Safeguarding of the Existence of Local Authorities: A Guarantee for The Protection of Their Autonomy

The level of security of the existence of LA is an important indicator of the closeness of government to the individuals. It is measured by the verification of the independence of local government. The goal here is to portray the safeguards established in the constitution as well as in the law in many countries against arbitrary disbandment of local authorities. Thus, out of 182 countries in the sample of Ivanyna and Shah, only 6 have significant safeguards of local governments against arbitrary dismissal. Less than half (48 percent) of countries have local authorities with limited independence, and in the rest of the countries, local authorities can be baselessly sacked by upper levels of government. According to their findings, in European and North American Countries and in Brazil as well, this indicator receives quite higher ratings while in African and Middle East countries, the existence of local governments is almost not secured. Yet the higher the security of existence is, the greater is the closeness to people.

The administrative relationships between the different tiers of government are governed according to the principles that: (i) autonomous local governments have a legal existence acknowledged by the Constitution and law; (ii) the legislation should specify the nature and scope of their powers and responsibilities as well as their relations with upper tiers of government; (iii) full responsibilities should be given to local authorities in matters of local interest, except where the national legislation specifies that the concerned matters lie outside their competence. (Keleș, 2016).

The supervision and control of local governments should only be carried out in conformity with the procedures and cases determined by the constitutional or legislative provisions. The concerned guardianship should not supersede local authorities’ autonomy and should be limited to a simple verification a posteriori of the legal character of decisions and acts of these subnational authorities. Local authorities should be suspended
or dismissed only under he conditions clearly defined by the law. Any project or decision of suspension or dissolution of a municipal council or executive shall be in conformity with the law. If any, the modalities of resumption should be determined by the law and should take pale in the shortest possible period.

Regarding the administrative supervision of local authorities, Keleș (2016) indicates that its scope and limits should be well defined. Central government is expected and even requested to refrain from replacing this supervision by a disguised mechanism of hierarchical control. Any supervision is allowed only according to the procedures and in the cases stated by the constitutional and legislative provisions. The aim of the so-called supervision must normally be to ensure the compliance with constitutional principles and legal provisions. In a similar vein, Sadioğlu (2016) points that local governments should be both under the protection of the Constitution and the law.

2.6.2.6 The Contribution of Local Government Empowerment Towards the Closeness to the People

Empowering local authorities highly contributes to the closeness of government to citizens. That empowerment can be gauged through the famous three dimensions that decentralization covers: political, fiscal and administrative. In each of these dimensions, emphasis is put on the discretion, because we are interested in examining the level of freedom enjoyed by local authorities in their capacity of citizen representatives.

2.6.2.6.1 Variables for the Assessment of Political Decentralization and Discretion

Political or democratic decentralization infers a relationship in which directly elected local government officials are accountable to local residents. It also refers to the enjoyment of autonomy for local self-governance. As suggested by Ivanyina and Shah, political decentralization is measured through the existence or not of: “direct popular elections of municipal assembly members and the executive head” as a measure of the strength of local democracy; provisions for the recall of elected representatives; “popular participation in local elections” and various mechanisms of direct participation of citizen in local decision-making.
2.6.2.6.1.1 Local Government Council Election

As far as the elections of local government council members are concerned, the answer to the following questions is needed: are local government decision making bodies elected or appointed? Is part of the assembly members appointed? Is part of them elected? Are assembly members elected from a list approved in advance by the central government? Ivanyna and Shah note that locally elected representatives are now spread worldwide. Popular elections for municipal council members are not held only in less than half (34 percent) of the countries in their sample, and local assemblies are appointed in only 14 countries. Sub-Saharan African countries to which Cameroon is part and Middle East countries to which Turkey is attached, are the regions of the planet still lagging behind in terms of direct election of local councils.

The criteria defined above are at the heart of local democracy. Local democracy infers that local communities have the ability to elect the bodies that will govern their decentralized unit: municipal council and the head of the municipal executive (Carlo Panara, 2016). Assemblies or councils express the representative nature of local government (Gaebler and Roesel, 2019). Serving as an elected member is the most intensive form of participation (Gormez, 1997). Generally, they make local laws and are the decision-making organ of their local government unit.

The size of councils affects the extent to which they can represent the aspirations of the electorate. There is a link between the size of councils and their efficiency as decision-making body in charge of the control of sometime a large and complex organization. A research indicated that the most effective problem-solving or decision-making body has five to seven members (Handy, 2007). Handy further asserted that with increasing size, the efficiency of councils of above seven members is likely to decrease.

Norton (1997) has a different view from Handy, because he argues that the more elected council members are proportionate to the number of inhabitants, the more inhabitants are likely to know a municipal councilor. The council’s function of representing the public makes appropriate the fact for it of having larger size, because it serves as a forum discussion, confirms or refers decisions, but normally does not formulate them neither implement them. Preparation of decisions may be given to relatively small committees of members when it is not a function of a separate executive. Keleş (2016) underlines that
though freely elected local representatives are a prerequisite for local autonomy, their presence or existence is not always a guarantee for a sufficient local autonomy.

2.6.2.6.1.2 Local Government Executive Election

The questions to be answered for the assessment of the criteria of local government executive election are the following: Is the executive head (mayor) directly or indirectly elected, or is he/she merely appointed? Ivanyna and Shah (2014) note that mayors directly elected by the local people are not yet widespread, given that almost 80 percent of the countries in their sample have some restrictions on direct elections. While there is no restrictions in thirty-six countries, mayors are appointed at all tiers of local government in 36 other countries. On this indicator, Middle East and African countries are lagging behind in so far as there are still local authorities with indirectly elected or appointed mayors in most of those countries. On the other hand, countries of Europe are also rated relatively low, even though the system in which municipal executive is responsible directly to the electorate is becoming more commonplace in Europe (Magre and Bertrana, 2007).

According to Sadioglu and Dede (2016), strong leadership in local authorities is indubitably related to both input-oriented (for political legitimacy) and out-put oriented (for economic efficiency) reforms. For this reason, the model of directly elected mayor was regarded as an important element of the reform completing new tools introduced with the paradigms of new public management, governance and direct democracy. Pilet et al (2009) suggest that in the array of possibilities to boost local democracy, the direct election of a mayor (DEM) is the most important institutional innovation according to a number of writers on local-governments. He further asserts that the model of DEM reflects the foremost expression of global endeavors to consolidate democracy at the local level and accordingly innovate.

Pleschberger (2016) cited the example of established reformist claim for which a directly elected mayor produces a range of gains concerning local democracy. These are: power ‘s visibility, personalization, increased accountability, more direct involvement and inclusion of the citizens in the making of local decisions. He also adds that the democratic insufficiencies of the model of indirectly elected mayor (IEM) seem to be overcomed in and by the model of DEM. Based on the core assumption of “difference hypothesis”
concerning the two models, Pleschberger conducted an empirical study to analyze the styles of actions and democratic direction of the indirectly elected mayors in the city of Vienna over the period 1973-2013. In this study, the citizenry was asked to voice their view in consultative referenda. Results showed an obvious penchant for the principle of majority to resolve matters of local interest and for DEM for representative democracy. In addition, proof for the support of DEM was provided through the reformist claim promoting the directly elected mayor model in local democracy.

Likewise, the Council of Europe in a document dated 2004 puts that many advantages are offered to local democracy by DEM model: (i) the DEM enjoys a more important moral, democratic and political legitimacy resulting from the voters direct choice leading the mayor to operate more or less independently, (ii) the greater distinction of the DEM who is regarded as the representation of people desires and interests, (iii) the political leadership is changed by a municipal executive who is more responsible, (iv) and the person of the DEM has a greater visibility leading to the provision of a much more instantaneous and suitable response to local affairs. Taking account of what precedes, the IEM is obviously the contrary model, in conceptual terms, and is assorted with, for instance, poor visibility and poor accountability.

Germany and England are two examples of DEM model. Germany has three main characteristics: firstly, a high degree of autonomy and discretion in/of local authorities; secondly, a local self-government status recognized in the constitution, and thirdly, a tradition of community identity and local democracy deeply rooted (Kuhlman 2009 cited by Pleschberger, 2016). Certainly, in consideration of what precedes, Robin Hambleton quoted by The Bristol Post (2015) affirms that “the introduction of DEMs is an international trend undoubtedly on the rise”26.

In all the countries ranked in the category of “western democracies” local authorities are elected and regarded as the basic of democratic society. At the level of territorial decentralized collectivities, the principle of separation of power is reflected by elected local authorities (Röth, Kaiser, Varol and Sadioğlu, 2016).

Three forms of democracy have been distinguished at the local level by Panara (2016): (i) direct democracy, (ii) representative democracy and (iii) participatory democracy. The executive head of local government and even the council members operate within the framework of representative democracy which constitutes the main form of democracy at the local level, because either local voters elect these governing bodies, or they are elected by bodies that have been previously elected by local elector, with the mission of representing the general local public.

As concerns the designation of the executive head (mayor or president), Panara (2016) notes that it gives lieu to three distinct contexts: parliamentary-like democracy, presidential-like democracy, and systems of governance that are mixed or sui generis.

In the parliamentary-like democracy, the form of the local government is like in a parliamentary democracy, because it is the municipal council who elects the mayor (e.g.: Czech Republic, etc.), or the municipal council elects and removes the head of the municipal executive from his/her office (e.g.: the Netherlands, Austria, etc.).

In the presidential-like democracy, the form of the local government resembles a presidential democracy. Local voters directly elect the executive head of the municipality. This support of the majority inside the municipal council is not needed by the mayor who cannot be removed from his/her office nor replaced before the end of the term. Due to the municipal council’s responsibility of approving the municipal budget and carrying out an general control on local government units, the mayor power is significantly restrained (e.g.: Polish, Hungarian, and most German municipalities).

In case of repeated illegal activity of the executive head, or if the executive head does not act in accordance with his obligation to unveil his own financial interests, then he can be removed/suspended from his office through a procedure of impeachment sued by the council.

The mayor has two main responsibilities: executing the council decisions and performing the day-to-day administration. The council and the mayor have their respective sphere of duties. The mayor is the head of the local administration unit, municipality’s legal representative, and is charged with the responsibility of the day-to-day business.
In mixed systems of governance and other sui generis, both elements of presidential and parliamentary democracy are found. As an example, in France, the municipal council elects the mayor, giving lieu to a context of parliamentary democracy. Within the municipal council, the support from the majority of members is needed by the mayor though he has no political accountability to the council, and accordingly the municipal council has no power to drive the mayor from his office before.

In Greece, the list of the candidate ranked first in the elections with more than 50% of the ballots, is elected mayor, thus constituting a trait of parliamentary-like democracy. Even without a support from the majority in the municipal council, the mayor can still remain in office.

In another hand, in Italy for instance, local voters directly elect the mayor, which is a feature of a presidential democracy. However, the municipal council have the ability to pass a vote of no confidence against the mayor. Hence the use here of the latin formula: “simul stabunt simul cadent” which means “together they stand, together they fall”.

In Sweden, the configuration of municipalities is close to parliamentary democracy, since the local authority is headed by the municipal assembly and not by an individual office (the mayor) which accordingly does not exist. Nevertheless, the title ‘mayor’ is used by some municipalities namely when it comes to designate a representative who will play the role of the president of the municipal assembly in dealing with foreign counterparts.

In England, a possibility of making a choice between three different forms of government is given to local authorities; these are : the parliamentary democracy also called “Westminster model”; a committee-based system and a sui generis presidential system.

2.6.2.6.1.3 Local Government Direct Democracy Provisions

For Ivanyna and Shah (2014), the questions to be answered in assessing the criteria of the “provisions for direct democracy” are the following : does the law provide for mandatory referenda at the local level for “major expenditures, taxes and regulatory decisions, recall of public officials, and requirement for direct participation of the local individuals in the processes of decision making?
Just three countries (USA, Switzerland, and Japan) in the sample examined have provisions for direct democracy contained in their constitution. No form of direct participation of the people in local decision making is allowed in nearly 40 percent of countries. Direct democracy provisions were introduced in countries of Europe, North America and Latin America whereas such citizen empowerment is lacking in Middle East and African countries.

In effect, the local level is the ideal venue where “the right to participate in public affairs” can be most efficiently and effectively experienced (Michels and De, 2010). Direct local democracy can be understood as the right to decide an issue recognized to citizens and not to their locally voted representatives. Thus, for instance, citizens in Switzerland (a country still applying direct participatory democracy) meet in local assemblies and elect a collegiate executive that will perform their decisions.

Mendelsohn (2003) stresses that direct and representative democracy are combined types of making decision, because direct democracy’s instruments, processes and procedures are profoundly inserted in the system of representative democracy. In this last system, the competency of the general public to decide on difficult issues (such as urban development) is doubted by their professional representatives. The efficacy of direct democracy tools such as a simple “opinion survey” is also questioned and discredited.

Introducing tools of direct democracy (such local referendums, citizen initiatives, recall, citizen ability to offer agenda item, participatory budgeting, citizen councils and open council) constitutes one of the main objectives of local government reforms (Sadioglu and Dede, 2016). Tools of direct democracy are recommended for the restructuring of the agendas of local administration. Besides the organs of decision-making elected by the people, the techniques and the mechanisms of direct democracy should be used by local inhabitants. Local governments in the majority of countries have begun to utilize direct democracy tools such as opinion polls, public opinion polls, surveys to consumers, periodic neighborhood assemblies, etc., which can be equated to the people’s voice (Sadioglu and Dede, 2016).

27 This right was proclaimed by article 21 of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and article 25 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) as well as in articles of many other international treaties.
The obligation to encourage or practice citizen participation in local government comes from the pressure of factors both endogenous and exogenous, namely voters’ aspirations and the commitment of political parties for the first category of factors, and the obligation to abide by the international treaties ratified by countries, as concerns the second category of factors. Whatever the origins are, the fact is that these pressures may aim at two different goals: one is administrative, i.e. to locally increase the public service efficiency. The other is political, i.e. to maximize citizen participation. Participative democracy entails that the main players in the political processes should be civil society organizations, groups and associations.

Participation is the major goal of local democracy (Keleş, 2016). According to Görmez (1997), emphasis should also be placed on citizen participation in government in general in a more direct way than by periodical voting. Public participation outside periodical elections enables to contribute to a larger representativity, responsiveness and accountability in the management of matters of local interest. Encouragement of public participation in order to ensure efficiency in performing local services, and to speed up economic and social development of local communities, are among the fundamental inputs awaited from local governments. Some modalities of public participation are municipal public opinion, community councils and local referenda.

Görmez (1997) further recalls that small communities’ participation in the government has been a right and often a duty of people since early time. For him, in addition to the political power exercised by citizens through the vote, they should have means that help them to determine specific issues either by referenda and group initiatives, or through other means such as taking part in municipal council discussions or those of their committees, advisory committees, consultative procedures such as opinion polls, open meetings and other means of discussing with individual and group interests.

Norton (1997) cited the example of the United States where local authorities have traditionally shown concern for citizen involvement in the government process to overcome, for instance, anti-government feelings that can be encountered among citizens. To achieve this goal, these authorities seek consultations with individuals, allow public participation in council and committee meetings, involve private organizations in their decision-making and seek the respect of the press and interest groups. In effect, as France (1976) puts it, one of the objectives pursued by decentralization is to make citizen
participation in the government more dynamic and effective. In a similar vein, Keleş (2016) points out that local self-government allows people participation in the processes of decision-making to deal with their own matters and is therefore the most democratic form of government.

Robert Dahl, a renowned political scientist, ascertained that throughout the 21st century, cities in the USA will be transformed into the most appropriate democratic institutions thanks to the progress in communication and technology (Dahl, 1969). The use of ICT28 also permits a greater citizens participation. Developments in ICT have had significant impacts on local governments and politics. It is recommended to equip local authorities with skills needed to better cope with e-government transformation and applications. E-government facilities open remarkable doors to efficiency and democracy goals which are expected to be achieved by the local governments in the reform process.

According to OECD (2019), ICT have multiplied opportunities for local governments to enrich the ways they communicate and involve citizens, namely by ICT-based participation, e-democracy, accountability and transparency in local governance. OECD further emphasizes that digital tools also help governments for: the delivery of local public services (e-government), the management of public resources in a more efficient manner (tax collection, for instance), improvement of staff capacity. ICT can also improve the central-local government relations, facilitating the move towards more practices of decentralized governance.

For the United Nations, modern forms of participation should be adopted by local authorities in order to give the citizens the possibility to genuinely participate in the process of decision-making. These new forms are the following: community councils, neighborhood councils, participatory budgeting, e-democracy, citizen initiatives, and referenda as much as they can be applied. The European Union on his side makes an emphasis of the principle of subsidiarity from the early 1990s.

28 ICT means Information and Communication Technologies.
2.6.2.6.1.4 Synthesis Table or Checklist of Variables for the Measurement of Political Decentralization

The table below displays a synthesis of variables for the measurement of political decentralization. This synthesis constitutes a sort of checklist we use for the comparative assessment of this dimension of the decentralization between Turkey and Cameroon.

Table 5: Synthesis of Variables for the Measurement of Political Decentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators Variables for Political decentralization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Components</td>
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</table>
| Municipal Council/Assembly Members Elections | • Entire assembly directly elected (1pt/1)  
• Assembly partially elected, partially appointed, or Assembly indirectly elected (0.5pt/1)  
• Assembly totally appointed, or no existing assembly (0pt/1) | Ivanyna & Shah (2014)  
• LG governing bodies (local council or assembly, mayor) are elected. | Panara (2016), Keleș (2016) |
| Municipal Executive Head Election | • Municipal Executive Head directly elected (1pt/1)  
• Municipal Executive Head indirectly elected, or coexist with appointed executive or does not exist at all (0.5pt/1)  
• Municipal Executive Head is appointed (0pt/1)  
• Executive responsible directly to the electors and not to the municipal council  
• DEM regarded as more important than IEM  
• Many advantages are offered to local democracy by DEM model: power visibility, personalization, increased accountability, more direct involvement and inclusion of the citizens in the making of local decisions.  
• DEM has several assets: a more important moral, democratic and political legitimacy of the mayor resulting from the popular choice, greater distinction of the DEM who is regarded as the representation of people desires and interests, the person of the DEM has a greater visibility.  
• the introduction of DEM is a growing international trend. | Ivanyna & Shah (2014)  
Pilet and al (2009)  
Pleschberger (2016)  
Council of Europe, 2004  
The Bristol Post (2015) |
| Direct local democracy | Obligatory referendum prescribed by Constitution or law in case of certain government decisions *(1pt/1)*  
| | Obligatory public approval through public hearings, citizen assemblies in case of certain government decisions *(0.5pt/1)*  
| | The law provides for other mechanisms for participation of citizens such as open sessions of municipal assembly, civil councils, Citizens’ Right for initiatives or to submit petition *(0.25pt/1)*  
| | The law does not provides for direct democracy *(0pt/1)*  
| | Leg. provisions for right to decide an issue given to citizens and not to their elected representatives.  
| | Existence of public participation mechanisms such as municipal public opinion, community councils and local referenda.  
| | emphasis also on citizen participation in government in general in a more direct way than by periodical voting  
| | The use of ICT to permit greater citizens participation.  
| | Local authorities equipped with skills needed to better cope with e-government transformation and applications  
| | the transformative effect of the ICT on local government and politics are discussed sufficiently  
| | New forms of participation adopted by local authorities in order to give citizens the possibility to participate in the process of decision-making.  
| | These new forms are community councils, neighborhood councils, participatory budgeting, e-democracy, referendums, civil initiatives and as much as they can be applied.  

Ivanyna & Shah (2014)  
Görmez (1997)  
Keles (2016)  
Norton (1997)  
Dahl (1967)  
Sadioğlu and Dede (2016)  
The United Nations

Source: from Ivanyna and Shah (2014), and author’s sketch 2019.

2.6.2.6.2 Variables for the Assessment of Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization can be weighed up through the verification of the existence of: an array of municipal responsibilities; the autonomy of municipalities in the setting of the rate and base for municipal revenues; the functions followed by consequent and adequate finance or revenue means; the level of transparency, predictability and unconditionality of higher level transfers; the level of self-financing the municipal expenses; the discretion
over the management of municipal services; autonomy in municipal procurement and planning; the right to issue bonds domestically and at the foreign level; the right to borrow from domestic and foreign sources; the assistance of upper tiers government for capital finance. More concretely, the following are the indicator-variables for the assessment of fiscal autonomy of local government.

2.6.2.6.2.1 Local Government Vertical Fiscal Gap

Vertical fiscal gap implies the fiscal shortcomings caused by the gap between the spending needs and revenue means of municipalities. Those shortcomings can be entirely or partially overcome by superior level of financing. Consequently, vertical fiscal gap is a gauge of local government fiscal dependence on upper level financing. The nature of this superior level financing has consequences on fiscal autonomy of local authorities. Although vertical fiscal gap is a worthwhile concept, it however cannot be scrutinized without considering several related indicators so as to better appraise local fiscal autonomy.

Ivanyna and Shah (2014) underline that at the world level, average vertical fiscal gap is 52 percent. In Latin America and Africa, it is more severe. Anyway, in all regions there are at the same time local authorities with great share of public spending, local governments with excessive dependence on higher-level financing, and nearly no local authorities solely relying on their own financing (Niger, Togo).

2.6.2.6.2.2 Local Government Taxation Autonomy

This variable can be measured through the empowerment and access of local governments to tools enabling them to cover all their spendings themselves. Through this same variable, local government right to regulate local taxation policy is also measured, namely determining bases and setting rates. Idem in the collection and administration of tax. In the sample of Ivanyna and Shah (2014), only 16 percent of countries have local authorities with a meaningful autonomy in taxation, whereas the remaining countries have local authorities with restricted autonomy or no autonomy at all in matter of taxation.
2.6.2.6.2.3 Local Government Unconditional Transfers

Local autonomy is preserved by grants that should be unconditional and formula-based. This type of grants has become widespread, even though conditional grants continue to prevail. This indicator receives high ratings mostly in European, North American, Latin American and South Asian Countries.

2.6.2.6.2.4 Local Government Expenditure Autonomy

This variable is assessed by the share of local authorities’ expenditures in total expenditures of general government. The actual discretion of local authorities regarding spendings is not totally reflected in this variable. On the one hand, local governments can be simple recipients with little choice or discretion over how to spend in their budget the money transferred to them from a superior-level government. If the local government vertical gap (difference between the spendings and the ‘non-transfer revenues’ of local governments) is large, and if upper-tier government transfers are set aside and discretionary, the genuine expenditure power of local governments may be much lower than it would be indicated by local government spendings.

On the other hand, even local government own revenues such as municipal tax or borrowed funds, can be dependent on policy from central government. If the power for tax regulation is not assigned to local governments, they would still be largely dependent on central government and cannot entirely count on taxation revenues.

As concerns the first variable above, it can be said that the real autonomy of local governments in expenditure is dependent both on vertical gap and on intergovernmental grant structure.

2.6.2.6.2.5 Local Government Borrowing Freedom

Some questions for the measurement of this variable are: do local governments have the right to borrow money in order to fulfil their financial needs? Do local authorities need the central government consent or regulation? In the reviewed sample, local governments are forbidden to borrow in 89 out of 160 countries whereas 22 countries allow local
authorities to borrow with no limitation. The rules governing local borrowing are more relaxed in European and Latin American countries.

In addition to the above, it can be highlighted that local authorities highly rely on central authorities funding. In the UK for instance, 65% of total income of local authorities come from the central government transfers. In view of compensating the insufficiency of the funding from central government, a propensity to augment local taxation, charges, fees, etc., is observed in many countries.

In France, it is stated in the constitutional provisions that financial means must be transferred equivalently with the powers transferred from central authorities to decentralized territorial collectivities. Analogous provisions are also laid down in the Greek’s constitution\(^{29}\). Powers delegation to local authorities should be accompanied by necessary resources to exercise those powers. Local government financial resources should be proportionate to their responsibilities and tasks. A meaningful percentage of local financial resources should originate from local taxes, charges and fees for which local authorities have power to set the rate. Local authorities should preferably collect local taxes themselves. Taxes should be commensurate with the needs and tasks of local authorities, and should have a nature that is sufficient, general, flexible and dynamic in order to enable these authorities to cover their responsibilities.

A financial equalization system applied both vertically and horizontally should ensure the financial sustainability of LA. The priorities of LA should be respected in the financial transfers from the central government. Local authorities borrowings should not jeopardize the fiscal policies of the government. They should be permitted to get their own-adequate financial resources that they may freely dispose. The grants to local authorities coming from the central government should not be assigned to finance specific projects. This is a significant aspect and indicator of their autonomy.

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\(^{29}\) Article 102 (5) of the Greek Constitution provides that: “\textit{Every transfer of responsibilities from central or regional administration of the State to local government also entails the transfer of the corresponding funds}”.
### 2.6.2.6 Synthesis or Checklist of the Variables for the Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization

The table below displays a synthesis of the variables for the assessment of fiscal decentralization.

**Table 6: Synthesis of the Variables for the Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator-Variables for Fiscal Decentralization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Components</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Local government vertical fiscal gap** | • Existing grants from other government (same- or higher-tier, also from other countries) as % of LG revenues.  
• percentage based on the level of fiscal dependence of local governments on superior level financing, i.e., grants from other governments (same- or higher tier, from other countries as well) | Ivanyna & Shah (2014) |
| **LG taxation autonomy** | • Financial resources of LA should be proportionate to their responsibilities and tasks.  
• LG should be permitted to get their own-adequate financial resources that they may freely dispose.  
• Powers delegated to local authorities are accompanied by necessary resources to exercise them.  
• At least one main tax (income, property, or sales tax) is fully regulated (base and rate set) by LG (1pt/1)  
• At least one major tax is partially regulated (rate or base set in boundaries specified by CG, or only after CG endorsement) by LG or some fees and minor taxes are fully regulated by LG (0.5pt/1)  
• No major taxes administered; minor taxes partially administered (0pt/1)  
• LG are treated asymmetrically (0.25pt/1) *  
• A meaningful percentage of local financial resources should originate from local taxes, charges and fees for which local authorities have power to set the rate.  
• Local authorities should preferably collect local taxes themselves  
• Taxes should be commensurate with the needs and tasks of local authorities, and should have a nature that is sufficient, general, dynamic and flexible in order to enable these authorities to cover their responsibilities. | The Council of Europe  
The United Nations |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LG unconditional transfers</th>
<th>The subsidiarity principle is respected in Tax collection</th>
<th>The European Union</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least half of transfers to LG budgets from same or higher-level governments are “unconditional and formula-based”</td>
<td>Ivanyna &amp; Shah (2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter to half of transfers are “unconditional and formula-based”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discretionary or conditional Transfers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LG expenditure autonomy</th>
<th>The grants to LA coming from the central government should not be assigned to finance specific projects.</th>
<th>The Council of Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LG borrowing freedom</th>
<th>Borrowing regulation not enacted by CG</th>
<th>Ivanyna &amp; Shah (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing only from/or under CG endorsement or regulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing is not permitted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LG Financial sustainability</th>
<th>A financial equalization system applied both vertically and horizontally should ensure the financial sustainability of LA.</th>
<th>The United Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: from Ivanyna and Shah (2014), and author’s sketch 2019.

*Asymmetric treatment of local authorities refers to a situation in a country in which there are differing regulations governing subnational authorities with respect to a given variable of decentralization.

2.6.2.6.3 Variables for the Assessment of Administrative Decentralization

In *Administrative decentralization* local authorities are empowered to recruit and dismiss local employees, as well as to establish the reference terms for local employment without referring to upper-tier government, thereby reinforcing the managerial power of elected officials over local personnel. The right of local authorities to recruit, fire and set terms of local employment should then be measured.

2.6.2.6.3.1 Local Government HR Policies
The questions to answer for the measurement of LG HR policies are the following: are LG entitled to carry out their own policies concerning recruitment, firing and establishing employment terms and conditions at the local level? In the reference sample, LG are allowed full discretion concerning hiring and firing terms and conditions in only 43 out of 158 countries. European, North American, and Latin American countries and Australia have the leading place on this indicator. In a higher number of countries (77), it is the central level of government that makes decisions about local recruitments and firing terms and conditions.

2.6.2.6.3.2 Local Government Employment

This variable is mostly focused on the share of local governments employment in GG employment. In the sample under review, the estimated general average for local government employment is 26 percent. However, more than 30 percent of the public personnel is locally employed in about 34 percent of the countries.

2.6.2.6.3.3 Synthesis or Checklist of the Variables for the Measurement of Administrative Decentralization

Table 7 below displays a synthesis of the variables used for the measurement of administrative decentralisation or autonomy.

Table 7: Synthesis of Variables for the Measurement of Administrative Decentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator- variables for administrative decentralization</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Source/Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local government employment</td>
<td>• Local government employment as % of GG employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ivanyna &amp; Shah (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG HR policies</td>
<td>• LG have full discretion over local employment only subject to HR polices defined by law (1pt/1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ivanyna &amp; Shah (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Partial discretion of LG over local employment, but public employment terms enacted by CG, or LG able to hire only to the minor positions, or recruiting from candidates selected by CG, or hiring after CG examination (0.5pt/1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- LG have no discretion in hiring (0pt/1)
- LG are treated asymmetrically (0.25pt/1) *

| The responsibility of LG upon their own personnel is full. |
| Opportunities for suitable training are provided to LG employees as well as career prospects and adequate remuneration. |

| LG are entitled to settle their own internal organization so as to adapt it to local matters and ensure a management that is effective. |
| The nature and extent of LG powers, responsibilities, and duties as well as their relations with upper tiers authorities are clearly stated in the legislation. |
| Central government’s supervision over LA is carried out in conformity with the conditions and procedures determined in the constitutional and legal provisions. |
| The responsibilities of LA is full in matters of local interests, except as otherwise provided by the law. |
| The supervision over LG is limited to a posteriori verification of the legality of LA’s decisions and acts. |
| The supervision over LG respect their autonomy. |

| The scope of the central supervision over LA is well delineated. |
| Administrative supervision by the central government is not transformed into a kind of hierarchical control. |
| Administrative supervision is carried out only as per the conditions and procedures specified in the Constitution and law. |
| The aim of the central supervision is to ensure the respect of the legal and constitutional provisions. |
| LA have the Right to Cooperate, they are authorized to establish syndicates and have the right to become members of national or international association protecting their rights and promoting their common interests. |
| LA have the Right to Legal Protection, i.e., the right to sue in order to guarantee the exercise of their responsibilities and the respect of their autonomy before national and international courts. |

Source: from Ivanyna and Shah (2014), and author’s sketch 2019.
Asymmetric treatment of LG refers to a situation in a country in which there are differing regulations governing subnational authorities with respect to a given variable of decentralization.

2.7 RATIONALE AND EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR THE ADOPTION OF DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON

With just a few differences, the rationale and explanatory factors for the adoption of decentralization and local government reforms are pretty the same in countries which adopted those reforms. This is the reason why the developments we make in this party are valid and applicable to both Turkey and Cameroon. However, where necessary, particularizations are made distinctively.

In effect, decentralization and municipal administration reform initiatives contained in the laws of 2004 did not pop up ex nihilo. Prior to the 1980s in Turkey and to the 1990s in Cameroon, restructuring efforts were directed towards restraining the administrative system's deficiencies and more work was related to social and political demands. In the post 1980s and 1990s regulation and restructuring efforts, demands from international environment have been added to this need. The decisions made in the constitution of either country are not only limited to changes in the economic structure, but also were extended to include changes in local administration. In the following, the reasons that led to the initiatives launched in 2004 will be investigated under two main trajectories. First, the developments and effects of international developments on the restructuring of the municipal system are examined. Second, national contexts are examined in order to appreciate the municipal reform which turns into an endless symphony of the two countries’ internal politico-administrative system.

2.7.1 Causes Arising from International Developments

Since the last quarter of the 20th century and in the early 21 century, there are rapid changes and transformations in the whole world that will continue to affect deeply the social structures and relations. This process of changes and transformations has had a profound impact on the ideas, structures and functions of public administration, and has led to discussions on the tasks of the state and the way of doing business.

In particular, the process of decentralization, which appears to be in line with globalization, accelerates the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity and the strengthening of local administrations, by the influence of widespread democratic development. Because the central management scale has not been sufficiently effective and functional in the solution to the problematic and comprehensive problems caused by rapid urbanization with rapid population growth, the importance of direct participation of citizens in the management of local issues, has been gained. In the division of business with the central administration, the area of movement was mainly due to social and cultural services, and to some extent the new functions in the economic development of cities to the administrations remaining within the framework of zoning activities. The new technological revolution, the process of urbanization and globalization, which marked the last period of the world, has a fundamental function that radically changes both qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of the nature and the structure of today's nation-state and the functioning and shaping of the established world order.

The phenomenon of globalization which makes a shift in the sovereignty scale inevitable, strengthens sovereignty based on the global scale by overcoming the nation-state, while on the other hand, the local order which survives the sovereignty of the nation-state is more "autonomous" and the "localization" of the local community, paving the way for local governments to become a force against central government (Köse, 2004). The rapid development and changes in the social and economic structure are shown to be rapidly moving away from the traditional understanding of the state and there is a new role assigned for the state. In the last 200 years, the increasing state of the state has become a structure which does not fulfill these duties that increase with time. These expanding state activities have become the source of the problems themselves rather than the solution of the problems over time (Aktan, 1998).
The expansion of the boundaries of the understanding of the social state and the welfare state have brought along degenerations and problems in the provision and distribution of public services. The inadequacy of the state structure, which is based on central planning, intervention, hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, and excessive rules, to offer public services, has begun to focus on what should be the role and functions of the state. In this framework, especially after the collapse of the Socialist state model in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, the principles of the traditional dominant state understanding in the world have been started to be questioned and changed (Aktan, 1998). After the world economic crisis in 1970, the limits of the state and its function have been discussed.

Basic issues such as the sovereignty of the state, how the relations between the state and individuals should be, and the role and functions of the state in the economy, have begun to be discussed. The philosophy in this discussion, criticism and questioning is to turn to the state (who directs the service itself), the state-dominating, and the state (governing and directing) that holds the helm.

The aim of all these discussions is to capture an ideal state that provides better service to people. Peter Drücker (2016), one of the leading management scientist of our age, participates in these discussions by saying that: the mega-state, which is the product of this century, has gone bankrupt in both financial and moral terms and has not produced any results. But it cannot be the "small state" to replace it. There are too many tasks in both domestic and foreign policy. It is the active state that is necessary for us and it is nothing more than the voters really miss. However, we need a theory about what the state can do (Drücker, 2016).

This implies that expanding state activities, and in particular the intervention of the state into the economy, are accompanied by political, economic and moral degenerations. Bribes, corruption and torpedo, which are the oldest types of political and economic degeneration, now include service nepotism, rent, collateralism, incentive, vote trade, etc. types that have also emerged. In other words, with the increase of state intervention to the economy, a state considered as the solution of the questions was the main source of the problems.

We see that the concept of "traditional state", which marked the last century, is now completely destroyed. The "new realities" in the world conducted to the adoption of an inevitable new state philosophy. The centralist, guardian, intrusive, force-based,
autocratic, bureaucratic, hierarchical, rules-based, holy and father-state definitions (Osborne and Gaebler, 1997) reflecting the conception of the traditional state started to drop and are replaced by democratic, decentralized, law-based, limited, constitutional, arbitrator, participant understanding and philosophy (Bras and Signoles, 2017).

According to the neo-liberal economy and the political view, the citizen is a reputable customer and an individual consumer of public services and, in this capacity, he has the right to demand services of a certain standard from the state. This means, in a sense, the change of public image regarding the role and duties of the state. Although citizens require a service, they have the right to reduce the cost of the services they receive from government and public administration.

The general framework drawn up by the discussion so far is the fact that the exit from the crisis created by the welfare state has resulted in the redefinition of the roles of the state, the service area and the service delivery methods and actors. This fact, which is described as the shrinking of the state's service area and which can be summarized as the reduction of the state on its basis, is expressed in four ways: (i) privatization, which means the transfer of certain services directly to the private sector, (ii) some services call ‘third sector’, not for the purpose of profit, but because they are services to foundations and similar organizations, (iii) localization, which refers to the overthrow of central government by some of the services from now on undertaken by local administrations, (iv) e-government applications that enable technological developments to be used more effectively in public service provision.

In Turkey, this transformation began with the government's decision taken in January 24, 1980. Initially, it was revealed that these works, which were initiated in relation to the economic field, should also be carried to the public administration area in time. However, it is difficult to say that this liberalization and transformation in the economic sphere were accomplished at the same level in the domain of public administration. At the beginning of 2000s, adaptation problems caused by change in this part of Turkey have had an important place on the basis of the problems of Turkish Public Administration. The initial rationale for public administration reform, which was already launched in 2004, encompassing the entire public administration apparatus, is to eliminate this alignment problem.
The effects of these tremors in the basic assumptions of classical public administration on the existing system have manifested themselves in different ways. This situation has not escaped from the attention of some scientists, and in this context, it started to be stated that some cases can no longer be solved within the framework of classical public administration. In this way, discussions were engaged on the ideas that some new models of understanding can be useful in the field of public administration.

In such a period, it is known that the understanding of NPM, which has been expressed as a management approach in the public administration, and which has emerged together in the 1980s, has developed. The approach also claims to be able to meet the need for a new theory of management, which Ducker described as the only need in the current situation.

In this approach, rather than politics, management, performance evaluation and efficiency, satisfaction of those receiving public service, competitiveness and cost reduction were included. In this system dominated by business logic in response to the classical operation of public administration, it is aimed to defocus the state in the center of responsibilities and to make the results and the outputs in the public sector a target. Public administration is tried to be more customer oriented by being freed from bureaucracy.

New Public Administration approach which is the first reinvention of public administration, aimed at bringing the understanding of citizenship, decentralization, monopoly in participation and public services, and envisaged a public administration that took civil society into consideration. This changes in public administration, which has a general framework in this way, and which affects all public administration devices, are further explained in the following three sub-headings.

2.7.2 New Public Administration and New Public Management Understanding

Under the leadership of its key proponent Dwight Waldo as regards New Public Administration (NPA), and Osborne & Gaebler concerning NPM, different definitions and ideas have been put forward for public administration. It would be more appropriate to address common points in these approaches instead of focusing on them. Common points of emphasis are:
- The scope of activity of public administration and services offered by the public sector should be redefined.
- Public services should not be provided only by bureaucracy as a monopoly, but by alternative methods in the market environment.
- Competition between public authorities and public employees should be ensured.
- An entrepreneurial management should be established. Employee initiative, risk and responsibility should be developed.
- There are shortcomings in public savings, effectivity, efficiency, quality and performance
- and these shortcomings should be eliminated. In particular, performance measurement should be allowed.
- The concepts and techniques of the private sector should be applied in the public sector.
- Focus should be on the mission, purpose and outcome, not on the rules.
- It is necessary to focus on the needs of the beneficiaries, not the orders and directives of the superiors. In this sense, it is necessary to redefine the beneficiaries of the service and to offer them options.
- Individuals should be given the right to speak under the supervision of public administration.
- Participation in management should be ensured. This requires participation of both citizens and employees in the process.
- Management should be decentralized. The public sector should be downsized.

In the current period which can be defined as public service age, the structure of public administration has grown, and its functions have been highly diversified. However, as a natural consequence of this growth process; There have been difficulties in paperwork, continuous increase in the need for additional financing, cumbersomeness in a growing structure and prevention of coordination. In addition to these problems of public administration, there were changes that occurred in the traditional public administration environment and thought, patterns that have brought about a radical change in public administration in the 21st century (Dinçer ve Yılmaz, 2003: 19).

The fact that public administration has spread over a very wide range of time and requires various specialization skills and the ways in which the use of political power in social life affects public administration has revealed the need for reform. The changes that have
taken place in the last 30 years in the world in this way can be summarized as globalization and transition from the conditions of industrial society to the information society in general. However, turkish past models and current structure exceed the management capacity to produce suitable solutions for this new environment. Within this framework, it is inevitable to modify not only turkish management structure but also turkish management paradigm. It is claimed that humanity expresses a process of reconstruction based on the common experience of countries (Dinçer ve Yılmaz, 2003).

Towards the end of the 1980s, it became clear that a new understanding of public administration began to dominate in developing countries. This new understanding is expressed from concepts such as NPM, market-based public administration, managerialism and entrepreneurial management. This orientation advocates and emphasizes the difference between administration and management. According to this view, the concept of management refers to a narrower meaning than the concept of business. This new understanding takes into account not only instructions in a way that can include local administrations, but also the setting of priorities, objectives, the change to performance evaluation system, the use of human resources effectively and efficiently, with an emphasis on their validity. In this process, it can be said that there have been significant strides in leading some factors to the transition from public administration to public management. It has been seen that there have been intense discussions on the public sector and its management, the criticism of the changes in economic theories and the effects of changes in the private sector on the public administration (Eryılmaz, 2006:25).

The New Public Management approach on the 2004 Public Administration reform initiative has a very significant impact. While the new Public Management concept is frequently emphasized in the rationale of legal texts raised in the context of the reform, it is stated in the report titled "Change in Management for Management of Change" prepared by the Turkish Prime Ministry in 2003, that the NPM approach is seen as the most important factor forcing public administration to change (Dincer, Yılmaz:2003). The global framework of the developments in the new role of the state in the direction of NPM thought came to the fore in the 1980s with changes and transformations of many states. The report also highlighted that there is an inevitable consequence for Turkey that triggered the 2004 reform initiatives shaping the most important international developments and is expressed as the NPM thought (Dincer, Yılmaz:2003: 20-53).
2.7.3 Governance Approach

In recent years, it has been seen that governance is one of the concepts that are emphasized in the context of better relations between the state and citizens. It is claimed that classical management approach is insufficient to better explain the relations between the political power and the citizens, and to explain the effects on this subject in the changing international relations. The concept of governance has been elaborated in order to eliminate the problems and constraints caused by this inadequacy and limited status. In this way, it can be seen that the state or the government formed a new conceptual framework by taking into consideration the national private sector and international private and public organizations.

This conceptual framework is perceived as an expression of the transition from industrial society to the information society. The globalization and postmodernist thought, which has undermined the concept of nation-state, was said to have brought serious criticism to modernism, and the dominance of modernism on the world has been broken. This situation caused the concept of governance to be discussed and kept on the agenda (Çukurçayır, 2006: 116).

Governance is a phenomenon that covers the processes, institutions and mechanisms, in which groups and citizens can convey their concerns, can legally enforce their rights, fulfill their obligations and find their differences. Three main dimensions of governance are mentioned: first, economic governance which refers to the decision-making processes that affect the economic activities of a country and its relations with other economies; second, administrative governance which includes a policy implementation system. Third, the situation highlighted as "good" governance, is used in the sense of a process and structures that direct political, social and economic relations in a participatory, transparent and responsible manner (Yayman, 2008: 305).

The multi-actor management approach revealed by governance approach has been one of the most important dynamics that led the 2004 municipal reform initiative in Turkey. Many "new" institutional structures created within the new municipal structure formed by the arrangements within the reform package have emerged as counterparts of the participatory and multi-actor management approach. Within this framework the "new" regulations created with the 2004 municipal reform initiative are:
- The requirement to prepare strategic plans for municipalities with more than 50 thousand inhabitants.

- In the process of preparation and implementation of strategic plans, all internal and external stakeholders of municipalities should be included in strategic planning as part of the process. Because, strategic planning necessarily involves a participatory process.

- The law numbered 5393 gives to municipal councils the authority to obtain information and control, question, general negotiation and nocturnal implementations and regulations regarding the implementation of governance approach in municipalities.

- Article 24 of the Law numbered 5393 and Article 15 of Law numbered 5216 state that headmen of districts and of public institutions in the province, as well as the professional institutions, private institutions, universities, trade unions and representatives of the non-governmental organizations linked to the matters on the agenda, their duties and activities without the right to vote may attend and participate in the meetings of specialized committees where the issues in the field are discussed, and may take the form of the regulation and participation management.

- Regulations such as the fact that municipal assembly meetings must be open to the public, the necessity to pre-publicize the meeting agenda, the fact that municipal councilors have been empowered to propose the adoption of relevant issues in the municipality, are the concrete implications of the participatory management approach in the 2004 municipal reform initiative.

- One of the most important and concrete arrangements for the 2004 municipal reform initiative is the city councils. It is expected that city councils formed with the participation of all the stakeholders living within the municipal boundaries are expected to have a common reason in municipal administration and decision processes.

- From the preparation of the legal texts for the 2004 reform initiative to the content of the age texts, it is possible to find traces of the governance approach which can be defined as multi-actor management thought. However, it is extremely difficult to say that the governance approach associated with the idea of the NPM has been applied in the most comprehensive way at the stage of the reform process. It is clear that a full social consensus was not reached
on the 2004 reform initiative. And it is one of the most concrete indicators of the fact that the reform initiative has been severely interrupted due to the failure of the law no. 522731.

2.7.4 Democratization

Local administrations, which are one of the types of organizations that are applied in the fulfillment of the local public services, gain more meaning than the management of local services when their functions and qualities are taken into consideration and their democratic dimension is prominent. It is seen that these administrations are justified in terms of realizing the three key objectives in local administration literature. Two of these three targets are freedom and participation targets that can be gathered under the general title of democracy, while the third is determined as the target effectiveness.

Firstly, local administration bodies are elected by the public and their responsibilities to the public are fundamental. Secondly, representatives responsible for local elections should be sensitive to local needs. In addition to this, local administration has a special place as it offers additional opportunities to take an active role in the country's management. Such a broad-based participation is of great importance in order to ensure the protection of democracy and to eliminate the disadvantage that the country is governed by a relatively small, specialized administrative and political staff. In other words, local administrations play an effective role in the formation of democratic future and play a role in the democratic climate. It provides the balancing of this power by preventing the collection of state power in one hand; it also prevents antidemocratic structures with its pluralism function. Because the presence of local administrations in a region makes the power of the central government relatively weak. It promotes, for instance, political education and thus gives great opportunities for public participation in public policies. In this aspect financial administrations developed the sense of freedom by expressing the feeling of freedom by engaging in activities that will meet the needs of society.

31 The law 5227 on the Fundamental Principles of Public Administration was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 15, 2004, but was not promulgated by the president of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet SEZER, who did not find it appropriate.
2.7.5 Endogenous Causes for the Adoption of Decentralization and Local Government Reforms in Turkey and Cameroon

Several reasons accounted for Turkey and Cameroon’s decision to decentralize. As already discussed, decentralization was imposed on the two governments by the institutions of Bretton Woods. In fact, decentralization was a prescription from the World Bank in the framework of structural adjustment reforms implemented in the 1980s. Structural adjustment loans were granted under the conditions that beneficiary countries deconcentrate their excessively centralized administrative system and through the devolution to their local authorities of an array of responsibilities, powers and functions previously entrusted to central authorities.

On the other hand, the decision of the two governments to decentralize responsibilities and authority towards local authorities also stems from endogenous factors. As far as Cameroon is concerned, it results from a necessity to implement a longstanding constitutional imperative\(^{32}\). The Constitution of 1996, modifying the Constitution of 1972 transformed Cameroon into a “decentralized unitary state” with three tiers government: central government, regional authorities and local authorities. It then gave decentralization a solid constitutional recognition and protection. Within this framework and based on the constitutional commitment to usher decentralisation, associations, ethnic and regional groups, raised pressures so that further citizens’ control and participation in the local processes of decision-making should be effective in order to build democracy. At the front line of those pressurizing groups were the chiefs conference of South West and the Elite Association of South West. They unfailingly made petitions for substantial reforms of the administrative organization of Cameroon in order to comply with the social demands and allow the rise of regional and local authorities that are strong and autonomous. Since it was quite impossible for the central government to flee those pressures, it attempted to keep the country together by theoretically conceding some autonomy to local authorities in a context of a twinge of centrifugal and centripetal forces.

\(^{32}\) “The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Government bill on decentralisation mentions as one of the reasons for tabling it the need ‘to place [Cameroon] in line with constitutional requirements in the area of decentralization’.”
It was also believed that decentralization would aid to fight poverty and foster the development of Cameroon.\footnote{Among the essential objectives cited in the Explanatory Statement to the bill on decentralisation is the imperative ‘to foster and promote harmonious development of regional and local authorities’. This objective is again repeated in article 4(1) on the Law on Decentralization.}

Like many countries, Turkey too has not escaped from the waves of reforms of the late 1990s and 2000s mostly inspired by NPM approach and good governance. The less to be said is that as a country having solicited the loans from multilateral donors as IMF and WB, Turkey has been given the conditionalities of reforming its administrative system so as to get the solicited loans. Those donors advocated the rollback of state, downsizing the government, contracting out or outsourcing, privatization and deregulation, and also decentralization which is the focus of our research. The reason behind the suggestion of this model was that it was believed the citizens can be better served when and if the public service is done locally. According to this orientation, policies decided from the central government to be applied over the whole country have lots of limitations in terms of effectivity and efficiency. It is then a shift from the top-down model (that used to be applied without success) to bottom up model where local authorities should be empowered.

Within the country, in the political class as well as in the civil society organizations, the need for change was also expressed due to the insufficiency of the central government to fill the expectations of the citizens. As an example, it was commonly agreed that a decision that is local by nature does not have to me made from the center. Rather, it is cost effective in the case where local authorities are entrusted with some powers.

Although the reforms of decentralization and local administration have two sources, both internal and external, it is not exaggerated to mention that in the case of Turkey and Cameroon, the external source has played a major role for the change which can arguably be called “exo-geneous” changes, stemming from the imposition of international organizations.
3 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY APPROACH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter two identified several research questions pertaining to the closeness of government to the people and its measurement in the context of decentralization reforms. Chapter three describes the methodology used to generate data to investigate those research questions. An introduction to the methodology of this thesis was provided in section 1.4 of chapter one; the present chapter intends to build on that introduction and to deliver assurance that suitable procedures were followed. Throughout this comparative study, several features of the two systems of decentralization were analyzed. As concern research methods, this chapter is organized around five major topics: comparative approach and design, methods, range and intentions of the comparative analysis; data collection techniques; Data analysis techniques; the question of reliability and validity.

3.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Among the research questions posed at the initial stage of this study, there were: to what extent has government decision-making moved closer to the individuals in Turkey and Cameroon in the implementation of decentralization and LG reforms? How well have these reforms been performed in terms of meeting the objective of moving decision closer to people? In order to answer these questions, we developed four research aims among which to comparatively assess the degree of the closeness of government to the people in the design of decentralization and LG reforms in Turkey and Cameroon; to empirically investigate the level of government closeness to the citizens resulting from the implementation the reforms in either country.

In order to facilitate the getting of data likely to most satisfactory address my research questions and aims, we chose to utilize a comparative case study approach. Case study methodology was described by Yin (2004) as a distinctive modality of empirical survey particularly suitable for exploring the why and the how of contemporary phenomena within an actual life context. Yin (2004) notes that this methodology is particularly appropriate when the researcher deems the context to be significantly pertinent to the
subject under review. This is the justification for our choice of such an approach that allowed for ‘cross-country’ comparison (Hakim, 2000) of policies and practices aimed at bringing decision-making closer to the people in Cameroon and Turkey.

As a thesis comparing the implementation of the concerned reforms in two countries, it clearly appears that our research falls within the framework of comparative local government which is a sub-field of comparative public administration. The German Professor Lorenz von Stein, considered in numerous parts of the world as the founder of the science of public administration, suggested in 1855 that “public administrators should be concerned with both theory and practice”. Thus, comparative studies of local government should be grounded on comparative analysis of public policies, administrative structures and processes, combining both theoretical and empirical approaches on local governments. The present research was then conducted under the perspective of these approaches.

Methodologically speaking, Wollmann (2008) explains that there are three main comparative research strategies: quantitative strategy, comparative research designs and qualitative case study approaches. The first one (i.e., quantitative strategy) is expected to address many cases and few variables. Our study examined only few (two) cases and many variables, therefore quantitative approach was ruled out.

The second research strategy, that is comparative approaches, obeys a research logic that is quasi-experimental in that it aims to isolate the operative dependent and independent variables under investigation by controlling other contextual variables and making them "homogeneous", ceteris paribus (Wollmann, 2008). Any quasi-experimental design has not been applied in this study.

The third research strategy is qualitative case study approach and is conceived as a case in the formation process which needs to be empirically reconstructed using the typical methods of the case study approach (document analysis, interviews, etc.). This approach was used in this study, as it sought to identify in detail the reform implementation and the potentially influential factors. Since our study is a qualitative research, the case study methodology utilized was “hypothesis-led” and not “hypothesis-testing”. Qualitative researches are not really designed for hypothesis testing.
As a comparative bi-case study strategy, through the cases of Turkey and Cameroon, this approach permitted to avoid the theoretical weaknesses of the single case study generally arriving at an *ad hoc* explanation which is likely to lack external validity, although in explaining the single case it may attain a high degree of internal validity. Thus, empirical generalizations which go beyond *ad hoc* explanations can be generated from this research strategy and may approach theory-building potential.

Since case study enquiry has been identified as a research methodology that allows the utilization of a varied range of design, data collection techniques and analysis of multiple sources of evidence (Hakim, 2000), to carry out this research, we first studied the bulk of legislative and regulatory instruments that make up the design of decentralization and local government reforms in either country, supplemented by academic and other official sources on the two countries’ system. The next part was concerned with empirical implementation of the framework and included semi-structured interviews on the subject matter in Turkey and Cameroon in order to get more acquainted with the purposes, key points and difficulties of the reform.

### 3.3 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY APPROACH AND DESIGN

The aim of a comparative case study is to assess distinct contexts in view of the identification of common factors and to separate them from specific factors for each context (Przeworski and Teune, 2000; Ragin and Amoroso, 2019). Therefore, a comparative assessment requires a clear identification of the variables investigated in the comparison. In this study primarily built on the line of comparison suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014), further enriched with a far more comprehensive framework, the analysis is conducted around five main variables: the structure of LG, their size, weight in the multi-level governance system, the security of their existence, as well as their empowerment in the interrelated and interconnected dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative and fiscal. These elements have been chosen because they have been considered relevant by the existing literature on government closeness to the people resulting from the implementation of the so-called reforms. Of course, other variables could have been chosen, but for the delimitation and feasibility of this study, the focus on some specific and no less relevant variables was decided. Future studies may compare the
chosen variables in other contexts or explore the other variables. The figure below presents the research design adopted for this study.

Figure 2: Research Design

The subject matter of decentralization and local government reforms has attracted the attention of many researchers in recent years. In effect, in the contexts of NPM, good governance, decentralization and other reform waves, local governments undergo significant political-administrative transformation both in developed and developing countries, with diversified reform tools and results. This transformation indicates the need to analyze, from comparative perspective and country case studies, the results of the reforms undergone or undergoing in local government and politics (in Sadioglu, U., In Dede, K., & IGI Global, 2016). It is at this level that the discipline of comparative local government gains prominence, as a sub-study field of comparative public administration which at its turn is also a sub-field of public administration.

Fred Riggs, one of the key proponents of comparative public administration cited by Otenyo and Lind (2006), asserted that “All subjects of Political Science and all scientific interpretations of public administration need to be comparative”. In his essay dated of 1887, Woodrow Wilson, the founder of the science of public administration already argued that: “Without comparative studies in government, we cannot rid ourselves of the
misconception that administration stands on a different basis in democracy & other states”. In order to further demonstrate the importance of comparative study of public administration, Woodrow Wilson provided the following image: “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit a murder with it” (Wilson, Barnes & Wilson, 1924). In effect, comparative study can provide a major contribution towards an improvement of the understanding of the way in which different countries’ institutions of public administration actually work. The different aspects that comparative method classically sought are means, processes and principles of “the best/most ideal” example. It is also interested in finding out which actor has been most effective in designing the reform and successfully implementing it.

Although the systems of local government vary from one country to another, countries still have lots of common aspects in this area. Therefore, the comparison of countries’ situation can be useful to identify lessons and to reflect one’s own situation. That is why comparative study is very informative and refreshing. A comparison illuminates indeed aspects of each system. It also allows to determine how far countries have conformed (or deviated) from their reform objectives. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2009) has recommended that “after appropriate examination, countries should adopt policies and legal frameworks from other governments that are implementing decentralization effectively”.

3.4 METHODS, RANGE AND INTENTIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

There is a scarcity of studies that comparatively assess the level of government closeness to the people manifested in countries as a result of the decentralization reforms. One objective of study is to help to fill this gap by providing an exploratory research aimed at provoking an informed discussion on the topic. The study then generated new literature and filled a gap in comparative local government. There have been and still are various challenges in a number of areas as a result of the reforms. The paper found out some shortcomings with respect to the subject matter in either country and proposes solutions to overcome faced mistakes and setbacks.
3.5 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES: THE USE OF LIBRARY MATERIALS AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The study is based on the one hand on secondary data analysis made from library materials in the form of documents, books, journals, acts, government reports, official documents, newspapers, and on-line sources. The work by Turkish scholars on Turkish local governments seems to be well furnished and has therefore been very helpful for the Turkish case. Arber (2006) defines the analysis of secondary data as the process of re-examining existing information. Commonly applied to quantitative research, secondary data analysis is also applicable to qualitative study (Hakim, 2000).

According to Babbie (2007), previously collected data can provide a source of information which is valuable and even lessen the need for the use of other sources. When using secondary data analysis, a couple of factors should be considered. It is important to get an understanding of the intention and theoretical perspective of the original research in order to ascertain whether they are fully appropriate to the research currently conducted (Lewis (2006). As concerns reliability, the rigor of the research method utilized in the original data collection and analysis is especially important (Lewis, 2006). In terms of validity, relevant factors include the use of terms, definitions and variables in relation with the current research (Babbie, 2007).

On the other hand, primary data was generated through semi-structured interviews with key informants in the implementation of reforms in both countries, purposively mayors, deputy mayors, municipal council members and municipal administrators. According to Fielding and Thomas (2006), the process of information gathering can be assisted by face-to-face interviewing through interaction built with each participant allowing the questioning to go deeper as much as possible. Semi-structured interviews were employed in this academic work due to the flexibility attached to such methodology.

In total, thirty three interviews were undertaken in Turkey and Cameroon. In Turkey, interviews were conducted in English and Turkish languages in fifteen municipalities from three big cities of the country: Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakir. In Cameroon, interviews were conducted in French in ten municipalities in two main cities: Yaounde and Douala. Before the beginning of interviews, a pilot interview was first administered with one specialist on local government from the Union of Municipalities of Turkey in
Ankara, and with one expert from the United Councils and Cities of Cameroon in Yaounde.

Triangulation was then used in this qualitative research. Data triangulation is the expression used by Denzin (1978) to refer to the utilization in a study of different sources of data sources. This triangulation aims at strengthening the study in so far as trying to generate a comprehensive perspective based on a sole source of data can be misleading. Supporting this way of seeing, Patton (2002) wrote that studies conducted on the basis of only one source of data are generally exposed to the risk of mistakes that can stem from the unique source of data collected (for instance, questions for interview that are neither clear nor digest, the risk of getting responses which are untrue or biased). However, studies using more than one source of data are likely to provide “cross-data validity checks”.

3.5.1 About the Conduct of Semi-Structured Interviews

In a qualitative study, an interview is basically an exchange enabling the researcher to direct the conversation towards a broad target and thereby insist on the particular topics that the interviewee would raise himself or herself (Babbie, 2005). According to Berg (2004), an interview is “a conversation with a purpose to gather information”. In the view of Patton (2002), “Qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption that the perspective of others is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit”. He further added that interview has the advantage of allowing the interviewer to penetrate the interviewee’s perspective. Thus, the interviews we undertook for the purpose of this study were held in the quest for first-hand experience from some informants involved in the reform implementation.

The questions asked during the interviews were open-ended and aimed at investigating the understanding, the experience and the evaluation of the reform implementation by these key informants. The format of the questions asked to all participants was semi-structured or semi-standardized given that they were already determined in advance with an open-ended character. They were asked following an order that was consistent, fair and systematic. In spite of the digressions and probes I used, I however posed specific questions that were fundamental for my study.
I used to begin the interviews by ensuring the participants about the respect of ethical considerations through, among other, my duty of keeping confidential all information on their identity. Thus those who could find the study or the questions sensitive could thereafter freely express their views. Babbie (2004) stresses that “the clearest concern in guarding participants’ interests and well-being is the protection of their identity.” By guaranteeing privacy to participants, their worries were reduced, and they could give candid responses. Joining the word to the act, the identity of respondents was not disclosed in the text which rather mentions only their code numbers that are known by only me.

The request of some who asked for the anonymity of their identity has been honored in the text in so far as only code numbers of interviews were used and I am the only person with the key to these code numbers.

For all interviews, I used to proceed as follows: I first expressed my thanks to the participant for accepting to have conversation me around my interview questions. After recalling to the participants all their rights with respect to the interview, as per the requirement of the permission we got from Ethic Commission from Hacettepe university, I used to go straight to the major questions. With the permission of some participants, all the interviews were digitally recorded. Following the advice of Patton (2002) according to which the “use of a tape recorder does not eliminate the need for taking notes, but does allow you to concentrate on taking strategic and focused notes, rather than attempting verbatim notes”, I also took some notes. Most of interviews lasted around 30 to 45 minutes.

The field notes were rewritten after the interviews and typed into a coherent format. A verbatim transcription of the interviews digitally recorded was done, and included nonverbal expressions respondents of the respondents, such as sighs, laughter and long pauses.

3.5.2 Concerning the Library Materials

The study also drew from a great amount of library materials in the form of documents, books, journals, acts, government reports, official documents, newspapers, and on-line sources. A qualitative content analysis was then made. Content analysis is defined by
Neuman (2000) as a technique through which an information or content is examined in its in written or symbolic form (for instance, movies, pictures, song lyrics, etc.)”. In content analysis, he continued, the first thing that an investigator should do is to first identify the materials to be analyzed in the forms of books, films, newspapers, etc.) so that the researcher can create a system to record some aspects of these materials. In this study, content analysis was used to analyze both library materials and data generated from personal interviews.

3.5.3 The Internet

Online data were also used in the research of the various websites of local government actors covered in this study. Existing debates and interviews on the subject matters available on YouTube were accessed. Many of them were conducted in public or private TV channels and involved all categories of actors in decentralization process, ranging from mayors, councilors, administrative authorities, members of government, civil society, university lecturers, politicians, as well as citizen, because they echoes so many challenges shared much more broadly. From those interviews and debates, I typically looked for responses that suit and fit to my questions. I also looked at stories that reflect interesting challenges, formative experiences and surprising lessons.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

According to Patton (2002), analyzing qualitative data is a daunting task in so far as “The challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data. This involves reducing the volume of raw information, sifting trivial from significance, identifying significant patterns, and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal.” An analogous view is offered by Berg (2004) who notes that analysis of qualitative data “makes sense of the information accessed during the getting-in stage”. He also affirms that “analysis involves creating categories or themes and then sorting answers to questions or statements from the fieldwork into these categories.”

For the analysis of data, I used thematic analysis through an inductive approach and a substantial and prolonged exploitation of the documents and notes from the fieldwork.
Also known as inductive reasoning, inductive approach “involves the search for pattern from observation and the development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through series of hypotheses”( Bernard, 2011).

By thematic analysis of text, Trochim (2005) understands the naming of major ideas or themes in a document or set of documents. Any of document can be concerned such as technical papers, memos, field notes or newspaper articles. According to Boyatzis (1998), a theme is “a pattern found in the information that describes and organizes the possible observations” on the one hand, and decodes the facets of the phenomenon, on the other hands. He further adds that five steps are covered in the development of inductive thematic codes, precisely: “reducing the raw information; identifying themes within subsamples; comparing themes across subsamples; creating a code, and determining the reliability of the code”. Insight and interpretation of generated data generated were provided by the themes developed in this study.

To conduct analytical categorization and thematic development, data were reduced to manageable levels using coding. As Neuman (2006) puts it, “Coding data is the hard work of reducing large mountains of raw data into small, manageable piles”. Additionally to making the data manageable, he further asserts that coding permits a fast retrieve of the significant parts of the data. Coding allows the emergence of themes to the surface through the move up of raw data that were in the deep inside. For Miles and Huberman (1994), codes are labels or tags which serve to assign elements of significance to the inferential or descriptive data gathered throughout a research. Codes are commonly accompanying “chunks” of changing entire paragraphs, sentences, phrases, or size-words unconnected or connected to a particular setting.” Also, from my readings of the field notes, major categories were developed.

3.7 THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

The terms validity and reliability are differently viewed and operationalized by quantitative and qualitative researchers. Although these two notions are generally used in the framework of quantitative research or measurement, qualitative research also considers them a lot. Thus, many data collections techniques are deployed by qualitative
research to “record their observations consistently” (Neuman, 2006) and to hence maximize at the reliability.

Reliability is perceived by Neuman (2006) as “consistency” or “dependability”. It entails that “the same thing is repeated or recurs under the identical or very similar conditions.” Concerning validity, Neuman indicates that it implies “truthfulness”. According the same author, validity is absent when there is a “poor fit between the constructs a researcher uses to describe, theorize, or analyze and what actually occurs in the social world”. He further asserts that in qualitative research, validity implies that “researchers are more interested in authenticity than in the idea of a single version of truth.” For him, “authenticity means giving a fair, honest, and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives it every day” (Neuman, 2006). He also adds that qualitative researchers are concerned more with “giving a candid portrayal of social life that is true to the experiences of people being studied than with matching an abstract construct to empirical data”. This study was closed to the depiction of validity, because a concentration was made, among others, on capturing people’s views and evaluation of the reform implementation.

As clearly demonstrated by Lincoln and Guba (1985) in agreement with Neuman, qualitative research seeks to generate deeper understanding, meaningful inferences and beneficial findings rather than leading to generalizable truths. For appraising the quality of a qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed four criteria that are well comparable with those used in assessing the quality of quantitative work. These are: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. In the framework of qualitative research, they explain that “credibility is analogous to internal validity; transferability analogous to external validity; dependability analogous to reliability; and confirmability analogous to objectivity”. Cook and Campbell (1979) reminded that “focus is normally placed on internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity”. Table 7 below provides the criteria respectively suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Cook and Campbell (1979) for judging research quality in quantitative and qualitative studies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for Assessing the Quality of Qualitative Research</th>
<th>Criteria for Assessing the Quality of Quantitative Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Internal Validity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferability</td>
<td>External Validity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependability</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmability</td>
<td>Objectivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Approval for this research was solicited and obtained from the Ethics Commission of Hacettepe University (HU) in Ankara. Research integrity was ensured thanks to all the efforts made to meet the standards laid out in the Ethics of Research Policy and Procedure of HU. Thus, compliance with all legal and ethical requirements was observed for the undertaking of our study in a transparent, honest, accountable and responsible manner possible. This necessitated, for instance, a permission solicited and obtained from Ivanyina and Shah for the use of their framework as the basic driver of this research, though we further enriched it by adding more qualitative criteria that have been helpful for the analysis of data from the fieldwork. Besides, participants to the semi-structured interviews were provided with an interviewee information sheet translated into their language in order to enable the making by them of a knowledgeable decision concerning their participation. The sheet covered information containing the research objective, the methodology, the intended utilization of data and how their contribution to the study would occur.

All the respondents were informed about the voluntary character of their participation in the study. They were also informed that all information they delivered would remain confidential. The participants were recalled their right to also ask questions and discuss the research during the interview as well as to stop it at any moment. The use of anonymity for data analysis was guaranteed. Prior to the interviews, a consent letter was requested from the top management of each participant’ organization to serve as the “legal” basis for the conduct of the interviews. Permission was sought from each participant to make audio record of the interview. The service of a translator was not required in both countries, because the researcher possesses a proficiency in their respective language. The
information recorded, transcribed and all other data files were kept secret in a protected computer only accessible to the researcher. Names and other participants’ details were kept in an isolated coded file in order to avoid this information to get connected to the interview transcripts and break the respondents’ anonymity. Tables 8 & 9 below present an anonymized breakdown of interviewees’ roles in each municipality or sites visited in Turkey and Cameroon.

Table 8: Participants ID and Role in Each Municipality Visited in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Participant ID</th>
<th>Function / role</th>
<th>Number of Participant/site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANKARA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 Aoff* 1</td>
<td>Economist at the Directorate of International Relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Human Resources and Training Manager</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Aoff 2</td>
<td>Economist at the Human Resources and Training Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Director of human resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Director of Construction and Urbanism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 Eoff** 1</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor and Municipal Council Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Director of Construction and Urbanism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7 Eoff 1</td>
<td>- Deputy Mayor;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Council Member;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Deputy Chairman of the District Municipal Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Deputy Human Resource Director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTANBUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor and Municipal Assembly Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 Eoff 1</td>
<td>- Mayor Advisor;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Member of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipal Council.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>11 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Human Resources and Training Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Public Relations Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>13 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİYARBAKIR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>15 Eoff 1</td>
<td>- Municipal Council Member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Deputy Mayor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>17 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Director of Public Relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of participants</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author
Table 9: Participants ID and Role in Each Municipality Visited in Cameroon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Participant ID</th>
<th>Function / role</th>
<th>Number of Participant/site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YAOUNDE</td>
<td>18 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Aoff 2</td>
<td>Head of the Unit of Hygiene, Environment and Salubrity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Eoff**1</td>
<td>Municipal Council Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Head of General Affairs Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 Aoff 2</td>
<td>Research Assistant /Legal Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 Aoff 3</td>
<td>Research Assistant /Legal Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Technical Advisor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOUALA</td>
<td>24 Eoff 1</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 Aoff 1</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total number of participants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author

* Appointed officials
**Elected officials
4 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT CLOSENESS TO THE PEOPLE IN THE DESIGN OF DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Based on the framework presented in the previous chapters for the measurement of the government closeness to people, the present chapter investigates the extent of this closeness in the design of decentralization and local government reforms in Turkey and Cameroon. The point of attention is to comparatively find out the level of fulfillment of the indicators of government closeness to people in either country. The comparative assessment is organized here around variables and indicators already mentioned in the literature review. The measurement framework serves as a checklist allowing to verify the presence or not and the extent of the government closeness to people in Turkey and Cameroon. To this end, this chapter builds on the examination of constitutional, legislative and regulatory provisions as well as other reliable textual sources on decentralization and local government reforms. The chapter is organized around seven key and inter-related topics including the structure of local government; average municipal size; the weight of local authorities in the multi-level governance system; the security of the existence of LA; their empowerment in the fiscal, political and administrative dimensions of decentralization). Before getting to the heart of the matter, the next section recalls the historical development of local administration and decentralization in the two countries.

4.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMEROON AND TURKEY

To understand the current situation of decentralization and local government in the countries under review and even beyond, it is useful to make a flashback in the history to investigate as much as possible the genesis and the evolution of decentralization until today. It is the aim of this part of the chapter.
4.2.1 Historical Development of Local Administration and Decentralization in Cameroon

What is nowadays called "Cameroon" was originally a German protectorate, following an agreement made on July 12, 1884, at the end of which the Douala chiefs totally abandoned the:

rights concerning sovereignty, legislation and administration of the territory called Cameroon, located along the Cameroon river between the Bimbia rivers in the north and Kwakwa in the south, up to 4 ° 10 'north longitude to mister Edouard Schmidt acting on behalf of the firm C. Wœrmann and to mister Johaness Voss, acting on behalf of the firm Jantzen and Thormalen, both in Hamburg, and traders for years in these rivers (Kamto, 1990).

While Germany seemed to have transformed Cameroon into a simple colony after the conquest of its Hinterland, it lost Cameroon during the First World War, under the assaults of Franco-British troops (Nkot, 1999). Thus, as of February 1916, Germany definitively left Cameroonian territory. On March 29 of the same year, a Franco-British agreement organized the division of Cameroon between the two powers: France occupied most of eastern Cameroon, almost four-fifths or approximately 432,000 km2 of the territory, and Great Britain subjugated western Cameroon, roughly the fifth or approximately 88,270 km2. In July 1922, a mandate agreement was signed, entrusting the administration of Cameroon to Great Britain and France on behalf of the League of Nations. After the Second World War, Cameroon has been placed under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) which had just been created, and in the name of which France and Great Britain now administer it.

Cameroon under French administration gained its independence on January 1, 1960, whereas Cameroon under British administration had been divided into two parts: on the one hand, Northern Cameroon with its regions of Dikwa, Adamoaoua of the Tigon group, Ndoro and Kentu and, on the other hand, Southern Cameroon including Buéa, Victoria and Tiko are the main agglomerations (Mveng, 1963: 495). Politically and administratively integrated into the British colony of neighboring Nigeria, the two parts
of British Cameroon, were governed by the system of Indirect Rule\textsuperscript{34}, were relatively isolated from each other, and also experienced different trajectories. Thus, faced with the divergence of the political forces of the two parts of British Cameroon over the fate of each of them, resolution 1350 (XII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations dated March 13, 1959 asked Great Britain to organize, under the supervision of the UN itself, separate plebiscites in Northern Cameroon, on the one hand, and Southern Cameroon, on the other hand.

After a first plebiscite held on November 7, 1959 resulting in no change in the situation, another plebiscite was organized on February 11 and 12, 1961, this time relating to both Northern Cameroon and Southern Cameroon. The question posed to the two parts of Cameroon under British administration was "whether they wish to achieve independence by uniting with the independent Republic of Cameroon or by uniting with the federation of independent Nigeria". In Northern Cameroon, the populations voted 59.97 percent for the union with Nigeria against 40.03 percent for the union with independent Cameroon. The people of Southern Cameroon, for their part, voted by 233,271 votes in favor of union with independent Cameroon and by 92,724 votes against this possibility.

Taking account of the results of the two plebiscites, resolution 1608 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations dated April 21, 1961 indicates, on the one hand, that northern Cameroon will join the Federation of Nigeria as separate province from the northern region and, on the other hand, that the government of Southern Cameroon and the Republic of Cameroon will begin talks with the aim of reaching a conclusion before October 1, 1961 (date of lifting of the trusteeship of Southern Cameroon) to arrangements to settle the attachment of Southern Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

Coming back to the historical development of local administration stricto sensu, it can be said that the origins of local administration structures in Cameroon as we know them today date back to 1916, during the first world war. France and England, winners of the war were given tutelage over Cameroon. Since then, the common appellation of local administration is “commune” in French and ‘local council’ in English. Communes have

\textsuperscript{34} The systeme of Indirect rule is a system of indirect administration, which was generally used Great Britain in its African colonies. A prevailing opinion maintains that it consists essentially of administering a given British colony through the local traditional authorities (Nkot, 1999).
been given different designation\textsuperscript{35} and have been subjected to many reforms concerning their organs and management.

The constitutional reform that led to the unification of Cameroon on May 20, 1972 aimed at standardizing the legislation of the former eastern and western Cameroon. It is at this point that municipality is defined as a decentralized public authority and a legal person under public law with legal personality and financial autonomy. In the law numbered 74/23 of 5\textsuperscript{th} December 1974 laying down organization of communes, the legislator carefully distinguished only two types of communes on the basis of demographic weight and the level of development. These are: urban communes which, in theory, have competent managerial staff and sufficient substantial resources to ensure good municipal management. They have been granted kind of democratic structures by the legislator. Unlike the urban communes, rural communes barely have adequate personnel and material. For this reason, the legislator has granted them a structure controlled by the executive power.

After these two types of communes, the first city councils, called in French language “communautés urbaines” were created in 1987\textsuperscript{36} for the urban agglomerations of Yaounde and Douala. By the law numbered 2004/018 dated July 22nd, 2004 laying down the rules applicable to communes, the city council creation was extended to other urban agglomeration\textsuperscript{37}. The same law has removed the labels “urban” and “rural” in the designation of communes.

After the independence in 1960, Cameroon had 90 communes. This number shifted to 150 in 1972 and 14 syndicates of communes were counted the same year. In 1977, 177 communes; in 1982, 190 communes and 38 syndicates of communes. In 1987, 190 communes and two city councils; 337 communes and two city councils in 1996; since 2008, 360 communes and 14 city councils. What communes are today has been influenced by the following events that Cameroon has gone through in its history: slavery, colonialization, independence, federalism, reunification, unitary state, economic crisis,

\textsuperscript{35} According to Barthelemy Kom (2014), every designation entails a mode of management. We can cite commune of full exercise, rural-mix commune, urban-mix commune, commune of middle exercise, urban commune of average exercise, urban commune, rural commune.

\textsuperscript{36} At first, the city councils for the urban agglomeration of Yaounde and Douala.

\textsuperscript{37} Article 109 of the law numbered 2004/018 dated of July 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2004.
structural adjustment, democratic transition, political pluralism and devaluation of franc CFA (Kom, 2014).

From 1920 to 1960, Cameroon has been subjected to two systems of administration: the British system of ‘indirect rule’ applied in the western Cameroon and the French system of ‘direct assimilation’ implemented in the eastern Cameroon. After the independence of eastern Cameroon in 1960, Cameroon became a federal state on October 1st, 1961 with two federated states each having a distinct legislative assembly and judiciary house: the federated state of western Cameroon corresponding to the anglophone part\textsuperscript{38} of Cameroon with its capital city in Buea, and the federated state of eastern Cameroon corresponding to the francophone part\textsuperscript{39} of Cameroon with its capital in Yaounde. On 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1972, Cameroon became a unitary state which later has been shaken by the grave economic crisis of the 1980s and started to experience democracy in 1990 with the instauration of political pluralism.

Several changes have been done in the number and the management system of communes in both western and eastern Cameroon. After the unification of Cameroon on 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1972, the law numbered 74/23 dated of 5\textsuperscript{th} December 1974, laying down the communal organization, has been the core legislative and regulatory framework for municipal management in Cameroon. This core law has led to the enactment of several implementation texts among which some are still in force today, for instance, the two inter-municipal cooperation mechanisms. The first is the Special Fund for Inter-communal Equipment and Intervention (F.E.I.C.O.M); the second is the Union of communes. Designed as an administrative public institution, the F.E.I.C.O.M with its headquarter in Yaoundé, acts as a regulator of municipal management and the main promoter of communal solidarity.

The union of municipalities aims at the grouping of communal entities to carry out works of common interest. The text establishing it stipulates that "the communes of a department may, either at the request of the supervisory authority, or by concordant deliberations duly approved, form a syndicate to carry out joint inter-municipal operations, such as opening

\textsuperscript{38} The part of Cameroon dominated by the presence of Anglophones and the use of English language covers the regions of Nord-West and South-West.

\textsuperscript{39} The part of Cameroon dominated by the presence of francophones and the use of French language is composed of eight regions out 10.
and maintenance of intercommunal roads, purchase and use of road machinery, exploitation of services by way of concession.

The transformation of the urban communes of Douala and Yaoundé into urban communities by a law of July 15, 1987, and the subsequent creation of four (04) urban district communes in each of the two cities increased the number of communes to two hundred (200). With the promulgation of the law n° 92/00340, the generalization of mayors’ elections in urban or rural communes started to be implemented. Only large agglomerations remained governed by a special law.

Like many African countries, Cameroon government engaged itself in the process of decentralizing towards lower levels of government significant powers and responsibilities previously exercised by the central government. This devolution of powers - administrative, political and fiscal - to subnational authorities was done in accordance with the Constitution of 18th January 1996, which amended the Constitution of 1972 and transformed Cameroon into a “decentralized unitary state” composed of the central state and a two-level system of ‘autonomous’ sub-national government. Translating these constitutional provisions into reality has already taken more than 20 years, is still far from been satisfactory and is considered as one of the main causes of social crises facing Cameroon. In fact, the anglophone separatist and armed crisis going on in the country since September 2016 has brought a new impulsion for the implementation of decentralization process which was going very slowly with the reason that the transformation was so sensitive and there was a risk of jeopardizing fragile national unity in case of rushing the process (Kofele-Kale, 2011).

In 2004, the three main laws on decentralization promulgated by the Head of the State, gave hope to the many Cameroonians who already considered that the so-called transfer of powers to subnational authorities would remain only theoretical, considering the lack of concrete action between the enactment of the constitution in 1996 and 2003. However, it took another six more years for the launching of the application of decentralization’s

40 Loi n° 92/003 du 14 aout 1994 modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la loi n° 74/23 du 5 décembre 1974 portant organisation communale.
laws, i.e., in 2010\textsuperscript{41}. In March 2018, a whole ministry was created and dedicated to decentralization and local development.

Thus, given the influence of the Napoleonic system that formerly characterized the central government under the leadership of a super-powerful president of the Republic, how can one elucidate the engagement taken more than twenty years ago to endow the country with decentralized units? Did this core change proceed from a simple free will of the government or outside the government to finally make effective the provisions of the Constitution concerning decentralization. What can explain this renewed interest in decentralization? The answers to these questions as well as to others will be provided throughout the chapter.

In accordance with the constitution, decentralization is defined by the Law on Decentralization as “the devolution of special powers and suitable resources from the state to decentralized units to enable them to properly perform their activities” (Article 2(1)). These activities must be carried out while abiding by the primacy of the State, territorial integrity and national unity (Article 3(2)). This devolution should abide by the principles of subsidiarity, progressivity\textsuperscript{42} and complementarity. According to Article 2(2) of this Law, decentralization is expected to play the role of the major local locomotive for good governance, democracy and development.

In their separate areas of competence, decentralized authorities are entrusted with the responsibility for the “promotion of economic, social, educational, health, cultural and sports development” (Article 4(1)). For the purpose of realizing their mandate, these subnational units are granted the statute of a public law corporation with financial and administrative autonomy for managing all regional or local related matters (Article 4(1)). To some extent, they supposedly reap the benefits of democratic governance in so far as they are purposely placed under the leadership of boards elected freely (Article 4(2) and

\textsuperscript{41} 2010 was the year of the very first transfers of competences to Communes in Cameroon, by decrees from the Prime Minister, Head of the Government. These transfers continued in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

\textsuperscript{42} Progressivity means that competences should be gradually transferred to local governments overtime.
elect their own executive members from these boards (Article 4(3)) under the terms and conditions established by law’ (Article 4 (2)).

4.2.2 Historical Development of Local Administration and Decentralization in Turkey

As far as Turkey is concerned, Keleş (2016) writes that Turkey does not have a very old history of local government in the western sense. Some urban services that were carried out by local authorities in the West, such as artisan organizations, foundations, etc., were not carried out in Turkey. According to historians, pursues Keleş, the status of local governments formalized in the Ottoman Empire only emerged as a result of the pressure of the external states to establish the centralization system and the political participation of minority members and their ethnic rights. After the Crimean war, the first municipality was created in 1855 in Istanbul. At the beginning, there was also a city council (city council) of 12 people. The city council was headed by a chairman. The chairman had two assistants, and they were natural members of the city council. City council members used to come to the office with appointments. After the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy in 1908, the provisional act on the municipality of Dersaadet, promulgated in 1912, continued its tradition.

After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, the Municipal Law numbered 1580 dated 1930 remained unchanged and in force until a recent time. The law ended in 2005 with the law no 5393 dated 3rd July 2005. Besides Istanbul, attempts were made from 1868 to create a municipal organization. Since the statutes of 1864 and 1870 were repealed in 1913 by the provisional law, the so-called administrative authority, in the Republican period, the village administrations were deprived of any legal basis until they were reorganized with the Village Law No. 442 of 1924. After the basic laws on the Special Provincial Administrations (5302) and on Municipalities (5393) carried out in the early 2000s, the Ministry of Interior has now taken a workshop to the agenda of changing the Village Law no 442.

According to Şarbak (2017), Turkey is a country with a long tradition of excessive centralization. Local governments in Turkey are not sufficiently strong. For instance, Şarbak (2017) explains that although special provincial administrations, which are kind of provincial-wide management, were regulated by a law of 1914, central government did
not allow the development of these administrations. Similarly, municipalities were fundamentally regulated by a law of 1930. However, they had limited duties and financial resources, and were accordingly unable to show any significant development until the 1960s.

It is only since 1963 that municipalities began to gain importance in political terms thanks to the election of mayors directly by the people. 1985 also constituted a milestone in the municipal history, because it was in that year that the powers of spatial planning were granted to municipalities. The above-mentioned laws on local governments were renewed in the reforms of the years 2004 and 2005 through which the powers and resources of municipalities allocated from the central government were increased, and their administrative and financial autonomies were strengthened.

Metropolitan municipality system has been introduced in big cities since 1984. Thus, a bilateral municipal structure was formed in metropolitan cities including district municipalities in charge of micro-services, and metropolitan municipalities responsible for macro-services. Subsequently, the metropolitan system was expanded to thirty cities in 2014. Now, 80% of Turkey’s population lives in metropolitan cities. Special provincial administrations and village managements have been removed in the cities where the metropolitan system is implemented.

In a chapter entitled “Vision of the Public Administration Reform in Turkey”, Öktem and Çiftçi (2016) write that the main reason which led to the reforms of 2003 was the environment of the previous political instability in the country. That environment allowed the coming to the power of a sole political party having its own reform discourses as well as a large representation in the parliament. This situation accelerated the decision-making and implementation process of reforms. It was quite easy for the new ruling party to construct and implement their vision and discourses. The developments that took place both in the world and Turkey concerning LG, led to the adoption of reforms through the following main acts:

- Law numbered 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey dated 12 July 2004, modified by the Law numbered 6360 of 2012,
- Law numbered 5302 on Special Provincial Administrations dated 22 February 2005,
4.3 DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF TURKEY AND CAMEROON

As Keleş & Güner (2016) puts it, “in the effort to examine local governments within a country, the first place to look at would be the constitution of that country”. Relevant information about local authorities such as their competencies, their types, their revenues and diverse other characteristics are usually provided by constitutions. Thus, in this part of the study, the constitutional provisions on decentralization and local government are examined alternately for Turkey and Cameroon.

4.3.1 Decentralization and Local Government in the Constitution of Turkey

Article 123 of the Turkish Constitution in force, enacted on 7th November 1982, stipulates that “the organization and functions of the administration are based on the principles of centralization and decentralization”. Detailed constitutional provisions were introduced with respect to local administrations. For instance, the title of article 127 of the Constitution is “Local Administrations”. This article provides what follows: “Local governments are public corporate bodies established to meet the common local needs of inhabitants of provinces, municipalities and villages. The principles of their constitution as well as their decision-making organs are determined by law.” The constitution enumerates three types of local government which are: special provincial administrations, municipalities and villages. It also underlines that other type of local government can be created by law, if necessary. Financial and administrative autonomy of LG is proclaimed by the Constitution which also highlights the following as concerns local governments:

- Local governments’ organs of decision-making are directly elected by the voters.
- Local government public legal personality.
- Their organization, functions and powers are set by the law in conformity with the tenet of decentralization.
- The elections of LA are held every 5 years.
- The central government has power of administrative supervision and control over LA to make sure that local services are performed as per the principle of integrity, to ensure unity in public affairs, to protect community interest and to meet local needs as required. Administrative custody authority is regulated by law.
• LG bodies or the members of these bodies who have been investigated or prosecuted for an offense against their duties may be removed from office by a provisional decision as a provisional measure.

• Local governments should be assigned financial resources matching with their functions.

• The financial operations of local governments are audited by the Court of Accounts.

In addition to the constitutional provisions mentioned above, it has to be noted that Turkey is a member-state of the Council of Europe who adopted in 1985 and opened for signature the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The charter came into effect in 1988. Turkey ratified the charter with some reservations. This international treaty ratified by the Republic of Turkey has the power of law in the Turkish internal legal order. The Charter lays down rules protecting and promoting self-government. According to the Charter:

• Local self-government principle shall be recognized by the provisions of the national legislation and, where appropriate, by constitutional provisions.

• LAs have the right and the ability to organize and manage a significant portion of public issues under their responsibilities targeting the local population interests, within the boundaries set by law.

• This right shall be exerted by freely elected members of assemblies or councils to which executive organs may be responsible to.

• Local authorities are free to organize their own internal organizations.

• The basic responsibilities and powers of LG shall be set by the constitution or law.

• Local authorities shall exercise their power of initiative with full discretion over all matters that are not banned from their competence nor delegated to any other authority, within the limits of the law.

• The authority closest to the citizens shall generally and preferably exercise public responsibilities.

• Powers granted to local governments shall not be limited or undermined by regional or central authorities.
• Changes in the boundaries of local government shall not be operated without prior consultation of the concerned local populations, ideally through a referendum when it is allowed by law.
• The working conditions of local government employees shall allow the recruitment of a staff of high-quality based on merit and competence, etc.

4.3.2 Decentralization and Local Government in the Constitution of Cameroon

The Constitution of 18 January 1996 determines the general regime of the administrative and territorial organization of Cameroon. The supreme law creates the types of decentralized units, delimits their field of action and circumscribes the scope of their competences. It determines the identity and functions of the bodies entrusted with the responsibility of managing decentralized units and evokes their relations with the central government. It gives the legislator the task of substantially drafting the needed implementing texts for effective decentralization. Decentralization thus emerges as the new constitutional basis of the territorial organization of the state. Under the constitutional norm of 02 June 1972, Cameroon was a unitary and centralized state. The new one insists on its decentralized character.

Decentralization is addressed in two distinct parts of the 1996 constitution. Firstly, in Part One, Article 1 states that the Republic of Cameroon is organized in the form of a ‘unitary decentralized state’. Secondly, in Part X, eight distinct articles are devoted to the two types of subnational authorities of Cameroon that are respectively regional and local authorities. In other words, Regions and Councils (or communes) are the two levels of the decentralization system of Cameroon. As already discussed, these subnational entities are defined as public and corporate bodies awarded autonomy financially and administratively to manage all local and regional matters of interest. They are assumed to be administered in a free manner by elected representatives (Article 55(2)), but the right to “exercise supervisory powers” upon these decentralized entities is conferred the central level of government (Article 55(3)).

While the constitution entrusts these elected bodies with the mission to “promote the economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development” at regional and local level, each in its separate area of competence (Article 55(2)), the responsibility to
guarantee the “harmonious development” of all regions and municipalities ultimately remains to the central government, because it is believed that this latter is better positioned to maintain inter-regional balance and to safeguard national solidarity and interests through the rational management of regional potentialities. The responsibility is conferred to the legislator for the establishment of rules laying down the organization and functioning of the decision-making bodies of decentralized entities as well as the financial regulations applicable to them, (Article 55(5) and (6)). The Constitution also leaves to the law task of defining the share of powers between the central and subnational governments units (Article 56(2)).

4.4 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPALITIES IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON: PRESENCE OF BOTH SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Turkey and Cameroon have got some similarities and differences in the architectures or structures of their local governments. According to the 2019 World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment Report (Key Findings), and to the study of Ivanych and Shah (2014), there are generally a maximum of three levels of subnational governments (municipal, intermediate and regional) or decentralized units whereas the number of tiers of local government varies from 1 to 5 across countries. The two levels system of subnational government and the two-tier structure of local government are the most widely adopted and preferred among countries.

Both Cameroon and Turkey belong to the category of countries that have a two-tier structure of local government. The Cameroonian two-level structure of local government comprises 14 city council-level entities and 360 municipal-level entities all together subdivided into the following three categories: urban councils, urban district councils and ordinary councils. As far as Turkey is concerned, its two-tier structure of local government is composed of 81 provincial-level entities and 1389 municipal-level entities all together subdivided into four categories as follows: metropolitan municipalities, special provincial administration, district municipalities and town municipalities.
4.4.1 Features of Local Government Structure in Cameroon

The table below presents the territorial organization of Cameroon in terms of subnational governments:

**Table 10: Subnational Governments of Cameroon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 2019</th>
<th>1st or basic level (municipal)</th>
<th>2nd level (regional)</th>
<th>Total number of subnational governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name in English and in national language</td>
<td>Councils-communes</td>
<td>Regions</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average size</td>
<td>66805 inhabitants/commune</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360 Councils-Communes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2019 SNG WOFI Report country profiles (page 43) and the author.

In Cameroon, the territorial boundaries of the deconcentrated administrative services of the state correspond to those of the two levels of subnational government. Thus, 10 regions and 360 districts at the deconcentrated level correspond to ten regions and 360 local councils at the decentralized level. Boex (2011) explains that unlike subnational governments, territorial deconcentrated services of state are simply a hierarchical part of the central government level. They are not legal entities or corporate bodies. They do not have their own budgets, which are typically included in the national budget. They do not raise revenues, cannot incur liabilities by borrowing on their own or engage in financial transactions, and do not have their own assets.

Regional authorities are the second level of subnational governments. A regional authority encompasses all the divisions of a region. Administratively speaking, Cameroon is divided in 10 regions each placed under the command of a Governor, and 58 divisions under the authority of a senior divisional officer or a Prefect for each of them. A division at its turn is sectioned into sub-divisions each headed by a divisional officer.

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43 Their French appellation is “Département” like in France.
44 According to the Law on Regions, this subnational unit is managed by two organs each having precise mandate: the council of the region and the president of the regional council (Article 25). The first organ is composed of indirectly elected divisional delegates, and traditional rulers representatives elected by their peers (Article 26). The chief executive officer of the region is the president of the regional council. A regional bureau assists the president of the regional council and comprises a senior vice-president, a vice-president, two secretaries and two questors.
or a Sub-Prefect. These authorities are the heads of administrative jurisdiction and are placed under the authority of MINAT\textsuperscript{45}. According to the regulation, the Governor and the Prefect represent both the president of the Republic and the government, while the Sub-Prefect represents only the government\textsuperscript{46}. Till now, regional councils are not effective yet.

Local authorities, the focus of our present study, are the basic level of subnational governments in Cameroon. The legal distinction between urban and rural councils and the special status of urban councils strikingly present in the old law have been abolished by the 2004 Laws on Decentralization and Councils\textsuperscript{47}. However, there are 45 local councils in urban areas, identified as 'divisional councils', grouped into 14 'city or urban councils. The rest of local councils, i.e., 315 are considered as located in rural areas. Serving as a link between administration and villages, traditional chiefs have the legal status of administrative assistants to these councils. Thus, as mentioned above, the Law on Councils distinguishes three varieties of councils or communes that are: city or urban councils, sub-divisional urban councils, and regular or ordinary councils.

In Cameroon, councils are created by presidential decree(s) which provides its denomination, territorial boundaries and head quarter. Similarly, the change of one or all the above constituents is done by a presidential decree. The decision for the creation of a council is not submitted to pre-established viability criteria. It solely depends on the government will endorsed by a presidential decree. However, in order to avoid or limit disparities, it is desirable that the erection of a collectivity into a council should take account of a sufficient population and a level of development allowing to draw necessary resources to the equilibrium of its budget, so as to provide a public service of quality (Kom, 2013).

Each council (or commune) possesses two leading organs, namely a deliberative body and an executive office. In most councils, namely councils other than urban councils, the deliberative organ is a ‘council’ composed of elected councilors\textsuperscript{48} (Article 24) and an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} MINAT= Ministry of Territorial Administration.
\item \textsuperscript{46} See Decree n ° 2008/377 of 12 November 2008 fixing the attributions of the heads of administrative districts and relating to the organization and functioning of their services.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See art 2 of the Law n ° 74–23 dated 05 December 1974 Organizing Councils.
\item \textsuperscript{48} The number of elected councilors differs from one council to another and depends on the population of the concerned locality and not on the type of the council. In general, municipalities with:
\begin{itemize}
\item less than 50,000 people shall have 25 councilors,
\item 50,000–100,000 shall have 31 councilors,
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
executive office of the council (Article 58). The executive office of the council comprises an indirectly elected mayor as the head, assisted by deputy mayors49 (Article 58(4)). Article 58(2)). This executive arm of the council is supported by a State-appointed General Secretary (Article 80(1)). The Secretary General is the principal collaborator of the Mayor, follows the instruction of the affairs of the council and receives from the mayor the necessary signing delegations.

Regarding urban councils, they have a particular nature stemming from their specific arrangement as concerns the exercise of authority and powers conferred to them. An urban council is a special council that is established from an urban settlement50. On the basis of their “specific nature”, urban settlements can be elevated to city councils by decree(s) of the president of the Republic (Article 109(1)). An urban center or settlement can be transformed to an urban community when the urban area acquires a sociological composition in which the indigenous group becomes the minority and inundated by a non-indigenous population who gets the numerical preponderance, or when an ethnic group which is dominant is however politically opposed to another ethnic group substantially smaller and minority. Other considerations such as the size of an urban settlement and its strategic importance in terms of political, administrative and economic features can also justify its erection to an urban council. However, there is not a quantitative criterium in those dimensions that will objectively or automatically lead to the transformation to an urban community. So, there currently are 14 urban settlements which have been raised to the status of city council51.

By definition, an urban council shall encompass two sub-divisional communes at least (Article 109(3 and 4)). The organs of a urban community are: first, the council of the city

49 The number of deputy mayors is set on the base of the size of the council:
_ 25–35 councilors shall have two deputy mayors,
_ 35–41 councilors shall have four deputy mayors,
_ 61 councilors shall six deputy mayors.
See Law on Councils, §58 (4).

50 The free dictionary by Farlex defines “urban settlement” as a densely populated area comprising mostly man-made structures that contain all of a society's administrative, cultural, residential and religious functions (see https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Urban+Settlements, retrieved on December 20, 2019).

council which is a deliberative organ comprising mayors of sub-divisional councils and elected representatives chosen from every sub-divisional council (Articles 112 & 113(1)).

Second, the government delegate to the urban community (Article 112), a state appointed official by a presidential decree, is the executive head of the urban council (Article 115) exercising the powers and duties of a mayor. As such, he convenes and chairs the meetings of the urban council (Article 115(2)) and constitutes the urban council executive together with his or her assistants (Article 115(3)). The delegate of the government has the responsibility to prepare and implement the budget of the urban council; to also prepare and implement the urban council executive decisions, organizes and manages city services, oversees city projects, manages the property and resources of the city, and represents the city at official functions (Article 116).

The figure below presents the administrative structure and typology of local governments in Cameroon

![Administrative Structure and Typology of Local Governments in Cameroon](image)

**Figure 3**: Administrative Structure and Typology of Local Governments in Cameroon

### 4.4.2 Relations between Local and Central Authorities

In Cameroon, lowering the rigid character of the former relations between local and central authorities is one critical goal of decentralization without totally excluding the central administrations from the actions of local administration units (Kofele-Kale, 2011). The necessity of redefining the structural relationships of central and subnational authorities has been supported by the following arguments: firstly, the transfer of
governance to the levels of local governments offers substantial opportunities for enhanced engagement of people and communities and for citizen participation in decisions clearly affecting their lives. Secondly, through the strengthening of local authorities, service provisions, programs and plans from municipalities should more accurately exhibit the needs from local citizens than in a system of centralized governance; thirdly, the fiscal base and the system of revenue collection would be more effectively and efficiently managed by autonomous local governments than central administrations given the duty of service delivery and the subsequent accountability of the firsts to their local political constituency\textsuperscript{52}.

These considerations are well-articulated in the Law on Decentralization in so far as it is provided, for instance, in article 10 (1) that \textit{“the central government shall exercise supervisory powers over regional and local authorities in order to ensure their harmonious development”} guided by the principles of \textit{“national solidarity, regional and council potentials and inter-regional and inter-council balance”}. Put differently, the supervisory role of the state is more a real aspiration to guarantee a harmonious development of subnational units is, than a simple reflection of a reluctance to waive control. For this reason, in the Fiscal Law, allowances are made for the proceeds from a number of local levies and taxes intended to equalization.

4.4.3 Features of the Administrative Structure of Local Governments in Turkey

The country has got a dual structure of local government. On the one hand, there is the structure of municipalities in large cities, and on the other hand there is structure of municipalities in other cities. Table 11 and figure 4 below present the administrative structure of local government in Turkey.

\textbf{Table 11: Local Government Structure in Turkey}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{2018} & \textbf{1\textsuperscript{st} or basic Level (Municipal)} & \textbf{2\textsuperscript{nd} level (provincial)} & \textbf{Total number of LG} \\
\hline
 & Municipalities in large Cities (30) & Municipalities in the other cities (51) & \\
\hline
 & Metropolitan Municipalities & SPA (İl Özel İdareleri) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{52} See MDP-ESA Working Document 1991.
### 4.4.3.1 Municipalities in Large Cities

In large cities, there are two types of municipal units: metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities.

#### 4.4.3.1.1 Metropolitan Municipalities

![Diagram: Administrative Structure and Typology of LG in Turkey](image)

**Figure 4**: Administrative Structure and Typology of LG in Turkey

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average size</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Metropolitan District Municipalities (Buyuksehir Belediyeler)</th>
<th>Sub-Provincial municipalities (Ilce Belediyeler)</th>
<th>Town municipalities (Belde belediyesi)</th>
<th>51 SPA (Il Özel İdareleri)</th>
<th>30 provincial metropolitan municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 577 inhabitants/municipalities</td>
<td>1398*</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1449**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author and 2018 Mahalli İdareler Genel Faaliyet Raporu by the Ministry of the Interior


** The number ‘1449’ is obtained because ‘30’ metropolitan municipalities are already taken into consideration in the number of municipalities.
The metropolitan municipalities’ system was established for the first time in Turkey on March 8, 1984 in the three largest cities the country: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. A few years later, metropolitan municipality status was granted to 16 cities, and in 2013, 14 more provinces with population larger than 750,000 each were transformed into metropolitan municipalities, thus pushing up the total number of these municipalities to 30. In the provinces erected to the metropolitan municipalities, the local government system was reorganized. The respective SPA and villages within them were abolished and replaced by the metropolitan municipalities whose territorial boundaries became those of the abolished provinces. As the sole local government unit with provincial scope, the metropolitan municipality performs the services of local government in the whole province. In addition to urban administration, it is also now in charge of rural administration where the need arises inside the territorial limits of the entire province.

In the 30 metropolitan municipalities, a system of two-level units was introduced, empowering in the same jurisdiction both the metropolitan municipality and district municipalities. Almost 80% of the Turkish population, i.e., more than 60 million live within metropolitan municipalities boundaries. The rationale for the adoption of the metropolitan municipality system is that: firstly, some specific services would be very difficult to be aligned without a metropolitan scope, for examples: infrastructure, urban transport, land development, environment, water and sewerage undertaken by more than one municipality in the same geographic location. Secondly, for technical reasons and for economies of scale, it is required to plan and manage those services in a single-handed manner in the whole urban space. Thirdly, to plan and execute the concerned services with efficiency and economy, an organization reinforced administratively and financially is needed.

The main functions of metropolitan municipalities are the following:

- the preparation of higher scale land development plans (1/5,000 to 1/25,000),
- the approval of plans of implementation (1/1,000 scale) elaborated by districts municipalities,
- the supervision and insurance of the compliance by district municipalities plans with respect to the land development implementation,
- the drawing up of the master for metropolitan transport, the planning and implementation of public transport,
the production of land lots and housing to ensure well-ordered urbanization, the
construction of infrastructure as required for trade and industry,
the building of main roads, avenues, squares and boulevards,
the protection of agricultural land, water basins and the environment of the city,
the delivery of water and sewer services,
the recycling and storage of solid waste,
the building of open and closed spaces for parking,
the building of leisure, sporting and recreational facilities, museums, zoos and
regional parks.
the building of slaughterhouses, wholesale food markets, cemeteries and,
the provision of firefighting and emergency services.

The management organs of metropolitan municipalities are: First, the Metropolitan
Municipal council which is the body of decision-making formed by all the mayors of
metropolitan district municipalities and by taking 1/5 of the number of municipal
councilors in district municipalities affiliated to the metropolitan municipality. Second,
the metropolitan municipality executive assembly comprises five members appointed by
the metropolitan municipality mayor, the general secretary when they do not attend, one
general secretary and one head of the municipal governor. Finally, the metropolitan
municipality mayor who is the executive body charged to ensure that the metropolitan
municipality and its affiliated company and businesses are managed effectively and
efficiently; to monitor and collect the metropolitan municipality income, receivable,
rights and benefits; to represent the metropolitan municipality in all the acts and in justice.

4.4.3.1.2 Metropolitan District Municipalities

In the provinces transformed to metropolitan municipalities, services that have a micro
character are assigned to district municipalities. There are in total 519 districts
municipalities within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities. 60 million
inhabitants of the total population of Turkey are served by this category of municipalities.
Metropolitan district municipalities are assigned the following main functions: the
collection of domestic waste; the hygiene and cleaning of streets; the preparation of the
plans of implementation (1/1,000 scale); the issuing of licenses for building; the provision
of municipal social services such as professional training for the unemployed, social aid, reducing poverty; the promotion of education, culture and sports. As first-tier municipalities for which the people directly elect the council members, metropolitan district municipalities significantly contribute to civic participation in governance.

4.4.3.1.3 Relations Between Metropolitan and District Municipalities

Since district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities have complementary services and deploy their activities in the same geographical area, they are expected to closely collaborate and coordinate their work. Otherwise, conflicts of functions or powers can arise; similarly gaps and overlaps may happen in municipal services. The metropolitan municipality is given the task to ensure the coordination of the metropolitan district municipalities and to resolve disputes among them. To that end and to enable an effective accomplishment to this sensitive mission, the council of metropolitan municipality comprises mayors of metropolitan district municipalities and one fifth of their councillors per district.

There exists a tutelage relationship established by the law between these two levels of municipalities. In this vein, metropolitan municipalities are entrusted the responsibility to guarantee the integrity of the administration of land development with the power to make higher scale plans whereas district municipalities are responsible for the elaboration of implementation plans which are submitted to the approbation of the council of the metropolitan municipality.

The council of metropolitan municipality is endowed with the power to adopt a directive and a measure for the resolution of any dispute arising involving a metropolitan municipality and a district municipality or involving two or several district municipalities. Based on resolution of the council of metropolitan municipality, some of their functions may be delegated to metropolitan district municipalities upon the consent of the latter; these are wholesale food markets and slaughterhouses; cemeteries and burial services; open and closed parking spaces; address assignment and numbering of building; passenger and freight terminals; special permits for food markets and slaughterhouses. Likewise, metropolitan municipality may fulfill some functions of metropolitan district municipalities or jointly with them at their expenses.
4.4.3.1.4 Affiliates of Metropolitan Municipalities

In the metropolitan municipality, certain services such as public transport, water and sewer are delivered by entities that are affiliated this local government unit. Some of these entities, for instance the administrations of water and sewer are created by law which grant public legal personality to them as well as a distinct budgetary power. Thus, whereas all metropolitan municipalities already have administrations of water and sewerage under their supervision, only Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir have affiliated entities for public transport. Although affiliated entities under public law produce and sell services, they are not permitted to make profits. This explains for instance why municipalities particularly subsidizes the public service of transport.

In the supervision of the administrations of water and sewer by metropolitan municipalities, the chairperson of their governing board is the metropolitan mayor. A director-general is entrusted the executive powers over these entities. A specific law determines the organization and functioning of the administrations of water and sewer services. It is the metropolitan municipal council which has the responsibility to configure this organization as per the principles elaborated the Ministry of Interior and the Department of State Personnel. 25,536 people in total works in affiliated entities of municipalities\(^53\).

The main functions of the administrations of water and sewer are the following:

- Provision of industrial, non-potable and potable water to the city, distribution to users and operation of the system,
- Removal and treatment waste water and storm water;
- Protection of water sources, seas, lakes and rivers in the region against pollution.

4.4.3.2 Municipalities in other Provinces

4.4.3.2.1 Special Provincial Administration

Special Provincial Administrations (SPA) are one of the three types of decentralized units defined in article 127 of the Constitution. SPA were obliged to provide public service to the people of the province, but the municipalities had to satisfy the needs of the population of villages and inhabitants of the city. This situation shows that there is no obstacle for the services provided by the Provincial Special Administrations to be both rural and urban. Because, within the boundaries of the province, there are both municipalities and villages.

For the establishment of Special Provincial Administrations, there is no need for any other formality other than the issuance of the law providing the province status of a place. With the establishment of the provincial organization of autonomous administration, the Provincial Special Management will be established automatically. Within the boundaries of a special provincial administration, more than a hundred municipalities and as many as 1,000 villages may be located. 2005 is the date of implementation of the most important radical changes in the Provincial Special Administrations through the law No. 5302. Also, With the Law No. 6360, which was enacted in 2012 and came into force immediately after the 2014 local elections, important changes were also made in the structure of the provincial special administrations. With this law, the number of metropolitan municipalities up to that date was increased to 29. In January 2013, this number increased to 30 with the addition of Ordu province through the Law No. 6447.

The most significant change in the newly created mainland municipalities is the overlap of the provincial and municipal boundaries, which were previously implemented in Istanbul and Kocaeli; in other words, the mainland is extended to the border of the municipality and the existence of legal units of Special Provincial Administrations has been ended in these places. As a result of this regulation, the number of 81 provincial special administrations in the country was reduced to 51. Thus, out of 81 provinces, there is the metropolitan system in 30 provinces as already mentioned, whereas a municipal system of a single-tier is found in the other 51 provinces. In the said provinces, municipalities usually provide local public services in urban areas while Special provincial administrations (SPA) deliver them in rural areas. Additional public services are delivered by Special provincial administrations such as agriculture, livestock, education, culture and sports within the central government remit in the whole province.
involving municipal areas. 6,502,018\textsuperscript{54} inhabitants live in the 51 non-metropolitan provincial municipalities and represent 9% of the population living in municipalities.

On 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 2005, significant changes were made in the Special Provincial Administration Law. According to this law, this unit is “a public legal entity with financial and administrative autonomy established in order to satisfy the common needs of the people of the province and the decision body selected by the voters”. The non-metropolitan municipalities have the following main functions: make plans of all scales for land development; collect and dispose of waste; provide services of water and sewer; issue building licenses; issue business licenses; protect environment, create green areas and parks; build infrastructure as required for trade and economy; ensure a well-planned urbanization and produce land lots and housing accordingly; build cemeteries, provide services for burials; deliver emergency and fire-fighting services; lessen poverty; offer services of arts, culture, tourism, sports and publicity; build and maintain state owned schools and places of worship (optional).

The organs of SPA are: first, the Provincial General Assembly which is the decision-making body. Its members are elected every 5 years in accordance with the principle of secret, equal and free ballot, open counting and casting by one-way proportional representation method. The number of members changes depending on the number of districts and the inhabitants on the ground. The provincial general assembly has the responsibility to negotiate the strategic plan of the SPA and the investment and work programs, for the activities of the SPA and the definition of the criteria for staff performance; to make decisions; to approve the budget and final accounts; to examine the development plan of the provincial environmental plan and the areas outside the municipal boundaries and to connect the decision; to decide on the privatization of the companies, enterprises and associations belonging to the SPA in order to award concessions for the sake of the SPA and to make the investments of provincial private administrations through the B.O\textsuperscript{55} or B.O.T\textsuperscript{56} models.

Second, the provincial executive committee which is a body that performs preliminary examination of the issues to be decided in the provincial general assembly and has more

\textsuperscript{55} BO means Build and Operate.
\textsuperscript{56} BOT means Build Operate and Transfer.
functions to carry out. It is composed of five provincial councilors and five officials appointed by the governor. The missions and functions of the provincial executive committee are: to review the budget and final accounts with the strategic plan and the annual work program and to submit opinions to the provincial general assembly; to take and implement the expropriation decisions related to the works received on the annual work program; to give the fines prescribed in the laws; to fix the opening and closing times of open places outside the municipality boundaries; to give an opinion on the matters referred by the Governor.

Third, the Governor. He is the head of the SPA and the legal representative of the entity. He implements the decisions taken by the provincial council and the provincial executive committee; manages the provincial special administration organization; appoints the provincial special administration personnel; manages the provincial special administration as per the strategic plan; prepares the strategic plan, performance plan, budget and work programs to be presented to the provincial general assembly; heads the provincial council and takes precautions for the happiness, health, peace and well-being of the people of the province; provides coordination between the provincial special administration services and other local governments and public institutions in terms of integrity and harmony.

If some of the duties and authorities are deemed appropriate, they can be transferred to the provincial deputy governors among the provincial special administration officials who have this administrative title. The work carried out on behalf of the special provincial administration is audited by the provincial general assembly.

The special provincial administration is organized as follows: there are general secretariat and directorates (financial affairs, health, agriculture, zoning, human resource, legal affairs). The unit can be established and removed with the decision of the provincial general assembly. The Secretary General is responsible for organizing and executing provincial special administrative services on behalf of the governor and his orders in accordance with the legislation, provincial general assembly and provincial council decisions, objectives and policies of the SPA, strategic plan and annual work program. The general secretary is appointed following a proposal from the governor approved by the Interior’s Ministry. There are also assistants to the secretary general.
The human resources of special provincial administration are managed according to the norms and standards of the norm structure. The purpose is to provide the employment of the appropriate workforce by conducting organization and job analysis, and to establish a rational Human Resource Management understanding by avoiding the employment of unqualified, excessive and unbalanced personnel.

The control of special provincial administration is done according to the basic principles and standards defined in the law 5018\textsuperscript{57}, i.e., performance-based budgeting, strategic planning and financial transparency. In addition, ministers and senior executives are responsible for the supervision.

4.4.3.2.2 District Municipalities

District municipalities are governed by the law numbered 5393 dated of 3 July 2005. According to this law, the municipality establishment population standard has been increased from 2,000 to 5,000 (scale economy). The municipalities, whose population is below 2000, have been transformed into village status, legal entities have been removed, some parishes have been removed and 43 new districts have been established. Non-metropolitan provinces have 402 districts. There is no difference between the functions and organization of district municipalities and provincial municipalities, except in terms of scale. Deliberations of district municipal council become effective provided that they are communicated to the district governor who is the central government representative. The law though does not allow district governors to refer back a deliberation to the council.

The population living in district municipalities is 4,815,668 inhabitants\textsuperscript{58} which represents 7\% of the population living in the boundaries of municipalities. The principle of administrative and financial autonomy of municipalities was introduced and they have become an authority in a wide range of fields such as education, health, social welfare, culture, economics and trade development from being an institution having authority and duties related to infrastructure only. An attempt has been made to establish a balance

\textsuperscript{57} The law numbered 5018 dated 24 December 2003 regulates Public Financial Management and Control
between administrative custody and autonomy in the audit. Administrative tutelage supervision authority imposed by central government authorities has been narrowed, instead, internal audit and external audit by the Court of Accounts have been strengthened.

4.4.3.2.3 Town Municipalities

The number of town municipalities units in Turkey is 396 in total, with a population of 1,218,925 inhabitants which corresponds to 2% of the total population living within the boundaries of municipalities. Like other municipalities, each town has a municipal council, a mayor and a municipal executive team. Usually, towns have a rural nature and have agriculture and livestock husbandry as major means of livelihood. Towns are regulated by the same law prescribing the responsibilities and functions of provincial and district municipalities. Put aside metropolitan municipalities, all the other types municipalities have the same organization, powers and functions.

4.4.3.2.4 Village Management

Regulated by the law numbered 442 S, villages generally have a population ranging from 150 to 2000. If the population is less than 150, it has to join one of the villagers around (the Muhtars). A few villages join together can become a village (muhtarlık). The Duties required of villages are health, cleanliness, public works, agriculture and education. Depending on the situation, villages can do laundry, hamam, bazaar and bazaar places, raise forests at suitable places, to establish irrigation facilities in the village and to bring books that will increase the knowledge of the villagers.

The organs managing a village are: (1) the Mukhtar, i.e., Head of the village administration and representative of the county. He is selected by the village association for five years. Political parties cannot nominate them. He or she does and performs compulsory work of the village, orders village work to collect and spends the money to be spent, represents the village in court and other official place. In relation with the State tasks, he or she informs the public about the extraordinary events such as announcing legislative and governmental orders to the public, establishing order, regulating
population transactions, natural disasters, and assisting the activities of the central government agencies.

Village Association: It is a general decision-making body and consists of voters in the country. Its duties: choosing members of the village council and elder council; deciding on the work to be performed, the release and other works to be done with the money; taking expropriation decision for village services; to give money to the villagers who do not perform mandatory work; to determine the amount of money received from the villagers for village services according to their situation.

4.4.3.2.5 Neighborhood Management

If the population is less than 500, the neighborhood cannot be established. The neighborhood does not have legal personality. Even though the organs are elected to work, they are not local government units. According to article 9 of Municipal Law, municipalities are obliged to identify common needs with the participation of the residents of the neighborhood, to enhance the life quality in the neighborhood, to carry out relations between municipalities and other public institutions and organizations, to give opinions on neighborhood issues, to develop cooperation with other institutions and to accomplish other duties given by law. Neighborhood Management Organs are headman and senior council members (4 members).

4.4.3.3 The changes Introduced by the Decree-Laws Numbered 644, 648 and the Law 6360 dated 2011 and 2012 in the Legal and Institutional Environment of Municipalities in Turkey

Turkish public administration in general and local governments in particular have experienced profound transformations with the introduction of the decree-laws numbered 644, 648 and the law 6360 respectively dated 4 July and 17 August 2011, and 12 November 2012.

With the decree-law numbered 644 modified and completed by the decree-law numbered 648, a Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation (MoEU) was established by merging the former Ministry of Public Works and Settlement and the former Ministry of
Environment and Forestry. This decree-law regulates the organization, the functioning and the responsibilities of the concerned ministry. According to the above mentioned act, the responsibilities and duties of the ministry are “drafting legislations concerning urbanization and environment and controlling their implementation, making policies to prevent pollution and determining standards for the protection of the environment, audit and impact assessment of facilities which may create pollution by leaving waste to receiving environment, making policies regarding global climate change, making urbanization policies and auditing their implementation”. The decree further covers provisions on the organization and structure of the Ministry, duties and responsibilities of each general directorate and department as well as the duties and responsibilities of the personnel.

Since competences have been given to municipalities in the area of urban planning, it is this ministry which has the duties to ensure that municipalities do respect the legislation regarding urbanization. It is certainly for this reason that through the decree numbered 703 dated 9 July 2018, the Directorate-General for Local Authorities under the Ministry of Interior was abolished and restructured as a new department with the same name under the MoEU. The consequence of this new regulation is that the administrative tutelage of local authorities in Turkey is ever since under the responsibility of the MoEU.

Concerning the law 6360 dated 2012, and as already discussed, it has increased the number of metropolitan municipalities up to 30 and has profoundly changed the structure of local governments in Turkey. Thus, with this law, Turkey has got a dual structure of local governments. In 30 provinces out of 81, there two-tiers municipalities, i.e., metropolitan municipality which is the upper tier and metropolitan districts municipalities which are basic level. The law 6360 has brought a new management system aimed at solving the following problems:

i. The inability to provide planning and coordination,

ii. Inadequate utilization of the scale economy,

iii. The difficulty of resolving increasing problems such as industrialization, transport and the environment into small-scale local administrations,

iv. Preventing resource waste and making sure of effective and on-site use,
The provision of public services in a quality, efficient and efficient manner,

The problems of lack of coordination in the presentation of public services,

The need for the existence of strong structures of local government that can provide services at an optimal scale,

The fact that small scale municipalities or villagers can not efficiently solve issues such as environmental and transportation problems,

Insufficient financial resources.

It was expected that metropolitan municipalities model will produce services at the provincial border and would reveal the following positive developments:

i. Local government units producing services at a wide scale can be equipped with advanced technologies,

ii. Services in these administrations will be produced on a wide scale with qualified technical personnel and productivity will be increased as these personnel will specialize in the work force,

iii. The local management system through large-scale units will provide efficient use of resources sent from the center,

iv. Resources will be effectively used in the integrated local government units within the provincial borders,

v. A more fair structure may emerge in terms of possibilities to be possessed,

vi. Efficiency will be provided in the presentation of local public services that need to be coordinated and integrated in a wide framework such as construction, planning, transportation, fire brigade,

vii. Within the framework of regulatory master building plans, provincial-wide zoning implementations can be implemented.

The law 6360 has brought the following changes:

i. The system of metropolitan municipalities was established in thirteen provinces (thereafter, the number was increased to 14 by
adding the province of Ordu) and there are currently thirty big cities in Turkey,

ii. All metropolitan municipality borders have provincial boundaries,

iii. 30 provincial special administrations were abolished,

iv. New districts municipalities have been established,

v. The territorial limits of all district municipalities have been included in the metropolitan municipalities,

vi. All the municipal units in these provinces have been abolished and transformed into neighborhood,

vii. All the village governments in these provinces were removed and consolidated in neighborhoods,

viii. Depending on municipal administrations, an Investment Monitoring and Coordination Department was established in the MoEU,

ix. The shares from and with the central government have been rearranged.

The establishment, duties, responsibilities and organs of metropolitan municipalities were determined widely by the SPA Law, which was enacted in 2005 in the metropolitan cities until the law 6360 became effective. SPA and metropolitan municipalities are responsible for the city administration. Some of the duties of both local governments, which have a say on the city, have sometimes forced the efficient use and management of resources.

By enlarging the scale, services should be transferred more efficiently and efficiently, so that each service can be seen as effective and productive. For example; transportation, sewerage, housing, zoning and planning will not be effective and efficient for each of the small units (Keleş, 2012).

The metropolitan municipalities system has enabled to increase the autonomy of municipalities since metropolitan achieves a strong institutional structure at provincial level. Because of the institutional capacities of the municipalities, capacities affecting central government are also increasing.
4.4.4 Comparative Table and Figures of the Administrative Structure of Local Governments in Turkey and Cameroon

Table 12 and figure 5 below exhibit the administrative structure of local government in both countries under review.

**Table 12**: Comparison of the Administrative Structure of LG in Turkey and Cameroon: Two Countries with Dual Structure of Local Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country + Area + population</th>
<th>Basic or 1st Level-Councils</th>
<th>Total LG Units + average municipal size</th>
<th>State or Region (2nd level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cameroon</strong> 475 442 km² 24.053 million inhabitants (2017)</td>
<td>In 14 Cities</td>
<td>Urban Councils (14)</td>
<td>374 LG Units 66 805 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban District Councils (45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Other cities</td>
<td>Councils (315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong> 780 043 km² 82.003 million inhabitants (2018)</td>
<td>In 30 provinces</td>
<td>Metropolitan Municipalities (30)</td>
<td>1449 LG Units 57 284 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metropolitan District Municipalities (519)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 51 provinces</td>
<td>Special Provincial Administrations (51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>District Municipalities (402)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Town Municipalities (396)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is not a set indicator of the level of government closeness to people from the perspective of subnational government structure, it can be noted that like most countries in the sample of 2019 Report of Subnational Government World Observatory on Finance and Investment (Country Profile), both Cameroon and Turkey have a two-level system of subnational governments, i.e., municipal and regional levels. They then belong to the majority trend in terms of the structure of subnational governments.

4.4.5 Functions and Responsibilities Delegated to Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon and Their Mode of Implementation

Before the beginning of the implementation of the decentralization policy in Cameroon, municipalities were considered as peripheral administrations, because they were primarily in charge of providing administrative services to users such as issuing civil status certificates. Since the implementation of decentralization reforms started to be effective, the competencies of municipalities have been expanded to different areas of activities, namely in economic, social, educational, health, sport, and cultural development. Kom (2014) divides into three groups the field of intervention of municipalities in Cameroon: firstly, the responsibility to enforce the laws of the republic and the application of the regulations on police and town planning; Secondly, the responsibility to ensure access to essential services, such as roads, sanitation, garbage
collection and removal, water supply, electrification, etc. Thirdly, the responsibility to make investments (acquisitions of land or expensive and durable equipment, new constructions, major repairs, etc.) and equipment.

In a more detailed way, articles 15 to 22 of the law numbered 2014/018 dated of 22 July 2014 laying down the rules applicable to communes provide that competencies are transferred to communes in the following domains: “environmental and natural resource management; economic action; planning and regional development, urbanism and housing; health, population and social action; education, alphabetization and professional training; youth, sports and leisure”. Article 110 of the same law defines competencies transferred to urban councils. These are essential in the field of green spaces, environment, sewerage, urban planning, blueprints and master plans, land use plans or planning documents in lieu thereof; land reserves of community interest; public lighting; community road infrastructure and road signs; public cemetery; sports facilities of community interest, etc. The transfer of powers, effective since 2010, is made by decrees of the prime minister enacted for each power devolved.

In Turkey, article 14 of the law on municipalities determines the functions of municipalities and distinguishes between compulsory and discretionary responsibilities for the service provision. The first category of responsibilities, i.e., compulsory responsibilities, includes “urban infrastructure facilities, urban traffic, environmental and public health issues, parks and recreation, social and cultural services, housing, economic development and construction and school maintenance”. Article 7 of the law on metropolitan municipalities assigns additional responsibilities to metropolitan municipalities that are: metropolitan transport master plan and disaster management, urban planning, basic services in water supply, sewerage, natural gas and transport services may be performed by separate established administration called affiliated agencies. Table 13 below provides the comparison of the responsibilities delegated to municipalities in either country.

**Table 13: Comparison of the responsibilities delegated to municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main responsibility areas</th>
<th>Sub-areas in Cameroon</th>
<th>Sub-areas in Turkey</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>
1. **Public order and safety**
   - Municipal police forces
   - Municipal police forces (Zabıta); fire brigades; emergency aid

2. **Housing and community amenities**
   - Urban planning and maintenance of public spaces; urban renewal; drinking water supply; sanitary sewerage.
   - Urban infrastructure, urban planning, and maintenance of public spaces; urban renewal; drinking water supply; sanitary sewerage

3. **Economic affairs/transports**
   - Promotion of economic development linked to agriculture and fishery; development of local touristic activities and craft production; construction and maintenance of equipment; transportation.
   - Local roads; city traffic; tourism; Promotion of economic development linked to agriculture, local trade fairs; support for micro-projects; storage or distribution of food products

4. **Environmental protection**
   - Cleaning of municipal streets, paths and public spaces; industrial and household waste management; reforestation and protection of municipal woodlands; protection of groundwater; promotion of green spaces, parks and gardens.
   - Environmental health; forestry, parks and green areas; protection of natural resources, industrial and household waste management

5. **Health**
   - Operation and maintenance of health facilities; sanitary control in local industries packaging
   - Relief services and ambulances; opening and operation of health facilities.

6. **Social protection**
   - Operation and maintenance of local social welfare centers
   - Social and aid services

7. **Education**
   - Maintenance and operation of nursery, pre-school and primary schools; management and administration of secondary schools and vocational training facilities and programs (shared with the regions); implementation of plans for eliminating illiteracy (shared with regions)
   - Pre-elementary school education centres; school buildings maintenance

8. **Recreation, culture & religion**
   - Promotion of sports and youth activities; maintenance of municipal stadiums and sports facilities; organization of traditional cultural events, local orchestras, ballet, and theatre companies; creation and management of socio-cultural centers and public libraries; support to sport and cultural associations
   - Youth and sports activities; leisure and recreational facilities; libraries and museums; conservation of cultural assets


Concerning the modes of implementation of local public services, Grossi, Marcou and Reichard (2010) note that in France, for instance, most of the local public services are delivered by municipalities and joint authorities either directly (by their own employees) or by contracting out. While contracting out is done mostly for commercial public services, administrative local public services are provided by local government departments. In all the cases local authorities remain legally responsible for service
provision. They further assert that in Germany, local services are traditionally provided in-house, either a unit of the municipal administration or by a local utility under municipality. Differently from France, contracting out or outsourcing local services to private companies has not attracted much attention in Germany.

The modes of implementation of local municipal services mentioned above are also found in Cameroon and Turkey, obviously with legal specifications in each country. As far as Turkey is concerned, following the neo-liberal reforms that occurred in many countries all over the world at the end of the 1980s, there are changes in the way municipal services are provided and these changes have reshaped the structures of local power, labour relations, and public accountability in particular (Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer, 2012). The most common practices of municipalities now are contracting out, privatization, public–private partnerships and the formation of parastatal corporations (Bergh, 2012; Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer, 2012). The framework for actions, interventions and operations of municipalities is being determined and governed by rules and regulations set out by the central government. The contracts are awarded through tenders to private firms which then provide the relevant local services to the people.

In Cameroon, to carry out actions of local public interest, municipalities can appeal to legal persons according to the complexity of the activities to be undertaken. The implementation methods used are: the in house provision (i.e. by municipal employees), the joint organisation and/or the outsourcing through: traditional public procurements, contracts of partnership, concession, farming, semi-public companies, public-private partnership. The choice and implementation of a method must comply with the applicable legal and regulatory provisions (Kom, 2012).

4.5 AN AVERAGE SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON LARGELY ABOVE THE WORLD SMALLEST AVERAGE SIZE

Among the criteria suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014) to assess the government closeness to the people, there is the fact that local governments should operate as much as possible in a small geographical area and population. Differently from Turkey, Cameroon currently has a problem of updated and reliable data concerning its population.
size and by extension, the population size of its local governments. Because the last
general census of the population and habitat which is the official source of population
data for elections and researches, dates back from 2005, i.e., 14 years ago. Yet, in the
meantime the total population has increased a lot, and internal migration also took place
for various reasons\textsuperscript{59}, thereby impacting the configuration of local governments across
the country. The urbanization rate in Cameroon is estimated at 52\%, i.e., 10 091 172
inhabitants. In the framework of this study, we use both old data from the last general
census of the Cameroonian population, and as much as possible available data from other
reliable sources such as : the World Bank, IMF, FRED\textsuperscript{60}, SNG-WOFI.

The average size of local authorities is big and differs between Turkey and Cameroon.
According to the fresh data provided by 2019 SNG-WOFI, the average size of local
governments or municipalities in Cameroon is 66 805 inhabitants versus 56 577
inhabitants in Turkey. Although the average municipal size of both countries is big, it is
far smaller than the world’s largest average size of LG which is around 130 000
inhabitants. It is also far bigger than the world’s smallest average municipal size which is
less than 2000 in some European countries. But there are great variations among
municipalities within each country taken separately.

\subsection{4.5.1 A Diversified Size of the Municipal Population}

Councils in Cameroon vary widely in their size in terms of both population and
geography. There are councils in rural areas, such as Mokolo in the region of Far North,
with a population of 200 000 inhabitants, compared to Biyouha in the Centre region with
less than 2000 inhabitants. 14 years after the last general census of the population and
given the increase of the population and the movement of internally displaced persons, it
is possible to find to nowadays some municipalities with more than 500,000 local citizens
in the cities of Yaounde and Douala.

\textsuperscript{59} The separatist crisis occurring in the regions of North West and South West of Cameroon has
provoked an important movement of more than 400,000 of internally displaced people, according
retrieved on November 11, 2019).

\textsuperscript{60} Federal Reserve of Economic Data.
In Turkey, the Scale Reform Act enacted in 2008 reduced the number of municipalities from 3,225 to 2,954. A new territorial reform was decided in 2012 and reduced the number of municipalities from 2,954 to 1,397. That change entered into force as of March 2014 elections. In 2018, the average municipal size (56,577 inhabitants) was large with respect to international comparison (5,900 inhabitants in the EU 28 and 9,700 inhabitants in the OECD). The median size of municipalities is however much smaller (8,600 inhabitants). While 37% of municipalities had more than 20,000 inhabitants, around 39% had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (excluding municipalities in and from metropolitan cities) and 7% fewer than 2,000 inhabitants.

Regarding Turkish provinces, in 2018, the average size of provinces was around 1 million inhabitants, ranging from 82,274 inhabitants in Bayburt, the least-populated province to 15,067,724 inhabitants in the province of İstanbul. Provinces are sub-divided into districts. There are only three districts in Bayburt, but 39 in İstanbul. In terms of GDP per capita, Turkey has the largest regional disparities across small regions within the OECD, even though disparities have diminished slightly over the last decade between Istanbul, the richest Turkish region, and Eastern Anatolia, which has been catching up (SNGWOFI, 2019). The GDP per capita of İstanbul is four times higher than the GDP per capita of Eastern Anatolia.

From a global perspective, Cameroon and Turkey do not belong to the number of countries having average municipal size that is remarkably small in terms of population. These countries are namely European and North American countries where France, for instance, with a population of 66,99 million inhabitants (2019)\(^{61}\), 34,970 communes\(^{62}\) (as of 1 January 2019) has an average population of almost 18,000 inhabitants per commune in 2018 and the median size is around 6,000 inhabitants. However about 43% of French municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and 14% fewer than 2,000 inhabitants.

### 4.5.2 A Varied Area Size of Local Government Units

The size of local government area is an important element for the closeness to the people. Cameroon has both large and small units of local government in terms of geographical

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\(^{61}\) Sources : INSEE, Eurostat.

area. The area of the council of Yokadouma, for instance, is the largest with 10,000 km². Many cities and councils of Cameroon have an area of more than hundred km² and other councils have an area of less than 5 km². Finally, the average area of councils in Cameroon can be obtained by dividing the total area of Cameroon by the number of councils, i.e., 475,444 km²/360 which is equal to 1,320 km².

4.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON: A LIMITED WEIGHT BUT A SECURED EXISTENCE

As already discussed in chapter three, in the effort to reach an opinion on the closeness of government to the individuals, the appraisal of the weight of local authorities and the safeguardings of their existence is important. The opinion is made based on two variables: the weight of local authorities and the safeguarding of the existence of local authorities.

4.6.1 The Weight of Turkish and Cameroonian Local Authorities in their Respective Multi-level Governance System

The amount of the share by local authorities of the national spendings reflects their weight and importance in the multi-level public governance. It enables to value or not their roles and responsibilities. The more this share is higher, the more the government is closer to the people. What is the percent of the share of local governments in the national expenditures of Cameroon and Turkey? Do the expenditure of local governments in the two countries increase in parallel with the increase in their powers, duties and responsibilities?

In the answering of the above questions, it should be noted that the availability of fiscal data in Cameroon concerning local councils is very low and the quality or reliability of the small available fiscal data is also very low. Yet the availability of these data in Turkey is medium, and their quality or reliability is evaluated high (SNG 2019 Report Country profiles). At this level of the analysis, it can be inferred that Turkey’s government is closer to its people than Cameroon government, because in the first country citizens or local citizens have better access to fiscal data that can help them to effectively participate in
their local affairs thanks to the reliable data at their disposal\(^{63}\), which is not the same for Cameroonian citizens general at the local level.

Moreover, information on aggregate expenditure across all local councils is not available in Cameroon whereas it is fully available as concerns Turkey. In Cameroon, there is no constitutional, legal or regulatory provision determining the percent of the state-budget to be affected to decentralized units. The legal framework only provides that annual budgets must be voted in accordance with an equilibrium between income and expenditure recorded in the same document. Every function, duty or responsibility transferred to decentralized units should be followed by the corresponding resource. However, local council current expenditure (i.e., staff expenditure, intermediate consumption, social expenditure, financial charges, subsidies and transfers, and others) must not exceed 60% of their total expenditure including staff costs (35% at most) and minimum rate of local councils capital expenditure must be set at 40% of their total expenditure. The general grant of decentralization created under Article 23 of the law No.2009/017, aims to compensate for the additional expenditure resulting from the gradual transfer of new competences.

Certainly, due to the absence of constraints in the amount of the state-budget to be assigned to decentralized units in Cameroon, the share of local government expenditure in the general government expenditure accounted for 2.9% in 2015, according to CLGF\(^{64}\). Commenting on this situation, Alioune Badiane\(^ {65}\) indicated that Cameroon should draw example from at least two countries: either from Kenya where the constitution provides that 15% of the state-budget are assigned to decentralized units, or from South Africa which allocates 52% of the state budget to provinces and municipalities. He added that Cameroon is still far to reach that level of decentralization funding. It is even late as compared to west African countries where 10 to 18% of the public budgets are assigned to local development\(^ {66}\).

\(^{63}\) Turkish Statistical Institute provides a significant and constantly updated amount of statistics concerning public organizations, including municipalities.

\(^{64}\) CLGF means Commonwealth Local Government Forum.

Even though the Turkish local government spending ratios to GDP and general government expenditure (respectively 3.8% and 10.1% in 2016) are well below the average for OECD unitary countries (9.2% of GDP and 28.7% of GG expenditure) to which it belongs, the relative importance of Turkish local government is higher than the one of Cameroon (which had a ratio of 2.9% in 2015 as concerns LG spending). In Turkey, due to the increasing share of metropolitan municipalities, municipalities in general have the highest share of LG expenditure, whereas SPAs have less than 20% of LG revenue, and the remaining part for other local actors. The LG share of public personnel spending is particularly low: only 8.2% compared to 43.0% in unitary countries of OECD. Personnel expenditure also accounts for a small share of LG expenditure and is again well below the OECD average for unitary countries (31.3%).

4.6.2 A Safeguarded Existence of Local Governments in Cameroon and Turkey Grounded on their Constitutional Backing

As already discussed, the safeguarded existence of local authorities is ascertained by whether or not their independence is backed by constitutional and legislative provisions. The higher the security of existence is, the more the public decision is closer to its people. The Constitution of both Turkey and Cameroon have well consecrated the role and place of local governments within the multi-level governance framework. In Turkey, article 123 clearly provides that the organization and functions of the administration are based on the principles of centralization and decentralization. In article 127, it is stated that local administrations are public corporate bodies established to meet the common local needs of the inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts, and villages. This article furthers that principles of constitution of local governments and their decision-making organs elected by the electorate are determined by law. However, the same article also provides that the central administration has the power of administrative guardianship over local authorities in the framework of principles and procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring that the principle of integrity of the administration is properly respected in the functioning of local services. Same for the uniformity of public service, the safeguarding of public interest and the meeting of local needs.
In Cameroon, article 1 paragraph 2 of the Constitution already states that the Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized unitary State. Article 55 provides that the decentralized territorial units of Cameroon are Regions and councils. Both regional and local authorities are defined as public law corporate bodies endowed with administrative and financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests. Like in Turkey, the state exercises supervisory authority over regional and local authorities, under conditions laid down by law.

As a limit of the autonomy of local authorities in both countries, their respective constitution also provides for cases of suspension of the municipal council as well as its president and bureau, by the President of the Republic, in case the activities of the Council (i) contravene the Constitution; (ii) threaten national security or public order; and (iii) undermine the territorial integrity of Cameroon. However, the presidential power to dissolve a municipal council or dismiss its president and bureau can only be exercised after due consultation with the Constitutional Council. The realization of decentralization remains subordinate to the legal plan to the respect of three essential conditions (Kofele-Kale, 2011): the existence of specific competences for the benefit of the regional and local authorities; the responsibility assumption for local affairs by authorities at the grassroots level that are independent from central state with respect to the method of their appointment, the evaluation of their actions and their dismissal. Emphasis is placed on a sufficient autonomy for local authorities in the management of their own affairs.

4.7 THE EXTENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPOWERMENT IN CAMEROON AND TURKEY

The criterion of local government empowerment seems to be at the heart of the government closeness to people. In fact, the elected officials of municipalities serve as the representatives of the general local public. Their decision is then considered as the will and decision of the general local public. Thus, when local governments or municipalities are considerably empowered, it can be said that public decision-making is closer to individuals. This empowerment can be measured at three levels corresponding to the three dimensions of decentralization. Here we rather use the word “discretion”, because it better reveals the sense of what we were searching, i.e. the extent of freedom
municipalities enjoy in the political, administrative and fiscal dimension of decentralization.

4.7.1 Political or Democratic Discretion of Local Governments in Turkey and Cameroon

From the viewpoint of the political or democratic discretion, the degree of government closeness to people is measured here based on the framework developed in the literature review and composed of three quantitative indicators suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014) to assess political discretion. These indicators are the following: municipal council elections, municipal executive election and provisions for direct democracy. Each of these criteria is rated on a scale of 0 to 1pt/1 for each tier and the final value of the criterion is the average over all tiers considered. The higher the score is, the closer the government is to its people. The quantitative indicators suggested by Ivanyna and Shah are followed by the verification of the presence of the qualitative indicators provided in the literature review.

4.7.1.1 Variables and Rating of the Criterion of Municipal Council Election

As far as the criterion of municipal council elections is concerned, the country where the whole municipal council is directly elected receives the highest score 1pt/1. The country that has municipal council partially elected, partially appointed, elected indirectly, or where LG are treated asymmetrically is rated 0.5pt/1. And the country where the municipal assembly is appointed or does not exist is scored 0pt/1.

Table 14 below provides the variables and rating of local government legislative election in Turkey and Cameroon.

**Table 14: LG Legislative Election Variables and Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whole municipal council is directly elected</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Each rating is actually for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Municipal council partially elected, partially appointed, or council elected indirectly, or local authorities have asymmetric treatment. 0.5pt/1 - - Each tier. But in case of two or more tiers, the final value is the average over all tiers considered.

Municipal assembly is appointed or does not exist 0pt/1 - -

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and the Author’s sketch.

4.7.1.2 Variables and Rating of the criterion of municipal executive election

Regarding the criterion of municipal executive election, the total score of 1pt/1 is assigned to the country where the mayor is directly elected by the people within the territorial boundaries of the municipality. The country with indirectly elected mayor, or where mayor does not exist, or coexists with appointed executive, receives 0.5pt/1. And the country where major is appointed, is rated 0pt/1. Table 15 offers the variables and rating of the assessment of the criteria.local government executive election.

Table 15: LG Executive Election Variables and Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor is directly elected</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Each rating is actually for each tier. But in case of two or more tiers, the final value is the average over all tiers considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected mayor, no mayor or mayor coexists with appointed executive. Local authorities receive asymmetric treatment.</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major is appointed</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and the Author’s sketch.

4.7.1.3 Variables and Rating of the criterion of Direct Local Democracy

Finally, concerning the criterion of provisions for direct local democracy, the country where obligatory referendum is prescribed by Constitution or law in case of certain government decisions gets the total score 1pt/1. A score of 0.5pt/1 is assigned to the country that has established obligatory public approval through public hearings, citizen assemblies in case of certain government decisions. The country where the law provides
for other mechanisms for the participation of citizen such as open sessions of municipal council, civil councils, right to initiate or submit petition, is rated 0.25pt/1. And the country where the law does not provides for direct democracy is scored 0pt/1. Table 16 presents the variables and rating of the criteria for the assessment of direct democracy.

**Table 16: Direct Democracy Variables and Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory referendum is prescribed by Constitution or law in case of certain LG decisions</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory public approval through public hearings, citizen assemblies in case of certain LG decisions</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law provides for other mechanisms for public participation such as open LA sessions, civil councils, right to initiate or submit petition.</td>
<td>0.25pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law does not provide for direct democracy</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and the Author’s sketch.

4.7.1.4 Comparative Assessment of the Level of Political Discretion of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon

Table 17 provides the comparative rating of Cameroon and Turkey according to the criteria aforementioned.

**Table 17: Comparative Summary of the Level of Political Discretion of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-variables Assessed</th>
<th>Cameroon’s Situation and Rating</th>
<th>Turkey’s Situation and Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Council Election</td>
<td>Whole council directly elected (1pt/1)</td>
<td>Whole council directly elected (1pt/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Municipal Executive election  | Mayors are indirectly elected and others appointed (0.25pt/1)*  | Mayors are directly elected (1pt/1)
---|---|---
Provisions for Direct Democracy  | The law provides for other mechanisms of participation of citizens such as open municipal council sessions, civil councils (0.25pt/1)  | The law provides for other mechanisms of participation of citizens such as open LG sessions, civil councils, (0.25pt/1)
  | The law does not provide for direct democracy (0pt/1)  | The law does not provide for direct democracy (0pt/1)
Total Score out of 4  | 1.5  | 2.25

Source: Author's Sketch, 2019

* This rate is the average over the two municipal levels existing in urban areas in Cameroon, i.e., the urban council where the mayor is appointed by a presidential decree, therefore getting 0pt/1, and the district local council where the mayor is indirectly elected, therefore obtaining 0.5pt/1.

4.7.1.5 Explanation of the Ratings of Political Discretion of Municipalities in Cameroon

Both Cameroon and Turkey apply a system of the whole municipal council directly elected. However, while all the mayors in Turkey are directly elected by the people within the boundaries of their municipalities, in Cameroon mayors of ordinary municipalities and district municipalities are indirectly elected, and the mayor of the urban city council is a state-appointed official by a presidential decree. The law does not provide for room for direct citizen participation in decision making at the local level in either country, because there is no compulsory referendum on certain matters, there is no possibility for the citizen to introduce petition that may can obligatorily be discussed at the council.

The Cameroonian approach to decentralization places indeed severe constraints on the political and administrative decision-making authority of local authorities (Aku, 2012). For instance, article 67 (1) of the Law on Councils confers on the state representative (senior divisional officer) supervisory powers over councils while article 115 designates a delegate of the government, also a state-appointed official by a presidential decree to exercise the duties and powers of a mayor at the head of the urban council and to chair its meetings. The reliance on civil servants appointed to perform elective functions is hard

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67 Mayors in Cameroon are elected among and by the municipal councilors the second Saturday after the municipal election.
to reconcile with article 26 of the Law on Councils or article 26(1) of the Law on Regions which respectively describe local and regional councils as ‘deliberative’ bodies in charge of settling ‘council matters by deliberation’ where decisions are taken by ‘a simple majority of votes’.

The effect of assigning oversight authority on an unelected civil servant, appointed by the central government to supervise and, in some cases, even veto the initiatives taken by an elected mayor in the course of intense debates in council with fellow elected councilors undermines the commitment of the law to democratic local governance. It is hard to reconcile legal rhetoric with the reality on the ground of appointed officials who are not directly accountable to the electorate but answerable only to the central authority that appointed them. The whole notion of democratic local governance is impaired when the public cannot hold its officials politically responsible for the policy decisions they make. And when decisions taken by elected officials are overridden by officials appointed by the central government then the public has no basis for holding those officials accountable, because they are implementing policy for which they had almost no role in making.

The purpose of devolving powers and responsibilities to sub-national authorities was to free them from their hierarchical dependence on the central government administration for those public services and functions that they have the authority to exercise autonomously. This autonomy of decision-making organs is compromised when the central administration continues to exercise excessive control of these sub-national units. The ubiquity of the central government in the running of local authorities is perceived as a major retreat from democratic local governance promised in the Law on Decentralization (Kofele-Kale, 2011).

Last but not least, Cameroon does not have legislative provisions for direct local democracy although several councils have set up, with civil society, NGOs and decentralized cooperation, frameworks for consultation and monitoring committees to track the physical and financial execution of public investments.
4.7.1.6 Explanation of the Ratings of the Political Discretion of Municipalities in Turkey

In Turkey, all the mayors, municipal councilors, general provincial councilors and chief of villages (mukhtars) are directly elected by people. Nation-wide elections at the local level are held every five years with the most recent on 31st March 2019. Participation rates in local elections are higher in Turkey than in Cameroon. In the last local elections held in Cameroon in 2013, election turnout was less than 70% of the registered voters, according to “Elections Cameroon”, the organism in charge of the election organization. Yet Turkey even achieves higher participation rates in local election than many developed countries in so far as they shifted from 76% in 2004 to 85% in 2009, 89% in 2014 and to 95% in 2019. As Ferhat Polat from TRTWORLD put it, one of the most critical indicators of a functioning democracy is political participation, because the degree of the citizen engagement in politics directly and indisputably determines the quality of democracy. In a democracy, political participation offers citizens the opportunity to raise their concerns, express their expectation and choices, and put pressure on elected officials so that they keep the promises of their political campaign.

In the same vein, the voter turnout is a credible barometer of a healthy democracy. When citizens vote, they have a direct say on every aspect of their lives conferred to local governments be it economic stability, free access to welfare, education, and so on. By voting, citizen can help to influence governance. From this point of view, local elections are a measure of the strength of Turkey’s democracy”. Ferhat Polat furthers that high voter turnout in local elections can be a proof that Turkish people are deeply invested in democracy. They take political participation very seriously, because they strongly believe it gives them a voice in the administration of their country. The same cannot be said about Cameroon whereas political participation is still very weak. Like Cameroon, Turkey does not have legislative provisions for direct local democracy.

4.7.2 Comparison of the Fiscal Discretion or Autonomy of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon

From the angle of fiscal discretion or autonomy of municipalities, the government closeness to people is measured through the verification of the following five sub-variables suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014): LA vertical fiscal gap, LA taxation autonomy, LA unconditional transfers, LA expenditure autonomy and LG borrowing. These five sub-variables are accompanied along with qualitative indicators developed by other scholars. Already, it should be noted that the availability, quality and reliability of subnational governments data is low in Cameroon whereas the availability of the same data is the Turkish context is medium and their quality and reliability is evaluated high (SNGWOFI, 2019). This can validly be considered as a weakness for both implementation of-and studies on decentralization in Cameroon and a strength and value added for the case of Turkey.

4.7.2.1 The Local Government Vertical Fiscal Gap in the Two Countries

The criterion of LG vertical fiscal gap is used for the assessment of the fiscal dependence of local authorities on superior level financing. It is evaluated in terms of grants from other governments (same- or higher-tier, also from other countries) as a percentage of municipal revenues. Table 18 displays municipal vertical gap in the two countries.

**Table 18**: Municipality vertical fiscal gap Variable and Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unique Variable</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants and subsidies from other governments (either same- or higher-tier, also from other countries) as % of municipal revenues.</td>
<td>70.1%*</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (*) Extract from SNGWOFI 2019 report country profile for Turkey with the precision that the percentage mentioned is from the year 2016.

(**) Overall, there is a scarcity of data in local finances in Cameroon (SNGWOFI, 2019).
4.7.2.1.1 Explanation of the Rating concerning Cameroon

Despite the scarcity of fiscal data concerning Cameroon, it can be noted that there is a high level of local government dependency on central government transfers. In effect, the financial system of municipalities in Cameroon makes them very dependent on the transfers from the central government. Also, the fragmented nature of revenue mobilization and the ad-hoc allocation criteria of resources to municipalities have led to considerable territorial imbalances. The general grant for decentralization is divided into two main components: first, the general operating grant also called ‘block grants, prepared by MINFI\(^{70}\) and, second the general investment allocation prepared by MINEPAT\(^{71}\). Block grants are granted as part of the transfer of responsibilities. The general investment allocation is chiefly intended for the local council investment expenditure, in particular capital expenditure such as basic service provision to the population, poverty alleviation and local economic development.

Moreover, equalization grants are transferred from the central government through MINDDEVEL\(^{72}\) via the ten regional branches of the FEICOM. These grants are allocated according to the commune’s population, area and other considerations. The main priorities for FEICOM in the allocation of the grant include utilities and urban development. Funding is also available to support infrastructure projects in border municipalities, or to help municipalities affected by natural disaster. Lastly, the equalization grants from FEICOM support the training of local staff. FEICOM also provides municipalities with non-financial support under the shape of expert technical assistance, project evaluation, and other facilities. This is a vital support, given the lack of technical competence in many local councils. In 2018, FEICOM was reformed by presidential decree n° 2018/635, to broaden the financing sources and to include regional councils in its fields of intervention. The same year, the National Council for Decentralization adopted a Local Development Index aiming at enabling the Government to improve resource allocation to municipalities in priority areas, beyond the population size criterion that has prevailed so far for the distribution of equalization revenues.

\(^{70}\) i.e. Ministry of Finances of Cameroon.
\(^{71}\) i.e. Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development of Cameroon
\(^{72}\) i.e. Ministry of Decentralization and Local Development of Cameroon
According to an assessment from PEFA released in 2017 and cited by SNGWOFI (2019), in 2015, the total revenue of communes amounted to XOF 151.6 billion, or 29 dollars PPP per capita (SNGWOFI, 2019). Municipalities are allowed to collect taxes and duties, but the total amount of municipal own revenues is limited. According to a UCLG-OECD 2015 survey on fiscal decentralization, it was 10% in 2013. Municipal taxes are collected in a system that distinguishes between own municipal taxation and shared taxation which is levied by tax services of the state. 70% of the revenues from the shared tax are directly redistributed by the national Treasury and 20% indirectly through the FEICOM within the framework of the Fund for Intermunicipal Cooperation and Equalization. The remaining 10% is scheduled to cover administrative costs. According to the same PEFA assessment cited by SNGWOFI (2019), in 2015, 78.7% of the total revenue of local governments are derived from tax revenue (own and allocated); 6.6 % from revenue transferred as part of the devolution of competences to communes by the relevant ministerial departments and 14.7% from other revenues including public transport licenses, market trading licenses and ground rents on shops.

4.7.2.1.2 Explanation of the Ratings Concerning Turkey

Though at a different and better level than Cameroon, the financing system of local government in Turkey is also dominated by grants and subsidies from the central level of government. As mentioned above, these grants and subsidies represented up to 70% of SNG revenue in 2016 vs 48.8% for the unitary countries of OECD to whom Turkey is part of (OECD countries, 2019). The major component of the transfers from central government is the system of national tax revenue sharing (CIT, PIT and VAT). They comprise primarily formula-based block grants that are predictable, and unconditional transfers; the share of conditional transfers is smaller than 3% of total revenues.

The revenue entitlements of municipalities from the national budget were firstly defined by the law no. 5779 dated of 2008. Major changes occurred in 2014 through the law no. 6360. As a result, municipalities were more dependent on transfers from central government. According to the new scheme of tax-sharing, of the total collection of tax revenues in the general budget, 6% of national taxes are allocated to metropolitan municipalities, 4.5% to metropolitan district municipalities (vs 2.5% before 2014), and 1.5% to other municipalities (vs 2.85% before 2014). These funds are redistributed
according to mechanisms of equalization based on various criteria, including population, surface area as well as economic development index, etc. Metropolitan municipalities have their own scheme of inter-metropolitan equalization. Transfers are channeled to municipalities through ‘İller Bankası’\textsuperscript{73}, except for metropolitan municipality transfers that are directly transferred to their account by the Ministry of Finance. In case municipalities are in situation of nonpayment of their debt, the Provinces Bank may deduct a percentage of up to 40\% from their revenues transferred (the decision is made by the Council of Ministers).

Since the law no. 5779 dated of 2008 entered into force, municipalities have received a fixed share of national tax receipts (corporation income and profits, personal income, and VAT), which are redistributed in the form of grants according several criteria. The law no. 6360 into force since 2014, substituted the above-mentioned law of 2008 and introduced significant changes in the distribution of the shares of general tax revenues going to different categories of SNGs. The purpose was to take account of the population of the new entities, including the metropolitan cities.

4.7.2.2 The Municipality Taxation Autonomy in Turkey and Cameroon

For this indicator, the rating of 1pt/1 is given to the country where one main tax at least (property, sales tax or income) is fully regulated by LG in terms of base and rate setting. The country where at least one major tax is partly regulated by LG which sets rate or base within the boundaries determined by CG, or only after the endorsement of CG, or some fees and minor taxes are fully regulated by LG, is scored 0.5pt/1. A score of 0pt/ is assigned to the country where no major taxes are administered by LG and there is partial administration of minor taxes. Country that has LG treated asymmetrically is rated 0.25

\textsuperscript{73} A Special Bank established in all the provinces of Turkey and through which the central government transfer funds to municipalities throughout the country.
or 0.75 pt/1. Table 19 provides the comparative assessment of taxation autonomy of municipality in both Turkey and Cameroon.

**Table 19: Municipality Taxation Autonomy Variables and Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least one main tax (property, sales tax or income) is fully regulated by LG in terms of base and rate setting.</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG partially regulates at least one major tax setting rate or base within the boundaries defined by CG, or only after the endorsement of CG, or some fees and minor taxes are fully regulated by LG</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No major taxes are administered and partial administration of minor taxes by LG</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td>0.25 or 0.75pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and Author’s Sketch.

4.7.2.2.1 Explanation of the Rating on Municipality Taxation Autonomy in Turkey

In Turkey, the major municipal tax is the property tax on land and buildings locally called “Emlak Vergisi”. Municipalities can set the rates of property tax within 0.1% and 0.3% with the approval of the CG and are responsible for collecting it. Property tax is paid by owners whether they live in the property or not. In 2016, it accounted for around 59% of LG tax revenue and 7.3% of the total revenue of LG. This tax is calculated based on the land and building's facilities and the size of the plot in square meters. Other local taxes include excise taxes which is composed of tax on motor vehicles and on petroleum consumption (approximately 10% of municipal tax revenue). There are also the environmental cleaning tax, the gas and electricity consumption tax, stamp tax, the advertisement tax, and insurance tax. The environmental cleaning tax, for instance, is paid by owners or residents who use the property. It is calculated on the basis of water consumption per cubic meter and is included in the water bill of the property. According
to OECD (2019), tax revenue accounted for 2.3% of public tax revenue in 2016 and was well below the average for OECD unitary countries (19.8% of public tax revenue). All taxes are own-source taxes in Turkey.

4.7.2.2.2 Explanation of the Rating on Municipality Taxation Autonomy in Cameroon

In Cameroon, municipalities are responsible for the administration and management of two sets of taxes that must be created by law, voted by the municipal council and subsequently approved by the State representative (the Prefect). The first set of taxes comprises the license, the patent, and the additional municipal centimes (CAC). All these taxes exist before the 2009 law on local taxation and are both issued and collected by the tax administration on behalf of municipalities and transferred back to them. The CAC constitutes a 10% additional rate to certain national taxes such as IRPP (personal income tax), IS (corporate tax), VAT (value added tax), and IRCM (income tax on capital). By law, 20% of CAC revenue are allocated to the FEICOM (its single major source of revenue) to be indirectly transferred to municipalities via grant allocation, and 10% are earmarked for the tax base costs of the State tax administration in charge of collection. According to the National Treasury, in 2016, it represented 74.7% of municipal share of national revenue (OECD, 2019). According to CLGF\textsuperscript{74}, 40% of this municipal share is allocated to Yaoundé, 20% to Douala; and 36% to other councils.

The second set of taxes includes the property tax, property transfer taxes, car stamp duty (vignette), the tax on games of chance and entertainment, the annual forest tax (of which, 40% is redistributed to municipalities on a per capita basis), the local development tax, stamp duty on advertising, and registration duties on leases. Since 2009, municipalities are entitled to levy them. To this list must be added airport stamp duty and certain charges on natural resource exploitation (which are intended for the Regions but are not yet effective), and stamp duties on car registration documents. According to the 2017 PEFA study cited by OECD (2019), in 2015 total tax revenue (own and allocated) was XOF 119.3 billion.

\textsuperscript{74} Commonwealth Local Government Forum.
4.7.2.3 Municipality Unconditional Transfers in Cameroon and Turkey

As far as municipal unconditional transfers are concerned, a rating of 1pt/1 is given to the country with “unconditional and formula-based” transfers for at least half of transfers from same or higher-level governments to municipal budgets. A rating of 0.5pt/1 is assigned to the country with “unconditional and formula based” transfers for a proportion of a quarter to half of transfers. The country where all transfers are discretionary or conditional, receives a score of 0pt/1. And the score of 0.25 or 0.75pt/1 is assigned to the country with LG treated asymmetrically. Table 20 below presents the assessment of the criterium of unconditional transfers of municipalities in the two countries.

Table 20: Municipalities Unconditional Transfers Variables and Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Unconditional and formula-based” transfers for at least half of transfers from same or higher-level government to municipal budgets.</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Unconditional and formula-based” transfers for a proportion of quarter to half of transfers</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All transfers to LG are discretionary or conditional</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td>0.25 or 0.75pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and Author’s Sketch.

4.7.2.3.1 Explanation of the Rating of Municipality Unconditional Transfers in Cameroon and Turkey

In Cameroon, the transfer of resources to municipalities and their distribution among communes are clear and predictable, according to a transparent formula and without restrictions on how they may be utilized. From the viewpoint of legislative and regulatory framework, Cameroon has one of the most advanced systems of financial transfers from the central government to local authorities in Africa (UCLG Africa and Cities Alliance, 2018). Combining predictability and transparency, these transfers are linked to national
taxes in the form of additional local council resources (CAC, ‘centimes additional communaux’), applied to national taxes such as the IS (10%), the IRPP (10%), the land tax (25%), the VAT (10%), the games tax (10%), business taxes (10%) and licenses (25%). These resources are directed to FEICOM (the municipalities’ equipment and intervention fund or Fonds d’Equipement et d’Intervention des Communes’), which transfers them to municipalities according to transparent criteria. Two studies commissioned by the ministry in charge of decentralisation in Cameroon and cited by UCLG Africa and Cities Alliance (2018)\textsuperscript{75}, show that the cost of the traditional operations of municipalities’ is 36.2 billion CFA francs, whereas the cost to exercise the responsibilities transferred from the central government to local councils is estimated at 115 billion CFA francs (base 2000) or 190-200 billion (base 2005). However, the actual sums transferred to municipalities are far below these figures.

In Turkey as well, and as already mentioned above concerning the transfer of grants and subsidies from the central government to municipalities, it is established that the intergovernmental transfer scheme is mainly of formula-based is predictable and unconditional (SNGWOFI, 2019). As evidence, (see the municipal vertical fiscal gap, op cit).

4.7.2.4 The Municipality Expenditure Autonomy in Turkey and Cameroon

The municipal expenditure autonomy is rated from 0 to 1pt/1 according to the same rating like in the case of municipal taxation autonomy, and it is a derivative of municipal unconditional transfers and municipal vertical fiscal gap. Taking into consideration the fact that the criterion of municipal expenditure autonomy is a derivative of the criteria of municipal unconditional transfers and municipal vertical fiscal gap, it entails that both the rating and explanations of the two latter can be logically applied to municipal expenditure autonomy. Thus, formula-based and unconditional transfers to local authorities will mutatis mutandis mean ‘unconditional’ and ‘formula-based’ expenditures of municipalities. This is valid for both Turkey and Cameroon. Table 21 below displays the

\textsuperscript{75} UCLG Africa and Cities Alliance (2018) Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa.
assessment of the criterion of unconditional transfers of municipalities in the two countries.

**Table 21:** LG Expenditure Autonomy Variables and Rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Half of municipal expenditures at least are “unconditional and formula-based”</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter to half of municipal expenditures are unconditional and formula-based</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The municipal expenditures are conditional</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td>0.25 or 0.75pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2014) and Author’s Sketch.

4.7.2.4.1 Explanation of the Rating of Municipality Expenditure Autonomy in Cameroon

Aggregate spending information across all municipalities is not available in Cameroon. According to CLGF cited by SNGWOFl (2019), in 2015, municipality total spending accounted for approximately 2.9% of general government spending. The vote of annual budgets must be done in compliance with a balance of income and spending recorded in the same single document. According to the legal framework, the minimum rate of capital expenditure must be set at 40% of total expenditure and current expenditure must not go beyond 60% of total expenditure including staff spending (35%). The problem of local council capacity to actually make direct investments has not been fully addressed in the laws on decentralization. The decentralization general grant aims to compensate for the additional spending resulting from the gradual transfer of new competences.

4.7.2.4.2 Explanation of the Rating of Municipality Expenditure Autonomy in Turkey

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76 Capital expenditure are the expenditure composed of Capital transfers and Direct investment (or GFCF)
77 Created under article 23, Act Nº.2009/017
Unlike Cameroon, aggregate expenditure information across all local governments is available in Turkey. LG expenditure ratio to general government expenditure is well below the average for unitary countries of OECD, which is 28.7% of public expenditure. Municipalities represent the highest share of LG spending due to the expanding share of metropolitan municipalities. The share of LG in public staff expenditure is remarkably low as compared to the one in OECD unitary countries: 8.2% vs. 43.0%. Staff expenditure also accounts for a small share of LG spending, well below the average for OECD unitary countries which is 31.3%.

4.7.2.5 Municipality Borrowing Freedom

As concerns LG borrowing freedom, a rating of 1pt/1 is given to the country where borrowing regulation is not an enactment from CG. A score of 0.5pt/1 is assigned to the country with borrowing done from CG only or under the endorsement or regulation of CG. The country where borrowing is not permitted is rated 0pt/1. Finally, the country where LG are treated asymmetrically, is rated 0.25 or 0.75pt/1. Table 22 below displays the rating of municipal borrowing freedom in Cameroon and Turkey.

Table 22: Municipality Borrowing Freedom Variables and Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing regulation is not enacted by CG</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing done only from CG or under CG approval or regulation</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing is not permitted</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td>0.25 or 0.75pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iavunya and Shah (2019) and Author’s Sketch.

4.7.2.5.1 Explanations of the Rating of Municipality Borrowing Freedom in Both Cameroon and Turkey

In both Turkey and Cameroon, municipalities are allowed to borrow in order to finance only “golden rule” investment projects, and under the approval of the central government (in the case of foreign borrowing). Also, there is a range of borrowing limits and
procedures. In Turkey, total outstanding debt stock cannot surpass the adjusted amount of the latest annual budget (1.5 times for metropolitan municipalities). Similarly, domestic borrowing is limited to an amount of 10% of the revenues of the previous year. The level of LG debt is drastically below the average of OECD unitary countries, i.e., only 11.8% of public debt. Financial debt is composed of loans exclusively. Municipalities, in particular metropolitan municipalities, are the main holders of the SNG debt with a total of around 95% of that debt, due to urban jurisdiction needs in the area of infrastructure investment.

4.7.2.6 Comparison of the Level of Fiscal Discretion or Autonomy of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon

After rating separately the different criteria of the fiscal discretion of municipalities, table 23 below displays the summary of the level of the fiscal discretion of municipalities in the two countries.

**Table 23: Summary of the Level of Fiscal Discretion of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-variables Assessed</th>
<th>Cameroon’s Situation and Rating</th>
<th>Turkey’s Situation and Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal vertical fiscal gap (grants from other governments either same- or higher-tier, also from other countries as % of Municipal revenues)*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality taxation autonomy</td>
<td>At least one major tax is partly regulated by LG which set rate or base within the boundaries defined by CG, or only after the approval of CG, or some fees and minor taxes are fully regulated by LG (0.5pt/1)</td>
<td>At least one major tax is partly regulated by LG which set rate or base within the boundaries defined by CG, or only after the approval of CG, or some fees and minor taxes are fully regulated by LG (0.5pt/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality unconditional transfers</td>
<td>“Unconditional and formula-based” transfers for at least half transfers from same or higher-level government to municipal budgets (1pt/1)</td>
<td>“Unconditional and formula-based” transfers for at least half transfers from same or higher-level government to municipal budgets (1pt/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal expenditure autonomy</td>
<td>At least half of municipal expenditures are ‘unconditional and formula-based’ (1pt/1)</td>
<td>At least half of municipal expenditures are ‘unconditional and formula-based’ (1pt/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal borrowing freedom</td>
<td>Borrowing is done only under the approval or regulation from CG (0.5pt/1)</td>
<td>Borrowing is done only after CG endorsement or regulation (0.5pt/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Score out of 4</strong>*</td>
<td>3pt/4</td>
<td>3pt/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Sketch, 2019, based on Ivanyna and Shah (2014) criteria
(*) the evaluation of the municipal vertical fiscal gap in percentage, does appear in the total score out of 4 in the fiscal discretion of municipalities.

If put aside the criterion of municipal vertical gap which is evaluated in percentage, we observe that both Turkey and Cameroon have got good rating (3pt/4) in the other criteria of fiscal discretion as suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014). This could therefore imply that from the standpoint of the financial or fiscal dimension, Turkish and Cameroonian Governments are closer to their citizens. However, such a remark is undoubtedly misleading when we give a look at the related literature where there is a common sense of agreement that the fiscal dimension is still the weakest in the decentralization process in either country. The rating and the reality on the field then corroborate one main finding of SNGWOFI report (2019) according to which:

“fiscal indicators are insufficient to get the facts right about decentralization, and they even may provide misleading pictures. To understand what is behind the numbers, fiscal indicators should be interpreted with caution. For example, a high share of tax is not necessarily equivalent to a high tax autonomy… Fiscal indicators must be complemented by additional approaches, including quantitative and qualitative indicators to determine the real magnitude of decentralization, to properly capture the trends at play and accurately assess the impacts and outcomes of decentralization”78.

As the same report further highlights, the vertical fiscal gap (that we first intentionally put aside above), appears to be most powerful criterion to be taken into consideration in the assessment of the level of fiscal discretion, because “a high reliance of subnational government on central government transfers is an indication of low decentralization”(SNGWOFI Report, 2019). From this point de view, it can be said that the degree of fiscal discretion of municipalities is still low in Cameroon and Turkey, given that the two countries heavily depend on central government transfers.

In measuring decentralization and by extension the degree of government closer to people, SNGWOFI Report (2019) warns that the limits of spending and revenue indicators as an indication of spending autonomy should be interpreted with caution, as in some cases these spending are delegated from the central authorities. The assignment of responsibilities to LG does not mean that LG have full autonomy in exercising them and regarding the choice of how and where expenses are allocated. LG may simply act as a “paying agent” with little or no decision-making power or room for manoeuvre. In

78 2019 SNG_WOFI_Report Key Findings, pp. 23-24
addition, LG expenditures can also be restricted by regulations, standards and norms which can impose mandatory expenditures (environmental norms, security standards, etc.) as well as guided by budgetary rules. Consequently, the share of LG in general government expenditure, while providing a valuable macroeconomic overview of the level of decentralization, is sometimes open to overestimation, in particular in countries where LG have numerous spending obligations on behalf of the central government.

4.7.3 Comparing the Extent of the Administrative Discretion or Autonomy of Municipalities in Cameroon and Turkey

The level of government closeness to people is assessed here through the two sub-variables suggested by Ivanyna and Shah (2014); these are municipal employment and municipal HR policies. Each criterion is rated on a scale of 0 to 1pt/1. The higher the score is, the closer the government is to its people. Assessing LG employment or municipal employment entails, on the one hand, the verification of municipalities ability of hire and fire, and to carry out their own policies concerning recruiting, dismissing and fixing the terms for employment at the local level. In other words, do municipalities in either country have the full power or discretion to hire and fire people? What is the share of municipal employment in terms of percent in the GG employment?

4.7.3.1 The Level of Discretion of Municipalities in Municipal Employment

Table 24 below presents the assessment of localement government employment in the two countries.

Table 24: LG Employment Variable and Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LG as % of GG employment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Sketch, 2019, based on Ivanyna and Shah (2014) criteria.

79 According to the data made available by the State Personnel Department of Turkey in September 2014, municipal employees accounted for about 8% of all public employees. In OECD countries to whom Turkish belongs, this ratio is above 30% except in Greece and in countries like Denmark, Sweden and Spain this ratio is above 70%.
4.7.3.2 The Discretion of Municipalities in HR Policies

As far as LG HR policies are concerned, the country where municipalities have full discretion on municipal employment, subjected to the general CG laws, receives the total score 1pt/1. The score 0.5pt/1 is assigned to the country in which municipalities partly have discretion, i.e. they can hire, but the terms for local employment are set by the central government, or municipalities can hire only to the minor posts and the senior posts selected by the CG. The country where municipalities have no discretion in hiring are scored 0pt/1. Finally, a rating of 0.25 or 0.75 is given to country where LG are treated asymmetrically. Table 20 below displays the comparative assessment of local government human resources policies in the two countries.

**Table 25: LG HR Policies Variables and Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full discretion of LG over local employment, subjected to CG laws</td>
<td>1pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial discretion of LG (in recruiting but public employment terms set by CG, or recruiting only to minor positions, or recruiting from candidates selected by CG, or hiring after CG examination.)</td>
<td>0.5pt/1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA have no discretion in hiring</td>
<td>0pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG are treated asymmetrically</td>
<td>0.25 or 0.75pt/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Sketch, 2019, based on the criteria of Ivanyna and Shah (2014)
4.7.3.3 Comparative Summary of the Level of Administrative Discretion or Autonomy of Municipalities in Turkey and Cameroon

Table 20 below presents the assessment of the level of administrative discretion demonstrated by municipalities in the two countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-variables Assessed</th>
<th>Cameroon’s Situation and/or Rating</th>
<th>Turkey’s Situation and/or Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Employment as % of GG employment</td>
<td>N/A(^{80})</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal HR policies rated on a scale of 0-1pt/1</td>
<td>Partial discretion of LA in hiring, but terms for local employment are set by CG, or recruiting only to the minor posts, or hiring from selected candidates by CG, hiring after CG examination (0.5pt/1).</td>
<td>Discretion of LA in hiring, but terms for local employment are set by CG, or recruiting only to the minor posts, or hiring from selected candidates by CG, hiring after CG examination (0.5pt/1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Sketch, 2019, based on the criteria of Ivanyna and Shah (2014)

4.7.3.3.1 Explanation of the Ratings of the Level of Administrative Discretion of Municipalities in Cameroon

In Cameroon, typical tables of municipal jobs and charts have been established to organize positions to fill in municipal services. Based on these typical tables and charts, municipal charts are set by municipal council decisions, taking into account the specificities of each municipality. The size of the municipal workforce is limited by budgetary constraints that require staff costs not to exceed 35% of operating expenses, which in turn must not exceed 60% of municipal total expenditure. Most municipal personnel are recruited by the mayor’s decision after the approval of the Prefect, and others by contract after the approval of the minister in charge of local governments. Too often temporary positions are offered and filled at the sole discretion of the mayor.

\(^{80}\) There is a scarcity of reliable data in Cameroon concerning municipal employment in particular and public sector employment in general.
In spite of the existence in Cameroon of the framework above-mentioned, there is a lack of a statutory instrument regulating the status and career of local government staff. With some exceptions, the non-qualified staff of municipalities is plethoric and relatively old, because their recruitment is generally carried out in a somewhat arbitrary manner by heads of municipal executives, without objective criteria, favoring tribalism and nepotism. As a result, the presence of skilled staff to perform the public services transferred to municipalities is far from being satisfied.

In such circumstances, municipalities are obliged to always ask for the technical assistance of the deconcentrated state services for the provision of public service delegated to them. The situation of Cameroon in this respect is consistent with one finding of a World Bank study\(^8\) asserting that delivering decentralized services is difficult when subnational units lack skills and institutional capacity and have only limited ability to hire and fire. The situation can be worse when the professional careers and the status of local government staff are/have not been regulated by any regulatory text just like it is still the case in Cameroon.

4.7.3.3.2 Explanation of the Ratings of the Level of Administrative Discretion in Turkey

Turkish municipalities have a better situation than Cameroonian municipalities in terms of organization, functioning of municipal services, and local human resource. In the past, the merit system was not systematically applied in the recruitment of municipal staff in Turkey. Now it is changing from one institution to another and greater attention is granted to municipalities taking into account the increased importance of their responsibilities. The employees sent to municipalities by the central government have better or best social security, different positions, different benefits for retirement, different salaries, different allowances, etc., as compared to contracted workers of the municipalities. This creates a problem because all the categories of workers perform the same job, but have different treatments as stated above.

In addition to the above, it should be noted that the applicants attending the public personnel competitive entrance examination are mostly new graduates and consequently

do not have the basic experience, meaning that municipalities would not get personnel with needed experience. Because all the staff in municipalities are not always competent to perform all the jobs entrusted to them, the Union of Municipalities of Turkey has the mission of trying to develop skills through training sessions.
5 THE CLOSENESS OF GOVERNMENT TO CITIZENS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON: FINDINGS FROM THE COMPARATIVE FIELD RESEARCH

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The discussion in chapter four, addressed the comparative assessment of the government closeness to the people resulting from the design of decentralization and local government reforms in Turkey and Cameroon. However, this assessment whatever relevant and valid as it may appear, is not sufficient to get the facts right about decentralization, and it may even provide misleading pictures. This appraisal should be interpreted with caution, to understand what is behind the numbers. For example, the good rating obtained by Cameroon and Turkey at the level of fiscal discretion is not necessarily equivalent to a high fiscal autonomy.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to complement, by an additional approach, the comparative measurement of the government closeness to people in the design of decentralization and local government reforms. This additional approach includes the analysis and results of the data generated from the semi-structured interviews held with key informants in the two countries in order to try to determine the real magnitude of decentralization from the viewpoint of the practitioners interviewed. The chapter tries to properly capture the reality on the field by finding out the gap between informants’ expectations and the actual outcomes.

The points of attention are: to investigate the extent to which the three interconnected dimensions of decentralization have been empirically operationalized; to determine the existence and severity of identifiable distortions in the reform execution and the extent to which these might be corrected: to determine how satisfactorily reform implementation has met performance expectations as concerns moving decision-making closer to the citizen. These points of attention are addressed within each of the following interrelated three key themes: government closeness to people resulting from political decentralization; closeness of government to citizens achieved in the administrative decentralization and government closeness to people resulting from fiscal decentralization. Each section follows the same structure: the analysis of the findings is
provided in terms of “what are the examples of good practices” and “what are the challenges to fix”, as discussed by the respondents.

5.2 THE EMPIRICAL DIMENSION OF THE POLITICAL DISCRETION OF MUNICIPALITIES

According to the research findings, in each country some respondents evaluated the implementation of political decentralization satisfactory whereas other delivered a negative evaluation of the same aspect. The participants’s responses are displayed in terms of what is consistent or not with the theoretical framework developed in chapter two which lay emphasis on a new distribution of powers according to the subsidiarity principle; strengthening democracy (citizen participation); local government administrators selection, i.e.: by appointment or by election.

5.2.1 Relations Between the Central Government and Municipalities, and Between Large City Municipalities and their District Municipalities

As Keuffer (2016) puts it, a recurring theme in the studies devoted to decentralization local government, federalism, and urban phenomena is the nature of relations between central and local governments and, more specifically, the extent to which they have autonomy to decide on their political system, local public policies and the goods and services they offer. Against this backdrop, participants’ responses pointed out what appeared for them as examples of good practices and examples of practices and challenges to be fixed.

5.2.1.1 Examples of Good Practices Identified in the Relations between the Central Government and Municipalities, and Between Large City Municipalities and their District Municipalities in Cameroon.

Some participants in Cameroon expressed the view that there not an overlapping of assignment among the different levels of government, rather, there is a clear description about the competences devolved to local authorities.
The decree transferring the power to communes clearly states what communes have to do. In the nature of a competence transferred, it is not everything related to that competence that is supposed to be done by communes. For instance, if a competence is transferred in the area of education, it does not entail that municipality will do everything related to education. Municipality will just perform what is stated with precision in the decree transferring the competence. In addition, at the procedural level, ministerial acts laying down ‘cahier des charges’ precise what must exactly be done by municipality within a determined field in such a way that everyone knows that at the concerned level of education, only the competence of building primary schools is given, meaning that the central state remains with the biggest part (Site 18, Aoff 1 &2).

When a competence is transferred from a ministerial department to commune, let’s take the case of social affairs or the granting of aid to the needy, the central administration no longer gets involved. The exercise of this competence is removed from the central administration to bring it closer to the people (Site 20, Aoff 1).

Other respondents underlined that despite the possibility of conflicts that may pop up from time to time between urban councils and district urban councils, there is an effective system of arbitration of those conflicts.

The overlapping conflicts between urban district and district municipalities are effectively arbitrated by the prefect who serves as the regulator of all acts concerning municipalities. That is to say that when a district mayor does not get along with the government delegate or urban council mayor, the prefect always tries to bring everyone back to his proper place. Thus, if there is disagreement between these two entities, the case is refered to the prefect (Site 27, Aoff 1).

5.2.1.2 Examples of Good Practices Identified in the Relations between the Central Government and Municipalities, and Between Large City Municipalities and their District Municipalities in Turkey

Participants agreed that central government does not intervene in the exercise of competences devolved to municipalities. Although there are sometime some overlaps between metropolitan municipalities and district metropolitan municipalities, the law is clear about what the role of every entity is (Site 1, Aoff 1).
5.2.1.3 Practices that Need to be addressed in the Relations between the Central Government and Municipalities, and Between Large City Municipalities and their District Municipalities in Cameroon

Most of respondents openly criticized the fact that the government delegate who is a state-appointed official at the head of executive of urban council has lots of powers over elected mayors of district councils who are accountable to their electors. This situation leads to what they called an “arrogance” of urban councils and their staff who considers themselves as the only and super powerful council of the city.

At a given moment, one has the impression that urban council does not know the existence of district communes. While the district mayor implements policies to meet the needs of people who elected him, the government delegate - who lacks democratic legitimacy - feels no obligation in this direction, certainly because he is appointed by the President of the Republic and does not feel himself accountable to the people. (Site 25, Aoff1).

The city council is also a form of guardianship or tutelage. For example, when the government delegate makes his city tour and finds that a district mayor has built public toilets in a place that does not suit him, the government delegate demolishes them without prior notice to the district council, yet the concerned construction may have come from a need of the local people (Site 22, Aoff1).

This attitude of urban council is explained by the fact that they behave like they are administratively on top of borough communes, whereas in reality nobody is the head of the other. The law has separated the competences of these two institutions. Other difficulties in the relations with urban council are that:

when the district councils were created, there was no division of land in such a way that they enjoy no right in the land. This is the reason why when a borough council undertake, for instance, to build public toilets at a given place, the urban community can come and demolish it without prior notice (Site 22, Aoff3).

Between city council and district councils, populations do not always know who is responsible for what in such a way that local councils as the unit closest to populations are frequently held accountable whenever the genuine responsible for a task is the city council or even the ministry in charge with urban development concerning, for instance, certain categories of roads. This citizens’ ignorance puts mayors of district councils in trouble (Site18, Eoff 1).
As far as the powers transferred to communes are concerned, some participants reported that the exercise of these powers is not done without intervention from the central government.

The guardianship here is ensured by the territorial administration and even by the ministry in charge of decentralization. When the mayor benefits from a project like a road building, the mayor is certainly the project owner, but the technical part is provided by the Minduh which is the technical ministry. In addition to the Minduh, there is also the prefect who sometimes intervenes at the time of the procurement. I remember once our commune had a project for the rehabilitation of the road xxx. It is the prefect who was at the center of the project. Thus, competences are transferred, but their exercise is not done without intervention of other authorities (Site 18, Eoff1).

5.2.1.4 Practices that Need to be addressed in the Relations between the Central Government and Municipalities, and Between Large City Municipalities and their District Municipalities in Turkey

Participants expressed the views that central government is so powerful over the life of local governments, because a mayor can easily be dismissed and replaced by a state-appointed official. However, they acknowledged that this power from the central government is grounded on security issues which constitutionally dominate over local democracy and others.

Central administration mixes in local governments. A dozen of mayors from 2014 local elections in Turkey were dismissed. These include those who have been involved in terror in the Southeast. It is grounded, but the central government is so powerful. They can easily dismiss a mayor and it would be difficult for the dismissed mayor to appeal for or defend his right to justice (Site 4, Aoff 1).

5.2.2 Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities

The analysis of the findings indicates what participants considered themselves as examples of good practices and examples of challenges to be addressed concerning the administrative supervision of local authorities in the two countries. Overall, from the perspective of respondents evaluating their system, the situation of Turkey appears better than Cameroon as anyone can judge in the following.
5.2.2.1 Examples of Good Practices in the Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities in Cameroon

All the participants admitted that the state representative (the prefect) applied an equitable supervision to all communes located within the territorial boundaries of his division irrespective of their political affiliation. This assumption was strikingly confirmed by one respondent who emphasized his appreciation of the prefect’s supervision by highlighting that:

The prefect assumes an important role of ensuring the effective execution of public service. When important delays are reported to the prefect concerning the execution of municipal projects, he will invite the concerned local council to take urgent and appropriate actions to make up these delays. At the divisional level, the prefect has full information on credits/means transferred to municipalities. It is on this basis that he may from time to time ask the mayors for urgent actions when there are delays. Under these conditions, municipalities working without prefect’s supervision will have many chances for project incompletion (Site 26, Aoff1).

Many respondents also agreed that in most areas of municipal work, the former “a priori control” from the state representative has been replaced by an “a posteriori control”, and in many matters, the prior approval of the prefect is not needed.

There are many acts that mayors take without prior approval of the prefect. For example, certain unblocks of funds no longer require the prior signature of the prefect. Some time ago, a prefect reminded a mayor that the latter doesn’t need to have the prior approval from the prefect to release funds for the holding of a municipal council or for a municipal celebration, for instance. It is all about the mayor’s prerogative. The law has exhaustively enumerated acts of councils that are subject to the prior approval of the prefect, e.g., recruitments. The list of council’s acts subject to prior approval or ex ante control is not long (Site 25, Aoff1).

Before the reform, the administrative tutelage was much more a priori and it was very strong. Since the reform, it is generally a posteriori. Municipalities today have the power to bring the representative of the state before the administrative court, in case they believe the prefect has committed an act against the law (Site 23, Aoff1).

Guardianship is also a tutelage of support-advice. The prefect who is in charge of the guardianship over communes also exercises the coordination of the deconcentrated services of the State. From this position, he can ask the Divisional Delegate of Public Works or the Divisional Delegate of Water and Energy to assist a municipality in a project where they have
expertise, while the municipality has not the competence to ask these delegates to assist (Site 25, Aoff 1).

Some participants noted that the state representative does not intervene in the assessment of the appropriateness of municipal council decision. Considering that the locally elected representatives represent the populations, when they make a decision in council, it supposes that it is the population of their community who have thus decided.

The appreciation of the opportunity of an expense belongs to the mayor or the municipal council. The supervisory authority stands very far aside. Some decisions or deliberations taken in the municipal council are sent to the prefect for approval. If a deliberation is taken in violation of the texts, the supervisory authority has the latitude to refuse its approval and then to prescribe the reformulation of said deliberation (Site 18, Eoff 1).

5.2.2.2 Examples of Good Practices in the Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities in Turkey

The respondents noted that it is the ministry of Interior that has an oversight on municipalities. But incumbents of that ministry can only investigate if municipalities are acting in accordance with the law. They cannot investigate the appropriateness of municipality decisions. Thus, a participant explained that:

Some years ago, the Constitutional Court of Turkish took an important decision about “Ankapark” in which Ankara metropolitan municipality decided to build a whole new and big park in Ankara for a huge amount of money. At the request of the Ministry of Interior arguing that the metropolitan municipality was doing a wasteful investment, the Turkish Court examined the case. In response, the constitutional court said that the Ministry of Interior does not have the right to ask or complaint about the appropriateness of that decision. It is only the council of Ankara metropolitan municipality that solely has the right to decide whether they need the park or not. The court furthered that if the metropolitan municipal council decided to build the park, it means it is the people of Ankara who so decided, because they elected those people to represent them. The Ministry of Interior could only investigate the procurement process of the investment and the way money was spent, but they cannot ask or tell the metropolitan municipality to stop or what to do (Site 1, Aoff 1).

The implication of this case in Turkey is that the supervisory body of municipalities cannot ask question on “why” municipalities are doing something, but they can ask questions on “how” municipalities are doing it. Another good practice acknowledged by the respondents is that the oversight is limited by the law and conducted only within the law. They cannot do what is not written in the law.
In Turkey, “Ankapark” is one of the most famous cases of jurisprudence about the content of the municipal autonomy versus the Ministry of Interior’s oversight on municipalities. In that case, the constitutional court used the word “subsidiarity” to say that local affairs should be decided only by locally elected organs (Site 1, Aoff 1).

Other participants added that municipalities do not need approval from the state representative for the effectivity of municipal council decisions.

Municipal council decisions enter into force in one week as soon as they are sent to the Governor. No need for his approval. But the decisions must be sent to him. He can’t review it and send it back to the municipalities. If he notices something against the law, he will sue the municipality. It is the court who has to determine whether the municipal assembly's decision is unlawful or not. Accordingly, the court will cancel or not the quarreled decision. Neither the governor nor the district governor cannot pressurize the mayor because he comes from elections. He was directly elected by the local voters (Site 7, Eoff 1).

The governor and the district governor have no authority over local authorities. There's no way they could get involved. Supervisory authority is not even done by the governor or the district governor. The sanctuary of supervision is the Ministry of Interior through its Inspectors and the other staff they sent. In recent years, the environment ministry has been added to the administrative supervision (Site 1, Aoff 1).

5.2.2.3 Challenges to Overcome in the Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities

Differently from participants in Turkey, many respondents in Cameroon negatively evaluated the practice of guardianship over municipalities.

The prefect has become even stronger in his supervision, because it is a guardianship which, instead of limiting itself on the verification of the regularity of municipal council decision, rather allows the prefect to take a position [ I weigh my words]. The holders of administrative supervisory powers are partisan even beyond the examination of the opportunity of municipal council decisions. This strong situation of tutelage over communes is reinforced by the law which requires mayors to obtain from the prefect a visa of regularity for many of their acts. Mayors’ acts which do not have that visa are illegal and accordingly have no value even financially. For instance, if a mayor appoints a staff and his decision is not covered by the visa of the guardianship, the promoted or appointed staff does not benefit from the financial effect of the appointment (Site 24, Eoff 1).

In the guardianship over communes, the state representatives even go beyond the texts governing this supervision. If a prefect can already decide...
to hold a meeting to impose a position on a mayor in relation to a problem, it means he is no longer exercising his role. It is rather a situation that is not authorised by law. But the mayor is obliged to accept because the prefect has several other means and places where he can “block” the mayor. Thus, I believe that the laws on decentralization have undermined decentralization by giving more powers to officials outside councils and by ensuring that the mayors are a bit like resigned victims of the prefecture (Site 19, Aoff 1).

These participants furthered that the so-called administrative autonomy of municipalities proclaimed in the constitution and laws is more textual and theoretical than practical. The margin of autonomy of municipalities is significantly reduced. They also indicated that this state of affairs is just logical given that the regulatory act defining tutelage powers is very old (dated 25 March 1977) and into force before the adoption of decentralization reforms.

The regulation on tutelage has not changed, rather things have remained just like in the ancient time before decentralization. For instance, concerning the approvals of mayor acts, the Prefect behaves just like he has the right to approve every decision of municipality. Given that the first decentralization reform laws are dated 2004, but the tutelage decree is dated 1977, it automatically implies a problem of discrepancy due to the tutelage spirit prevailing before the reforms (Site 27, Aoff 1).

There are still municipal council deliberations that must be submitted to the approval of the guardianship, for instance, municipal budget, municipal staff recruitment. The oversight is theoretically meant to ensure that these deliberations do not go beyond the capacity of the municipality. However, this seriously undermines autonomy of the municipalities (Site 22, Aoff 3).

Given the above considerations, participants sharing a negative point of view about the current situation of administrative tutelage over municipalities made a specific recommendation at this level that, if Cameroon does not go for federalism, the prefectural supervision should completely be dismissed.

Jurisdictional control over communes should rather be strengthened. Actions of mayors and municipal councils should no longer be submitted to the visa of the state-appointed official exercising tutelage. If the latter thinks that a mayor or a municipal council decision has violated the law, the only thing he should do is to sue. The mayor and councilors should be responsible only to the people who elected them and responsible to justice in case of misconduct. These are the two things that must be done if the government of Cameroon wants to empower mayors (Site 24, Eoff 1).
It is difficult to admit that representatives who benefited from the legitimacy of the people through elections, receive orders from appointed officials. It is not good for the exercise of local democracy (Site 24, Eoff 1).

5.2.3 Citizen Participation in Local Government in Turkey and Cameroon

The analysis of the findings shows that although a few participants succeeded to cite what appeared to them as examples of good practices, citizen participation in local government is still very low in both countries as demonstrated below:

5.2.3.1 Examples of Good Practices of Citizen Participation in Local Government in Cameroon

The recurring example of citizen participation cited by participants is the practice of “Animation and Development Committees” (ADC) which are said to work closely with the mayor. Another example is the use of participatory approach in decision-making.

In fact, ADC members are inhabitants of the neighborhoods. The chairs of ADC have become more important than some councilors by playing a much more important political role. The ADC has a general competence in everything related to development. ADC play a role of safety, a role of tranquility, a role of hygiene and salubrity, etc. (Site 22, Aoff 3).

When municipal council is set up, the texts provide that its sessions are public. Every citizen therefore has the right to attend the council of his or her local commune without any deliberative voice, but with the possibility of issuing opinions and ideas that can be taken into account (Site 23, Aoff 1).

I never worked out on a budget without being participatory. Each deputy mayor was asked to go to his fief and meet with civil society, NGO leaders and associations and invite them to identify their desiderata that will be channeled to the municipal council. The prioritization was done together with these actors, because there were so many problems. A campaign plan was elaborated and prioritized essential projects determined as such through the bottom up approach. Before funds for the realization of a project were released, proof had to be demonstrated that the selected project came from the grassroot citizens (Site 27, Aoff 1).
5.2.3.2 Examples of Good Practices of Citizen Participation in Local Government in Turkey

Some participants agreed that citizen participation is ensured through many ways and methods. The first methods they cited is the compulsory elaboration of strategic planning in municipalities.

The strategic planning of the future for 5 years is elaborated based on the collection of local citizen opinions through surveys, reciprocal sit-down interviews, interviews with civil society organizations and NGOs in the planning process. The opinions of different citizen assemblies are also collected; these are: women assemblies, youth assembly, the assembly of elderly people with disabilities, etc. (Site 13 Eoff 1).

Citizen participation in local governments is also effective and done through the various citizens assemblies. In particular, I attach great importance in making decisions based on the opinions collected from those citizens assemblies. (Site 14 Eoff 1).

Our municipality does not turn down any citizen, we listen to them. They can call our phone 24h/24 at any time. Our doors are always open. Citizens do not need to take an appointment to be received (Site 13, Eoff 1).

5.2.3.3 Examples of Challenges to Overcome With Respect to Citizen Participation in Local Government in Cameroon

According to many participants, the participation of citizens as presented above, is much more imaginary than real, especially in urban district municipalities.

In effect, most of inhabitants of municipalities do not care about the activities of their commune and do not even know the councilors who represent them. There is a need to find mechanisms likely to push local populations to be interested in their commune. This will require an increase in awareness and in the sense of the state in each of the compatriots (Site 23, Aoff 1).

Citizen participation in local government is null and non-existent. Participatory management implies real involvement of populations and taking into consideration the point of view of these populations in making decisions that affect them. The population itself has certainly resigned from its mission of controlling the municipal budget and even the public investment budget made by their communes. If, for example, you arrive in a neighborhood and ask people what their local council has planned as a project for their neighborhood, no one can answer you. When people do
not have information on the municipal budget, how can they control it? (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Citizen participation we are talking about cannot be effective since populations do not organize themselves. Personally, I am deputy mayor at the commune of X. Honestly, I do not see how the population participates in the management of local affairs of our municipality, nor do I see how citizens influence the management of the budget. I do not see how people have even influenced or directed a decision on their neighborhood (Site 18, Eoff 1).

People do not know the councilors who represent their neighborhood. This situation certainly suits mayors, who prefer management where local citizens are not aware of what is happening. For example, the law states that municipal council sessions are public. From the viewpoint of the spirit of the law, it means that at least the populations representatives such as heads of quarters, chiefs of villages, heads of blocks, must be invited to attend the said sessions in order to report, in turn, to their people, since they do not participate in the council, but nothing as such is done (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Participants who expressed their pessimism about citizen participation in local government argued that even the elected representatives of the populations, i.e., municipal council members, do not have a significant influence in decision-making.

One of the problems of decentralization in Cameroon is the fact that municipal council members come to city hall only on the of council session. They often come when the mayor has already prepared tons of documents that they cannot cover in one day before the council session, in such a way that during the sessions all what the mayor proposes is simply and purely adopted, without any other form of discussions. Outside council sessions, they are absent. In reality, the municipal council is steered from the beginning till the end by the mayor (Site 24, Eoff 1).

5.2.3.4 Examples of Challenges Facing Turkey in Matter of Citizen Participation in Local Government

The participants argued that civilian participation in local government is weak in Turkey.

Civilian participation is local government is so much weak. First, people electing municipal councilors don’t generally know the councilors who represent them or their neighborhood in the municipal assembly. They mostly vote for the mayor and political parties in municipal assembly. This is one reason why citizen participation is very weak. A second reason is that citizen participation is not clarified in the law. Nothing is said about how citizen participation should occur. In some cases, it is stated that municipalities can establish citizen assemblies (Site 1 Aoff 1).
Many municipalities have citizen assemblies. But citizen assemblies do not have any financial autonomy. They all rely on municipal budget. If municipalities give them budget to operate, they will operate. If municipalities cut that their budget, they cannot operate. So, it is all in the hands of mayors if they would like to engage the citizen or not. As a citizen, you have very limited power to influence out of periodical elections, because citizens have very limited channels for their engagement (Site 1 Aoff 1).

Civil society organizations do not draw the attention of anyone in Turkey. There is no local participation. In Turkey, everything is determined from the top. This is the case in all political party. It is the same for party A and for party B too. Everything is determined from the top for all local governments runned by both the political party in power and opposition party (Site 6, Aoff 1).

5.2.4 The Protection of the Rights of Local Authorities in Justice

While the majority of participants in Turkey demonstrated confidence in the protection of the rights of local authorities, in Cameroon it was pretty the contrary opinion.

5.2.4.1 Examples of Good Practices in the Protection of the Rights of Local Authorities in Justice in Turkey

The jurisprudence of Ankapark mentioned above is a powerful example of the judicial protection of municipality rights against the power of tutelage from the central government. This case illustrated the consistence of the principle of subsidiarity and the exclusive right of municipal councils in the assessment of the appropriateness or not of the decisions they make on the behalf of their local communities.

5.2.4.2 Examples of Good Practices in the Protection of the Rights of Local Authorities in Justice in Cameroon

Some participants highlighted that the right granted to municipalities to sue against prefects has improved the legal status of mayors, at least in theory, because in the same way the prefect can sue against a commune, a commune can also sue against guardianship in Cameroon (Site 27, Aoff1).
In the past, namely before the creation of administrative courts, in case of litigation all local councils whatever their remoteness, were obligated to go to Yaoundé, the capital, to sue against their guardianship, at the administrative chamber of Supreme Court. Nowadays, there are judicial decentralization characterized by the existence of an administrative court in the headquarter of each region thereby enabling interested council to easily sue. This is a step forward (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Prefects are recommended by their hierarchy to pay attention in the exercise of their supervisory powers, in order to avoid situations of weakening the state in which a mayor sues against a prefect and wins the case in justice. Prefects do everything in their power to avoid to find themselves in situation where they would be disavowed by the administrative court (Site 23, Aoff1).

5.2.4.3 Challenges Facing Local Authorities in the Protection of their Rights in Justice

Participants in Turkey did not raised complaints about the protection of municipal rights in or by justice. On the other hand, respondents in Cameroon asserted although the law allows municipalities to sue against the guardianship in the case they believe the prefect has acted against the law, the probability of exercising this municipal right is very small, thereby undermining the legal protection of their right, and by extension the right of the general public who elected their representatives.

It is currently difficult to envisage a situation of conflict in which a municipality could take legal action against a representative of the State. I see very badly a problem between municipalities and the state that could bring them to justice (Site 18, Eoff 1).

In practice, it is generally relations of collaboration between guardianship and communes, unfortunately at the detriment of the people who elected the mayor and local councilors to represent and defend their local interests. It is very rare to see a serious divergence between the state representative and the mayor (Site 24, Eoff 1).

The absence of referral cases to justice is also due to the mayors’ ignorance of their rights. The municipal executives always remain speechless even where their rights are transgressed, and they rather comply with the sometime illegal will of the prefect (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Respondents argued that the set of mayor and municipal council acts that must be submitted to the prior approval of the state representative give him means of pressure that he may well use on mayor to make his will triumph even though it is illegal.
In presence of the formidable supervisory powers of prefects who make them as "demi-gods", ‘wise’ mayors simply prefer to align without any other form of protest. The population who voted the mayor and councilors are unfortunately the victims of the incomplete or insufficient actions of their elected representatives (Site 24, Eoff 1).

5.3 THE EMPIRICAL EXTENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION OF MUNICIPALITIES

According to the research findings, in each country interview respondents evaluated the implementation of administrative decentralization not satisfactory. We also present the responses in terms of what are examples of good practices and examples of practices to fix. These responses answer questions around the improvement of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of local administration; LG power to hire and fire.

5.3.1 The Recruitment of Local Personnel

On this issue, participants provided examples of both good and bad practices. The situation in Turkey appear again better than the one in Cameroon, for the reasons that follow:

5.3.1.1 Examples of Good Practices in the Recruitment of Local Personnel in Cameroon

Participants considered that there are small safeguards to limit arbitrariness in recruitments. This is a circular letter from the minister in charge of decentralization which requires mayors to submit their draft recruitment to the prior approval of the prefect for communal agents, and to the minister for municipal junior and senior staff.

They also underlined that the ministry in charge of decentralization has established standard organizational charts of the communes and staff plans at the commune level. Thus, recruitments are made according to the size of the municipality and according to its needs. There is a maximum number of staff that can be found in a municipality, which means that the mayor does not have the latitude to recruit all his village even if he wanted to do it. The participants furthered that overall, for those who are regularly recruited, salaries are very good in municipalities, even better than those of government officials.
Examples of Good Practices in the Recruitment of Local Personnel in Turkey

Turkish municipalities have a better situation than Cameroonian municipalities in terms of organization, functioning of municipal services, and local human resource. In the past, the merit system was not systematically applied in the recruitment of municipal staff. Now it is changing from one institution to another and greater attention is granted to municipalities taking into account the increased importance of their responsibilities.

Basically, if a municipality needs (specialized) workers, it can send a request to the national government before the year starts, asking for instance for two urban planners, one computer engineering, etc. Then, the national office of government employees opens the positions for the municipality(ies) which submitted the request. A centrally organized exam for public service is held. The received applicants choose their lieu of assignments according to the merit order which means that the firsts will likely choose municipalities in big cities. According to the grades obtained in that exam, the received candidates are appointed as public employees (Memür) in the municipality of their choice following the criteria of choice priority to the merit order (Site 1, Aoff 1).

The positions to be filled in municipalities through the centrally organized exam are limited. Therefore, municipalities can also directly hire a limited number of people that will be called “Contracted employees”. The process of recruitment at the position of ‘contracted employee’ is very fast and simple in such a way that somebody recruited today can start the work tomorrow. In that case, municipalities can apply the merit system as well as they can ignore it. This process is entitled only for a limited number of positions. All the workers in a municipality are not only contracted civil servants. In total, some of the municipal workers are selected and placed by the central government, others are contracted by municipalities and others are contracted by the companies working with municipalities. (Site 1, Aoff 1).

The employees sent to municipalities by the central government have better or best social security, different positions, different benefits for retirement, different salaries, different allowances, etc., as compared to contracted workers of the municipalities. This creates a problem because all the categories of workers perform the same job, but have different treatments as stated above.
5.3.1.3 Examples of Practices to be addressed in the Recruitment of Local Personnel in Cameroon

Participants acknowledged that the principles of merit system are not practiced in recruitments. Recruitments are decided at the discretion of the incumbent mayor only, provided that he gets the approval of the prefect or of the minister in charge of decentralization according to the category of staff he intends to recruit.

I have never seen a job posting from municipalities somewhere, yet they silently, secretly but frequently recruit. I challenge you that if you have ever seen such practice in Cameroon, tell me! [The interviewer: No]. By so doing, they violate the constitutional principle of equal chances to all for access to the public service. Municipalities argue that in case they publish the offer, they will be inundated by applications. Yet, a job posting can lead to the recruitment of skilled staff (Site 24, Eoff 1).

If I am asked to assess the quality of municipal recruitments in terms of percentage, the criterion of merit plays at only two (2%) per cent. Recruitment is much more based on political patronage, nepotism and cronyism. There has never been a call for applications. But we think that with the advent of MINDDEVEL this problem will be solved (Site 25, Aoff 1).

At least ninety-five percent of the staff recruited are politically marked and bear the color of the one in power at head of the municipality. During these recruitments, there is never - I say again never - the search for competence or the quest for efficiency. In an institution like this, there are officially about three hundred employees. But barely fifty staff work normally. More than half have nothing to do. But they receive their salaries at the end of the month. Sometimes they come, sometimes they don’t (Site 24, Eoff 1).

The respondents shared the view that these bad practices in recruitments do not guarantee the capacity of municipalities to autonomously exercise the competences delegated to them. The staff in municipalities is plethoric in quantity but in terms of quality there is a scarcity of qualified human resources especially in technical services that require at least a level of engineer or master’s degree holders in fields such as environment.

The lack of qualified human resources in municipalities to effectively exercise the transferred competences leads them to an unavoidable collaboration with deconcentrated State services who provide municipalities with the necessary technical expertise. According to the respondents, the registered cases of collaboration so far as are mostly with the deconcentrated services of the ministry of public works which bring a big expertise to communes in almost every phase of projects. Same for the collaboration with
the deconcentrated services of the ministry of water and energy which assist communes in studies and realization of the projects in their area of expertise. However, some participants found this collaboration costly for communes.

Of course, there is a collaboration with various deconcentrated services of ministries. But communes feel like they are evolving in an environment of permanent blackmail. Aware of the fact that municipalities are lacking technical skills, the solicited deconcentrated services of ministries most of the time do kind blackmailing in such a way that communes must kindly negotiate with them. To remedy this problem, it is highly desirable for councils to have their own technical staff in each area of the transferred competences (Site 18, Eoff 1).

In this context of paucity of technical staff for the exercise of the transferred competences, some municipalities started to make efforts to solve this critical problem by recruiting the needed staff, as revealed by a participant:

There is transfer of competences and of some financial resources, but which has not been followed by all transfer of human resources. Thus, our commune has tried to get, for instance, a communication officer, who is basically a civil servant from the Ministry of Communication, a head of Hygiene and Environmental Service who is also a civil servant coming from the central government, an accountant-matières also a government official. But nothing yet in many other areas of transferred competences such as education, public works, etc. (Site 25, Aoff 1).

5.3.1.4 Examples of Practices to be Fixed in the Recruitment of Local Personnel in Turkey

Participants acknowledged that in Turkish municipalities, there are human resources problems. The system of centrally organized public personnel exam has some drawbacks in terms of the quality of personnel sent or placed to municipalities in remoted provinces or areas.

The system of “highest grades-first served” practiced in the competitive examination centrally organized by the department of public personnel, leads to a situation where received applicants choose their lieu of duty function according to the merit order which may mean that those who achieved the highest scores will likely choose to work in big cities whereas the lasts in the ranking would not have other choice than to be placed in the so-called remoted municipalities. This situation can have a consequence on the quality of public service delivered in big cities and remoted cities (Site 1, Aoff 1).
There can be a strong relationship between the use of the merit system in the recruitments and the capacities or capabilities of workers to provide public services. In certain technical fields devolved to municipalities such as women and shelter houses, for instance, municipalities had no skilled staff to operate, because they had no professional social service. So, they could not provide public service in that area. (Site 13, Eoff 1).

When devolving powers in technical areas such as social service, for instance, the central government also allows municipalities to hire social servants, i.e., to open new positions for social servants. Thus, municipalities can directly ask the central government to send specialized personnel. However, who would like to go to remoted municipalities like “Van” or “Diyarbakır” for example? But applicants who get low grades from the central government’s exam will have to go to these less considered municipalities, and candidates who get higher grade will choose big and attractive municipalities like Istanbul (Site 15, Eoff 1).

In addition to the above, the applicants attending the public personnel competitive entrance examination are mostly new graduates and consequently do not have the basic experience, meaning that municipalities would not get personnel with needed experience. Because all the staff in municipalities are not always competent to perform all the jobs entrusted to them, the Union of Municipalities of Turkey has the mission of trying to develop skills through training sessions.

In Turkey, there are both municipalities with skilled staff and others with low skilled personnel. Basically, municipalities with low skilled employees will not look for extra options to minimize the costs of service delivery. They fail in that case. But, municipalities having competent and skilled staff will basically have cost minimization, and accordingly, maximize profits. For instance, in garbage collection, municipalities with competent people find efficient and cheaper ways to collect the garbage (Site 14, Eoff 1).

5.3.2 The Exercise of Competences

Considering the low level of implementation of decentralization in Cameroon, participants agreed that they would hardly cite examples of good practices in the exercise of the competences transferred. However, interviewees in Turkey had different views on how municipalities are exercising their competences.
5.3.2.1 Examples of Good Practices in the Exercise of Competences

Many Turkish participants underlined that the use of strategic planning has positively changed the performance of municipalities.

In Turkey, municipalities have now the obligation to establish a strategic plan. It's very important to plan the future, because you'll know what to do and you will take necessary steps according to them. We have a five-year strategic plan. We implement it successfully. Every year our directors supervise. Performance, budget are all controlled. (Site 13, Eoff 1).

Strategically, every municipality makes its own plan. When we first arrived through the 2014 local elections, we received held meetings with neighborhood to discuss about their needs and interests. So, our strategic plan included a crusher construction site, for instance. Our municipality did not have it before and we realized it. Same for a rose garden project. Already in our strategic plan, we have done our services in the way we planned for 5 years in a proper way, and these are already applicable in our municipality, and we pay particular attention to all the rules and strategy (Site 14, Eoff 1).

However, other Turkish participants showed themselves very demanding towards local government performance.

As a citizen, I will never totally agree on a single government office. I can never say they are totally successful, because I always expect the best. So for me, everyone can do better. But if you put on a scale, let’s say if you compare Turkey with middle east, then Turkey is doing great. If you compare Turkey with Europe in terms of social services of municipalities for instance, Turkey is not doing that great. If you put Turkey on the level of IT’s usage, Turkey is above Europe. It therefore means that it depends on the specific aspect we are interested in. In terms of transportation, Istanbul for instance is doing good. I can not say they are totally successful (Site 1, Aoff 1).

Municipalities are political organizations where politicians need to be elected and re-elected. Therefore they try to be the best as much as possible in order to be reelected. If someone else comes with a better idea, then you lose elections. So, politicians are doing their best and trying hard. But there are many citizens issues that have to be addressed. I can not say they are successful in addressing all those issues. I cannot also say that they are failing. They are only trying and doing their best (Site 1, Aoff 1).

Another good practice to be highlighted is the motivation driver of Turkey, because although Turkey is a Middle East country, for its development in general and the
Turkey always look for a better option, differently from the behavior of middle east countries where they always compare themselves with each other among them. Thus, people always criticise Turkey saying that there are better roads in Germany or there are better streets in France. They never say Turkey is better than Iran. People never look that way. This is the reason why Turkey always try to catch the european development context. Even if Turkey fail many times, it always try to do and compare with Europe. This motivation drives Turkey to have sort of better cities (Site 1, Aoff 1).

5.3.2.2 Challenges to Overcome in the Exercise of Municipal Competences in Cameroon

According to the participants, communes do not operate freely in the exercise of the competences transferred to them. The central government continue to hold/retain functions. It is not totally left to local governments. There is transfer of powers, but municipalities do not freely exercise those powers yet. Their action is frequently undermined by central government authorities. This kind of practices constitute some bottlenecks.

Despite the transfer of powers to communes, there is still an interference of deconcentrated services of state through regional delegates, divisional delegates and district delegates of concerned ministries. In the field of environment for instance, the competence transferred by the competent ministry concerning the realization of environmental impact study, local councils cannot do anything without the opinion of the divisional or regional delegate of the environment. At each level of the process, municipalities must always get his prior favorable opinion. This situation creates tensions on the ground, because there are two competent services in conflict: the competent service of the local council and the deconcentrated service of the state doing the same job. In most cases, the opinion of those state officials prevails, because they belong to the central government (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Before the national assembly holds its session on the vote of the budget, municipalities are always asked to send their different needs, projects and priorities. But at the moment of the final decision for the project selection, mayors are not anymore associated in such a way that at the end of the process, communes are inadequate funds for projects they did not solicit or that did not have priority. Sometimes a project that is supposed to be
realized in municipality ‘A’ is mistakenly assigned to municipality ‘B’ (Site 22, Aoff 3).

5.3.2.3 Challenges to Overcome in the Exercise of Municipal Competences in Cameroon

Not all the participants shared the optimistic view about the capacity of municipalities to properly use strategic planning. Thus, one participant noted that:

Turkish local governments do not create their own strategic planning. Most of time, they copy the draft from the ministry of development and fill it. Their target indicators are not realistic. The monitoring part of the strategic plan is not strong, and the indicators are not strong as well. Always I can come up with the result I wished (Site 4, Aoff1).

5.4 THE EXTENT OF THE FISCAL DISCRETION OF MUNICIPALITIES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INTERVIEWED PRACTITIONERS

The fiscal dimension of decentralization was the component of the field research that generated more serious concerns from the participants in the two countries. Their responses were analyzed in terms of the level of taxing and spending responsibilities delegated to local governments, the level of the amount of resources delegated and the degree of discretion in managing such resources. In other words, what is the extent of local government power to decide on tax bases, tax rates and expenditure allocations.

5.4.1 The Funding of the Competences

Despite what the participants identified themselves as examples of good practices, they still complained without hesitation that their financial capacities are limited to exercise the competences transferred.
5.4.1.1 Examples of Good Practices in Cameroon and Turkey with Respect to the Funding of Competences

Taking account of the context and the reality of decentralization in Cameroon, some participants highlighted that:

The year 2019 is the first time that every council of the country is granted the amount of 100 million XAF (i.e., 169 114 US dollars) for the realization of investment projects, thanks to the action of the newly created ministry in charge of decentralization and local development. Projects selected at the grassroots are funded with that money (Site 27, Aoff 1).

The state encourages municipalities to carry out more and more income-generating activities. For example, the municipality of Dibombari, that of Dizangué are municipalities that have no problem to ensure their minimal operation. Because when Socapalm had been opened, these municipalities had bought shares and Socapalm paid them dividends every year. Similarly, a municipality can create and exploit a cocoa field instead of waiting every thing from the state (Site 27, Aoff 1).

The CACs come from communal taxes subject to equalization and exist because municipalities do not have the possibility to levy their taxes. They are centralized by the state, then redistributed to communes. Some taxes like VAT\(^{82}\) are taken directly by the State and inside it there is a fraction that goes to the municipalities.

As far as Turkey is concerned, participants reported that central transfers are regularly and timely delivered to municipalities two times every year (Site 4, Aoff 1). As already mentioned, municipalities in Turkey have two different incomes. One is from their own sources that they create a much as they can; the second is from the central government transfers.

From the national budget, municipalities receive central transfers. Half of the budget of municipalities comes from the central government. The other half is from municipalities own revenues as much as they can create. This second half is constituted of different taxes: property taxes, license taxes, housing taxes, money for the services from citizens, etc (Site 10, Eoff 1).

\(^{82}\text{VAT = Value Added Tax.}\)
5.4.1.2 Challenges to Overcome in Cameroon with Respect to the Funding of Competences

Participants in Cameroon commonly deplored the fact that financial resources that should go alongside with the competences transferred are insufficient and come in sawtooth in such a way that there are many projects that fall into forclusion or that are not realized due to the delay in the arrival of the funds.

The financial resources corresponding to the powers transferred is neither sufficient nor automatically put at the disposal of councils. All in all, honestly, it's like a game of fools. That is to say that central authorities have relieved themselves of what encumbered them, but they gave nothing to communes to take care of these responsibilities. As a result, the local councils today work only with their poor local taxation and funds from ‘additional communal centimes’ which arrive sometimes with delay. Accordingly, local councils are generally highly indebted vis-a-vis their contracting parties in the framework of contracting out. Local councils are not good clients for providers (Site 18, Aoff 1).

The state has indeed transferred several responsibilities to local authorities. But unfortunately, those responsibilities have not been accompanied by a transfer of the corresponding financial resources. For example, you will see that at the social level, the ministry in charge of social affairs, has transferred to municipalities all the responsibilities to take care of people in need. However, this ministry did not transfer any fund to the communes for this end. Similarly, the ministry in charge of environment has transferred several responsibilities to councils, namely in the field of environmental protection, but surprisingly without any funds for that (Site 24, Eoff 1).

Participants also stressed that the only level of autonomy of local authorities in financial matters is the local taxation they perceive directly. For the rest, municipalities are totally dependent on the state. Direct local taxation at its turn also suffers from a problem of insufficiency in its collection, because of the bad governance and practices existing in our public administration in general. Another weakness of local taxation, according to the interviewees, is the fact that there are local taxes directly collected by the state and which are not fairly redistributed to councils.

Concerning the property tax, for instance, the share that should go to local councils has not been paid back for at least five years. It is the services of the central state, namely the divisional tax centers, which collect the property tax, whereas it is local councils which should collect it, in my opinion. This tax can generate lots of resources to municipalities which benefits from the advantage of proximity to populations. Everyone knows
how far and how much councils need financial means to operate and even make neighborhoods viable (Site 24, Eoff 1).

In Cameroon we still apply the principle of uniqueness of the state coffers which entails that money of communes is placed in the public treasury at the ministry of finance. Money outflow movements from this state coffer are are governed by the rule of priorities. For instance, the main priorities for public spending at a moment can be, in descending order, security, debt re-imbursement, etc. Thus payments to communes can sometimes be ranked even at the fourth position. From this standpoint, by satisfying first priorities, it may happen that municipalities are not financially provided. But when there is no scarcity of resources, municipalities normally receive their means, which they then use to carry out their activities (Site 24, Eoff 1).

The communal taxes subject to equalization are affected by cash flow constraints and priorities. Same for the general endowment funds of decentralization. The resources corresponding to the responsibilities transferred do not suffer too much from this situation, even if there are reasons to regret the delays in making this money available, since municipalities are contracting out with providers who must normally be paid on time. The payment scheme of councils can cause financial damages to providers, who in turn can claim payment of damages from municipalities.

5.4.1.3 Challenges to Overcome in Turkey with Respect to the Funding of Competences

Some participants expressed the view that criteria for the central government transfers to municipalities are not good enough.

There is a need to have more clear criteria and indexes for the share of central government transfers between municipalities. People or municipalities in the metropolitan municipality of Kocaeli, for instance, get from the central government fundings that are incomprehensibly 14 times higher than citizens or municipalities in the metropolitan municipality of Gazientepe. There is a need to have more fair criteria and indexes for the share between municipalities (Site 1, Aoff 1).

Central government do not give to municipalities neither the full amount of money nor a reasonable amount of money from the taxes within their territorial boundaries. Municipalities from the ruling party are given more than opposition parties. That's what every incoming government does (Site 1, Aoff 1).

The fact that financial resources are controlled by the center strengthens the centralization and makes it effective on the local administrations.
5.4.2 Municipal Leeway in Terms of Base and Rate Setting, Collection and Direct Use of collected Funds

From the discussions with participants on the dimension of fiscal decentralization, both countries have many common features. Thus, the autonomy of their municipalities is chiefly manifested in the direct utilization of the local taxation they perceive directly. Outside of that, municipalities still heavily depend on the central government so far. The law in the two countries provides that many resources collected are intended for municipalities. However, the mobilization of those resources is still incumbent upon the competent services of the central State, which collect them and the so-called resources are redistributed to municipalities through equalization. While in Cameroon municipalities complain about the amount and the arrival time of the money from equalization, in Turkey they think the criteria for distribution are unfair and unclear.
6 CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter six presents a summary of the study, discusses the conclusions, makes recommendations, describes the limitations of the study, and identifies the opportunities for future research. Our study aimed at remedying some of the weaknesses in the current literature on comparative assessment of the government closeness to the people resulting from the implementation of decentralization and local government reforms. The study was then ambitious because it is an empirical comparative study that covers two countries located in two different continents and which also have some common features despite their varied historical, economic, political developments, and current political contexts.

A comparative study was favored because there is a scarcity of genuine and rigorous comparative case studies that focus on two or more countries from different continents. Much of the existing literature generally focus on one country, or a ‘family’ of countries, or one sector, or one program. Even though this study built from the framework developed by Ivanyina and Shah for the comparative assessment, it however departed from it by enriching that framework through an exploitation of the extent literature. Apart from that, the secondary data used in this study are mostly from 2016 to 2019, whereas the data Ivanyina and Shah used are data of 2005, as indicated in their paper. Our study has then generated new data and framework to strengthen the field of comparative public administration in general and comparative local governments in particular.

The two countries were selected because more than fifteen years for Turkey and nine years for Cameroon since implementation of decentralization and local government reforms became effective, no empirical comparative assessment had been undertaken on the level of closeness of government to the individuals. Moreover, unlike previous studies which only focus on the post-reform implementation period, our study offers the pre-reform historical background. The current study is the first to undertake a rigorous and empirical comparative assessment between Cameroon and Turkey, and to illustrate how two countries that enacted reform laws almost the same year have follow different trajectories of reform implementation, and achieved different level of the government closeness to people.
6.2 CONCLUSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES MANIFESTED IN THE DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS IN TURKEY AND CAMEROON

As already mentioned in the first chapter, according to Caiden (2017), administrative reforms cover three interrelated properties which are: (i) moral purpose stressing the necessity and importance of improving the status quo by eliminating the alleged deficiencies; (ii) The second is “artificial transformation” which points a total differentiation from the existing arrangements and the adopted policies. Finally, “administrative resistance”, when opposition to the change is assumed. It is in the light of these properties that decentralization reforms in Turkey and Cameroon under the period over review is conclusively assessed below.

As already discussed, the first reform laws on decentralization in either country date back to 2004 and have resulted from both endogenous and exogenous factors which pushed the central government to transfer many of its power and responsibilities to local authorities. The main thrust behind these transfers are to move decision-making closer to the citizen, to improve democracy, to establish the bottom-up approach in the public governance system, to increase efficiency and accountability, and permit local and regional development. However, achieving those outcomes depends in a large extent on the degree of autonomy granted to local authorities and especially on adequate financial resources.

Although this study did not go deeper into the assessment of all the above mentioned goals of decentralization reforms, the fact that they are interrelated and interconnected can allow the researcher to make a global comment with respect to the three main dimensions covered by decentralization.

6.2.1 The Strengths and Weaknesses Manifested in the Political Dimension of Decentralization in Turkey and Cameroon

The analytical framework provided in chapter 2 of this thesis posited that the ideal situation leading to a high political decentralization is when the following criteria are met: (i) the members of municipal council are directly elected by the voters; (ii) the municipal
executive head or the mayor is directly elected by the voters, and (iii) there are constitutional and/or legal provisions for direct democracy.

On the first point ‘i’ above mentioned, both Cameroon and Turkey have satisfied the related condition for political decentralization, since all the municipal councilors are directly elected by the local voters. On the second point (‘ii’), while Turkey has satisfied the ideal situation highlighted in the framework by applying a system of all the mayors directly elected by the local voters, Cameroon has rather chosen the system of mayors indirectly elected and other even appointed by the president of the republic, namely the Government Delegate to the City Council. As already discussed above, mayors indirectly elected cannot enjoy: the same political, democratic and moral legitimacy; visibility of power; greater inclusion and involvement of inhabitants in decision-making as it is the case in the system of DEM. More particularly, it can be said that the practice of IEM in Cameroon constitutes a ground for the poor political accountably of local authorities prevailing in the Country, whereas the situation is different in Turkey thanks to the DEM.

Concerning the last but not least point above (‘iii’), both countries do have neither constitutional nor legal provisions for direct democracy. In other words, the possibility is not given citizens in either country to decide on certain issues by referenda. In their political decentralization, Turkey and Cameroon still need to find the way to allow citizens to directly decide by referendum and even to initiate petitions. However, in terms of mechanisms for citizen participation, it should be underlined that thanks to their advanced use of ICT, Turkish municipalities have better situation than those of Cameroon.

From what precedes, it can be said that so far, Cameroon has not accomplished yet the desired moral purpose and artificial transformation through decentralization reforms with respect to the political dimension. On the contrary, administrative resistance to change has been observed. However, Turkey has shown a genuine political will in the political dimension of its decentralization even though there are still some reforms that can be made, for instance to make obligatory the referendum on certain issues.
6.2.2 The Strengths and Weaknesses Manifested in the Administrative Dimension of Decentralization in Turkey and Cameroon

According to the analytical framework in chapter 2 of the thesis, the ideal situation likely to offer a high administrative decentralization is when the following criteria are met: (i) local authorities are empowered to recruit and dismiss local employees, as well as to establish the reference terms for local employment without referring to upper-tier government, thereby reinforcing the managerial power of elected officials over local personnel; and (ii) municipal employees have the necessary skills and competences to well perform the competences transferred to municipalities.

As concerns the first indicator ‘i’ above recalled, in Cameroon, most municipal personnel are recruited by mayor’s decision after the approval of the Prefect, and the others by contract after the approval of the minister in charge of decentralization. Too often, temporary positions are offered and filled at the sole discretion of the mayor. There is a lack of a statutory instrument regulating the status and career of municipal employees. With some exceptions, the non-qualified staff of municipalities is plethoric and relatively old, because their recruitment is generally carried out in a somewhat arbitrary manner by heads of municipal executives, without objective criteria that rather favor tribalism and nepotism. As a result, the presence of skilled staff to perform the public services transferred to municipalities is far from been satisfied. Municipalities in Turkish have a better situation in terms of organization, functioning of municipal services, and local human resource. The principle of merit system is respected and applied to a large extent in the recruitment of municipal staff, especially the staff coming from the competitive examination organized by the central government.

As a business management practice besides total quality management, benchmarking, performance management, strategic management recommended by NPM to public administration, strategic planning is the most widely used in public sector. Turkey has made its use compulsory for all public organizations, thereby for municipalities as well. It help to describe the path between the point where the organization is currently located and the situation it desires to achieve. It is elaborated through the answering by the organization to four fundamental questions: (i) Where are we now? (ii) Where do we want to go? (iii) How can we reach where we want to go? and (iv). How do we track and evaluate our success? Strategic planning is a participatory planning approach. Starting
from the top management in the organization, it requires the participation of the employees at every level, and in the case of municipalities, the participation of local citizens. As such, it appears very advantageous both for the citizen participation and the performance of municipalities. The majority of participants interviewed in Turkey delivered a positive and optimistic response about the importance of strategic planning in the amelioration of the management of municipalities. This tool is then recommended to other countries who do not apply it yet like Cameroon.

Regarding the second indicator “ii”, similar modes of implementation of local municipal are found in either country, obviously with legal specifications in each country. The most common practices are in-house delivery, contracting out, public-private partnerships, joint utilities, and the formation of parastatal corporation. In the case of Cameroon where functional autonomy of municipalities is lesser than in Turkey, deconcentrated services of different ministries that devolved responsibilities, continue to play a decisive role in the public service provision by technically accompanying municipalities almost at every phase of projects, though, this collaboration with deconcentrated state services seems to be very expensive for the communes.

Thus, although the legal localism is high in Cameroon and Turkey in terms of the number of functions and responsibilities transferred to municipalities, however in Cameroon municipal employees do not yet have the necessary skills, competences and capacities to perform the functions transferred to municipalities. Here Turkey adoption and practice of strategic planning has helped a lot the municipalities not only to increase their efficiency and effectiveness, but also strengthen the citizen participation, because it is elaborated based on the collection of local citizen opinions through surveys, reciprocal sit-down interviews, interviews with civil society organizations and NGOs in the planning process.

6.2.3 The Strengths and Weaknesses Manifested in the Fiscal Dimension of Decentralization in Turkey and Cameroon

The fiscal discretion of municipalities has been assessed through the verification of a number of indicators which are: the autonomy of municipalities in the setting of the rate and base for municipal revenues; the functions followed by adequate and consequent finance or revenue means; the level of transparency, predictability and unconditionality of higher level transfers; the level of self-financing the municipal expenses; the discretion
over the management of municipal services; the autonomy in municipal procurement and planning; the right to issue bonds domestically and at the foreign level; the right to borrow from domestic and foreign sources; and the assistance of upper tiers government for capital finance.

Regarding the fiscal vertical gap, in Cameroon, there is a high level of local government dependency on central government transfers, because the financial system of municipalities makes them very dependent. Though at a different and better level than Cameroon, the financing system of local government in Turkey is also dominated by grants and subsidies from the central level of government, making them also dependent on the central government transfers. Thus, the transfer of powers and responsibilities without adequate and consequent financial resources particularly in Cameroon has caused the level of decentralization to be very weak in the country so many years later. It can be argued that reform laws were not followed with the sufficient and necessary political will from the government to operate the transformation desired from both endogenous and exogenous factors as discussed above.

Concerning the way or the method of transferring financial resources, both countries almost fill the criteria, since the transfer of resources to municipalities and their distribution among communes are clear and predictable, according to a transparent formula and without restrictions on how they may be utilized. However, the actual sums transferred to municipalities are still low in either country, though better in Turkey than in Cameroon.

From the viewpoint of municipal expenditure which has a close relationship with vertical fiscal gap, it was very low Cameroon with the highest value at 2.9% over the period under review. Turkey again had better outcome with a percentage of above 10% under the same period.

As far as local government borrowing are concerned, municipalities in either country are allowed to borrow in order to finance only “golden rule” investment projects, and under the approval of the central government (in the case of foreign borrowing). Also, there is a range of borrowing limits and procedures.
6.3 OTHER COMPARATIVE FINDINGS

- The forms and extent of decentralization differ between Turkey and Cameroon.
- The political, administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization are higher in Turkey than in Cameroon.
- The financing systems for local governments vary significantly between Turkey and Cameroon.
- Turkey and Cameroon have low decentralized spendings and low tax revenues, however Turkey’s situation is better than the one of Cameroon.
- Local governments in the two countries highly depend on the transfers and grants from the central government with the context of Turkey better than Cameroon.
- Municipalities expenditure as a share of public expenditure is higher in Turkey than in Cameroon.
- Decentralization outcomes in terms of government closeness to the people largely depends on the way decentralization and local government reforms are designed and implemented.
- On the base of the verification of the criteria for the comparative assessment, the level of government closeness to people is higher in Turkey than Cameroon.
- The country with higher decentralized spending (Turkey) and higher tax revenues (Turkey) is richer.
- The level of implementation of decentralization on the level of political willingness of the holders of political power.

6.4 MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING DECISION-MAKING CLOSEST TO THE PEOPLE IN CAMEROON AND TURKEY

This section offers recommendations coming mostly from the views of the respondents who contributed to the study by showing the practical gaps and describing how the laws are executed in everyday life. They formulated recommendations for the improvement of the outcomes of the implementation of decentralization. In addition to the ideas and suggestions already present alongside this study, an emphasis is put on the following recommendations so that Turkish and Cameroonian governments may identify conditions that may help to bring decision-making closest to the people, the following are suggested.
6.4.1 Main Recommendations for Cameroon

Recommendation 1: Empower the authority of mayors

- Actions and decisions of mayors should no longer be subject to an obligation to obtain prior visa or approval from the guardianship or prefect. Let mayors with free hands, because their hands are currently too much tied. Mayors must be responsible and accountable to the people who elected them and can be brought to justice in case of illegality or misconduct in the exercise of their duties.
- There is a need to completely dismiss the prefectoral supervision over local authorities and to rather strengthen the jurisdictional control over municipalities so that issues of legality should be referred to the competent judge.

Recommendation 2: Ensure that responsibilities transferred are sufficiently funded

- The competences transferred should systematically be accompanied by the corresponding financial resources, because nothing can be done without money.
- Municipalities should have a certain degree of autonomy in the design and provision of their public service responsibilities within the boundaries set by normative regulations.
- Municipalities need significant own revenues beyond grants and shared tax revenues.

Recommendation 3: Redefine the electoral system of local elected representatives to improve the quality of mayors and municipal councilors:

- Review the mode of designation of executive head of urban community by appointing him by election.
- Review the requirements for the eligibility of mayor, because it is not conceivable to have illiterate mayors likely to give room to local bad governance. The political component of the mayor election, as important as it could be, should not prevail on ethics and expected return. With well-educated mayors who have for example a university degree, decentralization will have another face and municipalities will
be developed. As an example, it is not obvious for an illiterate mayor to be able to cope with the management of communes which is becoming more complex day by day.

- Let the people choose themselves their representatives, even within political parties, because the practice of appointment of candidates to elections by the top management of their political parties is not democratic.

**Recommendation 4: Create a local public service**

- Solve the problem of local human resources by creating a local public service that will supply municipalities with qualified staff in each area such as education, health, environment, etc., i.e., real technicians who will directly accompany municipalities.

**Recommendation 5: Enact a statute of municipal employees**

- Value the status of the communal agent, because an agent cannot be unhappy and work optimally.

**Recommendation 6: consistently follow the bottom up approach in the selection municipal officials and projects:**

- projects adoption should take into account the grassroots interests.
- There should be a framework to collect opinion of populations on projects to be realized.

**Recommendation 7: Enforce and support municipal capacity building**

- In the recruitment, place a focus on skills and gives the opportunity to people who have the needed skills. In this regard, to get someone appointed to a position of department head, for instance, he must go to a call for applications. The interested applicants must apply and compete for that position. By so doing, unskilled people will be eliminated, and competent employees will be recruited in the concerned fields.
- The level and quality of training at the CEFAM should be reformed and a local public service should be put in place and framed a little bit
like state public service so that local development can be impulse as wished by all Cameroonian.

- Establish a local public service that will lead to the reform of institutions such as CEFAM created since the 1970s and therefore no longer adapted to the requirements of today's decentralization.
- Urgently reinforce the capacities of the municipal staff according to the various competences transferred to communes.
- In setting up the solicited local public service, consultation with the ministry in charge of public service should take place in order for the central state to offload a certain number of staff in profit of interested communes. For example, if in commune X, there is a need of a civil engineer, people apply and the qualified personnel is recruited and supported in the budget of the state, to exercise its activities in the municipality. He will continue to receive the salary of the state, and the commune will pay him some additional indemnities.
- The financial burden of municipalities in managing collaboration with deconcentrated state services should be reduced. The ideal would be that in the future, mayors are able to recruit and dispose of all types of staff. Because some municipal magistrates believe that the expertise of the state through its deconcentrated services cost them too much and is therefore more expensive than the management by their own technical staff that they would recruit.
- When municipalities resort to the deconcentrated services of the state, it is financially more expensive than the option of managing by their own staff. In addition, the mayor has to face the problem of availability of staff from deconcentrated services. In this collaboration, municipalities are taken to unlock financial incentives that are not supported by the municipal budget. It is therefore more expensive in time and money. Unfortunately, local councils do not already have enough money to recruit all the technical staff they need.

Recommendation 8: Introduce performance management system in the municipal work

- Municipalities should start to implement the budget program. It is possible to achieve performance through the budget program thanks to
its tools such as objectives, actions, activities, performance indicators and reporting at the end of the exercises on what has been done in terms of performance.

Recommendation 9: Increase the use of ICT in municipalities to arouse citizen participation in local government and improve the provision of public services.

6.4.2 Main Recommendations for Turkey

Recommendation 1: Increase the share of public budget with municipalities

- The share of local government expenditure as a share of general public expenditure should be increased.
- The support of the central government will be appreciated if more financial autonomy is given to local governments through the increase of their share in the national budget. In other words, it would be better for the budget to be provided with more opportunities for on-site management.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen local government fiscal autonomy

- Local governments should be permitted to have more own financial revenues instead of highly relying on central government transfers.

Recommendation 3: Build adequate mechanisms of coordination across levels of government

- To manage the shared joint responsibilities, establish governance mechanisms.
- Create a culture of co-operation and regular communication is essential for effective multilevel governance and successful long-term reform.
- Tools for vertical co-ordination include for example dialogue platforms, fiscal councils, standing commissions and intergovernmental consultation boards, and contractual arrangements.

Recommendation 4: Promote citizens’ engagement
• Citizens should be empowered through access to information.
• Elected local councils should have ownership and control of citizen participation and engagement initiatives.
• Participatory budgeting will strengthen inclusive governance.

Recommendation 5: *multiply the outsourcing of local service provision*

• Use more private companies for the public service delivery.
• Municipalities should devolve more tasks to private companies so that it creates more spaces in the budget allocated, because private companies are selected on the basis of the lowest bid and they are motivated to be more efficient or effective.
• Through procurement, municipalities should deal with private companies when they work on investment projects. To this effect, municipalities should hire personnel who well knows procurement who knows, assign tasks to private companies and follow or monitor them.

6.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

An evident advantage of this study is that beyond the rich theoretical discussions provided, it draws on the experience and expertise of interviewed key informants and practitioners working on the field of decentralization. However, several problems may also arise from this method. The opinions gathered are subjective and depend on each participant’s own experience. The technique is arduous, requiring a great deal of labor-intensive work to collate the data. Another limitation is the absence of sufficient and reliable secondary data in Cameroon, the compilation of which is expensive and requires highly trained manpower.

Furthermore, as it is common with most of qualitative case studies, generalization of findings provided by this study should be avoided beyond the scope of the two countries. These findings prominently illuminate the context in the municipalities visited in Turkey and Cameroon. Nevertheless, extrapolations from lessons learned and recommendations provided are possible, and can be useful to those interested in understanding how to bring government decision making closest to the people. I trust that its contents will be of great
interest to readers in both the concerned countries and in other developing and industrializing countries.

6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Firstly, although this is a unique study, decentralization reform is very wide and complex, and judging performance necessitates getting evidence from different stakeholders. In spite of the importance of the perception of the practitioners, it is not still adequately addressed whether government decision making has genuinely moved closer to the people. Future research should therefore focus on the viewpoint of the recipients, i.e., the members of the general public or the local citizens. In the two countries, reforms have been undertaken with the aim of realizing a larger vision: local development. Local development serves a useful function of rallying exogenous and endogenous support. Future research should then assess if local development vision is being realized. The gap between discourse and reality at micro level might even shed more light on how to improve decentralization policy.

Secondly, more comparative studies are needed in other aspects of the reform, for instance, to know whether decentralization is enabling better delivery of public service. Studying them would generate more insights about performance improvement.

Thirdly, at the moment this thesis is about to be defended, Cameroon has just passed a new law entitled “General Code of Regional and Local Authorities” which is aimed at providing a solution to the crisis with separatist tendency undergoing since 2017 in the two anglophone regions of the country, on the one hand, and at deepening the process of decentralization in general, on the other hand. The provisions of the new law will be effective after the local elections of February 9th, 2020. Obviously, there are some innovations that will deserve future research to assess the outcomes of the changes introduced with this law.

Last, but not the least, controversy still abounds as to what the optimal level of government closeness to people should be. Therefore, findings in this study suggest the need to study how other countries make judgments about the right degree of government decision closer to citizens.
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# ANNEXES

Annexe 1: List of Participants Interviewed in Turkey

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**DİYARBAKIR**

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<td>Sur</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Cihad KAYHAN</td>
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Annexe 2: Interview Questions Asked to Participants in Turkey in the Cities of Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakır (in Turkish)

HACCETEPE UNIVERSITY
H.Ü. Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Beytepe Campus
Ankara Turkey

Interview Questions

1. Yerel yönetimlere devredilen güçler ve yetkinlikler, merkezi yetkililer tarafından sıkça müdahale edilmeden ve önemli ölçüde müdahale edilmeden gerçekleştiriliyor mu?

2. Hem merkezi hem de yerel yönetimler tarafından tutarlı bir şekilde uygulanan bazı güçler var mı?

3. Yerel yönetimler bazı sektörlerde yeniden merkezileşme olgusuna tanıklık ediyor mu?

4. Devlet temsilcisi veya delegesinin (merkezi hükümet tarafından atan) hiyerarşik hakimiyeti, yerel idare'de büyük ölçüde koordine edici bir role mı düştü?

5. Acaba Valinin veya Kaymakamın yerel otoriterler üzerinde önceki kapsamlı apriori denetimi, son söze sahip olan idare mahkemenin sonsal yasal incelemesi ile etkin bir şekilde değiştirildi mi?

6. Adalette başvurma vakaları, devlet temsilcinin olumsuz kararına itiraz etti mi? Evet ise, sonuç neydi? Bu güçlerin aşırı/yersiz veya kötüye kullanmasına karşı, yerel yönetimlerin korunması ne kadar etkilidir?

7. Yerel personel nasıl işe alınır? Liyakat sistemi temelinde mi? Siyasi etki veya patronaj yok mu?

8. Promosyonlar, pozisyon ve kariyer gelişim umutlarının artışı ne olacak? Maaşlar iyi ve düzenli mi?

9. Yerel yönetimlere işlev devri de, yerel yönetimler için çalışan kamu sektörü çalışanlarının artmasıyla takip edildi mi?

10. Yerel yönetimdeki personel, transfer edilen fonksiyonları verimli ve etkin bir şekilde yerine getirmek için yeterli ve yetkin midir?

11. Yerel yönetimlerde çalışan kamu görevlilerinin yüzdesi nedir? yani memurlar? Sözleşmeli memurlar?
12. Acaba, devlet memurları, yerel seçilmiş yetkililerin görevlerini yerine getirmek için mi, atanmışlar?

13. Yerel Seçilmiş yetkililer tarafından alınan kararlar, merkezi hükümetin atanmış temsilcileri tarafından geçersiz kılındı mı?

14. Yerindelik ve tamamlayıcılık ilkesinin uygulanmasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

15. Devlet temsilcisi, siyasi bağlantıları ne olursa olsun tüm yerel yönetimlere eşit ve adil bir muamele uyguluyor mu?

16. Kent konseyleri ve diğer sivil uyruk kolları karar almada dikkate alınıyor mu?

17. Yerel yönetimlere devredilen yeterlilikler, merkezi hükümetin kredileri tarafından ne derece ve düzenli olarak finanse edilmektedir.

18. Yerel yönetim gelirleri, merkezi yönetim bütçesi ve müdahaleden ne ölçüde bağımsızdır?

19. Stratejik planlama, toplam kalite yönetimi, performansa dayalı bütçeleme gibi YKI'nin araçları veya enstrümanları yerel yönetiminin yönetişiminde kullanılıyor mu?

20. Yerel yönetimlerin, girdiler ve sonuçlar arasındaki ilişki bakımından etkinliğini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bütçe kaynakları verimli ve ekonomik olarak yönetiliyor mu?

21. Yerel yönetimlerin idari ve operasyonel kapasiteleri, dış kaynaklı sözleşmeleri etkin bir şekilde yönetmeye ve bunlara herhangi bir daha fazla işlevsel aktarımı garanti etmeye yeterli mi?

22. Türkiye'nin yerinden yönetim ve yerel yönetimlerin uygulaması nasıl değerlendirilebilirsiniz?

23. Yerinden yönetim ve yerel yönetim uygulamalarını geliştirmek için herhangi bir özel öneriniz var mı?
Annexe 3: Interview Questions to Participants in Cameroon in the Cities of Yaounde and Douala (English Version)

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
H.Ü. Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Beytepe Campus
Ankara Turkey

Interviews Questions

1. To what extent are the functions of local governments carried autonomously without frequent involvement and interference from the central authorities?

2. Is there a clear distinction between the respective powers allocated to local governments and those retained by the state? How can you evaluate and justify the management of powers exercised concurrently?

3. Has the hierarchical dominance of the state representative or delegate (appointed by the central government) reduced over local government?

4. Has the Prefet’s previous comprehensive a priori control (tutelle) over local authorities been replaced by a posteriori legality review, the administrative court having the final say?

5. With the obligation of local governments to always obtain prior approval by the representative of the state on all instruments adopted (budget, loans, securities and shares, and event recruitment of staff), do you feel local governments still have a margin of autonomy?

6. Have cases of referral to the justice happened to challenge a negative decision of the state’s representative? If, yes what was the result?

7. How effective is the protection of local governments against the misuse or the improper/excessive use of those powers?

8. Does the central administration continue to exercise excessive control over the sub-national units?

9. Has the transfer of functions to local government also been followed by an increase of public sector employees working for local governments?

10. Is the personnel of local government sufficient and competent to efficiently and effectively perform the transferred functions? Do the various backgrounds of local government workers correspond to the transferred competences?

11. Have civil servants been appointed to perform the functions of elected officials?
12. Have decisions taken by elected officials been overridden by appointed representatives of the central government? If yes, does that veto by unelected officials against the initiatives taken by local authorities not undermine democratic local governance?

13. Are the urban councils and other civil servants taken into consideration in the decision-making?

14. Are the transferred competences to local governments funded by central government credits on a consequent and regular basis?

15. To what extent are the local government revenues independent from central government budget and intervention?

16. Are local governments successful in the achievement of their functions or missions? If yes, to what extent? If not, why?

17. Are the tools or instruments of NPM such as strategic planning, total quality management, performance based budgeting used in the governance of local governments?

18. How do you appreciate the effectiveness of local governments in terms of the relationship between inputs and results? Are the budgetary resources efficiently and economically managed?

19. How do you describe the relationships between the levels of government in terms of dependency, separation and coordination?

20. What is your general level of satisfaction with the reform implementation in general and central-local relations in particular?

21. Any particular recommendation for the improvement of outcomes in the future?
Annexe 3: Interview Questions asked to Participants in Cameroon in the Cities of Yaounde and Douala (French version)

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
H.Ü. Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Beytepe Campus
Ankara Turkey

Interviews Questions

1. Les pouvoirs et compétences transférés aux communes sont-ils exercés sans intervention fréquente et sans ingérence des autorités centrales?

2. Existe-t-il des compétences exercées concurrentiellement par le gouvernement central?

3. Le pouvoir de tutelle du représentant de l’État (le préfet) sur les communes a-t-il été réduit? Ce pouvoir a-t-il été remplacé par un contrôle a posteriori de la légalité, la justice administrative ayant le dernier mot?

4. Des cas de saisine de la justice ont-ils déjà eu lieu pour contester une décision négative du représentant de l’État? Si oui quelle en a été l’issue?

5. Comment appréciez-vous le niveau de protection des collectivités locales contre l'utilisation abusive des pouvoirs de l’autorité de tutelle?

6. Comment est recruté le personnel local? Sur la base du mérite? Pas d'influence politique ou de favoritisme?

7. Qu'en est-il des promotions, des nominations et des perspectives de carrière? Des salaires bons et réguliers?

8. Le transfert des compétences aux communes a-t-il été suivi d'un transfert de ressources humaines de l'État dans les domaines concernés?
9. Le personnel des communes est-il suffisant et compétent pour exercer efficacement les responsabilités transférées ?

10. Les décisions prises par les élus locaux ont-elles été annulées par la tutelle?

11. Comment évaluez-vous la mise en œuvre du principe de subsidiarité et de complémentarité?

12. La participation des citoyens dans la gestion des affaires locales est-elle effective?

13. Les compétences transférées aux collectivités locales sont-elles financées par des crédits du gouvernement central de manière conséquente et régulière?


15. Les outils et instruments de gestion de la performance sont-ils utilisés dans la gouvernance des administrations locales?

16. Les capacités administratives et opérationnelles des collectivités locales sont-elles suffisantes pour gérer efficacement les contrats externalisés et pour justifier tout transfert fonctionnel approfondi de ceux-ci?

17. Quelle est votre évaluation en termes de pourcentage (%) de mise en œuvre de la décentralisation et des réformes de l’administration locale au Cameroun?

18. Avez-vous des suggestions particulières pour améliorer la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation au Cameroun?
# Annexe 4: List of the Participants Interviewed in Cameroon

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Annexe 6: Authorisation from IvanyNA and Shah to utilize their framework for the comparative measurement of the government closeness to the people
APPENDIX 1. ETHICS COMMISSION FORM

T.C. HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Rektörlik

SAYI : 35853172-300
KONU : Emmanuel Bekolo EBOLO (Etik Komisyon İznii)

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNĘ

İLGİ : 27.09.2019 tarihli ve 12908312-300/00000790024 sayılı yazımız.


Bilgilerini ve gereğini saygıyla rica ederim.

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr. Rahime Meral NOHUTCU
Rektör Yardımcısı